[Cite as Williams v. Williams, 2018-Ohio-611.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

LADONNA M. WILLIAMS 

Plaintiff-Appellant

v. 

JOHN M. WILLIAMS, SR. 

Defendant-Appellee 

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Appellate Case No. 2017-CA-47 

Trial Court Case No. 2015-DR-628 

(Domestic Relations Appeal) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 16th day of February, 2018. 

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GREGORY K. LIND, Atty. Reg. No. 0055227, 20 South Limestone Street, Suite 340, 

Springfield, Ohio 45502 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 

 

STACEY R. PAVLATOS, Atty. Reg. No. 0012392, 700 East High Street, Springfield, Ohio 

45505 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 

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TUCKER, J. 
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Plaintiff-appellant LaDonna Williams appeals from a Final Judgment and 

Decree of Divorce entered by the Clark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 

Relations Division. She challenges the trial court's distribution of marital assets and its 

award of attorney fees to John Williams. For the following reasons, the judgment of the 

trial court will be affirmed. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

The parties were married in November 1993. They have no children as a 

result of their marriage. Ms. Williams filed a complaint for divorce on August 10, 2015 

and Mr. Williams filed an answer. Hearings were conducted over the course of six days 

beginning in September 2016 and concluding in April 2017. 

Of relevance hereto, the trial court awarded a vacation timeshare 

membership with Globequest Travel Club to Ms. Williams. The trial court ordered her to 

reimburse Mr. Williams for his one-half share of that membership. The trial court also 

awarded Mr. Williams a portion of Ms. Williams’ retirement annuity. Finally, the trial court 

ordered Ms. Williams to pay Mr. Williams’ attorney’s fees in the amount of $24,308.23. 

Ms. Williams appeals. 

II. Globequest Timeshare 

Ms. Williams’ first assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING THE 

DEFENDANT HALF INTEREST IN THE PARTIES’ TRAVEL CLUB WITH 
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GLOBEQUEST 

Ms. Williams contends that the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Williams any 

interest in the Globequest timeshare. In support, she contends Mr. Williams signed a 

waiver of his interests thereto. Alternatively, she contends that he should be awarded 

no more than one-third of the timeshare as her daughter, Pamela Mahaney, is also a onethird owner of the timeshare. 

“In Ohio, marital property is defined as any real property, personal property, 

or interest therein that is owned by either or both spouses that [was] acquired by either 

or both spouses during the course of their marriage.” Smith v. Smith, 182 Ohio App. 3d 

375, 2009-Ohio-2326, 912 N.E.2d 1170, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), citing R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a). 

A trial court has broad discretion when dividing marital property. Bisker v. Bisker, 69 

Ohio St.3d 608, 609, 635 N.E.2d 308 (1994), citing Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 

432 N.E.2d 183 (1982). Thus, absent an abuse of that discretion, a reviewing court will 

uphold the trial court's division of that property. Smith at ¶ 16. An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the trial court's judgment is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

As noted, the trial court awarded the timeshare to Ms. Williams. The trial 

court, however, determined that Mr. Williams was entitled to one-half of the equity in the 

timeshare as Mahaney did not contribute to the purchase thereof and as all payments 

were made from marital funds. The trial court further found that Mr. Williams did not 

release any interest in this timeshare 

The evidence submitted during the hearing demonstrates that in October 

2010, Ms. Williams, Mr. Williams and Mahaney executed a membership application with 
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Globequest Travel Club for the purchase of an interest in a vacation timeshare. The 

purchase price was $12,750, and a down payment was made in the sum of $3,825. In 

conjunction with the application, all three executed a promissory note in the amount of 

$8,925. 

Ms. Williams claims that her Exhibit 15 demonstrates that Mr. Williams 

relinquished all rights to the timeshare. That document purports to be a copy of a 

memorandum regarding a transfer of equity wherein Mr. Williams indicates he desires to 

transfer his equity in a Smoky Mountain timeshare to a Nevada timeshare being 

purchased by Mahaney and Ms. Williams. The memorandum further states that Mr. 

Williams did not want his “name on file as owner” of the Nevada timeshare. 

We agree with the trial court that the evidence does not support a finding of 

waiver as to the Globequest timeshare. The Exhibit 15 memorandum, dated April 26, 

2005, was executed more than five years prior to the purchase of the Globequest 

timeshare. Further, from our reading of the memorandum, Mr. Williams did not waive 

his equity interest in the Nevada timeshare. Instead, he merely stated that he did not 

want his name on the title to the timeshare. In any event, the memorandum has no 

connection to the subsequent Globequest purchase. 

We also note Ms. Williams admitted that the down payment and all 

installment payments on the promissory note were made from joint marital funds. Ms. 

Williams further admitted that Mahaney did not contribute any funds to the purchase of 

the timeshare, nor did she make any payments to compensate Mr. or Ms. Williams for her 

share of the purchase. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion with 

regard to the requirement that Ms. Williams reimburse Mr. Williams for his one-half share 
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of the monies paid for the timeshare. 

The first assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Pension Distribution 

The second assignment of error asserted by Ms. Williams states as follows: 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE 

DEFENDANT AN AMORTIZED DISTRIBUTION OF THE PLAINTIFF’S 

ASSURANT PENSION PLAN. 

Ms. Williams contends that the trial court erred by awarding Mr. Williams an 

interest in her pension plan. In support, she contends that he waived his right to that 

interest. She alternatively argues that the trial court erred with regard to the appropriate 

amount of his interest. 

We first reject the claim of waiver. Upon her retirement, Ms. Williams had 

to elect how her pension benefits would be paid. She could elect either a single life 

annuity or a joint and survivor annuity under which Mr. Williams would receive a 

percentage of the pension after her death, for the remainder of his life. Election of 

survivorship benefits would have reduced the monthly pension payments. In order to 

elect the higher paying, single life annuity, Ms. Williams was required to obtain the signed 

consent of Mr. Williams. A clear reading of the consent form indicates that it is not a 

waiver of all interests in the pension, but rather a waiver of survivor benefits. 

We next address the division of the pension. A pension acquired during 

the marriage is considered to be marital property and is subject to equitable division. 

Sprankle v. Sprankle, 87 Ohio App. 3d 129, 132, 621 N.E.2d 1310 (9th Dist. 1993); R.C. 
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3105.171(A)(3)(a). “A trial court has broad discretion when considering retirement 

benefits; flexibility is necessary for the court to make an equitable decision based upon 

factors relevant to the situation before it.” Id. “When distributing retirement benefits in 

a divorce, a “trial court must apply its discretion based upon the circumstances of the 

case, the status of the parties, the nature, terms and conditions of the * * * retirement 

plan, and the reasonableness of the result.” Hoyt v. Hoyt, 53 Ohio St.3d 177, 179, 559 

N.E.2d 1292 (1990). Further, the trial court must attempt to accomplish two goals: (1) 

preserve the value of the retirement asset and (2) disentangle the parties' economic 

affairs to bring finality to the marriage. Id. 

Ohio courts have recognized several methods for the equitable distribution 

of a spousal interest in a pension fund. 46 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Family Law, Section 

444. One such method is to “[d]etermine the present value of the fund, calculate the 

nonemployee spouse's proportionate share, and offset that amount with other marital 

assets or with a lump sum payment or installment payments from the employee spouse.” 

Id., citing Sprankle at 132. 

In this case, there is no dispute that the entire Assurant pension was earned 

during the marriage. Nor does Ms. Williams contest the use of the present value method 

for valuation. Instead, she challenges the use of her life expectancy, rather than that of 

Mr. Williams, in determining the present value of the pension. 

Carter Feltner, a CPA, testified on behalf of Mr. Williams. Ms. Williams 

stipulated to his qualifications as an expert. Feltner testified as to the method for 

calculating the present value of the pension. He further testified that because there was 

no survivor benefit provision in the pension, it was proper to utilize Ms. William’s life 
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expectancy in the calculation. Ms. Williams did not present any testimony, expert or 

otherwise, to contest Feltner’s calculations or conclusions. 

Given the evidence before the trial court, we cannot conclude that it abused 

its discretion in the division of the pension. The second assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. Attorney Fees 

Ms. Williams’s third assignment of error is as follows: 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING THE 

DEFENDANT HIS ATTORNEY FEES IN THEIR ENTIRETY. 

Ms. Williams contends that the award of attorney fees to Mr. Williams is not 

equitable. In support, she contends that the trial court made a finding that both parties 

caused delays in the litigation. 

A divorce court “may award all or part of reasonable attorney's fees and 

litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the award equitable.” R.C. 

3105.73(A). In determining whether an award of fees is equitable, “the court may 

consider the parties' marital assets and income, any award of temporary spousal support, 

the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate.” 

Id. The decision whether to award attorney fees is within the trial court's sound discretion 

and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Janis v. Janis, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 23898, 2011-Ohio-3731, ¶ 78, citing Kapadia v. Kapadia, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 94456, 2011–Ohio–2255, ¶ 93. 

It is true that the trial court found both parties displayed a lack of respect 

toward each other, counsel and the court. However, the trial court went on to note that 
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Ms. Williams was “obstructive, evasive and generally non-compliant through the course 

of this entire litigation. As mentioned previously, it was not until this Court reminded her 

of her burden of proof to establish her claimed separate property that she began to 

cooperate. This case took much longer in terms of discovery efforts and trial time that 

[sic] it ever should have all of which was a direct and proximate result of Ms. Williams’ 

lack of cooperation.” 

From our review of the transcript, we agree with the trial court that, while 

both parties were obstreperous, the matter was drawn out due to Ms. Williams’ failure to 

cooperate. She clearly did not comply with discovery requests prior to the hearing, and 

she continued that pattern even after the hearing commenced. Indeed, we note that at 

the conclusion of the third day of trial, held on February 1, 2017, the trial court admonished 

Ms. Williams and her counsel to comply with the prior discovery requests. It appears 

from the record that Ms. Williams did not provide the discovery until the week of the next 

hearing which was conducted on March 20, 2017. 

 While Ms. Williams contends that Mr. Williams, likewise, did not comply 

with discovery, we find no evidence to support such a claim. The record indicates that 

Mr. Williams was not in possession of any documentation regarding the parties’ marital 

finances and property as all such evidence remained in the marital residence to which he 

did not have access. 

The parties were living on limited, fixed incomes consisting of Social 

Security benefits and pension benefits. Mr. Williams was 79 at the time of the hearings 

and Ms. Williams was 73. The trial court made an almost equal division of the parties’ 
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marital assets with each party receiving a little over $100,000 in assets.1 The trial court 

noted that Ms. Williams had other “considerable assets accessible to her” from an 

inheritance. The record shows that Ms. Williams received an inheritance of well over 

$500,000 during the marriage which was determined to be her separate property. Thus, 

the trial court found it equitable for her to pay Mr. Williams’ legal fees. 

A review of the record shows that both parties stipulated that the hourly rate, 

time spent, and total attorney fees of the other party were reasonable. The hourly billing 

and total fees of both attorneys was submitted on the record. We conclude that the 

award of attorney fees is supported by the trial court's finding that Ms. Williams caused 

Mr. Williams to incur unnecessary attorney fees. We cannot say, based upon this record, 

that the trial court abused its discretion regarding the award of attorney fees. 

Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled. 

V. Conclusion 

All of Ms. Williams’ assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed. 

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FROELICH, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

 

1 Ms. Williams received approximately $4,000 more in assets as she had pre-marital 

equity in the marital residence. 
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Copies mailed to: 

Gregory K. Lind 

Stacey R. Pavlatos 

Hon. Thomas J. Capper