Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 107 / Monday, June 4, 2001 / Notices 30025

determination that the facility has been

cleared of radioactive material before

the facility is released for unrestricted

use.

A copy of the final supporting

statement may be viewed free of charge

at the NRC Public Document Room, One

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville

Pike, Room O–1 F23, Rockville, MD

20852. OMB clearance requests are

available at the NRC worldwide web

site: http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/PUBLIC/

OMB/index.html. The document will be

available on the NRC home page site for

60 days after the signature date of this

notice.

Comments and questions should be

directed to the OMB reviewer listed

below by July 5, 2001. Comments

received after this date will be

considered if it is practical to do so, but

assurance of consideration cannot be

given to comments received after this

date. Amy Farrell, Office of Information

and Regulatory Affairs (3150–0028),

NEOB–10202, Office of Management

and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day

of May, 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Brenda Jo. Shelton,

NRC Clearance Officer, Office of the Chief

Information Officer.

[FR Doc. 01–13898 Filed 6–1–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–333]

Entergy Nuclear Fitzpatrick, LLC and

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power

Plant; Exemption

1.0 Background

Entergy Nuclear FitzPatrick, LLC and

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. are the

holders of Facility Operating License

No. DPR–59 which authorizes operation

of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear

Power Plant (JAF). The license provides,

among other things, that the facility is

subject to all rules, regulations, and

orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC, the Commission)

now or hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of a boiling-water

reactor located in Oswego County in

New York.

2.0 Purpose

By letter dated October 30, 2000, the

Power Authority of the State of New

York (PASNY), then the licensee for

JAF, submitted a request for exemption

from certain technical requirements of

Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR

part 50, in accordance with the

provisions of 10 CFR 50.12. Specifically,

PASNY requested an exemption from

Section III.G.2.c in that it requires

certain redundant trains of equipment

located in the same fire area, where

automatic fire detection and automatic

fire suppression are provided, to be

protected with a 1-hour rated fire

barrier. On November 21, 2000,

PASNY’s interests in the license were

transferred to Entergy Nuclear

FitzPatrick, LLC, which is now

authorized to possess and use

FitzPatrick and to Entergy Nuclear

Operations, Inc., which is now

authorized to possess, use and operate

FitzPatrick. By letter dated January 26,

2001, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

(the licensee) requested that the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

continue to review and act on all

requests before the Commission which

had been submitted by PASNY before

the transfer. Accordingly, the NRC staff

continued its review. By letter dated

February 7, 2001, the licensee provided

supplemental information.

Section III.G.2.c of appendix R Title

10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR), part 50 specifies that certain

fire protection features are necessary in

order to assure the ability to achieve and

maintain hot shutdown conditions. The

high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI)

for reactor coolant makeup and Train B

of residual heat removal (RHR) for

suppression pool cooling are credited in

the licensee’s safe shutdown analysis for

achieving and maintaining hot

shutdown conditions and Train B of

alternate shutdown cooling (ASD) is

credited for achieving cold shutdown

for a fire in the west cable tunnel (CT–

1). A power cable that supports HPCI,

Train B RHR and ASD is routed through

CT–1. CT–1 also houses the redundant

required safe shutdown equipment.

The power cable for HPCI, Train B

RHR and ASD in CT–1 has been

protected with a fire wrap material to

meet Appendix R in order to separate

these systems from the redundant

systems located in CT–1. However, it

was found that this fire wrap material

did not meet the requirements of 1-hour

fire protection. Thus, an exemption

from the requirements of Section

III.G.2.c of appendix R to 10 CFR part

50 was requested.

3.0 Discussion

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the

Commission may, upon application by

any interested person or upon its own

initiative, grant exemptions from the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50, when

(1) the exemptions are authorized by

law, will not present an undue risk to

public health or safety, and are

consistent with the common defense

and security; and (2) when special

circumstances are present.

A power cable for HPCI, Train B RHR

and ASD in CT–1 has been protected

with a fire wrap material to meet

appendix R in order to separate these

systems from the redundant systems

located in CT–1. The licensee intended

that the fire barrier material be rated for

1 hour, but the licensee later identified

that there was not sufficient evidence to

demonstrate that the barrier meets the

acceptance criteria for a rated 1–hour

fire barrier wrap. Based on fire barrier

testing, the barrier exceeded test

acceptance criteria at 30 minutes.

The primary in-situ combustible

loading in CT–1 is cable, which the

licensee states would contribute to a

slowly developing cable fire. The

originally installed cables for JAF were

specified and ordered before IEEE Std.

383–1974, which provides a flame

spread rating indicating slow flame

spreading, was issued. However, an

analysis was performed by the licensee

which evaluated the flame retardant

capability of the installed cable and it

was determined that the installed cable

was similar to IEEE 383–1974 rated

cable. The only other combustible

materials identified in the area are

limited quantities of fiberglass

associated with a water tank, ladders

and piping. The only ignition sources

which have been identified are the

cables.

An automatic area-wide early warning

smoke detection system is installed in

CT–1. The system was designed and

installed to National Fire Protection

Association (NFPA) standards, NFPA–

72D, 1979, Proprietary Signaling

Systems and NFPA–72E, 1978,

Automatic Detectors. In some cases the

installed system does not meet the

codes of record. These code deficiencies

are related to lack of electrical

supervision of circuits, lack of recording

of alarms, lack of environmental

qualification, over loading of fire

detection signaling lines, some beam

pockets lacking detectors, and power

supplies not meeting NFPA standards.

The licensee has determined that the

code deviations do not adversely impact

safety performance. The majority of the

deficiencies would not degrade the

performance of the fire detection system

but may impact the system’s

availability. Site administrative

procedures control compensatory

measures for the detection system in

CT–1 in the event that the detection

system is unavailable. The code

deficiency of lacking smoke detectors in

30026 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 107 / Monday, June 4, 2001 / Notices

two of the beam pockets may impact the

performance of the system. Based on the

proximity of the unprotected beam

pockets to the fire wrap, over 80 feet

away, the licensee concludes that the

smoke detectors in the general area are

adequate to provide detection of any

credible fire which may potentially

damage the fire wrap. Based on the

information provided by the licensee,

the staff concurs that the code

deviations and lack of detectors in all

beam pockets would not adversely

impact the fire detection system’s

performance in the area of the fire wrap.

An automatic area-wide wet pipe

sprinkler system is installed in CT–1.

The licensee states that the system

meets the design requirements of

NFPA–13, 1991, and is designed and

installed as an Extra Hazard (Group 1)

system. In addition, an in-tray automatic

wet pipe water spray system is designed

to suppress a tray based fire. The

licensee states that the water spray

system meets the design requirements of

NFPA–15, 1990, Water Spray Systems.

Water hose lines and fire extinguishers

are available to the fire brigade inside

the zone to support manual

suppression. In addition, hose stations

with additional lengths of hose are

available outside of the area if needed.

Transient combustible materials in

the area are kept to a minimum based

on the administrative limits for the area.

Administrative limits may be exceeded

only when an evaluation has been

performed and a combustible control

permit has been issued. All station hot

work, including cutting and welding, is

controlled by administrative

procedures. Special requirements for the

CT–1 are that fire protection personnel

will approve hot work in this area and

that fire protection personnel will

inspect the area during the performance

of hot work at least every 2 hours.

The NRC staff examined the licensee’s

rationale to support the exemption

request and believes that reasonable

assurance that at least one means of

achieving and maintaining safe

shutdown conditions will remain

available during and after any

postulated fire in the plant.

Accordingly, the request for an

exemption from the requirements of 10

CFR part 50 appendix R, Section

III.G.2.c with respect to fire area CT–1

meets the special circumstances

delineated in 10 CFR part 50.12(a)(2)(ii),

i.e., the application of the regulation in

these particular circumstances is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of the rule. While the installed

fire barrier in CT–1 has less than a 1-

hour fire endurance rating, it will

provide some resistance to fire. The area

where the fire barrier is located has no

ignition sources other than cables, has

available manual suppression

capability, and is equipped with

automatic fire suppression and fire

detection. Under these circumstances,

there is an adequate level of fire safety

such that there is reasonable assurance

that at least one means of achieving and

maintaining safe shutdown conditions

will remain available during and after

any postulated fire in the plant, and

therefore, the underlying purpose of the

rule is met.

Based on the NRC staff review, and

circumstances described above, the staff

concludes that an exemption from the

technical requirements of Section

III.G.2.c of appendix R to 10 CFR part

50 to the extent that it requires the

enclosure of cables of one redundant

train of safe shutdown equipment in a

1-hour fire rated barrier, is appropriate

for fire area CT–1. See the safety

evaluation that supports these findings

dated May 29, 2001.

4.0 Conclusion

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by

law, will not present an undue risk to

public health and safety, and is

consistent with the common defense

and security. Also, special

circumstances are present. Therefore,

the Commission hereby grants Entergy

Nuclear FitzPatrick, LLC and Entergy

Nuclear Operations, Inc. the requested

exemption from the requirements of

Section III.G.2.c of appendix R to 10

CFR part 50 for the JAF.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment (66 FR27540).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day

of May 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Cynthia A. Carpenter,

Acting Director, Division of Licensing Project

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–13900 Filed 6–1–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–334 and 50–412]

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating

Company, et al.; Notice of

Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–

66 and NPF–73, issued to FirstEnergy

Nuclear Operating Company, et al., (the

licensee), for operation of the Beaver

Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and

2 (BVPS–1 and 2) located in

Shippingport, Pennsylvania.

The proposed amendment would

revise the Technical Specifications

(TSs) associated with requirements for

handling irradiated fuel assemblies in

the reactor containment and in the fuel

building. The proposed amendment

would also revise the TSs associated

with ensuring that safety analysis

assumptions are met for a postulated

fuel handling accident (FHA).

Specifically, the revised FHA

radiological analysis that is submitted in

support of the proposed amendment,

demonstrates that ‘‘non-recently’’

irradiated fuel does not contain

sufficient fission products to require

operability of accident mitigation

features to meet the accident analysis

assumptions. Consequently, the

accident mitigation features such as

building integrity and engineered safety

feature (ESF) ventilation systems would

not be required during fuel handling

activities that do not involve ‘‘recently’’

irradiated fuel assemblies. The

radiological analyses utilized to support

this amendment request were performed

based on the guidance provided in

NUREG–0800, ‘‘Standard Review Plan,’’

Chapter 15.0.1 and Regulatory Guide

(RG) 1.183, ‘‘Alternative Radiological

Source Terms for Evaluating Design

Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power

Reactors.’’ The decay time specified in

TS 3/4.9.3, ‘‘Decay Time,’’ would be

revised from 150 hours to 100 hours.

The proposed amendment also includes

administrative, editorial, and format

changes to the TSs and Bases associated

with the revisions discussed above.

Changes to the Updated Final Safety

Analysis Reports for BVPS–1 and 2

associated with the description of a

postulated FHA and its calculated

radiological consequences are also

included.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the