IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs February 12, 2020

STATE OF TENNESSEE V. TIMOTHY T. MILLICAN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Giles County

No. CR-14086 Robert L. Jones, Judge

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No. M2019-00121-CCA-R3-CD

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A Giles County jury convicted Timothy T. Millican, Defendant, of one count of theft of 

property with a value of at least $10,000 but less than $60,000. The trial court sentenced 

Defendant as a Range I standard offender to four years at thirty percent release eligibility, 

which the trial court suspended to five years’ supervised probation following the service 

of a year in jail. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we 

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Mattea L. Rolin, Elkton, Tennessee, for the appellant, Timothy T. Millican.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Scott M. Corley, Assistant 

Attorney General; Brent A. Cooper, District Attorney General; and Victoria Haywood, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

Josh Bass, an investigator with the Giles County Sheriff’s Department, testified 

that he was involved with an investigation involving Defendant. Investigator Bass 

received a “Be on the Lookout” notification regarding a stolen 2006 Jeep from Lawrence 

County. His initial investigation revealed a Facebook post of a person resembling 

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Defendant standing next to the stolen Jeep and loading it with groceries. Based on his 

prior dealings with Defendant, Investigator Bass recognized him in the photograph. A 

few days later, on September 26, 2017, he received additional information from a 

criminal informant and went to Defendant’s home in Giles County. 

When Investigator Bass and his lieutenant arrived at Defendant’s home, Defendant 

was exiting the driver’s side of the Jeep. After being permitted to look at the vehicle 

identification number, Investigator Bass determined it matched the stolen Jeep from 

Lawrence County. The Jeep’s Hardin County license plate did not match the vehicle 

registration of the Jeep. Investigator Bass asked Defendant how the vehicle came into his 

possession. Defendant told Investigator Bass that “a black gentleman from Elkton had 

dropped it off” to “be worked on” but that he did not know this man’s name, where he 

lived, or any way to get in contact with him. Defendant told Investigator Bass that the 

man who dropped off the Jeep did not specify any mechanical issues and that the man 

would “come back at an undisclosed time and pick it up.” Investigator Bass confiscated 

the Jeep, removed a cooler and a shirt from it, and returned the personal items to 

Defendant. As Investigator Bass drove it away, he noted that the vehicle “started fine” 

and “was operable.” He said the Jeep was not making any noises, “jerking,” or doing 

anything unusual.

On several later occasions, Investigator Bass contacted Defendant to ask who 

dropped off the Jeep at his home. Each time, Defendant would state that he did not know 

yet. Eventually, Defendant refused to speak further to Investigator Bass, so Investigator 

Bass issued a warrant for his arrest for theft. Defendant never provided a name for the 

gentleman he claimed dropped the Jeep at his home.

On cross-examination, Investigator Bass stated that the person loading groceries 

into the Jeep in the photograph from the Facebook post was facing away from the 

camera. 

Noah Clint Roberson testified that, in 2017, he purchased a 2006 Jeep for $11,000. 

Mr. Roberson said that, on September 21, 2017, he went inside a gas station to purchase a 

drink. When he returned, his Jeep was missing, and he reported it stolen to the Lawrence 

County Sheriff’s Department. Mr. Roberson stated there was nothing wrong with the 

Jeep when it was stolen. Mr. Roberson said that he did not give Defendant consent to 

take and use his vehicle and that he did not even know Defendant.

Ralph Millican testified that he was Defendant’s father and that he saw Defendant 

driving the 2006 Jeep. Mr. Millican told Defendant to take the Jeep “back where [he] got 

it” and asked Defendant what he was doing with the Jeep. Defendant responded that he 

was “going to work on it” and that he needed to get a part for it. Mr. Millican stated that 
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he went to Defendant’s home “up on the hill, [a]nd this dude was up there” with “a little 

girl.” Mr. Millican “tried to run him off,” but the man said he was waiting for a ride. Mr. 

Millican said that he waited at Defendant’s home for about thirty to forty-five minutes 

until Defendant returned in the Jeep, and then Mr. Millican left.

On cross-examination, Mr. Millican testified that Defendant could not work on the 

Jeep himself because he had “no knees” and was “crippled.” Mr. Millican stated that 

Defendant had the tools to work on the Jeep and knew another man who could do the 

work. He described the man that he “tried to run off” as a white man, “black-headed,” 

weighing “about 180” and approximately five feet nine inches tall.

After closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury with, among other 

things, an instruction on recently stolen property:

If you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . from the evidence that 

the property in question had been recently stolen; and that soon thereafter 

the same property was in the exclusive possession of [D]efendant; this 

possession, unless satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 

from which you may reasonably draw an inference that [D]efendant gained 

possession through theft, or had knowledge that the property had been 

stolen. However, you are never required to make this inference. It is for 

you to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the 

evidence in this case warrant an inference, which the law permits you to 

draw from the possession of recently stolen property.

When the evidence is offered that [D]efendant was in possession of 

recently stolen property, [D]efendant has the right to introduce evidence 

that he came in to possession of the property lawfully, or possession may be 

satisfactorily explained through other circumstances or other evidence 

independent of any evidence offered by [D]efendant.

In considering whether possession of recently stolen property has 

been satisfactorily explained, you’re reminded that in the exercise of 

constitutional rights, the accused need not take the witness stand and 

testify.

The term, [“]recently,[”] is a relative term and has no fixed 

meaning[;] whether property may be considered as recently stolen depends 

upon the nature of the property, and all the facts and circumstances shown 

by the evidence in the case. The longer the period of time since the theft, 

the more doubtful becomes the inference, which may be drawn from 
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unexplained possession. The correctness of the inference, and the weight to 

be given to any explanation that may be shown by the evidence, are matters 

that must be determined by you, and you are not bound to accept either. 

You must weigh all the evidence presented as to [D]efendant’s alleged 

possession of the property in question, and decide, in light of all the facts 

and circumstances, whether any inference is warranted.

The jury found Defendant guilty of theft of property with a value at least $10,000 

but less than $60,000. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard 

offender to four years at thirty percent release eligibility, which the trial court suspended 

to five years’ supervised probation following the service of a year in jail. Defendant filed 

a timely motion for a new trial, and the trial court denied the motion following a hearing. 

This timely appeal follows.

Analysis

Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for 

theft of property. Specifically, Defendant argues that the evidence did not show that he 

intended to deprive the owner of the property or that he knowingly obtained or exercised 

control over the property without the owner’s consent. The State responds that, viewed 

in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror 

to convict Defendant.

Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is “whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Tenn. R. 

App. P. 13(e). Questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and weight of the evidence 

are resolved by the fact finder. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). This

court will not reweigh the evidence. Id. Our standard of review “is the same whether the 

conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 

2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence, replacing it with a 

presumption of guilt. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 

(Tenn. 1982). The defendant bears the burden of proving why the evidence was 

insufficient to support the conviction. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 

914. On appeal, the “State must be afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” State v. Vasques, 221 

S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007).
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“A person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of 

property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the 

owner’s effective consent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103(a) (2017). Moreover, “it is 

the law in Tennessee that possession of recently stolen property, unless it is satisfactorily 

explained, creates a permissible inference that the person who possessed the stolen 

property gained possession through theft.” State v. David Roger Petty, No. M2016-

01036-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 4457592, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2017) (citing 

State v. James, 315 S.W.3d 440, 450 (Tenn. 2010)), no perm. app. filed.

Here, there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was in possession of the 

Jeep just five days after it was stolen. Moreover, Defendant’s personal possessions, 

including a cooler and a shirt, were found within the Jeep. A photograph of Defendant 

loading groceries into the Jeep was posted to Facebook after Mr. Roberson reported the 

Jeep as stolen. Mr. Roberson said that he did not give Defendant consent to take and use 

his vehicle and that he did not even know Defendant 

While Defendant explained his possession of the Jeep by claiming that a black 

man “dropped off” the Jeep to be “worked on,” a rational juror could easily reject this 

explanation. First, Mr. Millican testified that he saw a white man and a little girl on his 

property shortly after Defendant possessed the Jeep, not a black man as Defendant 

claimed. Mr. Millican also testified that Defendant was “crippled” and could not work on 

a vehicle himself. Defendant never produced a name or contact information for the 

person whom he claimed “dropped off” the Jeep for repairs. Investigator Bass drove the 

Jeep after he confiscated it and testified that the Jeep “started fine,” “was operable,” and

was not making any noises, “jerking,” or doing anything unusual. The jury was free to 

reject Defendant’s explanation and to infer that Defendant had “gained possession” of the 

recently stolen vehicle “through theft” or that he “had knowledge that the property had 

been stolen.” James, 315 S.W.3d at 440. Questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, 

and weight of the evidence are resolved by the fact finder, and this court will not reweigh 

the evidence. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. Defendant is not entitled to relief.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE