1 14-3859 Scott v. Commissioner of Social Security 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JA NUARY 1, 2007, IS PE RMITTED AND IS GOVERNE D BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26 th day of April, two thousand sixteen. PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ Henry Scott, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. 14-3859 Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee .

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FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Henry Scott, pro se , Auburn, NY. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Graham Morrison, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (Stephen P. Conte, Regional Chief Counsel, Region II, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security2 Administration on the brief ), for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States Di strict Court for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J .; DiBianco, M.J. ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. Appellant Henry Scott, proceeding pro se , sought review of a fi nal determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commi ssioner”) denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits. He appeals the District C ourt’s grant of judgment on the pleadings to the Commissioner. We assume the parties’ familiar ity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, a nd the issues on appeal. We review de novo a district court’s judgment on the pleadings. Zabala v. Astrue , 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010). When the judgme nt upholds a benefits determination by the Commissioner, we conduct a de novo review of the administrative record ‘“to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s deci sion and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.”’ Id. (quoting Machadio v. Apfel , 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)). The substan tial evidence standard is “a very deferential standard of review—even more so than the ‘clearly erro neous’ standard,” and means that “once an [administrative law judge (“ALJ”)] finds facts, [this Court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude otherwise .” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin. , 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the magistrate judge, whose September 12, 2013 report and recommendation was ad opted in full by the District Court,3 correctly concluded that the ALJ complied with the applicable legal standards, and that the ALJ’s benefits determination was supported by substant ial evidence. The magistrate judge also properly refused to consider the “new” evidence submitted by Scott, and correctly determined that this evidence did not merit re mand for further consideration. See Tirado v. Bowen , 842 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1988). We affirm fo r substantially the reasons st ated by the magistrate judge. Scott’s claim that he is now b lind in his left eye does not meri t remand. First, he does not allege that he was blind, and therefore eligible for disability benefits, during the relevant period.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (limiting review of new evid ence to evidence relating “to the period on or before the date of the administ rative law judge hearing decision”); see also Tirado , 842 F.2d at 597 (new evidence is immaterial when there is no “reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have influenced the [Commissioner] to d ecide claimant’s application differently”). Second, although there is some evid ence in the record that he su ffered from minor vision problems during the relevant period, seve ral months prior to the ALJ’ s decision, Scott’s vision was measured as 20/20 in one ey e and 20/40 in the other. We have considered Scott’s remaining argumen ts and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of th e District Court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk