IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UPMC Pinnacle Hospitals, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Renee Orlandi (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), : No. 596 C.D. 2022

Respondent : Submitted: February 3, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: July 21, 2023

UPMC Pinnacle Hospitals (Employer) petitions for review of the May 

13, 2022, order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which 

modified in part, reversed in part, and otherwise affirmed a December 14, 2021, 

order of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) in this matter. The WCJ’s order

denied Employer’s termination petition and granted a review petition filed by Renee 

Orlandi (Claimant). The Board affirmed the WCJ’s denial of the termination 

petition, reversed the WCJ’s grant of the review petition to the extent that it 

erroneously added a supraspinatus left shoulder tear to the description of Claimant’s 

work injury, modified the WCJ’s description of injury to correctly reflect the 

evidence, and modified the WCJ’s order to reflect the WCJ’s intent to award 
2

Claimant temporary total disability benefits beginning on April 14, 2021. Upon 

review, we affirm the Board’s order.

I. Background

On August 6, 2019, Claimant sustained a work-related injury. 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a. On September 24, 2019, Employer issued a 

medical-only Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable (NTCP) accepting a left 

shoulder sprain “from scanning patients.” Id. On October 12, 2020, Employer filed 

a termination petition asserting that Claimant fully recovered from her injuries as of 

a June 23, 2020, independent medical examination (IME). Id. at 3a. On October 

22, 2020, Claimant filed a review petition seeking to expand the description of injury 

to include “left shoulder supraspinatus tear, cervical strain and cervical 

radiculopathy.” Id. at 6a. This litigation ensued.

Claimant testified in a deposition on November 17, 2020. R.R. at 9a. 

She worked for Employer as a registered vascular ultrasound technologist. Id. at 

16a-17a. She used her left arm to operate the machine and her right arm to perform 

compressions on patients; she did these tests 7-9 times per day. Id. at 18a. While 

working on her last patient of the day on August 6, 2019, she felt pain from the left 

side of her neck down to her trapezius, deltoid muscle areas, and left arm. Id. at 19a. 

She went the next day to an orthopedic walk-in clinic and was given prednisone; she 

missed a few days of work. Id. at 20a. Upon her return, her managers agreed to 

transfer her to another location where she did not have to do as many scans. Id. at 

21a. She treated conservatively with chiropractic care and physical therapy and 

underwent MRI and EMG exams. Id. at 23a. She continued working at the same 

pay rate, but had ongoing pain from her scanning duties, which she reported to her 
3

supervisors. Id. at 24a & 28a. As of the date of her deposition, she was on 

restrictions limiting lifting, pushing, and pulling, but still had pain. Id. at 28a.

Claimant acknowledged having received treatment on her left shoulder 

in February 2019, six months before the injury at issue. R.R. at 28a. At that time, 

she received an injection from Employer’s doctors and was able to resume full duty 

full time work until the injury at issue in August 2019; this previous treatment had 

been handled as a workers’ compensation matter. Id. at 29a. She also recalled 

having some bilateral shoulder pain on both sides in the 1990s that resolved with 

over-the-counter supplements. Id. at 29a-30a. She stated she did not have neck pain 

or treatment prior to August 2019. Id. at 36a.

At the time of her deposition, Claimant felt pain and stiffness from her 

ongoing work duties in the left side of her back at the trapezius muscles, over her 

left scapula area, and in her left shoulder. R.R. at 32a & 46a. Overall, however, her 

condition had improved from a 6/10 pain level to 3/10. Id. at 44a-45a. She stated 

that she used to ride horses and still owned a horse, but did not ride it as of the time 

of her deposition. Id. at 47a.

Claimant testified at a second deposition on May 10, 2021. R.R. at 62a. 

She had worked mostly full duty and in pain until undergoing neck surgery on April 

14, 2021, and had not yet returned to work as she was still healing. Id. at 69a-70a. 

She had hoped to avoid surgery, but conservative measures had not helped. Id. at 

71a. She was about to start physical therapy and had begun receiving Employerfunded short-term disability payments at 40% of her regular pay, which was $29.61 

per hour at 40 hours per week. Id. at 72a & 81a. Since the surgery, her neck felt

much better, but she still had left arm weakness and pain. Id. at 74a. She took 

Percocet, Zanaflex, and a steroid after the surgery and was taking Meloxicam (an 
4

anti-inflammatory) and Gabapentin for nerve pain. Id. at 75a. Since her previous 

deposition but before her surgery, she rode her horse occasionally with a horse 

trainer’s assistance at slow speeds for short periods of time (up to 10 minutes), but 

had not done so since the surgery. Id. at 77a & 82a. She intended to return to full 

duty work once she was released to do so.1 Id. at 79a & 83a.

Claimant’s treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Tyson Maugle, D.O., 

testified in a March 29, 2021, deposition. When he first saw Claimant in December 

2019, she reported experiencing pain since August 2019 in the left side of her neck 

radiating into the left shoulder and arm. R.R. at 135a. She told him that her work 

required her to turn her neck in ways that exacerbated her pain. Id. He took x-rays 

that showed degenerative conditions at C5-6, and he also detected left side cervical 

and arm radiculopathy; he initially attributed her condition to degenerative changes, 

but also believed that her work duties “contributed to her symptoms.” Id. at 138a39a. He concluded that her left shoulder issues were due to referred pain from her 

cervical condition. Id. at 141a. She underwent a cervical MRI later in December 

2019 that was consistent with mild degenerative changes. Id. at 142a & 144a. 

Dr. Maugle stated that at subsequent visits, Claimant continued to 

report pain when doing her work duties. R.R. at 143a & 148a. As of his March 

2021, deposition, Claimant’s radiculopathy had not improved with conservative 

treatment, and she had decided to undergo surgery. Id. at 149a-50a. She would have 

to stop working for the surgery and to heal afterwards; he thought she could return 

to full duty about three months after the surgery. Id. at 154a & 167a. Dr. Maugle’s 

ultimate diagnosis was cervical degenerative disc disease at C5-6 and C6-7 with 

1 According to Employer’s brief, Claimant returned to work on or about July 11, 2021. 

Employer’s Br. at 8 n.1.
5

bilateral foraminal stenosis at C5-6 and left side foraminal stenosis at C6-7 with left 

upper arm cervical radiculopathy. Id. at 150a-51a. Based on Claimant’s reports to 

him about her work duties and pain when repeatedly turning her neck while doing 

her job, he related her diagnosis and clinical presentation to her work-related 

activity. Id. at 151a-52a & 156a-57a. 

During cross-examination, Dr. Maugle acknowledged that his 

conclusions as to causation depended on the veracity and accuracy of the history 

Claimant reported to him and that she had not told him about any prior left shoulder 

or neck issues. R.R. at 160a & 166a-67a. He had not discussed causation in his 

contemporary medical notes. Id. at 161a. He conceded that Claimant’s diagnostics 

showed no acute findings and that her degenerative conditions are common at the 

C5-6 and C6-7 levels and could cause pain with certain maneuvers of the neck. Id. 

at 162a-64a. Her horseback riding could also cause symptoms. Id. 

Employer’s medical expert, Dr. Lawrence Pollack, D.O., an orthopedic 

surgeon, testified in a February 25, 2021, deposition. He saw Claimant for an IME 

on June 23, 2020. R.R. at 92a. Claimant told him of past left shoulder pain in early 

2019 with numbness, tingling, and a “buzzing sensation” that was treated with 

chiropractic care and an injection. Id. at 92a. She told him that on August 6, 2019, 

while working regular duty, she was performing a scan on a patient when she felt 

left shoulder and left cervical spine pain. Id. He read her medical records from her 

initial treatment for that injury beginning three days later; she reported in those 

records that her pain flared up from working. Id. at 93a. He noted in the records 

that after the August 2019 incident, she reported a “buzzing sensation” in her left 

arm as she had earlier that year. Id. at 95a.
6

Dr. Pollack agreed with Dr. Maugle that “the source of [Claimant’s] 

issue is cervical spine.” R.R. at 96a. He disagreed, however, that her condition was 

more serious and ultimately concluded that she sustained “at most” a left shoulder 

and cervical strain from her work duties that had fully resolved by the June 2020 

IME. Id. at 94a-96a & 98a. To the extent she continued to feel symptoms, Dr. 

Pollack attributed these to her underlying degenerative conditions. Id. at 98a.

At a hearing on April 27, 2021, Claimant’s counsel advised the WCJ 

and Employer’s counsel that Claimant had taken time off work to undergo surgery. 

Certified Record (C.R.) at 88.2 The WCJ stated that both doctors’ depositions had 

been submitted into evidence along with Claimant’s prior and upcoming depositions 

on May 10, 2021. Id. at 87. When asked by the WCJ if anything further would be 

added to the record, Employer’s counsel stated that other than a statement of wages, 

he did not believe so, and he reiterated this several minutes later. Id. at 88-89. The 

WCJ did not expressly close the record but advised the parties that they would have 

60 days from the hearing date to complete Claimant’s second deposition and submit 

briefs on their respective petitions. Id. at 88. As noted above, Claimant’s second 

deposition took place on May 10, 2021.

June 27, 2021, was 60 days from the April 27, 2021, hearing. The 

reproduced record prepared by Employer in association with this appeal includes a 

July 7, 2021, letter by Employer’s counsel to the WCJ; the letter lists Employer’s 

objections to Dr. Maugle’s deposition testimony.

3

 R.R. at 191a. The letter adds that 

Claimant’s counsel “has no objection to the timing of this request” and thanks the 

2 References to the Certified Record are to electronic pagination.

3 Employer’s Counsel objected to certain questions on causation as leading and “asked and 

answered.” R.R. at 139a & 151a-52a.
7

WCJ for his “kind attention to this request.” Id. The letter indicates “VIA WCAIS”4

at the top. Id. However, the letter does not include proof of filing in the WCAIS 

system and does not appear in the certified record or in the listing of exhibits in the 

WCJ’s December 14, 2021, decision on this matter. See id. at 193a; see also 

generally C.R.

The WCJ’s decision credited Claimant’s testimony as clear, concise, 

logical, and consistent with both the medical records and Dr. Maugle’s testimony. 

R.R. at 196a. The WCJ credited Dr. Maugle’s testimony for the same reasons, as 

well as because Dr. Maugle was Claimant’s treating doctor. Id. at 197a. The WCJ 

did not credit Dr. Pollack’s testimony as it contradicted that of Claimant and Dr. 

Maugle. Id. at 195a. The WCJ granted Claimant’s review petition because she had 

established that her work-related injury description should be expanded to include 

“left shoulder supraspinatus tear, cervical strain, and cervical radiculopathy,” which 

is how Claimant phrased her injury in her review petition. Id. at 197a; see also id. 

at 6a. The WCJ denied Employer’s termination petition because it had not shown 

that Claimant fully recovered from her work-related injury. Id. The WCJ’s decision 

did not expressly award wage loss benefits to Claimant as of April 14, 2021, when 

she went out of work for her surgery, but did state in the order that “Employer is 

ordered to deduct 20% from the Claimant’s compensation and pay same to 

Claimant’s counsel. The remainder of Claimant’s compensation is to be paid 

directly to the Claimant.” Id. at 199a.

Both sides appealed to the Board, which issued a May 13, 2022, 

decision and order. R.R. at 206a-22a. The Board reversed the WCJ’s inclusion of 

4 WCAIS is a web-based system for workers’ compensation claims management and 

adjudication. Parties use it to file petitions, applications, forms, exhibits, and other documents 

online with the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, the Workers’ Compensation Office of 

Adjudication, and the Board.
8

a supraspinatus left shoulder tear in the expanded description of injury and modified 

the description of injury from the “cervical strain and cervical radiculopathy” in the 

WCJ’s decision to “cervical strain, left shoulder strain or tear, and cervical 

degenerative disc disease at C5-C6 and C6-C7, bilateral foraminal stenosis at C5-

C6, and left sided foraminal stenosis at C6-C7, and left upper extremity cervical 

radiculopathy,” which was consistent with Dr. Maugle’s diagnosis.5 Id. at 222a; see 

also id. at 150a-51a. The Board noted that Employer’s objections to Dr. Maugle’s 

causation testimony may have been waived and, in any event, were meritless because 

that testimony was consistent and unequivocal that Claimant’s condition was related 

to her work duties. Id. at 220. In the alternative, the Board noted that even if the 

WCJ erred in accepting Dr. Maugle’s testimony, it would be harmless error since 

Claimant’s testimony relating her condition to her work duties was also found 

credible and “an exacerbation of her cervical issues was an obvious injury.” Id. 

Finally, the Board noted that even though the WCJ had not expressly awarded 

Claimant wage loss benefits in his decision, the order’s language indicated that the 

WCJ clearly intended to do so as of when she went out of work on April 14, 2021, 

for her surgery. Id. at 212a. Employer petitioned for review in this Court.

II. Issues

Employer raises three claims to this Court.

6 Employer first asserts that 

the Board erred by affirming the WCJ Decision expanding the description of 

5 Claimant has not appealed any aspect of the Board’s decision, which stated that “Dr. 

Maugle did not testify that the supraspinatus left shoulder tear was work-related and that Claimant 

conceded that that injury was not work-related.” R.R. at 217a.

6 This Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s necessary 

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or 
9

Claimant’s work injury to include work-related cervical conditions because Dr. 

Maugle’s causation testimony was equivocal and therefore incompetent. See

Employer’s Br. at 18-26. Second, Employer claims the Board erred by failing to 

rule on its objections. See id. at 26-32. Third, Employer argues that the Board erred 

by interpreting the WCJ’s order as intending to award Claimant wage loss benefits

from the date of the surgery on April 14, 2021. See id. at 32-34.

III. Discussion

A. Claimant’s Doctor’s Causation Testimony

When a claimant files a review petition seeking to expand an accepted 

description of a work injury, the claimant must show that the asserted additional 

injuries are causally related to the work injury. Degraw v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (Redner’s Warehouse Mkts., Inc.), 926 A.2d 997, 1000 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). In 

this regard, 

[a] claimant bears the burden of presenting unequivocal 

medical testimony to establish the causal link between a 

work incident and a disability when such a causal link is 

not obvious, and the causal link is not obvious if a claimant 

has a pre-existing condition related to the same body part 

the claimant alleges was injured at work. The question is 

one of law and is fully reviewable. In reviewing medical 

testimony, the testimony must be examined as a whole.

whether constitutional rights were violated. Russell v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Volkswagen 

of America), 550 A.2d 1364, 1365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). On appeal, the prevailing party is entitled 

to the benefit of the most favorable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Fulton v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sch. Dist. of Phila.), 707 A.2d 579, 582 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). The appellate 

role in a workers’ compensation case is not to reweigh the evidence or review the credibility of 

the witnesses; rather, the Board or reviewing court must simply determine whether, upon 

consideration of the evidence as a whole, the WCJ’s findings have the requisite measure of support 

in the record. Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Skirpan), 612 A.2d 434 

(Pa. 1992).
10

Moyer v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist.), 976 A.2d 597, 

599 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (internal citation omitted; emphasis in original). This 

Court has explained:

The question of whether expert medical testimony 

is unequivocal, and, thus, competent evidence to support 

factual determinations is a question of law subject to our 

review. In such cases, we review the testimony as a whole 

and may not base our analysis on a few words taken out of 

context. Taking a medical expert’s testimony as a whole, 

it will be found to be equivocal if it is based only upon 

possibilities, is vague, and leaves doubt. Medical 

testimony is unequivocal if a medical expert testifies, after 

providing foundation for the testimony, that, in his 

professional opinion, he believes or thinks a fact exists. 

Amandeo v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Conagra Foods), 37 A.3d 72, 80 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2012) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “Medical 

testimony is equivocal if it is less than positive or merely based upon possibilities.” 

Potere v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kemcorp), 21 A.3d 684, 690 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2011) (citing Lewis v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 498 A.2d 800 (Pa. 1985)). 

However, “there are no magic words that a doctor must recite to 

establish causation.” Campbell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pittsburgh Post 

Gazette), 954 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “There is no requirement that 

every utterance that escapes the lips of a medical witness on a medical subject must 

be certain, positive, and without reservation, exception, or p[e]radventure of a doubt 

in order to be considered unequivocal.” Id. “Moreover, it is not necessary that the 

claimant’s medical expert rule out with absolute certainty other factors that may have 

caused or contributed to a condition.” Id. 

Additionally, if a medical expert’s opinion is based on certain 

assumptions, the potential inaccuracy of those assumptions will not render the 
11

expert’s opinion equivocal and incompetent if the expert’s opinion is supported by 

the medical record. In Somerset Welding and Steel v. Workmen’s Compensation 

Appeal Board (Lee), 650 A.2d 114 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), the treating doctor stated 

that he assumed the medical history provided by the claimant was true and accurate 

when he assigned causation of the claimant’s condition to a work incident. Id. at 

118. To the extent that assumption was incorrect, this Court concluded that the 

doctor’s causation testimony was nevertheless competent and unequivocal: “medical 

causation testimony is not rendered equivocal because it is based on the medical 

expert’s assumption of the truthfulness of the information provided; however, the 

supposed facts forming the basis of that determination must be proven by competent 

evidence and accepted as true by the [WCJ].” Id. In Somerset Welding, the medical 

record included competent evidence that the actual injury occurred as described by 

the claimant, and therefore the doctor’s causation testimony was deemed competent. 

Id. at 118-19.

In Moyer, the claimant had preexisting back issues but was performing 

his full and usual work duties when he sustained a back injury after an incident and 

could not work afterwards. 976 A.2d at 598-99. The treating doctor, who had seen 

claimant previously for his back issues, assumed the incident was the cause of the 

claimant’s disability. Id. at 600. We deemed the doctor’s testimony competent 

because it was not solely based on his assumption but was ultimately supported by 

“the fact that there was a definite and documented injury at work requiring hospital 

treatment as well as corroborating medical documents that [the c]laimant had indeed 

suffered an injury while lifting a heavy object and had sought emergency treatment.” 

Id. The doctor’s causation opinion was valid because it was “not based on an 

assumption that [the c]laimant's injuries could cause such results, but rather, that if 
12

the accident occurred as [the c]laimant described it, then it was the cause of those 

results.” Id. (emphasis in original). In essence, the doctor’s opinion was competent 

because it was not based on an assumption, “but rather on a host of factors that led 

him inescapably to that conclusion.” Id. 

Here, the WCJ credited Dr. Maugle’s causation testimony and 

expanded the description of the work-related injury to include, inter alia, workrelated cervical radiculopathy. R.R. at 197a. The Board concluded that, taken as a 

whole, Dr. Maugle’s testimony regarding causation was unequivocal and consistent. 

Id. at 220a. Employer argues that Dr. Maugle’s causation testimony was 

contradictory and equivocal and, thus, incompetent. Employer’s Br. at 18-21 & 25-

26 (citing Potere). Employer adds that Dr. Maugle’s lack of knowledge of 

Claimant’s medical history, including prior symptoms identical to those she reported 

in August 2019, rendered his testimony incompetent. Id. at 21-23 (citing Sw. 

Airlines/Cambridge Integrated Serv. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (King), 985 

A.2d 280 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)). Claimant responds that the WCJ’s expansion of the 

description of injury was proper and therefore the Board did not err in affirming. 

Claimant’s Br. at 8-10. 

In his deposition, Dr. Maugle stated that when he first saw Claimant, 

he initially attributed her condition to degenerative changes. R.R. at 138a. However, 

based on her description of how she specifically felt pain when she had to turn her 

neck repeatedly to do her work duties, he added that “I did believe those contributed 

to her symptoms.” Id. at 139a; see also 135a, 143a & 148a. He then reiterated that 

he related her diagnosis and reported symptoms “to her work-related activity around 

August of 2019”; agreed when asked if “her clinical presentation is related to the 
13

way she described she performs her work duties”; and restated that he attributed her 

condition to “her work-related injury in August of 2019.” Id. at 151a-52a & 157a. 

On the other hand, during cross-examination, Dr. Maugle

acknowledged the possibility that Claimant’s condition and symptoms could be due 

solely to her underlying degenerative changes, activities of daily living, or riding her 

horse. Id. at 162a-64a. He also conceded that she had not mentioned any prior 

cervical or left shoulder issues to him and he did not disagree when questioned 

whether Claimant’s work duties were described as only a “contributing factor” to 

her condition along with her underlying degenerative changes. Id. at 167a. 

Based on the evidence as a whole, we conclude that Dr. Maugle’s 

causation testimony was competent. Although he conceded the possibility that 

Claimant’s degenerative conditions could become symptomatic in the absence of a

specific incident or work-related cause, he consistently related her condition to her 

work duties, particularly her need to turn her neck repeatedly in order to perform 

those duties. He did not express uncertainty that her condition was related to her 

work duties. Cf. PetSmart, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sauter), 219 A.3d 

703, 707 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (holding doctor’s testimony incompetent where he 

stated that the claimant’s symptomatology was of “indeterminate etiology” and that 

it was his “presumption” that the claimant’s diagnosis was work-related). As noted, 

“magic words” are not required to determine the competency of medical testimony 

and the bar for unequivocal testimony is not particularly high. Campbell, 954 A.2d 

at 730; cf. Potere, 21 A.3d at 691 (holding that contradictory opinions rendered 

doctor’s testimony “less than positive, and, hence, equivocal”).

Likewise, although Dr. Maugle stated that he first thought Claimant’s

condition was solely due to her degenerative changes, his subsequent causation 
14

testimony was not contradictory; once he knew of Claimant’s work duties, 

specifically her need to repeatedly turn her neck, he did not opine that any of the 

other possible causes, such as riding her horse or degenerative changes, were equally

or more likely to be the cause than her work duties. See Campbell, 954 A.2d at 730. 

Dr. Maugle’s reasonable description of how he went from his first impression that 

Claimant’s condition was due solely to her degenerative changes to his ultimate 

conclusion that her condition was work-related also distinguishes this case from 

Potere, on which Employer relies. There, the doctor’s entire testimony was found 

to be contradictory, including an opinion that the claimant was able to return to work 

full duty but, at the same time, also required light duty restrictions. 21 A.3d at 691.

Employer also argues that Dr. Maugle’s opinion is incompetent because 

Claimant had similar symptoms, such as the “buzzing sensation” in her left arm, in 

early 2019 and then again in August 2019 when she reported the injury at issue here,

and did not report the previous left shoulder issues to Dr. Maugle. It is true that “the 

causal link is not obvious if a claimant has a pre-existing condition related to the 

same body part the claimant alleges was injured at work.” Moyer, 976 A.2d at 599 

n.3. However, to the extent that Dr. Maugle’s causation testimony relied on a belief 

that Claimant had no prior left shoulder issues, this Court has explained that doctors’ 

assumptions, even if based on incomplete information, will not invalidate their 

testimony if their conclusions are supported in the record and therefore borne out by 

other evidence. Moyer, 976 A.2d at 600; Somerset Welding, 650 A.2d at 118. 

Here, the WCJ accepted as credible Claimant’s testimony that on 

August 6, 2019, she sustained pain to the left side of her neck down through her left 

shoulder to her left arm when performing her work duties. R.R. at 19a. The record 

reflects that she treated for it the next day and reported it to Employer, which not 
15

only accommodated her by transferring her to another location where her workload 

would be lighter, but accepted the injury, albeit as a left shoulder issue, via a 

medical-only NTCP. Id. at 1a & 20a-21a. Dr. Maugle explained that Claimant’s 

injury was not based in her shoulder, but in her cervical area; this conclusion was 

shared by Employer’s expert and accepted by the WCJ. Id. at 96a & 141a. Although 

Claimant did report similar conditions earlier in 2019 and was treated for them as a 

shoulder (rather than cervical) condition, at the time of the subject incident on 

August 6, 2019, she was working full duty and had not reported pain or difficulty or 

requested accommodations prior to that date. 

Employer’s reliance on Southwest Airlines is misplaced. There, in the 

context of a claim petition, the claimant alleged a head injury from being hit by a 

jetway door; based on her account, her treating doctor diagnosed her with postconcussive syndrome. 985 A.2d at 281-83. The claimant testified that she had no 

prior head injuries or concussion symptoms and had reported no such issues to her 

treating doctor. Id. at 282. However, fact witnesses could not corroborate that an 

incident occurred, and medical discovery revealed that the claimant also had an 

extensive history of head issues. Id. at 287-88 & n.6. The claimant’s diagnostic

tests did not reflect a head trauma and the employer’s doctor opined that she had not 

sustained an injury at all or, if anything, only a non-disabling “trivial” injury. Id. at 

283-85. The WCJ granted the claim petition and the Board affirmed, but this Court 

reversed, concluding that the claimant’s doctor’s testimony was incompetent, not

because it was equivocal, but because he lacked knowledge of the claimant’s 

extensive history of head issues and there was no other support for the claimant’s 

claim. Id. at 287-88.
16

Here, by contrast, there is an accepted injury and Claimant’s review 

petition burden was to establish the greater extent of her injury and its workrelatedness, not to establish a work-related injury in the first place. Although Dr. 

Maugle did not know specifically of Claimant’s early 2019 issues, this does not 

invalidate his otherwise supported conclusion that her reported, documented, 

accepted, and medically-treated issues that began on August 6, 2019, were indeed 

work related. Employer’s allegations in this regard are therefore meritless.

B. Employer’s Objections to Dr. Maugle’s Causation Testimony

Section 131.101 of the Pennsylvania Worker’s Compensation Act7

(Act) regulations states in relevant part: 

(c) The evidentiary record is closed when the parties have 

submitted all of their evidence and rested or when the 

judge has closed the evidentiary record on a party’s motion 

or the judge’s own motion. . . . When the judge determines 

that the evidentiary record is closed, the judge will notify 

the parties that the evidentiary record is closed on the 

record or in writing.

(d) A party may move to close the evidentiary record and 

all other parties shall advise the judge within 20 days as to 

whether the evidentiary record is closed or whether there 

is additional evidence to be submitted. At the conclusion 

of the 20-day period, the judge will determine whether the 

evidentiary record will be closed or will remain open.

(e) A judge may close the evidentiary record on the 

judge’s own motion even if all parties have not rested 

when the judge determines that the parties have had 

reasonable opportunity to present their case, provided that 

reasonable notice of the closing of the evidentiary record 

has been given to all parties.

7 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710.
17

34 Pa. Code § 131.101(c)-(e). Section 131.66(b) of the regulations states that when 

depositions are conducted, 

[o]bjections shall be made and the basis for the objections 

stated at the time of the taking of the depositions. Only 

objections which are identified in a separate writing, 

introduced prior to the close of the evidentiary record, as 

close of the record is specified in § 131.101(c)--(e) 

(relating to briefs, findings of fact and close of record), and 

stating the specific nature of the objections and the pages 

where they appear in the deposition or the exhibits to 

which they refer will be preserved for ruling. Objections 

not so preserved are waived.

34 Pa. Code § 131.66(b) (emphasis added). When issues with written objections 

have arisen, this Court has held that if they do not appear in the certified record, they 

are waived. Degraw, 926 A.2d at 1001 (stating that “[t]here is no list of preserved 

objections contained in the record. Thus, even if [the c]laimant’s counsel objected . 

. . , those objections would be waived.”); see also Alessandro v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Precision Metal Crafters, LLC), 972 A.2d 1245, 1248 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2009) (same).

Employer argues that the WCJ erred in failing to address its objections 

to Dr. Maugle’s causation testimony. Employer’s Br. at 27-32. Employer reiterates 

that this testimony was equivocal and adds that to the extent it was definitive, this 

was only because it was elicited by Claimant’s counsel’s leading and repetitive

questions. Id. Claimant responds that Employer waived its objections because they 

were never properly submitted to the WCJ for consideration. Claimant’s Br. at 11-

13. 

At the April 27, 2021, hearing, the WCJ stated that both doctors’ 

depositions had been submitted into evidence along with Claimant’s initial and 

upcoming deposition scheduled for May 10, 2021. C.R. at 87. When asked by the 
18

WCJ if anything further would be added to the record, Employer’s counsel stated 

that other than a statement of Claimant’s wages, he did not believe so, and he 

reiterated this several minutes later. Id. at 88-89. Although the WCJ did not 

expressly close the record, he advised the parties that they would have 60 days from 

the hearing date to complete Claimant’s second deposition and submit briefs on their 

respective petitions. Id. at 88. 

The 60-day deadline was June 27, 2021. However, the reproduced 

record prepared by Employer in association with this appeal includes a July 7, 2021, 

letter by Employer’s counsel to the WCJ. R.R. at 191a. The letter lists Employer’s 

objections raised at Dr. Maugle’s deposition and indicates “VIA WCAIS” at the top. 

Id. However, the letter does not include proof of filing in the WCAIS system and 

does not appear in the certified record or in the listing of exhibits in the WCJ’s 

December 14, 2021, decision. See id. at 193a; see also generally C.R.

The WCJ did not include Employer’s objections in the exhibit list at the 

beginning of his decision and did not address them in the decision. See R.R. at 193a99a. The Board suggested that Employer may have waived its objections, but 

ultimately concluded that they were meritless and that any error in this regard by the 

WCJ was harmless because Dr. Maugle’s testimony was ultimately deemed credible 

and persuasive. Id. at 219a-20a. We agree. 

As noted, Employer’s list of objections in its reproduced record does 

not include proof of filing via WCAIS and is not included in the certified record. 

See Degraw, 926 A.2d at 1001; Alessandro, 972 A.2d at 1248 n.2. Moreover, as 

discussed above, Dr. Maugle’s causation testimony was competent, supported by the 

record, and found credible and persuasive by the WCJ, who would have had 

discretion to deny Employer’s objections had they been properly preserved. See 
19

Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bromley), 161 A.3d 446, 467 

n.26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Employer’s objections are therefore both waived and 

meritless.

C. Claimant’s Eligibility for Wage Loss Benefits

The second paragraph of Section 413(a) of the Act states in relevant 

part:

A [WCJ] may, at any time, modify, reinstate, suspend, or 

terminate [an NCP] . . . upon petition filed by either party 

with the department, upon proof that the disability of an 

injured employe has increased, decreased, recurred, or has 

temporarily or finally ceased[.]

77 P.S. § 772. It is also “well-established that the form of the petition is not 

controlling where the facts warrant relief, and that if a claimant is entitled to relief 

under any section of the Act, his petition will be considered as filed under that 

section.” City of Phila. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cospelich), 893 A.2d 171, 

179-80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This 

court has found no error where a WCJ awarded benefits under a provision of the Act 

different from that under which the petition was filed. Id.; see also Steele v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Findlay Twp.), 155 A.3d 1173, 1179 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2017) (citing Cospelich and Gen. Refractories Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd.

(Wright), 635 A.2d 120, 122-23 (Pa. 1993) and noting that “[t]he Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has affirmed this practice”).

The flexibility of Section 413(a) has also been judicially extended to 

allow corrections of WCJ decisions, which may be made on a party’s petition or sua 

sponte by either the WCJ or the Board. See Johnson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Budd Co.), 693 A.2d 1015, 1017-18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (holding that “an 
20

administrative agency may, on its own motion, correct typographical, clerical and 

mechanical errors, as well as undisputed factual errors and factual misconceptions, 

provided proper notice and explanation is given”); see also Bentley v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ.), 987 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2009) (holding that the Board may correct a “technical error” in a WCJ decision); 

Pritchett v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stout), 713 A.2d 1214, 1217 & n.3 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1998) (same). However, this does not apply where correction of the alleged 

error requires a change in the WCJ’s factual or legal analysis or additional factual 

findings or conclusions of law. Varkey v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cardone 

Indus. & Fireman Fund), 827 A.2d 1267, 1273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Butcher v. 

Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Treadway Resort Inn), 517 A.2d 1023, 1026 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1986).

Here, the WCJ’s decision did not expressly award Claimant wage loss 

benefits. See R.R. at 194a-99a. However, the WCJ credited Dr. Maugle’s testimony 

that Claimant’s April 2021 surgery, which ultimately took her out of work through 

July 2021, was due to her accepted work-related injury. Id. at 197a. Employer notes 

that because it issued a medical-only NTCP, Claimant had to file a claim petition 

seeking wage loss benefits in addition to the review petition to expand the 

description of injury. Employer’s Br. at 32-33. Employer asserts that wage loss 

benefits were therefore never properly litigated before the WCJ. Id. Employer adds 

that the WCJ’s decision did not expressly award wage loss benefits and that the 

Board could not deduce that intent solely from the language of the WCJ’s order. Id. 

Claimant responds that the WCJ accepted Dr. Maugle’s attribution of Claimant’s 

surgery and subsequent time out of work to her work injury and that the evidence 

supported wage loss benefits. Claimant’s Br. at 13-15. As such, Claimant avers that 
21

the Board was within its authority to correct the WCJ’s oversight in failing to 

formally award wage loss benefits. Id.

The WCJ also stated in his order that “Employer is ordered to deduct 

20% from the Claimant’s compensation and pay same to Claimant’s counsel. The 

remainder of Claimant’s compensation is to be paid directly to the Claimant.” Id. at 

199a. The Board acknowledged the lack of clarity in the WCJ’s decision, but 

concluded that the decision and order, read as a whole, indicated that the WCJ 

intended to award wage loss benefits as of Claimant’s April 2021 surgery. Id. at 

209a-12a. This was primarily because the order would not make sense if it was read 

to require Employer to pay anything “directly to the Claimant” when all that had 

previously been accepted by Employer were medical expenses. Id.

We recognize that Claimant did not file a claim petition specifically 

seeking wage loss benefits after she went out of work in April 2021due to her surgery 

(while her October 2020 review petition was pending) and that the WCJ did not 

expressly award them to Claimant. This is not the typical typographical or clerical 

error that the Board usually corrects, such as a date, average weekly wage, or 

description of injury. See, e.g., Johnson, 693 A.2d at 1016 (holding that the Board 

was authorized to correct a WCJ’s misstatement of the claimant’s reinstatement 

date). 

However, based on our review of the record, correction of the “error” 

here does not require a change in the WCJ’s factual or legal analysis or additional 

factual findings or conclusions of law. Varkey, 827 A.2d at 1273; Butcher, 517 A.2d 

at 1026. Employer submitted into evidence a statement of wages reflecting 

Claimant’s average weekly wage of $1,361.07. C.R. at 328-29. This amount was 

higher than Claimant’s testimony that she earned $29.61 per hour for a 40-hour 
22

workweek ($1,184.40). R.R. at 81a. The statement of wages was included in the 

list of exhibits in the WCJ’s opinion. R.R. at 193a. There was no need, therefore, 

to litigate wages in this matter. Additionally, Employer was on notice as of Dr. 

Maugle’s March 2021 deposition that Claimant would be undergoing surgery and 

out of work for a period of time to heal, as well as Dr. Maugle’s attribution of the 

need for the surgery to Claimant’s accepted work-related injury. Id. at 149a-54a & 

167a. Employer was further on notice that Claimant had actually gone out of work 

after her April 2021 surgery because at the April 27, 2021, hearing, Claimant’s 

counsel informed Employer’s counsel and the WCJ; moreover, Claimant confirmed 

at her May 2021 deposition that she had gone out of work. C.R. at 88; R.R. at 69a70a. 

Although the WCJ’s decision and order did not expressly award

Claimant post-surgery wage loss benefits other than stating in the order that after a 

20% deduction for attorney’s fees, the “remainder of Claimant’s compensation is to 

be paid directly to the Claimant,” the WCJ did conclude that the surgery was related 

to her work injury. The record as a whole supports that determination as well as the 

reasonable inference that Claimant’s ensuing three months of disability were also 

due to her injury. See Ace Wire Spring & Form Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Walshesky), 93 A.3d 923, 931 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (holding that the reviewing 

tribunal or court shall “draw all reasonable inferences which are deducible from the 

evidence in support of the factfinder’s decision in favor of [the] prevailing party”). 

Therefore, the Board did not err in concluding that the language in the WCJ’s order 

reflected an intent to award wage loss benefits to Claimant for the period she was 
23

out of work following her surgery. Employer’s argument in this regard is therefore 

meritless.8

IV. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing discussion, the Board’s May 13, 2022, order 

modifying in part, reversing in part, and otherwise affirming the WCJ’s December 

14, 2021, order, which denied Employer’s termination petition, granted Claimant’s 

review petition, and awarded wage loss benefits as of Claimant’s April 14, 2021, 

surgery is affirmed.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

8 Claimant does not dispute that Employer is entitled to a credit for short-term disability 

benefits funded by Employer that Claimant received while out of work after her surgery during 

the litigation of this matter.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UPMC Pinnacle Hospitals, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Renee Orlandi (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), : No. 596 C.D. 2022

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of July, 2023, the May 13, 2022, order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge