DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JEFFREY SCHEIBLE, as Personal Representative of

the ESTATE OF JANICE JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v.

AUDLEY LIVINGSTON BROWN, THEODORE DENAULT,

LYDIA DENAULT, NEA RICHARDSON, and

R P FUNDING, INC., a Florida corporation,

Appellees.

No. 4D20-1899

[February 9, 2022]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; William W. Haury, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE 18-

001202 (18).

Daren Stabinski and Daniel Caine of Stabinski and Funt, P.A., Miami, 

for appellant.

Samuel D. Lopez of Samuel D. Lopez, P.A., Southwest Ranches, for 

appellee Nea Richardson.

WARNER, J.

Appellant Jeffrey Scheible, personal representative of the estate of 

Janice Johnson, challenges an order granting a new trial after a jury 

verdict in favor of the estate. The jury awarded damages to the estate for 

the negligence of appellee, a notary, who notarized a forged deed which 

conveyed the deceased’s property. The trial court determined that 

appellant had not proved that appellee’s negligence in notarizing the deed 

was a proximate cause of appellant’s damages, because the forged deed 

was void and had an invalid legal description. We reverse, as the 

notarization allowed the deed to be recorded and was thereby a proximate 

cause of the damage to the estate.

Scheible’s sister, Joyce Johnson, owned a home in Pembroke Pines at 

the time of her death in 2008. She left the home to Scheible who allowed 
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Joyce’s daughter (his niece), Janice, to live there rent free, so long as she 

paid expenses such as taxes and utilities. For two years thereafter, Janice 

lived in the home with her boyfriend, Audley Brown. Scheible then 

transferred the property to Janice with a quit-claim deed. Janice and 

Brown continued to live there until Janice’s death in June 2015. Janice 

passed away intestate, and Scheible was appointed personal 

representative of Janice’s estate.

Scheible discovered that in October 2015, Brown sold the property to 

third-party purchasers. To Scheible’s knowledge, Brown had never owned 

the property. However, further investigation revealed a quit-claim deed 

(“original deed”) dated February 9, 2015, transferring the property from 

Janice to Brown. The deed had been notarized by appellee Nea 

Richardson, a notary, and was recorded July 8, 2015, a month after 

Janice’s death. On July 28, 2015, a quit claim deed marked “corrective 

deed” was recorded.1 It appears to be the same quit claim deed as was 

recorded on July 8th with a lengthier legal description attached. It was 

neither re-executed nor re-notarized. Finally, a third warranty deed, dated 

October 26, 2015, and recorded the following day, transferred the subject 

property from Brown to the third-party purchasers.

After discovering these facts, Scheible filed suit as personal 

representative of Janice’s estate against multiple parties, including 

Richardson. He claimed damages against Richardson for her negligence 

in notarizing the deed in the absence of Janice’s presence or without 

properly ascertaining the identity of the individual signing the deed. The 

case proceeded to trial on the claim against Richardson after the claims 

against the other defendants were settled.

At trial, Scheible presented a case that the deed was forged, and that 

Richardson had been negligent in notarizing the deed without properly 

ascertaining the identity of the person signing it. The original deed and 

corrective deed were admitted into evidence. A handwriting expert testified 

that the signature on the deed was not written by Janice. Scheible testified 

about his relationship with Janice and how he discovered the quit claim 

deeds and sale of the property. A real estate appraiser testified as to 

damages.

1 Richardson claimed in argument at trial that the county recorder rejected the 

original deed because of an improper legal description, which resulted in the 

corrective deed being recorded. However, both deeds were recorded, and there is 

no evidence in the record to support this assertion.
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Richardson moved for a directed verdict, contending that she did not 

notarize the corrective deed, and it was void. She was therefore not the 

cause of any loss. The trial court denied the motion. Richardson then 

testified as to her pattern and practice of notarizing documents. She had 

no memory of notarizing the document and admitted that she did not 

record the entire driver’s license number of the signatory, although it was 

her usual practice to do so. She also admitted to differences between the 

signature and the name on the driver’s license. After resting, Richardson 

moved for directed verdict again, which was denied. The jury was 

instructed, deliberated, and awarded the estate $247,000 in damages.

After trial, Richardson moved to set aside the verdict and in the 

alternative for a new trial, arguing that she was not a proximate cause of 

injury to the estate. Scheible also moved for additur or a new trial as to 

damages.

The trial court issued an amended order granting Richardson a new 

trial. The court based its ruling on three independent grounds: 1) the 

original deed was a forgery and void; thus, “the actions of Defendant 

Richardson are of no consequence”; 2) the original deed had an incomplete 

legal description which rendered it void; and 3) the legal description in the

deed was corrected without re-executing the corrected deed and without 

the appropriate formalities; thus it was ineffective to convey an interest in 

property. The court also found that “Richardson had nothing to do with 

the correction of the legal description, the failure to execute the corrected 

deed with appropriate formalities, or the re-recording of the deed.” The 

court denied Scheible’s motion for additur, or in the alternative for a new 

trial on damages only, as moot.

This appeal follows.

Scheible argues that the evidence proved all the elements of negligence, 

and the court erred in granting the motion for new trial. While an abuse 

of discretion generally applies to review of orders granting a new trial, an 

appellate court reviews a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. See

Emmitt v. First Transit, Inc., 300 So. 3d 225, 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

To prove a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the 

defendant had a legal duty of care to the plaintiff; the defendant breached 

that duty; the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; and the 

plaintiff incurred damages as a result. Bryan v. Galley Maid Marine Prods., 

Inc., 287 So. 3d 1281, 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).
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As a notary, Richardson had a statutory duty to have “satisfactory 

evidence, that the person whose signature is to be notarized is the 

individual who is described in and who is executing the instrument.” §

117.05(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). Further, section 117.107(9) provides that 

“[a] notary public may not notarize a signature on a document if the person 

whose signature is being notarized is not in the presence of the notary 

public at the time the signature is notarized.” § 117.107(9), Fla. Stat. 

(2015). The breach of that statutory duty creates liability when it is the 

proximate cause of the damages sustained by the plaintiff. See Ameriseal 

of N.E. Fla., Inc. v. Leiffer, 673 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). There was 

sufficient evidence to show that Richardson breached her statutory duty. 

The court, in its ruling, focused on the proximate cause of the loss to 

Scheible and determined that Richardson could not be the proximate 

cause.

The test for proximate cause is contained within the standard jury 

instructions. “Negligence is a legal cause of [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] if 

it directly and in natural and continuous sequence produces or 

contributes substantially to producing such [loss] [injury] [or] [damage], so 

that it can reasonably be said that, but for the negligence, the [loss] [injury] 

[or] [damage] would not have occurred.” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 

401.12(a). In this case, in order for the forged quit claim deed to be 

recorded, it was required to be notarized. See § 695.03(1), Fla. Stat.

(2015). Without the notarization of the original quit claim deed, neither it 

nor the corrective deed were entitled to be recorded. Without recordation 

of the original quit claim deed, title of the property would not pass to Brown 

and subsequently to the third-party purchasers. Thus, the negligence of 

Richardson in failing to properly identify the person signing the deed 

directly and in natural and continuous sequence contributed to or

produced the damage, the loss of Janice’s property. See Fla. Std. Jury 

Instr. (Civ.) 401.12(a).

This case is similar to DeCamp v. Allen, 156 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1963). There, a notary falsely notarized the signatures of mortgagors on a 

mortgage which was recorded. When the mortgagors learned of the 

mortgage which they alleged that they did not sign, they paid it off and 

sued the notary for their damages. The trial court found for the 

mortgagors and entered judgment for damages. The appellate court 

affirmed, stating “the Court of Record properly found in its judgment that 

the defendant falsely notarized and acknowledged the purported mortgage; 

and that because of this false acknowledgment the mortgage was recorded 

in the public records of the said county, whereby the plaintiff was damaged 

to the extent of $500.” Id. at 662. In the same manner, the negligent 
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notarization of the quit claim deed in this case allowed it to be recorded 

and the property sold to third-party purchasers. Thus, the notarization 

was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained.

There are circumstances where a notary’s negligence has not been 

considered a proximate cause. For instance, in Gardner v. Weiler, 630 So. 

2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), a seller was fraudulently induced to sign a 

warranty deed in a scheme devised by her attorney and a buyer. The seller 

actually signed the instrument, but it was notarized in her absence by the 

notary. Id. at 670. The seller sued and obtained a jury verdict against the 

notary, arguing that the improper notarization proximately caused her 

damage because it allowed the instrument to be recorded in the public 

records, thus aiding the buyer’s scheme. We reversed on appeal, holding 

that the notarization was too tenuously related to the seller’s damage or 

loss to constitute legal proximate cause. Id. at 670–71. There, however, 

although the notarization was technically deficient, the seller admitted 

signing the deed. Thus, it was not a forgery, and the fraud was committed 

in how the sale was consummated, not in the recording of the deed.

In contrast, in this case the forged deed, signed by someone other than 

Janice, was the fraud, for which the notary statutes are designed to 

protect.

Throughout the ages, it has been necessary for people to 

protect their transactions from charlatans. In more recent 

generations, society has relied on identification documents in 

disparate circumstances, ranging from admittance to foreign 

nations, to cashing a bank draft. Where warranted by 

circumstances, officials of high public trust authenticated 

certain promises and agreements. The stakes were too high 

to risk admitting impostors claiming privity to certain 

transactions. Hence, the venerated and historic office of the 

notary public has long served this vital need.

See Peter J. Van Alstyne, The Notary’s Duty of Care for Identifying 

Document Signers, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1999). The notary 

is the proximate cause of damage to the defrauded property owner where 

the forged deed is recorded based upon the notary’s negligence in failing 

to confirm the identity of the signatory.

The trial court found that because the deed was forged, it was void and 

thus Richardson’s negligence was of no consequence. The fact that the 

deed was void, however, does not, as a matter of law, relieve Richardson 
6

of liability where she has been sued in negligence. Even if the deed is of 

no effect and does not pass title, that does not mean that no damages have 

resulted from the fact that the forged deed was recorded, and the property 

sold. In DeCamp, the mortgage was not executed by the mortgagors and 

thus appeared to have been forged, yet the court found the notary liable 

for damages. Cases from across the country have also found notaries 

liable in damages for negligently or falsely notarizing forged deeds. See,

e.g., City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Metcalf, 775 P.2d 1065 (Ariz. 1989); 

McDonald v. Plum, 90 Cal. Rptr. 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Chicago Title Ins. 

Co. v. LaPierre, 961 N.Y.S.2d 237 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); Lowe v. Wright,

292 S.W.2d 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956); Atlas Sec. Co. v. O’Donnell, 232 

N.W. 121 (Iowa 1930); Commonwealth, to Use of Willow Highlands Co. v. 

U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 73 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1950). To hold that the notary is 

exempt from liability because the deed was forged excuses the notary from 

the performance of the very essence of duties for which the notary is 

required.

As to the trial court’s conclusion that the original deed had an 

incomplete legal description and thus was ineffective to pass title, no 

evidence at trial supported that contention. While the corrected quit claim 

deed included a different legal description than the original deed, no 

evidence was presented that the original legal description was deficient. 

Richardson did mention in argument that the legal description was 

rejected by the county recorder, but she provided no evidence to the jury 

on this issue.

Finally, the trial court found that the deed was corrected without having 

it re-executed and re-notarized, thus making it ineffective to convey title. 

The deed, however, did purport to convey title, as Brown was able to sell 

to third-party purchasers as a result of recording the corrective deed, 

causing the estate’s damage. This could not have occurred without the 

original notarization by Richardson. Florida Standard Jury Instruction 

401.12(b) provides:

In order to be regarded as a legal cause of [loss] [injury] [or] 

[damage] negligence need not be the only cause. Negligence 

may be a legal cause of [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] even though 

it operates in combination with . . . [some other cause] if the 

negligence contributes substantially to producing such [loss] 

[injury] [or] [damage].

(emphasis supplied). Here, Richardson’s negligence operated in 

combination with the fraud of Brown (or someone else) to deprive Janice’s 
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estate of the home. It was for the jury to determine whether Richardson’s 

negligence was a proximate cause of damage. The court erred in granting 

a new trial on this ground as well.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order granting new trial and 

direct the reinstatement of the jury’s verdict. While Scheible also argues 

that the court erred in denying his motion for additur, the trial court did 

not consider his motion, finding it moot because of the court’s order 

granting a new trial on all issues. We thus do not consider this issue de 

novo but direct that the trial court shall consider the issue upon remand.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

CONNER, C.J., and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.