In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 07-1589

TERESA HANCOCK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General

of the United States Postal Service,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 02 C 50388—Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.

____________

ARGUED APRIL 3, 2008—DECIDED JUNE 24, 2008

____________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Theresa Hancock worked for

the U.S. Postal Service and suffered a lumbar strain

while on the job. After going through a series of examinations designed to assess her ability to perform certain

physical tasks on the job, she was given a new set of duties.

She had disagreements with her supervisors regarding

whether her new tasks ran afoul of her physical restrictions. These disagreements ultimately formed the basis

of her complaint in the district court alleging gender

discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and

a hostile work environment. The district court dismissed
2 No. 07-1589

1 These restrictions were as follows: lifting and carrying limited

to 50 pounds, twisting limited to no more than 12 tubs per

15 minutes, and no pushing greater than 475 pounds.

Hancock’s claims on summary judgment in large part

because she did not suffer an adverse employment action

and she could not identify a similarly situated employee.

Because we find no error in the district court’s analysis,

we affirm.

I. Background

From 1992 to 2001, Hancock was employed with the

U.S. Postal Service in Rockford, Illinois as a “flat sorter.”

The job involved utilizing and maintaining a flat

sorting machine that would organize and separate pieces

of mail larger than letter-size, such as magazines, newspapers, and manila envelopes. The first several years of

her employment with the Postal Service were uneventful,

save for an award she received early on for discharging

her duties in a safe manner.

Hancock’s troubles began in March 1998, when she

filed a grievance alleging that her supervisor, Leon Woods,

yelled at her and was disrespectful towards her. A month

later, this grievance was settled. Then, on June 18, 1999,

Hancock suffered a job-related back injury, namely a

lumbar strain. This injury limited her ability to bend,

stoop, and twist. Consistent with Department of Labor

requirements, she was given a limited duty job assignment that modified the nature of her work. Soon after

working this modified job, she told a supervisor that it did

not comport with restrictions set out in her limited duty

assignment.1

 Supervisors examined her restrictions and

disagreed; they told her to keep working. In response,
No. 07-1589 3

2 Postal Service Regulations require that if adequate duties are

not available within the employee’s work limitation tolerances, in the craft and work facility to which the employee

is regularly assigned, and within her regular house of duty,

other work may be assigned within the facility.

Hancock asked for a union representative, and was

given one within four hours. She utilized the union assistance to document her injury, but she did not request

medical treatment.

Hancock then made an appointment to see her own

physician. At the same time, the Postal Service had her

attend a fitness-for-duty examination to determine her

ability to work, and to clarify the extent of her restrictions. The Postal Service physician completed a new

duty status report which delineated Hancock’s restrictions. She was given a corresponding new job offer that

involved working on a different piece of equipment—the

meter belt. Hancock refused to accept the new assignment on the grounds that, in her view, it would trigger

her injury. The Postal Service physician assessed the

information a second time and confirmed that she

could perform this new job in a manner that was consistent with her restrictions. But Hancock still refused.

She then received a note from her personal physician

excusing her from work for a few days until he had the

chance to examine her. When she returned to work, she

came with a note from her physician directing that she

not work the meter belt. Because her injury had worsened

since June, she was given a new, more stringent set

of restrictions that also called for her to refrain from

working on the meter belt. As a result, Hancock was

given a job offer for a different shift, because there as no

work available on her shift that also met her restrictions.2
4 No. 07-1589

While she was on her restrictions, Hancock requested to

work in an area known as the Registry Cage. This is a

secure section on the workroom floor where a single

employee works. Her request was denied for two reasons.

First, the Postal Service determined that additional

staffing for this position was only needed on Hancock’s

regular day off. Second, despite Hancock’s contrary belief, the Postal Service concluded that the work requirements of the Registry Cage were outside her restrictions.

For instance, the duties included lifting up to 70 pound

bags of coin, which was clearly beyond Hancock’s restrictions.

Hancock also wanted to participate in the Associate

Supervisor Program (a management trainee program) but

was ultimately denied. This was due, in large measure,

to an unfavorable evaluation issued by the Manager of

Distribution Operations, Linda Medearis, on August 4,

1999. Hancock claims that she received this negative

evaluation because she had filed grievances and had

complained about management and her supervisors.

Critically, none of these grievances was the subject of an

Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint

that took place prior to August 4, 1999. Indeed, Medearis

claims that she did not select Hancock for the program

because a number of co-workers had indicated that she

was not doing her job. This is consistent with prior events:

Medearis also did not recommend Hancock for this

program in the March 1999 cycle, before the injury and

accompanying work restrictions, and before she started

filing administrative complaints.

Contemporaneous with these events, Hancock filed an

injury compensation claim with the Office of Workers

Compensation (“OWCP”). All of the documentation
No. 07-1589 5

3 The Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et

seq., holds the employee responsible for: (1) establishing that

the injury occurred while on the job, (2) proving that the medical condition is causally related to the injury, and (3) submitting a medical report from an attending physician.

received by the Postal Service Injury Compensation

Specialist concerning Hancock’s injury was forwarded

to OWCP. Then, on October 18, 1999, OWCP notified

Hancock that her claim was denied due to insufficient

medical documentation.3

 She was subsequently reclassified from a “limited duty” status (which is for employees

who are injured on the job) to a “light duty” status (which

is for employees who are injured outside of their job

duties). This meant that her workload was reduced to

20 hours per week and that her availability to be assigned

beyond these hours depended on available work that

was within her restrictions. Later, on February 11, 2000,

OWCP reversed its decision because it located a treatment note from Hancock’s physician. This took her from

light duty back to limited duty, which meant that her

full time work hours were restored.

From August 1999 to April 2000, Hancock filed several

complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) alleging discrimination based

on sex, physical disability, age, and retaliation for prior

EEO activity. In the context of these complaints, she made

the following six claims: (1) her limited duty job restrictions were violated; (2) her request to be trained in the

Registry Cage was not honored in order to harass her and

deny her an accommodation for her disability; (3) she

was harassed and denied accommodations when presented with job offers; (4) her work hours were reduced;
6 No. 07-1589

4 The term “employer” under the ADA specifically excludes

the United States and its agencies from its definition, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(5)(B), and so Hancock should have actually sued

under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.

(5) she was given an unfavorable evaluation for the Associate Supervisor Program; and (6) injury compensation

personnel withheld medical information in her worker’s

compensation cases. After exhausting her administrative

remedies, Hancock filed a complaint with the district

court consistent with this set of claims in October 2002.

Specifically, she alleged that the Postal Service discriminated against her on the basis of gender in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,

et seq., on the basis of disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),4

 on the basis of age in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“AEDA”), and that the Postal Service retaliated against

her for speaking out against a practice that Title VII

forbids. After an answer was filed, the Postal Service

moved for summary judgment on February 1, 2006. The

district court granted this motion in favor of the Postal

Service. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Hancock raises four issues before this Court. She argues

that the district court erred in denying her gender discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and

hostile work environment claims. We analyze each issue

in turn, bearing in mind that we review a district court’s

grant of summary judgment de novo and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant. Hoffman

v. MCA, Inc., 144 F.3d 1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 1998).
No. 07-1589 7

Because Hancock did not provide any direct or circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination, in order to

make a colorable claim, she had to prove that (1) she was

a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting her

employer’s legitimate business expectations; (3) she

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the

employer treated a similarly situated employee outside of

the class more favorably. Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472

F.3d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). Upon establishing these

elements, the burden shifts to the employer to produce

“evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for

the adverse action.” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). If the employer succeeds here,

then the burden shifts back to the employee to prove

that these reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination. E.E.O.C. v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Medical Center,

77 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1996).

Hancock’s gender discrimination claim fails at the

outset because she did not suffer an adverse employment

action and because she could not point to a single similarly situated employee outside the class who was

treated more favorably. An adverse employment action is

one that significantly alters the terms and conditions of

the employee’s job. Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th

Cir. 2004). General hostility, unless it was severe and

pervasive, does not meet the mark. Id. The action must be

more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482,

488 (7th Cir. 1996). Given this framework, it is clear that

Hancock cannot meet her burden. Nearly all of the socalled adverse employment actions that Hancock raises

were merely attempts by the Postal Service to ensure that
8 No. 07-1589

she provided it with work but did not work beyond

her personal restrictions. This is certainly true of her

supervisor’s decision to subject her to fitness-for-duty

examinations (which is required) and subsequent disagreements regarding whether work on the meter belt

violated her restrictions. Also, Hancock protests that her

work hours were reduced, but this was simply due to the

fact that there was a lack of available work that fell

within her very limiting restrictions. We could exhaustively critique each of Hancock’s complaints in this way,

but we need not do so because there is an even more clearcut flaw in her case: she has not provided this Court, or

the district court, with a single similarly situated employee. There is no evidence in the record that indicates

that Hancock’s supervisor acted differently when faced

with a disagreement from any other employee about

whether an assignment was within their restrictions, nor

is there evidence that Postal Service supervisors acted

differently when assessing what productive work was

available for Hancock. Hancock provides conclusory

affidavits from co-workers that state that other employees

were given better treatment, but not a single actual name

is provided. For all of these reasons, Hancock falls well

short of making her prima facie case of gender discrimination.

Hancock’s disability discrimination claim fares no

better, because she was not disabled as that term is defined

in the ADA. In order to establish her case here, Hancock

had to show that (1) she has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of her

major life activities; (2) she has a record of such impairment; or (3) she is regarded as having such impairment

by her employer. Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835,
No. 07-1589 9

842 (7th Cir. 2002). What undermines Hancock’s claim here

is that she has not adduced any evidence that any of her

major life activities were affected by her injury. See 29

C.F.R. § 1630(i) (noting that caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, seeing, walking, speaking, hearing,

breathing, leaning, and possibly working, are major life

activities). Hancock merely had a work-related back

injury that temporarily limited her ability to perform

certain job duties and short-term absences. But even if

Hancock could somehow establish that she was disabled

under the ADA, her claim would still fail on the grounds

that she cannot point to a single similarly situated employee outside the protected class who was treated more

favorably.

In order to prevail on her retaliation claim, Hancock had

to prove that the Postal Service took an adverse action

against her because she opposed a practice that Title VII

forbids. Kampmier, 472 F.3d at 939. Here, Medearis did

make written and oral comments in March and August 1999 that one of the reasons she did not recommend Hancock for the Associate Supervisor Program,

in addition to statements made by co-workers that she

was not doing her job, was the fact that she had “filed

grievances claiming harassment from [management].”

Hancock magnifies this comment and argues that within

one month of complaining about discriminatory treatment,

Medearis acted to deny her an appointment to the program. This statement is not consistent with the facts.

Hancock did in fact complain to Medearis in August 1999

about the treatment she was receiving from her supervisor Leon Woods, and Medearis did in fact give Hancock

a negative evaluation for the program later that month.

However, Medearis also gave Hancock a similarly
10 No. 07-1589

5 Hancock began filing complaints with the EEOC in August

1999.

negative evaluation for the program five months earlier,

in March. This was before Hancock lodged any complaints and, more importantly, before she engaged in any

EEO-related activity.5

 Moreover, Medearis’s statements

did not mention that Hancock complained of discrimination—she generally referred to “grievances,” and her

statement was made in the context of describing Hancock’s

“very negative attitude” towards management.

Hancock’s only real response here is an attempt to

recharacterize her March 1998 grievance against her

supervisor (for raising his voice at her) as prior EEO

activity. She contends that it was this grievance that

formed the basis of Medearis’s negative evaluation. This rereading of the events in this case is not persuasive. First,

Hancock did not base any of her five EEO complaints

(starting in August 1999) on an allegation that this

March 1998 grievance was prior EEO activity for which

she was retaliated against. Second, and consistent with this

view, her district court complaint also only refers to prior

EEO activity in 1999. There is no mention of EEO activity

that occurred in 1998. Third, and most significantly,

Hancock filed this grievance because her supervisor

was “disrespectful towards her.” There was no evidence,

or even an allegation, that this disrespect was fueled by

a discriminatory animus.

In the alternative, Hancock tries to establish her claim

of retaliation by utilizing the burden-shifting approach

articulated above. She was required to show “that

(1) after lodging a complaint about discrimination,
No. 07-1589 11

(2) only [she], and not otherwise similarly situated employees who did not complain, was (3) subjected to an

adverse employment action even though (4) [she] was

performing [her] job in a satisfactory manner.” Id. at 642.

Like her gender and disability discrimination claims,

Hancock’s attempt to make out a prima facie case falls

short because she has not identified a similarly situated non-complaining employee, much less presented

convincing evidence that such an employee was treated

more favorably.

As a part of her hostile work environment claim, Hancock had to demonstrate that the conduct complained

of was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir.

2005). In Hancock’s case, she had to show that she

was subjected to unwelcome harassment based upon

either her gender or disability. Beamon v. Marshall & Isley

Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 863 (7th Cir. 2005). We decline

to reach the substance of Hancock’s hostile work environment claim because she never alleged such a claim in

her district court complaint. It was raised for the first time

in her opposition to the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment, and so it is not properly before this

Court. See Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781 (7th

Cir. 1996).

We acknowledge that plaintiff’s working environment

was not the most supportive. Her supervisor criticized

her, she complained, and her manager viewed her as an

employee who, among other things, was not a “team

player.” However, at every step of the way, Hancock

was not able to shore up any bit of evidence that indicated that she was discriminated against on the basis of
12 No. 07-1589

her gender or disability or that she was retaliated against

because she complained of discrimination. She was

injured and inconvenienced. She was treated somewhat

unkindly. But there is a significant gap between such

conduct, which was fundamentally personal, and discrimination.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

judgment.

USCA-02-C-0072—6-24-08