NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONY JAMES MERRICK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

DAVID SHINN, Director, Arizona 

Department of Corrections; TRINITY 

FOOD SERVICES, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

CHARLES L. RYAN, Director, Arizona 

Department of Corrections - in his individual 

and official capacities; RONALD TOWLES, 

Supervisor, 

Defendants.

No. 20-15600 

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-05525-SPL-MTM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 20, 2021**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 28 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-15600 

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges. 

Arizona state prisoner Anthony James Merrick appeals pro se from the 

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging 

constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de 

novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 

213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s claims against defendant 

Shinn in his official capacity because Shinn is entitled to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity and Merrick does not seek prospective declaratory or injunctive relief. 

See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (Eleventh Amendment 

bars damages actions against state officials in their official capacities); see also 

Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(the Eleventh Amendment “does not . . . bar actions for prospective declaratory or 

injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities for their alleged 

violations of federal law.”).

The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s conditions-of-confinement 

claims because Merrick failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants 

knew of or disregarded an excessive risk to Merrick’s health. See Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (prison officials are liable for denying a 

prisoner humane conditions of confinement only if they know of and disregard a 
3 20-15600 

substantial risk of serious harm).

The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s claims based on his inability 

to purchase items at the prison store as well as the prices at the prison store 

because there is no constitutional right to purchase prison canteen products. See 

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (prisoners have no 

constitutional right to purchase canteen products).

The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s equal protection claims

because indigent prisoners are not a protected class. See Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 

F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2002) (indigent prisoners are not a protected class for 

purposes of stating an equal protection claim). 

The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s access-to-court claims 

because Merrick failed to allege facts sufficient to show an actual injury. See 

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996) (elements of an access-to-courts 

claim and actual injury requirement); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 

403, 417 (2002) (to plead an actual injury, the complaint “should state the 

underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),[ ] just 

as if it were being independently pursued”).

The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s failure-to-train and failureto-supervise claims because Merrick failed to allege facts sufficient to show that 

there was an underlying constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 
4 20-15600 

1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he or she was 

personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing as duplicative

Merrick’s claims in his initial complaint based on allegations regarding Keefe 

stores. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed claims that

repeated allegations that were previously dismissed under the district court’s 

authority to screen in forma pauperis complaints). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Merrick’s motion to 

appoint counsel because Merrick did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances.

See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting 

forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel). 

AFFIRMED.