In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-23-00078-CR

MICHAEL PAUL GARRETT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 6th District Court

Red River County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR02939

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Michael Paul Garrett was convicted of robbery. After the trial court found the State’s 

punishment-enhancement allegation true, it sentenced Garrett to sixty years’ imprisonment. In 

his sole point of error on appeal,1 Garrett argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support the trial court’s finding of guilt. Because we find the evidence sufficient, we affirm the 

trial court’s judgment. 

I. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding of Guilt

A. Standard of Review 

“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational [fact-finder] could have found the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 

292, 297 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hartsfield 

v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). “Our rigorous [legal 

sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 

S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction 

of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the [fact-finder] ‘to fairly 

resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from 

basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007)).

1

In our companion cause number 06-23-00077-CR, Garrett appeals his conviction for family violence assault by 

occlusion. 
3

“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined 

by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets 

out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of 

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). 

Here, the State alleged that Garrett, “while in the course of committing theft of property 

and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, intentionally, knowingly, or 

recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to Dora Smith-Garrett by striking the complainant with his 

fist.” The victim named by the State’s indictment is Garrett’s mother. 

B. The Evidence 

At trial, Dora testified that she had loaned money to Garrett, which Garrett had repaid a 

few days before the incident. On the day of the incident, Garrett spoke to Dora on the front 

porch of her house and again asked to borrow money. Dora locked the front door due to 

Garrett’s “personality” and explained, while standing outside, that she had bills to pay and could 

not loan him more money. According to Dora, she was putting her key in the door lock to go 

inside when Garrett “attacked [her] . . . . on the side of [her] face.” She testified that she was 

knocked off balance, that Garrett was wrestling with her in the yard, and that “he kept trying to 

choke [her].” Dora testified that she passed out because she could not breathe and that, when she 

woke up in the yard, Garrett and her keys were gone. Dora went to a neighbor’s house and 

called the police. 
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Samantha Manrique testified that she was dispatched to Dora’s neighbor’s house and saw 

Dora with “obvious physical injuries to her face[,] . . . neck,” and “all over her body.” Dora was 

transported to the hospital by ambulance. Meanwhile, Manrique went to Garrett’s house, which 

was a separate residence located on Dora’s property, and recovered Dora’s house and car keys 

from Garrett’s pocket. Dora and Manrique confirmed that Garrett took the keys without Dora’s

permission.2 

In his defense, Garrett testified that he did not assault Dora, despite the evidence 

indicating otherwise, and claimed that he had the keys before her assault.

3 As the trier of fact, 

the trial court found Garrett’s claim incredible. In making its finding of guilt, the trial court 

determined that Garrett had taken Dora’s keys and that “the keys were the means to the money,” 

which “had to either be in the car or in the house.” 

C. Analysis 

A person commits robbery “if, in the course of committing theft . . . and with intent to 

obtain or maintain control of the property, he . . . intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes 

bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1). A person commits theft “if he 

unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.” TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 31.03(b)(1). “Appropriation of property is unlawful if . . . it is without the owner’s 

effective consent.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03. 

2Dora testified that Garrett did not take any money or other property from inside the house and did not take her car. 

3During the State’s cross-examination, Garrett denied knowledge of his prior judgments of conviction for theft, 

family violence assault causing bodily injury, assault against an elderly individual, and resisting arrest. 
5

Garrett cites to his own self-serving testimony claiming that he had Dora’s keys before 

the assault and argues that, as a result, “there was no evidence that Garrett took the keys with the 

intent to deprive his mother of them.” We disagree. 

The evidence at trial showed that Dora spoke with Garrett outside of her home after she 

“[l]ocked the door behind [her]” because of Garrett’s “personality.” Because of Garrett’s 

demeanor, Dora “thought it would be more public [and safer] for [her] to come outside.” Dora 

testified that, after she denied Garrett’s request for money, Garrett assaulted her as she 

“commenced to putting the key in the door.” Dora testified that Garrett took her house and car 

keys without her permission during the assault. Manrique testified that Dora asked her to 

retrieve the keys, which she found in Garrett’s pocket. 

We find that the record provided ample evidence to show that Garrett appropriated 

Dora’s house and car keys without her effective consent and that, under the totality of the 

circumstances, the trial court was free to infer that Garrett’s appropriation of the keys was made 

with the intent to deprive Dora of them. This established that Garrett committed theft. We also 

find that Dora’s and Manrique’s testimony showed that Garrett intentionally or knowingly 

assaulted Dora while committing the theft. As a result, we conclude that that trial court, as a 

rational fact-finder, could have found the essential elements of robbery beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Consequently, we overrule Garrett’s sole point of error on appeal. 
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III. Conclusion 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Scott E. Stevens 

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: August 29, 2023

Date Decided: August 30, 2023

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