1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Six

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ELECTRO NIC CIT

ATION: 2004 FED App . 0067P (6th C ir.) File Name: 04a00 67p.06



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXT H CIR CUIT

_________________
N ORMA J EFF ERSON ,

Plaintiff- Appellant

,

v.

J EFF ERSON C OUNTY P UBL IC S CHOO L S YSTEM ; S TEPHEN D AESCHNER , Superintendent for Jeffe rson Count

y Pub lic School Sy

stem; C AROLYN M ERE DIT H , Director of Employee Relations for Jefferson County

Public School Sy

stem; G EORGE B ELL , Direct

or of Sec urity Service s for Jeff

erson Cou

nty Public Scho ol Sy stem; M AX IE J OHNSON , Principal of Chenoweth Elementary School, Defenda nts-Appe llees. X - - - -
> , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - N Nos. 02-5621/6038

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville. No. 00-00044—Jennifer B. Coffman, District Judge. 2 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. Nos. 02-5621/6038

1 Although plainti ff’s constitut ional claims were brought under t he Fou rteenth Am end ment, Sect ion 1983 pr ovides the usua l re medy f or consti tut ional violati ons by state off icials and her c o mplaint was interpr eted a s an ac tion und er that statu tory pr ovisio n.

2 Plain tiff

bro ught suit in state co urt aga inst the Je fferson C ounty Pub lic Scho ol Syste m, Su perin tende nt Step hen D aesch ner, C arolyn Mered ith, Director of Employee Relations for the school sy stem, George Be ll, Director of Security Services, Lisa Qureshi, an assist ant teacher, and

Argued: December 4, 2003
Decided and Filed: March 4, 2004

Befor e: MERRITT, DAUG

HTREY, a

nd GIBBONS, Circuit Judg es.

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: J. Key Schoen, SAL ES, TILLMAN & WA LBA UM , Lo ui sv il le , K en tu ck y, for Appellant. Michael Keith Kirk, WYAT T, TARRAN T & COMB S, Lou isv ill e, K en tu ck y, for Appellees. ON BRI EF: J. Key Schoen, SALES, TI LL MA N & WA LBA UM , Lo ui sv il le , K en tu ck y, for Appellan t. Michael Keith Kirk, By ron E. Leet, WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, Louisville, Kentuck y, f or Appel lees.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ MERRITT, C ir cuit Judge. In this case broug ht under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1 plaintiff Norma Jefferson brought various federaldue proc ess claim s again st a grou p of state defenda nts,
as well as de famation

and other

state la w claim s. 2 TheNos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. 3

Hearst-Arg yle Product ions , In c., the owner of a L ouis vil le t elev isi on stati on. Defen dants remov ed th e action to f eder al court. The cl aim s against Qureshi were remanded to st ate court and the t elevi sion s tati on has sett led wit

h pla int if

f; thos e two defen dants are n ot parties to this app eal.

3 P laintiff

fai led to i nclude a copy of her c omplaint

in t he Jo in t Append ix. In addi ti on to constitut ing a violat ion of the rul es for fi lings in our c ircuit, 6th Ci r. R. 30 (f)(1)(B ), the lack of a co mpla int mad e it difficult for this co urt to un tangle p laintiff’s mul ti ple , ov erl appi ng c laims and allegatio ns. primary questions before us arise from t hree of her federal due process claims: (1) whether shereceiv ed an ap propria te pred eprivation

hearing before her f

ive-day suspension a

n d alleged construc tiv e di scharge from her position as a school teacher in the Louisville pub li c school system; (2) whe ther she was deprived without due process of l a w of her constituti onally

-prote ct ed

property intere st in her job; and (3) whether

she was d

eprived of a subst

antive lib erty

interest

– her asserted interest in her good name and

reputation – withoutdue proc ess. 3 Plaintiff also has a pending arbitration proceeding

arising under the collective bargaining ag reement governing her employment with the Jefferson County

Public School Sy

stem.

We agree with the district court that before plaintiff was suspended

and allegedly

forced to retire she received an appropr iate predeprivation, right-of-reply hearing that complies with the due process requirements for such h earing s. Clevelan d Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermil

l , 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (befor

e termina tion, a pub lic employee with a propert y interest in continued employment should rece i v e constituti onally

adequate procedures, including “ oral or writtennotic e of the charges ag ainst him, an explanation of the employ

er's e vidence , and an o

pportunit y to present h is side of the story" to ensure due process of law). In addition,
we agree with the district court that plaintiff’s procedural due process claim based on the deprivation of a proper ty in terest 4 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. Nos. 02-5621/6038

4 In Hudson , the Supreme Court held that t he

unau thori zed intention al dep rivation of pro perty b y a state employee does not cons tit ute a vi olati on of th e proced ura l requ ireme nts of the Due Proc ess C lause o f the Fo urteen th Amendm ent if a meaningf ul [s tate ] postdepri vati on rem ed y f or the l oss is avail able.

468 U.S . at 533

.
5 In Vicory , a proced ural due pro cess case, we he ld as follows:

Secti on 1983 w as not mean t to s upply an e xclus ive f ederal remedyfor ever

y all eged wrong commit ted by state officials. Rather, the sta tu te i s a remedy f or only those wr ongs whi ch off end the Co nstitution’s p rohib ition aga inst p ropert y deprivat ion wit

hout procedura l due proces s. Thus we hold tha t in § 198 3 dam age su its claiming the de priva tion of a pro perty interest without proce dural due proce ss, the plaintiff must plead and prove that stat e remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequat e. In a proce dural due proce ss case under § 1983 , the plainti ff must attack the s tate’s corrective procedures as well as the sub stantive w rong

.
721 F.2d at

1066. inher job a

lso fails b ecause

she has not shown tha

t s ta te remed i es under Kentucky teacher tenure and breac h of contract statutes and ca ses are inadequate or incapable of
rem edying

the wr ongs s he all eges. S uch a s howin g o f defective state remedies is required in procedural due proc ess cases like this one. Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517 (1984); 4 Vicory v. Walton , 721 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1984). 5

Fi na ll y, we agree with the district cou rt t hat plaintiff’s “liberty interest” due process claim for inj ur y to reputation must be dismissed as well. As the Supreme Court made clear in Paul v. Da vis , 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976), there is no viable, free standing, federal due process claim arising from injury to one’s reputation. Such a cl aimis viable only inNos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. 5

combinationwith two othe r el ements: “ when the re is some injury to employment . . . in addition to damage to reputation and a subsequent denial of proce dural due process to redres s that injury.” I

n re Selcraig , 705 F.2d 789, 796 (5th Cir. 1983). Inthe instant case, as the district court concluded, not only is ther e no showing that state remedies for defamation and improper discharge are

inadequate, nonexistent or unfair, butplaintiff

has pend ing cla ims in state court that

have y et to be adjudica

ted and she may

ye t be able to bring other

claims instate court that will adequately redress her i njur ies . In addition, she has a

n arbitra tion proc eeding

that has a pparent ly been staye d pending the outcome of this litigation.

I. Pre deprivati on Due Pr ocess
It is necessary

to understand the basic facts and the district
court’s ruling on plaintiff’s entitlement to a predeprivation hearing be fore addressing her proce dural due process and liberty interest assignments of error. Plaintiff was a secondand third-g rade te acher a

t Chenowe

th Elementary

School in the Jefferson County

Public Scho ol District. On January 18, 1999, a grou

p of pare nts with childre n in plaintiff’s classroom met t o discuss a

llegat ions of impr

oper con duct brou ght to their attention by

plaintiff ’s teaching ass istant, Lisa Qureshi. At the meeting, the parents agreed to meet at the sc hool the next day to confr ont school

officia ls with the ir alleg ations. One of the pare nts alert ed a loca l televisi on station

about the ir plans. The parents also contacted Kentucky Child Protective Services to r epo rt allegations of abuse. The next day, the parents met with Che

noweth pr

incipal, defenda

nt Maxie Johnson, and accused plaintiff of misconduct in the classro om, including

grabb ing stude

nts by their arms or shirt collars, us i ng curse words, allowing students to watch inappropriatetelevision shows an d allowing

st uden ts to eat throughout

the day . At the en

d of the me eting, s everal

parents spoke with a local television reporter on camera. 6 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. Nos. 02-5621/6038

After the meeti

ng, Johnson con tacted Child Protective Services about the

allega tions of child

abuse and directed d efendant George Bell, Jefferson County Public School ’ s Director of Secur ity S ervice s, to inves tigate the allegations. Bell interviewed several students in p lainti ff’s cla ss, their parents , and L isa Qureshi, plaintiff’s teaching assistant who had first mad e the com plaints. OnJanuary

22, Bell met with Johnson, plaintiff

and plain tiff’s u nion representative, Ruby Fitzgerald, bef

ore any action was taken against her. At that hearin g, plaintiff was verbally informed of the allegations against her and

she submitt

ed a writ ten resp onse den

yin g all the allegations.

OnJanuary

27, 1999, B ell reported the results of

his investigation

to defendant Caroly

n Meredith, t he school system’sDirector of Employe e Relati ons. Bell concluded that some, butnot all, of the allegations against plaintiff were substantiated. On February 2, following review of Bell’s
re port b y the school district’s Employ ee Practices Review Committee, plaintiff received a letter listing the spe cifi c im proper conduct f ound by Bell’s i nvestig atio n and informin g plaintiff that she w ould be suspended for five days without pa y, starting the next day. The superinten dent of the Jeff erson County Public School Sy stem accepted Johnson’s decision to suspend plaintiff and notified the Board of Education about the suspension as required.

OnFebruary

5, 1999, two days into her sus pension
, plaintiff and her un io n r ep re se nt at iv e m et wi th Ca ro lyn Meredith and Minor

D aniels, the Executive Director of Busines s Affairs, t o discuss where plaintiff would be assigned following her suspe nsion. Mer

edith presented plaintiff

with
a lett er offering plaintiff a temporar y assignme

nt teaching langua ge arts at a

di fferent school in the sy stem and stating tha t sh e would be permanently reassigned the following school year. I

t is not disputed that
, instead of signing the transf er letter, plaintiff submitted a letter at the end of t h e meeti ng stating

“I, Norma J. Jef

ferson, am submittin

g thisNos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. 7

letter of retirement

which wil l go into effect at the end of the 1998-1999 contract ye ar.” Plaintiff claims that the retirement

w as coerce d becau se she wa s force d to choose retireme n t because the transfer was an una cceptable alternative. Kentucky Child Protective Services also conducted an investigation

during t he sa me time as Bell c onducted his investigation

to determine whether plaintiff abused her stude nts

. Students, their parents, school personnel and plaintiff were interviewed. Child Protective Services issued its report two months later exonerating pla intiff of any
cr iminal child abuse claims. The report also stated that th e ag ency’s finding s indicate d that some of the stu

dents ’ comments

were influenc ed by

their pa rents and Qureshi. The report crit icized Bell’s i

nvestig ation bec ause (1)

the pare nts
were present when Bell interviewed the chi ldren, (2) the investigation

lasted only a wee

k, and (3) it relied

too heavi ly
onthe opinions and u ncorroborated hearsay of Qureshi and the complaining parents.

The collective bargaining ag reement between

the teache

rs’ union and the sc

hool boar d gran ts plaintif f a prope rty interest incontin ued pay and bene fits beca

use it pro vides tha

t a tea cher may only

be suspended for “just cause.” S e e Loudermil

l
, 470 U.S. a

t 538-39. We

will assume for

purposes of th is appeal that the five-day suspension without pay and coerced retirement const

itute the d

epriv ation of a prop erty interest requiring a prelos s hea ring, which requires an opportuni ty to respond before any

depri v ation, as well as postdeprivationprocess wh ere necessary

. Id. at 5 42. If extensive postdeprivationpro cedures exist, as they do he re, the predeprivation process need not be elabor ate.
Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that the predeprivation hearing she received was adequate. She had notice of the charges against her

and an op

portunity to respond b oth orally and in writing, and she parti cipated in at least one meeting with decision makers before he r suspension. Plaintiff then had 8 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. Nos. 02-5621/6038

the option of initiating a postdeprivation arb itra tion proceeding

under the grievance proc edur es of the teac hers’ collective bargaining agr

eement or bringing

an action in state court pursuant to th e state teacher tenure statute, Ky . Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.7 90 , and common law tort and contract theorie s.
II. Post deprivati on Proc edural Due Proce ss
If satisfactory state

procedures are provided in a procedural due process case, then no const itutional deprivation has
oc curr ed despite the injury. Hudson , 468 U.S. at 533; Vicory , 721 F.2d at 1065-66 (in procedural due process cases claiming deprivation of property interes t , plaintiff must attack the state’s corr ective procedure as well as the substantive wrong). Plaintiff may not seek relief under Section 1983 withoutfirst pleading and proving the inadequacy

of state or admi nis trative processes and remedies to redress her due process viola tion s. Parratt v. Taylor , 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds
, Daniel v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Mansfield Apt. Owners Ass’n v. C ity of Mans

field
, 988 F.2d 1469, 1 4 75 (6th Cir . 1993). T he plaint iff must prove the inadequacy

of state remedies as an element of her constitutional tort. See Marino v. Ameruso , 837 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Al thou gh one nee d not exhaust state remedies before bri nging a S ectio n 1983 actio n clai ming a violation of procedural due process, one must nev erth eless prove as an elem ent of that claim that state procedural remedies are inadequate.” (e mphasis added)).

Plaintiff had at least three options available to her once she receive d notice of the suspension: (1) proceed with the detailed grievance procedure s set out in the collective bargaining

agree ment governing

the terms of h er employ ment; (2) brin

g suit in s tate cou

rt under Ky . Rev. Stat

. Ann.§ 161.790, or (3) bring suit in state court for breac h of the collective bargaining ag reement.Nos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. 9

The collective bargaining

grievance procedure s provide for several levels of review by school officials, culminating in the availab ility of

an arbitration hearing conducted by a neutral arbitrator chosen by the pa

rties. Once a teacher cho ose s the grievanceprocess , she must e xhaust th at process before bringing an acti on in state court. The collective bargaining agreement

does not prohibit a teacher from then

pursuing an action in state court.

Section161.790 se

ts out a de

tailed pr ocess an d timetabl e for notification, reply and he aring procedures befor e and after
a teacher has be en terminated, suspended without pay or publicly reprimanded. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.790(3)-(10). Section16 1. 79 0( 10 ) c le ar ly state s that the procedures set forth in subsections (3)-(9) are available to teachers who have been sus pended without pa

y, s uch as pla

intiff. The statute provides for

the right to a hearing

before an impar tial tribu nal, the right to have counsel present at the hearing and the right to present and questionwitnesses. The teacher has the right to appeal t

he tribu nal’s decision to the Circuit Court in the jurisdiction where the school district is located. Ky . Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.790(3)-(7).

Plaintiff first chose to pursue the grievance pr ocess under the colle ctive ba

rgaini ng ag reemen t. OnFebruary

11, 1999, plaintiff filed a “Level I

” grievance with the Boa rd of Education

containi n g mu ltiple claims for relief. The grievancewas denied

four day s later by the princ ipal, Maxie Johnson. Plaintiff then s ubmitted a “Level I I” grie vance, whic h was denied on March 8, 1999, by the Director of Employee Relations, Carolyn Mered ith, as th e superintendent’s designee. The union, with pl ain tiff’s acquiescence, then requested that her grievance be submitted to arbitration.

The district court conclude d that pla intiff fa iled to demonstr ate the inadequacy

of the panoply of r

emedies availab le to her, including arbitration anda postdeprivation 10 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. Nos. 02-5621/6038

a ctionin state court, whether brought as a common la w breach of contract claim or under Section 161.790 of the Kentucky statutes. Je

ff erson v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.
, 184 F. Supp. 2d 622, 625, moti on t o amend or alter judgment granted inpart and de

nied in par

t , 196 F. Supp. 2d 515, 516-17 (W.D. Ky. 2002). We ag ree with t he distri ct court. Plaintiff offers no plausible explanation a s to why these remedies are inadequate. The fact that plaintiff was required, as an initial mat

ter, to choose between proceeding

under the terms of the collective bargaining

a gre ement’s grievance proce dures or Section 161.790 of the Kentucky

Revised Statutes does not make the statestatute “unavailable” to her. Nothing in th e collective bargaining

agreement prevents a tea cher from bri nging an actionunder Section 161.790 at the conclusion of the grievance process. The collective barga i ning agreement state s that a teacher will not “be deemed to have wa ived or otherwis e prejudiced” her rig hts by first seeking

redress under the collective bargaining ag reement. III. Liberty Interests

The plaintiff

asserts no substan

tive due process c laim

under the inc orpor ation doctrine ba sed on viol ation of a specific provi sion of the First or any other amendment to the Constitution. Plaintiff simply recitesa combinationof fact s that she claims constitutes a “substantive liberty interest” due process cause of

action: (1) del ay in her ar bitra tion hearin g; (2) defamation, and (3) forced retire ment or constructive discharge.

Plaintiff first claims that defendants intentionally de layed her arb it ration hearing. Plaintiff learned in Dece mber 1999 that the arbitration had been set for l ate January 2000. The hearing never occurred, howev er, because on January 5, 2000, plaintiff filed he r complaint in Kentucky state court. Even thou ghher arbitration was not comple ted, plai ntiff cla ims sheNos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. 11

6 Before the motion for su mm ary jud gme nt was d ecide d, pla intiff moved to compel t

he producti on of 112 teache r arbit rati on cases brought against the Jeffer son Public School System between 1 990 and 2002 for the purpose of demonst rati ng that

her arbi trat ion hear ing had been intention ally delaye d. A magistrate judge conced ed the relevan ce of these doc ume nts to plainti ff’ s claim of delay and gra nt ed t he motion wi th some restrictions. However, the district court judge granted summary judgment to defendants on the federal clai ms before the document s were produced and those d ocumen ts wer e never produced. In li ght of our holdi ng that plaintiff’s clai ms fai l as a matt er of law, the appeal concer

nin g th e moti on to co mpe l is moo t, as found by the d istrict cou rt. ha d to file sui

t by that date to avoid st

atute of limit ation s problems

. A s a result of filing suit, the arbitration hearing
was hel d in abeyanc e pursuant to an agreement sig ned b y school system officials and he r own union r ep resentative. Plaintiff claims tha

t she did n ot agree to stay

the hearing pending her laws

uit a nd t hat the sta

y w as impose d in
re taliationfor filing a lawsuit. The school board and th e union respond that plaintiff knew that it was stan dard procedure to hold these typesof hearings in abey ance once a lawsuit is filed. Plaintiff’s own union president testified that he told plaint

iff’s at torney before the suit was filed that

filing
a complain

t would like ly r

esult in the

hearing being h eld in abeya nce. 6
Second, p laintiff

claims defamation as another element of her constitutional tort. The c om plaining parents had contacted the media and, after

th e F eb ru ar y 5 meeting, Laure n Roberts, a spokesperson

for the school system, desc ribed the allegations made ag ainst the p la intif f and stated that Bell’s inve sti gation

had substa

ntiated some of the

m. Roberts informed the media that plaintiff had been suspended for five da ys and stated that plaintiff h ad acted unprofessionally and inappropriately. Roberts also related to the media that eight students had b een removed from plaintif f’s clas s room becaus e of the alleged abuse. Plaint iff cl aims that t he defe ndants’ failure to give her a timely ar bitration hearingstigmatized her, 12 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. Nos. 02-5621/6038

harmed her reputation and

c aused her to be denied job opportunities in her chosen field. The “liberty” inter est that plaintiff cl ai ms wa s a br id ge d i s, es se nt ia ll y, that her freedom to pursue her chosen profession under the same conditions under which she had been working wa s curtailed, in part throu ghinjury

to her re

putation c aused by

th e false and stigmatizing publications. Assuming the combination of arbitration

delay, def

amation and

job loss, the q

uestion is whether these f acts co nstitute a

valid libe

rty interest claim and, if so, whe

ther pla intiff mus tshow that her

state remedies are inadequate.

In Zinermon v. Burch , 4 94 U .S. 113, 132 (1990), the Supreme Court said

that “the fact tha t a deprivation

of libert y is involved . . . does not automatically pre clude application of the Parratt

rule” requi ring a showing that state remedies are inadequate. In Zinermon , the Cour t held that we should look to the nature

of the dep rivat ion complained of and the circumstances under which the d eprivat ion occur

red to determine whether the rule of Parratt applies to defea t a liberty interest claim. Subseque nt to the Supreme Court’s de cisionin Zinermon , we have held that Zinerm on’

s extension of Par ratt

applies to some cases claiming deprivation

of due pr

ocess where lib er ty interests are concerned. Wilson v. Beebe , 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (arre stee bro

ught s ui t against state police officer seekingdamages under § 1983 and under pendent state cla im of negligence and

court he ld

rule of Parratt applied to § 1983 suits alleging depr

ivation of a libe

rty interest ); see also Jackso n v. City of Columbus , 194 F.3d 737, 750 ( 6th Cir.1999) (police chief brough t § 1983 cla

im agai nst city arisingfrom his suspension and investigat ion into alleged misconduct

and court held that a deprivation of lib erty interest based on damage to good na me and reputation does

n otautomatically prec lude application of Parratt r ule)
, overruled on other grounds
, Swierkie wicz v. So rema NA , 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Bacon v. Patera , 772 F.2d 259, 263- 64 (6th Cir. 19 85 ) ( pr iv at e i nv es ti ga to r’ s l ib er ty interest was infri ngedNos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. 13

by damage to reputation and resulting loss of em pl oyment due to police conduct, but remand nec essary to ascer tain
a dequ acy of state law remedies). A ccord Hellenic Am. Neighborhood

Action Comm. v. City of New Yor k , 1 01 F.3d 877, 880-82 (2d Cir. 1996) (fo llo wing Parratt and Hudson
, due process

rights held not vio lated whe re adeq uate postdeprivationr em ed y was provided by N ew York law for city contractor barred from bidding on government contrac ts resulting in inj ur y to liberty interest in good name and reputation); Birkenho lz v. Sluyter , 857 F.2d 1214, 1217(8th Cir. 1988 ) (s tate statute provided nursing director found negligent in care of patient s with adequate postdeprivation remedy to adjudicate any

challenge to misconduct findi ng) ; Econ. Dev. Corp. of Dade Cou nty, Inc . v. Stier heim , 782 F.2d 952 , 954-55 (11th Cir. 1986) (contractor § 1983 ac tio n a gains tcounty and county employee for

deprivation of due process rights a rising f rom loss of

contract and attend ant statemen ts made to pr

ess dismissed d ue to existence of adequa te state remedies to re dress injury); In re Sel craig , supra , 705 F.2d at 796 (discharged school official alleged

due process viol ation s for d amage to reputation and employment and denial of name-clearing he aring).

Plaintiff has already

filed multiple claims under the state’s defamation law and pursued the grieva nce procedures under the collective bargaining

agreement. She is pursuing actions in two othe

r forums in addition

to feder al court

. There is no showi ng t hat the remedies there are inadequa te. Kentucky lawprovi d es plaintiff with a panoply of postdeprivation remedies sufficient

to satisfy due proce ss. The district court properl y dismissed her claim s of deprivation of property a

nd liberty interest s.
IV. Costs

The district c ourt orde

red plai ntiff to pa y $5 ,239.90 a s costs to the defendants. When re viewi ng an award of costs on appeal, we look first to w hether t he expense s are al lowable 14 Jefferso n v. Jeff erson Coun ty Public Sc hool, et al

. Nos. 02-5621/6038

cost items and thent o whethe r the amo unts are reasona ble and nec es sary. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter & Gam ble Co.
, 9 24 F.2d 633, 643 (7th Cir. 1991). Under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of C ivil Procedure, “costsother than

attorne ys’ fees sha

ll be allow

ed as of c ourse to th e pr eva il in g pa rty u nl ess th e co urt ot her wis e di rec ts .” If authority exists to impo se a cost, we reverse only for abuse of discretion. The district

court awarded c osts to the def endants for removal fees and witness fees, mileag e r eimburse me nt and copying materia ls related to depositions. Statutory authority exists for awarding all these costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Plaintiff argue s that defendan

ts cannot recover because they di d not “pr evail” on all their claims. We do not agree. Becau se all of plaintiff’s federal claims have been dismissed, defenda nts are clearly

the “prevailing party

” in this action under Rule 54(d) and are ent itled to the rea sonable c osts awarde d by

the distri ct court

. For the foregoing reasons, the judg ment of the district court is affirmed.