IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2018-CA-00498-COA ARTHUR YOUNG APPELLANT

v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/19/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JANNIE M. LEW I S-BLACKMON COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HOLMES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: M. QUENTIN EMICK JR. C. E. SOREY II ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: GLENN F. BECKHAM HARRIS FREDERICK POW ERS III NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/05/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND C. WILSON, JJ. McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. This is an a

ppeal regarding a claim that A rthur Young, an injured railroad em ploy ee, brought against Illinois Central R ailroad Com pany (Illinois Central) pursuant to the Federal Em ploy e r’s Liability Act (FELA), 45 U

. S

. C

. § 51 et seq. (2018). During trial, Illinois Central challenged the testim ony of two o f Young’s experts. The circuit court granted said

m otion. Thereaf

t er, a H olm es County jury f ound Illinois Central liable f or the total am ount of $1,300,000. Illinois Central c hallenged the v erdict in several post-trial m otions. It f iled

a m o tion f or judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) o n the j ury ’s aw ard of $ 1,000,000 f or f uture dam ages and $100,000 f or partial and total d is a b i l i t y . Illinois Central also f iledthree m otions f or a new trial, c laim ing (1) that the jury ’s additional verdict o f $ 100,000 f or past and present phy s ical pain and suf f ering and $100,000 f

or p a s t and present em otional suf f e ring w as a g a i n s t the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence; (2) that the c ourt erred in its r ulings during the jury -selection p rocess; and (3) that the court e r r e d in the jury instructions given. The circuit court denied Illinois Central’s post-trial m otions except f or the JNOV m otion regarding the jury ’s verdict of $1,000,000 in f uture lost wages w hich the
court g ranted. Young a

ppealed the circuit court’s judgm e nt regarding the court’s exclusion of two of his expert witnesses and the f uture lost wages. 1 Finding no error, we af f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Young, a high school graduate with o ne y e a r of college education, w as hired to work f or Illinois Central as a trackm an i n 2 0 0 7

. On January 11, 2008, Young was working f or Illinois C entral i n Mem

phis, Tennessee. In the course of his d uties, Young was r iding a s a passenger in a Kubota tractor driven by his coworker, Jerry Brooks Jr., when a dum p truck operated by Illinois Central’s em ploy ee Michael Paul W allace backed i nto the K ubota. The collision caused the Kubota to roll over. Young reported the incident to h is f orem an, to his supervisor, and to the assistant chief

. Young c ontends that although he asked t o go to the hospital, he did not go because his f orem an, h is supervisor, a n d t he a s sistant chief did not
want an accident r eport to be f iled. Young wrote a statem ent in which he said that he only injured his elbow. But Young later contended that he f elt p ain in h is elbow, head, neck, and back i m m ediately af

ter the accident. Young was sent h om e f or the rest of the weekend, but

1 Illin o is C e n tral f

iled n o cro ss-ap p eal r eg ard in g th e m o tio n s th e circu it c o u rt d en ied an d h as rep o rted ly

p aid Y o u n g th e $ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 aw ard th at th e circu i t co u rt u p h eld

. 2he did not seek im m ediate m edical attention.

¶3. The m e dical testim ony showed that Young was treated b y his l o c a l p h y sician, Dr. Downer, f

or f lu-like s y m ptom s and/or his bronchitis on February 26, 2008; M arch 3, 2008; March 20, 2008; June 9, 2008; Septem ber 18, 2008; October 6, 2 008; a nd October 14, 2008. But he never m e ntioned having any injuries as a result of the accident at any appointm ent. ¶4. In August 2008, Young wrote a letter to Illinois Central indicating that he w as having

m ental and em otional is s u e s a s a result of the accident. Illinois Central granted him a

m edical leave o f absence f rom August 4, 2008, to October 2 0, 2008. During Young’s leave of absence, he sought psy chological assistance f or his nightm ares f

rom Lif e H e l p 2 in Greenwood. ¶5. Between October 2 0, 2008, and August 5, 2016, Young rece i v e d s p o radic orthopaedic

m edical care f

rom Dr. Ronald Childress. Young’s initial visit to D r. Childress w a s the f irst tim e th a t Y oung c om

plained of his alleged back injuries as a result of the accident. Throughout this tim e , Y o u n g continued to work f or Illinois Central, and he was prom oted to the position of

a production-support f

o rem an. 3 ¶6. On May 27, 2010, Arthur Young f iled a c om

plaint pursuant to FELA against Illinois Central in the Holm es County Circuit Court. Young sought to recover f or the injuries and related dam ages he suf

f ered during the January 2008 job-related accident. Illinois Central

2 L if e H elp is a f

u ll-serv i ce-co m m

u n ity m en tal h e alth f

acility

. 3 T h ere is n o th in g in th e reco rd to co m p are Y o u n g ’s p a y as a track m an to h is p a y as a p ro d u ctio n -su p p o rt f

o rem an . T h eref

o re, th e re is n o e v id en ce th at th ere w as a lo ss o f p ay in p resen t o r f

u tu re in co m e. 3answered and denied that Young suf f ered any injuries. ¶7. In a pre-trial o r der f iled on August 22, 2017, Young designated three experts to testif y at trial—Dr. Ronald G. Childress, his treating orthopedic phy sician; D r. Frank Giles, a vocational expert; and D r. Larry Ly nch, an econom ist. In the pre-trial order, I llinois Central also adm i tted that the January 1 1 , 2 008 accident was due to the f ailure to use reasonable care by o n e o f i t s em

ploy e es, other than Young. But Illinois Central did not adm it that Young suf f e red the injuries he claim ed. Theref ore, the sole issue at trial becam e dam ages. ¶8. The case proceeded to trial on O ctober 2, 2017. During trial, Young testif ied that he

was h ired as a track laborer but that his current position was to work as a production-support f orem an. He stated that his current job entailed m uch of the s am e hard labor. H e stated that

a f t e r t h e a c c i d ent he f

elt pain in h is head, neck, back, and elbow, b ut he d id not go to th e hospital im m ediately af

ter the accident allegedly b ecause Illinois Ce ntral did not want an accident repor t t o b e f

i led. H e s tated that a lthough he continued to g o to work, he also continued to have pain. Further, Young testif ied that he did not f

eel that he could work m

uch longer because it was getting hard f or him to do any thing. ¶9. Dr. Childress, Youn g ’ s t r e a t i n g orthopaedic phy sician, also testif ied at trial. Dr. Childress testif

ied that he f

irst saw Young o n October 20, 2008, and that Young com plained of back injuries as a r e sult of the accident. A t Young’s i nitial v isit, Dr. C hildress’s im p ressions were t h a t Y o ung had an acute lum bar spine strain with tendency f or som e

n u mb ness and tingling in his f eet. He also testif

ied that Young had a tensio n h e a d a c h e

com ing f rom an acute cervical spine strain. Dr. Childress recom m ended an M RI scan and

4EMG nerve-conduction st u d y ; he also prescribed Young D ay pro D arvocet m edication. Young was told to f

ollow u p within two m o nths or af t er the tests were c om

pleted. The MRI

scan was perf

orm ed on March 10, 2009. The MRI scan d ocum ented a sm all lef t -lateral C3- C4 disc bulge versus a m ild bony hy pertrophic spurring at the lef t C3/4 uncovertebral joint, but there was no evidence of s pinal or neurof oram inal stenosis. There was a m ild d esiccation and d isc degeneration at C2/3 and C3/4. Young did not f ollow up to get these results until July 12, 2011, m ore than two y ears later. ¶10. On that visit, D r. Childress advised Young of the MRI-scan f indings. Dr. Childress also testif ied that Young inf

orm ed him that he “ w a s having d i f f iculty with the prescribed

m edication”; theref

o r e, Dr. Childress advised Y o u n g to start t aking o ver-the-counter pain

m edicatio n . A l t h ough Dr. Childress advised Young to f ollow up with h im within two

m onths, Young’s next visit w as on F ebruary 2 1, 2014. During that v isit, Dr. C h i l d r e s s observed “f

air m obility of his cervical spine with rotation of thirty degrees lateral bending, of f ive deg r e e s . ” “He h ad som e tenderness i n his upper back and his lum bar spine to palpation.” Theref

o re, Dr. Childress encouraged Young to d o stretches and l ight exercises. Young’s next saw Dr. Childress on May 30, 2014. During that visit, Dr. Childress noted that Young w as restricted in his m obility

. Young reported to Dr. C hildres s t hat he was f unctioning but that he was struggling to f unction. Dr. Childress encouraged Young to do heat treatm ents with hot towels and hot tub soaks. Dr. Childress also recom m ended t hat Young see him within three m o nths, but Young did n ot return until A ugust 14, 2015. During that visit, Dr. Childress advised Young to take over-the-counter m edicine f or his pain but to

5ref

rain f r om heavy activities if the pain did not subside. Young’s last visit with Dr. Childress

was on August 5, 2 016. D r. Childress concluded that Young suf f er e d t r a u ma f

rom the January 2008 accident and that h e had both a n a cute and a chronic cervical and lum ber spine strain with cervical and l um bar disc pathology associated with his strain. Dr. Childress advised Young that if he had increasing problem s a nd dif f iculty to the extent that he did not f eel s af e working that he should request tim e of f or c o nsider other o ptions f or intervention. ¶11. On direct e xam ination, Young’s counsel asked D r. Childress about Young’s ability to continue with his particular prof ession: Q: Do y ou h ave an opinion b a s e d upon a reasonable degree of m edical probability of Mr. Young’s a bility to continue with this pa r ticular prof ession? A: I don’t think it’s in his best interest or the com pany ’s best inter e s t to have h im d o so because he has [ an] underly ing structural problem

. The f ear is that he could f

urther d ama g e t h o s e areas that already have abnorm ality

. He could m ake the disc rupture bigger to the extent he h as to have a surgery . So that in m y m ind it would be better f or him t o do a j o b that does not require the severe straining, lif t ing, walking o n uneven surf

aces, et cetera, in an e f

f o rt to avoi d a p r o b l em that f orces him to have a procedure done. ¶12. But on cross exam ination, Dr. Childress testif ied: Q: I ’ m w rapping [ up] here, Dr. Childress. You testif ied on direct exam i nation th a t y o u would not recom m end Mr. Young continue the very heavy work he’s doing now, v ibrating t ools , uneven surf ace, working on uneven surf

aces. But y ou also testif

ied in y our deposition he could probably

be a m anager indef

initely ? A: It depends on w hat the m anaging job entails. If i t does not e ntail u neven surf a c e s , h eavy tools, vibratory tools, and m ore or less that doesn’t require strenuous a ctivity , he’d have better longevity , better saf e ty , and better capability

to f unction.

6Q: But y ou’re not say ing Mr. Young can’t work any m ore, are y ou? A: No. ¶13. F o l l o w i n g D r . C h ildress’s testim ony , Young attem pted to call Dr. F rank Giles, a vocational expert. Illinois Central m oved ore tenus to exclude Dr. Giles’s testim ony , and the jury was excused. Illinois Central argued that Dr. Giles’s report d id not consider Young’s ability to f

ind other em

ploy m ent or include the value of other potential e m ploy m ent. Illinois Central argued that Dr. Giles’s opinion r egarding Y o u n g’s earning capacity was not consistent with Dr. Childress’s t estim ony that Young was phy sically capable o f working and possessed an earning capacity

. T h eref ore, Illinois Central averred that Dr. Giles should not be allowed to testif

y as to f uture lost wages. ¶14. In respon s e , Y o u n g p r o f f e r e d Dr. Giles’s vocational report. In Giles’s report, he quo t e d a letter f

rom Dr. Childress 4 dated Septem ber 12, 2014, which indicated, “with

reasona b l e me d i c a l certainty , these injuries have caused perm anent im pairm ent

. . . .” Dr. Giles also quoted Dr. Childress’s October 4, 2016 letter, which stated: I do not f

eel that [ Young] would be able t o continue saf e ly a t his p resent em ploy m ent f or m ore than 6 to 1 2 m onths, probably sooner. It will be in his best i nterest to discontinue this em ploy m ent and h ave his c ervical and lum bar disc m a naged w ith appropriate therapy and possible injections and/or surgical intervention, if

he has worsening dif

f i culty

. . . . Based on Dr. Giles’s understanding that Dr. Childress w ould testif y that Young was unable
to work at his c urrent job and w o u l d b e c o m e perm anently disabled, Dr. Giles’s report ref lected a n annual wage l oss of $62,649.60. D r . G i l e s did not give an opinion as to what

4 D r. C h i ld ress’s letter th at D r. G iles relied u p o n is n o t in th e r eco r d

. 7other em

ploy m e nt Y oung could e ngage in and if that w ould still result in a f uture loss of wages. ¶15. In addition to challenging Dr. Giles’s testim ony , Illinois Central also m oved to have the testim ony of Young’s econom ist, Dr. Ly nch, excluded because his opinions were based

on Dr. G iles’s erroneous report m aking Dr. Ly nch’s opinions erroneous as well. Dr. Ly nch

was expected to testif

y by deposition video t o the discounted value of the $62,649.60 per y ear loss-wage-earning f

igure that was provided in D r. Giles’s report. D r. L y nch used Young’s expected e arning capacity through age seventy af ter r educing the lost incom e f or taxes with

a t e n p e r c e n t f

ederal tax rate and a three to f ive percent Mississippi state rate. D r. Ly nch ultim ately concluded, based on the f i gure provided in Dr. Giles’s report, that Young’s

cum ulative loss would be $956,977. ¶16. Af ter argum ent of counsel, the circuit court g ranted I l l i n o i s Central’s m otions and excluded the opinions and testim ony of Dr. G iles and Dr. Ly nch. The c ircuit court held that Dr. G iles and D r . L y

nch “ignored Dr. Childress’s opinion that Young c ould perf orm

m eaningf ul em ploy m ent, and that Young possessed e conom ic potential.” The court f urther stated that i t could n ot allow D r. Giles’s testim ony because Dr. Childress’s testim ony was that Young was perm anently im paired, but not perm a nently disabled. ¶17. Af ter the conclusion of

the testim ony , on October 6, 2017, the jury awarded Young the f ollowing: Past and present phy sical pain and suf f e r ing . . . . . . .$100,000 Past and present m ental and em otional suf f ering . . . $100,000 Any partial and total disability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$100,000 Future wage loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,000,000

8W i th total dam ages being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,300,000[ .]

¶18. On October 2 6 , 2017, I llinois Central challenged the entire verdi c t through several post-trial m otions. In a m o t ion f or JNOV, Illinois Central argued t h at it was entitled t o a JNOV on the j ury ’s award o f f ut u re dam ages in the am ount of $1,000,000 as well as the jury ’s award of partial and total disability in the am ount of $100,000. Illinois Central also f i led three m otions f

or a n e w trial, asserting that (1) the jury ’s v erdict a warding Young $ 1 0 0 ,000 f

or past and present p a in and suf f ering and the jury ’s verdict awarding Young $100,000 f

or past and present em otional suf f ering was against the overwhelm i ng weight of the evidence; ( 2) that the c ourt erred d u r i n g the jury selection process b y deny ing its “f or cause” jury challenges f

or jurors who l i v e d i n the sam e sm all c om m unity w here Young resides; and (3) that the court erred in giving Jury Instructions JI12 and JI13 and in deny ing Jury Instructions D-8 and D-10. ¶19. On January 19, 2018, the circuit c ourt g ranted Illinois Central’s m otion f or JNOV as to the jury ’s verdic t o f $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 000 in f uture lost wages but denied the m otion f or JNOV

c h a l l e n g i ng the jury ’s award f or partial and total disability

. The court also denied Illinoi s Central’s m otions f

or a new trial. ¶20. On February 9, 2018, Young tim ely f iled his notice of a

ppeal. Young argues that the circuit court erred i n excluding his vocational and econom ic experts and er r e d i n granting Illinois Central’s m otion f or JNOV on the jury ’s verdict as to his f uture wage loss. ANALYSIS ¶21. The “FELA creates a tort rem edy f or railroad workers injured on the job and serves

9as the exclusive rem edy f or a railroad em

ploy ee injured as a r esult of his o r h er e m ploy er’s negligence.” Ill

. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Brent , 133 So. 3d 760, 766-67 (¶10) ( Miss. 2013) (citing Hogue v. S

. Ry. Co. , 390 U.S. 516, 517-18 ( 1968)); s ee also Rivera v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 378 F.3d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 2004). “W hat constitutes negligence f or [ FELA] purposes is a f ederal question, not vary i ng in accord a n c e w ith the dif f ering conceptions o f negligence applicable under state or local laws f or other purposes. Federal decisional law f orm ulating and a pply ing the concept governs.” Id. “This Court is bound to enf orce the f ederal law as Congress has provided and as the f ederal courts have read it.” Id. (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf. R.R. C o . v. Gibbs , 600 So. 2d 944, 946 (Miss. 1992)). “As a general m atter, F E L A c a s e s adjudic a t e d in state courts are subject to state procedural rules, but the substantive law governing them

is f ederal.” St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Dickerson , 470 U.S. 409, 411 (1985). Accordingly , “it has long been s ettled that questions c oncerning the m easure of dam ages in

a FELA action are f

ederal in character.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Gandy , 750 So. 2d 527, 534 (¶26) (Miss. 1999). ¶22. In gran t i n g I l l i n ois Central’s m otion t o exclude Young’s vocational and econom ic experts, the circuit c ourt r elied on Quinones-Pacheco v. American Airlines Inc

. , 979 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1 992), and Fashauer v. New J ersey Transit R ail Operations Inc ., 57 F.3d 1269 (3d Cir. 1995). W e f

ind these cases applicable here. ¶23. According to Q uinones-Pacheco , in tort actions, a plaintif f ’s loss of earning capacity is an econom i c concept that is based upon a m ed i c a l f o undation. Quinones-Pacheco , 979 F.2d at 6. “It is the plaintif f ’s burden to prove his or h er claim ed loss of earning capacity .”

1 0Id

. In o rder to prevail, “he m ust of f er evidence f

rom which a j ury m ay reasonably determ ine the annualized stream

of incom e that the plaintif

f , uninjured, would probably have earned, and contrast it, o ver the period of proven disability , to a sim ilar f orecast of what the injured plaintif f ’s earnings are likely to be.” Id .; see a lso Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co. , 946 F. 2d 1085 , 1 0 9 1 ( 5 th Cir. 1991) (“Recovery o f dam ages f o r loss of earning capacity

com pensates a plaintif

f f or the dif f erence between the i ncom e he could e arn bef ore his injury and the incom e he c ould earn af ter the injury .”). Fashauer h eld that in order to prevail on

a lost wages c laim , one m u st provide evidence that ( 1) he or she c annot work, i.e., i s perm anently disabled or (2) i f he o r she can work, what w ork he or she can perf o rm and how

m uch he or she will earn f

r om that ty pe of work. Fashauer , 57 F.3d at 1284-85. ¶24. In o rder t o m ake a successf ul claim f or f uture lost wages under FELA law, if there is
not total disability , our suprem e c ourt has held that there m ust be evidence of the em

ploy ee’s inability to secure the ty pe of job he was perf

orm ing bef

o re the accident f

r o m a nother

em ploy e r. Gandy , 750 So. 2d at 534 (¶26). In Gandy , a train conductor brought an action against the rai l r o a d com pany t o collect d am ages under FELA f or post-traum atic stress disorder caused by a collision. Id. at 529 (¶1). Gandy testif i ed that he was unable to get on

a locom o tive and that the sm ell of diesel f uel terrif ied him

. Id . at 529 (¶3). At the tim e of trial, G andy was no longer working f or the railroad b ut was working as a s ecurity g uard. Id

. at 533 (¶8). Gandy ’s psy chologist testif ied that he did not think that Gandy w ould be able
to w ork as a conductor at any tim e in the f oreseeable f

uture. Id. at 530 (¶5). There was also testim o ny that there were no non-conductor jobs in his seniority that w o u l d not require

1 1getting on a train. Id. at 530 (¶7).

¶25. An econom ist also testif ied on behalf of Gandy

. He calculated the present value of Gandy ’s net incom e based on what Gandy was m aking the last f ull y ear that he worked f

or the railroad com

pany , and the econom i st s ubtrac t e d f r o m that f

i gure the present value of Gandy ’s current security

- guard position to arrive at Gandy ’s lost incom e stream

. I d

. at 533 (¶8)

. W hen af

f irm ing the jury verdict, the Gandy court held that “under FELA, an injured worker has the right to recover dam ages f or his inability

to secure the ty

pe of work he was perf orm ing bef

ore the accident f

rom another em

p loy er because of the injuries f or which the def endant is liable.” Id. Thus, the Gandy court f ound the t estim o ny provided was suf f icient to support the jury ’s verdict. ¶26. The G andy court also r ef erenced W

iles v. New Y

ork, Chicago & St. L ouis R a i l r o a d Company , 283 F.2d 328, 330 (3d Cir. 1960). In W iles , an em

ploy ee o f the r ailroad brought

a FELA action f

or an injury sustained while using the railroad com pany ’s def

e c tive tool. Id

. The jury returned a verdict of $30,000 in f avor of the em

p loy ee, b ut the trial court set aside $20,000 o f that am ount, which was awarded f or “loss of earning p ower.” Id. On a ppeal, the trial court was reversed. There was evidence that W iles had a perm anent, but m inor, back def orm ity as a result of the accident. Id

. at 331. Testim ony showed that W iles w as em ploy ed by the railroad com

pany at a higher salary than that which he w as receiving at the tim e of the accident. Id. The key in W iles , however, was testim ony f rom a m edical w itness stating that W i les w ould h ave dif

f iculty getting a job in heavy industry w i t h any one other than his present em

ploy er. Id

. at 332. The appellate court held that W iles’s econom ic horizons were

1 2lim ited by his injury and, theref ore, the evidence sustained the jury ’s $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 award of dam ages f

or loss of f u ture earnings. I

d. ¶27. In light o f this case law, we now turn to the two issues on appeal: (1) w h e t h e r the circuit c ourt erred in excluding Young’s vocational and econom ic experts and (2) whether the circuit court erred i n g ranting Illinois Central’s m o tion f or JNOV as to his f

u ture loss earnings capacity

. I. Ex c lusion of the Ex pert Witnesses ¶28. As noted in our discussion of the law, entitlem ent to a f uture wage-loss award m ust be f ou n d e d o n testim ony that Young was either t otally disabled, that he could not obtain sim ilar w ork f

rom another em

ploy er, or that he was working at a l ower-pay ing job due to his im p airm ents. Young argues that th e c i r c u i t court erred in excluding his vocational and

econom ic experts who would have provided this testim ony had they not been excluded. ¶29. “Our well-established st a n d a r d o f r e v i e w f

or the trial court’s adm i ssion or suppression of e vidence, including expert t e s t i mo n y , is abuse of discretion.” Griffith v. Entergy Miss. Inc ., 203 So. 3d 579, 587 (¶29) (Miss. 2016). The Fif th Circuit also reviews a district court’s exclusion of

expert testim o ny under the Federal Rules of Evidence f o r abuse o f

discretion. In re Complaint of C.F. Bean L.L.C. , 841 F.3d 365, 3 69 (5th Cir. 2016). Additionally , the Fif th Circuit “give[ s ] the district court wide latitude in determ ini n g t h e a d m i ssibility of expert
t e s t i m ony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and its decision will not be distur b e d o n appeal unless m anif

estly erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation m arks om itted). W e discern no abuse of discretion in the present case.

1 3¶30. Rule 702 of the M ississippi Rules of Evidence, which places the circuit c ourt with the

gatekeeping responsibilities of evaluating the adm issibility of expert testim ony , provides: If s cientif ic, technical, or other specialized k n o w l e d ge will a s sist the trier of f act to understand the e vidence or t o determ ine a f act in issue, a witness qualif ied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, o r education, m ay testif y thereto in the f

orm of an opinion or otherwise, if ( 1) their testim ony is b ased upon suf

f i cient f acts or data, (2) the testim ony is the product of reliable principles and m ethods, and (3) the witness h as applied the principles and m ethods reliably

to the f acts of the case. Canadian Nat’l/Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Hall , 953 So. 2d 1084, 1 094-95 (¶30) (Miss. 2007); see also Miss. Trans. C

omm’n v. McLemore , 863 So. 2 d 31, 40 (¶25) (Miss. 2003) (adopting the Daubert 5 t est concerning expert testim ony )

. The McLemore case discussed a two-prong test which e x a mi n e s b o th the relevance and the reliability of a n expert witness to determ ine if
t e s t i mo n y i s adm issible. McLemore , 863 So. 2d at 40 (¶25). The trial courts have a n im p ortant role as gatekeepers on questions of adm issibility of expert testim ony . Id. ¶31. Here, the circuit court essentially f ound that D r. Giles’s report was unreliable because Giles m isinterpreted D r . C hildress’s letter a bout Y oung being “perm a nently i m p aired” to

m ean that Young was “perm anently disabled.” During trial, Dr. Childress did not testif y that Young’s im

pairm ent m ade him

perm anently

disabled. Rather, Dr. C hildress s tated that he d id not think it w as in Young’s or the com pany ’s best interest f

or him t o continue to wor k
at his p articular prof

ession because Young ha d a n u n d erly ing structural problem

. Dr. Childress also conceded that Young could work, b ut i t depended on what the job duties entailed. Because of Dr. Childress’s testim ony that Y oung was not p erm anently d isabled and

5 D a u b ert v. M

errell D o w P h a rm . In c ., 5 0 9 U .S . 5 7 9 , 5 8 2 (1 9 9 3 ).

1 4that he could work, the circuit court did not abuse its d iscretion and correctly f ound that Dr. Giles’s opinions regarding f uture loss w ages were unreliable. Th e r e w a s n o m edical f oundation or p r e d i c a t e t o support Dr. Giles’s proposed testim ony as to f uture l ost wages. There was n o evidence supporting Dr. Giles’s conclusion that Young w as perm anently disabled. Also, Dr. Giles f ailed to opine about what, if any , work Young could perf orm and how m uch he would earn f

rom that ty

pe of work a s required in Quinones-Pacheco , 979 F.2d
at 6-7, and Fashauer , 57 F.3d at 1284-85. T heref o re, this Court f

inds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking or excluding Dr. Giles’s testim ony . ¶32. W e next turn to the exclusion of testim o n y f r o m Y o u n g ’ s e c o n om ist, Dr. Ly nch. During Ly

nch’s deposition, he stated that he ba s ed his r eport on, am ong other things, Dr. Giles’s vocational report. His a ssum ptions f or his c a lculations are illustrated i n the f ollowing exchange on cross exam ination: Q: Now, Mr. Ly

nch, tell the jury when y our c alculations b eg[ an]. That is, w h e n did y o u assum e Arthur Young would f irst start losing w ages because he was not working at Illinois Central? A: My assum

ption – and it was

– it was at the request of the law f irm – is to assum e that he would w ork through the y ear 2017 and would not be able to work bey ond that. Dr. Ly nch’s opinions re sted upon the erroneous assum ption that Y oung was perm anently disabled a nd “would not be able to work bey ond 2017.” Theref ore, Dr. Ly

nch calculated the f uture lost wages based on D r. Giles’s projected a nnual loss o f $ 62,649.60, which as discussed was also erroneous. Because Dr. Ly n ch’s report relied on D r. Giles’s f aulty report, Dr. Ly nch analy sis was unreliable and was theref ore also properly

excluded.

1 5II. Judgm ent Notw ithstanding the Verdict

¶33. “ In o rder to rule on a m otion f or JNOV, the t r i a l c o u r t i s required to consider the evidence in the light m ost f avorable to the non-m oving party , giving that party the benef it of all f avorable i nf

erences that reasonably m ay be drawn theref rom .” W il s o n v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp

. , 883 So. 2d 56, 63 (¶21) (Miss. 2004). “[ I]f there is s ubstantial evidence in support of the v erdict, that is, evidence o f such quality and weight that reasonable and f air

m inded jurors in the exercise of im par t i a l j u d g m ent m ight have reached dif f erent conclusions, af

f i rm ance is required.” Id

. at (¶23). “In reviewing a circuit court decision on

a m otion f

or JNOV, this Court does not def e r t o t h e c i r c u i t c ourt’s decision but rather reviews the m atter de novo.” Id. at 64 (¶24). W e m ust a ccept all f

acts t h a t t h e p l a intif

f ’s evidence reasonably t ends to prove and all f avorable inf

erences that are f

airly de d u c i b le. Hampton v. Magnolia Towing Co. , 338 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1964). If the evidence, when viewed in the light m ost f avorable to the plaintif

f , c a n p o ssibly sustain his or her case, the

m otion f or JNOV cannot be granted. Id

. ¶34. In granting Illinois Central’s m o tion f or JNOV as to Young’s f uture loss of

earning capacity and f

uture l oss of earnings, the court reasoned that Young f a iled t o put f

orth suf f i cient evidence t o allow the jury to reach the $1,000,000 f uture wage-loss verdict. Young argues that the court erred in granting Illinois Central’s m otion because there was suf f icient evidence to support the jury ’ s verdict. W e disagree. ¶35. Here, Young’s only evidence of dam a ges w as provided through his testim ony and the
t e s t i m ony of his m edical d o ctor, Dr. Childress. Young t estif ied that he could no long e r

1 6perf

orm his duties at the railroad. Dr. Childress, Young’s treating phy sician, t e s t if ied that he did not think it was in the best interest of Young or the com pany f or Young to continue with his particular p rof

e ssion. Dr. Childress also testif ied that it would be better f o r Young
to perf orm work that does not require severe s training, lif ting, or walking on uneven surf aces. But according to Dr. Childress, even though Young had a perm anent im pairm ent, he could per f o rm work at other jobs. N otably , there w as no e vidence presented that Y oung would have dif f i culty f inding a job elsewhere in the i ndustry o r t hat he h ad ever sought work elsewhere. There was no evidence t h a t dem onstrated Y oung’s econom ic horizons outside of his current em

ploy e r. Moreover, any quantif ication of lost earnings by Dr. Giles and Dr. Ly nch w as properly excluded, leaving no econom ic testim ony to support the jury ’s verdict. In order to m ake a successf ul claim f or f uture lost earnings under FELA law, i f there is not total d isability , there m

ust be evidence of the em ploy e e ’s i nability t o s e c u r e t h e ty pe of

em ploy m ent he was p erf

orm ing bef

ore the accident f

rom another em

ploy e r. Gandy , 750 So. 2d at 534 (¶26); W

iles , 283 F.2d at 330. In this case we do n ot h ave such evidence. W e do
not f ind that the evidence in the record m eets the threshold required f or a f u ture econom ic loss verdict as outlined in Gandy , 750 So. 2d at 534 ( ¶26). There was only evidence that at

an u ncertain p oint Y oung would be unable to p erf o rm h is duties at his c urrent job. Theref ore, even considering the f a cts in a light m ost f

avorable to Young, we f

ind the record lacking in suf

f icient evidence to support the jury ’s verdict f or f uture lost wages. CONCLUSION ¶36. Finding no error, we af f irm the judgm ent of

the Holm es County

Circuit Court.

1 7¶37. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., C ARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, LAWRENCE AND C. WI L S ON, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN R ESULT O NLY WITHOUT S EPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

1 8