United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-2462

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Alonzo Beard

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

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Submitted: January 11, 2023

Filed: April 26, 2023

[Unpublished] 

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Before GRASZ, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Alonzo Beard was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The officers who arrested Beard had 

dash cameras recording the incident, but the video footage was deleted before trial. 
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Beard moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the Government’s failure to 

preserve the videos violated his due process rights. He also moved for a psychiatric 

examination of his competency before trial. The district court1 denied both motions. 

Beard then moved to proceed pro se, which the district court allowed. Beard 

challenges all three of the district court’s decisions, and we affirm. 

We review a denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment because of the 

destruction of evidence de novo. United States v. Webster, 625 F.3d 439, 446 (8th 

Cir. 2010). “[U]nless a defendant can show bad faith on the part of police, failure 

to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute denial of due process of 

law.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). 

Here, an officer testified at trial that the video footage was destroyed per standard 

department procedure. Beard has offered no evidence that the officers who 

responded to the scene or anyone in the police department acted in bad faith, so his 

due process claim fails.

Beard also challenges the denial of his motion for a psychiatric examination, 

which we review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Villareal, 567 F. App’x 

467, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2014). A district court can order a psychiatric or psychological 

examination of the defendant prior to a competency hearing if it has reason to believe 

that the defendant may be incompetent. See id. at 470; 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b). The 

only evidence the district court had when deciding Beard’s motion was defense 

counsel’s statement that he had reason to believe that Beard may not be mentally 

competent to stand trial. This was not enough to give the district court sufficient 

doubt about Beard’s competency.2

 See Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 800 (8th 

Cir. 1996) (“[T]he trial court may consider an express doubt by the accused’s 

1

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern 

District of Arkansas.

2

Beard has not demonstrated that the district court was aware of any of his 

mental health issues when it was considering the motion. Although the district court 

made statements at sentencing expressing concern for Beard’s mental health, those 

statements were made after the motion was decided. 
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attorney, although such doubt alone is not enough to establish sufficient doubt [about 

the accused’s mental competency].”); see also Villareal, 567 F. App’x at 470 

(holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering a psychiatric 

examination based solely on the defendant’s attorney’s observations). The district 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying Beard’s motion for a psychiatric 

examination. 

Last, Beard challenges the district court’s grant of his motion to proceed pro 

se. We review a district court’s determination that a defendant has made a valid 

waiver of the right to counsel de novo. United States v. Reed, 668 F.3d 978, 985–

86 (8th Cir. 2012). A defendant’s waiver of right to counsel must be “voluntary, 

intelligent, and knowing.” United States v. Ladoucer, 573 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 

2009) (citation omitted). “We will find a valid waiver if a district court adequately 

warns a defendant or if, on the record as a whole, we determine that the defendant 

knew and understood the disadvantages of self-representation.” United States v. 

Stewart, 20 F.3d 911, 917 (8th Cir. 1994). 

Beard argues that the district court granted his motion before it examined 

whether his waiver was knowing and voluntary. This was not the case. While the 

district court stated its intention to grant Beard’s motion at the outset, it then talked

with Beard about why he wanted to represent himself. Beard explained that he had 

researched the law. The district court explained each count Beard faced and its 

maximum sentence. It also cautioned Beard about the difficulty of arguing against

lawyers, that he was unfamiliar with the Rules of Evidence, and that the court would 

not try his case for him. Beard said he wanted to proceed anyway. The district court 

informed Beard of the disadvantages of self-representation, and Beard 

acknowledged that he understood those disadvantages.

3

 Based on this record, we 

find no error.

3

Beard argues that certain legal questions he asked the district court 

demonstrated that he didn’t understand the challenges of self-representation. But 

“[t]he court is not required to ensure that the defendant is capable of representing 

himself as well as a trained and experienced lawyer, only that he understands the 
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We affirm. 

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risks involved in representing himself and that he has knowingly and intelligently 

chosen self representation.” Ladoucer, 573 F.3d at 633 (citation omitted).