[Cite as State v. Sims, 2018-Ohio-388.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 105581

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

JONATHAN SIMS

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-16-609408-A 

BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, P.J., Stewart, J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 1, 2018 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ruth R. Fischbein-Cohen 

3552 Severn Rd., #613 

Cleveland, Ohio 44118 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Owen M. Patton 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jonathan Sims, appeals from his conviction following a 

guilty plea. He raises the following assignments of error for review: 

1. The identification of defendant should have been suppressed. 

2. It was error to convict defendant for possession of a firearm. 

3. The finding of guilt was against the manifest weight of the evidence and 

absent sufficient evidence. 

4. The court erred in overruling defendant’s motion for new counsel. 

{¶2} After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm Sims’s 

convictions. 

I. Procedural History

{¶3} In September 2016, Sims was named in a three-count indictment, charging 

him with aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); robbery in violation of 

R.C. 2911.02(A)(2); and kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2). Each count 

contained firearm specifications. 

{¶4} The indictment stemmed from allegations that Sims stole a vehicle owned by 

the victim, D.G., after Sims forcefully removed D.G. from the vehicle while in possession 

of a firearm. Several days after the incident, D.G. contacted the police after he spotted 

his vehicle parked in a nearby driveway. When the police arrived at the scene, Sims was 

getting out of the passenger’s seat of the vehicle. Sims was arrested after D.G. identified 

Sims as the individual who stole his vehicle. 
{¶5} In October 2016, Sims filed a motion to suppress “the cold-stand 

identification of [Sims] by [D.G.] and all subsequent identifications.” Following a 

suppression hearing, the trial court denied Sims’s motion to suppress. 

{¶6} In January 2017, Sims pleaded guilty to robbery in violation of R.C. 

2911.02(A)(2), with a one-year firearm specification. The remaining counts were nolled. 

 Following a Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court accepted Sims’s guilty plea and referred 

him to the county probation department for a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). 

{¶7} Prior to sentencing, Sims filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea and a pro 

se “notice of termination of representation of counsel.” During a comprehensive hearing 

on the motions, Sims argued that he wished to withdraw his plea and terminate counsel 

because he was dissatisfied with counsel’s representation during the suppression hearing. 

Sims further indicated that he believed counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 

counsel by failing to file several pretrial motions Sims had asked counsel to file on his 

behalf. 

{¶8} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Sims’s motions. The 

trial court stated that it reviewed the transcript of Sims’s Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy and 

confirmed that Sims was advised of all constitutional and nonconstitutional rights, and 

stated on the record that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation. 

{¶9} In February 2017, Sims was sentenced to a four-year term of imprisonment. 

{¶10} Sims now appeals from his conviction. 

II. Law and Analysis
A. Implications of Guilty Plea 

{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Sims argues the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress identification evidence. In his second assignment of error, Sims 

argues it was error to convict him for possession of a firearm. In his third assignment of 

error, Sims argues his robbery conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence 

and is not supported by sufficient evidence. We address these assigned errors together 

for judicial clarity. 

{¶12} “A plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.” Crim.R. 

11(B)(1). A defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives the right to appeal all 

nonjurisdictional issues arising at prior stages of the proceedings, although the defendant 

may contest the constitutionality of the plea itself. State v. Darling, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 104517, 2017-Ohio-7603, ¶ 12, citing State v. Lewis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102939, 

2015-Ohio-5267, ¶ 16. Thus, by entering into a guilty plea, a defendant waives the right 

to raise on appeal the propriety of a trial court’s suppression ruling. State v. Elliott, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102226, 2015-Ohio-3766, ¶ 15; State v. Bogan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 84468, 2005-Ohio-3412, ¶ 14; State v. Prieto, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 15 MA 0213, 

2017-Ohio-4156, ¶ 10 (“a guilty plea waives any right to appeal a ruling on a motion to 

suppress or any other trial court error, except for errors in the plea itself.”). In addition, 

“a guilty plea waives a defendant’s right to challenge the sufficiency or manifest weight 

of the evidence.” State v. Hill, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90513, 2008-Ohio-4857, ¶ 6; 

State v. Moree, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90894, 2009-Ohio-472, ¶ 16. 
{¶13} In this case, Sims’s arguments concerning the motion to suppress and the 

evidence supporting his conviction do not relate to the constitutionality of the plea itself, 

nor do they challenge the adequacy of the trial court’s Crim.R. 11 colloquy. 

Accordingly, we find Sims has waived his right to assert these issues on appeal. 

{¶14} Sims’s first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled. 

B. Motion to Terminate Counsel

{¶15} In his fourth assignment of error, Sims argues the trial court erred by 

denying his motion to terminate counsel. Arguably, Sims has waived his right to 

challenge the trial court’s judgment because his motion to terminate counsel relied 

exclusively on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel that occurred prior to the 

entry of his guilty plea. On appeal, Sims reiterates his displeasure with counsel’s 

performance during the pretrial process. However, he does not challenge the validity of 

his plea or otherwise claim that counsel’s performance caused his guilty plea to be less 

than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Darling at ¶ 14. 

{¶16} Nevertheless, even if Sims has not waived his right to challenge the court’s 

denial of his motion to terminate counsel, we find the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying the motion. 

{¶17} Although an indigent defendant has the right to the appointment of counsel, 

he has no right to have a particular attorney represent him and must demonstrate “good 

cause” in order for the substitution of counsel to be warranted. State v. Williams, 99 

Ohio St.3d 439, 2003-Ohio-4164, 793 N.E.2d 446, ¶ 55; State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d 
68, 72, 717 N.E.2d 298 (1999). Three recognized examples of “good cause” that would 

warrant the discharge of court-appointed counsel include (1) a conflict of interest, (2) a 

complete breakdown of communication, and (3) an irreconcilable conflict that could 

cause an apparently unjust result. State v. Burrell, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-024, 

2014-Ohio-1356, ¶ 24. Before an indigent defendant is entitled to discharge 

court-appointed counsel, he must show “a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of 

such magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.” 

State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286, 525 N.E.2d 792 (1988), paragraph four of the 

syllabus. A trial court’s denial of a motion to substitute counsel is reviewed for an abuse 

of discretion. Cowans at 73. 

{¶18} On appeal, Sims argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

request to terminate counsel because “he clearly expressed to the trial court that his 

relationship with his counsel was irreparably damaged.” Sims contends that counsel 

“never did a thing to assist him,” and that there was a “complete breakdown” in 

attorney-client communication such that there was good cause for the termination of 

counsel. We disagree. 

{¶19} As stated, Sims argued that he wished to terminate counsel because he was 

dissatisfied with counsel’s representation during the suppression hearing. He further 

claimed that counsel failed to file several motions Sims had asked counsel to file on his 

behalf. 
{¶20} After careful consideration, we do not find that Sims’s vague claims 

demonstrated a “complete breakdown” in communication that jeopardized Sims’s right to 

the effective assistance of counsel. As noted by the trial court, the transcript of the plea 

colloquy reflects that Sims had time to speak with his attorney before entering his plea 

and was satisfied with counsel’s representation. In addition, our review of the record 

supports the determination that Sims received effective assistance of counsel during the 

plea and suppression hearings. Counsel actively filed motions on Sims’s behalf, and 

contrary to Sims’s belief, had no obligation to file motions that would have been futile. 

{¶21} From this record, it is evident that Sims’s motion to terminate counsel was 

not motivated by a total breakdown in communication. Rather, the motion appears to 

have been motivated by (1) Sims’s displeasure with counsel’s strategy during the 

suppression hearing, and (2) Sims’s change of heart following his guilty plea. Sims, 

however, had “‘no constitutional right to determine strategy, and decisions about viable 

defenses are ‘within the exclusive province of defense counsel to make after consultation 

with his client.’” State v. Wade, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90145, 2008-Ohio-4870, ¶ 10, 

quoting State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 524, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001). Moreover, 

even if Sims did not get along well with counsel, a lack of rapport is not sufficient to 

constitute a total breakdown when it does not inhibit the attorney from both preparing and 

presenting a competent defense. State v. Lewis, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-074, 

2013-Ohio-3974, ¶ 48. 
{¶22} Having failed to demonstrate good cause to warrant the termination of 

counsel, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sims’s motion. 

{¶23} Sims’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶24} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR