United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-1277

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jack Eugene Knight

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

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Submitted: November 16, 2020

 Filed: February 16, 2021 

[Unpublished]

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Before BENTON, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Jack Knight argues that the district court1 erred in admitting criminal-history 

evidence during his trial, which ended with his conviction for possession and receipt 

1

The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., United States District Judge for the 

District of Nebraska.
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of child-pornography. Knight further argues that he received a substantively 

unreasonable sentence. We disagree on both counts and affirm the district court.

A jury convicted Knight on two counts of possessing and two counts of 

receiving child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B), (b)(1), (b)(2). 

At trial, the district court denied Knight’s motion to exclude evidence of his two 

prior convictions for child molestation. At sentencing, the district court calculated 

Knight’s offense level as 42 and his criminal history category as II. Knight’s 

adjusted United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”) range was 324 

to 405 months of imprisonment. The district court imposed concurrent 200-month 

terms on one possession count and both receipt counts, and a consecutive 200-month 

term on the second possession count. In total, the district court sentenced Knight to 

400 months of imprisonment.

Knight first argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his 

prior convictions because their probative value was substantially outweighed by 

unfair prejudice. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. DeFoggi, 839 F.3d 701, 708 (8th Cir. 2016). Knight’s 

prior child-molestation convictions were highly relevant to the child pornography 

charges at issue here and are expressly admissible under the rules of evidence. Rule 

414(a) provides that “[i]n a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child 

molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other 

child molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is 

relevant.” Fed. R. Evid. 414(a). As defined by Rule 414(d), child molestation 

includes any child-pornography-related conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. chapter 

110. See Fed. R. Evid. 414(d)(2)(B). Here, Knight’s past convictions showed his 

sexual interest in children as well as his motive, intent, and knowledge in receiving 

and possessing child pornography. See United States v. Emmert, 825 F.3d 906, 909 

(8th Cir. 2016) (“[E]vidence that [the defendant] sexually abused [two girls] is 

probative of [his] interest in underage girls . . . . In this way, [the defendant]’s prior 

conduct shows he has a propensity for exploiting young girls and connects him to 

the pornographic images found on his hard drive.”). And any prejudice those 
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convictions created was not “unfair” within the meaning of Rule 403. See United 

States v. Splettstoeszer, 956 F.3d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Furman, 

867 F.3d 981, 988 (8th Cir. 2017).

Knight next argues that he received a substantively unreasonable sentence. 

We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion and presume a 

sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Feemster, 572 

F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v. Harris, 964 F.3d 718, 725 

(8th Cir. 2020). And while a sentencing court abuses its discretion when it fails to 

consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight or gives 

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, “[s]entencing courts . . . have 

wide discretion to weigh the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. 

Donahue, 959 F.3d 864, 866–67 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Wilder, 

597 F.3d 936, 946 (8th Cir. 2010)). Here, we presume Knight’s sentence was 

reasonable because it was within the applicable Guidelines range. The district court 

also noted that it considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors in sentencing Knight, 

including his age and his criminal history. Nothing suggests that this is one of those 

“rare case[s]” where our presumption—that within-the-range sentences are 

reasonable—is overcome. United States v. Bolden, 596 F.3d 976, 985 (8th Cir. 

2010) (quoting United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2006)).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

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