Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 31135

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Seattle ACO.

Special Flight Permits

(i) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Incorporation by Reference

(j) Except for the EICAS status page checks

required by paragraphs (a), (b), (d), (d)(1), (e),

and (e)(1) of this AD, the actions shall be

done in accordance with Boeing Service

Bulletin 747–31–2288, dated December 17,

1998; Boeing Service Bulletin 747–31–2288,

Revision 1, dated January 28, 1999; Boeing

Service Bulletin 747–31–2288, Revision 2,

including Appendix A, dated November 18,

1999; Boeing Service Bulletin 757–31–0066,

Revision 1, dated December 17, 1998; Boeing

Special Attention Service Bulletin 757–31–

0066, Revision 2, including Appendix A,

dated November 18, 1999; Boeing Service

Bulletin 767–31–0106, Revision 1, dated

December 17, 1998; or Boeing Special

Attention Service Bulletin 767–31–0106,

Revision 2, including Appendix A, dated

November 18, 1999; as applicable.

(1) The incorporation by reference of

Boeing Service Bulletin 747–31–2288,

Revision 2, including Appendix A, dated

November 18, 1999; Boeing Special Attention

Service Bulletin 757–31–0066, Revision 2,

including Appendix A, dated November 18,

1999; and Boeing Special Attention Service

Bulletin 767–31–0106, Revision 2, including

Appendix A, dated November 18, 1999; is

approved by the Director of the Federal

Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)

and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) The incorporation by reference of

Boeing Service Bulletin 747–31–2288, dated

December 17, 1998; Boeing Service Bulletin

747–31–2288, Revision 1, dated January 28,

1999; Boeing Service Bulletin 757–31–0066,

Revision 1, dated December 17, 1998; and

Boeing Service Bulletin 767–31–0106,

Revision 1, dated December 17, 1998; was

approved previously by the Director of the

Federal Register as of September 16, 1999 (64

FR 47653, September 1, 1999).

(3) Copies may be obtained from Boeing

Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707,

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. Copies may

be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington; or at the Office of the Federal

Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite

700, Washington, DC.

Effective Date

(k) This amendment becomes effective on

July 16, 2001.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 25,

2001.

Vi L. Lipski,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 01–13999 Filed 6–8–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98–NM–298–AD; Amendment

39–12249; AD 2001–11–07]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing

Model 737, 757, and 767 Series

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD),

applicable to certain Boeing Model 737,

757, and 767 series airplanes. This AD

requires repetitive operational checks of

certain motor-operated hydraulic

shutoff valves to detect malfunctioning;

replacement with new valves, if

necessary; and eventual replacement of

certain existing valves with new valves,

which terminates the repetitive

inspections. This amendment is

prompted by reports that various

intermittent limit-switch problems have

caused valve failures. The actions

specified by this AD are intended to

prevent failure of the motor-operated

hydraulic shutoff valves, which could

result in leakage of hydraulic fluid to

the engine fire zone, reduced ability to

retract the landing gear, loss of backup

electrical power or other combinations

of failures; and consequent reduced

controllability of the airplane.

DATES: Effective July 16, 2001.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of July 16,

2001.

ADDRESSES: The service information

referenced in this AD may be obtained

from Boeing Commercial Airplane

Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,

Washington 98124–2207. This

information may be examined at the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),

Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules

Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington; or at the Office of

the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kenneth W. Frey, Aerospace Engineer,

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–

130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification

Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington 98055–4056; telephone

(425) 227–2673; fax (425) 227–1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to

include an airworthiness directive (AD)

that is applicable to certain Boeing

Model 737, 757, and 767 series

airplanes was published as a

supplemental notice of proposed

rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal

Register on June 21, 2000 (65 FR 38450).

That action proposed to require

repetitive operational checks of certain

motor-operated hydraulic shutoff valves

to detect malfunctioning; replacement

with new valves, if necessary; and

eventual replacement of certain existing

valves with new valves, which

terminates the repetitive inspections.

Comments

Interested persons have been afforded

an opportunity to participate in the

making of this amendment. Due

consideration has been given to the

comments received.

Support for the Proposal

One commenter concurred with the

original notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM), and that commenter submitted

no additional comment to the

supplemental NPRM.

Request To Clarify Subject Valves

Several commenters request that the

FAA clarify the language in the original

NPRM and supplemental NPRM to

clarify what valves on the airplane are

subject to the proposed AD. The

commenters point out that the

referenced service bulletins apply only

to valves in ‘‘sensitive system’’

applications (hereinafter referred to as

‘‘sensitive’’ applications). However, the

language in the NPRM and

supplemental NPRM does not clarify

whether only valves with the subject

part numbers (P/N) in ‘‘sensitive’’

applications are subject to the

requirements of the proposed AD, or

whether ALL valves with the subject P/

N’s installed on the airplane are subject

to the proposed AD, regardless of

whether the valves are installed in

‘‘sensitive’’ or ‘‘non-sensitive’’

applications.

The FAA concurs with the

commenters’ request for clarification.

This AD is intended to apply only to the

valves in locations listed in the

referenced service bulletins—that is,

valves in ‘‘sensitive’’ applications. The

FAA has revised paragraphs (a) and (b)

of this AD accordingly and added a new

note, Note 1, after the applicability

statement to clarify this issue.

(Subsequent notes have also been

reordered.)

Operators should note that, while the

airplane manufacturer will issue new

service bulletins with instructions for

31136 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

replacing valves in ‘‘non-sensitive’’

applications on the affected airplanes, at

this time, the FAA does not plan to

mandate replacing these valves.

Request To Reference New Service

Information

Several operators request that the

FAA revise the proposed AD to

reference new service bulletins issued

by Boeing.

The FAA concurs with the

commenters’ request and—since the

issuance of the supplemental NPRM—

has reviewed and approved the

following 10 new service bulletins:

• Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–

29A1073, Revision 3, including

Appendices A and B, dated December 2,

1999: This service bulletin revises

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–29A1073,

Revision 2, dated July 1, 1999, which

was referenced as an appropriate source

of service information in the

supplemental NPRM. Revision 3

describes procedures for repetitive

operational checks of certain motoroperated hydraulic shutoff valves to

detect malfunctioning on certain Boeing

Model 737–100, –200, –300, –400, and

–500 series airplanes. The procedures in

this bulletin are essentially similar to

those in Revision 2; however, this

service bulletin removes all Boeing

Model 737–600, 737–700, and 737–800

series airplanes from the effectivity

listing. (Boeing Model 737–600, –700,

and –800 series airplanes have been

included in a new service bulletin,

which is described below.) This service

bulletin also references a new service

bulletin, described below, that describes

replacement of the subject valves with

new, improved valves, which ends the

need for the repetitive operational

checks.

• Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–

29A1081, including Appendices A and

B, dated December 2, 1999: This service

bulletin describes procedures for

repetitive operational checks of certain

motor-operated hydraulic shutoff valves

to detect malfunctioning on certain

Boeing Model 737–600, 737–700, and

737–800 series airplanes. These

procedures are essentially the same as

those described in Boeing Alert Service

Bulletin 737–29A1073, Revision 2, for

these airplanes. This service bulletin

also references a new service bulletin,

described below, that describes

replacement of the subject valves with

new, improved valves, which ends the

need for the repetitive operational

checks.

• Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–

29A0048, Revision 3, including

Appendices A and B, dated December 2,

1999: This service bulletin revises

Boeing Service Bulletin 757–29A0048,

Revision 2, dated July 1, 1999, which

was referenced as an appropriate source

of service information in the

supplemental NPRM. Revision 3

describes procedures for repetitive

operational checks of certain motoroperated hydraulic shutoff valves to

detect malfunctioning on certain Boeing

Model 757 series airplanes. The

procedures in this service bulletin are

essentially similar to those in Revision

2; however, this service bulletin

removes all Boeing Model 757–300

series airplanes from the effectivity

listing. (Boeing Model 757–300 series

airplanes have been included in a new

service bulletin, which is described

below.) This service bulletin also

references a new service bulletin,

described below, that describes

replacement of the subject valves with

new, improved valves, which ends the

need for the repetitive operational

checks.

• Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–

29A0051, including Appendices A and

B, dated December 2, 1999: This service

bulletin describes procedures for

repetitive operational checks of certain

motor-operated hydraulic shutoff valves

to detect malfunctioning on certain

Boeing Model 757–300 series airplanes.

These procedures are essentially similar

to those described in Boeing Alert

Service Bulletin 757–29A0048, Revision

2, for these airplanes. This service

bulletin also references a new service

bulletin, described below, that describes

replacement of the subject valves with

new, improved valves, which ends the

need for the repetitive operational

checks.

• Boeing Service Bulletin 767–

29A0083, Revision 4, including

Appendix A, dated September 28, 2000:

This service bulletin revises Boeing

Service Bulletin 767–29A0083, Revision

2, dated July 15, 1999, which was

referenced as an appropriate source of

service information in the supplemental

NPRM. This service bulletin describes

procedures for repetitive operational

checks of certain motor-operated

hydraulic shutoff valves to detect

malfunctioning on certain Boeing Model

767 series airplanes. The procedures in

this service bulletin are essentially

similar to those in Revision 2. However,

this service bulletin also corrects certain

instructions for the functional test of

two of the motor-operated hydraulic

shutoff valves. The service bulletin

states that the functional tests in

previous revisions of the service

bulletin, including Revision 2, could not

be completed without the revised

instructions contained in Revision 4.

• Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–

29A1078, dated December 7, 2000: This

service bulletin describes procedures for

replacement of Circle Seal Controls

valves in ‘‘sensitive’’ applications on

certain Boeing Model 737–100, –200,

–300, –400, and –500 series airplanes,

with certain new Whittaker Controls

valves or new, improved Circle Seal

Controls valves. Such replacement

terminates the repetitive operational

checks described in Boeing Alert

Service Bulletin 737–29A1073, Revision

3.

• Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–

29A1082, dated December 7, 2000: This

service bulletin describes procedures for

replacement of Circle Seal Controls

valves in ‘‘sensitive’’ applications on

certain Boeing Model 737–600, –700,

and –800 series airplanes, with certain

new Whittaker Controls valves or new,

improved Circle Seal Controls valves.

Such replacement terminates the

repetitive operational checks described

in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–

29A1081.

• Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–

29A0049, dated December 7, 2000: This

service bulletin describes procedures for

replacement of Circle Seal Controls

valves in ‘‘sensitive’’ applications on

certain Boeing Model 757–200 series

airplanes, with certain new Whittaker

Controls valves or new, improved Circle

Seal Controls valves. Such replacement

terminates the repetitive operational

checks described in Boeing Alert

Service Bulletin 757–29A0048, Revision

3.

• Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–

29A0052, dated December 7, 2000: This

service bulletin describes procedures for

replacement of Circle Seal Controls

valves in ‘‘sensitive’’ applications on

certain Boeing Model 757–300 series

airplanes, with certain new Whittaker

Controls valves or new, improved Circle

Seal Controls valves. Such replacement

terminates the repetitive operational

checks described in Boeing Alert

Service Bulletin 757–29A0051.

• Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767–

29A0090, dated December 7, 2000: This

service bulletin describes procedures for

replacement of Circle Seal Controls

valves in ‘‘sensitive’’ applications on

certain Boeing Model 767 series

airplanes, with certain new Whittaker

Controls valves or new, improved Circle

Seal Controls valves. Such replacement

terminates the repetitive operational

checks described in Boeing Service

Bulletin 767–29A0083, Revision 4.

In view of the approval of these

service bulletins by the FAA, we have

revised paragraph (a) of this AD to

specify Boeing Service Bulletins 737–

29A1073, Revision 3 (for Model 737–

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 31137

100, –200, –300, –400, and –500 series

airplanes), 737–29A1081 (for Model

737–600, –700, and ‘‘800 series

airplanes), 757–29A0048, Revision 3

(for Model 757–200 series airplanes),

757–29A0051 (for Model 757–300 series

airplanes), and 767–29A0083, Revision

4 (for Model 767 series airplanes); as

applicable; as appropriate sources of

service information for the requirements

of that paragraph. The FAA has revised

paragraph (b) of this AD to specify

Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 737–

29A1078 (for Model 737–100, –200,

–300, –400, and –500 series airplanes),

737–29A1082 (for Model 737–600, –700,

and –800 series airplanes), 757–

29A0049 (for Model 757–200 series

airplanes), 757–29A0052 (for Model

757–300 series airplanes), and 767–

29A0090 (for Model 767 series

airplanes), as appropriate sources of

service information for the requirements

of that paragraph.

In addition, the FAA has provided for

airplanes on which the requirements of

this AD have been accomplished before

the effective date of this AD, by adding

two new notes, Notes 3 and 4, which

specify that operational checks and

valve replacements done before the

effective date of this AD per Boeing

Alert Service Bulletins 737–29A1073,

Revision 2, or 757–29A0048, Revision 2,

both dated July 1, 1999; or 767–

29A0083, Revision 2, dated July 15,

1999; as applicable; are acceptable for

compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b)

of this AD.

Also, the applicability statement of

this final rule has been revised to

specify airplanes listed in Boeing

Service Bulletins 737–29A1073,

Revision 3, 737–29A1081, 757–

29A0048, Revision 3, 757–29A0051, and

767–29A0083, Revision 4. The FAA has

determined that this change does not

add any new airplanes to the

applicability statement which were not

included in the applicability statement

of the proposed rule.

Allow Use of Serviceable Parts

Several commenters request that the

FAA revise paragraph (a)(1) of the

supplemental NPRM to allow

replacement of malfunctioning Circle

Seal Controls valves having P/N’s

S270T010–1 through –9, with new or

serviceable Circle Seal Controls valves

having P/N’s S270T010–1 through –9.

Paragraph (a)(1) of the supplemental

NPRM requires replacement of a

malfunctioning valve with a new

Whittaker Controls valve, and paragraph

(c) of the supplemental NPRM prohibits

installation after the effective date of

this AD of ‘‘any part identified in the

‘Existing Part Number’ column

(including parts marked with the suffix

‘‘R’’ after the serial number), of

Paragraph 2.E.’’ of the applicable alert

service bulletin. Parts listed in the

‘‘Existing Part Number’’ column are

Circle Seal Controls valves having P/N’s

S270T010–1 through –9. The

commenters state that prohibiting

installation any new or serviceable

valves with P/N’s S270T010–1 through

–9 imposes an undue burden on

operators. Commenters are also

concerned that airplanes needing

replacement valves could be grounded if

Whittaker Controls is unable to produce

a sufficient amount of replacement

parts.

The FAA concurs with the

commenters’ request to allow

installation of serviceable parts. The

FAA has revised paragraph (a)(2) of this

AD to allow replacement of a

malfunctioning valve with a new or

serviceable replacement valve

manufactured by Circle Seal Controls or

Whittaker Controls. A valve replaced

with a new or serviceable Circle Seal

Controls valve having a P/N S270T010–

1 through –9 will continue to be subject

to repetitive operational checks per

paragraph (a) of this AD, until the

terminating action is accomplished per

paragraph (b). Replacement of a valve

with a new or serviceable Whittaker

Controls valve or a new or serviceable

Circle Seal Controls valve with P/N

S270T010–10, –11, –12, –13, –14, or

–15; as applicable; terminates the

repetitive inspections for the replaced

valve. Relevant to this change to

paragraph (a)(1) of this AD, it is no

longer necessary to include paragraph

(c) of the supplemental NPRM in this

AD. [Installation of a Circle Seal

Controls valve having a P/N S270T010–

1 through –9 is prohibited after 3 years

after the effective date of this AD by

virtue of the terminating action required

by paragraph (b) of this AD.]

Request To Clarify Need for Repetitive

Operational Checks

Two commenters request that the

FAA clarify the requirements of

paragraph (a)(1) of the supplemental

NPRM. The commenters point out that

paragraph (a)(1) of the supplemental

NPRM requires replacement of any

malfunctioning Circle Seal Controls

valve with a new Whittaker Controls

valve before further flight. However,

that paragraph goes on to require

repeating the operational check required

by paragraph (a). The commenters point

out that paragraph (b) of the

supplemental NPRM states that

replacement of Circle Seal Controls

valves with new Whittaker Controls

valves constitutes terminating action for

the repetitive inspections required by

paragraph (a) of this AD. Therefore,

replacement parts installed per

paragraph (a)(1) of this AD should not

be subject to the repetitive operational

checks.

The FAA concurs with the

commenters’ rationale. Replacement of

all existing Circle Seal Controls valves

with new Whittaker Controls valves

does constitute terminating action for

the requirements of paragraph (a) of this

AD for the replaced valve. However, as

stated previously, the FAA has revised

this final rule to allow replacement of

existing Circle Seal Controls valves with

serviceable valves having certain part

numbers. Accordingly, paragraph (a)(1)

has been revised in this final rule, and

paragraph (c) of the supplemental

NPRM has not been included in this

final rule. No further change to the final

rule is needed in this regard.

Request To Allow Use of Certain Other

Valves for Terminating Action

Several commenters request that the

FAA revise the supplemental NPRM to

allow use of certain valves

manufactured by Circle Seal Controls,

Inc., as terminating action for the

repetitive operational checks in

paragraph (a) of the proposed AD. The

supplemental NPRM only allowed

replacement of any Circle Seal Controls

valve with a new Whittaker Controls

valve as terminating action for the

repetitive operational checks. (The

original NPRM had referenced

replacement with Circle Seal Controls

valves with part numbers (P/N)

S270T010–10, –11, and –12, as

terminating action. However, as

explained in the supplemental NPRM,

the FAA reviewed information

regarding the failure rate of the valves

and determined that the valves were not

an adequate replacement.) The

commenters’ rationale for their requests

includes the following:

• Boeing has found that initial

failures of Circle Seal Controls valves

with P/N’s S270T010–10, –11, and –12

were due to improper rework rather

than design flaws. Thus, Boeing now

considers these Circle Seal Controls

valves adequate for terminating action.

Other commenters state that these Circle

Seal Controls valves provide an

equivalent level of safety to that

provided by the Whittaker Controls

valves.

• Some operators are concerned about

Whittaker Controls’ ability to produce

an adequate supply of replacement parts

within the three-year compliance time

for the replacement required by this AD.

• Some operators point out that the

supplemental NPRM does not require

31138 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

repetitive operational checks of Circle

Seal Controls valves with P/N’s

S270T010–10, –11, and –12; therefore,

these valves should be acceptable for

terminating action.

The FAA concurs with the

commenters’ request to revise the final

rule to allow use of certain Circle Seal

Controls valves as terminating action for

this AD’s repetitive operational checks.

The FAA finds that replacement of

existing Circle Seal Controls valves with

Circle Seal Controls valves with P/N

S270T010–10, –11, –12, –13, –14, or

–15; or with Whittaker Controls valves;

is acceptable for doing the terminating

action in paragraph (b) of this AD.

Paragraph (b) of this AD has been

revised accordingly.

While replacement with Circle Seal

Controls valves with P/Ns S270T010–

10, –11, and –12 is acceptable as

terminating action, the FAA points out

that these valves are not currently being

manufactured by Circle Seal Controls.

That company is only manufacturing P/

Ns S270T010–13, –14, and –15 valves.

Request To Revise Preamble Language

One commenter requests that the FAA

revise the ‘‘Discussion’’ section in the

original NPRM and one sentence in the

‘‘Summary’’ section to more accurately

explain what prompted the proposed

AD. The sentence in the ‘‘Summary’’

explains that the proposal ‘‘was

prompted by reports that the motor

switch contacts on certain hydraulic

shutoff valves were mis-aligned, causing

subsequent malfunction of those

valves.’’ The commenter states that this

statement could be misleading and

requests that the FAA use a more

general statement.

The FAA concurs with the

commenter’s request, and has revised

the affected sentence in the summary of

this final rule to state that this AD is

prompted by reports that ‘‘various

intermittent limit switch problems have

caused valve failures.’’ (As the

‘‘Discussion’’ section is not restated in

this final rule, no change is necessary in

that regard.)

Request To Allow Installation of Only

Certain Valves

One commenter requests that the FAA

NOT revise the supplemental NPRM to

allow installation of Circle Seal Controls

valves to be terminating action for the

repetitive operational checks in this AD.

The commenter states that Circle Seal

Controls, Inc., has repeatedly failed to

design and manufacture reliable valves.

The commenter points out that each

new design has met all of the airplane

manufacturer’s design criteria, passed

all the appropriate tests, and been

approved by the FAA. However, after

each approval, the valves failed to

function. The commenter also questions

whether the FAA made an error in the

applicability of the supplemental NPRM

by making the AD apply only to Circle

Seal Controls valves having P/N

S270T010–1 through –9. The

commenter requests that the AD also

apply to Circle Seal Controls valves

having P/N S270T010–10 through –12.

The FAA does not concur with the

commenter’s requests. Information

provided by the manufacturer regarding

the failure rate of Circle Seal Controls

valves having P/N S270T010–10

through –12 resulted in the FAA

removing these parts from the list of

replacement parts acceptable for

terminating action in the supplemental

NPRM. However, since the issuance of

the supplemental NPRM, the FAA has

determined that the failures in Circle

Seal Controls valves having P/N

S270T010–10 through –12 were due to

manufacturing errors, not design flaws.

Also, further refinements in the design

of P/N S270T010–13 through –15 have

focused on improving the ease of

manufacture and assembly of the valves.

Thus, as stated previously, the FAA is

revising this final rule to allow

installation of either new Whittaker

Controls valves or new Circle Seal

Controls parts having P/N S270T010–10

through –15 as terminating action for

the requirements of this AD. The FAA

finds that these parts will adequately

ensure the continued safety of the

airplane fleet. No further change to the

final rule is necessary in this regard.

Request To Require Replacement of All

Valves in All Locations

One of the commenters that requested

clarification on which valves are subject

to the proposed AD also requests that

the FAA require replacement of ALL

valves of the subject part numbers on

the affected airplanes, not just those

installed in locations listed in the

service bulletins. The commenter’s

rationale is that, if the AD applies only

to valves installed in ‘‘sensitive’’

applications, it will result in a

‘‘configuration control nightmare’’ for

operators, with some valves being

acceptable for installation in some

applications on the affected airplanes,

but not in other applications. The

commenter’s point is that valves may

not be interchangeable from one

location to another. Thus, operators will

be forced to track the manufacturer of

every valve and create customized

maintenance instructions to ensure that

correct valves are installed in the correct

locations on the airplane.

Though the FAA acknowledges that

operators will have to track the location

of each valve to ensure that only the

correct parts are installed in the

locations identified in the referenced

service bulletins, the FAA does not

concur that it is necessary to require

replacement of all valves of the affected

part numbers, regardless of location, on

the subject airplanes. Requiring

replacement of all valves in all

locations, ‘‘sensitive’’ and ‘‘nonsensitive,’’ would place an undue

burden on affected operators and may

call into question the availability of

replacement parts for the three-year

compliance time. No change to the final

rule is necessary in this regard.

Request To Extend Threshold/

Repetitive Interval for Operational

Checks

Two commenters request that the

FAA increase the threshold and

repetitive interval for the operational

checks in paragraph (a) of the proposed

AD. One commenter requests that the

interval be increased from 6 months to

456 days; the other commenter requests

an increase to 1 year. The first

commenter states that the frequency of

operational checks associated with the

six-month interval may increase the

likelihood of failure of the valves. The

commenter bases its comment on the

fact that, except for testing, the valves

would normally only be operated during

an emergency situation, and the sixmonth interval would add unnecessary

cycles and may eventually contribute to

an early failure of the valves. The other

commenter states that there is no

technical justification for the six-month

threshold and interval because proper

operation of the valves cannot be

guaranteed no matter how frequent the

operational checks. The commenters

both state that an increased threshold

and repetitive interval will still be

adequate to ensure safety of flight.

The FAA does not concur with the

commenters’ requests. While the second

commenter is correct that an operational

check only guarantees the functionality

of the valve for that one cycle and the

valve could fail the next time it is

cycled, the FAA finds that the

operational check may be sufficient to

detect valves that are likely to fail. In

addition, the repetitive inspection

interval of six months will ensure that

a failed valve will be detected in a

timely manner. No change to the final

rule is necessary in this regard.

Request To Extend Compliance Time

for Replacement

Several commenters request that the

FAA revise the proposed rule to extend

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 31139

the three-year compliance time for the

replacement in paragraph (b) of the

proposed AD. Certain commenters state

that three years is not enough time for

operators to replace nearly 5,000 valves

in the affected airplane fleet. One

commenter suggests a compliance time

of four years; another suggests four and

a half years. Certain commenters

express concern that the parts

manufacturers may not be able to

produce an adequate supply of parts for

replacement of affected valves on the

entire affected worldwide fleet within

the three-year compliance time. The

commenters state that repetitive

operational checks at six-month

intervals, as required by paragraph (a) of

this AD, should provide an adequate

level of safety until valves can be

replaced.

The FAA does not concur with the

commenters’ request for an extension of

the compliance time for paragraph (b) of

this AD. The compliance time for the

replacement of existing Circle Seal

Controls valves was extended from two

years to three years in the supplemental

NPRM. The FAA finds that three years

is the maximum time that affected

airplanes may be allowed to continue to

operate with the older-design Circle

Seal Controls valves installed. Based on

commitments by Whittaker Controls, the

FAA finds that an adequate supply of

replacement parts will be available

within the three-year compliance time

for replacement the subject valves on

affected airplanes. No change to the

final rule is necessary in this regard.

Request To Revise Cost Estimate

Two commenters ask the FAA to

revise the cost impact information

presented in the proposed rule. One of

the commenters states that, for the

operational check on Model 757 series

airplanes, it finds 12 work hours to be

a more accurate estimate than the 3

hours stated in the proposal. The other

commenter states that the FAA has

‘‘grossly underestimated’’ the costs

associated with this AD: the estimated

inspection cost is for a single

operational check, but the check will be

required twice per year until

accomplishment of the terminating

action. The second commenter also

states that if the cost estimate is

intended to reflect the cost of replacing

all Circle Seal Controls valves (i.e., in

‘‘sensitive’’ and ‘‘non-sensitive’’

applications), the FAA’s

underestimation is worse.

The FAA does not concur with the

commenters’ request to revise the cost

impact information. The cost impact

information describes only the ‘‘direct’’

costs of the specific actions required by

this AD. The number of work hours

necessary to accomplish the required

actions is based on the manufacturer’s

estimate provided in the service

bulletin, excluding the time necessary to

gain access and close up. The estimate

represents the time necessary to perform

only the actions actually required by

this AD. The FAA recognizes that, in

accomplishing the requirements of any

AD, operators may incur ‘‘incidental’’

costs in addition to the ‘‘direct’’ costs.

The cost analysis in AD rulemaking

actions, however, typically does not

include incidental costs, such as the

time required to gain access and close

up, planning time, or time necessitated

by other administrative actions. Because

incidental costs may vary significantly

from operator to operator, they are

almost impossible to calculate.

With regard to the commenter’s

observation that the cost impact

estimate is only for a single operational

check, the FAA points out that the cost

estimate states that the cost is ‘‘per

operational check.’’

With regard to the commenter’s

observation about replacement of all

Circle Seal Controls valves versus

replacement of all valves specified in

the service bulletin: as stated

previously, this AD only requires

replacement of the valves stated in the

applicable service bulletin.

No change to the final rule is

necessary in this regard.

Conclusion

After careful review of the available

data, including the comments noted

above, the FAA has determined that air

safety and the public interest require the

adoption of the rule with the changes

previously described. The FAA has

determined that these changes will

neither increase the economic burden

on any operator nor increase the scope

of the AD.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 3,029 Boeing

Model 737 series airplanes of the

affected design in the worldwide fleet.

The FAA estimates that 1,234 airplanes

of U.S. registry will be affected by this

AD, and that it will take approximately

2 work hours per airplane to accomplish

the required operational check, at an

average labor rate of $60 per work hour.

Based on these figures, the cost impact

of this requirement on U.S. operators of

these airplanes is estimated to be

$148,080, or $120 per airplane, per

operational check.

There are approximately 802 Boeing

Model 757 series airplanes of the

affected design in the worldwide fleet.

The FAA estimates that 558 airplanes of

U.S. registry will be affected by this AD,

and that it will take approximately 3

work hours per airplane to accomplish

the required operational check, at an

average labor rate of $60 per work hour.

Based on these figures, the cost impact

of this requirement on U.S. operators of

these airplanes is estimated to be

$100,440, or $180 per airplane, per

operational check.

There are approximately 701 Boeing

Model 767 series airplanes of the

affected design in the worldwide fleet.

The FAA estimates that 280 airplanes of

U.S. registry will be affected by this AD,

and that it will take approximately 4

work hours per airplane to accomplish

the required operational check, at an

average labor rate of $60 per work hour.

Based on these figures, the cost impact

of this requirement on U.S. operators of

these airplanes is estimated to be

$67,200, or $240 per airplane, per

operational check.

For all airplanes, it will take

approximately 5 work hours per valve to

accomplish the replacement required by

this AD, at an average labor rate of $60

per work hour. Required parts and

hydraulic fluid will cost approximately

$4,316 per airplane. Based on these

figures, the cost impact of the valve

replacements required by this AD on

U.S. operators is estimated to be $4,616

per airplane, per valve replacement.

This AD will require eventual

replacement of approximately 5,000

valves.

The cost impact figures discussed

above are based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the requirements of this AD action, and

that no operator would accomplish

those actions in the future if this AD

were not adopted. The cost impact

figures discussed in AD rulemaking

actions represent only the time

necessary to perform the specific actions

actually required by the AD. These

figures typically do not include

incidental costs, such as the time

required to gain access and close up,

planning time, or time necessitated by

other administrative actions.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will

not have a substantial direct effect on

the States, on the relationship between

the national Government and the States,

or on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, it is

determined that this final rule does not

have federalism implications under

Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this action (1) is not a

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under

31140 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a

‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3)

will not have a significant economic

impact, positive or negative, on a

substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has

been prepared for this action and it is

contained in the Rules Docket. A copy

of it may be obtained from the Rules

Docket at the location provided under

the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Incorporation by reference,

Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration amends part 39 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

2001–11–07 Boeing: Amendment 39–12249.

Docket 98–NM–298–AD.

Applicability: Model 737, 757, and 767

series airplanes, certificated in any category,

as listed in the following Boeing Service

Bulletins:

TABLE 1.—EFFECTIVITY

Boeing Service Bulletin Date Affected models/series

737–29A1073, Revision 3 ................................................ December 2, 1999 ............. Model 737–100, –200, –300, –400, and –500.

737–29A1081 .................................................................... December 2, 1999 ............. Model 737–600, –700, and –800.

757–29A0048, Revision 3 ................................................ December 2, 1999 ............. Model 757–200.

757–29A0051 .................................................................... December 2, 1999 ............. Model 757–300.

767–29A0083, Revision 4 ................................................ September 28, 2000 .......... Model 767.

Note 1: Only motor operated hydraulic

shutoff valves manufactured by Circle Seal

Controls that are installed in the locations

specified in the applicable alert service

bulletin listed in the table above are subject

to this AD.

Note 2: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent failure of the motor operated

hydraulic shutoff valves, which could result

in leakage of hydraulic fluid to the engine

fire zone, reduced ability to retract the

landing gear, loss of backup electrical power

or other combinations of failures, and

consequent reduced controllability of the

airplane, accomplish the following:

Repetitive Operational Checks/Corrective

Action

(a) Within 6 months after the effective date

of this AD: Perform an operational check to

detect malfunctioning of any Circle Seal

Controls motor operated hydraulic shutoff

valve in a ‘‘sensitive system’’ application (as

defined in the applicable service bulletin)

having a part number specified in the

‘‘Existing Part Number’’ column (including

parts marked with the suffix ‘‘R’’ after the

serial number), of Paragraph 2.E. of Boeing

Alert Service Bulletins 737–29A1073,

Revision 3 (for Model 737–100, –200, –300,

–400, and –500 series airplanes), 737–

29A1081 (for Model 737–600, –700, and –800

series airplanes), 757–29A0048, Revision 3

(for Model 757–200 series airplanes), or 757–

29A0051 (for Model 757–300 series

airplanes); all dated December 2, 1999; or

Boeing Service Bulletin 767–29A0083,

Revision 4, dated September 28, 2000 (for

Model 767 series airplanes); as applicable; in

accordance with the applicable service

bulletin.

(1) If any malfunction of any valve is

detected, prior to further flight, replace the

valve with a new or serviceable Whittaker

Controls or Circle Seal Controls valve in

accordance with the applicable service

bulletin. Repeat the operational check

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6 months

until accomplishment of the terminating

action required by paragraph (b) of this AD

on all subject valves.

(2) If no malfunction of any valve is

detected, repeat the operational check

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6 months

until accomplishment of the terminating

action required by paragraph (b) of this AD

on all subject valves.

Note 3: Operational checks done before the

effective date of this AD per Boeing Alert

Service Bulletin 737–29A1073, Revision 2

(for Model 737 series airplanes), or 757–

29A0048, Revision 2 (for Model 757 series

airplanes), both dated July 1, 1999; or 767–

29A0083, Revision 2, dated July 15, 1999 (for

Model 767 series airplanes); as applicable; is

acceptable for compliance with paragraph (a)

of this AD.

Terminating Action

(b) Within 3 years after the effective date

of this AD, accomplish the replacement of

any Circle Seal Controls valve in a ‘‘sensitive

system’’ application (as defined in the

applicable service bulletin) having a P/N

specified in the ‘‘Existing Part Number’’

column (including parts marked with the

suffix ‘‘R’’ after the serial number), of

Paragraph 2.E. of Boeing Alert Service

Bulletin 737–29A1078 (for Model 737–100,

–200, –300, –400, and –500 series airplanes),

737–29A1082 (for Model 737–600, –700, and

–800 series airplanes), 757–29A0049 (for

Model 757–200 series airplanes), 757–

29A0052 (for Model 757–300 series

airplanes), or 767–29A0090 (for Model 767

series airplanes); all dated December 7, 2000;

as applicable. Replace an existing part with

a new Whittaker Controls valve having a P/

N specified in the ‘‘New Part Number’’

column of Paragraph 2.E. of the applicable

service bulletin; or with a new Circle Seal

Controls valve having P/N S270T010–10,

–11, –12, –13, –14, or –15; as applicable. Do

the replacement in accordance with the

applicable alert service bulletin.

Accomplishment of this replacement

constitutes terminating action for the

repetitive operational checks required by this

AD.

Note 4: Replacement of Circle Seal

Controls valves done before the effective date

of this AD per Boeing Alert Service Bulletin

737–29A1073, Revision 2 (for Model 737

series airplanes), or 757–29A0048, Revision 2

(for Model 757 series airplanes), both dated

July 1, 1999; or 767–29A0083, Revision 2,

dated July 15, 1999 (for Model 767 series

airplanes); as applicable; is acceptable for

compliance with paragraph (b) of this AD.

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 31141

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(c) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Seattle

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA.

Operators shall submit their requests through

an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 5: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Seattle ACO.

Special Flight Permits

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with §§ 21.197 and 21.199 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197

and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a

location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Incorporation by Reference

(e) The actions shall be done in accordance

with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–

29A1073, Revision 3, dated December 2,

1999; Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–

29A1081, dated December 2, 1999: Boeing

Alert Service Bulletin 757–29A0048,

Revision 3, dated December 2, 1999; Boeing

Alert Service Bulletin 757–29A0051, dated

December 2, 1999; Boeing Service Bulletin

767–29A0083, Revision 4, dated September

28, 2000; Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–

29A1078, dated December 7, 2000; Boeing

Alert Service Bulletin 737–29A1082, dated

December 7, 2000; Boeing Alert Service

Bulletin 757–29A0049, dated December 7,

2000; Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–

29A0052, dated December 7, 2000; or Boeing

Alert Service Bulletin 767–29A0090, dated

December 7, 2000; as applicable. This

incorporation by reference was approved by

the Director of the Federal Register in

accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR

part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing

Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707,

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. Copies may

be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington; or at the Office of the Federal

Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite

700, Washington, DC.

Effective Date

(f) This amendment becomes effective on

July 16, 2001.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 25,

2001.

Vi L. Lipski,

Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate,Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 01–14000 Filed 6–8–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2001–NM–126–AD; Amendment

39–12251; AD 2001–09–51]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing

Model 737–600, –700, –700C, and –800

Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for

comments.

SUMMARY: This document publishes in

the Federal Register an amendment

adopting airworthiness directive (AD)

2001–09–51 that was sent previously to

all known U.S. owners and operators of

Boeing Model 737–600, –700, –700C,

and –800 series airplanes by individual

notices. This AD requires inspection of

the small jam nut on the elevator tab

control rods to detect inspection putty

and to determine its condition; a torque

check of the small and large jam nuts on

the tab control rod, if necessary; and

corrective actions, as applicable. For

certain airplanes, this AD also requires

a one-time inspection for torque of the

small and large jam nuts on the tab

control rods; and corrective actions, as

applicable. This action is prompted by

reports indicating that operators found

problems with the elevator tab control

rods during accomplishment of an

existing AD. The actions specified by

this AD are intended to prevent

excessive freeplay in the tab control

mechanism, which could result in

elevator tab flutter and consequent loss

of controllability of the airplane.

DATES: Effective June 18, 2001, to all

persons except those persons to whom

it was made immediately effective by

emergency AD 2001–09–51, issued

April 24, 2001, which contained the

requirements of this amendment.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of June 18,

2001.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules

Docket must be received on or before

August 10, 2001.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2001–NM–

126–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.,

Monday through Friday, except Federal

holidays. Comments may be submitted

via fax to (425) 227–1232. Comments

may also be sent via the Internet using

the following address: 9-anmiarcomment@faa.gov. Comments sent

via fax or the Internet must contain

‘‘Docket No. 2001–NM–126–AD’’ in the

subject line and need not be submitted

in triplicate. Comments sent via the

Internet as attached electronic files must

be formatted in Microsoft Word 97 for

Windows or ASCII text.

The applicable service information

may be obtained from Boeing

Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box

3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207.

This information may be examined at

the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington; or at the Office of

the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kenneth J. Fairhurst, Aerospace

Engineer, Systems and Equipment

Branch, ANM–130S, FAA, Seattle

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–1118;

fax (425) 227–1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On April

24, 2001, the FAA issued emergency AD

2001–09–51, which is applicable to

certain Boeing Model 737–600, –700,

–700C, and –800 series airplanes.

That action was prompted by reports

indicating that, during accomplishment

of actions required by AD 2001–04–08,

amendment 39–12127 (66 FR 13229,

March 5, 2001), operators found

problems with the elevator tab control

rods on certain Boeing Model 737–700

and –800 series airplanes. One operator

found jam nuts that had been installed

improperly. Two other operators

reported damage that was attributed to

inadequately torqued jam nuts. The

control rod jam nuts may not have been

torqued properly when the control rod

length was rigged at Boeing prior to

delivery of the airplanes.

Improperly torqued jam nuts on the

elevator tab control rods could result in

damage to the tab control rod. If both tab

control rods are damaged, excessive

freeplay in the tab control mechanism

can occur, which could result in

elevator tab flutter. This condition, if

not corrected, could result in loss of

controllability of the airplane.

The elevator tab control rods on

Model 737–600 and –700C series

airplanes are identical to those on the

affected Model 737–700 and –800 series

airplanes. Therefore, those Model 737–

600 and –700C series airplanes may be