Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. *

Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

 

No. 08-1103

KIMNY KEO,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

 

Before

Torruella, Baldock, and Lipez, *

Circuit Judges.

 

Joseph A. MacDonald, on brief, for petitioner.

Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

Civil Division, Linda S. Wendtland, Senior Litigation

Counsel, and Justin Constantine, Trial Attorney, Office of

Immigration Litigation, on brief, for respondent.

 

September 25, 2008

 
 Petitioner also unsuccessfully sought relief under the 1

United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). Because

Petitioner has not argued his CAT claim in his appellate

brief, that claim is not before us on the Petition for

Review. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st

Cir. 1990) (recognizing “settled appellate rule that issues

adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some

effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived”).

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BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. The former Immigration and

Naturalization Service (now the Department of Homeland

Security) charged Petitioner Kimny Keo, a citizen of

Cambodia, with overstaying his non-immigrant visa. See 8

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Petitioner admitted the charge’s

factual allegations (contained in a Notice to Appear) and

filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal.

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3). In his application, 1

Petitioner alleged a fear of persecution in Cambodia related

to his past political activities.

Following a hearing at which Petitioner testified at

length, the Immigration Judge (IJ) found him not credible.

See id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),(iii) (establishing framework

for credibility determinations). Based on blanket findings,

the IJ first concluded Petitioner was not eligible for

asylum. The IJ explained that Petitioner did not meet his

burden of establishing he was a “refugee” within the meaning

of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), i.e., one having a well-founded
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fear of persecution based on, among other things, “political

opinion.” See id. § 1158(b) (requiring applicant for asylum

to establish refugee status). The IJ further concluded

Petitioner was not entitled to withholding of removal

because he did not meet his burden of establishing his life

or freedom would be threatened on account of “political

opinion” if removed to Cambodia. See id. § 1231(b)(3). The

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s

appeal, agreeing with the IJ’s “decision for the reasons

stated therein.” The BIA explained that the IJ’s adverse

credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. See 8

C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).

In Jiang v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2007)

we set forth the standard of review applicable to the

present Petition:

This court reviews findings of fact in immigration

proceedings, including findings with respect to

credibility, to determine whether those findings

are supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Under that standard, an adverse credibility

determination may stand if it is supported by

reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on

the record considered as a whole.

(internal quotations and citation omitted). We need not

repeat Petitioner’s story here. We have carefully reviewed

the entire record and the parties’ briefs, and conclude the

IJ and BIA reached a permissible result under the applicable

law. We have repeatedly opined that “‘when a lower court
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accurately takes the measure of a case and articulates a

cogent rationale, it serves no useful purpose for a

reviewing court to write at length.’” Metropolitan Life

Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d 119, 120 (1st Cir. 2005)

(quoting Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d 84, 86 (1st

Cir. 2002) (citing cases)). Because substantial evidence

supports both the IJ’s and BIA’s respective decisions, we

deny the Petition for Review for substantially the reasons

set forth in those decisions. See Lin v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d

22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Where the BIA adopts the IJ’s

ruling, but also engages in discussion of its own, we review

the decisions of both together.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.