[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-14187

Non-Argument Calendar

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D. C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-02218-TWT

DELTA CAB ASSOCIATION, INC.,

WORKESHET CHERINET WMICHAEL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(June 10, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs Delta Cab Association, Inc. (“Delta”), and Workeshet Cherinet 

Wmichael challenge the constitutionality of the City of Atlanta’s (“Atlanta”)

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taxicab ordinances. Plaintiffs claim that the ordinances violate the Equal 

Protection clause and the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 

city ordinances pass constitutional muster and, as applied, do not violate the 

Plaintiffs’ rights. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Atlanta.

Delta is a corporation owned by taxicab drivers, one of whom is Wmichael. 

Atlanta’s Bureau of Taxicabs and Vehicles for Hire regulates taxicabs pursuant to 

Atlanta City Ordinance Chapter 162. Atlanta requires that a taxicab company must 

have a permit to operate, and to obtain a permit, must own or lease at least 25 

taxicabs. Each individual vehicle must also possess a Certificate of Public 

Necessity and Convenience (“CPNC”). Atlanta limits the total number of CPNCs 

to 1600. Currently, 1555 CPNCs are outstanding and the City possesses 45 more 

that it could issue. Delta owns none of the outstanding CPNCs.

The district court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to show the requisite 

property interest to support a procedural due process claim and that Plaintiffs are 

treated no differently than other non-CPNC holders. Furthermore, the ordinance

scheme is rationally related to municipal control of the taxicab industry and serves 

a legitimate government interest. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that Atlanta has 

systematically failed to enforce the ordinances equally as to both CPNC and nonCPNC holders. Plaintiffs also argue that two property interests exist in this case: 

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(1) their alleged entitlement to the granting of a CPNC; and (2) Plaintiffs’ right to 

compete and own their own taxi company in Atlanta. We review these issues of 

constitutional law de novo. Maverick Boat Co. v. Am. Marine Holdings, Inc., 418 

F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 2005).

A viable due process claim requires proof of “(1) deprivation of a 

constitutionally protected property interest; (2) governmental action; (3) and 

constitutionally inadequate process.” Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. 

United States, 716 F.3d 535, 559 (11th Cir. 2013). The Plaintiffs have presented 

no case law to support either of their property interest theories and or to

demonstrate the necessary legitimate claim of entitlement. Doe v. Fla. Bar, 630 

F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 2011). While Doe may be distinguishable in that the 

certification at issue is not necessary to practice law in the same way that a CPNC 

is necessary to operate a taxicab company, that case does not create any sort of 

entitlement to permits that are required to own or operate a business. See Balt. Air 

Transp., Inc. v. Jackson, 419 F. App'x 932, 937 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[N]o 

constitutional right is implicated by a complaint that asserts a property interest in 

maintaining a business or earning a profit.”). Also, as Atlanta argues, Plaintiffs 

complain, not about a permit being taken away, but about their inability to acquire 

a permit. This fact cuts against entitlement. Because the Plaintiffs fail to 

demonstrate a constitutionally protected property interest, their due process 

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challenge fails.

The Plaintiffs go to great lengths to argue that because Atlanta does not 

strictly enforce the ordinances against existing taxicab companies with operating 

permits, the city intentionally treats taxicab drivers differently, thus violating the 

Equal Protection clause. This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, the 

unequal administration of a local statute by local officers “is not a denial of equal 

protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or 

purposeful discrimination.” E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1112-13 

(11th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate such intent or purpose 

beyond conclusory allegations of anti-competitive behavior. Second, other circuits

have upheld regulations that create barriers to entry for new taxicab companies. 

Kan. City Taxi Cab Drivers v. City of Kansas, 742 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 2013); 

Greater Hous. Small Taxicab Co. v. Houston, Tex., 660 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Although the Plaintiffs seek to distinguish these two cases, the regulations at issue

fundamentally operate in the same manner as Atlanta’s ordinances: the laws limit 

the number of taxicab permits – thus creating barriers to entry – in the interest of 

customer service.

For the foregoing reasons,1 the judgment of the district court is

 1 Other arguments raised on appeal by Plaintiffs are rejected without need for further 

discussion. For example, the parties disagree about the proper interpretation of City Code 

Section 162-97(b). Even if Plaintiffs’ interpretation is correct, that would merely be a matter of 

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AFFIRMED.

 

an executive agency’s failure to comply with a local ordinance. Especially in light of the City’s 

pattern and practice of following its interpretation, there is no evidence of discriminatory intent.

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