NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

RORY ELDON SNOW, Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0463

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-138508-001

The Honorable Warren J. Granville, Judge

VACATED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Andrea L. Kever

Counsel for Appellant

Law Office of Carrie M. Spiller, PLLC, Phoenix

By Carrie M. Spiller

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 5-29-2018
STATE v. SNOW

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 The State appeals from the superior court’s order granting 

Rory Eldon Snow’s motion to suppress evidence (methamphetamine and 

methamphetamine paraphernalia) discovered during a warrantless search 

of his person. For reasons that follow, we vacate the suppression ruling.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Detective Seymore (a Goodyear police officer assigned to the 

Arizona Department of Public Safety’s State Gang Task Force) was on 

patrol with his partner one evening in mid-August 2016. While speaking 

with an individual on an access road just off the southbound lanes of a main 

road, the detective observed a southbound bicyclist cross the main road and 

continue riding south in the northbound lanes. The detective and his 

partner drove after the bicyclist and activated lights to stop him a few 

blocks later.

¶3 Snow—the bicyclist—identified himself and provided a state 

identification card. While the other detective ran Snow’s information to 

check for outstanding warrants, Detective Seymore asked Snow several

questions, including whether he was carrying anything illegal. Snow 

responded by stating either that he had a “G pipe” or that he had an “oil 

burner.” The detective then searched Snow and found a methamphetamine 

pipe in one pocket and a bag of methamphetamine in the other. The 

detective arrested Snow immediately thereafter.

¶4 The State charged Snow with possession of 

methamphetamine, a class 4 felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, 

a class 6 felony. Snow moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the 

search, arguing both that the initial stop was unjustified and that the 

warrantless search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court 

conducted an evidentiary hearing, at which Detective Seymour testified 

that when he asked Snow if he was carrying anything illegal, Snow 

responded that he had a “G pipe,” which the detective recognized as a term 
STATE v. SNOW

Decision of the Court

3

for an item used to smoke methamphetamine. Snow testified that he did 

not say he had a “G pipe” but instead said he had an “oil burner.” After 

considering the testimony, the superior court granted Snow’s motion and 

suppressed the evidence, reasoning that the search was not simply a frisk 

for weapons, that the detective lacked probable cause to search Snow’s 

pockets absent prior observation of criminal activity, and that the search 

was not a search incident to arrest because Snow was not arrested until after 

the search was completed.

¶5 On the State’s motion, the court dismissed the case without 

prejudice, and the State appealed. We have jurisdiction under Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-4032(6).

DISCUSSION

¶6 We review the superior court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 

for an abuse of discretion, but review de novo its ultimate legal conclusions, 

including its assessment of the existence of probable cause. State v. Goudeau, 

239 Ariz. 421, 439, ¶ 26 (2016) (as amended); State v. Booker, 212 Ariz. 502, 

504, ¶ 10 (App. 2006).

¶7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A 

warrantless search is presumed unreasonable unless justified under a 

specific, well-defined exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Blakley, 

226 Ariz. 25, 27, ¶ 6 (App. 2010). One such exception is a search incident to 

arrest, which allows a contemporaneous search to accompany a lawful 

arrest (here, one supported by probable cause). See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 

332, 338 (2009); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980); State v. Bonillas, 

197 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 7 (App. 1999).

1 A search incident to arrest may occur 

before formal arrest as long as probable cause for the arrest existed at the 

time of the search. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111; State v. Carroll, 111 Ariz. 216, 

218–19 (1974); Bonillas, 197 Ariz. at 98, ¶ 7.

¶8 Here, the superior court erred by concluding that because 

Snow was not arrested until after the search, the search could not be 

considered a search incident to arrest. Assuming Snow told the detective 

that he was carrying a “G pipe,” known to the detective as a type of drug 

 

1 Another exception is an investigatory stop and frisk for weapons, see 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968), but the State does not contend that 

the search in this case was proper on this basis, and the evidence at the 

suppression hearing supports the court’s conclusion that it was not.
STATE v. SNOW

Decision of the Court

4

paraphernalia, the detective had probable cause to arrest him for possession 

of drug paraphernalia—even absent other evidence of criminal conduct. 

See State v. Durham, 108 Ariz. 233, 234–35 (1972) (noting that when a suspect 

told an officer that he had heroin for his own personal use, “[t]his 

admission, alone, justified an immediate arrest”); see also A.R.S. § 13-

3415(A) (classifying possession of drug paraphernalia as a class 6 felony); 

A.R.S. § 13-3883(a)(1) (authorizing a warrantless arrest based on probable 

cause that the person to be arrested committed a felony offense). With

probable cause for the arrest before the search, the fact that the search 

immediately preceded formal arrest does not invalidate it. Rawlings, 448 

U.S. at 111; Carroll, 111 Ariz. at 218–19; Bonillas, 197 Ariz. at 98, ¶ 7.

¶9 Snow suggests that under the rule of corpus delicti, his 

statement, standing alone, cannot support probable cause for a search. But 

Snow offers no authority for applying this rule—which prohibits conviction

of an accused based solely on the accused’s confession without 

corroborating evidence—in the context of a pretrial suppression hearing. 

Cf. State v. Jones, 198 Ariz. 18, 21–24, ¶¶ 9–16 (App. 2000) (holding that the 

rule of corpus delicti does not apply at a preliminary hearing). And although 

Snow posits that his statement was given in response to illegal questioning, 

the superior court did not find that the detective’s queries amounted to 

custodial interrogation. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).

¶10 Arguably, the superior court could have credited Snow’s 

testimony that he only disclosed having an “oil burner” (which in theory 

could refer to something other than drug paraphernalia) rather than the 

detective’s testimony that Snow admitted possessing a “G pipe.” But the 

court’s ruling does not reflect any such fact-based determination, and in 

any event, because the superior court did not analyze whether Snow’s 

statement established probable cause for an arrest, we vacate the ruling.

CONCLUSION

¶11 We vacate the ruling on Snow’s motion to suppress.