2021 WI 60

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2019AP1272-CR

COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

Jordan Alexander Lickes,

 Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 161, 949 N.W.2d 623

PDC No:2020 WI App 59 - Published

OPINION FILED: June 15, 2021 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: March 18, 2021 

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: Circuit 

COUNTY: Green 

JUDGE: James R. Beer 

JUSTICES:

REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 

the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, HAGEDORN, and 

KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting 

opinion in which DALLET, J., joined. 

NOT PARTICIPATING:

 

ATTORNEYS:

For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 

filed by Catherine E. White and Hurley Burish, S.C., Madison. There 

was an oral argument by Catherine E. White.

For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by Scott 

E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was 

Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 

Scott E. Rosenow. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Susan Lund, Sheila 

Sullivan, Julie Leary, Jessie Long and Legal Action of Wisconsin, 

Inc., Milwaukee. 
2021 WI 60

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2019AP1272-CR

(L.C. No. 2012CF64)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

Jordan Alexander Lickes,

 Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.

FILED

JUN 15, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court

REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 

Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, 

JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in 

which DALLET, J., joined.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.

¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. Jordan Lickes seeks review 

of the court of appeals decision,1 which reversed the Green County 

Circuit Court's order expunging three of Lickes's convictions.2 

 

1 State v. Lickes, 2020 WI App 59, 394 Wis. 2d 161, 949 

N.W.2d 623.

2 The Honorable Judge James R. Beer, Green County Circuit 

Court, presided.
No. 2019AP1272-CR

2

Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a) (2017-18),3 for individuals 

under the age of 25 at the time of an offense, a court "may order 

at the time of sentencing that [the individual's] record be 

expunged upon successful completion of the sentence[.]" If the 

individual is placed on probation, § 973.015(1m)(b) provides that 

he "has successfully completed the sentence if . . . [he] has 

satisfied the conditions of probation," among other things.

¶2 Lickes raises two principal issues. First, Lickes 

contends that the phrase "conditions of probation" under Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b) does not refer to the conditions set by the 

Department of Corrections (DOC) but only those conditions ordered 

by the sentencing court. According to Lickes, he did not need to 

satisfy DOC's conditions of probation in order for the circuit 

court to expunge all three of his convictions. Second, Lickes 

argues that, even if the phrase "conditions of probation" includes 

conditions set by DOC, circuit courts nonetheless have discretion 

to determine that an individual "satisfied [his] conditions of 

probation" despite having violated one or more conditions.

¶3 We hold: (1) the phrase "conditions of probation" in 

Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) means conditions set by both DOC and 

the sentencing court; and (2) the statute does not give circuit 

courts discretionary authority to declare an individual has 

"satisfied [his] conditions of probation" if the record 

demonstrates an individual has violated one or more "conditions of 

 

3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-

18 version unless otherwise indicated.
No. 2019AP1272-CR

3

probation," including DOC-imposed conditions. The circuit court 

erred in expunging Lickes's three convictions because he failed to 

satisfy DOC's "conditions of probation" for all three convictions. 

We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.4

I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Based on an incident in April 2012, the State charged 

then 19-year-old Lickes with four counts: (1) fourth-degree sexual 

assault, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3m) (hereinafter 

"Count 1"); (2) sexual intercourse with a child aged 16 or older, 

in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.09 (hereinafter "Count 2"); (3) 

disorderly conduct, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1) 

(hereinafter "Count 3"); and (4) exposing genitals or pubic area, 

in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.10(1) (hereinafter "Count 4").5

¶5 Lickes pled guilty to Count 2 and no contest to the other 

three counts. The circuit court sentenced Lickes in January 2014. 

For Counts 1 and 3, the circuit court withheld sentence and placed 

Lickes on probation for 24 months. For Count 2, the circuit court 

sentenced Lickes to 90 days in county jail with Huber privileges.6 

 

4 Decrying the "consequences" of the court's decision, the 

dissent advances several policy-laden arguments for affording 

circuit court judges greater discretion to apply a more forgiving 

approach toward expungement. Such policy choices rest with the 

legislature, not this court, which is limited to saying what the 

law is and not what we may wish it to be.

5 For Counts 1 and 3, the State originally charged Lickes with 

third-degree sexual assault and child enticement, respectively. 

However, the State later amended the charges as reflected above.

6 Huber privileges allow individuals to leave county jail for 

certain purposes, such as "[w]orking at employment" or 

"[p]erforming community service work." Wis. Stat. § 303.08.
No. 2019AP1272-CR

4

For Count 4, the circuit court imposed and stayed a three-year 

prison sentence——comprising one year of initial confinement and 

two years of extended supervision——and placed Lickes on three years 

of probation.

¶6 For convictions under Counts 1, 3, and 4, the circuit 

court imposed approximately ten conditions of probation. One of 

the conditions required Lickes to "enter into, participate [in], 

and successfully complete sex offender treatment." The circuit 

court informed Lickes that if he "successfully complete[d] 

probation and all the terms," the circuit court would expunge 

Lickes's convictions on Counts 1, 3, and 4, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m).

¶7 On October 6, 2015, Lickes's probation agent at DOC sent 

a document to the circuit court disclosing that "Mr. Lickes has 

violated his probation multiple times." In particular, the 

document stated that "Mr. Lickes has had unapproved sexual contact, 

has given his agent false information, and has been terminated 

from Sex Offender Treatment." The next page of the document

contained Lickes's signature, along with the statement: "I hereby 

admit as shown by my signature . . . that I violated the rules and 

conditions of probation as described on the front [of the 

document]." The document also indicated that, "in lieu of 

probation revocation proceedings being initiated, I hereby accept

45 days, as shown by my signature, . . . in the Green County Jail." 

The circuit court accepted the agreement between Lickes and DOC, 

ordering Lickes to serve 45 days in jail with Huber privileges.
No. 2019AP1272-CR

5

¶8 On January 23, 2016, Lickes completed his term of 

probation for his convictions under Counts 1 and 3. On July 8, 

2016, Lickes sent a letter to the circuit court requesting 

expungement for his convictions for Counts 1 and 3, pursuant to 

Wis. Stat. § 973.015. In September 2016, Lickes's DOC probation 

agent sent the circuit court a form entitled "Verification of 

Satisfaction of Probation Conditions for Expungement" regarding 

Counts 1 and 3. The form contained conflicting information. On 

the one hand, Lickes's probation agent checked a box stating that 

"[t]he offender has successfully completed his/her probation." 

However, the probation agent also checked a box stating that "[a]ll 

court ordered conditions have not been met," noting that "Lickes 

is still currently participating in sex offender treatment." 

(Emphasis in original.) The probation agent also declined to check 

the box stating that "[a]ll court ordered conditions have been 

met."

¶9 On January 23, 2017, Lickes completed his term of 

probation for Count 4. In July 2018, Lickes's probation agent 

sent the circuit court a form entitled "Certification of Discharge 

and Satisfaction of Probation Conditions for Expungement" 

regarding Count 4. On this form, the probation agent checked the 

box stating that "[t]he offender has successfully completed 

his/her probation" and "[a]ll court ordered conditions have been 

met."

¶10 In January 2019, the State filed a brief in circuit court 

opposing Lickes's expungement for convictions under Counts 1, 3, 

and 4, arguing that Lickes failed to satisfy his "conditions of 
No. 2019AP1272-CR

6

probation." According to the State, Lickes was not entitled to 

expungement because, as evidenced in the October 2015 document, 

Lickes violated his conditions of probation established by DOC. 

The State contended that, per Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m) and this 

court's decision in State v. Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 376 Wis. 2d 1, 898 

N.W.2d 20, the phrase "conditions of probation" refers to 

conditions set by both DOC and the sentencing court, and the 

circuit court must deny expungement if an individual has violated 

one or more of the conditions——as Lickes had allegedly done. 

Lickes submitted a brief arguing he was entitled to expungement.

¶11 In March 2019, the circuit court held expungement 

hearings regarding Counts 1 and 3. The circuit court ordered both 

of Lickes's convictions expunged. The circuit court found Lickes 

satisfied the sentencing court's conditions of probation, and 

Lickes's violations of the DOC conditions did not prevent 

expungement. In doing so, the circuit court relied, in part, upon 

the fact that Ozuna was not a unanimous decision and that the 

legislature's "intent" is to not "have so many people having 

criminal records."

¶12 The circuit court ordered supplemental briefing 

regarding the conviction for Count 4, held an expungement hearing 

on Count 4 in May 2019, and granted expungement for that 

conviction. Despite Lickes violating some of DOC's conditions of 

probation, the circuit court determined he was nevertheless 

entitled to expungement because, among other reasons, "[Ozuna]

does not deal with this situation" and it "declines to expand 

[Ozuna's holding]." The circuit court acknowledged that "Mr. 
No. 2019AP1272-CR

7

Lickes did break a rule, but it was not deemed serious by the 

Department [of Corrections], in that they didn't try to revoke 

probation[.]"

¶13 The State appealed the circuit court's decision. The 

court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order granting 

expungement of Lickes's convictions for all three counts. We 

granted Lickes's petition for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14 This case requires us to interpret the expungement 

statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015, and its application to undisputed 

facts. Statutory interpretation and its application are questions

of law we review "independently, while benefiting from the 

decisions by the court of appeals and circuit court." State v. 

Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, ¶18, 394 Wis. 2d 703, 951 N.W.2d 819 

(quotations and alterations omitted); see also Ozuna, 376 

Wis. 2d 1, ¶9.

III. DISCUSSION

A. "Conditions of Probation" in Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b)

¶15 "The Wisconsin statutes empower a circuit court to order 

certain criminal offenses to be expunged from a person's record, 

if the offender was younger than 25 at the time of the commission 

of the offense." Ozuna, 376 Wis. 2d 1, ¶11. Specifically, Wis. 

Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a) provides:

[W]hen a person is under the age of 25 at the time of 

the commission of an offense for which the person has 

been found guilty in a court for violation of a law for 

which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 years or 

less, the court may order at the time of sentencing that 

the record be expunged upon successful completion of the 
No. 2019AP1272-CR

8

sentence if the court determines the person will benefit 

and society will not be harmed by this disposition.

(Emphasis added.) "Under the statutory scheme, the determination 

of a defendant's eligibility for expungement must be made at the 

time of sentencing." Ozuna, 376 Wis. 2d 1, ¶11 (citing State v. 

Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶45, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811).

¶16 "If the circuit court determines that the defendant is 

eligible for expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a), 'the 

plain language of the statute indicates that once the defendant 

successfully completes his sentence, he has earned, and is 

automatically entitled to, expungement.'" Id., ¶12 (quoting State 

v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶23, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811). As 

particularly relevant to this case, a defendant must

"successful[ly] complet[e] . . . [his] sentence" before receiving 

expungement, as mandated by subsection (a). § 973.015(1m)(a). 

Subsection (b) provides three criteria for a defendant's 

"successful completion of [his] sentence": "[1] [t]he person has 

not been convicted of a subsequent offense, and if on probation, 

[2] the probation has not been revoked[,] and [3] the probationer 

has satisfied the conditions of probation." § 973.015(1m)(b). 

"[T]he probationer must meet all three of the statutory criteria" 

in order to be entitled to expungement. Ozuna, 376 Wis. 2d 1, 

¶13.

¶17 There is no dispute that Lickes satisfied the first two 

criteria: he was not convicted of a subsequent offense and his 

probation was not revoked. Instead, Lickes challenges the scope 

of the third criterion under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b): whether 
No. 2019AP1272-CR

9

he "satisfied [his] conditions of probation." Lickes contends 

that the phrase "conditions of probation" does not encompass the 

conditions set by DOC but only those conditions ordered by the 

sentencing court. According to Lickes, he did not need to satisfy 

DOC's conditions of probation in order for the circuit court to 

determine he satisfied the third criterion and then expunge all 

three of his convictions. We disagree. 

¶18 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of 

the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 

stop the inquiry.'" State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 

Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted 

source omitted). In doing so, we give statutory language "its 

common, ordinary, and accepted meaning." Id. In conducting a 

plain meaning analysis, we also examine "the context in which 

[statutory language] is used; not in isolation but as part of a 

whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closelyrelated statutes[.]" Id., ¶46. "Statutes are closely related 

when they are in the same chapter, reference one another, or use 

similar terms." State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶27, 378 

Wis. 2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773. The plain text of Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b) in relation to closely-related statutes resolves

the question presented: under § 973.015(1m)(b), the phrase 

"conditions of probation" refers to the conditions set by both DOC 

and the sentencing court. Accordingly, in addition to the other 

two criteria, defendants must satisfy all conditions of probation 

established by both DOC and the sentencing court before being 

entitled to expungement.
No. 2019AP1272-CR

10

¶19 As a foundational matter, the sentencing court and DOC 

each play a key role in the "imposition of probation," and both

set conditions of probation. As instructed by Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.10(1), "[i]mposition of probation shall have the effect of 

placing the defendant in the custody of the department and shall 

subject the defendant to the control of the department under 

conditions set by the court and rules and regulations established 

by the department[.]" "As a matter of law," therefore, individuals 

are required to "abide . . . with departmental regulations." 

State ex rel. Rodriguez v. DHSS, 133 Wis. 2d 47, 52, 393 N.W.2d 105 

(Ct. App. 1986). In other words, throughout the duration of 

probation, an individual must comply with conditions and 

regulations imposed by both the sentencing court and DOC. As this 

court has stated, "[p]robation agents have the authority to 

establish rules of probation that are supplemental to courtimposed conditions." State v. Purtell, 2014 WI 101, ¶6 n.7, 358 

Wis. 2d 212, 851 N.W.2d 417.

¶20 DOC does, therefore, impose "conditions of probation"

upon individuals. Closely-related statutes confirm this. In 

particular, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(d)4 requires circuit courts to 

determine whether "[t]he probationer has satisfied all rules and 

conditions of probation that were set by the department" before 

modifying or discharging a person from probation.

¶21 Other statutory provisions beyond Wis. Stat. ch. 973 

support the same conclusion. For example, under Wis. Stat. 

§ 301.132(2) DOC may require sex offenders to submit to a "lie 

detector test" as part of DOC's "conditions of probation." In 
No. 2019AP1272-CR

11

relevant part, the statute reads: "The department [of corrections] 

may require submission to a lie detector test under this subsection 

as . . . a condition of a sex offender's probation." 

§ 301.132(2). The same is true for the statute authorizing DOC to 

require convicted sex offenders to use GPS tracking devices as a 

"condition of probation." Specifically, the statute states: 

"If . . . a person is being placed on probation . . . for 

committing a sex offense . . . , the department may have the person 

tracked using a global positioning system tracking device, or 

passive position system tracking, as a condition of the person's 

probation." Wis. Stat. § 301.48(2)(d). Indeed, the statutes 

repeatedly employ the phrase "conditions of probation" to refer to 

conditions set by DOC. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1q)(b) 

("This paragraph does not prohibit the department [of corrections] 

from requiring pharmacological treatment using an antiandrogen or 

the chemical equivalent of an antiandrogen as a condition of 

probation.").

¶22 Recognizing that DOC does have the ability to set 

"conditions of probation," we turn now to the statute before us. 

Under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b), the phrase "conditions of 

probation" plainly refers to conditions imposed by both DOC and 

the sentencing court.7 Section 973.015(1m)(b) broadly states that, 

in order to be entitled to expungement, a probationer must 

"satisf[y] the conditions of probation." Importantly, the statute 

 

7 As a general matter, the parties do not dispute that 

sentencing courts have the ability to impose "conditions of 

probation."
No. 2019AP1272-CR

12

does not limit the phrase "conditions of probation" in any way, 

much less restrict it to only court-imposed conditions. In 

contrast, Wis. Stat. § 973.01(5) specifies that "the court may 

impose conditions upon the term of extended supervision" when 

imposing a bifurcated sentence. Similarly, Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.09(3)(d)3 states that "[t]he court may modify a person's 

period of probation and discharge the person from probation if," 

among other factors, "[t]he probationer has satisfied all 

conditions of probation that were set by the sentencing court."

¶23 In comparison, Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) contains no 

such modification; it refers broadly to "conditions of probation." 

Had the legislature wanted to limit the phrase solely to those 

conditions set by the sentencing court and thereby exclude 

conditions set by DOC, it could have done so, as it did elsewhere. 

See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2019 WI 24,

¶29, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 153 (stating that when the 

legislature uses different statutory phrases, we presume the 

legislature gave the phrases different meanings); Outagamie Cnty. 

v. Town of Greenville, 2000 WI App 65, ¶9, 233 Wis. 2d 566, 608 

N.W.2d 414 ("[I]f a statute contains a given provision, the 

omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a 

related subject is significant in showing" a different meaning) 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). 

¶24 But courts may not add to the text. It is a fundamental 

maxim of statutory interpretation that we do not "read into [a] 

statute language that the legislature did not put in." Matasek, 

353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶20 (quoted source omitted); see also Fond du Lac 
No. 2019AP1272-CR

13

Cnty. v. Town of Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 

(Ct. App. 1989) ("One of the maxims of statutory construction is 

that courts should not add words to a statute to give it a certain 

meaning.") (citation omitted). "Under the omitted-case canon of 

statutory interpretation, '[n]othing is to be added to what the 

text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso 

habendus est).'" State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 

WI 58, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 N.W.2d 480 (quoting Antonin Scalia 

& Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 

Texts 93 (2012)). Given that the legislature did not limit the 

phrase "conditions of probation" solely to court-imposed 

conditions or DOC-imposed conditions, we conclude that Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b) applies to conditions set by both the sentencing 

court and DOC. Courts may not "elaborate unprovided-for exceptions 

to a text." Scalia & Garner, supra, at 93.

¶25 This interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) is 

confirmed by a closely-related statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2), in 

which the legislature likewise employed the phrase "conditions of 

probation." Section 973.10(2) pertains to probation revocation 

proceedings and reads, in relevant part: "If a probationer 

violates the conditions of probation, the department of 

corrections may initiate a proceeding before the division of 

hearings and appeals in the department of administration." 

§ 973.10(2). In interpreting this language, Wisconsin courts have 

never held that DOC's statutory right to initiate revocation 

proceedings is solely limited to an individual's violations of the 

sentencing court's conditions. To the contrary, "[a] 
No. 2019AP1272-CR

14

probationer . . . is within the custody of the DOC and similarly 

subject to all of the conditions and rules of supervision, the 

violation of which could be cause for revocation." State ex rel. 

Rupinski v. Smith, 2007 WI App 4, ¶20, 297 Wis. 2d 749, 728 

N.W.2d 1 (emphasis added).

¶26 Within the context of Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2), the term 

"conditions of probation" is decidedly broad, encompassing more 

than just conditions set by the sentencing court. "When the same 

term is used throughout a chapter of the statutes, it is a 

reasonable deduction that . . . the term possess[es] an identical 

meaning each time it appears." Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting 

Co., 2018 WI 60, ¶29, 381 Wis. 2d 732, 914 N.W.2d 631 (quoted 

source omitted). Because the phrase "conditions of probation" in 

§ 973.10(2) encompasses more than just conditions set by the 
No. 2019AP1272-CR

15

sentencing court, this phrase retains an equally expansive meaning 

in Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).8

¶27 In short, DOC may impose conditions of probation upon 

individuals in addition to the conditions imposed by the sentencing 

court. Unlike closely-related statutes, Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b) does not limit "conditions of probation" to only 

those ordered by the circuit court. Accordingly, individuals must 

satisfy conditions of probation imposed by both DOC and the 

sentencing court in order for their records to be expunged under 

§ 973.015(1m)(b).

B. Discretion Under Wis. Stat. § 973.015

¶28 Lickes next argues that, even if the phrase "conditions 

of probation" in Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) includes conditions 

set by both DOC and the sentencing court, circuit courts 

nonetheless have discretion to determine that an individual 

 

8 Although not controlling our analysis, administrative rules 

promulgated under Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2) confirm our reading of 

the phrase "conditions of probation." In particular, to effectuate 

the language in § 973.10(2), the Department of Administration's 

Division of Hearings and Appeals ("the Division") enacted rules 

pertaining to the "procedure and practice for correction 

hearings." In relevant part, the Division requires that, before 

any final revocation hearing of probation, a probationer receive 

notice of "[t]he conduct that the [probationer] is alleged to have 

committed and the rule or condition that the offender is alleged 

to have violated." Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(1)(b). The rules 

define "conditions" as any "specific regulations imposed on the 

[probationer] by the court or department [of corrections]." Wis. 

Admin. Code § HA 2.02(4) (emphasis added). In practice, when DOC 

initiates revocation proceedings before the Division pursuant to 

§ 973.10(2), it can petition to revoke an individual's probation 

for violating conditions set by either the sentencing court or by 

DOC.
No. 2019AP1272-CR

16

"satisfied [his] conditions of probation" even when an individual 

has violated one or more "conditions of probation." We disagree.

¶29 In order to "satisf[y] the conditions of probation," an 

individual must satisfy all the conditions of probation

established by both the sentencing court and DOC. As we already 

explained in Ozuna, in order to successfully complete the sentence, 

"the probationer must meet all three of the statutory criteria, 

including satisfying all the conditions of probation." Ozuna, 376 

Wis. 2d 1, ¶13; see also Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶22 (noting that 

a defendant must meet "all the conditions of probation"). As Wis. 

Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a) plainly states, an individual's record of 

conviction may be expunged only "upon successful completion of the 

sentence," which requires fully satisfying all three criteria for 

expungement under subsection (b). Therefore, if a probationer 

does not satisfy all the conditions of probation established by

both the sentencing court and DOC, he is not entitled to

expungement of his convictions.

¶30 Accordingly, when an individual fails to fulfill all the 

conditions of his probation set by the sentencing court and DOC, 

circuit courts do not have discretion to conclude that he 

"satisfied [his] conditions of probation" for purposes of the third 

criterion under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b). It is well 

established that § 973.015(1m) affords circuit courts the 

discretion to decide whether an individual is entitled to 

expungement only at the time of sentencing. Matasek, 353 

Wis. 2d 601, ¶6 ("[I]f a circuit court is going to exercise its 

discretion to expunge a record, the discretion must be exercised 
No. 2019AP1272-CR

17

at the time of the sentencing proceeding."); see also State v. 

Arberry, 2018 WI 7, ¶21, 379 Wis. 2d 254, 905 N.W.2d 832 ("[T]he 

sentencing hearing . . . [is] the only time at which the circuit 

court could exercise its discretion to expunge a record under the 

statute, if it [is] going to do so[.]"). Section 973.015(1m) 

contains no language permitting circuit courts to exercise 

discretion at any other time. Once the individual completes his 

term of probation, the question for the circuit court becomes 

whether, based upon undisputed facts,9 the individual satisfied 

the three criteria for expungement set forth in § 973.015(1m)(b). 

See § 973.015(1m)(a) ("[T]he court may order at the time of 

sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion 

of the sentence[.]"). This is an objective inquiry: based upon 

undisputed facts, either the individual satisfied all three 

criteria of expungement, including every one of his conditions of 

probation, or he did not——a question of law that appellate courts 

review de novo. See Ozuna, 376 Wis. 2d 1, ¶9. Therefore, once an

individual completes his term of probation, if it is undisputed 

that the individual violated at least one of his conditions of 

probation——as in this very case——circuit courts must deny 

expungement.

 

9 As the parties agree, the circuit court may first need to 

conduct factfinding to determine whether an individual violated a 

condition of probation. See State v. Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, ¶14 n.9, 

376 Wis. 2d 1, 898 N.W.2d 20. Appellate courts review a circuit 

court's findings of fact under a "clearly erroneous" standard. 

Phelps v. Physicians, Inc. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 

Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615.
No. 2019AP1272-CR

18

C. Application to Lickes's Case

¶31 Applying these principles, we conclude the circuit court 

erred in expunging all three of Lickes's convictions. For Counts 

1 and 3, the sentencing court imposed two years of probation, which 

expired on January 23, 2016; for Count 4, the sentencing court 

imposed three years of probation, which expired on January 23, 

2017. As the sentencing court informed Lickes at the time of 

sentencing, if he "successfully complete[d] probation and all the 

terms," the circuit court would expunge Lickes's convictions on 

Counts 1, 3, and 4, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m).

¶32 Because Lickes violated DOC-imposed conditions, he 

failed to satisfy his "conditions of probation" for all three 

convictions, pursuant to the third criterion under Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b). As Lickes's probation agent notified the 

circuit court on October 6, 2015, "Mr. Lickes has violated his 

probation multiple times." In particular, the document submitted 

by the probation agent disclosed that "Mr. Lickes has had 

unapproved sexual contact, has given his agent false information, 

and has been terminated from Sex Offender Treatment." Lickes also 

signed the document, acknowledging that he "admit[s] as shown by 

[his] signature . . . that [he] violated the rules and conditions 

of probation." (Emphasis added.) Lickes's violation of his DOCimposed conditions occurred before his terms of probation expired 

for all three convictions.

¶33 Because Lickes admittedly violated his DOC-imposed 

conditions, he failed to "successful[ly] complet[e] . . . [his] 
No. 2019AP1272-CR

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sentence," as required by Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a).10 The 

circuit court did not have discretion to determine otherwise. As 

the circuit court recognized, "Mr. Lickes did break a rule" imposed 

by DOC. Consequently, the circuit court erred in granting Lickes's 

expungement for all three convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the 

decision of the court of appeals.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

affirmed.

 

10 The circuit court also determined that Lickes satisfied the 

sentencing court's conditions of probation, despite the State's 

contention that Lickes did not satisfy the sentencing court's sexoffender treatment requirement. According to Lickes, the circuit 

court did not err when it found that Lickes satisfied the courtordered conditions of probation. We need not resolve this 

question. As discussed, Lickes violated DOC's conditions of 

probation for all three convictions; therefore, regardless of 

whether Lickes violated the sentencing court's conditions of 

probation, he is still not entitled to expungement under Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015. See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, 

¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("Issues that are not 

dispositive need not be addressed.").
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

1

¶34 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). When a person is 

placed on probation by a court, that person is subject to a vast 

array of rules. Imposed both by the sentencing court and a 

Department of Corrections (DOC) agent, these rules set rigid 

contours for a person's life for the duration of the supervision 

period. They can include everything from the extraordinary to the 

mundane.

¶35 Indeed, the DOC's standard rules of community 

supervision require that a person meet regularly with the probation 

agent and obtain approval from the agent prior to moving; changing 

employment; leaving the state of Wisconsin; purchasing, trading, 

selling, or operating a motor vehicle; borrowing money; or buying 

anything on credit.1 The standard rules also broadly require that 

a person "[c]omply with any court ordered conditions and/or any 

additional rules established by [their] agent" that are subject to 

change at any time.2

¶36 Although the conditions of probation may be extensive, 

for many young people convicted of offenses there can be a 

significant reward for complying: expungement.3 The desire to 

insulate young offenders from the harsh consequences of a criminal 

 

1 Wis. Dep't of Corrections, Standard Rules of Community 

Supervision, 

https://doc.wi.gov/Pages/AboutDOC/CommunityCorrections/Supervisi

onRules.aspx (last visited June 9, 2021).

2 Id.

3 Following the majority opinion, I use the term 

"expungement." Other cases use the term "expunction," but the two 

terms mean the same thing. State v. Arberry, 2018 WI 7, ¶1 n.2, 

379 Wis. 2d 254, 905 N.W.2d 832.
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

2

record is both sensible and practical. In addition to the legal 

and financial penalties associated with the conviction itself, a 

criminal conviction carries significant collateral consequences. 

¶37 Such consequences often include increased difficulties 

in obtaining employment, housing, and education.4 The aggregate 

effect of these collateral consequences is that absent mechanisms 

for reducing the impact on young people, a criminal record can 

leave cascading negative ramifications. Importantly, the lack of 

access to employment is a primary factor leading to recidivism.5 

¶38 Yet the majority opinion places expungement further out 

of reach for those defendants who would benefit most. Although I 

agree with the majority that expungement requires satisfaction of 

conditions imposed by both the sentencing court and DOC, I part 

ways with the majority when it determines that the circuit court 

has no discretion to order expungement in the face of any rule 

violation, no matter how small. 

¶39 Does the majority's determination mean that if, without 

agent approval, probationers from the border community of 

Marinette, Wisconsin cross to Menominee, Michigan to do grocery 

shopping, that they must be denied expungement? The majority 

apparently responds, "Yes. Under the standard rules of probation, 

it is a violation."

 

4 See Larry J. Martin, Now the Real Work Begins, 94 Wis. Law. 

9, 9 (Jan. 2021) ("A criminal record can be a life-long barrier, 

presenting obstacles to employment, housing, education, and family 

reunification and often resulting in significant debt."). 

5 Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a 

Job, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 617, 647 (2005).
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

3

¶40 How about the standard rule of buying nothing on credit? 

What happens if the probationer, without agent approval, pays for 

gas with a credit card? "It's out of our hands," responds the 

majority. The same apparently holds true if the probationer misses 

a single meeting with the probation agent.

¶41 Admittedly, the violations here are more significant 

than the above examples, but that matters not. The majority 

interprets "satisfaction" as an all-or-nothing proposition. Thus, 

in the majority's view, regardless of the severity of the 

violation, the circuit court has no discretion at all in deciding 

whether to grant or deny expungement. Majority op., ¶30.

¶42 With a mere three paragraphs of analysis on the issue, 

see id., ¶¶28-30, the majority jettisons the future lives of 

countless young offenders and their families, who will be harmed 

by this stunted analysis. And why? The answer of the majority is 

"the legislature made us do this."

¶43 Nonsense. The legislature did no such thing. The plain 

text of Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) requires that a probationer 

"satisfy" the conditions of probation. Here, both the DOC and the 

circuit court, entities in the best position to make such a 

finding, determined that Jordan Lickes did so.

¶44 Rather than embracing those determinations, the majority 

instead embarks upon a misguided and destructive path. Its 

conclusory determination runs counter to the statutory language, 

has no basis in the case law the majority cites, and thwarts the 

purpose of the expungement statute.

¶45 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

4

I 

¶46 The legislature has been engaged in a consistent "effort 

to expand the availability of expungement to include a broader 

category of youthful offenders." State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶20, 

359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811. This legislative effort "offers 

young offenders a fresh start without the burden of a criminal 

record and a second chance at becoming law-abiding and productive 

members of the community." Id., ¶19. Today's majority opinion 

subverts the legislative trajectory. 

¶47 I begin by examining the framework for the exercise of 

judicial discretion enacted by the legislature. This framework 

provides "a means by which trial courts may, in appropriate cases, 

shield youthful offenders from some of the harsh consequences of 

criminal convictions." State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶42, 353 

Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811 (quoting State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, 

¶38, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341).

¶48 At the sentencing hearing, if certain criteria are 

fulfilled a circuit court may make the determination that a 

defendant will be eligible for expungement upon completion of the 

sentence. Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶45. Wisconsin Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(a)1. sets forth four criteria governing when a 

circuit court may deem a defendant eligible for expungement upon 

completion of the sentence: (1) the person must have been under 

25 when the offense was committed; (2) the maximum period of 

imprisonment for the offense must be six years or less; (3) the 

court must determine that the probationer will benefit and society 
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

5

will not be harmed by the disposition; and (4) the person must 

successfully complete the sentence. § 973.015(1m)(a)1. 

¶49 If defendants are made eligible for expungement by the 

circuit court, they must fulfill the conditions set forth in Wis. 

Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) to actually have their conviction expunged: 

(1) the person must not be convicted of a subsequent offense; (2) 

if the person is on probation, it must not be revoked; and (3) the 

person must "satisf[y] the conditions of probation." It is the 

"satisfaction" condition that is at issue in this case.

¶50 With this framework as a foundation, the majority 

proceeds to rigidly interpret "satisfaction" in an all-or-nothing 

fashion. In the majority's view the circuit court has no 

discretion at all in deciding whether to grant or deny expungement. 

Majority op., ¶30. One would expect a determination of such reach 

to be supported with more than the majority's cursory analysis. 

And it is an analysis that runs counter to the statutory language, 

has no basis in the case law the majority cites, and thwarts the 

purpose of the expungement statute. I address each in turn. 

II

¶51 The plain language of the expungement statute does not 

support the majority's conclusion. Wisconsin Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b) sets as a prerequisite for expungement that the 

person must "satisf[y] the conditions of probation."

¶52 I observe initially that the statute uses the word 

"satisfy." Nowhere does it mention a "violation" of a rule as 

preclusive of receiving expungement. If the legislature had wanted 
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

6

to require perfect compliance with "all" or "every" condition of 

probation, it certainly could have, but it did not.

¶53 "Satisfy" is ambiguous in the context of Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015. A recognized dictionary defines the term as follows: 

"[t]o meet or be sufficient for (a requirement)." Satisfy, The 

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 

https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=satisfy (last 

visited June 9, 2021) (emphasis added).

¶54 In deciding which definition to apply, we are guided by 

the principle that "a plain-meaning interpretation cannot 

contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory 

purpose." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 

2004 WI 58, ¶49, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. Indeed, "courts 

will favor an interpretation of statutory language that fulfills 

the statute's purpose." Wis. Indus. Energy Grp., Inc. v. Pub. 

Serv. Comm'n, 2012 WI 89, ¶15, 342 Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240.

¶55 The definition that makes the most sense is that which 

permits expungement when an offender has "sufficiently" complied 

with the terms of probation. Such a definition is clearly more 

consistent with the purpose of the expungement statute and the 

legislature's continuing quest to broaden its application. See

Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶20; see also State v. Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 

¶62, 376 Wis. 2d 1, 898 N.W.2d 20 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 

dissenting) (explaining that a definition of "satisfy" based on 

sufficiency "is more consistent with the purpose of the statute 

than using a definition that would limit expunction to offenders 

with . . . 'perfect' compliance"). In other words, by setting 
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

7

forth a "satisfaction" standard, the expungement statute eschews 

the "perfection" standard advanced by the majority.

¶56 In determining what is "sufficient" to comply with the 

terms of probation, the circuit court must use discretion. It 

must determine whether a person did enough to "satisfy" the 

conditions of probation. Such an exercise necessarily requires 

examining the relevant facts, applying a standard of law, and using 

a demonstrated rational process, i.e., the exercise of discretion. 

See State v. Walters, 2004 WI 18, ¶¶13-14, 269 Wis. 2d 142, 675 

N.W.2d 778. 

¶57 The majority's interpretation also violates the maxim 

that we are to avoid interpreting statutes to render absurd or 

unreasonable results. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. Indeed, the 

logical consequence of the majority's analysis and institution of 

a "perfection" standard coupled with its conclusion regarding a 

circuit court's lack of discretion is that a circuit court is 

required to deny expungement if a person violates any condition of 

probation, no matter how small. 

¶58 Looking at the DOC's standard conditions, the absurdity 

of such a proposition is revealed. Miss a single meeting with 

your agent? No expungement. Use a credit card without prior 

approval? No expungement. It is certainly unreasonable to 

condition one's future prospects of employment, housing, and 

education on a single missed meeting or use of a credit card to 

pay for gas.
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

8

III

¶59 The majority's conclusion is also out of step with the 

very case law on which it relies. For example, the majority relies 

on Ozuna to support a discretionless scheme and the proposition 

that satisfaction of conditions of probation means completion of 

all conditions with no slip-ups. Majority op., ¶29. But the Ozuna

court held no such thing.

¶60 Rather, in Ozuna the court consistently used language 

indicative of discretion, determining that "a court has no duty to 

expunge a probationer's record if the probationer has not satisfied 

the conditions of probation." Ozuna, 376 Wis. 2d 1, ¶14 (emphasis 

added). It even entitled one of the section headings in its 

opinion, "The Court May Deny Expungement if a Probationer Does Not 

Satisfy the Conditions of Probation." Id. (emphasis added). Ozuna

thus does not compel the majority's result.

¶61 The majority's citation to Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶22, 

is similarly unavailing. See majority op., ¶29. In the cited 

paragraph, the Hemp court simply set forth that a probationer must 

satisfy all the conditions of probation to receive expungement. 

Even accepting the court's addition of the word "all" where it 

does not appear in the statutory language, the Hemp court did not 

analyze the term "satisfy" or give any insight whatsoever into its 

meaning.

IV

¶62 Finally, bestowing the circuit court with discretion to 

make the determination of whether conditions of probation have 

been satisfied is consistent with the purpose of the expungement 
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

9

statute. The intent of the expungement statute is "to provide a 

break to young offenders who demonstrate the ability to comply 

with the law." Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶38. Expungement is a 

powerful tool to improve people's lives and open opportunities 

that would otherwise be closed. This court has previously noted 

the arc of legislation meant to "expand the availability of 

expungement to include a broader category of youthful offenders." 

Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶20.

¶63 Yet through its destructive holding, the majority 

forever shuts the door on countless young people who would benefit 

from the fresh start expungement offers. And for what? To teach 

them a lesson that they shouldn't miss a meeting? Such a minimal 

violation surely has nothing to say about a person's risk to 

society.

¶64 Moreover, the majority's determination could have longlasting consequences on the lives of those who commit crimes at a 

young age. Research consistently demonstrates that the brains of 

adolescents are not fully developed, and that as a result they are 

prone to risky behavior. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 

(2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-72 (2012). The 

majority ensures that expungement will remain out of reach for 
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

10

many of these people and that they will be held back as they 

attempt to change their lives for the better.6

¶65 As to the specific facts of the instant case, the circuit 

court determined that Lickes satisfied the conditions of his 

probation. DOC apparently agreed when it submitted the 

"Certification of Discharge and Satisfaction of Probation 

Conditions for Expungement."7 These are the entities that imposed 

conditions on Lickes in the first place, so they are in the best 

position to determine whether the conditions have been satisfied 

and whether Lickes and the public would be well served by 

expungement. 

 

6 The majority accuses this dissent of basing its conclusions 

on policy rather than the law. Majority op., ¶3 n.4. As should 

be clear by now, this criticism is misguided. The "consequences" 

the majority asks us to ignore are part and parcel of a statutory 

analysis, as confirmed by the very case law upon which the majority 

relies. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 

2004 WI 58, ¶¶46, 49, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (explaining 

that we are to interpret statutes to "avoid absurd or unreasonable 

results" and that "a plain-meaning interpretation cannot 

contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory 

purpose").

Further, the majority admonishes that this court is "limited 

to saying what the law is and not what we may wish it to be." 

Majority op., ¶3 n.4. This may be a snappy phrase, but it is only 

half true. To the extent that the majority means it is not the 

role of this court to say what the law should be, such an admonition 

ignores a fundamental role of courts——the development of the common 

law. Courts for centuries have been declaring just what the law 

should be. To reduce the court's role to only "saying what the 

law is," and not what the law should be, constitutes a vast and 

misleading oversimplification.

7 It should also be observed that DOC did not think Lickes's 

violations serious enough to warrant revocation of his probation.
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

2

¶66 It was the circuit court that placed on Lickes the 

condition that he "enter into, participate [in], and successfully 

complete sex offender treatment." Majority op., ¶6. And it was 

the circuit court that "examined the relevant facts, applied a 

proper standard of law, used a demonstrated rational process, and 

reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach" to 

conclude that he had done so. See Walters, 269 Wis. 2d 142, ¶¶13-

14. I thus determine that the circuit court did not erroneously 

exercise its discretion in expunging Lickes's convictions.

¶67 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

¶68 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 

DALLET joins this dissent.
No. 2019AP1272-CR.awb

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