IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 19–1320

Filed January 17, 2019

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

T.J. HIER,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance 

Commission. 

Grievance commission recommends public reprimand for violation 

of ethical rules. LICENSE SUSPENDED.

Tara van Brederode and Crystal W. Rink, Des Moines, for 

complainant. 

David L. Brown and Tyler R. Smith of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, 

Des Moines, for respondent. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a 

complaint against attorney T.J. Hier charging her with violating Iowa 

disciplinary rules in connection with her handling of a disputed attorney 

fee payment in what she aptly describes as a “hotly contested, emotional 

family law matter.” A division of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance 

Commission found that Hier violated several rules but that the Board 

failed to prove several other rule violations. The commission recommends

a public reprimand. The Board seeks a suspension. Hier requests a 

private admonition. We agree with the commission’s findings as to Hier’s 

rule violations, but we disagree with the commission’s recommended 

sanction. In light of Hier’s prior disciplinary history, we suspend her 

license to practice law for thirty days. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Hier obtained her Iowa law license in 1997. She began her career 

in private practice in Newton, and she served as an assistant county 

attorney in Jasper County. She had an inactive law license from 2001 to 

2005. She resumed practicing law solo out of her home in Baxter in 2006. 

She now practices in the areas of criminal, juvenile, and family law. Hier 

is under contract with the state public defender’s office for criminal and 

juvenile court appointments. She represents many clients pro bono and 

serves other low-income clients. She volunteers as a mock trial coach and

for domestic violence victim groups, her church, and the Special Olympics. 

Hier is legally blind, having lived nearly her entire life with Stargardt 

disease, a rare macular degeneration that requires her to use 

magnification techniques and devices to read documents. 

Our court has previously disciplined Hier five times. We publicly 

reprimanded her in 2009. We temporarily suspended her law license in 
3

2012 for failure to respond to the Board. We publicly reprimanded her 

again later that year and again in 2014. Most recently, in December of 

2017, we disciplined Hier for trust account violations after an audit by the 

Client Security Commission determined that she failed to maintain written 

monthly reconciliations, lacked a journal of receipts and disbursements, 

lacked documentation of electronic transfers, and failed to properly 

maintain client ledger subaccounts. We publicly reprimanded her for 

violating Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a) and (f) and Iowa 

Court Rule 45.2. Our 2017 public reprimand preceded some of Hier’s 

conduct at issue in this opinion. 

Hier represented Amanda Rothfus against Edwin Van Dorn, a 

former boyfriend with whom Rothfus had two children. In late 2016, Hier,

on behalf of Rothfus, filed an “Application for Rule to Show Cause and an 

Application to Modify Custody, Visitation, and Child Support.” The 

applications alleged Van Dorn was willfully violating the visitation 

schedule in the decree and was in arrears paying child support. Attorney 

Jeff Carter represented Van Dorn. Those matters were pending when 

Rothfus was deposed on August 11, 2017. The parties halted the 

deposition to negotiate a settlement agreement to resolve the pending 

litigation and recited the terms into the record transcribed by the court 

reporter. Rothfus agreed to dismiss the contempt action against Van Dorn 

in return for his payment of $1032.42 in child support and his payment 

of $750 towards Hier’s attorney fees. According to Carter, Hier told 

Van Dorn to make the $750 check out to her trust account. The same 

day, Van Dorn delivered his check for $1032.42 to the Iowa Child Support 

Recovery Unit and delivered his $750 check payable to Hier’s client trust 

account (CTA). 
4

Rather than deposit the check in her CTA, Hier deposited the check 

into her firm’s general account and credited the payment against Rothfus’s

outstanding balance. Hier later testified she did not remember telling

Van Dorn to make the check payable to her CTA, but he did so. 

Carter agreed to draft the stipulation reflecting the parties’ 

agreement, but he did not send the draft to Hier until a month later. 

During the intervening weeks, Van Dorn failed to remain current on his 

child support payments and failed to exercise visitation. Rothfus declined 

to sign the stipulation and insisted on proceeding to trial, contending that 

Van Dorn had misrepresented his work schedule, which was the basis for 

the custody modification. In response, on September 28, Carter filed a 

motion to enforce the settlement agreement that requested the stipulation 

be signed or the $750 returned. Hier filed a resistance asserting she need 

not return the $750 because Van Dorn’s misrepresentations excused 

Rothfus from signing the stipulation. 

On November 9, the parties appeared before Judge Rickers for a 

hearing on the motion to enforce the settlement. The hearing was 

continued at the request of the children’s guardian ad litem who had not 

received timely notice. Judge Rickers met with Hier and Carter in 

chambers and off the record discussed the dispute over Van Dorn’s $750 

payment to Hier. Hier offered to place the $750 payment in her CTA. Hier 

later testified that 

Mr. Carter was highly agitated and so I said, “Jeff, if it will 

make you feel better I can put it in my trust account.” And 

Judge Rickers said, “Well, I’m not going to order you to do 

that.” And I said -- I said, “Well, I will offer to do that.” And 

then there was nothing further said about it. 

Judge Rickers later testified he lacked a specific recollection of that 

in-chambers discussion:
5

Q. Judge Rickers, Ms. Hier testified during her 

testimony that you said, “I’m not going to order you to return 

the fees.” That was referring to a statement that you 

supposedly made on November 9, 2017. Do you recall making 

that statement? A: I do not specifically recall making that 

statement. . . . I said, “I don’t recall making it.” I’m not saying 

I didn’t say it either. I just don’t recall it. If I did make that 

statement, it was in the context of that the $750 had to be 

placed in Ms. Hier’s trust account. 

In any event, Judge Rickers promptly issued a written order continuing 

the hearing until January 26, 2018. The order stated, 

Petitioner paid the Respondent’s attorney $750.00 in attorney 

fees in contemplation of consummation of the settlement 

agreement. Respondent’s attorney has agreed to immediately 

transfer $750 to her client trust account pending resolution 

of the motion. Disposition of the attorney fees held in trust 

shall depend upon final resolution of the pending motion. 

Despite this court order, Hier never deposited the $750 into her CTA, nor 

did she inform the court that she neglected to do so. Hier testified that 

she did not read the order and thus was unaware of its terms. 

On January 25, the day before the scheduled hearing, Carter 

withdrew his motion to enforce the settlement agreement. He emailed Hier 

to inform her, but he stated that he expected her to return the $750 to 

Van Dorn as “that payment was made solely for the universal settlement 

that your client pulled out of.” Hier replied, stating that she would put the 

check in the mail that day and that she expected the check to arrive by 

January 29. Later that day, Hier emailed Carter to ask whether she should 

make the check payable to Van Dorn or to Carter’s law office. Carter 

received the email, but the record does not state whether Carter 

responded. Hier did not mail the check. 

Carter emailed Hier again on March 6. This email stated, “We are 

still waiting for you to return my client’s $750. I have been instructed to 

file something with the Court if we do not get it immediately. Please reply 
6

ASAP[.]” Hier did not reply to this email. Carter emailed Hier again on 

March 27, stating, 

Are you going to do anything on this? You told us repeatedly 

you would return these funds. My client is continuing to 

threaten his own action as well as instruct me to file 

something as well. Please show the courtesy of a reply to this 

email. 

Hier replied by email within the hour, stating she had discussed the matter 

with Rothfus and that they believed that “at least a portion of the amount 

should be attributed to resolution of the contempt action against 

Mr. Van Dorn.” Hier also suggested the payment issue be addressed at 

trial. 

Hier mailed Carter a letter dated March 27 stating, 

Against my better judgment, I am returning 1⁄2 of the $750 

($375) to you for the payment made by your client at 

depositions. Although my client has decided not to follow 

through with the custody/visitation issue, we did resolve the 

contempt action. This seems to me to be a fair resolution of 

our difference of opinion regarding this matter. 

Hier included a check to Carter for $375 from her law office account. 

The parties went to trial on May 31. The court issued its ruling on 

the modification on June 6 as follows: 

Petitioner paid $750 to [Hier] in connection with settlement 

negotiations which ultimately failed. [Hier] has returned $375 

of that payment, but claims she was entitled to keep the 

remainder as attorney fees. The Petitioner owes no attorney 

fees to [Hier] unless ordered by the court as a part of the 

proceedings, or under a contractual obligation. It is obvious 

that there was no contract entered into by these parties, and 

the court has previously entered no order regarding attorney 

fees. The court does find that in connection with this 

modification action, the Petitioner shall pay Respondent, as 

attorney fees, the sum of $1000, and the $375 previously 

retained by [Hier] shall be credited against that amount. 

Van Dorn filed his complaint with the Board alleging Hier’s mishandling 

of his $750 payment. Ultimately, the Board charged Hier with violating 
7

Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a), (d), (e), and (f); 32:3.3(a)(1);

and Iowa Court Rules 45.1 and 45.2(2). On May 2, 2019, the commission 

conducted an evidentiary hearing with testimony from Carter, Hier, and 

Judge Rickers. The commission found Hier violated Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a), (e), and (f); and Iowa Court Rule 45.1. It 

found the Board failed to prove violations of the remaining rules. 

The commission recommended that Hier be given a public 

reprimand, reciting as mitigating factors Hier’s contract with the state 

public defender’s office, her pro bono work, charitable contributions and 

community service, Judge Ricker’s testimony that he considered Hier to 

be a truthful and good lawyer, and Rothfus’s satisfaction with Hier’s 

representation. The commission considered Hier’s prior disciplinary 

history as an aggravating factor. In statements to our court, the Board 

requests a suspension while Hier proposes a private admonition. 

II. Scope of Review. 

“We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Silich, 872 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa

2015). “The Board must prove attorney misconduct by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence, a burden greater than a preponderance of 

the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morse, 887 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Iowa 

2016) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland, 862 

N.W.2d 627, 634–35 (Iowa 2015)). While “[w]e give the commission’s 

findings and recommendations respectful consideration, . . . we are not 

bound by them. Id. (quoting Weiland, 862 N.W.2d at 635). 

III. Ethical Violations. 

“[W]e approach with caution ethics complaints initiated by a 

litigation adversary.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ouderkirk, 
8

845 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Iowa 2014). Based on our de novo review of the record, 

we agree with the commission that Hier violated Iowa Rule of Professional 

Conduct 32:1.15(a), (e), and (f) and Iowa Court Rule 45.1, and that the 

Board failed to prove the remaining charges by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence. 

A. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a). Iowa Rule of 

Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a) states, “A lawyer shall hold property of 

clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with 

a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be 

kept in a separate account.” Comment 1 elaborates, “All property that is 

the property of clients or third persons . . . must be kept separate from the 

lawyer’s business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more 

trust accounts.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15 cmt. [1]. “The common 

theme running through Rule [32:1.15] and related court rules is that funds 

and property belonging to others must be kept scrupulously separate from 

the lawyer’s own funds and property.” 16 Gregory C. Sisk & Mark S. Cady, 

Iowa Practice Series:TM Lawyer and Judicial Ethics § 5:15(b) author’s cmt., 

at 517–18 (2019). 

Van Dorn paid $750 by check payable to Hier’s CTA on August 11, 

2017, as part of the parties’ oral settlement agreement. Hier admittedly 

deposited the $750 into her firm’s general account rather than her CTA. 

Hier should have deposited the $750 into her CTA until the written 

stipulation was executed and approved by the court. See In re Marriage of 

Udelhofen, 538 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing that a 

stipulation in a family law case “becomes final when it is accepted and 

approved by the court”); see also In re Marriage of Jones, 653 N.W.2d 589, 

593–94 (Iowa 2002) (“[T]he parties’ stipulation is not binding on the court,

. . . [and] the court has the authority to reject the stipulation. . . . The 
9

decree, not the stipulation, determines what rights the parties have.”

(Citations omitted.)). The settlement broke down, and Judge Rickers 

ultimately ordered Hier to transfer the funds to her CTA, which she failed 

to do. 

We reject Hier’s claim that the $750 was hers to keep upon receipt 

as a fee payment in settlement of the contempt action. Hier never 

dismissed the contempt action, which was submitted the following year for 

hearing with the modification action. Nor is Hier exonerated by the fact 

the district court later ordered Van Dorn to pay a larger amount ($1000) 

toward the fees Rothfus owed Hier. The $750 belonged in Hier’s CTA until 

the dispute was finally resolved by the court. We determine that Hier 

violated rule 32:1.15(a). 

B. Iowa Court Rule 45.1 and Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 

32:1.15(f). For the same reasons, we determine that Hier violated Iowa 

Court Rule 45.1 and Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(f). Rule 

45.1 states, 

Funds a lawyer receives from clients or third persons for 

matters arising out of the practice of law in Iowa must be 

deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust 

accounts at a financial institution with a branch 

geographically located in Iowa. 

Iowa Ct. R. 45.1. Because Hier placed funds that arose out of the practice 

of law that were owned by a third person into her firm account rather than 

her CTA, she violated rule 45.1. Hier’s violation of rule 45.1 in turn 

constitutes a violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(f), 

which states, “All client trust accounts shall be governed by chapter 45 of 

the Iowa Court Rules.” See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Lubinus, 869 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Iowa 2015) (holding that a violation of 

chapter 45 constitutes a violation of rule 32:1.15(f)). 
10

C. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(e). The 

commission also found that Hier violated Iowa Rule of Professional 

Conduct 32:1.15(e). This rule provides,

When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession 

of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may 

be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept 

separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The 

lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the property as 

to which the interests are not in dispute. 

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(e). Van Dorn demanded return of the $750 

when the settlement broke down, and Hier acknowledged the ongoing 

dispute when she later returned half that amount. Hier was obligated to 

keep the balance of the disputed funds in her CTA. See Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 181–82 (Iowa 2013) 

(stating rule 32:1.15(e) requires lawyers to keep “the disputed portion of 

the funds . . . in a trust account” until the dispute is resolved (quoting 

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15 cmt. [3])). 

Hier argues that Van Dorn never had any valid claim to the $750, 

and thus, she did not violate the rule by failing to place the funds in her 

trust account. Hier’s argument misunderstands the purpose of the rule. 

An attorney “must not take advantage of physical control of [disputed] 

funds.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 

440 (Iowa 2012) (quoting 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., The Law of 

Lawyering § 19.7, at 19–14 (3d ed. 2005 Supp.)). So long as the claim is 

not frivolous, an attorney must place disputed funds in her possession in 

a CTA. Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(e) cmt. [3]. Hier cannot act as 

“judge and jury to resolve the dispute in [her] own favor.” Morse, 887 

N.W.2d at 141. We determine that Hier violated rule 32:1.15(e) by failing 

to place the disputed funds in her CTA pending resolution of Van Dorn’s 

claim. 
11

D. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(d) and Iowa Court 

Rule 45.2(2). The commission found the Board failed to meet its burden 

to prove that Hier violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(d) 

and Iowa Court Rule 45.2(2) by failing to return the full $750 to Van Dorn. 

We agree with the commission. Rule 32:1.15(d) states, “[A] lawyer shall 

promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property 

that the client or third person is entitled to receive . . . .” Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:1.15(d). “[A] lawyer must promptly deliver to the client or third 

person any funds or other property that the client or third person is 

entitled to receive and must promptly render a full accounting regarding 

such property.” Iowa Court R. 45.2(2). The district court ultimately 

ordered Van Dorn to pay $1000 of Rothfus’s attorney fees. While Carter 

had demanded Hier return the full $750, their dispute merely required 

Hier to place the funds in her CTA. See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(e). 

E. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:3.3(a)(1). The 

commission also found that the Board failed to meet its burden to prove 

Hier violated Iowa Rule of Professional Responsibility 32:3.3(a)(1). We 

agree with the commission. That rule states, “A lawyer shall not knowingly 

. . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a 

false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by 

the lawyer[.]” Id. r. 32:3.3(a)(1). “[M]isrepresentation requires intent to 

deceive to support an ethical violation.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Sobel, 779 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 2010). “[T]he inability 

of a person to accurately recall an event does not necessarily lead to the 

conclusion that the person’s inaccurate recollection is an expression of 

dishonesty or deceit.” Id. 

The Board alleged Hier intended to deceive the court when she told 

Judge Rickers that she would place the $750 in her CTA. However, Hier 
12

testified that Judge Rickers stated that he would not order her to transfer 

the funds. Judge Rickers could not recall their discussions, and he testified 

that he believed Hier to be a good, truthful lawyer and that Hier had acted 

towards the court with honesty and honor during the child support dispute. 

In addition to Judge Rickers’s testimony, the commission heard the live 

testimony of Carter and Hier. We decline to second-guess the commission’s 

creditability determination that Hier did not intend to deceive the court. 

See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 659 

(Iowa 2013) (“We give deference to the commission’s credibility 

determination because the commission heard [the respondent attorney’s] 

live testimony and observed [his] demeanor.”). 

IV. Sanction. 

We must decide the appropriate sanction for Hier’s failure to place 

the disputed funds in her CTA pending resolution of Van Dorn’s claim. 

The commission recommended a public reprimand. The Board argues for 

a suspension. Hier requests a private admonition. If this were Hier’s first 

disciplinary transgression, no suspension would be warranted. But Hier 

already has had four prior public reprimands and a suspension. “[T]he 

prior disciplinary history of an attorney is a factor we must consider in 

imposing discipline.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 

925 N.W.2d 163, 181 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 580, 589 (Iowa 2011)). 

Hier’s most recent public reprimand in December 2017 was for 

violating some of the same trust account rules she violated here, and yet 

for the next six months, Hier persisted in refusing to place the disputed 

funds in her CTA. We consider the December 2017 public reprimand to 

be prior discipline because Van Dorn’s counsel renewed his demands for 

return of the disputed funds in January and March 2018. Hier paid back
13

half of the disputed amount but neglected to place the balance in her CTA. 

See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Noel, 933 N.W.2d 190, 205

(Iowa 2019) (explaining that “[i]n order to be prior discipline, we must have

found [the respondent lawyer’s] prior conduct violated our rules and

sanctioned him before he committed the conduct giving rise to the present

proceeding”). The 2017 public reprimand should have motivated Hier to

study and comply with the requirements of rule 32:1.15. 

We conclude a suspension is required based on Hier’s disciplinary 

history. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Santiago, 869 

N.W.2d 172, 183 (Iowa 2015) (citing Santiago’s “failure to learn” from trust 

account problems identified in an earlier audit as an aggravating factor 

even though no discipline was imposed previously); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. 

of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Fleming, 602 N.W. 340, 342 (Iowa 1999) (“[T]he 

board’s past leniency has not had the intended effect of moving [the 

respondent] toward higher standards of ethical practice.”); Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sprole, 596 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1999) 

(Sprole’s “prior discipline . . . has failed to curb the misconduct. . . . The 

protection of the public and the reputation of the bar require more than a 

public reprimand.” (Citation omitted.)). We now consider the length of the 

suspension to impose. 

“There is no standard sanction warranted by any particular type of 

misconduct.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon, 821 

N.W.2d 873, 880 (Iowa 2012). “Though prior cases can be instructive, the 

sanction warranted in a particular case must be based on the 

circumstances of that case.” Id. 

In determining what sanctions should be imposed, we 

consider the nature of the violations, the need for deterrence, 

protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the 

bar as a whole, and the attorney’s fitness to continue 
14

practicing law, as well as any aggravating or mitigating 

circumstances. 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Khowassah, 890 N.W.2d 647, 

651 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bartley, 

860 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Iowa 2015)). “Our primary purpose for imposing 

sanctions in not to punish the lawyer but to protect the public.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d 528, 542 (Iowa 

2013). 

In Morse, we imposed a thirty-day suspension for the lawyer’s 

violation of rule 32:1.15(e) after he kept $1400 that his client had 

advanced to pay the court reporter for a trial transcript. 887 N.W.2d at 

146. We discerned minimal client harm, and the client owed him a larger 

amount in fees. Id. at 144. But we considered “Morse’s twenty-six years 

of experience . . . [as] an aggravating factor.” Id. In another case, 

Rhinehart, we imposed a sixty-day suspension for violating rule 32:1.15(e),

among other rules. 827 N.W.2d at 183. Hier obtained her law license in 

1997 and has practiced continuously since 2006. We consider her 

experience as an aggravating factor. Hier’s obstinate refusal to place the 

disputed funds in her trust account as ordered was reckless and selfdefeating. 

“Our sanctions for trust account violations have ranged from a 

public reprimand to license revocation.” Lubinus, 869 N.W.2d at 550. 

“When an attorney’s minor trust account violations are the result of 

sloppiness or lack of oversight, we have levied a public reprimand rather 

than a suspension.” Id. By contrast, “when an attorney has committed 

multiple or more systematic trust account violations, we have imposed 

suspensions, often of thirty days.” Id. at 551. In Lubinus, an attorney 

violated rule 32:1.15(a) and related rules by knowingly removing unearned 
15

funds from his trust account to cover personal expenses. Id. at 553. We 

imposed a thirty-day suspension. Id. at 554. 

In Boles, we imposed a thirty-day suspension on an attorney for 

multiple trust account violations and failures to promptly return unearned 

fees. 808 N.W. 2d at 442–43. The attorney’s pattern of misconduct was 

an aggravating factor. Id. at 442. We considered as a mitigating factor 

that the attorney had taken corrective action to prevent further violations. 

Id. We also considered the attorney’s volunteer service and pro bono work, 

as well as the fact that no clients were harmed, as mitigating factors. Id. 

In Parrish, we imposed a sixty-day suspension for multiple trust 

account violations. 801 N.W.2d at 590. We noted as an aggravating factor 

the attorney’s six prior private admonitions, two of which involved trust 

account violations. Id. at 589. We noted that “Parrish’s conduct over the 

last ten years has now developed into a pattern of violating the Iowa Rules 

of Professional Conduct and the rules of this court relating to the 

administration of trust accounts.” Id. But we considered in mitigation 

Parrish’s pro bono legal services and community involvement. Id. 

We consider such mitigating factors in calibrating Hier’s discipline. 

She accepts court appointments from the state public defender’s office. A 

“willingness to accept court-appointed cases” is a mitigating factor. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Capotosto, 927 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Iowa 

2019). Hier performs pro bono work and works for low-income clients and 

indigent criminal defense clients. “Providing legal representation to an 

underserved part of the community is a significant mitigating factor.” 

Weiland, 862 N.W.2d at 643 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Taylor, 814 N.W.2d 259, 168 (Iowa 2012)). Hier volunteers for her 

church, for domestic assault victims, and as a mock trial coach and judge. 

See Boles, 808 N.W.2d at 442 (considering volunteering in the community 
16

as a mitigating factor). And we give weight to the testimony of Judge 

Rickers that he considered Hier to be a good and truthful lawyer. See

Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d at 183 (“Rhinehart’s general reputation for being a 

hardworking, highly competent, zealous advocate . . . are mitigating 

factors.”). Importantly, Hier’s client suffered no harm. See Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 467 (Iowa 2014) 

(noting the absence of client harm as a mitigating factor). 

After considering all of the relevant mitigating and aggravating 

factors here, we return to the most significant aggravating factor, Hier’s 

disciplinary history, and we determine that a thirty-day suspension is 

appropriate. 

V. Disposition. 

For these reasons, we suspend T.J. Hier’s license to practice law for 

thirty days. This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. 

See Iowa Ct. R. 34.23(3). Hier must comply with the notification 

requirements of rule 34.24. See id. r. 34.24. The costs of this proceeding 

are assessed against Hier pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 36.24(1). Unless 

the Board files an objection, Hier’s license will be automatically reinstated 

after the thirty-day period of suspension on the condition that all costs 

have been paid. See id. r. 34.23(2). 

LICENSE SUSPENDED. 

All justices concur, and Appel, J., also concurs specially. 
17

#19–1320, Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hier

APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).

I join the majority opinion in this matter. I write separately to 

emphasize that the canard “possession is nine tenths of the law” has no 

application when an attorney receives funds from a client, or third party, 

that are to be used for specific or limited purposes. For example, as we 

made clear in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Parrish, 

an attorney cannot assert a future-claim-of-right defense in the event the 

attorney misappropriates limited use client funds. 925 N.W.2d 163, 179 

(Iowa 2019). There is no allegation in this case that the attorney 

misappropriated the funds under Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 

32:8.4. But it is worth emphasizing that an attorney who fails to honor 

the restrictions of a client or third party, when entrusted with funds, could 

be sailing into waters more dangerous than those presented in this case.