J-S22002-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: C. E. C., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J. D., FATHER

No. 3439 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree September 19, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000947-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PLATT,

*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 04, 2018

J.D. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered on September 19, 2017, 

that granted the petition filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”) to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to C.E.C.

(“Child”) (born in June of 2006) and to change the goal to adoption.1,2 We 

affirm. 

In its opinion, the trial court set forth a brief history of this case, as 

follows:

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother’s parental rights were terminated in March of 2017. We are unaware 

of any appeal that she may have filed. 

2 A guardian ad litem (GAL), Patricia Cochran, Esq., and a child advocate, Joe 

Capozzoli, Esq., were appointed to represent the best interests and legal 

interests of Child. Both attorneys participated in the hearing. Moreover, we 

note that Attorney Capozzoli reported to the court that he had visited with 

Child and Child had indicated his wish to be adopted by his foster parents. 

See N.T., 9/19/17, at 26. 
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The family became known to [DHS] on May 7, 2014[,] after 

DHS received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report 

alleging that Child had 84 unexcused absences, 17 latenesses [sic] 

and 4 excused absences[] during the 2013-2014 academic school 

year, inter alia. At that time the identity and whereabouts of 

[Child’s] father [were] unknown to DHS. During an adjudicatory 

hearing on June 4, 2015, before the Honorable Jonathan Q. 

Irvine[,] Child was adjudicated dependent and the [c]ourt learned 

that J.D. was Child’s biological father. On August 18, 2015, DHS 

conducted a Parent Locater Search (“PLS”) on Father[,] which 

located him at 3319 Fairhill Street, Philadelphia, PA. On 

November 5, 2015, Father was arrested and charged with 

Aggravated Assault, Robbery, Conspiracy, Theft, Receiving Stolen 

Property, Possession of a Firearm, inter alia. On September 6, 

2016, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) revised Father’s 

Single Case Plan (“SCP”). The objectives identified for Father 

were (1) to initiate and respond to CUA via phone and 

correspondence; (2) to comply with court ordered 

recommendations; and (3) to complete [] forthwith [a] drug 

screen and assessment. 

On or about August 4, 2017[,] DHS filed the underlying 

Petition to Terminate Father’s Parental Rights. On September 19, 

2017, this [c]ourt ruled to terminate Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1) and (2) and ruled that the 

termination of Father’s rights was in the best interest of [] Child 

and Child’s goal was changed to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] 

§ 2511(b). 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/30/17, at 2-3 (unnumbered).

The termination/goal change hearing took place on September 19, 

2017. Father, who was represented by counsel, took part in the hearing by 

telephone from the Curran Freehold Correctional Facility, where he was 

incarcerated. The trial court provided the following discussion relating to the 

evidence presented at the hearing:

[T]his [c]ourt found clear and convincing evidence to terminate 

Father’s parental rights as he failed to remedy the conditions that 

brought [] Child into care. Furthermore, Father’s incarceration, 
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lack of housing, and failure to make any attempts to visit his Child 

while in prison also demonstrated that Father was unlikely to 

remedy the conditions within a reasonable period of time. The 

[c]ourt further found that because there was no strong bond 

between Father and Child[,] terminating parental rights would not 

cause the Child irreparable harm. Additionally, it would be in []

Child’s best interest to be adopted due to [his] and his siblings 

sharing a supportive pre-adoptive foster home. At the termination 

hearing, the [c]ourt reviewed Father’s extensive criminal 

history[,] which culminated in a conviction for felony Possession 

of a Controlled Substance by an inmate and his continued 

incarceration. The CUA Representative testified that Father had 

not achieved all of his SCP objectives nor had he attempted to 

perform any parental duties[,] which was evidenced by Father’s 

decision to not seek visitation with Child from prison. The CUA 

Representative testified that Child was in a good pre-adoptive 

home and that his grades were improving and that Child had a 

parental bond with his foster parents. The CUA Representative 

testified that Father was unable to meet Child’s needs and that 

there existed no parental bond between Father and Child and that 

there had been no contact between Father and Child for a year 

and a half. The CUA Representative testified that he believed that 

it was in Child’s best interest that the goal be changed to adoption. 

The testimony of the CUA [Representative] was deemed to be 

credible and accorded great weight. As the testimony before the 

[c]ourt on September 19, 2017 indicates, the evidence is clear 

and convincing that Father did not remedy the condition that 

caused his Child to come into care and that Father continued to 

be unable to provide care for his Child, warranting the involuntary 

termination of [] Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 2511(a)(1) and (2) and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

TCO at 4-5 (unnumbered). 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court announced its decision from 

the bench, stating: 

THE COURT: Having heard no evidence of that, having heard no 

evidence of father having family available, I – obviously, I have to 

rule in the best interest of the child.
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This child has been in placement for 28 months, since May of 

2015. He is in placement with three other siblings. He’s doing 

well in the pre-adoptive home. 

Father has not been compliant throughout the history of this case 

– presently serving five and a half to 18 years’ incarceration. 

He’s got a history of drug dealing, carrying guns, I presume 

shooting people, with an aggravated assault and firearms 

conviction, and he is in no position to parent this child at this time 

or in the near future.

Therefore, I find the City has met its burden by clear and 

convincing evidence to terminate the parental rights of [J.D.], and 

any unknown putative father, under 2511(a)(1) and (2), and 

2511(b). 

The goal for this child is changed to adoption. 

N.T. Hearing, 9/19/17, at 28. 

Father filed an appeal to this Court and attached a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). His concise 

statement provides the following:

The Father, JD, wishes to file an appeal on the grounds that the 

lower court abused its discretion and erred in law by not doing a

family find and plac[ing] the child with family (maternal and/or 

paternal family[)]. Additionally, DHS/CUA did not make 

reasonable efforts to help Father to meet his goals and objectives 

to be reunified with Father or Father’s family (maternal family, 

alternatively).

Father’s Rule 1925(a) Statement. 

In his brief, Father sets forth the following two issues: 

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or err[] in law when 

it terminated Father’s parental rights because he was 

incarcerated and where CUS made minimual [sic] efforts to 

assist Father in meeting his objectives and produced no 

evidence?
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II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or err[] in law when 

it denied the Grandparents[’] motion to intervene and care 

for [] Child where they were appropriate caregivers and the 

Father wanted [] Child with family? 

Father’s brief at 4. 

Initially, we note that in its brief, DHS asserts that Father has waived 

both issues set forth in his brief because they “do not align with the issues 

raised in his [c]oncise [s]tatement.” DHS’s brief at 9. We disagree, 

recognizing that Pa.R.A.P. 2116, entitled “Statement of Questions Involved,” 

provides that the statement of the questions in the brief “will be deemed to 

include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein.” Rule 2116(a). 

Father has sufficiently included reference to both issues he wishes to argue in 

his concise statement and in his statement of questions in his brief. Therefore, 

he has complied with the Rule so as to allow this Court to address his 

arguments.

Next, we address Father’s second issue relating to Maternal 

Grandfather’s (“MG”) motion to intervene, which we note does not appear of 

record. Father points out that in the permanency review order, dated March 

2, 2017, the court directed “DHS to explore all family resources to include 

Maternal Grandfather.” Permanency Review Order, 3/2/17. Additionally, the 

record contains a continuance order, dated June 21, 2017, which states, “Case 

was listed for Motion to Intervene (which was denied)[.]” Continuance Order, 

6/21/17. We are also aware that the court referenced MG’s motion to 
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intervene at the September 19, 2017 hearing. Specifically, the court stated 

that an attorney entered an appearance for MG on October 31, 2016, and filed 

a motion to intervene, which the court had denied. N.T., 9/19/17, at 25. The 

court also stated that “it was a little late in the game for the maternal 

grandfather to enter.” Id. 

To support his argument relating to the intervening of MG, Father cites 

23 Pa.C.S. § 5324, which sets forth the requirements for standing for any 

form of physical or legal custody. The pertinent portion of that statute is 

section 5324(3), which provides the requirements for standing for a 

grandparent who is not in loco parentis to the child. Father further refers to 

a hearing held on June 21, 2017, at which he claims MG was in attendance 

with counsel. It appears that the June 21st hearing occurred in the context of 

the dependency matter, but other than the orders and comments identified 

above, no transcript of that hearing appears in the certified record. 

DHS counters Father’s argument, stating that neither Father nor MG 

appealed from the June 21st order and that, therefore, the issue has been 

waived. We are compelled to agree with DHS’s position. In K.C. v. L.A., 128 

A.3d 774 (Pa. 2015), our Supreme Court with reliance on In re Barnes 

Found., 871 A.2d 792 (Pa. 2005), stated that “a common pleas court’s order 

denying intervention is one type of order which must be appealed within thirty 

days of its entry under Rule of Appellate Procedure 903, or not at all, precisely 

because the failure to attain intervenor status forecloses a later appeal.” K.C., 
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128 A.3d at 780 (quoting Barnes, 871 A.2d at 795). The K.C. Court further 

explained: 

While Barnes did not involve a child custody action, its

language is broad and applies to any “common pleas court’s order

denying intervention.” Barnes, 871 A.2d at 794. Moreover, the

rationale behind requiring the immediate appeal of a denial of

intervention in Barnes—namely, the risk of interference with

subsequent trial proceedings—is even more pronounced in the

context of a child custody action, given the significant interests at

stake. We, therefore, find that Barnes applies to the trial court’s

order in the instant case. Accordingly, because Barnes

unequivocally requires any party who was denied intervention and

who satisfies the requirements of Rule 3138to appeal from the

order denying intervention within 30 days of its entry or lose the

right to appeal the order entirely. Appellants’ right to appeal from

the order denying intervention in the instant case will be

manifestly lost if they are not permitted to appeal the order.

8 This court also indicated that the same requirement

applies to a party appealing an order denying

intervention under Rule 312. See Barnes, 871 A.2d

at 794. 

We recognize that this result may appear to be in tension 

with our goal of achieving the prompt resolution of child custody 

disputes, as permitting the piecemeal appeal of an order denying 

intervention may delay custody proceedings. However, we find 

this delay is preferable to the alternative of completely denying a 

party the right to file an appeal—given the possibility that the

party does, in fact, have standing and should have been granted 

intervention—which then forces that party to file his or her own 

separate custody action in order to seek redress. 

K.C., 128 A.3d at 780-81. Accordingly, because no appeal was filed within 

thirty days of the June 21, 2017 order denying intervention, that issue must 

be considered waived.

We now turn to Father’s first issue wherein he claims that the trial court 

erred by terminating his parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). 
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Essentially, Father argues that the evidence presented by DHS was vague,

that no objectives had been established for Father, and that no outreach was 

made at the prison where Father was housed. 

We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the 

following standard:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must 

stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury 

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879 

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented 

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts 

in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
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We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights 

is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, 

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination 

of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. 

With regard to Section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts 

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we 

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in 

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 
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946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent 

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

In this case, as noted above, the trial court terminated Father’s parental 

rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b).3 We need only agree with 

____________________________________________

3 These portions of the statute provide:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused 

or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be

remedied by the parent. 

***

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 
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the trial court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as section 

2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). 

In his brief, Father only takes issue with the trial court’s determination 

as to subsection (a)(1), essentially asserting a lack of credible evidence to 

support the termination of Father’s parental rights. He makes no reference to 

subsection (a)(2); nor does he address section 2511(b). Under these 

circumstances, it is apparent that Father does not disagree with the trial 

court’s determination as to subsection (a)(2) or section 2511(b). Therefore, 

we need not address further Father’s assertion of error relating to subsection 

(a)(1), because we may conclude that the petition requesting termination was 

properly granted under subsection (a)(2) and section (b). Moreover, we note 

that Father’s contentions center solely on allegations relating to credibility, 

which we cannot overturn because our review reveals that the trial court’s 

findings are supported by competent evidence. See T.B.B., 8335 A.2d at 

394. Accordingly, Father is not entitled to any relief. 

Decree affirmed.

____________________________________________

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/4/18