United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-1572 

VICENTE GONZÁLEZ ET AL., 

Plaintiffs, Appellants, 

v. 

ROGELIO VÉLEZ ET AL., 

Defendants, Appellees, 

OCTAVIO OTERO ET AL., 

Defendants. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Selya, Circuit Judge, and 

McConnell, District Judge.

 Nicolás Nogueras-Cartagena and Nogueras Law & Associates on 

brief for appellants. 

 Michael J. Carlson, Litigation Attorney, United States Army 

Litigation Division, and Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United 

States Attorney, on brief for appellees. 

 

 Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation. 
July 24, 2017 
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. This is a federal-sector 

employment discrimination case, in which the plaintiffs have 

attempted to improve their lot by invoking extravagant theories of 

liability. The plaintiffs' theories run headlong into an 

impenetrable barrier forged by the combination of the Civil Service 

Reform Act (CSRA), see 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (and scattered sections of 

Title 5 of the U.S. Code), and Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e 

to 2000e-17. The plaintiffs' claims cannot breach this barrier 

either by cloaking them in the raiment of the Bivens doctrine, see 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FBN, 403 U.S. 388, 389 

(1971), or by garbing them as causes of action brought under the 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), see 18 

U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 

dismissal of the plaintiffs' third amended complaint. 

I. BACKGROUND

Because this appeal follows the granting of a motion to 

dismiss, we draw the facts from the operative version of the 

complaint. See Butler v. Balolia, 736 F.3d 609, 611 (1st Cir. 

2013). We are at liberty, though, to supplement those facts with 

facts "gleaned from documents incorporated by reference into the 

complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to 

judicial notice." Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st 

Cir. 2011). 
- 4 - 

Plaintiff-appellant Vicente González and plaintiffappellant Víctor Franco were hired in 1996 as civilian employees 

of the Department of Army Civilian Police (DACP). As such, both 

men were attached to the Army garrison at Fort Buchanan in 

Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. By 2007, González had risen to the rank of 

chief. Franco remained an investigator. At that time, longsimmering workplace conflicts came to a boil: the plaintiffs allege 

that they were victims of a "witch hunt," culminating in a criminal 

investigation instigated by a cadre of coworkers and supervisors. 

In February of 2007, González's direct supervisor, James 

Adamski, announced plans to leave his post as the head of the 

Directorate of Emergency Services (DES) at Fort Buchanan. González 

told Adamski privately of his interest in the position. This news 

spread — and it did not receive unanimous acclaim. According to 

the plaintiffs, some of their colleagues hatched a plot to keep 

the job in the hands of a non-Puerto Rican and non-Hispanic 

individual. The plot had its genesis (the plaintiffs say) in the 

belief that such an individual would be more likely to acquiesce 

in the garrison's corrupt culture. 

To put meat on these bones, the plaintiffs asserted that 

the garrison commander (Stephen Ackman) and a staff judge advocate 

(Mark Nozaki) resented González's refusal to cooperate with their 

pernicious practices, which included wiping away valid traffic 

citations and conducting warrantless electronic surveillance. 
- 5 - 

Adamski, Ackman, Nozaki, Raymond Johnson (the garrison's fire 

chief), and Gunner Pederson (the garrison's deputy commander) "all 

conspired to ensure that González could not compete for the DES 

Director's opening, and to terminate his employment as Chief of 

Police of the DACP." Relatedly, the conspirators contrived to 

have Johnson, rather than González, appointed as the interim DES 

director. Other DACP personnel — including Rogelio Vélez, Octavio 

Otero, and Edwin Sepúlveda — were part of the conspiracy. As such, 

they began spreading false and defamatory information about the 

plaintiffs. For example, Vélez and Otero approached a federal 

prosecutor and instigated a criminal investigation of the 

plaintiffs' activities. In this regard, they told the prosecutor 

that González had been using his position for personal gain and 

that Franco had been employing his security credentials for 

"inappropriate purposes." 

The plaintiffs further alleged that the prosecutor 

swallowed this bait hook, line, and sinker: he relayed the negative 

information to the Criminal Investigations Division (CID), which 

then assigned two agents, Billy Higgason and Ramón Román, to look 

into the matter. In the course of the probe, Vélez gave a sworn 

statement, describing several examples of González's purported 

abuse of his authority. For instance, Vélez said that González 

had nullified several traffic citations in exchange for money or 

favors, had falsified a DACP investigator's training certificate, 
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had attempted to interfere with the detention of a suspected drug 

smuggler, and had solicited investments in his sister-in-law's 

music album from coworkers. Sepúlveda confirmed that González had 

asked him to invest $2,000 in the sister-in-law's music album. 

So, too, Otero identified a number of instances in which González 

ostensibly had taken actions that were either illegal or improper. 

According to the complaint, Otero also implicated 

Franco. He told investigators that Franco had brought a relative 

into the garrison and allowed him to leave with several cases of 

liquor. The investigators were given security videotape 

purporting to show Franco loading boxes into a vehicle. 

With the CID investigation underway, Ackman — in 

consultation with Nozaki and Pederson, among others — decided to 

suspend the plaintiffs. He placed González and Franco on 

administrative leave in April of 2007, but they continued to 

receive their regular pay and benefits. 

In the plaintiffs' view, it became crystal clear, as 

early as May 31, that there was no probable cause to bring criminal 

charges. Nevertheless, Franco was not allowed to return to work 

until late July. Even then, he was assigned mundane tasks for 

approximately four months until he was permitted to return to his 

regular work. 

The investigation continued until mid-November of 2007, 

when the CID issued a report finding no evidence of illegal 
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activity. Despite this finding, Johnson had González's security 

clearance revoked near the end of November. As late as the 

following February, Pederson urged that the revocation remain in 

effect. González's security clearance was not restored until April 

of 2008 — and it was not until then that González regained his 

former position. 

While still on administrative leave, the plaintiffs — 

both of whom are Hispanic and Puerto Rican — began complaining 

about disparate treatment due to race and national origin. They 

sought advice from the Army's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) 

office, which provided counseling and, in memoranda documenting 

the completion of that counseling, notified each plaintiff of his 

right to file a formal complaint within fifteen days. There is no 

allegation that González ever filed a formal EEO complaint. 

Franco, however, filed a formal complaint within the 

prescribed time period. He received a final decision on June 11, 

2007, which concluded that "no employment harm" had occurred 

because Franco had not experienced any loss of pay or pay grade. 

This decision explicitly warned that Franco had a limited time in 

which to take further action: he could either appeal the decision 

to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 

thirty days or file suit in federal court within ninety days. See 

29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.402(a), 1614.407(a). Franco did neither. 
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On March 17, 2008 (well over ninety days after Franco's 

receipt of the final administrative decision), González and Franco 

joined forces and filed this action in the federal district court.1 

Their complaint named twelve defendants (all sued in their personal 

capacities): Vélez, Otero, Sepúlveda, Adamski, Johnson, Ackman, 

Nozaki, Pederson, Higgason, Román, Berta Santiago (a Fort Buchanan 

detective), and Jorge Quiñones (a DACP investigator). We skip 

over a salmagundi of intervening pleadings, not relevant here, and 

focus on the plaintiffs' third amended complaint. That complaint 

alleged deprivations of the plaintiffs' First, Fourth, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought damages under the Bivens 

doctrine. See 403 U.S. at 389. It also proffered RICO claims, 

see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, positing that the named defendants 

conspired "to defraud the criminal investigation process and to 

fabricate a fraudulent criminal investigation against 

[p]laintiffs." In support of the RICO claims, the complaint set 

forth a laundry list of predicate acts, see id. § 1961(1), 

including obstruction of justice, see id. § 1503; obstruction of 

criminal investigations, see id. § 1510; obstruction of state or 

local law enforcement, see id. § 1511; tampering with a witness, 

 1 The plaintiffs' spouses and their respective conjugal 

partnerships were named as plaintiffs and remain parties to this 

appeal. Their claims are purely derivative, though, and for ease 

in exposition, we refer to González and Franco as if they were the 

sole plaintiffs and appellants. Our decision is, of course, 

binding on all parties. 
- 9 - 

victim, or informant, see id. § 1512; mail fraud, see id. § 1341; 

and wire fraud, see id. § 1343. 

The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, 

want of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to 

state an actionable claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)-(2), (6). 

The plaintiffs dropped their claims against Adamski and Quiñones 

and disavowed their First Amendment claims, but opposed the motion 

in all other respects. About six and one-half years after the 

filing of the dismissal motion — a delay resulting, at least in 

part,2 from a disorienting record, a steady influx of haphazard 

filings, and muddled briefing — the district court granted the 

motion and entered judgment in the defendants' favor. See González 

v. Otero, 172 F. Supp. 3d 477, 509 (D.P.R. 2016). The court 

dismissed all claims against Otero, Sepúlveda, Ackman, Nozaki, 

Higgason, and Román because the plaintiffs had failed to serve 

them within the allotted time and had not shown good cause for 

this failure. See id. at 498; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The 

plaintiffs have not challenged this ruling on appeal. 

 2 Some part of this delay was attributable to the court's 

effort to ascertain the applicability vel non of the Westfall Act, 

see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), and whether the United States should 

be substituted for certain defendants. Because this issue 

ultimately proved to be a dead letter and the district court's 

handling of it has no bearing on the outcome of the present appeal, 

there is no need to describe what transpired. 
- 10 - 

As to the other defendants (Vélez, Johnson, Pederson, 

and Santiago), the court ruled that the plaintiffs could not dodge 

the preclusive effect of the CSRA and Title VII by "creatively" 

pleading causes of action. González, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 503-06. 

In expounding upon this point, the court explained that, had the 

plaintiffs brought their claims under the appropriate statutes, 

they would be time-barred because they had failed to comply with 

various administrative procedures and deadlines. See id. at 496-

97. Using a belt-and-suspenders approach, the court held, in the 

alternative, that various defendants were entitled to either 

absolute or qualified immunity. See id. at 506-08. 

This timely appeal ensued. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo a district court's order granting a 

motion to dismiss. See SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 441 (1st 

Cir. 2010) (en banc); Fothergill v. United States, 566 F.3d 248, 

251 (1st Cir. 2009). We accept as true all well-pleaded facts and 

draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor. 

See Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2012). 

We are not bound by the lower court's reasoning, though, "but may 

affirm the order of dismissal on any ground made manifest by the 

record." Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Román-Cancel v. United States, 613 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 

2010)). 
- 11 - 

The parties' briefs raise an ear-splitting cacophony of 

issues. We cut through the noise and focus on an issue that we 

find dispositive of this appeal: preclusion. 

Federal-sector employment claims typically take one of 

two paths. The first path runs through the CSRA, which constitutes 

"a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action[s] taken 

against federal employees." United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 

439, 455 (1988). Such personnel actions include any actions 

undertaken in contravention of an employee's constitutional 

rights. See Irizarry v. United States, 427 F.3d 76, 77-78 (1st 

Cir. 2005); see also 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(2) ("All employees and 

applicants for employment should receive fair and equitable 

treatment in all aspects of personnel management . . . with proper 

regard for their . . . constitutional rights."). As a general 

matter, the CSRA occupies much of the field and (with some 

exceptions) precludes resort to other forms of redress. See Elgin 

v. Dep't of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2012) ("Given the 

painstaking detail with which the CSRA sets out the method for 

covered employees to obtain review of adverse employment actions, 

it is fairly discernible that Congress intended to deny such 

employees an additional avenue of review in district court."); see 

also Fausto, 484 U.S. at 455 (holding that CSRA precluded federal 

employee from bringing backpay suit against government). 
- 12 - 

Some types of claims, though, are excluded from the 

CSRA's monopoly over federal-sector employment actions. In 

particular, the statute "shall not be construed to extinguish or 

lessen" rights or remedies available under certain antidiscrimination statutes. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(d). As relevant here, 

Section 717 of Title VII creates a private right of action for 

federal employees with respect to workplace discrimination on the 

basis of, inter alia, race or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-16. This maps the contours of the second path through 

which federal-sector employment cases may proceed. 

These paths sometimes intersect. When a federal 

employee attributes an adverse employment action in part to bias 

based on race or national origin in derogation of federal 

antidiscrimination laws, his case becomes a "mixed case." See 

Perry v. MSPB, 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 (2017). This term — "mixed 

case" — signifies that the federal employee's case is governed 

partially by the CSRA and partially by Title VII. See Kloeckner 

v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 44-45 (2012). The distinction is 

consequential because, among other things, the two statutes have 

different jurisdictional trappings. In a typical case, CSRA claims 

must be presented to the agency-employer itself and, if pursued 

further, reviewed by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), 

with subsequent litigation taking place in the Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit. See id. In contrast, standard Title VII 
- 13 - 

claims must proceed in accordance with regulations promulgated by 

the EEOC and subsequent litigation starts in a federal district 

court. See Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1649 (2015). 

Here, the plaintiffs' allegations are a jumble. 

Stripped to their core, they seem to present a mixed case. The 

plaintiffs complain of discrimination based on race and national 

origin, as well as discrimination based on their unwillingness to 

tolerate corrupt practices within the garrison. Specific 

procedures exist for the prosecution of such mixed cases: the 

aggrieved employee may file a discrimination complaint with the 

employing agency itself, typically with its EEO office, or may 

file a complaint with the MSPB. See Kloeckner, 568 U.S. at 44-

45; Rodriguez v. United States, 852 F.3d 67, 84 (1st Cir. 2017). 

Either route comes with its own administrative processes. See 

Kloeckner, 568 U.S. at 45. A claimant cannot avoid those processes 

and their concomitant deadlines by the simple expedient of 

masquerading an employment discrimination claim in the guise of a 

different legal theory. See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 

820, 835 (1976) (holding that federal employee who missed deadline 

for filing Title VII claim could not bring suit based on alleged 

discriminatory conduct under Declaratory Judgment Act); cf. TapiaTapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 745 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding 

appellant's age discrimination allegations "not justiciable" when 

styled as constitutional claims because Age Discrimination in 
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Employment Act "provides the exclusive federal remedy for age 

discrimination in employment"). 

In this case, the plaintiffs have not made any effort to 

prosecute claims under the CSRA and, in any event, the district 

court had no jurisdiction to hear such claims. See Irizarry, 427 

F.3d at 78-79. Nor have the plaintiffs attempted to resurrect 

their Title VII claims; their third amended complaint does not so 

much as mention Title VII and, even apart from that omission, the 

record makes manifest that neither plaintiff has met the relevant 

Title VII deadlines. 

Faced with this inhospitable legal landscape, the 

plaintiffs try to breathe life into their federal-sector 

employment claims by carving out two additional paths to relief. 

On the facts of this case, both paths are dead ends. 

To begin, the plaintiffs asseverate that the 

Constitution itself provides an avenue, under the aegis of the Due 

Process Clause, for bringing federal-sector employment claims 

against coworkers and supervisors in their individual capacities. 

For this proposition, they rely on the Supreme Court's decision in 

Bivens. As we explain below, Bivens cannot carry the weight that 

the plaintiffs load upon it. 

In Bivens, the Court held that a Fourth Amendment 

violation by federal agents, acting under color of governmental 

authority, gave rise to a cause of action for money damages against 
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those agents in their individual capacities. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 

at 389. The basis for recognizing such a new constitutional tort 

and, thus, allowing such suits to proceed, is — as the plaintiffs 

suggest — derived from the Constitution itself. See Corr. Servs. 

Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66-67 (2001). 

While the boundaries of Bivens-type liability are hazy, 

the Supreme Court, in its most recent term, made plain its 

reluctance to extend the Bivens doctrine to new settings. See 

Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017) (per curiam); 

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). To this end, the 

Court specified that when a Bivens-type claim is lodged, the 

appropriate analysis must begin by determining whether the 

plaintiff is seeking to extend the Bivens doctrine to a new 

context. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864. For this purpose, a 

context is considered new "[i]f the case is different in a 

meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the Supreme] 

Court." Id. at 1859. Once it is determined that the context is 

new, the next step is to ask whether an alternative means of 

obtaining relief exists and, if so, whether "special factors" 

counsel hesitation in extending the reach of the Bivens doctrine. 

Id. at 1865. 

With respect to the Bivens doctrine, the universe of 

previous "cases decided by [the Supreme] Court," id. at 1859, is 

narrow. Bivens itself arose in a context that bears no resemblance 
- 16 - 

to the workplace-based discrimination that lies at the heart of 

the plaintiffs' case. 

Since deciding Bivens, the Court has recognized an 

implied right of action for constitutional torts in only two other 

contexts. In the first of these cases, the Court held that the 

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment permitted a damages 

action where a staffer sued a Member of Congress for cashiering 

her because of her gender. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 

243-44 (1979). Subsequently, the Court allowed a Bivens-type 

action under the Eighth Amendment in a case in which federal 

correctional officers had failed to treat a prisoner's asthma 

during his incarceration. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20-

23 (1980). 

For the most part, Bivens and its progeny arose in 

contexts that differ meaningfully from the present context. Bivens 

involved the illegal search of an individual's home — an issue 

foreign to this case.3 So, too, this case — which is not concerned 

 3 We note that González and Franco allege, as a tiny part of 

the parade of horribles that they muster, that their offices were 

illegally searched. While this allegation may implicate the Fourth 

Amendment, it is inextricably intertwined with a myriad of more 

serious allegations, none of which brings the Fourth Amendment 

into play. Given the Supreme Court's manifest reluctance to extend 

the Bivens doctrine, we do not think that the tail should be 

permitted to wag the dog. This is all the more so where, as here, 

the federal-sector employment context meaningfully distinguishes 

the plaintiffs' case from Bivens. 
- 17 - 

either with the rights of prison inmates or with the strictures of 

the Eighth Amendment — differs meaningfully from Carlson. 

This brings us to Davis, which arose in a context that 

bears a superficial similarity to the present context. That case, 

like this one, involves discrimination claims of federal 

employees. But even if we assume for argument's sake that the 

context is substantially the same, the plaintiffs hit a roadblock 

at the next step of the analysis, that is, whether there exists an 

alternative process that Congress reasonably may have viewed as an 

equally effective surrogate for an action brought directly under 

the Constitution. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858; Carlson, 446 

U.S. at 18-19. 

The linchpin of the Davis Court's analysis was its 

conclusion that Title VII, as then written, did not apply to 

congressional employees.4 See Davis, 442 U.S. at 247. Here, no 

such exemption bars the gateway to relief: the plaintiffs — unlike 

the plaintiff in Davis — had available to them alternative 

processes (the CSRA and Title VII) that Congress reasonably might 

have viewed as effective substitutes for an action brought under 

the Constitution.5 The existence of such alternative processes is 

 4 Title VII has since been extended to cover legislative 

employees. See 2 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2). 

5 The CSRA was not enacted until 1978. See Pub. L. No. 95-

454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978). Consequently, it was unavailable to 

the Davis plaintiff and, in all events, it would not have applied 
- 18 - 

a special factor that counsels convincingly against applying the 

holding in Davis to federal employees generally. 

Viewed against this backdrop, we conclude that the 

plaintiffs are seeking to extend the Bivens doctrine beyond 

acceptable limits. Federal-sector employment claims are sui 

generis: the CSRA and Title VII, with their regulatory 

accoutrements, form a comprehensive remedial network fully capable 

of protecting federal employees against acts of discrimination in 

the workplace. There is no justification for implying a Bivenstype remedy. 

 The plaintiffs dispute this conclusion. They argue 

that the statutory and regulatory mosaic does not afford as 

complete relief as a Bivens action and, thus, Congress might not 

have viewed those statutes and regulations as providing equally 

effective remediation. To illustrate this point, the plaintiffs 

note that they could not obtain punitive damages under either the 

CSRA or Title VII.6 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 372 & n.8 

(1983) (explaining that CSRA damages do not include punitive 

 

to a congressional staffer. See Davis v. Billington, 681 F.3d 

377, 385-86 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

6 The plaintiffs also insist that their months-long 

suspensions are not covered under the CSRA. This insistence is 

misplaced. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii) (defining "personnel 

action" to include "any . . . significant change in duties, 

responsibilities, or working conditions," whether or not 

specifically denominated). 
- 19 - 

damages); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (excluding government from 

punitive damages liability under Title VII). 

This same argument was addressed and rejected by the 

Bush Court. See 462 U.S. at 372 & n.8. There, the Court considered 

whether the CSRA, together with other laws, precluded a federal 

employee's claim that he had been retaliated against for exercising 

his First Amendment rights. See id. at 385-86 & n.25. Assuming 

arguendo that greater damages would be available in a 

constitutional tort suit, the Court nonetheless held that the 

existing statutory regime precluded such a suit. See id. 

The Bush Court couched its inquiry in a consideration of 

whether special factors existed that counselled hesitation in 

extending the Bivens remedy. See id. at 380. The Court determined 

that such factors were present, explaining that the "elaborate, 

comprehensive scheme that encompasses substantive provisions 

forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors and procedures — 

administrative and judicial — by which improper action may be 

redressed" militates against allowing the Bivens doctrine to 

intrude into the federal employment arena. 462 U.S. at 385; see 

Montplaisir v. Leighton, 875 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting 

that the Supreme Court "has jealously guarded [the] CSRA against 

inconcinnous judicial incursions"). 

The Bush Court's reasoning applies with undiminished 

force in the case at hand. The relevant "inquiry must concentrate 
- 20 - 

on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional 

action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits 

of allowing a damages action to proceed." Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 

1857-58. In the context of this case, the careful layering of 

federal statutes, including the CSRA and Title VII, involves a 

wide range of policy considerations best left to Congress's 

superior understanding of governmental structures and systems 

nationwide. See id. at 1858; see also Bush, 462 U.S. at 389 ("Not 

only has Congress developed considerable familiarity with 

balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of employees, but 

it also may inform itself through factfinding procedures such as 

hearings that are not available to the courts.") 

We conclude, therefore, that there is no basis for 

extending the Bivens doctrine to claims alleging arbitrary or 

discriminatory treatment in those precincts of the federal 

workplace patrolled by the CSRA and Title VII. The fact that other 

or different relief might be available to federal employees if 

constitutional tort suits were permitted does not alter this 

conclusion. The very purpose for which Congress enacted the CSRA 

was "to replace the haphazard arrangements for administrative and 

judicial review of personnel action" that characterized the 

preexisting civil service system. Fausto, 484 U.S. at 444. 

Engrafting new causes of action on an ad hoc basis would create a 
- 21 - 

patchwork that perpetuates the same infirmities that the CSRA was 

designed to avoid. 

The plaintiffs also attempt to blaze a trail to relief 

by alleging RICO violations. The question of whether the CSRA and 

Title VII, taken together, preclude a civil RICO action brought by 

a federal employee against his coworkers and supervisors is one of 

first impression at the federal appellate level. Several district 

courts, though, have held that the CSRA precludes a civil RICO 

action in this context. See, e.g., Bloch v. Exec. Office of the 

President, 164 F. Supp. 3d 841, 857 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that 

"civil RICO claim[s] . . . alleging unlawful activity in connection 

with plaintiff's removal from federal employment" are precluded); 

Ferris v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., 98 F. Supp. 2d 64, 69 (D. Me. 

2000) (holding that, in a federal-sector employment action, 

plaintiff "must seek redress . . . under the CSRA, not RICO"). 

These decisions are consistent with our case law, which 

has termed the CSRA framework "the exclusive mechanism for 

challenging adverse personnel actions in federal employment." 

Rodriguez, 852 F.3d at 82; see Berrios v. Dep't of the Army, 884 

F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1989) ("There is no longer any serious 

dispute that the CSRA preempts challenges to personnel actions 

brought under federal law."). They also fit snuggly with the 

statutory text, which instructs that the CSRA "shall not be 

construed to extinguish or lessen" the rights and remedies 
- 22 - 

available under a list of enumerated statutes. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(d). 

RICO is not one of these enumerated statutes, and the venerable 

maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius applies. See Frazier 

v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) 

(explaining that, "in harmony with the maxim . . . , the explicit 

provision of [one thing] within a statute cuts sharply against the 

implication of [others]"). 

Much the same reasoning pertains to the preclusive 

effect of Title VII vis-à-vis civil RICO actions. No less an 

authority than the Supreme Court has made pellucid that Title VII 

"provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of 

discrimination in federal employment." Brown, 425 U.S. at 835. 

"Exclusive" ordinarily means "exclusive," and we can envision no 

reason why a RICO claim premised on allegations of discrimination 

in federal employment might somehow elude the grasp of this 

congressionally declared exclusivity. 

To sum up, we hold that the CSRA and Title VII, taken 

together, preclude the plaintiffs' constitutional tort claims. 

Similarly, we hold that the CSRA and Title VII, taken together, 

preclude the plaintiffs' RICO claims. Lastly, we hold that there 

are no other arguably non-precluded claims before us.7 These 

 7 We recognize that the third amended complaint is a streamof-consciousness pleading, characterized more by prolixity than by 

clarity of expression. It may be possible for an inventive mind 

to tease arguably non-precluded claims out of its interstices. On 
- 23 - 

holdings, taken in cumulation, sound the death knell for the 

plaintiffs' appeal. 

Two loose ends remain. First, the plaintiffs lament the 

length of time — roughly six and one-half years — that elapsed 

between the filing of the motion to dismiss and the district 

court's decision. They contend that this delay warrants vacating 

the judgment. This contention is hopeless. 

Delay in the administration of justice is always 

regrettable. But there is no fixed time within which a district 

court must decide a dispositive motion, and delay alone is not a 

sufficient ground for vacating a civil judgment that, like this 

one, is correct on the merits. In such a situation, vacation of 

the judgment would be an empty exercise: on remand, the district 

court would simply re-enter its original judgment. Cf. Gibbs v. 

Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 78 (1939) (stating that it would be "useless" 

to reverse and remand where district court had corrected its error 

after an appeal was taken). We made it plain, long ago, that we 

will not force litigants "round and round the mulberry bush for no 

better reason than ceremonial punctiliousness." Jusino v. Zayas, 

875 F.2d 986, 990 (1st Cir. 1989). 

 

appeal, however, claims are deemed abandoned unless they are, at 

a minimum, accompanied by some developed argumentation. See United 

States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). The plaintiffs' 

briefs contain nothing resembling developed argumentation with 

respect to any such arguably non-precluded claims. 
- 24 - 

Second, the plaintiffs fault the district court for 

failing to rule on their motion for summary judgment. Once the 

court granted the motion to dismiss and jettisoned the action, 

however, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment became moot. 

See McCulloch v. Vélez, 364 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining 

that district court's allowance of motion to dismiss mooted pending 

motion for summary judgment). A court has no obligation — indeed, 

no authority — to adjudicate moot questions. See Barr v. Galvin, 

626 F.3d 99, 104 (1st Cir. 2010). Seen in this light, the district 

court's decision to forgo any ruling on the summary judgment motion 

was both proper and logical. 

III. CONCLUSION

We need go no further.8 For the reasons elucidated 

above, the judgment of the district court is 

Affirmed.

 8 Because we hold that the CSRA and Title VII, taken together, 

preclude the plaintiffs' claims, we take no view of the welter of 

other defenses (such as absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and 

the like) relied on by the district court and advanced by various 

defendants.