NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MICKI LYNN CASTRO, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0731 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201501499

The Honorable Richard Weiss, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jana Zinman

Counsel for Appellee

Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman

By Jill L. Evans

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 5-2-2019
STATE v. CASTRO

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Micki Lynn Castro appeals her convictions and sentences for 

possession of dangerous drugs for sale (methamphetamine) and possession 

of drug paraphernalia (methamphetamine). She argues the superior court 

erred by denying her motion to suppress because the arresting police officer 

lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to extend the traffic stop and 

detain her. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 On an afternoon in December 2015, Castro left a doctor’s 

office where she was undergoing physical therapy following ankle 

replacement surgery. Castro got into the driver’s seat of her SUV along

with a friend in the passenger’s seat and her minor daughter in the backseat. 

Shortly after they left the doctor’s office, she was pulled over by Detective 

Cortez. He had observed Castro abruptly change lanes without using her 

turn signal and cut off another car, and he initiated a traffic stop. 

¶3 Detective Cortez approached the driver’s-side window and 

asked Castro for her driver’s license, registration, and insurance. Castro 

asked him why she had been pulled over. He explained she had cut off 

another car and failed to use her turn signal. Castro “kind of smiled” and 

said “[you] saw that,” which Detective Cortez took to mean “she [knew]

she did it, and . . . was caught.” Detective Cortez, as an officer working in 

drug interdiction, was aware of Castro’s identity, “had been looking into 

her because of maybe possible drug sales and activity,” and “was trying to 

look into her behavior.” When Castro handed him her license, he waited to 

take it and noticed that her hand was shaking a little. Detective Cortez also 

noticed that the friend sitting in the passenger seat was staring straight 

 

1 “When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we consider only the 

evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view that evidence in 

the light most favorable to upholding the court’s ruling.” State v. Caraveo, 

222 Ariz. 228, 229 n. 1 (App. 2009).
STATE v. CASTRO

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3

ahead and “figured she was avoiding [him] for a reason.” He also observed 

that Castro made sure not to move a black sweater in the center console 

when searching for her paperwork and that she was sweating despite it 

being around 50 degrees outside. When he asked her why she was 

sweating, she replied that she had just come from physical therapy for her 

ankle. 

¶4 At that point, another officer arrived, and Detective Cortez 

asked Castro to exit the SUV. Detective Cortez noticed that Castro again 

made sure the sweater stayed in place over the center console as she exited. 

Detective Cortez told Castro that she was not going to get a ticket and he 

was going to fill out a warning; nevertheless, she continued to appear

nervous and her behavior did not change. When he remarked on this, she 

gave “fake” laughs and smiles that he did not think were genuine. Castro 

also began yawning repeatedly. When Detective Cortez confronted her 

with the information that her name had come up as a drug dealer, “[s]he 

kind of just gave a fake smile” and “raised her eyebrows,” but “did not . . . 

seem surprised.” Castro responded that she did not understand what he 

was saying. 

¶5 Detective Cortez then told Castro that during a previous drug 

investigation some months before, he located a travel trailer being used as 

a meth lab. That trailer was registered to Castro’s daughter, and 

consequently, Detective Cortez made contact with her husband during the 

investigation. Castro said she knew nothing about it but again “did not 

seem surprised” and laughed. Detective Cortez noticed that by then, Castro 

was cold, her lips were dry, she continuously licked her lips, and she still 

seemed nervous but was putting on a casual laughing demeanor. 

¶6 Detective Cortez told Castro that he knew she had previously 

been arrested for trafficking methamphetamine and conspiracy and that 

her name was associated with drug dealing. Castro responded that it was a 

long time ago and she had completed her probation. Detective Cortez asked 

her if there was anything illegal in her car. Castro gave no response but 

looked toward the car. In an attempt to “guilt trip” her into an admission, 

Detective Cortez said that he hoped there was nothing illegal in the car 

because her child was in the backseat. Castro responded that there was 

“nothing in the car basically” and gave another fake laugh. He asked for 

consent to search the car, and she declined because the “last time she gave 

consent she got screwed over.” Detective Cortez asked her if that meant 

that last time “probably something was found,” to which she “pretty much 

agreed.” He again asked her for consent to search, and Castro refused. 
STATE v. CASTRO

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¶7 Detective Cortez concluded—based on what he had heard 

and observed during the traffic stop—that Castro’s taking such care not to 

move the black sweater on the center console, her yawning and dry lips, her 

“being hot and then cold,” and her overall demeanor were all indicators of 

criminal activity. He told Castro she was not free to leave and informed her 

that a canine was en route. When Officer Hammontree arrived with his dog

approximately 20 minutes later, the dog sniffed inside the car and alerted.

Another officer searched the car and discovered methamphetamine. 

¶8 Castro was indicted for one count of possession of dangerous 

drugs for sale (methamphetamine) and one count of possession of drug 

paraphernalia (methamphetamine). Before trial, Castro moved to suppress 

the evidence seized from her car as a result of her roadside detention. The 

superior court held an evidentiary hearing, taking testimony from 

Detective Cortez, Officer Hammontree, and the friend who had been sitting 

in the passenger seat. The court denied Castro’s motion to suppress, noting 

that it was “a close call” but finding that the arresting officer had articulable 

reasonable suspicion to extend the detention beyond the original traffic 

stop. After a two-day trial, the jury found Castro guilty of both charges and 

she was sentenced to a total of six years in prison. 

DISCUSSION

¶9 We review for an abuse of discretion the superior court’s 

denial of a motion to suppress evidence. State v. Cheatham, 240 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 6 

(2016). “[W]e defer to the . . . court’s factual findings, including findings on 

credibility and the reasonableness of the inferences drawn by the officer, 

but we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact and the . . . court’s 

ultimate legal conclusions as to whether the totality of the circumstances 

warranted an investigative detention and whether its duration was 

reasonable.” State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 22, ¶ 19 (App. 2007).

¶10 “The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches 

and seizures by the [g]overnment, and its protections extend to brief 

investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional 

arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citations omitted).

An officer may conduct an investigatory stop of a vehicle when he has a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred, 

based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, 

112, ¶ 16 (App. 2010). “After an officer has effectuated the purpose of the 

stop, he must allow a driver to continue on his way unless (1) the encounter 

between the driver and the officer becomes consensual, or (2) during the 
STATE v. CASTRO

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encounter, the officer develops a reasonable and articulable suspicion that 

criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 112, ¶ 17.

¶11 Reasonable suspicion must be more than an “inchoate 

hunch,” but “the Fourth Amendment only requires that police articulate 

some minimal, objective justification for an investigatory detention.” Teagle, 

217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 25 (citations omitted). We assess whether an officer had 

reasonable suspicion “based on the totality of the circumstances, 

considering such objective factors as the suspect’s conduct and appearance, 

location, and surrounding circumstances, . . . and taking into account the 

officer’s relevant experience, training, and knowledge.” State v. Fornof, 218 

Ariz. 74, 76, ¶ 6 (App. 2008). Further, we “accord deference to a trained law 

enforcement officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and 

suspicious actions.” Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 26. We will not “parse out each 

individual factor, categorize it as potentially innocent, and reject it”; 

instead, we “must look at all of the factors . . . and examine them 

collectively.” Id. at 24, ¶ 25.

¶12 Here, Detective Cortez had articulable reasonable suspicion 

to extend the traffic stop and call for a canine unit. During the suppression 

hearing, Detective Cortez testified that he had been a police officer for 

almost 14 years, had participated in multiple training courses on highway 

drug interdiction and drug trends, had been a member of the gang task 

force for the past three years, and had conducted over 100 drug-related 

arrests. Detective Cortez also explained why he found Castro’s actions, 

behaviors, and responses to his questions indicative of criminal activity. He 

found it unusual that the friend in the passenger seat avoided making eye 

contact with him. In his experience, Castro’s repeated and careful 

avoidance of dislodging the black sweater on the center console was 

noticeable and abnormal, as people usually shuffle heedlessly through their 

things trying to find their paperwork. Despite Castro’s explanation, he 

interpreted her sweating—which soon changed to her being cold and 

having dry lips—as indicators of nervousness. He found it abnormal that 

her level of nervousness did not decrease when he told her she was not 

getting a ticket but only a warning, and believed her repeated laughter and 

smiles were disingenuous attempts to hide her nervousness. He was also 

surprised by her lack of offense when he mentioned that he associated her 

name with drug dealing, and her repeated yawning was something he had 

seen before from suspects committing a crime. 

¶13 While all of these factors alone may be innocuous, we will not 

“focus[] on potential innocent explanations for each individual factor,” but 

rather look to the totality of the circumstances. State v. O’Meara, 198 Ariz. 
STATE v. CASTRO

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294, 296, ¶ 12 (2000). It was within the superior court’s discretion to defer 

to Detective Cortez’s ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious

actions, and we detect no abuse in its ruling that all of these indicia 

amounted to “more than a hunch that criminal activity was taking place.” 

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.