Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DONALD R. SHULER GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Barkes, Kolbus, Rife & Shuler, LLP Attorney General of Indiana

Goshen, Indiana

JESSE R. DRUM

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MELISSA S. JOHNSON MABIE, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 43A03-1404-CR-112

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE KOSCIUSKO SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Joe V. Sutton, Judge

Cause No. 43D03-1201-FD-13

September 10, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Melissa S. Johnson Mabie appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation. 

Mabie raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its 

discretion when it sentenced Mabie following the court’s revocation of her probation. 

We affim.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 26, 2012, Mabie pleaded guilty to nonsupport of a dependent child, as 

a Class D felony. The trial court accepted Mabie’s plea that same day and ordered her to 

serve three years, all of which the court suspended to probation.

On May 16, 2013, the State filed a petition of probation violation with the court. 

In its petition, the State alleged that Mabie had filed to inform her probation officer of her 

employment status since January 8, 2013, and that she had not made required child 

support payments since January 11, 2013. On February 11, 2014, Mabie admitted that 

she had violated the terms of her probation as alleged.

On March 13, 2014, the court held Mabie’s sentencing hearing. At that hearing, 

the court found as mitigating circumstances that Mabie admitted to the probation 

violations and that she had no criminal history. The court found no aggravating 

circumstances. The court then ordered Mabie to “be incarcerated at the Kosciusko 

County Jail for a period of thirty-six (36) months, with eighteen (18) months 

suspended . . . on formal probation.” Appellant’s App. at 61. The court further 

authorized Mabie’s participation in work release “as long as she remains qualified.” Id. 

This appeal ensued.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Mabie asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced her 

following the revocation of her probation. As our supreme court has explained:

Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to 

which a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court determines the 

conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are 

violated. Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation 

rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in 

deciding how to proceed. If this discretion were not afforded to trial courts 

and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be 

less inclined to order probation to future defendants. Accordingly, a trial 

court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using 

the abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion occurs where the 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances.

Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citations omitted).

Upon the revocation of probation, the trial court may impose one or more of the 

following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or 

enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one (1) year 

beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the 

time of initial sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). And, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(a), “[a] 

person who commits a Class D felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six 

(6) months and three (3) years, with the advisory sentence being one and one half (1 1⁄2) 

years.”
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Here, Mabie first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it “imposed 

the maximum sentence possible in this matter.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. According to 

Mabie, her new sentence of eighteen months of incarceration followed by eighteen 

months of probation is the equivalent to three years of incarceration. We reject this 

argument. 

Mabie’s sentence following the revocation of her probation is not the maximum 

sentence possible. “Common sense dictates that less executed time means less 

punishment.” Jenkins v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1080, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. 

denied. “[A] maximum sentence is not just a sentence of maximum length, but a fully 

executed sentence of maximum length.” Id. at 1085-86 (emphasis original); see also

Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1024-25 (Ind. 2010) (holding that, under Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B), “appellate courts may consider all aspects of the penal 

consequences imposed by the trial judge”). As Mabie did not receive a fully executed 

sentence of three years, she did not receive a maximum sentence.

Moreover, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3), upon the revocation 

of her probation the trial court could have ordered Mabie to execute the entirety of her 

originally suspended three-year sentence. As our supreme court stated in Stephens v. 

State, 818 N.E.2d 936, 942 (Ind. 2004), a “[d]efendant is not entitled to any credit toward 

sentence of the time spent on probation once he violated its conditions.” Indeed, had the 

trial court simply ordered Mabie to execute the balance of the term it had originally 
5

suspended, the court’s order would have been for a twenty-month term of incarceration,

1

which is more than the executed term the court actually ordered.

Further, Mabie’s reliance on Mask v. State, 829 N.E.2d 932 (Ind. 2005), is 

misplaced. As our supreme court has since clarified:

Mask dealt with Indiana’s cap on consecutive sentencing in certain felony 

crime sprees, limiting a judge’s ability to “stack” sentences for multiple 

crimes arising out of a single episode. of conduct. . . . We held that for 

purposes of applying the consecutive sentence cap, the sentence imposed—

whether suspended or executed—controlled, because a defendant 

subsequently could violate his probation, have back-up time imposed, and 

thus serve a sentence that exceeds the statutory cap. . . . Mask does contain 

language that appears to support [the defendant’s] position: 

“[i]ncarceration in the context of [Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(c)] does 

not mean the period of executed time alone.” The emphasized text, 

however, makes it clear that Mask’s essential holding is confined to the 

context in which it arose—the consecutive sentencing cap statute . . . .

Jennings v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1003, 1008 (Ind. 2013) (emphases and first alteration 

original to Jennings; citations omitted). Likewise here, Mask’s essential holding does not 

apply.

Mabie next argues that “the maximum possible sentences are generally most 

appropriate for the worst offenders,” and that the court “found there to be no aggravating 

circumstances, yet imposed the maximum sentence.” Appellant’s Br. at 8-9 (quotation 

and citation omitted). But, again, Mabie did not receive the maximum possible sentence 

because she did not receive three years of incarceration. As we have already rejected the 

premise underlying these arguments, we need not consider them further. We cannot say 

 

1

 The State filed its petition of probation violation about sixteen months into Mabie’s original

thirty-six month term of probation, and the trial court issued its summons to Mabie that same day. As a 

matter of law, the issuance of the summons tolled Mabie's probationary period until the court’s final 

determination on the petition, which occurred nine months later in February of 2014. I.C. § 35-38-2-3(c). 

Thus, at the time the court sentenced Mabie for her probation violation, Mabie had a remaining, original 

probationary term of twenty months.
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that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Mabie following the revocation 

of her probation. Thus, we affirm her sentence.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.