United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 13, 2019

Decided March 13, 2019

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18-1608

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

NATHANIEL FORD,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States 

District Court for Northern District of 

Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:16CR020-001

Jon E. DeGuilio,

Judge.

O R D E R

Nathaniel Ford was convicted by a jury of drug-distribution and 

firearms-dealing charges, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, § 841(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), 

and 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), (g)(1), § 924(a)(2), and was eventually sentenced to 

168 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release. He later admitted to 

violating the conditions of his supervision (he had resumed dealing cocaine, for which 

he pleaded guilty to a new state charge) and blamed his probation officer for the 

violations. The district court revoked his supervised release and resentenced him to 

18 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to his state prison term. Ford appeals, 

but his appointed counsel has concluded that the appeal is frivolous and moves to 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18-1608 Page 2

withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Ford has not responded to the 

motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). 

At the outset we note that “the Anders safeguards do not govern our review of 

counsel’s motion to withdraw.” United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). 

The Constitution does not provide a right to counsel in a revocation proceeding where, 

as here, the defendant concedes the alleged violations and does not dispute the 

appropriateness of revocation or assert substantial and complex arguments in 

mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973); United States v. Eskridge, 

445 F.3d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, in practice we still apply the Anders

framework. Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 857. Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the 

nature of the case and addresses the issues that a case of this kind might be expected to 

involve. Because her analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the 

subjects she discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel first notes that Ford does not want to challenge the admissions on which 

his revocation was based, and thus she properly refrains from discussing whether 

Ford’s admissions were knowing and voluntary. See Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 857; 

United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel next questions whether Ford could argue that his term of 

reimprisonment is plainly unreasonable but correctly concludes that this challenge 

would be frivolous. The parties stipulated that Ford’s conviction for dealing cocaine 

constituted a Grade A violation and that his criminal history category was II, 

corresponding to a reimprisonment range of 27 to 33 months. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1); 

§ 7B1.4. (They also agreed that the sentence should be 27 months.) Because the district 

court accepted these calculations without objection, our review is only for plain error. 

See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). We see no fault in these 

calculations and agree with counsel that any challenge would be frivolous. 

Counsel also considers but rightly rejects an argument that the district court 

failed to consider the pertinent factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and Ford’s arguments in 

mitigation. A sentence, like Ford’s, that falls below the policy-statement range is 

presumptively reasonable on appeal. See United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 

2014); United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the court 

explained the sentence based on the Chapter 7 policy statements and relevant § 3553(a) 

factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a), highlighting the seriousness of the violations (Ford had 

relapsed into using and selling drugs), the need to promote respect for the law (he had 
No. 18-1608 Page 3

“reentered the drug business” after serving significant time for dealing drugs), the need 

to protect the public (in light of his continued drug dealing and gun possession), and 

Ford’s history and characteristics (his “unquestionably ... difficult” childhood 

circumstances, his lengthy sentence on state gun and drug charges, his violent 

tendencies and severe substance abuse, and his high risk of recidivating). 

Finally, counsel notes that challenging the imposition of Ford’s federal 

revocation sentence to run consecutively to his state prison term would be pointless. 

The Sentencing Commission has instructed that consecutive terms be imposed when 

revocation of supervised release results from a new prison sentence. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 7B1.3(f) & Application Note 4; see also United States v. Peterson, 852 F.3d 629, 631 

(7th Cir. 2017). Moreover, the court acknowledged that § 7B1.3(f) was advisory, but 

emphasized that “only a consecutive sentence would adequately account for the 

various [§] 3553(a) factors and avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.”

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw, and DISMISS Ford’s 

appeal.