alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2020010EN.01002001.xml

| 13.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 10/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 10/20

---

Order of the Court of 20 June 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto — Italy) — Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, Associazione Volontaria di Pubblica Assistenza ‘Croce Verde’ v ULSS 5 Polesana Rovigo, Regione del Veneto

(Case C-424/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Public procurement of supplies, works or services - Directive 2014/24/EU - Article 10(h) - Specific exclusions for service contracts - Patient transport ambulance services - Concept)

(2020/C 10/24)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Veneto

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, Associazione Volontaria di Pubblica Assistenza ‘Croce Verde’

Defendants: ULSS 5 Polesana Rovigo, Regione del Veneto

Interveners: Regione del Veneto, Croce Verde Adria, Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, Associazione Nazionale Pubbliche Assistenze (Organizzazione nazionale di volontariato) — ANPAS ODV, Associazione Nazionale Pubblica Assistenza (ANPAS) — Comitato regionale Liguria, Confederazione Nazionale delle Misericordie d’Italia

Operative part of the order

Article 10(h) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, read in conjunction with recital 28 of that directive, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which ambulance services that require the presence on board of a driver with emergency response training and at least one emergency responder with the qualifications and skills obtained from completing a course and passing an examination in emergency response, and transport services provided with basic levels of care using emergency vehicles, fall, in the absence of any emergency, within the exclusion provided for in that article.

---

(1)  OJ C 311, 3.9.2018.

---
#### Douglas POWELL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Sharon BLACKETTER, et al., Superintendent, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 07-35610.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 29, 2008.*

Filed Sept. 11, 2008.

*684Tonia L. Moro, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Medford, OR, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Stacie F. Beckerman, Lester R. Hunt-singer, Carolyn Alexander, Esq., U.S., Office of the Oregon Attorney General, Salem, OR, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See.*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

The facts and procedural history of this case are familiar to the parties, and we do not repeat them here. Douglas Powell appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition, arguing that the state procedural rule that no untimely appeal would be permitted in habeas matters was not firmly established when Powell’s habeas appeal was denied as untimely. We review *de novo*a district court’s denial of a petition for habeas corpus. *Beardslee v. Woodford,*358 F.3d 560, 568 (9th Cir. 2004).

Federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state court remedies. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The petitioner has not fairly presented his federal claim to a state court if the claim is presented in a “procedural context in which its merits will not be considered.” *Castille v. Peoples,*489 U.S. 346, 351-52, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). A state procedural rule must be “clear, consistently applied, and well-established” at the time of the petitioner’s default. *Wells v. Maass,*28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir.1994).

It was well-established at the time of Powell’s untimely appeal that Oregon law requires a petitioner to appeal from a civil judgment within thirty days. Or.Rev.Stat. § 19.255; *see also*Or.Rev.Stat. § 138.650 (requiring appeals from post-conviction judgments to be filed and served within thirty days of final judgment). Powell has not shown that this rule that the Oregon Court of Appeals relied on was inconsistently applied at the time of his appeal. *Bennett v. Mueller,*322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir.2003); *see also Far West Landscaping v. Modern Merchandising,*287 Or. 653, 601 P.2d 1237, 1240 (1979) (“It is our conclusion that in the face of the statute the trial court has no authority to set aside one judgment and enter another For [sic] the sole purpose of extending the time for appeal.”); *Young v. Peterson,*304 Or. 421, 746 P.2d 217, 218 (1987) (en bane) (mem.). *685Although the Oregon courts had yet to rule on the deadline in the specific factual context of a late post-conviction habeas appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we do not “require a state court to articulate every permutation of every rule before it can invoke procedural default.” *Bargas v. Burns,*179 F.8d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir.1999).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
152 So. 30

#### KINNEY v. FEDERAL LAND BANK OF NEW ORLEANS et al.

6 Div. 476.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Jan. 11, 1934.

*26Horace C. Wilkinson, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Lange, Simpson & Brantley, of Birmingham, for appellees.

GARDNER, Justice.

The appeal is from the order removing the cause from the state to the federal court. Bailey v. So. Ry. Co., 215 Ala. 677, 112 So. 203.

The defendant Federal Land Bank is a corporation organized under the laws of the United States, the majority stock of which is owned by the federal government, and that the petition presents facts justifying the removal order is not here questioned. 28 USCA §§ 71, 41, and 42; 54 O. J. 241; Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. Mitchell, 277 U. S. 213, 48 S. Ct. 449, 72 L. Ed. 854.

 Bond was executed and accepted by the court, and notice of the 'hearing duly given, all in compliance with the provisions of the federal statute (2S USCA § 72); but appellant insists the matter of verification was insufficient under some of our former decisions, among them Burgess v. Martin, 111 Ala. 656, 20 So. 506.

The above-noted statute merely provides that the petition be “duly verified,” and prescribes no form. As a condition precedent to the removal of the cause, petitioner is required to execute bond, a matter properly to be considered on questions of this character (Lambert v. Anderson [Ala. Sup.] 149 So. 98),1 and notice must also be given the opposing party. These requirements were met, and on t)he hearing no question raised as to the sufficiency of the verification to the petition. It may be seriously doubted that the matter of form of the verification, so readily amendable (Kinney v. Columbia Savings & Loan Ass’n, 191 U. S. 78, 24 S. Ct. 30, 48 L. Ed. 103) could be raised for the first time on appeal. But this question aside and undetermined, we think it clear the requirement of verification, in cases of this character, is purely cautionary — a pledge of good faith in the presentation of the petition, and sufficient under the authority of Worthen v. State, 189 Ala. 395, 66 So. 686.

The affidavit could serve no useful purpose by way of proof, as it is well settled the averments of fact in the petition are not to be controverted or inquired into by the state court (Stix & Co v. Keith, 90 Ala. 121, 7 So. 423; 4 Hughes, Federal Practice, § 2551), and the only purpose; to be served, therefore, was to put the judicial power in motion. In the Worthen Case, supra, this court held that, when such was the purpose, a verification in the form here presented sufficed.

It results that the removal order was correct, and is accordingly here affirmed.

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, C. J., and BOULDIN and FOSTER, JJ., concur.

1

227 Ala. 222.
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND , TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Knox Waste Service, LLC and * From the 2 66 th District Court Adolpho Martinez, Jr.

, of Erath County, Trial Court No. CV35857.

Vs. No. 11

- 1 9

- 00 407

- C V * September 30 , 20 2 1

Jason Sherman and * Memorandum Opinion by Williams, J. Melissa Miles Sherman, (P anel consists of: Bailey , C.J.,
Trotter , J. , and W illiams, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is

error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s opi nion,

the judgment of t he tr ia l court is reversed as it pertains to Knox Waste Service,
LLC, and we remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to compel

arbitration between Knox Waste Service, LLC and Jason Sherman and Melissa

Miles Sherman. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as it pertains to Adolpho

Martinez, Jr. The costs incurred by reason of this appeal are taxed two

- thirds
against Jason Sherman and Melissa Miles Sherman and one

- third against Adolpho

Martinez, Jr

.
# C_2010018EN.01000501.xml

| 23.1.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 18/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.1.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 18/5

---

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty

Cases where the Commission raises no objections

2010/C 18/02

| Date of adoption of the decision | 28.10.2009 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | N 233/09 |
| Member State | Hungary |
| Region | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Egyes erdészeti közcélú feladatok támogatása |
| Legal basis | — | Egyes erdészeti közcélú feladatok támogatásáról szóló .../2009. (...) FVM rendelet |

Date of adoption of the decision

28.10.2009

Reference number of State Aid

N 233/09

Member State

Hungary

Region

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Egyes erdészeti közcélú feladatok támogatása

Legal basis

—

Egyes erdészeti közcélú feladatok támogatásáról szóló .../2009. (...) FVM rendelet

| — | Az erdőről és az erdő védelméről szóló 1996. évi LIV. törvény 14. § (1) g); 15. § (3); 48. § (5); 13. § (4) a); illetve 12. § (1), (2) és (3) bekezdései. |
| --- | --- |

—

Az erdőről és az erdő védelméről szóló 1996. évi LIV. törvény 14. § (1) g); 15. § (3); 48. § (5); 13. § (4) a); illetve 12. § (1), (2) és (3) bekezdései.

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Aid for the forest sector

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Annual expenditure: HUF 900 million

Overall budget: HUF 6 300 million

Intensity

Up to 100 % of eligible expenses

Duration (period)

7 years from the approval by the Commission

Economic sectors

Forestry

Name and address of the granting authority

| Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development |
| --- |
| Budapest |
| Kossuth Lajos tér 11. |
| 1055 |
| MAGYARORSZÁG/HUNGARY |

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Budapest

Kossuth Lajos tér 11.

1055

MAGYARORSZÁG/HUNGARY

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

---
#### Richard Nguti ADE, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-2305.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 16, 2010.

Decided: May 5, 2010.

*289Kell Enow, Enow & Associates Immigration Practice, Marietta, Georgia, for Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Ernesto H. Molina, Jr., Assistant Director, Jeffery R. Leist, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Richard Nguti Ade, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

Ade first challenges the determination that he failed to establish his eligibility for asylum. To obtain reversal of a determination denying eligibility for relief, an alien “must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable fact-finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” *INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that Ade fails to show that the evidence compels a contrary result. We therefore find that substantial evidence supports the denial of relief.

Additionally, we uphold the denial of Ade’s request for withholding of removal. “Because the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum— even though the facts that must be proved are the same — an applicant who is ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).” *Camara v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir.2004). Because Ade failed to show that he is eligible for asylum, he cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of removal.

Finally, we find that substantial evidence supports the finding that Ade failed to meet the standard for relief under the Convention Against Torture. To obtain such relief, an applicant must establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2009). We find that Ade failed to make the requisite showing before the immigration court.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICER

OF

LENNAR PARTNERS, INC

Pooling and Servicing Agreement

 (the "Agreement"), dated August 15, 2003, among WACHOVIA

COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC. formerly known as FIRST

UNION COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., as Depositor, 

WACHOVIA BANK, N.A. formerly known as FIRST UNION NATIONAL

BANK, Master Servicer, 

LENNAR PARTNERS, INC., as Special Servicer, WELLS FARGO BANK

MINNESOTA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, and LASALLE BANK

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Paying Agent.

(FUNB 2001-C3)

 

The undersigned, Susan K. Chapman, as Vice President of LENNAR PARTNERS, INC.,      a Florida Corporation (the "Company"), in accordance with Section 3.13 of the     Agreement, does hereby certify on behalf of the Company that (i)  a review of the activities of the Company during the year ended December 31, 2003 and of the Company's  performance under the Agreement has been made under my supervision, (ii) to the best of my knowledge, based on such review,  the Company has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement throughout such period ended December 31, 2003 and (iii) the Company has received no notice regarding qualification, or challenging the status, of REMIC I, REMIC II as a REMIC under the REMIC Provisions or of the Grantor Trust under the Grantor Trust Provisions from the Internal Revenue Service or any other governmental agency or body.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed and delivered this Certificate as     of the 1st day of March, 2004. 

 

Susan K. Chapman

Susan K. Chapman

Vice President

Lennar Partners, Inc.

 

 

 

OC FUNB 2001-C3
First Amendment to the Supplemental Retirement Plan



 Exhibit 10.3 
  
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 
 AMGEN SUPPLEMENTAL RETIREMENT PLAN 
 AS AMENDED AND RESTATED EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2005

  
 Section 5.1 of the Amgen Supplemental Retirement Plan as
Amended and Restated Effective January 1, 2005 (the “Plan”) is hereby amended and restated, effective as of January 1, 2005, as follows: 
  

	5.1	Distributions. Following the termination of your employment with the Company, the Company will pay you the vested balance in your Account. The payment will be made to you in
a lump sum payment as soon as administratively practicable after the first day of the Plan Year following the Plan Year in which you terminated your employment (or such later date as may be required under applicable law). 


 
 To record this First Amendment to the Plan as set forth herein, the Company has caused its
authorized officer to execute this document this 19th day of October 2005. 
  

			
	 AMGEN INC.

		
	By:	 	 /s/ Brian McNamee

	 Title:
	 	 Senior Vice President, Human Resources
Exhibit 21.1

              Subsidiary Companies of Life Sciences Research, Inc.

    Name                                             Jurisdiction
    ----                                             ------------

    Huntingdon Life Sciences Group plc               England & Wales

    Huntingdon Life Sciences Ltd.                    England & Wales

    Huntingdon Life Sciences Inc.                    Delaware, USA

    HIH Capital Ltd.                                 Jersey

    HIH Ltd.                                         England & Wales

    HRC Ltd.                                         England & Wales

    Huntingdon Research Centre Ltd.                  England & Wales

    Huntingdon Consulting Engineers Ltd.             England & Wales

    Huntingdon LSR Ltd.                              England & Wales

    Paragon Global Services Ltd.                     England & Wales

    Pathfinder Clinical Development Ltd.             England & Wales

    Pathfinder Nominees Ltd.                         England & Wales

    Life Sciences Research Ltd.                      England & Wales

    Aquatox Ltd.                                     England & Wales

    Huntingdon Life Sciences Co., Ltd.               Japan
EXHIBIT 31.1








CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO


SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, Andrew Godfrey, certify that:





1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of First Quantum Ventures, Inc.;





2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial  condition,  results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;





4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officer  and  I  are  responsible  for establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:





a.  designed  such  disclosure  controls  and  procedures,  or caused  such disclosure  controls and  procedures to be designed  under our  supervision,  to ensure that  material  information  relating to the  registrant,  including  its consolidated subsidiaries,  is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;


b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's  disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions  about the effectiveness of the disclosure  controls and procedures,  as of the end of the period covered by this quarterly report based on such evaluation; and


c. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over  financial  reporting  that occurred  during the  registrant's  most recent fiscal  quarter  that  has  materially  affected,  or is  reasonably  likely  to materially affect, the registrant's  internal control over financial  reporting; and





5. I have  disclosed,  based on our most recent  evaluation of internal  control over financial reporting,  to the registrant's  auditors and the audit committee of the  registrant's  board of directors (or persons  performing  the equivalent functions):





a. all significant  deficiencies  and material  weaknesses in the design or operation of internal  control over  financial  reporting,  which are reasonably likely  to  adversely  affect  the  registrant's  ability  to  record,  process, summarize and report financial information; and


b. any fraud,  whether or not material,  that involves  management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's  internal control over financial reporting.





Date: November 15, 2010


/s/Andrew Godfrey


---------------------


Andrew Godfrey


Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 (as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), I, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of National Presto Industries, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended April 2, 2006 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.





Date: May 8, 2008
        
        
        /s/ M. J. CohenM.J. CohenChief Executive Officer








---
Denied and Opinion Filed January 26, 2018 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-00068-CV 

IN RE STACI WILLIAMS, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 44th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 18-00641 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Schenck 

Opinion by Justice Francis 

In this original proceeding, relator Staci Williams sought relief from a temporary 

restraining order requiring Carol Donovan, Chair of the Dallas County Democratic Party 

(DCDP), and the DCDP to remove Williams from the March 2018 Democratic Primary Ballot as 

a candidate for the office of Judge of the 101st Judicial District Court of Dallas County. On 

January 24, 2018, the Court conditionally granted relator’s petition for writ of mandamus by 

written opinion and ordered the trial court to vacate the temporary restraining order. We 

determined that the proceeding in the district court was moot as to the primary election ballot at 

the time it was heard, and the resulting order was void. 

After the opinion issued, the real parties in interest Michael G. “Mike” Lee and the Dallas 

County Republican Party (DCRP) filed a “Cross-Petition for Writ of Mandamus.” In their crosspetition, Lee and DCRP seek a writ of mandamus directing Donovan and the DCDP to reject 

Williams’s application to be on the primary ballot. That relief is unavailable because overseas 
 –2– 

and military ballots have already been printed and mailed for the March primary. See In re 

Meyer, No. 05-16-00063-CV, 2016 WL 375033, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 1, 2016, orig. 

proceeding) (mandamus requesting same relief as cross-relators denied when filed six days after 

overseas ballots mailed). 

Accordingly, we deny the cross-petition for writ of mandamus. The Court will not 

entertain motions for rehearing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 2. 

180068F.P05 

/Molly Francis/ 

MOLLY FRANCIS 

JUSTICE