J-S32043-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O. P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: D.F.W., NATURAL MOTHER No. 79 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered December 5, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Civil Division,

at No(s): CP-07-DP-0000100-2012 IN THE INTEREST OF: B.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: D.F.W., NATURAL MOTHER No. 80 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered December 5, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Juveni le Division,

at No(s): CP-07-DP-0000102-2012 IN RE: B.S.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: D.F.W., NATURAL MOTHER No. 81 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree entered December 10, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Orphan s’

Court, at No(s): 2013 AD 44 IN THE INTEREST OF: H.R.-S.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: D.F.W., NATURAL MOTHER No. 82 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree entered December 10, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Orphan s’

Court, at No(s): 2013 AD 44-AJ-S32043-14

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BEFORE: PANELLA, DONOHUE, and ALLEN, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED AUGUST 04, 2014 Appellant, D.F.W. (“Mother”), appeals from the orde r and decrees entered on December 5, 2013 and December 10, 2013, t erminating Mother’s parental rights to H.L. (born in July of 2004) and B.L. (born in February of 2002) (collectively “the Children”), and changing thei r permanency goals to adoption. 1 We affirm. Since 2004, Blair County Children, Youth and Familie s (“CYF”) has been involved with this family due to Mother’s inabil ity to care for and provide supervision for the Children, her abusive rela tionships with men, lack of suitable housing, Mother’s drug use, Mother’s me ntal health issues, and her failure to cooperate with CYF. 2 On May 3, 2012, H.L. was removed from Mother’s care an d placed in Clarion Psychiatric Hospital for H.L.’s suicidal and homi cidal intentions following a Childline report that Mother’s paramour, D.R., abused H.L. CYF was unable to establish that the allegations rose to th e level of abuse. On June 22, 2012, H.L. was released from Clarion Psychiatr ic Hospital, and placed in a mental health foster home through Blair C ounty Mental Health

Services.

1 On December 10, 2013, R.L. (“Father”) voluntarily r elinquished his parental rights to the Children.

2 On December 4, 2012, Mother’s parental rights to K.W. and T.W., who are the Children’s half-siblings, were terminated.J-S32043-14

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On July 7, 2012, CYF received a report that Mother w as unable to appropriately provide for the Children; i.e., that they were without proper care and control. On August 13, 2013, CYF received a r eport that B.L. had been acting out at home, acting out sexually, and tha t Mother was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, anxiety, a nd severe depression. On August 14, 2012, CYF received a Childli ne report that Mother took the Children to Altoona Regional Hospita l because they were exhibiting sexual acts on each other, and that D.R. ab used the Children. On August 14, 2012, Mother signed a Voluntary Placement Agreement to place B.L. in a foster home, and H.L. remained in his thera peutic foster home through Mental Health Services. On August 27, 2012, Mother moved out of her home and was residing at an emergency shelter. On September 17, 2012, fol lowing a dependency hearing, the trial court adjudicated the Children dep endent. The September 17, 2012 order directed Mother to: (1) refrain from all criminal activity; (2) attain and maintain clean, safe and appropriate housin g; (3) notify CYF within 48 hours of all changes in household composition, housing, and employment; (4) cooperate with all caseworkers and servi ce providers; (5) immediately provide caseworkers and all service provider s with signed and current consents of release and exchange of information; (6) fully cooperate with all rules of the Children’s placement; (7) underg o drug and alcohol evaluations and follow all treatment recommendations; (8) undergoJ-S32043-14

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psychiatric evaluations and follow all treatment recomm endations; and (9)

attend Women Aware. On November 8, 2012, H.L. was accepted by Sarah Reed C hildren’s Center (“Sarah Reed”), but CYF was unable to reach Mo ther for her to sign the necessary paperwork for H.L. to be admitted to Sar ah Reed. On November 14, 2012, the trial court granted CYF emerg ency protective custody of H.L. and admitted H.L. to Sarah Reed. On November 14, 2012, B.L. was placed in the custody of D.H. (“Foster Mother” ). On June 24, 2013, H.L. left Sarah Reed and was placed in Hoffman Homes f or Youth (“Hoffman Homes”), where he has remained. On July 9, 2013, CYF filed a petition to involuntar ily terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children and a motion for goa l change to adoption. On July 23, 2013, October 28, 2013, and November 26, 20 13, the trial court held hearings on the goal change and termination peti tion. At the hearing, Officer Cornell Thompson; Officer Nichole Douglas; Offic er Derek Swope; Kristel Wisor, a worker at Family Intervention Crisis Services (“FICS”); Foster Mother; William Harper, H.L.’s therapist at S arah Reed; Jennifer Vieth, H.L.’s therapist at Hoffman Homes; and Damien C harlesworth, a CYF caseworker; Father; and Mother testified. On December 5, 2013, the trial court entered its decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and orders changing theirJ-S32043-14

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permanency goal to adoption, and, on December 10, 201 3, the trial court entered amended decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights. On January 3, 2014, Mother timely filed notices of ap peal, along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursu ant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On January 30, 2014, the ap peals were consolidated sua sponte

. 3 Mother raises the following issues.

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental rights?

2. Whether or not the trial court erred in changing the goal to adoption?

Mother’s Brief at 30. Our standard of review regarding orders terminating p arental rights is

as follows: When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the d ecision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent a n abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient ev identiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must sta nd. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involun tarily terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the h earing judge’s decision the same deference that we would give t o a jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive re view of the record in order to determine whether the tri al court’s decision is supported by competent evidence. In re S.H. , 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005). In terminat ion cases, the burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and co nvincing evidence that

3 On June 16, 2014, this Court directed the trial court to provide an analysis regarding Mother’s appellate issues, including terminati on pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) and (b), and goal change to adop tion pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.J-S32043-14

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the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of par ental rights are valid.

Id. at 806. We have previously stated: The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convinc ing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

In re J.L.C. & J.R.C. , 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003). The trial court is free to believe all, part, or non e of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and

resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G. , 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If competent evidence supports the tria l court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B. , 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). Additionally , this Court “need only agree with [the trial court’s] d ecision as to any one subsection in order to affirm the termination of paren tal rights.” In re

B.L.W. , 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) ( en banc ), appeal denied , 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004). Accordingly, as the tr ial court focused on Section 2511(a)(1) in terminating Mother’s parental r ights, we will focus on

that section for our review. In terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial cou rt relied upon Section 2511(a)(1) and (b) which provide: § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination (a) General rule. --The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:J-S32043-14

- 7 - (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of th e petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused o r failed to perform parental duties.

* * * (b) Other considerations .--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfar e of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate ho using, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the cou rt shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the condit ions described therein which are first initiated subsequent t o the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. We have explained this Court’s review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the involuntary terminatio n of a parent’s rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) as follows: To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to t he filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled i ntent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or fa ilure to perform parental duties. In addition, Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to p erform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1) if the par ent either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties.J-S32043-14

- 8 - Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect o f termination of parental rights on the child pursuant t o [s]ection 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W. , 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal cita tions omitted). Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has stated: There is no simple or easy definition of parental duti es. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a c hild. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. T hese needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merel y passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has held that the parental obligation is a pos itive duty which requires affirmative performance. This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in the chil d and a genuine effort to maintain communication and associati on with the child. Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental d uty requires that a parent exert himself to take and mai ntain a place of importance in the child’s life. Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmativ ely with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every pr oblem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationsh ip, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles pla ced in the path of maintaining the parent-child relatio nship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitabl e or convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilit ies while others provide the child with . . . [the child’s] physi cal and emotional needs.J-S32043-14

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In re B., N.M. , 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied , 582 Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omi tted). On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to the Children. Mother’s Brief at 4. Specifically, Mother contends that she has suitable housing, she does not have mental health issues, and she had reasonable excuses for missing visits with the Children.

Mother’s Brief at 33-42. In terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to sect ion 2511(a)(1),

the trial court reviewed the record and the evidence presented, and concluded that it is clear from the record that, for a period of six months leading up to the filing of the petition for involu ntary termination, Mother failed to perform any parental duties for the Childr en. H.L. was removed from Mother’s care since May 3, 2012, and B.L. was remov ed from Mother’s care since August 14, 2012.

The trial court determined: [E]ven though [M]other clearly loves her children, and [H.L.] consistently expresses a desire to live with her, and care s deeply about her, and benefits from having contact with her, [M]other has not demonstrated any ability to provide the [Chil dren] a safe, secure and stable environment. She has not invest ed in any services for her own personal benefit. She has not cooperated with [CYF]. She has not provided any inde pendent verification concerning their medical treatment, her prescriptions, etc. She has not been honest with service providers. [The trial court] found her testimony to be lacking in credibility (e.g. in trying to explain why there has been so many missed visits, missed phone calls, failure to attend the monthly team meetings). [The trial court found] [Mother] to be anJ-S32043-14

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excuse maker, i.e., that it is everyone else’s fault tha t the boys are in their current placements[--] it is the fault of [Father], [CYF], etc. We find that she does not recognize and a ppreciate the significance of the issues the boys are facing, especiall y [H.L.]. She essentially states that a return to her ca re will help “cure” all these issues, despite the fact that these issues e xisted when the children where in her care, custody and contro l, including prior psychiatric hospitalizations .... Permanency Review Order, 12/5/13, at 5. Ms. Wisor, a caseworker for FICS, testified that FICS R eunification Services were open on January 18, 2013 for reunificati on for Mother and B.L. N.T., 7/23/13, at 32-33. Ms. Wisor testified that Mot her’s visits with B.L. decreased and became fully supervised due to concerns with Mother missing meetings, B.L.’s behavior declining, and concerns that D. R. was residing with

Mother. Id. at 35-41. Ms. Wisor testified that Mother never adva nced past step one because she missed thirty-six percent of her visit s with B.L. and thirty percent of her meetings. Id. at 52-53. Ms. Wisor testified that during FICS services, Mother te sted positive for opiates and benzodiazepines. Id. at 39. Ms. Wisor testified that Mother has health problems, but never provided FICS with confi rmation as to the medication Mother was taking. Id. at 50. Ms. Wisor also found that Mother’s housing was inappropriate, and Mother was not employed. Id. at 48. Mother received unemployment compensation, and it expired in February of 2013. Id. Further, Ms. Wisor testified that FICS made it clear

to Mother that reunification with the Children was no t possible if she

remained in contact with D.R. Id. at 42-43. Ms. Wisor testified that D.R.J-S32043-14

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was found hiding in Mother’s attic, and his mail continu ed to be delivered to

Mother’s residence. Id. at 36. Officer Douglas testified that he had approximately t welve interactions with Mother over the past two years. Id. at 17-18. Officer Douglas expressed concerns for the Children’s safety in the home. Id. at 19-20. Officer Swope testified that, on June 4, 2013, Mother and D.R. were involved

in an altercation where Mother was struck several times b y D.R. Id. at 29- 30. Ms. Wisor testified that, on July of 2013, FICS services were closed because of Mother’s lack of progress. Id. at 46-47. Mr. Harper, H.L.’s therapist from Sarah Reed, testifi ed that he worked on issues of safety, anger management, and reducing anxi ety with H.L. Id. at 82. Mr. Harper testified that he was unable to ma ke significant progress with family therapy because of the lack of consistent con tacts with Mother

and the existence of domestic violence in Mother’s hou se. Id. at 90, 92. Moreover, Ms. Veith, a therapist at Hoffman Homes, test ified that H.L. was only able to contact Mother fifty percent of time, and Mother failed to participate in monthly meetings to discuss H.L.’s progress and goals. Id. at 112. Ms. Veith also testified that H.L.’s aggressive be havior and anxiety is triggered when he cannot get in touch with Mother. 7/ 23/13, 104-105; 10/28/13, at 31. Ms. Veith stated that H.L.’s anxiety is a result of witnessing and experiencing domestic violence in Mother’s residence. N.T., 10/28/13, at at 29.J-S32043-14

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Mr. Charlesworth testified that FICS closed its services at the end of July 2013 because of lack of progress. He testified that CYF was willing to arrange bi-weekly visits and provide transportation, b ut Mother did not attend any of the visits in August or September of 201 3. N.T., 11/16/13, at

3-6. The testimony established that reunification betwee n the Children and

Mother had been unsuccessful due to Mother’s lack of stabl e housing and environment, and her failure to cooperate with CYF. In the instant matter,

the trial court found that Mother failed to fulfill her parental duties and responsibilities for two years. Supplemental Trial Cou rt Opinion, 6/24/14, at 10. The testimony established that the Children are in stable foster placement, and that adoption is in the best interest of the Children. Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that the tria l court properly terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1). We will

not disturb the trial court’s determinations. In re M.G. , 855 A.2d 68, 73-

74. The trial court must also consider how terminating Moth er’s parental rights would affect the needs and welfare of Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Pursuant to section 2511(b), the trial court’s inquiry is specifically directed to a consideration of whether term ination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical an d emotional needs of

the child. See In Re C.M.S. , 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005),J-S32043-14

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appeal denied , 587 Pa. 705, 897 A.2d 1183 (2006). “Intangibles su ch as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the

needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). We have

instructed that the court must also discern the nature a nd status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. See id

. Here, the trial court concluded that termination of M other’s parental rights to the Children would serve their development al, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Supplemental Trial Cou rt Opinion, 6/25/14, at

11. The trial court found that Mother and the Child ren have an unhealthy bond. Permanency Review Order, 12/5/13, at 4. With respect to B.L., the trial court explained: [T]here was sufficient evidence to show that there is no significant bond with his mother. After B.L.’s placemen t, [Mother] was sporadic in visits and did not participate i n her child’s services. B.L. actually looked to [F]oster [M]ot her as B.L.’s mom and the foster home as being his “home.” B. L. showed little interest in his mother when she was absent or not engaged with services or visits. As we specifically found, if a bond existed, it was an “unhealthy” bond. Once the g oal was changed and an adoptive home identified, B.L. was abl e to attach to the family and is more than ready to make a permanent transition to the adoptive home. Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/14, at 10. With respect to H.L., the trial court observed: [H.L.] clearly had difficulty being apart from [M]oth er, the evidence also supported, and we found, that his bond wi th [M]other was “unhealthy” as well. Any anxiety and str ess that H.L. felt from being apart from his mother was relat ed to hisJ-S32043-14

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concern as to whether she was okay due to his witnessing th e domestic violence over the years. Even though some conce rn was expressed as to how H.L. would react if [M]other’s pa rental rights were terminated, the evidence subsequently establ ished that he was able to move on and start bonding with ot her preadoptive parents, as his counselors, Mr. Harper and Jessica Veith, predicted and confirmed.

Id. at 10-11. While Mother professes that she loves the Children, thi s Court has held that a parent’s love of her child, alone, does not pre clude a termination.

See In re L.M. , 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007). Likewise, we have

stated that the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a terminat ion petition. See In re

K.K.R.-S. , 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008). After this Court’s careful review of the record, we fi nd that the competent evidence supports the trial court’s determinat ion that there was no bond between Mother and the Children which, if se vered, would be detrimental to the Children, and that the terminati on of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the C hildren. Thus, we will

not disturb the trial court’s determinations. See In re M.G. , 855 A.2d at 73-74. We affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s par ental rights on the basis of section 2511(a)(1) and (b). Next, we address Mother’s challenge to the change of th e permanency goal for Children to adoption. This Court has state d:J-S32043-14

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When reviewing an order regarding the change of a pl acement goal of a dependent child pursuant to the Juvenile Act , 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301, et seq ., our standard of review is abuse of discretion. When reviewing such a decision, we are bound by the facts as found by the trial court unless they are not supported in the record.

In re B.S. , 861 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omit ted).

In order to conclude that the trial court abused its discr etion, we must determine that the court’s judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, o r that the court’s action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bia s or ill will, as shown by the record. We are bound by the trial cour t’s findings of fact that have support in the record. The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the responsibil ities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving an y conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these responsibiliti es, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the ev idence. When the trial court’s findings are supported by competent ev idence of record, we will affirm even if the record could also sup port an opposite result.

In re A.K. , 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007). Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act sets forth the fol lowing pertinent inquiries for the reviewing court: (f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing. — At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine al l of the following: (1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement. (2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance with the permanency plan developed for the child. (3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating th e circumstances which necessitated the original placement.J-S32043-14

- 16 - (4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the child. (5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the child might be achieved. (5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finali ze the permanency plan in effect. (6) Whether the child is safe.

. . . (9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last 22 months or the court has determined that aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove t he child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to preserve and reunify the family need not be made or continue to be made, whether the county agency has file d or sought to join a petition to terminate parental r ights and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the child unless: (i) the child is being cared for by a relative best sui ted to the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child; (ii) the county agency has documented a compelling reason for determining that filing a petition to ter minate parental rights would not serve the needs and welfare of the child; or (iii) the child’s family has not been provided with necessary services to achieve the safe return to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian within the time frames se t forth in the permanency plan. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1)-(6), (9).

In addition:

The trial court must focus on the child and determine th e goal with reference to the child’s best interests, not those of the parents. “Safety, permanency, and well-being of the child mustJ-S32043-14

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take precedence over all other considerations.” Further, at the review hearing for a dependent child who has been rem oved from the parental home, the court must consider the sta tutorily mandated factors. “These statutory mandates clearly pla ce the trial court’s focus on the best interests of the child.”

In re S.B. , 943 A.2d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis in or iginal) (citations and quotations omitted). The record in this case reflects that the trial court app ropriately considered the Children’s best interests in deciding wheth er to change their permanency goal to adoption. The competent and in f act overwhelming evidence supports the trial court’s determinations, as Mo ther will cannot provide proper parental care and control for the Chil dren. Thus, we will not

disturb the trial court’s determinations. See In re M.G. , 855 A.2d at 73-74. After careful review, we affirm the decrees and order s terminating Mother’s parental rights on the basis of section 2511(a) (1) and (b), and changing the permanency goals for the Children to adop tion.

Decrees and orders affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 8/4/2014