UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

WENDELL JAY MOSIER, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES FARREN; AMY RHOADES; 

CULPABLE AGENTS; TXOAG TITLE 

VII CSED; CAROLINE WOODBURN; 

LANA KING (KEMPER); JOHN TERRY, 

 Defendants–Appellees. 

No. 17-1310 

(D.C. No. 1:17-CV-01144-LTB) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Wendell Jay Mosier appeals the district court’s dismissal for improper venue 

of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.1

 We affirm. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Mosier is pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). But we don’t act as his advocate. See 

Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 25, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

BACKGROUND 

Mosier is an inmate in the Potter County Detention Center in Amarillo, Texas. 

He filed pro se a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint in the United States District Court for 

the District of Colorado. Each defendant was a Texas resident. 

Mosier claimed that Texas denied him due process and violated his doublejeopardy rights by filing a criminal non-support charge for child-support arrearages 

he assertedly had already paid in full. He claimed that the resulting judgment led 

Texas to garnish his wages and deplete his savings account. 

The magistrate judge, in an order to show cause, asked Mosier to explain why 

the action shouldn’t be dismissed or transferred for improper venue. 

Mosier then filed a document titled “Amendment to Relief Sought.” R. at 65. 

In it, he claims “a significant loss of property in the form of lost wages as a resident 

of Colorado.” Id. The following day, he filed a response to the show-cause order 

titled “Cause to Proceed in the Current Venue.” Id. at 69. In that document, he stated 

that a substantial part of the property relevant to his claim involves wages and bank 

accounts based in Colorado.

The district court sua sponte determined that venue was improper, finding that 

“Mosier’s assertion regarding wages and bank accounts in Colorado do not [sic] 

demonstrate that a substantial part of property that is the subject of the [complaint] is 

situated in Colorado.” Id. at 77. The court also found that “because it appears that [] 

Mosier’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine[,]” transfer to a district with 

venue wouldn’t be in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 
3 

So the district court dismissed the case without prejudice for improper venue and 

entered judgment by separate order. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Mosier makes the same argument that he did below: that Texas 

violated his constitutional rights through its child-support proceedings. He fails to 

address the controlling issue—whether the district court incorrectly dismissed his 

complaint for improper venue.2

 But construing his pleadings liberally we turn to that 

argument, first addressing whether venue was improper, and then, whether the 

district court erred by dismissing, rather than transferring, the case. 

We review de novo whether venue was proper (because that determination is 

an interpretation of the venue statute). See Pierce v. Shorty Small’s of Branson 

Inc., 137 F.3d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir. 1998). And we review for abuse of discretion a 

district court’s decision to dismiss, rather than transfer, a case. See Johnson v. 

Christopher, 233 F. App’x 852, 854 (10th Cir. 2007). 

A. Was Venue Proper 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that, a civil action may be brought in 

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are 

residents of the State in which the district is located; 

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions 

giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the 

subject of the action is situated; or 

 2

 Instead, he lambasts the district court for making “no decisions based on any 

of the material facts,” and not “consider[ing] any grounds for relief” other than 

“jurisdiction.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 9. 
4 

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as 

provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is 

subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 

28 U.S.C § 1391(b). And as the district court determined, it’s undisputed that all the 

defendants reside in Texas, eliminating § 1391(b)(1) as enabling venue in Colorado.3 And 

because venue would be proper in another district, § 1391(b)(3) isn’t a potential avenue 

to venue. 

Thus, the only possible route to venue lies in § 1391(b)(2), which establishes that 

venue is proper in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events relevant to 

the action occurred, or where a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action 

is situated. And below, though recognizing that substantial parts of the relevant events 

occurred in Texas, Mosier argued that the relevant property was “taxable wages” and 

“Federal Bank accounts,” which presumably are located in Colorado.4 R. at 71. But 

Mosier’s claim is about Texas state court proceedings and against Texas residents. C.f. 

Coando v. Payne, 127 F. App’x 418, 419 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A] review of [the] 

complaint clearly establishes that all of the alleged events giving rise to his claims 

occurred in [a different state].”). So the district court was correct to reject Mosier’s vague 

references to garnished wages and emptied bank accounts. And venue was improper in 

the District of Colorado. 

 3

 Mosier agreed that “[t]his provision would place the venue in the Federal 

District Court in Amarillo[,] Texas.” R. at 70. But he further stated that the “local 

judiciary” is biased against him. Id. 

4

 He also claimed that Colorado is his true place of residence, arguing he spent 

relatively little time in Texas since 1999. The plaintiff’s domicile doesn’t factor into 

the venue analysis. 
5 

B. Was Dismissal, Rather Than Transfer, Proper 

Where it is “in the interest of justice,” a district court shall transfer an 

improperly filed case “to any district or division in which it could have been 

brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). But Mosier “offers us no reason to believe that an 

injustice will result from the dismissal as opposed to a transfer by, say, operation of a 

statute of limitations upon his claims.” Johnson, 233 F. App’x at 854. And Mosier 

offers us no other reason that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the 

case. Nor does our review of the record reveal any. See id. (“In the facts and 

circumstances of this case, we discern no such abuse given that the suit was filed in such 

an obviously improper venue.”). Thus we find no abuse of discretion. 

CONCLUSION 

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case. We also grant Mosier’s 

motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of filing fees. 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge