[Cite as State v. Zupancic , 2021-Ohio-1448.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF WAYNE )

STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. TYLER ZUPANCIC Appellant C.A. No. 20AP0007

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO CASE No. 2019 CR-B 001583

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: April 26, 2021

TEODOSIO, Judge. {¶1} Appellant, Tyler Zupancic, appeals from his conviction for obst ructing official business in the Wayne County Muni cipal Court. This Court affir ms. I. {¶2} Hotel staff at the Days Inn in W ooster as well as Wooster polic e were notified that Mr. Zupancic and his girlfriend (“ M.S.”) were causing disturban ces in Room 113 and were the source of a strong odor of marijuana throughout the entire firs t floor of the hotel. Officer Jonathan Ruggerri knew Mr. Zupancic from past incidents and learned that he had an active warrant for his arrest. When he reached Room 113, the officer heard the voices of both a male and a female inside

of the room and smelled an overw helming odor of marijuana. Ove r the next couple of hours, staff and several officers spoke to M.S. through the closed door and tried to convince her to open it because they suspected Mr. Zupancic was inside. Sometimes she answered and sometimes she

remained silent. After much sta lling and being told she needed to leave the premises, M.S. finally2

vacated the room. The officers ag ain verbally announced their presence, identified themselves as the police, and called out for anyone in the room to reveal the mselves. Upon receiving no response, the officers searched the room and ultimately found Mr. Zupanci c hiding underneath a mattress

and inside of one of the enclosed bedframes. {¶3} Mr. Zupancic was arrested and ch arged with obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), a mis demeanor of the second degre e. After a bench trial, the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to 90 days in jail and a $500.00 fine. Mr. Zupancic’s motion to stay the sentence was denied. {¶4} Mr. Zupancic now appeals from hi s conviction and raises one ass ignment of error

for this Court’s review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MA TTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST TYLER ZUPANCIC. {¶5} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Zupancic argues that his c onviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree. {¶6} Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a q uestion of law, which

this Court reviews de novo. State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence concerns the State’s burden of production * * *” and is, “[i]n essence, * * * a test of adequacy.” In re R.H. , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28319, 2017-Ohio-7852, ¶ 25; Thompkins at 386. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the e vidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph3

two of the syllabus. However, “we do not resolve evidentiary c onflicts or assess the credibility of witnesses, because these functions belong to the trier of fact. ” State v. Hall , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27827, 2017-Ohio-73, ¶ 10. {¶7} Mr. Zupancic was convicted of obstructing official business, un der R.C. 2921.31(A), which provides: No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to preve nt, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act with in the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties. “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific inten tion to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct o f a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’ s specific intention to engage in

conduct of that nature .” R.C. 2901.22(A). “Purpose can be est ablished by circumstantial evidence and may be ascertained from th e surrounding facts and circumsta nces of the case.” North Ridgeville v. Reichbaum , 112 Ohio App.3d 79, 85 (9th Dist.1996). Law enforcement offi cers are considered public officials. See R.C. 2921.01(A). {¶8} The front desk clerk at the Days Inn in Wooster testified at tr ial that, on November 24, 2019, she received complaints from hotel guests about Mr. Z upancic and M.S. fighting in Room 113. The odor of marijuana was also apparent all througho ut the first floor of the hotel. She spoke to Officer Ruggerri in the parking lot, informed him of the trouble with M.S. and Mr. Zupancic in Room 113, informed h im of the odor of marijuana, an d gave him permission to walk through the hotel. Officer Rugg erri testified that he knew Mr. Zupancic from prior encounters and

learned that he had a warrant for his arrest. The officer went to Room 113 and testified that the odor of marijuana was overwhelmin g as he approached the door to the room. He heard the voices of both a male and a female talking from inside of the room. H e was eventually able to converse4

with M.S. through the door, but testified that “everything beca me quiet” once he mentioned that Mr. Zupancic had a warrant for his arrest. Several other offic ers arrived at the scene over time because the entire incident took approximately an hour to an ho ur-and-a-half. M.S. would sometimes respond and talk with t he officers through the door, but would sometimes remain silent. At some point, the officers f ound out from hotel staff that M.S . and Mr. Zupancic were on the

hotel’s “do not rent” list. The front desk clerk returned to R oom 113 and told M.S. through the door that the hotel manager wanted the couple to leave the hote l. M.S. requested time to gather her belongings, but after much more time elapsed the manager au thorized the clerk to use a master key to open the door. After more prompting from officers, M.S. eventually unhooked the door

chain and the officers could fin ally see inside of the room. {¶9} Officer Ruggerri’s body cam video was entered into evidence. I n the video, the officers wait at the threshold of the open doorway while watchi ng M.S. pack up her belongings for another 15 minutes. Once M.S. finally vacates the room, the of ficers enter to look for Mr. Zupancic. They can be seen and heard in the video clearly anno uncing their presence, identifying themselves as police officers, and asking for anyone else in th e room to come out. After receiving no response, they spend the next minute searching the room and ultimately discover Mr. Zupancic hiding underneath the mattress and inside one of the enclosed b edframes. With weapons drawn, they immediately remove him from underneath the bed. Officer R uggerri testified that the amount of time that elapsed, combined with having to physically check underneath beds that cannot be seen under, was a delay in their investigation. After handcuff ing Mr. Zupancic and reading him

his Miranda rights, one of the officers asks him, “Be honest with me: Coul d you hear us?” Mr. Zupancic’s response to this question is faint and unintelligibl e in the video, but Officer Ruggerri testified that Mr. Zupancic admitted to hearing the officers an d admitted to knowing he had a5

warrant for his arrest. Officer Ruggerri testified that it typ ically takes two minutes to process someone with a warrant if they are compliant. Officer Phillip Coe testified that while speaking to Mr. Zupancic outside of the hotel , Mr. Zupancic claimed that he climbed under the bed and pulled the bed back on top of himself to elude the officers. He testi fied that Mr. Zupancic admitted that he knew the officers were pres ent and that he heard them callin g out to him. {¶10} Mr. Zupancic argues that the Sta te failed to set forth sufficie nt evidence that he “prevent[ed], obstruct[ed], or delay[ed]” the officers’ perform ance of their duties by “hamper[ing] or imped[ing]” them. He first relies on Officer Coe’s testimon y that the police were conducting a safety sweep of the room and claims that hiding underneath the mattress did not impede the officer’s duties, as they were “not searching the room just to find [him].” He also argues that he was already underneath the mattress when officers entered the r oom, and the officers did not call out for him or ask him to come out, so he did not take any acti on to impede, hamper, or delay the officers in their duties. We interpret these arguments collect ively as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to whether Mr. Zupancic did any act that hampered or impeded the officers in the performance of their lawful duties. See R.C. 2921.31(A). {¶11} “An affirmative act is required to support a conviction for obs tructing official business, and the mere failure t o obey a police officer’s reque st may not always amount to obstruction.” (Em phasis added.) State v. Moss , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28986, 2018-Ohio-4747, ¶

12. See also State v. McCrone , 63 Ohio App.3d 831, 834 (9th Dist.1989), quoting Hamilton v.

Hamm , 33 Ohio App.3d 175, 176 (12th Dist.1986) (“Generally, a perso n ‘cannot be guilty of obstructing official business by doing nothing * * *.’”). “How ever, a suspect may indeed obstruct official business when he creates a significant delay by ignori ng an officer’s repeated orders,6

thereby impeding the officer’s ability to perform his lawful du ties.” Moss at ¶ 12. The total course of the suspect’s conduct must be considered, rather than viewin g his actions in isolation. Id. {¶12} In State v. Welch , this Court affirmed convictions for obstructing official busi ness wherein an officer went to a resid ence to arrest the appellant on a warrant, believi ng the appellant to be there, but the appellant hid in the attic instead of comi ng out. See State v. Welch , 9th Dist. Summit No. 22002, 2004-Ohio-4582, ¶ 17-18. We have also affirm ed convictions for obstructing

official business in cases where the evidence showed the suspec ts ran into a basement and hid behind a furnace when police announced their presence, although these cases admittedly involved both flight from and hiding from the police. See State v. Lamb , 9th Dist. Summit No. 23418, 2007- Ohio-5107, ¶ 22; State v. Griffin , 9th Dist. Summit No. 19278, 1999 WL 334781, *2 (May 26, 1999). Our sister courts in the S econd and Fourth Districts ha ve found hiding to evade the police to be an affirmative act which impedes or hampers the officers in their duties, which is sufficient to support convictions for obstr ucting official business. See State v. Gillam , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27998, 2019-Ohio-808, ¶ 15, citing State v. Thomas , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26907, 2017- Ohio-5501, ¶ 31-32 (“[H]iding from the police in response to an order to surrender is sufficient to

constitute the offense of obstr ucting official business.”); State v. Newsome , 4th Dist. Hocking No. 17CA2, 2017-Ohio-7488, ¶ 11 (finding affirmative acts to suppor t an obstructing official business conviction when the appellant ran and hid from police even befo re they spotted him because the evidence showed he knew they were looking for him and sought to evade them); State v. Bailey , 4th Dist. Hocking No. 09CA9, 2010-Ohio-213, ¶ 35-36 (recognizin g “little distinction” between the affirmative acts of purposel y hiding in a bathroom and flee ing from police, both of which impeded or hampered the officers’ performance because they had to find the suspect).7

{¶13} After reviewing the record, we conclude that the State presente d sufficient evidence, if believed, to demonstrate that Mr. Zupancic committ ed the offense of obstructing

official business. The eviden ce showed that Mr. Zupancic had a n active warrant for his arrest and

the officers had reason to believe he was inside of Room 113. The odor of marijuana coming from the room was also overwhelming. When Officer Ruggerri explaine d through the hotel door that Mr. Zupancic had a warrant for h is arrest, Mr. Zupancic did mor e than simply refuse to respond to the officer verbally or open the door. Instead, he later admit ted to the officers that he tried to elude them by lifting up a mattress, crawling inside of the enclosed bedframe underneath, and then pulling the mattress back on top of himself to hide. These act ions constituted affirmative acts that hampered or impeded the officers in their investigation. The e vidence established that handling Mr. Zupancic’s warrant could have taken a matter of minutes, bu t the incident was instead delayed for hours. Even after the door was finally opened, the body ca m video showed officers standing at the threshold and talking to M .S. as she packed up her belon gings for another 15 minutes, all while Mr. Zupancic remained hidden under the bed. When the off icers finally entered the room to look for him, clearly identifying themselves again and askin g anyone in the room to come out, Mr. Zupancic stayed hidden under the bed for another minute and refused to respond until being discovered by the officers during their protective sweep. He t hen admitted to the officers that he heard them, knew they were looking for him because of his warra nt, and hid under the bed to elude

them. {¶14} Based on our review of the record and the evidence presented, w e conclude that the trial court, as trier of fact, could have reasonably determined that the State proved beyond a

reasonable doubt all of the element s of obstructing official bu siness. Mr. Zupancic committed8

affirmative acts that hampered or impeded police officers in th eir investigation, and did so with the purpose to prevent, obstruct , or delay that investigation. {¶15} Mr. Zupancic’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

III. {¶16} Mr. Zupancic’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judg ment of the Wayne County Municipal Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Wayne County Municipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the manda te, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to m ake a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

THOMAS A. TE ODOSIO FOR THE COURT9

HENSAL, P. J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES: WESLEY A. JOHNSTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. DANIEL R. LUTZ, Prosecuting Attorney, and ANDREA D. UHLER, Assi stant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.