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SJC-11475

COMMONWEALTH vs. PAUL STEWART.

Plymouth. March 6, 2014. - August 7, 2014.

Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 

& Lenk, JJ.1

Controlled Substances. Habitual Offender. Constitutional Law, 

Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, Probable cause, 

Reasonable suspicion. Threshold Police Inquiry. Probable 

Cause. Search and Seizure, Threshold police inquiry, 

Reasonable suspicion, Search incident to lawful arrest, 

Fruits of illegal search, Probable cause.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 

Department on July 23, 2008.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Frank 

M. Gaziano, J., and the cases were tried before Judith 

Fabricant, J.

After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 

Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

James P. Vander Salm for the defendant.

Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (Melissa L.

Brooks, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 

Commonwealth.

 

1 Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on this 

case prior to his retirement.
2

Michael J. Fellows, Committee for Public Counsel Services,

for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, 

submitted a brief.

William W. Adams, for Tari Richardson, amicus curiae, 

submitted a brief.

GANTS, J. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of 

possession of a class B substance (cocaine) with intent to 

distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c).

2 After that 

guilty finding, in the second part of a bifurcated trial, the 

jury found that the defendant had previously been convicted in 

2006 of distribution of a class B substance and in 1994 of 

assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and that he 

had been committed to prison for not less than three years on 

each of these prior convictions. As a result, the defendant was 

sentenced both under G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (d), which provides for 

a sentence of not less than five years nor more than fifteen 

years in State prison where a defendant is convicted of a 

violation of § 32A (c) after an earlier conviction of that 

offense, and under G. L. c. 279, § 25, as a habitual offender, 

which requires that the defendant "be punished by imprisonment 

in the [S]tate prison for the maximum term provided by law as a 

penalty for the felony for which he is then to be sentenced," 

which the judge determined to be the statutory maximum of 

fifteen years in State prison. In an unpublished memorandum and 

 

2 The jury found the defendant not guilty of possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute in a school zone.
3

order pursuant to rule 1:28 of the Appeals Court, a panel of 

that court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 1135 (2012). We 

granted the defendant's application for further appellate 

review.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the judge erred in 

denying his motion to suppress, that the defendant was 

prejudiced by the admission of statements made by the prosecutor

and some of the Commonwealth's witnesses that suggested that the 

defendant was known to be a drug dealer, and that the sentence 

was illegal because he was sentenced both as a subsequent 

offender and as a habitual criminal. We conclude that the 

motion to suppress should have been allowed and therefore vacate 

the defendant's conviction. Because the conviction is vacated 

and there is no significant likelihood that the case can be 

tried without the evidence that has been suppressed, we do not 

reach the trial or sentencing issues.

3

Motion to suppress. We summarize the facts as found by the 

motion judge, supplementing those findings with evidence in the 

record that is uncontroverted and that was implicitly credited 

by the judge. See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 

(2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008), and cases cited.

 

3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 

Committee for Public Counsel Services and counsel for Tari 

Richardson.
4

In the early evening of May 22, 2008, Sergeant Detective 

William Dwan, and Officers Peter Chu, John Ryle, and Brian 

Linehan of the Boston police department were returning to the 

police station in an unmarked sport utility vehicle after 

completing an undercover assignment. In Boston's theater 

district, Dwan observed the defendant walking on Washington 

Street followed by two men and one woman. The woman was 

counting currency. Dwan recognized the defendant because he had 

arrested him for the distribution of "crack" cocaine to an 

undercover police officer three years earlier in the same area. 

The officers observed the group turn onto Hayward Place, a

narrow one-way street which, in the officers' experience, was a 

popular area for drug use, because drug users could "duck into a 

number of doorways on the side street." The officers parked 

near the intersection of Hayward Place and the Harrison Avenue 

extension. From that vantage point, Dwan "observed the group 

huddle together in a doorway for a brief period of time, 

exchange something, and then separate."

The woman and one of the men walked toward Washington 

Street, while the defendant and the other man walked down 

Hayward Place in the direction of the officers. After the 

defendant had separated from the man with whom he had been 

walking and walked alone a short distance, Ryle and Chu left the 

vehicle and approached the defendant. Ryle displayed his police 
5

badge and ordered the defendant to stop and identify himself. 

The defendant complied. Shortly thereafter, Dwan approached and 

asked the defendant where he had been. The defendant denied 

that he had been at Hayward Place or had met others there.

Dwan then inquired about the contents of the thin nylon 

backpack that the defendant was carrying, which "was noticeably 

weighed down with an object." The defendant stated that the 

backpack contained his cellular telephone charger. Dwan asked 

for permission to search the bag, whereupon the defendant

removed the bag and handed it to him. Dwan removed a hard box 

that was designed to look like a cigarette package, but was 

"noticeably heavier." At this point, the defendant changed his 

mind and told Dwan that he could not look in the bag. On 

opening the box, Dwan discovered that it was a digital scale, 

which contained a white powder residue that he believed to be 

cocaine. The defendant was then arrested for possession of 

cocaine. In the search of the defendant that immediately 

followed, the officers found money and a plastic bag containing 

twelve smaller packages of cocaine.

The defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized as a 

result of his stop and subsequent arrest. The motion judge 

found that the officers had probable cause to believe that the 

defendant had participated in a drug transaction at the time 

they stopped him, based on their observations, experience, and 
6

familiarity with the defendant. Accordingly, the motion judge 

concluded that the officers searched the defendant incident to a 

valid arrest, and denied the defendant's motion to suppress.

A panel of the Appeals Court affirmed the denial of the 

motion to suppress, albeit on different grounds. Commonwealth

v. Stewart, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 1135. The panel concluded that 

the officers' observations of "what they believed, based on 

their training and experience, to be a street-level drug 

transaction" created "at least reasonable suspicion to stop the 

defendant and inquire further into his activities." The panel 

also concluded that the reasonable suspicion ripened into 

probable cause after the defendant lied about where he had just 

been. Id.

We accept the judge's findings of fact unless clearly 

erroneous. Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 485 (2005), 

citing Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 746-747 (2001), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1142 (2002). Applying this standard, we 

accept all the judge's findings except one: his finding that 

Dwan "observed an exchange of an unknown object." A careful 

look at Dwan's testimony reveals that he did not see such an 

exchange, but inferred from what he saw that an exchange had 

occurred. Dwan testified that he had an unobstructed view of 

the four persons after they "huddled together," but could see 

only "their upper torso area." When initially asked, "Did you 
7

see any exchange at all," he answered, "No, I didn't." The 

prosecutor later read Dwan an excerpt from his grand jury 

testimony, where he had stated, "On this occasion, I watched all 

three [sic] parties walk together, stop halfway up on Haeyward 

Place, and appear to make an exchange at that location." The 

prosecutor attempted to rephrase Dwan's grand jury testimony by 

asking, "[Y]ou testified that you saw an exchange, correct?" 

Dwan answered, "yes," even though that was not what he said to 

the grand jury; he said there that they "appear[ed] to make an 

exchange." There was no evidence at the motion hearing, either 

from what Dwan testified to at the hearing or before the grand 

jury, that Dwan actually observed an exchange.

Our finding that Dwan did not see an exchange, but simply 

inferred from what he knew and saw that an exchange had 

occurred, is supported by the absence of any evidence as to who 

participated in the exchange. If Dwan truly had observed an 

exchange, he could have testified to who made the exchange; he 

did not. Consequently, there was no evidence that the defendant 

participated in the exchange that Dwan inferred had happened 

during the "huddle."

We conclude that the investigatory stop of the defendant 

was supported by reasonable suspicion. "A police officer may 

make an investigatory stop 'where suspicious conduct gives the 

officer reasonable ground to suspect that a person is 
8

committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.' . . .

The action of the officer 'must be based on specific and 

articulable facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, in light 

of the officer's experience.'" Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 

506, 510-511 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 

390, 394 (2004). In view of Dwan's experience in drug 

investigations, he had reasonable grounds to suspect that he had 

witnessed a drug transaction based on the information he had 

earlier acquired (that the defendant, three years earlier, had 

been arrested for distributing narcotics to an undercover police 

officer in the theatre district of Boston) and that he had just 

acquired from his observations (three persons followed the 

defendant down a narrow street often used by drug users, with 

the woman counting currency as she walked, and then all four 

huddled briefly together in a doorway, before they dispersed).

Based on reasonable suspicion, the officers lawfully 

stopped the defendant and questioned him as to what had just 

happened. But reasonable suspicion alone was not sufficient to 

allow Dwan lawfully to open the hard cigarette box, where there 

was nothing to suggest that a weapon was inside.4

 

4 On appeal, the Commonwealth does not argue that the 

officers were justified in opening the cigarette box based on a 

reasonable belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous, 

and that the cigarette box may have contained a weapon. See 

Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 512 (2009).
9

Nor was opening the cigarette box lawful based on the

defendant's initial consent to Dwan's looking inside his 

backpack, where the defendant had withdrawn his consent before 

Dwan opened the cigarette box. A consent to search can be 

withdrawn or limited at any time before completion of the 

search. United States v. Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146, 151 (7th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 856 (1996), citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 

U.S. 248, 252 (1991). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caputo, 439 

Mass. 153, 163 (2003), quoting United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 

F.2d 126, 129 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991) ("defendant's consent may 

limit the extent or scope of a warrantless search"); 4 W. 

LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1 (c) at 58 (5th ed. 2012)

("consent usually may be withdrawn or limited at any time prior 

to the completion of the search"). Although evidence found 

during the search before the withdrawal of the consent may be 

lawfully admitted, a search must end on the withdrawal of 

consent where there is no other legal justification. See United 

States v. Mitchell, supra; 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, 

supra. Consequently, as the motion judge and the Appeals Court 

recognized, Dwan's opening of the cigarette box was lawful only 

if it was a search incident to arrest, supported by probable 

cause. We therefore turn to the question whether there was 

probable cause to arrest the defendant at the time the box was 

opened.
10

"[P]robable cause exists where, at the moment of arrest, 

the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police 

are enough to warrant a prudent person in believing that the 

individual arrested has committed or was committing an offense." 

Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238, 241 (1992), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Storey, 378 Mass. 312, 321 (1979), cert. denied,

446 U.S. 955 (1980). Probable cause may be established where 

the "silent movie" observed by an experienced narcotics 

investigator reveals "a sequence of activity consistent with a 

drug sale at a place notorious for illicit activity in 

narcotics." Commonwealth v. Santaliz, supra at 242. In

Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. 703, 704 (1998), we concluded

that probable cause existed where experienced narcotics officers 

observed a man who was known to have been arrested previously 

for narcotics sales engage in the following "silent movie" 

sequence: the man approached the passenger side of a vehicle 

that had stopped at a street curb, put his head inside the open 

window and appeared to exchange words with the driver (the 

defendant), who was alone in the vehicle; the man ran away, only 

to return one minute later and exchange something with the 

driver of the vehicle, and then the man walked away and the 

vehicle drove off. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 

Mass. at 241, we found probable cause (although we "found the 

case 'close'") where an experienced narcotics officer saw this 
11

"silent movie" sequence: the defendant was seated near a woman 

on the front porch of a "soup kitchen" known as a place of high 

incidence of drug activity when a taxicab stopped in front of 

the building; the woman took something from her waistband and 

handed it to the defendant; the defendant silently handed the 

object to a person in the taxicab, who gave the defendant money 

in return; the person left in the taxicab, and the defendant 

gave the money to the woman. Id. at 239-240.

The "silent movie" sequence in this case is comparable but 

with two significant differences: first, Dwan inferred that an 

exchange of something occurred but did not see an exchange; and, 

second, there was no evidence that the defendant exchanged 

anything himself. As to the first difference, in each of the 

cases cited by the motion judge and by the Commonwealth where 

probable cause was found based on the inference of an illegal 

exchange, an officer saw the defendant make an exchange with 

another person. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. at 704 

("Morales reached into the vehicle toward Kennedy, while Kennedy 

reached toward Morales"); Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. at 

240 ("The defendant handed the object to the woman, and she gave 

him money"). See also Commonwealth v. McCoy, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 

284, 286 (2003) (officers observed woman pass cash "through the 

rolled-down front-seat passenger's window to the passenger"); 

Commonwealth v. Gant, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 314, 315 (2001) (officer 
12

"saw the defendant exchange something with Gonzalez"). Although 

we do not require "that an officer must actually see an object 

exchanged," the suspect's movements, as observed by the officer, 

must provide factual support for the inference that the parties

exchanged an object. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, supra at 710.

See Commonwealth v. Levy, 459 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2011), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Kennedy, supra at 711 ("While we reject a per se 

rule that an officer must actually see an object exchanged to 

have probable cause to arrest," failure to see such exchange 

"weakens the Commonwealth's probable cause showing"). Here, the 

officer testified that the defendant and three companions 

huddled in a doorway, but his view was limited to their "upper 

torso area" and he did not testify to seeing the defendant make 

any hand movements suggesting an exchange or to seeing any 

object passing between the defendant and any of his companions.

See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Levy, 459 Mass. at 1011 (finding no 

probable cause where "[n]o officer saw an actual exchange of any 

kind").

As to the second difference, in each of the cases cited 

above, the apparent exchange involved only two persons, with one 

of them being the defendant, so if there was any exchange, there 

was no doubt that the defendant participated in it. Here, the 

defendant huddled with three individuals so, if there was an 

exchange, there was no certainty that the defendant participated 
13

in it. The failure to observe an actual exchange and the number 

of suspects who could have participated in any such exchange, 

when considered together, significantly weaken the weight of the

Commonwealth's evidence. Although that evidence is sufficient 

for reasonable suspicion, it falls short of probable cause.

The defendant's false denial that he had been on Hayward

Place or had met others there permits the reasonable inference 

that something occurred during that "huddle" that the defendant 

did not want to admit to the police and strengthens the 

suspicion that the defendant had participated in a drug 

transaction. We recognize that, in some instances, the added 

inferential weight of a false denial may be sufficient to turn 

reasonable suspicion into probable cause. See Commonwealth v. 

Riggins, 366 Mass. 81, 88 (1974) ("Implausible answers to 

police questions will, with other facts, support a finding of 

probable cause to conduct a search"). But we conclude here 

that, even when this inference is added to the weight of the 

totality of the evidence known to the officers before Dwan 

opened the cigarette box, the evidence still falls short of 

probable cause. There inevitably is a narrow line separating 

reasonable suspicion from probable cause, but in this "silent 

movie," where the observing police officer saw four people in a 

huddle but did not see the defendant himself (or anyone) 

actually make an exchange, the inference of an actual 
14

distribution of a controlled substance involving the defendant 

falls on the reasonable suspicion side of that line.5

Therefore, we conclude that there was no probable cause to 

make an arrest when the cigarette box was opened, and that the 

opening of that box cannot be justified as a search incident to 

arrest. Because the seizure of the plastic bag containing 

cocaine and the cash found during the search of the defendant 

was a fruit of the illegal search of the cigarette box, the 

cocaine and the cash should have been suppressed. Where the 

prosecution's case rested primarily on the defendant's 

possession of these items, the admission of the cocaine and cash 

was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant's 

conviction must therefore be vacated and a new trial ordered.

Because we vacate the conviction and doubt that the 

Commonwealth realistically can retry the case without the 

suppressed cocaine, we do not reach the issue regarding the 

legality of the defendant's sentence. Nor need we reach the 

 

5 We recognize that probable cause is an objective test, and 

does not depend on whether the officers subjectively believed 

there was probable cause, see Commonwealth v. Franco, 419 Mass. 

635, 639 (1995), citing Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 

175 (1982), but we note that Dwan, an experienced sergeant 

detective who had been in the drug control unit for nine years 

before this incident, did not arrest the defendant after he lied 

about his whereabouts. Instead, Dwan placed the defendant under

arrest only when Dwan saw the cocaine residue on the digital 

scale inside the cigarette box and even then arrested the 

defendant for possession of the cocaine residue, not for 

whatever happened during the "huddle" a few minutes earlier.
15

issue whether a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 

arose from statements made by the prosecutor and some of the 

Commonwealth's witnesses that suggested that the defendant was 

known to be a drug dealer.

Conclusion. Because the defendant's motion to suppress 

should have been allowed, and the admission of the evidence that 

should have been suppressed was not harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt, we vacate the defendant's conviction and remand the case 

to the Superior Court to allow the Commonwealth the opportunity 

to decide whether it will enter a nolle prosequi or proceed with

a new trial.

So ordered.