alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
154 So. 606

#### FEDERAL INTERMEDIATE CREDIT BANK OF NEW ORLEANS v. FAULK.

4 Div. 757.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 29, 1934.

Rehearing Denied May 24, 1934.

*622John W. Rish, of Dothan, for petitioner.

Mulkey & Mulkey, of Geneva, opposed.

Brief did not reach the Reporter.

BOTJLDIN, Justice.

Maybe the Court of Appeals, in its final decision, placed the presumption in favor of the trial court on too restricted basis in saying: “We must assume that there was testimony (omitted from the bill of exceptions) showing conclusively that the check here in question was actually paid.”

The opinion recites there was evidence in the bill of • exceptions that it was never paid.

Petitioner here relies on the rule as stated in Doe ex dem. School Commissioners v. Godwin, 30 Ala. 242, 244, viz.: “That when an affirmative charge is given, which is correct as an abstract legal proposition, this court will presume there was evidence to justify the charge, unless it affirmatively appear to the contrary.”

Obviously, there may have been uncon tradicted states of fact in evidence under which the drawer became entitled to a credit therefor although not actually paid by the bank issuing such cashier’s check. Appellate courts will not cast about for surmises as to what may have been the state of the evidence not shown in the bill of exceptions. Trial judges, knowing the presumptions indulged on appeal, may sign a bill of exceptions presenting only one side of the picture.

We concur with the Court of Appeals in holding that, where the bill of exceptions does not purport to set out the evidence in full, or else affirmatively shows there was no other evidence upon which the affirmative charge could be given, the giving of such charge cannot be reviewed on appeal. It is not necessary to limit the presumption to proof of actual payment as indicated by the above-quoted language. Whether such presumption should be indulged, if necessary to sustain the trial court, we think there is no need to decide, and therefore withhold expression of opinion.

Writ denied.

ANDERSON, C. J., and GARDNER and FOSTER, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Carbon Sciences, Inc (the “Company”) on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Derek W McLeish, Chief
Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1)  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.







May15,
      2008
              By:
              /s/ Derek
      W. McleishDerek
      W. McLeishChief Executive Officer and Acting
      Chief Financial Officer
# C_2019383EN.01001501.xml

| 11.11.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 383/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.11.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/15

---

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 5 September 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof — Austria) — Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Deutsche Bahn AG

(Case C-28/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro - Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 - Single euro payments area (SEPA) - Payment by direct debit - Article 9(2) - Accessibility of payments - Residence condition)

(2019/C 383/14)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Verein für Konsumenteninformation

Respondent: Deutsche Bahn AG

Operative part of the judgment

Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 must be interpreted as precluding a contractual clause, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which excludes payment by direct debit in euros under the European Union-wide direct debit scheme (SEPA direct debit) where the payer does not have his place of residence in the same Member State as that in which the payee has established his place of business.

---

(1)  OJ C 104, 19.3.2018.

---
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-10557

Summary Calendar

 

LAWRENCE D. FARAR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHIRLEY S. CHATER,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:95-CV-89-C

- - - - - - - - - -

April 3, 1997

Before JONES, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lawrence D. Farar appeals the Commissioner’s decision

denying Supplemental Security Income. Farar contends that the

proper legal standards were not applied and that substantial

evidence does not support the Commissioner’s decision. Farar

also contends that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not

consider the effects of his nonexertional impairments on his
No. 96-10557

- 2 -

ability to do sedentary work, did not properly evaluate his

subjective complaints of pain, and did not present a sufficient 

hypothetical to the vocational expert. Finally, Farar contends

that the ALJ did not properly identify available jobs that he

could perform and that the ALJ did not develop a full and fair

record.

We have reviewed the record and Farar’s brief and AFFIRM the

decision of the Commissioner for essentially the reasons adopted

and set forth by the district court. Farar v. Chater, No. 5:95-

CV-089-C (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 1996). Farar failed to raise before

the Appeals Council his assertions that he did not receive a full

and fair hearing and that the ALJ did not properly identify

available jobs. This court is without jurisdiction to examine

those issues because Farar has not demonstrated the requisite

prejudice. Paul v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir.1994). 

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2379 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.2379

                     One Hundred Sixteenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday,
           the third day of January, two thousand and nineteen

                                 An Act

 
     To reauthorize the Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. BULLETPROOF VEST PARTNERSHIP GRANT PROGRAM REAUTHORIZATION.
    (a) In General.--Section 1001(a)(23) of title I of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (34 U.S.C. 10261(a)(23)) is 
amended by striking ``part Y'' and all that follows and inserting 
``part Y, $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2020, and each fiscal year 
thereafter.''.
    (b) Program Name.--Part Y of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (34 U.S.C. 10531 et seq.) is amended by 
inserting before section 2501 the following:
``SEC. 2500. PATRICK LEAHY BULLETPROOF VEST PARTNERSHIP GRANT PROGRAM.
    ``The program under this part shall be known as the `Patrick Leahy 
Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Program'.''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
# C_2020414EN.01001602.xml

| 30.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 414/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 414/16

---

Order of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 10 September 2020 — Crocs Inc. v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Gifi Diffusion

(Case C-320/18 P) (1)

(Appeal - Community design - Invalidity proceedings - Declaration of invalidity - Appeal which has become devoid of purpose - No need to adjudicate - Costs)

(2020/C 414/20)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Crocs Inc. (represented by: J. Guise and D. Knight, Solicitors, and H. Haouideg, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents), Gifi Diffusion (represented by: C. de Chassey, avocate)

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no need to adjudicate on the appeal. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no need to adjudicate on the appeal.

| 2. | Crocs Inc. shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) in the present appeal proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Crocs Inc. shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) in the present appeal proceedings.

| 3. | Gifi Diffusion shall bear its own costs incurred in these proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Gifi Diffusion shall bear its own costs incurred in these proceedings.

---

(1)  OJ C 319, 10.9.2019.

---
IN THE TEXAS COURT DF CRIMINAL APPEAL^ AUSTIN, TEXAS 

### wmc&m,v.mii 

# M

Muldrow, Johnny (Petitioner) 

## OCT052015 

# Cause,#©W»BtalCtefk

THE STATE DF TEXAS (Respondent)

PETITIONER'S FIRST REQUEST FOR EXTENDED TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW AND REQUEST TO SUSPEND T.R.A.P. RULE 9.3(b) 

## fiifd 

## COURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALS OCT082015
TO THE HONORABLE ZIUSTICE(S) OF SAID COURT: AbelAcOSta,Clerk COMES NOW, JohnnyMuldrou, Petitioner, proceeding pro se and indigent 

### in the above-styled and numbered cause, and respectfully asks this Honorable Court to extend the filing deadline date for an additional (60) days, thus allowing Petitioner to prepare and present a meaningful Petition for Discretionary Review. In addition, Petitioner requests that due to his 

### INDIGENT status, that T.R.A.P. Rule 9.3(b) be suspended pursuant to T.R.A.P. Rule 2, allouing Petitioner to file ONLY the original Petition for Discretionary 

### Review instead of the required (11) copies, as required by Rule 9.3(b)(1). In support thereof, Petitioner would show the Court the following: 1. Petitioner was indigent during trial as well as during his appellate proceedings and continues to be indigent. 2. Petitioner submits that he does NOT have the legal skills capable to handle this proceeding and requires assistance from a fellow inmate due to the complexity of the issues involved with the case. 3. Petitioner is NOT requesting additional time to file his PDR to harass Respondent nor delay proceedings, but for the sole purpose of preparing and presenting a meaningful Petition for Discretionary Review. k. This Court granted Petitioner the opportunity to file an Out-of-Time 

### Petition for Discretionary review in a ruling dated September 23, 2015 

### in CauseNo. UR-83,804-01, and mandated that Petitioner file his PDR within 30 days of the ruling.



### WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner asks this Court to grant this 

### motion, extending thefiling deadline date for his Petition forDiscretionary Review for an additional (60) days, or any additional time this Court deems 

### appropriate. ADDITIONALLY, Petitioner asks that, due to his indigent status,

### T.R.A.P. Rule 9.3(b) be suspendedpursuant to T.R.A.P. Rule 2, allowing Petitioner to file ONLY the original ofhis Petition for Discretionary Review
in this Court. 

### Executed this 29th day of September, 2015. 

### Respectfully submitted,

DohnnyMuldrow - Petitioner Pro Se Representation TDC3 #1934318 Mark Li. Stiles Unit 3060 FM 3514 Beaumont, TX 77705

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

### Atrue and correct copy of the foregoing Request for Extended Time to File Petition for Discretionary Review and Request to Suspend T.R.A.P. Rule 

## 9.3(b), was deliveredto RespondentviaU.S. Postal Service, postageprepaid,
addressed to: 

### GaryD. Young, DistrictAttorney Lamar County Courthouse 119 North Main Street Paris, TX 75460 

### Executed this 29th day of September, 2015. Respectfully submitted,



### Dohnny Muldrow - Petitioner Pro Se Representation TDCZI #193431:6 Mark L). Stiles Unit 3060 FM 3514 Beaumont, TX 77705
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 249 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 249

  To amend the ICCVAM Authorization Act of 2000 to improve reporting 
    about animal testing and alternative test method use by Federal 
                   agencies, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 2019

 Mr. Calvert (for himself, Ms. Titus, and Mr. Buchanan) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                                Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the ICCVAM Authorization Act of 2000 to improve reporting 
    about animal testing and alternative test method use by Federal 
                   agencies, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Accountability in Chemical 
Testing Act'' or the ``FACT Act''.

SEC. 2. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS; PROVISION OF INFORMATION.

    (a) Report Contents.--
            (1) In general.--Paragraph (7) of section 3(e) of the 
        ICCVAM Authorization Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 285l-3(e)) is 
        amended by inserting before the period at the end of the 
        paragraph the following: ``, to include a description of the 
        progress on the development, validation, acceptance, and 
        utilization of alternative test methods (including animal use 
        data by species, number, and test type) for toxicological 
        testing conducted, supported, or required by, or submitted to, 
        each Federal agency listed in subsection (c) during the 
        reporting period''.
            (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) 
        applies with respect to reports that are made available to the 
        public on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act.
    (b) Provision of Information.--Section 4 of the ICCVAM 
Authorization Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 285l-4) is amended by adding at 
the end the following:
    ``(f) Provision of Information.--Each Federal agency carrying out a 
program described in subsection (a), or its specific regulatory unit or 
units, shall provide ICCVAM with information needed to carry out this 
Act.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### STATE v. BISHOP

No. 420P98

Case below: Guilford County Superior Court

Motion by defendant (Bishop) to waive all rights to appeal the sentence of death denied 5 November 1998.
EX-32.1




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND


CHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002










In
connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Bold View
Resources, Inc. for the quarter ended February 28, 2009, I certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of  2002, to my
knowledge, that:




(1)  
the Quarterly Report on Form 1O-Q of Bold View Resources, Inc. for the quarter
ended February 28, 2009
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934;
and




(2)  
the information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended February 28, 2009 fairly
presents in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of Bold View Resources
Inc..





By:
                        /s/ Richard
      HowieName:
                        Richard
      HowieTitle:
                        Principal
      Executive Officer, PrincipalFinancial
      Officer and DirectorDate:
                        March
      19, 2009
#### In re Eddy BAILEY, Petitioner.

No. 13-1671.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 19, 2013.

Decided: Oct. 4, 2013.

Eddy Bailey, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before DAVIS, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

*297Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Eddy Bailey petitions for a writ of mandamus, seeking an order (1) directing the district court to act on this court’s prior opinion remanding his civil action for further proceedings, (2) holding the district court in “contempt of court” for failure to comply with our opinion, and (3) issuing a subpoena for records of his email accounts. We conclude that Bailey is not entitled to mandamus relief.

“Mandamus is a drastic remedy, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.” *United States v. Moussaoui,*333 F.3d 509, 516 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mandamus relief “may not be used as a substitute for appeal.” *In re Lockheed Martin Corp.,*503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.2007). To obtain mandamus relief, the petitioner must show that:

> (1) he has a clear and indisputable right to the relief sought; (2) the responding party has a clear duty to do the specific act requested; (3) the act requested is an official act or duty; (4) there are no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires; and (5) the issuance of the writ will effect right and justice in the circumstances.

*In re Braxton,*258 F.3d 250, 261 (4th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Bailey first asserts that the district court has unreasonably delayed in ruling on his civil action following remand. However, the district court issued its final judgment in his case shortly after Bailey petitioned for mandamus relief. Because Bailey has already received the relief he seeks, this portion of his mandamus petition is moot.

Turning to Bailey’s remaining requests, we conclude that the relief Bailey seeks is not available by way of mandamus. *See Lockheed Martin,*503 F.3d at 353 (mandamus relief may not be used as a substitute for appeal); *Braxton,*258 F.3d at 261 (mandamus relief is only available when a party has a clear right to the requested relief).

Accordingly, although we grant Bailey leave to appeal in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
---

Exhibit
32.1





Certification
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


As
Adopted Pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Xodtec Group USA, Inc. (the
“Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended November 30, 2009 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),
Yao-Ting Su, as Chief Executive Officer, and Pi-Chu Lin, as Chief Financial
Officer, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d),
      as applicable of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
  and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Registrant.








Dated:
      February 12, 2010
            /s/ Yao-Ting SuYao-Ting
      SuChief
      Executive OfficerDated:
      February 12, 2010
            /s/ Pi-Chu LinPi-Chu
      LinChief
      Financial Officer








A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 21



Subsidiaries of the Registrant
        State or Province of Formation




North American Subsidiaries

MTS Testing Systems (Canada) Ltd.
        Ontario




International Subsidiaries

MTS Holdings France, SARL
        France


MTS Sensor Technologie und Verwaltungs-GmbH
        Germany


MTS Automotive Sensors GmbH
        Germany


MTS Sensor Technologie GmbH and Co. KG
        Germany


MTS Systems SAS
        France


MTS Systems GmbH
        Germany


MTS Systems Beteiligungs-GmbH
        Germany


MTS Systems Ltd.
        United Kingdom


MTS Systems Norden AB
        Sweden


MTS Systems srl
        Italy


MTS (Japan) Ltd.
        Japan


MTS Korea, Inc.
        Korea, Republic of


MTS Sensors Technology K.K.
        Japan


MTS Systems (China) Inc.
        China, Peoples Republic of


MTS Systems (Hong Kong) Inc.
        Hong Kong


---
#### James O’Donnell, Appellant, v Buffalo-DS Associates, LLC, et al., Respondents.

Submitted March 29, 2010;

decided May 11, 2010

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
Exhibit 32.1  Certification of the President Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002  In connection with the quarterly report of Liberty Silver Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the fiscal period ended September 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Geoff Browne, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  /s/ Geoff BrowneChief Executive Officer Date: November 19, 2010