1.11VeL1111. ircArs, 

MATTER OF LEE 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A-21086636 

Decided by Board May22, 1978 

(1) Validity of adoption for immigration purposes requires, inquiry into law of jurisdiction 

where adoption occurs. 

(2) Validity of adoption in Taiwan in 1960 determined by the Civil Code of the Republic of 

China. 

(3) While there is no provision in the Civil Code pertaining to categories of adoptable 

relatives, a general principle of Chinese customary law in the ease of a legal adoption 

(the institution of an heir) was that the adopting party be of the generation immediately 

above the adoptee; and in the absence of a showing to the contrary this rule is deemed 

applicable to adoptions for the cairn of charity as well. 

(4) Visa petition properly denied where the petitioner failed to establish that his alleged 

adoption of his granddaughter was valid under the Jaw of Taiwan in 1960, 

ON BEHALF OF PDTMONER: Pro se 

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Appleman, Maguire, and Farb, Board Members 

The petitioner has appealed from a decision of the District Director, 

dated February 10, 1977, denying a visa petition filed on behalf of his 

alleged adopted daughter under section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Aet, 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(2). The appeal will be dismissed. 

The District Director denied the petition for the reason that since the 

petitioner is the grandfather of the beneficiary (for whom he has 

assumed guardianship and maintenance functions), there is no immigration status to which the beneficiary is entitled based upon that relationship. 

The petitioner maintains on appeal that he a_ dolted the beneficiary as 

his own child when she was two years old because her mother had 

remarried and her father had died. He has submitted affidavits from two 

persons who were present at his home on May 5, 1960, when he announced that he had adopted the beneficiary. He has also submitted a 

document from a notary public in Taiwan certifying that the beneficiary's mother and grandfather mutually agreed that the grandfather 

would take over the functions of guardianship and maintenance for the 

beneficiary. 

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LA AbC1 AL11 LGllil1VLL 77-.. 

The petitioner claims that since he has functioned as parent to the 

beneficiary for 17 years, she is entitled to immigration benefits as his 

adopted child. In determining whether an adoption will be recognized 

for immigration purposes, our first inquiry is whether the adoption is 

valid under the law of the juris diction where it occurred. Matter of 

Kwok, 14 I. & N. Dec. 127 (BIA 1972); Matter of Lau, 10 I. & N. Dec. 

597 (BIA 1964). In this case, the Civil Code of the Republic of China 

provides the applicable law in effect in Taiwan in 1960. 

The Board has previously held that an adoption of a grandchild by a 

grandparent which allegedly took place in China in 1927 conferred no 

immigration benefits because such an adoption was contrary to Chinese 

law. See Matter of Wong -Setoo, 12 I.& N. Dec. 484 (BIA 1967). Our 

holding was based upon a memorandum from the Far Eastern Law 

Division of the Library of Congress, dated July 26, 1967, which advised 

the Board that, although there was no statutory provision in the Civil 

Code of the Republic of China pertaining to categories of adoptable 

persons, there was judicial authority to the effect that adoptions between certain persons related by blood would not be permitted under 

the Civil Code. 

Matter of Wong -Setoo, supra, would appear to resolve the issue presented here. However, an examination of that case and the accompanying memorandum indicated that the judicial interpretation cited therein 

specifically precludes adoptions between certain collateral relatives 

rather than lineal relatives as is the case with the grandparentgrandchild relationship. 

In an attempt to resolve this question, we requested the assistance of 

the Library of Congress. In a memorandum dated June 3, 1977, the 

head of the Far Eastern Law Division stated that there appears to be a 

general principle of Chinese customary law that the rank (generational 

order) of the parties to an adoption should be the same as that which 

exists between a parent and a c.bild. The author states that Chinese 

tradition recognized two types or adoption: legal adoption (the institution of a male heir) and adoption for the sake of charity. In the case of 

legal adoption, the adopting party had to be of the generation immediately above the person to be adopted. Thus, a grandparent would 

not be able to effect a legal adoption of a grandson. Whether this rule 

also applied in the case of adoptions for the sake of charity is unclear, 

according to the memorandum. The author goes on to say, at page 28: 

(Me are of the opinion that the question of whether a grandfather could have adopted 

his granddaughter under the law of the Republic of China can best be resolved by a 

decision of a Chinese court. Although oar sources tend to suggest that such an adoption 

would not have been allowed because it would have disturbed the order of the generations, there is no source which clearly and indisputably permits such a conclusion. The 

further question of whether such an attempted adoption would be void or merely 

voidable could be answered only In the light of a knowledge of the basis the Chinese 

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court used for its decision in answering the question of whether the law permitted such 

an adoption. 

We have held that an adoption must conform to the applicable law of 

the jurisdiction where it allegedly occurred as well as to the statutory 

requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, U.S.C. 1101 (b)(1)(E). 

See Matter of Dhillon, Interim Decision 2620 (BIA 1977); Matter of 

Annang, 14 I. & N. Dec. 502 (BIA 1973). 

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the District Director that the 

petitioner has not established that the beneficiary qualifies as his 

"adopted" child since he has failed to show that such an adoption would 

be valid under the Civil Code of the Republic of China as it existed in 

1960. The existence of a bona fide family unit between the petitioner and 

the beneficiary does not entitle the beneficiary to second-preference 

status if she does not meet one of the statutory definitions of "child" set 

out in section 101(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(I). See Matter of 

Lee, 11 I. & N. Dec. 911 (BIA 1966). That the parties are related by 

blood as grandparent and grandchild does not confer any status recognized by our immigration laws. We are not awzre of any authority for 

the proposition that the assumption of guardianship ,and maintenance 

functions towards a minor child is the equivalent 'of an adoption or 

comparable legal procedure which creates a pparent-child relationship 

within the meaning of section 101(b)(1). Compare Matter of Lee, Interim 

Decision 2606 (BIA 1977). 

Although we are dismissing the appeal, it is without prejudice to the 

filing of a new petition in the event that the petitioner acquires evidence 

that the alleged adoption would be valid under the law in force in 

Taiwan in 1960. 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

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