This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that th is electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. A-1-CA-36321 4 CLARISSA LONG, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Alisa Hart, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 12 Santa Fe, NM 13 Josephine H. Ford, Assistant Public Defender 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 VANZI, Chief Judge. 18
{1} Defendant Clarissa Long appeals from th e district court’s affirmance of her 19 conviction after a jury trial in metropolitan court for harassment. This Court issued a 202 calendar notice proposing to adopt the distri ct court’s memorandum and, to the extent 1 Defendant raised new issues in this Court, specifically that the language of NMSA 2 1978, Section 30-3A-2 (1997) is unconstituti onally vague, proposed to affirm due to 3 the failure to raise the issue in the district court. Defendant filed a memorandum in 4 opposition, following which this Court issueda second calendar notice still relying on 5 the district court’s memorandum opinion with respect to Defendant’s challenge to the 6 sufficiency of the evidence, but addre ssing Defendant’s void-for-vagueness argument 7 and proposing to affirm. Defendant has now filed a second memorandum in 8 opposition. Having given due consideration to Defendant’s second memorandum in 9 opposition, we affirm. 10
{2} Defendant maintains that the statute wa s unconstitutionally vague and that there 11 was insufficient evidence to support that De fendant either inte nded for her conduct to 12 annoy or harass or that her conduct created substantial emotional distress. Defendant’s 13 arguments remain largely the same, and to that extent we rely on the reasoning found 14 in the district court’s memorandum opinion and this Court’s second notice of 15 proposed disposition. To the extent Defendant continues to maintain that “the 16 language of the statute is insufficient to warn individuals when it is unlawful to insist 17 on speaking with a former boyfriend” and that “[t]he genera l public could not be 18 expected to understand what was wrong withwanting to speak with someone when 193 the specific intent is not to harm the a lleged victim, but to persuade him to accept 1 responsibility[,]” [MIO 4] we are not persua ded. Rather, we belie ve the general public 2 would understand that following a person around a grocery store loudly saying 3 degrading things; following a person to his car and not allowing him to get in; 4 banging, hitting, and kicking the vehicle; jump ing in front of the car as the person tries 5 to leave; showing up at the person’s home and hitting and kicking doors and windows 6 when the person will not speak to you; and engaging in this conduct regularly, 7 resulting in multiple reports to the police, does not fall within the ambit of “the right 8 to communicate to another in a reasonable manner.” State v. Stephens , 1991-NMCA9 019, ¶ 12, 111 N.M. 543, 807 P.2d 241. Thus, we conclude that Defendant should 10 have been aware from the language of th e statute that her conduct was unlawful. 11
{3} Accordingly, we affirm. 12

{4} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 15 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 16 WE CONCUR: 17

18 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 194 1 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 2