[Cite as State ex rel. DeWine v. Court of Claims of Ohio, 130 Ohio St.3d 244, 2011-Ohio-5283.] 

THE STATE EX REL. DEWINE, APPELLEE, v. COURT OF CLAIMS 

OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State ex rel. DeWine v. Court of Claims of Ohio, 

130 Ohio St.3d 244, 2011-Ohio-5283.] 

The Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the attorney general 

granting or denying payment of attorney fees in connection with an award 

of reparations filed on behalf of a victim of a crime. 

(No. 2010-1837—Submitted May 10, 2011—Decided October 18, 2011.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 

No. 09AP-863, 190 Ohio App.3d 161, 2010-Ohio-4437. 

__________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

The Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the attorney general 

granting or denying payment of attorney fees in connection with an award 

of reparations filed on behalf of a victim of a crime. 

__________________ 

O’DONNELL, J.

{¶ 1} The question we address in this appeal is whether the Court of 

Claims of Ohio has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decision of the 

attorney general granting or denying an award of attorney fees for preparing an 

application for reparations on behalf of a claimant. In this case, the Court of 

Claims assumed jurisdiction over a decision of the attorney general awarding 

attorney fees. Subsequently, the attorney general obtained both a writ of 

mandamus directing the Court of Claims to vacate its decision and dismiss the 

appeal and a writ of prohibition ordering the Court of Claims to refrain from 
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exercising jurisdiction over similar appeals from other attorney general decisions 

on attorney fees made pursuant to R.C. 2743.65. 

{¶ 2} The Court of Claims now appeals as of right to this court, 

contending that it has jurisdiction over all matters related to appeals from 

decisions of the attorney general regarding awards of reparations, including 

awards or denials of attorney fees. 

{¶ 3} The Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the 

attorney general granting or denying payment of attorney fees in connection with 

an award of reparations filed on behalf of a victim of a crime. Therefore, we 

affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 4} Attorney Jack Carney-DeBord submitted attorney-fee applications to 

the Ohio Attorney General requesting a total of $1,563.75 for representing Joseph 

Fletcher in connection with Fletcher’s application for crime-victim reparations. 

Pursuant to the provisions of R.C. 2743.65(A)(2), the attorney general made a 

maximum final award of $1,020 to Carney-DeBord. 

{¶ 5} After the attorney general denied a request for reconsideration, 

Carney-DeBord appealed the award of attorney fees to the Court of Claims. The 

attorney general moved to dismiss that appeal, asserting that the court lacked 

jurisdiction to act, but a Court of Claims panel of commissioners denied that 

motion and affirmed the $1,020 attorney fee awarded by the attorney general. In 

re Fletcher (Feb. 9, 2009), Ct.Cl. No. V2006-20836. The attorney general then 

appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and on 

review of that appeal, a judge of the Court of Claims affirmed the decision of the 

panel, concluding that pursuant to R.C. 2743.53(A) and 2743.55(A), the Court of 

Claims had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the attorney general’s award of 

attorney fees. In re Fletcher (July 2, 2009), Ct.Cl. No. V2006-20836. 
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{¶ 6} The attorney general then sought both a writ of mandamus to compel 

the Court of Claims to vacate its decision and dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction and a writ of prohibition to prevent the Court of Claims from 

reviewing similar appeals from other decisions of the attorney general granting or 

denying requests for attorney fees filed pursuant to R.C. 2743.65. 

{¶ 7} The Tenth District Court of Appeals issued the requested writs, 

holding that the Victims of Crime Act provides no authority for the Court of 

Claims to review a decision of the attorney general granting or denying payment 

of attorney fees for preparing a claim for crime-victim reparations and explaining 

that the attorney general’s decision in this regard is final pursuant to R.C. 

2743.65. 

{¶ 8} The Court of Claims now appeals to this court as of right, 

contending that R.C. 2743.53(A), part of the Victims of Crime Act, vests it with 

appellate jurisdiction over all matters related to appeals from decisions of the 

attorney general’s award of reparations, including decisions granting or denying 

payment of attorney fees. The court also maintains that the General Assembly did 

not expressly state that the attorney general’s decision on attorney fees is final 

and not appealable, and it further asserts that because the fees are paid from the 

reparations fund, they are a form of reparations. Thus, the Court of Claims 

believes it has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a decision of the attorney 

general granting or denying payment of attorney fees for preparing an application 

for reparations on behalf of a claimant. 

{¶ 9} In response, the attorney general argues that because the Court of 

Claims is a statutorily created court, it may exercise only the jurisdiction 

specifically conferred upon it by the General Assembly, and therefore, its 

appellate jurisdiction may not be implied but must be expressly provided by 

statute. According to the attorney general, the statute authorizing the payment of 

fees to an attorney for assisting a claimant in applying for reparations does not 
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also authorize a right to appeal an award of those fees to the Court of Claims. The 

attorney general further maintains that Carney-DeBord cannot be considered a 

claimant appealing an award of reparations, because the statutes expressly 

distinguish between the claimant and the attorney representing the claimant and 

because the fees charged by an attorney for preparing a claim are excluded by 

statute from an award of reparations. For these reasons, the attorney general 

contends that the Court of Claims patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction 

to hear the appeal in this case and that the court of appeals properly granted the 

writs in this case. 

{¶ 10} Accordingly, we are called upon to decide whether the Court of 

Claims has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the attorney general’s decisions 

granting or denying payment of fees to attorneys for seeking awards of 

reparations on behalf of victims of crime.

Law and Analysis 

{¶ 11} The Victims of Crime Act establishes a reparations fund in the state 

treasury to compensate persons for economic loss resulting from criminally 

injurious conduct. See R.C. 2743.191. Further, R.C. 2743.52(A) directs the 

attorney general to “make awards of reparations for economic loss arising from 

criminally injurious conduct, if satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the requirements for an award of reparations have been met.” 

{¶ 12} The act authorizes an appeal from decisions of the attorney general 

in connection with awards of reparations, providing in R.C. 2743.52(B), “A court 

of claims panel of commissioners or a judge of the court of claims has appellate 

jurisdiction to order awards of reparations for economic loss arising from 

criminally injurious conduct * * *.” 

{¶ 13} Specifically, R.C. 2743.61(B) provides that “[a] claimant may 

appeal an award of reparations, the amount of an award of reparations, or the 

denial of a claim for an award of reparations that is made by a final decision of 
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the attorney general after any reconsideration.” (Emphasis added.) No other 

provision of the act, however, establishes a right to appeal from a decision of the 

attorney general. 

{¶ 14} The questions presented in this case, therefore, are who may 

qualify as a claimant as that term is used in R.C. 2743.61(B) and what is the 

nature of the relationship between R.C. 2743.61 and R.C. 2743.65. In interpreting 

a statute, our duty is to ascertain the legislative intent as manifested in the words 

of the statute. Proctor v. Kardassilaris, 115 Ohio St.3d 71, 2007-Ohio-4838, 873 

N.E.2d 872, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 15} The General Assembly has defined the term “claimant” in R.C. 

2743.51(A) to mean a person who claims an award of reparations as a victim of a 

crime, a dependent of a deceased victim, a third person who assumes the legal 

obligations of a victim, a person who is authorized to act on behalf of any of the 

above, or the estate of a deceased victim. The Court of Claims urges that because 

attorneys are authorized to act on behalf of victims of crime, they are claimants as 

defined in R.C. 2743.51(A), but they are not. 

Fees Are Not Reparations 

{¶ 16} The fees charged by an attorney in preparing a claim for 

reparations are not recoverable as part of an award of reparations. While the 

Victims of Crime Act directs the attorney general to make an award of reparations 

to the claimant for economic loss, R.C. 2743.52(A), the term “economic loss” is 

defined in R.C. 2743.51(E) and (F)(4) to include only the attorney fees “incurred 

to successfully obtain a restraining order, custody order, or other order to 

physically separate a victim from an offender, if the attorney has not received 

payment under section 2743.65 of the Revised Code for assisting a claimant with 

an application for an award of reparations.” The General Assembly, however, did 

not include within the definition of “economic loss” attorney fees for assisting a 
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claimant to apply for an award of reparations, and therefore, attorney fees for 

preparing such a claim are not recoverable as part of an award of reparations. 

{¶ 17} R.C. 2743.71(B)(3) further clarifies that “[a]n attorney who 

represents an applicant for an award of reparations cannot charge the applicant for 

the services rendered in relation to that representation but is required to apply to 

the attorney general for payment for the representation.” Thus, an attorney who 

requests these types of fees is not seeking reimbursement for the victim’s 

economic loss on behalf of the claimant, but rather is requesting payment from the 

reparations fund for services the attorney rendered. 

{¶ 18} As a further indication that it did not intend attorney fees to be part 

of an award of reparations, the General Assembly provided a separate statute, 

R.C. 2743.65, to compensate attorneys who represent claimants. In this section, 

the legislature distinguished between claimants and attorneys representing 

claimants. R.C. 2743.65(A) states: “The attorney general shall determine, and the 

state shall pay, in accordance with this section attorney's fees, commensurate with 

services rendered, to the attorney representing a claimant under sections 2743.51 

to 2743.72 of the Revised Code. The attorney shall submit on an application form 

an itemized fee bill at the rate of sixty dollars per hour upon receipt of the final 

decision on the claim.” The statute also establishes maximum amounts that may 

be paid for particular services rendered and authorizes the attorney general to 

determine the amount of attorney fees allowed in each case. 

Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims 

{¶ 19} The Court of Claims is a statutorily created court. See R.C. 

2743.03. In State ex rel. Johnson v. Perry Cty. Court (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 53, 

54, 25 OBR 77, 495 N.E.2d 16, in which this court considered whether county 

courts have jurisdiction through inherent power or by statute to punish contempt, 

we explained that “[a] court created by statute * * * has only limited jurisdiction, 
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and may exercise only such powers as are directly conferred by legislative 

action.” 

{¶ 20} Further, we held in Truman v. Walton (1899), 59 Ohio St. 517, 525, 

53 N.E. 57, that “[t]he court held by a village mayor is of limited jurisdiction. His 

power to try persons accused of violating village ordinances or the criminal laws 

of the state is only such as has been conferred by statute. If such jurisdiction has 

not been thus created, it does not exist.” See also Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. 

Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, 900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 7 

(“municipal courts are statutorily created, R.C. 1901.01, and their subject-matter 

jurisdiction is set by statute”). 

{¶ 21} Similarly, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited by 

statute and specifically confined to the powers conferred by the legislature. 

{¶ 22} In contrast to R.C. 2743.52(B) and 2743.61(B), which expressly 

confer appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear appeals from 

decisions granting or denying awards of reparations to claimants, the General 

Assembly, in enacting R.C. 2743.65, did not confer appellate jurisdiction on the 

Court of Claims to hear appeals from decisions of the attorney general granting or 

denying payment of fees to attorneys for seeking reparations on behalf of 

claimants. Thus, no statutory authorization exists for the Court of Claims to 

consider such appeals, and as it is a court of limited jurisdiction, it can exercise 

only the authority specifically conferred on it by statute. 

{¶ 23} Thus, the Victims of Crime Act distinguishes between a claimant 

who alleges entitlement to an award of reparations and an attorney who requests 

attorney fees for submitting a claimant’s application for reparations. An attorney 

who requests fees from the attorney general for preparing a claimant’s application 

for reparations is not a claimant for purposes of R.C. 2743.61(B) and cannot 

appeal to the Court of Claims on that basis. Although the legislature has provided 

for a claimant to have the right to appeal to the Court of Claims from an award of 
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reparations, it has not similarly provided for an attorney seeking payment of legal 

fees for representing such a claimant to also have the right to appeal to the Court 

of Claims from a decision of the attorney general granting or denying an award of 

attorney fees. And because the Victims of Crime Act does not provide the right to 

appeal from an attorney-fee decision of the attorney general or confer jurisdiction 

on the Court of Claims to hear such an appeal, the court has no jurisdiction to 

review such an award. 

Conclusion

{¶ 24} The Court of Claims of Ohio lacks jurisdiction to consider appeals 

from decisions of the attorney general granting or denying attorney fees for 

seeking reparations on behalf of a victim of crime. Accordingly, the appellate 

court properly issued writs of mandamus and prohibition compelling the Court of 

Claims to vacate its decision and dismiss the appeal and prohibiting the Court of 

Claims from hearing similar appeals from decisions of the attorney general on 

attorney-fee applications in the future. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment 

of the court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., dissent. 

__________________ 

PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 

Attorneys as Claimants to Recover Fees 

{¶ 25} As the majority opinion notes, the dispositive issue is whether the 

Victims of Crime Act authorizes the Court of Claims to exercise appellate 

jurisdiction over the attorney general’s grant or denial of a request for attorney 

fees associated with representing an applicant for crime-victim reparations. R.C. 

2743.61(B) authorizes a claimant to appeal “the denial of a claim for an award of 
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reparations that is made by a final decision of the attorney general after any 

reconsideration.” 

{¶ 26} The term “claimant,” as used in R.C.2743.51 to 2743.72, means 

certain persons claiming an award of reparations under the Victims of Crime Act, 

including “[a] person who is authorized to act on behalf of any [such] person.” 

R.C. 2743.51(A)(1)(d) and (2)(d). For R.C. Chapter 2743, the term “claim for an 

award of reparations” or “claim” means “a claim for an award of reparations 

made under sections 2743.51 to 2743.72 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2743.01(C). 

R.C. 2743.65, which is within the sections specified for the definitional terms 

“claimant” and “claim for an award of reparations,” authorizes an attorney 

representing a crime-victims-reparations claimant to request attorney fees. 

{¶ 27} Based on the above-referenced statutes, it is clear that the court of 

appeals erred in holding that the Court of Claims lacked appellate jurisdiction 

over the attorney general’s final decision on Carney-DeBord’s requests for 

attorney fees in a crime-victim-reparations matter. R.C. 2743.61(B) authorizes an 

appeal to the Court of Claims by a “claimant” from “the denial of a claim for an 

award of reparations that is made by a final decision of the attorney general after 

any reconsideration.” An attorney who represents an applicant for crime-victim 

reparations is a “claimant” because the attorney “is authorized to act on behalf of” 

the applicant. R.C. 2743.51(A)(1)(d) and (2)(d). And the attorney’s appeal from 

the denial of a request for attorney fees for the representation of the applicant is 

the denial of a “claim for an award of reparations” because an attorney fee 

awarded under R.C. 2743.65 is “an award made under sections 2743.51 to 

2743.72 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2743.01(C). Finally, the denial of the 

attorney’s claim is made final by a determination of the attorney general after any 

reconsideration. R.C. 2743.65(C)(2). 

{¶ 28} Despite the unambiguous language of these provisions, the 

majority opinion concludes that fees charged by an attorney in preparing a claim 
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are not recoverable as part of an award of reparations because of R.C. 

2743.51(F)(4). That conclusion is based on a misinterpretation of R.C. 

2743.51(F)(4). 

{¶ 29} R.C. 2743.52(A) authorizes reparations for “economic loss,” which 

consists of “allowable expenses,” R.C. 2743.51(E). And allowable expenses 

include “reasonable charges incurred for reasonably needed * * * services.” R.C. 

2743.51(F)(1). This definition is broad enough to encompass attorney fees 

incurred in securing crime-victim reparations. Furthermore, R.C. 

2743.51(F)(4)(b) provides that “ ‘[a]llowable expense’ includes attorney’s fees 

* * * incurred to successfully obtain a restraining order, custody order, or other 

order to physically separate a victim from an offender” in certain circumstances. 

By using the phrase “ ‘allowable expense’ includes,” it is clear that the General 

Assembly was not setting forth an exhaustive list. See Gilman v. Hamilton Cty. 

Bd. of Revision, 127 Ohio St.3d 154, 2010-Ohio-4992, 937 N.E.2d 109, ¶ 15 

(holding that by using the phrase “owner includes” in R.C. 323.151(A)(2), the 

General Assembly intended a nonexhaustive list). 

{¶ 30} Therefore, R.C. 2743.51(F)(4) does not provide that attorney fees 

are allowable expenses only if the attorney has not received payment under R.C. 

2743.65. Rather, R.C. 2743.51(F)(4) establishes limits on attorney fees 

considered to be allowable expenses for fees incurred for successfully obtaining a 

restraining order, custody order, or other order to physically separate a victim 

from an offender. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, R.C. 

2743.51(F)(4) does not restrict attorney fees recoverable as part of an award of 

reparations to the types of legal assistance specified therein. And if the General 

Assembly had so intended, it would have used language specifying such. 

{¶ 31} The plain language of the applicable provisions justified the Court 

of Claims’ exercise of appellate jurisdiction over Carney-DeBord’s appeal. 

Because these provisions are unambiguous, we must apply them rather than 
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construe them. State ex rel. Brinda v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio 

St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-5228, 874 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 25. 

Final and Appealable Order 

{¶ 32} The court of appeals also determined that because R.C. 

2743.65(C)(2) specifies that the attorney general’s decision on an attorney’s 

request for fees is “final” but does not also specify that it is appealable, no appeal 

from such a decision to the Court of Claims is available. For the following 

reasons, that determination is incorrect. 

{¶ 33} In Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 127 

Ohio St.3d 469, 2010-Ohio-5710, 940 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 11, we held that a decision 

of the Ohio Department of Education denying a church’s application to sponsor 

community schools in Ohio because it was not an education-oriented entity was 

appealable notwithstanding a statutory provision specifying that the department’s 

determination was final. We observed, “Had the General Assembly intended that 

the department’s determination of whether an entity is education-oriented not be 

subject to administrative appeal, it could have * * * specif[ied] that the 

department’s decision is final and not subject to appeal,” as it had done in various 

other statutory provisions. Id. at ¶ 13. 

{¶ 34} Similarly, the General Assembly did not specify that the attorney 

general’s attorney-fee decisions made under R.C. 2743.65 are not subject to 

appeal. To the contrary, R.C. 2743.61 confers appellate jurisdiction on the Court 

of Claims over attorneys’ claims for fees for their representation of crime-victimreparations applicants. Moreover, although a specific statute generally prevails 

over a general statute if they cannot be reconciled so as to give effect to both, see 

Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 

522, ¶ 31-32, “[w]e should not * * * seek out a conflict where none exists,” 

Brookwood at ¶ 10. Here, as detailed previously, the language of the applicable 

provisions can be read to give effect to all of them, including R.C. 2743.61 and 
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2743.65. The fact that the attorney general’s attorney-fee decision is final 

pursuant to R.C. 2743.65(C)(2) is consistent with the authorization in R.C. 

2743.61(B) for the Court of Claims to exercise appellate jurisdiction over “the 

denial of a claim for an award of reparations that is made by a final decision of 

the attorney general after any reconsideration.” 

{¶ 35} Even though Brookwood is squarely on point with respect to 

whether the determination in this case is appealable, neither the attorney general 

nor the majority opinion mentions it. 

{¶ 36} R.C. 2743.53(A) provides that “[a] court of claims panel of 

commissioners shall hear and determine all matters relating to appeals from 

decisions of the attorney general pursuant to sections 2743.51 to 2743.72 of the 

Revised Code.” The attorney-fee appeals to the Court of Claims in this case and 

in similar cases are authorized by R.C. 2743.61 and 2743.65. Furthermore, under 

R.C. 2743.53(A), the Court of Claims may hear and determine all matters related 

to the appeals. 

{¶ 37} This conclusion is supported by the principle that “statutes 

providing for appeals should be given a liberal interpretation in favor of appeal.” 

Waltco Truck Equip. Co. v. Tallmadge Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1988), 40 Ohio 

St.3d 41, 42, 531 N.E.2d 685. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 38} Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the Court of Claims 

properly exercised appellate jurisdiction over Carney-DeBord’s appeal and that 

the attorney general established neither a clear legal right to vacation of the 

court’s decision and dismissal of the appeal nor a corresponding clear legal duty 

on the part of the court to perform these requested acts. Therefore, the court of 

appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus. 

{¶ 39} Moreover, the attorney general cannot establish that the exercise of 

appellate jurisdiction by the Court of Claims in these cases is unauthorized by 
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law. To the contrary, the court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction is authorized 

by R.C. 2743.61. Therefore, the court of appeals also erred in granting the writ of 

prohibition. 

{¶ 40} The attorney general failed to establish his entitlement to the 

requested extraordinary relief in mandamus and prohibition. The Court of Claims 

properly exercised appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the attorney 

general’s attorney-fee decision in the crime-victim-reparations case. Therefore, 

the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed, and the writs should be 

denied. I dissent. 

LUNDBERG STRATTON and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur in the foregoing 

opinion. 

__________________ 

 Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Elise Porter, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee. 

 Aaron D. Epstein and Damian W. Sikora, Assistant Attorneys General, for 

appellant. 

______________________