[Cite as State v. Voris, 2022-Ohio-152.]

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MIAMI COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

WILLIAM VORIS 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2021-CA-2 

Trial Court Case No. 2019-CR-459 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 21st day of January, 2022. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATTHEW C. JOSEPH, Atty. Reg. No. 0090869, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Miami 

County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Safety Building, 201 West Main Street, 

Troy, Ohio 45473 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

CARLO C. MCGINNIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0019540, 55 Park Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45419 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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DONOVAN, J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant William Voris appeals from his conviction for one count 

of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A)/(B)(3), a felony of 

the third degree. Voris filed a timely notice of appeal on February 2, 2021. 

{¶ 2} On October 9, 2019, Voris was indicted for the following offenses: Counts I 

and II, rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), both felonies of the first degree; Count 

III, unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A)/(B)(3), a felony 

of the third degree; and Count IV, corrupting another with drugs, in violation of R.C. 

2925.02(A)(4)(c)/(C)(1)(a), a felony of the second degree. On October 24, 2019, the 

State filed a superseding indictment amending Count II to rape, in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(1)(c), where the victim is less than 13 years of age, whether or not the 

offender knows the victim’s age. 

{¶ 3} On November 7, 2019, Voris, through counsel, filed a plea of not guilty by 

reason of insanity (NGRI) and a suggestion of incompetency to stand trial. Voris also 

filed a motion to suppress on the same day. On November 12, 2019, the trial court 

ordered that Voris be evaluated by the Forensic Psychiatry Center for Western Ohio 

(FPC) regarding his mental condition at the time the charged offenses. On December 5, 

2019, defense counsel filed a motion to extend the hearing and a request for an NGRI 

evaluation premised upon the counsel’s unavailability and Voris’s refusal to participate in 

the sanity evaluation. The trial court granted defense counsel’s motion to extend and 

scheduled the competency hearing for December 19, 2019. 

{¶ 4} On December 19, 2019, the trial court conducted a competency hearing at 

which both parties stipulated to a report from the FPC finding that Voris was competent 
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to stand trial. At the same hearing, the trial court ordered the FPC to conduct a second 

evaluation of Voris with respect to his mental condition at the time of the offenses, 

because he had failed to cooperate with the evaluator in that regard during his first 

interview. On December 30, 2019, the trial court filed an entry ordering the mental 

evaluation to be conducted by the FPC. On February 6, 2020, the trial court held a 

hearing wherein both parties stipulated to a report submitted by the FPC on January 14, 

2020, which found that Voris did not have any mental incapacity or suffer from any severe 

mental disease at the time that the alleged offenses were committed. On March 6, 2020, 

the trial court found Voris competent to stand trial and found that he suffered from no 

mental condition at the time of the offenses. 

{¶ 5} On March 20, 2020, the State filed a motion to continue the motion to 

suppress hearing due to the unavailability of a witness because of the mandatory COVID19 quarantine in effect in Miami County. In light of the health risk posed by COVID-19 

and the orders issued by the Ohio governor, the Miami County Court of Common Pleas 

issued an order staying all pending matters for 45 days. On March 23, 2020, the trial 

court continued the motion to suppress hearing “for a reasonable period of time.” A 

hearing on Voris’s motion to suppress was eventually held on May 5, 2020, and the trial 

court overruled the motion to suppress on June 11, 2020. 

{¶ 6} On July 7, 2020, Voris filed several documents and motions, drafted himself, 

in which he claimed that his right to speedy trial had been violated: “Letter to the Court;” 

“Petition for Release;” and “Letter Addressing the Petition for Release.” On July 9, 2020, 

Voris, again acting on his own behalf, filed a letter in which he argued that he had a 

conflict of interest with his trial counsel and no longer wished to be represented by him. 
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The next day, the trial court held a status conference in order to generate a briefing 

schedule to address Voris’s speedy trial argument. 

{¶ 7} On July 30, 2020, Voris’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, citing a “total 

breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.” The trial court granted defense counsel’s 

motion to withdraw. On August 13, 2020, the trial court appointed an attorney from the 

Office of the Ohio Public Defender to represent Voris. On August 14, 2020, the State 

filed a memorandum in opposition to Voris’s petition for release, arguing that there were 

still 48 days to try his case once the trial court ruled on his petition. On September 1, 

2020, Voris, represented by counsel, filed a reply to the State’s memorandum in 

opposition; he did not dispute the State’s calculation of the days remaining to try his case, 

but rather argued that he was entitled to discharge because he had been deprived of his 

constitutional right to speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. On September 11, 2020, 

the State filed a memorandum in opposition to Voris’s reply brief, arguing that “the delays 

in this case were primarily caused by [Voris], either through his delay in cooperating with 

the metal evaluations he requested or with his attorney.” Memorandum in Opposition, p. 

5. 

{¶ 8} On September 11, 2020, Voris also filed a “Motion for Determination of 

Competency” and requested a hearing on his competence to stand trial. On September 

17, 2020, the trial court ordered that Voris to be evaluated by the FPC for a third time. 

On October 9, 2020, the trial court overruled Voris’s petition for release, finding that 

neither his statutory right to speedy trial nor his constitutional right to speedy trial had 

been violated. The trial court also found that, by its own calculation, the State had 20 
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days to bring the case to trial once the trial court determined whether Voris was competent 

to stand trial. On October 26, 2020, the trial court conducted a competency hearing 

wherein the parties again stipulated to a report from the FPC finding that Voris was 

competent to stand trial, and on November 5, 2020, the trial court issued an order to that 

effect. 

{¶ 9} On November 16, 2020, the trial court scheduled Voris’ trial for December 8, 

2020. In its order, the trial court explained its reasoning for setting Voris’s trial date 

outside of the statutorily-required time period. On November 18, 2020, the trial court 

rescheduled Voris’s trial for December 7, 2020. 

{¶ 10} On November 30, 2020, a change of plea hearing was held wherein the 

parties agreed that Voris would plead guilty to Count III, unlawful sexual conduct with a 

minor, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts. However, in light of Voris’s 

erratic behavior at the plea hearing, the trial court was unable to take his guilty plea, and 

the case remained set for trial. On December 4, 2020, Voris filed a motion for a 

competency hearing based upon his behavior at the unsuccessful plea hearing. On the 

same day, the trial court held a competency hearing at which it heard Voris’s testimony 

regarding his behavior at the abortive plea hearing. At the end of the hearing, the trial 

court found Voris competent to stand trial. 

{¶ 11} On December 7, 2020, Voris plead guilty to Count III, unlawful sexual 

conduct with a minor, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts in accordance 

with the previous plea agreement between the parties. The plea form signed by all of 

the parties was filed on December 9, 2020. On January 6, 2021, the trial court sentenced 

Voris to 48 months in prison, with credit for 490 days already served. The court filed the 
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judgment entry of conviction on January 8, 2021. 

{¶ 12} Voris appeals. 

{¶ 13} Voris’s first assignment of error is: 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND VIOLATED 

APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY FAILING TO PROVIDE 

APPELLANT A TRIAL WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY LAW. 

{¶ 14} Voris contends that his constitutional right to speedy trial was violated 

pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 

10 of the Ohio Constitution, because approximately one year had passed without his trial 

being held. Voris also argues that his statutory right to speedy trial was violated pursuant 

to R.C. 2945.71 through R.C. 2945.73. 

I. Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial 

{¶ 15} The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 

and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, guarantee all criminal defendants the 

right to a speedy trial. State v. Gatewood, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2010-CA-18, 2012-Ohio202, ¶ 16. Ohio's speedy trial statute, R.C. 2945.71, “was [enacted] to [realize] the 

constitutional protection of [this] right.” Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 661 

N.E.2d 706 (1996); see also State v. Large, 2015-Ohio-33, 26 N.E.3d 328, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 16} To determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has 

been violated, a court should apply the four-factor balancing test adopted by the United 

States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 

(1972); see also State v. Louis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27909, 2020-Ohio-951, ¶ 32. 

The factors include: (1) the length of the delay “between accusation and trial”; (2) the 
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reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; 

and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 

651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992); State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-

Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 88. 

{¶ 17} A “delay becomes presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year,” and 

unless the length of the delay “is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry 

into the other factors.” Barker at 530; Adams at ¶ 89-90. None of the factors is controlling 

because a “balancing test necessarily compels” a court to evaluate an alleged speedy 

trial violation “on an ad hoc basis,” meaning that the court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances. Barker at 530; State v. Perkins, 2d Dist. Clark No. 08-CA-0081, 2009-

Ohio-3033, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 18} As previously stated, on November 7, 2019, Voris filed a motion to 

suppress. On the same day, Voris also filed an NGRI plea and suggestion of 

incompetency to stand trial. It is undisputed that the motion to suppress could not be 

heard until Voris was evaluated by the FPC and a competency hearing was held. On 

November 12, 2019, the trial court filed an entry ordering that Voris be evaluated by the 

FPC, and in December 2019, defense counsel filed a motion to extend the hearing and a 

request for an NGRI evaluation because Voris had refused to participate in the sanity 

evaluation. The trial court granted the motion to extend and scheduled the competency 

hearing for December 19, 2019. 

{¶ 19} On December 19, 2019, the trial court conducted a competency hearing at 

which both parties stipulated to a report from the FPC finding that Voris was competent 

to stand trial. At the request of defense counsel, the trial court ordered the FPC to 
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conduct an NGRI evaluation of Voris with respect to his mental condition at the time of 

the offenses, because he had failed to cooperate with the evaluator in that regard during 

his first interview; Voris’s NGRI examination was conducted on January 13, 2020. In 

early February 2020, the trial court held a hearing at which the parties stipulated to a 

report submitted by the FPC finding that Voris did not have any mental incapacity or suffer 

from any severe mental disease at the time of the offenses. Also on February 6, 2020, 

defense counsel request that the case be scheduled for a pretrial on March 2, 2020. 

{¶ 20} On March 20, 2020, the State filed a motion to continue the motion to 

suppress hearing due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the mandatory quarantine in effect 

in Miami County. On March 23, 2020, the trial court continued the motion to suppress 

hearing “for a reasonable period of time,” and a hearing on the motion to suppress was 

eventually held on May 5, 2020. The trial court overruled Voris’s motion to suppress on 

June 11, 2020. 

{¶ 21} In addition to the delays caused by the competency evaluations and the 

COVID-19 pandemic, the record establishes that Voris frequently refused to cooperate 

with defense counsel, claiming in several instances not to have recognized him. 

Furthermore, on July 2020, Voris filed several documents that he had drafted himself in 

which he claimed that his right to speedy trial had been violated and that he wanted 

different counsel. Counsel also filed a motion to withdraw. Shortly thereafter, the trial 

court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and new counsel was appointed. 

{¶ 22} The record reflects several reasons for the delay that were attributable to 

Voris, specifically his failure to cooperate with the NGRI evaluation in a timely fashion and 

his refusal to cooperate with defense counsel. Additionally, the trial court acted 
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reasonably when it continued Voris’s motion to suppress hearing because of the 

restrictions and quarantine arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. In short, the record 

reveals that the majority of the delay between Voris’s October 9, 2019, indictment and the 

adjudication of his motion was attributable to him and/or to forces outside the control of 

the trial court. Accordingly, the second Barker factor weighs against finding a 

constitutional speedy-trial violation. 

{¶ 23} The next Barker factor is “the defendant's assertion of his right” to a speedy 

trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. “ ‘It is well established 

under our law that the right to a speedy trial conferred by the Constitution is not selfexecuting. Affirmative action on the part of an accused in the nature of a demand to be 

tried is necessary to invoke the protection of the Constitution.’ ” Perkins, 2d Dist. Clark 

No. 08-CA-0081, 2009-Ohio-3033, ¶ 12, quoting Partsch v. Haskins, 175 Ohio St. 139, 

140, 191 N.E.2d 922 (1963). “ ‘In other words, there can be no denial where there has 

been no demand. The purpose of Section 10, Article I [of the Ohio Constitution] is to 

provide a trial for an accused without undue delay with its attendant anxieties and the 

possibility that the defense might be prejudiced by the lapse of time. However, it was 

not intended as a shield to the guilty, the protection of which might be invoked by sitting 

silently back and allowing the prosecution to believe that the accused is acquiescing in 

the delay. It is a right which must be claimed or it will be held to have been waived.’ ” Id. 

Here, the record establishes that Voris vigorously asserted his right to speedy trial in 

numerous filings, pro se and through counsel. Therefore, the third Barker factor weighs 

in favor of finding a constitutional speedy-trial violation. 

{¶ 24} With regard to the fourth Barker factor, we see no actual prejudice to Voris 
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as a result of the delay, which, as noted above, was largely attributable to him. In his 

appellate brief, Voris argues that the over one-year delay in this case was “presumptively 

prejudicial.” We note, however, that a finding of “presumptive prejudice” is merely a 

triggering mechanism under the first Barker factor, which justifies an inquiry into the other 

three factors. State v. Kraus, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2011-CA-35, 2013-Ohio-393, ¶ 23. 

The last of those other factors involves actual prejudice. Here, the only actual prejudice 

Voris suggests in his appellate brief is impairment of his defense, because he alleges that 

he suffers from dementia and “his ability to remember what happened in 2018 and 2019 

has diminished greatly.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 13. 

{¶ 25} Upon review, we find that any prejudice to Voris was solely attributable to 

him and the actions he took during these proceedings. Specifically, Voris’s own actions 

undermine his claims regarding his alleged dementia: 1) he could recall facts sufficient to 

allegedly prepare a document to file criminal charges against the former assistant 

prosecuting attorney in this case and to file a federal indictment against her and request 

protection under whistleblower laws; 2) he could recall the facts of a 1997 memorandum 

drafted on his behalf and sent to several CEOs of large companies such as Microsoft and 

Oracle; 3) he could describe his past communications with well-known government 

employees and businessmen; and 4) he could discuss at length his own theory, which he 

called the “paradigm of threes.” See Letter to the Court, July 7, 2020. Additionally, 

following Voris’s forensic evaluation in January 2020, Dr. Adkins stated that Voris 

displayed no memory deficits during the evaluation and demonstrated adequate shortand long-term memory. In light of the foregoing, we find that Voris’s constitutional right 

to a speedy trial was not violated. 
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Statutory Right to Speedy Trial 

{¶ 26} We also agree with the State's assessment that no statutory violation 

occurred. Ohio's speedy trial statutes constitute a rational effort to implement the 

constitutional right to a speedy trial and are to be strictly enforced. State v. Pachay, 64 

Ohio St.2d 218, 416 N.E.2d 589 (1980). In Ohio, R.C. 2945.71 requires the State to 

bring a felony defendant to trial within 270 days of arrest. R.C. 2945.71(C). Each day 

during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge is counted as 

three days pursuant to the “triple-count” provision of R.C. 2945.71(E). This triple-count 

provision reduces to 90 days the time for bringing to trial an accused who is incarcerated 

the entire time preceding trial. State v. Dankworth, 172 Ohio App.3d 159, 2007-Ohio2588, 873 N.E.2d 902, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). Pursuant to R.C. 2945.72, however, the time 

within which an accused must be brought to trial is extended by a period of delay caused 

by his own motions. State v. McClain, 2015-Ohio-3691, 41 N.E.3d 882, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 27} We have already analyzed Voris’s speedy trial argument based upon an 

alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Other than mentioning the statutes involved, 

R.C. 2945.71 through R.C. 2945.73, Voris has failed to provide any additional arguments 

in his appellate brief in support of his claim that his statutory rights to a speedy trial were 

violated. Furthermore, both the State and the trial court addressed this issue, and the 

trial court found that Voris’s statutory speedy trial rights had not been violated. 

{¶ 28} As previously stated, Voris filed a pro se petition for release on July 7, 2020. 

The State opposed the petition, arguing that there were still 48 days to try his case once 

the trial court ruled on his competency. On September 1, 2020, Voris, represented by 

counsel, filed a reply to the State’s memorandum in opposition in which he did not dispute 
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the State’s calculation of the days remaining to try his case; he only argued that he was 

entitled to discharge because he had been deprived of his constitutional right to speedy 

trial. The State responded that “the delays in this case were primarily caused by [Voris], 

either through his delay in cooperating with the metal evaluations he requested or with 

his attorney.” 

{¶ 29} The trial court found that neither Voris’s statutory right to speedy trial nor 

his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. The trial court also found that, 

by its calculation, the State had 20 days left to bring the case to trial once the trial court 

determined whether Voris was competent to stand trial. On October 26, 2020, the trial 

court conducted a competency hearing, and the parties again stipulated to a report from 

the FPC finding that Voris was competent to stand trial. The trial court issued an order 

to that effect on November 5, 2020. 

{¶ 30} As previously stated, on November 16, 2020, the trial court scheduled 

Voris’s trial for December 8, 2020, and explained its reasons for setting Voris’s trial date 

outside of the statutorily-required time period. Specifically, the trial court stated that it 

had discussed an appropriate trial date with both parties and found that the first available 

trial date was December 8, 2020. Relying upon R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court held that 

it could sua sponte issue a reasonable continuance. The trial court based its decision to 

continue Voris’s trial arguably outside of speedy trial time upon the COVID-19 pandemic 

and the fact that Miami County remained in a state of emergency because of the virus. 

Additionally, the trial court noted that Miami County had recently been designated a “red 

county” by the Ohio governor on November 12, 2020. The trial court defined “red” as 

“very high exposure and spread.” The trial court also referenced Opinion No. 2020-002 
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from the Ohio Attorney General, which stated that “Courts may suspend jury trials to 

prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus, and they may do so consistent with state 

and federal speedy-trial obligations. * * * Although tolling speedy trial time by suspending 

jury trial activity is an extraordinary step, it is lawful – and responsible – to do so during a 

pandemic emergency.” Voris did not further challenge the State’s or the trial court’s 

calculation of statutory speedy trial time in his reply to the State’s memorandum in 

opposition to his petition for release or in his appellate brief now before this Court. 

Therefore, we find that Voris’s statutory rights to a speedy trial were not violated. 

{¶ 31} Voris’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 32} Voris’s second assignment of error is: 

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE 

PROCESS AND FAILED TO EXERCISE ANY DISCRETION WHEN IT 

DENIED HIS REQUEST FOR A THIRD COMPETENCY EVALUATION 

AND FOUND APPELLANT COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL. 

{¶ 33} Voris argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a third 

competency evaluation after observing his erratic behavior at an unsuccessful plea 

hearing held on November 30, 2020. 

{¶ 34} “Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal defendant 

who is legally incompetent shall not be subjected to trial.” State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 

354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995). If a defendant “lacks the capacity to understand the 

nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist 

in preparing his defense[,]” he may not stand trial. State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 

2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 155. 
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{¶ 35} This due process right has been codified at R.C. 2945.37, which provides 

in pertinent part: 

(B) In a criminal action in a court of common pleas, * * * [the] defense may 

raise the issue of the defendant's competence to stand trial. If the issue is 

raised before the trial has commenced, the court shall hold a hearing on the 

issue as provided in this section. * * * 

(C) The court shall conduct the hearing required or authorized under 

division (B) of this section within thirty days after the issue is raised, unless 

the defendant has been referred for evaluation in which case the court shall 

conduct the hearing within ten days after the filing of the report of the 

evaluation * * *. 

{¶ 36} R.C. 2945.371 provides that if the issue of a defendant's competence to 

stand trial is raised under R.C. 2945.37, the court may order one or more, but not more 

than three, evaluations of the defendant's present mental condition. Further, R.C. 

2945.37(E) states that “[t]he prosecutor and defense counsel may submit evidence on 

the issue of the defendant's competence to stand trial. A written report of the evaluation 

of the defendant may be admitted into evidence at the hearing by stipulation, but, if either 

the prosecution or defense objects to its admission, the report may be admitted under 

sections 2317.36 to 2317.38 of the Revised Code or any other applicable statute or rule.” 

{¶ 37} The use of the word “may” in these statutes indicates that the decision 

whether to order an examination is a matter within the trial court's discretion. “Taken as 

a whole, the provisions of R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.371 support the inference that when 

the initial hearing on a competency motion is held, the trial court is only required to give 
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the defendant, or his counsel, the chance to submit evidence on the issue.” State v. 

Bailey, 90 Ohio App.3d 58, 67, 627 N.E.2d 1078 (11th Dist.1992). “If this evidence raises 

a genuine question as to the defendant's competency, the court can order that one or 

more evaluations be performed.” Id.; State v. Carson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2002-CA-73, 

2003-Ohio-5958, ¶ 30. 

{¶ 38} Thus, we review the decision of the trial court regarding competency 

evaluations for an abuse of discretion. State v. Curry, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2012-CA-50, 

2014-Ohio-3836, ¶ 40; State v. Cook, 2016-Ohio-2823, 64 N.E.3d 350, ¶ 63 (5th Dist.); 

State v. Patton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-800, 2009-Ohio-1382, ¶ 8. In order to find 

that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the trial court's decision was 

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 

219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶ 39} In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the test is 

“ ‘ “whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 

reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as 

factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” ’ ” State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio 

St.3d 353, 2014-Ohio-1914, 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 32, citing State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 

354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995), quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 

788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). It is with this standard in mind that we review the evidence 

in this record to determine whether Voris raised a genuine question as to his competency 

to stand trial and whether the trial court abused its discretion by declining to order a third

evaluation. 

{¶ 40} During the first competency hearing on December 19, 2019, the trial court 
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stated that an evaluation had been held, and the court had received a report dated 

November 26, 2019, which found that Voris was competent to stand trial pursuant to R.C. 

2945.371(G)(3). Tr. p. 2. Defense counsel replied Voris would stipulate to that report as 

to competency only, and that counsel believed his client was competent. As previously 

stated, the trial court then reordered an evaluation for NGRI and scheduled another 

hearing once the report was received. 

{¶ 41} On February 6, 2020, the trial court held a second hearing at which it 

referenced a January 14, 2020, report from the FPC regarding Voris’s “condition”; 

according to the court, that report also indicated that Voris was “okay to proceed with 

trial.” Tr. p. 2. The trial court further stated that the report indicated that there was “no 

issue and that defendant can proceed not having any mental incapacity or severe mental 

disease at the time of the offense.” Tr. p. 3. Voris and defense counsel again stipulated 

to the contents of the FPC report finding him to have been sane at the time of the offenses. 

{¶ 42} Thereafter, at the request of Voris’s newly appointed counsel, a third 

competency hearing was held on October 26, 2020. At that time, the parties again 

stipulated to a FPC report, dated October 15, 2020, which found Voris competent to stand 

trial. Voris then pled guilty to one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in 

exchange for dismissal of the other counts. However, because of Voris’s erratic behavior 

at the plea hearing, the trial court was unable to take his guilty plea, and the case 

remained set for trial. On December 4, 2020, Voris filed a motion for a competency 

hearing based upon his behavior at the plea hearing. On the same day, the trial court 

held a competency hearing at which it heard Voris’s testimony regarding his behavior at 

the abortive plea hearing. At the end of the hearing, the trial court found Voris competent 
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to stand trial and denied his request for an additional evaluation at the FPC. 

{¶ 43} In our view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Voris’s 

request for yet another mental evaluation. At the hearing held on December 4, 2020, the 

trial court stated the following after hearing Voris’s testimony: 

* * * [T]he court denies the motion. Based upon the information presented 

to this court. We have been in court since around September of 2019. 

The court has had various conversations with the defendant. As indicated, 

there were two prior competencies and an evaluation for the mental health 

at the time of the offenses. All three came back indicating there was no 

issue. There is no type of report indicating there was prior mental health 

history. On December 19, 2019, when we were in court for the 

competency [hearing], the defendant stated that he had no prior mental 

health history documented. He felt like there were people who thought 

maybe he did need some mental health treatment, but there was no doctor, 

no treatment and no medication. It wasn’t until today that we heard in that 

in 1986 there was some type of diagnosis. 

 Additionally, we were in court on Monday [November 30, 2020], 

where the defendant would be what I would describe as agitated, shaking, 

irritable, not wanting to listen to the court or go through with things and then 

as soon as the court changed direction and said we were not going to do 

what we originally came for, the defendant instantly was calm and indicated 

that he had calmed down. Today there’s been absolutely no issue. The 

defendant is completely calm, polite, respectful, answers the questions 
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posed by the court. He indicates, maybe not directly, to the questions, 

answered [sic] of the court about the difference between guilty or not guilty, 

he certainly indicated through his answers he knows that – that there is a 

difference between guilty, not guilty, right, wrong, done something or not 

done something. Those all indicate to the court that there is an 

understanding – the basic understanding of right and wrong. * * * 

Tr. (December 4, 2020), p. 21-22. 

{¶ 44} The transcript of the October 20, 2015 hearing shows that Voris’s responses 

to questions posed by the trial court were coherent and appropriate. While Voris did note 

some issues with his short-term memory, he did not claim that it affected his ability to 

understand the proceedings against him or his ability to assist counsel with his defense. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 

order a third evaluation, as Voris’s testimony did not raise a genuine question of his ability 

to understand the proceedings or to aid his attorneys. 

{¶ 45} Voris’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 46} Because they are interrelated, we will discuss Voris’s third and fourth 

assignments of error together: 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 

ACCEPTING A PLEA OF GUILTY THAT WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, 

INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN IN VIOLATION OF 

CRIM.R. 11. 

APPELLANT’S PLEA AND SENTENCE/TERMINATION ENTRY 

WERE CONTRARY TO LAW IN VIOLATION OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL 
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RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 

AND DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; SECTIONS 

10 AND 16; ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

{¶ 47} Voris’s appellate brief does not address his final two assignments of error 

and contains no arguments supporting either assignment. Nonetheless, we have 

reviewed the transcript of Voris’s plea hearing and find that the trial court substantially 

complied with Crim.R. 11. Additionally, the trial court’s judgment entry of conviction filed 

on January 8, 2021, in no way violated Voris’s constitutional rights to equal protection, 

fundamental fairness, and due process of the law. 

{¶ 48} Voris’s third and fourth assignments are overruled. 

{¶ 49} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . 

TUCKER, P.J. and EPLEY, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Matthew C. Joseph 

Carlo C. McGinnis 

Hon. Stacy M. Wall