IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1425

Filed January 24, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

GERRY HARLAND GREENLAND,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Decatur County, John D. Lloyd, 

Judge.

Gerry Greenland appeals his convictions for assault on a peace officer and 

attempt to commit murder of a peace officer. AFFIRMED.

Richard Hollis, Des Moines, and Kelsey L. Knight (until withdrawal) of Carr 

Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Heard by Bower, C.J., and Schumacher and Chiccelly, JJ.
2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

Gerry Greenland appeals his convictions for assault on a peace officer and 

attempt to commit murder of a peace officer, claiming insufficient evidence to 

support the convictions and the two charges should merge. We find sufficient 

evidence supports Greenland’s convictions and, as distinct actions underlie the 

offenses, the convictions do not merge. We affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

On the afternoon of May 23, 2019, Trevor Greenland and Brandon Quayle 

were working on a pickup in the shop at Norma Greenland’s home.1 Trevor and 

Quayle used a tractor to pull the truck out of the shop to the gravel road to pullstart it. Greenland—Trevor’s uncle and Norma’s son—came out of the house and 

asked Trevor and Quayle what they were doing. Trevor and Greenland exchanged 

words, then Greenland opened the pickup door and punched Trevor in the face. 

Trevor got out of the truck and walked around back; Greenland tried to strike him 

again, and Trevor struck back. Trevor and Quayle grabbed Greenland and 

restrained him until he calmed. After releasing him, Trevor and Greenland 

exchanged more words, then Greenland walked back to the house. 

Quayle called Monte Greenland—Trevor’s father and Greenland’s 

brother—and told him what had occurred. Trevor talked with Norma about what 

happened and called the sheriff’s department to report Greenland’s assault and 

ask them to come to the farm.

1 This case involves multiple people from the Greenland family. We will refer to 

the defendant, Gerry, as Greenland, and use first names for the other family 

members.
3

Greenland left the house, walked to the tractor—which was still on the 

road—unhooked the pickup truck, and drove the tractor back to the shop.

When Monte arrived, he and Greenland argued. Greenland was standing 

by the shop entrance armed with a crowbar, and Monte went back to his pickup,

grabbing a pipe. Monte approached, and Greenland retreated into the shop. 

Greenland drove the tractor out of the shed, now with bale spears attached to the 

front in a low position.

2

 Greenland drove at Monte, then up the driveway and 

directly into the driver’s side of Monte’s truck. The bale spears passed below the 

body of the truck but damaged the frame. 

Greenland then backed up, turned, and started down the driveway. Trevor 

called the sheriff’s department again and relayed what had just occurred. Trevor, 

Quayle, and Monte retreated to their respective vehicles and tried to evade 

Greenland in the tractor. Greenland drove up and down the gravel road chasing 

Trevor, Quayle, and Monte.3 Trevor and Quayle separately called for law 

enforcement. Trevor, Monte, and Quayle regrouped south of the farm. Greenland 

gave up the chase, turned around, and drove back to the farm.

Law enforcement vehicles came upon Trevor, Monte, and Quayle. Monte 

spoke with Sergeant Arnold about Greenland’s behavior, and Sergeant Arnold

2 The bale spears are devices created by Monte and connected to the front of the

tractor to lift two hay bales at a time. The tractor has two pointed spears, about six 

feet long and set two feet apart, which start parallel to the ground and angle up as 

they are lifted. When fully lifted, “[t]hose points on those spears are eye level . . . 

five and a half feet” high. The hydraulic lift mechanism stays on the tractor, with 

the spears attached and removed as necessary.

3 The tractor’s top speed was around fourteen miles per hour, and the men were 

able to get away when they had a clear path.
4

proceeded to the farm with his emergency lights flashing but no sirens. Sergeant 

Arnold’s vehicle had “Sheriff” emblazoned on the side.

Greenland was driving a utility vehicle when Sergeant Arnold came in sight 

of the farm. Greenland went back to the tractor, got on and started it, and raised 

the bale spears to a height of about three to three-and-a-half feet. Sergeant Arnold

entered the driveway when Greenland reversed and turned the tractor to head 

directly at the sheriff’s vehicle. Sergeant Arnold put his squad car in reverse and 

moved out of Greenland’s path. Greenland then turned and headed down the 

driveway where two more law enforcement vehicles were approaching. 

The lead vehicle was driven by Sheriff Boswell. Although the vehicle was

unmarked, it had a blue-and-red light bar running at the visor level of the 

windshield, blue and red flashing lights on either side of the license plate, strobe 

lights flashing at the top of the bumper, and a clearly visible sheriff star on the 

license plate. Sergeant Arnold, who had a similar vantage as Greenland, said the 

unmarked car had “very visible LED lights.” 

Sheriff Boswell drove into the entry area of the driveway, pulling to the right 

side when he saw Greenland approaching. Instead of going past the vehicle and 

down the driveway, Greenland turned the tractor directly into Sheriff Boswell’s 

vehicle. One tine of the bale spears went in at an angle through the front of the 

driver’s door aimed at the driver seat, and the other stopped by the door handle. 

The door buckled in on Sheriff Boswell, but the tine did not push through. 

Greenland’s tractor pushed the vehicle down the driveway and turned right around 

the corner before going into the ditch. Sheriff Boswell believed Greenland only 

stopped because the ground was wet and, with the added weight of his vehicle, 
5

the tractor could not get enough traction to keep going. Deputy Arnold testified 

after the impact, “The tractor spun down a little, almost killed it. [Greenland] 

dropped a gear and pushed the vehicle on out of the driveway and into that ditch.” 

Sheriff Boswell testified during the initial strike and while getting pushed into the 

ditch, he feared for his life. 

The last vehicle, driven by Deputy Savely, was immediately behind Sheriff 

Boswell. Deputy Savely’s vehicle was clearly marked “sheriff” on the side, and its 

emergency light bar was running. Deputy Savely started to turn into the driveway, 

but he saw Sheriff Boswell’s vehicle backing toward him. He put his vehicle in 

reverse and backed away to the far side of the road. He saw Sheriff Boswell’s 

vehicle was being pushed by the tractor. Deputy Savely jumped out of his car,

drew his firearm, and ordered Greenland to stop and get out of the tractor. 

Greenland “was very agitated, very animated. He was definitely upset at someone 

and cursing.” Greenland complied with Savely’s orders to get out of the tractor. 

After the tractor came to a stop, Sheriff Boswell was able to exit his vehicle 

through the passenger side door. He was not physically injured.

Following a bench trial, the court found Greenland guilty of attempt to 

commit murder of a peace officer acting in the performance of his duties, in 

violation of Iowa Code section 707.11 (2019); assault on a peace officer with intent 

to cause serious injury while using a dangerous weapon, in violation of 

sections 708.1 and 708.3A; and simple assault, in violation of sections 708.1 

and 708.2.

Greenland appeals his convictions for attempt to commit murder of a peace 

officer and assault with the intent to inflict serious injury or while using a dangerous 
6

weapon on a peace officer claiming the evidence is insufficient to support the two 

convictions and the court erred in failing to merge the two because assault with 

intent to inflict serious injury is a lesser-included offense of attempt to commit 

murder.

II. Standard of Review.

We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of 

errors at law. State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 800 (Iowa 2021). We will affirm if 

the factfinder’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Id. We “consider[ ]

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable 

inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” Id.

“A district court’s failure to merge convictions as required by statute results 

in an illegal sentence.” State v. Love, 858 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Iowa 2015). “Review 

of an illegal sentence for lack of merger is for correction of errors at law.” Id.

III. Analysis.

On appeal, Greenland challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

his convictions and claims his sentence is illegal because the assault and 

attempted murder convictions should have merged.

Sufficiency of the evidence. Greenland challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence he (1) was aware his actions were directed at a peace officer, and 

(2) intended to assault or attempt murder on the peace officer.4

4 Sheriff Boswell’s status as a peace officer, if known by Greenland, increases the 

mandatory minimum on the offense of attempt to commit murder and enhances 

the offense level of assault with intent to commit serious injury or with a dangerous 

weapon. See Iowa Code §§ 707.11(5), 708.2, 708.3A. 
7

Greenland first asserts the State did not establish he was aware the 

occupant of the vehicle was a law enforcement official at the time of his actions. 

Greenland states, “Given the lack of markings on the [sheriff’s] vehicle, the 

ambiguity of whether the vehicle’s sirens were activated, and whether [Greenland] 

had seen that the sheriff was uniformed, the conclusion that [Greenland] knew the 

vehicle’s occupant was a peace officer is not supported by substantial evidence.”5

The statute defining each offense requires that the offense be committed 

“with the knowledge that the person against whom the assault is committed [was 

or] is a peace officer.” See Iowa Code §§ 707.11(5)(b), 708.3A(1). Neither statute 

imposes specific indices a peace officer must display. Compare id., with Iowa 

Code § 321.279(1) (“The driver of a motor vehicle commits a serious misdemeanor 

if the driver willfully fails to bring the motor vehicle to a stop or otherwise eludes or 

attempts to elude a marked official law enforcement vehicle driven by a uniformed 

peace officer after being given a visual and audible signal to stop. The signal given 

by the peace officer shall be by flashing red light, or by flashing red and blue lights, 

and siren.” (emphasis added)). 

“Knowledge or intent is seldom capable of direct proof, but usually is 

established from the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Miller, 308 N.W.2d 4, 7 

(Iowa 1981); see State v. Henderson, 908 N.W.2d 868, 878 (Iowa 2018) 

(“[K]nowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence.”). As the trial court 

found:

At the time of the impact on Sheriff Boswell’s vehicle, its red 

and blue emergency lights were operating. That vehicle entered the 

5 Greenland’s argument cites the statutory requirements of eluding a peace officer. 

See Iowa Code § 321.279. 
8

premises on 120th shortly after the fully marked vehicle driven by 

Deputy Arnold entered the premises. The defendant was fully aware 

of the events that had transpired earlier including a fist fight with his 

nephew, deliberate ramming of his brother’s vehicle, and attempts to 

chase Trevor Greenland, Brandon Quayle and Monte Greenland

with the tractor, causing them to leave the premises. He knew why 

law enforcement vehicles were coming to the premises. He knew 

that those vehicles were operated by peace officers acting in the 

performance of their duties. 

The circumstances of this case are sufficient to infer Greenland knew Sheriff 

Boswell was a peace officer when he committed the offenses. Sergeant Arnold 

had arrived at the farm just before Sheriff Boswell. Upon seeing Sergeant Arnold’s 

marked law enforcement vehicle with its lights flashing, Greenland started the 

tractor, raised the bale tines, turned, and drove straight at Sergeant Arnold. As 

Sergeant Arnold backed away, Sheriff Boswell arrived in a white, unmarked SUV 

with blue and red flashing lights clearly displayed in the front window facing 

Greenland and near the front license plate marked with a sheriff star. Sheriff 

Boswell was followed closely by a third law enforcement vehicle also with 

emergency lights flashing. Greenland had a clear view of the front of Sheriff 

Boswell’s car and the emergency lights as he was driving unobstructed down the 

driveway before choosing to turn and ram the vehicle. 

Greenland also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence he “intended to 

cause serious injury or death to the sheriff.” More specifically, Greenland asserts 

the district court found he lowered the bale tines when approaching the sheriff’s 

vehicle and suggests he may have been attempting to aim the spears below the 

vehicle, not through it. We disagree. The unrefuted evidence is the original 

position of the bale tines passed mostly below Monte’s vehicle. But Greenland 

specifically raised the bale tines to at least three feet high upon seeing the 
9

approach of law enforcement—to a level of guaranteed impact. Despite the sheriff 

pulling to the side of the driveway, Greenland then purposely turned the tractor to 

ram the driver area of the sheriff’s stopped vehicle. The decisions to raise the 

spears and to turn directly into a stopped vehicle support an inference Greenland 

intended to cause serious injury or death upon impact.

Greenland further challenges whether the tractor should be considered a 

dangerous weapon, that is, one used in a way indicating the intention to inflict 

death or serious injury with the capability of doing so. See Iowa Code § 702.7

(stating a “dangerous weapon” includes “any instrument or device of any sort 

whatsoever which is actually used in such a manner as to indicate that the 

defendant intends to inflict death or serious injury upon the other, and which, when 

so used, is capable of inflicting death upon a human being”). Greenland notes the

slow speed of the tractor and the failure of the bale tines to penetrate all the way 

through the door. 

“Dangerous weapons, in fact, can encompass almost any instrumentality 

under certain circumstances.” State v. Greene, 709 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Iowa 2006); 

see State v. Oldfather, 306 N.W.2d 760, 763–64 (Iowa 1981) (“It is clear that an 

automobile, if it is used in such a manner as to indicate an intent to inflict death or 

serious injury, may be a ‘dangerous weapon’ . . . .”). Greenland driving his tractor

with the raised bale tines directly into an occupied stopped vehicle meets the 

statutory definition of using a dangerous weapon. The sheriff had stopped by the 

side of the driveway to leave a clear path for Greenland to get past him. Instead, 

Greenland turned his tractor, with five-foot spears attached to the front at an 

approximately three-foot high level, directly into the side of the vehicle, with the 
10

spears aimed at the driver seat. He then proceeded to push the vehicle down the 

driveway towards another law enforcement vehicle, around a corner, and into a 

ditch. If the sheriff’s vehicle had been less sturdy or the angle of Greenland’s 

impact had been different, the sheriff could have easily suffered serious injury or 

death. 

The district court concluded, “While it is never possible to know exactly what 

someone is thinking when they do an act, the circumstances detailed in this case 

fully support the conclusion that the defendant intended death to someone that day 

if he could accomplish it.” We discern no error in the court’s conclusion and affirm.

Merger. Greenland next asserts his sentence is illegal because the offense 

assault of a peace officer is a lesser-included offense of attempt to commit murder 

of a peace officer and the offenses should have been merged into the greater 

offense. 

The merger doctrine is codified in Iowa law: 

No person shall be convicted of a public offense which is 

necessarily included in another public offense of which the person is 

convicted. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty of more than one 

offense and such verdict conflicts with this section, the court shall 

enter judgment of guilty of the greater of the offenses only.

Iowa Code § 701.9; see State v. Hickman, 623 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 2001). In 

determining whether two offenses merge, “we look to the elements of each and 

determine if the greater offense can be committed without also committing the 

lesser offense. If the greater offense cannot be committed without also committing 

the lesser offense, the lesser is included in the greater.” Hickman, 623 N.W.2d at 

850. Our supreme court has determined “it is impossible to commit attempted 
11

murder without also performing an act which meets the statutory definition of an 

assault.” State v. Braggs, 784 N.W.2d 31, 36–37 (Iowa 2010).6 

Yet, whether convictions merge depends in part on how the case is 

presented and what factual issues the factfinder is asked to determine. Love, 858 

N.W.2d at 724. If the factfinder is not asked to and does not find sufficient evidence

to support two separate assaults in a single course of conduct, the offenses would 

merge, even if the evidence might be sufficient to support separate crimes. Id. at 

724–25. However, if the factfinder determines separate and distinct criminal acts

occurred to support each offense, merger is not necessary. See id. at 724. 

The district court made specific factual findings and conclusions of law to 

support both verdicts. As to the charge of assault on an officer, the court found as 

follows:

Directing a multi-thousand pound vehicle equipped with the 

equivalent of jousting lances on its front towards another vehicle with 

a person in it is an act intended to cause fear or pain to the person 

in the vehicle and which did in fact cause Sheriff Boswell to be in fear 

of painful or offensive contact.

The tractor was at the time of the defendant’s operation of it 

used in such a manner as to indicate that the defendant intended to 

inflict death or serious injury on the occupant of the vehicle he was 

ramming. Used in this manner, it was in fact capable of inflicting 

death.

The court also concludes that the defendant specifically 

intended to inflict serious injury on whomever was in the vehicle. The 

defendant’s actions in raising the bail tines to a higher level such that 

it was capable of impacting the vehicle rather than sliding under it, 

and his movement of the tractor off the driveway in pursuit of the 

vehicle, all indicate this specific intent.

6 The State argues it is possible to commit attempted murder without committing 

an assault, ending with an assertion: “This court should overrule Braggs and hold 

that a conviction for assault does not merge into a conviction for attempted murder, 

under any circumstances.” Because this court is “not at liberty to overrule 

controlling supreme court precedent,” State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 2014), we must apply the merger doctrine as established in Braggs. 
12

The court also made relevant findings as to the attempt-to-commit-murder 

charge:

The defendant’s actions on May 23, 2019, were done with full 

awareness on his part. He intentionally attacked at least three 

vehicles on that date, including the sheriff’s vehicle, and made 

contact with two of them. The contact between Monte Greenland’s

vehicle and the sheriff’s vehicle were separated by some minutes, 

during which time the defendant had returned the tractor to a place 

near the shed, mounted a utility vehicle, dismounted the utility vehicle 

and remounted the tractor.

A further consideration is the fact that the defendant had 

changed the position of the bail tines between the contact with Monte 

Greenland’s vehicle and the sheriff’s vehicle. He moved them to a 

position that improved the likelihood that the tines would make 

contact with the passenger compartment of any vehicle that the 

defendant was able to hit. He was aware that the sheriff’s vehicle 

was occupied at the time that he rammed it with the tractor and he 

made contact with that vehicle in such a way that one bail tine 

penetrated the passenger compartment.

The finder of fact is entitled to conclude that the defendant 

intends the natural results of his acts. The natural result of an act 

that causes the bail tines to penetrate the passenger compartment 

of an occupied vehicle is death to the occupant of the vehicle 

impacted. The defendant had a clear path to the road and chose 

instead to leave the driveway and turn towards the sheriff’s vehicle. 

While it is never possible to know exactly what someone is thinking 

when they do an act, the circumstances detailed in this case fully 

support the conclusion that the defendant intended death to 

someone that day if he could accomplish it.

The court’s findings use separate, distinct events within Greenland’s course 

of conduct to support the two convictions. The action underlying the assault is the 

act of driving at Sheriff Boswell’s vehicle, placing him in fear of painful or offensive 

contact. The action behind the attempt to commit murder offense is the physical 

ramming of Sheriff Boswell’s vehicle with the raised bale spears directed at the 

driver seat of the vehicle. Moreover, even if we considered the driving at and 

ramming of Sheriff Boswell’s vehicle to be a single course of action that would 
13

merge, Greenland did not stop upon ramming the sheriff’s vehicle. Instead, when 

the tractor was losing power after the initial strike, Greenland shifted gears to get 

moving again and pushed the vehicle around the corner and into a ditch. The act 

of switching gears in order to push the vehicle is sufficient to separate the actions 

into two distinct offenses.

We conclude the court to be correct when it specifically based the 

convictions on separate and distinct actions. Therefore, Greenland’s convictions 

for assault on a peace officer with intent to cause a serious injury and attempt to 

commit murder of a peace officer do not merge. See Love, 858 N.W.2d at 724–

25. 

AFFIRMED.