1

The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-3673

___________

Donald J. Cakora, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, * [UNPUBLISHED]

Social Security Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: May 23, 2003

 Filed: June 19, 2003

___________

Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Donald J. Cakora appeals the district court’s1

 order affirming the denial of

disability benefits. In his July 1999 application, Cakora alleged disability since June

1999 from traumatic epilepsy and an organic mental disorder. After a hearing, where

a vocational expert (VE) testified, the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that

Cakora could perform the jobs the VE identified in response to a hypothetical the ALJ
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posed. Having carefully reviewed the record, see Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d

1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (substantial-evidence standard of review), we affirm. 

Cakora first argues that the ALJ erred by ignoring several diagnoses and not

considering his impairments in combination. We disagree. The diagnoses he lists

were either not confirmed or not mentioned in the medical records, or he received no

more than conservative treatment for them. The ALJ’s opinion indicates he

considered the combined effects of the impairments that were supported by the

record. See Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994). 

We next reject Cakora’s challenges to the ALJ’s determinations that treating

physician Richard Burnett’s opinions about Cakora’s ability to work were not entitled

to great weight, that the testimony of Cakora and his friend Terry Walker were not

credible, and that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability determination

was not controlling. Contrary to Cakora’s assertion, the ALJ gave multiple valid

reasons for discounting Dr. Burnett’s opinions, see Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d

1019, 1023 (8th Cir. 2002) (statements that claimant could not be gainfully employed

are not medical opinions; when treating physician’s opinion is inconsistent with or

contrary to medical evidence, it is not entitled to deference); the ALJ adequately

explained and supported his credibility findings, see Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969,

972 (8th Cir. 2000); we find no basis for Cakora’s contention that the testimony of

his friend, who had worked as a mental-health technician, was entitled to more weight

because of his medical expertise, cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a) (2003) (acceptable

medical sources); and the ALJ’s opinion reflects that he reviewed and considered the

medical evaluations upon which Cakora’s most recent VA disability rating was based,

see Morrison v. Apfel, 146 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1998) (VA disability rating is not

binding on ALJ considering application for Social Security disability benefits, but it

must be considered). 
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Cakora also contends the ALJ did not properly evaluate his posttraumatic stress

disorder (PTSD) and his organic mental disorder. We find no diagnosis of PTSD in

the record, and it appears that VA psychiatrist James Doolos ruled out PTSD.

However, Cakora based his benefits application in part on organic mental disorder,

a diagnosis Dr. Doolos did make, and thus the ALJ should have completed a

psychiatric review technique form (PRTF). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a (2003)

(evaluation of mental impairments). Nonetheless, we find the error harmless,

because Cakora testified that he had memory and concentration problems or

“glitches” only monthly, with the “glitches” lasting at most fifteen to twenty minutes;

tests in 1988, 1990, and 1999--which were the only ones in the record--indicated no

new changes in his brain and only a mild memory loss; he still engaged in numerous

activities; and the VE testified that Cakora could work at the identified jobs even if

he had brief monthly episodes of altered awareness. See Montgomery v. Shalala, 30

F.3d 98, 100-01 (8th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that failure to complete PRTF could, in

certain cases, be harmless).

Finally, Cakora claims the ALJ did not develop the record and that the

hypothetical he posed did not adequately describe Cakora’s limitations. The hearing

transcript does not support Cakora’s assertion that the ALJ stated he would arrange

for a consultative examination; the ALJ considered the records of the VA specialists

who were treating Cakora for his allegedly disabling seizures and organic mental

disorder; and although the VA records predate Cakora’s alleged June 1999 date of

onset, Cakora did not request at the August 2000 hearing, where he was counseled

and submitted additional records, that the record be held open; the medical records

before the ALJ reflected no treatment for Cakora’s allegedly disabling conditions

after June 1999 and no treatment at all after November 1999; and at the Appeals

Council stage, Cakora offered only Dr. Burnett’s conclusory February 2001 letter

without any supporting treatment records. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742,

749-50 (8th Cir. 2001) (ALJ may issue decision without obtaining additional medical

evidence if existing evidence provides sufficient basis for decision); Shannon v.
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Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1995) (fact that claimant’s counsel did not obtain

records suggests they had only minor importance; reversal for failure to develop

record justified only where such failure is unfair or prejudicial). As to the

hypothetical, it included seizure- and “glitch”-related limitations. See Hunt v.

Massanari, 250 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 2001) (hypothetical is sufficient if it sets forth

impairments supported by substantial evidence and accepted as true by ALJ);

Haggard v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 1999) (VE’s response to properly

phrased hypothetical constitutes substantial evidence). 

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. See Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1217 (if

reviewing court finds it possible to draw two inconsistent positions from evidence

and one position represents Commissioner’s findings, court must affirm).

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.