[Cite as Cincinnati Equine v. Sandringham Farm, 2016-Ohio-803.]

 

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 4, 2016 

Graydon Head & Ritchey, LLP, Harry J. Finke IV and Harry W. Cappel, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 

Freund Freeze & Arnold, LPA, Jack S. Gatlin and Thomas P. Doyle, and Miller 

Wells, PLLC, William C. Rambicure and David A. Cohen, for Defendant-Appellant. 

 

Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

CINCINNATI EQUINE, LLC, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

SANDRINGHAM FARM, LLC, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NO. C-150067

TRIAL NO. 08CV-15831 

O P I N I O N.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 2

MOCK, Judge. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellee Cincinnati Equine, LLC, operates a large-animal 

veterinary practice in Ohio. Defendant-appellant Sandringham Farm, LLC, 

purportedly owns race horses and has a principal place of business in Georgetown, 

Kentucky. In May 2008, Cincinnati Equine filed a complaint in the Hamilton County 

Municipal Court claiming that Sandringham Farm owed $2,142.45 for veterinary 

services “the majority of which were provided in Hamilton County, Ohio.” 

{¶2} The complaint was served on Mr. and Mrs. Thomas J. Young as 

members of Sandringham Farm at addresses in Georgetown, Kentucky, and Naples, 

Florida. Thomas Young attempted to file a pro se answer on behalf of the 

corporation, but the trial court struck the pleading. Young filed several other 

pleadings, but the corporation did not appear in the action. 

{¶3} Cincinnati Equine filed a motion for a default judgment, which was 

denied by the trial court without explanation. Cincinnati Equine then filed a motion 

for summary judgment. In support of the motion, it submitted an affidavit in which 

it stated that it had “an agreement with Sandringham Farm” to provide veterinarian 

services to the horses listed on the attached invoice. The invoice listed three horses 

and five separate dates of service. On November 5, 2008, the trial court granted the 

motion for summary judgment. 

{¶4} After some initial attempts to collect on the judgment, nothing 

happened in the case until 2014. At that point, Sandringham Farm, represented by 

counsel, appeared in the action and filed a verified motion to void the judgment. As 

part of that motion, Young averred that the three horses listed on the invoice 

belonged to him, not to Sandringham Farm. He also averred that the horses were 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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mostly maintained in Kentucky and raced at Turfway Park in Kentucky. He further 

stated that Cincinnati Equine provided most of the care for Young’s horses in Boone 

County, Kentucky. Cincinnati Equine submitted a counter-affidavit that stated only 

that “[p]rior to the filing of the Complaint in this case, [Cincinnati Equine] 

performed veterinary services for Sandringham Farm, LLC in both Hamilton County, 

Ohio and Kentucky.” 

{¶5} The trial court denied the motion to void the judgment without an 

evidentiary hearing. In three assignments of error, Sandringham Farm now appeals. 

{¶6} In its first assignment of error, Sandringham Farm claims that the 

trial court erred when it granted Cincinnati Equine’s motion for summary judgment. 

In its second assignment of error, Sandringham Farm claims that the trial court 

erred when it struck Young’s pro se answer. But both of those decisions became final 

and appealable on November 5, 2008, when the trial court entered final judgment in 

the case. See R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). The time to appeal those decisions has run. See

App.R. 4(A)(1). We overrule Sandringham Farm’s first two assignments of error. 

{¶7} In its third assignment of error, Sandringham Farm claims that the 

trial court erred when it denied the motion to void the judgment. We conclude that 

the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the 

motion. 

{¶8} As this court has previously noted, “a judgment rendered without 

personal jurisdiction over a defendant is void.” Bardes v. Great Gatsby’s Auction 

Gallery, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-960421, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1611, *4 (Apr. 23, 

1997), citing Compuserve, Inc. v. Trionfo, 91 Ohio App.3d 157, 161, 631 N.E.2d 1120 

(10th Dist.1993). A void judgment is a nullity that may be collaterally attacked at any 

time. Lingo v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, 7 N.E.3d 1188, ¶ 46; 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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Boehm, Kurtz & Lowry v. Evans Landscaping, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C140597, 2015-Ohio-2692, ¶ 9. 

{¶9} Cincinnati Equine cites our decision in Estate of Hodary v. Chancey, 

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-980896, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6024 (Dec. 17, 1999), for 

the proposition that Sandringham Farm has waived the argument that the trial court 

lacked personal jurisdiction over it. In that case, we stated 

[p]ersonal jurisdiction, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, may be 

waived. Civ.R. 12(B) requires that a defense of lack of personal 

jurisdiction must be presented either in the defendant’s answer or by 

motion prior to the filing of defendant’s answer. Thus, if the defense is 

not asserted in a Civ.R. 12 motion, in a responsive pleading, or in a 

Civ.R. 15(A) amended responsive pleading, such defense is waived. 

Id. at 5. The distinction between Hodary and this case is that the defendant in 

Hodary appeared in the action and filed an answer. In doing so, however, he failed 

to “contest the trial court’s jurisdiction over him at that point [in his answer], or in 

any motion prior to his answer, or in any amendment to his original answer.” Id. 

{¶10} In this case, Young’s pro se attempts notwithstanding, Sandringham 

Farm did not appear prior to the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment. 

Where a defendant has not made an appearance in the matter, that defendant may 

challenge the judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction by filing a commonlaw motion to vacate or to set aside the judgment. See State ex rel. DeWine v. 9150 

Group L.P., 9th Dist. Summit No. 25939, 2012-Ohio-3339, ¶ 7, citing Compuserve, 

91 Ohio App.3d 157, 631 N.E.2d 1120. 

{¶11} While Sandringham Farm concedes that it was properly served with 

the complaint, proper service of process alone does not vest a court with personal 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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jurisdiction. During v. Quoico, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-735, 2012-Ohio-2990, ¶ 

26. Whether an Ohio court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 

involves a two-part inquiry. U.S. Sprint Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Mr. 

K’s Foods, Inc., 68 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 624 N.E.2d 1048 (1994). First, we must 

determine whether Ohio’s long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, and its complementary 

civil rule, Civ.R. 4.3(A), confer jurisdiction. Id. at 184. If so, we next must decide 

whether exercising jurisdiction comports with due process of law as guaranteed by 

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. This due-process 

requirement may be satisfied where the forum state has either specific or general 

jurisdiction over a nonresident. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 

466 U.S. 408, 414-415, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984), fn. 8 and 9. 

{¶12} R.C. 2307.382 and Civ.R. 4.3(A) allow Ohio courts to exercise 

jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in causes of action arising from several 

enumerated circumstances, including a nonresident’s “[t]ransacting any business in 

this state.” R.C. 2307.382(A)(1); Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1). Courts have construed this phrase 

broadly to mean not only “to contract,” but also “to carry on business” and “to have 

dealings.” Goldstein v. Christiansen, 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 236, 638 N.E.2d 541 (1994). 

{¶13} As to general jurisdiction, a defendant who maintains “continuous 

and systematic” contacts with the forum state may be subject to its jurisdiction, even 

where the conduct complained of did not arise from the continuous and systematic 

contacts. Helicopteros at 415; Internatl. Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of 

Unemp. Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 318, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). But 

the record contains no evidence that Sandringham Farm had contacts with Ohio 

which were “continuous and systematic.” 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶14} Alternately, three requirements must be met to establish specific 

jurisdiction. Fern Exposition Servs., LLC v. Lenhof, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C130791, 2014-Ohio-3246, ¶ 21, citing Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, 

Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1968). First, defendant must purposely avail himself 

of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum 

state. Id. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities 

there. Id. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequence caused by the defendant 

must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise 

of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Id. 

{¶15} In this case, Cincinnati Equine presented evidence, through the 

affidavit testimony of Dr. John Piehowicz, that it entered into an agreement with 

Sandringham Farm to provide veterinarian services for horses owned by 

Sandringham Farm, that Cincinnati Equine performed those services on the three 

horses listed on the invoice, and that the services were performed “in both Hamilton 

County, Ohio and Kentucky.” The complaint stated that the “majority of the 

services” were performed in Hamilton County. 

{¶16} On the other hand, Sandringham Farm presented the motion, verified 

by Young’s affidavit, which stated that the horses listed on the invoice were owned by 

Young, that Sandringham Farm had no agreement with Cincinnati Equine, and that 

the majority of the services performed by Cincinnati Equine were performed in 

Kentucky. 

{¶17} The record in this case contains contradictory evidence of who owned 

the horses that Cincinnati Equine treated, who contracted for that treatment, and 

how much of that treatment occurred in Ohio. As a result, we cannot determine if 

exercising personal jurisdiction over Sandringham Farm comports with Ohio’s long-
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 7

arm statute or whether there is specific jurisdiction over Sandringham Farm 

sufficient to satisfy due process. 

{¶18} Since the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing and the 

trial court’s jurisdiction is not clear from the record, we must remand the cause for 

an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction. 

See DeWine, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25939, 2012-Ohio-3339, at ¶ 25 (remanding 

cause for hearing where the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing 

to resolve conflicting evidence pertaining to personal jurisdiction); see also

Compuserve, 91 Ohio App.3d at 165, 631 N.E.2d 1120. To that extent, we sustain 

Sandringham Farm’s third assignment of error. 

{¶19} Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is reversed and the cause is 

remanded with instructions to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on 

the issue of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Sandringham Farm is 

consistent with Ohio’s long-arm statute and due process. 

Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 

DEWINE, P.J., and STAUTBERG, J., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.