****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT J. MOSBACK (AC 35173)
Beach, Alvord and Mullins, Js. Argued February 4—officially released August 11, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, geographical area number fifteen, Kahn, J. [motions to suppress, dismiss]; Alander, J. [motion for

judgment of acquittal, judgment].)
David V. DeRosa, with whom, on the brief, wasAustin B. Johns, for the appellant (defendant).
Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state’s attorney, andMaryRosePalmese, supervisoryassistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion MULLINS, J. The defendant, Robert J. Mosback, appealsfromthejudgmentofconviction, renderedafter
ajurytrial, ofoperating amotorvehiclewhile having an elevated blood alcohol content in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (2) and reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222 (a). The defendant claimsthatthetrialcourtimproperlydeniedhismotions (1) to suppress evidence ofhis medical records; (2) for
a judgment of acquittal that was based on the alleged insufficiency ofthe blood test evidence; and (3) to dismiss the reckless driving count, and refused to allow him to present his statute of limitations defense to the jury and refused his request to charge the jury on that issue. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In the late afternoon and evening of June 26, 2010, the defendant, a police officer with the city of Bristol, consumed multiple alcoholic beverages at two separate gatherings in his neighborhood while offduty. The defendant went home from the second gathering at approximately 8 p.m., and took a two hour nap. After waking from his nap, the defendant drove to the Bristol Police Department headquarters and reported forhis shift. His shift ran from 10:45 p.m. until 6:45 a.m. Shortly after starting his shift, the defendant left the department in his police cruiser and drove eastbound on Riverside Avenue. At the same time, Tammy Forrest was driving her vehicle in the opposite direction, westbound on Riverside Avenue.
As the vehicles were travelling toward one another, the defendant was driving at a high rate of speed and lost control of his cruiser at a bend in the road. He crossed into Forrest’s lane and nearly hit her vehicle head-on. After narrowly missing Forrest’s vehicle, the defendant crashed his cruiser sideways into a utility pole, causing the pole to break. The crash rendered the defendant unconscious. A short time later, medical personnel arrived and transported the defendant to Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center in Hartford for treatment. Thedefendantwasadmittedtothehospitalatapproximately 11:56 p.m. Immediatelyupon his admission, the medical staff ordered various tests, which was part of the hospital’s protocol for trauma patients such as the defendant. Among the tests performed by the medical staffwas
an ‘‘ETOH’’ test, which analyzed the defendant’s blood alcohol content. At approximately 12:01 a.m., the medical staffdrew a sample ofthe defendant’s blood, which
was sent to the laboratory for testing.The blood test was conducted using a Vitros Fusion 5.1 machine. The Vitros machine measured the defendant’s blood alcohol content by means ofan enzymatic reaction with alcohol dehydrogenase; itthen expressed the alcohol content results using a weight of alcohol to volume of blood ratio. The test was completed at approximately 12:45 a.m. The test revealed that the defendant had a serum blood alcohol concentration of 151 milligrams per deciliter.1 The serum blood alcohol contentrange forapatientwithno alcoholinhis system is less than ten milligrams per deciliter. A serum result of 151 milligrams per deciliter translated to a 0.13 percentwhole bloodalcohol content, whichisthe measure used to determine legal intoxication. As a result ofthe defendant’s elevatedbloodalcohol content, thetreating physician initially was unable to make an accurate assessment ofthe defendant’s condition, andthe defendant was kept at the hospital. The treating physician wrote ‘‘alcoholintoxication’’ underthe ‘‘clinicalimpression’’ section of the emergency physician record. The next morning, the defendant’s blood alcohol content fell closer to normal levels, and he was released from the hospital. The defendant’s evaluation at the hospital, including his blood test results, was recorded in his medical records. The police later seized the medical recordspursuantto asearchwarrantissued on November 16, 2010.
On November 22, 2010, the state issued awarrant for the defendant’s arrest andfiledthe original information charging the defendant with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of § 14-227a.2 The arrest warrant affidavit incorporated statements from the defendant’s neighbors, which indicated that the defendant had consumed multiple alcoholic beverages on the evening of the crash before beginning his shift. The arrest warrant affidavit also included statements from witnesses to the crash describing the defendant’s erratic driving. Finally, the affidavit contained the defendant’s hospital blood test result, which showed that his ‘‘blood alcohol content
was 0.151’’ on the night of the crash.
The police arrested the defendant on December 2, 2010. On May 29, 2012, the state filed an amended information. In the amended information, the state for the first time clarified that it was charging the defendant with operating his police cruiser while having an elevated blood alcohol content in violation of § 14-227a (a) (2). The state also added, inter alia,3 a new count of reckless driving in violation of § 14-222 (a).4
In the course of the jury trial on these charges, the defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal
on the basis of alleged insufficiency of the blood test evidence. The court denied that motion. The defendant
wasconvictedofoperatingamotorvehiclewhilehaving
an elevated blood alcohol content and reckless driving.The court imposed a sentence of six months and thirty days incarceration, execution suspended, followed by twoyearsofprobation. Thisappealfollowed.Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I
MOTION TO SUPPRESS MEDICAL RECORDS
The defendant claims that the court improperly deniedhis motionto suppress his medicalrecords. Specifically, the defendant claimsthathis original attorney, Theodore Wurz, provided ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, when he provided portions of the defendant’s medical records to the police. In particular, he argues that the court should have suppressed his medical records because the disclosure of those records ‘‘was premised on [Wurz’] failure to adequately investigate and seek expert assistance in reviewing the medical records before formulating a deeply flawed theory of the criminal case.’’ We are not persuaded.
We first set forth the standard of review for claims relating to a motion to suppress. ‘‘Our standard of review of a trial court’s findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. Afinding offactwill notbe disturbedunless itis clearly
erroneous in view ofthe evidence and pleadings in the whole record

. . . . [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision

. . . . Additionally, we are mindful of our authority to affirm a judgment of a trial court on a dispositive alternate ground for which there is support in the trial court record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pierce, 67 Conn. App. 634, 638–39, 789 A.2d 496, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 904, 795 A.2d 546 (2002).
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. Following the accident, the city filed
a workers’ compensation claim on behalf ofthe defendant.5 The city’s insurance carrier challenged the claim totheWorkers’ CompensationCommissiononthebasis of the defendant’s wilful misconduct and intoxication. Due to the challenge to the workers’ compensation claim, the city and the department became aware that the defendant’smedicalrecordsindicatedhewasintoxicated on the night of June 26, 2010.
On September 29, 2010, after meeting with the chief of the department, a representative from the city, and the defendant’s union representative, the defendant resigned from the department. Notwithstanding the defendant’s resignation, on the basis ofrumors that the defendant had been drinking at neighborhood gatherings prior to his shift, the department suspected thathe had been intoxicated when he crashed his cruiser and continued to investigate his alleged misconduct on the night ofJune 26, 2010. Inparticular, the department, the city, and the state’s attorney deputized James McGlynn, adetectivewiththestatepolice, toinvestigate the accident.
After resigning from the department, the defendant hired Wurz to assist him in rescinding his resignation and to represent him in connection with the department’s continued investigation into his alleged misconduct. The defendant and Wurz decided that their defense strategy would be to challenge the validity of the blood test, the results of which they believed had been released at 12:01 a.m., a mere five minutes after the defendant was admitted to the hospital.6 Accordingly, the defendant and Wurz agreedto cooperate with anypotential investigation and to challenge the validity of the blood test. On November 1, 2010, McGlynn, in furtherance ofhis investigation, contacted Wurz by telephone and requested an interview with the defendant. Wurz told McGlynn that the defendant would not meet with him. Instead, Wurz personally agreed to meet with McGlynn thatdaywithoutthe defendantbeingpresent. Wurz also told McGlynn that he possessed copies of the defendant’s medical records, which he claimed contained
an error that invalidated the test results, namely, the incorrectreleasetime ofthetestresults. Atthemeeting, Wurz provided McGlynn acopy ofportions ofthe medical records. During that meeting, McGlynn noticed that sections of the medical records were missing and requested that the defendant sign a full release of his medical records. In accordance with McGlynn’s requests, the defendant executed two signed authorizations releasing the medical records, one dated November 1, 2010, and another dated November 10, 2010. Thereafter, McGlynn prepared a search and seizure warrantto obtain afull copy ofthe defendant’s medical records. The search warrant affidavit stated that the defendanthadconsumedalcoholatneighborhoodgatherings prior to his shift, that his reported blood alcohol contentatthehospitalwas 0.151, andthathehadsigned authorizations to release his medical records. Ajudge signedthesearchwarrantonNovember 16, 2010. Thereafter, the police arrested the defendant and charged him with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
On May 11, 2012, the defendant obtained new counsel. On May 16, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his medical records on the ground that the release of those records to the police amounted to a ‘‘breach of

. . . [the defendant’s] attorney-client privilege.’’7 After holding a hearing on the motion to suppress, the court, Kahn, J ., issued a memorandum of decision in which it denied the motion to suppress onthe grounds that ‘‘[i]t was only a matter of time before theauthoritieswouldgainaccesstothemedicalrecords in full’’ and that Wurz had not been ineffective in representingthedefendant. The defendant’smedicalrecords, whichincludedthebloodtestresults, were enteredinto evidence at trial.
On appeal, the defendant contends that his medical records should have been suppressed because Wurz ‘‘rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate before disclosing privilege[d] medical records to the state police, and doing so without [getting] [the defendant’s] informed consent.’’ The state contends, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that ‘‘the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel had not yet attached’’ when Wurz provided the defendant’s medical records to the police. In his reply brief, the defendant responds that his sixth amendment right to counsel had attached when Wurz released his medical records because the police inquiry atthattime ‘‘was

more than a mere investigation but an attempt to build
a case against a targeted defendant

. . . .’’ We agree with the state’s alternative ground for affirmance.8
It is well established that ‘‘[a] criminal defendant is constitutionallyentitledto adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings.

. . . This right arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.

. . . It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thiersaint

v. CommissionerofCorrection, 316 Conn. 89, 100–101, 111 A.3d 829 (2015). ‘‘This right attaches onlyat orafter the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.

. . . The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of [the] government and [the] defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the criminal prosecutions to which alone the explicit guarantees of the [s]ixth [a]mendment are applicable.

. . . We also have noted that the time of the attachment of the right to counsel underthe federal constitution is no different underarticle first, § 8, ofthe constitution of Connecticut.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v.Pierre, 277Conn. 42, 92–93, 890A.2d474, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1197, 126 S. Ct. 2873, 165 L. Ed. 2d 904 (2006).In the present case, it is undisputed that the state had not charged the defendant with any crime on November 1, 2010, whenWurzprovidedthe defendant’s medical records to the police. Additionally, the state had not charged the defendant with any crime at the time he executedasecond signedrelease ofhismedical records on November 10, 2010. Indeed, the state did not file the original information against the defendant until November 22, 2010. Therefore, criminal proceedings had not commenced, and the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel had not been triggered when Wurz provided the medical records to the police. See, e.g., State v. Vitale, 190 Conn. 219, 233, 460 A.2d 961 (1983) (defendant’s sixth amendmentrightto counsel did not attach in period between arrest and filing of information or indictment); State v. Packard, 184 Conn. 258, 267, 439 A.2d 983 (1981) (‘‘[c]ounsel is required at all lineups and showups held after the commencementofcriminalproceedings andisnotrequired at the prearraignment stage, including the period from the initial detention to the formal arrest’’ [emphasis added]). As a result, in the present case the alleged constitutionally ineffective assistance of the defendant’s original attorney provided no basis to suppress the medical records. The court, thus, properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. II
SUFFICIENCY OF BLOOD TEST Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion for ajudgment of acquittal because the evidence of his blood test results was ‘‘insufficient to establish the element of ‘blood alcohol content’ in the statutorydefinition ofoperatingunderthe influence in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a).’’ Specifically, the defendant argues that the state failed to demonstrate that his blood alcohol content was elevated in terms of the ratio of weight of alcohol to weight of blood, as required by statute, and that evidence that he had an elevated blood alcohol content expressed in terms of weight of alcohol to volume of blood was insufficient. We disagree and conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have determined that the defendant was operating a motorvehicle with a blood alcohol content of0.08percentormorebyweight, asrequiredbystatute. We begin by setting forth our standard ofreview. ‘‘In reviewing a sufficiency ofthe evidence claim, we apply
a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second,
we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [trier offact] reasonablycouldhave concludedthatthe cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . In evaluating evidence, the trierof fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferencesthatareconsistentwiththedefendant’sinnocence.

. . . The trier may draw whatever inferences fromthe evidence orfacts establishedbythe evidenceit deemstobereasonableandlogical.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) Statev. Jordan, 314 Conn. 89, 106–107, 101A.3d 179 (2014). ‘‘Dueprocessrequiresthatthestate prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . It follows that insufficiency ofthe evidence to support a jury’s ultimate findings on each of these elements requires acquittal.’’ (Citation omitted.) State

v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 244, 627 A.2d 877 (1993).
The defendant claims thatthe bloodtest results were insufficient for the jury to conclude that he had an ‘‘elevated blood alcohol content’’ as defined by § 14- 227a (a) (2). The defendant argues that, because the Vitros machine measured his blood alcohol content withaweightofalcoholtovolume ofbloodbasis, rather than with a weight of alcohol to weight ofblood basis, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under § 14-227a (a) (2). We disagree.
Section 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence ofintoxicating liquor

. . . if such person operates a motor vehicle

. . . (2) while such person has an elevated blood alcohol content.

. . .’’ ‘‘Elevated blood alcohol content’’ is defined
as ‘‘a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is eight-hundredths ofone per cent or more ofalcohol, by weight

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (2). Here, to establish that the defendant’s blood alcohol content was greater than 0.08 percent, the state introduced into evidence blood test results that expressed the defendant’s blood alcohol content using a weight ofalcohol to volume ofblood ratio, instead ofa weight of alcohol to weight of blood ratio. This court and our Supreme Courthaveheld, inthecontextofBreathalyzer tests, that test results reporting blood alcohol content byusingaratio ofweightofalcoholtovolume ofbreath
are sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant had an ‘‘elevated blood alcohol content’’ as defined by § 14- 227a (a) (2). See, e.g., Stash v. Commissioner ofMotor Vehicles, 297Conn. 204, 211, 999A.2d696 (2010) (Intoxilyzer test results expressed in weight ofalcohol to volume of breath basis, rather than weight of alcohol to weight of blood basis, sufficient to show operator had elevated blood alcohol content as defined by General Statutes § 14-227b [o] [1]);9 State v. Pilotti, 99 Conn. App. 563, 571–79, 914A.2d 1067 (sufficientevidencethat defendant operated motor vehicle with blood alcohol greater than 0.08 percent by weight despite Breathalyzer test result reporting amount of alcohol measured by volume of breath rather than measured by weight of breath), cert. denied, 282 Conn. 903, 919 A.2d 1037(2007). Thus, Stash and Pilotti instruct that the statutory requirement regarding the amount of alcohol in one’s blood being eight-hundredths of 1 percent or more of alcohol, by weight, may be satisfied by a measuring metric of weight to volume.10 We see no reason to diverge from this principle in this case, where the state introduced into evidence blood test results that expressed the defendant’s blood alcohol content in terms of weight of alcohol to volume of blood.
In the present case, the blood test results showed that the defendant had a serum blood alcohol content of 151 milligrams per deciliter when he was admitted to the hospital. After the test results were introduced into evidence, Robert H. Powers, the director of the state toxicology laboratory, testified that the measurement translated to a whole blood alcohol content of approximately 0.13 percent.11 Powers then estimated that, because the defendant metabolized some of the alcohol that was in his system between the time ofthe crash and when he arrived at the hospital, the defendant’s blood alcohol content was 0.139 percent when he crashed his cruiser into a utility pole. That blood alcohol content clearly was greater than the legally permissible limit of 0.08 percent. This was strong evidence thatthe defendant had an elevatedblood alcohol content when he drove his police cruiser on the night of this incident. Although the defendant cross-examined the state’s witnessesaggressively, offeredhisownexperttoundermine the reliability ofthe test results, and criticized the validity of the blood test results at closing argument,
oncethebloodtestresultswere admittedinto evidence, it was within the province of the jury to assess the weight ofthat evidence. See State v. Kirsch, 263 Conn. 390, 409, 820 A.2d 236 (2003) (‘‘the defendant’s challenges to the methodology [of an alcohol dehydrogenase based blood test] affected the weight of the testimony and not its reliability’’). On the evidence presented here, the jury easily could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had an elevated blood alcohol content, as defined by § 14-227a (a) (2), when he operated his police cruiser on the night of June 26, 2010.
III

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS Finally, the defendant claims that the court improperly(1) deniedhismotiontodismisstherecklessdriving countbecause the state brought this charge beyondthe statute of limitations and (2) refused to allow him to present that ground to the jury. We disagree.
1Motion to Dismiss
The defendant claims that the court, Kahn, J ., improperly denied his motion to dismiss the reckless driving count. The defendant argues that ‘‘[t]he statute of limitations was not tolled by the state’s original November 22, 2010 information, as the charge of reckless driving is insufficiently related to the original charge of operating a motor vehicle [while] under the influence of alcohol

. . . .’’ We disagree.
The following facts and procedural history are relevanttothis claim. OnJune4, 2012, the defendantmoved to dismissthecountsaddedintheamendedinformation
on the ground that they were barred by the applicable statute oflimitations. OnJuly 11, 2012, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the reckless driving charge.
In its memorandum ofdecision, the court stated that the allegations underlying the reckless driving count
were ‘‘identicaltothefactsunderlyingtheoriginalinformation charging the defendant with operating a motor vehicle [while] undertheinfluence.’’Thecourtspecified that the warrant affidavits included allegations about the reckless manner that the defendant was driving on the night of the crash and, therefore, ‘‘the defendant
was aware, from the date of his arrest, of the factual allegations against which he would have to defend in regard to the crash on June 26, 2010.’’ According to the court, ‘‘[t]he factual allegations relating to the manner inwhichthedefendantwasdriving, speedanddirection, [were] also included in the affidavits. The affidavits also contained statements from witnesses on the scene relating to the alleged reckless manner in which the defendant operated the vehicle prior to the crash.’’ Finally, the court acknowledged that ‘‘[w]hile the elements of the offenses are slightly different, the factual allegations and evidence in support ofthose charges is similar. While there is an additional exposure to the defendant, that exposure is not impermissible orprejudicialunderthe circumstances ofthis case.’’ The record supports the court’s conclusions. ‘‘The standard of review governing the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly failed to grant his motion to dismiss a charge on the ground that the statute oflimitations hadpassed is well settled. Our review ofthetrial court’slegalconclusionsandresultingdenial ofthe defendant’s motion to dismiss is de novo.’’ State

v. Golodner, 305 Conn. 330, 357, 46 A.3d 71 (2012). Practice Book § 36-17 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Ifthe trialhasnotcommenced, theprosecutingauthoritymay amendthe information, oradd additional counts, orfile
a substitute information.

. . .’’ ‘‘The general rule is that, although the prosecution has broad authority to file an amended or substitute information prior to trial

. . . [General Statutes § 54-193 (c)] provides that no personmay be prosecuted except within one year next after the offense has been committed.

. . . The issuance of
an arrest warrant tolls the running of the statute of limitations, provided that it is executed without unreasonable delay and with due diligence.

. . . When the state files an amended or substitute information after the limitations period has passed, however, a timely informationwilltollthe statute oflimitations onlyifthe amended orsubstitute information does notbroaden or substantially amend the charges made in the timely information.

. . . Although notice is the touchstone of the analysis in determining whether an amended or substitute information substantially broadens or amends the timely charges

. . . factors to assist in this determination are whether the additional pleadings allege violations ofa different statute, contain different elements, rely on different evidence, or expose the defendant to apotentially greater sentence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Golodner, supra, 357–58.
Pursuant to § 54-193 (c),12 the charged violation of § 14-222 (a) was subjectto aoneyearlimitationsperiod because it was not punishable by a term of imprisonment ofmore than one year. Here, because the offense occurred on June 26, 2010, and the state did not file the amended information until May 29, 2012, there is
no dispute that the state failed to charge the defendant with reckless driving within the applicable one year statute of limitations. Consequently, we must address whether the ‘‘arrest warrant and [original] information

. . . served to toll the running of the statute of limitations’’ to permit the state to add the reckless driving charge. State v. Jennings, 101 Conn. App. 810, 821, 928 A.2d 541 (2007).
In the present case, in the original information, the state charged the defendant with violating § 14-227a. There are two distinctways in which a defendant could violate § 14-227a. Indeed, this court has explained that ‘‘subdivisions (1) and (2) of

. . . § 14-227a (a)

. . . are known, respectively, asthebehavioralandperse subdivisions ofthat statute.

. . . The behavioral subdivision prohibits apersonfrom operatingamotorvehiclewhile underthe influence ofintoxicating liquor. General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1). The per se subdivision prohibits
a person from operating a motor vehicle while he has
ablood alcohol content of0.08 percent orgreater. General Statutes § 14-227a(a) (2).’’ (Citation omitted.)State

v. Sunila, 98 Conn. App. 847, 849, 911 A.2d 773 (2006).
The original information in this case did not specify the subdivision of § 14-227a (a) under which the state would proceed with this prosecution. Thus, when the state had filed the original information, it was possible that the state would elect to prosecute the defendant for violating § 14-227a (a) (1) for operating his police cruiser while under the influence of an intoxicatingliquor.13 Indeed, ‘‘[i]n Connecticut, it is sufficient for the state to set out in the information the statutory
name ofthe crime withwhichthe defendantis charged, leaving to the defendant the burden ofrequesting a bill of particulars more precisely defining the manner in which the defendant committed the offense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walton, 34 Conn. App. 223, 227, 641 A.2d 391, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 902, 644 A.2d 916 (1994). Stated differently, the defendant had to be prepared to defend against either or both subdivisions until further clarification was obtained. In this case, the defendantneveraskedthe statetoidentify the precise way in which he violated § 14-227a (a) and, therefore, he was on notice that he was being charged with both statutory alternative theories available under that subsection.
In prosecutions for violations of § 14-227a (a) (1), direct evidence that the driver had an elevated blood alcohol content is not necessary or required for the state to prove that a driver operated a motor vehicle while under the influence ofan intoxicating liquor. See State v. Howell, 98 Conn. App. 369, 377, 908 A.2d 1145 (2006) (evidence that driver appeared impaired, spoke with slurred speech, failed field sobriety tests, and refused to submit to breath test sufficient for jury to find driver violated § 14-227a [a] [1]). To demonstrate that a defendant violated § 14-227a (a) (1), the state is required to show that, as a result of the consumption of intoxicating liquor, the defendant ‘‘had become so affected in his mental, physical or nervous processes that he lacked to an appreciable degree the ability to function properly in relation to the operation of his vehicle.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morelli, 293 Conn. 147, 154, 976 A.2d 678 (2009).
This court consistently has held that evidence of erratic driving supports ajury’s guilty verdict for violations of § 14-227a (a) (1). See, e.g., State v. Fontaine, 134 Conn. App. 224, 228, 40 A.3d 331 (conviction of violation of § 14-227a [a] [1] supportedby evidence that defendant ‘‘drove in an erratic manner, crossing over the white line on the right side ofthe roadway on three occasions’’), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 926, 41 A.3d 1051 (2012); State v. Monahan, 125 Conn. App. 113, 120, 7 A.3d 404 (2010) (conviction ofviolation of § 14-227a [a] [1] supported by evidence that driver ‘‘drove [vehicle] onto the right curb five to seven times and into the wrong lane three times, almost hitting four cars’’), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926, 11 A.3d 152 (2011); State v. Coyne, 118Conn. App. 818, 826–27, 985A.2d 1091 (2010) (‘‘testimony describing the defendant’s erratic driving, including drifting between travel lanes, turning without signaling, driving over atraffic cone, failing to maintain
a consistent speed and making a U-turn despite being familiarwiththearea’’ supportedconvictionofviolation of § 14-227a [a] [1]).Here, the arrestwarrant included witness statements indicating that, after consuming alcohol on the night ofJune 26, 2010, the defendant drove his police cruiser in an erratic manner and crashed into a utility pole. The amended information charging the defendant with reckless driving relied on those very facts pertaining to the manner in which the defendant drove. Significantly, the date, time, andplacethattherecklessdriving
was allegedto have occurredwere identicalto the date, time, and place that the defendant was alleged to have operated his police cruiser while under the influence ofalcohol. See State v. Almeda, 211 Conn. 441, 447–48, 560A.2d389 (1989) (prosecution on substitute information charging assault in first degree not time barred where factual allegationswere identicalto those underlying original information charging attempt to commit murder).
Thefactualallegationsunderlyingthe amendedinformation, thus, were ‘‘substantially similar to the facts underlying’’ the original information; id., 446; and did not ‘‘broaden or substantially amend the charges made in the first information.’’ State v. Jennings, supra, 101 Conn. App. 818.14The evidence inthe record, thus, demonstrates that the defendant had ‘‘timely notice

. . . of the factual allegations against which he [would] be requiredto defend’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Almeda, supra, 211 Conn. 446; and supports the court’s conclusion that ‘‘the defendant was aware, from the date of his arrest, of the factual allegations against which he would have to defend in regard to the crash onJune 26, 2010.’’15 Therefore, the courtproperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the reckless driving count. 2

Jury Charge Next, the defendant claims that the court, Alander, J ., improperly denied his requests to raise his statute oflimitations defense at trial and to include an instruction on the statute oflimitations in thejury charge. We
are not persuaded. ‘‘A challenge to the validity ofjury instructions presents a question of law over which [we have] plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101, 191, 49 A.3d 566 (2012). It is well established that ‘‘[c]entral to a defendant’s right to a fair trial is the right to have issues offact and credibility decided by the jury.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Diaz, 86 Conn. App. 244, 253, 860 A.2d 791 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 908, 870A.2d 1081 (2005). Nonetheless, ‘‘[t]he court shall decide all issues oflaw and all questions of law arising in the trial of criminal cases.

. . .’’ General Statutes § 54-89; see also State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 28, 60 A. 690 (1905) (‘‘[i]n jury trials it is the provinceofthe court to decide questions oflaw, and ofthejury to decide questions of fact’’). Indeed, ‘‘[t]he principal function ofajury charge is to assistthejuryin applying the law correctly to thefacts which [it] mightfind to be established

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 149 Conn. App. 758, 772, 89 A.3d 458, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 917, 94 A.3d 641 (2014). Significantly, it is well established that ‘‘[t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torres v. Carrese, 149 Conn. App. 596, 613, 90 A.3d256, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 912, 93A.3d595 (2014).
In the present case, the court permitted the state to charge the defendant with additional counts beyond the statutorily permitted period because the new information did not ‘‘broaden or substantially amend the charges made in the timely information.’’ State v. Golodner, supra, 305 Conn. 357. That determination required a comparison between the facts underlying the amended information and the facts underlying the original information; see State v. Jennings, supra, 101 Conn. App. 821; which was a legal determination outside ofthejury’spurview. See, e.g., Wattsv. Chittenden, 301 Conn. 575, 582, 22A.3d 1214 (2011) (inacivilaction, ‘‘[t]he question of whether a party’s claim is barred by the statute oflimitations is a question oflaw’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, in denying the motion to dismiss, the court, Kahn, J ., determinedthat‘‘thefactualallegationsunderlyingthe [reckless driving countinthe] substitute information

. . . are identical to the facts underlying the original information charging the defendant with operating a motor vehicle under the influence.’’ Such
adeterminationwas aconclusion oflawand, therefore, inappropriate for the jury’s consideration. As a result, under the circumstances of this case,16 the court, Alander, J

., properly denied both the defendant’s requestto raisethe statute oflimitations defensebefore thejuryandhisrequesttoinstructthejuryonhisstatute of limitations defense.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 ‘‘ ‘Serum’ is the liquid portion of the blood separated from the solids and a serum blood alcohol content is on average 16 percent higher than a whole blood alcohol content. See 1 E. Fitzgerald, IntoxicationTest Evidence (2d Ed. 1995) § 19:3, p. 19-10, and § 19:16, fig. 29.’’ Statev. Kirsch, 263 Conn. 390, 395 n.5, 820 A.2d 236 (2003). At trial, Robert H. Powers, the director of the state toxicology laboratory, testified that a serum result of 151 milligrams per deciliter translates to a 0.13 percent whole blood alcohol level.

2 General Statutes § 14-227aprovidesinrelevantpart: ‘‘(a) Operationwhile under the influence or while having an elevated blood alcohol content. No personshalloperateamotorvehiclewhileundertheinfluenceofintoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug

orbothifsuchperson operates amotorvehicle (1) while underthe influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an elevated blood alcohol content.

. . .’’

3 The amended information also included new charges ofreckless endan-germent in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63, and carryingafirearmwhileundertheinfluence ofintoxicatingliquorinviolation ofGeneral Statutes § 53-206d (a). The court dismissedthe carrying afirearm while under the influence count, and the defendant was acquitted of reckless endangerment.

4 General Statutes § 14-222 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state, or any road of any specially chartered municipal association

. . . recklessly, having regard to the width, traffic and use of such highway [or] road

. . . the intersection ofstreets and the weather conditions. The operation ofamotor vehicle upon any such highway [or] road

. . . at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of any person other than the operator of such motor vehicle

. . . shall constitute a violation of the provisions of this section.

. . .’’

5 Although ordinarily, employees file workers’ compensation claims on their own behalf, in this case the record indicates that the city filed a workers’ compensation claim on behalf of the defendant.

6 On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the validity of the blood test on this basis.

7 On May 16, 2012, the defendant filed a separate motion to suppress in which he claimed thatthe bloodtest results were inadmissible because they lacked scientific reliability, the state was unable to demonstrate a proper chain ofcustody, andthe blood sample was obtained in amannerthat failed to comply with applicable regulations. The court denied that motion, and the defendant does not challenge that ruling in this appeal.

8 It is appropriate for this court to considerthe state’s claim as alternative grounds for affirmance because it included ‘‘[a]ny other alternate ground for affirmance’’ in its preliminary statement of issues and raised the claim in its principal brief to this court, affording the defendant an adequate opportunity to respond, which he did in his reply brief. See Gerardi v. Bridgeport, 294 Conn. 461, 466, 985 A.2d 328 (2010).

9 ‘‘Elevated blood alcohol content’’ is defined by § 14-227b (o) (1), which governs the suspension of driver’s licenses, as ‘‘a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is eight-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight

. . . .’’ This definition is identical to the definition of ‘‘elevated blood alcohol content’’ set forth in § 14-227a (a) (2).

10 We do not suggest that ablood alcohol content measured with aweight to volume ratio is the scientific equivalent ofameasurement expressedwith

a weight to weight ratio. Nonetheless, it is well established that a blood alcohol content measured with a weight to volume ratio is admissible and competent evidence toprove that a defendanthad an elevatedblood alcohol content as defined by § 14-227a (a) (2). See, e.g., State v. Pilotti, supra, 99 Conn. App. 571–79.

11 Powers explained that serum blood alcohol levels tend to be higher by

afactor of 1.16 than the whole blood alcohol content, which is the measurement required by § 14-227a (a) (2). Thus, for the purposes of trial and to conform to the statutory requirements of § 14-227a, Powers converted the defendant’s serum blood alcohol content to a whole blood alcohol content of 0.13 percent. See footnote 1 ofthis opinion; see also State v. Kirsch, 263 Conn. 390, 403–409, 820 A.2d 236 (2003) (hospital blood test results initially reported in serum blood alcohol content, and converted by expert at trial to whole blood alcohol content equivalent, admissible to demonstrate that defendant operated motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor).

12 General Statutes § 54-193 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person may be prosecuted for any offense, other than an offense set forth in subsection (a) or (b) of this section, except within one year next after the offense has been committed.’’ The reckless driving charge did not encompass either subsection (a) or (b) of§ 54-193; thus, the oneyearstatute oflimitationssetforthinsubsection (c) was applicable.

13 In the amended information dated May 29, 2012, the state revised the § 14-227a charge to charge the defendant specifically with violating subsection (a) (2) of the statute for operating his police cruiser while having a blood alcohol content higherthan 0.08percent. Inthis appeal, the defendant has not made a constitutional notice challenge that the original information charging him simplywith § 14-227a, which identified no specific subsection,

was insufficiently precise such that he was unable to defend against it.

14 The defendant’s reliance on State v. Jennings, supra, 101 Conn. App. 810, is misplaced. In that case, the defendant originally was charged withstalking ‘‘on or about September 24, 2004.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 820. After the statute of limitations had passed, the state added a secondstalking chargethatwasbased onanincidentthatallegedlyoccurred ‘‘on or about September 20, 2004.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Thus, in that case, the defendant was called upon to answer for conduct arising from a wholly separate incident. This court held that the second charge was impermissible. We specified that because the second stalking charge ‘‘would doublethepossible maximumpenalty, the addition ofsecond count impermissibly would broaden the charges against the defendant by exposing him to a potentially greater sentence.’’ Id. In the present case, unlike in Jennings, the reckless driving charge arose from the exact incident as the charged violation of § 14-227a. Thus, the defendant here had notice, fromthe outset ofthe prosecution, that evidence pertaining to the manner in which he drove his cruiser on the night of the accident might be introduced at trial.

15 We are not persuaded by the defendant’s reliance on State v. Golodner, supra, 305 Conn. 330. In that case, a driver allegedly drove his vehicle at two individuals that were standing next to each other. Id., 336. The driver originally was charged with one count of reckless endangerment, which pertained to only one of the victims. More than one year later, after the statute oflimitationspassed, the state filed asubstitute informationinwhich it added a second reckless endangerment charge, which pertained to the second victim. Id., 355. In determining that the amended information impermissibly broadened the charges set forth in the original information, the Supreme Court emphasized that the ‘‘substitute information was filed relating to a different victim.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 358. As a result, the court in Golodner concluded that ‘‘the defendant had no notice that he was accused of any criminal conduct related to the new victim.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 359. In the present case, however, there is no concern that the defendant was charged in the amended information with conduct related to a new victim. Golodner, thus, is inapposite to the present case.
16 We are cognizant that, under circumstances wholly different from this case, factual issues are determinative of whether additional charges are precluded by the statute oflimitations. See, e.g., State v. Ali, 233 Conn. 403, 416, 660 A.2d 337 (1995) (‘‘the issue of whether the state executed the warrant within a reasonable period of time was properly a question of fact for the jury’’); State v. Parsons, 28 Conn. App. 91, 96, 612 A.2d 73 (tolling of statute of limitations was based on factual determination as to when offense occurred), cert. denied, 223 Conn. 920, 614 A.2d 829 (1992). In the present case, however, the tolling ofthe statute of limitations was properly determined by comparing the facts underlying the original and amended informations, whichwas aquestion oflawproperly determinedbythe court.