IN THE 

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF HELEN WYATT, 

Deceased, 

ROBERT WYATT, FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF ALL STATUTORY

BENEFICIARIES AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE ESTATE OF HELEN WYATT, 

Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v. 

VANGUARD HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, 

DBA PHOENIX BAPTIST HOSPITAL, 

Defendant/Appellee, 

PATRICIA KUHFUSS, FOR HERSELF AND ON BEHALF OF ALL STATUTORY

BENEFICIARIES AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE ESTATE OF KARL H. KUHFUSS, JR., 

Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN C. LINCOLN HEALTH NETWORK, 

DBA JOHN C. LINCOLN HOSPITAL DEER VALLEY, 

AN ARIZONA CORPORATION, 

Defendant/Appellee, 

No. CV-13-0272-PR 

Filed June 30, 2014 

 
WYATT v. VANGUARD HEALTH/KUHFUSS v. JOHN C. LINCOLN 

OPINION OF THE COURT

2

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

The Honorable Emmet J. Ronan, Judge 

No. CV2008-030580 

The Honorable J. Richard Gama, Judge 

No. CV2010-012450 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One 

232 Ariz. 506, 307 P.3d 73 (2013) 

VACATED

COUNSEL: 

James R. Broening (argued), Katherine M. Corcoran, and Michelle L. 

Donovan, Broening, Oberg, Woods & Wilson, P.C., Phoenix, for John C. 

Lincoln Health Network dba John C. Lincoln Hospital Deer Valley 

John E. Drazkowski, and Michael Warzynski, Jardine, Baker, Hickman & 

Houston, P.L.L.C., Phoenix, for Phoenix Baptist Hospital 

Scott E. Boehm (argued), Law Office of Scott E. Boehm, P.C., Phoenix; and 

Melanie L. Bossie, Wilkes & McHugh, P.A., Phoenix, for Robert Wyatt 

Robert W. Boatman, Shannon L. Clark (argued), and Lincoln Combs, 

Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A., Phoenix, for Patricia Kuhfuss 

James W. Kaucher (argued), Gust Rosenfeld, P.L.C., Tucson, for Amicus 

Curiae University of Arizona Health Network, Inc. 

John J. Egbert, Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, P.L.C., Phoenix, for Amicus 

Curiae Dignity Health, fka Catholic Healthcare West 

Sarah E. Kader., Arizona Center for Disability Law, Phoenix; and David L. 

Abney, Craig A. Knapp, and Dana R. Roberts, Knapp & Roberts, P.C., 

Scottsdale, for Amicus Curiae Arizona Center for Disability Law 

 
WYATT v. VANGUARD HEALTH/KUHFUSS v. JOHN C. LINCOLN 

OPINION OF THE COURT

3

David L. Abney, Craig A. Knapp, and Dana R. Roberts, Knapp & Roberts, 

P.C., Scottsdale, for Amici Curiae Autism Society of Greater Phoenix and 

Phoenix Area Autistic/Asperger’s Adult Support Group 

CHIEF JUSTICE BERCH authored the opinion of the Court, in which VICE 

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, JUSTICE PELANDER, JUSTICE BRUTINEL, and 

JUSTICE TIMMER joined. 

CHIEF JUSTICE BERCH, opinion of the Court: 

¶1 This case addresses whether § 46-455 of Arizona’s Adult 

Protective Services Act subjects acute care hospitals to potential liability. 

We conclude that it does. 

I. BACKGROUND 

¶2 The estates of Helen Wyatt and Karl H. Kuhfuss Jr. filed 

separate wrongful death actions against two acute care hospitals, Phoenix 

Baptist Hospital and John C. Lincoln Hospital, alleging violations of the 

Adult Protective Services Act (“APSA”), A.R.S. §§ 46-451 to -459, among 

other claims.

¶3 In each case, the trial court granted partial summary 

judgment, ruling that APSA does not apply to acute care hospitals. Each 

estate appealed. In re Estate of Wyatt, 232 Ariz. 506, 508 ¶ 2, 307 P.3d 73, 75 

(App. 2013). After consolidating the cases, the court of appeals reversed the 

judgments, finding the statutory terms unambiguous and concluding that 

APSA does apply to acute care hospitals. Id. at 508 ¶¶ 2, 7, 307 P.3d at 75.

¶4 We granted review to determine whether acute care hospitals 

may be liable under APSA. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 

5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

II. DISCUSSION 

¶5 We review issues of statutory construction de novo. In re 

Estate of Winn, 214 Ariz. 149, 151 ¶¶ 7-8, 150 P.3d 236, 238 (2007). When a 

statute is clear, we do not “resort to other methods of statutory 
WYATT v. VANGUARD HEALTH/KUHFUSS v. JOHN C. LINCOLN 

OPINION OF THE COURT

4

interpretation to determine the legislature’s intent because its intent is 

readily discernible from the face of the statute.” State v. Christian, 205 Ariz. 

64, 66 ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241, 1243 (2003). 

¶6 APSA provides “a remedial cause of action against those who 

abuse, neglect, or exploit the elderly.” Winn, 214 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 5, 150 P.3d 

at 237. “We construe such remedial statutes broadly to effectuate the 

legislature’s purpose in enacting them.” Id. The APSA provision at issue 

here provides as follows: 

A vulnerable adult whose life or health is being or has been 

endangered or injured by neglect, abuse or exploitation may 

file an action in superior court against any person or 

enterprise that has been employed to provide care . . . to such 

vulnerable adult for having caused or permitted such 

conduct. 

A.R.S. § 46-455(B) (emphasis added). 

¶7 The Hospitals argue that they cannot be liable under this 

APSA provision because they are not “employed to provide care” to their 

patients. Rather, they provide treatment. This difference, they contend, 

makes the phrase “provide care” ambiguous and thus requires us to 

consider legislative history and other resources to determine its meaning. 

See Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268-69, 872 P.2d 668, 672-73 (1994) 

(considering legislative history). 

¶8 We disagree that “provide care” is ambiguous. Although 

APSA does not define the term, we construe it according to its common 

meaning. A.R.S. § 1-213 (“Words and phrases shall be construed according 

to the common and approved use of the language.”). “Care” is ordinarily 

understood to mean “CHARGE, SUPERVISION, MANAGEMENT: 

responsibility for or attention to safety and well-being.” Webster’s New 

Int’l Dictionary 338 (3d ed. 1976); see also State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 392, 

937 P.2d 310, 314 (1997). Nothing in the statute suggests that the legislature 

intended a different meaning. 
WYATT v. VANGUARD HEALTH/KUHFUSS v. JOHN C. LINCOLN 

OPINION OF THE COURT

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¶9 The Hospitals argue that we should hold that they are not 

subject to APSA, as we did respecting the State in Estate of Braden ex rel. 

Gabaldon v. State, 228 Ariz. 323, 328 ¶ 20, 266 P.3d 349, 354 (2011). In Braden, 

however, we held that the State is not an “enterprise,” as that term is 

defined in the Act. Id. (construing A.R.S. § 46-455(Q)). The Hospitals here 

do not assert that they are not “enterprise[s]” within the meaning of APSA. 

¶10 The Hospitals also cite Estate of McGill ex rel. McGill v. Albrecht, 

203 Ariz. 525, 530 ¶ 16, 57 P.3d 384, 389 (2002), which clarifies when abuse 

is actionable under APSA. They urge us to hold that acute care hospitals 

are not covered by APSA, observing that, following McGill, the legislature 

amended APSA by exempting four classes of caregivers from potential 

liability. 2003 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 129, § 2 (1st Reg. Sess.) (amending A.R.S. 

§ 46-455(B)). We note, however, that when the legislature exempted 

physicians, podiatrists, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants, it did 

not also exempt acute care hospitals specifically or hospitals generally. See 

id. Thus acute care hospitals remain within APSA’s coverage. We decline 

to read in an exemption that the legislature did not specify. 

¶11 The Hospitals also argue that APSA applies only to those 

facilities listed in § 46-455(B)(1). We are not persuaded by this reading of 

the statute. Subsection (B) exempts the four categories of individual 

healthcare providers noted above from APSA liability, unless an exempted 

provider acts as a medical director at a facility listed in subsection (B)(1). 

Thus subsection (B)(1) effectively reinstates APSA liability to some of the 

healthcare providers exempted in the previous paragraph. In that sense, 

subsection (B)(1) expands APSA coverage for facility medical directors. It 

does not limit the types of enterprises subject to liability, as the Hospitals 

suggest. 

¶12 The question remains whether acute care hospitals provide 

the type of care covered by APSA. The Hospitals maintain that APSA was 

intended to cover only the “long-term-type care” generally available in 

nursing homes. We agree that concern about such services motivated the 

legislature to enact APSA, but APSA is not by its terms limited to nursing 

homes. Instead, the statute applies to any enterprise that is employed to 

provide care to a vulnerable adult, if that enterprise injures or endangers 

the vulnerable adult through “neglect, abuse or exploitation.” A.R.S. § 46-
WYATT v. VANGUARD HEALTH/KUHFUSS v. JOHN C. LINCOLN 

OPINION OF THE COURT

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455(B). The statute contains no exemption for acute care hospitals, which, 

like nursing homes, may provide non-acute care, such as feeding and 

attending to the daily needs of vulnerable adults during post-operative 

periods. 

¶13 We likewise reject the Hospitals’ suggestion that subjecting 

acute care hospitals to potential liability under APSA will lead to absurd 

results. Broad application of a remedial statute does not render it absurd. 

Indeed, too narrow a construction would thwart the legislature’s goal of 

protecting vulnerable adults. See McGill, 203 Ariz. at 528 ¶ 6, 57 P.3d at 387. 

The Hospitals concede that, although unlikely, a vulnerable person could 

possibly be injured or endangered through neglect, such as the failure to 

regularly turn an elderly patient, while in an acute care facility. The statute 

does not suggest that APSA liability should apply if such an injury occurs 

in a nursing home, but not if it occurs in an acute care hospital. Nothing in 

APSA indicates legislative intent to protect vulnerable adults from abuse, 

neglect, or exploitation only when they are housed in particular facilities. 

¶14 Without deciding whether plaintiffs have established APSA 

violations in accordance with the requirements of A.R.S. § 46-455 and the 

standards set forth in McGill, 203 Ariz. at 530 ¶ 16, 57 P.3d at 389, we 

conclude that because acute care hospitals provide care to vulnerable adults 

and are not expressly exempted by the statutory language of § 46-455(B), 

they may be liable under APSA. 

III. CONCLUSION 

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the opinion of the court 

of appeals and remand these cases to the superior court for further 

proceedings.