IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01527-SCT AMANDA M. COPELAND

v. GARY NEAL COPELAND, JR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/24/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. PERCY L. LYNCHARD, JR. TRIAL COURT ATTORNEY: TRACY BUSTER W ALSH COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: TATE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: BYRON RUSSELL MOBLEY ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: A. E. (RUSTY) HARLOW , JR. KATHI CRESTMAN W ILSON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CUSTODY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/31/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. A m a

n d a C o peland appeals a Tate County chancel l o r ’ s t e r m i n a t i o n o f G a

r y C o p e l a n d ’ s child-support obligation to his two m i nor children. W e af f irm the c hancellor’s decision, as it is supported by the record bef ore us. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Af ter their divorce, Gary and Am anda w ere awarded j oint l egal custody of t heir m inor

c hildren, with phy sical custody awarded to Am a nda a nd visitation awarded to Gary

. Gary subsequently f

iled a Petition f

o r C i tation of C ontem

p t and For M odif

ication and a Motion
f or Tem porary Relief

. Gary pray ed th e c o u r t w ould, inter a lia , f ind that t here h ad been as u b s t a ntial and m aterial change in circum stances entitling Gary t o custody of his m in o r

children a nd attendant child support, inter a lia , and grant a ny general relief deem ed proper by the court. ¶3. During the trial on G ary ’ s petition and m o tion, his seventeen-y e ar-old daughter and thirteen-y ear-old son testif ied. Based o n t h e children’s unwavering t estim o ny , including
responses to questions by the chancellor and explicit exhibits, the chancellor f ound that they

no longer loved their f

ather and they wished to term inate any relationship with h i m. Each child acknowledged sending hatef ul em ails and texts, which i n c l u d e d e x p r e s s e d d e s i r e s e i t

h e r
to k ill their f

ather or see him dead. The num erous text m e ssages a nd em ails adm itted into evidence were f

illed w ith vitriolic invectives, expressing deep-seated a nger, resentm ent, and i l l

- will not only toward their f ather, but also toward his parents and sister, inte r a l i a , supporting the chancellor’s f a ctual f inding. ¶4. Af ter ref lecting on the testim ony

and evidence, the chancellor decreed that: there had been a substantial a nd m aterial change in circum stances which warranted a n analy s is of the Albright 1 f actors, and t hat af

ter s uch analy s is, the cour t f i nds the Albright f

actors f avor t he Def

endant [ Am anda] retaining custody ; theref

ore, any request f or m o dif ication of custody is hereby denied. As to the child-support obligation, the chancellor decreed: the conduct of the m inor children is so egregious t h a t t h e Court is hereby term inating any legal obligation of the Plaintif f [ Gary ] to provide support f or the m inor children in any m anner, i ncluding, but not lim ited to, child support, health i nsurance, a n d m e dical expenses not c o vered by insurance, a n d any other f orm of support previously

ordered by

this court.

1 A lb rig h t v. A lb rig h t , 4 3 7 S o . 2 d 1 0 0 3 (M iss. 1 9 8 3 ). 2The c hancellor announced f rom the bench t hat “the relationship between f ather and children has deteriorated to a point unlike this court h as seen.” Rely ing on Caldwell v. Caldwell , 579
So. 2d 543 (Miss. 1991), a nd its progeny , t he chancello r c o n c l u ded that the children had severed and term i nated any relationship t hey m ay have had with their f ather. The chancellor stated that “the o nly tim e i n which the children had any phy sical contact or personal contact wit h t h e ir f

ather s ince this d ivorce was when t hey wanted som ething by way of m oney or possessions.” The chancellor f ound that the children’s conduct h ad severed the relationship

to the point that Gary was relieved l e g a l l y of any support of the children. The chancellor declared that he was “ well aware that the c ase m u st be e x trem e in order to take this action, and I believe that it is.” Yet the learned chancellor also lef t t he door open f

or r econciliation and expressed his willingness to reconsider the resum p tion of child support. He f

ound that “[ t]he issue of child support m ay be revisited in the f uture, should the r elationship between the Plaintif

f and the m inor children be am ended.”
ANALYSIS ¶5. Am anda app e a l e d , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e c h a n c e l l o r ’ s order abating Gary ’s support obligation w a s in error because ( 1 ) the chancellor was m anif estly wrong in granting relief that was not requested; (2) the children’s anim osity t owards their f ather existed at the tim e of the divorce; a nd ( 3 ) t h e c h a ncellor’s decision was n ot supported by the e vidence. The standard of review in child-custody cases is well-settled: Th i s Court e m

ploy s a lim ited standard of r eview in child-custody cases and will “af f i rm f indings of f

act by chancellors

. . . w h e n t h e y are supported by substantial evidence unless t h e chancellor abused his discretion, was m anif estly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal s t a n d a rd was

3applied.” B orden v. Borden , 1 67 So. 3d 238, 241 (Miss. 2 014). A dditionally ,

“f indings o f f

act m ade by a chancellor m ay n ot be set aside or disturbed upon appeal i f they are supported by substantial, credible evidence.” Marascalco v. Marascalco , 445 So. 2d 1380, 1382 (Miss. 1984).
Carter v. Carter , 204 So. 3d 747, 756 (Miss. 2016).
I. The chancellor did not err by granting relief that w a s n o t specifically requested. ¶6. In his pleadings, Gary sought the f

ollowing relief

: 5. There has been a substantial and m aterial c hange in c ircum stances s i n ce the entry of the prior Order of this Court which adversely af f ect s the m i nor c hildren of the parties to wit:

. . . s p e c i f i c a l ly , the prior Order should be m odif

ied to grant custody of the m i nor children to P laintif f , and with regard to visitation, child s upport, and incom e tax exem ptions.

. . . 7. The Plaintif

f is entitled to such other, dif f erent, or general relief a s the evidence shows proper. . . . 2
The pleadings raised the i ssue of f inancial support f

or the children, inter alia

. S ee Brennan

v. Br e n n a n , 6 3 8 S o. 2d 1 320, 1325 (Miss. 1 994) (W hen a party subm its f o r the court’s consideration the issue o f child support, he s ubm its all issues p ertaining to the subject of that support).

2 G ary req u ested th e sam e relief ag ain in h i s p r ay er f

o r relief : (e) T h at th e C o u rt m o d if y th e p rio r O rd er(s) to g ran t cu sto d y o f th e m in o r c h i l d ren t o P l ain tif

f , an d w ith r eg ard to v isitatio n , ch i ld su p p o rt, an d in co m e tax ex em

p tio n s;

. . . (g ) T h at th e C o u rt sh o u ld g ran t P lain tif f su ch f u r th er, d if f e ren t, o r g en e ral relief as th e C o u rt f

in d s p ro p er u p o n th e ev id en c e w h en t h is cau se co m es o n to b e h eard

. . . . 4¶7. Additionally , Rule 54(c) o f the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure reads in pertinent

part that “.

. . every f

i nal judgm ent shall grant the relief to which the party in whose f avor it is rendered is entitled by the proof and which i s within the jurisdiction of the court to grant,

even if t h e p a r t

y h a s not demanded such relief i n his pleadings

. . . .” M.R.C.P. 54(c) (em phasis added). Furtherm ore, in Redm ond v. Cooper , 151 Miss. 771, 119 S o. 592 (1928), this Court af

f i r m e d a chancellor’s decree and held that:
A pray er f

or g eneral relief is as b r o a d as the equitable powers of the court. Under it, the court will shape its decree according to the equities of the case, and, b roadly speaking, will grant any relief warranted by t he allegations of the bill, whether it i s the o nly pray er in the b ill, or whether there is a special pray er f or particular and dif

f erent relief

; and def e cts i n the special pray e r are usually cured by a general pray er. If the f acts a lleged are broad enough to warrant relief , it m a tters not how narrow the specif ic pray er m ay be, if the bill contains a pray e r f

o r general relief

. The pray er f

or general relief s e rves to aid and supplem ent the s pecial pray er by expanding the special r elief sought, so as to authorize f

urther relief of the sam e n ature. It m ay also serve a s a substitute f or the pray e r f

or s pecial r elief

, and authorize relief o f a d if f erent nature when t hat specially pray ed is denied.
Redm ond , 119 So. at 593 (quoting 21 C. J. 679, ¶ 858). ¶8. W hether we analy ze this issue u nder the specif ic request c oncerning child support or, alternatively , under the general request f or r elief , Gary p revails. Accordingly , w e f ind that the chancellor n eith e r a

bused his discretion nor applied an erroneous l egal standard. His judgm ent com

plies with our laws.
II. The chancellor did not er r in determ ining the children’s conduct w as an after-arising m aterial change in circum stances. ¶9. Child-sup p o r t changes are warranted “where t here is a showing of an af t er-arising

m aterial change in circum stances regarding o ne o r m ore o f the interested p arties, i.e., the

5f

ather, m other, or child.” Setser v. Piazza , 644 So. 2d 1211, 1215 (Miss. 1994) (citing Gregg

v. Montgom ery , 587 So. 2d 928, 931 (Miss. 1991)). T he change in circum s tances “m ust have been unan t i c i p a t e d by the parties at the tim e the child-support judgm ent was entered.”
Ravenstein v. Ravenstein , 167 So. 3d 210, 218 (Miss. 2014) (citing McEwen v. McEwen , 631 So. 2d 821, 823 (Miss. 1994)). Upon review of the recor d, we cannot say that the chancellor com m itted m a nif e st error in f

inding a m aterial change in circum stances. Even if ,

as A m anda argues, the children w ere hostile to Gary b ef ore the divorce decree was entered, Gary presented substantial evidence of a f e r vid increase in the children’s hostility af ter the divorce. For these reasons, we f ind this issue to be without m erit.
III. The chancellor’s term ination of Gary ’s c hild-support o bligation w as supported by the evidence. ¶10. The holdings i n sim ilar cases illustrate t he Herculean balancing act which is required of our chancellors. The outcom e in each of the sim ilar cases rested u pon t he issues raised and joined b y the parties and the specif ic f acts presented at those trials. The varied holdings in l i k e cases reveal that our chancellors astutely recognize the task bef ore them bef

o r e announcing their f

inal judgm ents. Such balancing acts are part of the f oundation upon which

our def erential standar d o f review m ust lie. Our review of f indings of f

acts is highly def erential to the chancellors, f or only he or she has heard the live testim ony and observed the witnesses f

irsthand. W e then determ ine whether the f indings of f

a cts support the conclusions of

law. In today ’s case, they do. ¶11. In this case, t h e c h a ncellor not only provided a s ound l egal basis f or his ruling, but rendered detailed f

actual f indings bef

ore he decreed that the c hildren had f orf eited t heir right

6to f

inancial support f

r om Gary based on their “clear and e xtrem e” conduct and b ehavior. In his ruling f

rom the trial bench, he stated: The children through em a ils and text m essages, as well as in-court testim o ny , have ref erenced their hatred and their unwillingness to have a relationship with their natural f

ather. They have sent vicious, venom ous, and hatef u l em ails and texts directed especially to him over and over and over again expressing their distaste, lack of love, and, in f ac t , t h e i r h a t red f

or him to the point that they wish that h e, in f

act, w ere dead, or under certain circ u ms t a n c e s, that they would kill him

.

. . . The Court f

inds based upon the actions of the children in this case at bar, t hat u nder the param eters set f orth in Caldwell v. Caldwell , they have taken t h e position as y oung a s they ma y b e, to c om pletely term inate a ny relationship w h i c h t hey m ay have with their f ather and them

. The Court is extrem el y cognizant that the r ight of visitation of a party is a very preciou s right to be protected and only in extrem e c ases

– clear and extrem e case s s u f f i c ient to constitute a f

orf eiture of child support should that rem edy be invoked.
In this case based u

pon the evidence presented where the children who have been supplied with their own com puters and their o wn cell p h o n e s a nd suf f iciently e ncouraged or at least unencouraged by the m other have set f orth that their relationship should not continue. The chancellor reviewed num erous texts and em ails f r om t h e c h i l d ren to their f ather, expressing an intense hatred of their f ather. Even t hen, t he chancellor af f orded the children

an o p portunity to repudiate the texts and em ails during their live testim ony . E a c h c h i ld rejecte d t h i s invitation and conf irm ed his or her convictions as to how h e or she f elt about their f ather. The chancellor, b eing the only one to view t he wi t n e s s e s a n d o bserve their dem eanor, is in the best position to determ ine if the actions and conduct of the m inor children were convincingly

clear and extrem e, warranting a term ination of child support.

7¶12. This Court in Caldwell held that a m inor child c o uld “f orf eit his support f

rom a noncustodial p arent,” if the child’s conduct was “clear and extrem e.” Caldwell , 579 So. 2d at 548. W e f

ind no error in the chancellor’s f indings that t h e c h i l d r e n’s clear and extrem e conduct f orf eited their right to support f rom their f ather. ¶13. W e are ever-m indf u l of the sage advice restated by Justice Maxwell (then a Court of Appeals judge in a case addressing f orf eiture).“W hen reviewing a chancellor’s decision to

term inate a p arent’s f

inancial o b ligations to his or her child, we do not ask if the decision is the sam e one we would have m ade. Rather, we are i nstructed to give the chancellor d ef erence

a n d a sk whether the decision was one the chancellor could h ave m ade.” Stasny v. Wag e s , 116 So. 3d 195, 196 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). 3 ¶14. W h ile the Legislature through statutes h as expanded the com m on-law obligation(s)

to pay child support, th e s tatutes singled out by the dissent are not the only o r exclusive statutes addressing child support. See also Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-5-23, 93-5-24, 93-5-34, 93-7-7, 9 3-9-35, 93-11-65, 93-11-69, and 9 3-11-71 (Rev. 2013). Nor is t he f ull body of our law f o und in s tatutes. C ourts m ust alway s b e vigilant neither to read statutes to override the constitutional restrictions i m posed on the various m a gistrates by Article 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the M ississippi C onstitution, nor to interf ere with the constitu tional authority of chancellors f

ound in Article 6, Section 159.

3 T h e C o u rt o f A p p e als af f irm ed th e ch an cello r’s f

in d in g s th at t h e ch ild ’s a c t i o n s w e re clear an d ex trem e t o a d eg ree to j u stif y f o rf eitin g p aren tal su p p o rt. S

ta sn y , 1 1 6 S o . 3 d at 1 9 8

. 8¶15. The dissent observes that the chancellor did n ot ref e rence S ections 4 3-19-101 and 43-
19-103 o f the Mississippi Code in his ruling. W e do not dispute t hat observation, but those sections have no relevance here. 4 Once the chancellor determ ined that, based on the clear and

extrem e conduct of the children, child support was f orf eited, com

puting an amount of child support using the f

o rm ula provided by the guidelines i s i r r e levant. It is a non sequitur to require a chancellor to apply irrelevant guidelines ef f ecting t h e a m o u n t of child support, when the sam e c hancello r h a s d e c reed the duty to pay c h ild support no longer exists. All child support statutes clearly have purpose a n d should b e consulted in all cases t o determ ine

an appropriate am ount of child support when child support is due. In this case, no child support is due. ¶16. The only issues presented to t his Court by th e p a r t i e s w e r e: (1) was the chancellor

m anif estly wrong in granting relief that was n ot r equested; (2) did the children’s anim osity toward t heir f

a ther exist at the t im e of the divorce; and (3) w as t he chancellor’s decision supported by the evidence. Neither party requested that t he c hancellor apply Sections 43-19-
101 or 43-19-103. ¶17. This issue was not presented to the trial c ourt, nor was t his issue raised i n the original appellate brief

s. “This Court m ay not act upon or consider m a tters w hich do not appear in the record and m

u st conf ine itself to what actually does appear in th e r e c o r d

. ” Shelton v.

4 T h e ap p licab ility o f th ese sam e sectio n s h as n o t b een raised in a sin g le case b ef o re th is C o u r t o r th e C o u rt o f A p p eals ad d ressin g term in atio n o f ch ild su p p o rt. S ee D ep ’t o

f H u m a n S ervs. v. M a rsh a ll , 8 5 9 S o . 2 d 3 8 7 (M iss. 2 0 0 3 ); C a ld w ell , 5 7 9 S o . 2 d 5 4 3 ; S

ta n sy , 1 1 6 S o . 3 d 1 9 5 ; D

yk es v. M

cM u rry , 9 3 8 S o . 2 d 3 3 0 (M iss. C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 6 ); R o b erts v. B r o w n , 8 0 5 S o . 2 d 6 4 9 (M i ss. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 2 ). 9Kindred , 279 So. 2d 642, 644 (Miss. 1973). Following t his Court’s well-es tablished

precedent, as these issues were not raised by the parties, we decline to f urther address them

. ¶18. There is no question that a chancellor has the authority to term inate child support. In this ca s e , t he chancellor m a de clear f indings on the record as to why the children had
f orf eited Gary ’s f

inancial support.
CONCLUSION ¶19. Thus, w e f

ind that the chancellor did not abuse h i s d i s c r e t i o n , w as not m anif estly
wrong o r clearly erroneous, and did not apply an erroneous legal s tandard. The chancellor’s
f indings of

f act were supported by

substantial and credible evidence. W e af f irm

. ¶20. AFFIRMED. WALLER, C .J., MAX WELL, B E A M A ND C HAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., CONCURS I N PART AND IN RESULT WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY RANDOLPH, P.J. , AND MAX WELL, J. DICKINSON, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN O PINION JOINED BY KITCHENS AND KING, JJ.; COLEMAN, J., JOINS IN PART. COLEMAN, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND IN RESULT: ¶21. I concur w i t h t h e ma j o r i t y ’ s a n a l y s i s of and holdings as t o the f irst two issues addressed in the m a

jority opinion, i.e. , the granting of r elief not specif ically r equested and
f inding that the attitudes of the children t oward their f ather constituted a m aterial change in circum stances. ¶22. However, a s to the third issue and t he b one o f contention between the m a jority and Presiding Justice Dickinson, I, on the one hand, agree with t he dissent that the statutory schem e f or child support has supplanted the com m on law. I agree that t he d ecisions to award

1 0child s upport and t o set the a m o unt of supp o r t are b oth governed by Mississippi Code

Sections 43-19-101 and 43-19-103. Accordingly , the m ajority i s i ncorrect when it writes that the two c o de sections h a ve no relevance. (Maj. Op. a t ¶ 15). Moreover, th e ma j ority ’s intim ation that Sections 43-19-101 and 43-19-103 are unconstitutional e ncroachm e nts upon the constitutional jurisdiction of the chancery

courts is m isplaced. (Maj. Op. at ¶ 14). ¶23. Nevertheless, the trial c ourt com m itted no reversible error. The chancellor issued an oral opinion f

rom the bench and clearly stated that he relied on Caldwell v. C aldwell , 579 So. 2d 543 ( Miss. 1991), when h e ended G a ry Copeland’s child support obligations. Am anda Copeland f

ailed to argue at the tim e or on w ritten m otion f or rehearing t hat the trial court had erred in doing so. Absent plain error, the court does not hold trial judges in e rror f or issues not presented to them

f or decision or not raised by the aggrieved party in its brief

. ¶24. Under the plain error doctrine, t he Court “retains the inherent authority to notice error

to prevent the m anif

est m iscarriage of justice, despite t rial counsel’s f ailure to preserve the
error.” Alpha Gulf Coast, Inc. v . Jackson , 8 01 So. 2d 7 09, 727 (¶ 60) ( Miss. 2001) (citing
Johnson v. Fargo , 6 04 So. 2d 306, 311 (Miss. 1992)). “For the plain-error doctrine to apply , there m ust have been a n e rror that resulted in m a n i f e s t m iscarriage of justice or seriously af f ects the f airness, i ntegrity or public reputation of j udicial proceedings.” J

ohnson v. State , 1 5 5 S o . 3 d 733, 738 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Burdette v. S tate , 110 So. 3d 2 96, 303 (Miss. 2013)). Because the Court has not bef ore today acknowledged the abrogation of the com m on law by Sections 43-19-101 and 43-19-103 and there is insuf f i cient reason to b elieve the chancellor would have reached a d if f erent result had he considered the i ssue p ursuant to the

1 1statutes, the error does n ot a rise t o the level o f plain error. Accordingly , I a g r e e w i t h t he

result reached by

the m ajority and would af f irm

. RANDOLPH, P.J., AND MAX W ELL, J., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART. DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶25. W h en M ississippi established its current Constitution in 1890, it granted t o the courts of c hancery not only the j urisdiction over m a tters controlled by principles of equity , but also jurisdiction over several areas c ontrolled by law, including “[ d]ivorce and a l i mo n y , ” and
“m inor’s business.” 5 Since its o rigin in England in 1576, 6 the duty to support children has been controlled by

legal (“com m on law”) principles. ¶26. At com m on law, parents had an obligation to support their children. B ut when a child display ed a c ertain l evel o f disrespect f o r a n oncustodial parent, judges had the discretion to relieve t hat parent o f the obligation to pay c hild support. And g e nerally , we still apply

com m on-law principles and doctrines to the issues bef ore us. ¶27. But it is the L egislature—not this Court—that decides whether to leave com m on-law principles and doctrines in p l ace or to supplant them with statutes; and when the Legislature, through i ts statutes, speaks on a m atter o f s u bstantive l aw, the s tatutory law s u p p l a n t s the

com m on law. 7 So, if the case bef ore us is to be decided properly , the f irst question is

5 M iss. C o n st. art. 6 , § 1 5 9

. 6 A ct F o r S ettin g o f th e P o o r o n Wo rk , a n d f o r th e A v o i d i n g o f Id len ess, 1 8 E lizab eth 1 , C

. 3 (1 5 7 6 ).

7 S ee e.g
. D e

S o t o C ty. v. T .D . , 1 6 0 S o . 3 d 1 1 5 4 , 1 1 5 6

– 5 8 (M iss. 2 0 1 5 ) ( “ O t h e r s , in clu d in g M ississip p i, h a v e s u p p lan ted th e co m m o n law w ith statu tes th at h av e estab lish ed th e leg islativ e b r a n c h ’ s v iew s o f th e ap p r o p riate l im its a n d p ro tectio n s o f so v ereig n 1 2whether the Legislature has c reated a child-support obligation. Clearly i t has. And statutes

supplant the com m on law, so c h a n c ellors m ust l ook to statutes f

or their authority to award—or not to award—child support. And if their cases are t o be decided properly , they

m ust f ollow the law. ¶28. The m aj o r i t y c orrectly observes that s tatutory enactm ents m ay not take a way f rom constitutional m andates; but that observa t i o n h as no bearing here. Nothing in any constitutional provision cited by the m ajority cr e a t e s a duty to pay child support. Thus, courts should look to the content of the statutes that control child support. ¶29. Section 43-19-101 seem s quite c l ear to m e . It creates a rebuttable presum p tion that

c h i l d support should be paid in a certain am ount based on t he num ber of children and th e
pay ing parent’s adjusted gross incom e. 8 Under the statute, t he “presum p tion applies in all judicial or administrative p roceedings regarding the awarding or m odif y ing o f child support in this state.” 9 And the presum ption controls the am ount awarded unless the judicial or adm inistra t i ve body awarding or m odif y ing t he c h ild support award m akes a writt e n f i nding or specif

i c f i nding on t he record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case as determ ined under the criteria specif ied in Section 43-19-103.” 10

im m u n ity

. . . . Were w e ap p ly in g co m m o n -law im m u n i ty , w e w o u ld b e f

r ee to lim it th at im m u n ity

. B u t th e L eg islatu re rem o v ed o u r d iscretio n w i t h t h e M ississip p i T o rt C laim s A c t.”).

8 M iss. C o d e A n n . § 4 3 -1 9 -1 0 1 (R ev . 2 0 1 5 ).

9 M iss. C o d e A n n . § 4 3 -1 9 -1 0 1 (1 ) (R e v . 2 0 1 5 ) (em p h asis ad d e d ).

10 M i ss. C o d e A n n . § 4 3

- 1 9 -1 0 1 (2 ) (R ev . 2 0 1 5 ). 1 3¶30. The section f ollowing this m andate sets f o rth the criteria w hich m ay be considered to rebut the presum

ption: (a) Extraordinary m edical, psy chological, educational o r dental expenses. (b) Independent incom e of the child. (c) The pay

m ent of both child support and spousal support to the o bligee. (d) Seasonal variations in one or both parents’ incom es or expenses. (e) The age of the child, taking into account the great e r n e e ds of older children. (f ) Special needs that have traditionally been m et within t he f am ily b udget e ven though the f

ulf illing of those needs will c ause the support t o exceed the proposed guidelines. (g) The particular shared p arental arrangem ent, such as where the noncustodial parent spends a g reat deal of tim e with the children thereby r educing the f

inancial expend i t ures incurred by the custodial parent, or the ref

usal of the noncustodial p arent to becom e involved in the activities of

the child, or giving due consideration to the custodial parent’s hom em aking services. (h) Total available assets of the obligee, obligor and the child. (i) Pay

m ent b y the obligee of child care expenses in order that the obligee m a y seek or retain em

ploy m e nt, or because of the disability of the obligee. (j) Any other adjustm ent which is needed to a c h i e v e a n equitable result which m a y include, but not be lim ited to, a r easonable and necessary existing expense or debt. 11 ¶31. Through subsection (j)’s catchall provision, the Legislature has granted chancellors broad d i s cretion to f

ind that the statutory presum ptions have been rebutted based on the

11 M i ss. C o d e A n n . § 4 3

- 1 9 -1 0 3 (R ev . 2 0 1 5 ). 1 4dem ands of equity —broad enough, in m y view, to encom pass the clear and extrem e conduct described in Caldwell v. Caldwell , 12 which the chancellor f ound. ¶32. But the chancellor’s analy sis should have began with the rebuttable presum ption that Gary m ust pay child support in the am ount set by statute, f ollowed by s pecif

i c f indings as to how the presum

ption was rebutted. 13 And this analy sis should have been applied to Gary ’s obligation to pay

child support as to each child. ¶33. My c olleague, Justice Colema n , u n n e c e s s a r i l y w o r r i e s t h a t this issue was not presented to the trial court. Clearly , the chancellor decided the issue of whether Gary ’s childsupport obligation s hould be term inated. Am a n d a a p p e a l ed t hat decision. So he and the

m ajority are incorrect when they suggest I would hold the c hancellor in error f or a n issue not presented to h im

. The issue—whether t h e child-support obligation should be

term inated—was addressed and decided in t he trial court. My resort to the statutes sim

ply applies the correct law to determ ine whether the chancellor’s decision was correct. ¶34. Justice Col e ma n a g r e e s t h a t t h e com m o n-law duty to pay child support has been supplanted by our statutes, 14 but he f inds no reversible error because “Am anda Copeland
f ailed to argue a t the tim e o r o n w r i t t e n m otion f or rehearing that the trial court erred in”

12 C a ld w ell v. C a ld w ell , 5 7 9 S o . 2 d 5 4 3 , 5 4 8 (M iss. 1 9 9 1 ).

13 S ee C h esn ey v . C h esn e y , 9 1 0 S o . 2 d 1 0 5 7 , 1 0 6 1 (M iss. 2 0 0 5 ) (citin g M cE a ch ern v. M cE a ch ern , 6 0 5 S o . 2 d 8 0 9 , 8 1 4 ( M iss. 1 9 9 2 )) ( “H o w ev er, f o r th is C o u rt to af

f irm an aw ard w h ich d ev iates f

ro m th e g u id elin e o f S ectio n 4 3

- 1 9 -1 0 1 (1 ), th e ch a n c e l lo r m u st o v erco m e th e reb u ttab le p resu m p tio n th at t h e statu t o ry aw ard is t h e ap p ro p riate m easu re o f ch ild su p p o rt b y m a k in g a n o n -th e-reco rd f in d in g th at i t w o u l d b e u n j u st o r in a

p p ro p riate to ap p l y th e g u id elin e s in th e in stan t case.”).

14 C o lem an O p . at ¶ 2 2

. 1 5r e l y i n g o n Caldwell

. 15 Justice C olem an p oints to no rule that requires an attorney to f ile a post-trial m otion, and I will not f ind an issue u nappealable b ecause an attorney f ailed to do

som ething he was n ot required to do—especially in a case dealing with child s u p p o r t and child custody , such as this one. ¶35. Because the chanc e l l o r f a i l e d t o f

o l l o w c o n t r o l l i n g statutory m andates bef ore
term inating child support, I would rem and f or a proper analy sis u nder t he applicable statutory provisions.
KITCHENS AND KING, JJ., J OIN T HIS OPINI O N . COLEMAN, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.

15 C o lem an O p . at ¶ 2 3

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