[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11799

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ADAM JOSEPH OWENS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-00122-TFM-28

____________________

Before GRANT, ABUDU, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

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GRANT, Circuit Judge:

Adam Joseph Owens was arrested as part of a federal-state 

task force’s investigation into a massive drug ring. He was charged 

with several crimes but ultimately pleaded guilty to one count,

possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The 

district court imposed 120-months’ imprisonment, which doubled

the 60-month total recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. 

The district court concluded that this upward variance was 

appropriate for Owens because he had been planning to sell drugs 

while in jail awaiting sentencing and had also caused the overdose 

death of one of his buyers. Owens challenges both findings.

Because we conclude that they were not clearly erroneous, we

affirm his sentence.

I.

Owens was one of forty-two defendants charged in a 

sprawling indictment targeting the Crossley Hills Drug Trafficking 

Organization. Beginning in 2016, the drug ring dealt heroin, 

fentanyl, methamphetamine, Xanax, and oxycodone in and around 

Mobile County, Alabama. Where the drug ring went, overdoses, 

hospitalizations, and deaths followed—Crossley Hills dealers killed 

so many unwary customers with fentanyl-laced heroin that their 

product earned the nickname “Grey Death.” Many transactions 

took place in hotels and motels around Mobile, but dollars were 

not the only currency. Sexual favors were also in play, and the 

dealers sometimes even incapacitated female customers with 

fentanyl-laced drugs so they could take advantage of them. See 

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United States v. William Owens, No. 22-12420, 2023 WL 7182353, at 

*1–2 (11th Cir. Nov. 1, 2023).

Owens was arrested on an outstanding warrant by officers 

involved in the Crossley Hills investigation. Their search of his 

vehicle paid off, uncovering several unlabeled pill bottles, over 150 

pills (including oxycodone), and a small bag of ecstasy. On top of 

all that, the officers found two loaded handguns, one of which was 

stolen from the local sheriff’s office. Originally charged in four 

counts, Owens ultimately pleaded guilty to one—possession of a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. As part of his 

plea, Owens admitted that he had trafficked in opioid-based 

prescription pills, that the pills were in his vehicle so he could sell 

them, and that he had possessed the two firearms in his vehicle to 

further his drug trafficking. In exchange, he got the government’s 

recommendation that he be sentenced to the mandatory minimum 

for the offense, 60 months in prison.

The arrest, however, had not deterred Owens. The 

presentence investigation report (PSI), entered during the 

sentencing process, stated that while Owens was in jail he managed 

to acquire items including a cell phone and several 8-milligram 

strips of a narcotic called Suboxone.1 This combination meant he 

could keep dealing drugs—even from jail. The PSI also indicated 

that Owens was linked to the death of at least one of Crossley 

1 Suboxone is a controlled substance that may be prescribed by doctors to treat

opioid addiction, but it carries serious risk of abuse. United States v. Abovyan, 

988 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021). 

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Hills’s victims. That man, a buyer the report refers to as B.B.,

bought oxycodone from Owens on November 30, 2017, and died 

later that same night. B.B.’s autopsy showed that he had overdosed 

on fentanyl and several fentanyl analogues.

At Owens’s initial sentencing hearing, the district court 

specifically highlighted B.B.’s death, along with Owens’s apparent 

efforts to deal drugs from jail, as uniquely troubling. Explaining

that it might depart from the government’s recommended 

sentence of 60 months, the court set a hearing to take evidence on 

both allegations.

At that second hearing, the court began by adopting the PSI 

and its 60-month Sentencing Guidelines calculation. Neither 

Owens nor the government objected to the PSI; nor did either 

party challenge the Guidelines calculation. The district court then 

heard testimony.

The government first called James Ward to testify about the 

contraband found in Owens’s possession at the jail. Ward was 

warden of the Conecuh County Detention Center where Owens 

had been held, and testified that while watching a cell phone search 

from a live video feed in his office, he saw Owens remove several 

items from his hair. An officer supervising the cell phone search 

seized the items, turning up a cell phone, a phone charger, 

cigarettes, earplugs, and Suboxone strips. All of these were 

brought to Ward, who emphasized on the stand the difficulties he 

faced in slowing the drug trade in his jail.

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The government next called Mobile Police Sergeant 

Nicholas Vegliacich to testify about B.B.’s death. He explained that

police had found extensive text message history between Owens 

and B.B., with the last messages between the two dated November 

30, 2017—the day of B.B.’s death. They had set up a drug sale, and 

geolocation data from their phones put them together at the 

proposed time and place. Six or seven hours later, B.B. was found 

dead.

Vegliacich also reviewed B.B.’s autopsy report, which listed 

the cause of death as a fentanyl overdose. Owens had been charged 

with distributing oxycodone (not fentanyl), and B.B. had arranged 

to buy oxycodone (not fentanyl). Even so, Vegliacich’s testimony 

connected the drugs Owens sold to B.B.’s death. He explained that 

the illicit drug market had “a huge problem with counterfeit 

pills”—specifically, pills that were often laced with fentanyl even 

though they looked like legitimate oxycodone.

At the close of the hearing, the district court found that 

Owens had possessed Suboxone for sale while he was in jail and 

that he had sold B.B. the drugs that caused his death. The court 

emphasized with frustration that, even while incarcerated, Owens 

had “continued to flout the drug laws of this country.” The court 

also decried the destructive social harm caused by the illegal trade 

in prescription opioids and highlighted the public-safety imperative 

for an increased sentence. B.B.’s death, the court added, was “a 

powerful factor” that was “not adequately taken into account by 

the guidelines.” Rejecting the government’s Guidelines 

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recommendation of 60 months, the court instead imposed a 

sentence of 120 months. Even so, it credited Owens for pleading 

guilty, and explained that the sentence was a show of mercy 

because it was lighter than the 30 years the court would ordinarily 

impose for a drug trafficking case involving the death of a 

customer.

Owens objected to the court’s reliance on its factual findings 

about the Suboxone and B.B.’s death. For the former, he argued

that the government had not shown that the seized strips were 

really Suboxone because it did not offer a toxicology report. For 

the latter, he said that he could not have caused B.B.’s fentanyloverdose death because he had only been charged with dealing 

oxycodone. The district court overruled both objections and 

finalized the sentence. Owens now appeals.

II.

Defendants can claim procedural error in sentencing even if 

the overall sentence is substantively reasonable. See United States v. 

Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009). Such errors include

miscalculating the Sentencing Guidelines range, treating the 

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors, relying on clearly erroneous facts, and failing to 

adequately explain the sentence issued. Id.

We ordinarily review the procedural reasonableness of a 

sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Waters, 937 F.3d 

1344, 1358 (11th Cir. 2019). One way a district court abuses its 

discretion is if the factual findings it uses in a sentencing 

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enhancement are clearly erroneous. Id. But if a defendant fails to 

object at the time of sentencing, our review is only for plain error, 

a much tougher standard. Id. To reverse an error raised for the 

first time on appeal, a defendant must show not only “that the error 

was ‘plain’” but also that it “affected his substantial rights.” United 

States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (alteration 

adopted) (quotation omitted). Even then, we exercise our 

discretion to correct an error only if it seriously affects “the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States 

v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).

This high standard reflects the “careful balance” that must 

be set “between judicial efficiency and the redress of injustice.” 

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). The plain-error 

rule disincentivizes “sandbagging,” where a defendant remains 

“silent about his objection and belatedly rais[es] the error only if 

the case does not conclude in his favor.” Id. at 134. But more 

fundamentally, requiring a contemporaneous objection gives the 

district court the first opportunity to consider—and resolve—a

defendant’s objections, which can often help parties and courts 

alike “avoid the costs of reversal and a retrial.” Turner, 474 F.3d at 

1275. After all, the district court “is ordinarily in the best position 

to determine the relevant facts and adjudicate the dispute.” Puckett, 

556 U.S. at 134. But it is often impossible to do so without a party 

raising an issue or developing a factual record about it. That 

failure, in turn, can impede this Court’s ability to fairly decide the 

issue on appeal.

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III.

Here, Owens raises two challenges to the district court’s 

decision to vary upward from the Sentencing Guidelines’ 

recommendation based on uncharged conduct. That choice is 

allowed as a general matter because uncharged conduct can be 

“directly germane to several § 3553(a) factors,” which the court is 

required to consider when determining a sentence. United States v. 

Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 637–38, 638 n.14 (11th Cir. 2013). Those

factors include “the ‘history and characteristics of the defendant,’

and the need for the sentence to ‘promote respect for the law,’

‘afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,’ and ‘protect the 

public from further crimes of the defendant.’” Id. at 637–38 

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2)). The district court’s relevant 

factual findings can be based on “facts admitted by the defendant’s 

guilty plea, undisputed statements in the PSI, or evidence 

presented at the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Matthews, 3 

F.4th 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2021). Reasonable inferences from this

evidence are allowed. Id.

If a defendant challenges one of the factual bases of the 

sentence, the government bears the burden of proving that fact by 

a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 

883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013). “A preponderance of the evidence is 

evidence which is more convincing than the evidence offered in 

opposition to it.” United States v. Watkins, 10 F.4th 1179, 1184 (11th 

Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quotation omitted). “It simply requires the 

trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable 

than its nonexistence.” Id. at 1184–85 (quotation omitted).

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A.

Owens first challenges the district court’s finding that he 

possessed Suboxone for distribution while in the county jail 

awaiting sentencing. His argument on appeal, however, reaches 

further than his objection at the sentencing hearing. There, he 

objected that the government never produced a toxicology report 

showing that the confiscated strips were Suboxone—essentially, an 

argument that while he may have been in possession of something, 

the government had not shown that it was a controlled substance. 

On appeal, however, he also contests the predicate finding that he 

possessed any contraband at all.

We begin with Owens’s preserved objection. Warden 

James Ward’s testimony was the only evidence taken at the hearing 

on the Suboxone strips. Ward admitted that he was not sure

whether the strips had been tested, but seemed certain that they 

were Suboxone based on his experience at the jail. He also 

explained that the drug trade was a huge problem in his prison, 

emphasizing that the jail “struggle[d] every day to keep [drugs] 

out,” and that inmates were “making money on cash apps left and 

right.” For his part, Owens never suggested what else the strips 

could be besides Suboxone. In fact, his counsel referred to the 

“Suboxone strips” when asking Ward if they had been tested.

The district court was entitled to make the reasonable 

inference from this testimony that Ward could recognize, based on 

his experience and on the circumstances surrounding the search, 

that the strips seized from Owens were Suboxone. The court saw

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Ward’s conclusion as credible, and that finding is entitled to 

substantial deference—especially considering that Owens offered 

no contrary explanation for what the confiscated strips might be. 

See United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Where the government presents unrebutted, credible firsthand 

testimony and the defendant presents no evidence at all, we do not 

hesitate to find that, “in light of all the evidence,” the government

has proved its version of events “is more likely true than not.” 

Watkins, 10 F.4th at 1185 (quotation omitted). We find no error.

Owens did not preserve his new challenge—that the district 

court erred in finding that he possessed any contraband at all 

(including the strips) in jail—so we review it only for plain error. 

This challenge likewise fails, again because of Ward’s testimony. 

He explained that in an effort to eliminate illicit cell phones, he had 

purchased a special cell phone detector for the jail. Ward testified 

that he observed real-time surveillance video while the inmates 

waited to walk through the scanner, and that he saw Owens 

remove several items from his hair—a cell phone, a phone charger, 

cigarettes, earplugs, and Subxone strips. Ward testified that the 

items had been dropped off in his office shortly after they were 

confiscated, but had since been handed over to the state of 

Alabama. Ward also explained that the jail’s surveillance system 

was live-feed only, meaning no recordings could be maintained.

Owens says Ward’s testimony alone is not enough. He 

objects that the district court needed to view the security camera 

footage, examine the contraband, or at least hear testimony from

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the officer who originally found it. We disagree. Ward’s account 

of the search is clear and logical, and the district court deemed it 

credible. Again, Owens did not offer any evidence that casts doubt

on Ward’s testimony. Nor did he offer any evidence at all to rebut 

that testimony. We find no error, much less plain error.

B.

Owens next challenges the district court’s finding that he 

sold the drugs to B.B. that caused his death. As with his attack on 

the district court’s Suboxone finding, Owens preserved only one 

argument on this front. Below, he objected that he could not have 

been responsible for B.B.’s fentanyl-overdose death because he was 

only charged with selling oxycodone. He now adds that the 

government failed to show that he sold any drugs to B.B. on the 

day in question.

The district court did not clearly err by finding that Owens’s 

drugs caused B.B.’s death. To start, the timing of B.B.’s death 

points to Owens, who sold B.B. drugs when the two met on 

November 30, 2017. Six to seven hours later, B.B. was dead of an 

overdose, with no evidence suggesting that he got drugs from any 

other source before his death.

The autopsy report’s conclusion that B.B. died from a 

fentanyl overdose does not mean that Owens’s oxycodone pills 

were not the cause of death. To the contrary, it fits the available 

evidence—Sergeant Vegliacich testified to a “huge problem” with 

counterfeit oxycodone pills that were contaminated with fentanyl. 

What’s more, the factual background of Owens’s PSI, which he did 

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not challenge, reflected that Crossley Hills dealers regularly cut 

various drugs with fentanyl—increasing both the drugs’ potency 

and the dealers’ profits. And other unwitting Crossley Hills 

customers had died from fentanyl overdoses after taking laced 

drugs from the gang. These factual allegations offer additional 

support for the district court’s conclusion that Owens was 

responsible for B.B.’s death, and by failing to object to them in his 

PSI, Owens admitted them for sentencing purposes. United States 

v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006). We see no error.

As for the unpreserved challenge to the court’s finding that 

Owens sold B.B. any drugs in the first place, once again, we review 

only for plain error. And, once again, we find it wanting. Sergeant 

Nicholas Vegliacich testified that he personally reviewed “at least 

50 pages of text messages” showing constant drug sales from 

Owens to B.B. Those communications included messages 

arranging a sale on the day of B.B.’s death, and geolocation data 

confirmed that Owens and B.B.’s cell phones were at the 

prearranged place at the scheduled time.

Owens argues that the district court erred by relying on this 

hearsay evidence to conclude that he sold drugs to B.B. But it “is 

well established in this circuit that the sentencing court may rely 

on reliable hearsay.” United States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th 

Cir. 2004).2 This cell phone evidence fits the bill. The district court 

2 After oral argument, Owens directed this Court’s attention to United States v. 

Lee, 68 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 1995), which he argues required the district court 

to make express findings stating why it found the hearsay evidence reliable. 

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did not err, plainly or otherwise, by concluding the government 

had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Owens sold 

B.B. drugs on the day he died.

* * *

Because the district court’s factual findings at sentencing 

were not clearly erroneous, we AFFIRM Owens’s sentence.

As we have explained before, Lee does not always require explicit credibility 

findings. In cases “where the record and the circumstances of the case 

demonstrate adequate indicia of reliability, [credibility] findings are not strictly 

necessary.” United States v. Baptiste, 935 F.3d 1304, 1316 (11th Cir. 2019)

(quotation omitted). The testimony of Sergeant Vegliacich, a lawenforcement officer, about his investigation of Owens exhibits none of the 

suspicious characteristics we have previously identified as warranting separate 

credibility findings. See id. at 1316–17.

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