Filed 12/11/20 Reed v. Edison CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has 

not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

CHRISTIE REED,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RONALD EDISON,

Defendant and Respondent.

B297816

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

19STRO02125

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Holly A. Thomas, Judge. Affirmed.

Christie Reed, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Sherry Anne Lear for Defendant and Respondent. 

_______________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Christie Reed sought a civil harassment restraining order 

against Ronald Edison. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial 

court denied Reed’s request and awarded Edison $2,000 in 

attorney’s fees. Reed appeals. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2019, Reed filed a petition for a civil

harassment restraining order against Edison under Code of Civil 

Procedure1 section 527.6. The petition alleged that Reed lived in 

an apartment building located on Budlong Avenue in Los Angeles 

(the property) and Edison was a friend of a neighboring tenant. 

The petition also alleged that on March 29, 2019, Edison locked 

Reed out of her apartment and threatened to kill her if she tried 

to get back into the apartment.

Edison opposed the petition and sought $2,000 in attorney’s 

fees. According to his declaration, Edison is a licensed real estate 

broker and was retained by the Federal National Mortgage 

Association (Fannie Mae) as the marketing agent for the 

property. Edison, however, never met Reed and he was not on the 

property on March 29, 2019. Edison also declared that he never 

harassed or threatened Reed in any way. According to a 

declaration submitted by Edison’s attorney, Reed “is a serial pro 

per litigant at State, Federal and Appellate Courts and has used 

various addresses including one in Joshua Tree, CA which 

appears to be her actual residence.”

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.
3

The hearing on the petition was held on April 23, 2019 and 

was transcribed by a court reporter. Both Reed and Edison 

testified at the hearing. “Having found no basis for the issuance 

of a permanent restraining order,” the court denied the petition 

with prejudice, dismissed the case, and ordered Reed to pay 

Edison $2,000 in attorney’s fees.

Reed timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

To issue a restraining order, the trial court must find by 

“clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists.”

(§ 527.6, subd. (i).) “The standard of proof known as clear and 

convincing evidence demands a degree of certainty greater than 

that involved with the preponderance standard, but less than 

what is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998.) When 

“the clear and convincing standard of proof applied in the trial 

court, an appellate court should review the record for sufficient 

evidence in a manner mindful of the elevated degree of certainty 

required by this standard.” (Id. at pp. 1000–1001.) “We resolve all 

factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the 

prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable 

inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported 

by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid 

value.” (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) 

In this case, Reed contends that the court erred in denying

the petition for a restraining order because Edison had no right 

to be on the property, Edison had a history of violence, and Reed 

was not given sufficient time to address Edison’s claims in his 

response to the petition. Reed also contends that the court abused 

its discretion by awarding Edison attorney’s fees. Construing 
4

Reed’s opening and only brief as a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the court’s denial of the petition and the 

award of attorney’s fees, we affirm the order.

First, the appellate record is inadequate for us to consider 

this or any other issue on appeal. Because Reed has elected to 

proceed with her appeal on only a clerk’s transcript, the appellate 

record does not include a reporter’s transcript of the evidentiary 

hearing or a suitable substitute. This omission precludes us from 

considering Reed’s appeal because we simply do not know what 

evidence was before the trial court, and both Reed and Edison 

testified at the hearing. (See, e.g., Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 

Cal.3d 564, 574 [failure to include transcript of trial precludes 

review of error; “a party challenging a judgment has the burden 

of showing reversible error by an adequate record”].)2

Second, as an appellate court our role is quite limited. We 

cannot reweigh the evidence or make determinations about the 

credibility of witnesses. (See Bloxham v. Saldinger (2014) 228 

Cal.App.4th 729, 750.) That is the job of the trial court whose 

ruling we are required to presume is correct; an appellant must 

affirmatively show that the trial court committed an error, and 

one that so affected the outcome of the case that it was 

prejudicial. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 

564.) Here, Reed essentially is asking us to reweigh the evidence 

on appeal which we cannot do.

2 In the notice designating the record on appeal, Reed checked a box 

acknowledging that without a record of the oral proceedings in the trial 

court, “the Court of Appeal will not be able to consider what was said 

during those proceedings in deciding whether an error was made” in 

the trial court proceedings.
5

Third, by not citing any legal authority to support her 

contentions that she was not given sufficient time to address 

Edison’s claims and that the court abused its discretion by 

awarding Edison attorney’s fees, Reed has forfeited those 

arguments. (See Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655 

[“[T]he trial court’s judgment is presumed to be correct, and the 

appellant has the burden to prove otherwise by presenting legal 

authority on each point made and factual analysis, supported by 

appropriate citations to the material facts in the record; 

otherwise, the argument may be deemed forfeited.”].)
6

DISPOSITION

Edison’s unopposed motion to strike Reed’s notice of 

lodging of trial exhibits and portions of her opening brief, filed on 

March 6, 2020, is granted. There is no indication in the record 

that the exhibits were offered or admitted into evidence at the 

hearing.

The April 23, 2019 order is affirmed. Edison shall recover 

his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.