IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 12–0844

Filed October 19, 2012

IOWA SUPREME COURT

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

PETER SEAN CANNON,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

The Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa 

recommends that attorney be publicly reprimanded. LICENSE 

SUSPENDED.

Charles L. Harrington and David J. Grace, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

David L. Brown and Jay D. Grimes of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, 

Des Moines, for appellee.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

The complainant, the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary 

Board (Board), alleges the respondent, Peter Sean Cannon, violated Iowa 

Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b). The alleged violation was based 

on three separate criminal convictions occurring in 2009 and 2010. The 

Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa (commission) found 

Cannon’s convictions constituted a violation of rule 32:8.4(b) and 

recommended we publicly reprimand Cannon. Upon our de novo review, 

we find Cannon violated rule 32:8.4(b) and suspend his license to 

practice law for thirty days.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Cannon was admitted to the Iowa bar in 1983. He practiced at the 

law firm of Connolly, O’Malley, Lillis, Hansen & Olson from 1983 until 

1998, when he became a sole practitioner. He has practiced as a sole 

practitioner in Iowa since 1998.

The Board filed a three-count complaint against Cannon on June 

24, 2011. Count I alleged that on July 13, 2009, Cannon was convicted 

of the crime of operating a boat while intoxicated, first offense, in 

violation of Iowa Code section 462A.14 (2009). Count II alleged that on 

October 8, 2009, Cannon was convicted of possession of cocaine, a 

controlled substance, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5). 

Finally, Count III alleged that on November 17, 2010, Cannon was 

convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), first 

offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2.1 With regard to these 

convictions, the Board invoked issue preclusion under Iowa Court Rule 

 1Cannon had previously been convicted of OWI, first offense, in 2007. The State 

agreed to reduce the charge at issue here to another OWI, first offense, in exchange for 

a guilty plea.
3

35.7(3).2 The Board contends these offenses violate Iowa Rule of 

Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b). The commission held a hearing on 

December 15, 2011. On May 11, 2012, the commission issued its 

findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended we publicly 

reprimand Cannon for the pattern of criminal conduct demonstrated by 

the three convictions.

II. Standard and Scope of Review.

We have described our standard of review in attorney disciplinary 

proceedings as follows:

Attorney disciplinary proceedings are reviewed de novo. The 

Board bears the burden of proving misconduct by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence, which is a lesser 

burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt but a greater 

burden than is imposed in the usual civil case. If we 

determine the Board has met its burden and proven 

misconduct, “we may impose a greater or lesser sanction 

than the sanction recommended by the commission.”

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver, 812 N.W.2d 4, 9 (Iowa 

2012) (citations omitted); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Iowa 2010). When the Board alleges 

that a criminal conviction violates rule 32:8.4(b), the Board bears the 

additional burden of showing a sufficient nexus between the criminal 

conduct and the respondent’s ability to function as an attorney. See 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Keele, 795 N.W.2d 507, 515 

(Iowa 2011). The Board must prove the nexus by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence. Id.

 2All citations to the Iowa Court Rules are to the 2012 version, effective February 

20, 2012.
4

III. Findings of Fact.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. The Board alleged that 

Cannon pled guilty to operating a boat while intoxicated, first offense; 

possession of cocaine; and OWI, first offense. In his answer to the 

Board’s complaint, Cannon admitted each of these convictions. 

Moreover, the Board has supplied the court files from each conviction, 

which include Cannon’s guilty pleas. The Board has proven each 

conviction by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.

IV. Ethical Violations.

The Board alleged that each of Cannon’s convictions constituted a 

violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b). Rule 32:8.4(b) 

states, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a 

criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 

trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:8.4(b). “[N]ot all criminal acts reflect on an attorney’s fitness 

to practice law.” Weaver, 812 N.W.2d at 12. Rather, we focus on the 

“link between the conduct and the actor’s ability to function as a lawyer.” 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d 33, 40 

(Iowa 2011) (citing 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law of Lawyering 

§ 65.4, at 65-8 (3d ed. Supp. 2009)). The crux of the question centers on 

whether Cannon’s conduct demonstrates he has character defects that 

would detract from his ability to be trusted with “important controversies 

and confidential information.” See id. (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

As we noted in Templeton,

[I]llegal conduct can reflect adversely on fitness to practice 

law. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor 

significance when considered separately, can indicate 

indifference to legal obligation. The mere commission of a 
5

criminal act does not necessarily reflect adversely on the 

fitness of an attorney to practice law. The nature and 

circumstances of the act are relevant to determine if the 

commission of the criminal act reflects adversely on the 

attorney’s fitness to practice law.

Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 767 (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

With these considerations in mind, we have adopted the following 

test to determine whether a criminal act violates rule 32:8.4(b):

There must be some rational connection other than the 

criminality of the act between the conduct and the actor’s 

fitness to practice law. Pertinent considerations include the 

lawyer’s mental state; the extent to which the act 

demonstrates disrespect for the law or law enforcement; the 

presence or absence of a victim; the extent of actual or 

potential injury to a victim; and the presence or absence of a 

pattern of criminal conduct.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Weaver, 812 

N.W.2d at 11.

The first factor we consider under Templeton is Cannon’s mental 

state. See Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 767. Cannon argues that his 

criminal acts were a result of depression and alcohol issues. He testified 

that these issues originated with a surgery he underwent in December of 

2006. According to Cannon, approximately eighty percent of his small 

intestine was removed, making his absorption rate for alcohol much 

higher than it had been previously. This medical issue also led to bouts 

of depression. We note that while Cannon’s substance abuse and mental 

state may have contributed to his actions, his depression and alcoholism 

do not excuse his mistakes. Moreover, Cannon presented no medical 

evidence as to how his depression affected his mind and decision 

making. See Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d at 41 (holding that attorney’s 

depression did not excuse the choices he made, particularly when he did 

not present evidence that his mental condition clouded his mind).
6

We next examine the factor relating to the presence or absence of a 

victim. Many violations of rule 32:8.4(b) involve victims of criminal 

conduct. See, e.g., Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d at 41 (attorney’s severe physical 

attack on his wife in the presence of his children caused physical and 

psychological damage to his wife and psychological trauma to his 

children); Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 770 (attorney’s criminal acts of 

invasion of privacy had serious consequences for his victims). While 

Cannon’s crimes did not result in any direct physical or psychological 

harm to a person, his OWI incident did result in property damage to the 

parking lot of a grocery store, thereby making the store a victim of his 

criminal action. We also consider potential injury to persons or property 

in determining whether a violation of rule 32:8.4(b) occurred. As we 

stated in Weaver, operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated “create[s]

. . . grave risk of potential injury” to others. See Weaver, 812 N.W.2d at 

11. As described below, each of Cannon’s criminal convictions shows a 

reckless disregard for the public.

Cannon’s boating-while-intoxicated conviction arose out of a stop 

by a water patrol officer with the Iowa Department of Natural Resources. 

The officer observed Cannon accelerating “rather quickly” in the five mile 

per hour speed-limit zone at 10:30 p.m. on Friday, July 11, 2008. The 

officer noted Cannon had slurred speech, slow reaction times, and 

smelled of alcohol. A subsequent breath test revealed Cannon’s blood 

alcohol content was .186. By driving a boat at night while intoxicated, 

Cannon could have seriously injured other people on the water, himself, 

or the passenger on his boat.

Cannon’s conviction for possession of cocaine also arose out of an 

incident involving alcohol. Responding to a report of a possible 

intoxicated driver, police found a vehicle stopped in the middle of a 
7

roadway. Cannon was observed walking away from the stopped vehicle. 

A woman in the driver’s seat and Cannon both appeared to be 

intoxicated. Cannon was arrested for public intoxication, and during a 

search conducted incident to that arrest, an officer found a baggy 

containing about one gram of cocaine in his suit coat pocket. Cannon 

denies he ever used cocaine, and the police officer reported that the 

woman he was with appeared to have cocaine on her upper lip. Though 

Cannon had not been driving during that incident, he knew his 

companion had been drinking, and he had reason to believe she was also 

using cocaine. The incident took place in a residential neighborhood in 

the early morning hours and could have resulted in serious or even fatal 

injury to other drivers or pedestrians.

Finally, Cannon was arrested for OWI after his car struck a barrier 

in a grocery store parking lot. When a police officer approached the car, 

Cannon and a female acquaintance were standing near it. Cannon 

appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. When questioned, 

Cannon denied he had been driving the car, even though he was holding 

the keys to the car. Cannon would not say who had been driving. He 

refused a breath test and was placed under arrest. Cannon later entered 

an Alford plea to OWI, first offense.3 Driving while intoxicated through a 

 3We have recently described an Alford plea as follows:

An Alford plea is a guilty plea entered pursuant to North Carolina 

v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 168, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 171–72 

(1970). “An Alford plea is a variation of a guilty plea. In effect, the pleas 

are the same as the defendant is agreeing to the imposition of a criminal 

sentence for the crime charged.” The plea only differs from the 

traditional guilty plea “in that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he 

or she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime.”

Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Van Haaften, 815 N.W.2d 17, 20 n.1 (Iowa 2012) (citations 

omitted).
8

grocery store parking lot could have caused serious injuries to 

pedestrians, other drivers, or passengers in other vehicles. Based upon 

the incidents described above, there was significant potential for injury to 

a multitude of people and damage to property.

Another factor we consider in determining whether an attorney has 

violated rule 32:8.4(b) is the presence of a pattern of criminal conduct. 

Weaver, 812 N.W.2d at 10–11 (citing Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 767). 

Patterns of criminal conduct have sometimes involved repeated 

convictions for the same crime. E.g., id. at 11 (finding a pattern of 

criminal conduct existed when the attorney had been convicted of three 

OWIs); Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 767–68 (finding a pattern of criminal 

conduct was shown by an attorney convicted of six counts of invasion of 

privacy). Here, even though Cannon has a variety of convictions, they all 

involve substance abuse and the possession of illegal substances.

Cannon was also convicted of OWI, first offense, in September 

2007, for which he received a private admonition. Even though the 2007 

OWI conviction is not at issue in this proceeding, a prior conviction is 

relevant to determining whether an attorney has displayed a pattern of 

criminal conduct. See Weaver, 812 N.W.2d at 11 (taking into account 

the attorney’s prior OWI convictions and determining there was a pattern 

of criminal conduct). Based on these criminal convictions spanning a 

relatively short period of time, a clear pattern of criminal conduct is 

demonstrated.

Identifying this pattern of criminal conduct is also important to the 

analysis of the final Templeton factor—whether Cannon demonstrated a 

disrespect for the law and law enforcement. We have previously held 

that repeated “convictions for the same offense . . . indicate a pattern of 

criminal conduct and demonstrate a disregard for laws.” Id.; see also 
9

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Axt, 791 N.W.2d 98, 101–02 

(Iowa 2010) (noting attorney’s second conviction for domestic abuse and 

repeated violations of a court order banning contact with the victim 

demonstrated disrespect for the law); cf. Keele, 795 N.W.2d at 514 

(holding that an isolated incident did not indicate disrespect for the law). 

Cannon’s repeated convictions for substance abuse-related offenses 

demonstrate disrespect for the law and law enforcement. In addition, 

police reports in two of Cannon’s convictions indicate that he refused to 

cooperate with the officers during their initial investigations, further 

suggesting disrespect for law enforcement. See Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d at 

41 (finding disrespect for law enforcement when an attorney prevented 

his victim from calling 911, lied to a neighbor in order to prevent the 

neighbor from calling 911, then broke the steel cage in the police car in 

order to use the police officer’s cell phone without permission).

One factor weighs against finding a violation of rule 32:8.4(b). 

There was no actual physical or economic harm to clients as a result of 

Cannon’s crimes. However, the factors weighing in favor of finding a 

violation outweigh this factor: his substance abuse and mental health 

issues; his repeated convictions for the same type of criminal conduct; 

his repeated disrespect for our laws and law enforcement; and finally, the 

very real risk that his repeated, irresponsible conduct could have caused 

significant harm to people and property. All these factors weigh in favor 

of finding a violation. After reviewing the Templeton factors, we conclude 

the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that a 

sufficient nexus exists between Cannon’s criminal acts and his fitness to 

practice law. See Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 767. Accordingly, we find 

that Cannon has violated rule 32:8.4(b). We must now determine an 

appropriate sanction.
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V. Sanctions.

There is no standard sanction warranted by any particular type of 

misconduct. Weaver, 812 N.W.2d at 13. Though prior cases can be 

instructive, the sanction warranted in a particular case must be based 

on the circumstances of that case. Id.

In determining the appropriate discipline, we consider the 

nature of the alleged violations, the need for deterrence, 

protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the 

bar as a whole, and the respondent’s fitness to continue in 

the practice of law, as well as any aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances. The form and extent of the sanctions must 

be tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of each 

individual case. Significant distinguishing factors in the 

imposition of punishment center on the existence of multiple 

instances of neglect, past disciplinary problems, and other 

companion violations.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“With regard to convictions [for] criminal offenses, an attorney’s 

license to practice law may be revoked or suspended depending on the 

severity of the offense and any aggravating or mitigating factors.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 270 

(Iowa 2010). We have previously found that an attorney’s conviction for 

second-offense drunk driving reflected adversely on the attorney’s fitness 

to practice law. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver, 750 

N.W.2d 71, 79 (Iowa 2008). As in Weaver, Cannon has been convicted of 

two OWI offenses, one involving boating and one involving an automobile. 

This conduct involves his character and reflects on his fitness to practice 

law. It also lessens public confidence in the legal profession. We found 

in Weaver that an attorney’s violation of the criminal laws involving 

drunk driving was sufficient, standing alone, to warrant a short 

suspension. Id. at 91.
11

We have also had the opportunity to review an attorney’s fitness to 

practice law as a result of drug-related criminal convictions. We have 

held that under our code of professional responsibility, attorneys have 

special responsibilities to refrain from drug possession and possession of 

drug paraphernalia. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Sloan, 692 N.W.2d 831, 832–33 (Iowa 2005). In Sloan, a three-month 

suspension was an appropriate sanction for an attorney’s conduct which 

resulted in convictions for serious misdemeanor possession of crack 

cocaine and simple misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. Id.; 

see also Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Shuminsky, 359 N.W.2d 

442, 445–46 (Iowa 1984) (two misdemeanor convictions for drug 

possession resulted in a suspension of not less than three months). 

After concluding that such conduct reflected on an attorney’s fitness to 

practice law, we also concluded that a suspension was necessary to deter 

others from similar conduct and assure the public that courts will 

uphold the ethics of the legal profession. Sloan, 692 N.W.2d at 833; 

Shuminsky, 359 N.W.2d at 445. Here, Cannon has likewise been 

convicted of possession of cocaine which, along with his other 

convictions, would warrant a suspension of his license to practice law.

We next turn to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances in 

determining an appropriate sanction. In considering sanctions, mental 

and physical conditions may be mitigating factors. “The full extent of 

mitigation depends on the relationship between the unethical conduct 

and the mental and physical illnesses.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Kress, 747 N.W.2d 530, 541 (Iowa 2008). “Depression 

and alcoholism can be mitigating factors if they contributed to an 

attorney’s misconduct.” Weaver, 812 N.W.2d at 13. However, we have 

also noted that alcoholism and depression do not constitute “ ‘legal 
12

justification, excuse, or defense’ ” for an attorney’s misconduct. Id. at 11 

(quoting Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d at 41).

Cannon claims that his physical and mental conditions, including 

alcoholism and depression, were factors in his criminal conduct. 

According to Cannon, he became depressed and started drinking more 

after major abdominal surgery in 2006. His problematic use of alcohol 

continued unabated for a number of years, ultimately resulting in his 

arrests and subsequent criminal convictions. The record, however, is 

devoid of any evidence beyond Cannon’s own testimony to support his 

claim that his medical problems were the reason for his alcohol abuse.

Regardless of the cause of his alcoholism and depression, both 

were undoubtedly factors in Cannon’s criminal conduct. In Weaver, we 

considered Weaver’s untreated depression and alcoholism as aggravating

factors. Id. at 13–14. Weaver had at least a ten-year history of 

alcoholism and depression that reflected adversely on his ability to 

practice law. Id. at 7–8. Additionally, Weaver had a history of 

noncompliance with treatment. Id. at 14 (quoting a letter from an

intensive drug court officer with the Seventh Judicial District that stated, 

among other things, that Weaver was “intent on doing things his own 

way”); see also Weaver, 750 N.W.2d at 76–77 (detailing Weaver’s 

resistance to an OWI sentence which included treatment at an alcohol 

treatment correctional facility).

In contrast, Cannon has sought and complied with treatment. 

Through addiction counseling spanning the course of two years, he has 

been able to recognize the genesis of his problem and has received 

treatment for both substance abuse and depression. He has received 

additional assistance from Alcoholics Anonymous, a lawyer’s assistance 

program, and a holistic Catholic-based substance abuse program called 
13

St. Gregory’s Retreat. He has further committed to continuing treatment 

and staying sober.

Cannon has provided evidence of compliance with treatment for 

both his alcoholism and depression, and he has apparently been 

abstinent from alcohol since November 2009. His depression and 

alcoholism have not led to further violations of our criminal code or other 

ethical complaints. Cannon has now accepted responsibility for his 

actions and taken steps to remedy his behavior. We consider accepting 

responsibility and demonstrating remorse to be mitigating factors. 

Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 770–71. Cannon also fully cooperated with 

the Board in its investigation of these disciplinary proceedings, which we 

also deem to be a mitigating factor. Axt, 791 N.W.2d at 103.

However, there are also significant aggravating factors which we 

must consider in fashioning an appropriate sanction. Cannon has been 

the subject of several prior disciplinary actions, including three public 

reprimands and a private admonishment between 1998 and 2010. In 

1998, he received a public reprimand for, among other things, violating 

the terms of a court order and attempting to interfere with the 

disciplinary process. In 2002, Cannon received a second public 

reprimand for violating our advertising rules, for neglecting a client 

matter, and for failing to respond to the Board’s inquiries. In 2008, 

Cannon received a private admonishment for his September 2007 OWI 

conviction, first offense.

Finally, on October 15, 2010, we issued another public reprimand 

to Cannon, this time for a violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 

32:8.4(c). We found Cannon had engaged in misrepresentation when he 

submitted a plagiarized brief to a bankruptcy court. See Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon, 789 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Iowa 2010).
14

We do not discipline an attorney twice for the same conduct, so 

Cannon’s previous violations of our ethical rules will not result in 

cumulative sanctions for those violations. See Keele, 795 N.W.2d at 512–

13. Nevertheless, we do consider previous disciplinary action as an 

aggravating factor in determining sanctions. Axt, 791 N.W.2d at 103. 

Further, we have determined that while private admonishments are not 

discipline, they do put an attorney on notice of ethical requirements. 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 

110 (Iowa 2012). As such, a private admonishment is also an 

aggravating factor. Id.

Additionally, we have found that a pattern of repeated offenses 

warranted increased sanctions. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Johnson, 792 N.W.2d 674, 683 (Iowa 2010) (finding that an attorney’s 

established pattern of neglecting client matters, among other ethical 

infractions, warranted severe sanctions); see also Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 

at 771 (attorney received a three-month suspension after being convicted 

of six counts of invasion of privacy). Cannon’s four criminal convictions 

in a relatively short period of time establishes a clear pattern of repeated 

offenses warranting an increased sanction.

We also consider experience to be an aggravating factor. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 381 (Iowa 

2005). Cannon has practiced law in Iowa since 1983. As an experienced 

attorney, he “should have known better.” See id.

The commission recommended that we publicly reprimand Cannon 

for his ethical violation. We respectfully disagree. The nature of the 

criminal acts, involving operating vehicles while intoxicated and 

possession of drugs, are serious violations of our laws. Additionally, 

these are not isolated instances of criminal conduct. Rather, there was a 
15

pattern of criminal conduct by Cannon involving alcohol and drugs. His 

interactions with law enforcement also show a disrespect for our laws 

and law enforcement. Such conduct undermines the reputation of the 

bar as a whole and reflects negatively on Cannon’s fitness to practice 

law. Considering all of the aggravating and mitigating factors, Cannon’s 

violation of our ethical rule warrants more than a public reprimand. We 

conclude that the appropriate sanction in this case is a suspension of 

Cannon’s license to practice law for thirty days.

VI. Disposition.

For the above reasons, we suspend the license of Peter Sean 

Cannon to practice law in this state for thirty days. The suspension 

applies to all facets of the practice of law. Iowa Ct. R. 35.13(3). Cannon 

must comply with the notification requirements of rule 35.23, and costs 

are taxed against him pursuant to rule 35.27(1). Unless the Board 

objects, Cannon’s license will be automatically reinstated on the day 

after the thirty-day suspension period expires if all costs have been paid. 

Iowa Ct. R. 35.13(2).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.