2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
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# U S A v . P epp e rs P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-3391

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/795* Ho nora ble M yron H . Brigh t, Unite d Sta tes C ourt o f A ppea ls for th e Eig hth C ircuit,

sitting by designation. NOT PRECEDE NTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT
No. 03-3391

__________ UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v. RONN IE PEPPERS, Ap pellan t.

__________ On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt for the M iddle D istrict of P enns ylvania Civil Action No. 1:00- CR-00105 Distri ct Judge: Honorable Sy lvia H. Rambo
Submitte d Under Third Circ uit L. A.R. 34.1( a)

April 20, 2004

___________ Before: SCIRI CA, GARTH, an d BRIGHT, * Circu it Judges

(Opinion Fi led: Apri l 21, 2004 )

OPI NION

__________-2-

Ga rth, Circu it Judge : Ronnie Peppers argues on appeal that t he crimi nal st atuteto which he unconditi onally

pled guilty in the Dis tri ct Court i s unconsti tuti onal. For the r easons set forth bel ow, we wi llaff irm. I. Because we write s olely for the be nefit

of the parties , we recount the fact s and the pro ced ura l histo ry of th is ca se o nly as th ey are relev ant to the f ollo win g di scu ssio n. In November 2000, the federalgovernment char ged Peppers wit h, among other things, com mitting first-degree m urder. Just befo re jury selection was to b egin, Pepp ers
anno unce d that h e w ished to repr esen t hims elf bu t the D istrict Co urt Jud ge de nied h is request . A jurysubsequently convict ed Peppers and t he District Court

Judge sent enced him to l ife i n prison plus five y ears. On appeal a three-judge panel of our Court vacated Peppers’s conviction and remanded for a new tria l because it determined that theDistri ct Co urt Ju dge had not pro per ly ruled on P epp ers’s req ues t to re pre sen t him selfat tria l. See United States v. Peppers, 302 F .3d 120 (3 d Cir. 200 2). On remand, Peppers entered into a plea agreement with t he United States Att orney for the M iddle District of Pe nnsylvania. In exch ange fo r the Un ited States Attorne y’s promise t o drop allof the other charge s and to se ek onlyan agreed- upon fift een-y ear sentence , Peppers agreed t o plead gui lty to posses sing a . 22 cali ber revol ver as an armed
care er cr imin al in v iolat ion of 1 8 U .S.C . § 92 2(g )(1) ( the “ felo n-in -po sses sion ” sta tute)
.1 18 U .S.C. § 922 (g)(1). -3-

Following a hearing, the Dist rict Court Judge acc epted Pepper s’s gui lty plea and sentence d him to fi fteen y ears i n prison. The sentence a lso i ncluded fi ve years of supervised release, a $1,200 fine, and a $ 100 spe cial assessmen t. At the hearing, P eppers specifi call y acknowle dged, through his attorney, that t he revolve r in ques tion had t ravele d in in tersta te co mm erce . Immediatel y fol lowing his sentenci ng, Peppers file d a notic e of appeal. He argues on ap peal th at his co nvictio n m ust be vaca ted be caus e the f elon-in -poss ession statute is unconsti tuti onal ins ofar that it exceeds the powers grant ed to Congress under the Co mm erce Cla use . II. We have juris dicti on to hear t his appealpursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standar d of revie w is “plai n error ” because Pepper s acknowledges t hat he di d not rai se the Co mm erce Cla use arg um ent b efo re th e D istrict Co urt. See Un ited S tates v. G ricc o, 277 F.3d 339, 350 ( 3d Cir. 2002) . Under plai n error review, we maygrant relie f onlyif the Distri ct Court c ommitted an e rror, it was pl ain, and it a ffected s ubstantial rights of the def end ant. United Stat

es v. Olano, 507 U .S. 725, 732 (1993).

III. Peppers’s argument i s fairly simple. He contends that the f elon-i n-posses sion stat ute, 1 whi ch makes it

il le galfor

anyper sonwho h as bee n co nvi ct ed o f a c ri me-4-

punishabl e by at

least one year in prison t o possess “ in or affe cting c ommerce” any firearm, is unconsti tuti onal becaus e it doe s not re quire t he government t o prove that the firearm had a “sub stantial e ffec t” on in terstate c om merc e. W hile Pe pper s con cede s in his appell ate bri ef that

our Court r ejected this very argument i n United Stat es v. Singlet ary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir . 2001), which is bi nding prece dent, Peppers expl ains that the Un ited States Sup reme C ourt has no t yet addressed this issue and he therefo re raise s it be for e ou r Co urt si mp ly to pre serv e it fo r rev iew by the Su pre me Co urt. We could easily affirm P eppers’s co nviction un der Singletary (thereby cl earing t he
wa y for Pe pper s to pe tition the S upre me C ourt fo r review ), but the gov ernm ent ask s us to take a di fferent

tack. The government cont ends that Peppers waived hi s right to chal lenge the constitutionali ty of the fel on-in- possessi on stat ute byvoluntarily

enteri ng a guilt

y pl ea in th e D istrict Co urt. See Wood ward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959, 964 ( 3d Cir. 1970) (“A [n u ncon ditiona l] plea o f gu ilty waive s all non -jurisdic tional d efen ses . . . .”); Abram v. United States, 398 F .2d 350, 35 0 (3d C ir. 1968) (sam e). The go vernm ent therefore asks us t o eithe r dismi ss Peppers ’s appealor summaril y affirm his convi ction wit hout reaching the merits of his arg umen t. In response to the g overnm ent’s request, Pep pers doe s no t disp ute th at an unc ond ition al gu ilty plea wa ives all no n-ju risdi ction al de fec ts. He conte nds, h ow ever, th at “[t]h e prec lusive e ffec ts of g uilty pleas d o no t apply . . . to
cons titutional c laims th at go ‘to the ve ry pow er of th e state to bring the de fend ant into court to answer the charge brought against him.’” (ReplyBr. at

1 (quoti ng Blackledge v.-5-

Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 ( 1974).) We disagree. While Peppers’ s clai m raises an issueof legi slative jurisdi ction, see United St ates v. Ryan, 41 F.3d 361, 363- 64 (8th Cir . 1994) ( descri bing Commere Clause cl aim as “a ques tion of legislativ e jurisd iction” ), that did not af fect th e D istrict Co urt’s jurisd iction to accept his guilty plea. One of ou r sist er circuit s recentlyconsidered this dist inction also in the c ontext of

an appeal fr om an unconditi onal guilty plea, albei t interpreting a diffe rent statu te, and gave the fo llow ing ex plana tion: Martin’s argument re sts on t he concept t

hat a gui lty

plea does not

waive juris dicti ona l def ens es to the c rime at iss ue. United Stat es v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7t

h Cir. 1994) . But the nexus with i nters tatecommerce, which courts frequently call the “j urisdi ctiona l ele ment,” i s simpl y one of t he essential e lements of

§ 844(i) . Although c ourts f requentl y cal l it

the “juri sdictional e lement” of t he stat ute, it i s “jurisdi ctiona l” only in the shorthand sense that without that ne xus, there can be no fede ral crime under the b om bin g sta tute. Kanar v. Un ited States, 118 F .3d 527, 53 0 (7th C ir. 1997). I t is not jurisdi ctiona l in t he sense that it

affects a court’ s subjec t ma tter ju risdi ction , i.e., a cou rt’s con stitutiona l or statuto ry pow er to adju dica te a c ase , her e au tho rized by 18 U.S .C. § 323 1. See Steel Co. v. Citizen s for a B etter E nv’t, 523 U. S. 8 3, 8 9, 1 18 S. Ct. 1003, 1010, 140 L. Ed.2 d 21 0 (19 98). T his co urt has recog nized for d ecad es that, d espite defe ndan ts’ tend ency to “ conf use[ ] facts e ssentia l to be a lleged as elem ents of th e crim e w ith ju risdi ction al req uire me nts a risin g as a m atter of la w,” once a defendant

pleads gui lty

in “ [a] court which hasjuri sdict ion of t he sub ject m atter and of th e de fend ant , as d id th e co urt in the in stan t cas e,” the court ’s judgment

cannot be ass ailed on gr ounds that

the government has not met its burden of proving “so-called juris dictional f acts. ” United Statesv. Hoyland, 264 F.2d 346 , 352- 53 (7 th Cir. 1 959 ); La Fever v. United States, 279 F.2d 833 , 834 ( 7th C ir. 1960 ). Eve n if the gov ernm ent fa ils to establ ish the connecti on to interst ate commerce, the dis tri ct court is not dep rive d of juris dicti on t o he ar th e ca se. See gen era lly St eel C o., 118 S. C t. at 10 10- 13. United Stat

es v. Martin, 147 F.3 d 52 9, 53 1-3 2 (7 th C ir. 19 97) (em pha sis ad ded ).1 For the same reason, our decis ion in United States v. Spinner, 180 F .3d 514 (3 d Cir.

1999) does not

rescue Pepper s’s cl aim. I n Spinner, the de fend ant ha d pled guilty to “access de vice fr aud.” Id. at 515. On appeal, t he defendant argued that his convi ction had to be va cated beca use th e U nited S tates ha d neg lected to alleg e the in terstate com me rce e lem ent o f the crim e in th e ind ictm ent. Id. Under the appl icabl e stat ute, access devi ce fraud i s a cri me only i f the “offens e affects inter state or forei gn commerce.” 18 U .S.C. § 102 9(a)(5 ). Her e, the ind ictme nt spe cifically alleg ed tha t Pep pers “ did know ingly possess, in and af fecting com merce, a firearm .” (Joint App endix at 34 .) Moreover, Peppers acknowledged at hi s guil ty plea hearing that the revol ver had tr aveled in interst ate commerce. Thus, Peppers , unlike the defendant in Spinner, cannot cl aim that the D istrict Co urt lack ed juris diction beca use th e indic tmen t on its face was missing t he inter state commerce element . Rather , Peppers alle ges that the interst ate commerce element cont ained i n the st atuteis not exacti ng enough, which, again, goes to legis lati ve juris dicti on. -6- The same holds t

rue here. Even assuming that the j urisdi ctiona l ele ment was missi ng (an assumption we expli citl y r ejected in Singletary ), t he District Court

sti ll had subject matter juri sdiction to ac cept Pepper s’s gui lty plea. 1 Because Peppers doe s not contend that his guilt

y pl ea was involunt ary , he i s forecl osed from rai sing hi s Commerce Cla use claim on a ppe al. For th e f or eg oi ng rea so ns , t

he ju dgm en t o f the Dis tric t C our t wi llbe AFFI RMED.