Filed 7/31/13 In re C.C. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re C.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. C.C., Defendant and Appellant. G047202 (Super. Ct. No. DL042030)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Orange County, Deborah J. Chuang, Judge. Reversed. Richard Jay Moller, appointment under the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney Genera l, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assist ant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Michael T. Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Pl aintiff and Respondent.2 After the juvenile court denied C.C .’s (minor) motion to suppress evidence,
she admitted misdemeanor coun ts for possession of a contro lled substance (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4060) and possession of less than one ounce of ma rijuana on school grounds by a minor. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (e)). Exercising its authority under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 725, the court imposed proba tion with several conditions,
but did not declare her to be a ward of the court. In this appeal, from the judgment, minor challenges the denial of her motion to suppress. We reverse.

FACTS

Minor admitted to David Yates, a cam pus control assistant, that she had been using her cell phone in cla ss. He asked her to turn ov er her phone. Without having been asked for anything else, minor also gave Yates paraphernalia used to prepare marijuana cigarettes. Because this raised Yate s’s suspicion of mariju ana use, he searched the contents of the phone. Some of the messages saved on it suggested minor possessed and possibly sold contraband drugs. Yates th en informed both the school principal and the assistant principal and took minor to her guidance counselor. At Yates’s request, minor gave him her car keys and Yates tu rned them over to Irvine Police Officer
Robinson who arrived ab out 20 minutes after th e initial encounter.
Robinson searched minor’s car. He fo und marijuana, a ma rijuana pipe, and a prescription pill. Robinson in terviewed minor in the office of the assistant principal
and she admitted the contents of the car belo nged to her. The record fails to disclose
where the car was located.3 DISCUSSION

1. The Order is Appealable After minor admitted the allegations of petition, the court ordered “minor declared a non ward of the Orange County J uvenile Court under [Wel fare and Institutions Code], [s]ection 725 . . . .” The court then imposed probation. In a supplemental brief, which we requested to deal with specific issues, not including whether the order was appealable, the Attorney Genera l for the first time argues there is no an appealable order. Normally we would not address an issue that is raised in this belated fashion. But because it deals with our jurisd iction, we cannot ignore it. Fortunately, the issue is easily
resolved. In response to the Attorney Genera l’s belated assertion, minor’s counsel
calls our attention to In re Do Kyung K. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 583. That case also dealt with a minor who was placed on probation without a wardship fi nding pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 725. In a detailed analysis which we need not repeat here, the court concluded that such an order was, in fact, appealable. ( In re Do Kyung K., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th 58 7-590.) We accept this precedent.

2. The Standard for Search es of Students and Their Po ssessions on School Property As both minor and the Attorney Gene ral acknowledge, the leading case dealing with searches of students is New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325 [105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720]. There the United States S upreme Court stated, “the accommodation of the privacy interests of scho olchildren with the substantial need of
teachers and administrators for freedom to ma intain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that sear ches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search ha s violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a4 search of a student should depend simp ly on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.” ( Id . at p. 341.)
And in In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 566 our Supreme Court recognized a similar st andard, recognizing that “official s must be permitted to exercise their broad supervisory and disciplinary power s, without worrying that every encounter
with a student will be converte d into an opportun ity for constitutional review. To allow minor students to challenge each of those d ecisions, through a motion to suppress or in a civil rights action under 42 United States Code section 1983, as lacking articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion would make a mockery of sch ool discipline and order.” ( Ibid.) Considering this relaxed standard fo r student searches, we cannot find fault with the conduct of school personnel. When minor voluntarily demonstrated her possession of drug paraphernalia , Yates was justified in se arching her telephone.

3. The Relaxed Standa rd for Student Searches Requires a Showing the Vehicle Search Took Place on School Property or its Immediate Vicinity
Minor calls our attention to the f act no evidence was presented that her vehicle was on school property when it was searched. She only cites In re Cody S. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 86, for th e proposition that the relaxed search rule should not be applied to the search of the vehicle. But th e case is hardly a prec edent for the proposition
asserted. In Cody , the opinion merely noted the tr ial court had granted the minor’s suppression motion to a search of a vehi cle that was not on school premises. ( Id. at p. 91.) The opinion does not state the basis fo r this decision nor was the search of the vehicle an issue in the appeal. Although we asked both sides to submit supplemental briefs on this issue, neither was able to poi nt to any California authority on the subject. The Attorney General points to New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. 325 and quotes extensively from that case dealing with the reasonableness standard for school5 searches. This, of course, fails to answer our question. Citing Vernonia School Dist. 47J
v. Acton (1995) 515 U.S. 646 [115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed .2d 564] and In re Randy G.,

supra, 26 Cal.4th 556, the minor points out th at these cases only involved searches on school property. But J.P. v. Millard Public Schools (2013) 285 Neb. 890 [830 N.W. 2d 453] held “school officials are not given ex press or implied authority to search on a public street, at a student’s home, or on ot her premises off school grounds, including an off-school-grounds vehicle that is not asso ciated with a school-sponsored event or activity.” ( Id. at p. 908.) And State v. Crystal B. (2000) 130 N.M. 336, held that the “lower standard [for searches] applies . . . onl y in furtherance of the school’s educationrelated goals; that is in a situation where th e student is on school property or while the student is under control of the school.” ( Id. at p. 339.) We find the latter two cases persuasive . Here minor was under the control of the school. The problem, as defense co unsel asserted during the suppression hearing,
is that there was no evidence where minor’s ve hicle was located. It may well have been in the school parking lot, in which case the sear ch would have been justified. It may have been on the street, immediately adjacent to the school, where the search might also have been justified. But, in the absence of any evidence as the vehicle’s location, we cannot
assume it was in either of these locations. We conclu de that, under the evidence presented, substantial evidence does not su pport a conclusion the lower standard for searches was applicable to th e search of minor’s vehicle. Thus probable cause would have to be demonstrated to support a sear ch of the car. It was not. And since the evidence supporting the charges was discovered during search of minor’s vehicle, we reverse the judgment on the basis the motion to suppress sh ould have been granted.6 DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed.

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, J.

ARONSON, J.