Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Hsiu Yan Chai, 2014 IL App (2d) 121234

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

HSIU YAN CHAI, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-12-1234

Filed August 19, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

On appeal from defendant’s convictions for criminal trespass to real 

property and resisting a peace officer based on an incident in which 

defendant was escorted out of a state motor vehicle license facility by 

police after becoming angry, his trespass conviction was reversed and 

his conviction for resisting a peace officer was upheld, since the State 

failed to prove that defendant received notice from “an owner or 

occupant” of the facility that his entry into the facility was forbidden, 

but defendant admitted that he committed the physical acts of placing 

his hands on a door to prevent being pushed out and being slow to 

offer his hands for cuffing, even though he argued that he did not 

“intend” to resist the officers by doing so.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 11-CM-5414; 

the Hon. Bruce R. Kelsey, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Thomas A. Lilien and Barbara R. Paschen, both of State Appellate 

Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Robert B. Berlin, State’s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne Hoffman 

and Edward R. Psenicka, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for 

the People.

Panel JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Burke and Justice McLaren concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Following a November 2011 incident at the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) in 

Lombard, the State charged defendant, Hsiu Yan Chai, with: (1) criminal trespass to real 

property (in that the DMV manager had previously provided Chai with notice that he was not 

to return to the DMV) (720 ILCS 5/21-3 (West 2010)); (2) resisting a peace officer (720 

ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2010)); (3) obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 

2010)); and (4) disturbing the peace (720 ILCS 5/26-1 (West 2010)). After a juror’s 

repudiation of a guilty verdict as to criminal trespass, and the jury’s sending three notes to 

the court that it was deadlocked, the jury ultimately convicted Chai of criminal trespass to 

real property and resisting a peace officer. It acquitted Chai of obstructing a peace officer and 

disturbing the peace. The court sentenced Chai to 20 days in jail for each conviction, to be 

served concurrently, and one year of conditional discharge.

¶ 2 Chai appeals, arguing, as to criminal trespass, that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to 

convict; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the court to give an improper deadlock 

instruction; and (3) the court committed plain error when it refused to answer the jury’s 

question on a point of law. We agree that the evidence was insufficient, because the State 

presented no evidence that an owner or occupant of the DMV provided Chai with notice that 

he was never to return to the property. Further, there was no evidence from which a rational 

juror could infer that an owner or occupant asked, explicitly or implicitly, the police to order 

Chai never to return. We decline to extend case law to allow a police officer, rather than an 

owner or occupant, to provide notice to the defendant under the circumstances of this case. 

Therefore, we reverse Chai’s conviction of criminal trespass and do not reach the latter two 

arguments. As to resisting a peace officer, Chai argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 

answer certain jury questions. We reject that argument and affirm the conviction of resisting 

a peace officer. We thus reverse in part and affirm in part.
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¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Chai, age 62 at the time of the present incident, has been a United States citizen since 

1994. In the 18 years before the incident, he was convicted of one misdemeanor charge of

criminal trespass. He has a degree from “MIT” (presumably the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology). However, he works in a restaurant. Chai’s proficiency in English was at issue 

in this case, and Chai used a Mandarin-speaking interpreter throughout the proceedings. The 

evidence adduced at trial concerned two incidents at the DMV. The first took place in 

September 2011, and the second took place in November 2011 and culminated in the four 

charges against Chai.

¶ 5 A. The September Incident

¶ 6 On September 1, 2011, Chai went to the DMV to help a friend obtain a driver’s license. 

Following a disagreement that is not detailed in the record, Chai began speaking in an angry 

manner to DMV employees. As a result, DMV security called the police. Officers Thomas 

McElroy and Ericson (who did not testify and whose first name is unclear from the record) 

escorted Chai outside and, according to McElroy, told him not to return.

¶ 7 Four witnesses testified concerning the September incident. These witnesses were DMV 

security guard Jeanette Ferguson, DMV manager Joseph Calafiore, McElroy, and Chai.

¶ 8 Ferguson made the decision to call the police. She testified:

“Q. And when the police arrived, did you say anything to the defendant once the 

police arrived?

A. No. I let the–I explained to the police officer what was going on and let them 

just, basically, kind of take control of it then. I just explained that–the situation as to 

what had previously occurred.

Q. Okay.

A. The reason why I had to call for him–for them to come to assist me.

Q. And was–to the best of your knowledge, was the defendant ever told not to 

come back to that facility?

A. Oh, yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, foundation.

THE COURT: She may answer.

Q. So he was told not to come back; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And now, Ms. Ferguson, bring your attention back to *** November 23 ***.” 

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 9 Calafiore observed the police remove Chai from the facility, and he spoke with the police 

after Chai left the premises. He testified:

“Q. After everything happened in the facility on September 1, what was the result 

of it?

A. He was escorted outside by the Lombard Police.

Q. And were there any instructions given to the defendant?

A. I was inside. I was told afterwards that he was–
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DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained as to what you were told. If you can repeat what you 

personally did or said at that time.

A. I inquired with the Lombard police as to what happened, and they told me 

that–

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.

THE COURT: Just a second. You can indicate what you did but not what the 

officers told you at this point.

A. Okay. Just inquired as to what they did.

THE STATE: I’ll rephrase my question, Judge.

THE COURT: Please.

Q. Was the defendant welcome to return to that facility?

A. No.

Q. Now, let’s go to November 23 of 2011.”

¶ 10 McElroy testified:

“Q. And, Officer, while you were at the DMV [on September 1], what happened?

A. We were told that–

[The court sustained a hearsay objection.]

Q. Officer, as a result of your arrival to the DMV, was [Chai] asked not to come 

back?

A. He was told not to come back.

Q. And who actually told him not to come back?

A. Officer Ericson.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, hearsay; objection, foundation.

COURT: Overruled. His answer will stand.

Q. Were you present when the defendant was told that he was not welcome to 

come back?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he say anything to you or to the other officer when he was told not to 

come back?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, relevance.

THE COURT: You may answer.

A. I don’t–he didn’t say anything directly to me, I wasn’t the reporting officer on 

the first incident though. I didn’t do that report. Officer Ericson did, so he didn’t say 

anything to me directly.

Q. But, eventually, he left the premises; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So, now coming back to November 23 ***.”

McElroy did not testify as to any further details regarding the oral notice not to return. No 

written notice was given.
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¶ 11 Chai denied that McElroy and Ericson ever told him not to return to the DMV. Rather, 

according to him, they asked him where he worked, he told them he worked down the street 

at “Mr. Wonton’s,” and they told him to return there.

¶ 12 B. The November Incident

¶ 13 A few months later, on November 23, 2011, Chai returned to the DMV. This time he 

accompanied his wife, who was hoping to obtain her first driver’s license. She had been a 

United States citizen for less than one year, her English was weak, and she needed help 

navigating the system. Chai’s wife had already passed the written portion of the test. Chai 

and his wife sat in the DMV for 40 minutes, waiting to be called for the road test. When it 

was Chai’s wife’s turn, they went outside and drove their car behind the DMV facility, where 

the test would begin. The instructor told Chai to wait inside the DMV. As Chai was leaving 

the car, he heard the instructor begin to talk to his wife, telling her to turn on various lights 

and turn signals. Chai saw that his wife was able to follow the instructions. Chai waited in 

the DMV as told. After about 15 minutes, an employee called him to the counter. The 

employee informed him that his wife could not take the road test because she did not 

sufficiently understand English. After some back-and-forth dialogue, the employee called 

Calafiore. According to DMV employees, by this point, Chai had become “irate” and 

“hostile.” For example, Ferguson testified that defendant was screaming, “It’s not fair! It’s 

not fair!”

¶ 14 Calafiore testified that Chai confronted him with a “high level” of profanity. Chai spoke 

broken English, but Calafiore was able to understand him. Calafiore asked Chai to sit in the 

waiting area. Chai got up several times, but he sat back down when Calafiore so instructed. 

Calafiore recognized Chai as the man who had caused the September disturbance, and, so, he 

called the police. When the police arrived, they asked Calafiore if he wanted Chai to be 

arrested, and Calafiore said yes.

¶ 15 McElroy and Officer Eric Gouty responded to the scene. McElroy also recognized Chai 

from the September incident. He conceded that, when he arrived, Chai was sitting peaceably 

in the waiting area. He told Chai that he was under arrest and asked Chai to walk outside. 

Chai cooperated. As is common practice, McElroy put his hands on Chai’s arm and shoulder 

area to guide him outside. (Chai believed that McElroy pushed him outside, rather than 

guided him.) When they were in the six-foot-wide vestibule area leading to the outside, Chai 

stopped moving forward, put his hand on the outer door, and turned around. He shouted 

something in Mandarin to his wife, who was still inside the DMV. McElroy considered this 

behavior hostile and uncooperative.

¶ 16 According to McElroy and Gouty, when Chai stopped moving forward and put his hand 

on the outer door, McElroy twice told Chai to remove his hand from the door. When Chai did 

not comply, but, rather, continued yelling to his wife, McElroy purposely used his knee to 

strike Chai in the buttocks. This was a standard technique to keep a suspect moving forward. 

In the same series of movements, McElroy also grabbed Chai’s torso. This caused McElroy 

and Chai to go tumbling out the door. Chai landed on the sidewalk, face down, with his 

hands underneath his body. McElroy was on top of Chai. McElroy told Chai three or four 

times to give him his hands and to “stop resisting.” McElroy then grabbed Chai’s hands from 

underneath his body and placed Chai in handcuffs. McElroy estimated that 7 to 12 seconds 
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elapsed from when McElroy first told Chai to give him his hands to when he had Chai in 

handcuffs.

¶ 17 Chai, in contrast, testified that, when he placed his hand on the outer door to turn around 

and say something to his wife, McElroy struck his head from behind. This caused them to go 

tumbling to the sidewalk. Chai put his hands in front of his body because he was trying to 

break his fall. He acknowledged that McElroy asked him for his hands three or four times 

and told him to stop resisting. He explained that he did not want to struggle but that the 

struggle occurred as a result of the fall:

“Q. What happened after the policeman used his fist to punch you?

A. Because I wasn’t even aware that was coming, so I fell down. And then he was 

on top of me ***. *** [M]y hand was in front as I was falling down trying to protect 

myself. So the policeman was using a lot of force to try to put my hand–put my hand 

behind my back. And I was struggling. And I heard the policeman said stop 

struggling. To be honest, it’s really–I don’t want to struggle. Otherwise, there is no 

way they can have my arm behind my back, so I let them do that and they helped me 

get up.”

Chai further stated that, as a result of being pushed to the ground by McElroy, he sustained a 

gash to his forehead. When he finally stood up, he could “feel the blood going, keep on 

coming down.”

¶ 18 Regarding Chai’s injury, McElroy and Gouty corroborated that Chai sustained a head 

wound for which he was taken to the hospital. Pictures of the head wound were submitted 

into evidence. Outside the presence of the jury, Chai’s attorney sought to raise the affirmative 

defense of self-defense to the charges that Chai resisted and obstructed a peace officer. The 

court denied the request, stating that self-defense does not apply where a defendant knows 

that he is interacting with police officers.

¶ 19 The State asked Chai if he was aware that McElroy and Gouty were police officers. Chai 

did not answer the question. The trial court excused the jury and told Chai that he must 

answer the question. When the jury returned, Chai answered, “yes,” he knew that McElroy 

and Gouty were police officers.

¶ 20 Finally, when defense counsel asked Chai if he understood that he was not welcome at 

the DMV when he entered the DMV in November, he answered: “Why is it I cannot go in? 

What’s the reason I cannot go?” When the State asked the same question, Chai answered: “I 

do not understand why I cannot enter.” Chai believed that he should be able to enter the 

DMV, because he is a United States citizen entitled to certain services.

¶ 21 C. Argument, Deliberation, and Sentencing

¶ 22 During closing arguments, the State discussed the alleged notice not to return: “The 

defendant denies he was told [not to return]. A credible officer’s testimony tells us that the 

defendant was on September 1 *** told not to return to the facility.” The defense did not 

object to the State’s characterization of the officer as “credible.” Instead, during its closing, 

the defense responded that, in the context of this case, the vague statement that, in September 

2011, an officer told Chai “not to return” to the DMV did not sufficiently prove that Chai 

knew he was not welcome at the DMV in November 2011:
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“Mr. Chai did not understand that he was ever told not to come back to that 

facility. And the police officer, who is sitting in court, Officer McElroy, he actually 

told you, well, I didn’t put it in writing. *** So [Chai] couldn’t possibly take 

something in writing and maybe ask someone else that is a fluent English speaker 

what it said, what restrictions were on it.

There was no testimony of any restrictions. For example, there was no testimony 

that, well you can’t go back there for the next 30 days, you can’t go back there for the 

next year, you can’t go back there for your lifetime.

It is completely unreasonable to ban someone [from the DMV] for a lifetime, so 

there must have been some restriction, but there was no testimony about that at all.”

¶ 23 After closing arguments, the jury engaged in two rounds of deliberations. In the first 

round, as is relevant to this appeal, the jury asked the trial court to define various elements in 

the instructions. Specifically, it asked the court to explain the difference between “resisting” 

and “obstructing.” It also asked: “What does knowingly mean? Does the defendant have to 

understand what was said to him?” Outside the presence of the jury, the court jokingly stated 

to the attorneys that it did not understand the difference between “resisting” and 

“obstructing” itself. The court made no specific comment about the “knowingly” question. 

The court responded to the questions by stating that the jury already had the instructions that 

apply to this case.1

¶ 24 The jury returned and indicated that it had reached a verdict on all four counts. The 

verdict forms indicated not guilty on the disorderly-conduct and obstruction charges and 

guilty on the criminal-trespass and resisting charges. The defense requested that the jury be 

polled as to the guilty verdicts. The court polled each juror and the first six jurors confirmed 

their verdicts. The seventh juror repudiated the criminal-trespass verdict. The seventh juror 

was never asked about the resisting verdict, and the remaining five jurors were not polled at 

all. Instead, the court ordered the jury to deliberate anew on all four charges. If it was unable 

to reach a verdict “shortly,” deliberations would resume the next day. Indeed, the jury was 

unable to reach a verdict “shortly.”

¶ 25 The next day, in the second round of deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note 

stating that it did not “expect to ever reach agreement on all four charges.”2 Upon receiving 

the note, the court and the parties agreed to give Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 

 

1The State suggests that the trial court never received the “knowingly” question. We are not 

persuaded by this suggestion. The handwritten question is in the record, photocopied on the same page 

as the “resisting”-versus-“obstructing” question. It is hard to imagine how it got there if the judge never 

saw it. Moreover, the transcripts reflect that the trial court stated, “As to the last two questions, they 

have instructions.” (Emphasis added.) We know that one of the questions the court referred to was the 

“resisting”-versus-“obstructing” question, because it joked about it. The only logical inference is that 

the second question was the “knowingly” question.

2The record contains two other notes sent by the jury: “We are deadlocked on the two remaining 

charges. We don’t expect to ever reach a unanimous agreement,” and “We reached agreement on one 

charge. We are deadlocked on the second.” However, the timing of these other notes, including the 

deliberation round during which they were sent, is not clear from the record, because the transcripts 

contain no discussion of them.
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1.06 (Supp. 2008) (hereinafter, IPI Civil (Supp. 2008) No. 1.06), which is known as the 

“post-Prim” instruction. That instruction states:

“1.06 Deadlocked Jury (Follow Up to 1.05)

In a large proportion of cases absolute certainty cannot be expected nor does the 

law require it.

If you fail to agree on a verdict the case must be retried. Any future jury must be 

selected in the same manner as you were chosen. There is no reason to believe that 

the case would ever be submitted to another jury more competent to decide it, or that 

the case can be tried any better or more exhaustively than it has been here, or that 

more or clearer evidence could be produced on behalf of any party.

You should now retire and reconsider the evidence in light of the court’s other 

instructions.” Id.

The notes on use for IPI Civil (Supp. 2008) No. 1.06 state that the instruction “may be given 

in the trial court’s discretion only after the jury has received the IPI 1.05 instruction and 

remains deadlocked.” (Emphasis added.) IPI Civil (Supp. 2008) No. 1.06, Notes on Use. 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 1.05, to which the notes on use refer, is known as 

the Prim instruction, and that instruction effectuates the minimum standards set forth in 

People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62 (1972), for providing adequate instruction to deadlocked juries 

while guarding against coercion. See also Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 

26.07 (Supp. 2009) (the criminal counterpart to IPI Civil No. 1.05).

¶ 26 After receiving the “post-Prim” instruction in isolation, the jury returned to again acquit 

on the disorderly-conduct and obstruction charges. It returned guilty verdicts on the 

criminal-trespass and resisting charges. Upon polling, each juror confirmed the verdict, and 

the jury was dismissed.

¶ 27 The trial court proceeded to sentencing. The State requested 20 days in jail and 1 year of 

conditional discharge. It noted that, in 2003, Chai had been convicted of criminal trespass. 

Defense counsel responded that this was the first she had heard of the prior conviction. Still, 

she asked for leniency, given that Chai had been in the country for nearly 20 years, had only 

the one prior conviction (a misdemeanor), was married, and was a graduate of MIT. The 

court sentenced Chai to 20 days in jail for each conviction, to be served concurrently, and 1

year of conditional discharge.

¶ 28 The trial court denied Chai’s posttrial motion. Regarding whether Chai knew he was not 

welcome at the DMV, the trial court stated that Chai’s demeanor at trial showed that he knew 

he was not welcome but felt entitled to go nevertheless. This appeal followed.

¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 30 The mainstay of Chai’s appeal concerns his conviction of criminal trespass to real 

property. He disputes the sufficiency of the evidence, claims ineffective assistance in regard 

to trial counsel’s agreement to give the “post-Prim” instruction in isolation, and contends that 

the trial court committed plain error when it refused to answer the jury’s question regarding 

the definition of “knowingly.” Because we find the evidence insufficient to convict, we do 

not reach Chai’s latter two arguments.

¶ 31 As to his conviction of resisting a peace officer, Chai argues that the trial court erred by 

declining to answer the jury’s question regarding the difference between “resisting” and 
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“obstructing.” We reject this argument and affirm Chai’s conviction of resisting a peace 

officer.

¶ 32 A. Criminal Trespass

¶ 33 We first consider the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the criminal-trespass 

conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether the 

evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

enables any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); People v. Cunningham, 212 

Ill. 2d 274, 278-80 (2004). A guilty verdict may be supported by not only the evidence itself, 

but also any reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence. Cunningham, 212 

Ill. 2d at 279-80. The reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trier 

of fact on questions of credibility and the weight to be afforded to the evidence. People v. 

Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1992). At the same time, the reviewing court has a duty to 

evaluate for itself the reasonableness of a guilty verdict. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280.

¶ 34 To obtain a conviction for criminal trespass to real property under section 21-3(a)(2) of 

the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code), the State had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Chai “enter[ed] upon the land of another, after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from 

the owner or occupant that such entry is forbidden.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 

5/21-3(a)(2) (West 2010). Although the language of the statute does not expressly set forth a 

mental-state requirement, case law has established that the “knowlingly” mental state applies 

to all elements of the offense. Dutton v. Roo-Mac, Inc., 100 Ill. App. 3d 116, 121 (1981) 

(dicta); People v. Ulatowski, 54 Ill. App. 3d 893, 896-98 (1977) (under predecessor section 

21-3, where a defendant high on LSD remained on the property after being told to leave, the 

State was required to prove that he knew he was told to leave).

¶ 35 Chai argues, and we agree, that the State failed to prove the notice element of the offense. 

The statute requires that an owner or occupant provide the defendant with notice. Here, 

according to the State’s theory of the case, the police provided the notice. Therefore, the 

State needed to establish a link between an owner or occupant of the DMV and the police. 

The State provided no evidence that an owner or occupant authorized or requested the police 

to provide Chai with notice that he was never to return.

¶ 36 We decline to extend existing case law to allow for notice to be given by a police officer 

rather than an owner or occupant under the circumstances of this case. See, e.g., People v. 

Gudgel, 183 Ill. App. 3d 881 (1989) (the bar owner called police to help remove a patron); 

People v. Thompson, 56 Ill. App. 3d 557 (1978) (the school superintendent authorized 

security to remove protesters). Both Gudgel and Thompson involved trespass prosecutions 

based on subsection (a)(3), remaining upon the land of another after receiving notice from 

the owner or occupant to depart. 720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(3) (West 2010). In each case, the owner 

or occupant requested the police to provide the defendant(s) with notice to leave the property.

¶ 37 Gudgel and Thompson allow for the inference that, if the owner or occupant called the 

police, the owner or occupant implicitly requested the police to provide the defendant with 

notice to depart. As stated in Gudgel, “it would be prudent to summon police and have them 

remove belligerent patrons rather than attempt[ ] to remove them personally.” Gudgel, 183 

Ill. App. 3d at 884.
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¶ 38 However, in the instant case, owner or occupant’s summoning police to remove a 

troublesome patron did not imply a request to tell that patron that he was never to return. 

Rather, given that the property at issue is a public facility and that Chai had committed the 

relatively minor “offense” of losing his temper, it is not natural or reasonable to infer that the 

owner or occupant, by enlisting the help of the police, instructed the police to tell Chai that 

he was forever banned from the facility. We cannot allow the jury to have made such an

inference absent any evidence.

¶ 39 In fact, the small amount of evidence concerning what DMV personnel told the police 

during the September incident supports the opposite inference. That is, the evidence supports 

the inference that DMV personnel gave the officers no specific instructions concerning future 

limitations on Chai’s access to the facility. For example, Ferguson testified that she called the 

police to “assist” her. When the officers arrived, she simply “explained to [them] what was 

going on and let them *** take control of it then.” Next, Calafiore testified as a passive and 

limited observer to the September incident. He stated that “[Chai] was escorted outside by 

the Lombard police”; “I was inside. I was told afterwards that he was–”; and “[I] inquired as 

to what they did.” He never testified that he even spoke to the police before Chai was 

removed in September, and therefore no inference can be made that he instructed the officers 

to notify Chai not to return to the DMV. Finally, McElroy did not testify to any interaction 

with DMV personnel preceding the September incident. Although he stated that, upon 

arriving at the facility, he and Ericson “were told that–,” defense counsel’s hearsay objection 

was sustained, and the State did not attempt to rephrase the question or revisit that topic.

¶ 40 Comparing the elements of the instant offense to those of a related trespass offense, 

criminal trespass to state-supported land (720 ILCS 5/21-5(a) (West 2010)) provides further 

support for the proposition that, to be convicted of criminal trespass to real property, the 

owner or occupant must, at a minimum, request the police to give the notice on his or her 

behalf. A person commits that crime when he or she: “enters upon land supported in whole or 

in part with State funds *** or any building on such land, after receiving, prior to such entry, 

notice from the State or its representative that such entry is forbidden, or remains upon such 

land or in such building after receiving notice from the State or its representative to depart, 

and who thereby interferes with another person’s lawful use or enjoyment of such building or 

land.” (Emphasis added.) Id. In enacting the statute, the legislature anticipated circumstances 

under which notice in a trespass case may be given directly by a state actor, such as a police 

officer. That offense contains additional elements not at issue here, such as interfering with 

another person’s lawful use. It is also a Class A, rather than a Class B, misdemeanor. Id. The 

State chose not to charge Chai with criminal trespass to state-supported land, and it is not for 

us to question whether it should have. The point is that the legislature has specified certain 

offenses for which notice must come from an owner or occupant and certain offenses for 

which notice may come directly from a state actor. Here, the State chose to charge Chai with 

criminal trespass to real property, which requires that the notice come from an owner or 

occupant of the property.

¶ 41 The jury struggled with the sufficiency of the evidence supporting criminal trespass to 

real property. A juror repudiated a guilty verdict and the jury sent three deadlock notes to the 

court, and expressed confusion about whether, to be convicted, Chai must have understood 

that he was forbidden to enter the property. However, we need not further consider the 

sufficiency of the evidence, because the State entirely failed to prove an element of the 
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offense, namely, that Chai received notice from an owner or occupant that entry was 

forbidden. Even in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence does not support a 

guilty verdict. Accordingly, we reverse Chai’s conviction of criminal trespass to real 

property.

¶ 42 We need not address Chai’s remaining challenges to the criminal-trespass conviction, 

concerning the trial court’s deadlock instruction and failure to answer substantively the jury’s 

question about the crime’s requisite mental state. However, in no way does our decision 

imply that the trial court’s deadlock instruction was proper (i.e., IPI Civil (Supp. 2008) No. 

1.06 given in isolation). Similarly, we express no opinion on the trial court’s response to the 

question about the crime’s requisite mental state.

¶ 43 B. Resisting a Peace Officer

¶ 44 Next, Chai argues that the court erred when it declined to substantively respond to the 

jury’s question regarding the difference between “resisting” and “obstructing.” Section 

31-1(a) of the Code states: “A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by 

one known to the person to be a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution 

employee of any authorized act within his [or her] official capacity commits a Class A 

misdemeanor.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2010). The State charged Chai 

with two different forms of the same offense, resisting a peace officer and obstructing a

peace officer. We need concern ourselves with only the “resisting” charge, as that was the 

only charge that led to a conviction. The jury instructions for resisting stated in part: “Third 

Proposition: That the defendant knowingly resisted the performance by Officer McElroy of 

an authorized act within his official capacity.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 45 Chai points to the trial court’s facetious comment that it did not know the difference 

between resisting and obstructing either, arguing that, if the question was enough to confuse 

the court, it warranted an answer. A substantive answer to the jury’s question likely would 

have stated that resisting a peace officer requires a physical act, whereas obstructing an 

officer “potentially” involves a “broad[er] range of actions.” People v. Lauer, 273 Ill. App. 

3d 469, 474 (1995).

¶ 46 Ordinarily, the trial court may exercise its discretion in answering jury questions. People 

v. Falls, 387 Ill. App. 3d 533, 537-38 (2008). A term that is within the common knowledge 

of the jury need not be defined by the court. People v. Sandy, 188 Ill. App. 3d 833, 842 

(1989). However, where the jury demonstrates confusion over the law, the court has a duty to 

clarify the law. Falls, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 537-38. Part of conducting a fundamentally fair trial 

is ensuring that the jury instructions enable the jury to make a fair determination of the case. 

See People v. Ogunsola, 87 Ill. 2d 216, 222 (1981) (the jury instruction was flawed in that it 

failed to set forth an element of the charged offense of deceptive practice, i.e., an intent to 

defraud).

¶ 47 Because Chai’s counsel failed to object to the court’s conduct at trial, Chai has forfeited 

the argument. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). However, under the plain-error

doctrine, we may review a forfeited error when either: (1) “the evidence in a case is so 

closely balanced that the jury’s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the 

evidence”; or (2) “the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and 

thus a fair trial.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79 (2005). The defendant bears the 
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burden of persuasion under both prongs. Id. at 187. For the reasons that follow, Chai has not 

met his burden.

¶ 48 Here, unlike in Ogunsola, there was nothing fundamentally defective about the 

instructions given to the jury concerning resisting a peace officer. In fact, Chai does not 

argue otherwise. Additionally, the trial court’s failure to inform the jury that resistance 

requires a physical act could not have prevented the jury from making a fair determination, 

nor could it otherwise have affected the outcome of the case. That Chai’s actions included 

physical acts–placing his hand on the door and being slow to offer his hands for cuffing–was 

not disputed in this case.

¶ 49 Chai admitted that he committed the physical acts that constituted the resisting charge. 

His defense was that he did not intend to resist the officers. According to him, he placed his 

hand on the door not to resist the officers, but so that he could turn around to talk to his wife. 

And, again according to him, he was slow to offer his hands for cuffing not because he 

wanted to struggle with the officers, but because he remained in a protective posture after the 

tumble to the ground.

¶ 50 Therefore, as to the resisting charge, the disputed element was Chai’s mental state. To the 

extent that Chai argues that the court should have defined “knowingly” as to the resisting 

charge, we reject that argument. In the context of that charge, the word “knowingly” was 

within the common knowledge of the jury.

¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 52 For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse Chai’s conviction of criminal trespass to real 

property. We affirm Chai’s conviction of resisting a peace officer.

¶ 53 Reversed in part and affirmed in part.