alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2233 

To require that States release persons charged with a misdemeanor on nonmonetary conditions only prior to court adjudication. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 10, 2019 

Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS of Illinois (for himself and Mr. EVANS) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To require that States release persons charged with a misdemeanor on non-monetary conditions only prior to court 

adjudication. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Bail Fairness Act of 

5 2019’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2233 IH

1 SEC. 2. NO MONETARY CONDITIONS OF RELEASE TO BE AP2 PLIED TO PERSONS CHARGED WITH MIS3 DEMEANORS. 

4 Section 501 of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control 

5 and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (34 U.S.C. 10152) is amend6 ed— 

7 (1) in subsection (a)(1), by adding at the end 

8 the following: 

9 ‘‘(I) Bail fairness programs.’’; and 

10 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

11 ‘‘(h) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section, the 

12 term ‘bail fairness program’ means a program under the 

13 law of a State that complies with the following: 

14 ‘‘(1) BAIL FOR MISDEMEANORS.—Monetary 

15 conditions of release from custody of a person may 

16 not be imposed if that person is held in custody by 

17 reason of having been arrested for the commission of 

18 a misdemeanor. 

19 ‘‘(2) PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION.—Any criminal 

20 charges filed against an offender described in para21 graph (1) may be dismissed if— 

22 ‘‘(A) the offender qualifies for and satis23 factorily completes a State-authorized mental 

24 health diversion program; 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 2233 IH

1 ‘‘(B) the offender qualifies for and satis2 factorily completes a State-authorized drug/al3 cohol abuse diversion program; 

4 ‘‘(C) the offender qualifies for and satis5 factorily completes a State-authorized commu6 nity service diversion program; or 

7 ‘‘(D) the offender qualifies for and satis8 factorily completes any other State-authorized 

9 diversion program that is appropriate to the age 

10 of the offender and the offense charged.’’. 

11 SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REVIEW OF RESEARCH 

12 RELATED TO BAIL REFORM AND PRETRIAL 

13 RELEASE PROGRAMS. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall review 

15 research and the results of studies which have been com16 pleted as of the date of the enactment of this Act related 

17 to bail reform and pretrial release programs in order to 

18 determine best practices, and shall make such best prac19 tices publicly available. 

20 (b) PREVENTING WASTE.—Not later than 180 days 

21 after completing the review under subsection (a), the At22 torney General shall publish guidelines for States related 

23 to reducing and preventing the waste of Federal resources 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
4 

•HR 2233 IH

1 in connection with bail reform and pretrial release pro2 grams. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
#### Isaac Farrar *versus*Allen Gilman *& al.*

The indorsement of negotiable paper belonging to a bank, by a cashier, is*prima facie*evidence of a legal transfer of such paper.

This was an action on a promissory note, dated Feb. 25, 1837, and payable to the Penobscot Bank or order, in fifty-seven days-and grace. THe signatures of the signers were admitted, as was the signature of the cashier of the bank, purporting to indorse the note to the plaintiff. The defendants consented- to be defaulted, subject to the opinion of the Court, whether such indorsement by the cashier, without any other proof of his authority, passed the property in the note to the plaintiff, so as to entitle him to maintain the action.

*Gilman,*for the defendants,

contended, that the cashier had no authority, by virtue of his office, to negotiate or to sell the paper of the bank, and that the-plaintiff had failed in establishing any title in himself to the note in suit.

*E. G. Rawson,*for the plaintiff.

The cashier is intrusted with the funds of the bank ; he is its executive officer; and, in the 'absence of all restrictions, it is his duty to apply the paper, as well as the cash of the bank, to such purposes as the interest of the bank may require. *Folger*v. *Chase,*18 Pick. 63 ; *Flucker*v. *Bank of U. S.,*8 Wheat. 338.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Weston C. J.

Negotiable notes of hand and bills of exchange áre often negotiated to and from banks, and from one bank to another. Nothing is more common than paper of this kind, bearing the indorsement of the cashier of a bank, in his *441official capacity. And it may perhaps be assumed as a universal usage, (hat when instruments of this description are indorsed or transferred by a bank, he becomes their organ for this purpose. It may not be necessary to decide, that he may do this without special authority ; and such an assumption might well be questionable. But as he is held out to the public as the confidential officer and actuary of the bank, as he is under bonds for the faithful performance of his duties, and as he acts as their organ in the transfer of negotiable paper, it is not in our opinion too much to hold, that when he indorses such paper, belonging to the bank, in his official capacity, it is *prima facie*evidence of a legal transfer.

In *Folger*v. *Chase,*18 Pick. 63, the authority of the cashier was proved by a vote of the directors. But Wilde J. who delivered the opinion of the Court, says, “ we think the indorsement by the cashier, in his official capacity, sufficiently shows, that the indorsement was made in behalf of the bank.” In the *United States*v. *Elijah D. Greene & als.*4 Mason, 427, a note, the property of the bank of Passamaquoddy, was indorsed by their cashier to the plaintiffs. His authority to do so, does not appear to have been proved, nor was it questioned.

*Judgment for plaintiff.*
# C_2018436EN.01004501.xml

| 3.12.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 436/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.12.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/45

---

Judgment of the General Court of 15 October 2018 — CompuGroup Medical v EUIPO — Medion (life coins)

(Case T-444/17) (1)

((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark life coins - Earlier EU word mark LIFE - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))

(2018/C 436/63)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: CompuGroup Medical AG (Koblenz, Germany) (represented by: B. Dix, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Fischer, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Medion AG (Essen, Germany) (represented by: G. Hagemeier, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 April 2017 (Case R 1569/2016-1) relating to opposition proceedings between Medion and CompuGroup Medical.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders CompuGroup Medical AG to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Medion AG. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders CompuGroup Medical AG to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Medion AG.

---

(1)  OJ C 283, 28.8.2017.

---
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Reliabrand, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the period from ended September 30, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:





1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.





/s/ Antal Markus



Antal Markus

CEO

Dated: November 14, 2012





This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company  for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
151 So. 922

#### STATE of Alabama et al. v. CENTRAL OF GEORGIA R. CO. et al.

3 Div. 72.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 21, 1933.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed by appellants.
#### Joseph Lee McFADDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry GAINEY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-6208.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2013.

Decided: April 30, 2013.

Joseph Lee MeFadden, Appellant Pro Se. David Cornwell Holler, Lee Erter Wilson Holler & Smith, LLC, Sumter, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

*177Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Lee McFadden appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *McFadden v. Gainey,*No. 4:12-cv-01470-MGL, 2013 WL 427328 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2013). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1120

Filed October 20, 2021

IN THE INTEREST OF K.R.,

Minor Child,

R.S., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Harrison County, Jennifer Bahr, 

District Associate Judge.

A father appeals a permanency order in a child-in-need-of-assistance 

proceeding. AFFIRMED.

Justin R. Wyatt of Woods & Wyatt, PLLC, Glenwood, for appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Diane Murphy Smith, Assistant 

Attorney General, and Jennifer V. Mumm, Harrison County Attorney, for appellee 

State.

Sara E. Benson of Meldrum & Benson Law, P.C., Council Bluffs, attorney 

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May and Ahlers, JJ.
2

MULLINS, Presiding Judge.

A father appeals a permanency order in a child-in-need-of-assistance 

proceeding setting the permanency goal as establishment of a guardianship in 

maternal relatives. 

The father questions whether the juvenile court erred in not placing the child 

in his custody and whether the establishment of a guardianship is in the child’s 

best interests. But he only states his disagreement with the juvenile court’s factual 

determinations and legal conclusions. Other than providing conclusory statements 

without citations to the record, he offers no meaningful substantive argument to 

facilitate appellate review,1 so we affirm without further opinion, deeming the 

arguments waived. See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (“The petition on appeal 

shall substantially comply with form 5 in rule 6.1401.”); 6.1401–Form 5 (“[S]tate

what findings of fact or conclusions of law the district court made with which you 

disagree and why, generally referencing a particular part of the record, witnesses’ 

testimony, or exhibits that support your position on appeal . . . . General 

conclusions, such as ‘the trial court’s ruling is not supported by law or the facts’ 

are not acceptable.”); see also In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A 

broad, all encompassing argument is insufficient to identify error in cases of de 

novo review.”); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (1996) (“[W]e will not 

speculate on the arguments [a party] might have made and then search for legal 

authority and comb the record for facts to support such arguments.”); Inghram v. 

Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974) (“To reach the merits 

 

1 He cites no case law and only two nominal statutes that reference what the court 

shall do after a permanency hearing.
3

of this case would require us to assume a partisan role and undertake the 

appellant’s research and advocacy. This role is one we refuse to assume.”); cf. 

Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (requiring arguments in briefs to contain reasoning, 

citations to authorities, and references to pertinent parts of the record).

AFFIRMED.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Fr ank, Clements and Haley

LORINE AND WILLIAM BROWN, D/B/A LAKE ANNA ELDER CARE, INC. MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1646-05-4 PER CURIAM NOVEMBER 22, 2005 SHERRY JUDY

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION (William E. Glover; Frank K. Friedman; Glover & Dahnk; Woods Rogers PLC, on briefs), for appellant. (Craig A. Brown; Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP, on brief), for appellee.

Lorine and William Brown, d/b/a Lake Anna Elder Care, Inc. (employer) appeal a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commis sion finding that (1) employer failed to prove that Sherry Judy’s (claimant) claim was barred by her willful misconduct; (2) claimant proved she gave notice of her industrial accident to employer as required by Code § 65.2-600; and (3) claimant proved she sustained an injury by acci dent arising out of and in the course of her employment on September 9, 2003. We have review ed the record and the commission’s opinion and find that this appeal is without merit. A ccordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the commission in its final opinion. See Judy v. Lorine and William Brown d/b/a Lake Anna Elder Care, Inc. , VWC File No. 216-20-16 (June 9, 2005). We dispense with oral argument and summarily affirm because the f acts and legal contentions are ad equately presented in the

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - materials before the Court and argument woul d not aid the decisional process. See Code § 17.1-403; Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

May 27, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135834 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 135834 

 COA: 281948 

Ingham CC: 06-000483-FC

MARCUS ANTHONY MATTHEWS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 28, 2007 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p0519 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

May 27, 2008 

 Clerk
September 1, 2023 

Re: Weekly Notification of Rule Amendments – 

Updates to Risk Parameters Established by ICC 

Pursuant to Section 5c(c)(1) of the Commodity 

Exchange Act and Commission Regulation 

40.6(d)

VIA ELECTRONIC PORTAL

Mr. Christopher Kirkpatrick

Secretary

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Three Lafayette Centre

1155 21st Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20581

Dear Mr. Kirkpatrick:

ICE Clear Credit (“ICC”) hereby submits, pursuant to Section 5c(c)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act and 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission”) Regulation 40.6(d), a notification of changes to 

risk parameters established by ICC in consultation with the ICC Risk Committee, Trading Advisory Group 

and/or Risk Working Group. ICC is registered with the Commission as a derivatives clearing organization.

The purpose of this notification is to report any changes to the risk parameters established by ICC. 

During the week ending September 1, 2023, changes were made to the following parameters: 

• Recovery rates for North American Risk Factors.

ICC has posted a copy of this submission on its website concurrent with this filling. 

ICC would be pleased to respond to any questions the Commission or the staff may have regarding this 

submission. Please direct any questions or requests for information to the attention of the undersigned 

at olivia.bazor@ice.com or 904-855-5580.

Sincerely,

Olivia Bazor

Staff Attorney
Exhibit 99.6  Principles
  
  P. A. Welch
  P.Eng.
  B. H. Emslie
  P.Eng.
  C. B. Kowalski
  P.Eng.
  
  G. M. Health
  P.Eng.
  R. F. Ott P.Geol.
  B. J. Wurster
  P.Eng.  Consent of Independent Petroleum
Engineers  We
hereby consent to the use and reference to our name and reports evaluating a
portion of EnCana Corporations petroleum and natural gas reserves as of December 31,
2007, and the information derived from our reports, as described or
incorporated by reference in: (i) EnCana Corporations Annual Report on Form 40-F
for the year ended December 31, 2007; (ii) EnCana Corporations and
EnCana Holdings Finance Corp.s registration statement on Form F-9 (File
Nos. 333-133648-01 and 333-133648); (iii) EnCana Corporations
registration statement on Form F-9 (File No. 333-137182); and (iv) EnCana
Corporations registration statements on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-124218,
333-13956, 333-140856 and 333-85598), filed with the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, or the Securities Act of 1933, as amended as applicable.  Sincerely,  McDANIEL &
ASSOCIATES CONSULTANTS LTD.  P. A. Welch, P. Eng.President & Managing DirectorCalgary,
  AlbertaFebruary 22,
  2008       2200, Bow Valley Square 3,
255 - 5 Avenue SW, Calgary AB  T2P
3G6    Tel: (403) 262-5506    Fax:
(403) 233-2744    www.mcdan.com
# C_2017195EN.01003801.xml

| 19.6.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 195/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.6.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 195/38

---

Action brought on 19 April 2017 — Siberian Vodka v EUIPO — Friedr. Schwarze (DIAMOND ICE)

(Case T-234/17)

(2017/C 195/51)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Siberian Vodka AG (Herisau, Switzerland) (represented by: O. Bischof, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Friedr. Schwarze GmbH & Co. KG (Oelde, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue:

Trade mark at issue: International registration designating the European Union in respect of the word mark ‘DIAMOND ICE’ — International registration No 1 211 695

Trade mark at issue:

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Procedure before EUIPO

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 February 2017 in Case R 1171/2016-4

Contested decision

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 8 February 2017 in the appeal proceedings R 1171/2016-4; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 8 February 2017 in the appeal proceedings R 1171/2016-4;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Plea in law

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

---
August 28, 2015

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

RENEE BAYLISS, Appellant

NO. 14-15-00501-CV V.

CRESCENT CITY APARTMENTS, Appellee

________________________________

Today the Court heard its own motion to dismiss the appeal from the 

judgment signed by the court below on June 1, 2015. Having considered the 

motion and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by 

appellant, Renee Bayliss and all other Occupants.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 102 (Friday, May 25, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 28920]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-13201]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institutes on Aging; Amended Notice of Meeting

    Notice is hereby given of a change in the meeting of the National 
Institute on Aging Special Emphasis Panel, June 13, 2001, 2 p.m. to 
June 13, 2001, 4:30 pm, 7201 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20892 which 
was published in the Federal Register on April 23, 2001, 66 FR 20474.
    The meeting will be held on May 29, 2001. The meeting is closed to 
the public.

    Dated: May 18, 2001.
LaVerne Y. Stringfield,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 01-13201 Filed 5-24-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
Exhibit
32.1





Statement
of Chief Executive Officer Furnished


Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





The undersigned, Richard B. Collins, is
the President and Chief Executive Officer of United Financial Bancorp, Inc. (the
“Company”).





This statement is being furnished in
connection with the filing by the Company of the Company’s Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 (the “Report”).





By execution of this statement, I
certify that to the best of my knowledge:





A)
            the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d))
      and





B)
            the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
      as of the dates and for the periods covered by the
  Report.





This
statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report so that this
statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.  It is not intended that this
statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
to United Financial Bancorp, Inc. and will be retained by United
Financial Bancorp, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.











November 7,
      2008
            /s/ Richard B.
      CollinsDated
            Richard
      B. CollinsChairman,
      President and Chief Executive
Officer




37