The Supreme Court of South Carolina 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Adam Rowell, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2022-000571 

ORDER 

After careful consideration of both Rowell's and the State's petitions for rehearing, 

the Court denies Rowell's petition for rehearing and grants the State's petition for 

rehearing. We dispense with further briefing and argument. The attached opinion 

is substituted for the previous opinion, which is withdrawn. 

s/ John W. Kittredge C.J. 

s/ John Cannon Few J. 

s/ George C. James, Jr. J. 

s/ D. Garrison Hill J. 

s/ Donald W. Beatty A.J. 

Columbia, South Carolina 

September 18, 2024 
 

 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Adam Rowell, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2022-000571 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal From Greenwood County 

Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 28215 

Heard February 7, 2024 – Filed July 17, 2024 

Re-Filed September 18, 2024 

VACATED AND REMANDED 

Billy J. Garrett, Jr., of The Garrett Law Firm, PC; Jane 

Hawthorne Merrill, of Hawthorne Merrill Law, LLC; and 

Clarence Rauch Wise, all of Greenwood, for Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of 

Columbia, and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of 

Greenwood, all for Respondent. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUSTICE HILL: After a jury convicted Adam Rowell of two felony driving under 

the influence charges, he discovered one of the jurors, Juror 164, had failed to 

disclose during voir dire that he had recently been arrested. Armed with this 

information, Rowell included it among other grounds in his motion for a new trial. 

Juror 164 was not present at the hearing on the new trial motion. After the hearing, 

Rowell requested another hearing so Juror 164 could be examined. Although the 

State consented to the request, the circuit court did not hold a second hearing and 

instead issued a written order denying Rowell a new trial. Rowell appealed. The 

court of appeals affirmed, holding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in 

failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing with Juror 164. State v. Rowell, 436 S.C. 

54, 870 S.E.2d 175 (Ct. App. 2022). We granted certiorari and now reverse. 

I. 

When the circuit court conducted the voir dire before Rowell's trial began, it asked 

whether any prospective juror or their close friends or family members had "ever 

been arrested or charged with a criminal offense through any state, local, or federal 

law enforcement agency." The question was the first of ten voir dire questions the 

circuit court asked collectively, instructing any jurors who needed to respond to 

come forward only after all ten had been asked. Juror 164 did not respond and ended 

up on Rowell's jury. 

After he was convicted, Rowell learned Juror 164 had been arrested the week before 

the trial for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, unlawful neglect of a 

child, and possessing a controlled substance within the proximity of a school. 

Although these charges had been administratively referred to the same assistant 

circuit solicitor who was prosecuting Rowell, there is no suggestion the solicitor had 

actual knowledge of the pending charges against Juror 164 before Rowell's trial had 

concluded. 

In its ruling denying Rowell a new trial, the circuit court found Juror 164's lack of 

response to voir dire was "unintentional" because the voir dire question about arrests 

was embedded in a series and the structure of the questioning could have confused 

the average juror. The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing with the circuit court that 

once a finding is made that no intentional concealment occurred the inquiry "ends," 

and therefore, there was no need to examine Juror 164 or hold another hearing. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

II. 

A. 

This case calls upon us to again address the question of how trial courts should 

resolve allegations that a juror concealed information during voir dire. The case 

before us concerns such an allegation raised by a defendant in a motion for a new 

trial after he had been convicted. The post-trial inquiry is more searching than when 

the alleged concealment surfaces during trial, for then the trial court has broad 

discretion to replace the juror with an alternate. 

Our state and federal constitutions guarantee a party the right to an impartial jury, 

and "voir dire can be an essential means of protecting this right." Warger v. Shauers, 

574 U.S. 40, 50 (2014); U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; S.C. Const. art. I, § 14. The 

trial court has the solemn duty to ensure "that every juror is unbiased, fair and 

impartial." State v. Gulledge, 277 S.C. 368, 370, 287 S.E.2d 488, 489 (1982). Jury 

selection is a pivotal stage of any trial, and it is vital that jurors truthfully answer 

voir dire questions. Id. at 371, 287 S.E.2d at 490. The trial court, the parties, and 

their counsel rely on these responses in assessing whether a juror should be 

dismissed for cause or peremptorily struck during the selection process. 

The right to peremptory strikes is not constitutionally guaranteed but is granted by 

statute. State v. Potts, 347 S.C. 126, 131, 554 S.E.2d 38, 40 (2001); S.C. Code Ann. 

§ 14-7-1050 (2017); S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1110 (2017). By allowing parties to 

reject a certain number of jurors who cannot be challenged for cause, the peremptory 

strike right enhances the fairness of the trial process, which in turn elevates public 

confidence in our justice system. 

Challenges for cause are also provided by statute. If a party challenges a juror for 

cause, the circuit court must examine the juror to determine if the juror "is sensible 

of any bias or prejudice" about the case. S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1020 (2017). The 

challenging party may also present supporting evidence, and the juror must 

be excused if "the juror is not indifferent to the cause." Id. 

Once a party has exhibited due diligence and timely raises a juror concealment claim, 

our precedent tells us the first step in analyzing the claim is to determine whether 

the concealment was intentional or unintentional. We defined the difference in State 

v. Woods, 345 S.C. 583, 588, 550 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2001): 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We hold that intentional concealment occurs when the 

question presented to the jury on voir dire is reasonably 

comprehensible to the average juror and the subject of the 

inquiry is of such significance that the juror's failure to 

respond is unreasonable. Unintentional concealment, on 

the other hand, occurs where the question posed is 

ambiguous or incomprehensible to the average juror, or 

where the subject of the inquiry is insignificant or so far 

removed in time that the juror's failure to respond is 

reasonable under the circumstances. 

Under this framework, if the concealment was intentional, it was inferred the juror 

was biased. State v. Coaxum, 410 S.C. 320, 328, 764 S.E.2d 242, 245–46 (2014). 

The moving party was entitled to a new trial as long as the party could show 

prejudice by demonstrating the information concealed would have either supported 

a challenge for cause or been a material factor in the use of the party's peremptory 

challenges. But if the concealment was unintentional, no bias could be inferred and 

the moving party could only receive a new trial if the party proved the concealed 

information suggested bias and the information would have been a material factor in 

the party's use of a peremptory challenge or would have resulted in a successful 

challenge for cause. See id. at 329, 764 S.E.2d at 246; S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1020 

(describing process for setting aside a biased juror for cause). As we explained in 

Coaxum, "[i]n other words, the moving party must show that it was prejudiced by 

the concealment because it was unable to strike a potential—and material—source 

of bias." Id. at 329, 764 S.E.2d at 246. 

We believe the time has come to abandon the intentional versus unintentional 

distinction. The distinction has proven unwieldy. This case is a good example of 

how awkward it is to apply, for it requires us to use an objective test (whether the 

voir dire question was ambiguous) to decide if a juror's conduct (withholding 

information the question sought to obtain) reveals that most subjective of human 

traits: bias. 

We conclude a better path is to simplify the inquiry. Where a party claims a juror 

has withheld material information in response to a voir dire question, the trial court 

must determine, preferably after a hearing, whether the juror's withholding suggests 

bias. This will typically turn on the nature of the information withheld, rather than 

the nature of the juror's state of mind in not disclosing it. The nature of the fox's 

disguise matters little to the chicken. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We have always maintained that it is the nature of the information concealed that 

drives the inquiry. Thompson v. O'Rourke, 288 S.C. 13, 15, 339 S.E.2d 505, 506 

(1986). The juror's intent may bear on the inquiry, but the ultimate question remains 

whether the juror was biased and whether the bias, in turn, caused prejudice. See, 

e.g., State v. Stone, 350 S.C. 442, 448–49, 567 S.E.2d 244, 247–48 (2002) (holding 

trial court abused discretion in removing juror during sentencing phase of capital 

trial where juror's innocent nondisclosure of "scant acquaintance" with witness did 

not affect her impartiality and "would neither have supported a challenge for cause 

nor would it have been a material factor" in party's exercise of preemptory strikes). 

We therefore hold today that when a juror untruthfully answers or fails to answer a 

material voir dire question, the juror's bias may not be presumed, and a new trial 

may be ordered only when prejudice is proven by showing the concealed information 

reveals a potential for bias and would have made an objectively material difference 

in the moving party's use of a peremptory strike or resulted in a successful challenge 

for cause. We overrule the "intentional versus unintentional" framework erected by 

the line of cases that began with State v. Gulledge, 277 S.C. 368, 287 S.E.2d 488 

(1982), and includes Coaxum and Woods. 

This standard aligns with our decisions in other juror misconduct contexts, where 

we have required a showing of prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Green, 432 S.C. 97, 99– 

101, 851 S.E.2d 440, 440–41 (2020) (evaluating prejudice of bailiff's comment to 

jury). The standard we set forth today for a juror's concealment of information 

during voir dire focuses on the potential bias of the juror and how the bias may 

prejudice a party. This protects a party's fundamental right to a fair and impartial 

jury, as well as society's interest in the finality of judgments. 

The United States Supreme Court has struck the balance a bit differently. See 

McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (plurality 

opinion) ("We hold that to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first 

demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, 

and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for 

a challenge for cause."). We have the right to interpret the South Carolina 

Constitution in a more expansive manner. State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 643–44, 

541 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2001). 

B. 

We next address whether the trial court should have granted Rowell the second 

hearing. As our cases illustrate, a hearing on juror misconduct claims is almost 

always preferred. McCoy v. State, 401 S.C. 363, 371, 737 S.E.2d 623, 628 (2013). 

Although we stop short of requiring a full-blown evidentiary hearing based on the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mere allegation of juror nondisclosure, a trial court must document cogent and 

compelling reasons for not holding one. We hold it was error for the circuit court to 

decline the request for an evidentiary hearing so Juror 164 could be examined as to 

whether his pending charges could have caused him to be biased. See id. 

("[E]valuating the merits of a juror misconduct claim is a fact-intensive inquiry, 

which is most appropriately conducted after a hearing."); Woods, 345 S.C. at 585– 

86, 550 S.E.2d at 283 (explaining trial court ruled on new trial motion alleging juror 

concealment after holding an evidentiary hearing during which the juror testified); 

see also Lynch v. Carolina Self Storage Centers, Inc., 409 S.C. 146, 160, 760 S.E.2d 

111, 119 (Ct. App. 2014). 

Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' opinion and remand for an evidentiary 

hearing on Juror 164's failure to disclose his pending criminal charges. At the 

hearing, the circuit court shall decide whether Rowell has proven prejudice by 

demonstrating the withheld information suggests a potential bias, and, if so, whether 

it would have supported a challenge for cause or would have been material to his use 

of peremptory strikes. Materiality is to be judged by an objective standard, i.e. 

whether a reasonable party would have exercised a strike had the requested 

information been disclosed. 

We recognize the practical difficulty of revisiting this issue after such a long passage 

of time and the demands it may make on finite human memories, even assuming 

Juror 164 is available to testify. But that is as far as we will speculate about what 

the remand hearing may reveal or what its result should be. 

VACATED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 

KITTREDGE, C.J., FEW, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Donald W. Beatty, 

concur.