Opinion issued October 31, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-22-00520-CV

NO. 01-22-00525-CV

———————————

ADERONKE ADEREMI, Appellant

V.

MASSANDRA KV VINEYARDS OWNER LLC, AS SUCCESSOR-ININTEREST TO PAC VINEYARDS LLC, Appellee

IN RE ADERONKE ADEREMI, Relator

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1176890

MEMORANDUM OPINION
2

In this forcible detainer action, appellant Aderonke Aderemi appeals from the 

county court’s judgment awarding possession of an apartment to appellee Massandra 

KV Vineyards Owner LLC (“Massandra”), as alleged successor-in-interest to PAC 

Vineyards LLC (“PAC Vineyards”). On appeal, Aderemi raises thirteen issues, 

including that Massandra lacked standing to sue and that no evidence established 

Massandra had a superior right to immediate possession of the apartment.

1 For the 

reasons discussed below, we conclude that Massandra had standing to bring the 

eviction suit, but the evidence was legally insufficient to establish Massandra’s right 

to possession. Accordingly, we reverse and render judgment.

Aderemi also filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that this Court 

stay enforcement of the county court’s post-judgment order directing the issuance of

a writ of possession. We dismiss the petition as moot.

Background

In October 2020, Aderemi and PAC Vineyards entered into a lease agreement 

for an apartment unit at the Vineyards apartment complex in Harris County. The 

1

In her other issues, Aderemi contends that the county court erred by entering a 

judgment that was unclear; entering findings of fact unsupported by legally 

sufficient evidence; denying her objection to an assigned judge; and issuing a postjudgment writ of possession. Aderemi also raises issues concerning opposing 

counsel, her own counsel’s ineffective assistance, and the admission of evidence. 

Because the legal sufficiency challenge to Massandra’s right to possession is 

dispositive of this appeal, we do not reach these remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 47.1.
3

lease conveyed possession of the apartment to Aderemi for seventeen months from 

November 2020 to April 2022. In April and May 2021, PAC Vineyards sent

Aderemi three notices stating that she had violated the lease by having garage sales 

on Vineyards’ grounds and refusing access to her apartment for required inspections.

In June 2021, PAC Vineyards sent Aderemi a notice of eviction. According 

to the notice, PAC Vineyards was terminating the lease due to the lease violations 

described in the prior notices and because PAC Vineyards had received complaints 

that Aderemi was harassing and threatening other Vineyards residents. The letter 

requested that Aderemi vacate her apartment within three days. Aderemi did not 

vacate the apartment.

In June 2021, PAC Vineyards filed an original petition for eviction against 

Aderemi in Harris County justice court. See TEX. PROP.CODE § 24.004(a) (providing 

that justice courts have jurisdiction to hear eviction suits and issue writs of 

possession). In August 2021, Massandra filed a verified first amended petition.2 The 

amended petition substituted Massandra as plaintiff, stating that Massandra was the 

successor-in-interest of PAC Vineyards and was the “owner and landlord” of the 

Vineyards apartment complex. Massandra’s authorized representative averred in the 

2 The petition names “Aderemi and all occupants” as defendants, but Aderemi is the 

only defendant who filed an answer, participated in the underlying proceedings, and 

participated in this appeal. Thus, Massandra and Aderemi are the only parties to this 

appeal.
4

verification that each of the facts alleged in the petition were within her personal 

knowledge and were true and correct.

The amended petition alleged that Massandra and Aderemi entered into a 

lease agreement conveying possession of the apartment to Aderemi. The amended 

petition further alleged that Aderemi had violated various provisions of the lease, 

and Massandra had sent Aderemi a notice to vacate the apartment, but Aderemi 

refused to vacate the apartment and was in possession when the amended petition 

was filed. Massandra requested an award of possession of the apartment and other 

relief, including attorney’s fees, costs, and interest.

In September 2021, the justice court signed a judgment awarding Massandra 

possession of the apartment. Aderemi appealed the justice court’s judgment to the 

county court for trial de novo. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.9(a) (authorizing party to 

appeal judgment in eviction case), 510.10(c) (stating that appeal of eviction 

judgment is by trial de novo in county court). Aderemi also filed an amended answer 

in the county court generally denying Massandra’s allegations and asserting several 

affirmative defenses. Massandra did not file any additional pleadings in the county 

court, so its live pleading was the first amended petition that it had filed in the justice 

court.

On December 6, 2021, the county court held a one-day bench trial in this case. 

The court admitted several documents into evidence, including the lease agreement 
5

between Aderemi and PAC Vineyards, the three lease-violation notices, and the 

eviction notice.

Nancy Hernandez, an assistant property manager at the Vineyards apartment 

complex, testified at trial. Massandra’s counsel asked Hernandez if “the current 

entity that owns the Vineyards . . . took over that property from another entity fairly 

recently” and if “it’s fair to say y’all are the new management.” Without further 

explanation, Hernandez answered both questions in the affirmative.

Several times during trial, the county court raised the issue of whether 

Massandra was a proper party. At the outset, the judge mentioned potential pleading 

issues and directed the parties to discuss “what the pleadings are” off the record. The 

court recessed, and afterwards the judge noted that the original petition listed PAC 

Vineyards as the sole plaintiff while the amended petition listed Massandra as the 

sole plaintiff. During Aderemi’s case-in-chief, the court acknowledged an objection 

“to the party.” Massandra’s counsel represented that “the Vineyards [apartment 

complex] [is] currently owned by Massandra,” but the court stated that “[t]here is 

nothing in the record as to when the current owner of this property took over this 

property.” Massandra’s counsel argued that Hernandez had testified about 

ownership of the apartment complex.

At the end of trial, the court orally announced that judgment would be for 

Massandra.
6

On April 5, 2022, the county court entered final judgment awarding 

possession of the apartment to Massandra. The judgment stated that Massandra was 

“entitled to obtain a Writ of Possession.” The judgment also set a supersedeas bond 

in the amount of $12,480.

Aderemi filed a supersedeas bond on April 6, the day after the judgment was 

signed. She also deposited $12,480 into the court’s registry. See TEX. R. APP. P.

24.1(a)(2) (providing that judgment may be superseded by filing bond), (c)(1)

(providing that, alternatively, judgment may be superseded by depositing funds in 

court’s registry). Aderemi filed a notice of appeal on July 5, 2022.

After requesting that each party file proposed findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, the county court adopted Massandra’s proposed findings and conclusions.

Finding No. 1 stated that “the parties entered into a lease contract . . . that conveyed 

to [Aderemi] the right of possession” to the subject apartment. The court ultimately 

concluded that Massandra was “entitled to possession” of the apartment.

On Massandra’s motion, the court entered an order directing the county clerk 

to issue a writ of possession “in conformity with the final judgment.”

3 The court 

3 According to the motion, the county court had “refus[ed] to issue the writ of 

possession” because Aderemi had filed a supersedeas bond. See TEX. R. APP. P.

24.1(f) (“Enforcement of a judgment must be suspended if the judgment is 

superseded.”).
7

entered the order on July 15, 2022, after Aderemi had posted a supersedeas bond, 

deposited funds into the court’s registry, and filed a notice of appeal.

Also on July 15, Aderemi filed an emergency petition for writ of mandamus 

in this Court requesting that we stay the county court’s July 15 order and stay 

execution of the writ of possession. The same day, this Court entered a temporary

order staying enforcement of the county court’s order. Four days later, Aderemi filed 

an emergency motion in this Court arguing that despite this Court’s stay order, she 

had received a notice to vacate the apartment within 24 hours. Aderemi’s motion 

included the notice to vacate. The following day, this Court issued a second order

stating that “[a]ny efforts to execute on the trial court’s July 15, 2022 order granting 

Massandra’s ‘Motion to Issue Writ of Possession’ are stayed pending resolution of 

[Aderemi’s] petition for writ of mandamus” or further order of this Court.

Standing and Right of Immediate Possession

Throughout most of her issues, Aderemi argues that Massandra offered no 

evidence proving that it was PAC Vineyards’ successor-in-interest or that it was the 

actual owner or landlord of the apartment. Aderemi contends that Massandra 

therefore lacked standing to bring the eviction suit. For the reasons discussed below, 

we disagree that this presents an issue of standing and conclude that Massandra had 

standing to sue.
8

However, Aderemi’s arguments also encompass the issue whether the 

evidence is legally sufficient to prove that Massandra had a right to possession of 

the apartment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Isaac v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 563 S.W.3d 

305, 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (stating that “the only 

issue to be adjudicated [in forcible-detainer action] is the right to actual possession”); 

see also Li v. Pemberton Park Cmty. Ass’n, 631 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tex. 2021) (per 

curiam) (stating that courts should review and evaluate pro se pleadings with 

liberality and patience); Manderscheid v. LAZ Parking of Tex., LLC, 506 S.W.3d 

521, 522 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) 

(applying liberal construction to pro se party’s appellate brief). For the reasons 

discussed below, we conclude that no evidence establishes Massandra had a right to

possession of the apartment.

A. Standing

On appeal, Aderemi primarily challenges Massandra’s standing to sue.

1. Standard of Review and Governing Law

Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, it may not be waived, and it 

may be raised for the first time on appeal. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 

137, 150 (Tex. 2012); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 

445–46 (Tex. 1993). The plaintiff has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate 

standing. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154. Standing is determined at the time suit is 
9

filed. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 n.9; Rolle v. Hardy, 527 S.W.3d 405, 

417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). We review de novo the 

jurisdictional issue of whether a party has standing to sue. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020).

The standing inquiry focuses on the plaintiff’s alleged injury. Under Texas 

law, standing requires that: (1) the plaintiff must be personally injured, and the injury 

must be concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, not hypothetical; (2) the 

plaintiff’s injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and (3) the 

plaintiff’s injury must be likely redressable by the requested relief. In re Abbott, 601 

S.W.3d 802, 808 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). If the plaintiff lacks standing, 

the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, and the case must be 

dismissed. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150–51.

A party may challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction either on the pleadings or 

by evidence negating jurisdictional facts. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 

133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We first consider whether the plaintiff’s petition 

alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction. Id.; see 

Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150 (“[O]ur [jurisdictional] analysis begins with the live 

pleadings.”). We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, taking as 

true all factual allegations, and look to the pleader’s intent. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 
10

150; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. We may also consider relevant evidence 

submitted by the defendant to negate the existence of jurisdictional facts. Heckman, 

369 S.W.3d at 150; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227.

2. Analysis

Aderemi argues that all her relevant dealings were with PAC Vineyards, not 

Massandra: she and PAC Vineyards were parties to the lease agreement; PAC 

Vineyards sent the lease-violation and eviction notices; and PAC Vineyards filed the 

original petition as sole plaintiff.

4 Aderemi further argues that Massandra produced 

no evidence proving that it succeeded to PAC Vineyards’ interests as the owner and 

landlord of the Vineyards apartment complex. Thus, Aderemi contends that 

Massandra lacked standing to sue.

All of Aderemi’s standing-related arguments challenge only part of the first 

element of standing: whether Massandra was personally injured by Aderemi’s 

refusal to return possession of the apartment upon demand. See In re Abbott, 601 

4 Aderemi also argues that the county court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 

identified PAC Vineyards—not Massandra—as the plaintiff. However, we 

determine standing from the beginning of suit, when Massandra filed the amended 

petition in county court. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 

446 n.9 (Tex. 1993); Rolle v. Hardy, 527 S.W.3d 405, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Massandra first appeared as plaintiff in the first amended 

petition, which alleged that Massandra was PAC Vineyards’ successor-in-interest 

and Massandra was the owner and landlord of the apartment. For purposes of our 

jurisdictional analysis, we consider whether Massandra’s amended petition 

affirmatively demonstrated standing. See Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 

S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012).
11

S.W.3d at 808. Aderemi does not contend that the alleged injury—the landlord’s 

loss of possession of the apartment, whomever the landlord may be—was not 

concrete, particularized, and imminent; fairly traceable to her conduct; or likely to 

be redressed by any relief. See id.; see also TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.002(a)(1) 

(providing that “person who refuses to surrender possession of real property on 

demand commits a forcible detainer if the person is a tenant . . . wilfully and without 

force holding over after the termination of the tenant’s right of possession”); Salazar 

v. HPA Tex. Sub 2016-1 LLC, No. 01-19-00330-CV, 2020 WL 7702176, at *5 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (stating that owner 

and lessor have standing to bring eviction suit and that plaintiff’s “status as a 

lessor/landlord demonstrates that it has a justiciable interest in the outcome of this 

proceeding”). We therefore consider only whether Massandra alleged that it was 

personally injured. See In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d at 808.

We begin our jurisdictional analysis with the live pleadings, which we 

liberally construe in Massandra’s favor. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150; Miranda, 

133 S.W.3d at 226. Massandra first appeared as plaintiff in the amended petition

filed in the justice court, alleging that it was the successor-in-interest to PAC 

Vineyards. See Finley Res., Inc. v. Headington Royalty, Inc., 672 S.W.3d 332, 342 

(Tex. 2023) (stating that “successor” “refers to rights and obligations transferred by 

merger, consolidation, or other legal succession”) (citation omitted); Broadway 
12

Nat’l Bank, Tr. of Marty Frances Evers Tr. v. Yates Energy Corp., 631 S.W.3d 16, 

25 n.5 (Tex. 2021) (“Corporations and other business entities do not have heirs, but 

they can have successors.”). The amended petition also alleged that Massandra was 

the owner and landlord of the Vineyards apartment complex, Massandra entered into 

a lease agreement with Aderemi conveying to her possession of the apartment, the 

lease was terminated due to alleged lease violations, and Aderemi refused to 

surrender possession of the apartment.

These allegations affirmatively demonstrate that Massandra was personally 

injured by Aderemi’s lease violations and refusal to return possession of the 

apartment upon demand. See In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d at 808. Based solely on the 

allegations in the pleadings, Massandra was entitled to possession of the apartment 

because Massandra had a landlord-tenant relationship with Aderemi arising from a 

lease agreement, the lease was terminated due to alleged lease violations by 

Aderemi, and Aderemi refused to return possession of the apartment to Massandra.

See Salazar, 2020 WL 7702176, at *5.

Aderemi did not produce any evidence in the county court to negate 

Massandra’s jurisdictional allegations. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150 (stating that 

courts may review relevant evidence submitted by defendant to negate existence of 

jurisdictional facts alleged in pleadings). On appeal, however, Aderemi relies on the 

lease agreement, the lease-violation notices, and the eviction notice, and she 
13

correctly argues that these documents show that Massandra was neither a party to 

the lease agreement nor the sender of the notices. Nevertheless, this evidence does 

not raise a fact issue on Massandra’s standing to sue. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 

227–28.

We determine standing at the time suit is filed. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d 

at 446 n.9; Rolle, 527 S.W.3d at 417. The lease agreement was executed in October 

2020 and became effective in November 2020. The three lease-violation notices 

were dated in April 2021 and May 2021, and the eviction notice was dated in June 

2021. In sum, all the evidence Aderemi relies on is dated between October 2020 and 

June 2021, but Massandra did not file the amended petition until August 2021. 

Between June 2021 and August 2021, however, Massandra could have succeeded to

PAC Vineyards’ interests in the Vineyards apartment complex and become the 

owner and landlord. Thus, the evidence Aderemi relies on has no bearing on whether 

Massandra had standing when it filed the amended petition.5

5 Additionally, we note that it is well settled that whether an owner or landlord is a 

successor-in-interest to the original owner or landlord presents an issue of capacity 

to sue, not standing to sue. E.g., King-Mays v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 194 S.W.3d 

143, 145 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (stating that “challenge to privity is 

a capacity issue, not standing”); Nine Greenway Ltd. v. Heard, Goggan, Blair & 

Williams, 875 S.W.2d 784, 786, 787 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ 

denied) (holding that whether plaintiff-landlord is successor-in-interest to original 

landlord is issue of capacity, not standing).
14

We therefore conclude that Massandra’s live pleading affirmatively 

demonstrated Massandra had standing to sue, and the jurisdictional evidence does 

not negate Massandra’s standing. See id. at 150; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226, 227–

28; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2008) (“A 

plaintiff does not lack standing simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of his 

claim; he lacks standing because his claim of injury is too slight for a court to afford 

redress.”); Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (stating that landlord-tenant relationship 

is not jurisdictional prerequisite to forcible detainer action). We therefore hold that 

Massandra had standing to bring the eviction suit.

We overrule Aderemi’s issues to the extent they challenge standing.

B. Right of Immediate Possession

To prove the merits of its forcible detainer claim and establish its entitlement 

to possession of the apartment, however, Massandra was required to produce 

evidence of its superior right to immediate possession.

1. Standard of Review and Governing Law

A forcible detainer action is designed to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive 

means to determine the right of immediate possession of real property where there 

is no claim of unlawful entry. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 

782, 787 (Tex. 2006); Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 310. The only issue to be adjudicated is 
15

the right of immediate possession of real property. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Shields 

Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 478 (Tex. 2017); Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 

310.

In a forcible detainer action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving its 

superior right to immediate possession by producing evidence showing that: (1) the 

plaintiff owns the property or has a landlord-tenant relationship with the defendant; 

(2) the defendant is either a tenant at will, a tenant at sufferance, or a tenant or 

subtenant willfully holding over after the termination of the defendant’s right of 

possession; (3) the plaintiff gave proper notice to the defendant to vacate the 

premises; and (4) the defendant refused to vacate the premises. Bradberry, 526 

S.W.3d at 478; Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 310–11 (stating that proof of landlord-tenant

relationship establishes basis for determining right of immediate possession). The 

plaintiff is not required to prove title to establish a right of possession; rather, the 

plaintiff is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a

superior right of immediate possession. Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 311.

In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact have the same 

weight as a jury’s verdict. Hall v. Lewis, 639 S.W.3d 197, 204 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). We therefore review the trial court’s findings for legal and 

factual sufficiency using the same standards that we use to review a jury verdict. Id.
16

at 204–05. When a complete reporter’s record exists, findings of fact are not binding 

unless they are supported by the evidence. Id. at 205.

When, as here, an appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of an adverse 

finding on an issue on which she did not have the burden of proof at trial, the 

appellant must demonstrate that no evidence supported the adverse finding. Exxon 

Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). We consider 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, crediting favorable 

evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregarding contrary evidence unless 

a reasonable fact finder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822, 

827 (Tex. 2005). We will sustain a no-evidence challenge if the record shows: (1) a 

complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by the rules of 

law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; 

(3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; and 

(4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 810

(citation omitted).

2. Analysis

Aderemi’s legal sufficiency arguments are the same as her standing 

arguments. That is, Aderemi argues that all the evidence shows her relevant dealings 

were with PAC Vineyards, not Massandra: she and PAC Vineyards were parties to 

the lease and PAC Vineyards sent the lease-violation and eviction notices. Aderemi 
17

argues that Massandra produced no evidence proving that it actually succeeded to 

the interests of PAC Vineyards or was the owner or landlord of the apartment. We 

construe these arguments as a no-evidence challenge to Massandra’s right to

possession.

The final judgment awarded possession of the apartment to Massandra. The 

county court also entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.6 Finding No. 1 

stated that “the parties entered into a lease contract . . . that conveyed to [Aderemi] 

the right of possession” of the apartment. No other finding addressed Massandra’s 

6

In the findings of fact, the case style identified Massandra, as PAC Vineyards’ 

successor-in-interest, as the plaintiff, but the body of the findings identified only 

PAC Vineyards as the plaintiff. In a subsequent appellate issue, Aderemi argues that 

the incorrect identification of PAC Vineyards as the plaintiff in the body of the 

findings further supports her no-evidence challenge to Massandra’s right to 

possession. We disagree. “A misnomer occurs when a party misnames itself or

another party, but the correct parties are involved.” In re Greater Houston 

Orthopaedic Specialists, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) 

(per curiam). “A misnomer does not invalidate a judgment as between parties where 

the record and judgment together point out, with certainty, the persons and subject 

matter to be bound.” Chen v. Breckenridge Ests. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 227 

S.W.3d 419, 420 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). Here, Massandra filed the 

amended petition as plaintiff; Massandra appeared at trial, presented evidence, and 

questioned witnesses; and the judgment listed Massandra as plaintiff and awarded 

Massandra possession of the apartment. Furthermore, the county court adopted 

Massandra’s proposed findings and conclusions as the court’s findings and 

conclusions, which indicates that Massandra misnamed itself in the body of the 

findings. To the extent the findings in this case “are susceptible of different 

constructions, they will be construed, if possible, to be in harmony with the 

judgment and to support it.” See Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299, 

301 (Tex. 1963); Tex. Outfitters Ltd. v. Nicholson, 534 S.W.3d 65, 74 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2017), aff’d, 572 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. 2019). We therefore conclude that 

the misnomer in the findings does not invalidate either the findings or the judgment.
18

right to possession. Thus, we consider whether legally sufficient evidence supports 

Finding No. 1.

At trial, the county court admitted several documents into evidence, including

the lease agreement, the notices of lease violations, and the eviction notice. The lease 

agreement identified the parties to the agreement as Aderemi and Preferred 

Apartment Advisors, LLC, as agent for PAC Vineyards. The lease does not mention 

Massandra. Furthermore, all the lease-violation notices and the eviction notice 

expressly state that they were sent on behalf of PAC Vineyards. The notices do not

mention Massandra.

Nancy Hernandez, the assistant property manager of the apartment complex, 

testified at trial. The only testimony remotely concerning Massandra’s right to

possession was the following exchange between Massandra’s counsel and 

Hernandez:

Q. And just to be clear, the—the current entity that owns the 

Vineyards, it took over that property from another entity fairly 

recently, right?

A. Yes, on July 19th.

Q. Okay. And so it’s fair to say y’all are the new management?

A. Correct.

Hernandez did not identify the “current entity” that owns the Vineyards apartment 

complex.
19

To establish its claim of forcible detainer, Massandra was required to prove 

that it owned the apartment or had a landlord-tenant relationship with Aderemi. See 

Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d at 478; Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 311. In the challenged Finding 

No. 1, the county court found that Massandra and Aderemi had entered into a lease 

agreement. The appellate record, however, reveals a complete absence of evidence 

that Massandra and Aderemi were parties to any lease agreement. See City of Keller, 

168 S.W.3d at 810 (stating that reviewing court will sustain no-evidence challenge 

if record shows complete absence of evidence of vital fact); cf. Trimble v. Fed. Nat’l 

Mortg. Ass’n, 516 S.W.3d 24, 30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) 

(concluding that original deed of trust, foreclosure sale deed, documents showing 

default of lease, and notice of eviction were legally sufficient evidence supporting

finding that landlord-tenant relationship existed and, thus, landlord had superior 

right of immediate possession). Accordingly, we conclude that no evidence supports

Finding No. 1 that Massandra and Aderemi entered into a lease agreement.

Massandra argues on appeal that Aderemi failed to raise the issue of whether 

Massandra was successor-in-interest to PAC Vineyards. However, Massandra bore 

the burden to prove the elements of its forcible-detainer claim, including that it either 

owned the apartment or had a landlord-tenant relationship with Aderemi. See 

Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d at 478; Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 310–11. Aderemi was not 

required to object to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the elements of 
20

Massandra’s claim to preserve her sufficiency challenge for appellate review. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(d) (“In a civil nonjury case, a complaint regarding the legal or 

factual insufficiency of the evidence . . . may be made for the first time on appeal in 

the complaining party’s brief.”); accord Superbash 2017, LLC v. Fun Fest Ent., 634 

S.W.3d 471, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (stating that legal 

insufficiency challenge “falls within an exception to the usual preservation-of-error 

requirements”).

Massandra also argues on appeal that its employee testified that Massandra

was the successor-in-interest to PAC Vineyards. But the county court did not find 

that Massandra was PAC Vineyards’ successor-in-interest; rather, it found that 

Massandra was a party to a lease agreement, and this finding served as the basis for 

concluding that Massandra was entitled to possession. Additionally, Massandra does 

not cite any part of the appellate record supporting this argument. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.1(i) (stating that appellate brief must contain clear and concise argument with 

appropriate citations to authorities and to record). Presumably, Massandra’s 

“employee” refers to Hernandez.

7 As discussed above, however, Hernandez did not

7 Massandra’s appellate brief does not mention Hernandez. At trial, Hernandez was 

the only witness to testify other than Aderemi, and Hernandez testified that she was 

the assistant property manager at the Vineyards complex. Hernandez was not asked 

to identify her employer. Although the record does not indicate that Hernandez was 

Massandra’s employee, for purposes of our analysis, we will assume without 

deciding that Massandra’s “employee” refers to Hernandez.
21

identify “the current entity that owns the Vineyards.” Therefore, we disagree with 

Massandra that Hernandez’s testimony supported Finding No. 1.

We note that the county court pointed out this issue several times at trial, 

thereby providing Massandra with several opportunities to prove its right of 

possession. For example, the judge mentioned potential pleading issues and noted 

that Aderemi had objected “to the party.” Massandra’s counsel responded that “the 

Vineyards [apartment complex] [is] currently owned by Massandra,” but argument 

of counsel is not evidence. See Fallon v. MD Anderson Physicians Network, 586 

S.W.3d 58, 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).

We hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the county court’s 

Finding No. 1 that Massandra and Aderemi were parties to a lease agreement. 

Therefore, no evidence establishes that Massandra had any right to possession of the 

apartment. See Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 310 (stating that “the only issue to be 

adjudicated [in forcible-detainer action] is the right to actual possession”). We 

sustain Aderemi’s issues concerning the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

Massandra’s right to possession.

Mandamus

On July 15, 2022—after the county court entered judgment awarding 

possession to Massandra, and after Aderemi posted a supersedeas bond, deposited 

funds into the court’s registry, and perfected her appeal to this Court—the county 
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court signed an order directing the county clerk “to issue a writ of possession in 

conformity with the final judgment in this case.” The same day this order was signed, 

Aderemi filed an emergency petition for writ of mandamus requesting that this Court 

“stay the execution of a Writ of Possession granted by the Trial Court.” Pending 

resolution of her mandamus petition, this Court issued two temporary orders staying 

enforcement of the county court’s order and execution of a writ of possession. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(c) (“The appellate court may issue any temporary orders 

necessary to preserve the parties’ rights.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b) (authorizing 

appellate court to “grant any just relief pending the court’s action” on petition in 

original appellate proceeding).

As discussed below, we conclude that Aderemi’s petition for writ of 

mandamus has become moot following our resolution of her direct appeal. We 

therefore do not consider the merits of her mandamus petition. See In re J.J.R.S., 

627 S.W.3d 211, 225 (Tex. 2021) (“Any ruling on the merits of a moot issue 

constitutes an advisory opinion, which we lack jurisdiction to issue.”).

Mootness occurs if the relief requested will not “affect the parties’ rights or 

interests.” State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018) (quoting 

Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 162). A case can become moot at any time, including on 

appeal. Id. When a case becomes moot, the court loses jurisdiction over the case 

because any decision would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. Id.
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However, an entire case “is not rendered moot simply because some of the issues 

become moot during the appellate process.” Id. (quoting In re Kellogg Brown & 

Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)). If only some issues 

become moot, the case remains live as to other issues that are not moot. Id.

Here, we have already resolved Aderemi’s direct appeal in her favor, resulting 

in reversal of the county court’s judgment. Upon reversal, the county court’s 

judgment becomes a nullity and unenforceable, and this Court’s judgment becomes 

the judgment of both courts. See Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229, 240 (Tex. 

2013); Bramlett v. Phillips, 359 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012), aff’d, 

407 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. 2013).

The county court’s order directed the county clerk to issue a writ of possession 

“in conformity with the final judgment,” and our judgment awards possession to

Aderemi. Thus, Aderemi—and only Aderemi—would be entitled to a writ of 

possession “in conformity with the final judgment.” Rule of Civil Procedure 510.8, 

however, only authorizes a prevailing plaintiff in an eviction case to obtain a writ of 

possession; a prevailing defendant is not entitled to a writ of possession. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 510.8(b)–(d). Because neither Massandra—as the non-prevailing party—nor 

Aderemi—as the defendant in the county court—may obtain a writ of possession in 

the eviction case, any decision from this Court granting or denying mandamus relief 

to stay execution of the writ of possession would not affect the parties’ rights or 
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interests. See Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 6. In light of our decision in Aderemi’s direct 

appeal, we vacate the county court’s July 15, 2022 order directing issuance of a writ 

of possession.

Accordingly, without regard to the merits, we hold that Aderemi’s petition for 

writ of mandamus is moot, and we therefore dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. We 

lift our prior stay orders. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b) (“Unless vacated or modified, 

an order granting temporary relief is effective until the case is finally decided.”).

Conclusion

We reverse the county court’s judgment and render judgment that Aderemi is 

entitled to possession of the subject apartment. We dismiss the petition for writ of 

mandamus for want of jurisdiction. We release and discharge the supersedeas bond 

and order that all funds deposited by Aderemi with the county court to suspend 

enforcement of the county court’s judgment be released to Aderemi.

April L. Farris

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Farris.