L ARRY KL AYMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. J UDI CI AL

WATCH, I

NC., et al. , Def endants. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

Civil Action No. 06-670 ( CKK)

MEMORAN DUM OP INION (Oc tober 13, 2010) Currently pendingbefor e the Court is Plaintiff L arr y Klay man’s (“ Klay

man”) [345] Motion to Disqualify

this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 144. This repre sents Klay man’s sec ond attempt to disqualify

this Court i n this case ba sed on the a lleg ation that cer tain of the Court’s ruling s, combined with the fa ct that the under signe d was a ppointed by

former President Will iam J . Clint on, are evidenc e that the Court has a n extrajudicial bias or pre judice ag ainst him. As the Court previously

made c lear

in denying K lay

man’s initial reque st for disqualifica tion, such alleg ations are leg ally

insufficient to support a r equest for disqualification. Klay

man’s most
rec ent filing s offe r no newfac tual or leg al support to the contra ry . Acc ording ly , upon a
sear chingrevie w of Kla

y man’s motion and the par ties’ re spective br iefing , the re levant ca se law and statutory

authority , and the e ntire re cord he rein, the Court shall DEN Y Klay man’s [345] Motion to Disqualify

the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. I n addition, the Court has conducte d its own independent re view of the rec ord and is satisfied that no rea sonable a nd informed obse rver

would question this C ourt’s impartiality . Acc ording ly , for the r easons se t forth below, the Court concludes that rec usal is neither re quired nor w arr anted in this case
.I. BACKG ROUND

The Court shall assume f

amiliarity with the numerous opinions issued by both this C ourt and Mag istrate Judge A lan Kay , which set for th in detail the fac tual background and a lleg ations of this case , and shall there fore provide only a brie f summary

of the instant ca se as is nec essar y to provide conte x t for re solution of the motion now before the Court. See Klaym an v. Judic ial W atch, Inc

. , Civil Action No. 06-670, 2007 WL140978 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2007); Klayman v. Judicial W

atch, Inc

. , Civil Action No. 06-670, 2007 WL 1034936 (Apr. 3, 2007) ; and Klayman v. Judic ial W

atch, Inc

. , Civil Action No. 06-670, 2007 WL1034937 (Apr. 3, 2007) . Def endant J udicial Watch, Inc. is a 501(c )(3) org anization formed under the laws of the District of Columbi a and he adquar

tere d in the District of Columbia. Klayman v. J udicial W atch, Inc

. , Civil Action No. 06-670, 2007 WL1034937, at *2 (Apr . 3, 2007). De fenda nt Fitton is P resident of J udicial Watch, Def

endant Or fane des is the Secr etar y and a D irec tor of Judi cial Watch, and Def endant F arr ell is a Direc tor of Judi cial Watch. Id. Plaintiff L arr y Klayman is the selfdescr ibed founde r and f

ormer Cha irman, Ge nera l Counsel, and Trea surer of Judi cial Watch, who resides in a

nd prac tices law in the State of Florida
. Id. Klay

man, an attorney , is curre ntly repr esentinghimself pro se in this m atter. Klay man’s Second A mended Complaint and Judi cial Watch’s Ame nded Counterc laim in this action include var ious leg al claims stemming f rom eve nts that occurr ed af ter Kla y man left J udicial Watch in September 2003. Id. Many of these c laims arise out of the Seve ranc e Ag ree ment enter ed into by Klay man and Judicial W atch on Septembe r 19, 2003. Id. The Court need not a ddress the spe cifics of the par ties’ claims at this time, other than to note that, inter alia , Klay man asser ts claims ag ainst the Def

endants unde r the L anham Ac t for unfa ir competition in
2the form of false a dvertisingand fa lse endorse ments and for brea ch of c ontrac t relatingto the Severa nce A g ree ment. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 97-106; 115-162. Judi cial Watch asse rts counter claims ag ainst Klay man under

the L anham Ac t for tra demar k infring ement, unfa ir competition in the form of fa lse adve rtising a nd false a ssociation, and cy bersquatting. Am. Count. ¶¶ 84-116. The instant litigation wa s initi ally filed by Klay man on April 12, 2006. See ge nerally Compl. R esolution of this matter has bee n delayed for sever al y ear s, larg ely

as a r esult of Klay man’s own r epea

ted fa ilure to comply

with the Court’s deadlines in this matter. See, e .g. , May 12, 2008 Orde r, Doc ket No. [166] (desc ribing Klay man’s ef forts to “stonewa ll” and “obstruct[]” discovery

in this m atter) ; Mar. 24, 2009 Or der, D ocket No. [301] (describingthe “voluminous number of filing s in this case re sulting fr om Klay man’s obstinance at eve ry stag e of this case” ); see also Klayman v . Judicial W atch, Inc

. , 628 F. Supp. 2d 98, 106-08 (D .D.C. 2009) (desc ribing Klay

man’s demonstra

ted fa ilure to comply

with Court-order ed dea dlines). The pa rties finally

rea ched the summary

judgme nt stag e in late 2008. How ever , afte r the parties’ cross-motions for summar y judgme nt were ripe but bef ore the Court had an oppor tunity to rule on them, Klay

man filed his first re quest for disqualific ation of this Court. See Pl.’s Mot. for Rec usal and/or Disqua lification, Docke t No. [298] . Klay man moved the Court to re cuse itself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which per mits a lit iga

nt to seek re cusal of a

fede ral judg e “in any proce edingin which his impartiality might re asonably

be questioned.” As set forth in his motion, Klay

man alleg ed that re cusal wa s warr anted unde r sec tion 455(a) f or larg ely the same
rea sons he now cla ims require r ecusa l under sec tion 144, namely : (1) var ious rulings issued by the Court cre ated a

n appea ranc e of bia s ag ainst him; and (2) that the unde rsig ned wa s appointed

3to the fede ral be nch by former President Clinton, aga inst whose administration Klay man was a self-de scribed “ strongand contr oversial a dvocate ,” cr eate d an appe ara nce of bias as we ll. See id. By Orde r and Me morandum Opinion dated June 25, 2009, the Court denied Kla y man’s motion for r ecusa l, finding tha

t “Klay man’s alleg ation that rec usal is warr anted or that an appe ara

nce of bias ag ainst him has been c reated bec ause of the Court’s ruling s in this case, alongwith the fac t that the under signe d was a ppointed by

former President Will iam J . Clint on, completely lack merit.” Klayman v. J

udicial W atch, Inc

. , 628 F. Supp. 2d 98, 111 (D.D .C. 2009). The Court there fore proce eded to r

ule on the par

ties’ cr oss-motions for summary judgme nt. Wit h the par

ties’ dispositive moti ons resolved, the instant case pr ocee ded to the pre trial stag e of litig ation, and the Court held a n initial pretrial status confe renc e on Apr il 30, 2010. Be cause of def

iciencie s in the parties’ Joint P retria l Statement — particular ly as conc erns Klay man’s portion of the statement — the pre trial status was continued until J uly 7, 2010, and the par ties were order ed to submit an amende d J oint Pretrial Statement. SeeApr. 30, 2010 Orde r, Doc ket No. [334] . The pre trial confe renc e and the parties’ deadline f or submitting their amendments we re subse quently continued upon motion by Klay man for a n extension of tim e. SeeJ une 6, 2010 Or der, D ocket No. [338]. The parties’ r evisions to the J oint Pretrial Statement
wer e ther efor e due by

no later tha

n J uly 12, 2010, and the f

inal pretria l status confer ence was schedule d for August 6, 2010. Id. Klay man, howeve r, did not file the re quired modifications to t he Joi nt Pretrial Statement by J uly 12, 2010, as orde red, instea d filing tha t same day

a Motion to St ay

all Procee dings Pending A djudication of Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge. SeeDocke t No. [341] . I mportantly , Klay man did not

actua lly file the propose d motion to di squalify at that time; he instead simply
4indicated that he intended to file a motion to disqualify pursuant to sec tion 144 by no later tha

n J uly 16, 2010, and ther efor e re quested a stay of all proc eeding s. Id. Howeve r, Jul y 16, 2010, 1

came and we nt without any such motion being filed. Rather , on J uly 19, 2010, three day s past his own proposed de adline, Klay man instead filed a

Notice with the Court re peatinghis intention to file a motion to disqualify and indicatingthat such motion would now be filed by no later tha

n J uly 20, 2010. SeeDocke t No. [343] . Once ag ain, howeve r, Klay man fa iled to file the propose d motion by

his own proposed de adline of July 20, 2010. Indeed, it wa s not until J uly 26, 2010, that Klay man filed the now -pending Motion to Disqualify

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. See Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify , Docke t No. [345]
. As set forth in the pr esent Motion to Disqualify , Klay man contends that disqualification of this Court is necessar

y beca use: (1) judicia l rulings in this case , and in a se parate, unre lated civil action in which Klay man serve s as counse l of rec ord, ar e evide nce of the Court’s extrajudicial bias ag ainst him; and (2) the unde rsig ned wa s appointed to the fe dera l bench by former President Clinton and is allege d to have c onnections to and a ssociations with the Democr atic par

ty , and is there fore biased a g ainst Klay man, who states that he filed numerous lawsuits ag ainst the Clinton admini stration and has a self-de scribed r eputation of be ing “ antiDemocr atic.” See ge nerally Pl.’s Mot. t o Disqualify . Def endants filed a

n opposition t o the Motion on August 12, 2010, asse rting that it is bot h untimely and leg ally

insufficient to support
As set forth in the a ccompa nying O rder , Klay

man’s [341] Motion to S tay is now moot 1 and shall be de nied for that rea son. In addition, Defe ndants have filed a r elated [342] Mot ion to Strike, in which Def

endants see k to strike Klay man’s stateme nt of the ca se, propose d list of witnesses, propose d list of ex hibits and proposed deposition testimony , based upon K lay man’s failure to comply

with this C ourt’s Orde rs g overningthe filing of the amended JointPretrial Statement. The Court shall hold in abeyance Def endants’ Motion to Strike and shall re solve the motion in t he conte x t of the final pr etrial status conf ere nce in this ca se. 5disqualification in this case a nd is y et another

attempt by

Klay man to further

delay resolution of this matter. SeeDef

s.’ Opp’n, D ocket No. [347]. After a de lay of three wee ks resulting from Klay man’s multiple reque sts for an e x tension of time, seeDocke t Nos. [349] ; [ 350]; [351] ; [352] , Klay

man filed a

reply in support of his Motion on S eptember 15, 2010. SeePl.’s Reply , Docke t No. [354] . Acc ording ly , the Motion to Disqualify is now fully

briefe d and ripe for this Court’s resolution. II. LEGAL STANDARD AND DISCUSSION To rec use a judg e under

section 144, a litig ant must submit , alongwith its m otion, an aff idavit stating “ the fa cts and the r easons f or [its ] belief that bias or pre judice exists.” 28 U.S.C
. § 144. Upon the filingof a “ timely and suff icient af fidavit,” sec tion 144 mandates that the assig ned “judg e shall proc eed no f urther, but a

nother judg e shall be a ssigne d to hear such proce eding .” Id. ; see also Bhd. of LocomotiveFiremen and E nginemen v . Bangor &Aroostook R.R. Co. , 380 F.2d 570, 576 ( D.C. Cir. 1967) (“The disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144, is mandatory

and automatic, r equiringonly a timely and suff icient af fidavit alleg ing pe rsonal bias or pre judice of the judge .”). “ Importantly , the mere fac t that a par ty has filed a

§ 144 motion,
acc ompanied by

the re quisite affidavit and cer tificate of counsel, doe s not automatically result in the cha lleng ed judg e’s disqualification.” Robertson v. Cartinhour , 691 F. Supp. 2d 65, 77 (D.D.C. 2010); see also United States v . Miller , 355 F. Supp. 2d 404, 405 (D.D .C. 2005) (“disqualific ation is not automatic upon submissi on of af fidavit and c ertificate”) . Rather, r ecusa l is require d onlyupon the filing of a “ timely and suff icient af fidavit.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. The que stion of whether

the motion and supporting a ffidavit is both timely and leg ally sufficie nt is for this Court to determine in the first instance
. United States v. Halde man , 559 F.2d
631, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“ I t is well settled that the involved judge has the pre rog ative, if indee d

not the duty , of passingon the leg al suffic iency of a Sec tion 144 challeng e.”) ; see also United States v. He ldt , 668 F.2d 1238, 1272 n.69 ( D.C. Cir. 1981) (notingthat “under section 144 . . . the transf er to a nother judg e for

decision is ‘at most permissive”’ ) (quoting Haldeman , 559 F.2d at 131). F irst, with respec t to the timeliness of the motion, section 144 is i tself silent as to “what the timeliness require ment means whe re, a s in this case, the re cusal motion rests on eve nts
occur ringafte r proc eeding s beg an.” S.E.C. v. Loving Spirit Found., Inc. , 392 F.3d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In such circ umstances, c ourts “have require d the af fidavit to be filed ‘ at the
ear liest moment.’” Id. As the D.C. Circuit has made clea r, the timeliness requir ement is “[c]rucial to the integ rity

of the judicial proc ess,” a s it “ensure s that a par ty may not wait and decide whether

to file based on ‘ whether he likes subseque nt treatment that he rec eives.’” Id. (quoting In re United ShoeMach. Corp. , 276 F.2d 77, 79 ( 1st Cir. 1960)). Second, in deter

mining whe ther the a ffidavit sets for th a leg ally

sufficie nt basis for disqualification, the Court “must ac cept the a ffidavit’s f actua l alleg ations as true e ven if the judge knows them to be fa lse.” Loving Spirit Found. , 392 F.3d at 496; see also United States v. Hanrahan , 248 F. Supp. 471, 474 (D.D .C. 1965) (“when pre sented with an a pplication and aff idavit such as this one, a Court may not pass upon the truth or fa lsity of the a lleg ations, but must acce pt them as true f or the purpose of dete rmining the leg al suffic iency of the a ffidavit”)
. Howeve r, the a ffidavit “must state f acts a s opposed to conclusions, and while the information and belief of the a ffiant a s to the truth of the alleg ations are sufficie nt, mere r umors and g ossip
are not enoug h.” Hanrahan , 248 F. Supp. at 474 (inter nal citations omitted). “The identifying fac ts of time, place, pe rsons, occ asion and c ircumstance s must be set forth, with at lea st that
7deg ree of par ticularity one would expect to find in a bill of par ticulars.” Id. (interna l citations omitted). I mportantly , g iven the re quirement that the Court a cce pt the fac ts stated in the aff idavit as true, the statute mandate s that “the attorney prese nting the motion [] sign a cer tificate stating that both the motion and declar ation are made in g ood faith.” Loving Spirit Found. , 392 F.3d at 496; see 28 U.S.C. § 144 (requiringthat the af fidavit “be acc ompanied by a ce rtificate of counse l of re cord statingthat it is m ade in g ood faith”) . The c ertifica tion requireme nt is key

to the integ rity of the re cusal proc ess and “ g uard[s] aga inst the removal of a n unbiased judg e throug h the filing of a f

alse a ffidavit.” Loving Spirit Found. , 392 F.3d at 496. Once it is established that the aff idavit has bee n proper ly

cer tified by counsel of r ecor d and that the f

acts set f orth there in have be en stated w ith sufficient par ticularity , the Court must then
asce rtain[] whether these fac ts would fairly convince a sane and rea sonable mind that the judge does in fac t harbor the persona l bias or prejudice contemplated by the statute. I t is well established that the fac ts must g ive fair support to the char g e of a bent mind that may preve nt or impede impartiality
. The basis of the disqualification is that persona l bias or prejudice exis ts, b y rea son of which the judge is unable to impartially exercise his functions in the particula r case . The fac tual alleg ations must establish by more than a prima fac ie case , but not beyond a rea sonable doubt that the mind of the judge is closed to justice; that the judge has a persona l bias or prejudice against the aff

iant which is of such a nature , and of such intensity , th at i t wo u l d rende r the judge unable to g ive the aff iant the fair trial to which ever y litigant is entitled. Obviously , such a showingcould ra rely be made
. Hanrahan , 248 F. Supp. at 475-76 ( internal c itations and quotations omit ted). “ I mportantly , to be disqualifying, the alleg ed bias usually ‘must stem from an e x trajudicial sourc e and r esult in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than wha t the judge lear

ned fr om his participation in the ca se.’” Robertson , 691 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp. , 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)) ; see also Liteky v . United States , 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994) (pr edispositions
8develope d duringproce eding s are rar ely sufficie nt). For

the re asons set for

th below, the Court finds that the Motion to Disqualify and supportingAffidavit are both untimely and leg ally insufficient to support disqualification. A. The Motion to Disqualif y Pursuant to Section 144 is Untimely As observe d above, the timeliness requireme nt is “[c] rucia l to the integrity of the judicial proce ss” and is intended to e nsure that a party is not sim ply

filing the motion on the basis of subsequent unfa

vorable ruling s or trea

tment by the Court. Spirit L oving Found. , 392 F.3d at 492. Even the br iefe st review of the docke t in this case confirms that Kla y man’s Motion to Disqualify is far f rom timely . For

this reason a lone, the motion must fail. See id. (af firmingdismiss al of untimely motion to di squalify

under se ction 144). First, to the extent the reque st for disqualifica tion is based on the under signe d’s alleg ed association with the De mocratic Party and appointment to the fe dera l bench by former President Clint on, it is readily

appar ent that Klay

man did not file the instant motion at the “ea rliest moment.” Klay

man should have be en aw are as ea rly as April of 2006, when this case was orig inally assig ned to this Court, that the undersig ned had be en appointed by former President Clint on. Moreove r, the other events identified by

Klay man in his Affidavit and r elied upon to support his claim of bias ar ising fr om the undersig ned’s a lleg ed assoc iation with the Democr atic party , of which K lay

man is repor

ted to be cr itical, occur

red a s far back a s the 1990’s, seePl.’s Aff. ¶ 13 (discussingevents surr ounding the undersig ned’s nomination to the fe dera l bench a nd
cer tain other e vents that occ urre d duringthe Clinton admini stration), with the most rec ent eve nt alleg edly occur ringin October

2009, see id. (indicatingthat Klay man re lease d a book cr itical of the judiciary , including the undersig ned, in Octobe r of 2009) . Klay man’s Motion is therefor e 9untimely

insofar a s it is premised on the undersig ned’s a lleg ed assoc iation with the Democr atic Party and appointment to the fe dera l bench by former President Clinton. See Spirit Loving Found. , 392 F.3d at 492-93 (re jectingthe timeliness of section 144 af fidavit for r ecusa l where party waited more than two y ear s after the first orde r of whic h it complained and ove r six months afte r the last). Second, insofar

as Klay man’s Motion to Disqualify is premised on the Court’s ruling s in this case, the Motion is equally untimely . Klay

man complains of de cisions in this case datingas far back a s 2008, with the most rece nt substantive ruling ide ntified in the Aff idavit havingbeen issued in J une 2009, more than a year prior to the filingof the instant Motion. SeePl.’s Aff. ¶ 13. In particula

r, Klay man identifies the f

ollowing de cisions by

this Court as demonstrating bia s and/or pre judice, listed below in chr onologic al orde r: 2 (a) the Court’s decision denying his reque st for a protec tive order , P l
. ’s Af f. ¶ 13, which appea

rs to ref er to the Court’s April 2, 2008 Orde r aff irming Mag istrate J udg e Kay ’s decision denying a motion by Klay man to qua sh cer

tain subpoenas issued by Def endants or, a lternatively , for a protec tive order , seeApr. 2, 2008 Orde r, Docke t No. [134] ; (b) the Court’s discovery ruling s permitting “discove ry into [hi s] divorce ,” Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 13, which appea

rs to ref er to the Court’s May 28, 2008 Orde r overr uling Klay

man’s objections to a discovery ruling issued by Mag istrate J udg e Kay in this case , see May 28, 2008 Orde r, Docke t No. [185] ; see also Klayman v. Judicial W atch, Inc. , 628 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102-04 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing in detail the Court’s ruling s reg arding Def endants’ r equest to take discovery from Klay

man’s ex-wife) ; The Court notes that Klay man has g ener ally

failed to spec ifically

identify by docket 2 number or date the par

ticular orde rs of whic h he now c omplains. The public docke t in this case , which wa s initi ally

filed more tha

n four year s ag o, contains in excess of 350 entr ies at pre sent. Klay man’s fa ilure to proper ly

cite to the re cord or

to identify

the ruling s of which he now complains has sig nificantly and nee dlessly

incre ased the difficulty

in determiningwhich of the hundreds of

ruling s in this case ar e now at issue. Nonetheless, to the e x tent the Court has bee n able to dete rmine which of its rulings ar e likely

descr ibed by

Klay man in his Affidavit, the Court has identified these decisions above
. 10(c) the Court’s order denying h i s re q u es t s for an extension of time to file his

summary judgme nt br iefing , Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 13, by which he appea rs to ref er to a series of Orde rs issu ed b y t h e C ourt in late Dec ember 2008 and ear ly J anuar y 2009, see Dec
. 18, 2008 Min. Orde r; Dec
. 23, 2008 Min. Orde r; Dec
. 30, 2008 Orde r, Docke t No. [ 293]; J an. 7, 2009 Min. Orde r; see al s o K l ayman v. Judicial W

atch, Inc. , 628 F. Supp. 2d 98, 105-09 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing in detail the Court’s ruling s reg ardingKlay

man’s multiple reque sts for extensions of tim e); (d) the Court’s ruling “dismiss[ ing] most of [hi s] case and barr [i ng ] [hi m] from prese nting evidenc e o n d am ages,” Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 13, which appea rs to ref ere nce the Court’s J une 25, 2009 Orde r and Memorandum Opinion resolving the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgme nt, see J une 25, 2009 Mem. Op., Docke t No. [319] ; and (e) the Court’s decision denying his initial motion for disqualification, Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 13, which was issued on J une 25, 2009, see J une 25, 2009 Mem. Op., Docke t No. [315]
. Given that Klay

man’s alleg ations of bias foc us on rulings that were all issued at least one y ear , and in some ca ses more tha n two y ear s, prior to the filingof his section 144 Motion, it is clea r that Klay man’s Motion to Disqualify is untim ely

insofar a s it is based on the Court’s ruling s in this case. See Spirit Loving Found. , 392 F.3d at 492-93. Such a findingis particular ly war rante d wher e, as he re, K lay man has c ontinued to actively participate in the pre sent litigation, despite the oc curr ence of the e vents of which he now complains. In the interve ning time pe riod since the Court f irst issued the ruling s identified by Klay man in his Affidavit, the pa rties have completed summary judgme nt briefing , the Court has ruled on the me rits of those motions, and the parties ha ve begun prepa

ringfor tria l in this matter. Klay man’s par ticipation in each of

these substantive stag es of litiga tion further c ounsels ag ainst disqualification. Id. at 493 (“ courts have observe d that filing motions betwee n the eve nts complained of

and submission of the aff idavit weig hs heavily

ag ainst a findingof timeliness”). Indeed, K lay

man himself alleg es that this Court has acte d with bias and/or pre judice towar ds him “over the y ear s.” Pl.’s Aff. ¶

4. Yet, despite this claim, Klay man waited until shortly

befor e the
11final pre trial status confe renc e in this case to f ile the instant Motion to Dis qualify . The timing of the motion strongly

sug g ests that this is y et another attempt by

Klay man to delay

final re solution of the pe nding litig ation and to avoid ruling s that may be unfa vorable to his case. Cf. S.E.C. v. Grossman , 887 F. Supp. 649, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (findingmotion to di squalify untimely wher e party “chose to delay

any motion and ga

mble” on outcome of

substantive ruling s); E. &J. Gallo W inery v . Gallo Catt le Co. , 967 F.2d 1280, 1296 ( 9th Cir. 1992) (af firmingdenial of motion to disqualify wher e “une x plained dela y sug g est[ed] that the re cusal statute [was] being misused for strateg ic purposes” ). Moreove r, as to these first two alleg ations of bias, the Court’s findingof untimeliness is further supported by

the fa ct that these same alleg ations formed the basis of Klay man’s first motion to di squalify

this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) filed in F ebrua ry of 2009. See Mot. for Recusal a nd/or Disqualification, Docket No. [298]. P ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge is require d to “disqualify

himself in any

proce edingin which his impartiality might re asonably

be questioned.” G iven that these a lleg ed sourc es of bias w ere known to Klay man at the time of the filing of his first motion t o disqualify in Febr uary 2009, it is clear that the pr esent Motion to Disqualify

— based on those sa

me fa ctual alleg ations but filed more than a y ear and a ha lf later — is untim ely . At a minimum, Klay man should have move d for r ecusa l under sec tion 144 at the same time that he move d for r ecusa l under sec tion 455(a), to the e x tent that both motions are premised on the sa

me alleg ations of bias. Klay man has off

ere d no explanation for such a leng thy delay in filing the pr esent motion. Acc ording ly , to the extent Klay man’s Motion is based on the Court’s a lleg ed political aff iliations and its ruli ng s in this case, his unexplained delay in filing the Motion to Disqualify
12rende rs the Motion untimely . Klay man’s re liance on the Court’s more re cent r ulings in Sataki v. Broadcasting Board of Governors , Civ. Action No. 10-534, an unr elated, se para te civil action in which Klay

man serve s as counse l of rec ord, does not save the Motion from this finding of untimeliness. Klay

man contends that, notwithst andingthe Court’s alleg edly long- standing bias ag ainst him, the present Motion is tim ely filed bec ause suc h bias has “r ece ntly . . . become much
more a cute,” as demonstra ted by the Court’s ruling s in the Sataki matter. See Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 4. Howeve r, the Court’s last substantive rulingin the Satakicivil action was issued on July 7, 2010 — more than two- and-a -half w eeks pr ior to the filing of the instant Motion to Dis qualify . Once ag ain, Klay

man offe rs no explanation for this delay . In such circ umstances, D.C. Circuit prec edent c ounsels that an unexplained delay of this leng th rende rs the filingof his Affidavit for disqualification untimely
. See Smuck v. Hobson , 408 F.2d 175, 183 ( D.C. Cir. 1969) (expressing “ser ious doubt” about the timeliness of an a ffidavit base d on rema rks made by

the judg e “mor e than two wee ks befor e” a nd a law r eview published by the judg e “mor e than a

y ear ” ea rlier)
. See also In re Martin-Trigona , 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1244-45 (D . Conn. 1983) (12-da y delay from time movant indicated pr obability of re cusal motion to tim e motion was ac tually filed re ndere d motion untimely); Bumpus v. Uniroy al Tir e Co. , 385 F. Supp. 711, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (findingsection 144 motion and affida

vit untim ely

wher e base d on events oc curr ing “ from two we eks to as fa r back a s two months before” ). It is therefor e cle ar that Klay man’s Motion to Disqualify under section 144 is untimely . For this reason a lone, Klay

man’s Motion to Disqualify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 must be denie d.

13B. The Motion to Disqualif y Doe s Not Str ictly Comply with the Certifi cation Requireme nt Set Forth in 28 U.S.C. § 144 In addition, although ne ither par ty has ra ised the issue, the Court notes that sec tion 144 require s that a par

ty ’s af fidavit submitted in support of a motion for disqualification under this statutory provision “be a ccompa

nied by a ce rtificate of counse l of rec ord statingthat it is m ade in g ood faith.” 28 U .S.C. § 144. The cer tification requir ement is not simply a pro f orma proc edura l obligation but is key

to the integ rity

of the re cusal proc ess. B eca use the Court must acc ept as true a ll factua l alleg ations asserte d in the aff idavit, even if the Court knows such alleg ations to be untrue, the c ertifica

tion requireme nt is essential to “guard a g ainst the remova l of an unbiase d judge throug h the filing of a f alse a ffidavit.” Loving Spirit Found. , 392 F.3d at 496. The
cer tification requir ement ther efor e ser ves as a “che ck on abuse of the re cusal proc ess,” a ssuring the Court that the statements in the af fidavit are made in g ood faith. Id. Given the importanc e of the ce rtification, the f

ailure to c omply

with this requirement is not simply a proc edura l error
. United States v. Miller , 355 F. Supp. 2d 404, 405-06 (D .D.C. 2005) (“ failure to make this
cer tification is gr ounds for de nying the motion”). Her e, ther e ar e two proble ms with the certific ation submitt ed by Klay man in support of this Moti on to Disqualify . First, althoug h Klay man is himself a license d attorney admitted to prac tice bef

ore this Court, he is ac ting a s a pro se Plaintiff in the instant action and not as counse l of re cord. Whether

a pro se litigant is in fac t able to file a motion for disqualification under section 144, notwithstanding the statutory require ment that the ac company ing a ffidavit be
cer tified as made in good f

aith by the “c ounsel of re cord,” appea rs to be one of

first impression in this Ci rcuit, and c ourts in other jurisdictions have va ried in their tre atment of pro se motions

14under se ction 144. For example, some courts have held that a pro se party cannot f ile a motion for disqualification under sec tion 144 as they cannot c omply

with the statute’s explicit
cer tification requir ement. See, e .g. , Buck enberge r v. Ree d , Civ. Action No. 6-7393, 2010 WL 3523021, at *1 (E.D. L a. Aug . 31, 2010) (c oncluding“that a pro se litigant may not use 28 U.S.C. § 144 as a means to see k rec usal bec ause of the ce rtification re quirement” and ther efor e denying the motion). Other cour ts have c oncluded that a pro se litigant may file a motion under this provision so l ongas the pa rty provides a c ertifica

te of g ood faith sig ned by a member

of the bar, a lbeit not counsel of re cord. See, e .g. , United States v. Rank in , 1 F. Supp. 2d 445, 450 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holdingthat “§ 144 re quires that, in the ca se of a pro se movant, the ce rtificate of g ood faith that ac companies the § 144 aff idavit be sig ned by

any member of

the bar of the court” ). Still other c ourts have de termined that it is appropriate to consider the merits of a pro se litigant’s se ction 144 motion notwit hstandingthe lack of any cer tification of g ood faith by counsel of r ecor d and/or a member of

the bar
. See, e .g. , Melv in v. Social Sec . Admin ., Civ. Action No. 5:09-235, 2010 WL3743543, at *2 (E.D.N .C. Sept. 14, 2010) (noting “ that the plain languag e of § 144 pr eclude s a pro se plaintiff bring ing [] a motion [ for disqualification] without a
cer tificate of g ood faith sig ned by

a member

of the ba r,” but none theless “ pr ocee d[i ng ] t o addre ss the merits of plaintiff’s motion in the spirit of the libera lity aff orded to pro selitigants”) ; W illiams v. New Y

ork City Housing Auth. , 287 F. Supp. 2d 247, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting the insufficienc y

of the pro se movant’s af fidavit wher e it lacke d the ce rtificate of counse l, but addre ssing the mova

nt’s arguments). The Court ultimately finds that it need not re solve the question of whethe r Klay man, as a pro se litigant, may move for disqua lification under se ction 144. As discussed below, the Court finds that Klay man’s Af fidavit, eve n if consider ed, is leg ally
15insufficient to support disqualification under sec tion 144.

Second, althoug h Klay

man has purpor

ted to file his own ce rtification of g ood faith under section 144, he ha s cer

tified there in only

that the “motion is being filed in g ood faith;” he has not simil arly cer tified that the ac company ing A ffidavit and the substantive fac tual alleg ations contained the rein have also be en filed in g ood faith. See Pl.’s Mot. t o Disqualify at 1-2. Nor does his Affidavit its elf c ontain any languag e ce rtifying that the fac tual alleg ations set forth there in have be en submitted in good f aith. See ge nerally Pl.’s Aff. Ac cording ly , even a ssuming that Klay man’s own c ertifica

tion of g ood faith as a pro se litigant is sufficie nt under sec tion 144, Klay man has not pre sented a

signe d “ce rtificate stating that both the motion and declaration are made in g ood faith.” Loving Spirit Found. , 392 F.3d at 496 (emphasis adde d). Ag ain, howeve r, beca use the Court finds that the substantive fa ctual alleg ations set forth in the Af fidavit, eve n if considere d on the merits, ar e not leg ally sufficie nt to warra

nt disqualification, the Court shall proce ed to consider

the merits of the pr esent Motion to Disqualify , notwithstanding Kla y man’s failure to submita ce rtification of g ood faith, either by himself as a pro se litigant or by counsel of re cord, a s to both the moti on and af fidavit. 3 C. The Facts Set Forth in Klayman’s Affidavit are Legally Insufficient to W arrant Disqualifi cation Ultimately , Klay

man’s Motion to Disqualify must be denied be cause the fa cts set forth in the supportingAffida

vit, even if a ccepted as true , are leg ally insufficient to demonstrate ac tual
The Court is also cog nizant that section 455 imposes a duty upon this Court t o consider 3 rec usal sua sponte , and, for this reason a s well, shall proce ed to consider Klay man’s substantive alleg ations in support of his Motion t o Disqualify
. See U nited States v. Barrett , 111 F.3d 947, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (r ecognizi ngthat “sec tion 455 requires judg es to consider rec usal sua sponte ”). 16bias war

rantingdisqualification under section 144. More over, the Court has also conduc ted its own independe nt reviewof the re cord in this case , including K lay man’s pre sent Motion and Affida vit, and is satisfied that no rea sonable a nd informed obse rver

would question this C ourt’s impartiality . Indeed, the Court has alre ady ruled that a lleg ations of bias base d on the Court’s appointment by

former President Clinton and the Court’s judicial rulings a re le g ally insufficient to warr ant or justify

disqualification. See Klaym an v. Judic ial W atch , Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2009). Klay

man offe rs no new f

actua l or leg al support that would sug g est the Court’s 4 prior ruling s on this point wer e in er ror, a nd for g ood rea son. The ca se law is cle ar that neither the Court’s judicial ruling s nor its alleg ed political af filiations support disqualification. 1. The Court’s Judicial Rul ings D o Not For m a Proper B asis for Disqualification First, as the Court has previously made c lear , “judicial ruling s alone a lmost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or pa

rtiality motion.” Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555. Such ruling s by
Whil e Klay

man’s initial motion for disqualification and the Court’s r uling de nying that 4 motion were e ach ba sed on sec tion 455(a) — a nd the pre sent motion by

contra st focuses on section 144 — the substantive standa rd for rec usal based on a lleg ed bias unde r the two sec tions is larg ely the same. See, e .g. , Liberty Lobby, Inc. v . Dow Jones &Co. , 838 F.2d 1287, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“ I t is well settled that a motion for re cusal unde r 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455, must be based upon pr ejudice f rom an e x tra-judicia l source.” ); United States v. He rnandez , 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 ( 9th Cir. 1997) (“The substantive standard f or re cusal unde r 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 is the same: ‘[W ]hether a r easona ble per son with knowledg e of a ll the fac ts would conclude that the judg e’s impar tiality might re asonably

be questioned.’ ”) ( quoting United States v. Studley , 783 F.2d 934, 939 ( 9th Cir. 1986)). To the e x tent the standar d under the sections diffe r, it is that section 144 require s proof of actual bias wher eas se ction 455(a) require s only the re asonable appearanceof bias. Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 368 F.3d 709, 718 ( 7th Cir. 2004); cf. Apple v. J

ewish Hosp. &Med. Ctr. , 829 F.2d 326, 333 ( 2d Cir. 1987) (re cog nizi ng that, while sec tion 455(a) pr ovides “broa der grounds for disqua lification than . . . § 144,” “ when, as her e, a pa

rty has not alleg ed any

g rounds for r ecusa l other than those r elatingto the district court’s a lleg ed bias or pr ejudice, those broade r g rounds ar e not implicated”) . Acc ording ly , a failure to show an appe ara nce of bias under se ction 455(a) invariably results in a fa ilure to show actua l bias under se ction 144. 17themselves “c annot possibly show relianc e upon an e x trajudicial sourc e” a nd “ca n only in the
rar est circ umstances e vidence the degree of favoritism or antag onism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is involved.” Id. Her e, althoug h Klay man complains that the Court has ruled unfa

vorably ag ainst him, he has fa iled to identify with the require d deg ree of par ticularity any extrajudicial source of bias re lated to the Court’s ruling s. See ge nerally Pl.’s Aff. As the Court’s discussion above make s clea r, “to be disqualifying, the alleg ed bias usually ‘must stem from an e x trajudicial sourc e and r esult in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judg e lea

rned f rom his participation in the ca se.’” Robertson , 691 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (quoting Grinnell Corp. , 384 U.S. at 583); see also Liteky , 510 U.S. at 554 (pre dispositi ons develope d duringproce eding s are rar ely sufficie nt); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v . Dow Jones &Co. , 838 F.2d 1287, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“ I t is well settled that a motion for re cusal unde r 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455 must be based upon pr ejudice f rom an e x tra-judicia l source.” ). Klay man’s conc lusory alleg ations and statements of opinion that the Court “ha s demonstrated a n extra-judicial bias and prejudice ” ag ainst him are wholly insufficient on this point. See H anrahan , 248 F. Supp. at 474 (the a ffidavit “must state f acts a s opposed to conclusions” a nd must do so with “particularity”); cf. Karim-Panahi v. U.S. Congress , No. 03-5186, 2004 WL1588167, at *4 (D.C. Cir. J ul. 14, 2004) (per

curiam) (holdingthat under se ction 455, “[a] judge should not rec use himself base d upon conclusory , unsupported or te nuous alleg ations”). Acc ording ly , while his dissatisfaction 5 The only specific alleg ation that could ar g uably be construe d as asse rting an 5 extrajudicial source of bias, as is re quired unde r sec tion 144, is Klay man’s asse rtion that he published a book in Octobe r of 2009, in which he was “ critica l of [the undersig ned], among other jurists and politi cians a

nd media figures.” Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 6. Importantly , howeve r, Klay man himself does not alleg e that the Court itself wa s actua lly awa re of the exist ence of this book or the alleg edly

critica l comments contained the rein. See id. There fore , even a ssuming the truth of the alleg ations in the Affidavit, as the Court must, there is no claim that this Court had 18with the Court’s ruling s may provide a proper g round for

appea l, his mere disag ree ment with the Court’s judicial ruling s does not provide a proper g round for

rec usal. See Liteky , 510 U.S. at 540; Spirit L oving Found. , 392 F.3d at 494 (“Indeed, w e have found no ca se whe re this or a ny other fe dera l court re cused a judge based only

on his or her r

ulings.” ); Karim-Panahi, 2004 WL 1588167, at *4 (whe re pla intiff has fa iled to point “to any thing that would sug g est that [the Court] has for

med an opinion on some basis other tha n her pa rticipation in this case,” rec usal is inappropriate). The Court has pr eviously addre ssed in g rea

t detail many

of Klay man’s complaints reg ardingthe Court’s ruling s in the instant case, a nd there fore need not do so a g ain her e, as it is clea r that such r

ulings do not constitute a va lid basis for re cusal. See Klaym an v. Judic ial W atch , Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 98, 101-10 (D .D.C. 2009). Moreove r, to the extent Klay man complains of the Court’s dec isions in t he Sataki matter, the Court notes that the pla intiff in that action has voluntarily

dismiss ed nea

rly all of the substantive c laims in that case, seeCiv. Action No. 10- 534, Docke t No. [67] (Notice of Voluntary Dismissal), and has fa iled to appea l the Court’s ruling denying he r re quest for a

preliminary

injunction. The D.C. Circuit has ca utioned that under suc h circ umstances, “ even if

a par ticular rulingor a se ries of r ulings re veale d bias, we doubt ve ry much that a r ecusa l motion would be proper whe re, a s here , the movant could have appea led the challeng ed dec isions but failed to do so.” Spirit L oving Found. , 392 F.3d at 494. Thus, while it is clear that Klay man is displeased with the Court’s ruling s in the instant action and in the Satakimatter, his disag ree ment with the Court’s decisions does not provide a proper g round for

rec usal. Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555. As the D.C. Circuit has aptly observe d, “if knowledg e of this book or a ny of the stateme nts alleg edly made ther ein. 19disqualification wer e re quired ‘me rely as a r esult of counse l’s disag ree ment with judicial conclusions re ache d in the course of litigation, the judicial sy stem would g rind to a halt.’” Loving Spirit

Found. , 392 F.3d at 494 (quoting Barnett v. City of Chicago , 952 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (N.D. I ll. 1998)). Klay man’s alleg ations of bias pre mised on the Court’s judicial ruling s
are there fore leg ally

insufficient a

nd do not warr ant disqualification. 6 2. The Court’s Alleg ed Political Affiliations and Appointment to the Fe dera l Be nch by For mer Preside nt Cli nton Do Not For m a Proper B asis for Disqualification Second, as the Court has previously made c lear , the fa ct that the under signe d was appointed to the fe dera l bench by former President Clinton, of whom Klay man has a lleg edly been c ritical in the past, does not wa rra nt or justify

disqualification. See Klaym an v. Judic ial W atch, Inc

. , 628 F. Supp. 2d 98, 110-11 (D .D.C. 2008) (“ [I ]tis clear that the mere fac t that the undersig ned wa s appointed by the forme r Clinton adminis tration — wher e for mer Preside nt Clint on is neither a pa

rty to or otherwise involved with this l awsuit — does not war rant or require rec usal in the instant case .”). N or does the c laim that the Court is alleg edly connec ted to and assoc iated with the De mocratic party , even if assumed true , support rec usal of this Court. The c ase la

w is clea r that re cusal is not war

rante d in this circumstance
. See Karim-Panahi , 2004 WL1588167, *4 (af

firminglower c ourt’s denia l of motion for rec usal based on a lleg ations that the judg e wa s “biased be cause of her ‘political-re ligious conne ctions’ and he r alleg ed loy alty to Cognizant that the Court is require d to acc ept Klay man’s alleg ations as true in 6 evaluating the le g al suffic iency of his section 144 Aff

idavit, the Court has not addre ssed her ein the ac tual merits or ver acity of such a lleg ations reg ardingthe Court’s prior judicial r ulings. The Court only

pauses he re br iefly

to emphasize that its si lence should not be rea d as agree ment with Klay man’s cha

rac terization of the re cord in this case ; to the contrar y , revie w of the Court’s ruling s demonstrates that Kla y man’s Motion to Disqualify is premised on a f

lawed a nd wholly inacc urate char acte rization of this C ourt’s prior judicia l decisions. 20those who selec ted, conf irmed and a

ppointed her” ); see also Mac Draw, Inc. v . CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc. , 138 F.3d 33, 38 ( 2d Cir. 1998), cert. de nied, 525 U.S. 874 (1998) (pla intiff’s 7 alleg ation that “a judg e is not impartial solely beca use an attorney

is embroiled in a contr oversy with the administration that appointed the judg e” is insuffic ient g rounds for r ecusa l). As the Second Circuit has pe rsuasively stated, J udg es g ener ally have political backgrounds to one deg ree or another but mu s t be presumed, absent more, to be impartial. At least i n the fede ral sy stem, judge s separ ate themselves from politics when g oing on the b en ch , and their life tenure reduc es any felt relianc e on political patrons. Indeed, a sug g estion of partiality based on the appointing administration may o ft en be a double-e dg ed sword. I f a Democr atic appointee’ s impartiality toward lawyers publicly identified as active Republicans may be questioned, a Republican appointee’ s impartiality toward lawy ers’ adver saries might simil arly be questioned on the g round that a Republican judge might fa

vor the Republica

n lawy ers. MacD raw , 138 F.3d at 38. I ndeed, c ourts have he ld that rec usal is not warra nted eve n when the President re sponsible for nominating the judg e is ac tually a party to the litigation. See, e .g. , In re Exe cutive O

ffice of President , 215 F.3d 25, 25 ( D.C. Cir. 2000) (“H ear ing a case involving the conduct of

the President who a

ppointed me will not create in rea sonable minds, with knowledg e of all re levant cir cumstance s that a re asonable inquiry would disclose, a pe rce ption that [ my ] ability to car ry out judicial responsibiliti es with integ rity , impartiality , and compe tence [would be] impaired.”) (interna l citation and quotation marks omitted). Cf. Reddy v. O ’Connor , 520 F. Supp. 2d 124, 128 (D.D.C. 2007) (in a c ase involvingChief J ustice John R oberts, conc luding that “no re asonable and informe d observe r would question the impartiality of the unde rsig ned based on the Chief J ustice’s a ppointment of the undersig ned [J udg e John D. Bates] to the
The Court notes that Klay man was c ounsel of re cord f or plaintiff in this case
. See 7 MacD raw , 138 F.3d at 35. 21[Foreig n Intellige nce Surve illance Court].”). Ac cording ly , neither the fac t that the undersig ned

was a ppointed by

the forme r Clinton adminis tration nor the Court’s a lleg ed conne ction to the Democr atic par

ty war rant or r equire rec usal in the instant case
. 8

III. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the Court finds that Klay man has fa iled to submita “timely and suff icient aff idavit” as is re quired to support disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144. First, the Motion to Disqualify

and supportingAffida

vit were not timely

filed at the “ ear liest moment,” and the Motion must be denie d for this rea son alone. Sec ond, Klay man has fa iled to comply with the
cer tification requir ement set for th in 28 U.S.C . § 144. Third and f inally , the fa ctual alleg ations set forth in the Af

fidavit are , even if

true, leg ally

insufficient to support a f inding that the Court has an a ctual extrajudicial bias or pr ejudice. T he Af fidavit larg ely

consists of conclusory
asser tions and opinions, which lack the ne cessa ry deg ree of par

ticularity require d in a sec tion 144 aff idavit. Moreover , neither of the g rounds asser

ted in Klay

man’s Af fidavit war

rant or r equire disqualification under

section 144. It is well settled that complaints reg arding the Court’s
The Court notes that Klay man also alleg es that re cusal is war rante d beca

use the 8 undersig ned’s spouse, a lso a lawyer, “ play ed a r ole which wa s useful to President Clinton during the infamous Monica

L ewinsky

scanda l.” Pl.’s Aff. ¶

6. I t is entirely

unclea r fr om Klay

man’s vague and c onclusory

asser tions how this allege d fac t, even if true , would tend to foster or cre ate an ac tual bias on the par

t of the under signe d in this case. Nor has Klay man provided a

ny leg al support for his appa

rent c laim that rec usal is warr anted a nd nece ssary

wher e, a de cade or more ag o, the pre siding judg e’s spouse r epre sented a n individual, who is not a party to the instant litigation, in a matter

wholly unrelated to the cur

rent law suit. According ly , as Klay man alleg es no financ ial or per sonal conc erns implicated by the re prese ntation nor provides a ny fac ts or evidenc e that would ca

use a r easona

ble and infor

med observe r to question this Court’s impartiality , the Court finds that this claim, even if true , is leg ally insufficient to support disqualification. Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. United States , 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000) (or der by Chief J ustice Will iam H. Rehnquist denying motion to rec use whe re his son’s lawfirm repr esente d a par

ty but his personal and f

inancial c oncer

ns were unaff

ecte d). 22judicial ruling s in this case as we ll as in the separ ate, unr elated Satakimatter do not provide a

proper g round for

rec usal. Althoug h it is clear that Kla y man is displeased with the substanc e of
cer tain of those dec isions, dis qualification is notrequire d mere ly beca use he disagree s with the Court’s judicial ruling s, and Klay man has fa iled to identify with particularity

any alleg ed extrajudicial source of bias. It is also equally established that disqualification is notwar rante d or require d mere ly

beca use the unde rsig ned wa s appointed to the fe dera l bench by former President Clint on and is alleg ed to have connec tions to and associations with the Democr atic par ty
. Acc ording ly , consistent with its obl iga tion to determine in the first instance whether the Motion and supporting A ffidavit ar e timely filed and le g ally

sufficie nt to require disqua lification, the Court finds that the instant Motion to Dis qualify is both unti mely

and leg ally

insufficient. Disqualification under

28 U.S.C. § 144 is t here fore neither r equire d nor wa rra nted. The Court is also satisfied, upon its own independe nt reviewof the re cord, tha t no rea sonable a

nd informed observe r would question this Court’s impartiality . Klay man’s [345] Motion to Disqualify this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 is DENI ED. An a ppropriate Orde r ac companies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: October

13, 2010
/s/ COLLE EN KOLLAR-K OTEL LY United States District J udg e

23