alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MOORE, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY FOR THE ESTATE OF SASSARD & KIMBALL, INC., BANKRUPT, *v.*BAY.

No. 27.

Argued October 22, 1931.

Decided November 2, 1931.

*Mr. Thomas S. Tobin,*with whom *Messrs. Charles F. Hutchins,, Frank C. Weller,*and *James P. Keleher*were on the brief, for petitioner. *Mr. Max Isaac*also appeared for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Mr. Justice Holmes

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The bankrupt executed a mortgage of automobiles, furniture, show room and shop equipment that is admitted to be bad as against creditors who were such at the date *5of the mortgage and those who became such between the date of the mortgage and that on which it was recorded, there having been a failure to observe the requirements of the Civil Code of California, § 3440. The question raised is whether the mortgage is void also as against those who gave the bankrupt credit at a later date, after the mortgage was on record. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an order of the District Judge giving the mortgage priority over the last creditors. Whether the Court was right must be decided by the Bankruptcy Act since it is superior to all state laws upon the subject. *Globe Bank*v. *Martin,*236 U. S. 288, 298.

The trustee in bankruptcy gets the title to all property which has been transferred by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors, or which prior to the petition .he could by any means have transferred, or which, might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him. Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 70; U. S. Code, Title 11, § 110. By § 67, Code, Title 11, § 107 (a), claims which for want of record or for other reasons would not have been valid liens as against the claims of the creditors of the bankrupt shall not be liens against his estate. The rights of the trustee by subrogation are to be enforced for the benefit of the estate. The Circuit Courts of Appeals seem generally to agree, as the language of the Bankruptcy Act appears to us to imply very plainly, that what thus is recovered for the benefit of the estate is to be distributed in “ dividends of an equal percentum on all allowed claims, except such as have priority or are secured.” Bankruptcy Act, § 65, Code, Title 11, § 105. *In re Kohler,*159 Fed. 871. *Mullen*v. *Warner,*11 F. (2d) 62. *Campbell*v. *Dalbey,*23 F. (2d) 229. *Cohen*v. *Schultz,*43 F. (2d) 340. *Globe Bank*v. *Martin,*236 U. S. 288, 305.

*Decree reversed.*
# C_2018032EN.01003501.xml

| 29.1.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 32/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.1.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/35

---

Action brought on 13 November 2017 — TrekStor v EUIPO — Beats Electronics (i.Beat jump)

(Case T-746/17)

(2018/C 032/48)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: TrekStor Ltd (Hong-Kong, China) (represented by: O. Spieker, M. Alber, A. Schönfleisch, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Beats Electronics LLC (Culver City, California, United States)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue:

Trade mark at issue: EU word mark ‘i.Beat jump’ EU trade mark No 4 729 075

Trade mark at issue:

Procedure before EUIPO: Proceedings for a declaration of invalidity

Procedure before EUIPO

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 September 2017 in Case R 2236/2016-4

Contested decision

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision insofar as it upholds the Cancellation Applicant’s application for revocation and revokes the Applicant’s rights in respect of European Union trade mark No 4 729 075 |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision insofar as it upholds the Cancellation Applicant’s application for revocation and revokes the Applicant’s rights in respect of European Union trade mark No 4 729 075

| — | dismiss the Cancellation Applicant’s application for revocation; |
| --- | --- |

—

dismiss the Cancellation Applicant’s application for revocation;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings including the costs necessarily incurred by the Applicant before the Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings including the costs necessarily incurred by the Applicant before the Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

Pleas in law

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation No 2017/1001; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation No 2017/1001;

| — | Infringement of Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation No 2017/1001. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation No 2017/1001.

---
#### UNITED STATES ex rel. POLYMERIS et al. *v.*TRUDELL, IMMIGRATION INSPECTOR.

No. 162.

Argued December 9, 1931. —

Decided January 4, 1932.

*Mr. Harold Van Riper*for petitioners.

*280
      *Mr. Claude R. Branch,*with whom *Solicitor General Thgcher, Assistant Attorney General Dodds,*and *Messrs. Frank M. Parrish*and *William H. Riley, Jr.-,*were on the brief, for respondent.

Mr. Justice Holmes

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The relators, Aspasia Polymeris and her daughter Antigone, are Greek citizens who lawfully entered the United States in 1909 and lived for a number of years in New York City, which became and remains their domicil. In 1923, on account of the illness of Aspasia’s husband, they went back to Greece with the intention, which the courts below found that they retained, of making only a temporary visit. The death of the husband and the necessity of settling his estate prolonged their stay until 1924. Beginning in that year they made several unsuccessful applications to the United States Consul General at Athens for documents that would permit them to return to New York. Finally, in 1929, they got authority to cross Canada, on a pretended trip from Greece to Japan, and, in 1930, presented themselves at St. Albans, Vermont, for admission to the United States. They were taken into custody by the immigration inspector and sought release by habeas corpus, on the. ground that they were entitled to enter the country. It was held that they “ were properly excluded under § 13 (a) of the Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, 43 Stat. 153, 161, since the Secretary of Labor did not admit them in his discretion, . . . and neither presented an unexpired valid immigration visa or an unexpired valid permit to reenter in accordance with the regulations promulgated under § 13 (b) of that Act.” 49 F. (2d) 730. A contrary decision was reached in *Johnson*v. *Keating,*17 F. (2d) 50. Therefore a writ of certiorari was granted by this Court.

The relators have no right to enter the United States unless.it has been given to them by the United States.' *281The burden of proof is upon them to show that they have the right. Immigration Act of 1924, § 23, 43 Stat. 165; Code, Title 8, § 221. By § 13, and the regulations under it, as remarked by the court below, a returning alien can not enter unless he has either an immigration visa or a return permit. The relators must show not only that they ought to be admitted but that the United States, by the only voice authorized to express its will, has said so. Obviously it has not done so, and therefore the judgment must be affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*
---

EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Osprey Ventures,
Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended November 30, 2009, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Periodic Report), I, James Yiu Yeung Lung, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|1. | the Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements
      of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
    and                                 
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   |                                                                                                                                                                          
|2. | the information contained in the Periodic Report fairly
      presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.

Date: January 5, 2010

/s/          
James Yiu Yeung Lung

James Yiu Yeung Lung Chief
Financial Officer

---
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JAMIR WILLIAMS,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 783 MAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 14th day of March, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
Secretary of the Commission
October 30, 2014
Page 3
EXHIBIT A

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION Sc OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ACT, 7 U.S.C. §7A-2 AND COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
REGULATION 40.2, 17 C.F.R. §40.2

tpSEF Inc. (“tpSEF”) hereby certifies that: (i) CDS Index Contract — North America Investment
Grade Swaps and Swaptions (the “Contract”) complies with the Commodity Exchange Act,
TUS.C. §1 ef seq. and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission”) regulations
thereunder; and (ii) concurrent with this submission, tpSEF posted on its website: (a) a notice of
pending certification of the Contracts with the Commission and (b) a copy of this submission.

TPSEF INC,

Title: ae Officer

Date: October 30, 2014
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 106 (Friday, June 1, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 29801]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-13767]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES


Notice of Open Special Meeting of the Advisory Committee of the 
Export-Import Bank of the United States (Export-Import Bank)

    Summary: The Advisory Committee was established by Pub. L. 98-181, 
November 30, 1983, to advise the Export-Import Bank on its programs and 
to provide comments for inclusion in the reports of the Export-Import 
Bank of the United States to Congress.
    Time and Place: Tuesday, June 19, 2001, at 9:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. 
The meeting will be held at the Export-Import Bank in Room 1143, 811 
Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20571.
    Agenda: This meeting will include a discussion on developments in 
private sector finance.
    Public Participation: The meeting will be open to public 
participation, and the last 10 minutes will be set aside for oral 
questions or comments. Members of the public may also file written 
statement(s) before or after the meeting. If any person wishes 
auxiliary aids (such as a sign language interpreter) or other special 
accommodations, please contact, prior to November 3, 2000, Nichole 
Westin, Room 1257, 811 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20571, 
Voice: (202) 565-3542 or TDD (202) 565-3377.
    Further Information: For further information, contact Nichole 
Westin, Room 1257, 811 Vermont Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20571, (202) 
565-3542.

John M. Niehuss,
General Counsel.
[FR Doc. 01-13767 Filed 5-31-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6690-01-M
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Lilly Ann Rodriguez, * From the 441st District Court

 of Midland County

Trial Court No. CR45948.

Vs. No. 11-18-00101-CR * March 26, 2020

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Wright, S.C.J.

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J., sitting

by assignment)

(Willson, J., not participating)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there 

is no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s 

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
Exhibit 23.1



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We have issued our report dated March 6, 2008 with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Image Sensing Systems, Inc. and subsidiaries appearing in the 2007 Annual Report of Image Sensing Systems, Inc. to its shareholders on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007 which is incorporated by reference in this Registration Statement. We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement of the aforementioned report.



/s/ Grant Thornton LLP



Minneapolis, Minnesota

July 3, 2008







---
Second Amendment to Employment Agreement



 Exhibit 10.3 

SECOND AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 

This Second Amendment (this “Amendment”) is made and entered into as of September 15, 2010 by and between Cellu Tissue
Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) and David J. Morris (the “Executive”) effective as of the date hereof. 

WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive entered into an agreement regarding the terms of the Executive’s employment with the Company
(the “Employment Agreement”) effective as of August 6, 2007; 
 WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive entered
into a First Amendment to the Employment Agreement effective as of January 18, 2010 in connection the initial public offering of the common stock of the Company; 

WHEREAS, the Company entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of the date hereof, with Clearwater Paper Corporation and
Sand Dollar Acquisition Corporation (the “Merger Agreement”); 
 WHEREAS, in connection with the transactions
contemplated by the Merger Agreement, the Company desires to provide the Executive with the ability to terminate his employment for “Good Reason” and receive any severance payment under the Employment Agreement if the Executive is required
to relocate his primary workplace by more than 50 miles from the Company’s current headquarters without his consent; and 

WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive desire to amend the Employment Agreement as set forth in this Amendment. 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises and the terms set forth in this Amendment, the parties hereby agree as
follows: 
 1. Section 5(e) of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended to replace the period at the end of clause
(iv) with “; or” and add a new subparagraph (v) that reads as follows: 
 (v) a relocation of
the Executive’s primary workplace by more than 50 miles from the Company’s current headquarters without the Executive’s consent. 

2. If the merger contemplated under the Merger Agreement is not consummated, this Amendment shall become null and void and shall have no
further force or effect. 
  







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and the Executive have executed this Second Amendment this
15th day of September, 2010. 
  

			
	CELLU TISSUE HOLDINGS, INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Russell C. Taylor

	
	EXECUTIVE
	
	 /s/ David J. Morris
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 0F 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of ECOBLUPRODUCTS,INC. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, STEVECONBOY, President of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                              
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
|   

|\s\
|---

|Steve Conboy
|------------

|Steve ConboyPresidentPrincipal Executive OfficerMay 24, 2010
|------------------------------------------------------------

---
STATE OF VERMONT 

Superior Court - Environmental Division 

========================================================================== 

E N T R Y R E G A R D I N G M O T I O N 

========================================================================== 

Merchant & Anderson Site Plan Application Docket No. 205-10-09 Vtec 

 (Appeal from Village of Waterbury Planning Commission determination) 

Title: Motion to Clarify Admissibility (Filing No. 5) 

Filed: October 29, 2010 

Filed By: Laruen S. Kolitch, Attorney for Appellees Amy Anderson and Michael Merchant 

Response: None (the Court considered Appellant’s Nov. 5th motion as a response.) 

 Granted Denied X Other 

Pending before the court is Neighbor’s motion to clarify the admissibility of evidence at 

trial, which raises similar evidentiary issues to the motion Applicants recently filed to exclude 

the evidence and testimony of John Pitrowiski, whom Neighbor plans to call as an expert witness 

at trial. We addressed the common legal issues in an Entry Order issued today in response to 

Applicants’ motion; that Order provides a more detailed explanation for our reasoning in 

declining to exclude Mr. Pitrowski’s testimony at this time. 

To the extent that Applicants seek an order prohibiting John Pitrowiski from offering 

evidence at trial due to the tardy or allegedly inadequate disclosure by Neighbor, we decline to 

grant such a severe sanction. Therefore, we conclude that Appellant my offer the testimony of 

John Pitrowiski at trial. To the extent that new objections are raised to Mr. Pitrowski’s testimony 

or other evidence introduced through him, the Court will address such objections as they arise 

during the trial. 

___________________________________________ ___November 18, 2010____ 

 Thomas S. Durkin, Judge Date 

==================================================================== 

Date copies sent to: ____________ Clerk's Initials _______ 

Copies sent to: 

 Paul S. Gillies, Attorney for Appellant Valerie Zimmerman 

 Lauren S. Kolitch, Attorney for Appellee/Applicants Amy Anderson and Michael Merchant 

 Attorney David W. Rugh for Interested Person Village of Waterbury
# C_2019172EN.01002503.xml

| 20.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 172/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 172/25

---

Order of the President of the Court of 11 February 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo — Spain) — ZW v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-498/18) (1)

(2019/C 172/34)

Language of the case: Spanish

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 399, 5.11.2018.

---
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I,
Herb Cross, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Affymax, Inc. ;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f))
for the registrant and have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



By:

/s/HERB CROSS Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)


Date:
March 10, 2011

---



QuickLinks
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Diijon TIMMONS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-5148.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 26, 2006.

Decided: June 7, 2006.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Jean B. Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Diijon Timmons pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute in excess of 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000). Timmons was sentenced to 235 months in prison for the drug offense and a consecutive 120-month term for the firearm offense, for an aggregate sentence of 355 months in prison. Timmons now appeals, challenging his sentence as unreasonable. We affirm.

After *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), a district court is no longer bound by the sentencing range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines, which are now advisory. *See United States v. Hughes,*401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir.2005). However, in determining a sentence *post-Booker,*sentencing courts are required to consider the correctly calculated guideline range and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp.2005). *Id.*We will affirm a *post-Booker*sentence if it falls within the statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable. *Id.*at 546-47. A sentence that falls within the correctly determined guideline range is presumptively reasonable. *United States v. Green,*436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.2006), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2309, 164 L.Ed.2d 828 (2006).

Here, the district court sentenced Timmons within the statutorily prescribed ranges, *see*21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(iii), and within the properly calculated guideline range. The court also took note of Timmons’ Position Statement Regarding Sentencing, in which Timmons’ attorney argued that a 240-month aggregate sentence would be appropriate in light of the sentencing factors set forth at § 3553(a). We therefore conclude that the sentence imposed is reasonable.

We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately set forth in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*