Third District Court of Appeal 

State of Florida 

Opinion filed January 17, 2024. 

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 

________________ 

No. 3D22-2121 

Lower Tribunal No. 17-29075 

________________ 

Peter Irwin, Ph.D.,

Appellant, 

vs. 

Signal Safe, Inc., etc.,

Appellee. 

An appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for MiamiDade County, Oscar Rodriguez-Fonts, Judge. 

Whitelock & Associates, P.A., and Meredith A. Chaiken, and 

Christopher J. Whitelock (Fort Lauderdale), for appellant. 

VLP Copenhaver Espino, Mike Piscitelli, and Kristen M. Jimenez (Fort 

Lauderdale), for appellee. 

Before SCALES, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ. 

MILLER, J. 
2

This is one of two companion appeals implicating the role sovereign 

immunity occupies in a tort claim stemming from a contractual relationship 

between two public entities.1 Appellant, Peter Irwin, Ph.D., an engineering

professor at Florida International University (“FIU”), challenges an order 

denying a motion to dismiss a negligence and defamation action filed in the 

lower tribunal by appellee, Signal Safe, Inc. On appeal, Dr. Irwin contends 

the trial court erred in failing to find he was cloaked from liability by sovereign 

immunity. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(F)(ii). For 

the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

This dispute finds its genesis in a series of contracts executed between 

the Florida Department of Transportation (“FDOT”) and FIU. Under the 

terms of the contracts, FIU agreed to evaluate the performance of traffic 

reinforcement devices manufactured by Signal Safe in simulated storm 

conditions using the Wall of Wind, an engineering testing facility located on 

campus. Dr. Irwin was designated as a “co-principal investigator.” After 

performing testing, the team of professionals involved reported unfavorable 

results to FDOT. Dr. Irwin allegedly also published the findings in a public 

presentation to FDOT. 

1 This case was consolidated with 3D22-2122 for purposes of oral argument. 
3

Signal Safe subsequently filed suit in the circuit court against FIU, Dr. 

Irwin, and Dr. Ioannis Zisis, the “principal investigator” assigned to the 

project. The claims against Dr. Zisis are the subject of the companion

appeal.

The complaint proceeded through several different iterations. In the 

operative pleading, the Fifth Amended Complaint, Signal Safe alleged that 

Dr. Irwin exceeded the scope of his employment by opining as to the efficacy 

of the traffic devices and engaging in unlicensed engineering that extended 

beyond the bounds of the teaching exception codified in section 471.0035, 

Florida Statutes (2022). See id. (“For the sole purpose of teaching the 

principles and methods of engineering design, . . . a person employed by a 

public postsecondary educational institution . . . is not required to be licensed 

under the provisions of this chapter as a professional engineer.”). In addition, 

Signal Safe asserted Dr. Irwin committed defamatory torts by publishing and 

presenting the results of the testing.

Contending that all the actions asserted as a basis for recovery in the 

complaint occurred within the scope of employment, Dr. Irwin moved to 

dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The trial court denied the motion, 

and the instant appeal ensued.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
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“The issue of sovereign immunity . . . is a legal issue subject to a de 

novo standard of review.” Plancher v. UCF Athletics Ass’n, Inc., 175 So. 3d 

724, 725 n.3 (Fla. 2015); see also Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Mia. Dade Coll. v. 

Verdini, 339 So. 3d 413, 417 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“We review the trial court’s 

determination regarding sovereign immunity, a question of law, de novo. The 

issue of sovereign immunity may properly be considered on a motion to 

dismiss.”) (internal citations omitted). In considering the propriety of a ruling 

on a motion to dismiss, the reviewing court is constrained by consideration 

of only the facts alleged within the four corners of the complaint, along with 

any incorporated attachments. See Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Moore, 347 

So. 3d 545, 547–48 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). 

ANALYSIS

“[D]eeply rooted in feudal notions of the divine right of kings,” sovereign 

immunity stems from the premise that “the King can do no wrong.” Hughes 

v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 340 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tenn. 

2011) (quoting Cooper v. Rutherford County, 531 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tenn. 

1975) (Henry, J., dissenting)). Distilled to its essence, “[t]he doctrine . . . 

provides that a sovereign cannot be sued without its own permission.” Am. 

Home Assurance Co. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459, 471 

(Fla. 2005). 
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“In Florida, sovereign immunity is the rule, rather than the exception

. . . .” Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984). 

The State and its subdivisions are shielded from civil liability unless 

sovereign immunity is waived by legislative enactment or constitutional 

amendment. See Art. X, § 13, Fla. Const. In this vein, “[t]he immunity of the 

State of Florida and its agencies from liability for claims arising under Florida 

law or common law is absolute absent a clear, specific, and unequivocal 

waiver . . . .” State, Dep’t of Elder Affs. v. Caldwell, 199 So. 3d 1107, 1109 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing Klonis v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 766 So. 2d 

1186, 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)).

The Legislature has waived the State’s sovereign immunity from 

liability for torts, “subject to the limitations specified in [section 768.28, Florida 

Statutes (2022)].” § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. That statute provides, in pertinent 

part:

In accordance with [article X, section 13 of the Florida 

Constitution], the state, for itself and for its agencies or 

subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability for 

torts, but only to the extent specified in this act. Actions at law 

against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to recover 

damages in tort for money damages against the state or its 

agencies or subdivisions for injury or loss of property, personal 

injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 

omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision while 

acting within the scope of the employee's office or employment

under circumstances in which the state or such agency or 
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subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant, 

in accordance with the general laws of this state, may be 

prosecuted subject to the limitations specified in this act.

Id. (emphasis added). A corollary provision, section 768.28(9)(a), Florida 

Statutes, further clarifies:

An officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its 

subdivisions may not be held personally liable in tort or named 

as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage 

suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the 

scope of her or his employment or function, unless such officer, 

employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose 

or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human 

rights, safety, or property.

The net effect of these two provisions is to insulate state employees 

from personal liability for torts committed within the scope of employment, 

absent the required scienter findings, while simultaneously allowing recourse 

against the State. Together, these provisions are intended “to give immunity 

to state employees and to make it clear that legal responsibility lies only with 

the State itself under its limited waiver of sovereign immunity.” Andrew v. 

Shands at Lake Shore, Inc., 970 So. 2d 887, 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). 

In analyzing whether an act occurred “within the scope of 

employment,” Florida courts are governed by a tri-partite inquiry, consistent 

with the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 228 (Am. L. Inst. 1958): 

(1) [Whether] the conduct is of the kind the employee is hired to 

perform; (2) [whether] the conduct occurs substantially within the 

time and space limits authorized or required by the work to be 
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performed; and (3) [whether] the conduct is activated at least in 

part by a purpose to serve the [employer].

Fernandez v. Fla. Nat’l Coll., Inc., 925 So. 2d 1096, 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) 

(quoting Sussman v. Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc., 557 So. 2d 74, 75–76 (Fla. 

3d DCA 1990)). This inquiry ordinarily “presents a question for jury 

determination.” Garcy v. Broward Process Servers, Inc., 583 So. 2d 714, 

716 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (Glickstein, J., dissenting) (citing Gonpere Corp. v. 

Rebull, 440 So. 2d 1307, 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)); see also De Martinez v. 

Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 442 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[L]itigating the 

question whether an employee’s allegedly tortious acts fall within the scope 

of employment will, of course, always require some evidence to show what 

the acts were. Accordingly, there will always be overlap between evidence 

going to the scope-of-employment determination and evidence bearing on 

the underlying liability claimed by the plaintiff . . . .”); Restatement (Second) 

of Agency § 229 cmt. a. (Am. L. Inst. 1958) (“The limits of the scope of 

employment are dependent upon the facts of the particular case.”). But

where the application of sovereign immunity is readily apparent on the face 

of the complaint, “it may be argued as a basis for a motion to dismiss.” 

Rankin v. Colman, 476 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). 

Against these principles, we turn to the case at hand. Signal Safe’s 

theory of liability on the claim of ordinary negligence is two-fold: (1) Dr. Irwin
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exceeded the scope of the contracts in opining “about the performance and 

ineffectiveness of [Signal Safe’s] and others’ devices to FDOT;” and (2) Dr. 

Irwin improperly performed unlicensed engineering. Signal Safe further 

asserts liability on the basis that Dr. Irwin published and presented the test 

results. We examine each theory, in turn.

Under the express terms of the original contract appended to the 

operative complaint, Dr. Irwin was selected to serve as a co-principal 

investigator. In that capacity, he was further obligated by subsequently 

ratified work orders to perform testing and report his results to FDOT. 

It is well-settled that “[e]xhibits attached to the complaint are 

controlling.” Ginsberg v. Lennar Fla. Holdings, Inc., 645 So. 2d 490, 494 

(Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Hence, to the extent the allegations in “the complaint 

are contradicted by the exhibits, the plain meaning of the exhibits will 

control.” Id. Applying these principles here, the bare allegation, contradicted 

by the contractual documents, that Dr. Irwin exceeded the scope of his 

employment in reporting the test results is insufficient to overcome sovereign 

immunity. 

Signal Safe further alleges “the development of a test method for 

assessing the performance of vehicular traffic signal assemblies during 

hurricane force winds . . . constitutes the practice of engineering.” Accepting 
9

these allegations as true, as we must, Signal Safe has failed to plead any 

nexus between the purported lack of licensure and the damages claimed in 

the complaint. And, perhaps more importantly, the claim against Dr. Irwin is 

one of ordinary negligence. This is insufficient to erode the broad sovereign 

immunity conferred upon state employees.

The remaining allegations in the complaint establish that Dr. Irwin 

performed the services during his employment and in his contractual 

capacity as co-principal investigator. Given that FIU was the financial 

beneficiary of the contract, these facts, as alleged, demonstrate that any 

tortious actions were both contemplated by and purposed to serve the 

employer. See Weiss v. Jacobson, 62 So. 2d 904, 906 (Fla. 1953) (en banc). 

This rationale extends equally to the defamatory torts. As an employee 

of a public university, Dr. Irwin enjoyed broad protection for statements made 

in reports, papers, and presentations. See Stephens v. Geoghegan, 702 So. 

2d 517, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“Public officials who make statements 

within the scope of their duties are absolutely immune from suit for 

defamation.”). This is true even though he was an associate professor. Id.

(“Florida law affords this protection to low-level, as well [as] high-placed 

public officials.”) (citation omitted). 
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Accordingly, we conclude the claims are barred by sovereign immunity. 

Therefore, we reverse the order under review and remand with instructions 

to dismiss the claims.

Reversed and remanded.