Filed 4/24/13 P. v. Hebrard CA2/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

LEANDRE HEBRARD, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B239269 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BA377622) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Robert J. Schuit, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Sarah A. Stockwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. 

Matthews and David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 

________________________________ 
2 

INTRODUCTION 

LeAndre Hebrard appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, of 

second degree robbery. He contends (1) the trial court erred in allowing a gang 

expert to testify about gang members leaving a gang, (2) there was insufficient 

evidence to support the gang enhancements, and (3) the court erred in sentencing 

him to separate consecutive terms for the firearm and gang enhancements. Finding 

no error, we affirm. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

 A jury found appellant guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).1

 

It found true the allegation that appellant personally used a firearm to commit the 

robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), that a principal was armed with a firearm 

(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and that the crime was committed for the benefit of a 

criminal street gang with the intent to promote, further, and assist the gang 

(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). 

The trial court sentenced appellant to a total of 23 years in prison, consisting 

of the midterm of three years for the robbery conviction, plus 10 years consecutive 

for the personal use firearm enhancement, and 10 years consecutive for the gang 

enhancement. The one-year firearm enhancement under section 12022, 

subdivision (a)(1) was imposed and stayed, pursuant to section 654. Appellant 

timely appealed. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 

In October 2010, Kristopher Sallico owned and operated Jimmy’s Cleaners 

on Martin Luther King Boulevard in Los Angeles. Sallico testified that on October 

27, 2010, at around 2:00 p.m., he was robbed by appellant and codefendant Andre 

 1

All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated. 
3 

McClelland.2 Sallico knew the two men as “Touche” and “4-Leaf,” respectively. 

He had spoken with the two men “numerous” times, mainly to advise them to 

become productive citizens. When appellant and McClelland entered his store, 

Sallico approached them. McClelland said to Sallico, “Pops, give me the money.” 

Sallico replied, “Are you joking?” Appellant, who was standing about three feet 

behind McClelland, lifted his shirt and showed Sallico the handle of a handgun. 

Sallico became frightened and walked to the cash register. He took out the money 

and gave it to McClelland. Appellant and McClelland walked out, got into a car, 

and drove away. 

After the men left, Sallico tried to contact his son but could not reach him. 

About an hour later, he called the police. When the police arrived, Sallico told an 

officer that he had been robbed in his store by two Black men who were Rolling 

40’s gang members. He identified the first man as “4-Leaf” and the second man as 

“Touche” and “LeAndre.” Later that day, Sallico positively identified appellant 

and McClelland as the robbers in a six-pack photographic lineup. He also 

identified appellant and McClelland as the robbers at the preliminary hearing and 

at trial. 

At trial, Sallico testified he believed that appellant and McClelland were 

affiliated with a gang. The area surrounding his store was a gang area, and gang 

members had repeatedly “tagg[ed]” his door and walls. Sallico testified that two 

months after the robbery, he sold the business because he “wanted to get [his] 

family out of the environment.” He also testified his son was friends with the 

robbers. He stated he was “unhappy with my son being affiliated with gangs,” and 

that he wanted to get his son away from “the gang and the lifestyle.” 

 2

The jury also convicted McClelland of second degree robbery. 
4 

Los Angeles Police Department Officer Guillermo Espinoza, the 

prosecution’s gang expert, testified that the Rolling 40’s Neighborhood Crips is a 

criminal street gang with about 850 members. Gang members have particular 

symbols, clothing, and tattoos they use to identify themselves. The primary 

activities of the gang include murder, shootings, robberies, assault, and drug sales. 

Officer Espinoza testified that gang members need to put in “work” -- committing 

crimes for the gang -- to “keep their name or status elevated.” Officer Espinoza 

stated that Sallico’s store was in Rolling 40’s territory, and Sallico was the father 

of a Rolling 40’s gang member. Officer Espinoza knew appellant as an active 

Rolling 40’s gang member. He had had “numerous contacts” with appellant and 

had arrested him before. Officer Espinoza also knew McClelland as a selfadmitted Rolling 40’s gang member who had gang tattoos and was known by his 

gang moniker of “4-Leaf.” 

Given a hypothetical fact pattern based on the facts of this case, Officer 

Espinoza opined that the robbery was committed for the benefit of a criminal street 

gang, the Rolling 40’s. He explained that gang members commit robberies to 

generate income and to instill fear in the community. The fear deters victims from 

reporting the crimes to the police. It also helps the gang recruit new members. 

On cross-examination, McClelland’s counsel elicited testimony from Officer 

Espinoza that it was “unusual” for a member of a gang to go out and rob the 

business of the father of a fellow gang member. Appellant’s counsel asked Officer 

Espinoza what the police policy was to determine when a person was no longer 

considered an “active” gang member. Officer Espinoza stated there was no written 

policy, but that it would include whether the gang member had a normal job and 

was living away from the gang’s territory. Counsel then elicited testimony that 
5 

appellant was living with his mother in an area outside the Rolling 40’s gang 

territory. 

 On redirect examination, over defense objections, Officer Espinoza testified 

that gang members looked down on members who attempt to leave the gang. 

These members could be disciplined, beaten up, or killed. When a gang member 

leaves the gang, his family may also be targeted. 

DISCUSSION 

 Appellant contends (1) the court erred in admitting, over defense objection, 

testimony by the prosecution’s gang expert about the possible repercussions 

suffered by members attempting to leave the gang, (2) there was insufficient 

evidence to support the gang enhancement allegation, and (3) the court improperly 

imposed both a firearm personal use enhancement and a gang enhancement. 

A. Gang Expert Testimony

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Officer 

Espinoza to opine about the possible repercussions that a member attempting to 

leave a gang could suffer. He contends the testimony should have been excluded 

under Evidence Code section 352 because it was irrelevant and speculative, as 

there was no evidence that Sallico’s son was attempting to leave the Rolling 40’s 

gang. We disagree. 

Here, the gang expert’s testimony about the repercussions facing gang 

members who attempt to leave was relevant to explain or rebut adverse testimony 

and inferences developed during cross-examination. (See People v. Cleveland

(2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 746 [redirect examination’s “‘principal purposes are to 

explain or rebut adverse testimony or inferences developed on crossexamination . . . .’”].) On cross-examination, McClelland’s attorney had elicited 

testimony from Officer Espinoza that it was unusual for gang members to target 
6 

the business of the father of another gang member, suggesting that the robbery was 

not gang-related. Sallico had testified that he wanted his son to leave the gang, and 

had encouraged appellant to become a productive citizen. Officer Espinoza’s 

testimony on redirect tended to show that the robbery was intended to intimidate 

Sallico and to discourage him from advising gang members to leave the gang. 

Thus, the testimony was relevant to appellant’s motive and intent in committing 

the robbery. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193.) In addition, while 

cross-examining the officer, appellant’s attorney had elicited testimony from which 

it could be inferred that appellant was no longer an active member of the Rolling 

40’s gang, as he was no longer living in the gang’s territory at the time of the 

crime. Evidence tending to show the disincentives for leaving a gang was relevant 

to rebut this inference. In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

allowing the gang expert’s testimony on redirect examination. 

In any event, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Sallico 

positively identified appellant as the robber. Even had the challenged testimony 

been excluded, the evidence, as discussed below, was sufficient to establish that 

the robbery was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Thus, it is not 

reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have occurred absent the 

alleged error. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1195.) 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the gang 

enhancement allegation. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

special allegation, this court examines “‘the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- 

that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- from which a 

reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
7 

doubt’ [citation], ‘presum[ing] in support of the judgment the existence of every 

fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence’ [citation].” (People v. 

Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 161.) Expert testimony may be used to 

prove the elements of a gang enhancement allegation. (See, e.g., People v. 

Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 621; People v. Martinez (2008) 

158 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1332-1333.) 

 Here, the jury found true the allegation that appellant committed the robbery 

for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, 

subdivision (b)(1)(C). “The section 186.22(b)(1) enhancement requires the jury to 

find that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and with 

the specific intent to promote the criminal street gang.” (People v. Ramon (2009) 

175 Cal.App.4th 843, 849 (Ramon).) We conclude that substantial evidence 

supports the jury’s findings that the crime was committed for the benefit of the 

Rolling 40’s gang, and that appellant had the specific intent to promote the gang 

when he robbed Sallico. The crime was committed by acknowledged Rolling 40’s 

gang members in territory claimed by the gang. The crime victim told the police 

he had been robbed by Rolling 40’s gang members. Officer Espinoza opined that 

the robbery increased the community’s fear of the Rolling 40’s gang, and that the 

gang would benefit from community members’ fear and reluctance to report crimes 

committed by gang members. As our Supreme Court has observed, “[e]xpert 

opinion that particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing its 

reputation for viciousness can be sufficient to raise the inference that the conduct 

was ‘committed for the benefit of . . . a[] criminal street gang’ within the meaning 

of section 186.22(b)(1).” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 63; accord 

People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 619 [from expert testimony that assault 

was “‘classic’” gang activity that frightened residents and secured gang’s drug-
8 

dealing stronghold in the area, jury could reasonably conclude charged offense was 

committed for benefit of gang and with specific intent of promoting its criminal 

activities under section 186.22, subd. (b)(1)]; People v. Vazquez (2009) 

178 Cal.App.4th 347, 351, 354 [reasonable jury could infer from expert testimony 

that violent crimes increased respect for gang and intimidated neighborhood 

residents, and from other evidence in record that murder was committed with 

specific intent to promote gang’s criminal activities]; People v. Ferraez (2003) 

112 Cal.App.4th 925, 930- 931 [jury could reasonably infer crime was gangrelated from expert testimony coupled with other evidence].) 

 Appellant’s reliance on Ramon is misplaced. In that case, the defendant was 

convicted of possession of a stolen vehicle and possession of an unregistered 

firearm. When asked how these crimes would benefit a criminal street gang, a 

gang expert testified that two gang members being together in a stolen vehicle with 

an unregistered firearm benefitted their gang because they could commit crimes 

that would be in furtherance of the gang. (Ramon, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 847-848.) The appellate court found this evidence insufficient to establish that 

the defendants had the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal 

conduct by other gang members. (Id. at p. 851.) Ramon is distinguishable from 

the instant case because in Ramon, there was no evidence the crime victim knew 

her vehicle had been stolen by gang members and thus no permissible inference 

that they had intended to intimidate her. (Id. at pp. 846-847.) Here, Sallico knew 

he was being robbed by gang members; it was one of the first things he reported to 

the police, and he was sufficiently intimidated to move his family away from the 

gang’s territory. In short, there was sufficient evidence to support the gang 

enhancements. 
9 

 C. Sentencing Error 

 Appellant contends one of the two 10-year enhancements (the section 

12022.53 personal use firearm enhancement and the 186.22 gang enhancement) 

must be stricken, as the imposition of two enhancements in the instant matter 

violates section 1170.1, subdivision (f), as interpreted by the California Supreme 

Court in People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501 (Rodriguez). Specifically, 

appellant contends that section 1170.1, subdivision (f) prohibits the imposition of 

both enhancements, where the 10-year gang enhancement was imposed due to the 

personal use of a firearm during a crime. We conclude that both enhancements 

were properly imposed. 

 Section 1170.1, subdivision (f) provides in pertinent part: “When two or 

more enhancements may be imposed for being armed with or using a dangerous or 

deadly weapon or a firearm in the commission of a single offense, only the greatest 

of those enhancements shall be imposed for that offense. . . .” Thus, in Rodriguez, 

the California Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be subjected to a gang 

enhancement under section 186.22 and a firearm enhancement under section 

12022.5, subdivision (a). (Rodriguez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 504.) Appellant, 

however, was subjected to a firearm personal use enhancement under section 

12022.53. Subdivision (e)(2) of that section provides: “An enhancement for 

participation in a criminal street gang pursuant to Chapter 11 (commencing with 

Section 186.20) of Title 7 of Part 1 shall not be imposed on a person in addition to 

an enhancement imposed pursuant to this subdivision, unless the person personally 

used or personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the offense.” In 

People v. Brookfield (2009) 47 Cal.4th 583, the Supreme Court explained that 

under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(2), “[a] defendant who personally uses or 

discharges a firearm in the commission of a gang-related offense is subject to both
10 

the increased punishment provided for in section 186.22 and the increased 

punishment provided for in section 12022.53.” (Id. at p. 590.) Because section 

12022.53, subdivision (e)(2) is the more specific statute, it prevails over the 

conflicting language in section 1170.1, subdivision (f). (People v. Robinson (2012) 

208 Cal.App.4th 232, 259-260.) Appellant personally used a firearm to commit 

the robbery when he showed Sallico a handgun during the crime. Thus, appellant 

was properly subject to both the firearm enhancement and the gang enhancement 

because he personally used a handgun to commit the gang-related crime. The 

court did not err in imposing the two enhancements. 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

 

 MANELLA, J. 

We concur: 

EPSTEIN, P. J. 

WILLHITE, J.