NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0669n.06 

No. 16-2754 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CENON GARCIA-RODRIGUEZ, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

BEFORE: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and BUSH, Circuit Judges. 

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-Appellant Cenon Garcia-Rodriguez appeals his sentence for conspiracy to 

possess and distribute cocaine and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a), 

(b)(1)(A)(ii), and (b)(1)(C). He argues that the district court improperly calculated his criminal 

history category as II by assessing two criminal history points for “committ[ing] the instant 

offense” while on probation, see USSG § 4A1.1(d), and one criminal history point for a “prior 

sentence,” see USSG §§ 4A1.1(c) and 4A1.2(e)(2). The district court properly assessed all three 

criminal history points, and we affirm Garcia-Rodriguez’s sentence. 

I. 

Garcia-Rodriguez has a history of engaging in drug-distribution schemes. In 2009, he 

pleaded guilty in Michigan state court to marijuana distribution. The state court sentenced him 
No. 16-2754, United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez 

-2- 

to five years of probation, which ran through March 5, 2014. In 2012, while on probation, 

Garcia-Rodriguez initiated the instant conspiracy to sell cocaine and heroin. 

As they had with his scheme to distribute marijuana, the police eventually caught him. 

He pleaded guilty by plea agreement to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin 

from January 2012 to February 2016. The plea agreement stipulated to a number of facts, 

including that he had been involved in a marijuana distribution scheme prior to the instant 

conspiracy and that during 2012 many of the players involved in the marijuana scheme had also 

sold cocaine and heroin with him. 

At sentencing, the district court assessed Garcia-Rodriguez three criminal history 

points—two points for committing the instant offense while on probation for the 2009 conviction 

for marijuana distribution and one point for the prior sentence itself—placing him in criminal 

history category II. Garcia-Rodriguez objected, arguing that the court should not assess any 

criminal history points. The district court overruled his objection and sentenced GarciaRodriguez to 151 months in prison, the top of the applicable Guidelines range.1

On appeal, Garcia-Rodriguez asserts that the district court imposed a procedurally 

unreasonable sentence by assessing three criminal history points and thus applying an improper 

Guidelines range based on his being in criminal history category II. The district court did not 

err, and we affirm Garcia-Rodriguez’s sentence. 

II. 

A court abuses its discretion and imposes a procedurally unreasonable sentence if it fails 

to calculate the Guidelines range properly. See United States v. Coppenger, 775 F.3d 799, 803 

(6th Cir. 2015). We review a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the application of the 

 1

 Based on a criminal history category II and a total offense level of 35, the court found Garcia-Rodriguez’s 

Guidelines range to be 188 to 235 months. The court applied a four-level reduction under USSG § 5K1.1, reducing 

Garcia-Rodriguez’s range to 121 to 151 months. 
No. 16-2754, United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez 

-3- 

Guidelines de novo, United States v. Wheeler, 330 F.3d 407, 411 (6th Cir. 2003), and a district 

court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts of a case for clear error, United States v. Webb, 

335 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2003).

The Guidelines direct how district courts must calculate a defendant’s criminal history. 

District courts add two criminal history points to a defendant’s criminal history calculation “if 

the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including 

probation.” USSG § 4A1.1(d). District courts also assess one criminal history point for each 

eligible “prior sentence.” USSG § 4A1.1(c). A defendant with one or no criminal history points 

is assigned a criminal history category of I, while a defendant with two or three criminal history 

points is assigned a criminal history category of II. USSG Ch. 5 Pt. A. (sentencing table). 

Garcia-Rodriguez argues that the district court erred when it assessed him three criminal 

history points, making his criminal history category II instead of I. He asserts that the marijuana 

distribution for which he was convicted in 2009 and the instant conspiracy to sell cocaine and 

heroin were parts of one unified and ongoing conspiracy to sell drugs. He argues that the district 

court should have considered the prior conviction as “relevant conduct” to the instant offense, 

which would not have resulted in the addition of any criminal history points to his criminal 

history calculation. See USSG § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1; USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1). Therefore, he asserts 

that the district court erred by assessing him criminal history points for “committ[ing] the instant 

offense while under a[] criminal justice sentence” and for having a “prior sentence.” 

These arguments fail. Garcia-Rodriguez’s argument that the district court erred by 

considering his prior marijuana distribution conviction a “prior sentence” instead of relevant 

conduct to the instant offense is meritless, because the Guidelines define a “prior sentence” as 

“any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, . . . for conduct not part of the 
No. 16-2754, United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez 

-4- 

instant offense.” USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1). The Guidelines do not define “conduct not part of the 

instant offense,” but we have explained that the “‘appropriate inquiry’ [examines] whether the 

‘prior sentence’ and the present offense involve conduct that is severable into two distinct 

offenses.” United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1338 (6th Cir. 1992).2

 

The district court did not err, let alone commit clear error, by determining that GarciaRodriguez’s 2009 conviction for marijuana distribution was a distinct and separate offense from 

the conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin. The Application Notes for USSG § 1B1.3 make 

this clear when considering a hypothetical that is nearly identical to the present case: 

The defendant was convicted for the sale of cocaine and sentenced to state prison. 

Immediately upon release from prison, he again sold cocaine to the same person, 

using the same accomplices and modus operandi. The instant federal offense (the 

offense of conviction) charges this latter sale. In this example, the offense 

conduct relevant to the state prison sentence is considered as prior criminal 

history, not as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as 

the offense of conviction. The prior state prison sentence is counted under 

Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood). 

USSG § 1B1.3, cmt. 5(C). Here, Garcia-Rodriguez was convicted in state court for the delivery 

of marijuana, was sentence for his crime (five years of probation), and then at some later point 

became involved in the instant offense. Though the prior marijuana sales and the instant 

conspiracy involved some overlap in the individuals involved, that consideration is irrelevant 

given that the activity in question occurred several years after his 2009 conviction. We find no 

error in the district court’s conclusion. 

Garcia-Rodriguez’s assertion that his probation sentence should not trigger the two 

criminal history point addition is equally meritless. Application note 4 to USSG § 4A1.1(d) 

 2

 The government failed to brief the appropriate inquiry, relying on United States v. Irons, 196 F.3d 634 

(6th Cir. 1999), which is inapposite to this case. The inquiry in Irons was whether the defendant’s prior sentences 

were “related” within the meaning of § 4A1.2(a)(2). That inquiry, which examines the relationship between two 

prior sentences, “is a different inquiry from whether a prior sentence was imposed ‘for conduct not part of the 

instant offense’ within the meaning of section 4A1.2(a)(1).” United States v. Yerena-Magana, 478 F.3d 683, 687 

(6th Cir. 2007). 
No. 16-2754, United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez 

-5- 

instructs a district court to add two criminal history points “if the defendant committed any part 

of the instant offense (i.e., any relevant conduct) while under any criminal justice sentence, 

including probation.” Since Garcia-Rodriguez concedes that he was on probation when he 

engaged in the instant conspiracy, the two point increase unquestionably applies. See, e.g., 

United States v. Jones, 551 F. App’x 268, 270-71 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming two point increase 

where a defendant conceded that he entered into a conspiracy while under post-release control). 

The district court did not err. 

III. 

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.