NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS W.S. RICHEY,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. D. DAHNE,
Defendant

- Appellant. No. 17

- 35032
D.C. No. 3:12

- cv - 05060

- BHS

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 13, 2018 Seattle, Washington Before: W. FLETCHER and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, ** District Judge.
Th omas Richey, a Washington state prisoner, filed an internal grievance complaining about the actions of a prison guard. The grievance included rude comments about the guard’s weight, including describing her as “extremely

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

APR 25 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

obese.” Dennis Dahne, an official charged with handling grievances , took issue with parts of the grievance and told Richey to rewrite the grievance to eliminate the objectionable commentary. Richey submitted a “rewrite” that kept the rude

comments , and that resulted in the facts that gen erated this lawsuit

. Dahne did not process the rewritten grievance still containing the offensive language about the guard’s weight , and the grievance was subsequently considered to be “administratively withdrawn,” which meant that it would not be processed. Richey sued for violation of his First Amendment right to petition and for retaliation for exercising his rights under the First Amendment. 1 The district court granted summary judgment to Richey on the right to petition claim, and denied summary judgment to Dahne on the retaliation claim, holding that there were material questions of fact related to that claim. Dahne appeals, arguing that he is entitled to qual ified immunity on both
claims. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Richey on his right to petition claim, but reverse the district court on qualified immunity grounds

on his retaliation claim.
1. Under the First Amendment , speech is protected unless the speech falls under one of a few narrowly defin ed categories of unprotected speech such as

1 We previously reviewed this case at the motion to dismiss stage, holding that Richey had stated a plausible claim for relief. Richey v. Dahne , 624 F. App'x 525 (9th Cir. 2015)

.3

fighting words, defamation, or obscenity. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul , 505 U.S. 377,
382

– 84 (1992)

. We have previously held that “disrespectful language in a prisoner’s grievance is itself protected activity un der the First Amendment.” Brodheim v. Cry , 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Bradley v. Hall , 64 F.3d 1276, 1281

– 82 (9th Cir. 1995)) . But t o say that a category of speech is protected does not mean that all governmental limits on such speech are
unconstitutional. In Turner v. Safley , the United States Supreme Court held that a prison regulation that restricts inmates’ constitutional rights could be constitutionally sound if it “is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. ” 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)

. The standard u nder Turner requires that a valid regulation must (1) be content neutral, (2) logically advance proper goals such as
institutional security and safety, and (3) not be an exaggerated response in relation to those go als. Id . at 93. The Supreme Court later clarified that a prison regulation
is considered to be content neutral if it s purpose is “unrelated to the suppression of expression.” Thornburgh v. Abbott , 490 U.S. 401, 415 (1989) (quoting Procunier
v. Martinez , 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974))

. In Brodheim we held squarely that no legitimate penological interest is served by prison rules prohibiting disrespectful language in grievances. Brodheim , 584 F.3d at 1273. W e reasoned that grievances were easy to insulate from other prisoners and from those prison officials who are the target of the grievance, so4

that disrespectful language in a grievance did not raise any substantial security

concern. Id

. “ A prisoner ’ s statement in a grievance need not have any more impact on prison security through the maintenance of respect than the prisoner ’ s unexpressed thoughts

. ” Id. ( quoting Bradley 64 F.3d at 1281 ).
Dahne c ontends that Brodheim clearly established only that it would be
unconstitutional to punish a prisoner because of the content of a grievance, and not that it was unconstitutional to refuse the grie vance because of that content. We reject this contention. T he holding of Brodheim is not as narrow as Dahne

c ontends

. While it is true that Brodheim involved a warning or threat against a prisoner because of the content of a grievance, limiting Brodheim to only those types of cases would require that we ignore the Brodheim court’s reasoning, and that we disregard the broader First Amendment framework under Turne r
. Instead, we consider that a correct reading of the scope of the holding in Brodheim is that rules prohibiting disrespectful language do not serve a legitimate penological
interest in the special context of prison grievances. Under the Turner framework , a prison may constrain the expression of prisoners for a non

- content

- based legitimate penological reason, such as avoiding hostilities or potential violence. But absent
such a legitimate penological reason , content

- based limitation of a prisoner’s

expre ssion is unconstitutional. Prisoners, just like those on the outside, have and value their First Amendment rights.5

We clarify, however, that a prison official merely requesting that a prisoner rewrite a grievance is not a First Amendment violation. The prison could and did have valid grounds to make such a request in the interest of maintaining good relations between prisoners and guards. But, t he violation here occurred when Dahne refused to allow the grievance to proceed through the administrative pr ocess after Richey did not rewrite it in a way that satisfied Dahne’s sense of propriety

. Functionally , allowing curtailment of the prison’s grievance process in this way
would mean that only a grievance that conformed to Dahne’s personal conception
of ac ceptable content c ould get meaningful review. That is the sort of content

based discrimination that runs contrary to First Amendment protections.
We also stress that the holding of Brodheim relates only to the narrow category of cases dealing with prison grievances. Nothing about Brodheim or our holding today should be construed as suggesting that prisoners have a right to publicly use disrespectful language in the broader prison environmen t. Such actions would plausibly raise legitimate penological concerns related to the security of guards and the desirability of maintaining harmonious relationships between guards and prisoners to the extent possible. He nce prisons will often be justifie d in curtailing that sort of public disrespectful behavior outside of the prison grievance process

.6

2. Turning to Richey’ s retaliation claim , w e hold that the district court erred by not granting summary judgment to Dahne on qualified immunity grounds.
In Rhodes v. Robinson , we held that a retaliation claim has five elements:

(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner ’ s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate ’ s ex ercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.
408 F.3d 559, 567

– 68 (9th Cir. 2005)

. Neither our prior case law nor that of the Supreme Court has clearly established that merely refusing to accept a grievance for processing is a retaliatory adverse action. Richey claims that under Brodheim an “adverse regulatory action” can count as a retaliatory adverse action. And he argues that refusing to process the grievance is an adverse regulato ry action. However, in context in Brodheim the “adverse regulatory action” language refer s to some additional punitive action or threat of punitive act ion over and above merely refusing to accept the grievance. Brodheim , 584 F.3d at 1270

– 71. Because of the lack of case law addressing the issue of whether not processing a grievance
could be viewed as retaliation , it is not the case that “every reasonabl e official would have understood” that refusing a grievance violates a prisoner’s right against
retaliation. Ashcroft v. al

- Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). We reverse the district court and grant summary judgment for Dahne on Richey’s retaliation claim o n qualified immunity grounds.7

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.