THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Jalann Lee Williams, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2017-000727 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Charleston County 

R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27895 

Heard October 18, 2018 – Filed June 19, 2019 

AFFIRMED 

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of 

Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney 

General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy 

Attorney General Melody J. Brown, Assistant Attorney 

General Sherrie Butterbaugh, all of Columbia; and 

Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for 

Respondent. 

JUSTICE FEW: In this appeal from a conviction for murder, we hold the trial court 

properly refused to charge the law of self-defense. The defendant shot and killed 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the victim with an unlawfully-possessed pistol the defendant intentionally brought

to an illegal drug transaction. We find the defendant was at fault in bringing on the 

violence. We affirm. 

Robert Mitchell made arrangements with Akim Ladson to meet for the purpose of 

purchasing from Ladson a particularly high-quality variety of marijuana known as 

"loud."1 Mitchell then went to the mobile home where he knew Jalann Williams to

be living to recruit Williams as a participant in the drug deal. The reasons Mitchell 

recruited Williams—and Williams agreed to go—are disputed. Mitchell testified 

Williams told him he was going to the drug deal to rob Ladson because Williams

needed money to pay his bail bondsman on other charges. Williams denied any 

intent to rob Ladson. He testified he loaned Mitchell the money to buy "loud," but 

the price seemed low, so he went to the drug deal to be sure Mitchell was buying the

proper marijuana. His apparent purpose was to ensure his loan would be repaid. 

Referring to the price, he testified, "I didn't really trust that but I was like, 'That's

him buying and as long as I get my money back by the end of the week I was all

right.'" Williams further explained his purpose, "I said, 'well, I'm going to go along 

with you because I don't believe nobody got no price [sic] for that weed.'" He later

testified, "Out of the whole my main concern was just to get my money back at the 

end of the week because I needed the money back."

These disputed facts, however, are not important to our analysis. What is important 

to our analysis is the undisputed fact that when Williams agreed to participate in the 

drug deal, he made a conscious choice to take his loaded pistol with him. 

Williams and Mitchell waited for Ladson in the same mobile home park where 

Williams was living. Ladson arrived in a car driven by his girlfriend, Alayah 

Hamlin. Ladson was in the front passenger seat. Williams and Mitchell entered the 

backseats of Hamlin's car and began the drug deal. Ladson handed Mitchell the 

marijuana, and Mitchell began to inspect and weigh it on a portable scale Williams

brought with him. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Williams, 

Ladson attacked Williams, Williams feared for his safety, and Williams had no 

opportunity to get away. Williams then shot and killed Ladson.

1

 "Loud" is defined in the Urban Dictionary as, "A slang term for marijuana of high 

quality," and, "Bomb-ass weed." See Loud, Urban Dictionary, 

https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=loud (last visited June 14, 

2019). 
 

The State charged Williams with murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm 

during the commission of a violent crime. At trial, Williams requested the trial court 

charge the jury the law of self-defense as to the murder charge. The trial court 

refused. The jury convicted Williams of murder and possession of a firearm during 

the commission of a violent crime. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the 

charge that Williams robbed Ladson. The trial court sentenced Williams to thirty 

years in prison. 

Williams appealed, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to charge the law of selfdefense. The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Williams, Op. No. 2017-UP-015 

(S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 11, 2017). We granted Williams' petition for a writ of 

certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. 

The trial court must charge the jury on the law applicable to the jury's deliberations. 

See State v. Marin, 415 S.C. 475, 482, 783 S.E.2d 808, 812 (2016) ("The trial court 

is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina. The law to

be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial.") (quotations 

and citations omitted); Winkler v. State, 418 S.C. 643, 655, 795 S.E.2d 686, 693 

(2016) (holding a trial court should not answer a jury's question if the answer is "not

applicable to the jury's deliberations") (citation omitted). In some cases, the jury 

must be charged that criminal liability for homicide may be excused under the 

doctrine of self-defense. The law requires this self-defense charge, however, only 

when there is evidence in the record that supports the right of the defendant to use 

deadly force. To enable trial courts to determine when the evidence does support

that right, and thus when the law of self-defense must be charged to the jury, this 

Court has listed four elements that must be present. State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491,

499, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011). If there is no evidence to support the existence of 

any one element, the trial court must not charge self-defense to the jury. Whether 

there is any evidence to support each element is a question of law. 

This structure places the burden on the defendant to produce some evidence to 

support the existence of each element. See Stone v. State, 294 S.C. 286, 287, 363 

S.E.2d 903, 904 (1988) (stating "a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on selfdefense if he has produced evidence tending to show the four elements of that

defense"); State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 105, 359 S.E.2d 63, 64-65 (1987) (stating 

the defendant "must . . . produce evidence" to support the charge of self-defense), 

overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 

(1991). While the State must present evidence to support the existence of each 

element of the crime charged, the State is under no burden to produce evidence to 

refute the existence of self-defense. However, if there is some evidence to support
 

 

 

 

 

 

each element of self-defense—whether found in the State's presentation of evidence 

or produced by the defendant—it becomes the State's burden to persuade the jury

beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one element of the defense does not exist. 

See State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 544, 500 S.E.2d 489, 492-93 (1998) (stating 

"current law requires the State to disprove self-defense, once raised by the defendant, 

beyond a reasonable doubt"); Bellamy, 293 S.C. at 105, 359 S.E.2d at 64 (finding 

the trial court erred in holding the defendant to the burden of persuasion (relying on 

State v. Glover, 284 S.C. 152, 326 S.E.2d 150 (1985), and State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 

45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984))).

This case involves the element we have traditionally described as, "The defendant 

[must be] without fault in bringing on the difficulty." Dickey, 394 S.C. at 499, 716 

S.E.2d at 101. The issue in this case is whether there was any evidence presented at 

trial that would support a finding Williams was "without fault."2 We addressed the 

element in State v. Bryant, 336 S.C. 340, 520 S.E.2d 319 (1999). We held the 

defendant's actions precluded a charge on self-defense as a matter of law because he 

was "responsible for bringing on the difficulty." 336 S.C. at 346, 520 S.E.2d at 322. 

We explained, "Any act of the accused in violation of law and reasonably calculated

to produce the occasion amounts to bringing on the difficulty and bars his right to 

assert self-defense as a[n] . . . excuse for a homicide." 336 S.C. at 345, 520 S.E.2d 

at 322 (citing 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 149 (1999)). We established in Bryant the

principle that a defendant is not entitled to a charge of self-defense if the evidence 

supports only the conclusion that he acted "in violation of law" in a manner 

"reasonably calculated to produce [a violent] occasion." Id. 

Under this principle from Bryant, the trial court properly refused to charge selfdefense. Williams' act of intentionally bringing a loaded, unlawfully-possessed 

pistol to an illegal drug transaction was a "violation of law" that was "reasonably 

calculated to produce" violence. Id. Williams' act "bars his right to assert selfdefense as a[n] . . . excuse for a homicide." Id. 

Intentionally bringing a loaded, unlawfully-possessed pistol to an illegal marijuana 

transaction is "in violation of law" in three important respects. First, Williams' 

2 We readily acknowledge Ladson was at fault, and perhaps Mitchell and Hamlin. 

The question, however, is not who else might have been at fault, but whether

Williams was without fault. In answering that question, it does not matter who else 

was at fault. Thus, the fact "there is evidence . . . that Ladson . . . produced the 

violent occasion" is not relevant. The dissent mistakenly relies on the premise that 

only one person can be at fault. 
possession of the pistol was a violation of law. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-20 

(2015) (providing, "It is unlawful for anyone to carry about the person any handgun 

. . . except . . ." under circumstances not applicable in this case). Second, the 

possession, purchase, or sale of marijuana is a violation of state and federal law. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(a) and (c) (2018); 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 844 (West

2013). Third, and most important, it is a separate violation of federal law to bring 

any gun to an illegal drug transaction. Subsection 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(A) (West 

2015) provides, "any person who, during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking 

crime . . . , uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime,

possesses a firearm, shall, (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 

5 years . . . ." 

In addition, intentionally bringing a loaded, unlawfully-possessed pistol to an illegal

drug transaction is "calculated to produce a violent occasion." Williams' pistol was 

not simply a convenience for him so he could protect himself just in case violence 

arose. Rather, it is well-documented that the mere presence of guns at illegal drug 

transactions produces the violence. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003, 

111 S. Ct. 2680, 2706, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836, 870 (1991) ("Studies . . . demonstrate a 

direct nexus between illegal drugs and crimes of violence."); State v. Banda, 371 

S.C. 245, 253, 639 S.E.2d 36, 40 (2006) (citing, in a different context, the 

"indisputable nexus between drugs and guns"). Congress enacted subsection 

924(c)(1)(A) for the purpose of separately criminalizing the combination of drug 

dealing and unlawful possession of a gun, not just the individual crimes. See Smith 

v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2060, 124 L. Ed. 2d 138, 155 

(1993) ("When Congress enacted the current version of § 924(c)(1), it was no doubt

aware that drugs and guns are a dangerous combination."). Congress recognized the 

causal connection between the presence of an unlawfully-possessed gun and 

violence in illegal drug transactions. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 

132, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1916, 141 L. Ed. 2d 111, 118 (1998) ("This Court has described 

[subsection 924(c)(1)'s] basic purpose broadly, as an effort to combat the 'dangerous 

combination' of 'drugs and guns.'" (citing Smith, 508 U.S. at 240, 113 S. Ct. at 2060, 

124 L. Ed. 2d at 155). 

We have held—in other circumstances—a defendant may lawfully arm himself in 

self-defense even when in unlawful possession of a firearm. See, e.g., State v. 

Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 513 S.E.2d 104 (1999). In Burriss, several men attacked and 

attempted to rob the defendant. 334 S.C. at 258, 513 S.E.2d at 106. The defendant 

pulled a gun and intentionally fired it into the ground. The shot caused a short pause

in the fight. When the fight resumed, the gun fired again—the defendant claimed 

accidentally—killing one of the men who attacked him. 334 S.C. at 258-59, 513 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

S.E.2d at 106. We reversed the trial court's refusal to charge the law of accident, 

334 S.C. at 264, 513 S.E.2d at 109, stating "a person can be acting lawfully, even if 

he is in unlawful possession of a weapon, if he was entitled to arm himself in selfdefense at the time of the shooting," 334 S.C. at 262, 513 S.E.2d at 108; see also 

State v. Slater, 373 S.C. 66, 71, 644 S.E.2d 50, 53 (2007) (stating "the [Burriss 

accident] analysis is equally applicable in determining if a defendant in unlawful 

possession of a weapon is entitled to a charge on self-defense"). 

The defendant in Burriss was not doing anything "in violation of law" except 

unlawfully possessing a pistol. As the Burriss majority explained, the defendant

simply "went to visit a friend at [the friend's] apartment" and "was waiting for his 

friend to come out of the apartment" when the men attacked him. 334 S.C. at 258, 

513 S.E.2d at 106. In this case, Williams was doing something "in violation of law" 

in addition to merely unlawfully possessing a pistol. He was participating in an 

illegal drug deal for which he illegally armed himself in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A). 

For this reason, Williams' case is more like Slater. In that case, Lord Byron Slater

"noticed that [a] disturbance was taking place in an adjacent parking lot. Carrying 

his gun with him, [Lord Byron] went to the adjacent parking lot to investigate." 373 

S.C. at 68, 644 S.E.2d at 51. The "disturbance" turned out to be a robbery, and when 

Lord Byron "surprised one of the attackers . . . , the man turned around and pointed 

a gun." Id. Lord Byron shot and killed him. Id. At Lord Byron's trial for "murder 

and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime," 373 S.C. at 

67-68, 644 S.E.2d at 51, the trial court refused to charge self-defense, 373 S.C. at 

69, 644 S.E.2d at 52. The jury convicted Lord Byron of both charges. Id. 

On appeal, relying on Burriss, Lord Byron argued the trial court erred in refusing 

the self-defense charge. 373 S.C. at 69-70, 644 S.E.2d at 52. We affirmed the trial 

court,3 stating, Lord Byron "fails to meet the first requirement for the self-defense 

charge: specifically, [Lord Byron] was not without fault in bringing on the 

difficulty." 373 S.C. at 70, 644 S.E.2d at 52. We cited the passage above from 

Bryant, and observed that Lord Byron "approached an altercation that was already 

3 The court of appeals reversed the trial court in a split decision. State v. Slater, 360 

S.C. 487, 493, 602 S.E.2d 90, 94 (Ct. App. 2004) (Hearn, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 

373 S.C. 66, 644 S.E.2d 50 (2007). On the State's petition for a writ of certiorari,

we reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the jury verdict. 373 S.C. at 71, 644 

S.E.2d at 53. 
 

 

 

underway with a loaded weapon by his side," which we found was "reasonably 

calculated to bring the difficulty." 373 S.C. at 70, 644 S.E.2d at 52. 

Slater is not identical to Williams' case. In fact, we stated Lord Byron "carried the 

cocked weapon, in open view, into an already violent attack." 373 S.C. at 71, 644 

S.E.2d at 53. Here—although Williams made his gun possession known to 

Mitchell—the evidence indicates Williams concealed his pistol from Ladson until

he was attacked. However, Slater is important to our analysis in this case because

Lord Byron armed himself for the purpose of entering into a situation he knew to be 

rife with violence—just like Williams did here. 

Slater is also important because we explained Burriss. Referring to Burriss, we 

"reject[ed] the position that the unlawful possession of a weapon could never 

constitute an unlawful activity which would preclude the assertion of self-defense." 

373 S.C. at 70, 644 S.E.2d at 52-53. Further explaining Burriss, we stated, 

"Clarifying an ambiguity in this Court's prior case law, we noted [in Burriss] that

where the defendant's unlawful possession of a weapon is merely incidental to the

defendant's lawful act of arming himself in self-defense, the unlawful possession of 

the weapon will not prevent the use of an accident defense." 373 S.C. at 71, 644 

S.E.2d at 53 (emphasis added) (citing Burriss, 334 S.C. at 262 n.5, 513 S.E.2d at 

108 n.5).

Where the unlawful possession of a weapon is not "merely incidental," as we found 

it was not in Slater, the unlawful possession of a weapon does foreclose a selfdefense charge. Like Lord Byron, Williams illegally armed himself before he chose 

to enter a situation he knew to be unlawful, and which he knew was likely to be 

violent. Williams' actions proximately caused the difficulty4

 as a matter of

established law because his act of taking a loaded, unlawfully-possessed pistol into 

an illegal drug transaction was not "merely incidental" to the act of arming himself

in self-defense. Bryant, 336 S.C. at 345, 520 S.E.2d at 322; Slater, 373 S.C. at 71,

644 S.E.2d at 53; see also State v. Smith, 391 S.C. 408, 415, 706 S.E.2d 12, 16 (2011) 

(holding, "Because Smith was acting unlawfully" in taking a loaded, unlawfullycarried pistol into an illegal drug transaction, "he was not entitled to an accident 

charge"). 

4

 In Slater, we said the question was whether "the weapon is the proximate cause of

the killing." 373 S.C. at 71, 644 S.E.2d at 53. We should have said the question is 

whether it is the proximate cause of the "difficulty" or "occasion" that led to the 

killing. 
 

 

We conclude with a quote from now Chief Judge Lockemy of the court of appeals 

in State v. Smith, 406 S.C. 547, 752 S.E.2d 795 (Ct. App. 2013). Concurring in the 

majority's decision to affirm the trial court's refusal to grant the defendant a directed 

verdict on the basis of self-defense, Judge Lockemy argued that bringing a loaded, 

unlawfully-possessed pistol to an illegal drug deal forecloses self-defense, 

At the time of the shooting, Smith was engaged in the 

crime of selling illegal drugs. This activity, in addition to 

damaging the lives of untold numbers of people, also 

results in shootings and deaths on a very frequent basis. 

Smith's decision to bring a loaded weapon to the drug deal 

clearly shows his knowledge of the danger of the situation.

His criminal conduct brought on the necessity to take the 

life of another. Smith created a situation fraught with 

peril. He cannot be excused for the violence that logically 

and tragically often occurs when engaging in such 

conduct, nor can he claim he did not anticipate the high 

probability of such violence. 

406 S.C. at 557, 752 S.E.2d at 800 (Lockemy, J., concurring).

In some future case involving facts different from these, perhaps the defendant will 

convince the trial court he has produced evidence he was not at fault in bringing on 

the violent occasion. In this case, however, there is no evidence on which a jury 

may find Williams' unlawful possession of a loaded pistol during an illegal drug

transaction was "merely incidental" to arming himself in self-defense. Rather—as a

matter of law—Williams' act of taking the pistol to the drug deal was a violation of 

law that produced the violent occasion. Bryant, 336 S.C. at 345, 520 S.E.2d at 322. 

The trial court correctly refused the charge. 

AFFIRMED. 

KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. JAMES, J., dissenting in a separate 

opinion in which BEATTY, C.J., concurs. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUSTICE JAMES: I dissent. Presumably, the majority would not balk at the 

giving of a self-defense instruction if Ladson and Williams (with a gun illegally 

concealed in his back pocket) had not been engaged in a drug deal but had instead 

been arguing about which radio station to listen to. I fully agree illegal drug 

transactions are rife with violence. They are an absolute blight on civilized society.

However, I believe our self-defense law already adequately sets forth the parameters

of how judges and juries are to consider the question of whether a drug-dealing or 

drug-purchasing defendant was or was not "without fault in bringing on the

difficulty." 

The majority cites this Court's holding in State v. Bryant that a defendant's act "in 

violation of law and reasonably calculated to produce the occasion amounts to 

bringing on the difficulty and bars his right to assert self-defense." 336 S.C. 340,

345, 520 S.E.2d 319, 322 (1999). As does the majority, I emphasize the portion of 

our holding in Bryant that self-defense is barred if the defendant's act was reasonably 

calculated to produce the violent occasion. Here, even the majority acknowledges 

the evidence indicates the gun was in Williams' back pocket the entire time before 

Ladson climbed over the front seat and then got on top of and began to choke

Williams, who was in the back seat. I respectfully reject the majority's supposition

that I rely upon the premise that only one person can be at fault in "bringing on the 

difficulty" as contemplated in our self-defense law. I do not. I simply conclude 

there is evidence in this case that Ladson, and Ladson only, produced the violent 

occasion by attacking Williams, which in turn led to Williams retrieving his gun 

from his back pocket and firing in self-defense. 

In its footnote 4, the majority clarifies our holding in State v. Slater,

5

 by stating, "In 

Slater, we said the question was whether 'the weapon is the proximate cause of the

killing.' 373 S.C. at 71, 644 S.E.2d at 53. We should have said the question is

whether it is the proximate cause of the 'difficulty' or 'occasion' that led to the 

killing." I agree with that clarification, and I believe it requires the giving of a selfdefense instruction in this case; as applied to the evidence in this record, there is 

evidence to support a finding by a jury that, in this case, the sole proximate cause of 

the "difficulty" or the "occasion" that led to the killing was Ladson choking 

Williams, not Williams having a gun in his back pocket. 

The majority cites Slater for the proposition that "where the defendant's unlawful 

possession of a weapon is merely incidental to the defendant's lawful act of arming 

himself in self-defense, the unlawful possession of the weapon will not prevent the 

5

 373 S.C. 66, 644 S.E.2d 50 (2007).
 

 

 

use of an accident defense." 373 S.C. at 71, 644 S.E.2d at 53 (emphasis added) 

(citing State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 262 n.5, 513 S.E.2d 104, 108 n.5 (1999)).6

Again, the majority acknowledges the evidence indicates Williams' gun was in his 

back pocket until he was attacked by Ladson. Consequently, there is evidence that 

the taking of the gun to the transaction was "merely incidental" to Williams lawfully

arming himself in self-defense after being attacked. In other words, Williams'

possession of the gun was a moot point, legally and factually, until Ladson brought 

about the difficulty by choking Williams. 

The defendant who, without first being attacked, brandishes a firearm during the 

course of any transaction, whether it is an illegal drug deal or otherwise, will likely 

be considered, as a matter of law, to have "brought about the difficulty." In virtually 

every such scenario, any violence that breaks out would likely be "calculated to 

produce" the violence that ensued. However, the majority makes an illogical and 

unnecessary leap when it broadly concludes that "intentionally bringing a loaded, 

unlawfully-possessed pistol to an illegal drug transaction is 'calculated to produce a 

violent occasion.'" 

Finally, and most respectfully, I take issue with the majority's emphasis of now Chief 

Judge Lockemy's concurrence in State v. Smith, in which he expresses his view that 

because the defendant was engaged in the crime of selling illegal drugs, his decision 

to bring a loaded weapon to the transaction foreclosed self-defense. 406 S.C. 547,

557, 752 S.E.2d 795, 800 (Ct. App. 2013). In the very next paragraph, however, the 

majority states it does not foreclose the possibility that a future drug-dealing or drugpurchasing defendant will rightly convince a trial court that a self-defense instruction 

is warranted. At the least, the majority is giving the trial bench mixed signals on this 

issue. 

I would reverse Williams' convictions and remand for a new trial. 

BEATTY, C.J., concurs. 

6 Of course, we have extended our reasoning to the issue of self-defense. See Slater, 

373 S.C. at 71, 644 S.E.2d at 53.