Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. * Not for P ubl ication in West’s F ederal Re porter 

# U nit edSta tes C ou rt o f A pp eal s

For t h e Firs t C ircu it

No. 08-1103 KIMNY KEO, Petitioner,

v . MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before Torruella, Baldock, and Lipez, * Circuit Judges.

Joseph A. MacDonald, on brief, for petitioner. Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Linda S. Wendtland, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Justin Constantine, Trial Attorney, Of f ice of Immigration Litigation, on brief, for respondent.

September 25, 2008Petitioner also unsuccessfully sought relief under the 1 United Nations Convention A g a inst Torture (CAT). Because Petition e r h a s not argued his CAT claim in his appellate brief, t h a t c l a i mi s n o t b e f o r e u s o n t h e P e t i t i o n f or Review. See U n i t e d States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (recog n i z i n g “settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived”). -2- BAL D O C K , C i r c u i tJu dge . The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (now the Department of Homeland Security) cha r g e d Petitioner Kimny Keo, a citizen of Cambodia, with overstaying his non-immigra n t visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Pet i t i o ner admitted the charge’s factual allega t ions (contained in a Notice to Appear) and filed an application f o r asylum and withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3). In his app l i c a t i o n, 1 Petitioner alleged a fear of persecution in Cambodia related to his past political activities. Following a hearing at which Petitioner testified at length, the Immigration Judge (IJ) found him not credible. See id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),(i i i ) (establishing framework for credibility determinations). Based on blanket findings, the IJ first concluded Petitioner was not eligible for asylum. The IJ expla i ned that Petitioner did not meet his burden of establishing he was a “refugee” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), i.e., one having a well-founded-3-

fear of persecution based on, among other things, “political opinion.” See id. § 1158(b) (requiring applicant for asylum
to e s t a b l ish refugee status). The IJ further concluded Petitioner was n o t entitled to withholding of removal because he di d n o t meet his burden of establishing his life

or freedom would be threatened on account o f “ political opinion” if removed to Cambodia. See id. § 1231(b)(3). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, agreeing with the I J ’s “decision for the reasons stated therein. ” The BIA explained that the IJ’s adverse

c r e d i bility determination was not clearly erroneous. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). In Jiang v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 25 , 27 (1st Cir. 2007) we set forth the standard of review a p p l icable to the present Petition: This court reviews findings of fact in immigration proceeding s , including findings with respect to credibility, t o determine whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Under that standard, an adverse credibility determination ma y stand if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. (internal quotations a n d citation omitted). We need not
repe a t P e titioner’s story here. We have carefully reviewed the entire record and the parties’ briefs , a n d conclude the IJ and BIA reached a permissible result under the applicable law. We have repeatedly opined that “‘w h e n a l ower court-4-

a c c u r a t e l y t a k e s t h e m e a s u r e o f a c a s e a n d a r t i c ulates a cogent rationale , i t serves no useful purpose for a reviewing court to write at l e n g th.’” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d 119, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 2002) (ci t i n g cases)). Because substantial evidence

s upports both the IJ’s and BIA’s respective decisions, we deny the Petition for Review for substantially the reasons set forth in those decisions. See Lin v. M u k a s e y, 521 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008 ) ( “ W here the BIA adopts the IJ’s ruling, but also engages in discussion of its own, we review the decisions of both together.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.