The Honor able John R. Gibs on, Senior Circuit J udg e, United States Court of Appe als for * the Eig hth Circuit.

NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0635n.06 F iled: October 20, 2008 No. 07-5536 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA P laintif f-App ellant, v. G AB RI EL H. BR OWN LEE Defendan t -Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEF OR E: KEITH , G RI F F IN , a nd G IBSO N, Ci r c uitJudg e s. *

DAMON J. K

EITH , Circuit Judge. Def endant Gabriel H. Br ownlee appea ls his conviction and sentenc e for committing eig ht violations of the terms of his r elea se from prison. Def endant wa s under supe rvised re lease following his conviction for c onspiracy to commit bank fraud. H e pled g uil ty to sev en of the vio latio ns , b ut d isp ute s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g re g ard ingthe e ig hth alleg ation—that he possessed w ith intent to di stribute presc ription drug s not prescr ibed to him. F or the re asons outlined below, we AF F IRM the district court’s r uling. I. F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND On Oc tob e r 2 1, 20 04 , G a

br ie l H. Br ow nle e (“ De fe nd ant” ) w a s se nte nc e d to fo ur mon ths in2

pr iso n, fo llo we d b y

36 mon ths of

su pe rv ise d re le a se , a ft e r be ing c on vic te d of c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it bank fra ud. (J.A. 11). After Def

endant’ s supervised rele ase w as transf err ed to the Western District of Te nn e sse e in M arc h 20 05 , De fe nd ant’ s p ro batio n o ff ic e r p e tit ion e d th e dis tr ic t c ourt to a rr e st Def endant a nd have his re maining te rm of super visi o n revoked based on e ight violations of the conditions of his supervised re lease . (J.A. 6). The Petition for Violation of Supervised Re lease (“the Petition”) noted t h at seven of the violati o n s qu a li f

ie d a s “ G r a d e C V io lati o n s ” u n d e r th e Se n te n c in g G u id e li n e s . T h e e ig h th a lleg ed vio la tio n, that D e fe nd ant p os se sse d w ithint e nt to dis tr ibute pr e sc ri pti on dr ug s n ot p re sc ri be d to him , qualified a s a “G rade A Violation.” (J.A. 6). The Petition stated: The de fenda

nt violated this condition i n that on October 28 , 2 0 0 6 , t he def

endant illega lly possessed with intent to distribute approxi mately 150 Xana x pills not presc ribed to him in Davidson County , TN. (Upon attemp t i n g t o en t er the Fa ded Nig htclub located at 115 2nd A ve. North, Nashville, TN, the defe ndant was sea rche d by clu b s e c u r it y an d f o u n d to b e in p o s s e s s io n o f 1 5 0 X an a x p il ls .) He was s u b s eq u en t l y

co n v i ct edo f Legen d

Dru g W i t h o u tP re s cr i p t i o nan d s en t en ce d

t o one (1) day jail (time serve d) and a ssessed costs of $291.80. (J.A. 6). Def endant pled g uilty to all of t he violations, except the alleg ation that he possessed X anax with the intent to dist ribute. (J.A. 18-28). De fenda nt noted that when he was found w ith the Xanax pills, he was char g ed only with misdeme anor possession by the Nashville Police De partment. (J.A. 33 -3 7)

. Th e Go ve rnme nt ar g ue d that des pit e the mis de me ano r ch arg e , und e r fe de ra l law , in te nt t o dis tr ibute c ou ld b e inf

e rr e d f ro m th e qu anti ty

of Xa na x fou nd , a nd De fe nd ant’ s “ a c tua l c on du c t” there fore constituted a “G rade A Violation.” (J .A. 32). The Gove rnment re commended that under t h e SentencingGuidelines, De fenda nt be sentenc ed to 21 months imprisonm ent. ( Id

. ) D e f e n d ant ref uted the pre scription drugviolation and maintained that beca use he had no intent to distribute the3

Xanax , he had c ommitt ed only “Gr ade C Violations,” a

nd that the appr opriat e ad visory rang e wa s there fore four to ten months imprisonment. (J .A. 33-37). The district cour

t considere d these a

rg uments and obser

ved: I t doesn’t see m to be any

dispute, there is no dispute that, Mr. B rownlee , that y ou took that bottle of materia l inside or wer e g oing in a nig htclub with it, so t hat - that lea ds to some infere nces which I think flow from that. Ifra nkly don’t find y our story

[t hat y ou fo un d th e dr

ug s in y our r e nta l c ar a

nd fo rg ot t hey we re in your j a c ke t] te rr ibl y believable that y ou didn’t know what it wa s and y ou took it in any way , that’s kind of i l l o g i c a l

. C e rt a i n l y y o u h a v e ane d u c a t i o n , s o i t ’ s n o t- i td o e s n ’ tm a k e an y s e n s e . It does appe ar that simpl y

looking at the evidenc e that it is n o t i n dispute that the m at er i al wa s t ak en i n t o t h e n i gh t cl u b fo r t h e p u rp o s e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n , i t ’s a l ar ge quantity , and it is sold and used rec reationally

. (J.A. 39-40). The court conclude d that the violation qua lified as “Gr ade A.” After revie wi n g t h e other violations to w h i ch Def endant ha d pled g uilty

within the context of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentenc ing f

actor s, J udg e McCalla se ntence d Def endant to 21 mont h s i m prisonment “with the

rec ommendation that [he] be allowe d to participate and enc ourag ed to par ticipate in a d ru g and alcohol prog ram.” (J.A. 47-48). II. DISCUSS ION A. Wheth er the district court abused its discretion by findin g that Defendant engaged in condu ct constitu ting a “Grade A V iolation ” of supervised re lease under U.S.S.G § 7B1.1. This Court reviews f

or abuse of discretion a district cour t’s finding that a def

endant violated the terms of his super

vised rele ase. Un ite d S

tates v . Cu rti

s , 237 F.3d 598, 605 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 83 (e )( 3) , a dis tr ic t c ourt may

re vo ke a te rm of su pe rv ise d r e le a se if

it “fin d s b y a p reponderanc e of the evidenc e that the de fenda nt violated a condition of super vised rele ase.” United States SentencingGuidelines (U.S.S.G.) Sec tion 7B1.1(a )(1) defines a “Gr ade A4

Violation” of super

vised rele ase as “conduc t c onstitut ing

. . . a loca l offense punishable by a ter m of imp ri so nme nt e xce e din g on e y e ar that

. . . is

. . . a c on tr oll e d su bs tanc e of

fe ns e .” Ap pli c a tio n N ote 1 of Section 7B 1.1 explains t hat a defe ndant’s ac tual conduct, not the a ctual cha rg e, is the controlling fa c tor , s ta tin g that: [a v io lati o n ] ma

y b e c h ar g e d w h e th e r o r n o t th e d e f e n d an t h a s b e e n th e s u

b je c t o f a separ ate f eder al, state, or loc al prosec ution f or such conduct. The g rade of violation does not depe nd upon the conduc t that is the subject of criminal char g es or of which the de fe nd a

nt i s c on vic te d in

a c ri min a l pr oc e e din g . Ra the r, the g ra de of vio latio n is ba se d o n th e de fe nd ant’ s a c tua l c on du c t. Un de r U. S.S. G. § 4B 1. 2( a ), a “ c on tr oll e d sub sta nc e of fe ns e ” inc lud e s an o ff

e ns e un de r s tate law, punishable by

imprisonment for a ter

m exceeding one y ear , that prohibits t h e p o s s es sion of a controlled substanc e with intent to distribute. Tennessee Code Section 39-17-417( a) pr ovides that

“ it i s an o ff

e ns e fo r a

de fe nd ant t o k

no wi ng ly

. . . p os se ss a

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e wi th i nte nt t o manufa cture , deliver or sell the controlled substance.” Such a viol ation is “a class d felony .” T.C.A. § 39-17-417( d)(1)

. Tenne ssee Code Section 40-35-111 pr ovides that the sentenc e for a cla ss D felony is not less than two y ear s. This Court must there fore deter mine whether

the district court a

bused its discretion in finding by a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that D e fe nd ant’ s a c tua l c on du c t—t he fa c ts u

nd e rl yinghis Tenne ssee a

rre st—constituted a “Gr ade Aviolation.” The district cour t, after summarizin g the undisputed evidenc e that Def endant e ntere d a nig htclub possessing 150 X anax pills not prescr ibed to him, and consideringhis claim that he had found the drugs in a rental car and was “to drop off” the pills t o their owne r, infer

red that Defe ndant had the intent to distribute the drug s. As thi s Co ur

t ha s h e ld, “ int e nt t o d istri bu te a c on tr oll e d s ub st ance has b e e n in fe rr e d s ole ly from possession of a larg e quantity of the substanc e.” Un ite d S tates v . W hite , 9 32 F .2 d 5 88 , 5 90 (6 th5

Cir . 1 99 1) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n o mitte d) . A lth ou gh Defendant a rgue s th a t he wa s n ot c ha rg e d w ith intent to distribute by Tenne ssee, De fenda nt’s “ac tual conduct” is the controlling c onsideration. The Gover nment, there fore , need not pr esent e vidence of a c onviction or eve n a p ro s ec u t i o n for the dis tr ibutio n c ha

rg e . Se c tio n 7B 1. 1 of the se nte nc ing g uid e lin es “p unish e s conduct co n s t i tu t i n g a

c ri me , n ot c o n v ic tion for a c ri me . App lic a tio n n ote 1 to the se c tio n e mph a size s th is, a s it a llo ws a court to find a G rade A violation even if pr osecutors do n o t bring char g es or do not obtain a conviction.” United States v. Mc Cullough , 1 73 F .3 d 4 30 , 1 99 9 U .S. Ap p. L EX I S 12 76 1, a t *6 (6 th Cir. Mar. 2, 1999) ( unpublished). He re , in a sse ssi ngDe fe nd ant’ s a c tua l c on du c t, Jud g e Mc Ca lla e va luate d th e un dis pu te d f a c ts and hea rd direc tly

from De fenda

nt, who stated: [O] n the A violation Ig ot, the pills wasn’ t m i n es [ s i c] , it was left in my vehicle, a rent-a-c ar ha d, and wa s supposed to drop the pills off to him. They didn’t have no date on them, so kne w something was wr ong with the pills, do ad m i t t hat, but once in the club, had lef

t them in my

jacke t, they

sear ched me at the door, the y didn’t know what it was e ither. (J.A. 37). Base d on the assessment of this story and the surr ounding f

acts, the c ourt found that Def endant intende d to distribute the drug s in his possession. Be cause the district judge had the opportunity to evaluate all the evidence involved, including t h e l ar ge q u an t i t y o f dr

u gs , De fe n d an t ’s ex p l an at i o n , as we l l as h i s d em ea n o r an d cr ed i b i l i t y , J u d ge McCalla did not abuse his discr etion by finding that Def endant’ s actua l c onduct constituted a “G rade A” violation of his supervise d rele ase. The sentenc e imposed wa s rea sonable. B. W he the r the

se nte nc ethe

dis tric t c ourt impos e d

fo r De fenda nt’ s v iol ations of sup e rv ise d re le as e was un reasonable. This Court revie ws a district cour t’s sentenc e upon re vocation of supe rvised re lease under a6

defe rential a

buse of discretion standard f or re asonable ness. United States v. Bolds , 511 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2007). This Court has held that a se ntence may be proc edura lly

unrea sonable “ if the district judge fails to consider the applicable Guidelines ra ng e or neg lects t o consider the other fa ctors listed in 18 U. S

. C

. § 3553(a) , and instead simply selec ts what the judg e dee ms an appropr iate sente nce without such require d considera tion.” United States v. Collington , 461 F.3d 805, 808 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (interna l citations omitted). A sentenc e may be substantively

unrea sonable “ when the district c ourt selec t[ s] t he sente nce a

rbitrar ily , bas[es] the s entenc e on impermissible fac tors, [or] fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a ) fac tors or g iv[ es] an unrea sonable amount of weig ht to any pertinent fa ctor.” Id

. (i nte rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) . H e re , th e se nte nc e wa s nei th er p ro c e dura lly no r s ub sta

nti ve ly

unrea sonable be cause the district court e valuated the evidenc e in the re cord a nd consid er ed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fa ctors bef ore imposing the sentenc e. Wit h reg ard to the nature, c ircumstance s, and ser iousness of Def endant’ s violations, the district court commented specific ally on all the offe nses, including the ones to which De fenda nt pled g uilty . (J.A. 40-41). Evaluating Def endant’ s history and chara cter istics, the court noted that at the time of the initial sentence , the def endant “ didn’t have a

lot of cr i m i n al history ,” (J.A. 42) but that “since then we ha

ve a hig h failure rate ,” [ this behavior] “tends to sug g est that . . . the ac tual conduct under supe rvision may

be a be tter pre dictor of f

uture c onduct.” Id

. Con sid e ri ngthe ne e d to pr ote c t th e pu bli c , th e c ourt

state d: I t just looks like there has been a fa ilure in the sy stem and that fr ankly the def endant has had some tr ouble addr essing it seriously , and re cog nizi ng that there can be serious penalties, if p r o v id e d

. So th a t s u g g e s ts th a t w e n e e d to h a v e a lo n g p e r iod of incar cer ation, up to three y ear s, in order to simply stop the conduct. (J.A. 43).7

Finally , applying the 15-21 S entenc ing Guidelines advisory rang e, Judge Mc Calla noted, “I think the guide line calc ulation is corre ct in this case, the co u rt doesn’t fe el constra ined by the g uid e lin e s and

sh ou ld n ot, the y ’r e sim

ply a dv iso ry . Th e y are us e fu l thou g h, and we sh ou ld c e rt a inl y pay attention to them in that reg ard.” (J.A. 45). B e c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

c on sid e re d a ll the a

pp ro pr iate se nte nc ingfa c tor s, di d not b a se its sentenc e on ar

bitrary or impermissible considerations, or improperly emphasize any

particula r fa ctor, the sentenc e below was not unr easona ble. We theref

ore AF F IRM the district court’s c onviction and sentenc e.