AUUSIN. -I3 78711 

April 7, 1977 

The Honorable Gibson Gayle, Jr. Opinion 80. H- 974 

President 

State Bar of Texas Re: Whether non-lawyers 

-Austin, Texas 76701 may represent corporations 

aa individuals at 

administrative hearings 

of state boaxds aud 

agencies. :. 

'. 

Dear Mr. Gayle: 

You have requested our opinion as to whether representation 

of corporations and individuals by non-lawyers before the 

Industrial Accident Board aa the State Board of Insurance 

constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. 

It is well established that the purpose of laws land 

decisions prohibiting the performance of legal services by 

non-lawvexs is to protect the public from unqualified persons. 

Hexter Title 6 Abstract Co. v~Grievance &ttee, 179 

m ~~(T~ac~ aevance thmaittee & De 

S.W.Zd 126 (Tex.Civ. App. -- Austin 1945, uo =+I %iele 

430a of the Penal Code, repealed in 1949, defined various 

servkes as the practik o$,lqw and.prohibited non-lawyers 

from rhm3ering such services. Prior to its repeal, several 

courts noted that the judiciary may have the final authority 

to define -the practice of law, but failed .to rule od the 

question and based their decisions,upon the statute. Hexter 

Title 5 Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee, aupra; Carr L 

'Ee:al;l;iWF '310 (Tex. Civ. App. --Ft. Worthm3, 

In Carr, the court held that representation 

of persons &f&e the RaEad Commission in Rule 37 proceedings 

was not included within the definition contained in article 

430a and thus did not constitute the practice of law. The 

court noted the power of the judiciary under authorities in 

other states bu't did not'apply any independent judicial 

examination to the services involved. However, in Grievance 

Committee v. bean, BUPrl)., an 

90 S.W.ZdT3mex. Civ. App. -- 

w.0.m.) , the court held that the definition of article 430a 

was not exclusive and that the judiciary retained the power 

to define the practice of law. 

p. 4054 ' 
. - 

c * 

i . -- i li’ .I ” - - 

I. ,.. Y 

The Honorable Gibson Gayle, Jr..- page 2 (R-974) 

* 

Following the repeal of article 430a in 1949, the responsibility for defining the practice of law rested exclusively 

with the judiciary, although the Legislature could act in aid 

thereof to protect the public. Bryant v. State, 457 S.W.2a 

72 (Tex. Civ. App. -- Eastlana 1970, wrE ref'd n.r.e.1. In 

Southern Traffic Bureau v. Thompson, 232 S.W.Zd 742 (Tex. 

Civ. App. -- San AntonioT950, writ ref'd n-r-e.), the court 

dealt with the a&ions of the Bureau in presenting and 

prosecuting claims against rail carriers. The court held 

that the Bureau's activities under agreements with shippers 

which gave the Bureau discretion to settle claims and accept 

settlement offers constituted the practice of law. See also 

Quarles v. State Bar of Texas, 316 S.W.Zd 797 (Tex. G.- 

ApT R&~l~,~.writ). Rowever, the court held 

that various investigational procedures did not involve the 

practice of law and stated: 

The rule limiting the practice of law . . ; 

should not be extended beyond the 

requirements of the comaongood. Southern 

haffic Bureau 5 Thompson, supra at 749. 

Thus, any decision concerning the definition of the practice 

of law should be based upon an analysis of the dangers apd 

benefits to the public. Of course, these factors will differ 

depending upon the substance and nature of particular administrative proceedings. In some instances, federal law is 

relevant. 

reasons, 

See ;.&20 C.F.R. 404.971 (1976). For these 

it wou impossible to answer-a general question 

conceru5xq the representation of persons aud corporations 

before all state agencies. Accordingly, we will address 

only ~+he the specific.agencies mentioned in your request, 

the Industrial Accident board and the State board of Insurance. 

The Industrial Accident Board was created by the 

Legislature to admgnister the State's Workmen's Compensation 

V.T.C.S. arts. 8306-8309h. In Sooth v. Texas 

"::B&liZ court explained: 

Em i0 ers* Insurance Association, 123-2r3ZZex. 

[Ilt is apparent that the Industrial 

Accident Board is not a court but an 

adminietrative body, that claims filed 

before.it are not pleadings, and that the 

presentation or hearing of claims is not 

intended to be attended or governed by 

rules or formalities appropriate to 

trials in court. 

p. 4055 
I . . 

The Sonorable Gibson Gayle, Jr. page 3 m-974) 

. . . . . 

It is important to the successful 

perfonaance of the duties of such administrative agency and to the attainment of 

the general purpose of the Workmen's 

Compensation Law that the board be permittea to entertain and promptly decide 

claims submitted to it, unhampered by 

unnecessary formality zna unrestrained by 

the rules of pleading and evidence that 

prevail in the courts. It is often desirable 

that the~~injuria employee be able to file his 

claim for compensation and submit it to ~. 

the board without the assistance of'an 

attorney at law. g. at326. 

The court further noted that the Board was empowered to make 

rules not inconsistent with law. 

Prior to 1975, article 8307, section 10(b) expressly 

rewgnized that nonlawyers might represent parties before 

the Industrial Accident Board, In the enactment of,Senate 

Bill 1010 by the 64th Legislature, the language 'theirattorneys or the duly authorized agents of the parties,' was 

deleted from section 10(b). This could have been an inadvertant 

omission which was beyond the scope of the conference committee's 

authority, since the language was in the bill as presented 

to the committee and was not a subject of disagreement 

between the two houses. Senate Rule 96(a), SR4, Senate 

Journal, 64th Leg., p. 4 (11475); House Rule 25, section 8, 

HSR 12, Rouse Journal, Vol. 1, 64th Leg., p. 63 (11675). In 

addition, the deletion was not accomplished in accordance 

with the rules pertaining to amendment of existing statutes; 

that is, the phrase was not bracketed and marked through as 

required by Joint Rule 22(c), SCR 17, Senate Journal, 64th 

p. 979 (42575). Accordingly, in our opinion, the 

%ion of this language from article 8307, section 10(b) 

was not a clear indication of an intent on the part of the 

Legislature to prohibit nonlawyers from practicing before 

the Board. 

The Industrial Accident Board has informed us that nonlawyers are permitted to represent parties at prehearing 

conferences and at hearings before the Board. - See Board 

P- 4056 
. 

The Honorable Gibson Gayle, Jr. - page 4 (H-974) 

Rule 5.080(b) [Texas Compensation MdnUal). They may likewise 

do so before the State Board of Insurance. Rule 059.01.04.008. 

(Rules of Practice and Procedure before the State Board of 

Insurance and the Commissioner of Insurance,.Dec. 31, 1975). 

This is not to say, of course, that a non-lawyer is required 

or entitled to represent an individual in the same manner as 

an attorney is or that he may charge a fee for such representation. This has long been the practice in this state and neither 

the judiciary nor the Legislature has seen fit to alter it. 

As previously stated, any prohibition of such representation 

by non-lawyers must result from an assessment of the public 

welfare. In our view, the Legislature and the agency involved 

are in the best position to make such an assessment. 

The settlement of claims by an insurance adjuster was 

authorized by the Statement of Principles approved by the 

State Bar in 1946. 22 Texas Bar Journal 69 (1959). Similarly, 

in a meeting of members of the Unauthorized'Practice of Law 

Subcommittee and insurance representatives on November 5, 

1976, a consensus was reached that *activities of insurance 

adjusters and persons representing claimants at prehearing 

wnfe,rences do not present any great problem or danger to 

the . . . public at the present time" and that the appearance 

of non-lawyers before the Industrial Accident Board and the 

Insurance Commission *does not. of itself. constitute (the1 

practice of law." See Carr <-Stringer, m m- See also 

Sooth v. Texas EmplGrnnsurance Association, supra, 

~diEctheinformal nature of Industrial Accident Board 

hekings: 

In the many briefs filed with this office in this 

matter, there is no reference to any detriment to the public 

resulting from representation by non-lawyers before these 

agencies. In our view, such a showing should be made in 

order to disturb the long standing practice of the agencies. 

Accordingly, in our opinion , representation of parties 

before the State Board of Insurance and the Industrial 

Accident.Board does not constitute the unauthorized practice 

of law so long as such representation is permitted by the 

agencies and is not prohibited by an act or decision of the 

Legislature or the courts. 

We are mindful of the case law of other jurisdictions 

which would in some instances preclude representation before 

agencies by non-lawyers. See Annot. 2 A.L.R.3d-724. 

the decisions are not consxent; 

However, 

they.vary with the terms 

of the various statutes and the differing views of the 

p. 4057 
* 

c , 

The Ronorable Gibson Gayle, Jr. - page 5 (R-974) 

public welfare on the part of the courts. See Eagle Indemnity 

Co. -- v. I.A.C. of California, 18 P.2d 341 (Calf. 1933); Denver 

Bar Ass~o~v. Public Utilities Commission,(~ :9:2)467 

TZlvoFFmeister v. ma, 349 s.w.za 5 . ; 

Goodman - v. Beall, 200 N.E.T7mOhio 1936). 

SUMMARY 

Representation of parties before the 

State Board of Insurance and the Industrial 

Accident Board does not constitute the 

unauthorized practice of law so long as 

such representation is permitted by the 

agencies and is not prohibited by any act 

or decision of the Legislature or the wurts. 

Very truly yours, 

Attorney General of Texas 

Opinion Committee 

klU1 

p. 4058