Present: All the Justices 

BALZER AND ASSOCIATES, INC. 

v. Record No. 950052 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 November 3, 1995 

THE LAKES ON 360, INC., ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Timothy J. Hauler, Judge 

 This appeal arises from a suit by a judgment creditor to 

void a transfer of real property by its judgment debtor. At the 

conclusion of the creditor's case, the chancellor found that the 

debtor had no equity in the property transferred, thus precluding 

a finding of fraudulent intent, and granted the debtor's motion 

to strike the evidence of the creditor. The issue we consider is 

whether the chancellor erred in granting the motion to strike. 

Because the creditor pled and presented a prima facie case 

sufficient to prove both a void fraudulent transfer, Code 

§ 55-80, and a voidable voluntary transfer, Code § 55-81, we 

reverse. 

 The following material facts are not in dispute. Bradley 

Investments, Ltd. (Bradley) initially purchased the property in 

question on July 1, 1988, from Howard F. and Alpha T. Hancock 

(the Hancocks) in exchange for a $1,000,000 purchase money note 

secured by a deed of trust. Contemporaneously with its 

acquisition of the property, Bradley further encumbered the 

property with a second deed of trust to secure a $4,200,000 

acquisition and development line of credit from Home Federal 

Savings Bank (the bank). 

 In October, 1991, Bradley became indebted to Balzer and 
Associates, Inc. (Balzer). Balzer received a judgment against 

Bradley in the amount of $28,773.48 plus fees and prospective 

interest on April 20, 1992. 

 Prior to February, 1992, Bradley was in default on its debt 

to the Hancocks on the purchase money note and the bank for funds 

expended from the acquisition and development line of credit. On 

February 4, 1992, Robert A. Conner (Conner), president of Bradley 

and husband of its principal owner, purported to transfer the 

property to The Lakes on 360, Inc. (The Lakes), which at that 

time had not received its corporate charter. Conner received a 

check made out to him personally for $5,000 as part of the 

transaction. 

 On February 20, 1992, six days after The Lakes received a 

corporate charter showing that the corporation was controlled by 

the Hancocks, Conner, by quitclaim deed, again purported to 

transfer the property to The Lakes in order to correct a mistake 

in the February 4, 1992 deed. No additional consideration was 

exchanged. 

 On May 11, 1992, Balzer filed a Bill of Complaint seeking to 

void the transfer of the property, naming as defendants Bradley 

and The Lakes (jointly, the defendants). Balzer specifically 

alleged that ". . . no consideration whatever passed from THE 

LAKES ON 360, INC. to Bradley for the Deed[s]; that Bradley would 

be rendered insolvent by the conveyance of the Property 

purportedly conveyed by the Deeds; [and] that the same [were] 

made to hinder, delay and defraud [Balzer] and other creditors." 

 In its prayer for relief, Bradley asked that the deeds "be 
declared void and of no effect." At trial, Conner testified that 

the $5,000 payment was made directly to him since Bradley was no 

longer a going concern. 

 It was further adduced through testimony or by stipulation 

that Bradley was insolvent at the time of the transfer; the 

Hancocks were Conner's uncle and aunt; The Lakes took the 

conveyance with the understanding that the property was subject 

to foreclosure by the Hancocks and the bank owning the deed of 

trust securing the acquisition and development loan; the 

outstanding amounts of the two loans exceeded $4,000,000; The 

Lakes was aware that additional mechanic's liens suits were 

pending against Bradley at the time of the conveyance; following 

the transfer, The Lakes obtained an additional $1,000,000 loan 

secured by the property; and, thereafter, the Hancocks 

subordinated their deed of trust to that of the bank. 

 At the conclusion of Balzer's case-in-chief, the defendants 

moved to strike the evidence. The chancellor, while concluding 

that the conveyance was "certainly questionable," nonetheless 

found that, as "the property had no equity in it at the time of 

the transfer," there was insufficient evidence of fraud on the 

part of Conner acting as an agent for Bradley to support voiding 

the transfer. On that basis, he granted defendants' motion to 

strike and dismissed Balzer's Bill of Complaint with prejudice. 

 The chancellor erroneously based his ruling on the 

presumption that the transfer was voidable only upon a showing of 

actual fraud. In Virginia, an existing creditor may seek to void 

a transfer of property by the debtor under one of two theories. 
The transfer can be alleged to have been made for the purposes of 

delaying, hindering, or defrauding the debtor's just creditors, 

both existing and future. Such transactions are fraudulent acts 

and are void except against bona fide transferees without 

knowledge of the fraudulent intent. Code § 55-80; see also

Consolidated Tramway Co. v. Germania Bank, 121 Va. 331, 335, 93 

S.E. 572, 573 (1917). 

 In the alternative, the transfer can be alleged to have been 

made without receipt by the debtor of "consideration deemed 

valuable in law" while the debtor was, or as a result of the 

transfer became, insolvent. Code § 55-81. In such cases, fraud 

or other malicious intent is not an element required to prove the 

voidability of the transfer. See Consolidated Tramway, 121 Va. 

at 335-36, 93 S.E.2d at 573, and Witz, Beidler & Co. v. Osburn, 

83 Va. 227, 229, 2 S.E. 33, 34-35 (1887) (distinguishing 

fraudulent and voidable voluntary transfers). In other words, a 

transfer undertaken by an insolvent debtor, or by a debtor who is 

thereby rendered insolvent, without return to him of valuable 

consideration is de jure fraudulent as against any existing 

creditor without any need to prove intent to defraud. Johnston 

v. Gill, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 587, 592 (1876). "The principle upon 

which voluntary conveyances are held void as to existing 

creditors is that a man should be just before he is generous." 

Battle v. Rock, 144 Va. 1, 15, 131 S.E. 344, 348 (1926). 

 Here, Balzer's allegations in the Bill of Complaint and the 

nature of the relief sought adequately pled alternative theories 

of fraudulent and voidable voluntary transfer in the context of 
Code §§ 55-80 and -81. The requirements for stating a cause of 

action are not so strict as to demand specificity beyond that 

necessary to "clearly [inform] the opposite party of the true 

nature of the claim or defense" pled. Rule 1:4(d); see also Code 

§ 8.01-275; cf. Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 422-23, 362 S.E.2d 

699, 705 (1987) (holding that Rule 1:4 and correlative statutes 

represent "a radical departure" from rules of common-law 

pleading). Moreover, where the allegations of a pleading support 

two alternative theories of recovery, the pleading of one is not 

made insufficient by the insufficiency of the other. Rule 

1:4(k); Code § 8.01-281. It is thus axiomatic that at the trial 

of a pleading which adequately states alternative theories of 

recovery, a motion to strike may not be sustained where the 

evidence would, if unrebutted, support recovery under at least 

one theory. 

 It is firmly established that, in considering a motion to 

strike a party's evidence, the chancellor must view the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Any reasonable doubt about 

the sufficiency of the evidence must be resolved in favor of the 

non-moving party. Shepherd v. Colton, 237 Va 537, 540, 378 

S.E.2d 828, 829-30 (1989). 

 We first consider whether the motion to strike should have 

been sustained with respect to the allegation of fraudulent 

transfer pursuant to Code § 55-80. The chancellor based his 

ruling on the finding that Bradley had no equity, actual or "of 

redemption", in the property. Balzer asserts that, since no 
evidence of the actual value of the property was adduced at 

trial, this finding is not supported by the record. We agree 

with Balzer. 

 Without direct evidence of the present value of the land, 

including the improvements which had been made since its 

acquisition, the mere fact of Bradley's insolvency was 

insufficient to establish that it had no equity in the property. 

 Moreover, the evidence available to the chancellor, including 

the original maximum credit available through the acquisition and 

development loan, the fact of improvements to the property which 

were subject to the mechanic's liens, and the additional 

development money available to The Lakes upon its acquisition of 

the property, would, under the standard of review described 

above, support the reasonable inference of the property having 

value at or above the established level of the encumbrances upon 

it. 

 In light of the close familial relationship between the 

parties, the apparent absence of adequate consideration, and the 

absence of certain evidence concerning the value of the property, 

we hold that Balzer made out a prima facie case of a fraudulent 

transfer and that the chancellor thus erred in granting the 

motion to strike under this theory of recovery. 

 Similarly, Balzer's evidence, viewed in this light, would 

have supported a finding of a voluntary transfer by an insolvent 

debtor without consideration valuable in law. The transfer from 

Bradley to The Lakes did not extinguish the debt to the Hancocks. 

 Rather, the transfer occurred with the understanding that the 
property remained subject to foreclosure by the Hancocks. In 

addition, the $5,000 payment was made to Conner individually and 

not to Bradley. Finally, in the absence of direct evidence 

establishing that the value of the property did not exceed the 

indebtedness against it, the remaining evidence, when viewed in 

the light most favorable to Balzer, suggests a lack of 

consideration to Bradley valuable in law. Such a transfer would 

be void as to Balzer, an existing creditor, since it left the 

debtor insolvent and was not made for valuable consideration in 

law. Accordingly, the chancellor erred in striking the evidence 

as to this theory of recovery. 

 Once a party has established a prima facie case in support 

of its claim that a transfer is voidable, the burden of producing 

evidence to rebut the prima facie case shifts to the opposing 

party. We cannot say whether the defendants would have been 

able, given the opportunity to present evidence of the value of 

the property and of the consideration received by Bradley for the 

transfer, to rebut Balzer's evidence, or at least bring into 

equipoise the ultimate questions of fraudulent intent pursuant to 

Code § 55-80, and lack of valuable consideration at law pursuant 

to Code § 55-81. See Pullen v. Fagan, 204 Va. 601, 604, 132 

S.E.2d 718, 720 (1963). 

 Accordingly, we will reverse the summary judgment and remand 

the proceeding for a new trial. 

Reversed and remanded.