1 3 -3 99 2 -cv (L)

In re: Tri b u ne Co mpany Fraudul ent Co nv eyan ce Li ti ga ti o n 

## I nthe 

# U ni t e d S t at es Cour tofA p pe al s For the Secon d Circu it

________________________

August Term, 2014 Nos. 13-3992-cv; 13-3875-cv; 13-4178-cv; 13-4196 -cv IN RE: TRIBUNE C OMPANY FRAUDULENT C ONVEYANC E LITIGATION NOTE HOLDERS, Deutsche Bank Trust C ompany Ameri cas, Law Debenture Trust C ompany of New York, Wi l mington Trust C o mpany, INDIVIDUAL RETIREES, Wi l l i am A. Ni ese, on behal f of a putati ve cl ass of Tribune C ompany reti rees, Pl ainti ffs-Appel l ants-C ross-Appel l ees, MARK S. KIRSC HNER, as Li ti gati on Trustee for the Tribune Li ti gati on Trust, Pl ai nti ff, TENDERING PHONES HOLDERS, C i tadel E qui ty Fund Ltd., C amden Asset

Management LLP and certai n of thei r affi l i ates,

P l ai nti ffs-Intervenors,

v. LARGE PRIVATE BENEFIC IAL OWNERS, FINANC IAL INSTITUTION HOLDERS, FINANC IAL INSTITUTION C ONDUITS, Merri l lLynch, Pi erce, F enner & Smi th, Inc., on behal f of a putati ve cl ass of former Tribune C ompany sharehol ders, PENSION FUNDS, i ncl u di ng publ i c, pri vate, and Taft Hartl ey Funds, INDIVIDUAL BENEFIC IAL OWNERS, Mari o J. Gabel l i, on behal f of a putati ve cl ass of former Tribune C ompany sharehol ders, MUTUAL FUNDS, AT1LARGE, ESTATE OF KAREN BABC OC K , PHILLIP S. BABC OC K , DOUGLAS BABC OC K, DEFENDANTS LISTED ON EXHIBIT B, Defendants-Appel l ees-C ross-Appel l ants, C URRENT AND FORMER DIREC TORS AND OFFIC ERS, Betsy D. Hol den, C hri stopher Reyes, Dudl ey S. Taft, Enri que Hernandez, Jr., Mi l es D. Whi te, Robert S. Morri son, Wi l l i am A. Osborn, Harry Amsden, Stephen D. C arver, Denni s J. Fi tzSi m ons, Robert Gremi l l i on, Donal d C . Grenesko, Davi d Dean Hi l l er, Ti mothy J. Landon, Thomas D. Leach, Lui s E. Le, Mark Hi ani k, Irving Qui mby, C rane Kenney, C handl er Bi gel ow, Dani elKazan, Ti mothy Kni ght, Thomas Finke, SAM ZELL AND AFF I LIATED ENTITIES, EGI-TRB, LLC, Equi ty Group Investments, LLC , Sam Investment Trust, SamuelZel l, Tower C H, LLC , Tower DC , LLC , Tower DL, LLC , Tower EH, LLC , Tower Gr, LARGE SHAREHOLDERS, C handl er Trusts and thei r representati ves, FINANC IAL ADVISORS, Val uati o n Research C orporati on, Duff & Phel ps, LLC , Morgan Stanl ey & C o. Inc. and Morgan Stanl ey C a pi t alServi ces, Inc., GreatBanc Trust C ompany, C i ti g roup Gl obalMarkets, Inc., C A PUBLICEMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, C A LPERS, UNIVERSITY OF C A REGENTS, T. ROWE PRIC E ASSOC IATES, INC ., MORGAN KEEGAN & C OMPANY, INC ., NTC A, DIOC ESE OF TRENTON-PENSION FUND, FIRST ENERGY SERVIC E C OMPANY, MARYLA ND STATE RETIREMENT AND PENSION SYSTEM, T BANK LC V QP, T BANK-LC V-PT, JAPAN POST INSURANC E, C O., LTD., SERVANTS OF RELIE F FOR INC URABLE C ANC ER (AKA DOMINIC AN SISTERS OF HAWTHORNE), NEW LIFE INTERNATIONAL, NEW LIFE INTERNATIONAL TRUST, SALVATION ARMY, SOUTHERN TERRITORIAL HEADQUARTERS, C ITY OF PHILADELPHIA EMPLOYEES, OHIO CARPENTERS’ MIDC AP (AKA OHIO C ARPENTERS’ PENSION FUND), TILDEN H. EDWARDS, JR., MALLOY AND EVANS, INC ., BEDFORD OAK PARTNERS, LP, DUFF AND PHELPS LLC , DURHAM J. MONSMA, C ERTAIN T AG-ALONG DEFENDANTS, MIC HAEL S. MEADOWS, WIRTZ C ORPORATION, Defendants.



## _ _ _ _ _ _ __________________

2A ppealfrom the Uni t ed States Di stri ct C ourt for the Southern Di stri c tof New York

No. 1:11-md-02296



## _ _ _ _ _ _ __________________ A R G U E D : N O V E M B E R 5, 2 014 D E C I D E D : M A R C H 29, 2016 A M E N D E D : D E C E M B E R 19, 2019



## _ _ _ _ _ _ __________________ Before: W I N T E R, D R O N E Y, C i rcui t Judges, and H E L L E R S T E I N , Di stri ct Judge. *



## ________________________ Appealfrom a di smi ssalby the Uni ted States Di stri ct C ourt for the Southern Di stri c t of New York (Ri chard J. Sul l i van, Judge), of state l aw, constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance cl a i ms brought by credi tors’ representati ves against the C hapter 11 debtor’s former sharehol ders, who were cashed out i n an LBO. The di stri c t court hel d that pl ai nti ffs l acked statutory standi ng under the Bankruptcy C ode. We hol d that appel l ants have statutory standi ng but affi rm on the ground that appel l ants’ cl ai ms are preempted by Secti on 546(e) of that C ode.



## ________________________

ROY T. ENGLERT, JR. (Lawrence S. Robbi ns, Ari elN. Lavi nbuk, Dani elN. Lerman, Shai D. Bronshtei n, Robbi ns, Russel l, Engl ert, Orseck, Unterei ner &

* J udge A lvin K . H e lle r ste in, ofth e South e r n Distr ict ofNe w Yor k, sittin g by de sign ation

. 3Sauber LLP, Washi ngton, DC , Prati k A. Shah, James E. Tysse, Z.W. Jul i us C hen, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Fel d LLP, Washi ngton, DC, Davi d M. Zensky, Mi tchel lHurl ey, Deborah J. Newman, Aki n Gump Strauss Hauer & Fel d LLP, New York, NY, Robert J. Lack & Hal Nei er, Fri edman Kapl an Sei l er & Adel man LLP, New York, NY, Dani elM. Scott & Kevin M. Magnuson, Kel l ey, Wol ter & Scott, P.A., Minneapol i s, MN, Davi d S. Rosner & Sheron Korpus, Kasowi tz Benson Torres & Fri edman LLP, New York, NY, Joseph Aronauer, Aronauer Re & Yudel l, LLP, New York, NY, on the bri ef), Robbi ns, Russel l, Engl ert, Orseck, Unterei ner & Sauber LLP, Washi ngton, DC , for Pl ai nti ffsAppel l ants-C ross-Appel l ees Note Hol ders. Jay Tei telbaum, Tei telbaum & Baskin LLP, Whi te Pl ai ns, NY, for Pl ai nti ffs-Appel l antsC ross-Appel l ees Indi vi dualReti rees. JoelA. Feuer & Oscar Garza, Gibson, Dunn & C rutcher LLP, Los Angel es, C A, Davi d C

. Bohan & John P. Si eger, Katten Muchi n Rosenman LLP, C hi c ago, IL, for Defendants-Appel l ees-C ross-Appel l ants Large Pri vate Benefi ci alOwners. PHILIP D. ANKER (Al an E. Schoenfel d, Adri elI. C epeda Deri eux, Pabl o G. Kapusta, Wi l mer C utl er Pi ckeri ng Hal e and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, Sabi n Wi l l ett & Mi chael C . D’Agnosti no, Bi ngham

4McC u t chen LLP, Boston, MA, Joel W. Mi l l ar, Washi ngton, DC , on the bri ef), Wi l mer C utl er Pi c keri ng Hal e and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, for DefendantsAppel l ees-C ross-Appel l ants Financi al Insti tuti o n Hol ders . El l i ot Moskowi tz, Davi s Pol k& Wardwel l LLP, New York, NY, Dani elL. C antor, O' Mel v eny & Myers LLP, New York, NY, Gregg M. Mashberg & Stephen L. Ratner, Proskauer Rose LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appel l ees-C ross-Appel l ants Financi alInsti tuti on C ondui ts. DOUGLAS HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER, Ropes & Gray LLP, Washi ngton, DC , D. Ross Marti n, Ropes & Gray LLP, New York, NY, Matthew L. Fornshel l, Ice Mi l l er LLP, C ol u mbus, OH, for DefendantsAppel l ees-C ross-Appel l ants Pensi on Funds. Andrew J. Entwi stl e, Entwi stl e & C appucci, LLP, New York, NY, Davi d N. Dunn, Potter Stewart, Jr. Law Offi ces, Brattl eboro, VT, Mark A. Neubauer, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Los Angel es, C A, for DefendantsAppel l ees-C ross-Appel l ants Indi vi dual Benefi ci alOwners. Mi chael S. Dol ui si o & Al exander Bi l us, Dechert LLP, Phi l adel phi a, PA, Steven R. Schoenfel d, Robi nson & C ol e LLP, New

5York, NY, for Defendants-Appel l ees-C rossAppel l ants Mutual Funds. Al an J. Stone & Andrew M. LeBl anc, Mi lbank, Tweed, Hadl ey & McC l oy LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appel l eeC ross-Appel l ant At-Large. Gary Stei n, Davi d K. Momborquette, Wi l l i am H. Gussman, Jr., Schul te Roth & ZabelLLP, New York, NY, for DefendantsAppel l ees-C ross-Appel l ants Defendants Li sted on Exhibi t B. Kevin C arrol l, Securi ti es Industry and Financi alMarkets Associ ati on, Washi ngton, DC , Hol l y K. Kul ka, NYSE Euronext, New York, NY, Marshal lH. Fi shman, Ti mothy P. Harkness, Davi d Y. Li vshi z, Freshfi el ds Bruckhaus Deri nger US LLP, New York, NY, for Ami ciC uri ae Securi ti es Industry and Fi nanci alMarkets Associ ati on, Internati onalSwaps and Deri vati ves Associ ati on, Inc., and the NYSE Euronext. Mi chael A. C onl ey, John W. Avery, Tracey A. Hardi n, Benjamin M. Vetter, Securi ti es and Exchange C ommi ssi on, Washi ngton, DC , for Ami cus C uri ae Securi ti es and Exchange C ommi ssi on.

6W I N T E Rand D R O N E Y, C i rcui t Judges:

Representati ves of certai n unsecured credi tors of the C hapter 11 debtor Tribune C o mpany appealfrom Judge Sul l i van’s grant of a moti on to di smi ss thei r state l aw, constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance cl ai m s brought agai nst Tribune’s former sharehol ders. Appel l ants seek to recover an amount suffi ci ent to sati sfy Tribune’s debts to them by avoi di ng (recoveri ng) payments by Tribune to sharehol ders that purchased al lof i t s stock. The payments occurred i n a transacti on commonly cal l ed a l everaged buyout (“LBO”), 1 soon after whi ch Tribune went i nto C hapter 11 bankruptcy. Appel l ants appealthe di stri c tcourt’s di smi ssalfor l a ck of statutory standi ng, and appel l ees cross-appeal from the di stri ct court’s rejecti on of thei r argument that appel l ants’ cl ai ms are preempted. 2 We address two i ssues: (i ) whether appel l ants are barred by the Bankruptcy C ode’s automati c stay provi si on from bri ngi ng state l aw, constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance cl a i ms whi l e avoi dance proceedi ngs agai nst

1 Ina typical LBO, a tar ge t compan y is acq uir e d w itha sign if ican t por tionofth e pur ch ase pr ice be in g paid th rougha loan se cur e d by th e tar ge t compan y’ s asse ts.

2 Be cause th e issue h as n o e ff e ct onour disposition of th is matte r, w e do n ot pause to con side r w h e th e r a cr o ss- appe al w as n e ce ssar y f or appe lle e s to r aise th e pr e e mption issue s in th is cour t, but, f or con ve n ie n ce pur p ose s, w e some time s r e f e r to th ose issue s by th e te rm cr ossappe al. 7the same transfers brought by a party exerci sing the powers of a bankruptcy

trustee on an i ntenti onal fraud theory are ongoi ng; and (i i ) i f not, whether the credi tors’ state l aw, constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance cl ai ms are preempted by Bankruptcy C ode Secti o n 546(e). On i ssue (i ) , we hol d that appel l ants are not barred by the C ode’s automati c stay because they have been freed from i ts restri cti ons by orders of the bankruptcy court and by the debtors’ confi rmed reorgani zati on pl an. On i ssue (i i ), the subject of appel l ees’ cross-appeal , we hol d that appel l ants’ cl a i ms are preempted by Secti on 546(e). That Secti on shi el ds certai n transacti o ns from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoi dance powers, i ncluding, i nter al i a, transfers by or to a fi nanci a li nsti tuti on i n connecti on wi th a securi ti es contract, except through an i ntenti onalfraudul ent conveyance cl ai m. 3 We therefore affi rm.

3 A s discusse d in f r a, af te r w e pr e viously issue d anopin ioninth is appe al, In r e Tr ibun e Co. Fr audule n t Con ve yan ce Litig. ( “Tr ibun e I”) , 818 F.3d 98 ( 2d Cir . 2016) , th e Supr e me Cour t clar if ie d th e te st f or de te r min in g w h e th e r a tr an saction f alls w ith inSe ction 546( e ), se e M e r it M gmt. Gr p., LP v. FTI Con sultin g, In c., 138 S. Ct. 883 ( 2018) , causin g us to r e call th e man date an d issue th is ame n de d opin ion

. 8BAC KGROUND

a) The LBO Tribune Medi a C ompany (formerl y known as “Tribune C ompany”) i s a mul ti m edi a corporati on that, in 2007, faced deteri orati ng fi nanci alprospects. Appel l ee SamuelZel l, a bi l l i onai re i nvestor, proposed to acqui re Tribune through an LBO. In consummating the LBO, Tribune borrowed over $11 bi l l i o n secured by i ts assets. The $11 bi l l i on pl us, combi ned wi th Zel l ’s $315 mi l l i on equi ty contributi on, was used to refi nance some of Tribune’s pre-exi sting bank debt and to cash out Tribune’s sharehol ders for over $8 bi l l i on at a premi um pri ce –- above i ts tradi ng range –- per share. It i s undi sputed that Tribune transferred the over $8 bi l l i o n to a “securi ti es cl eari ng agency” or other “fi nanci alinsti tuti on,” as those terms are used i n Secti o n 546(e), acti ng as i ntermedi ari es i n the LBO transacti on. 4Those i ntermedi ari es i n turn pai d the funds to the sharehol ders i n exchange for thei r shares that were then returned to Tri bune. Appel l ants seek to sati sfy Tribune’s

4 A ppe lle e s con te n d th at, w ithr e spe ct to th e LBO tr an saction , Tr ibun e also q u alif ie d as a “f in an cial in stitution ,” but appe llan ts disagr e e . W e de scr ibe th e f acts r e le van t to th at dispute in f r a . 9debts to them by avoi di ng Tribune’s payments to the sharehol ders. A ppel l ants

do not seek money from the i ntermedi ari es. See Note 15, i nfra. b) Bankruptcy Proceedi ngs On December 8, 2008, wi th debt and conti ngent l i abi l i ti es exceedi ng i ts assets by more than $3 bi l l i o n, Tribune and nearl y al lof i ts subsi di ari es fi l ed for bankruptcy under C hapter 11 i n the Di stri ct of Del aware. A trustee was not appoi nted, and Tribune and i t s affi l i ates conti nued to operate the busi nesses as debtors i n possessi on. See 11 U.S.C . § 1107(a) (“Subject to any l i mi tati o ns on a trustee . . . a debtor i n possessi on shal lhave al lthe ri ghts . . . , and powers, and shal lperform al lthe functi ons and duti es . . . of a trustee . . . .”). In di scussi ng the powers of a bankruptcy trustee that can be exerci sed by a trustee or parti es desi gnated by a bankruptcy court, we shal lrefer to the trustee or such parti es as the “trustee et al .” The bankruptcy court appoi nted an Offi c i a l Commi ttee of Unsecured C redi tors (the “C ommi ttee”) to represent the i nterests of unsecured credi t ors. In November 2010, al l egi ng that the LBO-rel ated payments consti tuted intenti onal fraudul ent conveyances, the C ommi ttee commenced an acti on under C o de Secti o n 548(a)(1)(A) agai nst the cashed out Tribune sharehol ders, vari ous

10offi cers, di rectors, fi nanci a ladvi sors, Zel l, and others al l eged to have benefi tted

from the LBO. An i ntenti onal fraudul ent conveyance i s defi ned as one i n whi ch there was “actual i ntent to hi nder, del a y, or defraud” a credi tor. 11 U.S.C . § 548(a)(1)(A). In June 2011, two subsets of unsecured credi t ors fi l ed state l aw, constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance cl a i ms in vari ous federal and state courts. The pl a i nti ffs, the appel l ants before us, were: (i ) the Reti ree Appel l ants, former Tribune empl oyees who hol d cl ai ms for unpai d reti rement benefi ts and (i i ) the Notehol der Appel l ants, the successor i ndenture trustees for Tri bune’s pre-LBO seni or notes and subordi nated debentures. A constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance i s, general l y speaki ng, a transfer for l ess than reasonabl yequi val ent val ue made when the debtor was i nsol vent or was rendered so by the transfer. See Pi card v. Fai rfi el d Greenwi ch Ltd., 762 F.3d 199, 208-09 (2d C i r. 2014). Before bri ngi ng these acti ons, appel l ants moved the bankruptcy court for an order stati ng that: (i ) after the expi rati on of the two-year statute of l i mi tati ons peri od duri ng whi ch the C ommi ttee was authori zed to bri ng avoi dance acti ons under 11 U.S.C . § 546(a), el i gibl e credi tors had regai ned the ri ght to prosecute thei r credi tor state l aw cl ai ms; and (i i ) the automati c stay i mposed by C ode

11Secti o n 362(a) was l i fted sol el y to permi t the i mmedi a te fi l ing of thei r compl aint.

In support of that moti on, the C ommi ttee argued that, under Secti on 546(a), the “state l aw constructi v e fraudul ent conveyance transfer cl ai m s ha[d] reverted to i ndi vi dualcredi tors” and that the “credi tors shoul d consi d er taking appropri ate acti ons to preserve those cl ai ms.” Statement of the Offi ci alC ommi ttee of Unsecured C redi tors i n Supp. of Mot. at 3, In re Tribune C o ., No 08-13141 (KJC ) (Bankr. D. Del . Mar. 17, 2011). In Apri l2011, the bankruptcy court l i fted the C ode’s automati c stay wi th regard to appel l ants’ acti ons. The court reasoned that because the C o mmi ttee had el ected not to bri ng the constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance acti ons wi thin the two-year l i mi t ati o ns peri od fol l owing the bankruptcy peti ti on i mposed by Secti o n 544, ful l ydi scussed i nfra, the unsecured credi t ors “regai ned the ri ght, i f any, to prosecute [such cl a i ms].” J. App’x at 373. Therefore, the court l i fted the Secti o n 362(a) automati c stay “to permi t the fi l ing of any compl ai nt by or on behal f of credi tors on account of such C redi tor [state l aw fraudul ent conveyance] C l ai ms.” Id. The court cl ari fi ed, however, that i t was not resol ving the i ssues of whether the i ndi vi dualcredi tors had statutory standi ng to bri ng such cl ai ms or whether such cl a i ms were preempted by Secti on 546(e).

12On March 15, 2012, the bankruptcy court set an expi rati on date of June 1,

2012 for the remai ni ng l i mi ted stay on the state l aw, fraudul ent conveyance cl a i ms. In July 2012, the bankruptcy court ordered confi rmati on of the proposed Tribune reorgani zati on pl an. The pl an termi nated the C ommi ttee and transferred responsi bi l i ty for prosecuti ng the i ntenti onalfraudul ent conveyance acti on to an enti ty cal l ed the Li ti gati on Trust. The confi rmed pl an al so provi ded that the Reti ree and Notehol der Appel l ants coul d pursue “any and al l LBO-Rel ated C auses of Acti on ari sing under state fraudul ent conveyance l aw,” except for the federal i ntenti onalfraudul ent conveyance and other LBO-rel ated cl a i ms pursued by the Li ti gati o n Trust. J. App’x at 643. Under the pl an, the Reti ree and Notehol der Appel l ants recovered approxi m atel y 33 cents on each dol l ar of debt. The pl an was schedul ed to take effect on December 31, 2012, the date on whi ch Tribune emerged from bankruptcy. c) Di stri ct C ourt Proceedi ngs Appel l ants’ vari ous state l aw, fraudul ent conveyance compl ai nts al l eged that the LBO payments, made through fi nanci al intermedi ari es as noted above, were for more than the reasonabl e val ue of the shares and made when Tri bune was i n di stressed fi nanci al condi ti on. Therefore, the compl ai nts concl uded, the

13payments were avoi dabl e by credi t ors under the l aws of vari ous states. These

acti ons were l ater consol i dated wi th the Li ti g ati on Trust’s ongoi ng federal i ntenti onalfraud cl ai ms in a mul ti -di stri c t l i ti gati on proceedi ng that was transferred to the Southern Di stri c t of New York. In re: Tribune C o. Fraudul ent C onveyance Li ti g., 831 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (J.P.M.L. 2011). After consol i dati on, the Tribune sharehol ders moved to di smi ss appel l ants’ cl a i ms. The di stri ct court granted the moti o n on the ground that the Bankruptcy C ode’s automati c stay provi si on depri ved appel l ants of statutory standi ng to pursue thei r cl ai ms so l o ng as the Li ti gati on Trustee was pursui ng the avoi dance of the same transfers, albei t under a di fferent l egaltheory. In re Tribune C o. Fraudul ent C onveyance Li ti g., 499 B.R. 310, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The court hel d that the bankruptcy court had onl y “condi ti onal l y l i fted the stay.” Id. at 314. The di stri ct court rejected appel l ees’ preempti on argument based on Secti o n 546(e). That Secti on bars a trustee et al . from exerci si ng i ts avoi dance powers under Secti on 544 to avoi d certai n transacti ons i ncl uding, i nter al i a, transfers “by or to . . . a fi nanci alinsti tuti on . . . i n connecti o n wi th a securi ti es contract,” except through an i ntenti onal fraudul ent conveyance cl ai m. 11 U.S.C

. § 546(e). The di stri c t court hel d that Secti on 546(e) di d not bar appel l ants’ acti ons

14because: (i ) Secti on 546(e)’s prohibi ti on on avoi di ng the desi gnated transfers

appl i ed onl y to a bankruptcy trustee et al ., i d. at 315-16; and (i i ) C ongress had decl i ned to extend Secti on 546(e) to state l aw, fraudul ent conveyance cl ai m s brought by credi tors, i d. at 318. d) Appel l a te Proceedi ngs Appel l ants appeal ed the di smi ssal for l ack of statutory standi ng, and appel l ees cross-appeal ed the rejecti on of thei r argument that appel l ants’ cl ai ms are preempted. In a pri o r opi ni on, In re Tribune C o. Fraudul ent C onveyance Li ti g. (“Tribune I”), 818 F.3d 98 (2d C i r. 2016), we affi rmed the di smi ssal of appel l ants’ cl ai ms on the ground that Secti o n 546(e) preempts “fraudul ent conveyance acti ons brought by credi tors whose cl ai ms are [] subject to Secti on 546(e).” Id. a t 118, 123-24. At the ti me, i t was the l aw in thi s C i rcui t , under In re Quebecor Worl d (USA) Inc. (“Quebecor”), 719 F.3d 94, 100 (2d C i r. 2013), that the payments at i ssue fel lwi thin Secti on 546(e) because enti ti es covered by Secti on 546(e) had served as i ntermedi ari es. See Tribune I, 818 F.3d at 120 (“Secti on 546(e)’s l anguage cl earl ycovers payments, such as those at i ssue here, by commerci alfi rms to fi nanci ali ntermedi ari es to purchase shares from the fi rm’s sharehol ders.”).

15Appel l ants peti ti o ned for reheari ng en banc, whi ch was deni ed, and we

i ssued the mandate. Appel l ants then peti ti oned for certi orari, presenti ng the fol l owing questi on, among others: “Whether the Second C i rcui tcorrectl y hel d . . . that a fraudul ent transfer i s exempt . . . under 11 U.S.C . § 546(e) when a fi nanci al i nsti tuti o n acts as a mere condui t for fraudul entl y transferred property.” Peti ti o n for a Wri t of C erti orari, Deutsche Bank Trust C o. Ams. v. Robert R. McC ormi ck Found., No. 16-317 (U.S. Sept. 9, 2016), 2016 WL 4761722, at *1. Whi l e that peti ti on was pendi ng, the Supreme C ourt i n Meri t Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI C onsul ting, Inc., 138 S. C t. 883 (2018), rejected Quebecor' s i nterpretati on of Secti o n 546(e)’s scope, hol di ng that Secti on 546(e) does “not protect transfers i n whi ch fi nanci ali nsti tuti ons served as mere condui t s.” Meri t Mgmt., 138 at 892. The questi on presented i n Meri t Mgmt. was whether, “i n the context of a transfer that was executed vi aone or more transacti ons,” such as a transfer from Party A to Party D that incl u ded Parti es B and C as i ntermedi ari es, the rel evant transfer for purposes of Secti o n 546(e) i s the overarchi ng transfer from Party A to Party D or “any component part[] of the overarchi ng transfer,” such as the transfer from Party B to Party C . Id. at 888. The C ourt concl u ded, based on the “pl a in meani ng” of Secti on 546(e), that the rel evant transfer i s the overarchi ng transfer,

16and therefore abrogated the rel evant porti on of Quebecor. Id. at 888, 897; see al so

i d. at 892 n.6 (i denti fying Quebecor as one of the deci si ons i n confl i ct wi th i ts hol di ng)

. Soon thereafter, Justi ces Kennedy and Thomas i ssued a statement suggesti ng that thi s C ourt mi ght wi sh to recal li ts mandate or provi de other rel i ef i n l i ght of Meri t Mgmt. See Statement of Justi c e Kennedy and Justi ce Thomas Respecti ng the Peti ti on for C erti orari, Deutsche Bank Trust C o. Ams., No. 16-317 (Apr. 3, 2018), 2018 WL 1600841. Appel l ants subsequ entl y fi l ed a moti on to recal l the mandate, and we recal l ed the mandate i n anti ci pati on of further panel revi ew. We have si nce agreed on changes to our pri or opi ni on, whi ch are refl ected i n thi s amended opi ni on. Upon the fi l ing of thi s amended opi ni on, the ori ginal opi ni on i s vacated. See, e.g., Brown v. C i ty of Oneonta, New York, 221 F.3d 329, 336 (2d C i r. 2000), amendi ng and supersedi ng 195 F.3d 111 (2d C i r. 1999). DISC USSION We revi ew de novo the di stri ct court’s grant of appel l ees’ moti o n to di smi ss. See Mary Jo C . v. N.Y. State & LocalRet. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 151 (2d C i r.

172013). The rel evant facts bei ng undi sputed for purposes of thi s proceedi ng, only

i ssues of l aw are before us. 5 a) Statutory Standi ng to Bri ng the C l ai ms We fi rst address the di stri ct court’s di smi ssal of appel l ants’ cl ai ms on the ground that they l a cked standi ng to bri ng them because of Secti o n 362(a)(1). 6In re Tribune, 499 B.R. at 325. When a bankruptcy acti on i s fi l ed, any “acti o n or proceedi ng agai nst the debtor” i s automati c al l ystayed by Secti o n 362(a). The

5 A ppe llan ts ar gue th at on e ofth e issue s w e addr e ss in fr a - - w h e th e r Tr ibun e ’ s payme n ts to sh ar e h o lde r s r e main subj e ct to Se ction 546( e ) f ollow in g M e r it M gmt. -

- r e quir e s r e solvin g tw o f actual dispute s “n e ve r be f or e te ste d inth is case ,” th u s pr e cludin g a de te rmin ation as a matte r of law an d n e ce ssitatin g a r e man d to th e distr ict cour t. A ppe llan ts’ Re ply in Suppor t ofM otionto Re call th e M an date at 9- 11 . Ne ith e r ofth e dispute s ide n tif ie d by appe llan ts is f actual in n atur e , h ow e ve r . A ppe llan ts f ir st con te n d th at ce r tain docume n ts cite d by appe lle e s do n o t suffice to e stablish th at Compute r sh ar e Tr ust Compan y, N.A . w as Tr ibun e ’ s “age nt” in con n e ctionw ithth e LBO payme n ts. But th at ar gume nt doe s n ot pr e se n t a f actual dispute about th e con te n t or accur acy ofth ose docume n ts; in ste ad, it on ly ch alle n ge s th e le gal sign if ican ce ofth e docume n ts, r aisin g a pur e que stion oflaw . Se con d, appe llan ts ar gue th at a con tr act to r e de e m sh ar e s is n ot a “se cur itie s con tr act” w ith inth e me an in g of11 U .S.C. § 101( 22) ( A) . But th at ar gume n t, too, is plain ly le gal. Th us, th e re ar e n o f actual dispute s pr e cludin g our con side r ation ofw h e th e r Tr ibun e ’ s payme n ts to sh ar e h olde rs r e main subj e ct to Se ction 546( e ) f ollow in g M e r it M gmt., an d a r e man d is un n e ce ssar y.

6 Th e te r m “stan din g” h as be e nuse d to de scr ibe issue s ar isin g inban kr uptcy pr oce e din gs w h e nin dividual cr e ditor s sue to r e cove r fun ds f r om th ir d par tie s to satisf y amoun ts ow e d to th e m by th e de btor , an d th at action is de f e n de d onth e gr oun d th at th e r e cove ry se e ks fun ds th at ar e r e cove r able un de r th e Code on ly by a r e p r e se ntative ofall cr e ditor s. St. P aul Fir e & M ar in e In s. Co. v. P e psiCo, In c., 884 F.2d 688, 696- 97 ( 2d Cir . 1989) , disappr ove d ofonoth e r gr oun ds by Inr e M ille r, 197 B.R. 810 ( W .D.N.C. 1996) . Th e use ofth e te r m “stan din g” is base d onth e suin g cr e ditor s’ n e e d to de mon str ate anin j ur y oth e r th anon e r e dr e ssable un de r th e Code on ly by th e tr uste e e t al. Id. at 704.

18purpose of the stay i s “to protect credi tors as wel las the debtor,” Ostano

C ommerzanstal tv. Tel ewi d e Sys., Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d C i r. 1986) (per curi am), by avoi di ng wasteful, dupl i cati v e, i ndi vi d u al acti ons by credi tors seeki ng i ndi vi dualrecoveri es from the debtor’s estate, and by ensuri ng an equi tabl e di stributi on of the debtor’s estate. See In re McMul l en, 386 F.3d 320, 324 (1st C i r. 2004) (noti ng that Secti on 362(a)(1), among other thi ngs, “safeguard[s] the debtor estate from pi ecemealdi ssi pati on . . . ensur[i ng] that the assets remai n wi thin the excl usi ve juri sdi cti o n of the bankruptcy court pendi ng thei r orderl y and equi tabl e di stributi on among the credi tors”). Al though fraudul ent conveyance acti ons are agai nst thi rd parti es rather than a debtor, there i s casel aw, di scussed i nfra, stati ng that the automati c stay appl i es to such acti ons. 7See In re C ol o ni alReal ty C o., 980 F.2d 125, 131 (2d C i r. 1992). The di stri ct court rul ed that Secti on 362’s automati c stay provi si o n depri v ed appel l ants of statutory standi ng to bri ng thei r cl ai ms because the Li ti gati on Trustee was sti l l pursui ng an i ntenti onalfraudul ent conveyance acti on chal l engi ng the same transfers under Secti on 548(a)(1)(A). In re Tribune, 499 B.R.

7 Th e implication s ofapplyin g th e automatic stay to f r audule n t con ve yan ce action s ar e discusse d in f r a. 19at 322-23. W e di sagree. The Bankruptcy C ode empowers a bankruptcy court to

rel ease parti es from the automati c stay “for cause” shown. In re Bogdanovi ch, 292 F.3d 104, 110 (2d C i r. 2002) (quoting 11 U.S.C . § 362(d)(1)). Once a credi tor obtai ns “a grant of rel i ef from the automati c stay” under Secti o n 362(d), i t may “press i ts cl ai ms outsi de of the bankruptcy proceedi ng.” St. PaulFi re & Mari ne Ins. C o. v. Pepsi C o, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 702 (2d C i r. 1989), di sapproved of on other grounds by In re Mi l l er, 197 B.R. 810 (W.D.N.C . 1996). In the present matter, the bankruptcy court granted appel l ants rel i ef from the automati c stay on three occasi ons. On Apri l25, 2011, the bankruptcy court granted appel l ants rel i ef “to permi t the fi l ing of any compl ai nt by or on behal f of credi tors on account of such C redi tor [state l aw fraudul ent conveyance] C l ai ms.” J. App’x at 373. A second order, entered on June 28, 2011, cl ari fi ed that “nei ther the automati c stay of [Secti o n 362] nor the provi si ons of the [ori ginal l i ft-stay order]” barred the parti es i n the state l aw acti ons from consol i d a ting and coordi nating these acti ons. J. App’x at 376. And the bankruptcy court’s thi rd order, entered on March 15, 2012, set an expi rati on date of June 1, 2012, for the “stay i mposed on the state l aw constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance acti ons.” J. App’x at 521. None of the Tribune sharehol ders fi l ed objecti ons to these orders.

20Final l y, the reorgani zati o n pl an, confi rmed by the bankruptcy court and i n

al lperti nent respects an order of that court, expressl y al l owed appel l ants to pursue “any and al lLBO-Rel ated C a uses of Acti o n ari sing under state fraudul ent conveyance l aw.” J. App’x at 643. Secti on 5.8.2 of the pl an provi ded that “nothi ng i n thi s Pl an shal lor i s i ntended to i mpai r” the ri ghts of credi tors to attempt to pursue di scl ai m ed state l aw avoi dance cl ai ms. J. App’x at 695. Thus, under both the bankruptcy court’s orders and the confi rmed reorgani zati on pl an, i f appel l ants had acti onabl e state l aw, constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance cl a i ms, asserti on of those cl ai ms was no l onger subject to Secti o n 362’s automati cstay. See, e.g., In re Heati ng Oi lPartners, LP, 422 F. App’x 15, 18 (2d C i r. 2011) (hol di ng that the automati c stay termi nates at di scharge); Uni ted States v. Whi te, 466 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th C i r. 2006) (si mi l arl y recogni zing that the automati c stay termi nates when “a di scharge i s granted”). For the foregoi ng reasons, we hol d that appel l ants’ cl ai ms are not barred by Secti on 362. b) Secti o n 546(e) and Preempti on We turn now to the i ssue rai sed by the cross-appeal : whether appel l ants’ cl a i ms are preempted because they confl i ct wi th C o de Secti on 546(e).

211. The Scope of Secti on 546(e)

The threshol d qu esti on i n our preempti on i nqui ry i s whether, i n the aftermath of Meri t Mgmt., 138 S. C t. 883, Tribune’s payments to the sharehol ders remai n subject to Secti on 546(e). As di scussed above, i t was previ ousl y the l aw in thi s C i rcui t that the payments were subject to Secti on 546(e) because enti ti es covered by Secti on 546(e) had served as i ntermedi a ri es. See Tribune I, 818 F.3d at 120; Quebecor, 719 F.3d at 100. Now, however, the parti es agree that Meri t Mgmt. “ forecl o ses” that basi s for fi ndi ng the payments covered by Secti on 546(e). Appel l ees’ Opposi ti o n to Appel l ants’ Moti on to Recal lthe Mandate at 16; see al so Meri t Mgmt., 138 S. C t. at 892 (hol di ng that Secti on 546(e) does “not protect transfers i n whi ch fi nanci ali nsti tuti ons served as mere condui t s”). Accordi ngl y, we must determi ne whether there i s an al ternati ve basi s for fi ndi ng that the payments are covered. For the reasons that fol l ow, we fi nd that such a basi s exi sts. (i ) Tribune i s a C overed Enti ty Under Meri t Mgmt., the payments at i ssue can be subject to Secti on 546(e) onl y i f (1) Tribune, whi ch made the payments, was a covered enti ty; or (2) the sharehol ders, who ul ti mately recei ved the payments, were covered enti ti es. See

22Meri t Mgmt., 138 S. C t. at 893 (“[T]he rel evant transfer for purposes of the §

546(e) safe-harbor i nqui ry i s the overarchi ng transfer[.]”). Accordi ng to appel l ees, that requi rement i s sati sfi ed because appel l ants’ compl ai nts, transacti on documents that are i ntegralto those compl ai nts, and materi a l s subject to judi ci alnoti ce establ i sh that Tribune was a “fi nanci alinsti tuti on” for the purposes of Secti on 546(e). 8See Appel l ees’ Opposi ti on to Appel l ants’ Moti on to Recal lthe Mandate at 16-20

. Tribune was a “fi nanci alinsti tuti on,” appel l ees maintain, because i twas a “customer” of C omputershare Trust C ompany, N.A. (“C omputershare”), and C omputershare was i ts agent i n the LBO transacti on. Id. at 17-18. We agree wi th appel l ees that Tribune was a “fi nanci al insti tuti o n” and therefore a covered enti ty. Secti on 546(e) provi des i n rel evant part that “the trustee may not avoi d . . . a transfer made by or to (or for the benefi t of) a . . . financi alinsti tuti on, . . . i n connecti on wi th a securi ti es contract, as defi ned in secti on 741(7),” except through an i ntenti onalfraudul ent conveyance cl ai m. 11 U.S.C . § 546(e). Secti on 101(22) of the C ode defi nes “fi nanci alinsti tuti on,” to incl ude, i nter al i a, “an enti ty

8 A ppe lle e s also ar gue th at Tr ibun e w as a cove r e d e ntity be cause it w as a “f in an cial par ticipan t,” an d th at th e sh ar e h olde r s w e r e like w ise cove r e d e n titie s. H avin g agr e e d w ith appe lle e s th at Tr ibun e w as a “f in an cial in stitution ,” w e do n ot r e ache ith e r ofappe lle e s’ alte rn ative ar gume n ts. 23that i s a commerci alor savi ngs bank, . . . trust company, . . . and, when any such .

. . enti ty i s acti ng as agent or custodi an for a customer (whether or not a ‘customer’, as defi ned i n secti on 741) i n connecti on wi th a securi ti es contract (as defi ned i n secti on 741) such customer.” 911 U.S.C . § 101(22)(A) (emphasi s added). Here, Tribune retai ned C omputershare to act as “Deposi tary” i n connecti on wi th the LBO tender offer. See Tri bune Offer to Purchase at 13, 113, In re Tribune C o ., No. 08-13141 (KJC ) (Bankr. D. Del . Aug. 20, 2010), EC F Nos. 5437-5, 5437-6. C omputershare i s a “fi nanci alinsti tuti on” for the purposes of Secti o n 546(e) because i t i s a trust company and a bank. See Offi ce of the C omptrol l er of the C urrency, Trust Banks Acti ve as of November 30, 2019, at https://www.occ.treas.gov/ topi cs/ charters-and-l i censi ng/fi nanci al -i nsti tuti on-l i sts / trust-by-name.pdf; Offi ce of the C omptrol l er of the C urrency, Nati onalBanks Acti ve as of November 30, 2019, at https://www.occ.treas.gov/ topi cs/ charters-and-l i censi ng/fi nanci al -i nsti tuti on-l i sts

9 A s th e Cour t n o te d inM e r it M gmt., “[ t] he par tie s [ t] he r e d[ id] n ot con te n d th at e ith e r th e de btor or pe tition e r inth [at] case qualif ie d as a ‘ fin an cial in stitution ’ by vir tue ofits status as a ‘ custome r ’ un de r § 101( 22) ( A ) . P e tition e r M e r it M an age me n t Gr oup, LP , discusse d th [ at] de fin ition on ly in f ootn ote s an d did n ot ar gue th at it some how dictate [ d] th e outcome inth [ e ] case .” M e r it M gmt., 138 S. Ct. at 890 n .2. Th e Cour t “th e r e f or e d[ id] n ot addr e ss w hat impact, ifan y, § 101( 22) ( A ) w ould h ave inth e application ofth e § 546( e ) saf e h arbor .” Id. 24/nati onal -by-name.pdf. Therefore, Tri bune was l i kewi se a “fi nanci alinsti tuti on”

wi th respect to the LBO payments i f i t was C omputershare’s “customer,” and C omputershare was acti ng as i ts agent. See 11 U.S.C . § 101(22)(A). In i ts rol e as Deposi tary, C omputershare performed mul ti pl e servi c es for Tribune. Fi rst, C o mputershare recei ved and hel d Tribune’s deposi tof the aggregate purchase pri ce for the shares. See Examiner’s Report, Vol . 1, at 206, In re Tribune C o., No. 08-13141 (KJC ) (Bankr. D. Del . Aug. 3, 2010), EC F No. 5247. Then, C omputershare recei ved tendered shares, retai ned them on Tribune’s behal f, and pai d the tenderi ng sharehol ders. Id.; see al so Tribune Offer to Purchase at 81, In re Tribune C o., No. 08-13141 (KJC ) (Bankr. D. Del . Aug. 20, 2010), EC F Nos. 5437-5, 5437-6. Gi v en these facts, we concl ude that Tribune was C omputershare’s “customer” wi th respect to the LBO payments. Al though Secti on 741 of the C o de provi des a speci al i z ed defi ni ti o n of “customer” for certai n purposes, see 11 U.S.C . § 741(2), the rel evant secti on for these purposes, Secti on 101(22), pl ai nl y states that i ts defi ni ti on of “customer” i s not l i mi ted by Secti on 741’s defi ni ti on,

see 11 U.S.C

. § 101(22)(A) (defi ni ng “fi nanci alinsti tuti on” to incl ude certai n enti ti es when such enti ti es are “acti ng as agent . . . for a customer (whether or not

25a ‘customer,’ as defi ned i n secti on 741)”). Moreover, Secti on 101(22) does not

provi de any al ternati ve speci al i zed defi ni ti on. Thus, we must gi ve the term i ts “ordi nary meani ng.” 10 Ransom v. FIA C ard Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 69 (2011). We have previ ousl y recogni zed that the “core” ordi nary defi ni ti on of “customer” i s “someone who buys goods or servi ces.” UBS Fi n. Servs., Inc. v. W. Vi rgi ni a Uni v. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 650 (2d C i r. 2011) (ci ting mul ti pl e di cti o nary defi ni ti o ns). Bl a ck’s Law Di c ti onary, whi ch provi des more granul a r defi ni ti ons, defi nes “customer” to i ncl ude “a person . . . for whom a bank has agreed to col l ect i tems.” Bl ack’s Law Di cti onary (10th ed. 2014). Regardl ess of whi ch defi ni ti o n we appl y, Tribune woul d qual i fy as C omputershare’s customer.

1 0 A ppe llan ts sugge st th at w e sh ould apply th e spe cialize d de fin ition of“custome r ” give ninSe ction 761( 9) , se e A ppe llan ts’ Re ply in Suppor t ofM otionto Re call th e M an date at 10- 11, w hich appe ar s ina subch apte r de alin g w ithcommodity br oke r liq uidation s. Se e 11 U .S.C. § 761( 9) . Se ction 761( 9) ’ s de fin ition, un like th e de fin ition of“custome r ” f r om Se ction 741( 2) , is n ot e xplicitly disclaime d inSe ction 101( 22) . Non e th e le ss, w e be lie ve it is cle ar th at th e de fin ition s fr om Se ction 761( 9) an d Se ction 101( 22) ar e n o t in te n de d to be coe xte n sive . Fir st, th e r e is n o in dication inSe ction 101( 22) ’ s te xt th at Se ction 761( 9) ’ s limite d de fin ition of “custome r ” sh ould apply. M or e ove r, Se ction 101( 22) ’ s e xplicit disclaime r ofSe ction 741( 2) ’s de fin ition sugge sts th at “custome r ” sh ould be give na br oad me an in g, so it w o uld be odd to h old – w ith out an y te xtual in dication – th at th e de fin ition inSe ction 761( 9) cir cumscr ibe s Se ction 101( 22) . Inaddition , oth e r subse ction s ofSe ction 101 e xplicitly in cor por ate de fin ition s f r om Se ction 761, in cludin g its de fin ition of“custome r ” spe cif ically. Se e , e .g. , 11 U .S.C. § 101( 6) ( “Th e te r m ‘ commodity br oke r ’ me an s futur e s commission me r ch an t, f or e ignfutur e s commission me r ch an t, cle ar in g or gan ization , le ve rage tr an saction me r ch an t, or commodity option s de ale r, as de fin e d inse ction 761 ofth is title , w ithr e spe ct to w h ich th e r e is a custome r, as de fin e d inse ction 761 ofth is title .”) . Th us, ifCon gr e ss h ad in te n de d to impor t Se ction 761( 9) ’ s de fin ition in to Se ction 101( 22) , it cle ar ly kn e w h o w ( ye t de clin e d) to do so. 26C omputershare agreed to col l ect i tems for Tribune by recei ving the tendered

shares and retai ni ng them, and Tribune bought C omputershare’s servi ces by retai ni ng C omputershare to act as Deposi tary. It i s l i kewi se pl ain that C omputershare was Tribune’s agent. “[S]tatutes empl oying common-l aw terms,” such as agent, “are presumed . . . ‘to i ncorporate the establ i shed meani ng of th[o]se terms,’” absent a contrary i ndi cati on. U.S. ex rel . O' Donnel lv. C o untrywi de Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 657 (2d C i r. 2016) (quoting Nati onwi d e Mut. Ins. C o. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)). Here, the parti es have not i denti fi ed any reason why the term “agent,” for the purposes of Secti o n 101(22), shoul d be gi ven anythi ng other than i t s common-l aw meaning, and we have i denti fi ed none. Thus, we wi l lappl y i ts common-l aw meaning. At common l aw, “[a]gency i s the fi duci ary rel ati onshi p that ari ses when one person (a ‘pri nci pal ’) mani fests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shal lact on the pri nci pal ’s behal f and subject to the pri nci pal ’s control, and the agent mani fests assent or otherwi se consents so to act.” Restatement (Thi rd) of Agency § 1.01 (2006); see al so C ommerci alUni on Ins. C o. v. Al i t al i a Ai rl ines, S.p.A., 347 F.3d 448, 462 (2d C i r. 2003) (“Establ i shment of [an agency] rel ati onshi p requi res facts suffi ci ent to show (1) the pri nci pal ’s mani festati on of

27i ntent to grant authori ty to the agent, and (2) agreement by the agent. In

addi ti on, the pri nci palmust maintain control o ver key aspects of the undertaki ng.”) (i nternal ci tati ons omi tted). General ly, “[w]hether an agency rel ati onshi p exi sts i s a mi xed questi on of l aw and fact.” C ommerci alUni on Ins., 347 F.3d at 462. However, the exi stence of an agency rel a ti onshi p can be resol ved “as a matter of l aw” i f: ”(1) the facts are undi sputed; or (2) there i s but one way for a reasonabl e jury to interpret them.” GarantiFinansalKi ral ama A.S. v. Aqua Mari ne & Tradi ng Inc., 697 F.3d 59, 71 (2d C i r. 2012). Here, Tribune mani fested i ts intent to grant authori ty to C omputershare by deposi ting the aggregate purchase pri ce for the shares wi th C omputershare and entrusti ng C omputershare to pay the tenderi ng sharehol ders. C omputershare, i n turn, mani fested i ts assent by accepti ng the funds and effectuati ng the transacti on. Then, as the transacti on proceeded, Tribune mai ntained control over key aspects of the undertaki ng. See Tribune Offer to Purchase at 81, In re Tri bune C o., No. 08-13141 (KJC ) (Bankr. D. Del . Aug. 20, 2010), EC F Nos. 5437-5, 5437-6 (“For purposes of the Tender Offer, [Tri bune] wi l lbe deemed to have accepted payment . . . shares that are properl y tendered and not properl y wi thdrawn onl y when, as and i f

we gi ve oralor wri tten noti ce to [C omputershare] of our

28acceptance of the shares for payment pursuant to the Tender Offer . . .”).

Accordi ngly, the undi sputed facts establ i sh that C omputershare was Tribune’s agent, 1 1 and we concl ude that Tribune was a “fi nanci alinsti tuti o n” wi th respect to the LBO payments. That concl usi on does not end our assessment of whether the payments are subject to Secti on 546(e), however, because we must al so determi ne whether al l of the payments were made “i n connecti o n wi th a securi ti es contract.” See Appel l ees’ Opposi ti o n to Appel l ants’ Moti on to Recal lthe Mandate at 20; Appel l ants’ Repl y in Support of Moti on to Recal lthe Mandate at 10.

(i i ) The Payments were Made i n C onnecti o n wi th a “Securi ti es C ontract” As stated above, Secti on 546(e) covers transfers “made by or to (or for the benefi t of) a . . . financi ali nsti tuti on, . . . i n connecti on wi th a securi ti es contract, as defi ned i n secti on 741(7)[.]” 1211 U.S.C . § 546(e). Appel l ants do not di spute

1 1 Th e de cision cite d by appe llan ts, M an uf actur e r s H an ove r Tr . Co. v. Yan akas, 7 F.3d 310 ( 2d Cir . 1993) , se e A ppe llan ts’ Re ply in Suppor t ofM otionto Re call th e M an date at 10, is in apposite . Th at de cision in volve d th e application of th e r ule th at, un de r n or mal cir cumstan ce s, a cr e ditor

- de btor r e lation sh ip doe s n ot amoun t to a f iduciar y r e lation sh ip. M an uf actur e r s H an ove r Tr ., 7 F.3d at 319. Tr ibun e an d Compute rsh ar e w e r e n ot ina cr e ditor

de btor r e lation sh ip.

1 2 Se ction 546( e ) also cove r s ce r tain “se ttle me n t payme n ts,” w h ich n e e d n ot be “in con n e ction w itha se cur itie s con tr act,” se e 11 U .S.C. § 546( e ), but appe lle e s’ th e o r y is th at th e 29that “approxi matelyhal f” of the payments were made i n connecti on wi th a

securi ti es contract because they i nvol ved the purchase of shares. See Appel l ants’ Repl y in Support of Moti on to Recal lthe M andate at 10 (acknowl edgi ng that the term “securi ti es contract,” for these purposes, “encompas ses contracts ‘to purchase shares’”) (emphasi s removed). However, they contend that the remai ni ng payments were not made i n connecti on wi th a securi ti es contract because they i nvol ved the redempti on, rather than the purchase, of shares. See i d. We di sagree wi th appel l ants. The term “redempti on,” i n the securi ti es context, means “repurchase.” See Quebecor, 719 F.3d at 99 (“General ly, ‘to redeem i s defi ned as to purchase back; to regai n possessi on by payment of a sti pul ated pri ce; to repurchase; to regai n, as mortgage property, by payi ng what i s due; to recei ve back by payi ng the obl i g ati on.’”) (qu o ting In re Uni ted Educ. C o., 153 F. 169, 171 (2d C i r. 1907)); Merri am-Webster’s C ol l egi ate Di cti onary 1042 (11th ed. 2003) (defi ni ng “redeem” as “to buy back” or “repurchase”). Secti on 741(7) defi nes “securi ti es contract” capaci ousl y to incl u d e, i nter al i a, a "contract

payme n ts ar e cove r e d be cause th e y w e r e tr an sf e r s made incon ne ction w itha se cur itie s con tr act. Se e Appe lle e s’ Opposition to A ppe llan ts’ M otionto Re call th e M an date at 20. Th us, w e ar e n ot de cidin g w h e th e r th e payme n ts at issue qu alify as “se ttle me n t payme n ts” un de r Se ction 546( e )

. 30for the purchase [or] sal e . . . of a securi ty, . . . incl uding any repurchase . . .

transacti on on any such securi ty,” 11 U.S.C . § 741(7)(A)(i ) (emphasi s added), as wel las “any other agreement or transacti o n that i s si mi l ar to an agreement or transacti on referred to i n thi s subparagraph.” 11 U.S.C

. § 741(7)(A)(vi i ); see al so In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC , 773 F.3d 411, 417 (2d C i r. 2014) (observi ng that Secti on 741(7)“defi nes ‘securi ti es contract’ wi th extraordi nary breadth”). Thus, we have no troubl e concl uding, based on Secti on 741(7)’s pl a in l anguage, that al lof the payments at i ssue, i ncl uding those connected to the redempti on of shares, were “i n connecti o n wi th a securi ti es contract.”

(i i i ) C oncl usi on For the foregoi ng reasons, we agree wi th appel l ees that the payments at i ssue remai n subject to Secti o n 546(e) fol l owing Meri t Mgmt

. 2. C onfl i c t-Preempti on Law Under the Supremacy C l ause, Arti cl e VI, C l ause 2 of the C onsti tuti on, federal l aw prevai l s when i t confl i cts wi th state l aw. Ari zona v. Uni ted States, 132 S. C t. 2492, 2500 (2012). As di scussed throughout thi s opi ni on, Secti on 546(e)’s reference to l i mi ting avoi dance by a trustee provi des appel l ants wi th a pl ai n l anguage argument that

31onl y a trustee et al ., and not credi tors acti ng on thei r own behal f, are barred from

bri ngi ng state l aw, constructi ve fraudul ent avoi dance cl ai ms. However, as di scussed i nfra, we bel i eve that the l anguage of Secti on 546(e) does not necessari l y have the meani ng appel l ants ascribe to i t. Even i f that meaning i s one of mul ti pl e reasonabl e constructi o ns of the statutory scheme, i t woul d not necessari l y precl ude preempti o n because a preempti ve effect may be i nferred where i t i s not expressl y provi ded. Under the i mpl i ed preempti on doctri ne, 13state l aws are “pre-empted to the extent of any confl i ct wi th a federal statute. Such a confl i ct occurs . . . when [] state l aw stands as an obstacl e to the accompl i shment and executi on of the ful l purposes and objecti ves of C ongress.” Hi l l man v. Maretta, 133 S. C t. 1943, 1949-50 (2013) (ci tati ons and i nternal quotati on marks omi tted); accord In re MethylTerti ary ButylEther (MTBE) Prods. Li ab. Li ti g., 725 F.3d 65, 97 (2d C i r. 2013) cert. deni ed sub nom. Exxon Mobi lC orp. v. C i ty of New York, 134 S. C t.

1 3 W e se e n o n e e d f or a full discussion ofvar ious mode s ofan alysis use d to de te r min e f e de r al pr e e mption, i.e ., “e x pr e ss” pr e e mption, Ch ambe r ofComme r ce v. W h itin g, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 ( 2011) , “fie ld” pr e e mption, A r izon a v. U n ite d State s, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 ( 2012) , or e ve n th at br an chof“implie d” pr e e mption th at r e qu ir e s a sh ow in g of“impossibility” of complyin g w ithboth state an d f e de r al law , id. at 2501. Th e on ly r e le van t an alysis in th e pr e se n t matte r is pr e e mption in f e r r e d f r om a con flict be tw e e nstate law an d th e pur pose s of f e de r al law , as discusse d inth e te x t.

321877 (2014) (courts wi l lfi nd i mpl i ed preempti on when “state l a w di rectl y

confl i cts wi th the structure and purpose of a federal statute”) (ci tati on and i nternal quotati on marks omi tted). Appel l ants argue that a recogni zed presumpti on agai nst preempti on l i mi ts the i mpl i ed preempti on doctri ne. They argue that Secti on 546(e) preempts credi tors’ state l aw, fraudul ent conveyance cl a i ms onl y i f

the cl ai ms woul d do “‘major damage’ to ‘cl ear and substanti al ’ federal i nterests.” Resp. & Repl y Br. of Pl s.-Appel l ants-C ross-Appel l ees 45 (quoting Hi l l man, 133 S. C t. 1943, 1950 (2013) (ci tati on omi tted)). The presumpti on agai nst i nferri ng preempti on i s premi sed on federal i sm grounds and, therefore, wei ghs most heavi ly where the parti cul ar regul atory area i s “tradi ti onal l y the domain of state l aw.” Hi l l man, 133 S. C t . at 1950; see al so Madei ra v. Affordabl e Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 241 (2d C i r. 2006) (“The mere fact of ‘tensi on’ between federal and state l aw i s general l y not enough to establ i sh an obstacl e supporti ng preempti on, parti cul arl y when the state l aw i nvol v es the exerci se of tradi ti onalpol i ce power.”). Accordi ng to appel l ants, the presumpti on agai nst preempti on ful l y appl i es i n the present context because fraudul ent conveyance cl a i ms are “among ‘the ol d est [purposes] wi thin the ambi t

33of the pol i ce power.’” Resp. & Repl y Br. of Pl s.-Appel l ants-C ross-Appel l ees 36

(quoting C al i forni a v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 734 (1949)). Preempti on i s al ways a matter of congressi onal intent, even where that i ntent must be i nferred. See C i pol l one v. Li ggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (congressi onali ntent i s the “ul ti mate touchstone of pre-empti on anal ysi s”) (quoting Mal one v. Whi te Motor C orp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)) (i nternal quotati o n marks omi tted); N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P’shi p v. Town of C l arkstown, 612 F.3d 97, 104 (2d C i r. 2010) (“The key to the preempti on i nqui ry i s the i ntent of C ongress.”). As i n the present matter, the presumpti on agai nst preempti on usual l ygoes to the wei ght to be gi ven to the l ack of an express statement overri di ng state l aw. The presumpti on i s strongest when C ongress i s l egi sl ating i n an area recogni zed as tradi ti onal lyone of state l a w al one. See Hi l l man, 133 S. C t. at 1950 (stating that because “[t]he regul ati o n of domesti c rel ati o ns i s tradi ti onal ly the domain of state l aw . . . [t]here i s [] a presumpti o n agai nst pre-empti on”) (i nternal quotati o n marks and ci t ati o n omi tted). However, the present context i s not such an area. To understate the proposi ti on, the regul ati o n of credi t ors’ ri ghts has “a

34hi story of si gni fi cant federal presence.” Uni t ed States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 90

(2000). C ongress’s power to enact bankruptcy l aws was made expl i ci t in the C onsti tuti on as ori ginal l y enacted, Art. 1, § 8, cl . 4, and detai l ed, preempti ve federal regul ati o n of credi tors’ ri ghts has, therefore, exi sted for over two centuri es. C harl es Jordan Tabb, The Hi story of the Bankruptcy Laws i n the Uni ted States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5, 7 (1995). Once a party enters bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy C ode consti tutes a whol esal e preempti o n of state l aws regardi ng credi tors’ ri ghts. See Eastern Equi p. and Servs. C orp. v. Factory Point Nat. Bank, Benni ngton, 236 F.3d 117, 120 (2d C i r. 2001) (“The Uni ted States Bankruptcy C ode provi d es a comprehensi ve federal system of penal ti es and protecti ons to govern the orderl y conduct of debtors’ affai rs and credi tors’ ri ghts.”); In re Mi l es, 430 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th C i r. 2005) (“C ongress i ntended the Bankruptcy C ode to create a whol e scheme under federal controlthat woul d adjust al lof the ri ghts and duti es of credi tors and debtors al i ke . . . .”). C onsi der, for exampl e, the present proceedi ng. Whi l e the i ssue before us i s often described as whether Secti on 546(e) preempts state fraudul ent conveyance l aws, Resp. & Repl y Br. of Pl s.-Appel l ants-C ross-Appel l ees 33, that i s a

35mi scharacteri zati on. Appel l ants’ state l aw cl ai m s were preempted when the

C hapter 11 proceedi ngs commenced and were not di smi ssed. Appel l ants’ own arguments posi t that those cl ai ms were, at the very l east, stayed by C ode Secti on 362. Whether, as appel l ants argue, they were restored i n ful lafter two years, see 11 U.S.C

. § 546(a)(1)(A), or by order of the bankruptcy court, see 11 U.S.C . § 349(b)(3), i s hotl y di sputed. But i f they were restored, i t was by force of federal l aw. Once Tribune entered bankruptcy, the credi tors’ avoi dance cl a i ms were vested i n the federal ly appoi nted trustee et al . 11 U.S.C . § 544(b)(1). A constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance acti o n brought by a trustee et al . under Secti o n 544 i s a cl ai m ari si ng under federal l aw. See In re Intel l i gent Di rect Mktg., 518 B.R. 579, 587 (E.D. C al

. 2014); In re Tri nsum Grp., Inc., 460 B.R. 379, 387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Sunbri dge C api tal, Inc., 454 B.R. 166, 169 n.16 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011); In re C harys Hol d ing C o ., Inc., 443 B.R. 628, 635-36 (Bankr. D. Del . 2010). Al though such a cl ai m borrows appl i cabl e state l aw standards regardi ng avoi di ng the transfer i n questi on, see Uni versal C hurch v. Gel tzer, 463 F.3d 218, 222 n.1 (2d C i r. 2006), the cl ai m has i ts own statute of l i mi tati ons, 11 U.S.C . § 546(a)(1)(A), measure of damages, see 11 U.S.C . § 550, and standards for

36di stributi on, 11 U.S.C . § 726. A di sposi ti on of thi s federal l aw cl ai m extingui shes

the ri ght of credi tors to bri ng state l a w, fraudul ent conveyance cl ai m s. See St. PaulFi re, 884 F.2d at 701 di sapproved of on other grounds by In re Mi l l er, 197 B.R. 810 (W.D.N.C

. 1996) (noti ng that “credi tors are bound by the outcome of the trustee’s acti on”); see al so In re PWS Hol di ng C orp., 303 F.3d 308, 314-15 (3d C i r. 2002) (barri ng credi tor’s state l aw, fraudul ent transfer cl ai ms after trustee rel eased § 544 cl ai ms). And, i f credi tors are al l o wed by a bankruptcy court, trustee, or, as appel l ants argue, by the Bankruptcy C ode, to bri ng state l aw acti ons i n thei r own name, that permi ssi on i s a matter of grace granted under federal authori ty. The standards for granti ng that permi ssi on, moreover, have everythi ng to do wi th the Bankruptcy C ode’s bal anci ng of debtors’ and credi tors’ ri ghts, In re C o l tex Loop C ent. Three Partners, L.P., 138 F.3d 39, 44 (2d C i r. 1998), or ri ghts among credi t ors, Uni ted States v. Ron Pai r Enters, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 248 (1989), and nothi ng to do wi th the vi ndi cati on of state pol i ce powers. We al so note here, and di scuss further i nfra, that the pol i ci es refl ected in Secti o n 546(e) rel ate to securi ti es markets, whi ch are subject to extensi ve federal regul a ti on. The regul ati on of these markets has exi sted and grown for over ei ghty years and refl ects very i mportant federal concerns.

37In the present matter, therefore, there i s no measurabl e concern about

federal i ntrusi on i nto tradi ti o nalstate domains. Our bottom l ine i s that the i ssue before us i s one of i nferri ng congressi onalintent from the C ode, wi thout si gni fi c ant countervai l ing pressures of state l aw concerns. 3. The Language of Secti on 546(e) Secti on 544(b) empowers a trustee et al . to avoi d a “transfer . . . [by] the debtor . . . voi dabl e under appl i cabl e l aw by a[n] [unsecured] credi tor.” Secti on 548(a) al so provi des the trustee et al . wi th independent federal intenti onal, 11 U.S.C . § 548(a)(1)(A), and constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance cl ai m s, 11 U.S.C . § 548(a)(1)(B). Secti on 546(e) provi des i n perti nent part: Notwi thstandi ng secti ons 544, . . . 548(a)(1)(B) . . . of thi s ti tl e, the trustee may not avoi d a transfer that i s a . . . settl ement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefi t of) a . . . stockbroker, fi nanci alinsti tuti on, fi nanci al parti ci pant, or securi ti es cl eari ng agency, or that i s a transfer made by or to (or for the benefi t of) a . . . stockbroker, fi nanci alinsti tuti on, fi nanci al parti ci pant, or securi ti es cl eari ng agency, in connecti on wi th a securi ti es contract . . . except under secti on 548(a)(1)(A). . . . Id. § 546(e). Secti on 546(e) thus expressl y prohibi t s trustees et al

. from usi ng thei r Secti o n 544(b) avoi dance powers and (general ly) Secti on 548 agai nst the transfers speci fi ed i n Secti on 546(e). However, Secti on 546(e) creates an excepti on to that

38prohibi ti on for cl ai m s brought by trustee et al

. under Secti on 548(a)(1)(A) that, as

noted, establ i shes a federal avoi dance cl ai m to be brought by a trustee et al

. based on an i ntenti o nalfraud theory. As di scussed supra, the Li ti gati on Trust brought a Secti on 548(a)(1)(A) cl ai m against the same transfers chal l enged by appel l ants’ acti ons before us on thi s appeal, whi ch was sti l lpendi ng when appel l ants’ cl ai ms were di smi ssed. The l anguage of Secti on 546(e) covers al ltransfers by or to covered enti ti es that are “settl ement payment[s]” or “i n connecti o n wi th a securi ti es contract.” Transfers i n whi ch ei ther the transferor or transferee i s not a covered enti ty are cl earl y incl uded i n the l anguage, so l ong as one of the two i s a covered enti ty. The Secti on does not di sti ngui sh between ki nds of transfers, e.g., settl ements of ordi nary day-to-day tradi ng, LBOs, or mergers i n whi ch sharehol ders of one company are i nvoluntari l y cashed out. So l ong as the transfer sought to be avoi ded i s wi thin the l anguage quoted above, the Secti on i ncl udes avoi dance proceedi ngs i n whi ch the covered enti ty woul d escape a damages judgment. But see In re Lyondel lC hem. C o., 503 B.R. 348, 372-73 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), as corrected (Jan. 16, 2014) (hol d ing that Secti o n 546(e) does not i ncl ude “LBO payments to stockhol ders at the very end of the asset transfer chai n, where the

39stockhol d ers are the ul ti mate benefi ci ari es of the constructi vel yfraudul ent

transfers, and can gi ve the money back to i njured credi tors wi th no damage to anyone but themsel ves”). 4. Appel l ants’ LegalTheory Appel l ants’ state l aw, constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance cl ai ms purport to be brought under mai nstream bankruptcy procedures di rectl y mandated by the C ode. However, an exami nati on of the C o de as a whol e, i n contrast wi th an i sol ated focus on the word “trustee” i n Secti on 546(e), reveal s that appel l ants’ theory rel i es upon adheri ng to statutory l anguage onl y when opportune and resol ving vari ous ambi gui ti es i n a way conveni ent to that theory. Even then, thei r l egaltheory resul ts i n anomal i es and i nconsi stenci es wi th parts of the C ode. The consequence of those ambi gui ti es, anomal i es, and confl i cts i s that a reader of Secti o n 546(e), at the ti me of enactment, woul d not have necessari l y concl uded that the reference onl y to a trustee et al . meant that credi tors may at some poi nt bri ng state l aw cl a i ms seeki ng the very rel i ef barred to the trustee et al . by Secti on 546(e). Its meaning, therefore, i s not pl ai n.

40(i ) Appel l ants’ Theory of Fraudul ent C o nveyance Avoi d ance Proceedi ngs Appel l ants’ theory goes as fol l ows. When a debtor enters bankruptcy, al l “l egalor equi tabl e interests of the debtor i n property,” 11 U.S.C . § 541(a)(1), vest i n the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Thi s property i ncludes l egalcl ai ms that coul d have been brought by the debtor. See U.S. ex rel . Spi cer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 361-62 (5th C i r. 2014) (“The phrase ‘al ll egalor equi tabl e i nterests’ i ncl udes l egalcl ai ms–whether based on state or federal l aw.”). Therefore, “the Trustee i s conferred wi th the authori ty to represent al lcredi tors and the Debtor’s estate and wi th the sol e responsibi l i ty of bri ngi ng acti ons on behal f of the Debtor’s estate to marshalassets for the estate’s credi tors.” In re Stei n, 314 B.R. 306, 311 (D.N.J. 2004). However, fraudul ent conveyance cl ai ms proceed on a theory that an i nsol vent debtor may not make what are essenti al l y gi fts that depri ve credi tors of assets avai l abl e to pay debts. See Grupo Mexi cano de Desarrol l o S.A. v. Al l i ance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999). Therefore, before a bankruptcy takes pl ace, fraudul ent conveyance cl ai m s bel ong to credi tors rather than to the debtor. As a consequence, Secti on 544(b)(1) provi des that a bankruptcy trustee may avoi d “any transfer of an i nterest of the debtor . . . that i s voi dabl e under

41appl i cabl e l aw by a credi tor hol di ng an unsecured cl ai m.” 11 U.S.C . § 544(b)(1).

The responsibi l i ty of the trustee et al . i s to “step i nto the shoes of a credi tor under state l aw and avoi d any transfers such a credi tor coul d have avoi ded.” Uni v. C hurch v. Gel tzer, 463 F.3d 218, 222 n.1 (2d C i r. 2006). The trustee et al ., however, i s subject to a statute of l i m i tati ons that requi res such cl ai m s to be brought wi thin two years of the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedi ng. See 11 U.S.C . § 546(a)(1)(A). Appel l ants i nfer from thi s statute of l i mi t ati o ns that i f the trustee et al . fai l s to act to enforce such cl ai ms duri ng that two-year peri od, the cl ai ms revert to credi tors who may then pursue thei r own state l aw, fraudul ent conveyance acti ons. Resp. & Repl y Br. of Pl s.- Appel l ants-C ross-Appel l ees 1. Thi s posi ti on assumes that, al though the power to bri ng such acti ons i s cl earl yvested i n the trustee et al . when the bankruptcy proceedi ng begi ns, i f the power i s not exerci sed, i t returns i n ful lfl ower to the credi tors after the bankruptcy ends or after two years. Appel l ants’ theory al so i s that thei r fraudul ent conveyance cl ai ms were onl y stayed under Secti o n 362(a), rather than exti ngui shed when assumed by the trustee on behal f of the bankrupt estate by the trustee et al

. under Secti on 544, and coul d be asserted by them as credi tors when the Secti on 362(a) stay was

42l i fted. Accordi ngl y, appel l ants argue, when the C ommi ttee di d not bri ng

constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance acti o ns agai nst the LBO transfers by December 8, 2010, appel l ants regai ned the ri ght to bri ng thei r own state l aw acti ons. See Resp. & Repl y Br. of Pl s.-Appel l ants-C ross Appel l ees 6. Moreover, they correctl y note that Secti on 362’s automati c stay was, as di scussed supra, l i fted. In ei ther case -- automati cal l yafter two years or by the bankruptcy court’s l i fting of the stay -- appel l ants assert that the ri ght to bri ng state l aw acti ons has reverted to them.

(i i ) Ambi gui ti es, Anomal i es, and C onfl i c ts When appel l ants’ arguments and thei r rel a ti on to the C ode are vi ewed, as we must vi ew them, i n thei r enti rety, In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 49 (2d C i r. 1997) (“The Supreme C ourt has thus expl ai ned . . . ‘we must not be gui d ed by a si ngl e sentence or [part] of a sentence [of the C ode], but l ook to the provi si ons of the whol e l aw, and to i ts object and pol i cy.’”) (quoting Kel l y v. Robi nson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986)), they reveal materi alambi gui ti es, anomal i es, and outri ght confl i cts wi th the purposes of C o de Secti ons 544, 362, and 548, not to menti on the outri ght confl i ct wi th Secti on 546(e) di scussed i nfra.

43A cri ti cal step i n the l ogi c of appel l ants’ theory fi nds no support i n the

l anguage of the C ode. In parti cul ar, the i nference that fraudul ent conveyance acti ons revert to credi tors i f ei ther the two-year statute of l i mi tati o ns passes wi thout an exerci se of the trustees’ et al . powers under Secti on 544 or the Secti on 362(a) stay i s l i fted by the bankruptcy court has no basi s in the C ode’s l anguage. To begi n, the l anguage of the automati c stay provi si on appl i es onl y to acti ons against “the debtor.” 11 U.S.C . § 362. To be sure, there are cases barri ng fraudul ent conveyance acti ons brought by credi tors before the passi ng of the l i mi t a ti ons peri od or l i fting of the stay. See, e.g., In re C rysen/ Montenay Energy C o., 902 F.2d 1098, 1101 (2d C i r. 1990). The rati onal es of these cases vary. Some rel y on Secti on 362(a) on the theory that the fraudul ent conveyance cl ai ms are the property of the debtors’ estate. See In re MortgageAmeri ca C orp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275-76 (5th C i r. 1983); Matter of Fl etcher, 176 B.R. 445, 452 (Bankr. W.D. Mi ch. 1995), rev’d and remanded on other grounds sub nom. In re Van Orden, No. 1:95- C V-79, 1995 WL 17903731 (W.D. Mi ch. Sept. 5, 1995). Some do not menti on Secti o n 362(a) and rel y on the need to protect trustees’ et al . powers to bri ng Secti o n 544 avoi dance acti ons. See In re Van Di epen, P.A., 236 F. App’x. 498, 502-03 (11th C i r. 2007); In re C l ark, 374 B.R. 874, 876 (Bankr. M.D. Al a. 2007); In re

44Tessmer, 329 B.R. 776, 780 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2005). Al l the casel aw agrees that the

trustee et al .’s powers under Secti on 544 are excl usi ve, at l east unti lthe stay i s l i fted or the two-year peri od expi res. Equal l y i mportant i s the fact that the i nference of a reversi on of fraudul ent conveyance cl ai m s to credi tors drawn from Secti on 544' s statute of l i m i t ati ons i s not based on the l anguage of the C ode, whi ch says nothi ng about the reversi on of cl a i ms vested i n the trustee et al . by Secti on 544. Statutes of l i mi tati on usual l y are i ntended to l i mi t the asserti on of stal e cl a i ms and to provi de peace to possibl e defendants, C o nverse v. Gen. Motors C o rp., 893 F.2d 513, 516 (2d C i r. 1990), and not to change the i denti ty of the authori zed pl ai nti ffs wi thout some express l anguage to that effect. A deci si ve part of appel l ants’ l egaltheory thus has no support i n the l anguage of the C ode. Even i f thi s gap i s assumed not to exi st, or can be otherwi se traversed, appel l ants’ theory encounters other seri ous probl ems. Secti on 544, vesti ng avoi dance powers i n the trustee et al ., i s i ntended to si mpl i fy proceedi ngs, reduce the costs of marshal l ing the debtor’s assets, and assure an eq ui tabl e di stributi on among the credi tors. See In re MortgageAmeri ca C orp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275-76 (5th C i r. 1983) (noti ng that “[t]he ‘strong arm’ provi si o n of the [Bankruptcy]

45C ode, 11 U.S.C

. § 544, al l o ws the bankruptcy trustee to step i nto the shoes of a

credi tor for the purpose of asserti ng causes of acti on under state fraudul ent conveyance acts for the benefi tof al lcredi tors, not just those who wi n a race to judgment” and Secti on 362 hel ps prevent “[a]cti o ns for the recovery of the debtor’s property by i ndi vi dualcredi tors under state fraudul ent conveyance l aws [that] woul d i nterfere wi th [the bankruptcy] estate and wi th the equ i tabl e di stributi on scheme dependent upon i t”). However, these purposes are hardl y consi stent wi th the process hypothesi zed by appel l ants. Accepti ng for purposes of argument appel l ants’ vi ew of the appl i cabl e process, Secti on 362, at the very l east, prevented appel l ants (for a ti me) from bri ngi ng thei r state l a w, fraudul ent conveyance cl ai ms, whi l e Secti on 546(e) barred the C ommi ttee from seeki ng to enforce or, necessari l y, to settl e them. Appel l ants’ argument thus seems to posi t that thei r cl ai ms are on hol d unti lthe trustees et al . deci de whether to bri ng an acti on they are powerl ess to bri ng or to pass on to credi tors a power they do not have. In short, i tassumes that, when credi tors’ avoi dance cl ai ms are l odged i n the trustee et al

. and are di mini shed i n that hand by the C ode, they reemerge i n undi mini shed form i n the hands of

46credi tors after the statute of l i m i tati ons governi ng acti ons by the trustee et al . has

run or the bankruptcy court l i fts the automati c stay. In the context of the C ode, however, any such process i s a gl ari ng anomaly . Secti o n 548(a)(1)(A) vests trustees wi th a federal cl ai m to avoi d the very transfers attacked by appel l ants’ state l aw cl ai ms –- but onl y on an i ntenti onal fraud theory. There i s l i ttl e apparent reason to l i m i ttrustees et al . to intenti onalfraud cl a i ms whi l e not exti ngui shing constructi v e fraud cl ai ms but rather l eaving them to be brought l ater by i ndi v i d ualcredi tors. In parti cul a r, enforcement of the i ntenti onalfraud cl ai m i s undermi ned i f credi tors can l ater bri ng state l aw, constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance cl a i ms invol ving the same transfers. Any trustee woul d have grave di ffi cul ty negoti a ting more than a nomi nal settl ement i n the federal acti on i f i t cannot precl ude state cl a i ms attacking the same transfers but not requi ri ng a showi ng of actualfraudul ent i ntent. Unabl e to settl e, a trustee et al . wi l lbe rel uctant to expend the estate’s resources on vi gorousl y pursui ng the federal cl ai m whi l e awai ting the stayed state cl ai ms to revert and to be l i ti gated by credi tors. As happened i n the present matter, the resul ti s that the trustee et al .’s acti on awai ts the pursui tof pi ecemealacti ons by credi tors. Thi s i s preci sel y opposi te of the i ntent of the C ode’s procedures. Whi l e a bankruptcy

47court can reduce the del ay by an earl y l i fting of the automati c stay wi th regard to

constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance acti o ns, that acti on woul d underl ine the anomal y of appl ying the stay to the bri ngi ng of cl ai ms that are barred to trustees et al

. Stayi ng ordi nary state l aw, constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance cl ai ms by i ndi vi dualcredi tors whi l e the trustee del iberates i s a rati onalmethod of avoi di ng pi ecemeall i ti gati on and ensuri ng an equ i tabl e di stributi o n of assets among credi tors. See MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hi l l, 436 F.3d 104, 108 (2d C i r. 2006) (“The objecti v es of the Bankruptcy C o de . . . i nclude . . . ‘the need to protect credi tors and reorgani z [ e] debtors from pi ecemeall i ti gati on . . . .’”) (quoting Ins. C o. of N. Am. v. NGC Settl ement Trust & Asbestos C l ai m s Mgmt. C orp., 118 F.3d 1056, 1069 (5th C i r. 1997)). However, the scheme descri bed by appel l ants does not resembl e thi s method ei ther i n si m pl i ci ty or i n the equi tabl e treatment of credi tors. To rati o nal i ze these anomal i es, appel l ants specul a te as to -- more accuratel y, i magine -- a del iberate bal anci ng of i nterests by C ongress. They argue that C o ngress wanted to bal ance the need for certai nty and fi nal i ty in securi ti es markets, recogni zed i n Secti on 546(e), agai nst the need to maxi mi ze credi tors’

48recoveri es, recogni zed i n vari ous other provi si o ns. C ongress di d so, they argue,

by l i mi ting only the avoi dance powers of trustees et al ., not those of i ndi vi dual credi tors (save for the stay), i n Secti on 546(e) because acti ons by trustees et al . are a greater threat to securi ti es markets than are acti ons by i ndi vi dualcredi tors. Resp. & Repl y Br. of Pl s.-Appel l ants-C ross-Appel l ees 71. That greater threat resul ts from the fact that a trustee’s power of avoi dance i s funded by the debtor’s estate, see 11 U.S.C . §§ 327, 330, supported by nati onal l ong-arm juri sdi cti on, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(d),(f), and can be used to avoi d the enti rety of a transfer, Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petrol eum C orp. (In re Tronox Inc.), 464 B.R. 606, 615-17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ci ting Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931)). C redi tors, i n turn, have no such fundi ng, are l i mi ted by state juri sdi cti onalrul es, and can sue onl y for thei r i ndi vi dual l osses. See In re Integrated Agri , Inc., 313 B.R. 419, 428 (Bankr. C .D. Il l . 2004). Therefore, appel l ants argue that a del iberate “bal ance” was struck by protecti ng securi ti es markets from trustees’ et al . acti ons whi l e subjecti ng them to the l esser di srupti on i ndi vi dualcredi tors’ acti ons mi ght cause after a two-year stay. Resp. & Repl y Br. of Pl s.-Appel l ants-C ross-Appel l ees 83- 85. For a court to upset thi s del i cate bal ance woul d consti tute judi c i alintrusi on on pol i cy deci si o ns ri ghtful l yl eft to the C ongress.

49However, the bal ance described above i s an ex post expl anati o n of a l egal

scheme that appel l ants must fi rst construct, and then justi fy as rati onal, because i t i s essenti alto thei r cl ai ms. Al though they argue that the scheme was del iberatel y constructed by C ongress, that argument l acks any support whatsoever i n the l egi sl a ti ve del iberati ons that l ed to Secti on 546(e)’s enactment. Moreover, appel l ants’ arguments understate the number of credi tors who woul d sue, i f al l o wed, and the correspondi ng extent of the danger to securi ti es markets. C redi tors may assi gn thei r cl ai ms and vari ous methods of aggregati on can l ead to bi l l i o ns of dol l ars of cl ai ms, as here.

(i i i ) No Pl ain Meani ng These i ssues refl ect ambi gui ti es as to exactl ywhat i s transferred to trustees et al . by Secti on 544(b)(1). It i s cl ear that trustees et al . own the debtors’ estates, whi ch i ncl ude the debtors’ property and l egalcl a i m s. See 11 U.S.C . § 541(a)(1) (Among other thi ngs, the “estate i s compri sed of . . . al ll egalor equi tabl e i nterests of the debtor i n property as of the commencement of the c ase”); U.S. ex rel . Spi cer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 361-62 (5th C i r. 2014) (“The phrase ‘al l l egalor equ i tabl e i nterests’ i ncl udes l egalcl ai ms -- whether based on state or federal l aw.”). Avoi d ance cl a i ms bel o ng to credi tors, however, and whether they

50become the property of the debtors’ estates i s a debated, and somewhat

metaphysi cal, i ssue. The i ssue does have a l i mi ted practi c albeari ng on the present matter, however. If the cl ai ms asserted by appel l ants became the property of the debtor’s estate upon Tri bune’s bankruptcy and were thereby l i mi t ed in the hands of the C ommi ttee, thei r reversi on i n an unal tered form, whether occurri ng automati cal l y or by act of the C ommi ttee or bankruptcy court, mi ght seem counteri ntui ti ve. Appel l ants’ rel i ance on the appl i cabi l i ty of the automati c stay to thei r cl a i ms woul d arguabl y support the “property” vi ew. The stay i s intended i n part to protect the property ri ghts of the trustee et al . i n the debtor’s estate. Subjecti ng avoi dance acti o ns by credi tors to the stay has been supported by vari ous courts on the ground that such cl ai ms are ei ther the property of the debtor’s estate or have an equi val ent l egalstatus. See In re MortgageAmeri ca C orp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275-76 (5th C i r. 1983); In re Swal l en’s, Inc., 205 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. S.D. Ohi o 1997); Matter of Fl etcher, 176 B.R. 445, 452 (Bankr. W.D. Mi ch. 1995). Whether, and to what degree, fraudul ent conveyance cl ai ms become the property of a bankrupt estate was, at the ti me of Secti on 546(e)’s enactment, and now, anythi ng but cl ear. The pri nci palSupreme C ourt precedent hel d that such

51cl a i ms are the property of the debtor’s estate. Tri mbl e v. Woodhead, 102 U.S.

647, 649 (1880). It i s a very ol d deci si on but has not been expressl y overrul ed. Subsequent court of appeal s deci si ons are bounti fulin contradi ctory statements regardi ng the property i ssue. C ompare In re C ybergeni c s C orp., 226 F.3d 237, 241, 246 (3d C i r. 2000) (stati ng that “fraudul ent transfer cl ai ms have l ong bel onged to a transferor’s credi tors, whose efforts to col l ect thei r debts have essenti al l y been thwarted as a consequence of the transferor’s acti ons” but al so noting that the debtor’s “‘ assets’ and ‘property of the estate’ have di fferent meani ngs, evi denced i n part by the numerous provi si o ns i n the Bankruptcy C ode that di sti ngui sh between property of the estate and property of the debtor, or refer to one but not the other”), and Pi card v. Fai rfi el d Greenwi ch Ltd., 762 F.3d 199, 212 (2d C i r. 2014) (“Our case l aw i s cl ear that assets targeted by a fraudul ent conveyance acti on do not become property of the debtor’s estate under the Bankruptcy C ode unti lthe Trustee obtai ns a favorabl e judgment.”), wi th C umberl and Oi lC o rp. v. Thropp, 791 F.2d 1037, 1042 (2d C i r. 1986) (noti ng that causes of acti on al l egi ng vi o l ati on of fraudul ent conveyance l aws woul d be property of the estate), and Nat’l Tax C redi t Partners v. Havl i k, 20 F.3d 705, 708- 09 (7th C i r. 1994) (“[T]he ri ght to recoup a fraudul ent conveyance, whi ch outsi d e

52of bankruptcy may be i nvoked by a credi tor, i s property of the estate that onl y a

trustee or debtor i n possessi on may pursue once a bankruptcy i s underway.”). Use of the term “property” as a short-hand way of suggesti ng excl usi vi ty has meri t, Henry E. Smi th, Property and Property Rul es, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1770-74 (2004), but Secti on 544(b)(1) does not expressl y state whether the bundl e of ri ghts transferred can revert. However, we need not resol ve ei ther the “property” or the reversi on i ssues. Whether the statutory l anguage has a pl ain meani ng turns on whether a consensus woul d have exi sted among reasonabl e, contemporaneous readers as to meani ng of that l anguage i n the parti cul ar statutory context. See Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d C i r. 2009) (“[W]e attempt to ascertai n how a reasonabl e reader woul d understand the statutory text, consi dered as a whol e.”); Engi ne Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. C oast Ai r Qual i ty Mgmt. Di st., 541 U.S. 246, 252-53 (2004) (noti ng that “[s]tatutory constructi on must begi n wi th the l anguage empl oyed by C ongress and the assumpti on that the ordi nary meani ng of that l anguage accuratel y expresses the l egi sl a ti ve purpose”) (qu o ting Park ‘N Fl y, Inc. v. Dol l ar Park & Fl y, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)). If di fferi ng vi ews as to meani ng were reasonabl e at the ti me of

53Secti o n 546(e)’s enactment, i ts meani ng i s l ess than pl ai n. See, e.g., Rodri guez v.

C uomo, 953 F.2d 33, 39-40 (2d C i r. 1992). Appel l ants’ arguments on meani ng rel ynot onl y on the reference to a trustee’s et al . powers but equ al l y, or more so, on a cl ai m of settl ed l aw at the ti m e of Secti on 546(e)’s enactment that credi tors’ avoi dance ri ghts not onl y revert to credi tors but al so revert i n thei r ori g inalbreadth. However, whether fraudul ent conveyance cl a i ms revert as a matter of l aw upon a trustee’s fai l ure to act was, both at the ti me Secti on 546(e) was passed as wel las now, uncl ear, as di scussed supra. A contemporaneous reader woul d not, therefore, necessari l y have bel i eved i t pl ain that Secti on 546(e)’s reference onl y to a trustee’s et al

. avoi dance cl ai m meant that credi tors coul d bri ng thei r own cl ai ms. 1 4 A contemporaneous reader woul d al so noti ce that the l anguage of the automati c stay provi si on does not l i teral l yappl y to appel l ants’ acti ons and that no provi si on for the reversi on of cl ai ms vested i n the trustee et al . by Secti on 544 exi sts. As expl ained supra, havi ng to draw an i nference of reversi on of ri ghts from that provi si on’s statute of l i m i tati ons mi ght wel lhave appeared as a l eap several bri dges too far to such a reader. Indeed, the vesti ng of avoi dance cl ai ms

1 4 Our task ofde te rmin in g h ow a con te mpor an e ous r e ade r w ould h ave r e ad Se ction 546( e ) doe s n ot de p e n d onth e case law ofon e par ticular cir cuit. 54i n the trustee et al ., the l ack of appl i cabl e l anguage i n the automati c stay

provi si on, and the l ack of a statutory basi s for reversi o n mi ght wel lhave suggested to such a reader that Secti on 544’s vesti ng of avoi dance proceedi ngs i n the trustee et al . cut off credi t ors from any avoi dance ri ghts other than a share of the proceeds i n bankruptcy. Even passi ng these obstacl es, the structure of the C ode and the rel ati onshi p of i ts perti nent secti ons mi ght have suggested to a contemporaneous reader that al tered ri ghts do not revert to credi tors unal tered, or to put i t another way, a trustee et al . cannot pass on, or “al l ow” to revert through passi vi ty, a ri ght the trustee et al . does not have. To be sure, contemporaneous readers mi ght have taken other vi ews, i ncl uding those of appel l ants, but that i s the very defi ni ti on of ambi gui ty. (i v) C oncl usi on We need not resol ve these i ssues or even hol d that the l ack of statutory support, ambi gui ti es, anomal i es, or confl i cts wi th purposes of the C ode are suffi ci ent to support a preempti on hol di ng. They are suffi ci ent, however, to di spel the suggesti ons found i n some di scussi o ns of these i ssues of a cl ear textual basi s for appel l ants’ theory i n the C ode and an overal lconsi stency wi th

55congressi onalpurpose. See In re Lyondel lC hem. C o ., 503 B.R. 348, 358-59

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) as corrected (Jan. 16, 2014); In re: Tri bune C o. Fraudul ent C onveyance Li ti g., 499 B.R. at 315. We al so need not i ssue a deci si on that affects fraudul ent conveyance acti ons brought by credi tors whose cl ai ms are not subject to Secti on 546(e). Our ensui ng di scussi on concl udes that the purposes and hi story of that Secti on necessari l y refl ect an i ntent to preempt the cl ai ms before us. We turn now to the confl i ct between those cl ai ms and Secti o n 546(e). 5. C onfl i c t wi th Secti on 546(e) As di scussed supra, the meani ng of Secti on 546(e) wi th regard to appel l ants’ ri ghts to bri ng the acti ons before us i s ambi guous. We must, therefore, l ook to i t s l anguage, l egi sl ati ve hi story, and purposes to determi ne i ts effect. Marvel C haracters, Inc. v. Si mon, 310 F.3d 280, 290 (2d C i r. 2002). Every congressi onalpurpose refl ected i n Secti on 546(e), however narrow or broad, i s i n confl i ct wi th appel l ants’ l egaltheory. Thei r cl ai ms are, therefore, preempted. Secti on 546(e) was i ntended to protect from avoi dance proceedi ngs payments by and to commodi ti es and securi ti es fi rms i n the settl ement of securi ti es transacti ons or the executi on of securi ti es contracts. The method of settl ement through such enti ti es i s essenti alto securi ti es markets. Payments by

56and to such enti ti es provi de certai nty as to each transacti o n’s consummati on,

speed to al l ow parti es to adjust the transacti on to market condi ti ons, fi nal i ty wi th regard to i nvestors’ stakes i n fi rms, and thus stabi l i ty to financi almarkets. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-420 (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 (1977). Unwi ndi ng settl ed securi ti es transacti ons by cl ai ms such as appel l ants’ woul d seri ousl y undermi ne - - a substanti al understatement -- markets i n whi ch certai nty, speed, fi nal i ty, and stabi l i ty are necessary to attract capi tal . To al l ow appel l ants’ cl ai ms to proceed, we woul d have to construe Secti on 546(e) as achi eving the opposi te of what i t was i ntended to achi eve. Al l owing credi tors to bri ng cl ai ms barred by Secti o n 546(e) to the trustee et al . onl yafter the trustee et al . fai l s to exerci se powers i t does not have woul d i ncrease the di srupti ve effect of an unwi ndi ng by l engtheni ng the peri od of uncertai nty for covered enti ti es and i nvestors. Indeed, the i dea of preventi ng a trustee from unwi ndi ng speci fi ed transacti ons whi l e al l owing credi tors to do so, but onl y l ater, i s a pol i cy in a frui tl ess search of a l ogi calrati o nal e. The narrowest purpose of Secti on 546(e) was to protect other commodi ti es and securi ti es fi rms from avoi dance cl ai ms seeki ng to unwind a bankrupt commodi ti es or securi ti es fi rm’s transacti o ns that consummated transfers

57between customers. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-420, at 1 (1982) (“The commodi ti es and

securi ti es markets operate through a compl ex system of accounts and guarantees. Because of the structure of the cl eari ng systems i n these i ndustri es and the someti mes vol ati l e nature [of] the markets, certai n protecti ons are necessary to prevent the i nsol vency of one commodi ty or securi ty fi rm from spreadi ng to other fi rms and possibl [y] threateni ng the col l apse of the affected market.”). It must be emphasi zed that appel l ants’ l egaltheory woul d cl earl y al l ow such cl a i ms to be brought (l ater) by credi tors of the bankrupt fi rm. Even the narrowest purpose of Secti on 546(e) i s thus at ri sk. Some judi ci aland other di scussi ons of these i ssues avoi d addressi ng the ful leffects of adopti ng appel l ants’ arguments. See In re Lyondel lC hem. C o., 503 B.R. 348, 359-78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) as corrected (Jan. 16, 2014). Such anal ysi s al ways begi ns by rel i ance on the “trustee” l anguage, i d. at 358, but then narrows the scope of the transfers covered by Secti on 546(e)’s l anguage. For exampl e, appel l ants argue that the concerns of the ami cu s curi ae Securi ti es and Exchange C ommi ssi on regardi ng the effect of the di stri ct court’s deci si o n on the securi ti es markets are mi spl aced, because appel l ants are not seeki ng money from the

58i ntermedi ari es. 15Resp. & Repl y Br. of Pl s.-Appel l ants C ross-Appel l ees 78-82. In

doi ng so, they rel yupon the Lyondel lopi ni on, whi ch, after rel ying on the “trustee” l anguage, hel d that Secti on 546(e) i s not preempti ve of state l aw, fraudul ent conveyance acti ons i nvol ving LBOs because such acti ons do not i mpl i cate the purposes of Secti on 546(e). 503 B.R. at 372-73. There i s no l i ttl e i rony i n putting l ynchpi n rel i ance on the word “trustee” whi l e i gnori ng the l anguage that fol l ows. In any event, for the reasons stated above, Secti on 546(e)’s l anguage i s broad enough under certai n ci rcumstances to cover a bankrupt fi rm’s LBO payments even where, as here, that fi rm’s busi ness was pri mari l y commerci ali n nature. 11 U.S.C . § 546(e) (l i mi tati ons on avoi dance of transfers made by a “customer” of a fi nanci alinsti tuti on “i n connecti on wi th a securi ti es contract”). A search for l egi sl ati ve purpose i s heavi l y informed by l anguage, and anal yzing al lthe l anguage of a provi si on and i ts rel ati onshi p to the C ode as a whol e i s preferabl e to using l i t eral ness here and percei ved l egi sl ati ve purpose (wi thout regard to l anguage) where as needed to reach parti cul ar

1 5 U n de r th e “Collapsin g Doctr in e ,” “[ c] o ur ts an alyzin g th e e ff e ct ofLBOs h ave r outin e ly an alyze d th e m by r e f e r e n ce to th e ir e con omic substan ce , ‘ collapsin g’ th e m, in man y case s, to con side r th e ove r all e ff e ct ofmulti- ste p tr an saction s.” In r e Lyon de ll Ch e m. Co., 503 B.R. 348, 354, 379 ( Ban kr . S.D.N.Y. 2014) as cor re cte d ( J an . 16, 2014) . M on ie s passe d th r ough in te r me diar ie s ar e de e me d to be th e pr ope r ty on ly ofth e ultimate r e cipie n ts, h e r e th e cash e d out sh ar e holde r s. 59resul ts. See Ki ng v. Burwel l, 135 S. C t. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“[O]ftenti mes the

meani ng -- or ambi gui ty -- of certai n words or phrases may onl y become evi dent when pl aced i n context. So when deci di ng whether the l anguage i s pl ai n, we must read the words i n thei r context and wi th a vi ew to thei r pl ace i n the overal l statutory scheme. Our duty, after al l, i s to construe statutes, not i sol ated provi si ons.”) (i nternalquotati on marks and ci tati ons omi tted). We do not dwel lon thi s because we percei ve no confl i ct between Secti on 546(e)’s l anguage and i ts purpose. Secti on 546(e) i s si mply a case of C ongress percei v i ng a need to address a parti cul ar probl em wi thin an i mportant process or market and usi ng statutory l anguage broader than necessary to resol ve the i mmedi ate probl em. Such broad l anguage i s i ntended to protect the process or market from the enti re genre of harms of whi ch the parti cul ar probl em was onl y one symptom. The l egi sl a ti ve hi story of Secti on 546(e) cl earl y reveal s such a purpose. That hi story (confi rmed by the broad l anguage adopted) refl ects a concern over the use of avoi d ance powers not onl yafter the bankruptcy of a commodi ti es or securi ti es fi rm, but al so after a “customer” or “other parti ci pant” i n the securi ti es markets enters bankruptcy. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-420 (1982). To be sure, the exampl es used by the Secti on’s proponents focused on the i mmedi ate

60concern of credi t ors of bankrupt brokers seeki ng to unwind payments by the

bankrupt fi rm to other brokers. Id. Such acti ons were percei ved as creati ng a danger of “a ri ppl e effect,” i d ., a chai n of bankruptci es among brokers di srupti ng the securi ti es market general l y. From these exampl es, appel l ants, and others, have argued that when monetary damages are sought onl y from sharehol ders, or an LBO i s i nvol ved, the purposes of Secti on 546(e) are not i mpl i cated. See Resp. & Repl y Br. of Pl s.-Appel l ants-C ross-Appel l ees 79; In re Lyondel l, 503 B.R. at 358- 59. Even apart from usi ng the oi land water mi xture of appl ying a narrow l i teral ness to the word “trustee” and di sregardi ng the rest of the Secti on’s l anguage, we di sagree. As courts have recogni zed, C ongress’s i ntent to “mini mi z[e] the di spl acement caused i n the commodi ti es and securi ti es markets i n the event of a major bankruptcy affecti ng those i ndustri es,” Quebecor, 719 F.3d at 100 (quoting Enron C redi tors Recovery C o rp. v. Al f a, S.A.B. de C .V., 651 F.3d 329, 333 (2d C i r. 2011)), refl ected a l a rger purpose memori al i z ed i n the l egi sl ati ve hi story’s menti on of bankrupt “customers” or “other parti ci pant[s]” and i n the broad statutory l anguage defi ni ng the transacti ons covered. That l arger purpose was to “promot[e] fi nal i ty . . . and certai nty” for i nvestors, by l i mi ting the ci rcumstances,

61e.g., to cases of i ntenti o nalfraud, under whi ch securi ti es transacti ons coul d be

unwound. In re Kai ser Steel C orp., 952 F.2d 1230, 1240 n.10 (10th C i r. 1991) (quoting H. Rep. No. 484, 101st C ong. 2d Sess. 2 (1990), repri nted i n 1990 U.S.C .C .A.N. 223, 224). The broad l anguage used i n Secti on 546(e) protects transacti ons rather than fi rms, refl ecti ng a purpose of enhanci ng the effi ci ency of securi ti es markets i n order to reduce the cost of capi talto the Ameri can economy. See Bankruptcy of C ommodi ty and Securi ti es Brokers: Heari ngs Before the Subcomm. on Monopol i es and C ommerci alLaw of the C omm. on the Judi c i ary, 47th C o ng. 239 (1981) (statement of Bevi s Longstreth, C ommi ssi oner, SEC ) (expl a ini ng that, wi thout 546(e), the Bankruptcy C ode’s “preference, fraudul ent transfer and stay provi si ons can be i nterpreted to appl y in harmfuland costl y ways to customary methods of operati on essenti alto the securi ti es industry”). As noted, central to a hi ghl y effi c i ent securi ti es market are methods of tradi ng securi ti es through commodi ti es and securi ti es fi rms. Secti on 546(e)’s protecti o n of the transacti ons consummated through these enti ti es was not i ntended as protecti o n of pol i ti cal l y favored speci a li nterests. Rather, i t was sought by the SEC –- and correspondi ng provi si ons by the C FTC, see Bankruptcy Act Revi si o n: Heari ngs on H.R. 31 and

62H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on C i vi l& C onsti tuti onalRi ghts of the H. C omm.

on the Judi ci a ry, 94th C ong., Supp. App. Pt. 4, 2406 (1976) -- i n order to protect i nvestors from the di srupti ve effect of after-the-fact unwi ndi ng of securi ti es transacti ons. A l ack of protecti o n agai nst the unwi ndi ng of securi ti es transacti ons woul d create substanti a ldeterrents, l i mi ted onl y by the copi ous i maginati ons of abl e l awyers, to i nvesti ng i n the securi ti es market. The effect of appel l ants’ l egal theory woul d be aki n to the effect of el i minating the l i mi ted l i abi l i ty of investors for the debts of a corporati on: a reducti on of capi tal avai l abl e to Ameri can securi ti es markets. For exampl e, al li nvestors i n publ i c compani es woul d face new and substanti alri sks, i f appel l ants’ theory i s adopted. At the very l east, each woul d have to confront a hi gher degree of uncertai nty even as to the consummati on of securi ti es transfers. The ri sks are not confi ned to the consummati on of securi ti es transacti ons. Pensi o n pl ans, mutualfunds, and si mi l ar i nsti tuti onalinvestors woul d fi nd securi ti es markets far more ri sky i f exposed to substanti all i abi l i ti es deri ved from i nvestments i n securi ti es sol d l ong ago. If appel l ants were to prevai l, a pensi on pl an whose posi ti on i n a fi rm was cashed out i n a merger

63mi ght have to set asi de reserves i n case the survi ving fi rm went bankrupt and

tri ggered avoi dance acti ons based on a cl ai m that the cash out pri ce exceeded the val ue of the shares. Every economi c downturn coul d expose such i nsti tuti onal i nvestors not onl y to a decl ine i n the val ue of thei r current portfol i o s but al so to cl a i ms for substanti almoni es recei v ed from mergers duri ng good ti mes. Gi v en the occasi onalvol ati l i ty of economi c events, any transacti on buyi ng out sharehol ders woul d ri sk bei ng attacked as a fraudul ent conveyance avoi dabl e by credi tors i f the fi rm fal tered. Appel l ants’ l egaltheory coul d even reach i nvestors who, after voti ng agai nst a merger approved by other sharehol ders, were i nvol u ntari l y cashed out. Tender offers, whi ch al most al ways i nvol ve a premi um above tradi ng pri ce, Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premi ums Real l y Premi ums? Market Pri ce, Fai r Val ue, and C orporate Law, 99 Yal e L.J. 1235, 1235 (1990), woul d i mperi lcashed out sharehol ders i f the survi ving enti ty encountered fi nanci aldi ffi cul ti es. If appel l ants’ theory was adopted, i ndi vi d ualinvestors fol l o wing a conservati ve buy-and-hol d strategy wi th a di versi fi ed portfol i o desi gned to reduce ri sk mi ght wel ldeci de that such a strategy woul d actual l y increase the ri sk of crushi ng l i abi l i ti es. Such a strategy i s adopted because i tinvol ves l ow

64costs of moni tori ng the prospects of i ndi vi d ualcompani es and emphasi zes the

offsetti ng of unsystemati cri sks by i nvesti ng i n mul ti pl e fi rms. See Lei gh v. Engl e, 858 F.2d 361, 368 (7th C i r. 1988). Appel l ants’ l egaltheory mi ght wel l requi re costl y and constant moni tori ng by i nvestors to ri d thei r portfol i os of i nvestments i n fi rms that mi ght, under then-current ci rcumstances, be subject to mergers, stock buy-backs, or tender offers (and woul d otherwi se be good i nvestments). Investi ng i n mul ti pl e compani es, the essence of di versi fi cati on, woul d i ncrease the danger of avoi dance l i abi l i ty. The threat to i nvestors i s not si mply l osi ng a l awsui t. Gi v en the costl iness of defendi ng such l egalacti ons and the l ong del ay in l earni ng thei r outcome, exposi ng i nvestors to even very weak l awsui ts invol ving mi l l i o ns of dol l ars woul d be a substanti aldeterrent to i nvesti ng in securi ti es. The need to set asi de reserves to meet the costs of l i ti gati on -- not to menti on costs of l osi ng -- woul d suck money from capi talmarkets. As noted, concern has been expressed that LBOs are di fferent from other transacti ons i n ways perti nent to the Bankruptcy C o de. In re Lyondel l C hem. C o., 503 B.R. 348, 354, 358-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), as corrected (Jan. 16, 2014).

65However, the l anguage of Secti on 546(e) cl earl y covers the LBO payments at

i ssue here for the reasons stated above. Moreover, securi ti es markets are heavi l yregul ated by state and federal governments. The statutory suppl ements used i n l aw schoolsecuri ti es regul ati on courses are thi ck enough to ri valKevl a r i n stoppi ng bul l ets. Mergers and tender offers are among the most regul ated transacti ons. See, e.g., Wi l l i ams Act, 15 U.S.C .A. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d). Much of the content of state and federal regul a ti on i s desi gned to protect i nvestors i n such transacti o ns. Much of that content i s al so desi gned to maxi mi ze the payout to sharehol d ers cashed out i n a merger, see, e.g., Revl o n, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hol di ngs, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del

. 1986); UnocalC orp. v. Mesa Petrol eum C o., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del . 1985), or accepti ng a tender offer, see Wi l l i ams Act, 15 U.S.C .A. §§ 78m(d)- (e), 78n(d). Appel l ants’ l egaltheory woul d al l ow credi tors to seek to portray that maxi mi zati on as evi dence supporti ng a crushi ng l i abi l i ty. A l egalrul e substanti al l y undermi ning those goal s of state and federal regul ati on –- agai n, one aki n to el i m inating l i mi ted l i abi l i ty –- i s a systemi cri sk. It i s al so argued that the Bankruptcy C ode has many di fferent purposes and that Secti on 546(e) does not cl earl y“trump[] al l[the] other[s].” In re Tribune

66C o. Fraudul ent C o nveyance Li ti g., 499 B.R. 310, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The

perti nent -- and “trumpi ng” -- “other” purpose of the C ode i s sai d to be the maxi mi zati on of assets avai l abl e to credi tors. Id. C o urts customari l y accommodate statutory provi si ons i n tensi o n wi th one another where the pri nci palpurpose of each i s attainabl e by l i m i ting each i n achi evi ng secondary goal s. See, e.g., In re C ol oni a l Real ty C o., 980 F.2d 125, 132 (2d C i r. 1992). However, Secti on 546(e) i s i n ful lconfl i ct wi th the goalof maxi mi zi ng the assets avai l abl e to credi tors. Its purpose i s to protect a nati onal, heavi l y regul ated market by l i mi ting credi tors’ ri ghts. C onfl i cting goal s are not accommodated by gi ving val ue wi th the ri ght hand and taki ng i t away wi th the l eft. Secti o n 546(e) cannot be trumped by the C ode’s goalof maxi mi zi ng the return to credi tors wi thout thwarting the Secti on’s purposes. 6. Addi ti onalC onsi derati ons Regardi ng C ongressi o nalIntent We therefore concl ude that C ongress i ntended to protect from constructi ve fraudul ent conveyance avoi dance proceedi ngs transfers by a debtor i n bankruptcy that fal lwi thin Secti on 546(e)’s terms. As di scussed supra, appel l ants’ theory hangs on the ambi guous use of the word “trustee,” has no basi s i n the l anguage of the C ode, l eads to substanti a l anomal i es, ambi gui ti es and

67confl i cts wi th the C ode’s procedures, and, most i m portantl y, i s i n i rreconci l abl e

confl i ct wi th the purposes of Secti on 546(e). In thi s regard, we do not i gnore Secti o n 544(b)(2), whi ch prohibi ts avoi dance of a transfer to a chari tabl e contributi on by a trustee but al so expressl y preempts state l aw cl ai m s by credi tors. It states: “Any cl ai m by any person to recover a transferred contributi on described i n the precedi ng sentence under Federal or State l aw in a Federal or State court shal l be preempted by the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C . § 544(b)(2). Appel l ants rel y heavi l yupon thi s provi si on to argue that, whi l e C ongress knew how to expl i ci tl y preempt state l aw in the Bankruptcy C ode, i tchose not to do so i n the context of Secti o n 546(e). Appel l ants’ argument suffers from a fatal fl aw, however. In Ari zona v. Uni ted States, the Supreme C ourt made cl ear that “the exi stence of an express pre-empti on provi si o [n] does not bar the ordi nary worki ng of confl i ct preempti on pri nci pl es or i mpose a speci a lburden that woul d make i t more di ffi cul t to establ i sh the preempti on of l aws fal l ing outsi de the cl ause.” 132 S. C t. 2492, 2504-05 (2012) (quotati on marks and ci tati ons omi tted); see al so Hi l l m an, 133 S. C t. at 1954 (“[W]e have made cl ear that the exi stence of a separate pre-empti on provi si on does not bar the ordi nary worki ng of confl i ct pre-empti on pri nci pl es.”)

68(i nternalquotati on marks and ci tati ons omi tted). Secti on 544(b)(2) does not,

therefore, undermi ne our concl usi on as to C o ngress’s i ntent. Next, appel l ants argue that C ongress’s fai l ure to amend Secti on 546(e) over the years that i t has exi sted i n perti nent form refl ects a congressi o nalintent to al l ow thei r acti ons to proceed. In support, they poi nt only to requests for an amendment by the C hai r of the C FTC and by C omex, see Bankruptcy Act Revi si on: Heari ngs on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on C i vi l& C onsti tuti onalRi ghts of the H. C omm. on the Judi c i ary, 94th C o ng., Supp. App. Pt. 4, 2406 (1976); Bankruptcy Reform Act: Heari ngs on S. 2266 and H.R. 8000 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements i n Judi c i al Machi nery of the S. C omm. on the Judi ci ary, 95th C ong. 1297 (1978), the enactment of Secti o n 544(b)(2) wi th an express preempti on provi si on, and a deci si on i n the Di stri ct of Del aware, PHP Li qui dating, LLC v. Robbi ns, 291 B.R. 603, 607 (D. Del

. 2003), aff’d sub nom. In re PHP Heal thcare C orp., 128 F. App’x 839 (3d C i r. 2005). To be sure, a hi story of rel evant practi ce may support an i nference of congressi onalacqui escence. See, e.g., Fi ero v. Fi n. Indus. Regul atory Auth., 660 F.3d 569, 577 (2d C i r. 2011) (noti ng that FINRA’s “l ongstandi ng rel i ance” on enforcement mechani sms other than fi nes -- and C ongress’s fai l ure to al ter

69FINRA’s enforcement powers -- “i ndi cates that FINRA i s not authori zed to

enforce the col l ecti on of i t s fi nes through the courts”); Am. Tel . & Tel . C o. v. M/V C ape Fear, 967 F.2d 864, 872 (3d C i r. 1992) (“The Supreme C ourt i n the past has i mpl i ed pri vate causes of acti on where C ongress, after a ‘consensus of opi ni on concerni ng the exi stence of a pri vate cause of acti on’ had devel oped i n the federal courts, has amended a statute wi thout menti oni ng a pri vate remedy.”) (quoting Merri l lLynch, Pi erce, Fenner & Smi th, Inc. v. C urran, 456 U.S. 353, 380 (1982)). However, the effect or meani ng of l egi sl ati on i s not to be gl eaned from i sol ated requests for more protecti ve, but possibl y redundant, l egi sl a ti on. The i mpact of Secti on 544(b)(2) i s di scussed i mmedi atel y above and need not be repeated here. Final l y, the fai l ure of C ongress to respond to court deci si ons i s of i nterpreti ve si gni fi cance onl y when the deci si ons are l arge i n number and uni versal l y, or al most so, fol l owed. See Merri l l L ynch, 456 U.S. at 379 (hol di ng that congressi onalamendment of the C ommodi ty Exchange Act that was si l ent on the subject of pri vate judi ci a lremedi es di d not overturn federal court deci si ons routi nel y and consi stentl y [] recogni z[i ng] an i m pl i ed pri vate cause of acti on”) (emphasi s added); see al so Touche Ross & C o . v. Redi ngton, 442 U.S.

70560, 577 n.19 (1979) (hol di ng that the Supreme C ourt’s i m pl i cati on of a pri vate

ri ght of acti on under § 10(b) of the Securi ti es and Exchange Act of 1934 was si mply acqui escence i n “the 25-year-ol d acceptance by the l ower federal courts of an i mpl i ed acti on”). The present deci si on i s far from a departure from a general l y accepted understandi ng. The di stri ct court deci si on i n thi s very case and the bankruptcy court deci si on i n Lyondel lare i n fact the sol e extensi ve judi ci aldi scussi ons of the i ssue. Indeed, our present deci si on does not even consti tute a spl i t among the ci rcui ts. As or more tel l ing wi th regard to the exi stence of a general understandi ng or a need for acti on, we fi nd no hi story of the use of state l aw, constructi v e fraudul ent conveyance acti ons to unwi nd settl ed securi ti es transacti ons, ei ther after a bankruptcy or i n i ts absence. The C onsti tuti on’s establ i shment of two l egi sl ati ve branches that must act jointl y and wi th the executi ve’s approval was desi gned to render hasty acti on possibl e onl y in ci rcumstances of wi del y percei ved need. C ongress’s fai l ure to act must be vi ewed i n that context, and rel i ance upon an i nference of sati sfacti on wi th the status quo must at l east be based on evi dence of a l ong-standi ng and recogni zed status quo. In the present matter, we cannot draw the suggested

71i nference on the basi s of the ski mpy evi dence submi tted whi l e the i nference of a

preempti ve i ntent i s easi l y drawn. 7. The Rel evance of Meri t Mgmt

. to thi s Preempti on Hol di ng Appel l ants fi nal l y contend that thi s preempti o n hol di ng “cannot be reconci l ed” wi th the Supreme C ourt’s deci si on i n Meri t Mgmt

. Appel l ants’ Moti on to Recal lthe Mandate at 10. Again, we di sagree. As an i ni ti almatter, the Meri t Mgmt. C ourt was not tasked wi th assessi ng Secti on 546(e)’s preempti ve force, and i t di d not address preempti on. Instead, the sol e i ssue i n Meri t Mgmt. was whether, “i n the context of a transfer that was executed vi a one or more transacti ons,” the rel evant transfer for the purposes of Secti on 546(e) was the overarchi ng transfer or any of i ts component transfers. Meri t Mgmt., 138 S. C t. at 888. Accordi ngl y, Meri t Mgmt. does not controlour di sposi ti on of the preempti on i ssue. Nor have we l o cated anythi ng i n Meri t Mgmt.’s reasoni ng that contradi cts our assessment of C ongress’s preempti ve i ntent. Appel l ants suggest that the Supreme C ourt rejected a pri mary premi se upon whi ch we have rel i ed here: that Secti o n 546(e) was i ntended to promote “‘fi nal i ty’ in the securi ti es markets.” Appel l ants’ Moti on to Recal lthe Mandate at 10-11. The C ourt di d no such thi ng,

72however. Instead, i t merel y concl uded that, to the extent the pol i ci es ani mating

Secti o n 546(e) were rel evant for determi ni ng the safe harbor’s scope, those pol i ci es di d not suppl y a basi s for “devi at[ing] from the pl ai n meani ng of the l anguage used i n § 546(e).” Meri t Mgmt., 138 S. C t. at 897; see al so i d . at 888 (“The C ourt concl udes that the pl ai n meaning of § 546(e) di ctates that the onl y rel evant transfer for purposes of the safe harbor i s the [overarchi ng] transfer that the trustee seeks to avoi d.”). Al so, the fai l u res of the “purposi v i st arguments” in Meri tMgmt., i d. at 897, are not parti cul a rl y instructi v e here due to the di stincti ons between the i nqui ri es here and there. The Supreme C ourt has repeatedl y hel d that where, as i n Meri t Mgmt., courts are i nterpreti ng the meani ng of a statutory provi si on, they shoul d not al l ow extri nsi cevi dence of C ongressi onalpurpose to al ter the pl ai n meani ng of the statute. See, e.g., Henson v. Santander C onsumer USA Inc., 137 S. C t. 1718, 1725 (2017) (“[I]t i s qui te mi staken to assume . . . that whatever mi ght appear to further the statute’s pri mary objecti ve must be the l aw.”) (internalquotati on marks and al terati ons omi tted); Dodd v. Uni ted States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005) (“We must presume that the l egi sl ature says i n a statute what i tmeans and means i n a statute what i t says there.”) (i nternal quotati on marks and al terati ons

73omi tted). But where, as here, we are assessi ng whether a statute preempts

certai n cl ai ms, we have been di rected to consul t evi dence of C ongressi onal purpose to ascertai n whether the statute has a preempti ve effect beyond that provi ded by i ts pl ain terms. See, e.g., Al t ri a Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (“C ongress may i ndi cate pre-empti ve i ntent through a statute’s express l anguage or through i ts structure and purpose

. [Even where] a federal l aw contai ns an express pre-empti on cl ause, i t does not i mmedi atel y end the i nqui ry because the questi on of the substance and scope of C ongress’ di spl acement of state l aw sti l lremai ns.”) (i nternal ci tati ons omi tted) (emphasi s added). Thus, i n l i ght of these di fferent di recti ves, i t i s cl ear that a “purposi vi st” argument shoul d carry far more wei ght in thi s case than i n Meri t Mgmt. Final l y, i tbears emphasi zi ng that the other reasons underpi nni ng our preempti on hol di ng are not i mpl i cated by Meri t Mgmt. in any way . Speci fi cal l y, Meri t Mgmt. does not contradi ct our fi ndi ngs that appel l ants’ l egaltheory has no support i n the l anguage of the C ode; l eads to substanti alanomal i es and confl i cts wi th the C ode’s procedures; and req ui res readi ng Secti on 546(e)’s reference to a trustee et al . avoi dance cl ai m to mean that credi tors coul d bri ng thei r own cl ai ms –- a readi ng that i s l ess than pl ai n.

74For these reasons, we fi nd that our preempti on hol di ng i s consi stent wi th

Meri t Mgmt. C ONC LUSION For the reasons stated, we affi rm the di smi ssalof appel l ants’ cl ai ms, on preempti on rather than standi ng grounds. We resol ve no i ssues regardi ng the ri ghts of credi tors to bri ng state l aw, fraudul ent conveyance cl ai ms not l i mi ted i n the hands of a trustee et al . by C ode Secti on 546(e) or by si mi l a r provi si ons such as Secti on 546(g), whi ch was at i ssue i n an appeal heard i n tandem wi th the present matter, see Whyte v. Barcl ays Bank PLC , 644 F. App’x 60, 60 (2d C i r. 2016) (affi rming the di stri ct court’s di smi ssal of state l aw, fraudul ent conveyance cl a i ms l i mi ted by Secti on 546(g) “for substanti al ly the reasons stated i n [Tribune I]”), cert. deni ed, 137 S. C t. 2114 (2017).

75