IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1539

Filed April 12, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHARLES EDWARD WHITTINGHILL, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Tom Reidel, Judge.

A defendant appeals from an imposed sentence. AFFIRMED. 

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ashley Stewart, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Charles Whittinghill pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver 

methamphetamine. The plea agreement allowed for both parties to present 

argument on sentencing but provided the State would not resist Whittinghill’s 

request to enter a Residential Correctional Facility (RCF) for substance-abuse 

treatment, provided Whittinghill was approved for RCF prior to the sentencing 

hearing. After finding Whittinghill had entered into the plea knowingly and 

voluntarily, the district court deferred ruling on acceptance of the plea agreement 

until the presentence investigation report (PSI) was complete. 

At the sentencing hearing, the court accepted the plea agreement. The 

State, citing the PSI, argued for incarceration. Whittinghill argued for placement in 

a RCF, although it appears the facility rejected his admission request prior to 

sentencing. Whittinghill claimed his conviction was premised on his drug addiction; 

as a result, treatment and probation would be an appropriate sentence. The court, 

after a thorough analysis of Whittinghill’s lengthy criminal history, repeated parole 

and probation violations, and prior failed attempts at substance-abuse treatment, 

sentenced Whittinghill to an indeterminate ten-year period of incarceration. 

Whittinghill now appeals. He claims the district court abused its discretion 

by sentencing him to prison rather than a community-based treatment program 

because, due to his drug addiction, attending such a program would be the best 

method of rehabilitating him and protecting the community.1 See Iowa Code 

1 As part of this argument, Whittinghill contends the court did not consider less 

restrictive options than prison. But the court expressly noted, “In the entire thought 

process, I start with the least restrictive alternatives before moving on to the more 

restrictive.” 
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§ 901.5 (2022). “Our review of a sentence imposed in a criminal case is for 

correction of errors at law. We will not reverse the decision of a district court absent 

an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. 

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he 

decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within the statutory 

limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” Id. 

Upon our review, we determine the district court did not abuse its discretion 

during sentencing. The PSI indicates Whittinghill has had repeated opportunities 

to engage in substance-abuse treatment, failing each time. Past rehabilitation 

attempts that kept Whittinghill out of prison have failed. He has over twenty prior 

convictions. His history on probation and parole includes a multitude of 

violations—he has had prior probations extended twice, revoked five times, and 

was found in contempt for violations of the terms of probation three times. He has 

also absconded from work release twice. And his current parole officer indicated 

Whittinghill was putting “very little effort” into his parole. Such behavior indicates 

further attempts at community supervision will not be productive. See State v. 

Carlson, No. 19-2113, 2021 WL 210702, at *2 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021) 

(“We have often said or implied it is appropriate for a sentencing court to consider 

the defendant’s likelihood of success on probation.”). 

Whittinghill seems to assert the only valid penological justification for 

incarceration is specific deterrence, which is ineffective in the context of drug 

addiction. But even assuming that his argument regarding deterrence is true, such 

ignores the district court’s recognition of other justifications for incarceration, 

including incapacitation, which are consistent with the legislature’s command that 
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sentences should, in part, be crafted to protect the public. See Iowa Code § 901.5. 

Given the repetitive nature of Whittinghill’s conduct, it was not unreasonable for 

the court to conclude incarceration was necessary to protect the public from further 

offenses. 

Ultimately, we, like the district court, determine the PSI aptly described the 

need to incarcerate Whittinghill: 

To be quite succinct, the defendant’s behavior speaks for itself. He 

has had extensive contact with the criminal justice system for 

approximately 30 years and has often times not performed well when 

given the opportunity for a community-based program. . . . He has 

been given the opportunity for substance abuse and mental health 

treatment in the past, but has consistently failed to follow through 

with those programs. There is no doubt that these issues have 

caused him a great deal of turmoil, stress and legal issues, however, 

if he chooses to not address these problems, he does not leave much 

in the way of viable options. 

By crafting a sentence in light of Whittinghill’s criminal history, past conduct on 

probation, and prior attempts at substance-abuse treatment, the court did not

abuse its discretion in sentencing Whittinghill to a period of incarceration.

AFFIRMED.