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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0067P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 04a0067p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

NORMA JEFFERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC

SCHOOL SYSTEM; STEPHEN

DAESCHNER, Superintendent

for Jefferson County Public

School System; CAROLYN

MEREDITH, Director of

Employee Relations for

Jefferson County Public

School System; GEORGE

BELL, Director of Security

Services for Jefferson County

Public School System; MAXIE

JOHNSON, Principal of

Chenoweth Elementary

School,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Nos. 02-5621/6038

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.

No. 00-00044—Jennifer B. Coffman, District Judge.

2 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

Nos. 02-5621/6038

1

Although plaintiff’s constitutional claims were brought under the

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1983 provides the usual remedy for

constitutional violations by state officials and her complaint was

interpreted as an action under that statutory provision. 

2

Plaintiff brought suit in state court against the Jefferson County

Public School System, Superintendent Stephen Daeschner, Carolyn

Meredith, Director of Employee Relations for the school system, George

Bell, Director of Security Services, Lisa Qureshi, an assistant teacher, and

Argued: December 4, 2003

Decided and Filed: March 4, 2004 

Before: MERRITT, DAUGHTREY, and GIBBONS,

Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: J. Key Schoen, SALES, TILLMAN &

WALBAUM, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Michael

Keith Kirk, WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, Louisville,

Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: J. Key Schoen,

SALES, TILLMAN & WALBAUM, Louisville, Kentucky,

for Appellant. Michael Keith Kirk, Byron E. Leet, WYATT,

TARRANT & COMBS, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellees.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

MERRITT, Circuit Judge. In this case brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 plaintiff Norma Jefferson brought various

federal due process claims against a group of state defendants,

as well as defamation and other state law claims.

2

 The
Nos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

3

Hearst-Argyle Productions, Inc., the owner of a Louisville television

station. Defendants removed the action to federal court. The claims

against Qureshi were remanded to state court and the television station has

settled with plaintiff; those two defendants are not parties to this appeal.

3

Plaintiff failed to include a copy of her complaint in the Joint

Appendix. In addition to constituting a violation of the rules for filings

in our circuit, 6th Cir. R. 30(f)(1)(B), the lack of a complaint made it

difficult for this court to untangle plaintiff’s multiple, overlapping claims

and allegations. 

primary questions before us arise from three of her federal

due process claims: (1) whether she received an appropriate

predeprivation hearing before her five-day suspension and

alleged constructive discharge from her position as a school

teacher in the Louisville public school system; (2) whether

she was deprived without due process of law of her

constitutionally-protected property interest in her job; and

(3) whether she was deprived of a substantive liberty interest

– her asserted interest in her good name and reputation –

without due process.

3

 Plaintiff also has a pending arbitration

proceeding arising under the collective bargaining agreement

governing her employment with the Jefferson County Public

School System.

We agree with the district court that before plaintiff was

suspended and allegedly forced to retire she received an

appropriate predeprivation, right-of-reply hearing that

complies with the due process requirements for such hearings.

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546

(1985) (before termination, a public employee with a property

interest in continued employment should receive

constitutionally adequate procedures, including “oral or

written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of

the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his

side of the story" to ensure due process of law). In addition,

we agree with the district court that plaintiff’s procedural due

process claim based on the deprivation of a property interest

4 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

Nos. 02-5621/6038

4

In Hudson, the Supreme Court held that the

unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state

employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural

requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment if a meaningful [state] postdeprivation remedy for

the loss is available.

468 U.S. at 533. 

5

In Vicory, a procedural due process case, we held as follows:

Section 1983 was not meant to supply an exclusive federal

remedy for every alleged wrong committed by state officials.

Rather, the statute is a remedy for only those wrongs which

offend the Constitution’s prohibition against property

deprivation without procedural due process. Thus we hold that

in § 1983 damage suits claiming the deprivation of a property

interest without procedural due process, the plaintiff must plead

and prove that state remedies for redressing the wrong are

inadequate. In a procedural due process case under § 1983, the

plaintiff must attack the state’s corrective procedures as well as

the substantive wrong. 

721 F.2d at 1066.

in her job also fails because she has not shown that state

remedies under Kentucky teacher tenure and breach of

contract statutes and cases are inadequate or incapable of

remedying the wrongs she alleges. Such a showing of

defective state remedies is required in procedural due process

cases like this one. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984);4

Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1984).5

Finally, we agree with the district court that plaintiff’s

“liberty interest” due process claim for injury to reputation

must be dismissed as well. As the Supreme Court made clear

in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976), there is no

viable, free standing, federal due process claim arising from

injury to one’s reputation. Such a claim is viable only in
Nos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

5

combination with two other elements: “when there is some

injury to employment . . . in addition to damage to reputation

and a subsequent denial of procedural due process to redress

that injury.” In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 796 (5th Cir.

1983). In the instant case, as the district court concluded, not

only is there no showing that state remedies for defamation

and improper discharge are inadequate, nonexistent or unfair,

but plaintiff has pending claims in state court that have yet to

be adjudicated and she may yet be able to bring other claims

in state court that will adequately redress her injuries. In

addition, she has an arbitration proceeding that has apparently

been stayed pending the outcome of this litigation. 

I. Predeprivation Due Process

It is necessary to understand the basic facts and the district

court’s ruling on plaintiff’s entitlement to a predeprivation

hearing before addressing her procedural due process and

liberty interest assignments of error. Plaintiff was a secondand third-grade teacher at Chenoweth Elementary School in

the Jefferson County Public School District. On January 18,

1999, a group of parents with children in plaintiff’s classroom

met to discuss allegations of improper conduct brought to

their attention by plaintiff’s teaching assistant, Lisa Qureshi.

At the meeting, the parents agreed to meet at the school the

next day to confront school officials with their allegations.

One of the parents alerted a local television station about their

plans. The parents also contacted Kentucky Child Protective

Services to report allegations of abuse. The next day, the

parents met with Chenoweth principal, defendant Maxie

Johnson, and accused plaintiff of misconduct in the

classroom, including grabbing students by their arms or shirt

collars, using curse words, allowing students to watch

inappropriate television shows and allowing students to eat

throughout the day. At the end of the meeting, several parents

spoke with a local television reporter on camera. 

6 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

Nos. 02-5621/6038

After the meeting, Johnson contacted Child Protective

Services about the allegations of child abuse and directed

defendant George Bell, Jefferson County Public School’s

Director of Security Services, to investigate the allegations.

Bell interviewed several students in plaintiff’s class, their

parents, and Lisa Qureshi, plaintiff’s teaching assistant who

had first made the complaints. On January 22, Bell met with

Johnson, plaintiff and plaintiff’s union representative, Ruby

Fitzgerald, before any action was taken against her. At that

hearing, plaintiff was verbally informed of the allegations

against her and she submitted a written response denying all

the allegations.

On January 27, 1999, Bell reported the results of his

investigation to defendant Carolyn Meredith, the school

system’s Director of Employee Relations. Bell concluded

that some, but not all, of the allegations against plaintiff were

substantiated. On February 2, following review of Bell’s

report by the school district’s Employee Practices Review

Committee, plaintiff received a letter listing the specific

improper conduct found by Bell’s investigation and informing

plaintiff that she would be suspended for five days without

pay, starting the next day. The superintendent of the

Jefferson County Public School System accepted Johnson’s

decision to suspend plaintiff and notified the Board of

Education about the suspension as required. 

On February 5, 1999, two days into her suspension,

plaintiff and her union representative met with Carolyn

Meredith and Minor Daniels, the Executive Director of

Business Affairs, to discuss where plaintiff would be assigned

following her suspension. Meredith presented plaintiff with

a letter offering plaintiff a temporary assignment teaching

language arts at a different school in the system and stating

that she would be permanently reassigned the following

school year. It is not disputed that, instead of signing the

transfer letter, plaintiff submitted a letter at the end of the

meeting stating “I, Norma J. Jefferson, am submitting this
Nos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

7

letter of retirement which will go into effect at the end of the

1998-1999 contract year.” Plaintiff claims that the retirement

was coerced because she was forced to choose retirement

because the transfer was an unacceptable alternative.

Kentucky Child Protective Services also conducted an

investigation during the same time as Bell conducted his

investigation to determine whether plaintiff abused her

students. Students, their parents, school personnel and

plaintiff were interviewed. Child Protective Services issued

its report two months later exonerating plaintiff of any

criminal child abuse claims. The report also stated that the

agency’s findings indicated that some of the students’

comments were influenced by their parents and Qureshi. The

report criticized Bell’s investigation because (1) the parents

were present when Bell interviewed the children, (2) the

investigation lasted only a week, and (3) it relied too heavily

on the opinions and uncorroborated hearsay of Qureshi and

the complaining parents. 

The collective bargaining agreement between the teachers’

union and the school board grants plaintiff a property interest

in continued pay and benefits because it provides that a

teacher may only be suspended for “just cause.” See

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39. We will assume for purposes

of this appeal that the five-day suspension without pay and

coerced retirement constitute the deprivation of a property

interest requiring a preloss hearing, which requires an

opportunity to respond before any deprivation, as well as

postdeprivation process where necessary. Id. at 542. If

extensive postdeprivation procedures exist, as they do here,

the predeprivation process need not be elaborate. 

Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that the predeprivation

hearing she received was adequate. She had notice of the

charges against her and an opportunity to respond both orally

and in writing, and she participated in at least one meeting

with decisionmakers before her suspension. Plaintiff then had

8 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

Nos. 02-5621/6038

the option of initiating a postdeprivation arbitration

proceeding under the grievance procedures of the teachers’

collective bargaining agreement or bringing an action in state

court pursuant to the state teacher tenure statute, Ky. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 161.790, and common law tort and contract

theories.

II. Postdeprivation Procedural Due Process 

If satisfactory state procedures are provided in a procedural

due process case, then no constitutional deprivation has

occurred despite the injury. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533;

Vicory, 721 F.2d at 1065-66 (in procedural due process cases

claiming deprivation of property interest, plaintiff must attack

the state’s corrective procedure as well as the substantive

wrong). Plaintiff may not seek relief under Section 1983

without first pleading and proving the inadequacy of state or

administrative processes and remedies to redress her due

process violations. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981),

overruled on other grounds, Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327

(1986); Mansfield Apt. Owners Ass’n v. City of Mansfield,

988 F.2d 1469, 1475 (6th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff must

prove the inadequacy of state remedies as an element of her

constitutional tort. See Marino v. Ameruso, 837 F.2d 45, 47

(2d Cir. 1988) (“Although one need not exhaust state

remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action claiming a

violation of procedural due process, one must nevertheless

prove as an element of that claim that state procedural

remedies are inadequate.” (emphasis added)). 

Plaintiff had at least three options available to her once she

received notice of the suspension: (1) proceed with the

detailed grievance procedures set out in the collective

bargaining agreement governing the terms of her

employment; (2) bring suit in state court under Ky. Rev. Stat.

Ann.§ 161.790, or (3) bring suit in state court for breach of

the collective bargaining agreement. 
Nos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

9

The collective bargaining grievance procedures provide for

several levels of review by school officials, culminating in the

availability of an arbitration hearing conducted by a neutral

arbitrator chosen by the parties. Once a teacher chooses the

grievance process, she must exhaust that process before

bringing an action in state court. The collective bargaining

agreement does not prohibit a teacher from then pursuing an

action in state court. 

Section 161.790 sets out a detailed process and timetable

for notification, reply and hearing procedures before and after

a teacher has been terminated, suspended without pay or

publicly reprimanded. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.790(3)-(10).

Section 161.790(10) clearly states that the procedures set

forth in subsections (3)-(9) are available to teachers who have

been suspended without pay, such as plaintiff. The statute

provides for the right to a hearing before an impartial tribunal,

the right to have counsel present at the hearing and the right

to present and question witnesses. The teacher has the right

to appeal the tribunal’s decision to the Circuit Court in the

jurisdiction where the school district is located. Ky. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 161.790(3)-(7). 

Plaintiff first chose to pursue the grievance process under

the collective bargaining agreement. On February 11, 1999,

plaintiff filed a “Level I” grievance with the Board of

Education containing multiple claims for relief. The

grievance was denied four days later by the principal, Maxie

Johnson. Plaintiff then submitted a “Level II” grievance,

which was denied on March 8, 1999, by the Director of

Employee Relations, Carolyn Meredith, as the

superintendent’s designee. The union, with plaintiff’s

acquiescence, then requested that her grievance be submitted

to arbitration. 

The district court concluded that plaintiff failed to

demonstrate the inadequacy of the panoply of remedies

available to her, including arbitration and a postdeprivation

10 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

Nos. 02-5621/6038

action in state court, whether brought as a common law

breach of contract claim or under Section 161.790 of the

Kentucky statutes. Jefferson v. Jefferson County Bd. of

Educ., 184 F. Supp. 2d 622, 625, motion to amend or alter

judgment granted in part and denied in part, 196 F. Supp. 2d

515, 516-17 (W.D. Ky. 2002). We agree with the district

court. Plaintiff offers no plausible explanation as to why

these remedies are inadequate. 

The fact that plaintiff was required, as an initial matter, to

choose between proceeding under the terms of the collective

bargaining agreement’s grievance procedures or Section

161.790 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes does not make the

state statute “unavailable” to her. Nothing in the collective

bargaining agreement prevents a teacher from bringing an

action under Section 161.790 at the conclusion of the

grievance process. The collective bargaining agreementstates

that a teacher will not “be deemed to have waived or

otherwise prejudiced” her rights by first seeking redress under

the collective bargaining agreement. 

III. Liberty Interests

The plaintiff asserts no substantive due process claim under

the incorporation doctrine based on violation of a specific

provision of the First or any other amendment to the

Constitution. Plaintiff simply recites a combination of facts

that she claims constitutes a “substantive liberty interest” due

process cause of action: (1) delay in her arbitration hearing;

(2) defamation, and (3) forced retirement or constructive

discharge.

Plaintiff first claims that defendants intentionally delayed

her arbitration hearing. Plaintiff learned in December 1999

that the arbitration had been set for late January 2000. The

hearing never occurred, however, because on January 5, 2000,

plaintiff filed her complaint in Kentucky state court. Even

though her arbitration was not completed, plaintiff claims she
Nos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

11

6

Before the motion for summary judgment was decided, plaintiff

moved to compel the production of 112 teacher arbitration cases brought

against the Jefferson Public School System between 1990 and 2002 for

the purpose of demonstrating that her arbitration hearing had been

intentionally delayed. A magistrate judge conceded the relevance of these

documents to plaintiff’s claim of delay and granted the motion with some

restrictions. However, the district court judge granted summary judgment

to defendants on the federal claims before the documents were produced

and those documents were never produced. In light of our holding that

plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law, the appeal concerning the motion

to compel is moot, as found by the district court. 

had to file suit by that date to avoid statute of limitations

problems. As a result of filing suit, the arbitration hearing

was held in abeyance pursuant to an agreement signed by

school system officials and her own union representative.

Plaintiff claims that she did not agree to stay the hearing

pending her lawsuit and that the stay was imposed in

retaliation for filing a lawsuit. The school board and the

union respond that plaintiff knew that it was standard

procedure to hold these types of hearings in abeyance once a

lawsuit is filed. Plaintiff’s own union president testified that

he told plaintiff’s attorney before the suit was filed that filing

a complaint would likely result in the hearing being held in

abeyance.

6

 

Second, plaintiff claims defamation as another element of

her constitutional tort. The complaining parents had

contacted the media and, after the February 5 meeting, Lauren

Roberts, a spokesperson for the school system, described the

allegations made against the plaintiff and stated that Bell’s

investigation had substantiated some of them. Roberts

informed the media that plaintiff had been suspended for five

days and stated that plaintiff had acted unprofessionally and

inappropriately. Roberts also related to the media that eight

studentshad been removed from plaintiff’s classroombecause

of the alleged abuse. Plaintiff claims that the defendants’

failure to give her a timely arbitration hearing stigmatized her,

12 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

Nos. 02-5621/6038

harmed her reputation and caused her to be denied job

opportunities in her chosen field. The “liberty” interest that

plaintiff claims was abridged is, essentially, that her freedom

to pursue her chosen profession under the same conditions

under which she had been working was curtailed, in part

through injury to her reputation caused by the false and

stigmatizing publications. Assuming the combination of

arbitration delay, defamation and job loss, the question is

whether these facts constitute a valid liberty interest claim

and, if so, whether plaintiff must show that her state remedies

are inadequate. 

In Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990), the

Supreme Court said that “the fact that a deprivation of liberty

is involved . . . does not automatically preclude application of

the Parratt rule” requiring a showing that state remedies are

inadequate. In Zinermon, the Court held that we should look

to the nature of the deprivation complained of and the

circumstances under which the deprivation occurred to

determine whether the rule of Parratt applies to defeat a

liberty interest claim. Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s

decision in Zinermon, we have held that Zinermon’s

extension of Parratt applies to some cases claiming

deprivation of due process where liberty interests are

concerned. Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en

banc) (arrestee brought suit against state police officer

seeking damages under § 1983 and under pendent state claim

of negligence and court held rule of Parratt applied to § 1983

suits alleging deprivation of a liberty interest); see also

Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 750 (6th

Cir.1999) (police chief brought § 1983 claim against city

arising from his suspension and investigation into alleged

misconduct and court held that a deprivation of liberty

interest based on damage to good name and reputation does

not automatically preclude application of Parratt rule),

overruled on other grounds, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA, 534

U.S. 506 (2002); Bacon v. Patera, 772 F.2d 259, 263-64 (6th

Cir. 1985) (private investigator’s liberty interestwasinfringed
Nos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

13

by damage to reputation and resulting loss of employment

due to police conduct, but remand necessary to ascertain

adequacy of state law remedies). Accord Hellenic Am.

Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d

877, 880-82 (2d Cir. 1996) (following Parratt and Hudson,

due process rights held not violated where adequate

postdeprivation remedy was provided by New York law for

city contractor barred from bidding on government contracts

resulting in injury to liberty interest in good name and

reputation); Birkenholz v. Sluyter, 857 F.2d 1214, 1217 (8th

Cir. 1988) (state statute provided nursing director found

negligent in care of patients with adequate postdeprivation

remedy to adjudicate any challenge to misconduct finding);

Econ. Dev. Corp. of Dade County, Inc. v. Stierheim, 782 F.2d

952, 954-55 (11th Cir. 1986) (contractor § 1983 action

against county and county employee for deprivation of due

process rights arising from loss of contract and attendant

statements made to press dismissed due to existence of

adequate state remedies to redress injury); In re Selcraig,

supra, 705 F.2d at 796 (discharged school official alleged due

process violations for damage to reputation and employment

and denial of name-clearing hearing). 

Plaintiff has already filed multiple claims under the state’s

defamation law and pursued the grievance procedures under

the collective bargaining agreement. She is pursuing actions

in two other forums in addition to federal court. There is no

showing that the remedies there are inadequate. Kentucky

law provides plaintiff with a panoply of postdeprivation

remedies sufficient to satisfy due process. The district court

properly dismissed her claims of deprivation of property and

liberty interests.

IV. Costs

The district court ordered plaintiff to pay $5,239.90 as costs

to the defendants. When reviewing an award of costs on

appeal, we look first to whether the expenses are allowable

14 Jefferson v. Jefferson County

Public School, et al.

Nos. 02-5621/6038

cost items and then to whether the amounts are reasonable

and necessary. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v.

Procter & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 643 (7th Cir. 1991).

Under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

“costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course

to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” If

authority exists to impose a cost, we reverse only for abuse of

discretion. The district court awarded costs to the defendants

for removal fees and witness fees, mileage reimbursement and

copying materials related to depositions. Statutory authority

exists for awarding all these costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Plaintiff argues that defendants cannot recover because they

did not “prevail” on all their claims. We do not agree.

Because all of plaintiff’s federal claims have been dismissed,

defendants are clearly the “prevailing party” in this action

under Rule 54(d) and are entitled to the reasonable costs

awarded by the district court.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is affirmed.