I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2529 

To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the expiration 

of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 7, 2019 

Mr. ENGEL (for himself and Mr. MCCAUL) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a 

period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 

consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating 

to the expiration of the New START Treaty, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Richard G. Lugar and 

5 Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nu6 clear Forces’’. 

7 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

8 Congress makes the following findings: 


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1 (1) Since the end of World War II, the United 

2 States has relied on a robust and effective nuclear 

3 deterrent as part of its national defense, particularly 

4 against the Soviet Union and its successor state, the 

5 Russian Federation. 

6 (2) The United States nuclear arsenal must re7 main, safe, secure, and reliable such that it can ef8 fectively ensure the security of the United States 

9 and its allies. 

10 (3) Along with its nuclear deterrent, the United 

11 States has pursued a number of arms control, disar12 mament, and nonproliferation agreements with the 

13 Soviet Union and Russia to ensure strategic stability 

14 and the protection of the United States homeland, 

15 such as— 

16 (A) the Interim Agreement Between the 

17 United States of America and the Union of So18 viet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures 

19 with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Of20 fensive Arms, signed on May 26, 1972 (com21 monly referred to as SALT I); and 

22 (B) the Treaty Between the United States 

23 of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

24 Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 


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1 signed on July 31, 1991 (commonly referred to 

2 as START I). 

3 (4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet 

4 Union, the United States continues to rely on a com5 bination of nuclear deterrence and strategic arms 

6 control to help protect the United States from nu7 clear attack. 

8 (5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and 

9 the Russia signed the Treaty between the United 

10 States of America and the Russian Federation on 

11 Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 

12 of Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to 

13 as ‘‘New Start Treaty’’). 

14 (6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated 

15 December 2, 2010, former Secretaries of State 

16 Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. 

17 Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin L. 

18 Powell urged the Senate to ratify the Treaty, stating 

19 that it was in ‘‘the national interest to ratify’’. 

20 (7) During the ratification process, the Treaty 

21 garnered bipartisan support, and the United States 

22 Senate approved the Treaty on December 22, 2010, 

23 by a 71–26 vote. 

24 (8) The Treaty entered into force on February 

25 5, 2011, placing numerical limits on United States 


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1 and Russian strategic systems, including interconti2 nental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic 

3 missiles, and heavy bombers, as well as warheads. 

4 (9) On February 5, 2018, the Treaty’s central 

5 limits on strategic arms took effect. 

6 (10) Through the Treaty’s verification regime, 

7 which includes short-notice, on-site inspections at 

8 military bases and facilities, the United States is 

9 able to verify the data provided by Russia regarding 

10 its strategic nuclear arsenal. The verification regime 

11 provides both countries insight into each other’s 

12 strategic nuclear delivery systems, warheads, and fa13 cilities, as well as data exchanges to track the status 

14 and makeup of nuclear weapons systems. 

15 (11) During a February 26, 2019, hearing on 

16 nuclear deterrence requirements of the Senate 

17 Armed Services Committee, Commander of the 

18 United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 

19 General John Hyten voiced his support for the Trea20 ty, saying he was ‘‘a big supporter of the New 

21 START agreement’’ and stating, ‘‘The New START 

22 treaty’’ provides ‘‘insights into the Russians capa23 bilities. Those are hugely beneficial to me.’’. 

24 (12) During a March 2017 hearing on nuclear 

25 deterrence requirements of the House Armed ServVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529

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1 ices Committee, Air Force General Paul Selva, the 

2 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also en3 dorsed the New START Treaty, saying the Treaty 

4 is ‘‘a bilateral, verifiable agreement that gives us 

5 some degree of predictability on what our potential 

6 adversaries look like’’. 

7 (13) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the 

8 Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deter9 rence and Nuclear Integration, asserted that the 

10 New START Treaty was of ‘‘huge value’’ to United 

11 States security. 

12 (14) During a September 2018 hearing before 

13 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Deputy 

14 Secretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg 

15 stated that ‘‘the transparency and verification re16 quirements of the New START Treaty are a ben17 efit’’ to the security of the United States and, in re18 sponse to a question regarding missile defense, as19 serted that the Treaty had ‘‘no’’ effect on limiting 

20 United States missile defense capabilities. 

21 (15) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic 

22 Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 

23 Committee, Retired Air Force General and former 

24 commander of United States Strategic Command 

25 Robert Kehler stated, ‘‘I think that we have gotten 


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1 tremendous benefit out of those kinds of agreements 

2 with the Russians over the years, provided that the 

3 Russians comply,’’ regarding the importance of the 

4 New START Treaty. 

5 (16) The Department of State confirmed in 

6 February 2018 that Russia had met the Treaty’s 

7 central limits on strategic arms and stated that ‘‘im8 plementation of the New START Treaty enhances 

9 the safety and security of the United States’’. 

10 (17) The Nuclear Posture Review states that 

11 arms control agreements can ‘‘foster transparency, 

12 understanding, and predictability in adversary rela13 tions, thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding 

14 and miscalculation’’. 

15 (18) The New START Treaty strengthens 

16 United States nuclear security and strategic stability 

17 by reducing the number of strategic systems in Rus18 sia’s nuclear arsenal and provides the United States 

19 with the inspection and monitoring tools necessary 

20 to confidently verify Russian compliance with the 

21 Treaty. 

22 (19) The New START Treaty does not restrict 

23 United States nuclear modernization programs or 

24 limit United States missile defense efforts. 


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1 (20) If the New START Treaty is not extended 

2 or replaced before it expires in 2021, the United 

3 States runs the risk of having no legally binding, 

4 verifiable limits on Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal 

5 for the first time since 1972. 

6 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

7 It is the sense of Congress that the United States 

8 should seek to extend the New START Treaty from its 

9 initial termination date in February 2021 to February 

10 2026, as provided for under Article XIV of the Treaty, 

11 unless the President determines and informs the appro12 priate congressional committees that— 

13 (1) Russia is in material breach of the Treaty; 

14 or 

15 (2) the United States and Russia have entered 

16 into a new arms control agreement to replace the 

17 Treaty that provides equal or greater constraints, 

18 transparency, and verification measures with regard 

19 to Russia’s nuclear forces. 

20 SEC. 4. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS. 

21 (a) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—Not 

22 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 

23 this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 

24 to the appropriate congressional committees an intel25 ligence assessment based on all sources of the national seVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:31 May 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2529.IH H2529

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1 curity and intelligence implications of the expiration of the 

2 New START Treaty without the United States and Rus3 sia having entered into a new arms control agreement to 

4 replace the Treaty that provides equal or greater con5 straints, transparency, and verification measures with re6 gard to Russia’s nuclear forces. The assessment shall be 

7 submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a clas8 sified annex, and shall include the following elements: 

9 (1) A description of the size and posture of 

10 Russia’s nuclear forces and strategic delivery vehi11 cles, as well as predicted force levels through Feb12 ruary 2026 under each of the following potential sce13 narios: 

14 (A) The Treaty expires in February 2021 

15 without such a replacement agreement. 

16 (B) The Treaty is extended until February 

17 2026. 

18 (2) An assessment of how strategic stability 

19 would be impacted if the Treaty is not extended or 

20 such a replacement agreement is not concluded. 

21 (3) An assessment of the impact on United 

22 States allies if the limitations on Russia’s nuclear 

23 forces are dissolved if the Treaty is not extended or 

24 such a replacement agreement is not concluded. 


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1 (4) A description of the intelligence collection 

2 benefits of the Treaty. 

3 (5) An assessment of how the United States in4 telligence community’s confidence in its assessments 

5 of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal and future nu6 clear force levels would be impacted if the Treaty is 

7 not extended or such a replacement agreement is not 

8 concluded. 

9 (6) An assessment of what specific capabilities 

10 the United States intelligence community would have 

11 to develop, deploy, or realign to ensure no loss of 

12 collection capability occurs if the Treaty is not ex13 tended or such a replacement agreement is not con14 cluded. 

15 (b) SECRETARY OF STATE.— 

16 (1) RELATING TO NATO, NATO MEMBER COUN17 TRIES, AND OTHER UNITED STATES ALLIES.—Not 

18 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 

19 of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 

20 with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report, 

21 which shall be in an unclassified form, but may con22 tain a classified annex, and provide a briefing to the 

23 appropriate congressional committees that includes 

24 an assessment of the likely reactions of the North 

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1 ber countries, and other United States allies to a 

2 United States decision not to extend the New 

3 START Treaty or enter into a new arms control 

4 agreement with Russia to replace the Treaty that 

5 provides equal or greater constraints, transparency, 

6 and verification measures with regard to Russia’s 

7 nuclear forces. 

8 (2) RELATING TO OTHER MATTERS.—Not later 

9 than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 

10 Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the New 

11 START Treaty is extended or expires, the Secretary 

12 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De13 fense, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 

14 congressional committees that includes the following 

15 elements: 

16 (A) A description of any discussions with 

17 Russia on the Treaty or a similar agreement on 

18 the reduction and limitation of strategic offen19 sive arms at the Assistant Secretary, Ambassa20 dorial level or higher. 

21 (B) The dates, locations, discussion topics, 

22 agenda, outcomes, and Russian interlocutors in23 volved in those discussions. 


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1 (C) An identification of the United States 

2 Government departments and agencies involved 

3 in the discussions. 

4 (D) The types of systems, both nuclear 

5 and nonnuclear, discussed by either side in such 

6 discussions. 

7 (E) Whether an offer of extension of the 

8 Treaty, of any length of time, has been offered 

9 by either side. 

10 SEC. 5. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION IN EVENT OF EXPI11 RATION OF NEW START TREATY. 

12 If the New START Treaty is allowed to expire before 

13 the United States and Russia enter into a new arms con14 trol agreement to replace the Treaty that provides equal 

15 or greater constraints, transparency, and verification 

16 measures with regard to Russia’s nuclear forces, not later 

17 than 30 days after such expiration the President shall sub18 mit to the appropriate congressional committees— 

19 (1) a justification for why the New START 

20 Treaty was allowed to expire; and 

21 (2) a certification that extending the Treaty 

22 was not in the national security interest of the 

23 United States. 

24 SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS. 

25 In this Act: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com3 mittees’’ means— 

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

5 Committee on Armed Services, and the Perma6 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

7 House of Representatives; and 

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

9 the Committee on Armed Services, and the Se10 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 

11 (2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term 

12 ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 

13 that term in section 3 of the National Security Act 

14 of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 

15 (3) NEW START TREATY; TREATY.—The terms 

16 ‘‘New START Treaty’’ and ‘‘Treaty’’ mean the 

17 Treaty between the United States of America and 

18 the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 

19 Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 

20 Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into 

21 force on February 5, 2011. 

Æ 


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