If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

WILLIAM ANDERSON and BETTY TAYLOR,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNPUBLISHED

February 4, 2021

v No. 351124

Wayne Circuit Court

CITY OF DETROIT, POLICE CHIEF JAMES 

CRAIG, ASSISTANT POLICE CHIEF ARNOLD 

WILLIAMS, CAPTAIN OCTAVEIOUS MILES, 

POLICE LIEUTENANT TONYA WILSONGOLFIN, and POLICE SERGEANT WINSTON 

CRAIG,

LC No. 18-009696-CD

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and STEPHENS and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this whistleblower protection action, plaintiffs, William Anderson and Betty Taylor, 

appeal as of right the order dismissing their complaint against defendants, the city of Detroit, Police 

Chief James Craig, Assistant Police Chief Arnold Williams, Captain Octaveious Miles, Police 

Lieutenant Tanya Wilson-Golfin, and Police Sergeant Winston Craig, for failing to comply with 

discovery. Because the trial court failed to consider whether lesser sanctions in lieu of dismissal 

were appropriate, the trial court abused its discretion, and we vacate and remand for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2018, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that they had discovered a payroll 

fraud scheme orchestrated by Lieutenant Wilson-Golfin and Sergeant Craig. They claimed to 

suffer retaliation in violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., after

they raised the issue of fraud with Assistant Chief Williams, Captain Miles, and Chief Craig. As 

a result of their report, plaintiffs asserted that they received less desirable work assignments and 

loss of pay. During the course of discovery, the opposing parties filed multiple motions to compel 

discovery responses from each other. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants filed 
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incomplete and inappropriately redacted discovery. Defendant contended that plaintiffs failed to 

particularly identify the claimed deficiencies in the discovery materials and did not timely address 

their discovery requests. Ultimately, the trial court appointed a discovery master to review the 

parties’ disputes and make recommendations. Nonetheless, over the course of the case, the trial 

court signed three orders compelling plaintiffs to respond to the discovery requests of Lieutenant 

Wilson-Golfin and Sergeant Craig, and compelling plaintiffs to identify defendants’ responses that 

plaintiffs considered incomplete. All defendants eventually filed supplemental responses to 

plaintiffs’ interrogatories.

The trial court entered an order rescheduling the end of discovery to September 17, 2019. 

On September 10, 2019, defendants filed a joint motion to extend the time period to file dispositive 

motions. On September 17, 2019, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to extend discovery until 

January 2020. After plaintiffs failed to appear for their depositions noticed for September 16 and 

17, 2019, all defendants sought dismissal of the complaint and sanctions for the failure to comply 

with discovery. Plaintiffs filed a motion for protective order to prevent their depositions, claiming 

that defendants had not provided complete answers to interrogatories or allowed plaintiffs to 

inspect documents.

At the hearing on defendants’ motions to dismiss, the city’s counsel reported that he had 

scheduled plaintiffs’ depositions for September 9 and 13, 2019, but plaintiffs counsel asked to 

reschedule them to the next week. The city’s counsel then scheduled the depositions for September 

16 and 17, 2019—the dates on which plaintiffs failed to appear without any communication from 

plaintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that he told the city’s counsel to schedule the 

depositions for that week, but not those particular dates. The city’s counsel reported that plaintiffs 

had also failed to appear for scheduled depositions in April 2019. The trial court dismissed all 

defendants from the case on the ground that plaintiffs had missed too many scheduled depositions. 

Plaintiffs now appeal.

II. DISMISSAL AS DISCOVERY SANCTION

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing their complaint 

without conducting the requisite analysis of equitable factors and possible alternative sanctions. 

We agree.

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s imposition of discovery 

sanctions. Jilek v Stockson, 297 Mich App 663, 665; 825 NW2d 358 (2012). An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the decision is outside the range of principled outcomes. Id. 

MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c) provides: “If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit 

discovery, . . . the court in which the action is pending may order such sanctions as are just, 

including, but not limited to . . . dismissing the action.” A court may impose the severe sanction 

of dismissal “only when a party flagrantly and wantonly refuses to facilitate discovery, not when 

the failure to comply with a discovery request is accidental or involuntary.” Hardrick v Auto Club 

Ins Ass’n, 294 Mich App 651, 661-662; 819 NW2d 28 (2011) (citation and quotation omitted). 

The following factors should be considered in determining the appropriateness of a discovery 

sanction:
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(1) whether the violation was wilful or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing 

to comply with discovery requests (or refusal to disclose witnesses); (3) the 

prejudice to the [other party]; (4) actual notice to the [other party] of the witness 

and the length of time prior to trial that the [other party] received such actual notice; 

(5) whether there exists a history of [the party’s] engaging in deliberate delay; (6) 

the degree of compliance by the [party] with other provisions of the court’s order; 

(7) an attempt by the [party] to timely cure the defect, and (8) whether a lesser 

sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Dean v Tucker, 182 Mich App 

27, 32-33; 451 NW2d 571 (1990).] 

“[B]ecause default [or dismissal] is a severe sanction, it is imperative that the trial court 

balance the factors and explain its reasons for imposing such a grave sanction to allow for 

meaningful appellate review.” Kalamazoo Oil Co v Boerman, 242 Mich App 75, 88; 618 NW2d 

66 (2000). “The record should reflect that the trial court gave careful consideration to the factors 

involved and considered all of its options in determining what sanction was just and proper in the 

context of the case before it.” Duray Dev, LLC v Perrin, 288 Mich App 143, 165; 792 NW2d 749 

(2010). A trial court’s failure to explain its reasons for dismissal and to consider alternative 

sanctions constitutes an abuse of discretion. Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 506-507; 

536 NW2d 280 (1995) (“[B]ecause the trial court did not evaluate other available options on the 

record, it abused its discretion in dismissing the case.”).

The trial court abused its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint as a discovery 

sanction without analyzing the required equitable factors or considering alternative sanctions on 

the record. Specifically, there was no analysis of the Dean factors or consideration of alternatives 

to dismissal on the record, as it was required to do before dismissing the case. Rather, the entirety 

of the trial court’s explanation for dismissal consisted of the statement: “Okay, the Plaintiffs have 

missed too many depositions scheduled by Defense counsel and the email confirmed that date of 

the 15th [sic].”

1

 Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to even consider whether 

a lesser sanction than dismissal was appropriate. Id.

2

 

Vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain 

jurisdiction. 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron 

 

1 Defendants asserted that plaintiffs failed to appear for their depositions on three different dates. 

However, with regard to the first date, plaintiffs apparently objected to being deposed first and in 

light of the limited state of discovery. With regard to the second date, plaintiffs’ counsel apparently 

objected to the availability on the noticed date, and therefore, defendants rescheduled the 

depositions to the following week. 

2

In light of our holding regarding dismissal as a sanction, we need not address plaintiffs’ due 

process challenge and the trial court’s failure to rule on their motion for protective order.