J-S32043-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: D.F.W., NATURAL MOTHER No. 79 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order entered December 5, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Civil Division, 

at No(s): CP-07-DP-0000100-2012 

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: D.F.W., NATURAL MOTHER No. 80 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order entered December 5, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Juvenile Division, 

at No(s): CP-07-DP-0000102-2012 

IN RE: B.S.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: D.F.W., NATURAL MOTHER No. 81 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Decree entered December 10, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No(s): 2013 AD 44 

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.R.-S.L., A 

MINOR 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: D.F.W., NATURAL MOTHER No. 82 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Decree entered December 10, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No(s): 2013 AD 44-A 
J-S32043-14 

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BEFORE: PANELLA, DONOHUE, and ALLEN, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED AUGUST 04, 2014 

Appellant, D.F.W. (“Mother”), appeals from the order and decrees 

entered on December 5, 2013 and December 10, 2013, terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to H.L. (born in July of 2004) and B.L. (born in February of 

2002) (collectively “the Children”), and changing their permanency goals to 

adoption.1

 We affirm. 

Since 2004, Blair County Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) has 

been involved with this family due to Mother’s inability to care for and 

provide supervision for the Children, her abusive relationships with men, 

lack of suitable housing, Mother’s drug use, Mother’s mental health issues, 

and her failure to cooperate with CYF.2

 

On May 3, 2012, H.L. was removed from Mother’s care and placed in 

Clarion Psychiatric Hospital for H.L.’s suicidal and homicidal intentions 

following a Childline report that Mother’s paramour, D.R., abused H.L. CYF 

was unable to establish that the allegations rose to the level of abuse. On 

June 22, 2012, H.L. was released from Clarion Psychiatric Hospital, and 

placed in a mental health foster home through Blair County Mental Health 

Services. 

 

1

 On December 10, 2013, R.L. (“Father”) voluntarily relinquished his 

parental rights to the Children. 

2

 On December 4, 2012, Mother’s parental rights to K.W. and T.W., who are 

the Children’s half-siblings, were terminated.
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On July 7, 2012, CYF received a report that Mother was unable to 

appropriately provide for the Children; i.e., that they were without proper 

care and control. On August 13, 2013, CYF received a report that B.L. had 

been acting out at home, acting out sexually, and that Mother was 

diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, anxiety, and severe 

depression. On August 14, 2012, CYF received a Childline report that 

Mother took the Children to Altoona Regional Hospital because they were 

exhibiting sexual acts on each other, and that D.R. abused the Children. On 

August 14, 2012, Mother signed a Voluntary Placement Agreement to place 

B.L. in a foster home, and H.L. remained in his therapeutic foster home 

through Mental Health Services. 

On August 27, 2012, Mother moved out of her home and was residing 

at an emergency shelter. On September 17, 2012, following a dependency 

hearing, the trial court adjudicated the Children dependent. The September 

17, 2012 order directed Mother to: (1) refrain from all criminal activity; (2) 

attain and maintain clean, safe and appropriate housing; (3) notify CYF 

within 48 hours of all changes in household composition, housing, and 

employment; (4) cooperate with all caseworkers and service providers; (5) 

immediately provide caseworkers and all service providers with signed and 

current consents of release and exchange of information; (6) fully cooperate 

with all rules of the Children’s placement; (7) undergo drug and alcohol 

evaluations and follow all treatment recommendations; (8) undergo 
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psychiatric evaluations and follow all treatment recommendations; and (9) 

attend Women Aware. 

On November 8, 2012, H.L. was accepted by Sarah Reed Children’s 

Center (“Sarah Reed”), but CYF was unable to reach Mother for her to sign 

the necessary paperwork for H.L. to be admitted to Sarah Reed. On 

November 14, 2012, the trial court granted CYF emergency protective 

custody of H.L. and admitted H.L. to Sarah Reed. On November 14, 2012, 

B.L. was placed in the custody of D.H. (“Foster Mother”). On June 24, 2013, 

H.L. left Sarah Reed and was placed in Hoffman Homes for Youth (“Hoffman 

Homes”), where he has remained. 

On July 9, 2013, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to the Children and a motion for goal change to adoption. On 

July 23, 2013, October 28, 2013, and November 26, 2013, the trial court 

held hearings on the goal change and termination petition. At the hearing, 

Officer Cornell Thompson; Officer Nichole Douglas; Officer Derek Swope; 

Kristel Wisor, a worker at Family Intervention Crisis Services (“FICS”); 

Foster Mother; William Harper, H.L.’s therapist at Sarah Reed; Jennifer 

Vieth, H.L.’s therapist at Hoffman Homes; and Damien Charlesworth, a CYF 

caseworker; Father; and Mother testified. On December 5, 2013, the trial 

court entered its decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and orders changing their 
J-S32043-14 

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permanency goal to adoption, and, on December 10, 2013, the trial court 

entered amended decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

On January 3, 2014, Mother timely filed notices of appeal, along with 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On January 30, 2014, the appeals were consolidated 

sua sponte.

3

 Mother raises the following issues. 

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s 

parental rights? 

2. Whether or not the trial court erred in changing the goal to 

adoption? 

Mother’s Brief at 30. 

Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is 

as follows: 

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental 

rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the 

trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an 

abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary 

support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. 

Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a 

jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review 

of the record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence. 

In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005). In termination cases, the 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

 

3

 On June 16, 2014, this Court directed the trial court to provide an analysis 

regarding Mother’s appellate issues, including termination pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) and (b), and goal change to adoption pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. 
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the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. 

Id. at 806. We have previously stated: 

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we 

will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re 

Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). Additionally, 

this Court “need only agree with [the trial court’s] decision as to any one 

subsection in order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 581 

Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004). Accordingly, as the trial court focused on 

Section 2511(a)(1) in terminating Mother’s parental rights, we will focus on 

that section for our review. 

In terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court relied upon 

Section 2511(a)(1) and (b) which provide: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties. 

* * * 

 (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. 

 We have explained this Court’s review of a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights 

pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) as follows: 

 To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of 

conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing 

of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. In addition, 

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be 

terminated pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1) if the parent 

either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental

duties. 
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Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of 

inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of 

termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

[s]ection 2511(b). 

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted). 

 Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has stated: 

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A 

child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These 

needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this 

Court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty 

which requires affirmative performance. 

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child. 

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child’s life. 

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with . . . [the child’s] physical and 

emotional needs. 
J-S32043-14 

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In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 

Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her 

parental rights to the Children. Mother’s Brief at 4. Specifically, Mother 

contends that she has suitable housing, she does not have mental health 

issues, and she had reasonable excuses for missing visits with the Children. 

Mother’s Brief at 33-42. 

In terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), 

the trial court reviewed the record and the evidence presented, and 

concluded that it is clear from the record that, for a period of six months 

leading up to the filing of the petition for involuntary termination, Mother 

failed to perform any parental duties for the Children. H.L. was removed 

from Mother’s care since May 3, 2012, and B.L. was removed from Mother’s 

care since August 14, 2012. 

The trial court determined: 

[E]ven though [M]other clearly loves her children, and [H.L.] 

consistently expresses a desire to live with her, and cares deeply 

about her, and benefits from having contact with her, [M]other 

has not demonstrated any ability to provide the [Children] a 

safe, secure and stable environment. She has not invested in 

any services for her own personal benefit. She has not

cooperated with [CYF]. She has not provided any independent 

verification concerning their medical treatment, her 

prescriptions, etc. She has not been honest with service 

providers. [The trial court] found her testimony to be lacking in 

credibility (e.g. in trying to explain why there has been so many 

missed visits, missed phone calls, failure to attend the monthly 

team meetings). [The trial court found] [Mother] to be an 
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excuse maker, i.e., that it is everyone else’s fault that the boys 

are in their current placements[--] it is the fault of [Father], 

[CYF], etc. We find that she does not recognize and appreciate 

the significance of the issues the boys are facing, especially 

[H.L.]. She essentially states that a return to her care will help 

“cure” all these issues, despite the fact that these issues existed 

when the children where in her care, custody and control, 

including prior psychiatric hospitalizations .... 

Permanency Review Order, 12/5/13, at 5. 

 Ms. Wisor, a caseworker for FICS, testified that FICS Reunification 

Services were open on January 18, 2013 for reunification for Mother and B.L. 

N.T., 7/23/13, at 32-33. Ms. Wisor testified that Mother’s visits with B.L. 

decreased and became fully supervised due to concerns with Mother missing 

meetings, B.L.’s behavior declining, and concerns that D.R. was residing with 

Mother. Id. at 35-41. Ms. Wisor testified that Mother never advanced past 

step one because she missed thirty-six percent of her visits with B.L. and 

thirty percent of her meetings. Id. at 52-53. 

 Ms. Wisor testified that during FICS services, Mother tested positive for 

opiates and benzodiazepines. Id. at 39. Ms. Wisor testified that Mother has 

health problems, but never provided FICS with confirmation as to the 

medication Mother was taking. Id. at 50. Ms. Wisor also found that 

Mother’s housing was inappropriate, and Mother was not employed. Id. at 

48. Mother received unemployment compensation, and it expired in 

February of 2013. Id. Further, Ms. Wisor testified that FICS made it clear

to Mother that reunification with the Children was not possible if she 

remained in contact with D.R. Id. at 42-43. Ms. Wisor testified that D.R. 
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was found hiding in Mother’s attic, and his mail continued to be delivered to 

Mother’s residence. Id. at 36. 

 Officer Douglas testified that he had approximately twelve interactions 

with Mother over the past two years. Id. at 17-18. Officer Douglas 

expressed concerns for the Children’s safety in the home. Id. at 19-20. 

Officer Swope testified that, on June 4, 2013, Mother and D.R. were involved 

in an altercation where Mother was struck several times by D.R. Id. at 29-

30. Ms. Wisor testified that, on July of 2013, FICS services were closed 

because of Mother’s lack of progress. Id. at 46-47. 

 Mr. Harper, H.L.’s therapist from Sarah Reed, testified that he worked 

on issues of safety, anger management, and reducing anxiety with H.L. Id.

at 82. Mr. Harper testified that he was unable to make significant progress 

with family therapy because of the lack of consistent contacts with Mother 

and the existence of domestic violence in Mother’s house. Id. at 90, 92. 

Moreover, Ms. Veith, a therapist at Hoffman Homes, testified that H.L. was 

only able to contact Mother fifty percent of time, and Mother failed to 

participate in monthly meetings to discuss H.L.’s progress and goals. Id. at 

112. Ms. Veith also testified that H.L.’s aggressive behavior and anxiety is 

triggered when he cannot get in touch with Mother. 7/23/13, 104-105; 

10/28/13, at 31. Ms. Veith stated that H.L.’s anxiety is a result of 

witnessing and experiencing domestic violence in Mother’s residence. N.T., 

10/28/13, at at 29. 
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 Mr. Charlesworth testified that FICS closed its services at the end of 

July 2013 because of lack of progress. He testified that CYF was willing to 

arrange bi-weekly visits and provide transportation, but Mother did not 

attend any of the visits in August or September of 2013. N.T., 11/16/13, at 

3-6. 

 The testimony established that reunification between the Children and 

Mother had been unsuccessful due to Mother’s lack of stable housing and 

environment, and her failure to cooperate with CYF. In the instant matter, 

the trial court found that Mother failed to fulfill her parental duties and 

responsibilities for two years. Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/14, at 

10. The testimony established that the Children are in stable foster 

placement, and that adoption is in the best interest of the Children. 

Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court properly 

terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1). We will 

not disturb the trial court’s determinations. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-

74. 

 The trial court must also consider how terminating Mother’s parental 

rights would affect the needs and welfare of Children pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Pursuant to section 2511(b), the trial court’s inquiry is 

specifically directed to a consideration of whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs of 

the child. See In Re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005), 
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appeal denied, 587 Pa. 705, 897 A.2d 1183 (2006). “Intangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the 

needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). We have 

instructed that the court must also discern the nature and status of the 

parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing that bond. See id. 

 Here, the trial court concluded that termination of Mother’s parental 

rights to the Children would serve their developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare. Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/14, at 

11. The trial court found that Mother and the Children have an unhealthy 

bond. Permanency Review Order, 12/5/13, at 4. With respect to B.L., the 

trial court explained: 

[T]here was sufficient evidence to show that there is no

significant bond with his mother. After B.L.’s placement, 

[Mother] was sporadic in visits and did not participate in her 

child’s services. B.L. actually looked to [F]oster [M]other as 

B.L.’s mom and the foster home as being his “home.” B.L. 

showed little interest in his mother when she was absent or not 

engaged with services or visits. As we specifically found, if a 

bond existed, it was an “unhealthy” bond. Once the goal was 

changed and an adoptive home identified, B.L. was able to 

attach to the family and is more than ready to make a

permanent transition to the adoptive home. 

Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/14, at 10. 

 With respect to H.L., the trial court observed: 

[H.L.] clearly had difficulty being apart from [M]other, the 

evidence also supported, and we found, that his bond with 

[M]other was “unhealthy” as well. Any anxiety and stress that 

H.L. felt from being apart from his mother was related to his 
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concern as to whether she was okay due to his witnessing the 

domestic violence over the years. Even though some concern 

was expressed as to how H.L. would react if [M]other’s parental 

rights were terminated, the evidence subsequently established 

that he was able to move on and start bonding with other preadoptive parents, as his counselors, Mr. Harper and Jessica

Veith, predicted and confirmed. 

Id. at 10-11. 

 While Mother professes that she loves the Children, this Court has held 

that a parent’s love of her child, alone, does not preclude a termination. 

See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007). Likewise, we have 

stated that the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent 

will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition. See In re 

K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

 After this Court’s careful review of the record, we find that the 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s determination that there was 

no bond between Mother and the Children which, if severed, would be 

detrimental to the Children, and that the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the Children. Thus, we will 

not disturb the trial court’s determinations. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 

73-74. We affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights on the 

basis of section 2511(a)(1) and (b). 

 Next, we address Mother’s challenge to the change of the permanency 

goal for Children to adoption. This Court has stated: 
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When reviewing an order regarding the change of a placement 

goal of a dependent child pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. 

C.S.A. § 6301, et seq., our standard of review is abuse of 

discretion. When reviewing such a decision, we are bound by 

the facts as found by the trial court unless they are not

supported in the record. 

In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

In order to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we 

must determine that the court’s judgment was manifestly 

unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, or that the 

court’s action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, 

as shown by the record. We are bound by the trial court’s 

findings of fact that have support in the record. The trial court, 

not the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of 

evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts 

in the testimony. In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial 

court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. When 

the trial court’s findings are supported by competent evidence of 

record, we will affirm even if the record could also support an 

opposite result. 

In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

 Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act sets forth the following pertinent 

inquiries for the reviewing court: 

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.— 

At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the 

following: 

 

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of 

the placement. 

 

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of 

compliance with the permanency plan developed for the 

child. 

 

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement. 

 
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(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child. 

 

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the 

child might be achieved. 

 

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize 

the permanency plan in effect. 

(6) Whether the child is safe. 

. . . 

 

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of 

the last 22 months or the court has determined that 

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable 

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the 

child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to 

preserve and reunify the family need not be made or 

continue to be made, whether the county agency has filed 

or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights 

and to identify, recruit, process and approve a 

qualified family to adopt the child unless: 

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best suited to 

the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child; 

 

(ii) the county agency has documented a compelling 

reason for determining that filing a petition to terminate 

parental rights would not serve the needs and welfare of 

the child; or 

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with 

necessary services to achieve the safe return to the child’s

parent, guardian or custodian within the time frames set 

forth in the permanency plan. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1)-(6), (9). 

In addition: 

The trial court must focus on the child and determine the goal 

with reference to the child’s best interests, not those of the 

parents. “Safety, permanency, and well-being of the child must 
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take precedence over all other considerations.” Further, at the 

review hearing for a dependent child who has been removed 

from the parental home, the court must consider the statutorily 

mandated factors. “These statutory mandates clearly place the 

trial court’s focus on the best interests of the child.” 

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis in original) 

(citations and quotations omitted). 

 The record in this case reflects that the trial court appropriately 

considered the Children’s best interests in deciding whether to change their 

permanency goal to adoption. The competent and in fact overwhelming 

evidence supports the trial court’s determinations, as Mother will cannot 

provide proper parental care and control for the Children. Thus, we will not 

disturb the trial court’s determinations. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74. 

 After careful review, we affirm the decrees and orders terminating 

Mother’s parental rights on the basis of section 2511(a)(1) and (b), and 

changing the permanency goals for the Children to adoption. 

 Decrees and orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/4/2014