UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA SA N D RAM U L D RO W, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 08-1771 (RMU)

: v. : Re Docume nt No.: 6

: EMC MORTGAGE : CORPORATI ON e t al

. , : : De fe nd ants
. :

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION D E NYI NG D EF END A N T R OS E NB E RG ’ S M OT I ON T O D IS M IS S

I. IN TR OD UC TIO N This matter come s befor e the c ourt on defe ndant Rosenber gand Associates, L L C’s (“ Ros e nb e rg ” ) m oti on

to d ism iss . T he pla int if

f h a s b ro ught s uit

a g a ins t Ro se nb e rgun de r t he F a ir Debt Collection Practice s Act (“ FDCPA”) , 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. , c la imi ngthat it e ng a g e d in unlawful de bt collection pra ctices. Rosenbe rgcontends that it is not a proper party in the litigation and ther efor e not subject to or in violation of the F DCPA. Rosenberg asks that the court dismiss the matter ag ainst it for failure to state a c laim, which the cour t denies bec ause the p l a i n t i f f a p p r o p r i at e l y i d e n t i f

i e d R o s e nb e r ga s a

p arty.

II. BACKG ROUND A. F actual History In October

2006, the plaintiff, a r esident of the D istrict of Columbia, obtained a loan f rom defe ndant EMC Mortg ag e Company (“EMC”) to purcha se a r esidential prope rty in the District of Columbi a. Compl. ¶ 5. The loan w as sec ured by a first de ed of trust on the pla intiff’s re sidence
.I n th e co m pl ai nt , th e pl ai nt if

f al le g es th at

E MC h ir ed

R os en be rgto in it ia te f

or ec lo sure 1 procee ding s. See Com pl. ¶ ¶ 6- 7. R osenb ergreiterates this fact in it’s m otion. See Def. ’s Mot. at 2. The no tice sent to the p laintiff, h owe v er, indicates that Mortg ag e E lectronic Reg istration Sy stem s, I nc., is th e ho lder o f the m ortg ag e. See P l. ’s O pp ’n , E x. A
. Th is d if fe re nc e is im m aterial for the p urpose s of this Mem orand um O pinion
. Altho ug h the plain tiff referenc es this notice as an attach m ent to her com

plaint, see e .g. , C om

pl
. 2 ¶ ¶ 7- 13, no suc h attac hm ent ex ists. I t w as n ot until the plaintiff filed her oppo sition to the instant m otion that sh e pro v ided the d efendants an d the court w ith a copy of this n otice. See P l. ’s Opp’ n, Ex. A. 2 Id. Ov e r t

he ne xt fe w ye ars , th e pla int if f b e c ame inc re a sin g ly

un a ble to m ake he r m onthl y pay ments. Id . ¶

6. Ul tim ate ly , E MC hir e d Ro se nb e rg , a Ma ry land law f ir m, a s a su bs tit ute 1 trustee to initiate fore closure pr ocee dings a g ainst the plaintiff af ter she de faulted on he r loan. Id
. ¶¶ 6- 7; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex . A. On J une 23, 2008, Rosenber gmailed a notice to the plaintiff at the plaintiff’ s residenc e, 2 descr ibing Rosenbe rg ’s re lationship to EMC , explaining that Rosenber gwas the le g al enf orce r of the loan and inf

ormingthe plaintiff that the notice was a n “attempt to collec t a debt.” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A at 1-2. The notice included the total amount owe d by the plaintiff, allowingfor interest, late c harg es and othe r day -to-day char g es that mig ht be incurr ed at the pla intiff’s expense, and a dvised the plaintiff that she c ould either take no action and a ssume the validity of the debt or notify

the def endant within thirty

day s that she disputed part or all of the de bt. Id. at 1. Ac c or din gto t

he no tic e , if

the pla int if

f d id n ot d isp ute the de bt, sh e wa s to se nd a c he c k to Rosenberg , who would not deposit the che ck until after informingthe plaintiff of a ny adjustments in the amount owed. Id . I f t he pla int if

f c onte ste d th e de bt w ith in t hir ty da y s, Rosenbergwould suspend collec tion activities, obtain verification of the debt and ma il the verific ation to the plaintiff. Id
.The plaintiff indicates that the no tice adv ised th at she cou ld co ntact E MC re g ardingm itig ation 3 proced

ures. C om

pl. ¶ 13
. The notice attached

to the p laintiff’s op position is o stensibly

w hat shou ld hav e be en attached to the com plaint and contain s no suc h ad v isem ent. See Pl.’s Opp ’n, Ex. A. Thi s con tr adi ct ion , however, does not af fe ct the co urt ’s anal ysis be low. 3 The notice sent by

Rosenbergstated that the plaintiff’ s “fa ilure to contest the va lidity of the debt under

the Act may

not be construe d by

any Court as an a dmission of li ability .” Id . at 1- 2. Additionally , the notice infor med the plaintiff that she might be e ligible f or a pa y ment plan prog ram a

nd instructed the plaintiff to c ontact Rosenber gto determine if she met the program’s qualifications, with foreclosure proce eding s continuing in the inter im. Id . at 2. The f orec losure sale wa s scheduled f

or Jul y 29, 2008. Id. at 3. Ros e nb e rgno tif

ie d th e pla int if

f t hat he r p ro pe rt

y wa s b e ingso ld at a

fo re c los ur e sa le to
s at i s f y h e r d e b to nth e p r o p e rty an d

i n f o r m e d h e r th atth e s a l e d at e w a s s u

b j e c tt o u p t o a th i rtyday postponement. Id . at 1. Also included in the notice was the total amount owed by the plaintiff, plus attorney ’s fe es, for eclosure costs and all ac crua ls under the ter ms of the Dee d of Trust and Note and throug h the date of the notice. Id . 1, 3. Rosenbergidentified itself as the entity the plaintiff should contac t to stop t he for eclosure sale a nd provided its addre ss and phone number. Id. at 2. Ac c or din gto t he no tic e , th e min imum ba lanc e re qu ir e d to c ur e the de fa ult obligation was $12,565.59, plus attorney ’s fe es, for eclosure costs and all ac crua ls. Id . at . Followingthe proc edure s set forth in the notice, the plaintiff disputed the debt in writing and re quested fr om Rosenbergthe amount nec essar y to bringthe mortg ag e cur rent. Compl. ¶ 12. The plaintiff the n contac ted EMC to discuss loan miti g ation to stop the forec losure sale
. Id . ¶ 3 13. The for eclosure sale did not occ ur. Id . at ¶ 23.4 B. Pr ocedural History On Se pte mbe r 1 5, 20 08 , th e pla int if f f ile d a c ivi l a c tio n a g a ins t E MC a nd Ros e nb e rgin the Superior Court for

the District of Columbia. See Muldrow v. EMC Mortgage Corp. et al ., D. C. Su pe r. Ct. , Ca se No . 2 00 8- 65 8 R( RP) . T he pla int if f a c c us e d E MC w ithvio latin gthe D. C. Consumer Protection Proce dures Ac t and ac cused Rosenbe rgof violatingthe FD CPA. See generally Compl. Rosenbergremove d the ac tion to thi s court on Oc tober 16, 2008. See Notice of Removal. On Octobe r 23, 2008, Rosenber gmoved to dismiss the ac tion ag ainst it, alleg ing that the plaintiff failed to state a

claim in acc ordanc e with Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (6). See Rosenberg ’s Mot. to Dismis s (“De f.’s Mot”) . The plaintiff oppose d Rosenberg ’s motion on November

11, 2008, se e ge ne ra lly

Pl. ’s Op p’ n, and

the c ourt tur ns no w t o th e pa

rt ie s’ argume nts
.

III . A NA LY SIS A. Le ga l St anda r d fora M ot ion to Di sm iss A Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss tests the lega l sufficienc y of a c omplaint. Browning v. Clint on , 2 92 F .3 d 2 35 , 2 42 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 2) . T he c omp la int ne e d o nly

se t f or th a sh or t and pla in statement of the c laim, givingthe def endant f air notice of the c laim and the g rounds upon which it rests. Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. W illiams , 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing FED . R. CI V. P. 8(a)( 2) and Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “ Such simpli fied notice pleadingis made possible by the libera l opportunity

for discove ry

and the other

pre- trial proce dures e stablished by the Rules to disclose more pre cisely the basis of both cla im and5

defe nse to define more na rrowly the disputed fac ts and issues.” Conley , 355 U.S. at 47-48 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . It is no t ne c e ssa ry fo r t he pla int if

f t o p le a d a ll e le me nts of

his prima fa cie c ase in the c omplaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sonoma N.A ., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002), or “plea d law or match fa cts to ever y element of

a leg al theory ,” Kri e

ge r v . F ad e ly , 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (inter nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). Yet, the plaintiff must alleg e “a ny set of fa cts consistent with the alleg ations.” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 5 50 U. S. 5 44 , 5 63 (2 00 7) (a br og atin gthe of

t- qu ote d la

ngua g e fr om Conley , 355 U.S. at 45-56, instructingcourts not to dismiss for f ailure to state a

claim unless it appea

rs beyond doubt that “no set of f acts in support of his cla im [ ] would entit le him to relief” ); Aktieselsk

abet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. FameJeans, I nc. , 525 F.3d 8, 16 n.4 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (af firmingthat “a c omplaint needs some information about the circ umstances g iving r ise to the
c la ims ” ). Whil e the se fa c ts m us t “ po sse ss e no ugh h e ft

to ‘ sh o[w ] that th e ple a de r i s e nti tle d to relief ,’” a complaint “does not ne ed deta iled fac tual alleg ations.” Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 555, 557. In resolvinga Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the cour t must t reat the complaint’s fa ctual alleg ations – including mixed questions of law and f act – a s true and dr aw a ll reasona ble infer ence s there from in the plaintiff’ s favor
. Macharia v. U nited States , 334 F.3d 61, 64, 67 ( D.C. Cir. 20 03 ); Ho ly

Lan d F ou nd . fo r R e lie f &De v . v . A sh c ro

ft , 333 F.3d 156, 165 ( D.C. Cir. 2003); Browning , 292 F.3d at 242. Whi le many well-plea ded complaints ar e conc lusory , the cour t need not acc ept as true infere nces unsuppor ted by fac ts set out in the complaint or leg al conc lusions cast a s fac tual alleg ations. W arre n v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 353 F.3d 36, 40 ( D.C. Cir. 2004); Browning , 292 F.3d at 242.The plaintiff’s com plaint a ppears to state claim s un der th ese three sec tions. See Com pl. ¶ ¶ 40
- 4 59. In co unt three, how ev er, the p laintiff cites to § 1692 f, b ut qu otes fro m § 1692 g (b). Id. ¶¶ 45 , 48. B ased on the d iscussion in the p laintiff’s co m

plaint, see id

. ¶ ¶ 4 0-49 , and the p arties’ briefs , see Def. ’s Mot. at 7
- 11; P l.’s O pp’n at 3- 5; D ef.’s Rep ly at 5
- 8, the co urt ass um es that the pl a i nt i f f in t e nd e d t o c i t e to § 16 92 g. 6 B. T he Co ur t D e nie s D e fend antRo se nbe r g’ s M ot ion to Di sm iss Deter mining that “[t]here is abundant e vidence of the use of abusive, de ceptive, a

nd
un fa ir de bt c oll e c tio n p ra c tic e s b y many de bt c oll e c tor s, ” Con g re ss p a sse d th e F DC PA t o eliminate those pra ctices. 15 U .S.C. § 1692(a). The F DCPA protects (1) consumers ( 2) who have be en subjec ted to abusive, de ceptive or unfair de bt collection pra ctices ( 3) by a debt collector (4) in an a

ttempt to collect a debt. Se e Pi pe r v . P or tno

ff , 396 F.3d 227, 232 ( 3d Cir. 2005) (c iting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e-f ). The f irst and sec ond prong s of this analy sis are not contested in this case
. See ge nerally D e f
. ’ s M o t
. ; P l
. ’ s O p p ’ n ; D e f
. ’ s R e p l y. Rosenbergmaintains that as a substitute trustee, it is not a debt collec tor within the meaningof §§ 1692d, 1692e or 1692g of the F DCPA. More spec ifically , Rosenbergargues that

4 pursuant to the ter

ms of § 1692a(6) , substitut e trustee s are only liable under

§ 1692f(6) . Def

.’s Mot. at 5-11. Section 1692a( 6) states, in re levant par t, that [f]o r the pu rpose of

se c tio n 1 69 2f

(6 ) o f t his tit le , [th e te rm

“ de bt c oll e c tor ” ] al so inc lud e s any

pe rs on wh o use s any ins tr ume nta lity of int e rs tate c omm e rc e or the ma ils in a ny bu sin e ss t

he pr inc ipa l pu

rp os e of which is th e en fo rc e me nt o f s e c ur ity int e re sts
. Ba sed on this languag e, Rosenber gargues that substitute trustees ar e exempt from liability under all provisions of the FD CPA e x c e pt § 1692f(6) . Def

.’s Mot. at 5-8. Rosenber gfurther argues that, even if

the cour t determines it is a debt c ollector within the mea ning of the sec tions cited by the plaintiff, it was still not invol ved in the collec tion of a debt. Id. at 9-11.7

The plaintiff c ounters that her mortg ag e is a “ debt” a s defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) beca use it constitutes an obligation to pay money that arose out a transa ction in which the proper ty was primar ily

for pe rsonal, fa

mily or household purpose s. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. The plaintiff also asse rts that, althoug h Rosenbergis unquestionably a substitute trustee, that fa ct does not prec lude it from beingheld liable as a debt collec tor. Id. at 3. As thi s Ci rc uit

ha s n ot d e te rm ine d whe the r § 16 92 a (6 ) o f t he F DC PA e xclu de s su

bs tit ute trustees fr om liabilit y

under the g ener al provisions of the F DCPA, both parties cite de cisions from other

jurisdictions to support t heir positions. Compare Piper , 396 F.3d at 232 (applying the FDCPA to debts sec ured by rea l property

); Ro me a v . H

e ibe rge r &As so cs. , 163 F.3d 111, 116 ( 2d Cir . 1 99 8) (c on c lud ingthat an e vic tio n n oti c e fo r f a ilure to p ay

re nt c an b e an atte mpt

to c oll e c t a debt); Shapiro & Meinhold v. Zartman , 823 P.2d 120, 124 (Colo. 1992) (holding that “ a fore closure is a

method of collec ting a

nd debt” a

nd, thus, the defe ndant attorne y s “ar e not exempt
mere ly beca use their c ollection activities are primarily limit ed to fore closures” ) with Jordan v. Kent Recov ery Se rvs., Inc

. , 731 F. Supp. 652, 658 (D. D el. 1990) (distinguishing a debt collec tor fr om a n e nf or c e r o f a se c ur ity int e re st, wh o h a s a

“ pr e se nt r ig ht t o a

pie c e of se c ur e d p ro pe rt

y [and] attempts to retrieve something which another person possesse s but which the holder of the
secur ity interest still owns”). This court, howe ver, f

inds persuasive the Four

th Circuit case of W

ils on v . D ra

pe r & Go ldb e rg , P LLC – a ca se involving ne arly identical cir cumstance s though not a ddresse d by either party in their brief

s. 443 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff in W ilson br ou g ht s uit

a g a ins t the law f irm that acte d as the substitute trustee for the holder of

the dee d of trust on the plaintiff’s proper ty
. Id. at 37 4. Th e de fe nd ant i nit iate d f or e c los ur e pr oc e e din g s o n th e pla int if f’ s p ro pe rt

y8

and sent he r a notice that provided infor mation reg ardingthe cr editor and the amount of the de bt owed. Id. The W

ilson defe ndants included in their notice a stateme nt specify ing that they

wer e not ‘“de bt collectors’ or ac ting in conne ction with the collection of a ‘debt.’” Id. Ne ve rt

he le ss, the c ourt he ld t hat th e de fa

ult on a De e d o f T ru st N ote is a

de bt, and that c on c lud ingoth e rw ise “would cr eate an enor

mous loophole in the [ FDCPA] imm unizi ngany debt from c overa g e if that de bt h a pp e ne d to be se c ur e d b y

a re a l pr op e rt

y int e re st a nd fo re c los ur e pr oc e e din g s w e re us e d to collect that de bt.” Id. at3 7 6 (c i t i n g Piper , 3 96 F .2 d at 23 4; Romea , 1 63 F .3 d at 11 6; Sh ap iro , 823 P.2d at 124). The W

ilson court we nt on to ex plain that [S ection 1692a( 6)] applies to those whose on ly ro le in t he de bt c oll e c tio n p ro c e ss i s the enf orce ment of a se curity

interest. See J

ordan [, 731 F. Supp. at 657 ] (“I t thus a pp e ars that Co ng re ss i nte nd e d a n e nf or c e r o f a

se c ur ity int e re st, su c h as a reposse ssion ag ency , to f

all outside the ambit of the FDCPA except for the pr ovisions of § 1692f( 6).”) . In other wor ds, this provision is not an exception to the definition of debt c ollector, it is an i nclusion to the t erm de bt collector. It serves to include as de bt c oll e c tor s, fo r t

he purp oses of

§ 1 69 2f (6 ), tho se wh o o nly

e nf or c e se c ur ity int e re sts . It do e s n ot e xclu de tho se wh o en fo rc e se c ur ity int e re sts but w ho a lso fa ll under the g ener al def

inition of “debt collec tor.” See P iper , 396 F.3d at 236 (“Sec tion 1692a(6) thus recognizes that there ar e people who eng ag e in t h e b u s i ness of reposse ssing pr operty , whose business does not primar ily invo lve communicating with debtors in an ef

fort to sec ure pa

y ment of debts.”)
. 443 F.3d at 378 (emphasis in orig inal). L ike the def

endant in W

ilson , Ro se nb e rgis a

law f ir m th at w a s h ir e d a s a

su bs tit ute trustee to enf

orce a De ed of Tr

ust Note. See ge nerally Def .’s Mot.; Pl .’s Opp’n, Ex. A. Neve rtheless, in initiating for eclosure proce eding s, Rosenbergundertook the r ole of de bt collector and communicated with the plaintiff in a manne r re gulated by the FD CPA. See W

ilson , 443 F.3d at 376-78. Adoptingthe def endant’ s logic that law firms a ctingas substitute trustees for mortg ag e holder s are exempt from the provisions of the FD CPA is contrary to the stated purpose of

the FD CPA. See 15 U. S.C. § 1 69 2( a ) ( e xpla ini ngthat th e F DC PA i s d e signe d to9

protec t consumers fr om unfair c ollection prac tices). Ac cording ly , the cour t determines that the plaintiff has a lleg ed suff

icient fa cts to support her c laim that, for the pur poses of the a ctions descr ibed in the complaint, the plaintiff’ s mortga g e is a “ debt” a nd defe ndant Rosenber gwas actingas a “ debt collec tor.”

IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the c ourt denies de fenda nt Rosenberg ’s motion to dis miss. An Orde r consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and conte mporane ously

issued this 28th day

of September , 2009.

RI CARDO M. URBI NA Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge