*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GERJUAN

RAINER TYUS

(SC 20462)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,

Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crime of murder in connection with the shooting death of

the victim, the defendant appealed. Prior to the shooting, the defendant

was involved in a dispute with the victim, after which the victim drove

by the defendant’s apartment and shot the defendant, and the defendant

fired back at the victim. The defendant’s close friend, A, thereafter stated

an intention to seek revenge against the victim. Approximately two

weeks later, the victim was shot and killed at a cafe ́ in New London.

In an interview with the police after the victim’s murder, the defendant

told them that, on the night of the victim’s murder, he and A had traveled

directly from Boston to a nightclub in Norwich located approximately

twelve miles away from the cafe ́, thereby indicating that he and A were

not present at the cafe ́ at the time of the murder. The defendant and

A were subsequently charged with murder and conspiracy to commit

murder, but the conspiracy charges were dismissed prior to trial. The

trial court granted the state’s motion to join the cases against the defendant and A for trial. At trial, A’s girlfriend, E, testified that A told her

that he had shot someone on the night the victim was killed. Bullet

casings from the scene of the shooting at the defendant’s apartment and

from the murder scene were submitted to the state forensic laboratory.

A ballistics analyst, P, examined the evidence and generated a written

report containing his findings. S, who also was employed at the laboratory, served as a technical reviewer of P’s report. P died before trial

and was therefore unavailable to testify. The state subsequently sought

to admit testimony from S, and the court denied the defendant’s motion

to preclude S’s testimony. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder

as a principal or an accessory. The Appellate Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, and the defendant, on the granting of certification,

appealed to this court. Held:

1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not

abused its discretion in joining the defendant’s case with A’s case for

trial: the state’s case against the defendant and the state’s case against

A both arose from the shooting death of the victim, most of the state’s

evidence would have been admissible against both the defendant and

A if their cases had been tried separately, and the defendant’s and

A’s defenses were not antagonistic because each served as the other’s

principal alibi witness, the defendant and A both having claimed that

they were together at a certain nightclub at the time of the shooting;

moreover, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that joinder was

improper on the ground that E’s testimony regarding A’s admission that

he had shot someone on the night of the victim’s murder could not have

been admitted into evidence against the defendant under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, because, contrary to the defendant’s

claim, that hearsay exception is applicable even in cases, such as the

present one, in which the defendant is not facing a conspiracy charge

at the time of trial.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the admission into evidence of certain information regarding the location of his

cell phone (CSLI) around the time of the victim’s murder violated his

fourth amendment rights insofar as the police obtained that information

without a warrant: the admission of the defendant’s CSLI was harmless

because evidence other than the defendant’s CSLI placed the defendant

close to the crime scene at the time of the victim’s murder, including

CSLI from the cell phone of A, who maintained at trial that he and the

defendant were together the entire evening, and there was additional

evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant

and A had lied about being at the Norwich nightclub at the time of the

murder, including testimony from a witness that he saw the defendant
and a man matching A’s description entering that nightclub fifteen to

twenty minutes after the witness was told that the victim had been shot;

moreover, there was evidence that the defendant and A were driving

in a rented silver vehicle on the night of the murder, and witnesses

testified that a man matching A’s description ran from the scene of the

shooting and entered a vehicle matching the description of the rented

vehicle, the defendant’s and A’s DNA were found in that vehicle, and

a substance found in the interior of that vehicle possessed genetic

characteristics similar to those of the victim.

3. Although the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the defendant’s

right to confrontation was not violated when the trial court allowed S,

an employee of the state forensic laboratory to testify about certain

findings made by P, a ballistics analyst with the same laboratory who

was unavailable to testify at the defendant’s trial, the admission of S’s

testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:

a. The defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation was violated

when the trial court allowed S to testify about certain of P’s findings

regarding the ballistics evidence in the case, the defendant having been

deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine P with respect those findings; although S was asked about his own analysis and conclusions in

connection with his independent review of the ballistics evidence, S was

also asked during direct examination about certain evidence that P had

reviewed, and about which P had made findings, but that S had no

recollection of reviewing himself, and, because, in those instances, S

relied solely on P’s findings rather than his own, the state indirectly

communicated P’s findings to the jury through S’s testimony.

b. The admission of S’s testimony about P’s findings was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt, as S’s testimony was cumulative of other evidence,

including S’s testimony regarding his analysis and conclusions based on

his independent review of the evidence, from which the jury reasonably

could have concluded that the firearm that the defendant used to fire

back at the victim at the defendant’s apartment was the same weapon

that was used to kill the victim; moreover, other evidence presented at

trial provided the jury with a strong evidentiary basis to conclude that

the defendant had ready access to the type of firearm that was used to

murder the victim, and there was other compelling evidence of the

defendant’s guilt, including DNA evidence, motive, and evidence that

placed the defendant close to the cafe ́ at the time of the victim’s murder.

Argued October 14, 2021—officially released April 12, 2022

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of murder and conspiracy to commit murder,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

New London, where the court, Jongbloed, J., granted

the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to commit murder and granted the state’s motion

to consolidate for trial the defendant’s case with that

of a codefendant; thereafter, the case was tried to the

jury before A. Hadden, J.; subsequently, the court, A.

Hadden, J., denied the defendant’s motion to preclude

certain evidence; verdict and judgment of guilty, from

which the defendant appealed to this court; thereafter,

the case was transferred to the Appellate Court, Lavine,

Sheldon and Harper, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s

judgment, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Pamela S. Nagy, supervisory assistant public defender,

for the appellant (defendant).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Michael L. Regan, former

state’s attorney, and Paul J. Narducci, state’s attorney,

for the appellee (state).
Charles D. Ray, Dana M. Delger, pro hac vice, M.

Christopher Fabricant, pro hac vice, Don O. Burley,

pro hac vice, Barbara E. Butterworth, pro hac vice,

Jessica L. Hannah, pro hac vice, and Alexander E.

Harding, pro hac vice, filed a brief for the Innocence

Project, Inc., as amicus curiae.
Opinion

KAHN, J. The defendant, Gerjuan Rainer Tyus,

appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court,

which affirmed his conviction of murder in violation of

General Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a) and 53a-8. In this appeal,

the defendant claims that (1) the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its

discretion in joining the defendant’s case with that of his

codefendant, Darius Armadore, because the evidence

in both cases was cross admissible, (2) his fourth

amendment rights were violated under Carpenter v.

United States, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed.

2d 507 (2018), when the police obtained his cell site

location information (CSLI) without a warrant supported by probable cause, and (3) the Appellate Court

incorrectly concluded that the defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated when the trial court allowed

a state’s firearms examiner to testify about the findings

of a second firearms examiner, who was deceased and,

thus, unavailable to testify at trial. The state disagrees

with each of these claims and asserts, in the alternative,

that any error was harmless. For the reasons that follow,

we agree that the Appellate Court correctly concluded

that the trial court had not abused its discretion in

joining the defendant’s case with the codefendant’s case

and that the violations of the defendant’s constitutional

rights were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could

have found from the evidence admitted at trial, and

procedural history are relevant to our review of the

defendant’s claims. In December, 2006, the defendant

was involved in an ongoing dispute with the victim,

Todd Thomas, over jewelry that the victim’s brother

had given to the defendant. The victim demanded that

the defendant return the jewelry, but the defendant

refused to do so unless the victim paid him $10,000.

The victim’s girlfriend, Devena Colebut, told the

police that, after the victim had requested that the jewelry be returned, she and the victim were driving in the

victim’s white Lexus in New London. She recognized the

defendant’s vehicle, a blue Range Rover, which began

to follow the Lexus. Soon after, she heard three or four

gunshots, and the victim pushed her down. The victim

made several turns in an attempt to evade the Range

Rover.1

On December 3, 2006, the victim drove by the defendant’s apartment on Willetts Avenue in New London as

a passenger in the white Lexus, which was registered

to his wife. The victim fired several gunshots from a

.38 caliber firearm, striking the defendant in the leg and

the back. The defendant fired gunshots back at the

victim with a nine millimeter firearm. The defendant’s

acquaintance, Rashard Johnson, who was present at the
scene of that shooting, told the police that the defendant

had a gun that he thought might be a nine millimeter

firearm. Five nine millimeter cartridge casings were

subsequently recovered from the scene of the shooting

on Willetts Avenue. Those casings were found in front

of 28 Willetts Avenue, the very same location the defendant later identified to the police on a hand drawn map

as the place he had been standing. Several casings from

a .38 caliber firearm were found farther down the street,

in front of 24 Willetts Avenue from the location where

the victim had fired. Later that same day, while the

defendant was being treated for his wounds at the hospital, his close friend, Armadore, visited the defendant at

the hospital and was overheard to say, ‘‘we’re gonna

get them niggas . . . .’’2

On December 15, 2006, the defendant’s then girlfriend,

Takeisha Betts, went with the defendant to rent a silver

Chevrolet Impala and listed herself and the defendant

as authorized drivers of that vehicle.3 The defendant

and Armadore drove this rental vehicle to Boston, Massachusetts, at approximately 7 p.m. on December 22,

2006. While in Boston, the defendant and Armadore

visited family and then picked up three women. One

of the women subsequently refused to return to Connecticut with them, so the defendant and Armadore

drove the other two women back to Connecticut in the

silver Impala.

That evening, the victim was at Ernie’s Cafe ́ on Bank

Street in New London. Kevin Thorne, an acquaintance

of the defendant, testified that he was at Ernie’s Cafe ́

around that time and that, while he was there, he and

the defendant communicated several times over their

cell phones in order to arrange a marijuana sale. Shortly

after midnight, the victim was shot in the head while

he was standing outside of the front entrance of Ernie’s

Cafe ́ smoking a cigarette. Thorne was outside of the

bar and near the victim at the time of the shooting, and

his phone records show that he was on the phone with

the defendant around that time.

Witnesses observed a light-skinned African American

male wearing a hooded sweatshirt fleeing the scene of

the crime toward a municipal parking lot on Golden

Street, where he entered the passenger side of a silver

vehicle that was waiting there with its motor running.

The vehicle immediately sped away. The victim was

transferred to Lawrence + Memorial Hospital in New

London and was pronounced dead upon arrival.

After the shooting, the defendant and Armadore arrived

at Bella Notte, a nightclub in Norwich located approximately twelve and one-half miles north of Ernie’s Cafe ́.

The defendant elected to testify at trial and asserted

that he and Armadore had driven straight from Boston

to Bella Notte, and that they were there at the time the

victim was shot. However, CSLI from two cell phones

belonging to the defendant and one cell phone belong-
ing to Armadore showed that they were in New London

at the time of the victim’s death. Further, a state’s witness, Eduardo Guilbert, testified that he saw the defendant and a man matching Armadore’s description

entering Bella Notte sometime after Guilbert received a

phone call informing him that the victim had been shot.4

A few hours later, the defendant dropped Armadore

off at the apartment Armadore shared with his then

girlfriend, Ritchae Ebrahimi. At trial, Ebrahimi testified

that, after Armadore arrived at their home, they argued

over his having been with other women that evening,

and that he told her he had shot someone that night.

The police recovered one nine millimeter cartridge

casing from the scene of the December 23, 2006 shooting at Ernie’s Cafe ́. Ballistics evidence showed that this

cartridge casing had been fired from the same firearm

as all five of the nine millimeter cartridge casings that

were recovered in front of 28 Willetts Avenue at the

scene of the December 3, 2006 shooting.

The police also recovered the silver Impala that the

defendant and his girlfriend rented, after it was returned

to a rental car company in New London. The police

then searched that vehicle for evidence related to the

shooting. In addition to both the defendant’s and Armadore’s DNA, a red, bloodlike substance found on the

interior of the Impala’s front passenger door possessed

genetic characteristics similar to that of the victim’s.

Angela Przech, an employee at the state forensics laboratory, noted that a bloodlike substance, although not

blood, could be skin cells, saliva, sweat, or brain tissue.

Both the defendant and Armadore were interviewed

by the police relating to their whereabouts during the

night of and at the time of the shooting. During his

initial interview with the police, the defendant stated

that he and Armadore arrived at Bella Notte before

11:30 p.m. and that he did not see anyone he knew at

Bella Notte. In a subsequent interview, however, the

defendant said that he recognized a female friend at

Bella Notte. Further, during an interview with the police

shortly after the shooting, the defendant stated that he

and Armadore had driven to Boston in a black car, but,

after returning to Connecticut, they exchanged it for a

rented silver car. In his March, 2008 interview with the

police, the defendant stated that he and Armadore drove

to Boston in a rental car. During his interview with the

police in December, 2006, Armadore stated that he and

the defendant traveled to Boston in a silver Impala to

visit family. Both the defendant and Armadore testified

at trial that they did not recall telling the police that they

had ridden in a silver Impala that evening. Specifically,

Armadore denied telling the police that he ever had

ridden in a silver Impala with the defendant on the

evening in question. The jury, however, was presented

with forensic evidence showing that both Armadore

and the defendant had been inside of the silver Impala
rented by the defendant and his girlfriend. Throughout

the investigation and even during their trial testimony,

both the defendant and Armadore maintained that they

were together at all times that evening and night.

On November 20, 2012, the defendant and Armadore

were arrested and charged with murder in violation of

§ 53a-54a and conspiracy to commit murder in violation

of § 53a-54a and General Statutes § 53a-48. The conspiracy charges were later dismissed as to both defendants

on the ground that they were barred by the statute of

limitations. The state then filed long form informations

charging the defendant and Armadore with murder,

both as a principal and as an accessory, in violation of

§§ 53a-54a (a) and 53a-8.

The state subsequently filed a motion to join for trial

the cases against the defendant and Armadore. The

trial court granted that motion, over the objections of

counsel, and the case was tried before a single jury,

which returned guilty verdicts as to both the defendant

and Armadore.5 The court sentenced the defendant to

a term of fifty-five years of incarceration.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to this court, which transferred the appeal to the

Appellate Court.6 Before the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed ‘‘(1) that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the state’s motion to join his case for

trial with that of . . . Armadore; (2) that he was

deprived of his constitutional right to confrontation

when the state’s firearms examiner was permitted to

testify regarding the findings of another firearms examiner, who was deceased, and thus unable to testify at

trial; and (3) that the court erred in denying his request

for a limiting instruction to the jury concerning the

testimony of the state’s firearms examiner.’’ State v.

Tyus, 184 Conn. App. 669, 670–71, 195 A.3d 737 (2018).

The Appellate Court disagreed with those claims and,

accordingly, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction. Id., 685. This certified appeal followed. See

State v. Tyus, 335 Conn. 907, 227 A.3d 77 (2020). Additional facts and procedural history are set forth subsequently in this opinion as necessary.

The present appeal presents three certified questions:

(1) whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that

the trial court had not abused its discretion in joining

the defendant’s case with that of Armadore because the

evidence in both cases was cross admissible; (2) whether,

in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Carpenter, the defendant’s fourth amendment rights were violated when the police obtained his

historical CSLI without a warrant; and (3) whether the

Appellate Court correctly concluded that the defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated when the

trial court allowed a substitute firearms examiner to

testify about the findings of the primary examiner, who

was unable to testify at trial.7 We address these three
claims in turn.

I

The defendant first claims that the Appellate Court

incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused

its discretion in joining the defendant’s case with that

of Armadore’s case because the evidence in both cases

was cross admissible.8 We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our consideration of this claim. Before

trial, the state filed a motion for joinder of the defendant’s case with Armadore’s for trial pursuant to Practice Book § 41-19. The state argued that joining the

cases would promote judicial economy because the

witnesses, physical evidence, and scientific evidence

presented for each case would be identical. The state

also argued that the defendant’s and Armadore’s

defenses would not be antagonistic, and, therefore, neither would suffer substantial injustice by having their

cases tried together.

In an objection to the state’s motion for joinder,

defense counsel argued that the defendant would be

substantially prejudiced by joining his case with Armadore’s because Ebrahimi’s testimony that Armadore

told her he had shot someone on December 23, 2006,

would constitute inadmissible hearsay against him. Specifically, counsel argued that the only way the state

could introduce Armadore’s confession against the defendant would be pursuant to the coconspirator exception

to the hearsay rule but that this exception would not

apply because the conspiracy charge against the defendant had been dismissed. The trial court heard argument on the motion for joinder and orally granted that

motion, finding that a joint trial would not be unfairly

prejudicial to either the defendant or to Armadore.

On appeal, the defendant renews his claim that the

joinder of his case with Armadore’s case was improper

because Armadore’s confession to his girlfriend was

not admissible against him under the coconspirator

exception to the hearsay rule because the conspiracy

charges against him had been dismissed. He, thus,

argues that its introduction and use in his joint trial with

Armadore resulted in unfair prejudice. The Appellate

Court rejected this claim, reasoning that it was based

on the erroneous legal premise that a coconspirator’s

statements are only admissible in criminal cases involving conspiracy charges. State v. Tyus, supra, 184 Conn.

App. 678–79. The Appellate Court concluded that,

because the defendant provided no other basis for the

objection to the joinder, the trial court did not err in

joining the cases for trial. Id., 679. We agree with the

well reasoned decision of the Appellate Court on this

particular point and are, thus, unpersuaded by the

defendant’s claim.

As the Appellate Court aptly noted, Practice Book
§ 41-19 provides that ‘‘[t]he judicial authority may, upon

its own motion or the motion of any party, order that

two or more informations, whether against the same

defendant or different defendants, be tried together.’’

This court has observed that ‘‘[t]he argument for joinder

is most persuasive when the offenses are based [on]

the same act or criminal transaction, since it seems

unduly inefficient to require the state to resolve the

same issues at numerous trials. . . . In contrast, when

the cases are not of the same character, the argument

for joinder is far less compelling because the state must

prove each offense with separate evidence and witnesses [thus] eliminat[ing] any real savings in time or

efficiency which might otherwise be provided by a single trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

LaFleur, 307 Conn. 115, 157, 51 A.3d 1048 (2012). Further, ‘‘[a] joint trial expedites the administration of justice, reduces the congestion of trial dockets, conserves

judicial time, lessens the burden [on] citizens who must

sacrifice both time and money to serve [on] juries, and

avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses who would

otherwise be called to testify only once.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booth, 250 Conn. 611,

622, 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied sub nom. Brown

v. Connecticut, 529 U.S. 1060, 120 S. Ct. 1568, 146 L.

Ed. 2d 471 (2000).

Although joint trials may serve to conserve judicial

resources, we note that trials may not be joined if a

‘‘substantial injustice is likely to result unless a separate

trial be accorded.’’ State v. White, 229 Conn. 125, 158,

640 A.2d 572 (1994). ‘‘A separate trial will be ordered

[when] the defenses of the accused are antagonistic,

or evidence will be introduced against one which will

not be admissible against others, and it clearly appears

that a joint trial will probably be prejudicial to the rights

of one or more of the accused.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Booth, supra, 250 Conn. 620.

We also note that ‘‘[t]he phrase prejudicial to the rights

of the [accused] means something more than that a

joint trial will probably be less advantageous to the

accused than separate trials.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

Further, ‘‘we will reverse a trial court’s ruling on

joinder only [when] the trial court commits an abuse

of discretion that results in manifest prejudice to one

or more of the defendants.’’ State v. Vinal, 198 Conn.

644, 649, 504 A.2d 1364 (1986). ‘‘[I]t is the defendant’s

burden on appeal to show that joinder was improper

by proving substantial prejudice that could not be cured

by the trial court’s instructions to the jury . . . . [I]n

deciding whether to [join informations] for trial, the trial

court enjoys broad discretion, which, in the absence of

manifest abuse, an appellate court may not disturb.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Devon D., 321 Conn. 656, 665, 138 A.3d 849

(2016).
In the present case, the state’s case against the defendant arose from the same criminal incident as its case

against Armadore, namely, the shooting death of the

victim. Further, at the time of the trial, most of the

state’s evidence would have been admissible against

both the defendant and Armadore had their cases been

tried separately. Finally, the defendant’s and Armadore’s

defenses to the charges were not antagonistic. Indeed,

each served as the other’s principal alibi witness, as

both claimed that they were together at Bella Notte at

the time of the shooting.

Defense counsel’s only opposition to joinder before

the trial court, and the basis for the defendant’s related

claim of error before the Appellate Court and in the

present appeal, is that Armadore’s confession that he

shot someone could only have been admitted into evidence against the defendant under the coconspirator

exception to the hearsay rule if he was facing a conspiracy charge. Counsel claimed that this exception could

not possibly apply in the defendant’s case because the

conspiracy charges against both him and Armadore

were barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant’s argument, in fact, assumed that Armadore’s confession would have been admitted against the defendant

under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule

had his conspiracy charge remained pending.9 Defense

counsel asserted no other evidentiary or other basis for

excluding Armadore’s confession, and counsel neither

objected to Ebrahimi’s testimony regarding Armadore’s

confession at trial nor requested the issuance of a limiting instruction to the jury.

Thus, the defendant’s argument that joinder was

improper rests squarely on his contention that the

absence of a conspiracy charge made Ebrahimi’s testimony about Armadore’s confession inadmissible against

him. As the Appellate Court correctly concluded, this

argument must fail as a matter of law. State v. Tyus,

supra, 184 Conn. App. 678–79. Section 8-3 of the 2009

edition of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides

in relevant part: ‘‘The following are not excluded by

the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available

as a witness:

‘‘(1) Statement by a party opponent. A statement that

is being offered against a party and is . . . (D) a statement by a coconspirator of a party while the conspiracy

is ongoing and in furtherance of the conspiracy . . . .’’

(Emphasis omitted.)

We agree with the Appellate Court that neither the

plain language of this rule, nor the common law it is

based on, limits the application of the exception only

to criminal cases involving charges of conspiracy. See

Conn. Code Evid. (2009) § 8-3 (1), commentary (‘‘[t]he

[hearsay exception for statements of coconspirators]

is applicable in civil and criminal cases alike’’); see also
State v. Marion, 175 Conn. 211, 219–20 n.8, 397 A.2d

533 (1978) (noting that application of coconspirator

exception to hearsay rule requires prima facie showing

of existence of conspiracy); Cooke v. Weed, 90 Conn.

544, 550, 97 A. 765 (1916) (noting that statement made

by alleged coconspirator of defendant was ‘‘admissible

under the [well settled] rule relating to the declarations

of coconspirators’’ in civil trial for damages when defendant had not been charged with conspiracy). Because

this was the defendant’s only basis before the trial court

for claiming that his case should not have been joined

with Armadore’s for trial, we conclude that the Appellate Court did not err in determining that the trial court’s

joinder of the defendant’s and Armadore’s cases was

proper.

II

We now turn to the first of the defendant’s constitutional claims. The defendant claims that his constitutional rights were violated when the police obtained

three days of his CSLI without a warrant. The state

responds by arguing that the admission of the defendant’s CSLI into evidence was not error, but, if it was,

that error was harmless. Because we ultimately agree

with the state that the admission of the CSLI was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we need not decide

whether it was an error.

The defendant claims for the first time10 that, in light

of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Carpenter, his fourth amendment rights were violated

when the police obtained three days of his CSLI without

a warrant. Carpenter held that, under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution, ‘‘the [g]overnment must generally obtain a warrant supported by

probable cause’’ before acquiring CSLI; Carpenter v.

United States, supra, 138 S. Ct. 2221; because individuals maintain ‘‘a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

record[s] of [their] physical movements as captured

through CSLI.’’ Id., 2217. The defendant thus argues

that his constitutional rights were violated when the

police obtained his CSLI without a warrant. The state

argues that Carpenter did not conclude whether CSLI

collection of less than seven days without a warrant

constitutes a search, and, therefore, because only three

days of CSLI were obtained in the present case, the

defendant’s rights were not violated.

Additional facts and procedural history are required

to resolve this claim. Approximately two weeks after

the victim’s murder, Detective Franklin S. Jarvis of the

New London Police Department filed ex parte orders,

pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 54-47aa

(b), to compel the disclosure of historical CSLI for two

cell phones belonging to the defendant, and one belonging to Armadore from the day of the murder to the day

after the murder. At the time, § 54-47aa (b) required only

‘‘a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime
has been or is being committed’’ to obtain such historical CSLI. The orders were subsequently granted and the

records were submitted to Detective Richard Curcuro

of the New London Police Department. Those records

were then sent to James J. Wines, an agent with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s cellular analysis survey team, who analyzed the CSLI and prepared a slideshow presentation with his analysis. Neither defense

counsel nor Armadore’s counsel sought to suppress

Wines’ expert testimony or his slideshow containing

the CSLI, which were admitted without objection.11

Because the CSLI evidence provided a comprehensive chronicle of the cell phone users’ past physical

movements, the data showed that all three phones activated cell towers in New London between approximately 12:04 and 12:15 a.m., within minutes of when a

911 call was received at 12:09 a.m., reporting the shooting of the victim. Specifically, both of the defendant’s

phones activated cell sites west of the Thames River

in New London, approximately 0.4 miles from Ernie’s

Cafe ́, between 12:04 a.m. and 12:13 a.m. Armadore’s

phone activated a cell site east of the Thames River,

approximately three miles from Ernie’s Cafe ́, at 12:15

a.m. The evidence also showed that the cell phones

activated cell towers north of New London from approximately 12:42 to 12:44 a.m., and activated a cell tower

farther north near Bella Notte, between approximately

1:12 and 1:55 a.m.

Because the defendant’s claim related to the admission of CSLI is unpreserved, we look to the familiar

test set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,

567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317

Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). In order for a

defendant to prevail under that test, he or she must

show that ‘‘(1) the record is adequate to review the

alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional

magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right;

(3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and

. . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if

subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to

demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional

violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 239–40; see In re Yasiel

R., supra, 781 (modifying third prong of Golding). ‘‘The

first two [prongs of Golding] involve a determination

of whether the claim is reviewable; the second two . . .

involve a determination of whether the defendant may

prevail.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Peeler, 271 Conn. 338, 360, 857 A.2d 808 (2004), cert.

denied, 546 U.S. 845, 126 S. Ct. 94, 163 L. Ed. 2d 110

(2005).

Even if we assume, without deciding, that the defendant’s Carpenter claim is reviewable under the first two

prongs of Golding and that a constitutional violation

existed under the third prong,12 it fails under the fourth
prong. For the reasons set forth subsequently in this

opinion, we conclude that the state has sustained its

burden of demonstrating that any claimed error by the

trial court in admitting the CSLI evidence was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Armadore, 338

Conn. 407, 437, 258 A.3d 601 (2021) (‘‘[i]t is well settled

that constitutional search and seizure violations are not

structural improprieties requiring reversal, but rather,

are subject to harmless error analysis’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). As a result, the defendant’s constitutional claim related to the admission of his CLSI data

must fail.

We begin with the applicable standard of review.

‘‘Whether any error is harmless in a particular case

depends upon a number of factors, such as the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s

case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points,

the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,

and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s

case. . . . Most importantly, we must examine the

impact of the evidence on the trier of fact and the result

of the trial. . . . If the evidence may have had a tendency to influence the judgment of the jury, it cannot

be considered harmless [beyond a reasonable doubt].’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Thus, we begin

our analysis of that question by placing those pieces of

evidence in the context of the other evidence admitted

at trial.

First, even without the evidence of the defendant’s

historical CSLI, there was other compelling evidence

admitted at trial that placed the defendant close to the

scene of the crime at the time of the shooting. The

historical CSLI from Armadore’s cell phone was admitted into evidence and was relied on by Wines, who

testified that this cell phone was located in New London, approximately three miles from Ernie’s Cafe ́,

minutes after the 911 call was received that reported

the shooting. See id., 438–47 (holding that criminal

defendant does not have privacy right in his codefendant’s CSLI, and, thus, does not have standing to challenge admission of that evidence). Armadore specifically

testified at trial that he had this cell phone with him

throughout the night of the shooting and that he was

receiving calls on it. Both the defendant and Armadore

readily admitted to the police, and, indeed, even maintained at trial, that they were together on the night the

victim was shot and killed. The confluence of these two

pieces of evidence constitutes highly persuasive proof

that puts the defendant precisely where he claimed not

to be at the time of the shooting, namely, in the city of

New London. This evidence directly and categorically

contradicts the defendant’s assertion that both he and

Armadore drove directly from Boston to Bella Notte

on the night of the murder.
Even without CSLI, there was additional evidence

presented from which the jury could have reasonably

inferred that the defendant and Armadore had lied

about being at Bella Notte when the shooting occurred,

further strengthening the state’s case. As stated previously in this opinion, Guilbert testified at trial that

he had witnessed the defendant and a man matching

Armadore’s description enter Bella Notte approximately

fifteen to twenty minutes after Guilbert received a

phone call informing him that the victim had been shot.

Thus, records of the defendant’s historical CSLI were

cumulative of other evidence showing that the defendant was not at Bella Notte at the time of the shooting,

as he claimed.

Still other circumstantial evidence indicative of the

defendant’s guilt was presented by the state at trial.

There was evidence that the defendant and Armadore

went to Boston on the night of the shooting in a rented

silver Impala. Multiple witnesses testified that, immediately after the shooting, a man fitting Armadore’s description ran from the scene of the shooting and entered the

passenger side of a running, silver vehicle matching the

appearance of the defendant’s rented Impala. Both the

defendant’s and Armadore’s DNA were found in the

Impala, even though Armadore testified at trial that he

had never been in that vehicle. Additionally, and perhaps more persuasively, a red, bloodlike substance consistent with being either skin cells, saliva, sweat, or

brain tissue, found on the interior of the Impala’s front

passenger door, possessed genetic characteristics similar to those of the victim. The defendant’s own contradictory statements to the police during the course of

the investigation are particularly damaging, as they are

indicative of an effort to hide his role in the shooting.

Further, both the defendant and Armadore testified that

they were together the entire evening. The state also

presented evidence that, hours after the shooting, Armadore confessed to his girlfriend, Ebrahimi, that he had

shot someone that night.

Finally, the state presented particularly strong evidence of motive in the present case. The defendant and

the victim had an ongoing dispute over the return of

certain jewelry that was in the defendant’s possession.

Specifically, there was evidence that the defendant,

while riding in his Range Rover, previously shot at the

victim and his girlfriend. Just three weeks prior to the

victim’s death, the victim drove by the defendant’s residence on Willetts Avenue and shot the defendant in the

leg and back. While visiting the defendant at the hospital

where he was receiving treatment for those wounds,

Armadore stated an intention to seek revenge for the

victim’s shooting of the defendant.

Because the admission of the defendant’s historical

CSLI was cumulative of other evidence contained in

the record, and because the state presented other signif-
icant evidence of motive, intent, and the defendant’s

participation in the crime, we conclude that the state

met its burden of showing that the admission of that

evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

III

The defendant next claims that the Appellate Court

erred in concluding that his right to confrontation was

not violated by the testimony of the substitute firearms

examiner, who testified about the findings of the primary examiner. We agree with the defendant that the

Appellate Court erred by not determining that a constitutional violation occurred; however, we conclude that

the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

A

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our review of this claim. As stated previously in this opinion, the police recovered five nine

millimeter casings from the Willetts Avenue shooting

and one nine millimeter casing from the scene of the

victim’s death. Those casings were then submitted to

the state forensic laboratory, where a ballistics analyst,

Gerald Petillo, examined the evidence and generated a

written report containing his conclusions. James Stephenson, who was also employed at the laboratory at

the time, was the ‘‘technical reviewer’’ of Petillo’s

report. As part of his technical review, Stephenson also

physically examined the casings recovered from the

two shootings.

Petillo died prior to trial and, therefore, was unavailable to testify. The state subsequently sought to admit

testimony from Stephenson in lieu of Petillo. In response,

the defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude Stephenson from testifying and also to exclude

any evidence related to the firearms examination conducted in this case. In that motion, the defendant argued

that Stephenson would be testifying as a surrogate

expert based on Petillo’s examination, which would

violate the defendant’s right to confrontation under Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 131 S. Ct. 2705,

180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011), and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d

314 (2009). The state opposed the defendant’s motion,

arguing that there was no confrontation clause violation

because Stephenson conducted ‘‘his own review and

comparison of the actual physical evidence . . . .’’ Stephenson testified, outside of the jury’s presence, that

he reviewed Petillo’s findings but also conducted his

own examination of the evidence and reached his own

conclusions. The court then denied the motion to preclude Stephenson’s testimony.

At trial, Stephenson testified that, when analysts at

the state forensic laboratory examine shell casings, they

look for class characteristics such as the manufacturer

and caliber designations to determine from what types
of firearms they may have been fired. They then look

for ‘‘individual marks that occur only during the firing

process’’ that indicate whether the casings came from

a sole source. After finding the marks, the objects can

then be viewed through a comparison microscope to

look ‘‘for those areas of agreement that occurred during

the firing process to determine whether two objects were

fired from the same source.’’

Stephenson also testified about his role as a technical

reviewer. He noted that the primary examiner, Petillo,

had conducted an examination of the casings using a

comparison microscope. Stephenson then testified that

his role as technical reviewer was to look at the same

evidence and ‘‘to determine whether they came to the

same conclusions during the examination process.’’

Specifically, Stephenson noted that the ‘‘[t]echnical

reviewer was the position of signing off after the . . .

review of all the . . . evidence . . . .’’ He also

expressly stated that, if the technical reviewer disagreed with the primary examiner’s conclusion that

items were fired from the same source, the evidence

would have to be reviewed again, and both reviewers

would have to come to an agreement, or ‘‘it would be

an inconclusive result, because the [technical reviewer]

couldn’t come to the same result as the [primary] examiner had come to during his examination.’’

Stephenson ultimately testified that his own examination of the .38 caliber casings found near 24 Willetts

Avenue led him to conclude that all of the casings had

been fired from the same firearm. He also opined as to

his scientific conclusion that all of the nine millimeter

casings found near 28 Willetts Avenue were fired from

the same firearm. Finally, Stephenson testified that his

review had also led him to conclude that the nine millimeter cartridge casing found at Ernie’s Cafe ́ was fired

from the same firearm that had fired the nine millimeter

casings found near 28 Willetts Avenue.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court

improperly admitted Stephenson’s testimony in violation of his sixth amendment right to confrontation

because his testimony was predicated on Petillo’s findings and conclusions. The defendant argues that Petillo’s findings and conclusions constituted testimonial

hearsay and that, because Petillo was unavailable for

cross-examination, Stephenson could not testify as to

Petillo’s conclusions without violating the defendant’s

constitutional right to confrontation. For the reasons

that follow, we agree with the defendant that parts of

Stephenson’s testimony were improperly used as an

implicit conduit for Petillo’s findings.

We begin with the applicable standard of review. ‘‘Under

Crawford v. Washington, [541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S. Ct.

1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)], hearsay statements of

an unavailable witness that are testimonial in nature

may be admitted in accordance with the confrontation
clause only if the defendant previously has had the

opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable witness.’’

State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 618, 960 A.2d 993 (2008).

‘‘Nontestimonial [hearsay] statements, however, are not

subject to the confrontation clause and may be admitted

under state rules of evidence’’ if they fall under a hearsay exception. Id. A threshold inquiry of whether the

admission of the statement presents a constitutional

due process claim is whether the hearsay statement

was testimonial in nature, which presents a question

of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., id.,

618–19.

We recently addressed an almost identical claim, also

involving expert testimony by Stephenson, who acted

as a technical reviewer for Petillo in State v. Lebrick,

334 Conn. 492, 521–22, 223 A.3d 333 (2020). In Lebrick,

we held that ‘‘Stephenson’s testimony was admissible,

even if predicated in material part on testimonial hearsay, as long as the underlying hearsay was not admitted

into evidence or otherwise put before the jury for the

truth of the matter asserted.’’ Id., 527. In that case, we

concluded that, ‘‘[a]lthough the jury was informed that

Stephenson had reviewed ‘a number of reports and

photographs in preparation for [his] testimony,’ the contents of those reports were not presented to the jury.

When the state attempted to elicit information regarding

‘which reports [Stephenson had] reviewed,’ the defendant objected to this line of inquiry, and the trial court

implicitly sustained the defendant’s objection, ruling

that Stephenson’s testimony must be limited to ‘his own

conclusions.’ Thus, the jury was not informed of the

nature of the reports on which Stephenson had relied,

who generated the reports, what information they contained, or whether Stephenson’s expert opinions were

consistent with the reports.’’ Id. As such, we concluded

that the trial court did not err in allowing Stephenson’s

testimony. See id.

Stephenson’s testimony in the present case is, however, meaningfully different from his testimony in Lebrick.

In the present case, Stephenson testified before the jury

that, in his role as the technical reviewer of the primary

examiner’s analysis, he reviewed Petillo’s initial notes.

In addition, he informed the jury that, if his independent

conclusions, as a technical reviewer, had not matched

the primary examiner’s (Petillo’s), findings, the results

would have been considered inconclusive. The defendant claims that, from this general testimony, the jury

could have readily inferred that, because the results

reached were not considered inconclusive, Petillo’s

results must have matched Stephenson’s. Although it

is unclear how the jury would have known whether any

aspects of Petillo’s findings were deemed inconclusive

without his actual conclusions or report having been

directly admitted, what made Stephenson’s testimony

in this case problematic was his direct testimony about

Petillo’s findings. During Stephenson’s direct examina-
tion, the prosecutor specifically inquired if he had

reviewed Petillo’s findings as to specific conclusions,

rather than focusing on Stephenson’s own independent

analysis and conclusions. For example, at the outset of

Stephenson’s testimony relating to the examination of

specific cartridges, the following colloquy occurred:

‘‘Q: And who was the original examiner in this particular case?

‘‘A: . . . Petillo.

‘‘Q: And what was your role with respect to the examination of those cartridge cases?

‘‘A: Reviewing the cartridge cases in the comparison

microscope to make a determination [as to] whether

his conclusions were correct at the time.

‘‘Q: And did you come to an opinion as to what his

conclusions were?

‘‘A: I did.

‘‘Q. Did you also come to a conclusion as to whether

or not, to a reasonable degree of certainty in the field

of ballistics or firearms examination, as to whether or

not those were all fired from the same clip?

‘‘A: I did.

‘‘Q: And what was your conclusion with respect to

that?

‘‘A: They had been fired in the same firearm.’’

Although Stephenson was asked about his own analysis and conclusions, there were other times during his

direct examination when he was shown other pieces of

evidence, such as two bullets contained in state’s exhibits 62 and 116, which he had no recollection of independently reviewing. When Stephenson was specifically

asked about that evidence, he relied on Petillo’s findings. Thus, by inquiring directly about Petillo’s report

with respect to particular pieces of evidence that Stephenson did not have any recollection of independently

reviewing, the state indirectly communicated Petillo’s

findings to the jury through Stephenson’s testimony.13

We, therefore, disagree with the Appellate Court that

‘‘the only inculpatory conclusions or statements regarding the firearms evidence that were presented to the

jury were made by Stephenson . . . .’’ State v. Tyus,

supra, 184 Conn. App. 682. Because the defendant was

deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Petillo

with respect to Petillo’s conclusions, his constitutional

right to confrontation was violated.

B

Having concluded that the trial court committed error

by permitting Stephenson to implicitly testify as to Petillo’s conclusions, we next turn to the question of whether

that particular error requires reversal of the defendant’s
conviction, when considered in the context of the record

as a whole. Because the defendant’s claim is constitutional in nature, the state bears the burden of establishing that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 334 Conn. 688, 706–

707, 224 A.3d 504 (2020). ‘‘That determination must be

made in light of the entire record [including the strength

of the state’s case without the evidence admitted in

error]. . . . Additional factors . . . . include the

importance of the challenged evidence to the prosecution’s case, whether it is cumulative, the extent of crossexamination permitted, and the presence or absence of

corroborating or contradicting evidence or testimony.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 707.

Stephenson’s testimony about Petillo’s findings and

conclusions was redundant to other evidence presented

at trial. First, Stephenson’s testimony about his own

independent observations and conclusions provided

powerful evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the firearm that the defendant

used to fire back at the victim after the December 3,

2006 shooting was the same weapon used to shoot

and kill the victim three weeks later. Second, even if

Stephenson’s testimony had been omitted in its entirety,

Johnson’s testimony and the physical casings, which

were submitted into evidence at trial, firmly established

the fact that a nine millimeter semiautomatic firearm

was used by the defendant to fire back at the victim

on Willetts Avenue. It is likewise undisputed that a

casing from a nine millimeter semiautomatic firearm

was discovered at the scene of the victim’s murder.

Thus, even without a detailed forensic examination of

the casings admitted into evidence, the jury would still

have had a strong evidentiary basis to conclude that

the defendant had ready access to the type of firearm

that was subsequently used to kill the victim.

As we noted in part II of this opinion, there was also

other compelling evidence, including Armadore’s CSLI

that placed the defendant close to the scene of the

crime at the time of the murder, a getaway car that

resembled the car rented by the defendant, a bloodlike

substance with DNA similar to that of the victim that

was found in that car, and a confession by Armadore.

There was also strong evidence of motive in that the

victim and the defendant had an ongoing dispute over

the return of jewelry in the defendant’s possession. That

feud resulted in two prior shooting incidents, including

one in which the victim shot and wounded the defendant three weeks before his murder.

Because Stephenson’s testimony regarding Petillo’s

conclusions was cumulative of other evidence, and

because the state presented other significant evidence

of intent and of the defendant’s guilt and participation

in the crime, we conclude that the state met its burden
of showing that the admission of that evidence was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 At trial, Colebut testified that she did not remember any of these events.

In response, the state introduced Colebut’s prior statement to the police

into evidence pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986).

2 We note that Armadore’s counsel challenged the admission of this statement on appeal by claiming that the witness who overhead this statement

had improperly identified him as the speaker for the first time in court, in

violation of State v. Dickson, 322 Conn. 410, 426, 141 A.3d 810 (2016), cert.

denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 2263, 198 L. Ed. 2d 713 (2017). State v.

Armadore, 186 Conn. App. 140, 153, 198 A.3d 586 (2018), aff’d, 338 Conn.

407, 258 A.3d 601 (2021). The Appellate Court agreed, holding that the

identification was improper but concluding that the error was harmless. Id.,

156–58. We note that defense counsel made no objection to the admission

of this statement.

3 Betts and the defendant rented a car because Betts, who was pregnant

at the time, needed a vehicle in order to get to medical appointments. The

defendant was no longer in possession of the blue Range Rover by the time

that the shooting occurred, as it had been taken into evidence by the police

following the prior shooting on Willetts Avenue.

4 Although Guilbert, who had consumed several alcoholic beverages that

night, could not recall the precise time these events occurred and initially

told the police that the defendant may have arrived at Ernie’s Cafe ́ around

11 p.m., he clearly testified that he had learned of the victim’s death before

the defendant’s arrival. He further testified that the defendant offered to

buy him a drink but that he declined because he was about to leave. He

left and went to the hospital to meet the victim’s family.

5 The jury did not specify whether its verdict against the defendant was

based on principal or accessorial liability.

6 Armadore filed a separate appeal, and his conviction and sentence were

affirmed in State v. Armadore, 338 Conn. 407, 258 A.3d 601 (2021).

7 The defendant also claims that the Appellate Court improperly upheld

the trial court’s refusal to give a limiting instruction concerning the firearms

examiner’s testimony. We agree with the Appellate Court that the trial court’s

general instruction on expert testimony was sufficient to guide the jury in

its assessment of Stephenson’s testimony. See State v. Tyus, supra 184 Conn.

App. 682. As the Appellate Court aptly noted, the defendant’s requested

instruction that ‘‘Stephenson’s opinions in this case are not to be treated

by [the jury] as scientifically definitive’’ and ‘‘that the probability of [Stephenson’s] opinion being correct is for [the jury] . . . alone to determine’’ is

substantially similar to the instruction that was actually given. (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 684–85. The jury was instructed that ‘‘[s]uch

[expert] testimony is presented to you to assist you in your deliberations.

No such testimony is binding upon you, however, and you may disregard

such testimony either in whole or in part. It is for you to consider the

testimony with the other circumstances in the case, and using your best

judgment, determine whether you will give any weight to it, and, if so, what

weight you will give to it. The testimony is entitled to such weight as you

find the expert’s qualifications in his or her field entitle it to receive, and

it must be considered by you, but it is not controlling upon your judgment.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Thus, the trial court properly

instructed the jury that it alone could assess the credibility of the expert

witnesses, including Stephenson. For this reason, we conclude that this

claim is wholly without merit.

8

In his brief to this court and before the Appellate Court, the defendant

claimed, for the first time, that the admission of ‘‘inflammatory evidence

pertaining [solely] to Armadore’’ unfairly prejudiced [the defendant] because

it made him appear violent and guilty by association. The evidence he

points to relates to Armadore’s testimony about domestic violence incidents

between Armadore and his girlfriend. Defense counsel neither objected to

any of the evidence that the defendant now claims prejudiced him at trial

nor asked the trial court for a limiting instruction regarding that evidence.

Because those claims are not properly preserved, we decline to address

them. See, e.g., State v. Cabral, 275 Conn. 514, 530–31, 881 A.2d 247 (‘‘[t]he

standard for the preservation of a claim alleging an improper evidentiary
ruling at trial is well settled. This court is not bound to consider claims of

law not made at the trial. . . . In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling

for review, trial counsel must object properly. . . . In objecting to evidence,

counsel must properly articulate the basis of the objection so as to apprise

the trial court of the precise nature of the objection and its real purpose, in

order to form an adequate basis for a reviewable ruling.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1048, 126 S. Ct. 773, 163 L. Ed. 2d

600 (2005).

9 Specifically, as the Appellate Court noted, defense counsel assumed, in

his objection to the state’s motion for joinder, that ‘‘the state will be able

to show that Armadore’s statement was made (1) while the conspiracy was

ongoing and (2) in furtherance of the conspiracy.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Tyus, supra, 184 Conn. App. 677 n.5. Counsel also

‘‘assume[d] that the state will also have made the threshold showing of the

existence of a conspiracy in order that this statement [may] be properly

offered, let alone admitted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

10 Carpenter was decided approximately one month after the defendant’s

appeal was argued before the Appellate Court. As such, the defendant also

claims that, because the rule announced in Carpenter is a new constitutional

rule, it applies to all pending cases, regardless of whether the claim was

preserved at trial. The state argues that the defendant is not entitled to

retroactive application of Carpenter because he did not pursue any claim,

before either the trial court or the Appellate Court, that his CSLI data should

have been suppressed. This court first applied the holding of Carpenter in

State v. Brown, 331 Conn. 258, 202 A.3d 1003 (2019). In Brown, the police

had obtained two months of the defendant’s CSLI pursuant to an ex parte

order. Id., 265–66. The defendant moved to suppress the CSLI. Id., 268. The

appeal in Brown was pending before the Appellate Court when Carpenter

was decided. In Brown, this court applied Carpenter and held that obtaining

CSLI without a warrant violated the defendant’s fourth amendment rights.

Id., 273. Thus, it is clear that we apply the rule from Carpenter retroactively

to cases pending on appeal, subject to review under State v. Golding, 213

Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317

Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.

314, 322, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987) (‘‘[A]t a minimum, all

defendants whose cases [are] still pending on direct appeal at the time of

[a law changing] decision should be entitled to invoke the new rule. . . .

[F]ailure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases

pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.))

11 We note that there was an objection to the labeling on the printout of

Wines’ slideshow presentation that identified the defendant by name in

relation to the cell phone numbers from which calls were made and received

on the night of the shooting. The trial court sustained the objection, and

the prosecutor had Wines redact the defendant’s name, insofar as it revealed

to whom the cell phone numbers were registered or by whom they were

used. The printout, thus, showed only which cell phone numbers were

activated and where and when they were activated. However, there was

other evidence admitted at trial that established that two of these phone

numbers were connected to a cell phone registered to or used by the defendant and that the other phone number was connected to a cell phone

registered to Armadore.

12 We observe that there may not be a meaningful distinction between the

state’s obtaining more or less than seven days of CSLI without a warrant.

See Carpenter v. United States, supra, 138 S. Ct. 2217 (‘‘time-stamped data

[provides] an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his [or

her] particular movements, but through them his [or her] familial, political,

professional, religious, and sexual associations’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Allowing CSLI collection for a period of three days, in the absence

of compelling reasons or exigent circumstances, may not adequately alleviate

those concerns. See id., 2222. Indeed, several of our sister states have

concluded that obtaining less than seven days of CSLI may constitute a

search for which a warrant is required. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 159, 165–66, 156 N.E.3d 754 (2020) (‘‘[c]ollecting more than

six hours of CSLI data invades a defendant’s reasonable expectation of

privacy, and, therefore, under the [f]ourth [a]mendment to the United States

[c]onstitution . . . requires a warrant supported by a showing of probable

cause); People v. Simpson, 62 Misc. 3d 374, 380, 88 N.Y.S.3d 763 (2018)

(‘‘this [c]ourt finds that the period of time in Carpenter—seven days—is
less significant to the ultimate decision by the [c]ourt than the underlying

rationale supporting the [c]ourt’s express holding’’); State v. Gibbs, Docket

No. 2017-001846, 2020 WL 4814266, *4 (S.C. App. August 19, 2020) (concluding that CSLI obtained by authorities over five day period constituted search

under fourth amendment).

13 We recognize that, in some cases in which, due to the passage of time

and the unavailability of the evidence, such as bodily fluids or DNA samples,

a subsequent examiner may by necessity be limited to a review of the

analysis of the original examiner, the subsequent examiner should testify

only as to his or her own independent conclusions based on the review of

the analysis conducted by the prior examiner. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois,

567 U.S. 50, 56–58, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 183 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2012) (expert testimony

did not violate defendant’s right to confrontation when expert reached

independent conclusions after relying on DNA report generated by thirdparty laboratory from rape kit). In this case, Stephenson’s direct testimony

was not so limited by the state. By contrast, in Lebrick, Stephenson testified

only about his own conclusions based on comparisons of photographs of

the ballistics evidence, without any reference to Petillo’s conclusions. State

v. Lebrick, supra, 334 Conn. 527. Although defense counsel did cross-examine

Stephenson about Petillo’s findings, this is not a situation in which defense

counsel opened the door to the admission of Petillo’s findings, because the

prosecutor indirectly introduced them during Stephenson’s direct examination.