UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4439

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

TIMOTHY CHAMEL HICKSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. 

(4:11-cr-00769-TLW-1)

Submitted: October 31, 2012 Decided: December 13, 2012

Before WYNN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea, 

Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Timothy Chamel Hickson pleaded guilty to possession of 

a firearm after sustaining a prior conviction for an offense 

punishable by a term exceeding one year of imprisonment, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). The district court 

sentenced Hickson to 188 months of imprisonment, and he now 

appeals. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether 

the district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, 

whether the court erred in finding that Hickson was an armed 

career criminal, and whether sentence was reasonable. Hickson 

has also filed a pro se supplemental brief raising additional 

issues.* Finding no error, we affirm. 

Counsel first questions whether the district court 

complied with Rule 11. The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is 

to ensure that the plea of guilt is entered into knowingly and 

voluntarily. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002). 

Accordingly, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, 

through colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant 

of, and determine that he understands, the nature of the charges 

to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the 

 * We have considered the issues raised in Hickson’s pro se 

brief and conclude they lack merit. 
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maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is 

relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The 

court also must determine whether there is a factual basis for 

the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th 

Cir. 1991). 

In addition, as Hickson did not move in the district 

court to withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 

hearing is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 

277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). We have thoroughly reviewed 

the record and conclude that the district court fully complied 

with the requirements of Rule 11. We conclude, therefore, that 

Hickson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.

Counsel next questions whether the district court 

correctly concluded that Hickson qualified for the enhanced 

penalties of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e) (2006). We review a district court’s determination of 

whether prior convictions qualify as predicate convictions for 

purposes of the ACCA de novo. United States v. Brandon, 247 

F.3d 186, 188 (4th Cir. 2001). Under the ACCA, if a defendant 

is convicted of violating § 922(g) and has sustained three prior 

convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses 

committed on occasions different from one another, the defendant 

is subject to a statutory mandatory minimum of fifteen years of 

imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A violent felony is 
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defined as a “crime, punishable by a term exceeding one year of 

imprisonment, . . . that . . . has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of force against the person of 

another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). A serious drug 

offense is any offense under state law that involves the 

distribution of a controlled substance for which a maximum term 

of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law. 

In addition, to determine whether offenses were 

committed on occasions different from one another, a court must 

consider:

(1) whether the offenses arose in different geographic 

locations; (2) whether the nature of each offense was 

substantively different; (3) whether each offense 

involved different victims; (4) whether each offense 

involved different criminal objectives; and (5) after 

the defendant committed the first-in-time offense, did 

the defendant have the opportunity to make a conscious 

and knowing decision to engage in the next-in-time 

offense.

United States v. Leeson, 453 F.3d 631, 640 (4th Cir. 2006)

(citing United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 335-37 (4th 

Cir. 1995)). Here, Hickson had sustained prior convictions for

assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature and two 

counts of distribution of cocaine base. The district court did 

not err in determining that the controlled substance offenses 

were committed on occasions separate from one another and

qualified as two predicate offenses for purposes of the ACCA. 
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Finally, counsel questions whether the sentence is 

reasonable. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying 

an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 

330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009). In so doing, we examine the sentence 

for “significant procedural error,” including “failing to 

calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, 

treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 

[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence 

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 

explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We will 

presume on appeal that a sentence within a properly calculated 

advisory Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. 

Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see Rita v. United 

States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-56 (2007) (upholding presumption of 

reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence). We have 

thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence 

was procedurally and substantively reasonable.

We have examined the entire record in accordance with 

the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues 

for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. This court requires that counsel inform Hickson, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Hickson requests that a 
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petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Hickson. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED