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*********************************************** 
J. Y. v. M. R.*

(AC 44312)

Elgo, Moll and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant mother appealed to this court from the trial court’s adjudication of several postjudgment motions for modification of custody and

visitation orders relating to the parties’ minor child and its issuance of

additional orders related to the same. After the plaintiff father filed a

custody application, the trial court approved an agreement between the

parties, who had never been married, which provided that they would

share joint legal custody of the child, with the child’s primary residence

being with the mother, and set forth a parenting schedule. Approximately

one year later, the father filed a postjudgment motion to modify,

requesting an increase in overnight visits and that his residence be

designated as the child’s primary residence for school purposes. Thereafter, the parties executed stipulation agreements revising the parenting

schedule, which the trial court approved. The mother then filed a postjudgment motion for modification, seeking to impose certain restrictions

on the father’s parenting time. The trial court heard evidentiary hearings

on the parties’ motions for modification. Thereafter, it filed interim

orders indicating, inter alia, that the parties would continue to share

joint legal and physical custody of the child and were required to comply

with the applicable rule of practice (§ 25-26 (g)) in filing any future

motions for modification. A few months later, in response to health

concerns relating to the COVID-19 pandemic, the mother filed an application for an emergency ex parte order of custody, along with a second

postjudgment motion for modification, which requested that the court

temporarily deny the father visitation. The trial court declined to award

ex parte relief but ordered a hearing to be held on the application

and the motion. That hearing was postponed and never rescheduled.

Thereafter, the trial court denied the mother’s second modification

motion and issued final orders relating to the parties’ initial modification

motions, which incorporated the interim orders. The final orders provided, inter alia, that the parties would continue to share joint legal and

physical custody of the child, with the father’s residence serving as the

child’s primary residence for school purposes and required the parties

to file a request for leave pursuant to Practice Book § 25-26 (g), in the

event that they wished to modify the final orders. The mother appealed

and, after being granted leave by the trial court, filed two additional

postjudgment motions for modification, seeking to modify the final

orders with respect to the parenting schedule and the child’s primary

residence for school purposes. Following a hearing, the trial court denied

the mother’s additional modification motions, and the mother amended

her appeal to encompass that denial. Held:

1. The trial court did not commit error in issuing the interim orders or the

final orders:

a. The defendant mother’s claim that the trial court improperly issued

interim orders was moot: the interim orders ceased to exist after they

were subsumed by the final orders, and, accordingly, there was no practical relief that the trial court could afford the mother with respect to the

interim orders; moreover, the ‘‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’’

exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply because the mother

failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable likelihood that the

issue presented would arise again in the future.

b. The defendant mother’s claim that the trial court committed error in

issuing the final orders was unavailing: in issuing the final orders, the

court considered the child’s best interests as required by the applicable

statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 46b-56), and such orders were not fatally flawed

merely because they incorporated the interim orders, which the mother

argued were defective; moreover, the mother’s alternative argument that,

even if it is assumed that the interim orders properly modified the prior

custody and visitation orders, the trial court applied the wrong legal

standard in issuing the final orders was unavailing, as, at the time of
issuance, the court plainly stated that the interim orders were temporary

in nature and that final orders disposing of the initial orders were forthcoming, and, accordingly, the interim orders did not constitute prior court

orders that required a material change in circumstances for modification;

furthermore, the mother failed to establish that the trial court abused

its discretion in transferring the child’s primary residence for school

purposes from the mother to the plaintiff father because, in issuing its

orders, the court did not engage in speculation but, rather, properly

considered the child’s best interests, and its determination was supported

by the guardian ad litem’s testimony and was reasonable despite the

amount of time between the issuance of the order and the start of the

child’s schooling in light of the history of extensive litigation between

the parties; additionally, the mother failed to demonstrate that the trial

court abused its discretion in issuing the order pursuant to Practice

Book § 25-26 (g), requiring the parties to seek leave of the court before

filing motions for modification of the final orders for a period of five

years because the order applied to both parties, the parties had filed

numerous modification motions following the initial judgment, and the

guardian ad litem had testified in favor of the order, considering it to

be appropriate in light of the length of the litigation, the financial and

emotional toll it was taking on the parties, and her belief that the child

had been affected by the distress the litigation caused to the parties.

2. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant mother’s two modification motions filed after the issuance of the final orders: that court applied

the correct legal standard in denying the two modification motions,

as it properly determined that there had been no material change in

circumstances since the date the final orders were issued, and, in arguing

that exigent circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic, warranted the court’s consideration of circumstances prior to the issuance

of the final orders, the mother was essentially attempting to use her

motions to mount an improper collateral attack on the final orders;

moreover, the mother’s alternative argument, that the trial court improperly determined that she had failed to demonstrate that a material change

in circumstances had occurred since the issuance of the final orders,

was unavailing because the court was free to credit or reject all or part

of the conflicting testimony regarding such change in circumstances

that was presented by the parties.

3. The defendant mother’s claim that the trial court improperly had denied

her second modification motion, which she had filed between the issuance of the interim orders and the final orders, was moot: the only

practical relief this court could have afforded the mother was a remand

to the trial court with direction to conduct an evidentiary hearing, which

would have been superfluous because the mother’s second modification

motion raised the same issues that were encompassed by one of the

modification motions she filed after the issuance of the final orders,

and the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on that motion,

giving the mother the opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence

as to those issues; accordingly, the mother already had received the

relief that she was seeking.

Argued March 7—officially released October 11, 2022

Procedural History

Application for custody as to the parties’ minor child,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Waterbury and transferred to the judicial district of New

Haven, where the court, Klatt, J., rendered judgment

in accordance with the parties’ custody and parenting

agreement; thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for

modification; subsequently, the court, Klau, J., issued

an order modifying the judgment in accordance with

the parties’ agreement; thereafter, the defendant filed

a motion for modification; subsequently, the court,

Klau, J., issued interim orders pending the issuance of

final orders on the parties’ respective pending motions

for modification; thereafter, the court, Price-Boreland,

J., ordered that a hearing be held with respect to an
application for ex parte relief and a second motion for

modification filed by the defendant; subsequently, the

court, Klau, J., issued final orders disposing of the

plaintiff’s motion for modification and the defendant’s

initial motion for modification and denied the defendant’s second motion for modification, and the defendant appealed to this court; thereafter, after being

granted leave by the court, Goodrow, J., the defendant

filed two additional motions for modification, which

the court, Price-Boreland, J., denied, and the defendant

filed an amended appeal. Appeal dismissed in part;

affirmed.

Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, for the appellant (defendant).

James J. Healy, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

MOLL, J. In this custody dispute, the defendant, M.

R., appeals from the decisions of the trial court adjudicating several postjudgment motions for modification

of custody and visitation orders. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) issued interim

orders pending its issuance of final orders vis-a`-vis two

motions for modification filed in 2018 and 2019, respectively, (2) issued final orders disposing of the two aforesaid motions for modification, (3) denied two motions

for modification that she filed in 2021, following the

issuance of the final orders, and (4) denied a motion

for modification that she filed in 2020, in between the

issuance of the interim orders and the final orders.1 We

dismiss, as moot, the portions of the appeal challenging

the propriety of the interim orders and the denial of

the defendant’s motion for modification filed in 2020,

and we affirm the remainder of the trial court’s decisions.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff, J.

Y., and the defendant, who never married, have a minor

child who was born in April, 2016. In January, 2017, the

plaintiff filed a custody application, requesting joint

legal custody of the child and that the child’s primary

residence be with him. On September 29, 2017, the

parties executed a custody and parenting agreement.

The agreement provided, inter alia, that the parties

would share joint legal custody of the child, with the

child’s primary residence being with the defendant, and

set forth a parenting schedule. Pursuant to the parenting

schedule, the child would have seven overnight visits

with the plaintiff over the course of a recurrent four

week schedule. The agreement further provided that,

‘‘[u]nless or until the [defendant] relocates to another

school district, the [t]own of Cheshire shall be considered the child’s primary town of residence for school

purposes.’’ The same day, the trial court, Klatt, J.,

approved the agreement and incorporated its terms into

the court’s judgment rendered that day.

On October 17, 2018, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment

motion to modify the September 29, 2017 judgment,

requesting, inter alia, an increase in the number of the

child’s overnight visits with him from seven to fourteen

and that his residence be designated as the child’s primary residence for school purposes. On January 16,

2019, the parties executed a stipulation agreeing, inter

alia, to a revised parenting schedule, which increased

the number of the child’s overnight visits with the plaintiff from seven to eight. On January 23, 2019, the court,

Tindill, J., approved the stipulation. On September 18,

2019, the parties executed an agreement further modifying the parenting schedule, increasing the number of

the child’s overnight visits with the plaintiff from eight

to ten. The court, Klau, J., approved the agreement on
the same day. On November 25, 2019, the defendant

filed a postjudgment motion for modification, seeking,

inter alia, to impose certain limitations and restrictions

with respect to the plaintiff’s parenting time.

In December, 2019, the court held three evidentiary

hearings on the parties’ respective October 17, 2018 and

November 25, 2019 motions for modification (initial

modification motions). On January 7, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to continue the evidentiary hearings

for personal medical reasons. On January 9, 2020, the

court ordered that a telephonic conference would be

held on January 13, 2020, to address the motion for

continuance. The court further ordered the parties’ trial

counsel to ‘‘be prepared to discuss whether a continuance should be contingent upon the court entering a

temporary order adopting [a] proposed parenting

schedule [submitted by the plaintiff].’’ The plaintiff’s

proposed parenting schedule increased the number of

the child’s overnight visits with him from ten to fourteen.

On January 13, 2020, during the telephonic conference, the court granted the defendant’s motion for continuance and reserved its decision as to whether it

would issue an interim order. The same day, the defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to the court

issuing an interim order. On January 29, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for order requesting that the court

adopt his proposed parenting schedule on a temporary

basis. On February 6, 2020, the court held one additional

evidentiary hearing on the initial modification motions,2

and the parties’ trial counsel presented closing arguments on February 13, 2020. Both parties submitted

proposed orders. The plaintiff requested, inter alia, sole

legal and physical custody, with the child attending

school in the town in which he resided, which, at all

relevant times, was Southington. The defendant sought,

inter alia, joint legal custody, with the child’s primary

residence being with her and the child attending kindergarten in Cheshire, where the defendant lived.

On February 26, 2020, citing Yontef v. Yontef, 185

Conn. 275, 440 A.2d 899 (1981), the court issued interim

orders (interim orders) pending the issuance of final

orders on the initial modification motions.3 The interim

orders provided that (1) the parties continued to share

joint legal custody of the child, (2) effective immediately, the parties were to share physical custody of

the child in accordance with the plaintiff’s proposed

parenting schedule, (3) the parties were required to

comply with Practice Book § 25-26 (g) in filing any

future motions for modification, and (4) all prior custody and visitation orders ‘‘not inconsistent’’ with the

temporary orders remained in full force and effect.4

On May 8, 2020, the defendant filed an application

for an emergency ex parte order of custody, seeking

temporary custody of the child with no visitation
allowed for the plaintiff. The defendant averred that,

during the plaintiff’s parenting time, the child was being

left with third parties and the plaintiff was not following

the then current guidelines set forth by the Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention with regard to the

nascent COVID-19 pandemic. Concurrently with the

application for ex parte relief, the defendant filed a

postjudgment motion for modification, requesting that

the court temporarily deny the plaintiff visitation (May

8, 2020 modification motion).5 The same day, the court,

Price-Boreland, J., declined to award ex parte relief

but ordered that a hearing would be held on June 5,

2020, as to the application and the May 8, 2020 modification motion. Thereafter, the June 5, 2020 hearing was

postponed and never rescheduled. On September 1,

2020, without conducting a hearing, the court, Klau, J.,

denied the May 8, 2020 modification motion.

On September 1, 2020, the court issued a memorandum of decision that resolved the initial modification

motions.6 The court stated that, in addition to issuing

related orders, it was incorporating the interim orders

into its final orders disposing of the initial modification

motions (final orders). The court ordered in relevant

part that (1) the parties shared joint legal and physical

custody of the child, with the plaintiff’s residence serving as the child’s primary residence for school purposes,

(2) the plaintiff’s proposed parenting schedule was

adopted and approved, (3) any party seeking to modify

the new custody and visitation orders within five years

was required to file a request for leave pursuant to

Practice Book § 25-26 (g), and (4) the new custody

and visitation orders superseded ‘‘all prior inconsistent

orders,’’ whereas ‘‘[p]rior orders not inconsistent’’ with

the new orders remained in full force and effect. On

September 18, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to

reargue, which the court denied on the same day.7 On

October 6, 2020, the defendant filed this appeal.8

On March 30, 2021, after being granted leave by the

court, Goodrow, J., in accordance with Practice Book

§ 25-26 (g) and the final orders, the defendant filed

two postjudgment motions for modification, seeking to

modify the final orders as to (1) the parties’ parenting

schedule and (2) the child’s primary residence for

school purposes (March 30, 2021 modification

motions).9 On April 22, 2021, the plaintiff filed objections. On August 11, 2021, following an evidentiary hearing, the court, Price-Boreland, J., denied the March 30,

2021 modification motions. On August 30, 2021, the

defendant filed a motion for reconsideration and reargument, which the court denied on September 1, 2021.

The defendant subsequently amended her appeal to

encompass the court’s denials of the March 30, 2021

modification motions.10 Additional facts and procedural

history will be set forth as necessary.

Before addressing the defendant’s claims, we set
forth the following relevant legal principles. ‘‘General

Statutes § 46b-56 provides trial courts with the statutory

authority to modify an order of custody or visitation.

General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 46b-56 (c) directs the

court, when making or modifying any order regarding

the custody, care, education, visitation and support of

children, to consider the best interests of the child, and

in doing so [the court] may consider, but shall not be

limited to, one or more of [sixteen enumerated] factors11

. . . . The court is not required to assign any weight

to any of the factors that it considers . . . .’’ (Footnote

in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dolan

v. Dolan, 211 Conn. App. 390, 398–99, 272 A.3d 768,

cert. denied, 343 Conn. 924, 275 A.3d 626 (2022).

Before modifying a custody order, ‘‘a court must satisfy two requirements. First, modification of a custody

award must be based upon either a material change

[in] circumstances which alters the court’s finding of

the best interests of the child . . . or a finding that the

custody order sought to be modified was not based

upon the best interests of the child. . . . Second, the

court shall consider the best interests of the child and

in doing so may consider several factors. . . . Before

a court may modify a custody order, it must find that

there has been a material change in circumstances since

the prior order of the court, but the ultimate test is the

best interests of the child. . . . These requirements are

based on the interest in finality of judgments . . . and

the family’s need for stability.’’ (Footnotes omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Petrov v. Gueorguieva,

167 Conn. App. 505, 511–12, 146 A.3d 26 (2016); see also

Cleveland v. Cleveland, 161 Conn. 452, 459–60, 289 A.2d

909 (1971) (material changes in circumstances requirement was developed, in part, ‘‘to give effect to the principle

of res judicata’’). ‘‘The burden of proving a change to be

in the best interest of the child rests on the party seeking

the change.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Petrov

v. Gueorguieva, supra, 512. ‘‘The power of the trial court

to modify the existing order does not . . . include the

power to retry issues already decided . . . or to allow

the parties to use a motion to modify as an appeal. . . .

Rather, the trial court’s discretion includes only the power

to adapt the order to some distinct and definite change

in the circumstances or conditions of the parties. . . .

[I]ts inquiry is necessarily confined to a comparison

between the current conditions and the last court order.’’

(Citations omitted.) Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn.

729, 738, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).

In considering whether to modify visitation orders, as

opposed to custody orders, a court ‘‘is not required to

find as a threshold matter that a change in circumstances

has occurred. . . . Instead, [i]n modifying an order concerning visitation, the trial court shall be guided by the

best interests of the child . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Balaska

v.Balaska, 130 Conn. App. 510, 515–16, 25 A.3d 680 (2011).
‘‘Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision

regarding custody [and] visitation . . . orders is one of

abuse of discretion. . . . [T]he authority to exercise the

judicial discretion [authorized by § 46b-56] . . . is not

conferred [on] this court, but [on] the trial court, and . . .

we are not privileged to usurp that authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial court. . . . A mere difference

of opinion or judgment cannot justify our intervention.

Nothing short of a conviction that the action of the trial

court is one [that] discloses a clear abuse of discretion

can warrant our interference. . . .

‘‘The trial court has the opportunity to view the parties

[firsthand] and is therefore in the best position to assess

the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, in

which such personal factors as the demeanor and attitude

of the parties are so significant. . . . [E]very reasonable

presumption should be given in favor of the correctness

of [the trial court’s] action. . . . We are limited in our

review to determining whether the trial court abused its

broad discretion to award custody based upon the best

interests of the child as reasonably supported by the evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dolan v. Dolan, supra, 211 Conn. App. 399–400. ‘‘Our

deferential standard of review, however, does not extend

to the court’s interpretation of and application of the law

to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled

to plenary review on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge, 207 Conn. App. 28, 34,

263 A.3d 403 (2021).

I

We first address the defendant’s claims that, as to the

initial modification motions, the trial court committed

error in issuing (1) the interim orders and (2) the final

orders. We consider each claim in turn.

A

The defendant asserts that the court improperly issued

the interim orders pursuant to Yontef v. Yontef, supra,

185 Conn. 275.12 The defendant maintains that Yontef does

not authorize a court, postjudgment, to modify custody

and visitation orders on an interim basis without first

satisfying the statutory requirements of § 46b-56. In addition to addressing the merits of this claim, the plaintiff

argues that this claim is moot because the interim orders

were superseded by the final orders. We agree with the

plaintiff that the claim is moot.13

‘‘Mootness implicates [the] court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve.

. . . It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of

an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate

jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to

decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting

of actual relief or from the determination of which no

practical relief can follow. . . . Because mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it presents a question
of law over which our review is plenary. . . . Mootness

presents a circumstance wherein the issue before the

court has been resolved or had lost its significance

because of a change in the condition or affairs between

the parties. . . . A case is moot when due to intervening

circumstances a controversy between the parties no

longer exists.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barber

v.Barber, 193 Conn. App. 190, 220–21, 219 A.3d 378 (2019).

In the present case, the interim orders, issued on February 26, 2020, ceased to exist after they were subsumed

by the final orders issued on September 1, 2020. Thus,

we conclude that there is no practical relief that we may

afford the defendant vis-a`-vis the interim orders, and,

therefore, her claim challenging the interim orders is

moot. See, e.g., Schult v. Schult, 40 Conn. App. 675, 692,

672 A.2d 959 (1996) (claim regarding temporary custody

order was moot when order merged with final dissolution

decree), aff’d, 241 Conn. 767, 699 A.2d 134 (1997).

The defendant argues that her claim is not moot

because, in incorporating the interim orders into the final

orders, the court ‘‘reiterat[ed]’’ the interim orders and

left them ‘‘largely unchanged.’’ As we have explained,

however, the interim orders became inoperative following

the issuance of the final orders. Insofar as the defendant

takes issue with the interim orders as integrated into the

final orders, her redress is to challenge the propriety of

the final orders. See part I B of this opinion.

The defendant further argues that, even if her claim is

moot, it is subject to appellate review under the ‘‘capable

of repetition, yet evading review’’ exception to the mootness doctrine. We disagree.

‘‘[F]or an otherwise moot question to qualify for review

under the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’

exception, it must meet three requirements. First, the

challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action,

by its very nature must be of a limited duration so that

there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority

of cases raising a question about its validity will become

moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the

future, and that it will affect either the same complaining

party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that

party can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question

must have some public importance. Unless all three

requirements are met, the appeal must be dismissed as

moot.’’ Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 382–83, 660 A.2d

323 (1995).

Focusing on the second prong of the exception, the

analysis ‘‘entails two separate inquiries: (1) whether the

question presented will recur at all; and (2) whether the

interests of the people likely to be affected by the question

presented are adequately represented in the current litigation. A requirement of the likelihood that a question will
recur is an integral component of the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ doctrine. In the absence of the

possibility of such repetition, there would be no justification for reaching the issue, as a decision would neither

provide relief in the present case nor prospectively resolve

cases anticipated in the future.’’ Id., 384. The second prong

‘‘does not provide an exception to the mootness doctrine

when it is merely possible that a question could recur,

but rather there must be a reasonable likelihood that the

question presented in the pending case will arise again

in the future . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Russo v. Common Council, 80 Conn.

App. 100, 110, 832 A.2d 1227 (2003).

In arguing that the second prong of the exception is

satisfied in the present case, the defendant broadly asserts

that, ‘‘if allowed, family courts [in reliance on Yontef] will

render many more ‘interim’ modifications in this and other

custody cases . . . .’’ Although it is possible that this

issue will reoccur, the defendant has not demonstrated

that there is a reasonable likelihood that it will. Her concern is purely speculative. See New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 502, 510,

970 A.2d 578 (2009) (‘‘speculation and conjecture . . .

have no place in appellate review’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that the ‘‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’’ exception does not

apply to enable us to review the defendant’s moot claim.

B

The defendant next claims that the court committed

error in issuing the final orders. The defendant raises four

contentions: (1) the final orders are ‘‘taint[ed]’’ because

they incorporate the allegedly flawed interim orders; (2)

assuming that the interim orders operated to modify the

prior custody and visitation orders, the court applied the

wrong legal standard in failing to consider the present

best interests of the child and whether circumstances had

changed since the issuance of the interim orders; (3)

the court abused its discretion in transferring the child’s

primary residence for school purposes from the defendant

to the plaintiff, and (4) the court abused its discretion in

ordering the parties, for a period of five years, to comply

with Practice Book § 25-26 (g) in filing motions to modify

the final orders. These contentions are unavailing.

1

The defendant’s first contention is that the final orders

are fatally flawed because they incorporate the interim

orders, which, as summarized in part I A of this opinion,

the defendant maintains were defective. The defendant

argues that the defects that plagued the interim orders

carried over into the final orders. We disagree.

Resolving the defendant’s claim requires us to construe

the final orders. ‘‘As we previously set forth in this opinion,

[o]ur deferential standard of review [in domestic relations

cases] . . . does not extend to the court’s interpretation
of and application of the law to the facts. It is axiomatic

that a matter of law is entitled to plenary review on appeal.

. . . Moreover, [t]he construction of [an order or] judgment is a question of law for the court . . . [and] our

review . . . is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge, supra, 207 Conn. App. 34.

In issuing the final orders, the court cited the statutory

factors delineated in General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 46b56 (c) and considered the child’s best interests. This analysis applied to the final orders in toto, including the portion

of the final orders that assimilated the interim orders. In

other words, in incorporating the interim orders into the

final orders, the court considered the child’s best interests

as required by statute. Even if we assume arguendo that

the court committed a legal error in issuing the interim

orders, that error was not transferred to the final orders

simply by virtue of the fact that the final orders contain

the interim orders. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s

argument.

2

The defendant’s second contention is that, assuming

that the interim orders functioned to modify the prior

custody and visitation orders, the court applied the wrong

legal standard in issuing the final orders because the court

neither considered whether there had been a material

change in circumstances since February 26, 2020, when

the court issued the interim orders, nor examined the

present best interests of the child. The crux of the defendant’s argument is that the interim orders, when issued,

became the ‘‘prior court order[s]’’ for purposes of any

future modifications. The defendant asserts that, because

no evidentiary record was developed for the period

between the issuance of the interim orders and the final

orders, the court had no basis on which to issue the final

orders. We are not persuaded.

The question of whether the court applied the correct

legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary

review. See In re Paulo T., 213 Conn. App. 858, 867, 279

A.3d 766, cert. granted, 344 Conn. 904, A.3d (2022).

‘‘Before a court may modify a custody order, it must find

that there has been a material change in circumstances

since the prior order of the court, but the ultimate test is

the best interests of the child.’’ (Emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Petrov v. Gueorguieva, supra,

167 Conn. App. 511–12. We disagree with the defendant’s

legal premise that, at the time that the final orders were

issued, the interim orders constituted the ‘‘prior court

order[s]’’ in effect. In issuing the interim orders, which

followed the close of evidence on the initial modification

motions, the court plainly stated that the interim orders

were temporary in nature and that final orders disposing

of the initial modification motions were forthcoming. We

cannot conclude that such temporary orders established

the starting point for the court’s modification analysis visa`-vis the final orders. Accordingly, the defendant’s argu-
ment fails.

3

The defendant’s third contention is that the court

abused its discretion in transferring the child’s primary

residence for school purposes from the defendant to the

plaintiff. The defendant argues that the modified school

residence order was not in the child’s best interests and

that the court speculated as to the suitability of the school

district in which the plaintiff lives, particularly given that

the child would not start attending kindergarten until the

fall of 2021. We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant. The parties’ 2017 custody and parenting

agreement, as incorporated into the September 29, 2017

judgment, provided that, unless or until the defendant

relocated, the town of Cheshire was designated as the

child’s primary residence for school purposes. In their

respective proposed orders filed in connection with the

initial modification motions, the parties separately

requested that their respective residences be deemed as

the child’s primary residence and that the child attend

school in their respective towns.

During the evidentiary hearings held on the initial modification motions, the guardian ad litem for the minor

child testified that it was ‘‘appropriate’’ for the court to

designate the child’s primary residence for school purposes in advance of the child attending kindergarten in

the fall of 2021 in light of, in part, the parties’ lengthy

litigation history. The guardian ad litem further testified

that deeming the plaintiff’s residence as the child’s primary residence for school purposes would be ‘‘appropriate’’ if the court was ‘‘concern[ed] about [his] position

in the child’s life’’ and wanted to ‘‘fortify that position a

little bit for him . . . .’’ Along those lines, the guardian

ad litem testified, inter alia, that she was ‘‘concerned that

[the defendant] doesn’t seem to value . . . [the plaintiff’s]

role as [the child’s] father,’’ was ‘‘concerned for [the

child’s] future relationship with [the plaintiff] if [the defendant] cannot embrace in a way that [the child] can see

and feel the importance of [the plaintiff] in [the child’s]

life,’’ did not believe that the defendant was able to

‘‘acknowledge that . . . [the plaintiff] has redeemable

qualities as a parent,’’ and did not believe that the defendant ‘‘[saw] the value to [the plaintiff’s] time with [the

child] . . . to the same degree that she values her own

time as a parent with [the child].’’

The guardian ad litem also offered testimony comparing

the Cheshire and Southington school districts. She testified that both towns had full day kindergarten programs

starting at approximately the same time and that, although

Cheshire’s school system ranked higher than Southington’s school system on the basis of a report that she

had reviewed, the data indicated that students from both

schools were scoring ‘‘very close’’ on various tests.14
After hearing the parties’ closing arguments on February 13, 2020, the court stated on the record that, ‘‘[g]iven

the history of the litigation between the parties, I do think

it is better, even at this point, rather than waiting to the

fall [of] 2021 when [the child] starts school, to make a

decision [as to the child’s primary residence for school

purposes] one way or the other. I really don’t want to

leave doors open that sort of invite issues in the future.

I think it needs to be decided, subject of course always

to the parties’ right to seek modifications, setting aside

the issue of the request [for] leave [requirement of Practice

Book § 25-26 (g)].’’

In the final orders, the court transferred the child’s

primary residence for school purposes from the defendant

to the plaintiff. Before issuing its orders, the court found

in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he parties’ relationship effectively

ended about ten months after their [child’s] birth in April,

2016. The [defendant] was, and still is, uncertain about

the role she wants the [plaintiff] to play in the child’s life.’’

The court further found that, although ‘‘the [defendant]

believes it is important for [the child] to have a father

figure in [the child’s] life, it is questionable whether she

believes that the [plaintiff] should play that role. Obviously, this leads to significant tensions in the parties’

ongoing relationship.’’

We conclude that the court, in transferring the child’s

primary residence for school purposes from the defendant

to the plaintiff, properly considered the child’s best interests and did not engage in speculation. Although the child

was not scheduled to begin kindergarten until the fall of

2021, approximately one year following the issuance of

the final orders, the court reasonably determined that

issuing the modified school residence order immediately

was proper ‘‘[g]iven the history of the litigation between

the parties’’ and to avoid ‘‘leav[ing] doors open that sort

of invite issues in the future.’’ This determination was

buttressed by the guardian ad litem’s testimony advocating for swift action on the school residence issue. Moreover, against the backdrop of the guardian ad litem’s

testimony that designating the plaintiff’s residence as the

child’s primary residence for school purposes would be

‘‘appropriate’’ if the court was ‘‘concern[ed] about [his]

position in the child’s life’’ and wanted to ‘‘fortify that

position a little bit for him,’’ the court found that the

defendant was ‘‘uncertain about the role she wants the

[plaintiff] to play in the child’s life’’ and that it was ‘‘questionable’’ whether the defendant believed that the plaintiff

should be a ‘‘father figure’’ for the child. Finally, the record

contained evidence indicating that the Southington and

Cheshire school systems, although not identical, were

comparable in educational quality.

In sum, we conclude that the defendant has not established that the court abused its discretion in modifying

the prior custody orders by transferring the child’s primary

residence for school purposes from the defendant to the
plaintiff.

4

The defendant’s fourth contention is that the court

abused its discretion in ordering the parties, for a period

of five years, to seek leave of the court to file motions

for modification of the final orders in accordance with

Practice Book § 25-26 (g). The defendant maintains that

an order pursuant to § 25-26 (g) can be issued only in

cases presenting ‘‘ ‘extreme, compelling situation[s].’ ’’

The defendant argues that the court did not find that

the present matter constituted an ‘‘ ‘extreme, compelling

[situation]’ ’’ and that, even if it had, the record does not

support such a finding. We are not persuaded.

Practice Book § 25-26 ‘‘governs a litigant’s ability to file

a postdissolution motion for modification of a custody or

visitation order.’’ Morera v. Thurber, 162 Conn. App. 261,

269, 131 A.3d 1155 (2016). Section 25-26 (g) provides in

relevant part: ‘‘[U]pon or after entry of a judgment or final

order of custody and/or visitation . . . the judicial

authority may order that any further motion for modification of a final custody or visitation order shall be appended

with a request for leave to file such motion . . . . The

specific factual and legal basis for the claimed modification shall be sworn to by the moving party or other person

having personal knowledge of the facts recited therein.

If no objection to the request has been filed by any party

within ten days of the date of service of such request on

the other party, the request for leave may be determined

by the judicial authority with or without hearing. If an

objection is filed, the request shall be placed on the next

short calendar, unless the judicial authority otherwise

directs. At such hearing, the moving party must demonstrate probable cause that grounds exist for the motion

to be granted. . . .’’

In proposing that a Practice Book § 25-26 (g) order may

be issued in ‘‘ ‘extreme, compelling situation[s]’ ’’ only,

the defendant cites several appellate cases addressing

either a trial court’s refusal to consider motions or a trial

court’s orders restricting a party’s ability to file motions.

See Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 484–85, 706

A.2d 960 (1998) (recognizing that exceptions to general

rule that court must consider and decide ‘‘on a reasonably

prompt basis’’ all motions properly before it may exist in

‘‘extreme, compelling situation,’’ such as case involving

harassing or vexatious litigation, and concluding that

record did not support conclusion that circumstances

existed to justify court’s refusal to consider motions); see

also Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 339, 915 A.2d 790

(2007) (quoting Ahneman in concluding that case did

not present ‘‘ ‘extreme and compelling circumstance’ ’’

supporting court’s refusal to consider motion); Eisenlohr

v. Eisenlohr, 135 Conn. App. 337, 346–48, 43 A.3d 694

(2012) (concluding that court did not abuse its discretion

in restricting defendant’s ability to file motions for modification of custody and parenting access orders in light of
‘‘troubling facts’’ of case, including court’s findings that

defendant had failed to comply with prior court orders

and had engaged in ‘‘lengthy pattern of contemptuous

conduct’’); Strobel v. Strobel, 92 Conn. App. 662, 665, 886

A.2d 865 (2005) (order prohibiting parties from filing

motions or pleadings without prior approval was deemed

‘‘praiseworthy’’ when record reflected that parties had

filed ‘‘barrages of repetitive and abusive motions in an

apparently ceaseless war of hostility and vindictiveness

toward one another and that those motions are not only

abusive to the system but, more importantly, to their now

teenage son’’). We do not construe these cases as curbing

a court’s discretion to impose filing restrictions by limiting

such orders to cases with circumstances deemed to be

extreme and compelling. Indeed, neither Eisenlohr nor

Strobel, which were decided after Ahneman, cites Ahneman or instructs that orders imposing filing restrictions

are reserved for such cases. See Eisenlohr v. Eisenlohr,

supra, 346–48; Strobel v. Strobel, supra, 665.

We perceive no clear abuse of discretion underlying

the court’s inclusion of the Practice Book § 25-26 (g)

order, which applies to both parties, in the final orders.15

The parties’ child was nearly one and one-half years old

when the September 29, 2017 judgment was rendered,

and the child was four years old at the time of the final

orders. As the court stated in issuing the final orders, less

than one year following the September 29, 2017 judgment,

the parties began filing ‘‘[a] slew of . . . motions’’ concerning the child. Moreover, during the evidentiary hearings held on the initial modification motions, the guardian

ad litem for the minor child testified in favor of the court

issuing a § 25-26 (g) order, considering such an order to

be ‘‘an appropriate mechanism to use’’ in light of the

length of the litigation, the financial and emotional toll of

the litigation on the parties, and the guardian ad litem’s

belief that the child was ‘‘not unscathed by the distress

that [the parties] ha[d] gone through.’’ See Eisenlohr v.

Eisenlohr, supra, 135 Conn. App. 347 n.5 (in concluding

that trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing

filing restrictions on defendant, this court cited guardian

ad litem’s testimony that case warranted imposition of

such order and that such order ‘‘ ‘would be best’ ’’ for

minor child).

‘‘An appellant who seeks to reverse the trial court’s

exercise of judicial discretion assumes a heavy burden.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 347. We conclude

that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court

abused its discretion in issuing the Practice Book § 25-

26 (g) order.16

II

We next turn to the defendant’s claim that the trial

court improperly denied her March 30, 2021 modification

motions. The defendant asserts that the court (1) applied

the wrong legal standard in denying these motions or,

alternatively, (2) incorrectly determined that there had
not been a material change in circumstances since the

issuance of the final orders. We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant. In the March 30, 2021 modification motions,

the defendant sought to modify the portions of the final

orders incorporating the plaintiff’s proposed parenting

schedule and designating the plaintiff’s residence as the

child’s primary residence for school purposes. As to the

parenting schedule, the defendant argued that (1) in adopting and approving the parenting schedule in the final

orders, the court had no evidence before it regarding the

COVID-19 pandemic, and (2) the plaintiff was unavailable

to spend sufficient time with the child, frequently leaving

the child with his girlfriend or family members during

his parenting time. As to the school residence order, the

defendant argued that (1) at the time it issued the final

orders, the court had no evidence before it regarding (a)

the suitability of the Southington school system or (b)

how the Cheshire and Southington school systems were

addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, and (2) the child was

developing strong ties with the town of Cheshire. In her

proposed orders filed in connection with the March 30,

2021 modification motions, the defendant requested that

the court, inter alia, (1) adopt a new parenting schedule

reducing the number of the child’s overnight visits with

the plaintiff, (2) order that the child would attend kindergarten in Cheshire, and (3) order that the parties would

continue to share joint legal custody, with the defendant’s

residence being designated as the child’s primary residence.

On August 11, 2021, the court, Price-Boreland, J., held

an evidentiary hearing on the March 30, 2021 modification

motions, during which the plaintiff and the defendant

testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court orally

denied the March 30, 2021 modification motions. The

same day, the court issued a written order stating that,

in denying the March 30, 2021 modification motions, it

determined that ‘‘there has been no material or substantial

change in circumstances since September 1, 2020, when

[the final orders were] entered.’’

A

The defendant first contends that the court applied

the wrong legal standard in denying her March 30, 2021

modification motions. The defendant maintains that the

court should have considered whether there had been a

material change in circumstances since February or

March, 2020,17 rather than September 1, 2020, when the

final orders were issued. We are not persuaded.

Whether the court applied the correct legal standard

is a question of law subject to plenary review. See In

re Paulo T., supra, 213 Conn. App. 867. The defendant

acknowledges the well established legal principles requiring courts, when entertaining motions to modify custody,

to compare the current circumstances to those that
existed at the time of the prior court orders. See Petrov

v. Gueorguieva, supra, 167 Conn. App. 511–12. The defendant posits, however, that the ‘‘exigent circumstances’’ of

this case require us to recognize an exception to the

settled rule governing modifications of custody orders

and to conclude that the court committed error by not

examining the circumstances that existed prior to the final

orders. The defendant cites ‘‘numerous impediments’’ that

arose between February, 2020, and September, 2020, that

deprived her of ‘‘an ‘adequate opportunity to litigate . . .

fully’’ the initial modification motions. These ‘‘impediments’’ include (1) emergency orders issued by the executive and judicial branches in response to the COVID-19

pandemic affecting court operations, (2) the court’s denial

on August 19, 2020, of a motion that she filed on March

16, 2020, seeking to open the evidence as to the initial

modification motions,18 and (3) the court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to denying her May 8,

2020 modification motion.19 The defendant further argues

that the evidentiary record vis-a`-vis the final orders contained no evidence regarding the effects of the COVID19 pandemic, such that, by not considering circumstances

that existed prior to the final orders, the court ‘‘forever

overlook[ed] seven of the most tumultuous months in the

history of parenting.’’

The defendant’s arguments are unavailing. In essence,

the defendant is attempting to use her March 30, 2021

modification motions to mount a collateral attack on the

final orders, which is a maneuver that cannot be countenanced. See Borkowski v. Borkowski, supra, 228 Conn.

738 (‘‘[t]he power of the trial court to modify the existing

order does not . . . include the power to retry issues

already decided . . . or to allow the parties to use a

motion to modify as an appeal’’ (citation omitted)). The

March 30, 2021 modification motions sought to modify

portions of the final orders issued on September 1, 2020,

and the court, in accordance with the law, correctly compared the current circumstances with those existing as of

September 1, 2020. Notwithstanding the unique conditions

created by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, it would

strain logic for us to conclude that, in deciding whether

to modify the final orders issued on September 1, 2020,

the court committed error by failing to analyze the circumstances that existed prior to September 1, 2020.

In sum, we conclude that the court applied the correct

legal standard in denying the March 30, 2021 modification

motions.

B

In the alternative, the defendant asserts that the court

improperly determined that she failed to demonstrate that

a material change in circumstances had occurred since

the issuance of the final orders. The defendant argues

that ‘‘[t]he record shows the onset of [the COVID-19]

pandemic, disputes over health and safety of the minor

child, school closings, and the parties using self-help
because existing orders were insufficient,’’ such that the

court could not reasonably have determined that there

had been no material change in circumstances. We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant. The defendant offered testimony during the

August 11, 2021 evidentiary hearing. As to the parties’

child, who was five years old at the time of the hearing,

the defendant testified that (1) the child was experiencing

difficulties with respect to transitions from the defendant’s home to the plaintiff’s home, feeling ‘‘stressed,’’

‘‘upset,’’ and ‘‘traumatized’’ the day before the start of the

plaintiff’s parenting time and ‘‘beg[ging]’’ to stay home

with her, (2) the child was struggling to sleep at the

plaintiff’s home, (3) the plaintiff oftentimes left the child

with his girlfriend or others during his parenting time,

and (4) the plaintiff, who is employed as a firefighter and

a landscaper, had started working more hours, and the

defendant anticipated that, as a result of his increased

work schedule, the plaintiff would have future availability

issues, thereby creating inconsistencies in the parties’ parenting schedule. With respect to the school issue, the

defendant testified that (1) her research indicated that

Cheshire had a better school system than Southington,

(2) the child expressed a desire to attend school in Cheshire, and (3) all of the child’s friends in Cheshire were

attending kindergarten in Cheshire. The defendant further

testified that the child participated in various extracurricular activities in Cheshire. With regard to the COVID-19

pandemic, the defendant testified that she was concerned

about the child’s well-being in light of potential disruptions

in the parties’ parenting schedule stemming from the pandemic, particularly if the child had to attend school parttime or be subject to remote learning in the fall of 2021.

The defendant further testified that, during the pandemic,

while the plaintiff continued to work full-time, she worked

from home and watched the child when the child’s daycare was closed.

The plaintiff, who also testified during the evidentiary

hearing, disputed most of the defendant’s testimony. He

testified that neither his career nor his work schedule

had changed since the issuance of the final orders. He

further testified that he never left the child with strangers

and that, although on occasion his sisters watched the

child if he had to ‘‘run out . . . for an hour or two,’’ he

did not routinely leave the child with his significant other

or family members. As to the child, he testified that the

child was not a heavy sleeper in general but that the child

was ‘‘always . . . happy when [he woke the child] up,’’

and he disagreed with the defendant’s characterization of

the child being ‘‘traumatized’’ to go to his home. With

respect to the school issue, the defendant testified that

he was not concerned about the child making friends in

Southington, that he lived one quarter of a mile from the

school that he planned for the child to attend, and that

he had no intent to relocate. As to the COVID-19 pandemic,
the plaintiff testified that there was a time when the child’s

daycare was closed as a result of the pandemic but that

the parties ‘‘just worked it out amongst [themselves] and

kind of co-parented . . . .’’

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court

stated: ‘‘The court has listened to the testimony and considers some, but not all, of the testimony to be credible.

The court takes into consideration that there was a trial

held for a four day period [on the initial modification

motions] in which the court made some decisions after

some significant consideration of the circumstances. At

that point [the court] had the opportunity to hear extensive testimony, view the witnesses, and come to some

final decision. I think at that time the court took into

consideration that the [plaintiff] does live in Southington

and is employed as a firefighter and a landscaper. And

to the degree that the landscaping business . . . has

expanded . . . the reality is that that sometimes happens

as parents and we make the necessary judgment about

how we ensure that our child continues to be appropriately cared for.’’ In its written order denying the March

30, 2021 modification motions, the court concluded that

there had been no substantial or material change in circumstances since the issuance of the final orders.

On the basis of the record before us, we conclude that

the court reasonably determined that the defendant failed

to demonstrate a material change in circumstances since

the issuance of the final orders warranting modification.

Faced with conflicting testimony from the parties, ‘‘the

court was free to credit or reject all or part of the testimony

[presented] . . . . On review, we do not reexamine the

court’s credibility assessments.’’ Zilkha v. Zilkha, 167

Conn. App. 480, 489, 144 A.3d 447 (2016). Thus, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the March 30, 2021 modification motions.

III

Last, we address the defendant’s claim that the trial

court improperly denied her May 8, 2020 modification

motion. The defendant’s sole argument is that the court

failed to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying the

motion. The plaintiff, in addition to disagreeing with the

merits of the defendant’s claim, argues that this claim has

been rendered moot, inter alia, by virtue of the August

11, 2021 evidentiary hearing held on the defendant’s March

30, 2021 modification motions. We agree with the plaintiff

that the claim is moot.

‘‘Mootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve.

. . . It is a [well settled] general rule that the existence of

an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate

jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to

decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting

of actual relief or from the determination of which no

practical relief can follow. . . . An actual controversy
must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but

also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When,

during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred

that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has

become moot.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aldin

Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State, 209 Conn. App. 741,

753, 269 A.3d 790 (2022).

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant. In the May 8, 2020 modification motion,

the defendant requested that the plaintiff temporarily be

denied visitation with the child because he allegedly had

been ‘‘continu[ing] to put the health and safety of the

child at risk daily.’’ In the affidavit accompanying her

corresponding application for an ex parte order of custody, the defendant averred in relevant part that (1) the

plaintiff was not abiding by guidelines issued at the time

by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in

relation to the COVID-19 pandemic in that he was not

social distancing or wearing masks or gloves when in the

company of others, thus putting himself and the child at

risk, and (2) the plaintiff was leaving the child with third

parties for extended periods of time during his parenting

time. In conjunction with its denial of the defendant’s

request for ex parte relief, the court, Price-Boreland, J.,

ordered a hearing to be held on June 5, 2020, on the

application as well as the May 8, 2020 modification motion;

however, as a result of the pandemic, that hearing was

postponed and never rescheduled. On September 1, 2020,

the court, Klau, J., denied the May 8, 2020 modification

motion without conducting a hearing.

While the original appeal filed on October 6, 2020, was

pending, the defendant filed the March 30, 2021 modification motions. One of those motions sought to modify the

parties’ parenting schedule on the basis of (1) the COVID19 pandemic and (2) assertions that the plaintiff regularly

was leaving the child in the care of his girlfriend or family

members during his parenting time. On August 11, 2021,

the court held an evidentiary hearing on the March 30,

2021 modification motions and denied both motions on

the same day.

With respect to the defendant’s claim vis-a`-vis the denial

of the May 8, 2020 modification motion, the only practical

relief that we could afford her is a remand to the trial

court with direction to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

Under the circumstances of this case, however, we conclude that such relief would be superfluous. The defendant’s March 30, 2021 modification motion concerning

the parties’ parenting schedule raised the same issues

encompassed by the May 8, 2020 modification motion,

namely, whether modification was warranted in light of

(1) the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular its effect on the

health and safety of the child, and (2) assertions that the

plaintiff was leaving the child with third parties during

his parenting time. The court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on the March 30, 2021 modification motion,

thereby giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard

and to submit evidence as to those issues. Put simply, in

effect, the defendant has received the relief that she seeks

as to the denial of her May 8, 2020 modification motion,

thereby rendering her claim moot.20 See, e.g., Wilkens v.

Wilkens, 10 Conn. App. 576, 579–80, 523 A.2d 1371 (1987)

(claim raised challenging ‘‘correctness of’’ evidentiary

hearing held on defendant’s first motion to modify pendente lite unallocated alimony and support order was

deemed moot because defendant had been afforded relief

by virtue of evidentiary hearing held, during pendency of

appeal, on second motion to modify).

The portions of the appeal taken from the court’s February 26, 2020 decision issuing the interim orders and the

court’s September 1, 2020 denial of the defendant’s May

8, 2020 postjudgment motion for modification are dismissed as moot; the decisions are affirmed in all other

respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as

amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,

Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49; we decline to identify any person

protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order

or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom

that person’s identity may be ascertained.

1 For ease of reference, we address the defendant’s claims in a different

order than they are presented in her appellate briefs.

2 Prior to the evidentiary hearings held in December, 2019, the court conducted several evidentiary hearings on certain motions for contempt that are

not relevant to this appeal. The parties and the court agreed that the evidentiary

record as to the initial modification motions would include the evidence introduced during the contempt proceedings.

3

In his proposed orders filed in relation to the initial modification motions,

the plaintiff requested that the court issue ‘‘an immediate interim postjudgment

order in accordance with the [plaintiff’s proposed orders] regarding custody

and parenting access. [The plaintiff asserted that] [t]he court ha[d] authority

to do so pursuant to [Yontef] . . . .’’

4 The court initially issued the interim orders on February 21, 2020. On

February 24, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion, which the court treated as a

motion to reargue, requesting that the court alter a portion of the interim orders

identifying the start date of the temporary parenting schedule. On February

26, 2020, the court vacated the February 21, 2020 interim orders and issued

the operative interim orders.

5 The defendant filed the application seeking ex parte relief and the May 8,

2020 modification motion as a self-represented party.

6 The September 1, 2020 decision reflects that, in addition to the initial

modification motions, the court resolved a postjudgment motion that the defendant filed on August 2, 2018, seeking to modify the parties’ parenting schedule.

In her principal appellate brief, however, the defendant states that the August

2, 2018 motion had been disposed of by stipulations executed by the parties

and was no longer at issue at the time of the evidentiary hearings held on the

initial modification motions. Whether the defendant’s August 2, 2018 motion

was properly before the court does not affect our resolution of the defendant’s

claims on appeal, and, therefore, we need not discuss the issue further.

7 On September 18, 2020, the defendant also filed (1) a motion for articulation,

(2) a motion to open, vacate, and/or modify, and (3) a motion to correct, all

of which were substantively similar to her motion to reargue. The court denied

these motions.

8 On July 16, 2021, counsel for the guardian ad litem for the minor child filed

a statement adopting the appellate brief filed by the plaintiff. See Practice Book

§ 67-13.

9 On March 10, 2021, the defendant filed requests for leave to file the March

30, 2021 motions for modification, which the court granted on March 24, 2021.
10 Following the September 29, 2017 judgment, the parties filed other postjudgment motions for modification not mentioned in this opinion, none of which

is relevant to this appeal.

11 ‘‘The statutory factors are as follows: ‘(1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child; (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents

to understand and meet the needs of the child; (3) any relevant and material

information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the

child; (4) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody; (5) the past and

current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child’s

siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests

of the child; (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and

encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the

other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;

(7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to

involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (8) the ability of each parent to be

actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the child’s adjustment to his or

her home, school and community environments; (10) the length of time that

the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability

of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider

favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family home pendente

lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (11) the stability of the child’s

existing or proposed residences, or both; (12) the mental and physical health

of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial

parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody

unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the

child; (13) the child’s cultural background; (14) the effect on the child of the

actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents

or between a parent and another individual or the child; (15) whether the child

or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively

in section 46b-120; and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b69b.’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 46b-56 (c).’’ Dolan v. Dolan, 211 Conn.

App. 390, 398–99 n.6, 272 A.3d 768, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 924, 275 A.3d

626 (2022).

12 As this court recently summarized, ‘‘[i]n Yontef, our Supreme Court noted

that pendente lite custody orders do not survive the rendition of a judgment

and that the judgment itself, being automatically stayed by operation of Practice

Book (1981) § 3065 (now § 61-11), is not binding for twenty days. Yontef v.

Yontef, supra, 185 Conn. 291. The court further noted that, ‘[i]n this twentyday gap period, the parties arguably may revert to their common law rights,

under which both are entitled, without preference, to take custody.’ Id. The

court found that such a resolution was both ‘unseemly’ and ‘inconsistent with

the concern, repeatedly enunciated in the statutes and the cases, for the best

interests of the children.’ Id. The court therefore advised that ‘[a] trial court

rendering a judgment in a disputed custody case should . . . consider entering

protective orders sua sponte to ensure an orderly transition that protects the

primary interests of the children in a continuous, stable custodial placement.’

Id., 291–92.

‘‘More specifically, the court stated: ‘In the interest of minimizing the emotional trauma so often imposed upon the children of divorce, a trial court

should, at or before the time of its judgment, inquire whether its custody order

is apt to be acceptable to the parties or is apt to be further litigated upon

appeal. If an appeal appears likely, the court should enter whatever interim

postjudgment order it deems most appropriate, in the exercise of its broad

discretion, taking into consideration the needs of the minor children for continuity, stability and well-being as well as the need of the parent who appeals for

a fair opportunity fully to present his or her case. These legitimate needs are

not, in all probability, apt to be protected if dissatisfied parties are able to

intervene unilaterally, without judicial supervision, to effect changes in custody

pending appeal. A court exercising its equitable jurisdiction with regard to

custody has the duty to assure itself that its judgment will be implemented

equitably to serve the best interests of the children for the near as well as for

the more distant future.’ Id., 293–94.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Thunelius v. Posacki,

193 Conn. App. 666, 687–89, 220 A.3d 194 (2019).

As this court further explained, ‘‘[our Supreme Court’s] concern in Yontef

was to ensure an orderly transition [from prejudgment status to postjudgment

status] that protects the primary interests of the children in a continuous, stable

custodial placement during the period in which the enforcement of the judgment

is stayed. . . . In 1986, however, Practice Book § 61-11 was amended to

exclude custody and visitation orders from operation of the automatic stay
of execution provision. . . . Such orders, once issued, are now immediately

enforceable, and, thus, there is no longer a gap period between pendente lite

custody orders and the final orders. . . . Thus . . . Yontef-type protective

orders may be superfluous in most cases involving issues of custody and

visitation.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 690 n.20.

13 The plaintiff also argues that (1) the defendant did not appeal from the

interim orders, (2) any such appeal would be subject to dismissal for lack of

a final judgment, and (3) the defendant did not object to the interim orders

and, thus, has waived her claim on appeal. We note that the defendant’s appeal

form reflects that her original appeal, filed on October 6, 2020, encompassed

the interim orders. As to the plaintiff’s remaining arguments, we need not

address them further in light of our conclusion that the defendant’s claim

is moot.

14 During an evidentiary hearing held on December 18, 2019, while subject

to direct examination by the plaintiff’s trial counsel, the guardian ad litem

testified as to research that she had performed comparing the Cheshire and

Southington school districts. The defendant’s trial counsel moved to strike that

testimony on the basis that the guardian ad litem was testifying from facts

not in evidence, and the court ordered that testimony to be stricken. During

subsequent evidentiary hearings held on December 19, 2019, and February 6,

2020, on cross-examination, the defendant’s trial counsel asked the guardian

ad litem about the research that she had performed regarding the Cheshire

and Southington school districts. The guardian ad litem proceeded to testify

as to her research. The defendant’s trial counsel did not move to strike that testimony.

15 Notably, in their respective proposed orders vis-a`-vis the initial modification

motions, both parties requested that the court impose restrictions with respect

to the filing of motions for modification. The plaintiff requested an order

providing that (1) neither party was permitted to file motions for modification

of custody, child support, or the parenting schedule for a period of five years,

unless there was an ‘‘ ‘emergency’ involving the safety and the physical wellbeing of the minor child,’’ in which case the movant was required to file a

request for leave to file a motion for modification pursuant to Practice Book

§ 25-26 (g), and (2) either party could file motions for modification of custody,

child support, or the parenting schedule after five years, provided that attendant

requests for leave were filed in accordance with § 25-26 (g). The defendant

requested an order providing that, in the event that a dispute arose between

the parties regarding ‘‘the health, education, or general welfare of the child,’’

the parties were required to attend at least five counseling sessions with a coparenting counselor before filing any motion to modify.

16 The defendant also asserts that the Practice Book § 25-26 (g) order will

lead to unnecessary and harmful delays. This argument is unavailing. As noted

in footnote 15 of this opinion, the defendant requested an order requiring the

parties to participate in a minimum of five counseling sessions before filing a

motion for modification. Such an order, if issued, unquestionably would have

caused significant delays if either party sought to file a motion to modify.

17 The defendant proposes four different dates as starting points from which

the court should have considered whether a material change in circumstances

had occurred: (1) February 6, 2020, when the evidentiary record closed as to

the initial modification motions; (2) February 26, 2020, when the court issued

the interim orders; (3) March 10, 2020, when Governor Ned Lamont declared

a public health emergency and a civil preparedness emergency regarding the

COVID-19 pandemic throughout the state; see Gonzalez v. Commissioner of

Correction, 211 Conn. App. 632, 635, 273 A.3d 252, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 922,

275 A.3d 212 (2022); or (4) March 18, 2020, when the chief court administrator

issued a statement providing that, effective March 19, 2020, Superior Court

operations were limited to ‘‘Priority 1 functions’’ in certain designated buildings.

Statement from Judge Patrick L. Carroll III, Chief Court Administrator (March

18, 2020), available at https://jud.ct.gov/HomePDFs/JudgeCarrollStatement.pdf

(last visited October 3, 2022).

18 The defendant’s motion to open the evidence stated that there was ‘‘newly

discovered evidence concerning the plaintiff’s ability to care for the child

. . . .’’ The defendant has not raised a claim on appeal challenging the court’s

denial of the motion to open the evidence.

19 We address the defendant’s separate claim as to the denial of the May 8,

2020 modification motion in part III of this opinion.

20 In her principal appellate brief, the defendant suggests that she is not

certain that a hearing on the May 8, 2020 modification motion is necessary.

As the defendant states, ‘‘[b]y the time this appeal is resolved, perhaps mask
wearing and social distancing will be a concern of the past, and maybe there

will be no present reason for a hearing on the [May 8, 2020 modification

motion]. . . . [If the matter is remanded for a hearing, she] can decide at that

time whether or not she still wants to proceed based on present circumstances.’’

(Citation omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted.)