PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 22-2053 and 22-2076

EDDIE WILLIAMS,

 Appellant in No. 22-2076

v.

SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI;

ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA;

DISTRICT ATTORNEY LEBANON COUNTY,

 Appellants in No. 22-2053

________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1-20-cv-00908)

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

________________

Argued November 9, 2023

Before: RESTREPO, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 13, 2024)

________________
2

Brian L. Deiderick [ARGUED]

Office of the District Attorney

County of Lebanon

400 S. 8th Street, Rm. 11

Lebanon, PA 17042

Ronald Eisenberg

Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General 

1600 Arch Street, Ste. 300

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellants in No. 22-2053

Michael Wiseman [ARGUED]

Wiseman & Schwartz, LLP

718 Arch Street, Ste. 702

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellant in No. 22-2076

__________

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

The framers drafted the Bill of Rights to contain broad 

principles curbing the powers of our federal government. See, 

e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V. They also included more 

particularized rules to safeguard individual liberty like the 

Sixth Amendment, which defends against unjustified 
3

deprivations of life and liberty1 by mandating that the 

government afford several specific procedural protections to 

the criminally accused.2 This appeal involves one such 

guarantee: an accused person’s right “to be confronted with the 

witnesses against [them]” pursuant to the Confrontation Clause 

of the Sixth Amendment.

In 2015, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

prosecuted Eddie Williams for a series of crimes related to an 

1 See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 

(1965) (“The [jury trial] clause was clearly intended to protect 

the accused from oppression by the [g]overnment . . . .” 

(citation omitted)).

2 The Supreme Court has applied all but one of the 

Sixth Amendment’s protections to the states through the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See In re 

Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272–74 (1948) (right to a public trial; 

right to notice of accusations); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 

335, 342, 345 (1963) (right to counsel); Pointer v. Texas, 380 

U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (right to confront hostile witnesses); 

Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (right to an 

impartial jury); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223

(1967) (right to a speedy trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 

14, 17–19 (1967) (right to compulsory process to obtain 

witness testimony; right to confront favorable witnesses). The 

Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the Vicinage Clause, but 

we have assumed “for the purposes of discussion, without 

expressing any views upon the matter, that the state-anddistrict guarantee is so closely related to the purpose of the 

jury-trial guarantee that it is applicable to the states.” Zicarelli

v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466, 479 (3d Cir. 1976).
4

alleged dispute over illegal drug profits that killed one person 

and seriously injured another. A jury returned a guilty verdict 

on all twenty counts, and the trial judge sentenced Mr. 

Williams to life imprisonment, plus a term of 21.5 to 47 years. 

But at trial, Mr. Williams’s judge twice read a non-testifying 

codefendant’s Criminal Information to the jury in violation of 

the Sixth Amendment. Mr. Williams’s attorney’s 

constitutionally ineffective response only made matters worse. 

These two interrelated injuries each justified the District 

Court’s decision to grant habeas relief to Mr. Williams. After 

all, for our Constitution’s liberty-ensuring principles to have 

any strength, they must, like a muscle, be used correctly, 

consistently, and forcefully. For the following reasons, we will 

affirm.

I

A decade ago, law enforcement saw Rick Cannon, 

Akeita Harden, and Mr. Williams leave the apartment complex 

in Lebanon, Pennsylvania, where Marcus Ortiz was killed, and

Keith Crawford was grievously wounded—both by gunshots 

to the head. Arriving at the scene moments after the gunshots 

were reported, the responding patrol officer observed Mr. 

Williams and Mr. Cannon enter a vehicle driven by Ms.

Harden. A car chase ensued, and all three suspects eventually

abandoned the vehicle to flee on foot. Law enforcement 

apprehended Mr. Cannon and Ms. Harden that day, and Mr.

Williams seven months later.

In July 2015, Mr. Cannon pleaded guilty to a twentycount Criminal Information, which included homicide and

attempted homicide charges, aggravated assault, robbery,

possessing controlled substances with intent to deliver, two

firearms charges, flight to avoid arrest, and conspiracy charges
5

related to each. Nine of those charges named Mr. Williams as

a coconspirator. Meanwhile, Mr. Williams was charged with

the same twenty offenses as Mr. Cannon and proceeded to a

joint trial with Ms. Harden in October 2015.

Here marks the start of our controversy. During Mr.

Williams’s attorney’s opening statement, he stated:

Second thing that will make this case a little bit

easier for you is that there’s one guy who hasn’t

really been mentioned. . . . That guy’s name is

Rick Cannon. The reason that Mr. Cannon is so

pivotal is because he’s already said that he did

this. He wrote down on a piece of paper under

oath, yes, I killed that man. He stood in this very

courtroom, put up his hand and took an oath and

told Judge Kline, yes, I killed that man. He

admitted that he killed him. Rick, we already

know for an absolute fact that Rick Cannon

killed the man.

Supp. App’x 121. The Commonwealth did not object

contemporaneously, but, after opening statements concluded,

explained at sidebar that it “[took] exception” to defense

counsel’s opening because it mischaracterized the facts. Supp. 

App’x 127; see also id. at 128 (“I think it’s a 

mischaracterization of the facts to say that we know for a fact 

that Rick Cannon is the person that pulled the trigger . . . .”). In 

reality, the homicide count in Mr. Cannon’s Criminal 

Information only read: “In that the Defendant, acting as a 

principal and/or accomplice[,] . . . did fire a gun at the victim 

striking him with a bullet.” Supp. App’x 132.
6

As a “curative instruction,” the trial court recommended

“read[ing] into the record what Mr. Cannon pled guilty to” as

that would “clear[] the air on the matter.” Supp. App’x 129.

The court explained that it thought it “fair” for the jury to hear

that Mr. Cannon “pled [guilty] as a principal or an accomplice

as well.” Supp. App’x 130. From there, the scope of what was

to be read increased:

THE COURT: I think in fairness, because there’s

so much here, I know [Mr. Cannon is] on appeal,

but I sentenced him, and I’ll say he was

sentenced after that. Okay. I’m going to read

each one.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just Count 1 you mean

or you want to read the whole thing?

THE COURT: I think I need to. . . . Does

anybody have an objection?

[COMMONWEALTH]: He pled to everything.

THE COURT: He pled to everything. It will take

a minute or two, but it’s going to clear the air in

terms of the opening.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have no problem

with that.

Supp. App’x 130–31. Having decided to read the entirety of the

Criminal Information rather than just the homicide count, the

trial court then addressed the jury:
7

At a sidebar there was an objection made to

certain characterization[s] of what the District

Attorney knew or [did] not kn[o]w about Rick

Cannon, and all parties have agreed that Rick

Cannon pled guilty before this jurist. I took the

guilty plea and sentenced him.

So to make it perfectly clear to the jury what he

did and what he alleged he pled guilty to, I’m

going to read the entire [Criminal] Information

concerning Rick Cannon, and I want you to just

slowly listen carefully to it as I go through. All

Counsel has agreed that he pled guilty to all of

these charges, and I sentenced him thereafter.

The amount of sentence is not a relevant factor

here, but the fact that he pled guilty to these [is a

relevant factor]. So take your time, and we will

go through it.

Supp. App’x 131 (emphasis added). The trial court proceeded

to read aloud the entirety of Mr. Cannon’s twenty-count

Criminal Information. Nine charges in Mr. Cannon’s Criminal

Information specifically named Mr. Williams as a

coconspirator.3 For instance, Count 5 read:

3 The nine charges naming Mr. Williams included: 

Count 4, Criminal Conspiracy, Violation of the Drug Act;

Counts 5 and 6, Criminal Conspiracy, Criminal Homicide;

Counts 9 and 10, Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated

Assault; Counts 13 and 14, Criminal Conspiracy, Aggravated

Assault; Count 17, Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Robbery;

and Count 19, Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Flight to Avoid

Apprehension.
8

Count 5: Criminal Conspiracy Criminal

Homicide . . . In that the Defendant, acting as a 

principal and/or accomplice, with the intent of 

promoting or facilitating the commission of the 

crime of Criminal Homicide, unlawfully did 

agree with AKEITA HARDEN and/or EDDIE

WILLIAMS, that they or one or more of them 

would engage in conduct which constitutes such 

a crime, or an attempt or solicitation to commit 

such a crime, and did an overt act in the 

pursuance thereof, the Defendant did fire a gun 

at MARCUS ANTONIO ORTIZ striking him 

with a bullet.

App’x 36 (emphasis added).

This was not the last time Mr. Cannon’s Criminal 

Information was raised during Mr. Williams’s trial. Both 

defense counsel and the Commonwealth made it an issue in 

their closing arguments. First, defense counsel argued:

Rick Cannon shot Mr. Crawford, and he shot Mr. 

Ortiz, and we know that for one reason, because 

he, himself, said he did it. The Judge read to you 

the charges that Mr. Cannon pled guilty to, and 

I’m going to just read one of them to you, the 

first one, the most important one, Criminal 

Homicide.

That the Defendant it does say acting as a 

principal and/or accomplice, which is standard in 

this thing, unlawfully, intentionally, knowingly, 

recklessly or negligently did cause the death of 
9

another human being, namely Marcus Ortiz, to 

wit . . . did cause the death of Marcus Ortiz, that 

is to say, the Defendant did fire a gun at the 

victim striking him with a bullet.

Mr. Cannon came into this courtroom right here 

and stood right over here. He put up his hand. He 

faced – he looked Judge Kline right in the eye, 

and he said, “I did it. That’s what I did.” And you 

know, when you give a plea, the Judge, the job 

of the Judge is to make sure you know what 

you’re doing and you’re doing it voluntarily, and 

Judge Kline did his job. He made sure he knew 

what he was talking about and knew that he was 

doing it voluntarily. There’s a long series of 

questions that go on with that, and that was 

performed in this case. So we know for one thing 

that Mr. Cannon already pled guilty to killing 

Marcus Ortiz.

App’x 53–54. The Commonwealth responded in its closing by 

telling the jury:

Now, I want to talk to you about something else, 

and I’ve got a great deal of respect for both 

Defense Counsel; but I’m going to suggest that 

there’s some disingenuous comments being 

made up here previously. You heard from 

[defense counsel] that all the evidence has to 

come from up there, not from down here, from 

that stand. Told you that multiple times, and then 

stands down here and says, [“]We know for a fact 

Rick Cannon pulled the trigger.[”] Did that come 
10

from the stand? It didn’t. It comes from him 

telling you that. We don’t know that for a fact. 

That has never been proven or said anywhere in 

this courtroom despite what he says to you, and 

it’s disingenuous to say otherwise.

What we know is Rick Cannon pled guilty as a 

principal or accomplice to these crimes. He 

owned his share of this, okay; but if you want to 

ascribe great value to Rick Cannon’s guilty plea, 

the next part of that disingenuousness was he 

didn’t tell you everything about what Rick 

Cannon pled guilty to. He told you the part he 

wanted you to hear because if you are going to 

ascribe any importance to Rick Cannon pleading 

guilty as a principal or an accomplice to the 

homicide and the shooting, then you better 

ascribe that same importance to this. Rick 

Cannon pled guilty to Criminal Conspiracy with 

Akeita Harden and Eddie Williams to commit 

homicide. So if they want you to ascribe 

importance to one, you got to follow along with 

the other.

App’x 54 (emphasis added).

The jury would hear about the Criminal Information 

that named Mr. Williams as a coconspirator yet another time

after it asked, about an hour and a half into deliberations, for 

“the stipulation as to what Rick Cannon pled guilty to.” App’x 

44. With the agreement of all counsel, the trial judge reread 

each count. The jury then found Mr. Williams guilty of all 

twenty charges, including murder in the first degree.
11

After denial of his direct appeal, Mr. Williams filed a 

Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition in July 2017, 

arguing that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for 

“deliberately inform[ing] the jury that [Mr. Cannon] pled 

guilty, . . . thus allowing the jury to hear that he pled guilty.” 

Supp. App’x 77. The PCRA court found that Mr. Cannon’s 

Criminal Information “never specifically or inferentially 

identifie[d] [Mr. Williams] in the role of principal or 

accessory” and therefore did not violate the Confrontation 

Clause. Supp. App’x 88. The Superior Court affirmed the 

PCRA court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Mr. 

Williams’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal on March 24, 

2020.

In June 2020, Mr. Williams filed the petition at issue 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He alleged five instances of 

ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), including defense

counsel’s failure to object to the reading of Mr. Cannon’s 

Criminal Information. Based on a review of the record, the

Magistrate Judge prepared a Report and Recommendation 

(R&R). The R&R recommended denying Mr. Williams’s 

petition with respect to his Confrontation Clause claims 

because the Criminal Information “did not describe the factual 

basis for the plea or serve a prosecutorial function. [It was] also 

not created for the purpose of being introduced at trial.” 

Williams v. Superintendent, SCI Greene, No. 1:20-cv-0908, 

2021 WL 8315910, at *23 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2021). Thus, the 

R&R concluded that the Criminal Information was neither

testimonial, nor did it violate the Sixth Amendment, and trial 

counsel was therefore not ineffective for failing to object. 

Mr. Williams filed objections to the R&R. The District 

Court sustained only his objections to the Confrontation Clause 
12

issue and the related IAC claim, concluding that Mr. Williams 

was indeed entitled to relief, and vacated his conviction and 

sentence. See Williams v. Superintendent, SCI Greene, No. 

3:20-CV-908, 2022 WL 1321128, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 

2022). The Commonwealth timely appealed the District 

Court’s decision, and Mr. Williams timely cross-appealed.4

II

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1291 and 2253. “Because the District Court granted habeas 

without an evidentiary hearing, we review de novo.” Maple v. 

Albion, 19 F.4th 570, 571 (3d Cir. 2021). We review the state 

court’s determinations on the merits for a decision “contrary 

to” or an “unreasonable application” of clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). An 

unreasonable application of federal law occurs where “the state 

court unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the 

particular facts, unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new 

context, or unreasonably refuses to extend the principle to a 

new context where it should apply.” McMullen v. Tennis, 562 

F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2009). There is a “presumption of 

correctness” for determinations of a factual issue made by the 

state court and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting said 

presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1).

4

 A panel of this Court granted Mr. Williams’s request 

for a certificate of appealability on the arguments he raised on 

cross-appeal. Because we affirm the District Court’s grant of 

relief, we need not address these arguments.
13

Meanwhile, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim 

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the 

state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 

(2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 

(2004)). Additionally, federal habeas relief must only be 

granted where the petitioner demonstrates that the trial error 

“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 

U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).

III

Under the Sixth Amendment, all those criminally 

accused “shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 

witnesses against [them].” U.S. Const. amend. VI. As a result, 

the Confrontation Clause prohibits the “admission of 

testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial 

unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had 

a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). Here, there is no 

dispute that Mr. Cannon was unavailable for trial and that Mr. 

Williams had no prior opportunity to cross examine him. The 

parties only disagree on whether Mr. Cannon’s Criminal 

Information, as it was read to the jury, was testimonial.5It was.

5

 The Commonwealth seeks to avoid the substance of 

this case by arguing that 1) Mr. Williams’s petition is untimely 

because he somehow waived his opportunity to take advantage 

of the prisoner mailbox rule by failing to assert it before the 

PCRA court and 2) Mr. Williams failed to exhaust his 

Confrontation Clause claim when he did not include the issue 

in his allocatur request to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. As 
14

“Testimony” is typically a “solemn declaration or 

affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving 

some fact.” Id. at 51 (citation omitted). But “statements made 

under circumstances that would lead an objective witness 

reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 

use at a later trial are [also] testimonial.” United States v. 

Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2005). Such statements 

include “material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, 

prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 

reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial 

statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, 

such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 

confessions.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 

310 (2009) (omission in original) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. 

at 51–52); see also United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 773-

74 (3d Cir. 2016). Accomplice confessions to the authorities 

and plea allocutions are among the statements the Supreme 

Court has enumerated as “plainly testimonial.” Crawford, 541 

U.S. at 63–64.

The trial court’s presentation of Mr. Cannon’s Criminal 

Information operated, for all intents and purposes, as a plea 

allocution. In fact, at Mr. Cannon’s actual plea allocution, the 

court read aloud each charge in the Criminal Information and 

asked him if he wished to enter a guilty plea to each. When Mr.

Cannon answered affirmatively, he adopted, as his own, the

statements read from the Criminal Information. To put it

another way, the allegations related to charges set forth in the

Criminal Information became Mr. Cannon’s testimony. See,

neither claim has merit, we will proceed to the constitutional 

issues raised by this appeal.
15

e.g., United States v. Porter, 933 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2019)

(“Courts have long understood a guilty plea to be ‘a confession

of all the facts charged in the indictment, and also of the evil

intent imputed to the defendant.’” (quoting Class v. United

States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 804 (2018)). It was Mr. Cannon’s

admission of guilt to those charges, together with the

description of the charges themselves, as recited by the court,

that were therefore testimonial. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 64

(collecting cases illustrating “plainly testimonial statements,”

including plea allocutions).

So it was in effect Mr. Cannon’s plea that was presented

to the jury as “what [Mr. Cannon] did” and what “[a]ll counsel

. . . agreed that he pled guilty to.” Supp. App’x 131. After

reading all twenty counts, nine of which named Mr. Williams

as a coconspirator, the court reiterated that “to each of those

Counts [Mr. Cannon] pled guilty.” Supp. App’x 138. Mr. 

Cannon’s Criminal Information, in effect, became a plea 

regardless of whether the trial court read the charges from the 

plea allocution transcript or from the document itself. Indeed,

“[t]he trial judge telling the jury that [Mr.] Cannon ‘pled guilty 

to all of these charges and I sentenced him thereafter’ would 

surely be understood by the jury as [Mr.] Cannon having 

admitted guilt, thus bringing the [c]ourt’s acknowledgement of 

[his] statement of guilt so near to the introduction of a 

confession as to make the two indistinguishable.” Williams, 

2022 WL 1321128, at *19.

The Criminal Information’s testimonial and

confessional nature puts it squarely in the territory of Bruton,

where the Supreme Court held that an accused person is

deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when

a non-testifying codefendant’s confession naming them as a
16

participant in the crime is introduced at their joint trial, despite

an instruction that the jury consider the statement only as to the

codefendant. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135–36

(1968); see also Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 54–55

(1899) (in prosecution for receipt of stolen property,

accomplices’ guilty pleas inadmissible to prove that property

received by the accused was “actually stolen from the United

States” because the accused lacked opportunity to cross

examine). The Supreme Court refined the Bruton rule in

Richardson v. Marsh, recognizing that “the Confrontation

Clause is not violated by the admission of a non-testifying

codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction

when . . . the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the

defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence,”

481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987), and has since qualified Richardson

such that the use of “neutral references to some ‘other person’”

as opposed to “an obvious blank or the word ‘deleted’” is not

“directly accusatory” and thus does not violate Bruton. Samia

v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 2004, 2010, 2017 (2023). No such

redaction or modification occurred here.

As Bruton wisely warned, “[a] jury cannot segregate

evidence into separate intellectual boxes. It cannot determine

that a confession is true insofar as it admits that A has

committed criminal acts with B and at the same time

effectively ignore the inevitable conclusion that B has

committed those same criminal acts with A.” 391 U.S. at 131

(internal quotation marks omitted). So, too, does the trial

court’s presentation of Mr. Cannon’s guilty plea to crimes

involving Mr. Williams present the “inevitable conclusion”

that Mr. Williams committed the same or related criminal acts,

especially with the trial court’s endorsement of the Criminal

Information as “mak[ing] it perfectly clear to the jury what
17

[Mr. Cannon] did.” Supp. App’x 131. For these reasons, the

reading of the Criminal Information to the jury as evidence of

what Mr. Cannon pleaded guilty to violated Mr. Williams’s

right to confront the witness against him. It was “contrary to”

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1), which has specifically named plea allocutions and 

confessions as “plainly testimonial.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 

63–64. We hold that no “fairminded jurist[] could disagree.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 

664).6

IV

The aforementioned Bruton violation occurred in 

response to, and was later encouraged by, Mr. Williams’s own 

trial attorney. The District Court found that defense counsel’s 

misrepresentation of the facts surrounding Mr. Cannon’s plea, 

coupled with his failure to object to the reading of Mr. 

6

 Indeed, though not part of the established precedent 

at the time of Mr. Williams’s PCRA petition, the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Hemphill v. New York reinforces our view. 

595 U.S. 140 (2022). Hemphill’s facts are surprisingly similar 

to those we are faced with, though arguably less egregious 

because the plea allocution read at that trial did not name the 

accused. Id. at 144–45. There the Court held that a trial court’s 

admission of portions of a non-testifying third party’s plea 

allocution transcript to correct a “misleading impression” 

created by the defense attorney’s opening statement violated 

the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 143–44. The Court explained 

that the Sixth Amendment “admits no exception for cases in 

which the trial judge believes unconfronted testimonial hearsay 

might reasonably be necessary to correct a misleading 

impression. Courts may not overlook its command, no matter 

how noble the motive.” Id. at 154.
18

Cannon’s Criminal Information on two occasions, amounted to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Williams, 2022 WL 

1321128, at *13–16. We agree.

The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is a wellsettled and firmly established one containing two components. 

“First the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Second, the defendant

must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable.” Id.

Because Strickland’s test is “clearly established 

[f]ederal law,” Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 

2010) (citation omitted), we consider whether the state court 

decision involved an unreasonable application of Strickland or 

an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d).7 We apply a doubly deferential standard of review to 

a Strickland claim, Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 

(2009), though whether “double deference” applies to 

prejudice as well as performance is an open question in our 

7 Pennsylvania employs a three-pronged test for 

ineffective assistance claims. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 

527 A.2d 973, 975-77 (Pa. 1987). This test is not contrary 

to Strickland. See Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 106 n.9 (3d Cir. 

2005). “Thus, under § 2254(d)(1), the relevant question here is 

whether the [state court’s] decision involved an unreasonable 

application of Strickland.” Id.
19

Circuit. See Mathias v. Superintendent Frackville SCI, 876 

F.3d 462, 477 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017). “The question ‘is not whether 

a federal court believes the state court’s determination’ under 

the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that 

determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher 

threshold.’” Id. (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473 (2007)).

A

An attorney’s performance is deficient when it falls

below “an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 688. Here the PCRA court determined that Mr. 

Williams’s ineffective assistance claim was without merit. 

First, the PCRA court explained that a motion in limine to 

redact the Criminal Information was not guaranteed to succeed.

Next, it concluded that although the trial strategy was not 

successful, it did not amount to ineffective assistance where 

counsel “had a reasonable basis for referencing [Mr.] Canon’s 

guilty plea to the homicide” as a third-party culpability

defense. Williams, 2022 WL 1321128, at *13 (emphasis 

added). Finally, the PCRA court determined that Mr. Williams 

“failed to show that an alternative offered a substantially 

greater prospect of success.” Id. We hold these determinations 

to reflect an unreasonable application of Strickland for the 

following reasons.

We first note that “strategic choices made as a result [of 

substantial investigations into plausible lines of defense] ‘will 

seldom if ever’ be found wanting.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681. 

But defense counsel’s strategic choice to pursue a third-party 

culpability defense is not the error here. Rather it was the 

execution of that strategy by knowingly, “patently 

misrepresent[ing] [Mr.] Cannon’s guilty plea” to homicide in 
20

his opening statement and then allowing the trial court, without 

objection, to read Mr. Cannon’s Criminal Information in its 

entirety that was ineffective. Williams, 2022 WL 1321128 at 

*14.8 Failure to raise a meritorious objection can constitute 

deficient performance, especially when the Commonwealth 

has not “provided any strategic explanation for trial counsel’s 

failure” “[n]or are we able to identify one.” Preston v. 

Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 382 (3d Cir. 

2018); see also Lambert v. Warden Green SCI, 861 F.3d 459, 

471 (3d Cir. 2017) (“We recognize that the right of 

confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and 

fundamental requirement of the kind of fair trial which is this 

country’s constitutional goal. Thus[,] a good argument exists 

that [Mr.] Lambert presents a substantial claim that it would be 

objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to allow the 

Commonwealth to violate this right by failing to request a 

limiting instruction pursuant to Richardson.” (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted)).

To “cur[e]” the misrepresentation, however, defense 

counsel acquiesced to the trial court reading, not just the 

criminal homicide charge to which Mr. Cannon pleaded guilty, 

but the Criminal Information in its entirety, including nine 

counts naming Mr. Williams as a coconspirator. Supp. App’x

129. The reading of those nine counts clearly violated Bruton.

And contrary to the PCRAcourt’s conclusions, defense counsel

likely would have prevailed had he objected to its reading,

moved to confine the reading to just the first count, or sought

8

 We need not determine whether the initial 

misrepresentation constituted error as Mr. Williams concedes 

that he was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s opening 

statement.
21

a redaction of any information identifying Mr. Williams. Yet

we need not rule here on the adequacy of trial tactics that

defense counsel failed to employ. The PCRA court’s

determination that a motion to restrict the language of the

Criminal Information was not certain to succeed was a clear

misapplication of federal law, and counsel’s failure to object on

two occasions to the reading of the Criminal Information was

objectively unreasonable.

The PCRA court’s decision also hinged on “an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

It assumed the only charge that was read to the jury and that 

was material to the court’s analysis is Count 1 of Mr. Cannon’s 

Criminal Information. Indeed, we agree that reading only 

Count 1, which did not identify Mr. Williams, would have 

corrected the misrepresentation in defense counsel’s opening 

statement. But reading the entire twenty-count Criminal 

Information, nine counts of which named Mr. Williams as a 

coconspirator, went far beyond clarifying for the jury that Mr.

Cannon pleaded guilty to Criminal Homicide as a principal 

and/or accomplice.

To be clear, competent counsel need not be flawless and 

“may not be faulted for a reasonable miscalculation or lack of 

foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to be remote 

possibilities.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added). 

But Mr. Williams’s defense counsel did not reasonably 

miscalculate the Commonwealth’s prosecution strategy to 

introduce Mr. Cannon’s Criminal Information. At the PCRA 

evidentiary hearing, he even admitted as much. See Supp. 

App’x 360–61 (“In retrospect, I should have tried to redact the 

information so to speak so as to have the homicide charge read 
22

but not the conspiracy charge read because the conspiracy 

charge obviously implicates people other than Mr. Cannon.” 

(emphasis added)). Instead, he had the opportunity to object to 

or ask for a redaction of that Criminal Information but chose 

not to. Moreover, the misrepresentation that the 

Commonwealth sought correction of was defense counsel’s

statement that Mr. Cannon “told Judge Kline, yes, I killed that

man.” Supp. App’x 121. That mischaracterization relates to the 

homicide charge and would have been cured by reading only

Count 1 of Mr. Cannon’s Criminal Information, which made 

no reference to Mr. Williams. For defense counsel to allow the 

other counts to be read without the opportunity to crossexamine Mr. Cannon about Mr. Williams’s involvement in the 

shootings was objectively unreasonable.

For these reasons, we hold that Mr. Williams satisfied 

the deficiency prong of Strickland when his attorney failed to 

object, request redactions, or request limiting instructions to 

the trial court’s reading of Mr. Cannon’s entire Criminal 

Information to the jury.

B

We next consider whether defense counsel’s failure to 

object to the reading of the entire Criminal Information was

“so serious as to deprive [Mr. Williams] of a fair trial.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Such prejudice exists when “there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” Id. at 694. Because a reasonable probability is 

one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” id., 

the Strickland prejudice standard is not “stringent”—it is, in 

fact, “less demanding than the preponderance standard.” 

Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Baker 
23

v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Woodford 

v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22 (2002) (“[Strickland] specifically 

rejected the proposition that [one] had to prove it more likely 

than not that the outcome would have been altered.”).

The PCRA court concluded that Mr. Williams’s claim 

lacked merit in part because “in light of the cumulative 

evidence presented at trial, including the living victim’s 

identification of [Mr. Williams], [it found] that [he had] failed 

to show that an alternative offered a substantially greater 

prospect for success.” Supp. App’x 88-89 (emphasis added). 

This language addresses prejudice because it refers to the 

weight and degree of other evidence in the record in 

comparison to evidence of Mr. Cannon’s guilty plea. However, 

it incorrectly quotes the Pennsylvania standard for 

performance. See id. at 81 (“Where matters of strategy and 

tactics are concerned, a finding that a chosen strategy lacked a 

reasonable basis is not warranted unless it can be concluded 

that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success

substantially greater than the course actually pursued.” 

(emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 

294, 312 (Pa. 2014))). Thus, it is unclear whether the PCRA 

court actually addressed prejudice under Strickland with 

respect to the Criminal Information.

If the PCRA Court did not address prejudice, our review 

of that issue would be de novo. See, e.g., Abdul-Salaam v. Sec’y 

Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 895 F.3d 254, 269 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Because 

the Commonwealth courts did not reach the prejudice prong of 

the analysis, our review is de novo.”). But assuming arguendo

that it did address prejudice, our review is nonetheless de novo 

because the standard it used was contrary to clearly established 

federal law. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 
24

(2000) (declaring as contrary to Strickland a state court’s 

rejection of an ineffective assistance claim “on the grounds that 

the prisoner had not established by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding would have 

been different” (emphasis added)); Rogers v. Superintendent 

Greene SCI, 80 F.4th 458, 464-65 (3d Cir. 2023) (holding as 

contrary to federal law the state court’s requirement that 

petitioner show “the outcome would have been different”); 

Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 F.3d 290, 304-05 (3d Cir. 2009) 

(similar). By requiring Mr. Williams to show a “substantially 

greater prospect for success,” the PCRA court demanded a 

higher standard than what Strickland requires, which is only “a

reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 694.9

Our de novo review of the prejudice prong reveals the 

following. First, in response to Mr. Williams’s counsel’s 

9

 To be sure, Pennsylvania’s “substantially greater 

prospect” standard is appropriate for performance, since we 

have repeatedly endorsed Pennsylvania’s three-part IAC test as 

consistent with Strickland when properly applied. See, e.g.,

Tyson v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 976 F.3d 382, 391 (3d 

Cir. 2020) (“This Court has repeatedly recognized that 

Pennsylvania’s test for ineffective assistance of counsel is 

consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland

because it requires findings as to both deficient performance 

and actual prejudice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

However, Strickland’s prejudice prong is “easier to fulfill” than 

its performance prong and even “less demanding than the 

preponderance standard.” McKernan v. Superintendent 

Smithfield SCI, 849 F.3d 557, 567 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).
25

decisions, the Commonwealth in its closing argument 

encouraged the jury to draw the substantive inference that Mr. 

Williams was guilty of conspiracy based on Mr. Cannon’s 

admission despite there being insufficient direct evidence of an 

actual agreement between Mr. Williams and Mr. Cannon to 

commit the homicide. See Lambert, 861 F.3d at 472 (finding 

Bruton error prejudicial where there was no direct evidence of 

an agreement between the accused and an alleged 

coconspirator and the prosecutor encouraged the jury to draw 

inference of guilt based on a coconspirator’s statement); Brown 

v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 834 F.3d 506, 521 (3d Cir. 2016) 

(finding a Bruton violation prejudicial when “the unmasking 

of [Mr.] Lambert happened during a part of the closing 

arguments when the prosecutor was asking the jury to find 

[Mr.] Garcia guilty”); see also Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 

248, 261 n.12 (3d Cir. 2011) (suggesting that use of a statement 

admitted in violation of Bruton “for their truth in order to 

establish [defendant’s] guilt” is relevant to the harmless error 

determination).

Second, the jury note requesting that the Criminal 

Information be reread suggests that the jury was influenced by 

Mr. Cannon’s plea during deliberations. See Heath v. Jones, 

941 F.2d 1126, 1134 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Actual prejudice occurs 

when the prejudice actually enters the jury box and affects the 

jurors.”). Making matters worse, the jury requested to rehear 

the Criminal Information shortly after commencing 

deliberations and reached a verdict after only a few additional 

hours of deliberation. Cf. Johnson v. Superintendent Fayette 

SCI, 949 F.3d 791, 805 (3d Cir. 2020) (“holding that the length 

of jury deliberations may be one consideration in assessing the 

strength of the prosecution’s case”).
26

Third, there are serious reliability concerns with much 

of the Commonwealth’s trial evidence. The Commonwealth’s 

primary witness, Mr. Crawford, was shot in the head and could 

testify only by typing “yes” or “no” into a cell phone. Not only 

does this raise serious concerns about Mr. Crawford’s 

diminished capacity, his testimony itself was often equivocal. 

For example, he could not remember whether Ms. Harden was 

in or outside the apartment when he was shot. He also testified 

inconsistently regarding who shot Mr. Ortiz and who removed 

his watch and ring. His testimony was also inconsistent with 

the Commonwealth’s own evidence: Mr. Crawford testified 

that Mr. Ortiz was shot first, but the Commonwealth’s own 

forensic DNA analyst testified that Mr. Ortiz “was the last 

person shot” with the sole murder weapon. We also note that 

any evidence of motive from Ms. Harden’s pretrial 

statements—to the effect that Mr. Williams planned to rob and 

kill Mr. Crawford—would be substantively inadmissible as to 

his guilt.

Thus, considering the quality and not just the quantity 

of the Commonwealth’s evidence, the introduction and 

proliferation of Mr. Cannon’s Criminal Information is much 

more likely to have had the prejudicial effect of “improperly 

corroborating the[] less-than-credible [evidence], making it 

more likely that the jury would set aside their doubts in favor 

of a conviction.” Id. at 803-04 (finding prejudice where “the 

prosecution’s two key witnesses were substantially impeached 

and their testimony was contradicted through other witness 

testimony” and thus the improperly admitted confession “gave 

significant weight to [the less than credible] testimony that [the 

accused] was the shooter and validated [a] dubious police 

statement”); see Washington v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 801 

F.3d 160, 171 (3d Cir. 2015) (improperly admitted confession 
27

when “viewed in tandem” with coconspirator’s “less-thancredible” statement had a “corroborative effect” that likely 

affected the jury’s verdict, thus demonstrating actual 

prejudice); see also Brown, 834 F.3d at 520 (testimony from 

the Commonwealth’s primary witness “undercut his reliability 

and usefulness” because “[b]y his own admission, he was 

impaired from marijuana and Xanax” and “had a powerful 

motive to implicate” the accused); Adamson, 633 F.3d at 261 

(admission of improperly redacted/limited confession was not 

harmless because “[t]here were no eyewitness statements 

identifying [the accused] as taking part in the robbery, nor was 

there any physical evidence tying him to the robbery”); 

Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2008) (Bruton

error was not harmless because the accused “never confessed 

to being a shooter, and there was no witness at the trial who 

said that he saw [him] fire a weapon” and so “although there 

was evidence at trial incriminating [him] . . . , it was not so 

compelling that it overcame the Bruton error”). 

Cumulatively, these concerns lead us to believe that Mr.

Williams has successfully shown that the reading of Mr.

Cannon’s entire and unredacted Criminal Information had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict,” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, satisfying Strickland’s 

prejudice prong.

V

The judgment of the District Court will therefore 

be affirmed, and the case will be remanded for the District 

Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus.