IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 13, 2024

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LANDON ALLEN TURNER

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County

No. 10904 Thomas W. Graham, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2023-01254-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

A Marion County jury convicted Landon Allen Turner, Defendant, of reckless homicide 

and aggravated child abuse for the death of Z.H.,1 Defendant’s girlfriend’s two-year-old 

son. He argues on appeal that: (1) the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to circuit 

court; (2) the State violated its Brady obligations by failing to provide defense counsel with 

a copy of Defendant’s statements prior to the juvenile transfer hearing; (3) the evidence 

was insufficient to support his convictions; (4) his conviction for aggravated child abuse 

should be barred under the doctrine of “mutually exclusive verdicts”; and (5) his sentence 

is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD 

WITT, JR., J., and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., joined.

M. Keith Davis (on appeal and at trial), Dunlap, Tennessee; Ted Engel, District Public 

Defender; and Norman Lipton (at juvenile transfer hearing), Assistant Public Defender, 

Jasper, Tennessee, for the appellant, Landon Allen Turner.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Courtney Lynch, District Attorney General; and Steven H. Strain and

Sherry D. Shelton (at trial), and Julia Veal (at juvenile transfer hearing), Assistant District 

Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

 

1

It is the policy of this Court to protect the identities of minor victims by using their initials. 

05/22/2024
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Defendant was initially charged in 2018 in the Marion County Juvenile Court with 

first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. The juvenile court transferred 

Defendant’s case to circuit court after a juvenile transfer hearing. The Marion County 

Grand Jury indicted Defendant for one count of first degree felony murder and one count 

of aggravated child abuse. Trial took place over four days in April 2022.

Trial

Z.H.’s Death

The proof at trial established that Z.H. was born in August 2014 to E.R. (“Mother”)

and E.H. (“Father”). Mother and Father later ended their romantic relationship but 

continued to co-parent Z.H. Mother took care of Z.H. on days Father worked, and Father

took care of Z.H. on days Mother worked. Z.H. spent most of his time with Father. Father

accused Mother of partying too much and abdicating her responsibilities to Z.H. Father

testified at trial that Z.H. would sometimes stay with him for weeks at a time. Sometimes, 

Mother would bring Z.H. back to Father after only a few hours.

In August 2016, Mother was in a romantic relationship with Defendant. Defendant 

lived with Mother in her apartment in South Pittsburg, Tennessee. Defendant was 17 years 

old, and Mother was 20. Defendant and Father did not get along.

Mother left her apartment around 5:30 a.m. on Wednesday, August 17, 2016, for 

her job at Taco Bell in Kimball. She left Z.H. in Defendant’s care because she “couldn’t 

get ahold of” Father. While working, she received a call from Defendant, who reported 

that Z.H. had fallen off the bed. At the time, Mother’s bed frame was larger than her 

mattress, so a portion of the frame rail was left exposed. Defendant told Mother that Z.H. 

was fine and was playing normally. Defendant testified at trial that Z.H. had a mark on his 

head from the incident and cried immediately afterward but was otherwise fine. Defendant 

said that Z.H. was laughing and playing not long after.

Mother left work around noon that day. When she returned home, she and Z.H. 

went to visit Mother’s aunt, who was recovering from knee surgery. Mother noticed a 

“small mark” on Z.H.’s head but did not believe it to be serious, especially given that Z.H. 

was a little boy and ran into things. Mother also noticed a scratch on Z.H.’s chest but 

attributed it to his falling off the bed.

Mother left for work around 4:45 p.m. on Thursday, August 18, 2016, because she 

was scheduled to work the closing shift. Mother left Z.H. in Defendant’s care again 

because she could not reach Father. According to Mother, no one else was with Defendant 

and Z.H. Defendant called Mother during her shift and told her that “there had been a 
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tricycle accident.” Defendant told Mother that Z.H. was riding on his tricycle and that he 

and Z.H. collided as Z.H. rounded a corner, causing Defendant to fall on top of Z.H. 

Mother described Z.H.’s tricycle at trial as a “small red toddler tricycle.” At the time, Z.H. 

was around three feet tall and weighed about thirty pounds. Mother returned home after 

her shift ended at midnight. Z.H. was in bed asleep, so she kissed him good night and left 

his bedroom.

Mother worked the “mid-shift” on Friday, August 19, 2019, which lasted from 11:00 

a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Before Mother left, Z.H. was “very fussy and clingy,” more so than 

usual. Mother saw no reason to take Z.H. to the doctor at this point—in addition to the 

knot on his head and the scratch on his chest, he had a slightly swollen lip, but Mother did 

not believe it to be serious. She attributed Z.H.’s mood and swollen lip to being sore from

the tricycle accident. Mother put Z.H. in the bath and left Defendant to bathe Z.H. Mother

wanted to leave while Z.H. was in the bath so he would not cry when she left. Mother left

her apartment around 10:30 that morning, leaving Z.H. in Defendant’s care.

At trial, Mother described an event on November 21, 2015 when Z.H. was one year 

old where he jumped off the couch and Mother took him to the hospital.2 Mother said the

hospital staff told her at that time that she “was a first-time mom and [she] was overreacting 

and that [Z.H.] was fine.”

Mother received a phone call from a friend while she was working that morning, 

who reported to her that Defendant and Z.H. were on their way to Parkridge West Hospital 

in Jasper. Mother called Defendant, who told her, “I can’t wait for you to get here, I have 

to take him now.” Mother recalled at trial that Defendant sounded “anxious.” Defendant 

did not tell Mother what had happened to Z.H. Mother left work and drove to the hospital.

Defendant and his mother, Amanda Fitzgerald, arrived with Z.H. at the hospital at 

the same time as Mother. Defendant was holding Z.H., who appeared “lifeless” to Mother. 

Mother “grabbed” Z.H. and ran into the hospital. She did not believe Z.H. was breathing 

and informed the medical staff. In her rush, Mother did not closely look at Z.H.

Harold Fry, at the time a registered nurse at Parkridge West, was the first person to 

attend to Z.H. Defendant told Mr. Fry that Z.H. had fallen off a tricycle the day before. 

Mr. Fry observed Z.H. and saw bruising “all over his body,” which led Mr. Fry to suspect 

that “th[is] was more than just a tricycle accident.” As the trauma team attended to Z.H., 

he slipped in and out of consciousness and his breathing was “erratic.” Mr. Fry noted that 

Z.H. had bruising and swelling all over his face, forehead, and on both sides of his eyes, 

 

2 Michelle Story, the nurse who helped treat Z.H. at that time, testified for the defense at trial and 

recounted this event. Z.H.’s medical records from this event were admitted as an exhibit at trial. 
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among other injuries. Mr. Fry noted that Mother was upset and Defendant appeared 

“unemotional.” 

After about an hour, Z.H. was transported to the Children’s Hospital at Erlanger in 

Chattanooga because his condition continued to worsen. An airlift was unavailable

because of poor weather, so Z.H. had to be transported by ambulance. Mother and 

Defendant rode together following the ambulance to Erlanger.

After Z.H. was transported to Erlanger, Mr. Fry contacted child protective services 

because he suspected that Z.H. was a victim of child abuse. Mr. Fry later told law 

enforcement that he did not believe Z.H.’s injuries were consistent with falling off a 

tricycle.

Mother told Erlanger staff on arrival that she had gotten home around midnight the 

previous night and Z.H. was already in bed asleep. She told the staff that on the morning 

of August 19, she had brought Z.H. into bed with her because he was “moaning” and that 

he did not eat or drink well that morning. Mother told hospital staff that she did not see 

bruising, but she attributed Z.H.’s being “out of it” to his tricycle accident, about which 

she told the staff. One of the hospital staff overheard Mother saying to someone on the 

phone, “if anything happens to me, I love you.” Defendant told hospital staff that he had 

run into Z.H. while he was riding a tricycle.

Dr. Darwin Koller was the treating pediatric emergency physician for Z.H. at 

Erlanger. Upon Z.H.’s arrival, Dr. Koller and his team were “struck” by the extent of 

bruising on Z.H.’s body. Z.H. was bruised in places that Dr. Koller did not expect a twoyear-old boy to be bruised, such as his ears, lip, the inside of his arms, and his belly. Z.H. 

also had bruising on both sides of his scrotum and bruising and an abrasion on his penis. 

Dr. Koller explained at trial that two-year-old boys are more commonly bruised on their 

shins and outer forearms from bumping into things while playing. Dr. Koller opined at 

trial that Z.H.’s injuries were caused by “nonaccidental trauma,” which he said is the 

“modern term” for child abuse. Dr. Koller testified extensively at trial as to Z.H.’s injuries. 

Dr. Koller noted that Z.H. had suffered a “diffuse axonal injury” to his brain which, 

according to Dr. Koller, would have been immediately symptomatic. Several photographs 

of Z.H. taken while under Dr. Koller’s care were admitted as exhibits at trial.3 A CT scan 

of Z.H.’s head revealed that he was bleeding between his skull and his scalp, and an 

abdominal CT scan showed serious internal bleeding from lacerations on his liver and that 

blood was pooling in his belly. After having “coded” three times, Z.H. died at 3:41 p.m.

 

3 These photographs are not contained in the record on appeal.
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Dr. Koller determined that Z.H. died from hemorrhagic shock, cardiopulmonary 

arrest, and “nonaccidental trauma,” i.e., child abuse. A postmortem x-ray of Z.H. revealed 

an older, healing fracture in his left leg. Z.H.’s medical records from Erlanger were 

admitted as an exhibit at trial.

According to Father, when Dr. Koller told Z.H.’s family that he had died, Defendant 

told Father, “Man, I’m sorry. I didn’t mean it to go that far.” Father threatened to kill 

Defendant. Police had to remove Father from the room.

Mother had not seen Z.H. after arriving at Erlanger until after he had passed away. 

When she saw Z.H., he “had bruises all over him and he seemed kind of purple. . . . His

head looked swollen.” This surprised Mother, who testified at trial that Z.H. “didn’t really 

get whoopings [because] he was a good toddler.” Mother also testified at trial that she did 

not inflict Z.H.’s injuries and she did not see them when she placed Z.H. in the bath that 

morning.

Law Enforcement Investigation

The proof at trial established that around 3:30 p.m. on August 19, 2016, Tennessee 

Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) Agent Mark Wilson traveled with other law enforcement 

personnel to Mother’s apartment. They secured the scene and searched the apartment, 

collecting evidence they believed might be relevant. A sheet found on the floor near the 

bathroom with bloodstains on it was collected and sent to the TBI for DNA testing, which 

revealed that the blood on the sheets belonged to Z.H. Z.H.’s blood was also found on the 

spout of a sippy cup in the kitchen.

TBI Agents Brittany Burke and Josh Melton interviewed Mother before she left 

Erlanger. Mother waived her Miranda rights and told the agents what had happened. 

Mother told Agent Burke that Z.H. “didn’t really want to move his arm” the morning of 

his death. Agent Burke noticed the healing fracture in Z.H.’s left leg in his medical records 

but did not ask Mother about it in either interview.

The next day, August 20, 2016, Dr. Emily Dennison, a Nashville medical examiner, 

performed an autopsy on Z.H. Z.H.’s head, eyes, and scalp were very swollen. He had 

bruising all over his head and neck and hemorrhaging in his eyelids, as well as lacerations 

and bruising in his mouth. Dr. Dennison observed that Z.H. had hemorrhaging under his 

scalp around nearly his entire head, and blood had pooled around his eyes. The right side 

of Z.H.’s face was “one big bruise” and the left side was similar. Z.H.’s submental space, 

which is the space under the chin, was also heavily bruised. Dr. Dennison testified at trial 

that “it is unusual to get accidental trauma to this area.” Additionally, Dr. Dennison did 

not believe that Z.H.’s head injuries were caused by a fall from a tricycle.
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Z.H.’s brain was swollen but did not bleed. Dr. Dennison opined that blows to 

Z.H.’s head such that would cause the bruising he had would have resulted in his brain 

swelling. This brain injury would have been “immediately symptomatic” for Z.H. Dr. 

Dennison testified that Z.H. would have been lethargic, “in and out of consciousness,” and 

possibly had seizures. Z.H.’s brain injuries were “acute,” or recent.

Z.H.’s torso had significant pattern bruising, though Dr. Dennison could not 

determine what was used to cause it. Dr. Dennison observed bruising and a laceration on 

Z.H.’s penis as well as internal bruising of his spermatic cord, all of which she attributed 

to blunt force trauma.

Dr. Dennison observed petechial hemorrhages of Z.H.’s thymus (an organ 

surrounding a child’s heart), and bruising of his heart muscle, both attributable to blunt 

force trauma. Z.H.’s lungs were bruised, which Dr. Dennison testified would not have 

been caused by his intubation at Parkridge West; rather, blunt force trauma caused those 

injuries. Z.H.’s lung cavities had significant amounts of blood in them. Z.H.’s esophagus 

was bruised, as was his diaphragm, which is “difficult to injure.” Additionally, some of 

Z.H.’s ribs were fractured on the back side, which is associated with nonaccidental trauma. 

Dr. Dennison explained at trial that babies’ and children’s bones are “a lot more elastic and 

bendable” than adult bones, so much more force is required to break children’s bones. 

Z.H.’s mesentery, the area surrounding his intestines, was heavily bruised and had 

bled internally. Z.H. suffered significant bruising in his retroperitoneal space, the area 

surrounding his kidneys, and his kidney function was significantly impaired before he died. 

His liver was lacerated in multiple places, one of which was “very deep.” Dr. Dennison 

could not collect and measure all of the blood from Z.H.’s internal bleeding, but she 

collected 400 milliliters of blood from his belly and his chest cavity, which constituted 

around 35% of a two-year-old’s total blood volume. Z.H.’s left humerus had recently been 

fractured near his elbow, which Dr. Dennison stated is generally seen “with kids who are 

pulled or grabbed around the arm.” 

Dr. Dennison did not believe that any of Z.H.’s injuries were caused by resuscitation 

attempts. Rather, she attributed nearly every injury Z.H. suffered to blunt force trauma. 

She estimated that all of Z.H.’s injuries occurred within a two-day window before his death.

Dr. Dennison observed a few things that were not caused by blunt force trauma and 

that had not occurred in the few days leading to his death. For example, Z.H. had an “air 

pocket” in one of his lungs, which Dr. Dennison stated he could have been born with. Z.H. 

also had “pleural adhesions,” which is when “the lungs are stuck to the chest wall.” Dr. 
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Dennison explained that this could be caused in several ways, such as a past illness or a 

surgery.

Dr. Dennison ultimately concluded that Z.H.’s cause of death was blunt force 

trauma and his manner of death was homicide. Aside from his extensive injuries, Z.H. was 

a normal, healthy, well-developed two-year-old. Dr. Dennison’s autopsy report of Z.H. 

was admitted as an exhibit at trial, as were several photographs of Z.H. taken during the 

autopsy.4

Defense Proof

Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial, relaying a different version of events 

from Mother and the State’s other witnesses.

Defendant testified that the morning of Thursday, August 18, 2016, Z.H. got into 

some “coconut hair oil” and covered himself in it. Defendant said that Z.H. had eaten some 

of the hair oil and “there was mess all over him.” According to Defendant, Mother was 

“pretty upset” about the situation. Defendant claimed that Mother began yelling at Z.H., 

which led to an argument between Defendant and Mother because Defendant told her “she 

should not be yelling like that.” Z.H. began to cry during the argument, and Defendant 

claimed that Mother struck Z.H. “open handedly” on the side of his face. Z.H. would not 

stop crying, so Mother continued to hit him. Defendant stated he left the apartment and 

went to Ms. Fitzgerald’s house. Defendant said he saw Mother hit Z.H. three or four times. 

Defendant conceded on cross-examination that his testimony at trial was the first time he 

had ever mentioned anything about Z.H. getting into the hair oil. Defendant also 

acknowledged that he was physically superior to Mother and could have prevented her 

from beating Z.H. or called the police. He did not seek medical attention for Z.H. after 

Mother allegedly beat him.

Defendant stayed with Ms. Fitzgerald for 30 or 45 minutes and then returned to 

Mother’s apartment. He testified he began to pack his things and told Mother that he was 

leaving her. A photograph taken by TBI agents during their search of Mother’s apartment 

and admitted as an exhibit at trial showed a stack of folded clothes, which Defendant 

claimed were his. Defendant did not leave Mother that day. He alleged that he was afraid 

that Mother would claim that he beat Z.H.

Defendant claimed that he saw Z.H. later on August 18, and that he had other 

bruising on his head besides what occurred when he fell off the bed the previous day. 

Defendant confirmed that Mother left for work that afternoon and that he watched Z.H. 

 

4 These photographs are not in the record on appeal.
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Defendant described Z.H.’s behavior as “tired” and “drowsy.” Defendant said that Z.H. 

did not want to eat. Z.H. “drank plenty, but he stayed in his bedroom most of the day.” 

Defendant confirmed that Mother returned home around midnight.

Defendant testified he next saw Z.H. the following morning, on August 19. 

Defendant stated that Mother went into Z.H.’s room because he was crying, and Z.H. 

screamed when Mother tried to pick him up. According to Defendant, Mother brought 

Z.H. back to her bedroom and said, “‘He seems like he’s hurting, and he’s favoring his 

arm.’” Defendant said they decided to put Z.H. in the bath to make him feel better. He did 

not notice that Z.H. had any trouble moving his body, “other than his arm that he favored.” 

Defendant testified that he saw more bruising on Z.H.’s chest and arm, on his head, on his 

back, and on his face. Defendant told Mother that she needed to take Z.H. to the doctor for 

his arm, but Mother refused because she did not want anyone to find out, especially Father. 

Defendant conceded on cross-examination that he initially told TBI agents that he and 

Mother both decided that Z.H. did not need medical attention at that time.

Defendant finished bathing Z.H. while Mother left for work. Defendant fixed some 

pizza rolls for Z.H. to eat and brought him a drink in a sippy cup. Defendant said that Z.H. 

was sitting at the end of the bed “and he just started having a seizure.” Z.H. fell off the bed 

onto his face and Defendant rushed to pick him up. Z.H. cried for a few seconds and “then 

his eyes started to roll back.” Defendant ran with Z.H. out of the apartment to Ms. 

Fitzgerald’s house. Ms. Fitzgerald drove Defendant and Z.H. to Parkridge West Hospital 

because they decided an ambulance would not arrive quickly enough. Defendant told a 

friend who was nearby to call Mother. Defendant told Ms. Fitzgerald that Z.H. had fallen 

off of his tricycle.

Defendant said that during the drive to the hospital, which he estimated took 5 or 10 

minutes, Z.H. would wake up for a few seconds, cry, and then convulse and moan. They 

met Mother at the hospital.

Defendant testified that he told hospital staff at Parkridge West that he had fallen on 

Z.H. while Z.H. was riding his tricycle. Defendant admitted that the tricycle incident was 

a lie. He stated that Mother “came up with the story . . . so if anybody ask[ed] questions 

that she would back [Defendant] up.” He claimed that Mother made up the tricycle story 

after he returned from Ms. Fitzgerald’s apartment to pack his belongings. Defendant said, 

“I didn’t think he was going to die, so I didn’t mind going along with that lie.” However, 

Defendant admitted on cross-examination that he had not spoken to Mother before he told 

Ms. Fitzgerald and the Parkridge West staff about the alleged tricycle accident. According 

to Defendant, Mother was worried about how Father would react if he knew that Z.H. had 

been injured. Defendant alleged that Mother did not want Father to watch Z.H. on 

Thursday or Friday because she did not want Father to see Z.H. and ask questions.
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Defendant also relayed the tricycle lie to Erlanger staff before Z.H. died and to TBI 

agents after he died. Defendant claimed at trial that he lied to the TBI agents “because he 

was already invested in the lie” and did not want to be blamed for Z.H.’s death if he 

changed his story. Defendant and Mother ended their romantic relationship around a 

month after Z.H. died.

Defendant testified that he did not cause any of Z.H.’s injuries that led to his death. 

Defendant claimed that Mother was responsible for Z.H.’s injuries.

On cross-examination, Defendant conceded that he did not see Mother kick Z.H. in 

the groin. Defendant admitted that despite being interviewed twice by TBI agents before 

he was charged (the second occurring well after Defendant and Mother ended their 

relationship), Defendant maintained the lie about the tricycle accident and did not say that 

Mother had caused Z.H.’s injuries. Defendant insisted that Mother had caused Z.H.’s 

injuries.

Defendant presented Father as a witness at trial. Father testified that he believed 

that Defendant and Mother were both responsible for Z.H.’s death. Z.H. had been with 

Father “[p]retty well the whole 30 days” prior to his death, save the five days immediately 

preceding his death, which Z.H. spent with Mother. Father testified at trial that he had kept 

Z.H. from Mother because he had an argument with Defendant.

According to Father, Mother sent him a text message the weekend before Z.H.’s 

death stating that she and Defendant were no longer in a romantic relationship. Father

allowed Mother to watch Z.H. because she had told him this. However, Mother later sent 

Father a video of Z.H. playing, and Father heard Defendant’s voice in the background. 

Father confronted Mother about this, and Mother told Father to “mind [his] f[***]ing 

business.”

Father’s cell phone was broken and he had car problems the day before Z.H.’s death, 

so he used other people’s phones to contact Mother and asked her to bring Z.H. to him, but 

Mother refused. Mother told Father that Z.H. would be staying with her aunt and cousins. 

Mother also told Father that she tried to bring Z.H. to him but could not contact him.

Father described an incident at trial in which Z.H. collided with him while riding 

his tricycle and the two fell down the stairs. Father told Mother about the incident. Z.H. 

was not hurt.

Dr. John Hunsaker testified for the defense as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. 

Hunsaker examined statements from Mother, Father, and Defendant, as well as Z.H.’s 
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medical records, Dr. Dennison’s autopsy report, and photographs from the hospital and 

from the autopsy. Dr. Hunsaker agreed with Dr. Dennison that Z.H.’s death was caused 

by blunt force injuries, but disagreed that the manner of Z.H.’s death was homicide. Dr. 

Hunsaker did not believe that the injuries to Z.H.’s head led to his death. Dr. Hunsaker 

disagreed with Dr. Dennison’s conclusion that Z.H.’s injuries were caused within the last 

48 hours of his life because she did not microscopically examine the lacerated area of 

Z.H.’s liver. According to Dr. Hunsaker, there was no way to accurately estimate when 

Z.H.’s injuries occurred because Dr. Dennison did not perform certain microscopic tests

on Z.H.’s brain, though he believed that Z.H.’s brain injuries did not occur on the day of 

his death. 

Dr. Hunsaker conceded on cross-examination that he was unaware that Defendant 

had stated that Z.H. fell off the bed and hit his head on a bed rail. Dr. Hunsaker was 

likewise unaware that the tricycle accident had not happened. He conceded that Z.H.’s 

injuries were “probably not” consistent with falling off a tricycle. Ultimately, Dr. 

Hunsaker maintained that there was not enough information to conclude that Z.H.’s injuries 

were caused by another person.

Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal

The jury convicted Defendant of the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide 

and aggravated child abuse as charged in the indictment.

After considering the proof offered at the sentencing hearing and the relevant 

statutory factors, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 22 years for aggravated child abuse 

and 3 years and 6 months for reckless homicide. The trial court aligned the sentences 

concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of 22 years’ incarceration.

Defendant appealed, and this Court waived the timely filing requirement for 

Defendant’s notice of appeal.

Analysis

Defendant argues on appeal that: (1) the juvenile court erred in transferring his case 

to circuit court; (2) the State violated its Brady obligations by failing to provide defense 

counsel with a copy of Defendant’s statements prior to the juvenile transfer hearing; (3) 

the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (4) his conviction for aggravated 

child abuse should be barred under the doctrine of “mutually exclusive verdicts”; and (5) 

his sentence is excessive.5 We address each issue in turn.

 

5 We have reordered Defendant’s issues for clarity.
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Juvenile Transfer Hearing

Defendant contends that the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to circuit 

court. The State argues that the juvenile court properly transferred jurisdiction because the 

evidence established probable cause to believe that Defendant committed the charged 

offenses. We agree with the State.

A juvenile court may transfer a juvenile to circuit court if the juvenile court finds 

that there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the alleged acts, is not 

mentally impaired, and should be legally restrained. T.C.A. § 37-1-134(a)(4); see also

State v. Brown, No. W2012-01297-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4029216, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Aug. 7, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2013). The terms “probable cause” 

and “reasonable grounds” are interchangeable in juvenile transfer analysis. See State v. 

Reed, No. M2009-00887-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3432663, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 

31, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2011). We review the juvenile court’s 

findings regarding the criteria in subsection (a)(4) for abuse of discretion. See State v. 

Adkisson, No. W2022-01009-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1252173, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

Mar. 25, 2024) (citation omitted), no perm. app. filed. In making its probable cause 

determination under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a), the juvenile court 

must consider:

(1) The extent and nature of the child’s prior delinquency records;

(2) The nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of the child’s response 

thereto;

(3) Whether the offense was against person or property, with greater weight 

in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;

(4) Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated 

manner;

(5) The possible rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services 

and facilities currently available to the court in this state; and

(6) Whether the child’s conduct would be a criminal gang offense . . . if 

committed by an adult.

T.C.A. § 37-1-134(b) (2018).6

 Additionally, the juvenile court’s findings of fact “‘are 

given the weight of a jury verdict and are conclusive unless we find that the evidence 

preponderates against these findings.’” Adkisson, 2024 WL 1252173, at *6 (quoting State 

v. Swatzell, No. 01-C01-9005-CC-00126, 1992 WL 25008, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 

14, 1992), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 4, 1992)).

 

6 This statute has since been amended to include an additional factor not relevant here.
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The juvenile court heard testimony at the transfer hearing from Agent Burke and 

Dr. Dennison. Dr. Dennison’s testimony mirrored her trial testimony, so we need not 

repeat it here.

Agent Burke testified at the hearing that she spoke with Defendant at Erlanger the 

night Z.H. died. She recorded the interview, but a recording was not available for the 

transfer hearing. The State gave defense counsel a written summary of the interview before 

the hearing.

In the first interview, Defendant told Agent Burke that he had babysat Z.H. for the 

previous two days while Mother was at work. Defendant said that on Wednesday, August 

17, Z.H. fell off the bed. Z.H. hit his head on the bed frame, which was wider than the 

mattress. Defendant told Agent Burke that Z.H. had a knot on his head, a bruise, and had 

a cut on his lip.

Defendant told Agent Burke that he fell on Z.H. while Z.H. was riding his tricycle 

on Thursday, August 18. According to Defendant, Z.H. landed on the floor, the tricycle 

landed on Z.H., and Defendant landed on the tricycle. Defendant told Agent Burke that 

Andrew Ford was in the apartment when the alleged tricycle accident happened.

Defendant said that the next morning, Friday, August 19, Z.H. “was acting kind of 

sore” and did not want to move one of his arms. Defendant told Agent Burke that Mother

put Z.H. in the bath and left for work. Defendant claimed that he fed Z.H. some pizza rolls 

after his bath, at which point Z.H. began seizing and fell off the bed. Defendant grabbed 

Z.H., ran to Ms. Fitzgerald, and they left for the hospital.

Defendant did not allege that Mother beat Z.H. Rather, Defendant told Agent Burke 

that Mother “babied” Z.H. and that Z.H. would cry if he fell because he knew Mother

would pick him up and baby him.

Agent Burke interviewed Defendant for a second time in December 2017. His 

second interview was largely consistent with his first, save the added detail that Defendant 

and Mr. Ford took Z.H. to Wal-Mart after the tricycle accident. Agent Burke could not 

verify that they went to Wal-Mart.

Agent Burke also interviewed Mother at Erlanger. Mother’s version of events was 

consistent with her trial testimony. Mother did not suspect at the time that Defendant had 

killed Z.H., but she told Agent Burke after the autopsy report was released that it did not 

make sense in light of what Defendant had told her. 
- 13 -

After hearing from Agent Burke and Dr. Dennison, the juvenile court found that 

reasonable grounds existed to believe that Defendant committed the acts as alleged. The 

juvenile court noted that it heard no testimony to establish that Defendant was mentally 

impaired and that the interest of the community required legal restraint or discipline. The 

juvenile court found Defendant’s prior juvenile record a non-issue, having heard nothing 

about it. The juvenile court found that the offenses at issue here were committed against a 

person, which weighed in favor of transfer, and that they were committed in a premeditated 

and aggressive manner, which the juvenile court gave great weight. The juvenile court 

found factor (6) inapplicable because no evidence showed that these offenses were 

committed in connection with gang activity. Additionally, the court noted that Defendant 

was “outside the window of anything [the juvenile court] could offer” because he was 

twenty years old at the time of the juvenile transfer hearing. 

Defendant does not argue that he was mentally impaired, nor does he argue that the 

evidence did not establish probable cause to believe he should be legally restrained. 

Rather, Defendant argues that the evidence did not establish probable cause to believe that 

he committed the charged offenses.

Defendant was charged in juvenile court with first-degree felony murder and 

aggravated child abuse. First degree felony murder in this context is “[a] killing of another 

committed in the perpetration of . . . aggravated child abuse[.]” T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2). 

“A person commits the offense of aggravated child abuse . . . , who [knowingly, other than 

by accidental means, treats a child under eighteen (18) years of age in such a manner as to 

inflict injury] . . . and . . . [t]he act of abuse . . . results in serious bodily injury to the 

child[.]” T.C.A. §§ 39-15-402(A)(1); 39-15-401(a). There was no question that Z.H. had 

died, that Z.H. was under 18 years old, and that his injuries were serious. The transfer 

hearing’s focus was on whether there was probable cause to believe that Defendant was 

responsible for Z.H.’s injuries.

The record here establishes that the juvenile court thoroughly made the requisite 

findings. The juvenile court heard testimony that Defendant babysat Z.H. in the two days 

leading up to his death and on the morning of his death. Defendant’s explanation of the 

events as established in his interview with Agent Burke was that Z.H.’s injuries were the 

result of his accidentally falling off the bed on Wednesday and his tricycle accident on 

Thursday. Mother told Agent Burke that the autopsy results did not make sense in light of 

Defendant’s version of events and that she had seen only minor injuries on Z.H. the 

morning of his death. Dr. Dennison testified that Z.H.’s death was caused by blunt force 

injuries and that his manner of death was homicide. Dr. Dennison further testified that 

Z.H.’s injuries were inconsistent with the accidents that Defendant alleged, his injuries 

were not consistent with those from medical intervention, and that his injuries were 

typically seen in children who were beaten or shaken. Defendant was alone with Z.H. on 
- 14 -

the morning of his death. This proof supports the conclusion that probable cause existed 

that Defendant committed the offenses of first degree felony murder and aggravated child 

abuse. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant’s case 

was appropriate for transfer to circuit court. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Brady Violation

Defendant complains that the State violated its disclosure obligations under Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide defense counsel with copies of 

Defendant’s statements before the juvenile transfer hearing. The State argues that 

Defendant has waived this issue by failing to provide an adequate record for our review, 

and alternatively, the juvenile court properly concluded that the State did not withhold 

material exculpatory evidence from Defendant. We agree with the State that this issue is 

waived.

“[T]he suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. To establish a Brady 

violation, a defendant must show that: “(1) the defendant requested the information . . . ;

(2) the State suppressed evidence in its possession; (3) the suppressed evidence was 

favorable to the defendant; and (4) the evidence was material.” State v. Jackson, 444 

S.W.3d 554, 594 (Tenn. 2014). Favorable evidence is material where “‘there is a 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.’” Id. at 595 (quoting State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 

(Tenn. 1995)). A defendant must prove a constitutional violation by a preponderance of 

the evidence. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d at 389. Additionally, Brady’s disclosure obligations 

apply at juvenile transfer hearings, which are dispositional rather than adjudicatory. See 

State v. Booker, No. E2018-01439-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 1697367, at *22 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Apr. 8, 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022); see also Tenn. 

R. Juv. Prac. & Proc. 206, Advisory Comm’n Cmt.

As an initial matter, we must address the State’s waiver argument. Defendant did 

not avail himself of the opportunity to address this argument in his reply brief. The State 

notes that Defendant did not provide us with the recording or the summary of his first 

interview with Agent Burke or the transcript of his second interview. Therefore, the State 

argues, we cannot determine whether the statements were exculpatory or material. We 

agree.

The appellant bears the burden of preparing an adequate record for the resolution of 

the issues. See State v. Rimmer, 623 S.W.3d 235, 296 (Tenn. 2021) (citing State v. Ballard, 

855 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993)) (appendix); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 24(a). “In the 
- 15 -

absence of an adequate record, this [C]ourt must presume that the trial court’s ruling was 

correct.” Rimmer, 623 S.W.3d at 296 (citing State v. Richardson, 875 S.W.2d 671, 674 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) and State v. Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)) 

(appendix). Because Defendant did not provide us with the evidence that the State 

allegedly withheld, we cannot determine whether it was exculpatory or material. This issue 

is waived for our consideration, and Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support either of his 

convictions. The State argues that the evidence was sufficient with respect to both. We 

agree with the State.

When examining whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a 

conviction, several well-settled principles guide our analysis. We determine “whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Tenn. R. 

App. P. 13(e). A guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with 

a presumption of guilt. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992). The defendant 

bears the burden on appeal to demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). 

“[A] jury verdict, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the 

witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State 

v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). The State is entitled on appeal to “the strongest 

legitimate view of the evidence and to all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be 

drawn therefrom.” State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tenn. 2003). As such, this Court 

is precluded from re-weighing or reconsidering the evidence when evaluating the 

convicting proof. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State 

v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Moreover, we may not 

substitute our own “inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial 

evidence.” Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 779. Questions as to the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence, as well as factual issues raised by such evidence, are resolved 

by the trier of fact, not this Court. State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990). 

These principles guide us “‘whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial 

evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. 

Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)).

Aggravated Child Abuse
- 16 -

As stated above, “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated child abuse . . . ,

who [knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child under eighteen (18) years 

of age in such a manner as to inflict injury] . . . and . . . [t]he act of abuse . . . results in 

serious bodily injury to the child[.]” T.C.A. §§ 39-15-402(A)(1); 39-15-401(a).

The proof at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, established that 

Defendant babysat Z.H., a normal and well-developed two-year-old, by himself while 

Mother was at work in the two days leading up to Z.H.’s death and on the morning of his 

death. Mother never saw any serious injuries on Z.H., including when she left for work 

the morning of his death. Defendant rushed Z.H. to the hospital on Friday, August 19, 

2016, because Z.H. was seizing. Drs. Koller and Dennison testified to the extent of Z.H.’s 

injuries. Z.H. was covered in bruises, had a laceration on his liver that led to serious 

internal bleeding, had a recent diffuse axonal brain injury that would have been 

immediately symptomatic, and had bruising on his scrotum and a laceration on his penis, 

among other injuries. Dr. Koller concluded that Z.H.’s injuries were the result of 

“nonaccidental trauma,” i.e., child abuse, because they were inconsistent with the types of 

accidental injuries that two-year-old boys typically sustain. Dr. Dennison observed 

bruising and lacerations to Z.H.’s internal organs as well as pooled blood from where Z.H. 

had bled internally. Dr. Dennison testified that Z.H.’s injuries would not have been caused 

by resuscitation attempts, and both doctors rejected the notion that Z.H.’s injuries were 

caused by a fall from the bed or a tricycle collision with Defendant. Dr. Dennison 

concluded that nearly all of Z.H.’s injuries were attributed to blunt force trauma occurring 

in a two-day window before his death. 

To be sure, Defendant offered his version of events, and the jury simply rejected it, 

as was its prerogative. This evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that 

Defendant committed aggravated child abuse against Z.H., and Defendant is not entitled to 

relief on this issue. 

Reckless Homicide

“Reckless homicide is a reckless killing of another.” T.C.A. § 39-13-215(a). “A 

person acts recklessly with respect to . . . the result of the conduct when the person is aware 

of, but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that . . . the result will 

occur.” Id. § 39-11-106(34). “The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 

disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 

would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s 

standpoint.” Id. “When recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element is also 

established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly.” T.C.A. § 39-11-301(a)(2). So, 

the mens rea of recklessness is encompassed by the definition of “knowing.” State v. 
- 17 -

Brown, 311 S.W.3d 422, 433-34 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 723 

(Tenn. 2001)). 

As discussed above, the evidence established that Defendant acted knowingly with 

respect to the abuse. We believe that a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 

severely beating Z.H. would result in his death. Cf. Brown, 311 S.W.3d at 435 (holding 

that failure to instruct jury on reckless homicide as lesser included offense of felony murder 

committed in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse was not harmless error because 

the jury could have concluded that the defendant was aware of, but consciously disregarded 

a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim’s death would occur). The evidence 

presented at trial was therefore sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for reckless 

homicide. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

“Mutually Exclusive Verdicts”

Defendant argues that we should vacate his conviction for aggravated child abuse 

because the jury’s verdicts were mutually exclusive. The jury found that Defendant acted 

recklessly, argues Defendant, which therefore precludes a finding that he acted knowingly. 

The State argues that this is not a basis for relief, and in any event, the jury’s verdicts were 

not mutually exclusive. We agree with the State that this issue is not a basis for relief.

Mutually exclusive verdicts exist when “‘a guilty verdict on one count logically 

excludes a finding of guilty on the other.’” State v. Snipes, No. W2011-02161-CCA-R3-

CD, 2013 WL 1557367, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2013) (quoting State v. Jones, 

No. W2009-01698-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 856375, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 

2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2011)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2013). 

Our supreme court specifically rejected this doctrine in State v. Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 77 

(Tenn. 2015) and maintained that even inconsistent verdicts are not a basis for relief in 

Tennessee.

We, of course, are in no position to overrule our supreme court. See State v. Lackey, 

No. M2015-01508-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4055709, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 

2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016). Defendant is not entitled to relief on this 

issue.

Sentencing

Defendant complains that his sentence is excessive because he was only seventeen 

years old when he committed his crimes. However, Defendant does not challenge the trial 
- 18 -

court’s reliance on enhancement factors. The State counters that the trial court properly 

exercised its discretion in sentencing Defendant. We agree with the State.

“[S]entences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range are to 

be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” 

State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). Stated differently, this Court is “bound 

by a trial court’s decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed 

in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles set out” in the Sentencing Act. 

State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 346 (Tenn. 2008). “‘A trial court abuses its discretion 

when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling 

on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice 

to the complaining party.’” State v. Gevedon, 671 S.W.3d 537, 543 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting 

State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010)). “The abuse of discretion standard of 

review envisions a less rigorous review of the lower court’s decision and a decreased 

likelihood that the decision will be reversed on appeal.” State v. McCaleb, 582 S.W.3d 

179, 186 (Tenn. 2019). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of demonstrating 

its impropriety. T.C.A. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.; see also State v. Ashby, 

823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).

As to enhancement factors, we note that a trial court’s misapplication of an 

enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the presumption of reasonableness, 

so long as the trial court articulates reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of 

sentencing. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705-06. Additionally, “‘[t]he application of a single 

enhancement factor can justify an enhanced sentence.’” State v. Rollins, No. E2022-

00890-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 4078700, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2023) (quoting 

State v. Banks, No. M2019-00017-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 5888, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

Aug. 25, 2020)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2023). “The weighing of mitigating 

and enhancement factors is left to the sound discretion of the trial court,” and is not a basis 

for reversal. State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 103 (Tenn. 2014) (citing State v. Carter, 254 

S.W.3d 335, 345 (Tenn. 2008)).

The trial court here explained each enhancement factor it considered in determining 

Defendant’s sentence and the weight it accorded each factor. The trial court specifically 

relied on enhancement factors (1), (5), and (14) with respect to both convictions, noting 

that it gave factor (14) great weight. See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-114(1), (5), (14). The trial court 

also applied enhancement factor (4) to the reckless homicide conviction. Id. § (4). As to 

mitigating factors, the trial court applied mitigating factor (6) because Defendant was 17 

years old when these offenses occurred. Id. § 40-25-113(6). The trial court therefore 

lowered his sentence by one year on the aggravated child abuse conviction and six months 

on the reckless homicide conviction. Defendant claims that his sentence is cruel and 

unusual, but this argument falls flat. His sentence is proportionate under the Eighth 
- 19 -

Amendment because the trial court considered his age in fashioning its sentence. See 

Booker, 656 S.W.3d at 60 (stating that sentencing courts must “take the mitigating qualities 

of youth into account”). Defendant’s argument boils down to a disagreement with the trial 

court on the weight that his age should have been given in determining his sentence. As 

noted above, this is not a ground for relief. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d at 103. Defendant is not 

entitled to relief on this issue.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

____________________________________

 TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE