NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HUGO A. MARTINEZ-DAVALOS, 

Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

Respondent.

No. 15-71935

Agency No. A092-232-127

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 5, 2016

Pasadena, California

Before: REINHARDT, WARDLAW, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Hugo A. Martinez-Davalos, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) denial of deferral of 

removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). As the parties are 

familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We grant the petition and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

OCT 13 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

1. As a preliminary matter, we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 

See Pechenkov v. Holder, 705 F.3d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that 

jurisdiction remains where the immigration judge “denies relief on the merits, for 

failure to demonstrate the requisite factual grounds for relief, rather than in reliance 

on the conviction”). We decline the government’s request to revisit our decision in 

Pechenkov.

2. In the first iteration of this case, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found

Martinez credible, and held that he met his burden to show that it is more likely 

than not he would be tortured if he returns to Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 

1208.16(c)(2). Thus, the IJ granted Martinez CAT relief. The BIA vacated that 

decision on appeal and the case was then appealed to this court. We granted the 

government’s unopposed motion to remand in light of intervening case law.

During the second iteration, on remand proceedings in front of the same IJ, 

Martinez presented additional personal and expert witness testimony clarifying the 

extent of police corruption in Mexico and corroborating his claims that the 

Mexican police would acquiesce to his torture if he returned. Despite the 

additional evidence supporting the application for deferral of removal, the IJ 

reversed his previous decision. The IJ again found Martinez credible, but this time 

held that Martinez had not met his burden to show that it is more likely than not 

that he would be tortured if he returned to Mexico. As such, the IJ denied 
3 

Martinez CAT relief. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial.

On remand, the IJ and BIA discussed the evidence that led to their denial of 

Martinez’s application for deferral of removal under the CAT, but never discussed

the IJ’s opposite interpretation of essentially the same, if not stronger, facts in the 

remand proceeding. If the agency fails “to engage in a substantive analysis of its 

decision, we have no ability to conduct a meaningful review of its decision.” 

Arrendondo v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Su Hwa She 

v. Holder, 629 F.3d 958, 963–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Rather than countenance a 

decision that leaves us to speculate based on an incomplete analysis, we remand 

the case to the BIA for clarification.”). Because the agency in this case gave no 

reasoned explanation for why stronger support for Martinez’s application for 

deferral of removal under the CAT led the agency to reach a different conclusion

the second time, we remand for reconsideration or a reasoned explanation by the IJ 

of why he reaches a decision contrary to his first.

GRANTED and REMANDED.