Opinion issued June 2, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

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NO. 01-14-00383-CV

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GLENN HERBERT JOHNSON, Appellant

V.

HARRIS COUNTY, HARRIS COUNTY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, 

HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT, HARRIS COUNTY 

HOSPITAL DISTRICT, PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY OF HARRIS 

COUNTY, HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, HOUSTON 

COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM, HARRIS COUNTY EDUCATION 

DISTRICT, CITY OF HOUSTON, AND HASHMET WALI, Appellees

On Appeal from the 190th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2013-08713
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Glenn Herbert Johnson filed a bill of review to set aside a default judgment

taken against him in connection with a Harris County tax lien and sheriff’s sale of 

his encumbered property. The trial court granted Johnson’s requested relief. It

vacated the default judgment, reopened the tax case, and set aside the constable’s 

sale of Johnson’s property. The trial court also ordered the County to refund the 

property’s purchase price to Hashmet Wali, who had purchased the land at the tax 

sale. On appeal, Johnson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

granting him his requested relief and in refunding Wali’s money to him. Finding 

no error, we affirm.

Background

In 2009, Harris County sued Johnson, seeking recovery of unpaid property 

taxes. In 2011, the trial court entered a default judgment against Johnson, at the 

time unaware that the County’s service of process was defective and Johnson did 

not have notice of the suit. A Harris County constable conducted a tax sale of the 

property. Wali purchased the property for $55,800. In 2013, Johnson petitioned

for a bill of review, challenging the default judgment on the basis that he was never 

served with the tax suit. Johnson requested that the trial court: “vacate the Default 

Judgment in Cause No. 2009-51784,” “[r]eopen cause 2009-51784 and grant a new 
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trial, with the parties reverting to their original status as Plaintiff and Defendant,” 

and “set aside the Constable/Sheriff’s sale of the above specified property.” 

Based on the proof of lack of proper service with citation, the trial court 

declared the default judgment void as a matter of law. Harris County and Wali

then jointly moved to vacate it and void the constable’s sale and deed, pursuant to 

sections 33.56 and 34.07 of the Texas Tax Code. The trial court ordered Harris 

County to refund to Wali his purchase price proceeds of $55,800, an amount that 

included court costs and proceeds in excess of the lien in the amount of $7,124.15. 

The trial court’s final order reinstated the tax court cause number, 2009-51784, and 

noted that “[t]his Order finally disposes of all parties and claims and is 

appealable.” Wali then petitioned to release the $7,124.15 held in the court’s 

registry. The trial court granted Wali’s petition and ordered the District Clerk to 

release the excess proceeds. 

Discussion

As we liberally construe his pro se brief, Johnson contends that the trial 

court erred in granting his requested relief and in refunding the tax sale purchase 

price to Wali. He claims a right to excess proceeds from the tax sale. In particular, 

he contends that (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction or plenary power to 

enter orders after it declared that the default judgment was void; (2) Wali waived 

his subrogation rights by filing a petition for excess proceeds within the statute of 
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limitations pursuant to section 34.07; (3) Wali cannot recover the taxes, penalties, 

interest, and attorney’s fees the taxing units received; (4) Harris County and Wali 

did not meet the statutory requirements to vacate the default judgment and void the 

sale; (5) Wali is barred by the statute of limitations from petitioning for the tax sale

proceeds; and (6) the Mother Hubbard clause in the court’s final order precluded

the later order to the district clerk directing it to distribute the excess proceeds. 

Standard of Review

We regard this case as an appeal from a bench trial. When a trial court 

issues no findings of fact, we imply that the trial court made all the necessary 

findings to support its judgment. Douglas v. Petroleum Wholesale, Inc., 190 

S.W.3d 97, 99 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Roberson v. 

Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989)). An abuse of discretion occurs when 

the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to 

guiding principles. Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011); 

Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996).

Analysis

At the outset, we consider Johnson’s contentions in light of the invited error 

doctrine. 
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I. Invited Error Doctrine

Under the invited error doctrine, a party cannot complain on appeal that the 

trial court ordered a specific action that the party requested. Sentinel Integrity

Solutions, Inc. v. Mistras Grp., Inc., 414 S.W.3d 911, 919–20 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that party waived complaints that 

trial court erred in failing to determine enforceability of covenant not to compete 

and that covenant was enforceable, as party complained at trial that covenant was 

not enforceable); cf. Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. 2005) 

(per curiam) (determining that invited error doctrine is inapplicable when party did 

not request trial court ruling complained of on appeal).

In his first and amended petitions, Johnson requested that the court “vacate 

the Default Judgment in Cause No. 2009-51784,” “[r]eopen cause 2009-51784 and 

grant a new trial, with the parties reverting to their original status as Plaintiff and 

Defendant,” and “set aside the Constable/Sheriff’s sale of the above specified 

property.” We hold that Johnson’s appellate complaints about the trial court’s 

orders to vacate the default judgment, reopen the tax case, and set aside the 

constable’s sale are barred under the invited error doctrine. See Sentinel, 414 

S.W.3d at 919–20.
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II. Return of Proceeds

In his remaining issues, Johnson contends (1) that the court erred in ordering 

the return of the purchase price to Wali because it did not have jurisdiction and 

acted after its plenary power expired. Johnson further contends that (2) a Mother 

Hubbard clause in the order to reinstate the tax case precluded the return of the 

proceeds; (3) Harris County did not meet its requirements under section 33.56; and 

(4) Wali petitioned for a refund and excess proceeds after the statute of limitations 

passed pursuant to section 34.07.

A. Applicable Law

Section 33.56 of the Tax Code provides that a taxing unit that was a party to 

a judgment for foreclosure of a tax lien “may file a petition to vacate the judgment 

on one or more of the following grounds . . . (2) failure to serve a person needed 

for just adjudication under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” TEX. TAX CODE 

ANN. § 33.56(a). The section also requires that a taxing unit must file the petition 

under the same cause number as the delinquent tax suit in the same court. Id.

§ 33.56(b). Additionally, the taxing unit may not file a petition if a tax sale of the 

property has occurred unless one of several listed requirements is met, one of 

which is the tax sale purchaser’s consent to the petition. Id. § 33.56(c). The 

purchaser’s consent to a petition may be shown by the purchaser’s joinder in the 
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taxing unit’s petition. Id. § 33.56(d). If the court grants the petition, “the court 

shall enter an order providing that: 

(1) the judgment, any tax sale based on that judgment, and any subsequent 

resale are vacated; 

(2) any applicable tax deed or applicable resale deed is canceled; 

(3) the delinquent tax suit is revived; and 

(4) . . . the taxes, penalties, interest, and attorney’s fees and costs, and the 

liens that secure each of those items, are reinstated.”

Id. § 33.56(f).

Separately, section 34.07 provides that a buyer who purchased property at a 

void tax sale “may elect to file an action against the taxing units to which proceeds 

of the sale were distributed to recover an amount from each taxing unit equal to the 

distribution of taxes, penalties, interest, and attorney’s fees the taxing unit 

received.” Id. § 34.07(d). But a limitations period exists: “A suit filed against the 

taxing units under Subsection (d) may not be maintained unless the action is 

instituted before the first anniversary of the date of sale or resale.” Id. § 34.07(f).

B. Analysis

1. Trial court’s lack of plenary power to order purchase price

Johnson generally argues that because the court voided the default judgment, 

no other judgment can result from it and the subsequent orders should also be 

voided. In his view, the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after its order 

voiding the default judgment. It is apparent from the face of the record that the 

trial court’s order voiding the default judgment was not a final order. See Lehmann
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v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001) (“[W]hen there has not been a 

conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes of 

appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it 

clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all 

parties.”). The trial court thus had plenary power to address the parties’ remaining 

claims. See id.

2. Preclusion of relief by Mother Hubbard Clause

Johnson next contends that the Mother Hubbard clause in the order to 

reinstate the tax case precludes the court’s subsequent order to the district clerk to

reimburse Wali for the purchase price because it lacked plenary power to do so. 

However, in its final order, the trial court ordered that “the purchaser’s purchase 

money be refunded.” The earlier order includes the amounts held by the district 

clerk that the trial court directed it to release in July 2014. We hold that the 

Mother Hubbard clause does not preclude Wali’s relief, because the court’s order 

to distribute the proceeds was in aid of execution of its judgment. See TEX. R. CIV.

P. 308 (“The court shall cause its judgments and decrees to be carried into 

execution. . . .”). 

3. Return of entire purchase price to Wali

We next consider whether the court abused its discretion in ordering the 

return of the entire purchase price to Wali and reinstating Harris County’s claims 
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against Johnson for unpaid property taxes. In this issue, Johnson argues that Harris 

County did not meet its requirements under section 33.56 so as to require 

disbursement. We disagree. Harris County and Wali filed a joint motion to vacate 

the judgment and void the constable’s sale and deed, and Wali demonstrated 

consent by signing the motion through his attorney. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 33.56 (c), (d); Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex. 1986) 

(explaining that attorney’s actions within scope of employment are regarded as 

client’s acts). At the time of the motion, the trial court already had voided the 

default judgment for failure to properly serve a party. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 33.56 (a). The parties filed the motion under both case numbers, including in the

related 2009 tax case. See id. § 33.56 (b). Accordingly, we hold that the court did 

not abuse its discretion when it reinstated Harris County’s claim against Johnson 

for unpaid taxes, penalties, interest, and attorney’s fees, and the accompanying tax

liens on the property. See id. § 33.56 (f); Samlowski, 332 S.W.3d at 410. 

Moreover, Johnson expressly requested that the parties return to their “original” 

status before suit was filed. Thus, any error was invited. See Sentinel, 414 S.W.3d 

at 919–20.

4. Statute of limitations

Finally, Johnson contends that Wali’s claim to a refund is barred by the 

statute of limitations. Limitations, however, is an affirmative defense. See TEX. R.
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CIV. P. 94 (“[A] party shall set forth affirmatively . . . statute of limitations . . . and 

any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”). Harris 

County and Wali jointly moved to reinstate the tax lien under section 33.56 and 

requested that “the sale proceeds be refunded to Defendant Wali.” Assuming that 

one would be available given the defect in the underlying judgment, Harris County 

did not pursue an affirmative defense that Wali’s recovery of his purchase price

was barred by limitations. Accordingly, we hold that Wali’s claim is not barred. 

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 94.

Conclusion

Because none of Johnson’s claimed errors has merit, we hold that the court 

did not abuse its discretion when the court reinstated the tax lien and refunded the 

purchase price of the encumbered property. See Samlowski, 332 S.W.3d at 410. 

We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jane Bland

Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale.