UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WAYNE LEWIS CHARLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 98-2087

ORDER

Filed August 27, 1999

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY , PORFILIO, ANDERSON ,

TACHA, BALDOCK , BRORBY , EBEL , KELLY , HENRY , BRISCOE ,

LUCERO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

This matter is before the court on defendant-appellant’s petition for rehearing

with suggestion for rehearing en banc. The petition is denied by the panel that

rendered the original decision. On their own motion, however, a majority of that

panel has determined that amendment of the original opinion, Judge Holloway voting

to grant rehearing, is appropriate. Consequently, the majority decision issued on

May 7, 1999 is withdrawn. The attached amended opinion is substituted in its place.
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Judge Holloway concurs in part and dissents in part from the amended decision. His

amended dissent is likewise attached.

The rehearing petition and en banc suggestion were circulated to all the active

judges of the court. A poll was called. Upon review, the en banc suggestion is

denied. Judges Seymour, Ebel, Kelly, Henry, and Murphy would grant rehearing.

Entered for the Court

PATRICK FISHER, Clerk of Court

by:

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Chief Deputy Clerk 
F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

AUG 27 1999

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 98-2087

WAYNE LEWIS CHARLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

(D.C. NO. CR-97-335-JC)

Benjamin A. Gonzales, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New

Mexico, for Appellant.

Kathleen Bliss, Assistant United States Attorney (John J. Kelly, United States

Attorney with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellee.

Before PORFILIO , HOLLOWAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.

ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.
-2-

Wayne Lewis Charley was convicted, after a jury trial, of seven counts of

sexual abuse of a child in Indian country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241,

2242, and 2246, and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal he contends, inter

alia: (1) that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 is unconstitutional and that the

admission, under that rule, of evidence of his prior sex offense conviction denied him

due process; (2) that the district court erred by permitting five health care

professionals, called by the government as lay witnesses, to (i) give expert opinion

testimony without furnishing the defense with advance summaries of their testimony

as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E); (ii) give expert testimony without

adequate foundation, in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 702; (iii) improperly vouch for the

credibility of the alleged victims, in violation of Rule 702; (iv) offer expert

conclusions that had not been screened for reliability, in violation of Rule 702; and

(v) offer testimony that assumed, as a fact, that the alleged victims were in fact

abused, in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 403; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient

to convict him on Count I of the indictment. We conclude that the district court

erroneously admitted portions of the testimony of the health care professionals, but

that these errors were harmless. We therefore affirm Defendant’s convictions on

Counts II through VII of the indictment. As to Count I of the indictment, we hold

that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Accordingly, we reverse
1The names of the alleged victims are fully disclosed in the record and in

the briefs. However, to the extent it may assist in preserving their privacy, we

will use only the girls’ initials in this opinion.

2Dr. Junkins recorded a slight irregularity at the base of D.J.’s hymen, but

drew no direct conclusion from that fact. A later examination by Dr. Renee

Ornelas, using magnification, showed no abnormality.

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the conviction on that count and remand for the entry of a judgment of acquittal on

Count I.

BACKGROUND

On April 11, 1997, Dorothy Kalleco took her daughters, 13-year-old D.J. and

10-year-old J.J., 1 to the Crownpoint Healthcare Facility in Crownpoint, New Mexico.

There she told D.J.’s pediatrician, Dr. Edward Junkins, that the girls had disclosed

to her that an “uncle” had sexually molested them on numerous occasions over an

extended period of time. II R. at 157. Defendant, 65-year-old Wayne Lewis Charley,

the girls’ uncle by Navajo clan affiliation, was subsequently identified as the alleged

abuser. 

Dr. Junkins interviewed the girls out of the mother’s presence. They provided

detailed accounts of anal and genital contact by their uncle both with his fingers and

his penis. A physical examination showed no evidence of abuse. Both girls had

intact hymens, 2

 and the anal and genital areas appeared normal with no visible

bleeding, bruising, scarring, tears, tags or discharge. According to Dr. Junkins, this
-4-

circumstance was not inconsistent with sexual abuse since children’s tissues heal

quickly, although there may be residual scarring.

Dr. Junkins testified that the report of abuse had immediate significance to him

as a possible unifying explanation for D.J.’s extensive history of atypical and

medically puzzling physical complaints and conditions. These included persistent

bed-wetting, chronic urinary tract infections, chronic stomach pain, headaches,

breathing problems and, recently, numbness of her arm, a burning feeling in her face,

and pain in the side of her face, arm and leg. One April entry in D.J.’s medical chart

described her as anxious and crying. J.J.’s medical chart did not show a similarly

extensive history of complaints, except for persistent bed-wetting.

While the girls were at the Crownpoint Healthcare Facility, Dr. Junkins called

the Crownpoint Police Department and reported the incident to Sergeant Daniel Zuni.

Officer Zuni responded and conducted a preliminary interview with the girls. In the

course of the interview, the girls told Zuni that the sexual abuse had occurred

primarily at their residence and secondarily at the Elite Laundromat, located in the

Crownpoint Shopping Mall where, beginning in January 1997, Defendant worked

several evenings each week from 7:00 to 10:00 P.M. Both locations are within the

boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation. Officer Zuni also ascertained that

Defendant was the alleged perpetrator. He then went to Defendant’s residence and
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determined that Defendant was a member of the Navajo Nation, as were the girls,

thus making the alleged crime a federal offense.

Later that same evening, on April 11, criminal investigator Patricia Henry, to

whom Officer Zuni had referred the matter, reported the circumstances to Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agent John D. Tanburg, who then commenced an

investigation. On April 30, 1997, Agent Tanburg visited the girls’ residence and

interviewed the girls in detail. During the visit, Tanburg was accompanied by

another investigator who inspected the girls’ residence. At some point, Tanburg

obtained a warrant, arrested Defendant, and placed him in a secure halfway house.

None of the law enforcement officers were able to discover any direct

evidence of the reported incidents. There were no eyewitnesses; there was no

physical evidence; and Defendant denied the accusations. However, from the outset

of the girls’ disclosures, everyone involved, including those providing treatment, was

aware that Defendant had been convicted in 1994 for sexually abusing his five-yearold granddaughter, and had been sentenced to one year in prison and three years of

supervised release. He was released from federal custody on June 23, 1995. 

In May 1997, about a month after the initial disclosures, the girls were referred

to Western New Mexico Counseling Services in Gallup for supportive counseling.

Joelle Baum, a registered nurse and registered health counselor, who also held a

temporary license in art therapy, evaluated the girls and began a course of treatment
3The first four counts charged Defendant with abusing “Jane Doe A,”

intended to refer to D.J. I R., Tab 9. The last three counts charged Defendant

with abusing “Jane Doe B,” intended to refer to J.J. Id. The last three counts are

“aggravated” sexual abuse because the victim, J.J., was under the age of 12 at the

time of the abuse. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). 

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for J.J. Kristine Lee Carlson, a clinical therapist and Sexual Assault Coordinator for

Gallup, New Mexico, began a course of treatment for D.J. 

On June 4, 1997, the girls were seen and examined by Dr. Renee Ornelas, a

pediatrician at the University of New Mexico. Like Dr. Junkins, Dr. Ornelas also

found the girls’ genital and anal areas to be normal, evidencing no signs of abuse.

But, after receiving information from Ms. Kalleco about the girls’ medical history

and reports of abuse, and after interviewing the girls, Dr. Ornelas concluded that the

girls had been sexually molested. 

On the same day as the Ornelas examination, June 4, 1997, a federal grand jury

returned a seven-count indictment against Defendant, charging him with four counts

of sexual abuse of a child in Indian country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2242,

and 2246, and three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in Indian country,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241, and 2246. 3 Count I of the indictment

charged Defendant with abusing D.J. “[o]n or about October 1995.” I R., Tab 9.

Counts II through VII all charged Defendant with abusing either D.J. or J.J. “[o]n or

about March 1997.” Id.
4Neither the specific grounds for objection in the motion in limine nor the

precise grounds or terms upon which the grant of a continuing objection was

claimed are beyond dispute. To the contrary, it appears that defense counsel did

not uniformly present the district court, at appropriate times, with the precise

objection upon which it sought a ruling. However, the government raises no

-7-

Well before trial in this case, the government notified defense counsel that it

would call as witnesses certain health care professionals who had examined,

counseled, or treated D.J. and/or J.J. In connection with that prospective testimony,

the government also provided defense counsel with voluminous medical information

and associated notes and records. However, it did not designate any of these

witnesses as experts and, accordingly, did not provide defense counsel with any

summaries of expert witness testimony pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).

On October 24, 1997, the Friday preceding the start of trial, defense counsel

filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent any of the designated health care

professionals from offering expert opinion testimony regarding whether D.J. or J.J.

were in fact sexually abused or were being treated for sexual abuse. The district

court addressed the motion on October 27, 1997, the first day of trial, and denied it

on the government’s representation that the witnesses in question were not being

called as experts under Fed. R. Evid. 702, but as lay or fact witnesses under Fed. R.

Evid. 701. After a colloquy with defense counsel regarding how counsel could

preserve his objections, the court indicated that it recognized defense counsel’s

continuing objection to the testimony of the health care professionals. 4 
issue with respect to these subjects on appeal. See Appellee’s Br. at 19 n.7. Our

analysis, therefore, proceeds on the assumption that the defense made specific,

timely, and proper objections to the disputed testimony and that those objections

were overruled. The one exception is the testimony of the school counselor,

Carolyn Joe, and Defendant concedes, as discussed below, that he failed to object

to her testimony at trial. 

-8-

The trial began that afternoon, and lasted three days. The government called

twelve witnesses during the presentation of its case-in-chief. Among the first

witnesses called were Dr. Junkins, Dr. Ornelas, Ms. Baum, and Ms. Carlson. As will

be discussed more fully below, these witnesses testified regarding their visits with

the girls, the symptoms exhibited by the girls, the treatment they provided the girls,

and, with respect to Dr. Junkins and Dr. Ornelas, their diagnoses. 

The government also called FBI Agent Tanburg and Navajo investigators Zuni

and Sampson Cowboy. Tanburg and Zuni told the jury about their respective

investigations of the allegations, and Cowboy testified about Defendant’s 1994 abuse

conviction. 

Near the end of their presentation, the prosecutors called the two young girls

to the stand. Both D.J. and J.J. testified, in graphic detail (mostly elicited by defense

counsel on cross-examination), that Defendant had abused them in a variety of ways

at various times and places. D.J. testified that Defendant molested her chiefly at her

residence, and described sexual encounters with Defendant in her kitchen, hallway,

and bedroom. D.J. testified that these incidents occurred primarily in the evening.
-9-

She also testified to some incidents of molestation which occurred at locations

outside her residence, in particular one instance in the parking lot of the Elite

Laundromat in a truck. J.J., by contrast, testified that Defendant molested her chiefly

at the laundromat, and described incidents in the employees’ room, the bathroom, and

near the washing machines.

D.J. could not specifically recall whether Defendant had abused her in 1995,

although she testified that the abuse had been occurring “[s]ince [she] was small,”

and had begun before Defendant went to prison in 1994 and continued after his

release . III R. at 358, 363. 

Following the testimony of the girls, the government called Dr. Timothy Kern,

a urologist and surgeon who performed prostate surgery on Defendant on September

29, 1995. Kern testified that 95% of men who undergo such prostate surgery have

no erectile problems after the surgery. On cross-examination, Kern stated that

patients such as Defendant are told, upon release from the hospital, that they should

not engage in sexual activity for four to six weeks afterwards, because ejaculation

during this post-operative period “usually” although “[n]ot necessarily in every case”

causes bleeding which requires urgent medical attention. IV R. at 442, 449. Kern,

testifying from medical records, stated that Defendant had come in for a postoperative checkup in late October, and no evidence of bleeding was apparent. 
-10-

The government’s final witness was Ms. Kalleco, who testified that, during the

spring of 1997, she had often been out of the house in the evenings because she

frequently traveled to Albuquerque to visit her sister who was in the hospital at that

time. She stated that, on many of these occasions, the girls were home alone,

because she took the girls’ siblings with her to Albuquerque. She also testified that

Defendant frequently visited her house, ate some meals there, and on occasion asked

questions designed to ascertain whether she expected to be away from the home in

the evening.

The defense’s primary theory of the case was that the girls’ mother was in a

sort of a feud with Defendant’s family over two separate incidents, one involving an

automobile accident, and the other involving the sale of a pickup truck, and, in an

attempt to get back at Defendant or his family, had pressured the girls into accusing

Defendant of abuse. Secondarily, the defense argued that D.J. had invented the

allegations of abuse to avoid having to go to school. Additionally, there was

evidence that J.J. had told a social worker that, in accusing Defendant of sexual

abuse, she and her sister were “just playing,” III R. at 323, and that D.J., when asked

by doctors about the possibility of sexual abuse some years earlier, had denied that

she was being abused . 

The defense also called Bucky Belen, Defendant’s co-worker at the

laundromat, who testified that he had seen the girls at the laundromat numerous
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times, where they would help Defendant and sometimes ask him for money, but that

he had never seen Defendant act inappropriately toward them. 

Defendant’s son, Dwayne Charley, testified for the defense, and stated that he

provided Defendant transportation to work each night, either by driving Defendant

there himself, or by driving his truck to his sister’s house and letting Defendant drive

it to work from there. Dwayne Charley testified that, on the nights when he didn’t

personally drive his father to work, he delivered the truck to his sister’s house at

approximately 7:00 P.M., and that if Defendant had driven anywhere else on his way

to work he would have been late. 

The defense’s final witness was Charley himself, who, through a Navajo

interpreter, denied ever abusing or in any way inappropriately touching either of the

girls. Defendant also denied ever being at the girls’ house. Additionally, Defendant

stated that while the girls were at his workplace, they would never help him and that

they never asked him for money. Defendant also testified that he had told the FBI

about his first offense, in 1994, and that he had never denied his involvement in the

first offense to the FBI. 

After the defense presented its case, the government presented one rebuttal

witness, FBI Agent Greg Calles, who had been assigned to investigate Charley’s

1994 crime. Calles testified that Defendant had initially denied abusing his

granddaughter, but that he later recanted and admitted molesting his granddaughter.
5Rule 403 states as follows:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations

of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence. 

6Rule 414(a) states as follows:

In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of

child molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of

another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and

may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is

relevant. 

-12-

After deliberating for about three hours, the jury convicted Defendant on all

seven counts listed in the indictment. At sentencing, the district court, applying the

United States Sentencing Guidelines, sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. 

DISCUSSION

I. Evidence of Prior Conviction for Sexual Molestation

Evidence of Defendant’s prior conviction for sexual molestation of his

granddaughter was admitted into evidence pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403 5 and

414(a). 6

 Defendant contends that Rule 414 is unconstitutional, and that introduction

of his prior conviction for a sex offense was so prejudicial that it denied him his due

process right to a fair trial. 
-13-

We recently held that Rule 414 is not unconstitutional on its face, “because

Rule 403 applies to Rule 414 evidence,” and “[a]pplication of Rule 403 . . . should

always result in the exclusion of evidence that” is so prejudicial that it violates a

defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. United States v. Castillo , 140 F.3d 874,

883-84 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, when reviewing a district court’s decision to admit

evidence under Rule 414 and Rule 403, we must conduct a “case-specific inquiry”

into whether the district court “should have excluded the Rule 414 evidence under

Rule 403.” Id. We will disturb a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under Rule

403 only for abuse of discretion. Id. at 884. 

In this case, the district court made the following findings with respect to the

admission of Defendant’s prior conviction for child sexual abuse:

For the record, I have made a balancing test under 403 and 41[4], and

I find the testimony of the previous sexual activity by the defendant to

outweigh any harm to come to him under 403. Specifically, under

relevancy, in the discussions under Rule 413 it says, [“]The proposed

reform is critical to the protection of the public from rapists and child

molesters, and is justified by the distinctive characteristics of the cases

it will affect. In child molestation cases, for example, a history of

similar acts tends to be exceptionally probative because it shows an

unusual disposition of defendant—a sexual or sadosexual interest in

children—that simply does not exist in ordinary people. Moreover,

such cases require reliance on child victims whose credibility can

readily be attacked in the absence of substantial corroboration . In such

cases, there is a compelling public interest in admitting all significant

evidence that will illumine the credibility of the charge and any denial

by the defense.[”] So I have conducted that balancing test. As I

previously stated to you I found it was more probative than not under

4[0]3.
7Defendant’s brief on this point is almost entirely devoted to arguing that

Rule 414 is unconstitutional on its face, an argument foreclosed by our holding in

Castillo . 

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III. R. at 269-70 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 413 advisory committee’s note (statement of

Rep. Susan Molinari)) (emphasis added). These on-the-record findings are sufficient

to explain the district court’s reasoning in admitting the statement, see Castillo , 140

F.3d at 884 (requiring that the district court “‘make a reasoned, recorded’ statement

of its 403 decision when it admits evidence under Rule 413-415” (quoting United

States v. Guardia , 135 F.3d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998)), especially in light of the

fact that Defendant’s brief contains no argument that these findings are insufficient. 7

By invoking the stated general reasons for the Rule’s enactment, the district court

was implying that those reasons were particularly important in this case.

Specifically, the district court alluded to the similarity between Defendant’s prior

crime and the present charges, and to the fact that there was little direct

corroborating evidence. See Guardia , 135 F.3d at 1331. After examining the record

as a whole, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by

admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior conviction.
8

It is doubtful that Carolyn Joe, a school counselor, can even be

categorized as a health care professional, and even if she can, there is some

question as to whether she in fact offered any expert testimony or merely testified

as a lay witness under Fed. R. Evid. 701. Her testimony chiefly dealt with D.J.’s

excessive absences from school. In any event, Defendant admits that he did not

object at trial to Joe’s testimony. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2; Appellee’s Br.

at 19 n.7. Accordingly, we review the district court’s decision to admit Joe’s

testimony for plain error, see United States v. Enjady , 134 F.3d 1427, 1435 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 202 (1998), and find none. Our discussion below is

therefore confined to the testimony of the other four challenged witnesses. 

9Proposed amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 701 expressly exclude testimony

based on specialized knowledge. By its terms, Fed. R. Evid. 702 covers such

testimony. 

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II. Expert Witnesses

Defendant objects to the testimony of five health care professionals called as

witnesses by the government: Dr. Junkins, Dr. Ornelas, Ms. Baum, Ms. Carlson, and

school counselor Carolyn Joe. 8

 The government concedes that it elicited expert

opinion testimony regarding sexual molestation of D.J. and J.J. from at least some

of these witnesses, despite representing to the court that they were merely being

called as lay or fact witnesses. 9

 

In his motion in limine, Defendant raised several objections to the testimony

of these witnesses. First, Defendant argued that the government, by designating

them as lay witnesses, was circumventing the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P.

16(a)(1)(E), and asked the district court to sanction the government by limiting these

witnesses to fact testimony or excluding their testimony altogether. Second,

Defendant argued that the district court should exclude all opinions based on
10In making the determination as to whether the district court abused its

discretion, we do not make independent findings of reliability; rather, we

examine the record evidence presented to the district court, and decide whether

the district court’s decision, in the face of that record evidence, to allow the

testimony to be admitted was an abuse of discretion. 

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statements of the girls themselves because such opinions are unreliable and/or

constitute impermissible vouching for the credibility of the girls. In a related

argument, Defendant asked the district court to exclude, as prejudicial under Fed. R.

Evid. 403, any testimony that the girls had been abused or referred for treatment of

sexual abuse, contending that such testimony “improperly suggests to the jury the

existence of child abuse.” I R., Tab 31 at 3. On appeal, Defendant presses each of

these arguments, and argues additionally that the district court erred by allowing

these witnesses to offer expert testimony without being properly qualified as experts.

As indicated above, our analysis of the testimony of these witnesses proceeds

on the assumption that defense counsel made timely appropriate objections to the

portions of their testimony disputed in Defendant’s appellate briefs, and that the

district court overruled those objections. Accordingly, we review those rulings under

an abuse of discretion standard. 10
11We note that, at the time of trial, and indeed at the time of appellate

arguments in this case, Kumho Tire had not yet been decided. Our circuit’s

precedent, prior to Kumho Tire , held that trial courts need conduct a gatekeeper

inquiry only with respect to evidence based on “a particular methodology or

technique,” and not with respect to evidence “based solely upon experience or

training.” Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc. , 82 F.3d 1513, 1518-19 (10th Cir.

1996). The Supreme Court, in Kumho Tire , held that trial courts must conduct

some kind of gatekeeping function with respect to all expert testimony, not just

to testimony predicated on some specific scientific methodology. However, the

Court also held that trial courts have great latitude in determining the methods by

which it tests the reliability of expert testimony. Indeed, the abuse of discretion

standard “applies as much to the trial court’s decisions about how to determine

reliability as to its ultimate conclusion.” Kumho Tire , 119 S. Ct. at 1176. Even

though the trial court in this case did not have the benefit of Kumho Tire ’s

direction, its evidentiary decisions do not warrant reversal if it determined, in

some apparent manner, that the expert testimony it admitted was reliable. See id.

at 1179 (upholding the decision of the trial court to exclude a particular expert’s

testimony, even though the trial court did not have the benefit of Kumho Tire ,

because the trial court “did not abuse its discretionary authority in this case”). 

-17-

 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael , 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999); 11 United States

v. Haslip , 160 F.3d 649, 653 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 1346 (1999).

A. Rule 16 Violation

We agree with Defendant that the government violated Rule 16(a)(1)(E),

which requires the government, at the defendant’s request, to “disclose to the

defendant a written summary of testimony that the government intends to use under

Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at

trial.” A party failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 16 is subject to

sanction by the district court, which “may order such party to permit the discovery
-18-

or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence

not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the

circumstances.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). A district court’s decision to apply or

not to apply sanctions “will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion.” United

States v. Wicker , 848 F.2d 1059, 1060 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v.

Fernandez , 780 F.2d 1573, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986)). “In selecting a proper sanction,

a court should typically consider (1) the reasons the government delayed producing

requested materials, including whether the government acted in bad faith; (2) the

extent of prejudice to defendant as a result of the delay; and (3) the feasibility of

curing the prejudice with a continuance.” United States v. Gonzales , 164 F.3d 1285,

1292 (10th Cir. 1999); see Wicker , 848 F.2d at 1061. “Frequently it will be found

that the party who requested disclosure has not been prejudiced and that no sanction

is needed.” 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 260, at 121-22

(1982) (citing cases). We note that the sanction requested by Defendant—exclusion

of the witnesses’ expert testimony—is almost never imposed “in the absence of a

constitutional violation or statutory authority for such exclusion.” Gonzales , 164

F.3d at 1292. 

In this case, Defendant requested that the government turn over summaries of

the testimony of all its expert witnesses. The government refused to comply with

this request, because it maintained that each of its witnesses would be testifying as
-19-

lay witnesses rather than as experts. Nevertheless, between July and September

1997, the government turned over to the defense copies of all medical and counseling

records from which the witnesses would be testifying. Therefore, the government

argues that the defense suffered no prejudice because it knew well in advance of trial

who was going to testify and the nature and purpose of the expected testimony.

Defense counsel had the opportunity to interview the government’s witnesses prior

to trial, and in fact questioned Dr. Junkins a few days before the trial began. Indeed,

defense counsel himself has had a difficult time, even when directly questioned on

the matter, identifying any particular prejudice. He does not identify, for example,

any witnesses he would have called if the government had designated its health care

professionals as experts prior to trial and furnished summaries of their testimony in

addition to information already available to the defense. Nor does he specify any

significant hindrance to his preparation for cross-examination of the witnesses in

question. We note that in some ways, defense counsel may in fact have been better

off with the actual records than with Rule 16 summaries. 

In light of these facts, we cannot conclude that Defendant suffered any

prejudice as a result of the government’s failure to provide Rule 16 summaries for

its witnesses who admittedly gave expert testimony. When we couple this conclusion

with the fact that there is no evidence that the government was motivated by bad
12Rule 702, which governs the admission of expert testimony, states as

follows:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of

an opinion or otherwise.

-20-

faith, we are persuaded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing

to exclude the expert testimony of these witnesses. 

B. Admissibility of the Testimony

Defendant’s remaining arguments—that the challenged witnesses

impermissibly vouched for the girls’ credibility, gave unduly prejudicial statements,

and testified without adequate foundation—are grounded in Fed. R. Evid. 403 and

702. 12 Because the objections vary as to the testimony of each witness, we will

consider the witnesses separately. 

1. Dr. Junkins

Testimony admitted without objection established that Dr. Junkins is a board

certified pediatrician who attended medical school at Johns Hopkins University.

From 1994 through July 1997 he was employed by the Public Health Service serving

as a physician at the Crownpoint Healthcare Facility in Crownpoint, New Mexico.
-21-

At the Crownpoint facility, Dr. Junkins primarily treated Native American patients,

both children and adults, in a family practice setting, and was regarded by family

practitioners there as a specialist in pediatrics to whom young patients with special

problems were referred. After leaving Crownpoint, he was employed as a physician

at the Primary Children’s Medical Center in Salt Lake City, Utah.

In addition to these credentials, Dr. Junkins also had specific experience with

child sexual abuse cases. He testified about the form he fills out and the list of

things he covers in suspected abuse cases , and how he followed that form in this

case. He testified that normal physical examinations can still be consistent with

abuse, stating that “that’s been my experience with child abuse examinations.” II R.

at 165. He testified that he looks for scars and bruising, telling the jury that “I look

for all that. I often don’t find it, and so this did not surprise me in this case.” Id. at

166. He stated further that “a physical exam [in suspected abuse cases] is—you

know, in my experience 90 percent of the time normal.” Id. at 220. In response from

a question from the trial judge regarding the number of times he had testified in

court, Dr. Junkins stated that although he had actually testified in court a handful of

times, he had “been involved in cases at the initial evaluation probably two or three

dozen times.” II R. at 223. And, again emphasizing the basis of his opinion in

experience, he testified:

Q. And that’s why, if you didn’t see a traumatized area within 72

hours, so what?
13The medical records, marked for identification as Government’s Exhibits

1 and 2, were extensively incorporated into the trial record through Dr. Junkins’

testimony, but they were never offered or admitted into evidence as exhibits.

14Treating professionals may relate statements made to them by the alleged

victims, as long as the statements were made for the purposes of diagnosis or

treatment. Such statements are admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4), as

exceptions to the hearsay rule, provided a proper foundation is laid. See United

States v. Tome , 61 F.3d 1446, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Joe , 8

F.3d 1488, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1993). 

-22-

A. Oh, that’s what I— that’s been my overwhelming experience with

this. I would have been surprised in fact.

Id. at 217-18 (emphasis added). In light of this record evidence regarding Dr.

Junkins’ qualifications, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in

allowing him to offer expert testimony. 

Dr. Junkins testified, also without objection, to the facts of the girls’ medical

history and treatment, 13 and the facts of his examination. He also related what the

girls told him. 14 He then offered two opinions to which Defendant objects. He

testified, essentially, that while his physical examination revealed nothing

remarkably abnormal, a normal examination is not necessarily inconsistent with a

history of sexual abuse. More significantly, he linked the girls’—especially

D.J.’s—atypical history of physical complaints and manifestations to the alleged

sexual abuse:

Q. But, now, in light of knowing her whole history, what do

you think was related to the urinary tract infections, the

kidney infections, the bed wetting, the abdominal pain, the

paralysis, the nausea?
15Although Defendant’s counsel made a continuing objection at the

beginning of trial which we have construed as covering this testimony, see supra

note 4, we note that there was no specific objection made to these earlier

statements, and no motion to strike. In contrast, as noted above, counsel did

specifically object to the more qualified statement offered on redirect

examination, and that objection was overruled. 

-23-

MR. FINZEL: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead.

THE WITNESS: What was related to all those things, the

unifying diagnosis that could —could possibly pull all of it

together would be an abusive situation, an incredibly stressful

situation, such as sexual or physical abuse could —could describe

or explain all of those problems. Could .

II R. at 219 (emphasis added). 

This was a more qualified version of an earlier statement by him that abuse

“would” explain, and “was” a unifying diagnosis for, all of D.J.’s symptoms and

history—immediately qualified by “helped” to bring the problems together. Id. at

162. Dr. Junkins also stated that the entire visit on April 11 caused it to become

“clear to [him] as a pediatrician what had been going on and what’s the cause of all

these problems.” Id. at 155. 15 Taken as a whole, however, we regard the qualified

opinion set out above (“could” explain), which was offered as a summation at the

end of his testimony, to be the essence of Dr. Junkins’ opinion, and what the jury

was left with by way of information. Thus, any error in the admission of the earlier

statements was harmless. 
16In his petition for rehearing, Defendant raises, for the first time on

appeal, an objection to the government’s expert witnesses statements that the

girls symptoms were “consistent with” symptoms often exhibited by victims of

child sexual abuse. In this petition, Defendant argues that these “consistent

with” statements were admitted by the district court without any kind of

reliability finding, as required by Daubert and Kumho Tire . In his appellate

briefs, however, Defendant raised Daubert -style reliability issues only with

respect to other statements by government witnesses, such as statements that the

girls were in fact abused, or statements that seemed to assume, as a fact, that

abuse had occurred. See Appellant’s Opening Br. at 40; Appellant’s Reply Br. at

5-6, 13. Indeed, in his appellate briefs, Defendant urged us to adopt the approach

of the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Whitted , 11 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 1993),

and stated that “[t]he court recognized in Whitted that doctors may be permitted

to testify in child sexual abuse cases concerning characteristics of the alleged

victim and of sexually abused children generally; they may summarize the

medical evidence and express an opinion that the evidence is consistent or

inconsistent with the alleged victim’s allegations .” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 10

(emphasis added). And, at oral argument, Defendant’s counsel stated as follows:

[Dr. Junkins] testified, as is allowed by law, that his findings and

review of the [medical] history were consistent with allegations of

sexual abuse. . . . We did not object to that particular testimony, and

I would say right now that we don’t object to it today. That is

permitted by law. It was his going to the ultimate conclusion, . . .

where he said that the “unifying diagnosis” . . . was that sexual

abuse was the cause of the children’s symptoms [that was

objectionable]. . . . The case that I base my entire argument on is

-24-

The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing these general and

conditional opinions. Thus, for example, the court did not abuse its discretion by

allowing Dr. Junkins to “summarize the medical evidence and express an opinion that

the evidence is consistent or inconsistent with the victim’s allegations of sexual

abuse,” and allowing him to “inform the jury of characteristics in sexually abused

children and describe the characteristics the alleged victim exhibits.” 16 United States
[Whitted] . 

It is axiomatic that “[p]etitions for rehearing . . . are permitted to enable parties

to notify, and to correct, errors of fact or law on the issues already presented;

they are not meant to permit parties to assert new grounds for relief.” Sierra

Club v. Hodel , 848 F.2d 1068, 1100-01 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (also

stating that “[a] party cannot on petition for rehearing shift his position” (citation

omitted)). 

Thus, we do not purport to make any kind of independent appellate

determination that such “consistent with” statements—or any other statements,

for that matter—pass muster under Daubert or Kumho Tire . We were not even

asked to make such a determination with respect to the “consistent with”

statements. Indeed, we decline Defendant’s invitation, raised for the first time on

appeal in a petition for rehearing, to evaluate the reliability of these statements

under Daubert . We cite Whitted and the other Eighth Circuit cases because

Defendant relied on them so heavily, and because we disagree with Defendant

(and with the dissent) in our characterization of Dr. Junkins’ testimony. Under

our characterization, Dr. Junkins substantially presented “consistent with”

testimony, and was not testifying that the girls were in fact abused. Thus, under

the very cases cited to us by Defendant, such testimony is admissible. 

Defendant’s attempt, at the rehearing stage, to introduce new issues into this case

is unavailing. 

-25-

v. Whitted , 11 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Wright , 119

F.3d 630, 635 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that a witness’s testimony that he “conducted

a ‘Sexual molestation exam’ and that in his opinion the lack of medical evidence was

not inconsistent with molestation” was admissible); United States v. Johns , 15 F.3d

740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994) (allowing an expert to tell the jury about typical “emotional

and psychological traits for abuse victims,” and noting that such testimony was

admissible because the witness “made no comment on [the alleged victim’s]
-26-

credibility nor did [the witness] identify [the alleged victim] as a victim of child

abuse”). 

Defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Junkins in detail, was conversant with the

subject matter, made no attempt whatsoever to challenge his experience, his training,

his qualifications, or the basis for his opinions, and cites nothing to us on appeal

which the defense was prevented from using to dispute any part of the testimony.

There was no error in the admission of Dr. Junkins’ testimony.

2. Dr. Ornelas

Dr. Ornelas’s credentials and expertise were also introduced without objection.

Dr. Ornelas graduated from the University of Southern California (USC) with a

degree in biology, and then went on to attend medical school at the University of

California at Irvine. She completed a medical residency at the USC Medical Center

in Los Angeles, and is now a pediatrician at the University of New Mexico (UNM).

At the time of trial she had been in practice for eleven years. For the last seven

years, she had been the head of UNM’s Para Los Ni n ̃ os Program, which coordinates

medical evaluations of children who are referred for concerns of sexual abuse. In

view of this record evidence, we cannot say that the district court abused its

discretion in allowing Dr. Ornelas to offer expert testimony. 
17The government examined Dr. Ornelas with respect to exhibits marked

for identification as Government’s Exhibits 7 and 8, which consisted of D.J.’s

and J.J.’s respective records taken in connection with the Ornelas evaluation. 

However, those records were not offered or admitted as evidence at trial.

-27-

Agent Tanburg reported his interview with D.J. and J.J. to Dr. Ornelas. On

June 4, 1997, the day Defendant was indicted, Dr. Ornelas and her intake social

worker saw the girls, examined and evaluated them. The girls’ mother provided

information regarding the girls’ medical problems and their reports of abuse.

Although the record is not entirely clear on the point, it appears that Dr. Ornelas did

not obtain copies of the girls’ medical records from the Crownpoint Healthcare

Facility or confer with Dr. Junkins or any other treating physician. 17

At trial Dr. Ornelas did not testify to any further contact with or treatment of

the girls beyond the examination and evaluation on June 4, 1997, except for a workup on the condition of the girls’ kidneys in order to see if there was an anatomical

problem which caused their frequent problems with bed-wetting.

Dr. Ornelas testified that her examination of the girls showed no physical

evidence of sexual abuse. She found no bruising, bleeding, scarring or tags, and she

found that the hymens were intact. Defendant, for obvious reasons, does not

challenge this portion of her testimony which, in any event, was a factual recitation

of the doctor’s observations, not an opinion. She opined generally that penetration

does not necessarily occur in abuse cases. Rather, coitus can occur externally,
18The following exchange is an example.

Q. Okay. So you’re saying that painful urination would be

a symptom consistent with sex abuse?

A. Yes. It certainly could be.

III R. at 351 (emphasis added).

19Again, we note that although we construe Defendant’s continuing

objection as covering this testimony, we are nonetheless troubled by counsel’s

failure to make a specific objection to this particular testimony, or move to have

it stricken. 

-28-

between the labia. She also generalized that abuse can cause symptoms and behavior

such as headaches, numbness, urinary tract infections, and bed-wetting. 18 As noted

above, Defendant does not object to this particular testimony. See supra note 16; cf.

Whitted , 11 F.3d at 785-86. 

The problem with Dr. Ornelas’ testimony lies in the fact that she was permitted

to give the jury her unconditional opinion that each of the girls was in fact sexually

abused. She testified that her “final conclusion was that [D.J.] had been sexually

abused,” III R. at 317-18, and that “[J.J.] also had a normal examination and also

she—my conclusion is that she was also sexually abused,” id. at 323. Furthermore,

Dr. Ornelas stated that “[t]he kind of contact that occurred is what’s called labial

coitus . . . .” Id. at 322 (emphasis added). 19 

She evidently based this opinion on what the girls said, to her and others, as

indicated by the following exchange on cross-examination:
-29-

Q. Then your assessment of child abuse is based on what [D.J.] told

you about both [D.J.] and [J.J.]?

A. And what—the information from her mother and the information

that we had that the children had given on prior interviews.

Q. Told the same—or—stories before?

A. Yes, well, had made disclosures before—

Q. Uh-huh.

A. —about sexual abuse.

Q. And, of course, the mother got the information she said from the

children.

A. That’s correct.

Id. at 344.

Regardless of whether Dr. Ornelas based her conclusion on the girls’

allegations of sexual abuse, or on the girls’ history of atypical medical symptoms, her

testimony is problematic. If the conclusion was based on the girls’ medical

symptoms, questions surrounding the reliability of such a conclusion arise. On the

other hand, if the conclusion was based on the girls’ allegations, Dr. Ornelas was

merely vouching for the credibility of the child complainants. 

The opinion offered by Dr. Ornelas falls under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Among

other things, that Rule imposes a special gatekeeping obligation on the trial judge to

ensure that an opinion offered by an expert is reliable. See Kumho Tire , 119 S. Ct.

at 1176. Indeed, “where [expert] testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods,
20Proposed amendments to Rule 702 are currently under consideration. 

Should these amendments take effect, trial judges conducting the gatekeeping

inquiry will be required to undertake a three-part reliability inquiry in connection

with all expert testimony. Gatekeeping judges must make certain that all expert

testimony admitted at trial “is sufficiently based upon reliable facts or data” and

“is the product of reliable principles and methods,” and that “the witness has

applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Proposed

Fed. R. Evid. 702, quoted in 67 U.S.L.W. 2588 (Apr. 6, 1999).

-30-

or their application are called sufficiently into question . . . the trial judge must

determine whether the testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and

experience of [the relevant] discipline.’” Id. at 1175 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)). The trial judge has broad

discretion, reviewable for its abuse, “to determine reliability in light of the particular

facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Kumho Tire , 119 S. Ct. at 1179. 20

The trial judge is granted great latitude in deciding which factors to use in evaluating

the reliability of expert testimony, and in deciding whether to hold a formal hearing.

Id. at 1176. 

Here, no reliability determination was made at all with respect to Dr. Ornelas’

unconditional opinion that D.J. and J.J. were sexually abused. As a practical matter,

that issue might have been disposed of simply by sustaining the objection, on

foundation grounds, to the question seeking to elicit Dr. Ornelas’s opinion. At that

point, government counsel might have approached the subject in a more acceptable

way, and if not, a bench conference could have ended the line of questioning. Or,
-31-

the subject could have been explored and passed on prior to trial, in the sound

discretion of the trial judge. See Kumho Tire , 119 S. Ct. at 1176. But, as it

happened, nothing was adduced here which demonstrates that the testimony had an

adequate foundation. The record does not disclose, for example, what data would

support ruling out all causes except sexual abuse for the girls’ physical complaints,

or to what degree Dr. Ornelas relied on her purely subjective views. Cf. id. at 1177.

Indeed, Dr. Ornelas herself, as indicated above, ordered a work-up to determine if

an anatomical problem (rather than sexual abuse, presumably) was causing the girls

to wet the bed. III R. at 324-25. Thus, if Dr. Ornelas’s unqualified opinion was

based on the girls’ medical history, there is insufficient support in this record for the

district court’s decision to admit it. See Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16 , 845

F. Supp. 1342 (D. Neb. 1994) (conducting a reliability inquiry and determining that

expert opinion testimony that sexual abuse in fact occurred was, in that particular

case, not reliable), aff’d , 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995). 

On the other hand, if Dr. Ornelas’ opinion was largely based on crediting the

girls’ account, whether disclosed to her or others, she was essentially vouching for

their truthfulness. In general, expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the

credibility of another witness encroaches upon the jury’s vital and exclusive function

to make credibility determinations, and therefore does not “assist the trier of fact”
21Courts have also held that testimony which vouches for the credibility of

a witness violates other evidentiary rules, such as Rule 608(a)(1) or Rule 403. 

Some courts have held that, although Rule 608(a)(1) “permits testimony

concerning a witness’s general character or reputation for truthfulness,” it

“prohibits any testimony as to a witness’s truthfulness on a particular occasion.” 

State v. Rimmasch , 775 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1989) (construing Utah R. Evid.

608); see also United States v. Azure , 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986); State v.

Wood , 460 S.E.2d 771, 778 (W. Va. 1995) (construing W. Va. R. Evid. 608);

People v. Koon , 713 P.2d 410, 412 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (construing Colo. R.

Evid. 608). And at least one court has held, in a sexual abuse case, that

testimony that bolsters the credibility of the complaining witness violates Rule

403’s balancing test. United States v. Funds Held in the Name or for the Benefit

of John Hugh Wetterer , 991 F. Supp. 112, 120-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 

22The government attempts to distinguish Whitted by arguing that the

testifying doctor in that case was a hired expert, while the testifying doctors in

this case were the girls’ actual treating physicians. This distinction misses the

point. The crucial factor that separates admissible opinion testimony from

impermissible vouching is the basis upon which the doctor forms his or her

opinion, not the status of the doctor. 

-32-

as required by Rule 702. 21 See United States v. Azure , 801 F.2d 336, 339-40 (8th

Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Shay , 57 F.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 1995); Whitted ,

11 F.3d at 785-86; 22 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 702.03[5] (1998). Indeed, the

government concedes that, in this case, testimony to the effect that D.J. and J.J. were

“telling the truth . . . would be impermissible.” Appellee’s Br. at 26.

Most courts that have considered the issue have concluded that expert

testimony, based on the statements of the alleged victim, that sexual abuse in fact

occurred is inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 (or similar military or state

evidentiary rules) because, in such cases, the expert offering the opinion is merely
23See Whitted , 11 F.3d at 785-86; United States v. Birdsall , 47 M.J. 404,

409-10 (C.A.A.F. 1998); Johnson v. State , 732 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Ark. 1987);

State v. Batangan , 799 P.2d 48, 52 (Haw. 1990); State v. Bressman , 689 P.2d

901, 907-08 (Kan. 1984); State v. Black , 537 A.2d 1154, 1157 & n.1 (Me. 1988);

Commonwealth v. Colin C. , 643 N.E.2d 19, 22-23 (Mass. 1994); People v.

Beckley , 456 N.W.2d 391, 407-08 (Mich. 1990); Goodson v. State , 566 So. 2d

1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1990); State v. Lucero , 863 P.2d 1071, 1075 (N.M. 1993);

State v. Kallin , 877 P.2d 138, 140-41 (Utah 1994); State v. Gokey , 574 A.2d 766,

768, 771-72 (Vt. 1990); State v. Haseltine , 352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Wis. Ct. App.

1984) . Other state courts, however, disagree, and have allowed such testimony to

be admitted. See Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly of God , 808 P.2d 1211,

1216-17 (Alaska 1991); Glendening v. State , 536 So. 2d 212, 220 (Fla. 1988);

State v. Hester , 760 P.2d 27, 31-32 (Idaho 1988); State v. Geyman , 729 P.2d 475,

479 (Mont. 1986); Townsend v. State , 734 P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1987); State v.

Figured , 446 S.E.2d 838, 842-43 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Stowers , 690

N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ohio 1998); State v. Wilson , 855 P.2d 657, 660 (Or. Ct. App.

1993); Johnson v. State , 970 S.W.2d 716, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Several

of these cases, however, did not address whether the vouching problem was

implicated by such testimony. 

-33-

vouching for the credibility of the alleged victim. 23 Thus, if Dr. Ornelas largely

based her opinion on the statements of the girls, then under the foundation (or lack

thereof) presented in this case, we consider it inadmissible. Therefore, regardless

of whether Dr. Ornelas’s conclusion was based on the girls’ medical history or on

their allegations of abuse, its admission was erroneous. 

3. Joelle Baum and Kristine Lee Carlson

Joelle Baum and Kristine Lee Carlson testified, without objection, that they

practiced as licensed mental health counselors. Ms. Baum stated that she is a
24Although these witnesses also held themselves out as “art therapists,” III

R. at 237, 251, the district court made no findings as to whether these witnesses

qualified as expert art therapists, and neither Ms. Baum nor Ms. Carlson offered

any expert opinion based upon art therapy. Their references to pictures drawn by

the girls, such as, for instance, pictures of a house where the girls said they felt

afraid, were factual observations, and not interpretations or diagnoses based on

specialized knowledge of art therapy. 

-34-

registered nurse and a registered mental health counselor, and was trained as an art

therapist. 24 At the time of trial, she was employed at Western New Mexico

Counseling Services in Gallup, New Mexico, where she provided supportive

counseling to both families and individuals. Ms. Carlson stated that she is a clinical

therapist and the Sexual Assault Coordinator for the city of Gallup, New Mexico.

She stated that, at the time of trial, she had approximately eleven years’ experience

as a therapist, and had been employed as Gallup’s Sexual Assault Coordinator for

about eighteen months. Like Ms. Baum, Ms. Carlson stated that she counsels both

families and individuals, and provides a full range of counseling services ranging

from trauma to depression. In light of this record evidence regarding their

qualifications, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in

allowing these counselors to offer expert testimony. 

Aside from alleging that these counselors were not properly qualified,

Defendant objects to their testimony on three grounds. First, he argues that it was

error to let Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson testify at all because evidence of the referral

of D.J. and J.J. to Western New Mexico Counseling Services for treatment of sexual
25We note that some courts have held that a counselor’s testimony that

“[the alleged victim] was referred to me for sexual abuse recovery counseling”

constitutes impermissible vouching and is therefore inadmissible. State v.

-35-

abuse prejudicially presumes the fact in issue—that sexual abuse occurred. Second,

he contends that they impermissibly vouched for the girls’ credibility. Finally, he

asserts that their testimony contained numerous baseless statements (other than the

fact of referral) that assumed the fact of sexual abuse. 

With respect to Defendant’s contention that evidence of the referral itself was

prejudicial, we are, under the circumstances of this case, compelled to disagree. Ms.

Baum testified that the referral came about because “the girls had disclosed sexual

abuse and that they were having a real difficult time and needed . . . supportive

counseling to help them cope.” III R. at 239. This does not go to the truth of the

matter of sexual abuse, but, rather, to the reason for the referral. Likewise,

statements by both Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson that they were treating trauma

associated with sexual abuse relate to the treatment. While we agree with Defendant

that some prejudice flows from the premise underlying this testimony, the additional

testimony given by Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson with respect to what they observed

and did caused this testimony regarding referral to be more probative than prejudicial

under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Cross-examination is the tool for clarifying any ambiguities

on the point. Thus, on cross-examination, defense counsel emphasized that the

referral was based only on an allegation of sexual abuse. 25
Haslam , 663 A.2d 902, 905-06 (R.I. 1995); cf. Commonwealth v. McCaffrey , 633

N.E.2d 1062, 1067-68 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). We disagree with the analysis of

these courts. A statement by a counselor that the alleged victim was referred for

sexual abuse counseling is not necessarily the same as a statement that the victim

is telling the truth, or even that the victim was in fact sexually abused, and

therefore does not necessarily rise to the level of impermissible vouching. 

-36-

As to Defendant’s contention that the counselors vouched for the credibility

of the children, we note that the counselors testified without objection regarding the

facts of their observations of the girls, the nature of the treatment given, and what

the girls said and did in connection with their treatment. For instance, Ms. Baum

described J.J. as distressed and fearful when telling about really bad dreams she was

having. She stated that J.J. drew a house and said she was having bad memories

about experiences that had happened there. She also stated that J.J.’s bed-wetting

had decreased after counseling.

As to D.J., Ms. Baum testified that she was experiencing paralysis of her legs,

that her brother had to carry her into the session, and that she seemed very

uncomfortable and anxious and had difficulty talking about the situation. D.J. also

said she was having bad memories from past experiences in her house . Both girls

expressed fear of being at home without their mother there .

Ms. Carlson testified that D.J. complained of nightmares, was very fearful, did

not like to wear dresses, and related distressing flashbacks and images. Also,

Carlson testified that D.J. feared being away from her mother, disliked being
26Ms. Baum offered only one statement that can be construed as an expertstyle opinion—that bed-wetting can be a symptom of anxiety. The balance of her

testimony consisted of relating the course of her treatment. 

-37-

touched, was afraid of strangers, and expressed fear of Defendant’s wife . Finally,

D.J. talked about ways to be safe at home and identified things to protect her such

as ancestors, her dog, dragons and lions. She then created artwork in the form of a

large shield. These unchallenged factual observations and statements were properly

admitted, as expressions connected with treatment. 

Both Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson did express opinions: 26 that the girls needed

supportive counseling; that bed-wetting can be a symptom of anxiety; that once

traumatized a child is slow to trust an adult; and that D.J.’s symptoms were

consistent with the symptoms of sexual abuse victims. These opinions, some of

which were general and others qualified, did not constitute impermissible vouching,

see Whitted , 11 F.3d at 785-86, and were not objected to in any event, see supra note

16. 

However, Ms. Carlson’s opinion that D.J.’s symptoms were more consistent

with the symptoms of children who have been sexually abused than with the

symptoms of children who witness physical abuse of their mother was erroneously
27This statement is more than a mere “consistent with” statement, to which

no timely objection was made, and is more akin to those statements which seemed

to assume that abuse occurred, and to which timely reliability objections were

mounted. 

-38-

admitted. 27 No sufficient foundation was laid for this kind of expert analysis. See

Kumho Tire , 119 S. Ct. at 1175-76. 

Finally, Defendant’s third argument has merit. The counselors were permitted

to offer testimony that assumed the fact of abuse—a determination to be made by the

jury. Ms. Baum stated that “it was becoming increasingly hard for the children to

be in the[ir] house because some of the abuse had happened in the house.” III R. at

243. Ms. Carlson talked about the environment “where the abuse occurred,” id. at

251, and engaged in the following exchange with government counsel:

A. The home environment seems to have changed during that time

and become more stabilized, so that the abuse that I have been

dealing with her at this point in time seems to be recent.

Q. Although you’re aware of abuse over an extended time of [D.J.],

sexual abuse?

A. Oh, yes. Yes.

Id. at 258.

Q. And so if she had expressed a desire to not going to school or had

problems that would prevent her from going to school, what

would have been the reason for those based on your counseling

sessions with [D.J.]?

A. I would have connected that—I do connect those to the trauma of

the sexual abuse.
28At least, no foundation for these statements appears in the record. It

could be that the counselors were making these statements based on their belief

that the girls were telling the truth. In that case, their testimony would constitute

impermissible vouching. See Whitted , 11 F.3d at 785. It could be that the

counselors were inartfully trying to relate to the jury out-of-court statements

made to them by the girls in the course of diagnosis or treatment, admissible

under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). See Tome , 61 F.3d at 1449-50. But they do not

come across as such in the record. 

-39-

Id. at 258-59.

While the latter quote may also have been an opinion, it was also more

particularly a statement of fact. It was error to admit these statements which were

manifestly outside the counselors’ direct knowledge. 28 Such statements had minimal

probative value, and, in the context of this referral for treatment of problems

allegedly connected with sexual abuse, they were unquestionably prejudicial. They

also impermissibly invaded the province of the jurors. Accordingly, they were

inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403, and it was error to allow them. 

C. Harmless Error

Finally, we must determine whether the district court’s erroneous decisions to

admit the conclusions of Dr. Ornelas, the prejudicial statements of Ms. Baum and

Ms. Carlson, and the physical abuse-related opinion of Ms. Carlson were harmless.

A non-constitutional error, such as a decision whether to admit or exclude evidence,

is considered harmless “unless a substantial right of [a] party is affected.” Fed. R.
29The dissent agrees with us that the proper harmless error standard is

different from the standard used in insufficiency of the evidence cases, and

reemphasizes the point. As indicated above, we expressly apply the Kotteakos

harmless error standard here. While we, like the dissent, are not totally free from

doubt about whether the erroneously admitted testimony may have had some

influence on the outcome of the case, we part company from the dissent because,

as discussed below, we do not have grave doubt that the errors had a substantial

effect on the outcome. Grave doubt, by definition, does not refer to every level

of doubt, and substantial influence, by definition, does not mean any or some

influence. 

-40-

Evid. 103(a). We have stated that an error affecting a substantial right of a party is

an error which had a “‘substantial influence’ on the outcome or [which] leaves one

in ‘grave doubt’ as to whether it had such effect.” United States v. Rivera , 900 F.2d

1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S.

750, 765 (1946)). When conducting our harmless error analysis, we review the

record as a whole. See United States v. McVeigh , 153 F.3d 1166, 1204 (10th Cir.

1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 1148 (1999). Harmless error analysis is not the same

as insufficiency of the evidence analysis. 29 See United States v. Tome , 61 F.3d 1446,

1455 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[t]he question is not whether, omitting the

inadmissible statements, the record contains sufficient evidence for a jury to convict

the defendant”). The burden of proving that an error is harmless falls on the

government. See Rivera , 900 F.2d at 1469 n.4.

Harmless error is not an easy issue in this case. Defendant took the stand in

his own defense and categorically denied ever inappropriately touching either of the
-41-

girls. There was no physical evidence of abuse, and no eyewitnesses to the alleged

misdeeds. 

On the other hand, both girls testified, each corroborating the other. Both

were old enough to understand the true nature of their accounts. D.J. especially had

an undisputed and documented history of atypical medical conditions and complaints

that was consistent with sexual abuse. In addition, both girls displayed symptoms

of emotional distress that were consistent with sexual abuse. J.J. was distressed and

fearful, and drew a picture of a house where she had had bad experiences. D.J. also

had bad memories associated with a house, and complained of nightmares, expressed

fear of strangers and Defendant’s wife, and did not like to wear dresses. 

Defendant had a prior conviction for sexual abuse of a child, for which he

served one year in prison and three years on supervised release. Indeed, because

Defendant was released from prison for this offense in 1995, and was on supervised

release at the time of the events in question here, the prior conviction and sentence

were proximate in time to the allegations underlying this case. 

It is also undisputed that the girls were often left home alone in the evening.

Thus, the evidence established that the Defendant had both the inclination and the

opportunity to commit the crimes. 

Furthermore, there were three aspects of Defendant’s testimony that were

flatly contradicted by other witnesses. He testified that he was never at the girls’
-42-

house, a fact contradicted by the girls and by Ms. Kalleco; he testified that the girls,

when at his workplace, would never help him and never ask him for money, a fact

contradicted by defense witness Bucky Belen; and he testified that he had never

denied his involvement in the 1994 sexual abuse offense to the FBI, a fact

contradicted by Agent Calles. As to these facts, the jury necessarily had to weigh

Defendant’s credibility. 

The problem facing us is the impact that the testimony of Dr. Ornelas, Ms.

Baum, and Ms. Carlson might have had on the jury’s deliberations under the

circumstances outlined above. The admission of the expert conclusion of a highly

credible physician that the girls were in fact sexually abused, coupled with the

admission of the testimony of two counselors who assumed that the girls had been

abused, and stated it as a fact, undoubtedly had some effect on the jury’s

deliberations. However, nearly all of Dr. Ornelas’s, Ms. Baum’s, and Ms. Carlson’s

testimony was properly admitted at trial, and, as discussed above, there is no

evidentiary problem with the testimony of any of the other witnesses. Thus, only a

small, albeit important, portion of the testimony admitted at trial was erroneously

admitted. 

Defendant calls to our attention several cases in which courts, when faced with

similar situations, have found that the admission of expert testimony, in sexual abuse

cases, which vouches for the credibility of other witnesses constitutes reversible or
-43-

even plain error, and our own research has unearthed several other such cases. See ,

e.g. , Whitted , 11 F.3d at 786-87 (plain error); United States v. Birdsall , 47 M.J. 404,

410 (C.A.A.F. 1998); see also , e.g. , Commonwealth v. Colin C. , 643 N.E.2d 19, 23

(Mass. 1994); State v. Gokey , 574 A.2d 766, 772 (Vt. 1990). But see , e.g. , Brown

v. State , 523 So. 2d 729, 730 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988) (holding the error harmless “in

light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt”); Commonwealth v. Rather , 638 N.E.2d

915, 920 (Mass App. Ct. 1994) (holding the error harmless due to eyewitness

corroboration of the victims’ testimony). However, after carefully studying these

cases, we conclude that each of them, even the cases finding the error harmless, is

in important respects distinguishable from the case at hand. These cases do not

appear to compel a result, on the facts presented to us here, in one direction or the

other. Our problem is compounded by the fact that the government, which has the

burden of showing that the error is harmless, failed to address the issue in its brief.

However, after reading and re-reading the record, we are persuaded that the

errors in admitting portions of the testimony of Dr. Ornelas, Ms. Baum, and Ms.

Carlson did not affect a substantial right of a party. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). In

light of the strength of the properly admitted testimony, outlined above, and the

relatively modest amount of erroneously admitted testimony, we cannot say that the

erroneously admitted portions of the testimony substantially affected the trial’s

outcome, and we are not in grave doubt that the testimony had such effect. Any
-44-

errors in the admission of evidence committed by the district court were harmless.

III. Insufficiency of the Evidence on Count I

Finally, we address Defendant’s final argument—that the government

presented insufficient evidence to convict him on Count I of the indictment. In

conducting this inquiry, we must “determine whether the evidence, considered most

favorably to the government, is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find

[Defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” on Count I of the indictment. United

States v. Perez , 959 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir. 1992); see also United States v.

Wacker , 72 F.3d 1453, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that all evidence is to be

viewed “in the light most favorable to the government” and that “[w]e reverse only

if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt”).

Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence in the record which points

toward abuse of D.J. “on or about” October 1995. The record evidence on this point

is as follows: D.J. stated at trial that Defendant had been abusing her “[s]ince [she]

was small,” III R. at 358; D.J. testified that Defendant had abused her both before

he went to prison and after he got out of prison ; D.J. testified that Defendant abused

her “more than five times,” and that not all of these times were in 1997, id. at 394;

and J.J. testified that Defendant had abused D.J. when the girls were little .
-45-

However, there is no direct evidence of even any contact between Defendant

and D.J. during the entire year 1995, let alone evidence of sexual abuse during

October of that year. Defendant was in prison for the first half of 1995, and D.J.

testified that she could not remember any abuse in 1995, or even being with

Defendant at any time in 1995. In addition, Dr. Kern testified that Defendant, due

to his prostate surgery, would likely have demonstrated signs of bleeding had he tried

to ejaculate during the period between September 29, 1995, and late October 1995,

and that no such signs of bleeding were apparent. 

We have stated that, where, as here, time is not an element of the offense, and

where “the phrase ‘on or about’ is used in an indictment in connection with a specific

date . . . , if the prosecution proves that the offense was committed within a few

weeks of the date, the proof will be deemed sufficient to hold [the] defendant

responsible for the charge.” Kokotan v. United States , 408 F.2d 1134, 1138 (10th

Cir. 1969). Indeed, “[a] variance between the date alleged in the indictment and the

date of the commission of the offense as shown by the evidence is generally not

fatal.” United States v. Harmon , 486 F.2d 363, 366 (10th Cir. 1973). The important

consideration is that there must be some evidence which tends to show that the

defendant committed the charged offense on “a date reasonably near to the specified

date” alleged in the indictment. Castillo , 140 F.3d at 885; see also United States v.
30Often, in determining whether the date of the evidence in the case is

“reasonably near” to the date alleged in the indictment, courts will consider

whether the defendant’s “substantial rights” were “prejudiced” by the variance. 

See Tsinhnahijinnie , 112 F.3d at 991; United States v. Brewer , 1 F.3d 1430, 1437

(4th Cir. 1993). We think it evident that Defendant was prejudiced by the

temporal variance between the evidence and the indictment in this case.

-46-

Tsinhnahijinnie , 112 F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1997). 30 Thus, even if we assume,

arguendo, that because of his prostate surgery Defendant could not have committed

sexual abuse during the entire month of October 1995, that does not necessarily

compel a finding of insufficient evidence on Count I. Evidence tending to show that

Defendant committed the crime within a few weeks of—or some other interval

which, under the circumstances of the case, could be considered reasonably near

to—October 1995 may be enough under our precedents. See Kokotan , 408 F.2d at

1138.

However, no such evidence exists in this case. Had D.J. been able to more

specifically recall abuse which could be indexed to late 1995, such as, for instance,

abuse soon after Defendant’s release from prison, or abuse while D.J. was in a

certain grade in school or while D.J. had a certain schoolteacher, or abuse coincident

with some family event, our conclusion would likely be different. On this record,

however, we are compelled to conclude that the government has not met its burden

of proving Defendant guilty on Count I. See Tsinhnahijinnie , 112 F.3d at 990-92

(finding the evidence insufficient in a similar case, where the alleged victim could
31Acquittal on Count I will have no effect on the sentence imposed in this

case. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 240 months on each of

Counts I-IV, and to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment on each of Counts

V-VII. Even with the acquittal on Count I, Defendant still must serve,

concurrently, three life sentences and three sentences of 240 months’

imprisonment. 

-47-

not recall abuse in 1992 as charged in the indictment, and there was no other

evidence of abuse in 1992). Accordingly, we reverse Defendant’s conviction on

Count I and remand to the district court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court erred by

admitting the conclusions of Dr. Ornelas that the children had in fact been sexually

abused, the prejudicial statements of the counselors assuming that abuse had

occurred, and the physical abuse-related conclusion of Ms. Carlson, but that these

errors were harmless. Furthermore, we conclude that the government presented

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict as to Count I of the indictment.

Accordingly, we REVERSE Defendant’s conviction on Count I, and REMAND the

case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on Count

I.31 We AFFIRM Defendant’s convictions on all other counts.
No. 98-2087

United States v. Charley

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:

I

I concur in Part I of the majority opinion and its conclusion that we cannot say

the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the evidence of Defendant’s prior

conviction in light of United States v. Castillo , 140 F.3d 874 (10 th Cir. 1998). I also

join in Part III of the opinion, reversing the Defendant’s conviction on Count I and

remanding for the entry of a judgment of acquittal on that Count. I also concur in

the opinion’s rulings in Part II-B that the district court erred in admitting the

conclusions of Dr. Ornelas, the prejudicial statements of Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson,

and the physical abuse-related opinion of Ms. Carlson.

However, I disagree with the majority on several critical questions, which I

shall briefly set out now with a full explanation to follow. First, I would hold that

there was error in the admission of Dr. Junkins’s testimony that sexual abuse

“would” explain, and was a “unifying diagnosis” of, D.J.’s symptoms and history.

As explained below, I believe that the prejudicial effect of this crucial testimony was

too great to have been cured by Dr. Junkins’s later, subtle shift to say that sexual

abuse “could” explain D.J.’s problems. Therefore I cannot join Part II-B(1) in

holding there was no error or only harmless error in the admission of the testimony

of Dr. Junkins. Second, with or without consideration of the error in the admission
-2-

of such testimony of Dr. Junkins and the other errors discussed below, I cannot

concur in Part II-C of the opinion holding that the numerous substantial errors the

majority concedes occurred in the admission of doctors’ and counselors’ testimony

were harmless and must respectfully dissent from that holding. I would have grave

doubt about the influence of this evidence on the jury’s verdict, even if I were in

agreement that the errors identified in the majority opinion were the only errors that

occurred in this trial.

Finally, under the particular circumstances present in this case, I disagree with

the majority’s refusal to consider arguments made in the petition for rehearing, which

the majority justifies on the grounds that the points were not previously raised on

appeal. Defendant Charley’s petition for rehearing on these points is based on an

intervening change in the law: Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael , 119 S. Ct. 1167

(1999), made a clear holding that the trial court’s “gatekeeping” obligation applies

to all expert testimony, not just “scientific” testimony, id. at 1174, and thus overruled

our narrower, contrary rule in Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc. , 82 F.3d 1513,

1519 (10 th Cir. 1996). For the reasons explained below, I would hold that the issues

are properly raised and would decide them in favor of the Defendant.

Accordingly, I would reverse the convictions on Counts II through VII and

remand for further proceedings on those Counts.
-3-

II

A

I turn first to my disagreement with the harmless error conclusion of the

majority opinion. As the opinion notes, we are instructed by Kotteakos v. United

States , 328 U.S. 750 (1946), on the strict standard that applies for a conviction to be

upheld despite error. The test that controls is clearly laid down by the Court:

But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that

happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that

the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible

to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry

cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart

from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the

error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave

doubt, the conviction cannot stand.

328 U.S. at 765. See also United States v. McVeigh , 153 F.3d 1166, 1203 (10 th Cir.

1998), cert . denied , 119 S. Ct. 1148 (1999). And, as the majority further notes, the

government ordinarily has the burden of proving that a non-constitutional error was

harmless. United States v. Rivera , 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 n. 4 (10 th Cir. 1990) ( en

banc ). In the instant case, however, the government in briefing for this court took

an all-or-nothing stand that there were no errors and made no alternative claim or

showing that even if particular rulings were in error, they were nevertheless

harmless. Even at argument, counsel for the government conceded only that opinion

testimony had been offered and admitted at trial, contrary to counsel’s contention,

which the trial judge accepted, that the doctors and therapists would testify only as
-4-

fact witnesses. Thus, harmless error has been argued by the government only in

response to the violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, not as to the content of the opinions

expressed by the expert witnesses.

Against this backdrop I will explain my reasons for being unable to join the

majority’s harmless error conclusion. The prejudicial, substantial damage done to

the Defendant’s case by the erroneous admission of evidence is treated below.

1. Dr. Edward P. Junkins, Jr.

In Dr. Junkins’s testimony, he first described the various symptoms for which

he and others at the Crownpoint Healthcare Facility had seen D.J. in the past, before

they were aware of any allegations of sexual abuse. These included several visits

from April 7 through April 10, 1997. He was then asked if he had seen D.J. after

April 10, 1997, and he said that he had. Then the following exchange occurred:

Q. And what, if anything, did she present to you that [sic] the point?

A. Yeah, it was at this point that I was asked to see her personally

by her mother. Her mother caught me during my office time and

said that there was something that she needed to tell me and that

she had brought [D.J.] as well as her sister, [J.J.], and it was this

visit on April the 11 th that I became very concerned, and at the

same time it became clear to me as a pediatrician what had been

going on and what’s the cause of all these problems .

II R. at 155 (emphasis added). Dr. Junkins went on to read from the form that he

fills out in suspected cases of abuse, at the bottom of which, he testified, he had

added, “This patient presented finally when she had been seen several times for
-5-

abdominal pain, urinary tract infections, neurologic symptoms, anuresis.” This

question and answer followed:

Q. What did you mean by that?

A. I meant to make it clear in the chart that I thought that this, the

history offered, of suspected abuse by her, would help me explain

a lot of the symptoms . It was a unifying diagnosis, and – and

evaluated, I think, as being clear by all of the symptoms that she

had and the history that was offered. That’s why I wrote that

finally she had – she had something which I felt helped to bring

all of these problems together .

Id. at 161-62 (emphasis added). As explained below, I believe the admission of this

testimony by Dr. Junkins was in error for reasons the majority opinion gives as to Dr.

Ornelas’s opinion. Slip op. at 29-35.

The majority cites testimony by Dr. Junkins on re-direct examination which

was qualified – that is, testimony that sexual abuse could explain the other symptoms

D.J. had reported – as “the essence of Dr. Junkins’ opinion, and what the jury was

left with by way of information.” Slip op. at 24-25. I am not persuaded that the later

testimony cured the error in the earlier testimony which clearly stated that suspected

abuse “would” help explain many symptoms. There was no emphasis or clarification

making it plain to the jury that Dr. Junkins was really saying that abuse “could”

explain the symptoms. Dr. Junkins did not disclaim his testimony given on direct

examination, did not assert that he was modifying or restricting that testimony, and

in fact did not even refer to his testimony on direct examination when he gave the
1The majority concedes that defendant “raised Daubert -style reliability

issues . . . with respect to other statements by government witnesses, such as

statements that the girls were in fact abused . . . .” Slip op. at 25 n.16. I do not

see why Dr. Junkins’s statements are not within this category along with those of

Dr. Ornelas.

-6-

testimony on re-direct examination. Lacking anything of substance on which to

justify ignoring Dr. Junkins’s testimony on direct examination, the majority resorts

to a “characterization” of it (slip op. at n.16) in an unpersuasive attempt to avoid its

probable impact on the jury.

Dr. Junkins’s unqualified opinion was nearly as forceful as that of Dr. Ornelas

and was admitted in error for the same reasons explained so clearly by the majority

with respect to the latter. 1 The majority is wrong in dismissing this testimony and

analyzing the issues as if these prejudicial statements had not been uttered. Also

troubling is the majority’s facile statement that any error in the admission of Dr.

Junkins’s unqualified opinion was harmless. I disagree with this conclusion and I

believe that the majority short changes Defendant Charley by here focusing on this

error in isolation, ignoring it when undertaking the more comprehensive harmless

error analysis in Part II-C of the opinion.

In sum, when considered with the other erroneously admitted evidence, I

believe this error had substantial influence or leaves me in “grave doubt” whether the

jury concluded that Dr. Junkins’s diagnosis was that D.J. had in fact been sexually

abused. I believe that admission of Dr. Junkins’s opinion was error for the same
-7-

reasons explained by the majority in its discussion of Dr. Ornelas’s testimony. Slip

op. at 29-35 (improper vouching for the testimony of D.J. and J.J. or error due to the

lack of a reliability determination as required by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,

Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho ).

The majority holds that Defendant Charley’s Daubert objections as to certain

expert testimony were forfeited by failure to raise them until the petition for

rehearing. Slip op. at 25 n.16. I disagree with that holding. However, I do not

understand the majority to hold that the Daubert errors were forfeited as to the

unqualified opinions given by Dr. Junkins as discussed above (testimony that history

of abuse “would help [Junkins] explain a lot of the symptoms.”). Accordingly, I

must also dissent from the majority’s application of an erroneous standard of review

and its implicit holding that the record in this case is adequate for consideration of

reliability by this court, positions which are inconsistent with our precedents.

The majority states that the standard of review on the reliability issue is abuse

of discretion. Slip op. at 17. This conflicts with our holding in United States v. Call ,

129 F.3d 1402, 1405 (10 th Cir. 1997), that we first conduct de novo review as to

whether the district court “properly followed the framework set forth in Daubert .”

I would hold that the district court erred in not applying Daubert (even though the

error was perhaps in reliance on Compton ). On this record, this conclusion is

inescapable.
-8-

Yet another problem lies in the majority’s treatment of the Daubert issues. 

The majority states that the trial court’s “evidentiary decisions do not warrant

reversal if it determined, in ‘some apparent manner,’ that the expert testimony it

admitted was reliable.” Slip op. at 17 n.11. I must confess that I do not know how

this statement relates to the majority’s analysis, for I do not find that the majority

opinion at any point actually shows that the trial court here determined in some

apparent manner that any of the expert testimony admitted was reliable. I must

disagree with any suggestion that this record supports a finding that any of these

witnesses’ opinions were reliable under Daubert , and I am distressed by the

majority’s suggestion that the district judge here undertook some such reliability

inquiry. It is painfully obvious that the trial judge made no such determinations.

The government recognizes that “the district court did not make the preliminary

determinations of relevance and reliability now required by Kumho Tire.”

Opposition To Petition for Rehearing at 14. Instead, the judge either was of the

opinion that the witnesses were testifying only as fact witnesses as the government

contended or, more likely, once it became apparent that the prosecution was eliciting

opinion evidence, the judge determined that no Daubert screening was necessary

because of our holding in Compton . In any event, expert witnesses neither described

any method by which their opinions were reached, nor discussed the factors bearing

on the reliability issue. See Kumho , 119 S. Ct. at 1167. Thus, it would indeed have
-9-

been guesswork for the trial judge to find that the methods were reliable, and this

court is likewise without a record developing factors that inform determinations of

reliability of the experts’ opinions. 

2. Dr. Renee Ornelas

I concur in the majority’s analysis that there was error in admission of the

testimony of Dr. Ornelas. I add my observations to explain why I reach a different

conclusion on harmless error than the majority. I am particularly concerned about

Dr. Ornelas’s statement of her unqualified opinion of sexual abuse immediately in

response to the early questions concerning D.J. The prosecutor’s questioning of Dr.

Ornelas began by eliciting general information on her position and procedures. Then

the first specific question asked about this case was whether she had examined D.J.,

to which Dr. Ornelas responded that she had. This colloquy immediately followed:

Q. And what were your findings based upon her medical history?

A. Was that she had a normal genital exam and that – my final

conclusion was that she had been sexually abused .

III R. at 317-18 (emphasis added).

I join the majority opinion’s analysis and conclusions that there was error in the

admission of Dr. Ornelas’s testimony. As persuasively explained by the majority

opinion, Dr. Ornelas was erroneously permitted to testify it was her unconditional

opinion that both D.J. and J.J. had been sexually abused. III R. at 317-18; 323. As

the majority opinion points out, if those conclusions were based on the girls’
2The government’s position that “each of its witnesses would be testifying

as lay witnesses rather than as experts” (slip op. at 18), apparently accepted by the

trial judge, placed the case in a posture where a direct Daubert challenge to the

reliability of the expert testimony of the doctors and the health care professionals

was made awkward. Nevertheless, Daubert was specifically raised by defense

counsel below who challenged the testimony of the mental health witnesses and

asserted: “I don’t think it’s scientifically reliable.” II R. 117. Continuing his

argument, attorney Finzel stated:

So since Daubert if we had notice they intended to use them as

experts we would be prepared to challenge their expertise on the

basis that it’s not scientifically reliable nor is it necessarily accepted

in the community, the basis for their opinions.

Id. at 118. When the mental health therapists’ testimony, “art therapy,” and the

children’s drawings were brought up, defense counsel Finzel objected: “[I]t’s my

position that that could never pass the Daubert test for admissibility as expert

-10-

symptoms, those Fed. R. Evid. 702 opinions were admitted without the required

special gate keeping determination on reliability of an expert’s opinion. Kumho, 119

S. Ct. at 1175-76. Or, if Dr. Ornelas’s opinion was largely based on crediting the

accounts given by D.J. and J.J., Dr. Ornelas was actually vouching for their

truthfulness and invading the credibility province of the jury. See United States v.

Azure , 801 F.2d 336, 339-40 (8 th Cir. 1986); United States v. Samara , 643 F.2d 701,

705 (10 th Cir. 1981), and other authorities cited by the majority. Either premise for

the admission of Dr. Ornelas’s damaging testimony was wrong, and admitting that

testimony was error, as the majority opinion itself holds.

3. Joelle Baum and Kristine Lee Carlson

I agree with the majority opinion’s holding that there also was error in the

admission of portions of the testimony of the counselors, Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson. 2
testimony and shouldn’t be slid in sideways as being something with validity to

it.” II R. 227. Counsel Finzel renewed his objection to the mental health care

witnesses’ testimony the next day just before the testimony of Ms. Baum; the

judge responded that Finzel had his objection on the record and “you don’t have

to renew it.” III R. 235. Thus Daubert and reliability were clearly raised below.

3

I note also that this opinion of Carlson clearly appears to have been based

in part on “art therapy,” contrary to the assertion in the majority opinion, p.35 n.

24, that no such opinions were given. In answer to the last of several questions

about her opinion, and in explaining her opinion, Carlson stated: “Some of the

symptoms would fit under both, but the images she’s done in her artwork , the

feeling uncomfortable wearing dresses, those are more symptomatic of sexual

abuse than of witnessing physical abuse .” III R. 258 (emphasis added).

-11-

Ms. Carlson’s opinion that D.J.’s symptoms were more consistent with those of

children who have been sexually abused than with those of children who had

witnessed physical abuse of their mother was erroneously admitted. 3 No sufficient

foundation had been laid for such statements, and no reliability analysis was made.

Slip op. at 39-40. I agree and also join the holding that the counselors were

erroneously permitted to give testimony that assumed the fact of abuse, which was for

the jury to determine, and was “manifestly outside the counselors’ direct knowledge”;

those statements were inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Id. at 40-41.

As noted by the majority, Baum and Carlson did express other opinions. I

would hold that these opinions were admitted in error because there was no Daubert

screening of the opinions for the reliability of the methods, if any, used in reaching

the witnesses’ conclusions. This brings me to the question whether this Daubert
-12-

reliability objection to these witnesses’ opinions is properly before us. I am

convinced that it is.

4. Effect of change in controlling law.

The majority applies Daubert , as made applicable to all expert testimony by

Kumho , where the majority deems the point to have been properly raised. Thus the

majority properly recognizes that Kumho should be applied by us as the prevailing

law at the time of our decision. The government defends the trial judge’s failure to

perform the gatekeeper function as to Ms. Carlson’s testimony that D.J.’s symptoms

were consistent with symptoms of child sexual abuse. It argues that the judge

“understandably did not specifically apply Kumho Tire because it was not decided at

the time of trial.” Opposition To Petition For Rehearing at 13-14.

However, the rights of the parties, under our precedent, should be decided

under the case law in effect at the time of our decision. Peterson v.

Shearson/American Express, Inc . 849 F.2d 464, 466 (10 th Cir. 1988). Thus the failure

to consider and decide reliability is not justified. Moreover, no defense for that

failure can be grounded on a suggestion that the trial judge simply did not

“specifically apply Kumho Tire ,” by chapter and verse. The error was in not doing

any reliability assessment under Daubert or Kumho standards. What the majority does

not come to grips with is the impact of Compton v. Subaru , which was the prevailing

law in our Circuit until months after oral argument of this appeal. In Compton we
-13-

had held that Daubert applied only to testimony “based upon a particular

methodology or technique,” 82 F.3d at 1519, not expert testimony based on the

witnesses’s training and experience.

In light of Compton , and its being overruled by Kumho , I believe that

Defendant should be allowed to assert his Daubert argument as to all of the opinion

testimony. To hold, as the majority decision does, that Charley cannot raise

additional Daubert issues for the first time in his petition for rehearing here is to

ignore the precedent of Compton v. Subaru , to hold counsel to an impractical and

unfair standard for raising issues controlled by adverse extant precedent, and to

require counsel to presciently divine the future course of the law. Although we

ordinarily adhere closely to our procedural rules, I am persuaded that we should

consider the expansion of defendant Charley’s Daubert argument because of the

intervening change in the law. We are mindful that Defendant’s Petition for

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc says that “ Kumho Tire did not create new law; it

merely explained the application of Daubert and Fed. R. Evid. 702.” Petition at 7,

n.3. Nevertheless, in assessing the Defendant’s right to assert Daubert-Kumho

objection to expert testimony, see id. at 8-11, I am persuaded that we should consider

Kumho’s overruling of Compton and permit objections, now made viable by Kumho ,

challenging the lack of a record showing of reliability for Dr. Junkins’s and other

expert opinions.
-14-

The rights of the parties, under our precedent, should be decided by this

appellate court under the case law in effect as the time of our decision. Thus the

sufficiency or defects in the records pertaining to the expert opinions and the

assessment of their reliability should be weighed under Daubert and Kumho . See,

e.g., United States v. Byers , 740 F.2d 1104, 1115 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ( en banc );

Nations v. Sun Oil Co. , 695 F.2d 933, 936 (5 th Cir. 1983). In Byers, it appears that

all twelve members of the court accepted the general proposition that an intervening

change in the law may justify raising an issue for the first time on petition for

rehearing, although two members of the court were of the view that in the exercise

of judicial discretion the court should not have considered the issue raised there. See

id. at 1132-1135 (Robinson, J., concurring in the judgment). 

Precedent of our court supports permitting a party to raise a new issue on

appeal, contrary to the general rule, because of an intervening change in the law.

E.g. , Peterson v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. , 849 F.2d 464, 466 (10 th Cir. 1988)

(absent injustice, an appellate court should apply case law in effect when its decision

is rendered; before new decision, it would have been difficult to argue that assertion

of new rule had a basis in existing law, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). As Justice

Black once said:

[W]e have frequently allowed parties to raise issues for the first time on

appeal when there has been a significant change in the law since the

trial. This principle has most often been applied in proceedings relating

to criminal prosecutions, but it has also been invoked in purely civil
-15-

cases. The principle has not been limited to constitutional issues, and

the Court has permitted consideration on appeal of statutory arguments

not presented below. In deciding whether such new arguments can be

considered, we have primarily considered three factors: first, whether

there has been a material change in the law; second, whether assertion

of the issue earlier would have been futile; and third, whether an

important public interest is served by allowing consideration of the

issue.

Standard Industries, Inc. v. Tigrett Industries, Inc. , 397 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1970)

(Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.). And Judge Posner has observed for the

Seventh Circuit:

A party should be allowed to take advantage of a decision rendered

during the pendency of his case, even if he had not reserved the point

decided, if the decision could not reasonably have been anticipated. A

contrary rule would induce parties to drown the trial judge with

reservations.

McKnight v. General Motors Corp. , 908 F.2d 104, 108 (7 th Cir. 1990).

In sum, the circumstances and precedents support the right of Defendant to

have us consider this expanded Daubert and Kumho issue here. Doing so, I find fatal

defects as to expert opinions admitted in evidence.

B

Because of the combined impact of the evidence outlined above, I cannot agree

with the harmless error conclusion of the majority. The several prejudicial errors at

trial convince me that we cannot say with fair assurance, as Kotteakos and our

precedent require, that after pondering all that happened, we believe the judgment

was not substantially swayed by the errors that occurred. In any event, the damage
-16-

done by those errors leaves me in grave doubt so that I cannot agree to let the

convictions on Counts II through VII stand. Kotteakos , 328 U.S. at 765.

As the majority opinion notes, the Defendant took the stand in his own defense

and categorically denied the abuse of either D.J. or J.J. charged against him. IV R.

569, 571, 573-74, 575-76, 579-80. The opinion acknowledges that there were no

eyewitnesses to the alleged misdeeds. Slip op. at 43. Furthermore, although repeated

physical abuse of both D.J. and J.J. was alleged, there was no physical evidence of

abuse noted, id., despite physical examinations of both girls by two pediatricians

called by the government, Dr. Junkins and Dr. Ornelas. II R. at 142; III R. 313. Dr.

Junkins did comment from his April 11, 1997, examination that D.J. had an

abnormality, “a little small irregularity at the base of the hymen.” He just used his

naked eyes with no means of magnification. II R. 163. Dr. Junkins said that unless

a child is examined within 72 hours of an act, the findings are overwhelmingly

normal. Id. at 166.

Dr. Ornelas testified that D.J. had “a normal genital exam,” III R. 317, but

added in her opening remarks that “my final conclusion was that she had been

sexually abused.” Id. at 317-18. She said “there weren’t any scars or tears or

lacerations or defects in the hymen, those kinds of things.” Id. at 321. She made her

abuse diagnosis because of the way she said the contact occurred, by “labial coitus.”

Id. at 322. Dr. Ornelas said that J.J. “also had a normal examination” but said she
-17-

concluded that J.J. was also sexually abused. Id. at 323. This was based on J.J.’s

“history that we had from her sister” and from other information. Id. Doubt about

what was related by J.J. is raised by the testimony of Dr. Ornelas explaining that

children want to be polite saying “yes” or “no” to everything, but relating this

information about J.J.’s interview: “ And so what [J.J.] said in this case was that she

had just been playing, that she wasn’t serious and that, in essence, nothing happened,

and she didn’t want to talk about it .” Id. at 324 (emphasis added). Dr. Ornelas said

this did not change her diagnosis as to J.J.

As to D.J., Dr. Ornelas testified that from her examination of the hymen, the

vagina, the clitoris, the labia minora and labia majora, and the posterior fourchette –

she found all were within normal limits with no tags, no tears, no bruising and no

discharge. III R. at 332. J.J.’s examination by Dr. Ornelas also was completely, in

every regard, within normal limits. Id. at 333.

Thus at trial substantial doubt was raised about the reported sexual abuse of

D.J. and J.J., considering the record as a whole. Their own testimony, if truthful and

accurate, did present a shocking view of Defendant Charley’s conduct and laid a

strong basis for the prosecution’s case. Nevertheless, our question is “not whether,

omitting the inadmissible statements, the record contains sufficient evidence for a

jury to convict the defendant,” United States v. Tome , 61 F.3d 1446, 1455 (10 th Cir.

1995), as the majority opinion notes. Even where the government’s case against a
-18-

defendant in a child sexual abuse case was “very strong,” the Eighth Circuit held such

sufficiency of the evidence alone was not enough to support a finding of harmless

error. United States v. Azure , 801 F.2d at 341. We must determine whether in light

of the whole record, the erroneously admitted evidence substantially influenced the

outcome of Defendant’s trial, or whether we are left in “grave doubt” as to whether

it had such an effect. Tome , 61 F.3d at 1455. If the answer to either inquiry is yes,

the errors require reversal for a new trial. Id.

The review of the record made carefully by the majority opinion and the further

references to the evidence I have presented above compel me to respectfully dissent

as to the harmless error holding. Because of the lack of physical evidence, and the

absence of other witnesses to the alleged conduct, this case turned almost entirely on

the credibility of D.J. and J.J. By the time the two victims took the stand, their

credibility had been improperly enhanced by the testimony of four witnesses who,

although not formally proffered as experts, likely were very impressive to the jurors

because of their professional standing. Whether the improperly admitted opinion

evidence is considered as vouching for D.J.’s and J.J.’s testimony, or as lacking the

proper foundation of a reliability determination by the judge, is not of controlling

importance, once we reach the stage of determining whether the errors were harmless.

Either way the expert opinions are analyzed, the result was unfairly prejudicial to

Defendant.
-19-

Although I cannot say that Mr. Charley likely would have been acquitted if not

for the erroneously admitted testimony, nevertheless I cannot say that the errors did

not have substantial influence on the verdicts. In any event, I am in grave doubt as

to the latter question, and accordingly I cannot hold that the errors were harmless.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the convictions on Counts II

through VII. I would reverse those convictions and remand for a new trial free of the

serious errors in the admission of testimony.
F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAY 7 1999

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 98-2087

WAYNE LEWIS CHARLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

(D.C. NO. CR-97-335-JC)

Benjamin A. Gonzales, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New

Mexico, for Appellant.

Kathleen Bliss, Assistant United States Attorney (John J. Kelly, United States

Attorney with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellee.

Before PORFILIO , HOLLOWAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.

ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.
-2-

Wayne Lewis Charley was convicted, after a jury trial, of seven counts of

sexual abuse of a child in Indian country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241,

2242, and 2246, and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal he contends, inter

alia: (1) that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 is unconstitutional and that the

admission, under that rule, of evidence of his prior sex offense conviction denied him

due process; (2) that the district court erred by permitting five health care

professionals, called by the government as lay witnesses, to (i) give expert opinion

testimony without furnishing the defense with advance summaries of their testimony

as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E); (ii) give expert testimony without

adequate foundation, in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 702; (iii) improperly vouch for the

credibility of the alleged victims, in violation of Rule 702; (iv) offer expert

conclusions that had not been screened for reliability, in violation of Rule 702; and

(v) offer testimony that assumed, as a fact, that the alleged victims were in fact

abused, in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 403; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient

to convict him on Count I of the indictment. We conclude that the district court

erroneously admitted portions of the testimony of the health care professionals, but

that these errors were harmless. We therefore affirm Defendant’s convictions on

Counts II through VII of the indictment. As to Count I of the indictment, we hold

that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Accordingly, we reverse
1The names of the alleged victims are fully disclosed in the record and in

the briefs. However, to the extent it may assist in preserving their privacy, we

will use only the girls’ initials in this opinion.

2Dr. Junkins recorded a slight irregularity at the base of D.J.’s hymen, but

drew no direct conclusion from that fact. A later examination by Dr. Renee

Ornelas, using magnification, showed no abnormality.

-3-

the conviction on that count and remand for the entry of a judgment of acquittal on

Count I.

BACKGROUND

On April 11, 1997, Dorothy Kalleco took her daughters, 13-year-old D.J. and

10-year-old J.J., 1 to the Crownpoint Healthcare Facility in Crownpoint, New Mexico.

There she told D.J.’s pediatrician, Dr. Edward Junkins, that the girls had disclosed

to her that an “uncle” had sexually molested them on numerous occasions over an

extended period of time. II R. at 157. Defendant, 65-year-old Wayne Lewis Charley,

the girls’ uncle by Navajo clan affiliation, was subsequently identified as the alleged

abuser. 

Dr. Junkins interviewed the girls out of the mother’s presence. They provided

detailed accounts of anal and genital contact by their uncle both with his fingers and

his penis. A physical examination showed no evidence of abuse. Both girls had

intact hymens, 2

 and the anal and genital areas appeared normal with no visible

bleeding, bruising, scarring, tears, tags or discharge. According to Dr. Junkins, this
-4-

circumstance was not inconsistent with sexual abuse since children’s tissues heal

quickly, although there may be residual scarring.

Dr. Junkins testified that the report of abuse had immediate significance to him

as a possible unifying explanation for D.J.’s extensive history of atypical and

medically puzzling physical complaints and conditions. These included persistent

bed-wetting, chronic urinary tract infections, chronic stomach pain, headaches,

breathing problems and, recently, numbness of her arm, a burning feeling in her face,

and pain in the side of her face, arm and leg. One April entry in D.J.’s medical chart

described her as anxious and crying. J.J.’s medical chart did not show a similarly

extensive history of complaints, except for persistent bed-wetting.

While the girls were at the Crownpoint Healthcare Facility, Dr. Junkins called

the Crownpoint Police Department and reported the incident to Sergeant Daniel Zuni.

Officer Zuni responded and conducted a preliminary interview with the girls. In the

course of the interview, the girls told Zuni that the sexual abuse had occurred

primarily at their residence and secondarily at the Elite Laundromat, located in the

Crownpoint Shopping Mall where, beginning in January 1997, Defendant worked

several evenings each week from 7:00 to 10:00 P.M. Both locations are within the

boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation. Officer Zuni also ascertained that

Defendant was the alleged perpetrator. He then went to Defendant’s residence and
-5-

determined that Defendant was a member of the Navajo Nation, as were the girls,

thus making the alleged crime a federal offense.

Later that same evening, on April 11, criminal investigator Patricia Henry, to

whom Officer Zuni had referred the matter, reported the circumstances to Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agent John D. Tanburg, who then commenced an

investigation. On April 30, 1997, Agent Tanburg visited the girls’ residence and

interviewed the girls in detail. During the visit, Tanburg was accompanied by

another investigator who inspected the girls’ residence. At some point, Tanburg

obtained a warrant, arrested Defendant, and placed him in a secure halfway house.

None of the law enforcement officers were able to discover any direct

evidence of the reported incidents. There were no eyewitnesses; there was no

physical evidence; and Defendant denied the accusations. However, from the outset

of the girls’ disclosures, everyone involved, including those providing treatment, was

aware that Defendant had been convicted in 1994 for sexually abusing his five-yearold granddaughter, and had been sentenced to one year in prison and three years of

supervised release. He was released from federal custody on June 23, 1995. 

In May 1997, about a month after the initial disclosures, the girls were referred

to Western New Mexico Counseling Services in Gallup for supportive counseling.

Joelle Baum, a registered nurse and registered health counselor, who also held a

temporary license in art therapy, evaluated the girls and began a course of treatment
3The first four counts charged Defendant with abusing “Jane Doe A,”

intended to refer to D.J. I R., Tab 9. The last three counts charged Defendant

with abusing “Jane Doe B,” intended to refer to J.J. Id. The last three counts are

“aggravated” sexual abuse because the victim, J.J., was under the age of 12 at the

time of the abuse. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). 

-6-

for J.J. Kristine Lee Carlson, a clinical therapist and sexual assault coordinator for

Gallup, New Mexico, began a course of treatment for D.J. 

On June 4, 1997, the girls were seen and examined by Dr. Renee Ornelas, a

pediatrician at the University of New Mexico. Like Dr. Junkins, Dr. Ornelas also

found the girls’ genital and anal areas to be normal, evidencing no signs of abuse.

But, after receiving information from Ms. Kalleco about the girls’ medical history

and reports of abuse, and after interviewing the girls, Dr. Ornelas concluded that the

girls had been sexually molested. 

On the same day as the Ornelas examination, June 4, 1997, a federal grand jury

returned a seven-count indictment against Defendant, charging him with four counts

of sexual abuse of a child in Indian country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2242,

and 2246, and three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in Indian country,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241, and 2246. 3 Count I of the indictment

charged Defendant with abusing D.J. “[o]n or about October 1995.” I R., Tab 9.

Counts II through VII all charged Defendant with abusing either D.J. or J.J. “[o]n or

about March 1997.” Id.
4Neither the specific grounds for objection in the motion in limine nor the

precise grounds or terms upon which the grant of a continuing objection was

claimed are beyond dispute. To the contrary, it appears that defense counsel did

not uniformly present the district court, at appropriate times, with the precise

objection upon which it sought a ruling. However, the government raises no

-7-

Well before trial in this case, the government notified defense counsel that it

would call as witnesses certain health care professionals who had examined,

counseled, or treated D.J. and J.J. In connection with that prospective testimony, the

government also provided defense counsel with voluminous medical information and

associated notes and records. However, it did not designate any of these witnesses

as experts and, accordingly, did not provide defense counsel with any summaries of

expert witness testimony pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).

On October 24, 1997, the Friday preceding the start of trial, defense counsel

filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent any of the designated health care

professionals from offering expert opinion testimony regarding whether D.J. or J.J.

were in fact sexually abused or were being treated for sexual abuse. The district

court addressed the motion on October 27, 1997, the first day of trial, and denied it

on the government’s representation that the witnesses in question were not being

called as experts under Fed. R. Evid. 702, but as lay or fact witnesses under Fed. R.

Evid. 701. After a colloquy with defense counsel regarding how counsel could

preserve his objections, the court indicated that it recognized defense counsel’s

continuing objection to the testimony of the health care professionals. 4 
issue with respect to these subjects on appeal. See Appellee’s Br. at 19 n.7. Our

analysis, therefore, proceeds on the assumption that the defense made specific,

timely, and proper objections to the disputed testimony and that those objections

were overruled. The one exception is the testimony of the school counselor,

Carolyn Joe, and Defendant concedes, as discussed below, that he failed to object

to her testimony at trial. 

-8-

The trial began that afternoon, and lasted three days. The government called

twelve witnesses during the presentation of its case-in-chief. Among the first

witnesses called were Dr. Junkins, Dr. Ornelas, Ms. Baum, and Ms. Carlson. As will

be discussed more fully below, these witnesses testified regarding their visits with

the girls, the symptoms exhibited by the girls, the treatment they provided the girls,

and, with respect to Dr. Junkins and Dr. Ornelas, their diagnoses. 

The government also called FBI Agent Tanburg and Navajo investigators Zuni

and Sampson Cowboy. Tanburg and Zuni told the jury about their respective

investigations of the allegations, and Cowboy testified about Defendant’s 1994 abuse

conviction. 

Near the end of their presentation, the prosecutors called the two young girls

to the stand. Both D.J. and J.J. testified, in graphic detail (mostly elicited by defense

counsel on cross-examination), that Defendant had abused them in a variety of ways

at various times and places. D.J. testified that Defendant molested her chiefly at her

residence, and described sexual encounters with Defendant in her kitchen, hallway,

and bedroom. D.J. testified that these incidents occurred primarily in the evening.
-9-

She also testified to some incidents of molestation which occurred at locations

outside her residence, in particular one instance in the parking lot of the Elite

Laundromat in a truck. J.J., by contrast, testified that Defendant molested her chiefly

at the laundromat, and described incidents in the employees’ room, the bathroom, and

near the washing machines.

D.J. could not specifically recall whether Defendant had abused her in 1995,

although she testified that the abuse had been occurring “[s]ince [she] was small,”

and had begun before Defendant went to prison in 1994 and continued after his

release . III R. at 358, 363. 

Following the testimony of the girls, the government called Dr. Timothy Kern,

a urologist and surgeon who performed prostate surgery on Defendant on September

29, 1995. Kern testified that 95% of men who undergo such prostate surgery have

no erectile problems after the surgery. On cross-examination, Kern stated that

patients such as Defendant are told, upon release from the hospital, that they should

not engage in sexual activity for four to six weeks afterwards, because ejaculation

during this post-operative period “usually” although “[n]ot necessarily in every case”

causes bleeding which requires urgent medical attention. IV R. at 442, 449. Kern,

testifying from medical records, stated that Defendant had come in for a postoperative checkup in late October, and no evidence of bleeding was apparent. 
-10-

The government’s final witness was Ms. Kalleco, who testified that, during the

spring of 1997, she had often been out of the house in the evenings because she

frequently traveled to Albuquerque to visit her sister who was in the hospital at that

time. She stated that, on many of these occasions, the girls were home alone,

because she took the girls’ siblings with her to Albuquerque. She also testified that

Defendant frequently visited her house, ate some meals there, and on occasion asked

questions designed to ascertain whether she expected to be away from the home in

the evening.

The defense’s primary theory of the case was that the girls’ mother was in a

sort of a feud with Defendant’s family over two separate incidents, one involving an

automobile accident, and the other involving the sale of a pickup truck, and, in an

attempt to get back at Defendant or his family, had pressured the girls into accusing

Defendant of abuse. Secondarily, the defense argued that D.J. had invented the

allegations of abuse to avoid having to go to school. Additionally, there was

evidence that J.J. had told a social worker that, in accusing Defendant of sexual

abuse, she and her sister were “just playing,” III R. at 323, and that D.J., when asked

by doctors about the possibility of sexual abuse some years earlier, had denied that

she was being abused . 

The defense also called Bucky Belen, Defendant’s co-worker at the

laundromat, who testified that he had seen the girls at the laundromat numerous
-11-

times, where they would help Defendant and sometimes ask him for money, but that

he had never seen Defendant act inappropriately toward them. 

Defendant’s son, Dwayne Charley, testified for the defense, and stated that he

provided Defendant transportation to work each night, either by driving Defendant

there himself, or by driving his truck to his sister’s house and letting Defendant drive

it to work from there. Dwayne Charley testified that, on the nights when he didn’t

personally drive his father to work, he delivered the truck to his sister’s house at

approximately 7:00 P.M., and that if Defendant had driven anywhere else on his way

to work he would have been late. 

The defense’s final witness was Charley himself, who, through a Navajo

interpreter, denied ever abusing or in any way inappropriately touching either of the

girls. Defendant also denied ever being at the girls’ house. Additionally, Defendant

stated that while the girls were at his workplace, they would never help him and that

they never asked him for money. Defendant also testified that he had told the FBI

about his first offense, in 1994, and that he had never denied his involvement in the

first offense to the FBI. 

After the defense presented its case, the government presented one rebuttal

witness, FBI Agent Greg Calles, who had been assigned to investigate Charley’s

1994 crime. Calles testified that Defendant had initially denied abusing his
5Rule 403 states as follows:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations

of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence. 

6Rule 414(a) states as follows:

In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of

child molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of

another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and

may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is

relevant. 

-12-

granddaughter, but that he later recanted and admitted molesting his granddaughter.

After deliberating for about three hours, the jury convicted Defendant on all

seven counts listed in the indictment. At sentencing, the district court, applying the

United States Sentencing Guidelines, sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. 

DISCUSSION

I. Evidence of Prior Conviction for Sexual Molestation

Evidence of Defendant’s prior conviction for sexual molestation of his

granddaughter was admitted into evidence pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403 5 and

414(a). 6 Defendant contends that Rule 414 is unconstitutional, and that introduction
-13-

of his prior conviction for a sex offense was so prejudicial that it denied him his due

process right to a fair trial. 

We recently held that Rule 414 is not unconstitutional on its face, “because

Rule 403 applies to Rule 414 evidence,” and “[a]pplication of Rule 403 . . . should

always result in the exclusion of evidence that” is so prejudicial that it violates a

defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. United States v. Castillo , 140 F.3d 874,

883-84 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, when reviewing a district court’s decision to admit

evidence under Rule 414 and Rule 403, we must conduct a “case-specific inquiry”

into whether the district court “should have excluded the Rule 414 evidence under

Rule 403.” Id. We will disturb a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under Rule

403 only for abuse of discretion. Id. at 884. 

In this case, the district court made the following findings with respect to the

admission of Defendant’s prior conviction for child sexual abuse:

For the record, I have made a balancing test under 403 and 41[4], and

I find the testimony of the previous sexual activity by the defendant to

outweigh any harm to come to him under 403. Specifically, under

relevancy, in the discussions under Rule 413 it says, [“]The proposed

reform is critical to the protection of the public from rapists and child

molesters, and is justified by the distinctive characteristics of the cases

it will affect. In child molestation cases, for example, a history of

similar acts tends to be exceptionally probative because it shows an

unusual disposition of defendant—a sexual or sadosexual interest in

children—that simply does not exist in ordinary people. Moreover,

such cases require reliance on child victims whose credibility can

readily be attacked in the absence of substantial corroboration . In such

cases, there is a compelling public interest in admitting all significant

evidence that will illumine the credibility of the charge and any denial
7Defendant’s brief on this point is almost entirely devoted to arguing that

Rule 414 is unconstitutional on its face, an argument foreclosed by our holding in

Castillo . 

-14-

by the defense.[”] So I have conducted that balancing test. As I

previously stated to you I found it was more probative than not under

4[0]3.

III. R. at 269-70 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 413 advisory committee’s note (statement of

Rep. Susan Molinari)) (emphasis added). These on-the-record findings are sufficient

to explain the district court’s reasoning in admitting the statement, see Castillo , 140

F.3d at 884 (requiring that the district court “‘make a reasoned, recorded’ statement

of its 403 decision when it admits evidence under Rule 413-415” (quoting United

States v. Guardia , 135 F.3d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998)), especially in light of the

fact that Defendant’s brief contains no argument that these findings are insufficient. 7

By invoking the stated general reasons for the Rule’s enactment, the district court

was implying that those reasons were particularly important in this case.

Specifically, the district court alluded to the similarity between Defendant’s prior

crime and the present charges, and to the fact that there was little direct

corroborating evidence. See Guardia , 135 F.3d at 1331. After examining the record

as a whole, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by

admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior conviction.
8

It is doubtful that Carolyn Joe, a school counselor, can even be

categorized as a health care professional, and even if she can, there is some

question as to whether she in fact offered any expert testimony or merely testified

as a lay witness under Fed. R. Evid. 701. Her testimony chiefly dealt with D.J.’s

excessive absences from school. In any event, Defendant admits that he did not

object at trial to Joe’s testimony. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2; Appellee’s Br.

at 19 n.7. Accordingly, we review the district court’s decision to admit Joe’s

testimony for plain error, see United States v. Enjady , 134 F.3d 1427, 1435 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 202 (1998), and find none. Our discussion below is

therefore confined to the testimony of the other four challenged witnesses. 

9Proposed amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 701 expressly exclude testimony

based on specialized knowledge. By its terms, Fed. R. Evid. 702 covers such

testimony. 

-15-

II. Expert Witnesses

Defendant objects to the testimony of five health care professionals called as

witnesses by the government: Dr. Junkins, Dr. Ornelas, Ms. Baum, Ms. Carlson, and

school counselor Carolyn Joe. 8

 The government concedes that it elicited expert

opinion testimony regarding sexual molestation of D.J. and J.J. from at least some

of these witnesses, despite representing to the court that they were merely being

called as lay or fact witnesses. 9

 

In his motion in limine, Defendant raised several objections to the testimony

of these witnesses. First, Defendant argued that the government, by designating

them as lay witnesses, was circumventing the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P.

16(a)(1)(E), and asked the district court to sanction the government by limiting these

witnesses to fact testimony or excluding their testimony altogether. Second,

Defendant argued that the district court should exclude all opinions based on
-16-

statements of the girls themselves because such opinions are unreliable and/or

constitute impermissible vouching for the credibility of the girls. In a related

argument, Defendant asked the district court to exclude, as prejudicial under Fed. R.

Evid. 403, any testimony that the girls had been abused or referred for treatment of

sexual abuse, contending that such testimony “improperly suggests to the jury the

existence of child abuse.” I R., Tab 31 at 3. On appeal, Defendant presses each of

these arguments, and argues additionally that the district court erred by allowing

these witnesses to offer expert testimony without being properly qualified as experts.

As indicated above, our analysis of the testimony of these witnesses proceeds

on the assumption that defense counsel made timely appropriate objections to

relevant portions of their testimony, and that the district court overruled those

objections. Accordingly, we review those rulings under an abuse of discretion

standard. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999); United

States v. Haslip, 160 F.3d 649, 653 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1346

(1999).

A. Rule 16 Violation

We agree with Defendant that the government violated Rule 16(a)(1)(E),

which requires the government, at the defendant’s request, to “disclose to the
-17-

defendant a written summary of testimony that the government intends to use under

Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at

trial.” A party failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 16 is subject to

sanction by the district court, which “may order such party to permit the discovery

or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence

not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the

circumstances.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). A district court’s decision to apply or

not to apply sanctions “will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion.” United

States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059, 1060 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v.

Fernandez, 780 F.2d 1573, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986)). “In selecting a proper sanction,

a court should typically consider (1) the reasons the government delayed producing

requested materials, including whether the government acted in bad faith; (2) the

extent of prejudice to defendant as a result of the delay; and (3) the feasibility of

curing the prejudice with a continuance.” United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285,

1292 (10th Cir. 1999); see Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1061. “Frequently it will be found

that the party who requested disclosure has not been prejudiced and that no sanction

is needed.” 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 260, at 121-22

(1982) (citing cases). We note that the sanction requested by Defendant—exclusion

of the witnesses’ expert testimony—is almost never imposed “in the absence of a
-18-

constitutional violation or statutory authority for such exclusion.” Gonzales, 164

F.3d at 1292. 

In this case, Defendant requested that the government turn over summaries of

the testimony of all its expert witnesses. The government refused to comply with

this request, because it maintained that each of its witnesses would be testifying as

lay witnesses rather than as experts. Nevertheless, between July and September

1997, the government turned over to the defense copies of all medical and counseling

records from which the witnesses would be testifying. Therefore, the government

argues that the defense suffered no prejudice because it knew well in advance of trial

who was going to testify and the nature and purpose of the expected testimony.

Defense counsel had the opportunity to interview the government’s witnesses prior

to trial, and in fact questioned Dr. Junkins a few days before the trial began. Indeed,

defense counsel himself has had a difficult time, even when directly questioned on

the matter, identifying any particular prejudice. He does not identify, for example,

any witnesses he would have called if the government had designated its health care

professionals as experts prior to trial and furnished summaries of their testimony in

addition to information already available to the defense. Nor does he specify any

significant hindrance to his preparation for cross-examination of the witnesses in

question. We note that in some ways, defense counsel may in fact have been better

off with the actual records than with Rule 16 summaries. 
10Rule 702, which governs the admission of expert testimony, states as

follows:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of

an opinion or otherwise.

-19-

In light of these facts, we cannot conclude that Defendant suffered any

prejudice as a result of the government’s failure to provide Rule 16 summaries for

its witnesses who admittedly gave expert testimony. When we couple this conclusion

with the fact that there is no evidence that the government was motivated by bad

faith, we are persuaded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing

to exclude the expert testimony of these witnesses. 

B. Admissibility of the Testimony

Defendant’s remaining arguments—that the challenged witnesses

impermissibly vouched for the girls’ credibility, gave unduly prejudicial statements,

and testified without adequate foundation—are grounded in Fed. R. Evid. 403 and

702.10 Because the objections vary as to the testimony of each witness, we will

consider the witnesses separately. 

1. Dr. Junkins
-20-

Dr. Junkins qualified as an expert, although his credentials, contrary to proper

procedure, were established piecemeal throughout his testimony. He is a board

certified pediatrician. From 1994 through July 1997 he was employed by the Public

Health Service serving as a physician at the Crownpoint Healthcare Facility in

Crownpoint, New Mexico. At the Crownpoint facility, Dr. Junkins primarily treated

Native American patients, both children and adults, in a family practice setting, and

was regarded by family practitioners there as a specialist in pediatrics to whom

young patients with special problems were referred. After leaving Crownpoint, he

was employed as a physician at the Primary Children’s Medical Center in Salt Lake

City, Utah.

In addition to these credentials, Dr. Junkins also had specific experience with

child sexual abuse cases. He testified about the form he fills out and the list of

things he covers in suspected abuse cases, and how he followed that form in this

case. He testified that normal physical examinations can still be consistent with

abuse, stating that “that’s been my experience with child abuse examinations.” II R.

at 165. He testified that he looks for scars and bruising, telling the jury that “I look

for all that. I often don’t find it, and so this did not surprise me in this case.” Id. at

166. He stated further that “a physical exam [in suspected abuse cases] is—you

know, in my experience 90 percent of the time normal.” Id. at 220. And, again

emphasizing the basis of his opinion in experience, he testified:
11The medical records, marked for identification as Government’s Exhibits

1 and 2, were extensively incorporated into the trial record through Dr. Junkins’

testimony, but they were never offered or admitted into evidence as exhibits.

12Treating professionals may relate statements made to them by the alleged

victims, as long as the statements were made for the purposes of diagnosis or

treatment. Such statements are admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4), as

exceptions to the hearsay rule, provided a proper foundation is laid. See United

States v. Tome , 61 F.3d 1446, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Joe , 8

F.3d 1488, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1993). 

-21-

Q. And that’s why, if you didn’t see a traumatized area within 72

hours, so what?

A. Oh, that’s what I—that’s been my overwhelming experience with

this. I would have been surprised in fact.

Id. at 217-18 (emphasis added). Dr. Junkins was qualified to render expert opinions

regarding child sexual abuse. 

Dr. Junkins properly testified to the facts of the girls’ medical history and

treatment,11 his examination, and what the girls told him.12 He then offered two

opinions to which Defendant objects. He testified, essentially, that while his

physical examination revealed nothing remarkably abnormal, a normal examination

is not necessarily inconsistent with a history of sexual abuse. More significantly, he

linked the girls’—especially D.J.’s—atypical history of physical complaints and

manifestations to the alleged sexual abuse:

Q. But, now, in light of knowing her whole history, what do

you think was related to the urinary tract infections, the

kidney infections, the bed wetting, the abdominal pain, the

paralysis, the nausea?
-22-

MR. FINZEL: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead.

THE WITNESS: What was related to all those things, the

unifying diagnosis that could—could possibly pull all of it

together would be an abusive situation, an incredibly stressful

situation, such as sexual or physical abuse could—could describe

or explain all of those problems. Could.

II R. at 219 (emphasis added). 

This was a more qualified version of an earlier statement by him that abuse

“would” explain, and “was” a unifying diagnosis for, all of D.J.’s symptoms and

history—immediately qualified by “helped” to bring the problems together. Id. at

162. Dr. Junkins also stated that the entire visit on April 11 caused it to become

“clear to [him] as a pediatrician what had been going on and what’s the cause of all

these problems.” Id. at 155. Taken as a whole, however, we regard the qualified

opinion set out above (“could” explain), which was offered as a summation at the

end of his testimony, to be the essence of Dr. Junkins’ opinion, and what the jury

was left with by way of information.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing these general and

conditional opinions. A qualified medical expert in a sexual abuse case can, for

example, “summarize the medical evidence and express an opinion that the evidence

is consistent or inconsistent with the victim’s allegations of sexual abuse,” and “can

inform the jury of characteristics in sexually abused children and describe the
-23-

characteristics the alleged victim exhibits.” United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782,

785 (8th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 635 (8th Cir.

1997) (stating that a witness’s testimony that he “conducted a ‘Sexual molestation

exam’ and that in his opinion the lack of medical evidence was not inconsistent with

molestation” was admissible); United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir.

1994) (allowing an expert to tell the jury about typical “emotional and psychological

traits for abuse victims,” and noting that such testimony was admissible because the

witness “made no comment on [the alleged victim’s] credibility nor did [the witness]

identify [the alleged victim] as a victim of child abuse”). 

Defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Junkins in detail, was conversant with the

subject matter, made no attempt whatsoever to challenge his experience, his training

qualifications, or the basis for his opinions, and cites nothing to us on appeal which

the defense was prevented from using to dispute any part of the testimony. There

was no error in the admission of Dr. Junkins’ testimony.

2. Dr. Ornelas

Dr. Ornelas was also qualified to render expert opinions regarding child sexual

abuse. Dr. Ornelas is a pediatrician at the University of New Mexico, and at the time

of trial had been in practice for eleven years. For the last seven years, she had been
13The government examined Dr. Ornelas with respect to exhibits marked

for identification as Government’s Exhibits 7 and 8, which consisted of D.J.’s

and J.J.’s respective records taken in connection with the Ornelas evaluation. 

However, those records were not offered or admitted as evidence at trial.

-24-

the head of UNM’s Para Los Nin ̃ os Program, which coordinates medical evaluations

of children who are referred for concerns of sexual abuse. 

Agent Tanburg reported his interview with D.J. and J.J. to Dr. Ornelas. On

June 4, 1997, the day Defendant was indicted, Dr. Ornelas and her intake social

worker saw the girls, examined and evaluated them. The girls’ mother provided

information regarding the girls’ medical problems and their reports of abuse.

Although the record is not entirely clear on the point, it appears that Dr. Ornelas did

not obtain copies of the girls’ medical records from the Crownpoint Healthcare

Facility or confer with Dr. Junkins or any other treating physician.13

At trial Dr. Ornelas did not testify to any further contact with or treatment of

the girls beyond the examination and evaluation on June 4, 1997, except for a workup on the condition of the girls’ kidneys in order to see if there was an anatomical

problem which caused their frequent problems with bed-wetting.

Dr. Ornelas testified that her examination of the girls showed no physical

evidence of sexual abuse. She found no bruising, bleeding, scarring or tags, and she

found that the hymens were intact. Defendant, for obvious reasons, does not

challenge this portion of her testimony which, in any event, was a factual recitation
14The following exchange is an example.

Q. Okay. So you’re saying that painful urination would be

a symptom consistent with sex abuse?

A. Yes. It certainly could be.

III R. at 351 (emphasis added).

-25-

of the doctor’s observations, not an opinion. She opined generally that penetration

does not necessarily occur in abuse cases. Rather, coitus can occur externally,

between the labia. She also generalized that abuse can cause symptoms and behavior

such as headaches, numbness, urinary tract infections, and bed-wetting.14

There was no error in allowing such generalized medical opinion evidence.

Whitted, 11 F.3d at 785-86. Furthermore, the opinions depict matters so close to

being self-evident that failure to conduct a gatekeeper inquiry prior to allowing the

testimony was not error.

The problem with Dr. Ornelas’ testimony lies in the fact that she was permitted

to give the jury her unconditional opinion that each of the girls was in fact sexually

abused. She testified that her “final conclusion was that [D.J.] had been sexually

abused,” III R. at 317-18, and that “[J.J.] also had a normal examination and also

she—my conclusion is that she was also sexually abused,” id. at 323. Furthermore,

Dr. Ornelas stated that “[t]he kind of contact that occurred is what’s called labial

coitus . . . .” Id. at 322 (emphasis added). 
-26-

She evidently based this opinion on what the girls said, to her and others, as

indicated by the following exchange on cross-examination:

Q. Then your assessment of child abuse is based on what [D.J.] told

you about both [D.J.] and [J.J.]?

A. And what—the information from her mother and the information

that we had that the children had given on prior interviews.

Q. Told the same—or—stories before?

A. Yes, well, had made disclosures before—

Q. Uh-huh.

A. —about sexual abuse.

Q. And, of course, the mother got the information she said from the

children.

A. That’s correct.

Id. at 344.

Regardless of whether Dr. Ornelas based her conclusion on the girls’

allegations of sexual abuse, or on the girls’ history of atypical medical symptoms, her

testimony is problematic. If the conclusion was based on the girls’ medical

symptoms, questions surrounding the reliability of such a conclusion arise. On the

other hand, if the conclusion was based on the girls’ allegations, Dr. Ornelas was

merely vouching for the credibility of the child complainants. 

The opinion offered by Dr. Ornelas falls under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Among

other things, that Rule imposes a special gatekeeping obligation on the trial judge to
15Proposed amendments to Rule 702 are currently under consideration. 

Should these amendments take effect, trial judges conducting the gatekeeping

inquiry will be required to undertake a three-part reliability inquiry in connection

with all expert testimony. Gatekeeping judges must make certain that all expert

testimony admitted at trial “is sufficiently based upon reliable facts or data” and

“is the product of reliable principles and methods,” and that “the witness has

applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Proposed

Fed. R. Evid. 702, quoted in 67 U.S.L.W. 2588 (Apr. 6, 1999).

-27-

ensure that an opinion offered by an expert is reliable. See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct.

at 1176. Indeed, “where [expert] testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods,

or their application are called sufficiently into question . . . the trial judge must

determine whether the testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and

experience of [the relevant] discipline.’” Id. at 1175 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)). The trial judge has broad

discretion, reviewable for its abuse, “to determine reliability in light of the particular

facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1179.15

The trial judge is granted great latitude in deciding which factors to use in evaluating

the reliability of expert testimony, and in deciding whether to hold a formal hearing.

Id. at 1176. 

Here, no reliability determination was made at all with respect to Dr. Ornelas’

unconditional opinion that D.J. and J.J. were sexually abused. As a practical matter,

that issue might have been disposed of simply by sustaining the objection, on

foundation grounds, to the question seeking to elicit Dr. Ornelas’s opinion. At that
-28-

point, government counsel might have approached the subject in a more acceptable

way, and if not, a bench conference could have ended the line of questioning. Or,

the subject could have been explored and passed on prior to trial, in the sound

discretion of the trial judge. See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1176. But, as it

happened, nothing was done here. The record does not disclose, for example, what

data would support ruling out all causes except sexual abuse for the girls’ physical

complaints, or to what degree Dr. Ornelas relied on her purely subjective views. Cf.

id. at 1177. Indeed, Dr. Ornelas herself, as indicated above, ordered a work-up to

determine if an anatomical problem was causing the girls to wet the bed. III R. at

324-25. Thus, if Dr. Ornelas’s opinion was based on the girls’ medical history, there

is simply no showing on this record, as required by Rule 702 and Kumho Tire, that

such testimony is reliable. See Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp.

1342 (D. Neb. 1994) (conducting a reliability inquiry and determining that expert

opinion testimony that sexual abuse in fact occurred was, in that particular case, not

reliable), aff’d, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995). 

On the other hand, if Dr. Ornelas’ opinion was largely based on crediting the

girls’ account, whether disclosed to her or others, she was essentially vouching for

their truthfulness. In general, expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the

credibility of another witness encroaches upon the jury’s vital and exclusive function

to make credibility determinations, and therefore does not “assist the trier of fact”
16Courts have also held that testimony which vouches for the credibility of

a witness violates other evidentiary rules, such as Rule 608(a)(1) or Rule 403. 

Some courts have held that, although Rule 608(a)(1) “permits testimony

concerning a witness’s general character or reputation for truthfulness,” it

“prohibits any testimony as to a witness’s truthfulness on a particular occasion.” 

State v. Rimmasch , 775 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1989) (construing Utah R. Evid.

608); see also United States v. Azure , 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986); State v.

Wood , 460 S.E.2d 771, 778 (W. Va. 1995) (construing W. Va. R. Evid. 608);

People v. Koon , 713 P.2d 410, 412 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (construing Colo. R.

Evid. 608). And at least one court has held, in a sexual abuse case, that

testimony that bolsters the credibility of the complaining witness violates Rule

403’s balancing test. United States v. Funds Held in the Name or for the Benefit

of John Hugh Wetterer , 991 F. Supp. 112, 120-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 

17The government attempts to distinguish Whitted by arguing that the

testifying doctor in that case was a hired expert, while the testifying doctors in

this case were the girls’ actual treating physicians. This distinction misses the

point. The crucial factor that separates admissible opinion testimony from

impermissible vouching is the basis upon which the doctor forms his or her

opinion, not the status of the doctor. 

-29-

as required by Rule 702.16 See United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339-40 (8th

Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 1995); Whitted,

11 F.3d at 785-86;17 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 702.03[5] (1998). Indeed, the

government concedes that, in this case, testimony to the effect that D.J. and J.J. were

“telling the truth . . . would be impermissible.” Appellee’s Br. at 26.

Most courts that have considered the issue have concluded that expert

testimony, based on the statements of the alleged victim, that sexual abuse in fact

occurred is inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 (or similar military or state

evidentiary rules) because, in such cases, the expert offering the opinion is merely
18See Whitted , 11 F.3d at 785-86; United States v. Birdsall , 47 M.J. 404,

409-10 (C.A.A.F. 1998); Johnson v. State , 732 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Ark. 1987);

State v. Batangan , 799 P.2d 48, 52 (Haw. 1990); State v. Bressman , 689 P.2d

901, 907-08 (Kan. 1984); State v. Black , 537 A.2d 1154, 1157 & n.1 (Me. 1988);

Commonwealth v. Colin C. , 643 N.E.2d 19, 22-23 (Mass. 1994); People v.

Beckley , 456 N.W.2d 391, 407-08 (Mich. 1990); Goodson v. State , 566 So. 2d

1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1990); State v. Lucero , 863 P.2d 1071, 1075 (N.M. 1993);

State v. Kallin , 877 P.2d 138, 140-41 (Utah 1994); State v. Gokey , 574 A.2d 766,

768, 771-72 (Vt. 1990); State v. Haseltine , 352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Wis. Ct. App.

1984) . Other state courts, however, disagree, and have allowed such testimony to

be admitted. See Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly of God , 808 P.2d 1211,

1216-17 (Alaska 1991); Glendening v. State , 536 So. 2d 212, 220 (Fla. 1988);

State v. Hester , 760 P.2d 27, 31-32 (Idaho 1988); State v. Geyman , 729 P.2d 475,

479 (Mont. 1986); Townsend v. State , 734 P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1987); State v.

Figured , 446 S.E.2d 838, 842-43 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Stowers , 690

N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ohio 1998); State v. Wilson , 855 P.2d 657, 660 (Or. Ct. App.

1993); Johnson v. State , 970 S.W.2d 716, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Several

of these cases, however, did not address whether the vouching problem was

implicated by such testimony. 

-30-

vouching for the credibility of the alleged victim.18 Thus, if Dr. Ornelas largely

based her opinion on the statements of the girls, then under the foundation (or lack

thereof) presented in this case, we consider it inadmissible. Therefore, regardless

of whether Dr. Ornelas’s conclusion was based on the girls’ medical history or on

their allegations of abuse, its admission was erroneous. 

3. Joelle Baum and Kristine Lee Carlson

Joelle Baum and Kristine Lee Carlson testified as mental health experts. As

an initial matter, we conclude that, as licensed mental health counselors, Ms. Baum
19These witnesses also held themselves out as “art therapists.” III R. at

237, 251. The district court made no findings as to whether these witnesses

qualified as expert art therapists. However, neither Ms. Baum nor Ms. Carlson

offered any expert opinion based upon art therapy. Their references to pictures

drawn by the girls, such as, for instance, pictures of a house where the girls said

they felt afraid, were factual observations, and not interpretations or diagnoses

based on specialized knowledge of art therapy. 

-31-

and Ms. Carlson were properly qualified to testify as they did.19 Aside from alleging

that these counselors were not properly qualified, Defendant objects to their

testimony on three grounds. First, he argues that it was error to let Ms. Baum and

Ms. Carlson testify at all because evidence of the referral of D.J. and J.J. to Western

New Mexico Counseling Services for treatment of sexual abuse prejudicially

presumes the fact in issue—that sexual abuse occurred. Second, he contends that

they impermissibly vouched for the girls’ credibility. Finally, he asserts that their

testimony contained numerous baseless statements (other than the fact of referral)

that assumed the fact of sexual abuse. 

With respect to Defendant’s contention that evidence of the referral itself was

prejudicial, we are, under the circumstances of this case, compelled to disagree. Ms.

Baum testified that the referral came about because “the girls had disclosed sexual

abuse and that they were having a real difficult time and needed . . . supportive

counseling to help them cope.” III R. at 239. This does not go to the truth of the

matter of sexual abuse, but, rather, to the reason for the referral. Likewise,

statements by both Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson that they were treating trauma
20We note that some courts have held that a counselor’s testimony that

“[the alleged victim] was referred to me for sexual abuse recovery counseling”

constitutes impermissible vouching and is therefore inadmissible. State v.

Haslam , 663 A.2d 902, 905-06 (R.I. 1995); cf. Commonwealth v. McCaffrey , 633

N.E.2d 1062, 1067-68 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). We disagree with the analysis of

these courts. A statement by a counselor that the alleged victim was referred for

sexual abuse counseling is not necessarily the same as a statement that the victim

is telling the truth, or even that the victim was in fact sexually abused, and

therefore does not necessarily rise to the level of impermissible vouching. 

-32-

associated with sexual abuse relate to the treatment. While we agree with Defendant

that some prejudice flows from the premise underlying this testimony, the additional

testimony given by Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson with respect to what they observed

and did caused this testimony regarding referral to be more probative than prejudicial

under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Cross-examination is the tool for clarifying any ambiguities

on the point. Thus, on cross-examination, defense counsel emphasized that the

referral was based only on an allegation of sexual abuse.20

As to Defendant’s contention that the counselors vouched for the credibility

of the children, we note that the counselors permissibly testified regarding the facts

of their observations of the girls, the nature of the treatment given, and what the girls

said and did in connection with their treatment. For instance, Ms. Baum described

J.J. as distressed and fearful when telling about really bad dreams she was having.

She stated that J.J. drew a house and said she was having bad memories about

experiences that had happened there. She also stated that J.J.’s bed-wetting had

decreased after counseling.
-33-

As to D.J., Ms. Baum testified that she was experiencing paralysis of her legs,

that her brother had to carry her into the session, and that she seemed very

uncomfortable and anxious and had difficulty talking about the situation. D.J. also

said she was having bad memories from past experiences in her house. Both girls

expressed fear of being at home without their mother there.

Ms. Carlson testified that D.J. complained of nightmares, was very fearful, did

not like to wear dresses, and related distressing flashbacks and images. Also,

Carlson testified that D.J. feared being away from her mother, disliked being

touched, was afraid of strangers, and expressed fear of Defendant’s wife. Finally,

D.J. talked about ways to be safe at home and identified things to protect her such

as ancestors, her dog, dragons and lions. She then created artwork in the form of a

large shield. All of these factual observations and statements given in treatment

were properly admitted.

Both Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson did express opinions: that the girls needed

supportive counseling; that bed-wetting can be a symptom of anxiety; that once

traumatized a child is slow to trust an adult; and that D.J.’s symptoms were

consistent with the symptoms of sexual abuse victims. These opinions, some of

which were general and others qualified, were within the expertise of the witnesses.

They were both relevant and sufficiently reliable, and would assist the jury, as
-34-

required by Fed. R. Evid. 702. This testimony did not constitute impermissible

vouching. See Whitted, 11 F.3d at 785-86. 

However, Ms. Carlson’s opinion that D.J.’s symptoms were more consistent

with the symptoms of children who have been sexually abused than with the

symptoms of children who witness physical abuse of their mother was erroneously

admitted. No sufficient foundation was laid for this kind of expert analysis, and no

reliability inquiry was undertaken. See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1175-76. 

Finally, Defendant’s third argument has merit. The counselors were permitted

to offer testimony that assumed the fact of abuse—a determination to be made by the

jury. Ms. Baum stated that “it was becoming increasingly hard for the children to

be in the[ir] house because some of the abuse had happened in the house.” III R. at

243. Ms. Carlson talked about the environment “where the abuse occurred,” id. at

251, and engaged in the following exchange with government counsel:

A. The home environment seems to have changed during that time

and become more stabilized, so that the abuse that I have been

dealing with her at this point in time seems to be recent.

Q. Although you’re aware of abuse over an extended time of [D.J.],

sexual abuse?

A. Oh, yes. Yes.

Id. at 258.

Q. And so if she had expressed a desire to not going to school or had

problems that would prevent her from going to school, what
21At least, no foundation for these statements appears in the record. It

could be that the counselors were making these statements based on their belief

that the girls were telling the truth. In that case, their testimony would constitute

impermissible vouching. See Whitted , 11 F.3d at 785. It could be that the

counselors were inartfully trying to relate to the jury out-of-court statements

made to them by the girls in the course of diagnosis or treatment, admissible

under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). See Tome , 61 F.3d at 1449-50. But they do not

come across as such in the record. 

-35-

would have been the reason for those based on your counseling

sessions with [D.J.]?

A. I would have connected that—I do connect those to the trauma of

the sexual abuse.

Id. at 258-59.

While the latter quote may also have been an opinion, it was also more

particularly a statement of fact. It was error to admit these statements which were

manifestly outside the counselors’ direct knowledge.

21 Such statements had minimal

probative value, and, in the context of this referral for treatment of problems

allegedly connected with sexual abuse, they were unquestionably prejudicial. They

also impermissibly invaded the province of the jurors. Accordingly, they were

inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403, and it was error to allow them. 

C. Harmless Error

Finally, we must determine whether the district court’s erroneous decisions to

admit the conclusions of Dr. Ornelas, the prejudicial statements of Ms. Baum and
22The dissent agrees with us that the proper harmless error standard is

different from the standard used in insufficiency of the evidence cases, and

reemphasizes the point. As indicated above, we expressly apply the Kotteakos

harmless error standard here. While we, like the dissent, are not totally free from

doubt about whether the erroneously admitted testimony may have had some

influence on the outcome of the case, we part company from the dissent because,

as discussed below, we do not have grave doubt that the errors had a substantial

effect on the outcome. Grave doubt, by definition, does not include doubt at

every level, and substantial influence, by definition, does not mean any or some

influence. 

-36-

Ms. Carlson, and the physical abuse-related opinion of Ms. Carlson were harmless.

A non-constitutional error, such as a decision whether to admit or exclude evidence,

is considered harmless “unless a substantial right of [a] party is affected.” Fed. R.

Evid. 103(a). We have stated that an error affecting a substantial right of a party is

an error which had a “‘substantial influence’ on the outcome or [which] leaves one

in ‘grave doubt’ as to whether it had such effect.” United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d

1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.

750, 765 (1946)). When conducting our harmless error analysis, we review the

record as a whole. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1204 (10th Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1148 (1999). Harmless error analysis is not the same

as insufficiency of the evidence analysis.22 See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446,

1455 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[t]he question is not whether, omitting the

inadmissible statements, the record contains sufficient evidence for a jury to convict
-37-

the defendant”). The burden of proving that an error is harmless falls on the

government. See Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1469 n.4.

Harmless error is not an easy issue in this case. Defendant took the stand in

his own defense and categorically denied ever inappropriately touching either of the

girls. There was no physical evidence of abuse, and no eyewitnesses to the alleged

misdeeds. 

On the other hand, both girls testified, each corroborating the other. Both

were old enough to understand the true nature of their accounts. D.J. especially had

an undisputed and documented history of atypical medical conditions and complaints

that was consistent with sexual abuse. In addition, both girls displayed symptoms

of emotional distress that were consistent with sexual abuse. J.J. was distressed and

fearful, and drew a picture of a house where she had had bad experiences. D.J. also

had bad memories associated with a house, and complained of nightmares, expressed

fear of strangers and Defendant’s wife, and did not like to wear dresses. 

Defendant had a prior conviction for sexual abuse of a child, for which he

served one year in prison and three years on supervised release. Indeed, because

Defendant was released from prison for this offense in 1995, and was on supervised

release at the time of the events in question here, the prior conviction and sentence

were proximate in time to the allegations underlying this case. 
-38-

It is also undisputed that the girls were often left home alone in the evening.

Thus, the evidence established that the Defendant had both the inclination and the

opportunity to commit the crimes. 

Furthermore, there were three aspects of Defendant’s testimony that were

flatly contradicted by other witnesses. He testified that he was never at the girls’

house, a fact contradicted by the girls and by Ms. Kalleco; he testified that the girls,

when at his workplace, would never help him and never ask him for money, a fact

contradicted by defense witness Bucky Belen; and he testified that he had never

denied his involvement in the 1994 sexual abuse offense to the FBI, a fact

contradicted by Agent Calles. As to these facts, the jury necessarily had to weigh

Defendant’s credibility. 

The problem facing us is the impact that the testimony of Dr. Ornelas, Ms.

Baum, and Ms. Carlson might have had on the jury’s deliberations under the

circumstances outlined above. The admission of the expert conclusion of a highly

credible physician that the girls were in fact sexually abused, coupled with the

admission of the testimony of two counselors who assumed that the girls had been

abused, and stated it as a fact, undoubtedly had some effect on the jury’s

deliberations. However, nearly all of Dr. Ornelas’s, Ms. Baum’s, and Ms. Carlson’s

testimony was properly admitted at trial, and, as discussed above, there is no

evidentiary problem with the testimony of any of the other witnesses. Thus, only a
-39-

small, albeit important, portion of the testimony admitted at trial was erroneously

admitted. 

Defendant calls to our attention several cases in which courts, when faced with

similar situations, have found that the admission of expert testimony, in sexual abuse

cases, which vouches for the credibility of other witnesses constitutes reversible or

even plain error, and our own research has unearthed several other such cases. See,

e.g., Whitted, 11 F.3d at 786-87 (plain error); United States v. Birdsall, 47 M.J. 404,

410 (C.A.A.F. 1998); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colin C., 643 N.E.2d 19, 23

(Mass. 1994); State v. Gokey, 574 A.2d 766, 772 (Vt. 1990). But see, e.g., Brown

v. State, 523 So. 2d 729, 730 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988) (holding the error harmless “in

light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt”); Commonwealth v. Rather, 638 N.E.2d

915, 920 (Mass App. Ct. 1994) (holding the error harmless due to eyewitness

corroboration of the victims’ testimony). However, after carefully studying these

cases, we conclude that each of them, even the cases finding the error harmless, is

in important respects distinguishable from the case at hand. These cases do not

appear to compel a result, on the facts presented to us here, in one direction or the

other. Our problem is compounded by the fact that the government, which has the

burden of showing that the error is harmless, failed to address the issue in its brief.

However, after reading and re-reading the record, we are persuaded that the

errors in admitting portions of the testimony of Dr. Ornelas, Ms. Baum, and Ms.
-40-

Carlson did not affect a substantial right of a party. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). In

light of the strength of the properly admitted testimony, outlined above, and the

relatively modest amount of erroneously admitted testimony, we cannot say that the

erroneously admitted portions of the testimony substantially affected the trial’s

outcome, and we are not in grave doubt that the testimony had such effect. Any

errors in the admission of evidence committed by the district court were harmless.

III. Insufficiency of the Evidence on Count I

Finally, we address Defendant’s final argument—that the government

presented insufficient evidence to convict him on Count I of the indictment. In

conducting this inquiry, we must “determine whether the evidence, considered most

favorably to the government, is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find

[Defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” on Count I of the indictment. United

States v. Perez, 959 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir. 1992); see also United States v.

Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that all evidence is to be

viewed “in the light most favorable to the government” and that “[w]e reverse only

if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt”).
-41-

Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence in the record which points

toward abuse of D.J. “on or about” October 1995. The record evidence on this point

is as follows: D.J. stated at trial that Defendant had been abusing her “[s]ince [she]

was small,” III R. at 358; D.J. testified that Defendant had abused her both before

he went to prison and after he got out of prison; D.J. testified that Defendant abused

her “more than five times,” and that not all of these times were in 1997, id. at 394;

and J.J. testified that Defendant had abused D.J. when the girls were little.

However, there is no direct evidence of even any contact between Defendant

and D.J. during the entire year 1995, let alone evidence of sexual abuse during

October of that year. Defendant was in prison for the first half of 1995, and D.J.

testified that she could not remember any abuse in 1995, or even being with

Defendant at any time in 1995. In addition, Dr. Kern testified that Defendant, due

to his prostate surgery, would likely have demonstrated signs of bleeding had he tried

to ejaculate during the period between September 29, 1995, and late October 1995,

and that no such signs of bleeding were apparent. 

We have stated that, where, as here, time is not an element of the offense, and

where “the phrase ‘on or about’ is used in an indictment in connection with a specific

date . . . , if the prosecution proves that the offense was committed within a few

weeks of the date, the proof will be deemed sufficient to hold [the] defendant

responsible for the charge.” Kokotan v. United States, 408 F.2d 1134, 1138 (10th
23Often, in determining whether the date of the evidence in the case is

“reasonably near” to the date alleged in the indictment, courts will consider

whether the defendant’s “substantial rights” were “prejudiced” by the variance. 

See Tsinhnahijinnie , 112 F.3d at 991; United States v. Brewer , 1 F.3d 1430, 1437

(4th Cir. 1993). We think it evident that Defendant was prejudiced by the

temporal variance between the evidence and the indictment in this case.

-42-

Cir. 1969). Indeed, “[a] variance between the date alleged in the indictment and the

date of the commission of the offense as shown by the evidence is generally not

fatal.” United States v. Harmon, 486 F.2d 363, 366 (10th Cir. 1973). The important

consideration is that there must be some evidence which tends to show that the

defendant committed the charged offense on “a date reasonably near to the specified

date” alleged in the indictment. Castillo, 140 F.3d at 885; see also United States v.

Tsinhnahijinnie, 112 F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1997).23 Thus, even if we assume,

arguendo, that because of his prostate surgery Defendant could not have committed

sexual abuse during the entire month of October 1995, that does not necessarily

compel a finding of insufficient evidence on Count I. Evidence tending to show that

Defendant committed the crime within a few weeks of—or some other interval

which, under the circumstances of the case, could be considered reasonably near

to—October 1995 may be enough under our precedents. See Kokotan, 408 F.2d at

1138.

However, no such evidence exists in this case. Had D.J. been able to more

specifically recall abuse which could be indexed to late 1995, such as, for instance,
-43-

abuse soon after Defendant’s release from prison, or abuse while D.J. was in a

certain grade in school or while D.J. had a certain schoolteacher, or abuse coincident

with some family event, our conclusion would likely be different. On this record,

however, we are compelled to conclude that the government has not met its burden

of proving Defendant guilty on Count I. See Tsinhnahijinnie, 112 F.3d at 990-92

(finding the evidence insufficient in a similar case, where the alleged victim could

not recall abuse in 1992 as charged in the indictment, and there was no other

evidence of abuse in 1992). Accordingly, we reverse Defendant’s conviction on

Count I and remand to the district court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court erred by

admitting the conclusions of Dr. Ornelas that the children had in fact been sexually

abused, the prejudicial statements of the counselors assuming that abuse had

occurred, and the physical abuse-related conclusion of Ms. Carlson, but that these

errors were harmless. Furthermore, we conclude that the government presented
24Acquittal on Count I will have no effect on the sentence imposed in this

case. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 240 months on each of

Counts I-IV, and to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment on each of Counts

V-VII. Even with the acquittal on Count I, Defendant still must serve,

concurrently, three life sentences and three sentences of 240 months’

imprisonment. 

-44-

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict as to Count I of the indictment.

Accordingly, we REVERSE Defendant’s conviction on Count I, and REMAND the

case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on Count

I.24 We AFFIRM Defendant’s convictions on all other counts.
No. 98-2087, United States v. Charley

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:

I

I concur in Part I of the majority opinion and its conclusion that we cannot say the trial

judge abused his discretion in admitting the evidence of Defendant’s prior conviction. I also

join in Part III of the opinion, reversing the Defendant’s conviction on Count I and

remanding for the entry of a judgment of acquittal on that Count. I also concur in the

opinion’s rulings in Part II-B that the district court erred in admitting the conclusions of Dr.

Ornelas, the prejudicial statements of Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson, and the physical abuserelated opinion of Ms. Carlson. However, I would also hold that there was error in the

admission of Dr. Junkins’s testimony that sexual abuse “would” explain, and was a “unifying

diagnosis” of, D.J.’s symptoms and history. As explained below, I believe that the

prejudicial effect of this testimony was too great to have been cured by Dr. Junkins’s later,

more qualified statements that sexual abuse “could” explain D.J.’s problems.

Therefore I cannot join Part II-B(1) in holding there was no error in the admission of

the testimony of Dr. Junkins. Nevertheless, with or without consideration of the error in the

admission of such testimony of Dr. Junkins, I am unable to concur in Part II-C of the opinion

holding that errors in the admission of doctors’ and counselors’ testimony were harmless and

respectfully dissent from that holding. Accordingly, I would reverse the convictions on

Counts II through VII and remand for further proceedings on those Counts.

II

A
-2-

I turn first to my disagreement with the harmless error conclusion of the majority

opinion. As the opinion notes, we are instructed by Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750

(1946), on the strict standard that applies for a conviction to be upheld despite error. The

Court’s test that controls is clearly said:

But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened

without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was

not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that

substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether

there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the

error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence.

If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.

328 U.S. at 765. See also United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998),

cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1148 (1999). And, as the majority further notes, the government

ordinarily has the burden of proving that a non-constitutional error was harmless. United

States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc). In the instant case,

however, the government in briefing took an all-or-nothing stand that there were no errors

and made no alternative claim or showing that even if particular rulings were in error, they

were nevertheless harmless. Even at argument, counsel for the government conceded only

that opinion testimony had been offered and admitted at trial, contrary to her contention,

which the trial judge accepted, that the doctors and therapists would testify only as fact

witnesses. Thus, harmless error has been argued only regarding the violation of Fed. R.

Crim. P. 16, not as to the content of the opinions expressed by the expert witnesses.
-3-

Against this backdrop I will explain my reasons for being unable to join the majority’s

harmless error conclusion. The prejudicial damage to the Defendant by the erroneous

admission of evidence is treated below.

1. Dr. Renee Ornelas

I concur in the majority’s analysis that there was error in admission of the testimony

of Dr. Ornelas. I add my observations to explain why I reach a different conclusion on

harmless error than the majority. I am particularly concerned about Dr. Ornelas’s statement

of her unqualified opinion of sexual abuse immediately in response to the early questions

concerning D.J. The prosecutor’s questioning of Dr. Ornelas began with general information

on her position and procedures. Then the first specific question asked about this case was

whether she had examined D.J., to which Dr. Ornelas responded that she had. This colloquy

immediately followed:

Q. And what were your findings based upon her medical history?

A. Was that she had a normal genital exam and that – my final conclusion

was that she had been sexually abused.

III R. at 317-18 (emphasis added).

I join the majority opinion’s analysis and conclusions that there was error in the

admission of Dr. Ornelas’s testimony. As persuasively explained by the majority opinion

(slip op. at 26-31), Dr. Ornelas was erroneously permitted to testify it was her unconditional

opinion that both D.J. and J.J. had been sexually abused. III R. at 317-18; 323. As the

majority opinion points out, slip op. at 27-28, if those conclusions were based on the girls’
-4-

symptoms, those Fed. R. Evid. 702 opinions were admitted without the required special gate

keeping determination on reliability of an expert’s opinion. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,

119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999). Or, if Dr. Ornelas’s opinion was largely based on crediting

the accounts given by D.J. and J.J., Dr. Ornelas was actually vouching for their truthfulness

and invading the credibility province of the jury. See United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336,

339-40 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 705 (10th Cir. 1981), and other

authorities cited by the majority. Slip op. at 30. Either premise for the admission of Dr.

Ornelas’s testimony was wrong, and admitting that testimony was error, as the majority

opinion holds.

2. Joelle Baum and Kristine Lee Carlson

I agree with the majority opinion’s holding that there was error in the admission of

portions of the testimony of the counselors, Ms. Baum and Ms. Carlson. Ms. Carlson’s

opinion that D.J.’s symptoms were more consistent with those of children who have been

sexually abused than with those of children who had witnessed physical abuse of their mother

was erroneously admitted. No sufficient foundation had been laid for such statements, and

no reliability inquiry was made. Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1175-76. Slip op. at 35. I agree

and also join the holding that the counselors were erroneously permitted to give testimony

that assumed the fact of abuse, which was for the jury to determine. Slip op. at 35. I also

agree that there was error in the admission of the counselors’ statements that were
-5-

“manifestly outside the counselors’ direct knowledge,” id. at 36; those statements invaded

the province of the jury and were inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Id. at 35-37.

3. Dr. Edward P. Junkins, Jr.

In Dr. Junkins’s testimony, he first described the various symptoms for which he and

others at the Crownpoint Healthcare Facility had seen D.J. in the past, before they were

aware of any allegations of sexual abuse. These included several visits from April 7 through

April 10, 1997. He was then asked if he had seen D.J. after April 10, 1997, and he said that

he had. Then the following exchange occurred:

Q. And what, if anything, did she present to you that [sic] the point?

A: Yeah, it was at this point that I was asked to see her personally by her

mother. Her mother caught me during my office time and said that

there was something that she needed to tell me and that she had brought

[D.J.] as well as her sister, [J.J.], and it was this visit on April the 11th

that I became very concerned, and at the same time it became clear to

me as a pediatrician what had been going on and what’s the cause of all

these problems.

II R. at 155 (emphasis added). Dr. Junkins went on to read from the form that he fills out in

suspected cases of abuse, at the bottom of which, he testified, he had added, “This patient

presented finally when she had been seen several times for abdominal pain, urinary tract

infections, neurologic symptoms, anuresis.” This question and answer followed:

Q. What did you mean by that?

A. I meant to make it clear in the chart that I thought that this, the history

offered, of suspected abuse by her, would help me explain a lot of the

symptoms. It was a unifying diagnosis, and – and evaluated, I think, as

being clear by all of the symptoms that she had and the history that was
-6-

offered. That’s why I wrote that finally she had – she had something

which I felt helped to bring all of these problems together.

Id. at 161-62 (emphasis added).

The majority cites later testimony by Dr. Junkins which was qualified – that is,

testimony that sexual abuse could explain the other symptoms D.J. had reported – as “the

essence of Dr. Junkins’ opinion, and what the jury was left with by way of information.” Slip

op. at 23. I am not persuaded that the later testimony cured the error in the earlier testimony

which clearly stated that suspected abuse “would” help explain many symptoms. There was

no emphasis or clarification making it plain to the jury that Dr. Junkins was really saying that

abuse “could” explain the symptoms. Therefore I believe this error had substantial influence

or leaves me in “grave doubt” whether the jury understood that Dr. Junkins’s diagnosis was

that D.J. had in fact been sexually abused. I believe that admission of this testimony was

error for the same reasons explained by the majority in its discussion of Dr. Ornelas’s

testimony. Slip op. at 26-31 (improper vouching for the testimony of D.J. and J.J. or error

due to the lack of a reliability determination as required by Kumho Tire).

B

Because of the combined impact of the evidence outlined above, I cannot agree with

the harmless error conclusion of the majority. The several prejudicial errors at trial convince

me that I cannot say with fair assurance, as Kotteakos and our precedent require, that after

pondering all that happened, I believe the judgment was not substantially swayed by the

errors that occurred. And in any event, my view of their influence leaves me in grave doubt
-7-

so that I cannot agree to let the convictions on Counts II through VII stand. Kotteakos, 328

U.S. at 765.

As the majority opinion notes, the Defendant took the stand in his own defense and

categorically denied the abuse of either D.J. or J.J. charged against him. IV R. 569, 571, 573-

74, 575-76, 579-80. The opinion notes further that there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged

misdeeds. Slip op. at 38. Furthermore, although repeated physical abuse of both D.J. and

J.J. was alleged, there was no physical evidence of abuse noted, id., despite physical

examinations of both girls by two pediatricians called by the government, Dr. Junkins and

Dr. Ornelas. II R. at 142; III R. 313. Dr. Junkins did comment from his April 11, 1997,

examination that D.J. had an abnormality, “a little small irregularity at the base of the

hymen.” He just used his eyes with no means of magnification. II R. 163. Dr. Junkins said

that unless a child is examined within 72 hours of an act, the findings are overwhelmingly

normal. Id. at 166.

Dr. Ornelas testified that D.J. had “a normal genital exam,” III R. 317, but added in

her opening remarks that “my final conclusion was that she had been sexually abused.” Id.

at 317-18. She said “there weren’t any scars or tears or lacerations or defects in the hymen,

those kinds of things,” id. at 318, but she made her abuse diagnosis because of the way she

said the contact occurred, by “labial coitus.” Id. at 322. Dr. Ornelas said that J.J. “also had

a normal examination” but said she concluded that J.J. was also sexually abused. Id. at 323.

This was based on J.J.’s “history that we had from her sister” and from other information.
-8-

Id. Doubt about what was related by J.J. is raised by the testimony of Dr. Ornelas explaining

that children want to be polite saying “yes” or “no” to everything, but relating this

information about J.J.’s interview: “And so what [J.J.] said in this case was that she had just

been playing, that she wasn’t serious and that, in essence, nothing happened, and she didn’t

want to talk about it.” Id. at 324 (emphasis added). Dr. Ornelas said this did not change her

diagnosis as to J.J.

As to D.J., Dr. Ornelas testified that from her examination of the hymen, the vagina,

the clitoris, the labia minora and labia majora, and the posterior fourchette – she found all

were within normal limits with no tags, no tears, no bruising and no discharge. III R. at 332.

J.J.’s examination by Dr. Ornelas also was completely, in every regard, within normal limits.

Id. at 333.

Thus there were some doubts raised in this record about the reported sexual abuse of

D.J. and J.J., considering the record as a whole. Their own testimony, if truthful and

accurate, did present a shocking view of Defendant Charley’s conduct and laid a strong basis

for the prosecution’s case. Nevertheless, our question is “not whether, omitting the

inadmissible statements, the record contains sufficient evidence for a jury to convict the

defendant,” United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir. 1995), as the majority

opinion notes. Even where the government’s case against a defendant in a child sexual abuse

case was “very strong,” the Eighth Circuit held such sufficiency of the evidence alone was

not enough to support a finding of harmless error. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d at 341.
-9-

We must determine whether in light of the whole record, the erroneously admitted evidence

substantially influenced the outcome of Defendant’s trial, or whether we are left in “grave

doubt” as to whether it had such an effect. Tome, 61 F.3d at 1455. If the answer to either

inquiry is yes, the error requires reversal for a new trial. Id.

The review of the record made carefully by the majority opinion and the further

references to the evidence I have presented above compel me to respectfully dissent as to the

harmless error holding. Because of the lack of physical evidence, and of other witnesses to

the alleged conduct, this case turned almost entirely on the credibility of D.J. and J.J. By the

time the two victims took the stand, their credibility had been improperly enhanced by the

testimony of four witnesses who, although not formally proffered as experts, likely were very

impressive to the jurors because of their professional standing. Whether the improperly

admitted opinion evidence is considered as vouching for D.J.’s and J.J.’s testimony, or as

lacking the proper foundation of a reliability determination by the judge, is not of controlling

importance, once we reach the stage of determining whether the errors were harmless. Either

way the opinions are analyzed, the result was unfairly prejudicial to Defendant.

Although I cannot say that Mr. Charley likely would have been acquitted if not for the

erroneously admitted testimony, neither can I say that the errors did not have substantial

influence on the verdicts. Instead, I am in grave doubt as to the latter question, and

accordingly I cannot hold that the errors were harmless. Therefore, I respectfully dissent

from the affirmance of the convictions on Counts II through VII. I would reverse those
-10-

convictions and remand for a new trial free of the serious errors in the admission of

testimony.