[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-13876

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60052-BB-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

STEPHANIE LORRAINE PRENDERGAST, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(August 31, 2017)

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Stephanie Prendergast appeals her convictions for making a false claim of 

United States citizenship with the intent to obtain a state benefit, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1015(e), and using or attempting to use a false, forged, counterfeited, or altered 

passport, 18 U.S.C. § 1543. On appeal, Prendergast asserts that the district court 

erred by denying her post-verdict motion for a new trial, arguing that the district 

court improperly applied the materiality standard under Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83 (1963), rather than the materiality standard under Giglio v. United States, 

405 U.S. 150 (1972). She contends that she was entitled to a new trial under 

Giglio because the government withheld or suppressed the existence of a fake or 

fraudulent passport with similar biographical information on it as the one involved 

in her case, which, if it had been disclosed, would have shown that the testimony 

of two witnesses was false. 

We review the district court’s denial of a new trial motion asserting a Brady 

or Giglio claim for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 

1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 2002). We review a district court’s factual findings for clear 

error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119 

(11th Cir. 1996). And we may affirm for any reason supported by the record, even 

if not relied upon by the district court. United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 

1189 (11th Cir. 2008). 

To prove a Brady violation, the defendant must establish that:

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(1) the government possessed favorable evidence to the defendant; (2) 

the defendant does not possess the evidence and could not obtain the 

evidence with any reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution 

suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) had the evidence been 

disclosed to the defendant, there is a reasonable probability that the 

outcome would have been different.

United States v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135, 1146 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Vallejo, 297 

F.3d at 1164). Giglio errors, which are a “species” of Brady errors, require the 

defendant to establish that:

(1) the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or failed to 

correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony; and (2) 

such use was material i.e., that there is any reasonable likelihood that 

the false testimony could have affected the judgment.

Stein, 846 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Ford v. Hall, 546 F.3d 1326, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 

2008)). Like Brady errors, new trials are not required whenever “a combing of the 

prosecutors’ files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the 

defense but not likely to have changed the verdict[.]” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 

(quoting United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968)). Furthermore, 

“the suggestion that a statement may have been false is simply insufficient; the 

defendant must conclusively show that the statement was actually false.” Maharaj 

v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Stein, 

846 F.3d at 1150. But the Giglio materiality standard “is more defense-friendly 

than Brady’s,” because Giglio requires a new trial unless the district court finds 

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that the false testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Stein, 846 F.3d 

at 1147.

No error occurred as to the district court’s choice of materiality standard 

because Prendergast failed to establish the materiality prong under any relevant 

standard. Prendergast also failed to establish that the government suppressed the 

existence of the Suresh Benny case or any information related to the case because

it disclosed both Suresh Benny’s name and his offense’s potential relation to 

Prendergast’s charged offense before trial. Lastly, Prendergast failed to establish 

that Williams or Vila presented false testimony. Neither Williams nor Vila 

suggested that they possessed any knowledge about what happened to 

Prendergast’s passport after Williams gave it to her supervisor.

AFFIRMED.

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