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Case 1:07-cv-05434-AKH Document 10 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 1 of 3Case 1:07-cv-05434-AKH Document 10 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 2 of 3Case 1:07-cv-05434-AKH Document 10 Filed 11/02/2007 Page 3 of 3
No. 80.

#### Washington ex rel. Clithero et al. *v.*Showalter et al.

Jurisdictional statement submitted October 12, 1931.

Decided October 19, 1931.

*Raymond M. Hudson*and *Robert L. Edmiston*for appellants.

*Messrs.. John H. Dunbar*and *E. W. Anderson*for appellees.

*Per Curiam:*

The appeal herein is dismissed for the want of á substantial federal question. *Wabash Ry. Co.*v. *Flannigan,*192 U. S. 29; *Erie R. Co.*v. *Solomon,*237 U. S. 427; *C. A. King & Co.*v. *Horton,*276 U. S. 600; *Bank of Indianola*v. *Miller,*276 U. S. 605; *Roe*v. *Kansas,*278 U. S. 191. *Messrs.*
#### Pedro RAMOS-GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 07-74177.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 25, 2010.*

Filed June 11, 2010.

Rosaura Del Carmen Rodriguez, Rios Cantor, P.S., Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

OIL, Margaret Kuehne Taylor, Esquire, David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. LeFevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, WWS-District Counsel, Esquire, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of the District Counsel, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Pedro Ramos-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of *642the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to remand based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to remand, *Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir.2008), and de novo due process claims, *Vasquez-Zavala v. Ashcroft,*324 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ramos-Gonzalez’s motion to remand due to ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to comply with the requirements set forth in *Matter of Lozada,*19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and the ineffective assistance he alleges is not plain on the face of the record. *See Reyes v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 592, 597-99 (9th Cir.2004). It follows that Ramos-Gonzalez’s due process claim fails. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (requiring error and prejudice for a petitioner to prevail on a due process claim).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Calvin L. Harris, Appellant.

Submitted December 19, 2011;

decided January 12, 2012

Reported below, 88 AD3d 83.

Motion for waiver of strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals granted only to the extent that the appeal may be prosecuted upon the original file and an original and seven copies of appellant’s appendix.
205 JUL -7 PH A: 49

OFC. OF THE SECRETARIAT

July 7, 2004

BY EMAIL AND FACSIMILE

Office of the Secretariat

Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre

1155 21st Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20581

NYMEX Submission 05.111

Re: Notification of Listing Additional Year for NYMEX Central Appalachian Futures
Contracts

Dear Ms. Jean Webb:

The New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. ("NYMEX" or the "Exchange" is notifying the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (““CFTC” or “Commission’) that it will add one year to
the listing of Central Appalachian Coal Futures Contracts. Currently three years, the current and
the next two, are listed for trading. The Exchange will list one additional year so that four
consecutive years are listed for trading at all times. The additional contracts for calendar year
2008 will be listed starting Sunday evening, July 10, 2005 for NYMEX Trade Date July 11,
2005. Pursuant to Section 5c(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“Act”) and CFTC Rule 40.6,
the Exchange hereby certifies that this listing of additional contract months comply with the Act,
including regulations under the Act.

Should you have any questions concerning the above, please contact Jay Gottlieb,
Director, Research, at (212) 299-2607; or the undersigned at (212) 299-2390.

Very truly yours,

Robert A. Levin
Senior Vice President, Research
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 965 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 965

 To amend the Chesapeake Bay Initiative Act of 1998 to provide for the 
continuing authorization of the Chesapeake Bay Gateways and Watertrails 
                                Network.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 10, 2009

 Mr. Sarbanes (for himself, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Castle, Mr. Ruppersberger, 
   Mr. Scott of Virginia, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Norton, Ms. Edwards of 
   Maryland, Mr. Moran of Virginia, Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Kratovil, Mr. 
    Cummings, Mr. Wittman, Mr. Nye, and Mr. Platts) introduced the 
    following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural 
                               Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Chesapeake Bay Initiative Act of 1998 to provide for the 
continuing authorization of the Chesapeake Bay Gateways and Watertrails 
                                Network.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Chesapeake Bay Gateways and 
Watertrails Network Continuing Authorization Act''.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    Section 502 of the Chesapeake Bay Initiative Act of 1998 (16 U.S.C. 
461 note; Public Law 105-312) is amended by striking subsection (c) and 
inserting the following:
    ``(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this section.''.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

JONATHAN ANDREW BUCHANAN,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D22-1265

LT Case No. 2017-300787-CFDB

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

/ 

Opinion filed February 3, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Volusia County,

Raul A. Zambrano, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and 

Joshua Mosley, Assistant Public 

Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport,

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 

Beach, for Appellee.

WALLIS, J.
In this Anders1 appeal, we affirm Appellant’s judgment and sentence,

but remand for the trial court to correct the order revoking his 

probation. Specifically, although the trial court’s order states that Appellant 

willfully and substantially violated condition 10, the trial court's oral 

pronouncement was that a violation had not been proven. Consequently, 

we remand with instructions for the trial court to enter a corrected written 

order that comports with the conditions that were determined to have been 

violated. See Wasden v. State, 342 So. 3d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022);

Crichton v. State, 299 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020); Hart v. State, 252 So.

3d 1285, 1286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (“Where the oral pronouncement of 

revocation conflicts with the written order, the oral pronouncement 

controls.”).

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 

LAMBERT, C.J. and EVANDER, J., concur.

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

2
#### Gregory JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Terry L. McCANN, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 08-1915.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted June 13, 2008.

Decided Sept. 16, 2008.

Gregory Johnson, Joliet, IL, pro se.

Charles Redfern, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Re-spondenb-Appellee.

Before MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge, ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge and JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge.

ORDER

Gregory Johnson, an Illinois prisoner, was convicted after a bench trial of first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. The district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, *see*28 U.S.C. § 2254, adopting outright the state’s reasons urging dismissal set forth in its 70-page response. Johnson now seeks a certificate of appealability, but because the district court failed to analyze Johnson’s claims and articulate the reasons for its decision, we vacate the judgment and remand the case with instructions that the district comply with the dictates of Circuit Rule 50.

Johnson raised ten claims in his petition. The state, in its response, contended that eight were procedurally defaulted and that the other two failed on their merits. The district court, noting that it was a “major departure” from its usual practice, explained that it was accepting and adopting outright the state’s reasons for dismissal because “extraordinary care had been devoted to all the issues.” The district court offered no other reason for denying relief under § 2254.

The district court’s order does not comport with this circuit’s Rules. Circuit Rule *51750 provides that “[w]henever a district court resolves any claim or counterclaim on the merits, terminates the litigation in its court (as by remanding or transferring the case, or denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis with or without prejudice), or enters an interlocutory order that may be appealed to the court of appeals, the judge shall give his or her reasons, either orally on the record or by written statement.”

We have explained before that a district court who adopts a party’s brief outright as the statement of reasons for granting summary judgment fails to fulfill its obligation under Circuit Rule 50. *See Rakestraw v. United Airlines, Inc.,*981 F.2d 1524, 1527 (7th Cir.1992); *Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Associates, Inc.,*965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir.1992); *DiLeo v. Ernst & Young,*901 F.2d 624, 626 (7th Cir.1990). The same is true when the district court adopts a state’s response outright as the basis for dismissing a § 2254 petition. As we have said, “[jjudicial adoption of an entire brief ... withholds information about what arguments, in particular, the court found persuasive, and why it rejected contrary views.” *DiLeo,*901 F.2d at 626. The district court’s order here falls short in this regal'd. And the appropriate remedy for a violation of Rule 50 is to remand the case for compliance with it. *Sims v. Lucas,*9 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir.1993).

According, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND the case so that the district court may set forth its reasons for dismissing Johnson’s § 2254 petition.
#### CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Plaintiff-counter-defendant—Appellee, v. LANDMARK HOTELS, LLC, a California limited liability company, Defendant-counter-claimant—Appellant.

No. 04-56427.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 8, 2006.

Decided June 15, 2006.

*650Annabelle M. Harris, Larry M. Arnold, Esq., Cummins *&*White LLP, Newport Beach, CA, Russell E. Yates, Esq., Yates *&*Leal, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff-counter-defendant-Appellee.

J. Peter Gyben, Esq., Law Offices of J. Peter Gyben, Irvine, CA, for Defendants counter-claimant-Appellant.

Before: KOZINSKI and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and MARTINEZ,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

1. *Acme Galvanizing Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.,*221 Cal.App.3d 170, 270 Cal.Rptr. 405, 410-11 (1990), construed a resulting-loss provision materially indistinguishable from the one at issue here. (The policy in *Acme*construed the words “ensuing loss,” but the term operated precisely like the resulting-loss provision here.) According to *Acme,*a loss falls within the resulting-loss exception to the policy exclusions only if an excluded cause of loss resulted in a separate peril (such as a fire) that itself is covered by the policy, and this secondary peril caused a loss. *Id.*at 411. Here, the excluded peril (contractor negligence) did not cause the rain. Rather, the contractor’s negligence merely permitted the rain to enter the building, causing the loss for which the insured seeks coverage. Where negligence allows forces of nature to cause damage, the negligence is the “efficient proximate cause of the damage.” *Tento Int’l. Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,*222 F.3d 660, 662 (9th Cir.2000).

Tentó’s separate discussion of the policy exclusions did not interpret the resulting-loss provision. *Id.*at 663-64. The district court did not err in holding that the policy here did not cover rain damage resulting from contractor negligence.

2. Because the policy affords Landmark no coverage, we need not decide whether the district court erred in apportioning business interruption losses.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Agriculture

###### Rural Utilities Service 

# AGENCY:

Rural Utilities Service, USDA. 

# ACTION:

Notice of finding of no significant impact. 

# SUMMARY:

Notice is hereby given that the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) has made a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) with respect to possible financing assistance to Georgia Transmission Corporation for the construction of a 500/230 kV Substation in Mitchell County, Georgia. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Bob Quigel, Environmental Protection Specialist, Engineering and Environmental Staff, RUS, Stop 1571, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20250-1571, telephone (202) 720-0468, e-mail at                         *bquigel@rus.usda.gov.*

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The project is to be named the Raccoon Creek Substation. It will provide for the interconnection of the existing 500 kV Farley to North Tipton and 230 kV Mitchell to Thomasville transmission lines. The site location for the substation is at the intersection of Jackson Dairy Road and Stagecoach Road in northwest Mitchell County. The size of the site is 110 acres. The fenced area for the substation will be approximately 25 acres. The land use at the site is agricultural field. 

                    Copies of the FONSI are available for review at, or can be obtained from, RUS at the address provided herein or from Mr. John Lasseter, Georgia Transmission Corporation, 2100 East Exchange Place, Tucker, Georgia 30085-2088, telephone (770) 270-7710. Mr. Lasseter's e-mail address is                     *john.lasseter@gatrans.com.*

Dated: May 21, 2001.

Sylvia M. Green, 

Acting Assistant Administrator, Electric Program. 

[FR Doc. 01-13825 Filed 5-31-01; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410-15-P
EXHIBIT 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Nevwest Explorations Corp. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending January 31, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Albert
Abah, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.1350, as adopted pursuanT to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
12th day of March, 2008.


/s/ Albert Abah
---------------------------
Chief Executive Officer
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Office of the United States Trade Representative

# AGENCY:

Office of the United States Trade Representative.

# ACTION:

 Notice of designation of “Senior Agency Official” for certain purposes under section 5.6 of Executive Order 12958 entitled “Classified National Security Information.”

# SUMMARY:

The General Counsel of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has been designated as the senior agency official for purposes of section 1.8(d) of Executive Order 12958 and has the authority, along with the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the Deputy USTRs, to classify or re-classify information that has not previously been disclosed to the public after a request for it has been received under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or the Privacy Act of 1974.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

The FOIA Office, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 600 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20508. The telephone number is (202) 395-3419.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Executive Order 12958 (“the Order”) provides that heads of agencies that originate or handle classified information shall designate one or more senior agency officials to carry out certain duties and responsibilities under the Order. On May 10, 2001, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick designated the position of General Counsel as a “Senior Agency Official” pursuant to the provisions of section 5.6 of the Order. The General Counsel shall have the authority to classify or re-classify information after a request has been received under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, or the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, so long as that information has not previously disclosed to the public. Such classification or re-classification shall be done in a manner that meet the requirements of the Order and on a document-by-document basis. 

Sybia Harrison,

Agency FOIA Officer. 

[FR Doc. 01-14147 Filed 6-5-01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3190-01-M
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Melvin LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-50239.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 5, 2010.*

Filed April 21, 2010.

Carole C. Peterson, Esquire, Michael J. Raphael, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kathryn Ann Young, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

*600Before: RYMER, MCKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Melvin Lewis appeals from the district court’s order granting in part and denying in part his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Lewis’ counsel has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided the appellant with the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80-81, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.