[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Robinson, 126 Ohio St.3d 371, 2010-Ohio-3829.] 

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. ROBINSON.

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Robinson, 

126 Ohio St.3d 371, 2010-Ohio-3829.] 

Attorneys — Misconduct — One-year license suspension. 

(No. 2009-2267 — Submitted April 20, 2010 — Decided August 25, 2010.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-013. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Respondent, David Jerome Robinson of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0059369, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1992, 

and his attorney registration is currently inactive. Based upon stipulations and 

findings that respondent violated four of the Rules of Professional Conduct by 

giving false and misleading testimony and destroying documents that had 

potential evidentiary value, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline recommends that we suspend respondent’s license to practice law in 

Ohio for two years. 

{¶ 2} Respondent objects to the board’s findings and recommended 

sanction, arguing that his testimony was not willfully false and therefore he did 

not violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit, or misrepresentation), (d) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice), or (h) (prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on a 

lawyer’s fitness to practice law). Furthermore, he argues, Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from destroying or concealing a document with evidentiary 

value) applies only to attorneys serving as advocates and not to those acting in 

their personal capacity as parties to litigation. Consequently, respondent asks that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

we find no violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and thus impose no 

sanction. In the event that we do find a violation, respondent asks that we impose 

a sanction that does not involve an actual suspension from the practice of law. 

{¶ 3} For the reasons that follow, we overrule respondent’s objections 

and accept the board’s findings that respondent violated the ethical standards 

incumbent on Ohio lawyers. However, we will follow the panel recommendation, 

rather than the board’s recommended sanction, and suspend respondent’s license 

to practice law for 12 months.

Misconduct 

Findings of the Panel and Board 

{¶ 4} The parties have stipulated and the board has found that in 2000, 

respondent joined a Columbus law firm as a partner to develop the firm’s 

government-affairs practice. When the firm formed a lobbying subsidiary in 

2005, respondent entered into an employment agreement that required him to 

keep all business information confidential during his employment and thereafter. 

In early 2007, respondent began to organize his campaign for elected office. But 

he abandoned his effort in July of that year, when the firm’s managing partner 

presented respondent with a revised employment agreement with a lobbying 

subsidiary that would have required him to resign his firm partnership and stop 

practicing law. 

{¶ 5} Believing that his job was in jeopardy, respondent began to 

investigate employment opportunities with two other Columbus law firms. He 

sought copies of a number of his firm’s documents, including client-billing 

reports for himself and another employee, engagement letters for current and 

former clients, and Powerpoint presentations. Respondent met with 

representatives of the two other firms and faxed a copy of his employment 

contract and a redacted copy of his current firm’s engagement letter to one of 

them. After executing a confidentiality agreement with one of those firms on 
January Term, 2010 

3

August 3, 2007, he disclosed detailed information about his clients and his clientbilling reports. 

{¶ 6} On August 3 and 4, 2007, while the rest of his firm was on a retreat 

in Pennsylvania, respondent went to his office, where he packed and removed 

seven boxes of documents. He took some of those boxes to his home and some to 

a second house that he was renovating, and he disposed of the rest in a dumpster 

at the renovation site. 

{¶ 7} The firm terminated respondent’s employment on August 14, 

2007. The following day, he accepted a position as a partner, chairing the 

government-relations practice group, at the law firm to which he had not 

disclosed the confidential information. On August 23, 2007, respondent’s former 

employer filed a civil complaint alleging that he had violated the nonsolicitation 

and nondisclosure covenant of his employment agreement. The firm sought 

injunctive relief. 

{¶ 8} At his August 27, 2007 deposition, respondent testified that he had 

“made sure not to take any client files or client information” and stated that he 

“did not take any of the [lobbying subsidiary’s] business plans or marketing 

information.” He claimed that he did not recall taking anything related to the 

subsidiary, and when asked, “So in your possession today either at your house, in 

your car, or in this law firm or somewhere else, do you have in your possession 

any documentation that relates to [the subsidiary]?” he testified, “Again, not that 

I’m aware of.” 

{¶ 9} Just two days later, at a hearing on the firm’s complaint for 

injunctive relief, respondent testified, “[T]o the best of my knowledge, I did not 

take any business plans or marketing lists” from the firm. He claimed that he 

could not give a complete list of what he did or did not have, but denied having 

taken business plans or “other materials that * * * would be sensitive to [the 

firm].” He said that he did not recall taking any information relating to the firm 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4 

or its lobbying subsidiary while investigating other employment opportunities. 

Though he admitted that he might have begun to clean out his office after he 

started looking for a new position, respondent could not recall whether he had 

done so in August or during the firm’s retreat. 

{¶ 10} At the August 29 hearing, respondent agreed that the firm’s e-mail 

list of customers and prospective customers is confidential and declared, “And 

that’s why I didn’t take it.” When questioned about the copies of engagement 

letters that he had requested, respondent stated, “I know that I do not possess the 

engagement letters. I know I never intended to use the engagement letters, you 

know, in any way to the use of confidential information. Again to the best of my 

knowledge, I believe they’re in my office, but I can’t attest to that because again I 

had two hours to clear out my stuff, and I did not have adequate time to do any 

sort of inventory as to what was in my office and what was not. So all I can really 

testify to is that I to the best of my knowledge don’t possess these engagement 

letters.” However, on further questioning, he did admit that he had taken a 

redacted version of the engagement letter from the firm and had forwarded it to 

his new employer. 

{¶ 11} The parties further stipulate that after respondent’s testimony, the 

court recessed for lunch, and respondent went to the courthouse cafeteria with his 

attorney. Before leaving the cafeteria, respondent took his personal trial notebook 

into the men’s restroom, removed a firm report of his 2004-2007 billable hours, 

tore it up, and disposed of it in the restroom trash receptacle. At the end of the 

day, he returned home and placed several boxes of firm documents in his car. As 

he drove toward downtown Columbus, he stopped three times to tear up and 

dispose of confidential firm documents. 

{¶ 12} On September 6, 2007, the trial court granted an agreed temporary 

restraining order in favor of the firm and ordered respondent to provide the firm 

with all its confidential information that remained in respondent’s possession. 
January Term, 2010 

5

The next day, respondent returned three boxes of materials, including his 2000 to 

2006 timesheets, economic-development papers, Powerpoint presentations, and 

various documents related to training, lobbying, and client strategy. 

{¶ 13} Four days later, respondent self-reported his destruction of 

documents to both the firm and the court. He later provided an inventory of the 

documents that he had destroyed on August 4 and August 29. On September 20, 

2007, respondent testified at a second hearing on the firm’s complaint. 

Subsequently, the trial court granted the firm’s motion for injunctive relief. 

{¶ 14} The panel and board accepted the parties’ stipulations and noted 

that respondent’s misconduct occurred over a brief, three-month period and arose 

in the context of the contractual dispute with his firm rather than in the provision 

of legal services to clients. However, they concluded that much of respondent’s 

August 27, 2007 deposition and August 29, 2007 hearing testimony regarding his 

removal and possession of firm documents was “misleading and false.” They 

further observed that the potential evidentiary value of the documents was not 

only in their content, but in the fact that respondent possessed them and had 

violated or intended to violate his contractual obligation by sharing them with 

others. 

{¶ 15} Based upon these stipulations and findings of fact, the panel and 

board found that respondent had made false statements under oath at his August 

27, 2007 deposition and at the August 29, 2007 hearing, thereby violating 

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). They also concluded that respondent’s 

conduct in destroying documents having potential evidentiary value on the same 

date that he testified that he did not possess such documents violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a). 

Respondent’s Objections 

Insufficient Evidence of Willful Violation
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

{¶ 16} Respondent contends that he did not violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), 

8.4(d), or 8.4(h), because he testified truthfully, based upon his knowledge at the 

time of both his deposition and the preliminary-injunction hearing. He argues that 

at the time of that testimony, he genuinely did not remember when he had 

removed documents from his office, what documents he had removed, or what 

documents had remained in his possession, despite the fact that he had removed 

seven boxes of material from his office less than four weeks earlier. Moreover, he 

claims that he did not intend to conceal the documents, or the fact that he 

possessed them, from opposing counsel. Therefore, he argues, even if his 

testimony was misleading, relator has failed to prove that he willfully violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4, and therefore, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. IV(1), he cannot be 

punished for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct. The record, however, 

contains ample evidence from which we may infer respondent’s willful violation 

of these rules. 

{¶ 17} Respondent offers many excuses for his false and misleading 

testimony: (1) he was confused by the questions, (2) he believed that the first 

question, which asked whether he took any documents after he left the firm, 

framed all the subsequent questions, (3) he regularly took work home, but he 

could not speak “as to what [he] took out of the office or didn’t take out of the 

office,” (4) he did not have any litigation experience and was attempting to 

answer the questions to the best of his ability, (5) he was struggling under 

substantial pressure from his first experience in a courtroom and as a defendant in 

a highly contentious lawsuit just two weeks after having been fired, and (6) he 

had no access to his calendar, and opposing counsel did not offer to refresh his 

recollection as to the dates in question. 

{¶ 18} Respondent’s actions and the circumstances surrounding those 

actions, however, belie his self-serving claims. See Detling v. Chockley (1982), 

70 Ohio St.2d 134, 137, 24 O.O.3d 239, 436 N.E.2d 208 (state of mind is inferred 
January Term, 2010 

7

from the conduct and surrounding circumstances), overruled on other grounds by 

Cabe v. Lunich (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 598, 640 N.E.2d 159. Approximately three 

weeks before his deposition and preliminary-injunction-hearing testimony, 

respondent went to his office while the rest of the firm was on retreat and carried 

seven boxes of documents out of the building. He did not reveal that these 

materials were in his possession or offer to inventory them during his deposition 

testimony. Instead, he admitted that he had billing sheets and his Microsoft 

Office contacts, claimed that he did not recall taking anything related to the 

subsidiary, and emphasized that he did not take “any client files or client 

information” and that he “did not take any of the business plans or marketing 

information.” Indeed, he specifically denied having any other documents “that 

[he was] aware of” related to the firm or its subsidiary in his possession. 

{¶ 19} At the preliminary-injunction hearing, just two days later, 

respondent’s memory continued to fail him. When asked whether he could recall 

cleaning or clearing things out of his office any time before August 14, 2007, 

respondent testified, “You know, I might have. I just don’t recall the specific 

date.” While he knew that he had cleaned his office “in the summer,” he could 

not recall whether he had done so in the six or seven weeks—or more specifically 

in the three to four weeks—immediately preceding his testimony. When 

confronted with surveillance tapes, which, unbeknownst to him, had recorded him 

exiting the firm’s offices with numerous boxes on August 3 and 4, 2007, 

respondent claimed that the materials he removed were “personal information,” 

that he had never intended to take anything of a “confidential nature,” and that he 

had removed “material that [he] didn’t know why [he] had [it] there in the first 

place.” 

{¶ 20} The very day that he was confronted with videotape evidence of 

his surreptitious removal of boxes from the firm’s office, respondent, while at the 

cafeteria with his counsel, went into the men’s restroom and destroyed a firm 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8 

document that had been in his self-prepared trial notebook during his testimony 

and disposed of it in the waste can. That night, he went home, reviewed the 

materials he had removed from his office, and disposed of a number of firm 

documents in several trash receptacles between his home and his new office in 

downtown Columbus. Among the documents destroyed in this manner were 

business plans and marketing lists that respondent had testified were not in his 

possession. He later acknowledged that he had known that the majority of the 

materials were in his possession when he testified on August 27, 2007. 

{¶ 21} Given the timing and circumstances surrounding respondent’s 

removal of materials from his office, his testimony, and his destruction of 

documents, the panel and board reasonably concluded that his inability to recall 

these events was simply “incredible.” As we have observed, “it is of no 

consequence that the board’s findings of fact are in contravention of respondent’s 

or any other witness’s testimony. ‘Where the evidence is in conflict, the trier of 

facts may determine what should be accepted as the truth and what should be 

rejected as false.’ ” Disciplinary Counsel v. Zingarelli (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 

217, 729 N.E.2d 1167, quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 478, 

53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 118. Because the record does not weigh heavily against 

the findings of the panel, as adopted by the board, “we defer to the panel’s 

credibility determinations, inasmuch as the panel members saw and heard 

[respondent’s testimony] firsthand.” Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio 

St.3d 164, 2006-Ohio-550, 842 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 24. 

{¶ 22} Consequently, we accept the board’s conclusion that the facts and 

circumstances clearly and convincingly demonstrate that respondent has willfully 

engaged in conduct that (1) is deliberately dishonest, (2) is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice, and (3) adversely reflects upon respondent’s fitness to 

practice law. He has therefore violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). 

Accordingly, we overrule respondent’s first, second, and fourth objections. 
January Term, 2010 

9

Application of Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a) to 

Attorney Acting as Party to Litigation

{¶ 23} In his third objection, respondent contends that the board erred in 

applying Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a) to his conduct. He contends that the rule, which 

prohibits a lawyer from unlawfully destroying or concealing a document or other 

material having potential evidentiary value, applies only to attorneys who are 

acting in their professional capacity as advocates because Chapter III of the Rules 

of Professional Conduct is titled “Advocate.” Respondent, however, cites no 

decision from this court or any other court that limits the applicability of the rule 

in this manner. 

{¶ 24} As the board observed, in In re Melvin (Del.2002), 807 A.2d 550, 

the Supreme Court of Delaware applied the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct 3.4(a) and 3.4(c), which are substantially similar to the Ohio 

Rules of Professional Conduct, to a respondent’s personal conduct that had 

occurred outside his role as an advocate. Id. at 553. There, the court imposed a 

one-year suspension from the practice of law after respondent admitted that he 

had violated a protection order that prohibited him from having contact with his 

wife and concealed or destroyed his wife’s journal or papers, which might have 

aided in the lodging of a criminal charge against him. Id. at 552. 

{¶ 25} Additionally, we observe that in Attorney Grievance Comm. v. 

White (1999), 354 Md. 346, 350, 731 A.2d 447, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 

imposed reciprocal discipline after the United States District Court for the District 

of Maryland disciplined an attorney for destroying discoverable evidence and 

giving false testimony about the extent of that destruction in her capacity as a 

plaintiff in a civil action. Id. at 364. 

{¶ 26} In White, the court noted that in dismissing the respondent’s 

underlying employment-discrimination claim, the United States District Court had 

found that the respondent had (1) destroyed “parts of an autobiographical 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

manuscript, a substantial portion of which covered events bearing on her claims 

before the court,” (2) lied in her deposition “when she stated that she had 

destroyed the entire manuscript,” and (3) “knowingly and willfully intended to 

destroy discoverable and relevant evidence, and that her statements to the contrary 

were not believable.” Id. at 350; see White v. Maryland Public Defender (1997), 

170 F.R.D. 138, 150-151. 

{¶ 27} Based upon those findings, the respondent was indefinitely 

suspended from the practice of law in the United States District Court. White, 354 

Md. at 351, 731 A.2d 447. Relying upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, 

and sanction imposed by the United States District Court, the Court of Appeals of 

Maryland concluded that respondent’s conduct violated Maryland Rules of 

Professional Conduct 3.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). As a consequence of those 

violations, as well as additional instances of false and misleading testimony (as 

both an advocate in a client’s postconviction proceedings and as the plaintiff in 

her civil action), the Court of Appeals of Maryland disbarred the respondent. Id. 

{¶ 28} Notably, in applying Prof.Cond.R. 3.3 to the respondent’s actions 

as a party to litigation and as an advocate, the Maryland court observed : “Even 

though she did not represent herself while testifying, candor by a lawyer, in any 

capacity, is one of the most important character traits of a member of the Bar.” 

Id. at 364. 

{¶ 29} Likewise, we have recognized: “One of the fundamental tenets of 

the professional responsibility of a lawyer is that he should maintain a degree of 

personal and professional integrity that meets the highest standard. The integrity 

of the profession can be maintained only if the conduct of the individual attorney 

is above reproach. He should refrain from any illegal conduct. Anything short of 

this lessens public confidence in the legal profession — because obedience to the 

law exemplifies respect for the law.” Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Stein (1972), 29 

Ohio St.2d 77, 81, 58 O.O.2d 151, 278 N.E.2d 670. 
January Term, 2010 

11

{¶ 30} R.C. 2921.12 (tampering with evidence) makes it a third-degree 

felony for any person who knows that an official proceeding is in progress or 

likely to be instituted to destroy documents with potential evidentiary value so as 

to impair their value or availability as evidence. Thus, in applying Prof.Cond.R. 

3.4(a) to respondent’s conduct as a party to litigation, we do not hold respondent 

to a higher standard than a member of the general public. Instead, we recognize 

that respondent’s conduct, be it in a personal or professional capacity, 

demonstrates a lack of respect for the law that he has been sworn to uphold, 

thereby undermining public confidence in our justice system. Therefore, we 

conclude that the prohibitions against the obstruction of access to evidence set 

forth in Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a) apply with equal force to attorneys acting in either a 

personal or professional capacity. Accordingly, we overrule respondent’s third 

objection and adopt the board’s finding that respondent’s conduct violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a). 

Sanction 

{¶ 31} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 

sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final 

determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 

listed in the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure of Complaints and 

Hearings before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 

(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”) 10(B). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 

473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 

{¶ 32} Although the parties did not submit any stipulated factors in 

aggravation or mitigation, the panel and board found that the following 

aggravating factors weighed in favor of a more severe sanction: a dishonest or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and a refusal to 

acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), 

(c), (d), and (g). In mitigation, the panel and board each noted respondent’s lack 

of a prior disciplinary record, his excellent reputation in the charitable and 

political communities, as demonstrated by the testimony of three witnesses, and 

his general character, as demonstrated by more than two dozen letters from 

attorneys, judges, law enforcement officers, elected officials, and business and 

community leaders. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (e). 

{¶ 33} Citing respondent’s pattern of misconduct involving multiple false 

statements under oath, his destruction of documents to conceal his possession of 

them, and a selfish motive, relator urged the panel to recommend a 12-month 

suspension. In contrast, respondent argued that the complaint against him should 

be dismissed, claiming that his conduct did not violate any Rules of Professional 

Conduct. 

{¶ 34} Noting that our precedent requires an actual suspension when an 

attorney has engaged in a pattern of dishonesty and finding that the aggravating 

factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the panel recommended a 12-month 

suspension from the practice of law. Having considered the relevant factors and 

having adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, the board, however, 

recommends that we suspend respondent’s license for two years. 

{¶ 35} In his final objection, respondent argues that the board erred in 

finding multiple aggravating factors, ignoring significant mitigating factors, and 

therefore recommending a sanction that was too harsh. Based upon the foregoing, 

however, we find that the record clearly and convincingly demonstrates that 

respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses 

throughout August 2007 and that he did so with the selfish motives of furthering 

his own career and preventing the firm from discovering his breach of his 

employment agreement. 
January Term, 2010 

13

{¶ 36} We acknowledge that respondent has self-reported his destruction 

of documents to both the firm and the trial court and that he has admitted the 

wrongfulness of that conduct. Throughout this disciplinary proceeding, however, 

he has steadfastly maintained that his testimony was not false or misleading. Yet 

the panel and board found, and we agree, that in light of the facts and 

circumstances of this case, respondent’s failure of recollection on the stand is 

simply not credible. Therefore, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence 

demonstrates that respondent has refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 

his conduct. 

{¶ 37} Respondent’s arguments that the panel and board failed to consider 

his mental state at the time of his conduct and the “minimal” injury that his 

conduct has caused as factors in mitigation of his punishment are likewise without 

merit. 

{¶ 38} Although he cites two cases in which we accepted board findings 

that have considered stress as a factor in mitigation, those cases are factually 

distinguishable. In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fidler (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 396, 397, 

700 N.E.2d 323, while the panel received evidence that the respondent was under 

great personal stress at the time he committed two minor theft offenses, it is not 

clear that that factor played a significant role in the recommendation or imposition 

of a sanction. And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Spencer (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 316, 

317, 643 N.E.2d 1086, respondent’s stress was due, at least in part, to familial 

circumstances that were beyond his control. Here, in contrast, respondent’s stress 

was the direct result of his own, conscious decisions (1) to seek public office, a 

move that appears to have precipitated his termination from his employment, (2) 

to give false and misleading testimony about his removal and possession of 

documents from his office, and (3) to destroy those documents upon learning that 

his former firm had videotape evidence of him removing boxes from his office. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

{¶ 39} Respondent’s reliance upon Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 119 

Ohio St.3d 47, 2008-Ohio-3321, 891 N.E.2d 740, for the proposition that we have 

demonstrated “substantial leniency toward lawyers whose personal conduct 

illustrates an impairment of their normally sound judgment” is similarly 

misplaced. In Walker, the respondent presented evidence of alcoholism and 

substance abuse that contributed to his misconduct, and evidence of his successful 

treatment, so that his impairment qualified as a mitigating factor pursuant to 

BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). Id. at ¶ 14. Here, in contrast, respondent has 

offered no medical evidence to demonstrate that his “stress” rose to this level of 

impairment. 

{¶ 40} Because respondent’s claims that his conduct caused no harm to 

his former employer or his clients ignore the risk of harm that his false and 

misleading testimony created for the legal profession and the judicial system as a 

whole, this argument is also without merit. 

Sanctions Imposed in Similar Cases 

{¶ 41} We have held that attorney misconduct involving dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, warrants an actual suspension from the 

practice of law because this court “ ‘cannot permit attorneys who lie either to their 

clients or to the court to continue practicing law without interruption.’ ” 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 190-191, 658 

N.E.2d 237, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Greene (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 13, 

16, 655 N.E.2d 1299. 

{¶ 42} Respondent relies upon four cases to support his plea for a stayed 

suspension or a public reprimand. While each of those cases addresses 

misconduct involving dishonesty, they are all factually distinguishable from this 

case because they involve fewer incidents of misconduct and a number of 

mitigating factors that far outweigh one or two aggravating factors. 
January Term, 2010 

15

{¶ 43} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Niermeyer, 119 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008-

Ohio-3824, 892 N.E.2d 434, the respondent had committed a single incident 

involving dishonesty by filing a falsified document with the Bureau of Workers’ 

Compensation. Id. at ¶ 4. Because the mitigating factors, including the 

respondent’s self-reporting, immediate efforts to rectify the consequences of his 

actions, and his good reputation, outweighed the respondent’s dishonest or selfish 

motive, we imposed a 12-month stayed suspension. Id. at ¶ 9-10. 

{¶ 44} In Dayton Bar Assn. v. Ellison, 118 Ohio St.3d 128, 2008-Ohio1808, 886 N.E.2d 836, the respondent misled one client about the disposition of 

her case and neglected two client matters. Id. at ¶ 1, 9. Although respondent had 

previously received a public reprimand for neglect, we determined that her 27 

years of respected practice representing disadvantaged clients, acknowledgement 

of her wrongdoing, and cooperation in the disciplinary process weighed in favor 

of a one-year, stayed suspension. Id. at ¶ 14-15. 

{¶ 45} In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Stubbs, 109 Ohio St.3d 446, 2006-Ohio2818, 848 N.E.2d 843, the respondent had falsified a document in an effort to 

convince the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles that she had insurance at the time 

she had received a traffic citation. Id. at ¶ 3-4. Her failure to carry insurance had 

resulted in the suspension of her driver’s license. Id. We determined that 

mitigating factors of no prior discipline, a cooperative attitude during the 

disciplinary proceedings, good character and reputation, her genuine remorse for 

her actions, and her treatment for depression outweighed the single aggravating 

factor – the commission of multiple offenses. Id. at ¶ 7-8, 12. Therefore, we 

imposed a six-month, stayed suspension and one year of monitored probation. Id. 

at ¶ 13. 

{¶ 46} And in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Shea, 117 Ohio St.3d 55, 2008-

Ohio-263, 881 N.E.2d 847, we publicly reprimanded the respondent for making a 

false statement to a child-support enforcement agency in a failed attempt to obtain 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

a copy of a default notice filed against his former employer. Id. at ¶ 5-6, 17. 

There, in addition to mitigating factors including no prior discipline and full 

cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, we noted that respondent’s conduct 

was “short-lived and harmed no one.” Id. at ¶ 12-13. 

{¶ 47} We find Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009-

Ohio-5930, 919 N.E.2d 180, to be the most instructive. There, the respondent 

directed a staff member to deliver a copy of a motion to a local newspaper in 

violation of the trial court’s verbal order prohibiting counsel from discussing the 

case with the media. Id. at ¶ 8-10. Respondent falsely told the court that his staff 

had misconstrued his instructions and had leaked the information to the media, 

and after firing his assistant for divulging confidential information, he wrote a 

misleading letter to the unemployment-compensation bureau, again suggesting 

that his assistant was responsible for the leak. Id. at ¶ 12-16, 19, 22. We 

determined that respondent’s conduct in deliberately disobeying a court order and 

lying about it to the judge during a hearing violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a 

tribunal), 3.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation 

under the rules of a tribunal), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). Id. at ¶ 3, 34. 

{¶ 48} In aggravation, we found that the respondent in Rohrer had 

committed multiple offenses, had exhibited a selfish or dishonest motive in his 

misrepresentations to the unemployment-compensation bureau, and had 

demonstrated a lack of remorse with regard to his violation of the court order. Id. 

at ¶ 34, 36, 40, citing BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (d), and (g). But in 

mitigation of a more serious sanction, we found that respondent had no prior 

disciplinary record and had displayed a cooperative attitude toward the 

disciplinary proceedings, that the trial court had already imposed sanctions on 

him, and that he had presented character witnesses attesting to his good 

reputation. Id. at ¶ 32. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (d), (e), and (f). 
January Term, 2010 

17

Observing our precedent favoring an actual suspension for misconduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and respondent’s deliberate 

representations to the trial court and another state agency, we concluded that his 

misconduct warranted an actual six-month suspension from the practice of law. 

Id. at ¶ 43, 52-53. 

{¶ 49} In this case, respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct 

involving multiple instances of lying and misrepresentation under oath, as well as 

the destruction of documents with potential evidentiary value in a pending civil 

proceeding. Thus, his misconduct is more extensive and more serious than that of 

the respondent in Rohrer. Although he admitted destroying the documents, 

throughout this disciplinary proceeding, he maintained that his inability to recall 

significant events, occurring as little as three weeks before his testimony, was 

genuine. We agree that these aggravating factors outweigh respondent’s lack of 

prior discipline and good reputation. 

{¶ 50} Based upon the foregoing, we accept the board’s findings that 

respondent violated the ethical standards incumbent on Ohio lawyers and 

conclude that a one-year suspension is the appropriate sanction for his 

misconduct. Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of 

law in the state of Ohio for one year. Costs are taxed to respondent. 

Judgment accordingly. 

 PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 O’CONNOR and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent and would suspend respondent 

from the practice of law in Ohio for two years. 

 BROWN, C.J., not participating. 

__________________ 

Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, 

Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

Hadden Co., L.P.A., and E. Bruce Hadden, for respondent. 

______________________