1

NO. PD-0659-15

IN THE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

____________________________________________________

PAUL HENRI WAGNER, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

APPELLANT’S

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

No. 05-13-01329-CR

In the

Fifth District Court of Appeals at Dallas

____________________________________________________

On appeal from Cause Number MA-1114870-L

In County Criminal Court No. 10

of Dallas County, Texas 

Honorable Roberto Canas, Judge Presiding

 ____________________________________________________

DAN WOOD, JR. VINCENT W. PERINI

ATTORNEY AT LAW ATTORNEY AT LAW 

4303 N. Central Expressway 2501 Oak Lawn Ave., Suite 560

Dallas, Texas 75205 Dallas, Texas 75219-4082

Tel. (214) 559-8815 Tel. (214) 750-7477

Fax (214) 696-0867 Fax (214) 521-5690

Email: danwoodjr@sbcglobal.net Email: vperini@airmail.net

Attorneys for Appellant

APPELLANT RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT
2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................................ 4 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT.................................................... 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..........................................................................................6

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY.............................................................. 7

QUESTIONS PRESENTED...................................................................................7-8

FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

WHAT IS THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF THE PHRASE 

“COMMUNICATING...IN A... HARASSING MANNER” AS USED IN THE 

STATUTE FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE 

CASES, AND, AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE, DID IT PENALIZE 

PROTECTED SPEECH IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S FIRST 

AMENDMENT RIGHTS? [TEX. PEN. CODE §25.07(A)(1)(A)]................ 9

First Reason for Granting Review

In its decision, the Court of Appeals adopted a definition of “harass,” which 

conflicts with a decision of the Third Court of Appeals in Austin on the same 

issue, the definition of the phrase “communicating... in a...harassing manner.”

Second Reason for Granting Review

This statute is an important legal tool in family violence cases, and because the 

conflicting decisions of the Fifth and Third courts of appeal create a wide 

disparity between the districts, this important question of state law has not 

been, but should be, settled by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Third Reason for Granting Review

The definition adopted by the court of appeals from a dictionary definition 

used previously in an earlier Fifth Court of Appeals decision (i.e.“persistently 

disturbs, bothers continually, or pesters...”) is too encompassing and threatens

to criminalize otherwise protected speech.
3

SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

WHETHER THIS IS A “CONTENT-BASED” FIRST AMENDMENT 

CASE AND OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY A DIFFERENT 

STANDARD OF REVIEW, “STRICT SCRUTINY” AS ENUNCIATED IN 

THE CASE OF EX PARTE LO...........................................................................14

THIRD QUESTION FOR REVIEW

IF STRICT SCRUTINY IS THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW, 

WHETHER THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW CAN BE 

WAIVED...................................................................................14

Reason for Granting Review

The Court of Appeals declined to decide whether Ex Parte Lo controlled, 

asserting, in effect, that its “strict scrutiny” standard of review had been 

waived, because it was first raised in appellant’s Reply Brief, which itself,

according to the opinion, provided no discussion or authority for declaring 

the case “content-based.”

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES .......................................................... 9

PRAYER FOR RELIEF................................................................................................ 17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE..................................................................................... 18

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................... 18

APPENDIX...................................................................................................................... 19

Wagner v. State, No. 05-13-01329-CR (Tex. App.--Dallas, delivered May 5, 2015) (Mem. 

Op.) (not designated for publication).
4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

 PAGE

Cases

Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).........................................10

Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476, (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)..........................................10

Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 SW2d 425 (Tex. 1998)................. 11,12

Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, (Tex.Crim. App. 1979)..............................................14

Ex Parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ..........................................14,15

Garcia v. State, 212 S.W.3d 877, (Tex. App. – Austin 2006)...........................11,12,13 Fn. 9

Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 800 (7th Circuit 2000)..............................................16

Kramer v. Price, 712 F. 2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983), affirmed en banc,

 723 F. 2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1984)......................................................................................10

Long v. State, 931 S.W. 2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)...........................................10

Patton v. State, 835 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. App-Dallas, 1992, no pet.)...............................11

Snowden v. State, 677 A.2d 33, 36 n. 1 (Delaware 1996)...........................................12

Wagner v. State, No. 05-13-01329-CR, (Tex.App.-Dallas, delivered May 5, 2015)

(Mem. Op.) .............................................................................................. 7

Statutes and Rules

TEX.PEN. CODE §25.07 (a)(1)(A).................................................................6,11,15

TEX.PEN. CODE 25.07 (g) ............................................................................... 10

Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Section 3.06 (d)...............................12

Constitutional Provisions

First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Due Process of Law

guarantee of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.Constitution; U.S. CONST.,

AMEND. I, XIV ....................................................................................13 Fn. 1

Other

Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 645 (1989) ....................................11
5

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The conflicting definitions of “communicating... in a... harassing manner” in the Third 

and Fifth courts of appeal, arising from the decision of the Fifth Court of Appeals in this case, set 

in motion a collision between the law in their respective districts which is more than a mere 

game of words. It makes the likelihood of arrest and conviction very different in two large parts 

of the state involving millions of Texans. Moreover, a First Amendment Freedom of Speech 

issue is at stake.

Oral argument will help delineate these important matters.
6

NO. PD-1058-14

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

PAUL HENRI WAGNER, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

NOW COMES, Paul Henri Wagner, Appellant in this cause, by and through his attorneys 

of record, Dan Wood, Jr. and Vincent W Perini, and pursuant to the provision of Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 66, et seq., urges this Court to grant discretionary review, and in support will 

show as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged by information (CR: 11) with the Class “A” Misdemeanor crime 

of Violation of a Protective Order prohibition against “communicating with a protected party in a

threatening or harassing manner,” TEX. PEN. CODE §25.07(a)(1)(A) (West 2012). Appellant 

entered a plea of Not Guilty, and was tried before a jury (RR2: 49). He was found guilty (RR3: 

132). By agreement between the State and Defendant, the jury on punishment was waived, and 

punishment was determined by the Court as follows: 365 days in jail, suspended, and the 
7

Defendant placed on community supervision for 24 months, plus a fine of $375.00 (RR3: 139). 

Judgment was entered (CR: 14-15).

The defendant filed a Combined Motion for New Trial and Motion for Arrest of Judgment, 

which was timely presented to the Court (CR: 43;RR4: 7). The combined motions were supported 

by defendant’s affidavit (CR: 58-62). A hearing was held on August 29, 2013, after which the trial 

court denied the motions (RR4: 26). Appellant gave timely Notice of Appeal (CR: 13).

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant’s conviction in its opinion in Wagner v.

State, No. 05-13-01329-CR, (Tex.App.-Dallas, delivered May 5, 2015) (Mem. Op.) (not 

designated for publication). This Court granted Appellant’s motion for extension of time to file his 

Petition for Discretionary Review by July 6, 2015. This petition is timely filed.

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

WHAT IS THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF THE PHRASE

“COMMUNICATING... IN A ... HARASSING MANNER”AS USED IN THE 

STATUTE FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE CASES, 

AND, AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE, DID IT PENALIZE PROTECTED SPEECH 

IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS? [TEX.

PEN. CODE §25.07(A)(1)(A)].

First Reason for Granting Review

In its decision, the Court of Appeals adopted a definition of “harass,” which 

conflicts with a decision of the Third Court of Appeals in Austin on the 
8

same issue, the definition of the phrase “communicating... in a...harassing 

manner.”

Second Reason for Granting Review

This statute is an important legal tool in family violence cases, and because the 

conflicting decisions of the Fifth and Third courts of appeal create a wide disparity 

between the districts, this important question of state law has not been, but should 

be, settled by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Third Reason for Granting Review

The definition adopted by the court of appeals from a dictionary definition used 

previously in an earlier Fifth Court of Appeals decision (i.e.“persistently disturbs, 

bothers continually, or pesters...”) is too broad in its reach and threatens to 

criminalize otherwise protected speech. 

SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

WHETHER THIS IS A “CONTENT-BASED” FIRST AMENDMENT CASE AND OUGHT 

TO HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY A DIFFERENT STANDARD OF REVIEW, “STRICT 

SCRUTINY” AS ENUNCIATED IN THE CASE OF EX PARTE LO.

THIRD QUESTION FOR REVIEW

IF STRICT SCRUTINY IS THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW, WHETHER THE 

CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW CAN BE WAIVED.

Reason for Granting Review

The Court of Appeals declined to decide whether Ex Parte Lo controlled, asserting, in 

effect, that its “strict scrutiny” standard of review had been waived, because it was first 

raised in appellant’s Reply Brief, which itself, according to the opinion, provided no 

discussion or authority for declaring the case “content-based.”
9

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

WHAT IS THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF THE 

PHRASE“COMMUNICATING...IN A... HARASSING MANNER” AS USED IN THE 

STATUTE FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE CASES, AND, AS 

APPLIED IN THIS CASE, DID IT PENALIZE PROTECTED SPEECH IN 

VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS? [TEX. PEN.

CODE §25.07(A)(1)(A)].

First Reason for Granting Review

In its decision, the Court of Appeals adopted a definition of “harass,” which conflicts with 

a decision of the Third Court of Appeals in Austin on the same issue, the definition of the 

phrase “communicating... in a...harassing manner.”

Second Reason for Granting Review

This statute is an important legal tool in family violence cases, and because the 

conflicting decisions of the Fifth and Third courts of appeal create a wide disparity 

between the districts, this important question of state law has not been, but should 

be, settled by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Third Reason for Granting Review

The definition adopted by the court of appeals from a dictionary definition used 

previously in an earlier Fifth Court of Appeals decision (i.e.“persistently disturbs, 

bothers continually, or pesters...”) is too broad in its reach and threatens to 

criminalize otherwise protected speech.

The Court of Appeals opinion sets out the facts in its opinion. Mem. Op. pp. 2-5. Briefly 

summarizing the record, however, Appellant and his wife, Laura, were separated and she wanted 

a divorce. They had a young daughter. Laura obtained a protective order. Although the court had 

the authority to prohibit all communication except through surrogates, the protective order did not 

prohibit Petitioner’s communicating with his wife so long as the communication was not “...in a 
10

threatening or harassing manner.” Such a protective order is enforceable pursuant to a criminal 

statute, the language of which is identical to the court’s protective order. See, TEX.PEN.CODE

§25.07(g) (West 2012).

In the twenty-two days following issuance of the Protective order and until she called the 

police, Appellant and his wife communicated regularly with one another – but not every day –

about bread-and-butter family matters such as medical coverage, the child’s sickness following a 

trip to Mexico, unemployment, and his new job, but also about his hope to reconcile with her. Most 

of the communications were by email and text message, and photocopies of both were offered and 

admitted in evidence. However, our record does not show that Appellant was abusive or even 

profane or threatening. Our record does not show that Appellant berated his wife or that he ever 

called or left messages at odd hours. 

Appellant’s entreaties to Laura were usually at the end of a communication about mundane 

family subjects. The couple belonged to a nondenominational church, and Appellant’s speech to 

his wife was often couched in religious language.

On direct appeal Appellant complained that the absence of a definition – in the Fifth 

District – of the phrase “communicating... in a... harassing manner” rendered the statute vague 

and overbroad as applied to petitioner in violation of his First Amendment rights.

“A statute is considered impermissibly overbroad if, in addition to prescribing activities 

which may constitutionally be forbidden, it sweeps within its coverage speech or conduct which 

is protected by the First Amendment.” Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476, (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); 

Long v. State, 931 S.W. 2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Kramer v. Price, 712 F. 2d 174 (5th Cir. 

1983), affirmed en banc, 723 F. 2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1984); Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1989).
11

In response, the Court of Appeals ruled that the definition applicable for judging the 

lawfulness of petitioner’s speech to his wife would be the dictionary definition of harassment 

found in Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 645 (1989), as follows:

“[A] person harasses another when he persistently disturbs, bothers continually, or pesters that 

person (emphasis added).” Mem. Op. at 7

The court explained that it was appropriate to consult standard dictionaries for the 

meaning of undefined statutory terms and, further, that this dictionary definition had been used 

previously by the Fifth Court of Appeals in Patton v. State, 835 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. App-Dallas, 

1992, no pet.). Mem. Op. at 7, Fn. 5.

The Patton definition had been used. However, there had been neither an argument about 

statutory definitions in the Patton case, nor any kind of constitutional challenge, for vagueness 

and overbreadth or otherwise. The case could have been decided without the dictionary.

In his opening brief, Appellant advocated adoption of the definition enunciated by the 

Third Court of Appeals in the case of Garcia v. State, 212 S.W.3rd 877 (Tex. App. -- Austin 

2006, no pet.). It was a case directly in point. The defendant in Garcia challenged Penal Code 

§25.07 (a)(1)(A) as facially overbroad and vague in violation of the First and Fourteenth 

amendments. As in the case at bar, the conduct at issue was “harassing” communication. Garcia, 

at 889. 

To avoid finding the provision unconstitutional, and in search of an adequate definition of 

“harass,” the Third Court of Appeals turned to the Supreme Court of Texas, which had faced a 

similar problem in a case involving a lawyer accused of violating a disciplinary rule. 

Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W. 2d 425 (Tex. 1998). The lawyer had

been sanctioned for communicating with jurors following their verdict in a personal injury case 
12

in a manner found to have been “calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror...” 

(Emphasis added). Id. and see, TEX. DISC. R. PROF. COND. 3.06 (d). The Supreme Court first 

observed that, “in colloquial usage,” “harass” may be considered vague. In a thirty-one page 

opinion, with concurrences and dissents, the Supreme Court avoided finding constitutional 

infirmity by fashioning a definition of “harass” as follows: 

(1) a course of conduct, 

(2) directed at a specific person or persons,

(3) causing or tending to cause substantial distress, and

(4) having no legitimate purpose.

Benton at 439. 

The Third Court of Appeals added a “reasonable person” standard to the Supreme 

Court’s definition to further avoid vagueness, as follows: “the course of conduct must be such as 

would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and must actually cause 

substantial emotional distress to the person.” This is in harmony with some of the cases cited by 

the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Snowden v. State, 677 A.2d 33, 36 n. 1 (Delaware 1996), (as cited 

in Benton at 439); Garcia v. State, 212 S.W.3rd 877, 893, n. 9 (Tex. App. -- Austin 2006, no 

pet.) The Dallas Court of Appeals below rejected this definition, creating the conflict between 

the districts.

The conflict between the Third Court of Appeals and the Fifth Court of Appeals 

definitions of “harass” is not insubstantial. The Austin court’s definition is thoughtfully crafted 

and nuanced. The Dallas court’s definition, on the other hand, is simplistic. The practical effect 

of this disparity will result in different outcomes. For North Texas counties in the vicinity of the 

Red River (those in the Fifth District) there now is a low threshold for probable cause, 
13

prosecution, and conviction for violating that prohibition in protective orders. Merely 

“bothering” a protected individual not only brings the possibility of a Class A Misdemeanor 

conviction, but, even more significant, it will increase the frequency of jail incarceration and bail 

bonds. On the other hand, in those 23 counties across the state’s midsection, from Bastrop and 

New Braunfels all the way out to San Angelo and beyond to the Permian Basin (the Third 

District), the likelihood of handcuffs is less. The Third Courts definition requires a greater degree 

of culpability for arrest and prosecution. For example, if Petitioner’s prosecution had been in the 

Third District, the evidence would most likely have been found insufficient, because the State 

would have had to prove that there was no legitimacy whatsoever to Appellant’s attempts at 

reconciliation. 

From the standpoint of precision, the Fifth Court of Appeals definition is inferior by 

comparison. For police, sheriff deputies, prosecutors, and trial courts, its simplicity is unlikely to 

provide real guidance in deciding these difficult family violence conflicts -- as its failure to 

ensure constitutional rights. It will increase the likelihood of freedom of speech problems.1

 

1 In its opinion the Court of Appeals says that petitioner waived his complaints that Petitioner’s 

freedom of speech rights under the First Amendment (and Fourteenth) to the United States 

Constitution had been violated. This was in conjunction with the court’s criticism that Appellant 

had inadequately briefed Freedom of Religion and applicability of the Texas Constitution. 

Whatever might be said about those, appellant’s brief contained citations and analysis about 

First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth issues (Appellant’s Brief, pages 21-22) and a 

lengthy discussion of the effect on this case of adopting the Third Court of Appeals definition in 

Garcia v. State (Appellant’s brief, pages 27-31).
14

SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

WHETHER THIS IS A “CONTENT-BASED” FIRST AMENDMENT CASE AND OUGHT TO 

HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY A DIFFERENT STANDARD OF REVIEW, “STRICT 

SCRUTINY” AS ENUNCIATED IN THE CASE OF EX PARTE LO.

THIRD QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

IF STRICT SCRUTINY IS THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW, WHETHER THE 

CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW CAN BE WAIVED.

Reason for Granting Review

The Court of Appeals declined to decide whether Ex Parte Lo controlled, asserting, in effect, that 

its “strict scrutiny” standard of review had been waived because it was first raised in appellant’s 

Reply Brief, which itself provided no discussion or authority for declaring the case “contentbased.”

Appellant will address both the Second and Third Questions here. This Court decided the 

case of Ex parte Lo in the fall of 2013. Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W. 3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). 

Appellant’s Brief and the State’s Brief were filed in the spring of 2014. Neither brief cited the Lo

case. Appellant did so for the first time in his Reply Brief, asserting that it controlled the 

standard of review in this case and its “strict scrutiny” standard should be the standard of review. 

This was so even though Appellant had initially identified the customary standard as applicable, 

citing Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). In his Reply Brief, Appellant

reasoned that the Ex parte Lo standard should apply instead, because, as Appellant asserted, this 

case was “content-based.” (Reply Brief, pp. 1- 4) 

In a Supplemental Brief allowed by the court, the State took issue. The State argued this 

case was a “content-neutral” rather than “content-based” statute, and strict scrutiny was 
15

inapplicable, because Penal Code § 25.07(a)(1)(A) confers benefits or imposes burdens on 

speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed. State’s Supp. Brief, pp. 2-3. The State 

insisted that that “harassing” communications in the Protective Order statute “depended upon the 

frequency and effect of the communication, not their content.” State’s Supp. Brief, p. 5. In a 

footnote the State notes that the “manner and means” in the information speaks only of the 

frequency of the communications, not the content. State’s Supp. Brief, p. 5, Fn. 3. This overlooks 

the Information’s language which accuses the defendant of communicating “in a threatening and 

harassing manner...” And other language in the charging document that his actions were “in 

violation of an order issued by the 292nd Court in Dallas County,” i.e. The Protective Order (CR: 

11). Of course, the Protective Order charged Petitioner with “communicating... in a... harassing

manner.” The word “harassing” modifies the manner of communications, and can describe 

content as well as frequency.

As if to illustrate this ambiguity, the Dallas Court of Appeals, while arguing in agreement 

with the State that the content of Petitioner’s communications were irrelevant, nevertheless 

wrote “[T]he statute clearly protects Laura from appellant’s repeated, unsolicited, and 

unwelcome communications in which he professes his love and begged her not to divorce him” 

(Emphasis added). Mem. Op. at 9. It should be clear, despite arguments to the contrary, content 

mattered in this case.

Despite discussing the issue about which standard of review to apply, the Court of 

Appeals declined to resolve the controversy. In a footnote to its opinion, the court below chose to 

apply the customary standard with the burden on the defendant to establish unconstitutionality. 

Mem. Op. at p. 6, Fn. 4. As explanation, the footnote explained that appellant had first raised the 

argument about Ex parte Lo and “strict scrutiny” in his reply brief. Moreover, it said there had 
16

been no discussion by Appellant or authority to establish that this case was “content-based.” On 

the contrary, Appellant had cited and examined the language in Ex Parte Lo that “when the 

government seeks to restrict and punish speech based on its content, the usual presumption of 

constitutionality is reversed.” Further, petitioner argued in his Reply Brief that in “this case the 

prosecution seeks to punish speech it “disfavored” “based on the ideas expressed.”

 “Strict scrutiny” is the right standard of review in this case. This is a “content based” 

case. The State’s analysis is flawed because it overlooks the important word “harassing” in the 

statute and in the information in this case. “Harassing” not only describes the frequency of 

communications but describes their content as well -- in those cases, such as this, when the 

content of the speech is an issue. In this case content is everything. It was so at the trial and on 

direct appeal. The Court of Appeals opinion affirming appellant’s conviction is replete with 

discussion of the appellant’s communications to his disaffected wife. “If it is necessary to look at 

the content of the speech in question to decide if the speaker violated the law, then the regulation 

is content-based.” Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (7th Circuit 2000) (as cited in Lo at 

footnote 12). 

The Court of Appeals was in error when it chose not to decide the issue of Ex parte Lo’s

applicability in this case. It ruled, in effect, that the “strict scrutiny” standard had been waived by 

Appellant. Similarly, the Court was in error when it applied the customary “strict scrutiny”

standard of review. 
17

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant respectfully prays that this Court 

grant discretionary review and, after full briefing on the merits, issue an opinion reversing the 

Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand and for other proceedings consistent with this Court’s 

opinion.

Respectfully submitted,

DAN WOOD, JR.

ATTORNEY AT LAW

4303 N. Central Expressway

Dallas, Texas 75205

Tel: (214) 559-8815

Fax: (214) 696-0867

Email: danwoodjr@sbcglobal.net

VINCENT W. PERINI

 ATTORNEY AT LAW 

2501 Oak Lawn Ave., Suite 560

Dallas, Texas 75219-4082

Tel. (214) 750-7477

 Fax (214) 521-5690

 Email: vperini@airmail.net

By: /Vincent W. Perini/ 

Vincent W. Perini

State Bar No. 15782000

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify the foregoing Petition for Discretionary Review was served upon the State of 

Texas by sending a true and correct copy to the Criminal District Attorney of Dallas County via 

mail to: Hon. Susan Hawk, Criminal District Attorney, Attn: Appellate Section, Frank Crowley 

Court Bldg.,133 N. Riverfront, LB 19, Dallas, TX 75207, on July 7, 2015.

/Vincent W. Perini/

____________________________

Vincent W. Perini

Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Rule 9.4(i) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, I certify that 

the total word count for the foregoing Petition for Discretionary Review is 2,361words as shown 

by the word count function of the computer program, MS Word 2007, used to generate the 

document.

/Vincent W. Perini/

_______________________________

Vincent W. Perini

Attorney for Appellant
19

__________________________

APPENDIX

_________________________

• Paul Henri Wagner v. State, No. 05-13-01329-CR (Tex. App.--Dallas, 

delivered May 5, 2015) (not designated for publication)
AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed May 5, 2015.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-13-01329-CR

PAUL HENRI WAGNER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 10

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MA-1114870L

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Stoddart

Opinion by Justice Evans

Paul Henri Wagner appeals his misdemeanor conviction for violating a protective order. 

In three issues, appellant challenges (1) the constitutionality of the statute and information under 

which he was charged, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, and (3) the 

admission of certain evidence. Concluding that appellant’s issues lack merit, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of a series of communications appellant sent to Laura, his wife at 

the time, during the three-week period immediately following the issuance of a protective order 

prohibiting him from “[c]ommunicating directly with [Laura] . . . in a threatening or harassing 
–2–

manner.”1 Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at trial revealed the 

following events. 

One day after the order was signed, Laura sent appellant a text message stating, “I pray 

for u[sic] everyday [sic]. That you would be humbled in the sight of the Lord and redeemed.” 

The next day, November 18, appellant texted Laura that he prayed for her every day too. The 

two exchanged texts about whether appellant had obtained a job and family finances, and 

appellant then inquired whether Laura had an attorney. When Laura did not reply to this text, 

appellant texted, “Are you still wanting to talk?” She responded, “I think it would be best to not 

talk except through email.” Appellant responded “Why?” to which Laura replied, “Please just 

respect my wishes.”

The following day, appellant emailed Laura about bills, to profess his love for her, and 

express his desire to be reconciled. On November 23, appellant texted, “I miss you so much 

Laura.” She did not respond. On November 25, appellant sent Laura a text about whether he 

could pay the daycare bill online. The two exchanged a few texts about financial matters, and 

then appellant sent Laura a text expressing his desire “to be Ephesians 5:25-30” for her, how 

much he loved and missed her, and wished that “God would soften your heart towards me.” 

Laura did not reply to the text.

On November 26, Laura texted appellant about whether his medical insurance was still in 

effect. Instead of answering the question directly, appellant asked if she went to the doctor and 

whether she was alright. He then texted her, “don’t be cold and hard towards me” and “My heart 

is in so much pain without you. I can’t correspond with you like this anymore. I’m sorry.” 

 1 The protective order also contains a finding that family violence occurred and that family violence was likely 

to occur in the foreseeable future.
–3–

Only after Laura responded that their daughter needed medicine, did appellant confirm their 

insurance was suspended. 

On November 28, appellant sent Laura several texts asking for bedding and whether 

Laura had an attorney. Appellant then texted Laura, “It would be so much easier if we could just 

talk on the phone.” When Laura didn’t respond, appellant texted, “Can we talk on the phone?” 

After Laura refused and told appellant she was trying to go to bed, appellant again texted Laura 

to inquire whether she had a lawyer. Laura responded, “Stop texting me.” 

On November 30, appellant emailed Laura about money in a bank account and the two 

exchanged four more emails from November 30 to December 2 about finances. On December 5,

however, after he was served with the divorce petition, appellant phoned Laura and left a 

voicemail in which he was upset and begging her not to divorce him.2 That same day, he sent 

Laura a long email replete with love poems, prayers, bible references, memories from their life 

together, professions of his love for Laura, pleas for reconciliation, and requests to be forgiven. 

As it appears in the record, the December 5 email is six single-spaced typed pages. The email 

begins: 

To you I share my heart. 

Poetry

Dec. 2, 2011

Your face is always in my mind and I look at your pictures often. I greatly desire 

that I had more pictures of you to look at. You are so beautiful and I love to look 

into your eyes. Why didn’t I see it before? I was blinded by how majestic you 

are.

 2 Laura testified that after the protective order was signed, appellant left two or three voice mails on her phone.
–4–

The email also included lines such as “Without you my world is destroyed and I am thrown into 

loneliness and despair” and “God hates divorce and although you feel you have that right, I beg 

for your mercy.” Appellant goes on to acknowledge:

Due to the ways of men and the powers that be, I have been prohibited from 

coming before her in humility to profess my love. ‘Do not speak or write,’ they 

say. ‘A weapon against you will be sought after in your words of love. She 

brought down men who seek destruction on you twice already. Why would you 

even trust her a third time?’ But I cannot be silent any longer. My heart fails for 

not proclaiming my love for Laura. 

Appellant sent another email to Laura on December 6 which began, “Why did you 

deceive me?” referring to Laura’s hiring of an attorney. Appellant urged her to “[c]ancel this 

divorce and let us be separated for a time until I can prove myself to you.”

On December 7, appellant emailed Laura again. Although the first paragraph of the 

email requested information from Laura with respect to appellant’s denial of unemployment 

compensation benefits, the remaining four paragraphs were a plea for reconciliation stating, 

among other things, “Please don’t divorce me Laura. I’m begging you, please. I’ll do anything.” 

On December 8, appellant sent Laura another email at 7:21 a.m. pleading with her not to 

proceed with the divorce and stating, “Is there anything I can do for you not to divorce me? I am 

in agony right now knowing what divorce will do to us and [our child]. What will she think 

about God and marriage growing up in a divorced family?” He sent Laura yet another email on 

December 8 at 2:26 p.m. requesting her help, stating he saw a woman and child that reminded 

him of his mom and his daughter and he had been having anxiety attacks all day and trouble 

breathing and didn’t know what to do. That night, at 8:08 p.m., appellant sent an email to 

numerous members of the couple’s church begging them to help him in his efforts to stop the 

divorce and reconcile with Laura by contacting her on his behalf. Although church-friends

informed Laura about appellant’s email, no one from their church complied with appellant’s 
–5–

request to urge her to reconcile with him. Two days later, Laura complained to the police that 

appellant had violated the protective order. 

Appellant was charged by information with the misdemeanor crime of violation of a 

protective order pursuant to section 25.07(a)(2)(a) of the Texas Penal Code. The statute

provides, among other things, a person commits an offense if, in violation of a family violence

protective order, he knowingly or intentionally communicates directly with a protected 

individual “in a threatening or harassing manner.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.07(a)(2)(A) 

(West Supp. 2014). The information substantially tracked the statutory language of the offense, 

alleging that appellant intentionally and knowingly communicated directly with Laura in a 

threatening and harassing manner in that he made repeated telephone calls and sent repeated text 

messages and emails to Laura in violation of the protective order. Appellant pleaded not guilty 

and, after a jury trial, was convicted of the offense. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In his first issue, appellant contends that the language “communicates . . . in a . . . 

harassing manner” as used in section 25.07(a)(2)(A) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, 

and violates his rights to free speech and freedom of religion under the United States and Texas 

constitutions. He asserts the statutory language violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the United States Constitution as well as sections six and eight of Article I of the Texas 

Constitution. Additionally under this issue, appellant asserts the use of the word “repeated” in 

the information is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and violates articles 21.02(7) and 

21.21(7) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.3

 This issue is multifarious because it 

 3 Appellant complains that the information failed to give notice of the specific acts for which his conviction 

was sought. Because he failed to raise this objection before trial, he waived the complaint. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b) (West 2005); Jacobsen v. State, 325 S.W.3d 733, 739–40 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no 

pet.).
–6–

embraces multiple legal theories in a single issue. See Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010). Nevertheless, to the extent that we can discern, and appellant has properly 

preserved and briefed various arguments under this issue, we may address them in the interest of 

justice. See id. 

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Ex parte 

Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In assessing a statute’s constitutionality, we 

start with the presumption that the statute is valid and the legislature did not act arbitrarily or 

unreasonably in enacting the statute. See Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002). As the party challenging the statute, appellant has the burden of establishing its 

unconstitutionality.4

 Id. We must uphold the statute if we can determine a reasonable 

construction that renders it constitutional. See Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1978). 

Appellant’s overbreadth and vagueness complaints, as we understand them, are based on 

the statute’s failure to define “in a harassing manner.” Appellant argues that the failure to define 

“in a harassing manner” makes section 25.07(a)(2)(A) overbroad and vague because it allowed 

him to be prosecuted and convicted for speech protected by the First Amendment, such as his 

communications with Laura about money, bills, their child, and his desire to avoid a divorce.

A statute is not vague or overbroad simply because a word or phrase is not specifically 

defined. See Morgan v. State, 557 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Undefined terms 

 4 In his initial appellate brief, appellant applied the above presumption and burden of proof to his constitutional 

challenges. In his reply brief, however, appellant asserts Ex Parte Lo controls. Lo reverses the presumption and 

burden of proof for facial constitutional challenges to content-based regulations, described as “laws that distinguish 

favored from disfavored speech based on the ideas expressed.” Id. at 15. In a single paragraph without any legal 

analysis or discussion appellant concludes Lo’s presumption and burden of proof applies here because “the 

prosecution seeks to punish speech it ‘disfavored’ ‘based on the ideas expressed.’” Because appellant first raised 

this argument in his reply brief and has not put forth any discussion or authority establishing the statute under which 

he was convicted was a content-based regulation, and the statute itself does not address the content of 

communications, we apply the presumption and burden of proof generally applicable to challenges involving the 

constitutionality of statutes. 
–7–

are typically given their plain meaning unless the language is ambiguous or the plain language 

leads to absurd results the Legislature could not have possibly intended. See Wilson v. State, 448 

S.W.3d 418, 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We may consult standard dictionaries in determining 

the fair, objective meaning of undefined statutory terms. See Clinton v. State, 354 S.W.3d 795, 

800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A person harasses another when he persistently disturbs, bothers 

continually, or pesters that person. See WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY

645 (1989).5

 Harassment is not protected speech under the First Amendment and is not 

communication, although it may take the form of speech. See Garcia, 212 S.W.3d at 888–89 

(quoting Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988)). Because section 25.07(a)(2)(A)

only prohibits intentional or knowing communication with a protected individual that is 

threatening or harassing, we reject appellant’s overbreadth challenge. See id. at 889. 

A statute may be unconstitutionally vague even if it is not overbroad. Garcia, 212 

S.W.3d at 899. A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague if it does not give a 

person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and establish 

definite guidelines for law enforcement. See Scott v. State, 322 S.W.3d 662, 665 n.2 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010). A defendant must first show the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his 

conduct before he can complain the statute is vague on its face.6 Village of Hoffman Estates v. 

 5 Appellant cites us to the definition of harass utilized by the Austin Court of Appeals in holding section 

25.07(a)(2)(A) was not facially vague. See Garcia v. State, 212 S.W.3d 877, 890 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no 

pet.). Instead, we rely on the dictionary definition of harassment we used previously in Patton v. State, 835 S.W.2d 

684 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no pet.). Patton involved a sufficiency challenge to three convictions for violating a 

protective order under the predecessor statute that, like current section 25.07 (a) (2) (A), provided a person commits 

an offense if, in violation of an order issued pursuant to certain sections of the family code, he “knowingly or 

intentionally . . . (2) directly communicates with a member of the family or household in a threatening or harassing 

manner . . . .”

6 Appellant appears to argue that section 25.07(a)(2)(A) implicates the free-speech guarantee of the First 

Amendment such that he may present a facial vagueness challenge without first demonstrating the statue was vague 

as to his conduct. We do not agree. Although the First Amendment generally protects the free communication and 

receipt of ideas, opinions and information, it allows the State to proscribe communicative conduct that invades the 

substantial privacy interests of another “in an essentially intolerable manner.” See Scott v. State, 322 S.W.3d at 670 

(holding section of telephone harassment statute prohibiting repeated ringing or repeated telephone communications 
–8–

Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982); Scott, 322 S.W.3d at 670–71. 

Appellant complains the statute is vague as applied to him because he did not know the 

definition of “harassing manner” and the statute prohibited communications with Laura about 

money, their child, and his attempts to dissuade his wife from divorcing him. Contrary to 

appellant’s contention, however, section 25.07(a)(2)(A) did not prohibit appellant from 

communicating with Laura on any subject. Rather, using the ordinary dictionary definition 

above, it merely prohibited intentional or knowing communications that persistently disturbed, 

bothered continually, or pestered Laura. 

Although appellant argued in the trial court and on appeal that he had no intention to 

harass Laura and did not know his communications with her after the protective order was 

entered would be deemed “in a . . . harassing manner,” the evidence belies his contentions. 

Appellant continued to text and call Laura even after she told him it would be best to 

communicate by email. He made at least eight unsolicited communications to Laura in the threeweek period following the issuance of the protective order and six of those communications 

occurred between December 5 and December 8, after he was served with divorce papers. 

Moreover, in his December 5 email, appellant acknowledged he had been prohibited from 

professing his love to Laura, but was doing so anyway. “The vagueness doctrine is not designed 

to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes 

general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to 

provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.” Webb v. State, 991 S.W.2d 

408, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). When measured by common 

understanding and practice, the statutory language of section 25.07(a)(2)(A) is not 

 “in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another” did not 

implicate conduct protected by First Amendment).
–9–

unconstitutionally vague as applied to appellant’s conduct. The statute clearly protects Laura 

from appellant’s repeated, unsolicited, and unwelcome communications in which he professes 

his love and begs her not to divorce him. Accordingly, the statute was not unconstitutionally 

vague as applied to appellant’s conduct. In light of our resolution of appellant’s as applied 

vagueness challenge, any facial vagueness challenge necessarily fails. See Village of Hoffman 

Estates, 455 U.S. at 495; Scott, 322 S.W.3d at 670–71. 

To the extent appellant complains under his first issue that the statute also violates his 

freedom of speech and freedom of religion rights under the United States and Texas 

Constitutions, he has waived these complaints by inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1(i). Apart from a general reference to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 

and sections six and eight of Article I of the Texas Constitution, appellant has provided no legal 

analysis or discussion with appropriate legal authority explaining how the statute violates these 

rights. Because appellant’s conclusory statement asserting violations of these constitutional 

provisions is unsupported by analysis and relevant legal citations, he has not complied with 

appellate briefing requirements. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Accordingly, these complaints 

present nothing for review. See Morehead v. State, 807 S.W.2d 577, 579 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991). 

In his second issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction. In reviewing for legal sufficiency, we must determine whether any reasonable fact

finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Wise v. 

State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

318 (1979)). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving 

deference to the fact finder’s responsibility to weigh evidence, resolve conflicting testimony, and 

draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See id. We also determine 
–10–

“whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force 

of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Clayton v. State, 235 

S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated 

equally. Id.

Under section 25.07(a)(2)(A), a person can be convicted for violating a protective order if 

the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally 

communicated directly with a protected individual in a threatening or harassing manner. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.07 (a)(2)(A). When analyzing for legal sufficiency, non-technical terms 

that are not legislatively defined are to be understood as ordinary usage allows, and jurors may 

give them any meaning which is acceptable in common parlance unless the term has a technical 

meaning. See Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 771–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

After reviewing the record, we find the evidence legally sufficient to support appellant’s 

conviction. During the three-week period at issue, appellant initiated multiple emails and texts

as well as several telephone calls to Laura that were filled with unsolicited declarations of love 

and poetry, pleas for reconciliation, as well as arguments to support his reconciliation attempt. 

Many of the communications initiated by appellant focused exclusively on how he viewed their 

relationship and what he wanted, urging Laura to see things from his point of view. At no time 

did Laura express a desire to reconcile with him, or otherwise encourage him to send 

communications regarding his feelings for her or his desire that she not proceed with the divorce. 

Instead, her texts and emails to him completely ignored his declarations and pleas. After she 

served appellant with divorce papers, his emails persisted and intensified. In his December 5 

email, appellant acknowledges that he has been prohibited from professing his love to Laura, but 

he nevertheless continues to send her an email each of the next three days urging her not to 
–11–

divorce him. When she did not respond to these pleas, he initiated an email to church members 

soliciting their help in communicating his message to Laura.

Laura testified that she thought appellant’s repeated communications with her were 

harassing because the volume, frequency, and length of the emails, together with the language he 

used “made me feel like I was being coerced or twisting my arm . . . it didn’t make me feel 

comfortable at all.” Based on the evidence before it, the jury could have rationally found that 

appellant intentionally or knowingly communicated directly with Laura in a harassing manner in 

that he made repeated telephone calls and sent repeated text messages and emails to her in 

violation of the protective order. We resolve appellant’s second issue against him. 

In his third issue, appellant complains about the trial court’s admission into evidence of 

the email appellant sent to the church members soliciting their help to stop the divorce and save 

his marriage to Laura. He asserts that because the email was not a direct communication to

Laura, it was irrelevant. He further argues that the email was more prejudicial than probative 

under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 because it confused the jury about the elements of the crime, 

allowing them to convict appellant based on an email that was not prohibited by the protective 

order.

We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See De La Paz 

v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). If the trial court’s decision is correct 

on any theory of law applicable to the case, we will uphold the ruling. See id. Proof of a 

culpable mental state generally relies upon circumstantial evidence. Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 

92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Accordingly, appellant’s intent may be inferred 

from his words, actions, and conduct. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2004). Here, the email appellant sent to numerous church members after Laura ignored his 

previous five emails begging her not to divorce him is relevant to appellant’s intent with respect 
–12–

to his communications with Laura. Shortly after appellant was served with divorce papers, he 

sent her emails with increased frequency that repeatedly asked her not to divorce him, despite the 

fact he had no indication that Laura had any reservations about proceeding with the divorce. 

Contrary to appellant’s contention that he was merely trying to express his love and save his 

marriage, the email to the church members suggests that rather than accept and respect Laura’s 

decision, appellant was communicating with her in an effort to strong-arm her into changing her

mind about the divorce. When his goal was not achieved by direct communication with Laura, 

he emailed church members to assist him in persuading Laura to drop the divorce. As such, the 

email to church members is evidence of appellant’s intent with respect to his direct 

communications with Laura. (Laura testified church members did not contact her to do what 

appellant requested but church friends provided the email to her). There is nothing in the record 

to support appellant’s contention that the jury was confused by the admission. Appellant’s 

closing argument made clear appellant did not send Laura the email to the church members. 

Moreover, the jury charge made clear appellant had to communicate directly with Laura in a 

harassing manner to be convicted. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting appellant’s email to the church members. We resolve appellant’s third 

issue against him. 

Having overruled all of appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

 

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

131329F.U05

/ David Evans/

DAVID EVANS

JUSTICE
–13–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

PAUL HENRI WAGNER, Appellant

No. 05-13-01329-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court 

No. 10, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MA-1114870L

Opinion delivered by Justice Evans, Justices 

Francis and Stoddart participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 5th day of May, 2015.
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Case # PD-0659-15

Case Information

Location Court Of Criminal Appeals

Date Filed 07/06/2015 11:24:07 PM

Case Number PD-0659-15

Case Description

Assigned to Judge

Attorney Dan Wood

Firm Name Dan Wood, Jr. Attorney at Law

Filed By Dan Wood

Filer Type Not Applicable

Fees

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Transaction ID 9761327

Order # 005951964-0

Petition for Discretionary Review

Filing Type EFile

Filing Code Petition for Discretionary Review

Filing Description Appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review

Reference Number Wagner

Comments Please let me know if the Court needs anything

further. Thank you. Dan Wood

Status Rejected

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Rejection Information

Rejection

Reason Time Rejection Comment

07/07/2015 The petition for discretionary review does not contain the identity of Judge, Parties
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and Counsel [Rule 68.4(a)]. You have ten days to tender a corrected petition for

discretionary review.

Documents

Lead Document Wagner v State PDR.pdf [Original]