This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 LUCIANO GALLEGOS, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 31,757 4 NEW MEXICO TECH a/k/a, 5 NEW MEXICO INSTITUTE OF 6 MINING AND TECHNOLOGY, 7 Defendant-Appellee. 8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SOCORRO COUNTY 9 Matthew G. Reynolds, District Judge 10 Joseph David Camacho 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellant 13 Keleher & McLeod, P.A. 14 Sean Olivas 15 Christina Muscarella Gooch 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellee 18 MEMORANDUM OPINION 19 ZAMORA, Judge. 202 {1} Luciano Gallegos (Plaintiff) appeals a district court order awarding New 1 Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology (Defendant) post-offer costs pursuant to 2 Rule 1-068 NMRA. Plaintiff argues that the di strict court’s application of Rule 1-068 3 was inequitable and reversal is warranted in light of the “totality of the circumstances” 4 in this case. We conclude that the distri ct court properly applie d Rule 1-068 and affirm 5 the award of post-offer costs to Defendant. 6 BACKGROUND 7
{2} On October 14, 2005, Plaintiff was wo rking on Defendant’s premises and 8 sustained injuries when a 17,000 pound steel roller, owned by Defendant, went out of 9 control, pinning Plaintiff between a truck and a chip spreader. As a result of the 10 accident Plaintiff suffered injuries including a chest wall contusion, a liver hematoma, 11 a lower rib dislocation, meniscal tears inhis knee, and post-traumatic stress disorder 12 (PTSD). Plaintiff’s abdominal and liver in juries appeared to be healed within 13 approximately six weeks of the accident, however, Plaintiff’s knee injury and PTSD 14 continued to require treatment. Plaintiff wa s concurrently treated for shoulder pain. 15 Plaintiff reported to his orthopedist th at the accident had injured his shoulder. 16 However, it was later determined that Pl aintiff’s shoulder problems were caused by 17 a pre-existing condition, not by the accident. 183 {3} Plaintiff filed a complaint for personal in juries in the district court. The New 1 Mexico County Insurance Authority (NMCIA ), Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation 2 insurer, sought leave to intervene to protect its subrogati on interests for benefits paid 3 to Plaintiff. The district court held th at NMCIA’s interests would be adequately 4 protected without intervention until the c onclusion of the case, just before the 5 judgment on damages was going tobe entered. Prior to trial, Defendant tendered an 6 offer of settlement in the amount of $400,000. Plaintiff rejected that offer and 7 ultimately recovered a total award of $373, 408.23, which was less than the offer of 8 settlement. NMCIA, who had been permitted to intervene on the final day of trial, , 9 worked with Plaintiff to compromise th e amount of its subrogation lien to $96,186.45, 10 of which Plaintiff’s counsel was entitled to $45,631.08 in fees and costs. {4} Pursuant 11 to Rule 1-068, Defendant moved for its costs as of the date of the offer of judgment. 12 The district court awarded Defendant the recovery of post-offer costs in the amount 13 of $24,226.91. Plaintiff filed a motion for rec onsideration of the district court’s award 14 of post-offer costs to Defendant. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for 15 reconsideration. This appeal followed. 16 DISCUSSION 17
{5} Plaintiff argues the district court’s rigid application of Rule 1-068 is inequitable 18 and should be reversed because: (1) it punishes him for reasonably rejecting 194 Defendant’s offer of settlement, and (2) Plaintiff is unable to pay Defendant’s post1 offer costs. We are not persuaded. 2
{6} Whether an award of costs is mandatoryin this case is an issue of rule 3 interpretation which wereview de novo. Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co. , 2003-NMCA-085, 4 ¶ 99, 134 N.M. 77, 73 P.3d 215. Where a plaintiff rejects a defendant’s pre-trial offer 5 of settlement and ultimately obtains a judgment that is less than the defendant’s pre6 trial offer, the award of co sts is governed by Rule 1-068. Montoya v. Pearson , 2006- 7 NMCA-097, ¶ 22, 140 N.M. 243, 142 P.3d 11. Ru le 1-068 states in pertinent part: 8 If an offer of settlement made by a defending party is not accepted and 9 the judgment finally obtained by the claimant is not more favorable than 10 the offer, the claimant must pay th e costs, excluding attorney’s fees, 11 incurred by the defending party after the making of the offer and shall 12 not recover costs incurred thereafter. 13 It is well settled that when the plaintiff receives a judgment that is less than the 14 defendant’s offer of settlement, the appli cation of Rule 1-068 is mandatory and the 15 plaintiff must pay the defendant’s post-offer costs. See Dunleavy v. Miller , 1993- 16 NMSC-059, ¶ 30, 116 N.M. 353, 862 P.2d 1212 (“[W]hen the plaintiff receives a 17 judgment that is less than the offer of judgment, he or she . . . must pay his or her own 18 post[-]offer costs as well as the defendant ’s post[-]offer costs. ” (emphasis added)); 19 Montoya , 2006-NMCA-097, ¶ 22 (stating that “thereis no discretion in the application 205 of Rule 1-068”); Apodaca , 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 101 (stating that Rule 1-068 is 1 “mandatory where a judgment for a plaintiff is less than the offer”). 2
{7} In this case, Defendant made a pre- trial offer to settle the case for $400,000. 3 Plaintiff rejected this offer. After trial, the district court entered a judgment in favor 4 of Plaintiff, including attorney fees and costs, in the amount of $373,408.23. Because 5 the judgment was less than the pre-trial o ffer, Plaintiff must pay Defendant’s post6 offer costs pursuant to Rule 1-068. Plaintiff contends that his re jection of Defendant’s 7 offer of settlement was reasonable because: (1) he expected the damages award to be 8 significantly higher; (2) NMCIA held a si zeable subrogation lien; and (3) Plaintiff’s 9 counsel also represented NMCIA, precluding Plaintiff from accepting the offer of 10 settlement. And, Plaintiff argues, because rejecting the offer wa s reasonable under the 11 circumstances Rule 1-068 should not be applied. We disagree. 12
{8} First, we reject Plaintiff’s assertion that his counsel also represented NMCIA. 13 An attorney-client relationship is created by court appointment or by contract. Holland 14 v. Lawless , 1981-NMCA-004, ¶ 5, 95 N.M. 490, 623 P.2d 1004. Here, the district 15 court did not permit NMCIA to intervene prio r to the judgment stage of the suit. Until 16 the final day of trial when NMCIA did intervene, it was not a party in the litigation, 17 even though it did have a protected interest in the outcome. Through the course of the 18 proceedings, NMCIA was represented by independent counsel. As a result, there was 196 no dual representation or conf lict of interest. Plaintiff’s counsel owed Plaintiff 1 undivided loyalty and NMCIA’s interest did not preclude Plaintiff from accepting 2 Defendant’s offer of settlement. See State v. Almanza , 1996-NMCA-013, ¶ 4, 121 3 N.M. 300, 910 P.2d 934 (“The client is entitled to the undivided loyalty of the 4 attorney.”). 5
{9} With regard to NMCIA’s lien and Plai ntiff’s expectation that the damages 6 award would exceed the offer of settlement, we hold that because the application of 7 Rule 1-068 is mandatory, not di scretionary, these are not f actors to be considered by 8 the district court when applying the rule. No r would it have been proper for the district 9 court to consider Plaintiff’s ab ility to pay Defendant’s costs. See Montoya , 2006- 10 NMCA-097, ¶ 22 (“The ability of the party liable for costs to pay those costs is a 11 factor that may be considered under Rule 1-054 NMRA, where the [district] court has 12 some discretion in the matter. But because there is no discretionin the application of 13 Rule 1-068, the [district] court’s ruling th at [the p]laintiff should not be required to 14 pay costs because he could not afford them cannot stand.” (emphasis added)). 15
{10} Plaintiff’s reliance on Apodacato support the proposition that a district court 16 has the authority and discretion to avoi d “shifting” costs based on a plaintiff’s 17 indigency is misdirected. In Apodaca , a judgment was entered in favor of the 18 defendant. The defendant filed for costs, as a prevailing party, under Rule 1-054(D) 197 and for post-offer costs under Rule 1-068. Apodaca , 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 96. The 1 defendant argued it did not matter whether the judgment was for or against the 2 plaintiffs, the award of costs was mandatory under Rule 1-068 when the offer 3 exceeded the judgment. The plaintiffs’ opposition to costs under Rule 1-054(D) was 4 based on their inability to pay. Id. ¶ 102. They argued that Rule 1-068 should be 5 harmonized with Rule 1-054, which gives the district court discretion in awarding 6
costs. Id. ¶ 98. The essential que stion before this Court was whether “Rule 1-068 7 applie[d] where judgment is entered infavor of [a] defendant-offeror.” Id. ¶ 99. This 8 Court concluded Rule 1-068 does not apply where a judgment is entered in the 9 defendant’s favor and thatthe proper relief was found under Rule 1-054, which is 10 discretionary. Id. ¶¶ 101-02. This Court did not deviate from the its longstanding 11 position that Rule 1-068 is mandatory even in the situation “where a judgment for a 12 plaintiff is less than [the defendant’s] offer.” Id . ¶ 101 13
{11} To the extent that Plaintiff requests thatthis Court invoke equity to reverse the 14 district court’s award of costs, we decline to do so here. We will only disturb a district 15 court’s decision to grant or deny equitabl e relief upon finding an abuse of discretion. 16 Gilmore v. Gilmore , 2010-NMCA-013, ¶ 24, 147 N.M. 625, 227 P.3d 115. “An abuse 17 of discretion occurs when a ruling is cl early contrary to the logical conclusions 188 demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.” Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, 1 ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. 2
{12} In this case, after the district court aw arded Defendant post-offer costs, Plaintiff 3 moved for reconsideration, requesting that th e district court apply equity to avoid a 4 “harsh result of a reasonable decision in re jecting an offer of settlement.” Plaintiff’s 5 motion was denied. Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in failing to consider 6 the NMCIA’s $364,000 subrogation lien, however, at the time Plaintiff moved for 7 reconsideration, NMCIA had agreed toaccept $96,186.45 to satisfy its lien and out 8 of that amount it would pay Plaintiff’s counsel $45,631.08 for his fees and costs. 9 Additionally, at the time that the distri ct court denied Plaintiff’s motion for 10 reconsideration, it had been established that Plaintiff’s damages claims were inflated 11 due to the inclusion of expenses related to the pre-existing shoulder injury for which 12 Defendant was not liable. Given these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the 13 district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 14
{13} Plaintiff also argues that this court s hould use its inherent equitable powers to 15 avoid the application of Rule 1-068. Plai ntiff’s argument requires a departure from 16 established precedent which makes the application of Rule 1-068 mandatory. See 17 Dunleavy , 1993-NMSC-059, ¶ 30; see also Montoya , 2006-NMCA-097, ¶ 22; 18 Apodaca , 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 101. 199 {14} An appellate court may not use its equitable powers todepart from established 1 precedent without special justification. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson , 2 1999-NMSC-028, ¶ 11, 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450 (stating that “[s]tare decisis is 3 the judicial obligation to follow precedent, and it lies at the very core of the judicial 4 process of interpreting and announcing law[ ,]” and holding that “any departure from 5 [precedent] . . . demands special justifi cation” (omission in original) (internal 6 quotation marks and citation omitted)). When determining whether special 7 justification to depart from precedent ex ists, we consider the following factors: 8 1) whether the precedent is so unworkable as to be intolerable; 2) 9 whether parties justifiably relied on the precedent so that reversing it 10 would create an undue hardship; 3) whether the principles of law have 11 developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule “no more than a 12 remnant of abandoned doctrine;” and 4) whether the facts have changed 13 in the interval from the old rule to reconsideration so as to have “robbed 14 the old rule” of justification. 15 Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque , 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 34, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 17
{15} Plaintiff does not argue, nor cite authority to support the proposition that the 18 factors listed above justify a departure from our precedent, which requires the 19 mandatory application of Rule 1-068 inthis case, and we have found none. 20 Accordingly, we decline to depart from established precedent here. See In re Adoption 21 of Doe , 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (holding that where a 2210 party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority 1 exists); See also Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 2 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (holding that this [C]ourt has no duty to review an argument that 3 is not adequately developed and declining to entertain a cursory argument that relied 4 on several factual assertions that were made without citation to the record or 5 authority); ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t , 1998-NMCA-078, 6 ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969 (holding that this Court will not consider 7 propositions that are unsupported by citation to authority). 8 CONCLUSION 9
{16} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s award of post-offer 10 costs to Defendant. 11
{17} IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

_______________________________ 13 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 14 WE CONCUR: 15

____________________________ 16 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 17

____________________________ 18 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 19