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# tbtral <!Claims No.15-380T 

# FILED (Filed: March 20, 2017) 

### ************************* 

## * MAR 20 2017 U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS ANTHONY

### J. KISELIS, 

## * * * Plaintiff, 

## * * v. 

## * * THE UNITED STATES, 

## * * Defendant. 

## * * ************************* TaxRefundSuit; ValidTaxReturn; Valid Refund Claim; 28 U.S.C. § 1346; 26 

## u.s.c. § 7422; 26 

## u.s.c. § 651l(b)(2)(A); "Look Back" Provision.

Anthony J. Kiselis, Amsterdam, NewYork, pro se. Caroline D. Ciraolo, David I. Pincus, Marv M. Abate, and Margaret E. Sheer, U.S. Department ofJustice, Tax Division, Court ofFederal Claims Section, P.O. Box 26 Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C., 20044, for Defendant.
OPINIONAND ORDEROFDISMISSAL Williams, Judge. In this tax refund action Plaintiffpro se 1 seeks the return of $46,697.17 levied by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to satisfy Plaintiffstax liability for the year 2000.2 This matter comes before the Court onDefendant'smotionto dismiss the complaintpursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) or 12(b)(6).

During the oral argument held on September 13, 2016, Plaintiffrequested that his prose designationbe stricken. Tr. 4 (Sept. 13, 2016). The CourtdeniedPlaintiffsrequest. Id. Although Plaintiffis an attorney, he is representing himselfin this matter and is not admitted to practice before this Court.
2 Plaintiffalso seeks $500,000 without articulating a basis for recovery.
1

-- 7014 1200 ODDO 9093 6934Because Plaintiff failed to submit a valid refund claim to the IRS, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs suit, and Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. Background3 On September 8, 2005, because Plaintiffhad not yet filed a tax return for the year 2000, the IRS prepared a substitute federal tax return ("Substitute for Return" or "SFR") for Plaintifffor that year. When a taxpayer does not file a tax return, Section 6020(b) ofthe Internal Revenue Code permits the IRS to execute a SFR in orderto determine the taxpayer's liability. The statute provides inpart: (b) Execution ofReturn by Secretary.

- (1) Authority ofSecretary to execute return.
- 

### Ifany person fails to make any return required by any internal revenue law orregulation made thereunder at the time prescribedtherefor
... , the Secretary shall make such return from his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtainthrough testimony or otherwise. (2) Status ofreturns.
- Any return so made and subscribed by the Secretary shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes. 26 U.S.C. 

### § 6020(b) (2012). The following third parties had provided the IRS with information regarding Plaintiffs income for the 2000 taxyear:
• Dean Witter Reynolds (Form 5498, Form 1099-B, Form 1099-DIV, Form 1099-R);

• GMAC Mortgage (Form 1098);
• Fidelity Investments (Form 1099-R);
• Lasalle Bank (Form 1099-INT);
• Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith (Forms 1099-DIV);

• Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (Forms 1099-B, Forms 1099-DIV);
• Williams & Montgomery Ltd., Profit SharingPlan & Trust (Form 1099-R);

3 This background is derived from Plaintiffs complaint, exhibits to Defendant's motionto dismiss and exhibits to Defendant's supplemental brief.
2• Zurich Money Market Fund (Form 1099-DIV);
• Anthony Suizzo (Form 1099-MISC); and
• Wexford Clearing Services Corp. (Form 1099-DIV) Def.'s Mot. Ex. 2. The SFR indicated the following regarding Plaintiff's income and tax liability:

• gross income of $429,128.00 (comprised of distributions reported by Plaintiff's employer and by various financial entities and Plaintiff's self-employment income);
• taxable income of$424,016.50;

• tax liability of$147,003.00;

• interest (calculated through October 9, 2005) of$51,l70.57; and
• penalties of$77,732.79. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 5, at 68. On September 19, 2005, the IRS sent Letter 2566

- Proposed Individual Tax Assessment

- to Plaintiff's last known address. Id. at 66-72. Inthe Letter, the IRS informed Plaintiffthat ithad no record ofreceiving Plaintiff'sForm 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for the 2000 tax year and that, as a result, the IRS had determined Plaintiff's tax liability as ofthat date to be $275,906.36. Id. at 66, 68. The Letterfurther stated thatbecause the IRS computedPlaintiff'stax liabilitybased solely on income, it would be to Plaintiff's advantage to file his return "so that [he could] claim all ofthe exemptions, deductions, and credits thatthe law allows." Id. at 66. Finally, the letter informed Plaintiffthat within 30 days, the IRS had to receive one ofthe following: 1. Plaintiff's Form 1040 completed and signed, including all schedules and forms, withthe cover letter; 2. The "Consentto Assessment and Collection" form signed and dated; 3. A statement explaining why Plaintiffbelieved he was not required to file, or information Plaintiffwanted the IRS to consider; or 4. Plaintiff's appeal ofthe IRS'sproposed assessment.

3Plaintiffdid not respond to the letter, and on December 12, 2005, the IRS sent Plaintiffa Notice ofDeficiency viacertifiedmail to Plaintiff's last known address. The IRS advised Plaintiff that it had assessed a $147,003.00 deficiency and had imposed $77,732.79 in penalties based on the SFR. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 1, at 6. The Notice gave Plaintiff 90 days to contest the deficiency determination in Tax Court or face a deficiency assessment. Id. OnMay 8, 2006, the IRS assessed additional tax, interest and penalties for Plaintiff's 2000 tax year to account for additional interest and penalties that had accrued since the IRS issued Plaintiffthe Notice ofDeficiency

-- a $33,075.67 late filing penalty, $60,343.85 in interest, and a $36,750.75 failure-to-pay tax penalty. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 4, at 57, 63. Over three years later, on June 26, 2009, after searching without success for Plaintiff's address, the IRS sentPlaintiffLetter 1058, "FinalNotice Reply Within 30 days" to Plaintiff's last known address, informing Plaintiffofhis unpaid taxes and the IRS's intent to levy his accounts if Plaintiffdid not pay the tax or request an appeal within 30 days. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 3, at 18-20 (Archive History Transcript), Ex. 4, at 58.4 OnAugust 13, 2009, over 30 days after Plaintiffwas sent the Final Notice, the IRS issued a levy against Plaintiff's Bank ofAmerica account in the amount of$46,700.00. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 3, at 20. 5 Form 668A

- Notice ofLevy provides banks must hold money for 21 calendar days before sending the funds to the IRS. OnAugust 19, 2009, the Revenue Officer again conducted a search for Plaintiff's contact information, but was unsuccessful. Id. OnAugust 28, 2009, Plaintiffcontacted the Revenue Officerbytelephone inquiring about the levy on his Bank ofAmerica account. Id. at 21. At that time, Bank ofAmerica had not yet sent the monies levied from Plaintiff's account to the IRS. During the conversation, Plaintiff provided the Revenue Officer with his updated contact information. Id. The Revenue Officer informed Plaintiffthat the levy on his bank account would only be released ifPlaintiffsubmitted income tax returns for tax years 2000 through 2007

- - which Plaintiffhad not done. Plaintiff objected and requested his case be transferred to NewYork. Id. at 21. Plaintiffalso informed the Revenue Officer that "when in Chicago, Illinois, back a few years, he [had been] beaten up by a
4 The IRS must give a taxpayer notice at least 30 days priorto executing a levy, "inperson,

... left atthe [person's] dwelling orusual place ofbusiness
... [,] or sent by certified orregistered mail to the person's lastknown address." 26 U.S.C. § 633 l(d)(2). The statute does notrequire that Plaintiffreceive or accept the notifications

- - the IRS need only mail the notice by certified or registered mail to the plaintiff's last known address. Smith v. Rossotte, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270 (D. Or. 2003) (citing Williams v. Comm'nInternal Revenue Serv., 935 F.2d 1066, 1067 (9th Cir. 1991)). The Advisory Revenue Officer, LuAnn J. Bondanza, testified that a copy ofLetter 1058, could not be located, but the Archive Transcript ofPlaintiff's tax history indicates that the IRS sent the notice. Bondanza Suppl. Deel. 

### ii 5(a) (Oct. 12, 2006); Def.'s Mot. Ex. 3, at 18.
5 Although Ms. Bondanza testified that the IRS has not been able to locate a copy ofthe Notice ofLevy that was sentto Plaintiff, the Archive Transcript ofPlaintiff's tax history indicates that the IRS sent the notice. Bondanza Suppl. Deel. 

### ii 5(b); Def.'s Mot. Ex. 3, at 20. 4drug guy and is now involved in litigation and [would] have to stay in a homeless shelter in September ifthe IRS steals his money." Id. (Revenue Officer notes in archived transcript). On September 8, 2009, Plaintiffs Power ofAttorney "POA'' representative, Tax Masters, contacted the IRS and asked ifthe levy on Plaintiffs account could be released. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 3, at 22. The IRS informed Tax Masters, as it had informed Plaintiff, that the levy would not be released until Plaintiff provided tax returns for tax years 2000 through 2007, to the assigned Revenue Officer. Id. According to Tax Masters, Plaintiffs income from 2000 consisted of an IRA rollover that was not taxable and proceeds from the sale ofstock sold at a loss. Id. The IRS directed Tax Masters to discuss Plaintiffs case with the assigned Revenue Officer. Id. A week later, on September 15, 2009, pursuant to the levy, the IRS secured $46,697.17 from Plaintiffs Bank ofAmerica account. Id. at 24. The IRS allocated the funds to Plaintiffs outstanding tax liabilities for 2000, 2001and2002,

-- in particular $23,679.17, in satisfaction of Plaintiffs liability for tax year 2000. Neither Plaintiffnor Tax Masters requested Forms 1040 or supplied the IRS with information about Plaintiffs income or expenses for tax year 2000. Id. On September 23, 2009, at Plaintiffsrequest, the IRS reassigned his case from its Chicago office to its Albany, New York office. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 3, at 26, 30, 47. As ofJanuary 29, 2010, Plaintiffwas current with filing his tax returns for years 2003 through 2008, but his only returns for years 2000 through 2002 were SFRs. Id. at 29. Upon reconsideration ofthe 2001 and 2002 SFRs, the IRS determined that Plaintiffhad a zero balance for those years, but still owed a "large" balance for the 2000 tax year. Id. at 29, 30. Offer in Compromise and Dealings with the IRS Plaintiff filed a proposed offer in compromise of $5,000 on Form 656 "Doubt as to Collectibility," and, on February 9, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a partial payment to the IRS of $1,150. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 4, at 59; Def.'s Suppl. Br. Ex. 10, at 85. On October 19, 2010, the IRS rejected Plaintiffs offer in compromise, because it calculated that the "reasonable collection potential" from Plaintiffwas $87,680.77, "based solely on equity in assets that included $50 in bank account[,] $46,409.77 value ofretirement account with Morgan Stanley, and a dissipated asset (a house) valued at $41,221." Def.'s Suppl. Br. Ex. 10, at 85-86. OnNovember 15, 2010, Plaintiff timely filed an appeal of this rejection and requested a conference with an Appeals Officer. Id. at 85. On May 10, 2011, an IRS Appeals Officer held a conference with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff asserted that he did not have an ownership interest in the house. Id. at 87. On May 23, 2011, Plaintifffaxed the Appeals Officer an affidavit from his mother representing that she, not Plaintiff, owned the house. Id. The Appeals Officer determined that this was insufficient to "reverse[] Compliance determination of dissipated asset." Id. On May 23, 2011, the Appeals Officer sustained the rejection ofPlaintiffs offer in compromise based on the equity value ofPlaintiffs assets and terminated Plaintiffs offer in compromise. Id. at 87-88.

5OnNovember 16, 2011, the IRS's Office ofthe TaxpayerAdvocate in Albany, NewYork received an application for a taxpayer assistance order from Plaintiff. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 3, at 40.6 By March 8, 2012, the IRS had the authority to levy Plaintiffs Morgan Stanley account because Plaintiffs outstanding tax liability for the year 2000 had not been satisfied by the funds levied from PlaintiffsBankofAmericaaccount. Id. at 43-44. However, the IRS suspended suchactivity after consultingthe Albany Taxpayer Advocate's Office. Id. at 44. Because Plaintiffrepresented that he had no income, the Albany TaxpayerAdvocate's Office requested that Plaintifffile a zero tax return for tax year 2000 by September 10, 2012. Id. at45. When Plaintiffstill had not filed a tax return for 2000 as of September 10, 2012, the Albany Taxpayer Advocate's office closed Plaintiffscase. Id. On October 16, 2012, Plaintiff sent a letter regarding his case to National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson. Id. at 47. On December 3, 2012, following consultation between the National andtheAlbany TaxpayerAdvocate's Offices, the AlbanyTaxpayerAdvocate sentaletter to Plaintiffthathis file with the Albany office would not be reopened because he failed to submit anoriginal year2000 taxreturn. Id. at 49. Inthis letterto Plaintiff,the AlbanyTaxpayerAdvocate told Plaintiffthat it had informed the Revenue Officer that the collection action against Plaintiff couldresume. Id. As aresult, onJanuary 8, 2013, the IRS issued alevy notice to Morgan Stanley, and onMarch 18, 2013, secured a levy onPlaintiffs Morgan Stanley account totaling $92,955.90 to satisfy Plaintiffs outstanding liability for the 2000 tax year. Id. at 51-52. Two days after the levy onPlaintiffs Morgan Stanley account was secured, onMarch 20, 2013, Plaintiffmet with the Revenue Officer in Albany, New York and informed her that he had filed a Form 1040 for the 2000 tax year with the IRS office in New York, New York. Id. at 53. The Revenue OfficerconfirmedthatPlaintiffs2000 tax returnhadbeenreceivedbythe IRS office inNew York on January 9, 2013. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 6, at 73; Comp!. Ex. A, at 1. In his Form 1040, Plaintiffreported an adjusted gross income of $800, sought a refund of $46,617.17, and represented that he owed no payments to the IRS. Id. at 74. However, the Revenue Officer informed Plaintiffthat, regardless ofwhetherhis taxreturnwas accepted, he couldnotberefunded the $46,670.17, as thatrefund claim wasbarredunder the "3 year statute for refunds." Def.'sMot. Ex. 

### 3, at 53. OnApril 24, 2013, the IRS denied Plaintiffs claim for refund, contained in his January 8, 2013 tax return. Comp!. Ex. A, at 1. On July 18, 2013, the IRS Office ofAppeals upheld that determination. Id. The IRS treated Plaintiffs tax return for tax year 2000 that it received on January 9, 2013, as a refund claim for $46,679.17, but determined on appeal that there was "no basis to allow any part of [that] claim." Id. The IRS ultimately made no determination on the validity ofPlaintiffs 2000 tax return. However, the IRS abated the entirety ofthe tax, interest and penalties assessedunderthe SFR, and

6 The Office ofthe Taxpayer Advocate has the authority to issue a taxpayer assistance order ifthe assigned advocate determines that "thetaxpayeris suffering oris aboutto suffer a significant hardship as a result ofthe manner in which the internal revenue laws are being administered by the Secretary [ofthe Treasury]." 26 U.S.C. § 781 l(a).


### 6issued Plaintiffa refund of$98,229.79 which included the $92,955.90 that had been levied from Morgan Stanley to satisfy Plaintiffs outstanding liability for the 2000 tax year. The IRS also refunded Plaintiffthe $1,150 received aspartoftheterminated offerincompromise, and $4,123.89 ininterest on the returned funds levied from Plaintiffs Morgan Stanley account. Comp!. Exs. A, B. The IRS did not refund the $46,697.17 that was levied from Plaintiffs Bank of America account on September 9, 2009.
Discussion Jurisdiction Concurrent withthe district courts ofthe United States, the United States Court ofFederal Claims hasjurisdiction over actions against the United States "for the recovery ofany internalrevenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimedto have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2013); !shierv. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 530, 534 (2014). "Inthe context oftaxrefund suits, the United States sovereign immunity is construed narrowly andjurisdiction ofthe Court ofFederal Claims is limited by the Internal Revenue Code
...." Waltner v. United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012). "Despite its spacious terms,§ 1346(a)(l) must be read in conformity with other statutory provisions which qualify a taxpayer's right to bring a refund suit upon compliance with certain conditions. The first is§ 7422(a)
...." United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 601 (1990). Ifa taxpayerfails to file a claimfor refundwiththe IRS, sovereignimmunityhas notbeenwaived, and the Court ofFederal Claims does nothavejurisdiction. See Waltner, 679 F.3d at 1333. Plaintiffhas the burden ofestablishing subject-matterjurisdictionin this Court. Revnolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Court must dismiss the action ifit finds subject-matterjurisdiction to be lacking. Adair v. United States, 497 F.3d 1244, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's Action To establish jurisdiction, Plaintiff must establish that he filed an administrative refund claim withthe IRS priorto filing suit inthis Court. 26 U.S.C. § 7422. The statute provides: No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax allegedto havebeen erroneously or illegally assed orcollected

... until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary [ofthe Treasury], according to the provisions ofthe law
... and the regulations ofthe Secretary established inpursuance thereof. 26 U.S.C. § 7422. Thus, "Section 7422(a)
... imposes, as ajurisdictional prerequisiteto a refund suit, filing arefund claimwiththe IRS thatcomplies withIRS regulations." Chi. Milwaukee Com. v. United States, 40 F.3d 373, 374 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Burlington N., Inc. v. United States, 684 F.2d 866, 868 (Ct. Cl. 1982)).
7On January 9, 2013, Plaintifffiled a tax return for the 2000 tax year, which contained a claim for a refund.7 To constitute an administrative claim for refund, the tax return must satisfy 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-3(a)(5). Waltner, 679 F.3d at 1333. Section 301.6402-3(a) provides that "a properly executed individual
... original income tax return or amended return shall constitute a claim for refund or credit
... ifit contains a statement setting forth the amount determined as an overpayment and advising whether such amount shall be refunded to the taxpayer." Id. (quoting 26 C.F.R. §301.6402-3(a)(5)) (emphasis added). Additionally, for a return to constitute a refund claim it "must set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner ofthe exact basis thereof
..." Waltner, 679 F.3d at 1333 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-3(b)(l)). In short, "to be a valid return for purposes ofa refund claim, the return must contain sufficient data to allow calculation oftax." Waltner, 679 F.3d at 1333. Plaintiffstax return, filed January 9, 2013, failed to comport withthe Treasury Regulation and cannot be considered valid. In his 2000 tax return and claim for refund, Plaintiffreported $800 of gross income from interest and ordinary dividends and nearly $50,000 in business expenses, and requested arefund of$46,679.17. Although nine financial institutionsprovided the IRS with information relating to Plaintiffs investment income for 2000, Plaintifffailed to attach a Schedule D. Plaintiffprovided no information regarding distributions from third-party financial institutions. By filing such an incomplete return and failing to attach a Schedule D, Plaintifffailed to include sufficient data for the IRS to calculate his tax liability as required by the Treasury Regulation. See Waltner, 679 F.3d at 1333 (stating that "forms that lack essential information
..

. are not tax returns within the meaning ofthe Internal Revenue Code and thus cannot serve as a basis for a tax refund suit"); see also Kehmeier v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 442, 445-46 (2010). "[I]t is not enough for a form to contain some income information required by the tax code." United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Diamond, 107 Fed. Cl. 702, 705-06 (2012), affdper curiam, 530 F. App'x 943 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("A properly executed return must contain a recital ofincome; without such essential information, the IRS cannot calculate the tax orrefund owed upon the return."). 8

7 The SFR the IRS prepared for Plaintifffor the 2000 tax year did not qualify as a taxreturn because Plaintiffdid not sign the SFR as required under § 6020, and an unsigned SFR does not constitute a return for purposes of§ 651 l(a). As such, Plaintiffwas still required to file a return. See Healer v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 115 T.C. 316, 322-23 (2000); see also Tieman v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 528, 530 n.2 (2013) (noting that where the IRS prepared SFRs that were not later signed by plaintiff in accordance with § 6020(a), no return had been filed for purposes of§ 6511). 8 Plaintiff appears to contend that the IRS' acceptance of his return rendered it valid. Plaintifftestified in an affidavit that he was first told that he needed to file a Year 2000 tax return "in about November, 2012," and that, following this instruction, he "forthwithprepared the Form in perfect form, signed it, dated it, and filed it; and the IRS accepted it as good; valid; and efficacious." Kiselis Aff. 

### iJ 11 (Dec. 5, 2016). Contrary to Plaintiffs assumption, the IRS' mere acceptance ofPlaintiffs 2000 tax return neither cures the retum's deficiencies nor establishes its validity. Plaintiffdoes not address his failure to attach a Schedule D to his taxreturn and does not 

### 8The fact that the IRS may have been able to piece together what Plaintiff should have reported ina Schedule D using the Forms 1099 submittedby financial institutions does not render Plaintiffstax return valid. Plaintiffwas obligatedto providethat financial informationto the IRS inhis return. As the Supreme Court recognized in Angelus Milling Co. v. Commissioner: [I]tis not enoughthat somewhereunderthe Commissioner'sroofis the information whichmightenablehimtopass ona claimforrefund. Theprotectionoftherevenue authorizes the Commissionerto demand information in a particular form, and he is entitled to insist that the form be observed so as to advise him expeditiously and accurately ofthe true nature ofthe claim. 325 U.S. 293, 299 (1945). In addition, to be a valid taxreturn for purposes ofarefund claim, the return must "evince[] an honest and genuine endeavorto satisfy the law." Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172, 180 (1934); Waltner, 679 F.3d at 1334; Moore, 627 F.2d at 835. As the Courthasrecognized, it is notenoughthat a tax return "contain some income information," rather, there must also be an "honest and reasonable intent to supply the information required by the tax code." Kehmeier, 95 Fed. Cl. at 445 (quoting Moore, 627 F.2d at 835). Here, Plaintiffwas aware ofthe tax liability the IRS had assessed based ondistributions reportedbythird-party financial institutions, butfailed to reportthis onhis Form 1040. As such, Plaintifffailed to exhibit an honest andreasonable intent to provide the requisite information. Because the Form 1040 Plaintiffsubmitted to the IRS does not constitute a valid return, Plaintiffdid not submit a proper refund claim to the IRS, and this Court lacksjurisdiction. See Waltner, 679 F.3d at 1334.9 Plaintiffalso seeks recovery ofthe funds levied from his Morgan Stanley account, but the IRS already refunded Plaintiffthe $92,955.90 levied from that account, plus $4,123.89 ininterest, making this claim moot. Comp!. Ex. A; see Haas v. United States, 83 A.F.T.R. 2d 99-408 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (finding plaintiffs refund claim moot, where "the objective ofplaintiffs suit, a refund ofthe monies representing herdisallowed losses" hadbeen achieved).

provide any evidence challengingthe accuracy ofthe distributions reportedbythird-party financial institutions.
9 In any event, even assuming a valid and timely refund claim, the amount oftax that the IRS would be permitted to refund Plaintiff would be subject to the "categorical limitation" in Section 651 l(b)(2)(A), referred to as the "look-back" provision. See Diamond, 107 Fed. CL at 707 n.6. As the Court in Diamond explained, "[u]nder Subsection 651 l(b), plaintiffs may obtain a ... refund not exceeding the portion ofthe taxes paid within three years ofmaking the claim." Id. Because Plaintiffpaid the $46,697.17 tax liability via levy on September 15, 2009, Plaintiff could only haverecoveredthat amountbyfiling a validrefund claimno laterthan three years from that date. This "look-backperiod limitationis a constraint onremedy, notjurisdiction." Id. (citing (Murdock v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 389, 394 (2012)). 9Plaintiffdoes not articulate why he is entitled to any additional refund. To the extent that Plaintiffseeks damages stemming from the IRS's placement ofa levy on his bank accounts as an unauthorized collection, the district courts ofthe United States have exclusivejurisdiction over such claims. See 26 U.S.C. § 7433; Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The "specific grant ofjurisdictionto district courts to hear damage claims arising out of the IRS's collection activities obviates any possible jurisdiction [the Court of Federal Claims] might otherwise have." Tieman, 113 Fed. CL at 534. Conclusion
Defendant's motionto dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerkis directedto dismissthis action for lack ofsubject-matterjurisdiction.

10