An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-769

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 31 December 2014

MILDRED WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. Mecklenburg County

No. 10 CVS 9849

SHONDU LAMAR LYNCH, TYISHA 

STAFFORD, THOMAS C. RUFF, JR. 

d/b/a THOMAS C. RUFF, JR. & 

ASSOCIATES, and FIRST CITIZENS 

BANK & TRUST COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal by Plaintiff from judgment entered 28 October 2013 

and orders entered 30 December 2013 by Judge Eric L. Levinson in 

Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of 

Appeals 8 December 2014.

Tin, Fulton, Walker & Owen, PLLC, by John W. Gresham; and 

Vann Law Firm, P.A., by Christopher M. Vann, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Poyner Spruill LLP, by Cynthia L. Van Horne and E. 

Fitzgerald Parnell, III, for Defendant-Appellee Thomas C. 

Ruff, Jr. d/b/a Thomas C. Ruff, Jr. & Associates, 

Defendant-Appellee.

McGEE, Chief Judge.
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Mildred Williams (“Plaintiff”) was living in Florida in 

February 2004 when Shondu Lamar Lynch (“Lynch”) contacted her 

concerning real property Plaintiff owned in Charlotte at 300 

Wednesbury Boulevard (“the property”). Lynch represented 

himself as a realtor, and he convinced Plaintiff to allow him to 

place the property on the market for sale and to act as her 

agent. Plaintiff signed a general power of attorney on 4 

February 2004, whereby Plaintiff gave Lynch authority to “act in 

[her] name, place and stead in any way which [she] [herself]

could do, if [she] were personally present, with respect to” 

real estate transactions, “to the extent that [she] [was]

permitted by law to act through an agent[.]” This general power 

of attorney was signed and notarized, and the blank space in the 

box next to the section granting Lynch powers to conduct real 

estate transactions for Plaintiff was initialed by Plaintiff. 

In a blank space following a section labeled “Other Terms[,]” 

the following wording was handwritten: “Further in regards to 

the real estate property located at 300 Wednesbury Blvd, I 

Mildred William[s] give full authority to Shondu Lynch 

aforemention [sic] property and receive[d] monitery [sic] 

proceeds should be made payable to Shondu Lynch.” The blank 

space labeled “Other Terms” did not have a box for initialing, 

and Williams did not initial that space. There was a section 
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labeled “Durable Provision:” with a blank space in a block to 

the left that could be initialed to make this general power of 

attorney durable, but the block space was not initialed.

An offer to purchase was made on the property, and Thomas 

C. Ruff, Jr. (“Defendant”) was retained as the closing attorney. 

Defendant testified that when reading the general power of 

attorney he “noticed that the section . . . provided for 

durability . . . wasn’t initialed, so [he] felt that would be 

more appropriate that it be and, as a result of that conclusion, 

prepared and had sent to” Plaintiff a limited power of attorney

with a durability provision. This limited power of attorney, 

notarized 7 April 2004, stated in relevant part:

I, [Plaintiff], pursuant to the provisions 

of the N.C. General Statutes [§] 32A-1 et 

seq., do hereby appoint SHONDU LYNCH, as my 

true and lawful attorney-in-fact, which 

appointment shall continue in effect 

notwithstanding any incapacity or mental 

incompetence of mine which occurs after the 

date of execution and acknowledgment hereof;

AND I do empower the said SHONDU LYNCH, as 

my attorney-in-fact to act for me and in my 

name, place, and stead to sign any documents 

and otherwise deal with any and all real 

property or any interest in any of the same 

which I may now or hereafter own, and 

especially to execute all necessary 

documents in order to convey good and 

marketable title to such property, and to do 

any act or thing and enter into any such 

transaction as he may see fit and in his 

discretion find to be for my best interest 

to facilitate such sale; and I do further 
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empower my said attorney-in-fact with full 

power and authority to do any and every act 

for me, and in my name, that I could do 

personally present and under no disability 

relating to such sale.

This limited power of attorney was specifically limited to 

Plaintiff’s property at 300 Wednesbury Boulevard. Plaintiff 

signed this limited power of attorney and her signature was 

notarized on 7 April 2004. There are three documents relevant 

to this appeal — the general power of attorney, the limited 

power of attorney, and a third document that was notarized on 7 

April 2004 by the same notary who notarized the limited power of 

attorney and was given to Defendant prior to closing. This 

third document (“the unsigned authorization”) stated: “I, 

Mildred Mercedes Williams give authorization to Attorney Tom 

Ruff, Charlotte, NC, to make proceeds from closing payable to 

Shondu Lynch for the property located at 300 Wednesbury Blvd. 

Charlotte, NC 28269.” The document was typed except for the 

names “Mildred Mercedes Williams,” and “Shondu Lynch,” which 

were handwritten in underlined blank spaces. The unsigned 

authorization was not signed by Plaintiff or anyone else other 

than the notary who had notarized it. 

The sale of the property proceeded, and a check for the net 

proceeds of $135,597.03 was drawn on Defendant’s trust account 

and made payable to “Mildred Williams” at the 8 April 2004 
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closing. This check was delivered to Lynch, who took the check 

to First Citizens Bank ("First Citizens") and attempted to 

negotiate the check. First Citizens refused to negotiate the 

check in the manner requested by Lynch. At the request of First 

Citizens and Lynch, Defendant had one of his employees modify 

the check so that the payee line read: “Shondu Lynch for Mildred 

Williams.”

Lynch was able to negotiate the check at First Citizens

after the alteration. Plaintiff apparently was unaware the 

closing had occurred until her mortgage company sent her a 

letter informing her the mortgage on the property had been paid

in full. Plaintiff received none of the proceeds of the sale 

from Lynch, and she filed this action against Lynch, Defendant, 

and others. A default judgment was entered on 13 February 2012 

against Lynch for $135,597.03, the full amount of the check.

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her first complaint without 

prejudice as to Defendant on 5 May 2009. Plaintiff filed a new 

complaint ("second complaint") on 5 May 2010. The second

complaint alleged essentially the same facts as Plaintiff's

first complaint, and alleged claims against Defendant for breach 

of contract, conversion, and “Professional Malpractice.” 

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the claims 

against him in the second complaint were barred by the statute 
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of limitations. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss on 26 August 2010. Williams v. Lynch, __ N.C. App. __, 

__, 741 S.E.2d 373, 375 (2013) (“Williams I”). 

This Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s “professional malpractice,” or professional 

negligence, claim against Defendant and remanded for trial on 

that claim. Id. at __, 741 S.E.2d at 377. Plaintiff’s claim of 

professional negligence against Defendant was tried on 14 

October 2013. Plaintiff's motion for directed verdict at the 

close of the evidence was denied. The jury determined that 

Plaintiff had not been “damaged by the professional negligence 

of Defendant[.]” The trial court entered judgment on 28 October 

2013, ordering that Plaintiff recover nothing from Defendant, 

and that all claims against Defendant be dismissed. Plaintiff 

filed a Rule 50(b)(1) motion on 8 November 2013, requesting 

“that the verdict and judgment be set aside and judgment entered 

in her favor[,]” or, in the alternative, that she be granted a 

new trial. Plaintiff’s motion was denied by order entered 30 

December 2013. Plaintiff appeals.

I.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred “by not 

allowing the introduction of or the cross-examination of 
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Defendant’s expert witness with 2003 Formal Ethics Opinion 7.” 

We disagree.

Formal Ethics Opinion 7 states: “Opinion rules that a 

lawyer may not prepare a power of attorney for the benefit of 

the principal at the request of another individual or thirdparty payer without consulting with, exercising independent 

professional judgment on behalf of, and obtaining consent from 

the principal.” 2003 Formal Ethics Opinion 7. 

Defendant made a motion in limine to prevent Plaintiff from 

using Formal Ethics Opinion 7 as a basis for establishing

Defendant’s alleged professional negligence. The trial court 

heard Defendant's motion on the first day of trial. Plaintiff’s 

attorney argued that Plaintiff was not seeking to admit the 

ethics opinion as part of “the basis for our claim that there 

was malpractice.” Plaintiff argued that the professional 

negligence claim was based upon Defendant “being handed a check 

by [Lynch] saying the bank won’t negotiate it, will you put my 

name on it, [and] at that point had the clear chance to look at 

three documents.” Plaintiff explained the basis for the 

professional negligence claim was Defendant’s reliance on the

general power of attorney, the limited power of attorney, and 

the unsigned authorization, in deciding to present Lynch with a 
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check for the sale proceeds of the property made out to “Shondu 

Lynch for Mildred Williams.”

“‘The judge has a wide discretion to make or refuse to make 

advance rulings. . . .’ McCormick on Evidence, Section 52 (3rd 

ed. 1984). The ground for reversing a court's decision on such 

a motion is an abuse of discretion.” Webster v. Powell, 98 N.C. 

App. 432, 439, 391 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1990) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff makes no argument in her brief that the trial court 

abused its discretion in preventing Plaintiff from crossexamining Defendant’s expert with Formal Ethics Opinion 7, and 

makes no argument concerning how she was prejudiced assuming 

arguendo the trial court did abuse its discretion. Plaintiff 

merely states:

Plaintiff should have been permitted to 

cross-examine the expert with this ethics 

opinion and ask whether the standard of care 

required an attorney to consult with his 

client and obtain her consent before 

preparing a power of attorney. The trial 

court committed error by prohibiting this 

line of inquiry and a new trial is required.

We hold that Plaintiff fails to show the trial court abused

its discretion by granting Defendant’s motion in limine. This 

argument is without merit.

II.

Plaintiff next argues that “the trial court erred by 

denying Plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and judgment 
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notwithstanding the verdict [JNOV] since [Defendant] had no 

legal authority to give the sales proceeds to Shondu Lynch.” We 

disagree.

Our Supreme Court has stated the appropriate standard of 

review for a JNOV:

[A] motion [for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict] is 

essentially a renewal of an earlier 

motion for directed verdict. 

Accordingly, if the motion for directed 

verdict could have been properly 

granted, then the subsequent motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

should also be granted. In considering 

any motion for directed verdict, the 

trial court must view all the evidence 

that supports the non-movant's claim as 

being true and that evidence must be 

considered in the light most favorable 

to the non-movant, giving to the nonmovant the benefit of every reasonable 

inference that may legitimately be 

drawn from the evidence with 

contradictions, conflicts, and 

inconsistencies being resolved in the 

non-movant's favor. This Court has 

also held that a motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict is 

cautiously and sparingly granted. It 

is also elementary that the movant for 

[judgment notwithstanding the verdict] 

must make a motion for directed verdict 

at the close of all the evidence. 

Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 313 

N.C. 362, 368–69, 329 S.E.2d 333, 337–38 

(1985) (internal citations omitted). “On 

appeal our standard of review for a judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict is the same as 

that for a directed verdict; that is, 

whether the evidence was sufficient to go to 
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the jury.” 

Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 192 N.C. 

App. 114, 125, 665 S.E.2d 493, 501 (2008) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s argument on appeal is that the trial court 

erred in denying Plaintiff’s motions because “[n]one of the 

three documents that [Defendant] relied upon gave him the 

authority to put Mr. Lynch’s name on the proceeds check so that 

Mr. Lynch could cash it.”

Both Plaintiff and Defendant presented expert testimony at 

trial. Plaintiff’s expert, attorney Michael K. Elliott

(“Elliott”), stated that he would have been suspicious because 

of the handwritten authorization in the general power of 

attorney and the unsigned authorization purporting to instruct 

Defendant to make the proceeds check payable to Lynch. Elliott

testified: “Definitely before I wrote out a six-figure check, I 

would have talked to [Plaintiff] about this before I did so.” 

Elliott opined that Defendant “breached his duty of care, or 

standard of care, to [Plaintiff] by altering the check to allow 

Mr. Lynch to leave with it.” However, because we are reviewing 

the trial court’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss 

and motion for a JNOV, we cannot consider this testimony, as it 

is favorable to Plaintiff. Id. (“In considering any motion for 

directed verdict . . . contradictions, conflicts, and 
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inconsistencies [in the evidence are] resolved in the nonmovant's favor.”).

Upon cross-examination, Elliott agreed that he had

acknowledged in his deposition “that the matters about which [he 

was] opining [that Defendant should have contacted Plaintiff 

before altering the check] were on points of law that had not 

been settled by the appellate courts of North Carolina,” and 

that “[r]easonable minds could differ as to whether or not what 

[he] opined . . . actually was required by the standard of 

care.” Elliott testified at trial that his opinion had changed 

since his deposition, and that his belief at the time of the 

trial was “competent practice would have required the closing 

attorney to at least contact the principal before drafting 

another power of attorney.” Elliott was asked if he agreed 

“that through th[e] limited power of attorney, that Mr. Lynch 

had the authority to receive and endorse checks for 

[Plaintiff.]” Elliott answered: “That’s what [the limited power 

of attorney] says.” 

Defendant’s expert witness, attorney Ralph McMillan 

(“McMillan”), testified that he believed Defendant's purpose in

drafting the limited power of attorney “was to make it durable, 

because that’s what the title companies like to see in a 

residential transaction to make sure that the title is good.” 
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McMillan opined that the two powers of attorney provided the 

authority required for Lynch to act on Plaintiff’s behalf in the 

manner he did. McMillan further testified that Defendant was 

correct under the law in relying on the two powers of attorney 

in taking “instructions concerning the closing in question from 

Shondu Lynch[,]” and that the two powers of attorney allowed 

Defendant to make the check payable to “Shondu Lynch for Mildred 

Williams.” In fact, McMillan’s opinion was that Defendant was 

compelled to alter the check in response to Lynch’s request. 

Finally, McMillan testified that, in his expert opinion,

Defendant “conformed his conduct to the applicable standard of 

care for Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, lawyers in 2004[.]”

When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 

Defendant, as we are required to do, and not considering

evidence favorable to Plaintiff, we hold the evidence was 

sufficient to submit to the jury on the claim of professional 

negligence, and Plaintiff’s motions for directed verdict and 

JNOV were properly denied. This argument is without merit.

III.

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in 

“instructing the jury that the powers of attorney at issue 

authorized Mr. Lynch to direct [Defendant] to make the sales 
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proceeds check payable to Shondu Lynch for Mildred Williams.” 

We disagree.

The following discussion occurred at the preliminary charge 

conference:

[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Now, I don’t think 

that the court has ruled about the 

obligation to interpret the scope of the 

power of attorney, especially given the 

arguments we have made about them.

THE COURT: I do intend to instruct them. 

There needs to be some modification, some 

language here, because I'm a little worried 

about some of the peremptory implications 

for the jury, possible peremptory

instruction concerning that. But I do 

intend to instruct the jury that the powers 

of attorney standing alone would generally –

would authorize an attorney to engage in 

this real estate transaction and to disburse 

moneys, but go on and say that that does not 

-- in some way I need to fashion a language 

that it does not necessarily -- this does 

not mean that it shields from all possible 

liability those –

[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Disbursements which 

may be negligent.

THE COURT: Right. Go on and describe in 

some way with a sentence or two that here 

the gravamen of the malpractice claim is 

that this later document gave rise or should 

have given rise or that an ordinary lawyer 

or blah, blah, blah, would have taken or 

done – taken some measure or something. I 

don't plan to just stop, because to do so is

[to] suggest to the jury that they should, 

frankly, find –

[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: It sounds like that 

language would be what we could accept. 
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THE COURT: So it is my – I haven’t gone back 

– I didn’t share this peremptory concern I 

have with you before. I’m looking at 

everything in the totality, but . . . it’s 

my current thought that, yes, it’s my 

intention to tell them that those powers of 

attorney would authorize a lawyer, and that 

they were valid, you know, on the four 

corners of that document, however I put it 

in some way, and I’m going to work on the 

language here, but then go on and add a 

sentence, et cetera, that says that this 

case is about this, without telling them 

again what they should do or not do or try 

to give them some language that doesn’t 

infer to them or push them one way or the 

other.

[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Right. A neutral –

THE COURT: All right.

The following day the trial court presented its proposed 

instruction to the parties. In her brief, Plaintiff argues: 

The trial court instructed the jury that 

“both the general power of attorney and the 

limited power of attorney authorize Mr. 

Lynch to direct [Defendant] to make the 

sales proceeds check payable to Shondu Lynch 

for Mildred Williams.” This statement was 

an incorrect statement of the law. There is 

no authority in either the general power of 

attorney or the limited power of attorney 

for [Defendant] to alter the check. . . . . 

The trial court’s instruction misled the

jury and mandates a new trial.

When the trial court asked Plaintiff to state any objection 

to the instructions for the record, Plaintiff stated:

[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, on the 

instructions with regard to the general and 
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limited power are valid, because as we 

signed them, et cetera, that paragraph? As 

we have indicated, we do not believe, with 

the first power of attorney, the general 

power of attorney, that that instruction, we 

believe, is incorrect. I believe the second 

is that that one is clearly more -- that one 

is less, so. With regard to the -- and, 

therefore, that would include the next 

paragraph, because that is where you set out 

that the law allows them to do that.

The trial court’s entire instruction on this matter was as 

follows:

Ladies and gentlemen, as a preliminary 

matter I offer the following two 

instructions or conclusions to you that you 

must accept as true for the purposes of your 

deliberation. First, both the general power 

of attorney and the limited power of 

attorney are valid because [Plaintiff]

signed them. They both appear to be duly 

notarized, and because a power of attorney 

is effective whether or not it has been 

recorded. 

Second, both the general power of attorney 

and the limited power of attorney authorize

Mr. Lynch to direct [Defendant] to make the 

sales proceeds check payable to Shondu Lynch 

for [Plaintiff]. Ladies and gentlemen, 

North Carolina law provides unless, one, a 

lawyer has actual knowledge that her writing 

is not a valid power of attorney, or, two, 

the action taken or to be taken by the 

attorney-in-fact, who in this case was 

Shondu Lynch, is beyond the apparent power 

or authority of, granted in the power–ofattorney writing, a lawyer who in good faith 

relies on a writing that on its face is duly 

signed, acknowledged, and otherwise appears 

reputable and that purports to confer a 

power of attorney, durable or otherwise, 

shall be protected to the full extent of the 
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powers and authority that . . . reasonably 

appear to be granted to the attorney-in-fact 

designated in the power of attorney, and no 

lawyer dealing in good faith with the 

attorney-in-fact shall be held responsible 

for any breach of fiduciary duty by that 

attorney-in-fact, including any breach of 

loyalty, any act of self-dealing, or any 

misapplication of money or other property 

paid or transferred as directed by that 

attorney-in-fact. An attorney is not 

required to inquire as to the effectiveness 

of a power of attorney before he relies on 

it.

Ladies and gentlemen, notwithstanding these 

two instructions or conclusions, which, 

again, you must accept as true for purposes 

of your deliberations, I instruct you that 

these two instructions or conclusions are 

not dispositive of whether, once [the 

unsigned authorization] was presented to 

[Defendant], his failure to contact 

Plaintiff to obtain her approval constituted 

negligence.

Although it is difficult to follow Plaintiff’s objection, 

the apparent stated objection was to the following portion of 

the instruction: “both the general power of attorney and the 

limited power of attorney are valid because Mrs. Williams signed 

them. They both appear to be duly notarized, and because a 

power of attorney is effective whether or not it has been 

recorded.” Further, Plaintiff was apparently only objecting to 

this portion of the instruction as it related to the general 

power of attorney, not the limited power of attorney. Plaintiff 

further stated: “that would include the next paragraph, because 
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that is where you set out that the law allows them to do that.” 

This portion of the objection seems to reference the second 

paragraph, which includes the portion of the instruction 

objected to on appeal: That “both the general power of attorney 

and the limited power of attorney authorize Mr. Lynch to direct 

[Defendant] to make the sales proceeds check payable to Shondu 

Lynch for Mildred Williams.” However, Plaintiff’s objection at 

trial did not specifically address this portion of the 

instruction. 

In similar circumstances, our Supreme Court has held that

[p]ursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2),

[a] party may not assign as error any 

portion of the jury charge or omission 

therefrom unless he objects thereto 

before the jury retires to consider its 

verdict, stating distinctly that to 

which he objects and the grounds of his 

objection; provided, that opportunity 

was given to the party to make the 

objection out of the hearing of the 

jury, and, on request of any party, out 

of the presence of the jury.

In the instant case defendant was given the 

opportunity to object to the wording of the 

instruction on flight and failed to do so. 

Defendant has not alleged, nor do we find, 

plain error. This assignment of error is 

overruled.

State v. Beck, 346 N.C. 750, 759, 487 S.E.2d 751, 757 (1997). 

Because Plaintiff failed to properly and distinctly object to 

the relevant portion of the instruction at trial, and because 
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Plaintiff has not argued plain error, this argument has not been 

preserved for appellate review. This argument is dismissed.

IV.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in 

instructing the jury on insulating negligence. We disagree.

Plaintiff contends that “[t]he negligent conduct of 

[Defendant] was placing Mr. Lynch’s name on the check without 

first communicating with [Plaintiff] or having any instruction 

in the powers of attorney to do so. This negligence was 

completely independent from Mr. Lynch’s conduct in stealing the 

money from Plaintiff.” However, the fact that Defendant’s 

alleged negligent act was completed before Lynch’s illegal act 

is not dispositive. Defendant’s alleged negligent act and the 

Plaintiff’s claim of professional negligence against Defendant 

are not synonymous. Plaintiff was not damaged at the time 

Defendant altered the check, Plaintiff was damaged when Lynch 

withdrew her money and kept it for himself. 

An essential element of [professional 

negligence] is a showing that [the] 

defendant proximately caused [the 

plaintiff’s] damages. Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 

N.C. 338, 355, 329 S.E.2d 355, 366 (1985) 

(professional malpractice claim against 

attorney requires existence of proximate 

cause)[.]

Proximate cause is defined as “a cause which 

in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken 

by any new and independent cause, produced 
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the plaintiff's injuries, and without which 

the injuries would not have occurred[.]”

Self v. Yelton, 201 N.C. App. 653, 659, 688 S.E.2d 34, 38 (2010)

(citations omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, in this case 

Plaintiff had to prove not only that Defendant committed a 

negligent act, but that this negligent act was a proximate cause 

of Plaintiff’s damages. Insulating negligence, if proven, can 

serve to sever that link between a defendant’s negligent act and 

the plaintiff’s damages. Insulating negligence is a method of 

proving that a “new and independent cause” broke the causal link 

between a defendant’s negligent act and the plaintiff’s damages. 

Plaintiff fails to make the appropriate argument on appeal. 

Plaintiff should have argued that no evidence was presented at 

trial that any act of Lynch broke the causal link between 

Defendant’s alleged negligence and Plaintiff’s damages. Because 

Plaintiff failed to do so, this argument is abandoned.1 Beck, 

346 N.C. at 759, 487 S.E.2d at 757. Further, Plaintiff does not 

indicate in her brief that she objected to this instruction at 

trial, nor does she argue that any error in the instruction 

amounted to plain error. Id. This argument is dismissed.

V.

 

1 Plaintiff’s general statement that “[t]here was no evidence in 

the record to support the instruction of insulating negligence” 

does not suffice.
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We do not address Plaintiff’s argument concerning 

contributory negligence because the jury determined that 

Defendant did not commit professional negligence and therefore 

did not reach the issue of contributory negligence. Plaintiff 

concedes in her brief “that if Defendant is the prevailing party 

then he is entitled to costs as provided in the order.” 

Therefore, we do not address her argument related to costs.

No error.

Judges STEELMAN and BELL concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).