[Cite as Furbee v. Bittner, 2015-Ohio-4425.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LAKE COUNTY, OHIO 

WILLIAM FURBEE, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 CASE NOS. 2014-L-077, 

 - vs - : 2014-L-080, 

 2014-L-091, 

PATRICIA M. BITTNER, et al., : 2014-L-106, 

 and 2014-L-107 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

Appeals from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 

2004 PR 02450. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Paul R. Malchesky, Cannon, Aveni & Malchesky Co., L.P.A., 41 East Erie Street, 

Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

David J. Sternberg, Sternberg & Zeid Co., L.P.A., 7547 Mentor Avenue, #301, Mentor, 

OH 44060-5466 (For Defendant-Appellant). 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Patricia Bittner, appeals from the judgments of the Lake County 

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, inter alia, adopting the magistrate’s decision 

awarding custody of the minor child, R.B., to appellee, William Furbee. The Guardian 

Ad Litem, Rebecca J. Castell, (“GAL”) has also filed a brief contesting the trial court’s 

adoption of the magistrate’s decision. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
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{¶2} R.B., daughter of appellant and appellee, was born in December 2003; the 

parties were never married, but remained in a relationship until shortly after their 

daughter was born. In December 2004, appellee filed a motion for visitation. By way of 

agreed judgment entry, appellee was granted visitation every other weekend from 

Friday, 7:00 p.m. through Monday, 11:00 a.m., along with five weeks summer parenting 

time. Appellee was required to provide for all transportation vis-à-vis visitation, which 

involved a multiple-hour drive each way. 

{¶3} From 2004 through November 2012, appellee exercised his parenting time 

on a regular basis and provided the transportation as required by the order. During this 

time, appellant resided with her parents and had several mental health episodes that 

required hospitalization. In the fall of 2012, appellant’s mother fell ill and passed away. 

{¶4} Appellant, who has a schizoaffective disorder, experienced significant 

psychiatric problems subsequent to her mother’s death. She thought her father, Jack 

Bittner, was satan, and believed her brother-in-law, Steve O’Shea, was his evil helper. 

On one occasion, appellant became agitated with her father and attacked him over one 

of her mother’s rings. This took place in front of R.B., who called 911. Appellant was 

placed in a mental hospital for seven days after this incident. 

{¶5} During the weeks following her mother’s death, appellant also indicated 

she feared the family cat because, in her view, it came from a cursed pyramid. She 

expressed a concern that she was going to be mummified and the cat was sent to be 

her guardian into the underworld. 

{¶6} Throughout October and November 2012, appellant had been considering 

moving to the state of Washington with R.B. Appellant’s father encouraged the move so 
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she could get away from the area after her mother’s passing. Accordingly, on or about 

November 30, 2012, without discussing the change of residence with appellee or the 

court, appellant moved with R.B. to Washington to live with her sister, Teresa O’Shea 

and her husband, Steve. 

{¶7} Appellee subsequently attempted to contact R.B. for six consecutive days, 

but was unable to reach her. Ultimately, he called the police to check on the child. The 

police visited Jack Bittner’s residence, where R.B. had been living, but did not find the 

child. 

{¶8} Finally, on December 7, 2012, appellant contacted appellee and advised 

him she and R.B. were staying with her sister in Washington. On December 11, 2012, 

appellee filed an emergency ex parte motion for temporary custody as a result of 

appellant’s removal of R.B. from Ohio. Appellee subsequently filed a motion for legal 

custody on January 31, 2013. Appellee later filed a motion to show cause, alleging he 

had been denied parenting time with his daughter due to appellant’s actions. 

{¶9} Appellant recognized she had no plan for appellee to visit R.B., despite 

the agreed visitation order. Eventually, R.B. was enrolled in school in Washington. In 

March 2013, however, appellant was asked to leave the O’Shea home due to mental 

illness. She returned to Ohio, but left R.B. in the custody of the O’Sheas. According to 

appellee, he did not learn of appellant’s return until the fall of 2013. 

{¶10} Appellee communicated with R.B. between one and three times a week 

via telephone; he believed his calls were being monitored or disrupted by appellant or 

her family and maintained R.B. was being turned against him. And when appellee 
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attempted to arrange a visit in July 2013, Steve O’Shea stated they could discuss 

visitation when appellant “signed over guardianship” of R.B. to the O’Sheas. 

{¶11} Although appellant conceded that removing R.B. from Ohio alienated the 

child from appellee, R.B. ostensibly thrived while living in Washington. While attending 

third grade, she was taken off an IEP. R.B. also became actively involved in ice 

skating. 

{¶12} Due to the mental health issues and concerns that R.B. was being overly 

influenced by Jack Bittner as well as the O’Sheas, the GAL recommended 

psychological evaluations be performed on all parties as well as R.B. In October 2013, 

the parties agreed to undergo psychological examinations; join the O’Sheas to the 

pending action; and return R.B. to Ohio at the end of her fall semester in order to live 

with appellant and visit with appellee. 

{¶13} Dr. Farshid Afsarifard was retained to perform the psychological 

examinations. His initial observations raised concerns regarding R.B.’s emotional 

stability. He expressed concerns about the problems engendered by the parties’ 

inability to effectively work together. He recommended R.B. remain in Washington with 

the O’Sheas until the end of her fourth grade year. This would permit the child to 

remain stable and keep the structure within which she had been living for the previous 

year. 

{¶14} R.B. returned to Ohio from Washington on December 23, 2013, and was 

reunited with appellee the next day in Dr. Afsarifard’s office. R.B. left the office with 

appellee who spent Christmas Eve with appellee and his family. Appellee stated R.B. 

adjusted back into his family almost immediately and was fine during the visit. R.B. 
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visited appellant on Christmas and then spent the following week with appellee. The 

GAL requested the court permit R.B. to return to Washington to finish the school year; 

the request was denied and R.B. was returned to appellant, who re-enrolled the child in 

Kirtland Elementary. Since returning to Ohio, R.B. continued to visit with appellee while 

residing with appellant. 

{¶15} On October 23, 2013, the GAL filed her report. In the report, the GAL 

determined a change of circumstances had occurred since the prior decree and thus, 

she recommended R.B. be placed in the legal custody of appellee. Trial on appellee’s 

motion for legal custody commenced January 13, 2014 and continued January 14, 

2014; May 12, 2014; and May 13, 2014. On May 9, 2014, prior to the hearing’s 

completion, the GAL filed a revised report in which she changed her recommendation; 

in the revised report, the GAL determined there had been no change of circumstances 

sufficient to warrant a modification of the custody order. The GAL therefore 

recommended that R.B. remain in appellant’s custody. 

{¶16} On June 27, 2014, the magistrate issued his decision. In the decision, 

the magistrate, inter alia, recommended granting appellee legal custody of R.B. 

Preliminary objections to the magistrate’s decision were filed by appellant, the GAL, and 

third-party defendants, the O’Sheas. 

{¶17} On August 6, 2014, the trial court sua sponte issued an interim order 

transferring R.B. to appellee’s school district. Appellant, the GAL, and the O’Sheas filed 

notices of appeal to this order. Appellee subsequently filed an emergency ex parte 

motion for possessory time on August 15, 2014. The court granted this motion on 

August 18, 2014. The GAL appealed this judgment. 
 6

{¶18} After the transcript of proceedings was filed, the GAL filed motions to stay 

the trial court’s interim orders pending appeal. The trial court denied these motions. 

After reviewing the objections, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision on 

October 16, 2014. Notices of appeal were filed by appellant and the GAL. The various 

appeals were subsequently consolidated. Appellant assigns three errors for our review. 

Her first assignment of error provides: 

{¶19} “The magistrate erred in terminating child support as of February 2013.” 

{¶20} Under this assignment of error, appellant contends the magistrate erred in 

terminating the child support order in February 2013 because the conclusion was not 

supported by any facts or testimony. We do not agree. 

{¶21} In his decision, the magistrate noted that when appellee was laid off from 

2008 through 2010, his support obligation was reduced to $50 per month. In March 

2012, the Lake County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“LCCSEA”) calculated 

appellee’s support obligation in the amount of $368.50 per month. LCCSEA 

subsequently issued an administrative order for appellee to commence paying that 

amount. The magistrate observed that appellee filed a motion for a hearing on the child 

support issue on January 3, 2014; in that motion, appellant noted that appellee 

requested a hearing on the child support issue on April 12, 2012, but no action had 

been taken. 

{¶22} In his decision, the magistrate stated that appellant’s former attorneys did 

not aggressively pursue the support issue; instead, the magistrate asserted, parenting 

time was “always at the forefront.” The magistrate further commented, “[a] good portion 
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of the delay in hearing is directly attributable to [appellant’s] flight from the jurisdiction 

and the way she and her former attorneys decided to pursue the support issue.” 

{¶23} With the foregoing background in mind, the magistrate determined 

appellee should pay child support to appellant in the amount of $368.50 from March 

2012, the date of the administrative order, through February 2013, the time at which 

appellant left R.B. in the care and custody of the O’Sheas. The magistrate justified his 

decision for limiting child support in this respect and we discern nothing unreasonable in 

his rationale. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in adopting this 

portion of the magistrate’s order. 

{¶24} Appellant’s first assignment of error lacks merit. 

{¶25} We shall treat both appellant’s second assignment of error and the GAL’s 

first and second assignments of error together as they are analytically related. For her 

second assignment of error, appellant contends: 

{¶26} “The magistrate abused his discretion in granting Furbee’s motion for legal 

custody was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” (Sic.) 

{¶27} The GAL’s first and second assignments of error provide: 

{¶28} “[1.] The trial court erred by awarding legal custody of the minor child to 

father against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶29} “[2.] The trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the best 

interest of the minor child in awarding a change of custody to father.” 

{¶30} Before addressing the weight-of-the-evidence challenges and the GAL’s 

argument asserting error relating to the court’s best-interest determination, we shall first 

address several preliminary arguments raised by appellant. Appellant first asserts the 
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magistrate erred in basing his decision on an in-camera interview with R.B. Appellant 

contends the magistrate is required to consider the entire transcript of proceedings, 

rather than rely exclusively on his interview with the child. This argument lacks merit. 

{¶31} First of all, the magistrate’s decision clearly demonstrates he considered 

all the evidence and testimony submitted at the hearing. The magistrate does speak to 

the information he gleaned from R.B. during the in-camera interview. This information, 

however, was directly relevant to the statutory best-interest analysis pursuant to R.C. 

3109.04(F)(1)(b), which mandates a court to consider “the child’s wishes and concerns 

as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning the child, the 

wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court [if the court has conducted 

an interview.]” 

{¶32} In his decision, the magistrate notes that R.B. expressed her wish to 

remain with the O’Sheas; because, however, both parents were interested in 

maintaining custody of the child, their right to care and custody of R.B. take priority. 

R.B. also expressed an interest in remaining with appellant; as will be discussed fully 

below, however, the court determined, in light of the surrounding circumstances of the 

case, that remaining with appellant was simply not in R.B.’s best interest. The 

magistrate’s decision demonstrates he considered the in-camera interview as well as 

the evidence presented at the hearing. We discern no error in the manner in which the 

magistrate proceeded in entering his decision. 

{¶33} Appellant further argues the magistrate was not an unbiased fact finder to 

the extent his examination of the GAL exhibited “disdain” for her viewpoints. We do not 

agree. 
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{¶34} Although the magistrate vigorously questioned the GAL, the inquiries do 

not indicate a bias. Rather, the GAL, in her initial report recommended, in light of the 

surrounding circumstances of appellant’s mental illness, hospitalizations, and her 

unilateral decision to remove R.B. from Ohio, which effectively deprived appellee of 

visitation, that appellee be granted custody. In her revised report, she changed her 

recommendation, concluding appellant should retain custody because, during the 

several months she had custody of R.B. prior to the hearing, she had demonstrated 

greater stability managing her mental health. The magistrate, however, questioned the 

GAL’s recommendation in light of appellant’s past behavior and actions. This line of 

questioning did not exhibit disdain, but, rather, an interest in rendering a decision that 

would adequately protect R.B.’s best interest as well as the relative parental rights at 

stake in the case. We therefore see no bias in the manner in which the magistrate 

examined the GAL. 

{¶35} Next, appellant argues the magistrate erred in concluding she cannot or is 

not willing to provide adequate care for the minor child. Although the magistrate did 

draw the foregoing conclusion, he did so in relation to the O’Sheas’ motion for custody. 

The magistrate specifically ruled that the O’Sheas met their burden regarding 

appellant’s inability or unwillingness to provide adequate care for R.B., but they failed to 

do so as it related to appellee. As a result, the magistrate determined, their motion for 

legal custody was denied. The O’Sheas did not appeal this judgment. In this respect, 

appellant’s argument is misdirected. 

{¶36} It further bears noting that appellee was not required to establish appellant 

cannot or is not willing to provide adequate care for R.B. As will be discussed below, for 
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a change of custody, R.C. 3109.04(E) requires a change of circumstances and a 

determination that (1) the modification is in the child’s best interests and (2) the harm 

likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantages of the 

change of environment to the child. To the extent the magistrate’s finding relating to the 

O’Sheas’ motion had no legal bearing upon the magistrate’s ultimate conclusion to grant 

custody to appellee, any analysis of those issues would be advisory dicta. It is wellsettled that appellate courts do not indulge in advisory opinions. Cascioli v. Cent. Mut. 

Ins. Co., 4 Ohio St.3d 179, 183 (1983). We shall therefore refrain from addressing this 

argument. 

{¶37} Next, appellant asserts the magistrate erred in concluding appellee’s other 

four children are “marginal” to the custody case. In her brief, however, appellant 

identifies an exchange, during the hearing, between the magistrate and Dr. Afsarifard, 

relating to appellee’s wife, not their children. During this exchange, the magistrate 

observed that the mental health of appellee’s wife is a marginal issue as compared to 

the mental health of the parties. Whether the magistrate’s statement is completely 

accurate is debatable; nevertheless, the angle of the exchange at issue was to focus 

the doctor’s attention on whether he could say appellant could remain functionally and 

psychologically stable, especially in light of her history of mental instability. The doctor 

stated he could not make such a prediction, but observed, if past events are the only 

basis of an assessment, he would also look to some of the questionable decisions 

appellee’s wife had made in her past. The magistrate noted that any issues relating to 

appellee’s wife’s past were of marginal import for purposes of his inquiry into appellant’s 
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psychological stability. We find nothing peculiar or problematic regarding the manner in 

which the magistrate managed the dialogue with the doctor. 

{¶38} We additionally note that R.B.’s relationship and interaction with appellee’s 

other four children is not marginal, and we do not read the magistrate’s decision to 

suggest otherwise. The magistrate acknowledges that the two eldest twin daughters 

were sexually abused by their previous stepfather and were in counseling; he further 

underscored that appellee’s son has special needs and the youngest daughter was, at 

the time of the hearing, not quite two years old. Appellee testified that all the children 

get along well and the magistrate underscored that appellee and his wife are both 

responsible in their employment and support their household. Given these points, we 

cannot conclude the magistrate disregarded appellee’s other children as marginally 

relevant to the custody allocation. 

{¶39} We shall now turn to appellant’s and the GAL’s arguments asserting the 

magistrate’s decision, relating to a change of circumstance and R.B.’s best interests, is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶40} R.C. 3109.04(E)(1) governs change-of-custody actions. It provides: 

{¶41} (E)(1)(a) The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating 

parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children unless it 

finds, based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that 

were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a 

change has occurred in the circumstances of the child, the child’s 

residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a shared 

parenting decree, and that the modification is necessary to serve 

the best interest of the child. In applying these standards, the court 

shall retain the residential parent designated by the prior decree or 

the prior shared parenting decree, unless a modification is in the 

best interest of the child and one of the following applies: 

{¶42} * * * 
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{¶43} (iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is 

outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the 

child. 

{¶44} “[B]efore a modification can be made pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), 

the trial court must make a threshold determination that a change in circumstances has 

occurred.” Buttolph v. Buttolph, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 09CA0003, 2009-Ohio-6909, ¶11. 

Moreover, the requisite change of circumstances “must be a change of substance, not 

a slight or inconsequential change.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418 (1997).

The statute is intentionally designed to require a significant change in order “to spare 

children from a constant tug of war between their parents who would file a motion for 

change of custody each time the parent out of custody thought he or she could provide 

the child a ‘better’ environment.” Id., quoting Wyss v. Wyss, 3 Ohio App.3d 412, 416 

(10th Dist.1982). 

{¶45} In his decision, the magistrate made a preliminary finding that there had 

been a change of circumstances since the prior decree. To wit, the magistrate identified 

the following facts upon which it premised its conclusion: Appellant denied contact 

between R.B. and appellee for over a year; she removed R.B. from the state; she 

ratified the placement of R.B. in a new school system in the state of Washington; she 

abandoned R.B. in Washington and ceded custody to the O’Sheas; the O’Sheas 

retained custody of R.B., despite appellee’s demands to return the child; the magistrate 

further underscored appellant’s numerous mental health problems that had surfaced 

since her mother’s passing as well as the multiple hospitalizations to which she has 

been subject; and, finally, the magistrate identified the trauma the child has experienced 

as a result of appellant’s mental instability. 
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{¶46} The foregoing findings represent facts and actions that occurred since the 

original order; the significance of appellant’s mental health issues were not apparent at 

the time of the prior order. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates appellant, or her 

family, took active steps to prevent appellee from exercising visitation at the time the 

agreed order was entered. Conversely, there was adequate direct and circumstantial 

evidence to support the inference that appellant, with the assistance and 

encouragement of her family, took measures to preclude appellee from visiting R.B. 

during and after the unilateral move to Washington. The magistrate’s findings are 

supported by the record and it is not our position to re-weigh the evidence or substitute 

 our judgment for that of the trial court. Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). We 

therefore conclude the magistrate did not err in finding a change of circumstances 

sufficient to meet the statutory requirements. 

{¶47} Moreover, the magistrate engaged in a thorough analysis of each statutory 

best-interest factor set forth under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a) – (j). Those factors are as 

follows: 

(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care; 

(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to 

division (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and 

concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities 

concerning the child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as 

expressed to the court; 

(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s 

parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect 

the child’s best interest; 

(d) The child’s adjustment to the child's home, school, and 

community; 
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(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the 

situation; 

(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved 

parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights; 

(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support 

payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that parent 

pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an 

obligor; 

(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either 

parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any 

criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an 

abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case 

in which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a 

neglected child, previously has been determined to be the 

perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act that is the basis of an 

adjudication; whether either parent or any member of the 

household of either parent previously has been convicted of or 

pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code 

or a sexually oriented offense involving a victim who at the time of 

the commission of the offense was a member of the family or 

household that is the subject of the current proceeding; whether 

either parent or any member of the household of either parent 

previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense 

involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense 

was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the 

current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the 

commission of the offense; and whether there is reason to believe 

that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being 

an abused child or a neglected child; 

(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a 

shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the 

other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of 

the court; 

(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is 

planning to establish a residence, outside this state. 

 

{¶48} In considering the foregoing factors, the magistrate acknowledged that 

R.B. expressed a desire to remain with the O’Sheas and, secondarily, expressed an 

interest in remaining with appellant. The magistrate also recognized that, while R.B. 
 15

had a strong bond with appellant, R.B. exhibited a lack of respect for appellant as well. 

And, the magistrate noted, the bond R.B. has with appellant must be viewed in light of 

her total removal from appellee’s companionship and influence. The magistrate 

underscored that R.B.’s relationship and interaction with appellee had been completely 

severed for over a year by appellant’s move to Washington and the O’Sheas’ steadfast 

position on remaining R.B.’s de facto custodian well after appellant had left Washington. 

{¶49} The magistrate expressed concern over appellant’s erratic mental health 

and emphasized that, even though she has been stable for several months, she was not 

in counseling; and the magistrate was dubious, in light of appellant’s history of severe 

mental health issues, that she would be capable of maintaining her stability, especially if 

she is forced to deal with a traumatic or life-changing event. Alternatively, the magistrate 

found appellee, who conceded he suffered from depression some years ago, has no 

mental or physical health issues. 

{¶50} The magistrate noted appellee has maintained a job and provided for a 

household without outside intervention. Alternatively, the magistrate pointed out that 

appellant, prior to her recent stability, was unable to independently maintain a 

household on her own or her mental health without multiple hospitalizations, much less 

independently provide for the needs of R.B. He further emphasized appellant’s history 

of poor compliance with taking medications and seeking treatment. And, in light of 

appellant’s history of depending upon her father and the O’Sheas, if appellant retained 

custody of R.B., the child would be further exposed to individuals who, in the 

magistrate’s opinion, aided in significantly alienating the child from appellee, an 

environment that would not serve R.B.’s best interests. 
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{¶51} The magistrate acknowledged that both the GAL and Dr. Afsarifard 

“lobbied” for the child to remain with either the O’Sheas or appellant to the extent each 

believed awarding appellee custody would cause adjustment issues in a new school, 

home, and community. Nevertheless, the magistrate pointed out, after R.B. left 

Washington and enrolled in Kirtland Elementary and resumed visitation with appellee, 

she experienced no adjustment problems. 

{¶52} The magistrate found that appellant, her father, and the O’Sheas 

“systematically and egregiously flouted the Court’s Order of parenting time for 

[appellee]. The child was intentionally removed from the state, the consequences to 

[appellee] were as if the child had been placed in the permanent custody of the state.” 

Moreover, the court determined appellant had a history of willfully denying appellee the 

right to parenting time. The record reflects that, not only did she remove R.B. from Ohio 

without consulting appellee or the court, she, on other occasions would decline appellee 

visitation. To wit, appellee testified that in 2010, over a six-month period, he did not 

receive visitation during two 30-day increments; additionally, in May 2012, he was 

denied two weekend visits. The magistrate therefore found appellee would be 

significantly more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time. 

{¶53} The magistrate found, given the case history, the only way to guarantee 

appellee would have an appropriate parent-child relationship with R.B. would be to 

remove her from the people who severed that relationship. The magistrate 

consequently determined that the surrounding circumstances demonstrated it was in 

R.B.’s best interests to be placed in appellee’s custody. We hold the magistrate’s 

conclusion was a sound exercise of his discretion. Further, in light of the evidence, as 
 17

well as the magistrate’s factual findings, the foregoing determination supports the 

conclusion that any harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed 

by the advantages of the change of environment to the child. Accordingly, the 

magistrate’s decision is supported by the weight of the evidence and the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in adopting the same. 

{¶54} Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit; the GAL’s two 

assignments of error are similarly without merit. 

{¶55} Appellant’s final assignment of error provides: 

{¶56} “The court erred in ordering emergency relief pursuant to Juvenile Rule 

40(D)(4)(e)(ii) regarding venue of school enrollment for the minor child.” 

{¶57} On August 6, 2014, the trial court entered an interim order transferring 

R.B. to appellee’s school district. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in ordering this 

transfer because there was no motion for such relief and there was no emergency 

justifying such relief. Because we affirm the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s 

decision relating to the change of custody, R.B. will necessarily be attending a school in 

appellee’s district. Any argument relating to the order at issue is therefore moot. 

{¶58} Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶59} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Lake 

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., 

concur.