Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: APPELLEE PRO SE:

ROBIN R. HALL ROBERT BANKERT

Zionsville, Indiana Zionsville, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ROBIN (BANKERT) HALL, )

)

Appellant - Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) No. 06A01-1304-DR-186

)

ROBERT H. BANKERT, )

)

Appellee - Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE BOONE CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable J. Jeffrey Edens,Judge

Cause No. 06C01-0303-DR-133

April 30, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge
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Robin Bankert Hall appeals from the trial court’s order disposing of then-pending 

issues involving the allocation of extraordinary uninsured medical expenses, tax deductions, 

and the treatment of gratuitous support in post-dissolution proceedings involving Robert H. 

Bankert, Hall’s former husband. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

resolving these issues, we affirm.

The facts pertinent to this appeal reflect that Bankert filed a motion to modify his child 

support obligation for three of his children. Shortly after filing this motion, Bankert was 

notified that the Social Security Administration found he was qualified for Social Security 

Disability benefits. As a result of that determination, Bankert was awarded back benefits 

totaling $13,872.00 on approximately November 1, 2012, with future monthly benefits of 

$2,312.00 commencing in November 2012. On January 8, 2013, Bankert was notified that 

three children from his marriage to Hall were entitled to back benefits and monthly benefits 

due to their father’s disability. On approximately January 14, 2013, each child was awarded 

back benefits totaling $3,782.32, with monthly benefits commencing in February 2013 in the 

amount of $391.00 for each child. 

Hall was employed full time, working 40 hours per week at the hourly rate of $15.00 

for a weekly gross income of $600.00. Hall chose to work fewer hours during the summer 

months and asked the trial court to deviate in its calculation of Hall’s weekly gross income to 

account for that reduction in hours. The trial court, however, declined to do so. The trial 

court imputed to Bankert weekly income in the amount of $804.22 in light of Bankert’s 
3

disability income, and modified Bankert’s weekly support obligation to $152.34 retroactive 

to October 23, 2012, the date Bankert filed his petition to modify support.

The trial court determined that based upon the Indiana Child Support Guidelines and 

the parties’ respective incomes that Hall should be obligated to pay the first $1,141.92 of 

annual uninsured healthcare expenses incurred by the parties’ three children. Once that 

threshold was met, any additional uninsured healthcare expenses incurred by the children 

were to be split pursuant to the parties’ income percentages, with Hall being responsible for 

59% and Bankert being responsible for 41%. 

The trial court also entered findings and conclusions regarding gratuitous support 

received by the children from Bankert. All three children receive monthly Social Security 

benefits of $391.00. Combined, their weekly disability benefits total $270.69. The children 

collectively receive $118.35 each week, and $6,154.32 each year, more than Bankert’s child 

support obligation. Additionally, the children received lump-sum benefits of $11,347.00 

collectively. Bankert asked the trial court to recognize the monthly gratuity by awarding him 

the dependency deduction for tax purposes for all three children, or to increase the threshold 

amount of Hall’s initial responsibility for annual uninsured healthcare expenses incurred by 

the parties’ children in an amount equal to the amount of the gratuity. On the other hand, 

while acknowledging the gratuity, Hall represented to the trial court her intention to place an 

amount equal to the gratuity in a college fund for the children. She wished to do so 

voluntarily, however, without the existence of a court order to that effect and without court 

supervision. Hall maintained that she wished to have the ability to exercise her discretion to 
4

assist the children with purchases, such as a car. The trial court decided not to enter an order 

requiring Hall to place the gratuity into a college fund, but also decided that Bankert should 

receive some credit for the gratuity. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Hall should 

be responsible for the first $7,296.12 of the children’s annual uninsured healthcare expenses. 

Hall was given the option of voluntarily funding an irrevocable trust fund for the benefit of 

each of the children in the amount of the gratuity for the purposes of paying incurred college 

expenses. If Hall chose that option, neither party would be allowed to act as trustee or cotrustee of the trust fund. 

Further, pursuant to a prior order, each of the parties was allowed to claim one of the 

three children for purposes of the dependency deduction with respect to taxes. The 

entitlement to the tax deduction for the third child alternated each year with Hall claiming the 

deduction for that child on even-numbered years, and Bankert claiming the deduction on oddnumbered years so long as Bankert was current in his child support obligations. Both parties 

agreed that due to the lump-sum disability payment, Bankert was not in arrears with respect 

to child support. Hall, however, claimed the alternating dependency deduction for 2011, 

contending that Bankert’s then-existing arrearage entitled her to do so. The trial court 

observed that according to child support records maintained by the Boone County Clerk’s 

Office, Bankert was at least current, if he had not overpaid his child support for that year, and 
5

that he should be allowed to claim the alternating dependency deduction for 2011. The trial 

court allowed the prior order regarding dependency deductions to stand. Hall now appeals.1

Our Supreme Court has placed a “strong emphasis on trial court discretion in 

determining child support obligations” and has acknowledged “the principle that child 

support modifications will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.” Lea v. Lea, 

691 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ind. 1998).

Hall claims that the trial court exceeded its authority with respect to how the gratuity 

was acknowledged. She contends that it was erroneous to enter an order increasing the 

threshold amount of uninsured medical expenses for which she would be responsible, and 

proposing the irrevocable trust option in the alternative. Ind. Child Support Guideline 

3(G)(5) addresses how a parent’s child support obligation is to be adjusted by the receipt of 

Social Security benefits. Lump-sum payments of Social Security Disability benefits are to be 

applied as a credit against any child support arrearage. Child Supp. G. 3(G)(5)(b)(1). The 

trial court correctly applied the lump-sum payments here. Further, Bankert’s receipt of 

Social Security Disability benefits was included as income for purposes of determining the 

child support obligations of the parties, and the monthly payments were credited against 

Bankert’s child support obligation. See Child Supp. G. 3(G)(5)(a)(2)(ii).

 

1 Of the three issues stated by Hall, one of them, addressing the dependency deduction, has been waived for 

failure to present cogent argument and citation to authority. See Groves v. State, 823 N .E.2d 1229, 1231 n.2 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[f]ailure to put forth a cogent argument acts as a waiver of the issue on appeal”). See 

also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring argument section of brief to contain the contentions of the 

appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning and citations to relevant authorities). 
6

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by increasing the threshold 

amount of Hall’s initial responsibility for uninsured medical expenses. Bankert sought a 

credit for the gratuity. Hall did not want Bankert to receive all three dependency deductions. 

The trial court calculated which of the parties would benefit most from the dependency 

deductions, and in denying Bankert’s request, explained that such a conclusion was 

supported by the finding that Hall would benefit more from the deductions than Bankert. 

Thus, even though Hall had also requested all three dependency deductions, the trial court 

allowed the allocation of the dependency deductions set forth in its prior order to stand.2

Hall had stated her intention to apply the gratuity, in large part, if not all, toward a 

college fund for the children. She declined to voluntarily agree to establish the fund with 

reporting responsibilities accounting for those funds to Bankert. Hall also opposed the 

issuance of a court order requiring her to do the same. The trial court’s order reflects the 

goal of reducing needless expense and litigation about the use of the gratuity. Hall has the 

option of exercising her discretion in the use of the gratuity for the benefit of the children, but

with increased responsibility for the uninsured medical expenses. Further, in recognition of 

the desirable goal of establishing a college fund for the children, the trial court allowed Hall 

to do so, but in a manner that would reduce friction between her and Bankert about 

 

2 There appears to be a scrivener’s error in that portion of the trial court’s order. The dependency deduction 

allocation was suggested as one of two means of recognizing the credit to Bankert for the gratuity. The trial 

court’s explanation appears self-contradictory because it states that Hall would benefit more from the 

dependency deductions than would Bankert, but then declines to allocate all three dependency deductions to 

Hall. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Hall had filed a separate request for a modification of the allocation of 

dependency deductions. It appears, however, that the trial court was explaining why that means of recognizing 

the credit was not the best option, and the trial court’s decision to allow its prior order with regard to the 

deductions to stand was its denial of Hall’s separate request. 
7

accountability for the use of those funds. Hall has failed to show an abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion here. 

Hall also challenges the trial court’s decision to allow Bankert to claim the alternating 

dependency deduction for 2011. Our review of the record, however, leads us to conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The child support payment summary and 

record of child support payments admitted into evidence by Bankert support the trial court’s 

finding and conclusion. Hall has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion.

Judgment affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., and PYLE, J., concur.