F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
G EORGE G AR R I DO , AKA J o rge Arturo Ga

rrido, Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 06-50717

D.C. No. CR-04-01594-SVW-4

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
A L B E R T T. R OBL ES , AKA Albe rt Tza re ih R ob le s; A lbe rt o Del Tzare ih,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 06-50718

D.C. No. CR-04-01594-SVW-1

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntra l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia Stephen V. Wilson, Dist rict Judge, Pre siding

Argued and Submitted No ve mbe r 1 5, 20 10 —Pa sa de na , Ca lif or niaU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. Filed April 15, 2013
Be fore : Harr

y Preg erson, John T. Noonan,
and Ric ha rd A. Pa e z, Ci rc uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Preg erson

SUMMAR

Y *

Crim inal L aw The pa nel re verse d Albert Robles’s a nd Geor g e Ga

rrido’s h o n est servic es fr aud convic tions, rever sed Robles’s money launder ing c onvictions, and aff irmed Robles ’s briber

y convictions in a case that arose out of events that took place while Robles was Tr easur er of the City of South Gate, California.
Robles and Gar

rido, a loca l busine s s m an and friend of Rob le s, we re imp lic ate d in tw o s c he me s to awa

rd c ity contra cts to particular

companies while rea

pi ngsubstantial be ne fi ts f or the mse lve s.
Th e pa ne l r e ve rs e d Ro ble s’ s 18 U.S.C. § 13 46 ho ne st s erv i ce s fr au d

co nv i ct i o n s wi thr e s p ec tt o C o unt s 1 thro u gh 11, 13 through 15, 17, and 23 through 25, and Ga rrido’s § 1 3 4 6 h o n e s t s e r

v i c e s f r a u d c o nv i c t i o n w i th r e s p e c t to Counts 23 through 25 be cause , under Skilling v. United States , 130 S. Ct

. 2 896 (2010), the jur y instructionsU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 3

err oneously

permitted convictions on the unconstitut ional the or y of a fa ilure to d isc los e a

c on fl ic t of

int e re st. The pa nel reve rsed Robles’s § 1346 honest servic es fr aud convictions with respe ct to Counts 16, 22, and 27 and Ga rrido ’s ho ne st s e rv ice s f

ra ud c onvic tio ns wi th r e sp e c t to Cou n t s 22 and 27, and a cquitted Robles on Counts 16, 22,
and 27 , a nd a c qu itt e d G arrid o on Count s 2 2 a nd 27 be c a us e these c ounts are ba sed on Skilling ’s unconstitutional theory of a failure to disclose a conflict of interest in a state disclosure form, an d b eca

use there is insufficient evidenc e to support Counts 16 and 27. The pa nel rev er s edRobles’s 18 U.S.C. § 1957 money launder ing c onvictions with re spect to Counts 18 through 21 beca use they are predic ated on the flawe d honest servic es fra ud convictions. The pa nel af firmed Robl es ’s 18 U.S.C. § 666 bribery
c onvic tio ns wi th r e sp e c t to Counts 33 thr ou gh 37 be c a us e § 666 convictions do not require t he def endant to be influence d in an offic ial act.

CO UN SEL
Kar en L . L andau , Oa kland, California; De nnis P. R iordan, Riordan & Horg an, San F ranc isco, California, f or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts

. Elana Shavit Artson, Assistant United States Attorney , L os Ang eles, California , for Plaintiff-A ppellee.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 4
OP IN ION
PREGERS ON, Circuit J udg e: Albert T. Robles (“ Robles”) appeals his convictions for honest servic es mail and wire frau d (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1 3 4 6 ) , mo n e y

la un d e r in g( 1 8 U

. S. C. § 1 9 5 7 ) , and bribery (18 U.S.C. § 666 ). Geor g e Ga rrido (“ Gar

rido”) appea ls his convictions for hon es t service s mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346). We have jur i s d i ct ion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
After Robles and Garrido were convicted and sentence d,
and wh ile the ir

c a se s w e re on

a pp e a l, t he Sup re me Court

in Skilling v

. United States , 130 S. Ct . 2896 (2010), na rrowed the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to include only honest servic es f r a u d b a s e d o n b r ib e r

y an d k ic k

b a c k s c h e mes. Id . at 2933. The Court prohibit ed prosecutions (such a s those in this case) based on a

fai lureto d

isc los ea c on

flict of i nte re

st as unconstitutionally

vague. Id . at 2932. In light of Skilling , we reve rse Robles’s a

nd Gar rido’s honest services fr aud convict i ons and re verse Robles’s money laundering convictions. We aff

irm Robles’s bribery

convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 666 be cause such convic tions do not require the defe ndant to be en gage d in an offic ial act. Ac cording ly , we rema nd for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

I.
F o l l o w i n ga

j ur y tr i a l , R o b l e s w a s c o nv i c t e d o f tw e ntyo n e c o unt s o f h o n e s t s e r

v i c e s m a i l an d w i r e f

r a u d (C ounts 1–11, 13–17, 22–25, 27 ); four c ounts of money laundering (Counts 18–21); and five c o unts of bribery (Counts 33–37).U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 5
Ga rrido wa s c onvic te d of

fi ve c ounts of

ho ne st s e rv ic e s ma il fra ud (22–25, 27).
Robles’s and Gar

rido’s convictions arose out of a se ri es of eve nts that took place whi le Robles was Tr easur er of the City of South Gate, California. Robles was ele cted Tr easur er in 1997 and re elec t ed i n 2 001. He ha d previously serve d as Mayor and a s an e le c te d me mbe r o f t he South G ate City Council. Garrido was a loc al businessman and friend of Robles’s. Roble s and Ga rrido we re implicate d in two
sc he me s to awa

rd c ity c ontr a c ts to part ic ula r c omp anie s whil e re a pin gsu bs tanti a l be ne fi ts f

or the mse lve s.
A. Sewer Repair and Housin g P roje ct S chem es (Counts 1–21)
The fir st scheme, c harg ed ag ainst Robles a lone, involved two corpor ate e ntities: the Southland Companies, comprised of se ve ra l ho us ingde ve lop me nt co rp or atio ns , a nd PSO MA S, an eng ineering c onsulting firm. The South l and C ompanies
wer e deve loping housingprojec ts in S outh Gate, and PSO MA S wa s inte re ste d in se we r r e pa ir

c ontr a c ts i n So uth Gate.
The indictment a lleg ed that Robles used his influenc e as Trea surer to induce the Southland Companies a nd PSOMAS into hiring Robles’s friend Edward Espi noza (“Espinoza”) as a c on su lta nt; dir e c te d th e c ity

c ounc il t o a

wa rd c ontr act s to the two companies; and conc eale d or fa iled to disclose thatU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 6

T h e i n di c t me nt al l e g e d t h a t t h e S ou t h l a n d Co mp a n i e s a n d PS O M AS 1 p aid o ve r $ 2 m illio n from cit y co ntrac t s t o E sp i no za o r his co m p an i es. E sp ino z a in tur n w a s a lleg e d to ha v e p a id o v e r $ 1 .4 m ill io n to R o b le s’s f am i l y and f

riend s.

I n 2002 , el ect ed of

f i ci al s i n Cal i f

orn i a h ad a dut y t o di s cl ose t he s our ce 2
o f g ift s in e x c e ss o f $ 5 0 o n F o rm 7 0 0

. See C a l. G o v ’t C o d e § 8 9 5 0 3 (f) (p ro v id ing tha t t h e gift l im it is a d j u s te d e v e ry o d d -nu m b e re d ye a r) . A “g ift ” is “a n y p a ym e n t t h a t co n fer s a p e rs o n a l b e n e fit o n the re c ip ie n t, to the e x te n t t h a t co n sid e ra tio n o f eq u a l o r gre a te r va lue is n o t re c e ive d

. . . .” I d. § 8 2 0 2 8 (a ). A “g ift ” d o e s n o t i n c lu d e c a m p a ig n c o n trib u tio n s. Id

. § 82 0 2 8 (b)(4). “ C o nt ri b ut i o n” i s d ef i ned as “a p ayment

. . . excep t t o t he ext ent t hat f

ul l an d adequat e c ons i de rati on i s r ece i ved, un l es s i t i s cl ear f r om t he s ur r oundi ng ci r cums t anc es t hat i t i s not m ade f or pol i t i cal portions of the city ’s money paid to thos e companies w as f unn e l e d t o R o b l e s an d

t o R o b l e s ’ s f

r i e n d s an d

f am i l y. 1 Counts 1 through 11 a lleg ed that ch ecks were mailed from the City

of South Gate to P SOMAS and from PSOMAS to E M Ve ntu

re s, a c omp any that Es pin oza owne d and us e d to
re c e ive mon e y

fr om ind ivi du a ls and e nti tie s who did bu sin e ss with the City

of South Gate. Counts 13 through 15 a nd 17 charg ed that wire transfe rs wer e made from thre e Southland housing de velopment projec ts to Espinoz a, EM Ve ntur es, and E T E & A s s o c iate s , a

f in an c ia l a dv is o r

y f ir m t h at E s p in o za owned a nd used to rec eive money from in d i v i duals and entities who did business with the Cit y of South Gate.
Count 1 6 s pe c if

ic a lly a lle g e d th at Ro ble s f a ile d to disclose in a 2002 California Fo rm 700, Statement of Economic Intere sts, that he rec eived from Espinoza a $65,000 platinum membe rship in the Anthony Robbins Foundation, a self-he lp motivational orga nization, and t h at Robles cause d that For m 700 “to be tra

nsmitt ed in in terstate c ommerce by wire c ommunications” by faxing it to Sacramento. 2U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 7

pur po s es
. ” Id . § 8 2 0 1 5 (a ). A p a ym e n t “m a d e a t t h e b e h e st o f a c a n d id a te i s a co nt ri b ut i o n t o t he cand i d a te u n less

. . . [i ]t i s cl ear f rom t he
s ur r ou n di n g c i r c u ms t a n c e s t h a t t h e pa y me n t w a s ma de f or pu r pos es un r el at ed t o hi s or her ca ndi dac y f or e l ect i ve of

f i ce. ” Id

. § 82015( b) ( 2) ( B )

. O n e t y pe of pa y men t t h at i s pr es u med t o be f or p urpose s un r el at ed t o a can di dat e’ s can di dacy f or el ect i ve of

f i ce i s a pa y m e n t “ m a d e p r i n c i p a l l y f o r p e r s o n a l p u r p o s e s , ” w h i c h “ m a y be
cons i dere d a gi f

t

. ” Id

. § 8 2 0 1 5 (b)(2)(B )( I)

.
I n J anu ar y 200 0, K l i s t of f b o ug ht a per s onal comp ut er an d com put er 3
s of t war e f or Rob l es
. I n O ct ob er and N ovemb er 200 0, K l i s t of f wr ot e t wo c h e c k s to P yra m id P r e s s fo r C iti z e n s fo r G o o d G o v e rn m e n t. A lso in N o vem b er 20 0 0 , K l i st o ff m ad e a p art i al pa y m ent f o r a t el ep ho ne swi t ch boar d s y s t em f

or Robl es
. I n Fe br u ar y 2001, K l i s t of f pa i d f or copyi ng ex pens es f

or Ro bl es
. K l i s t of

f made al l of

t hes e pay ment s at R o b le s’s re q u e st. Counts 18 thr ou g h 21 c ha rg e d Rob le s un de r 18 U.S.C

. § 1957 with money

launder ing. T hose counts a l l eg ed that Robles used the m oney g ained from the honest ser vices fr aud to purcha se prope rty

in Mex ico and f

or a pla t i n um membership in the Anthony Robbins Foundation.
B. Waste- Hauli ng Contract Schem e (C ounts 22–37)
The sec ond scheme , charg ed ag ainst bo t h Robles and Gar rido, alleg ed that R obles, while he w as Tre asure r, ca used the City of South Gate to aw ard imprope rly a was t e-hauling
c o ntr a c tt o M i c h a e l K l i s t o f f ’ s ( “ K l i s t o f

f ” ) w a s t e c o mp any, Kl ist of f &Son s.
Gar rido and Klistoff ha d b ee n friends f or seve ral year s befor e Ga

rrido introduce d Klistoff to Robl es
. In 1999, at R o b l es ’s re qu es t , Kl i s t o ff b egan m a k i n g camp ai gn c ontr ibutio ns and

g if ts to Robles and Robles’s g ener al 3U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 8

A gen er al pur po s e co m m i t t ee i s a c om mi t t ee t hat : ( 1) r ece i ves 4 cont r i but i ons t ot al i ng $1, 00 0 or more i n a ca l endar y ear , an d i s “ f ormed
or e x i s t s pr i mar i l y t o s u ppor t or oppos e mor e t h an on e ca n di dat e or ba l l ot
meas ur e”; ( 2) mak es i ndependen t ex pe ndi t ur es of mo r e t han $1, 00 0 per cal en da r y e a r ; or ( 3) ma k e s c on t r i bu t i on s t ot a l i n g $1 0, 00 0 i n a c a l endar y e a r a t t h e b e h e s t o f c a n d i d a t e s o r c o m m i t t e e s
. Ca l

. Gov ’ t Code § § 82 0 2 7

. 5 , 82 0 1 3 (a)–(c). purp os e c omm itt e e , Ci tize ns fo r G oo d G ov e rnme nt. Klistoff 4 agree d to ma

ke these c ontributions because he knew Robles ha d in fl ue nc e in S outh G ate and Kl ist of f wa s h op ingto g a in
a c c e ss t o f

utu re wa ste -h a

uli ngc ontr a c ts. About ten day s befor e the Ma rch 2001 e lectio n , Robles
a sk e d th e the n- c urr ent w a ste -h a uli ngc omp any

fo r S outh Gate, W as t e Manag ement, whose contra ct with the city was set to expi re in e ight months, t o pay $15,000 worth of pr int ingbil ls that Ro ble s was about t o in c ur . Wa ste Mana g e me nt d e c lin e d to pa y the bil ls b e c a

us e it w a s to o late to report them as a campa ign contribution. After Robles was
ree lected T rea surer , Robles told W aste Mana g ement that they
wer e not his friends and that, as fa r as Robles wa s conce rned, Was te Mana g e me nt w as “ou t of town. ” Rob le s to ld Wa ste Manag ement to g o awa y quietly or he would h u rt t he
c omp any in o the r c iti e s.
In 2001, Klistoff told Garr ido that he w an ted Klistoff & S o n s to be awa

rded South Gate ’s ten-year waste- hauling
c ontr a c t, w or

th a bo ut $ 48 mil lio n. Garrido a gre e d to he lp Klistoff g et the contr act on the c on d itions that: (1) Klistoff hired Ga rrido as a consultant fo r $350,000 per year for the duration of the t en-year waste- haulingcontra ct, and (2) Ga rrido’s r ecy cl i n g business would be cut in on the
c ontr a c t if

it w a s awa

rd e d to Kl ist of

f &Son s.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 9

Ad vi s i ng K l i s t of

f t o re t ai n G ar ubo and p ay i ng G ar ubo’ s cons ul t ant f ees 5

w e re the o n ly se rv ic e s G a rr id o p ro v id e d K listo ff e v e n tho u g h K listo ff agr eed t o pay G ar r i do $35 0, 00 0 per y ear f or t he l i f e of t he t en- y ear was t eh a u ling c o n tra c t. B e tw e e n 2 0 0 2 a n d 2 0 0 3 , K listo ff m a d e fi v e p a ym e n ts Rob le s m et w ithKl ist of

f b e fo re South G ate se nt o ut i ts reque st for proposa ls for the wa ste-haulingcontra ct. Robles showed Klistoff the draft request for proposals, which c alled for one company

to perfo rm reside ntial service s and three
c omp anie s to pe rf

or m c omm e rci a l w a ste -h a

uli ngse rv ic e s. Klistoff sug g ested to R obles that one company could per form bo th w a ste -h a

uli ngse rv ic e s. Th e fi na l r e qu e st f or pr op os a ls inc or po rate d Kl ist of

f’ s su g g e sti on and c a lle d fo r a sin g le company to perfor

m both the resi d en t ial and commer cial service s. Kl i stoff & Sons submi tted its bid for the wastehaulingcontra ct in J une 2001.
In July 20 01 , Ro ble s a ssi g ne d his frie nd , L ou is M or e t, t o work on the city ’s waste- hauling contra ct as the fac ilitator for the bid d i n g p ro ce s s
. M o re t p resented the staff
rec ommendation for the c ont rac t to the city council and attended the meeting when the city council voted to aw ard the contra ct. Robles told More t that “he ha d a horse in the rac e” and that horse was Klistoff & Sons. R o b l es was conce rned
a bo ut Klis tof

f’ s a bil ity to m ake a

pe rs ua siv e pre se ntatio n to the c ontr act se le c tio n c omm itt e e , s o h e a sk e d M or e t to re c omm e nd

a c on su lta nt t o h e lp Klis to ff & Son s p repa re its oral pre sentation in support o f i t s bid. Moret rec ommended Ray Gar ubo (“G arubo” ) as a co n s ultant. Shortly there afte r, Gar rido contac ted Kli stoff and advised him to hire Ga rubo as a consultant to help Klistoff & Sons make an e ffe ctive and convincingprese ntation to city officia ls. Klistoff retained Gar ubo as a consultant, but Garrido paid Gar ubo’s consulting fe e s. 5U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 10

t o G arri d o o f

$8 7 , 5 0 0 each, f

o r a t o t al of $ 4 3 7 , 5 0 0

. K l i st o f f did no t m ake
an y f u r t h er pa y men t s t o G ar r i do. Klistoff rec eived infor

mation that no competingcompany was g iven. Robles showed Klistoff th e o ther c ompeting companies’ bids, even t h o u g h the bids were supposed to be confide ntial. Mor eover , at Robles’s re quest, Moret provide d Robles and Gar

ubo with a copy

of the c onfidential questions that the selec tion c ommitt ee would ask the bidders to answ er during oral prese ntations. None of the other bidder s were pr ov ide d w iththe se c on fi de nti a l qu e sti on s in a dv anc e of the ir
or a l pr e se ntatio ns
. After the ora l presentations, the selection committee voted to rec ommend that South Gate eng ag e in exclusi ve neg otiations with Kli stoff &Sons. The vote was in pa rt ba se d o n Klis tof

f’ s o ra l pr e se ntatio n. Th e c ity c ounc il approve d the select i on committee’s re commendation and ult imate ly

awa rd e d th e $4 8 mi lli on

wa ste -h a uli ngc ontr a c t to Kl ist of f &Son s. Counts 22 through 25 and 27 charg ed Robles and Ga rrido with honest service s mail fra ud in connec tion with the waste

ha uli ngc ontr a c t sc he me . Co unt 22 is b ased on Ca lif or nia For m 700, Statement of Economic Intere sts, for calenda r year 20 00 in whic h Ro ble s f a ile d to dis c los e the pa y me nts rec eived f

rom Klistoff for a

computer, sof

tware , and a telephone sw itchboard sy stem. Se esu pra note 3. The F orm 700 wa s mailed. Counts 23 through 25 a re ba sed on three
c he c ks fr om G arrido ’s bu sin e ss, GWS Nur se ry and Sup pli e s, Inc ., re c e ive d b y

Ga ru bo fo r a ssi sti ngKl ist of

f &Son s in its eff orts to obtain the waste- haulingcontra ct with South Gate.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 11
Count 27 refe rs to a Californi a Fo rm 700, Statement of Economic Intere sts, for ca lendar year 2001, in which Robles failed to disclose c opying se rvi ce s paid for by Klistoff on Robles’s behalf

. Counts 33 through 37 were char g ed aga inst Robles alone. Robles was cha

rg ed under

18 U.S.C. § 666 with acce pting bribes fr om Klistoff in con n ection with t he wa ste-hauling
c ontr a c t.
C. Ind ictm ent and Trial
Th e g ov e rnme nt f

ile d th e or ig ina l in dic tme nt a g a ins t Robles, Klistoff, and Espinoza in November 2004. It filed a First Superse ding I

ndi ct ment in Dece mber 2004, a lleg ing forty counts ag ainst those same de fe n d an t s. On Marc h 10, 20 05 , E sp ino za p le d guil ty to f ou r c ounts of

the F ir st SupersedingIndictment. On Marc h 24, 2005, the g overnme nt fi le d th e Se c on d Su

pe rs e din gInd ic tme nt a gainst Rob le s, Klistoff, and Ga

rrido. In J une 2005, af

ter Klistoff enter ed into a plea a gree ment, the g overnme nt filed a re dacte d Se c on d Su

pe rs e din gInd ic tme nt whic h d e le ted Kli sto ff a s a name d defe ndant in the ca ption. The reda cted Sec ond SupersedingIndictment charg ed Robles with twenty -one counts of honest ser

vices mail and w ire fr aud, four counts of money laundering, a

nd five c ount s of briber

y . Gar rido was charg ed with five c ounts of honest servic es mail fra ud. A j ury convicted Robles and Garrido on all counts alleg ed in the reda cted Sec ond Superseding Indictment. The district court sentenc ed Robles to ten year s in prison, f in es , and
re sti tut ion . G arrido wa s s e nte nc e d to fi ft y -o ne months in pr iso n, fi ne s, and

re sti tu tio n. Rob le s and Ga rrido tim e ly appea led.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 12

T h e i n d i c t m e n t a l l e g e d t h a t S o u t h Ga t e ’ s p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s ’ “ d u t y of 6 h on es t s er v i ce s i n cl u ded t h e f ol l owi n g obl i g at i on s : ( a) t o a ct a s t r u s t ee s f or the c iti z e n s, a n d in the b e st inte re sts o f t h e p u b lic, w itho u t p u rs u ing the ir
own pe r s on al i n t er es t s ; ( b) t o c on du ct e l ec t i on c amp ai g n i n g a n d f u n dra ising a c tivities o p e n ly an d fre e fro m fra u d a n d d ish o n e sty; (c ) to re fra in f r om t aki ng of

f i ci al ac t i on on an y m at t er i n whi ch t hey m i gh t have a di r ect
o r in d ire c t f

ina n c ia l i n te re s t w itho u t f irst d isc lo sin g a n y su c h inte re st to t h e pu bl i c; a n d ( d) t o a bi de b y the l aw s of t h e U n i t ed St at es , t h e l aw s of the S ta te o f C a lif

o rn ia , an d the law s o f t h e C ity o f S o u th G a te .”

II.
A. Ro ble s’ s a nd G ar r ido ’s 18 U. S.C . § 13 46 Hon e st Se r vic e s F r aud C onv ic ti ons
Robles was convic ted of hone st service s mai l and wire fra ud on Counts 1 through 11, 13 through 17, 22 through 25, and 27. Gar

rido was convicted of honest ser vices mail fr aud on Counts 22 through 25, a nd 27. Honest ser

vices mail and wi re fr a ud c a se s “ re l[y] on t

he ide a that ‘ a pu bli c of fi c ia l a c ts as trustee for the citizens a nd the State . . . and thus owes the
no rm a l f idu c iary dutie s of a tru ste e , e. g ., ho ne sty and loy a lty to them.’” United States v. Kincaid-Chaunc ey , 556 F.3d

6 9 2 3 , 9 3 9 (9 thC i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g U n ite d S ta te s v

. Sil v a no , 812 F.2d 754, 759 ( 1st Cir. 1987)).
1. Honest Service s Fra ud B efore and After Ski lli ng
Be fore 1987, the gover

nment prosec uted honest services fra ud case s under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fr aud) a nd 1343 (wire fra ud). United States v. W

eyhrauc h , 5 48 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2008), vac ated and remande d on other gr o unds , 1 30 S. Ct . 2 97 1 ( 20 10 ); U n ite d S ta te s v

. B ru no , 809 F.2d 1097, 1099, 1104–05 ( 5th Cir. 1987) . Sections 1341U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 13

and 13 43 “ c ri min a lize the us e of th e ma ils or wi re s in further ance of ‘a

ny s ch em e or artifice to defra ud, or for obtaining mone y

or property by means of false or fra udulent prete nses, re prese ntations, or promises.’” Skilling v. United States , 130 S. Ct . 2896, 2908 n.1 (2010) ( quoting §§ 1341 a nd 1343).
Althou gh t h ose statutes prohibit the use of the mails or wire se rvice s to perpetr ate f raudule nt schemes to deprive oth e rs of “ mon e y or pr op e rt y ,” our c ourt

and oth e r c ourt s interpre ted the statutes to apply to the deprivation of the pu bli c ’s “ int ang ible ri g hts ” to p ub lic of fi c ia ls’ ho ne st service s. Un ite d S

tates v . M

ilo v an ov ic , 678 F. 3 d 7 13, 720 (9 th Cir . 2 01 2) (e n b anc ); W eyhrauc h , 548 F.3d at 1243; see also Bruno , 809 F.2d at 1105 (statingcitizens “may be de fr a ud e d o f n on

pe c un iary int ere sts ” su c h a s th e “ ho ne st service s of [their] p ub lic officia ls”); United States v. Gray , 7 9 0 F.2d 1290, 1295 ( 6th Cir. 1986) (explaining “the ‘intang ible rights’ theory is anchore d upo n t h e defenda nt’s mis us e of his pu

bli c of fi c e fo r p e rs on a l pr of

it” ); United States v. Keane , 5 22 F .2 d 5 34 , 5 49 (7 th C ir

. 19 75 ) (n oti ng “ the ma il fr a ud statut e in t

his c ir c uit

ha s b een us e d .

. . to p ro se c ute pu bli c of fi c ia ls f or
. . . d e pr ivi ng the ir

c on sti tue nts of

the ir ri ght t o lo ya l, f

a ith fu l and

ho ne st p ub lic se rv ic e ” ); United States v. States , 4 8 8 F. 2 d 7 6 1 , 7 6 5 (8 thC i r. 1 9 7 3 ) ( h o l d i n g a fra udulent scheme may “d ec ei v e and de fra ud the public . . . of ce rtain intang ible political and civil rights”).

In 1987, howeve r, the Supreme Court he ld that § 1341 was limited to protectingproper ty rights, a nd sug g ested that “[i] f Cong ress de sires to g o further , it mustspeak more clea rly than it has.” McNally v. United States , 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). Congre ss responde d by inserting§ 1346 into the fede ral c riminal code the followingyear
. Skilling , 1 30 S. Ct

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 14

at 29 27 ; see als o Act of N ov. 18, 1988, P ub. L . 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988) (c odif i ed at 18 U.S.C. § 1346). By enac ting § 1346, Congress “ meant to reinstate the body of p re- McNally honest servic es law.” Skilling , 1 3 0 S. Ct. at 2929 (citation and internal quotation m arks omitted). Sec tion 1346 “def ines the term ‘scheme or a rtifice to de fra

ud’” f or the purp os e s o f h on e st s e rv ic e s ma il an d wir e fr a ud “ to include ‘a

scheme or ar

tifice to deprive an o t h erof the intang ible right of honest servic es.’” Id. at 2908 n.1 (quoting § 1346). Followingthe ena ctment of § 1346, c ou rt s around the country interpre ted the statute to encompa ss va rious ty pes of scheme s and to make c riminal a wide va riety of ac ts. See, e.g. , W eyhrauc h , 5 48 F .3 d 1 24 3–44 (l ist ingc a se s) ; United States v. W

alker , 490 F.3d 1 2 8 2 , 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) (n oti ngthat “ [t]he sc op e of c on du c t c ov ere d b y

the ho ne st service s mail fraud statute is e x tremely broad” ). But see United States v. Brumle

y , 116 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1997) (holdingviolation of § 1346 require s that“a state offic ial br e a c he d a

duty re sp e c tin gthe pr ov isi on

of se rv ic e s o we d to the of fi c ia l’ s e mpl oye r u

nd e r s tate law” ). Th e Ni nth Cir c uit
rec ognized two theories of honest service s fra ud: ( 1) briber

y and (2 ) f a ilure to d iscl os e a m ate ri a l c on fl ic t of int e re st. Kincaid-Chauncey , 556 F.3d at 942. The prose cution of Robles and Gar

rido proce eded unde r that fr amewor k.
After Robles’s and Ga

rrido’s tria l, the Supreme Court grante d cer

tiorari in the F ifth Circuit case Un i t ed States v. Skilling , 554 F.3d 529 ( 5th Cir 2009), to determine whe ther a publi c official m ay be convicted of honest services f raud f or failingto disclose materia l information. See Sk illing v. United States , 130 S. Ct . 393 (2009).U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 15

Fo llowing t he Sup rem e C o urt ’ s d eci si o n i n Ski l l i ng , t he part i es f i l ed 7
s uppl ement al bri ef

s addres s i ng t he i mp act of t hat ca s e on t he i s s ues r ai s ed in th is a p p e a l. Ind ec i d i n g Skilling , the Supreme Court limited the re ach
o f § 1 3 4 6

. T h e C o urth e l d th at§ 1 3 4 6 c r i m ina lize s on ly bribery and kickba ck sche mes, not failure s to d isclose a conflict of i n t er es t. Skilling , 130 S. Ct . at 2933. Thus, by limit ing § 134 6 to bribery and kickba ck sche mes, and pr oh ibi tin g § 1 34 6 p ro se c uti on s b a se d o n a fa ilure to d isc los e a conf lict of intere st, Skilling

c ha ng e d th e a pp lic a ble ana ly sis that app lie s to the pr e se nt a pp e a l. The que stion after Skilling

7 is whether Robles a

nd Gar rido wer e indicted, tri ed , and convicted of honest service s fra ud based on a

proper bribery or ki ckbac k theory , or whether they wer e indi cted, tried, and convicted on the unconstitution al undisclosed conf lict of i nt e r e s tth e o r

y.
2
. Th e I m pa c to f Skill

ing
On a pp e a l, t he pa rt ie s h ave su

bmi tt e d c h a n g i n gargume nts as to whethe r R obles and Ga rrido we re c harg ed with sche mes involving bribe ry

and kickba cks or invol v i n gundisclosed conflicts of inter est. Be fore Skilling , Robles and Gar rido
ar gu ed that the gove rnment’s c ase w as founde d on ly on a bribery theory , and that the g overnme nt’s evidenc e wa s insufficient to support their c onvi ctions. The g overnme nt disagree d, insisti ngthat its case wa s root ed in Robles’s fa ilure to dis c los e a

c on fl ic t of

int e re st. In s up po rt

of its contention, the g overn ment highlighted the district cour t’s findingthat the indictment, viewed a s a whole, alleg ed a
sc he me ba se d o n a

n und isc los e d c on fl ic t of

int e re st.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 16
After Skilling , h ow e ve r, the part ie s tr a de d p os iti on s. Robles and Gar

rido no w ar gue that the indictment, and the
c onvic tio ns re su lti ng fr om it, a lle g e d only a fa ilure to d isc los e a conf lict of interest. On the other ha nd, the gover

nment now argue s th at th e ind ic tme nt is ba se d on br ibe ry and kic kb a c ks

. The g overnme nt also argu es that the district court’s ins tr uc tio ns on

the fa ilure to disc los e the or y , whil e e rr on e ou s, did not af fe c t Ro ble s’ s and

Ga rrido ’s su

bs tanti a l r ights be c a us e the sc he me s a lle g e d in the ind ic tme nt “ inv olv e d b oth bribes and kic kbacks.”
3. Stand ard of Review “[C] onstitut ional err or occ urs when a jury is instructed on alternative theories of guilt and returns a g ener al ver dict that may rest on a le g ally

invalid theory .” S

k illing , 1 3 0 S. Ct . at 2 9 3 4 (c i t i n g Y

ates v. United States , 354 U.S. 298 (1957)).

“ Any omi ssi on or mis state me nt o f a

n elem ent of

an o ff e ns e in the jury

instruction s is constitut ional err or and, the ref ore, require s reve rsal unless we find the er ror ‘ harmless beyond a
rea sonable doubt.’” United States v. Kilbride , 584 F.3d 1240, 1 2 4 7 (9 thC i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Cha pm an v . Ca liforn ia , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Where there was n o o b j ection at trial, howeve r, we revie w jury instructions for plain er

ror. Id. “A p l ai n err or that af fec ts substantial rights may be consi d er ed even though it was not brought to the court’s attenti o n.” F ed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). “To notice e rror under Rule 52(b), we must find that (1) there is ‘ error’; (2) it was ‘plain’; and (3) the er

ror a ffe cted ‘ substantial rig hts.’” United Sta te s v . R e c io , 371 F.3d 1093, 1100 ( 9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 (1993)) . Even if these thre e conditions are met, the cour t m ay reve rse the dis tr ic t c ourt on ly if the e rr or “ ‘s e ri ou sly a ff e c ts the fa ir

ne ss,U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 17 integrity or public re putation of judic i al proce eding s.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Olano , 507 U.S. at 736).
4
. The Jury Ins tr u ct i o n s o n Un d i s cl o s ed Co n f l i cts of Intere st w ere Erroneous and the Errorwas P lai n
Th e parti es agre e that th e fi rs t tw o p ro ng s o f t he pla in
e rro r t e st a

re satis fi e d. An

e rr or is p la in i f i t is c le arl y inc on sis te nt wi th e sta

bli sh e d law at the tim e of appellate consider ati on. Johnson v. U nited States , 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1 99 7) ; see also He nderson v. United States , 133 S. Ct . 1121, 1130 (2013) (holding “whether a leg al question was se ttled or unsettled at the time of tria l, ‘it is enough t h at an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appe llate consider ati o n
. ’” ( quoting Johnson , 520 U.S. at 468)).
The c ourt instructed the jury on the m ai l and wire fra ud
c ounts a s f

oll ow s:
In o rd e r f or de fe nd ants Rob le s and

Ga rrido to be found guilty of [mail or wire fr aud], the g overnme nt must prove e ach of the following fo ur e le me nts be yon d a

re a so na ble do ub t: First, the de fenda

nt knowingly

mad e up or participated i n a sche me or plan to de prive the Cit y of South G ate and

its c iti zen s o f t

he ir right to the honest servic es of their elec ted offic ials . . . . Secondly , the def endant a cted wi th t he int e nt to de fr a

ud , that is, the int e nt t o deprive the City

of South Gate a

nd its citiz ens of th e i r r i g h tt o th e h o n e s ts e r

v i c e s o f th e ir el ec t ed off

icials . . . . Third, the de fenda ntU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 18
used a materia l falsehood or omitted material information . .

. . Four

th, the defe ndant used,
or cause d someone to use, the ma ils [ or a w ire
c omm un ic atio n] in

int ers tate c omm e rc e to car ry out or attempt to car

ry out the scheme or plan. Trial Tr. 1922–1925, July 26, 2005.
The c ourt define d the inten t t o d efr aud the public of ho ne st s e rv ic e s a s f

oll ow s:
Public o fficials and public employees i nh e r e nt l y o w e a d

uty t o th e p u

b l i c t o a c t in the public’s best intere st. I f, instead, the officia l acts or make s his deci s i on based on the o f f ic ia l’ s o wnp e r s o n a l i nte r e s ts , s u c has acc eptinga bribe , takinga kickba ck, or r e c e iv ing a b e n e fi t f ro m a n u n dis c lo s ed
c on fli c t of inte re st , the offic ial has def

raude d the public of the officia l’s hones ts ervic es even though the city

may not suf fe r any monetary loss in the transaction. Trial Tr. 1925–26, July

26, 2005 (empha sis added). Thus, the jury

instructions imp ro perly allowed a conviction wher e “the officia l acts or make s hi s decision based on the officia l’s own per sonal interests, such a s a c c e pti ng a br ibe , takin g a kic kb a c k, or re c e ivi ng a ben e fi t from an un dis c los e d c on

fli c t of inte re st

. . . .” Trial Tr. 1925, J uly 26, 2005 (empha sis a dded). Be cause the district court’s instructions pe rmitted the jury to convict Robles and Ga rridoU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 19

on Skilling ’ s n o wun c o n s t i tut i o n a l f a i l ur e t o d i s c l o s e th e o r

y, there was e rror

and the e rror

was plain.
5
. The Error Affecte d th e A p p el l a n ts ’ S u b s ta n ti al Rights
An e rr or a ff e c ts s ub sta

nti a l r ights if the re is “ a

re a so na ble probability

that the er

ror a ffe cted the o u t co me of the tria l.” United States v. Marc us , 130 S. Ct . 2159, 2164 (20 1 0 ). To dete r mi n e if th e e r

r o r a f f e c te d th e o utc o me o f th e tria l, “we consider ‘ al l circ umstances at trial including the strength of the evidenc e ag ainst [t he] defendant.’” United States v. Cha mb e rs , 9 18 F .2 d 145 5, 14 59 (9 th C ir . 1 99 0) (a lte ra tio n in
o ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. W agner , 8 3 4 F.2d 1474, 14 85 (9 th C ir . 1 98 7) ). We “ re vie w the jur y ins tr uc tio ns a s a whole,” not only

the er roneous instructions. KincaidC h a u n cey , 5 5 6 F

. 3 d at 9 4 6

. We ma y a ls o e xami n e the arguments made by the par ties. See Chapman , 386 U.S. at 25 (notingthat the prosec utor’s argument repe atedly relied on a n err or of law ).
After revie wingthe trial rec ord as a whole, we conclude that there is a rea sonable p ro b ab i lity that the jury

convicted Rob le s and

Ga rrido of ho ne st s e rv ice s fr a

ud ba se d o n th e ir failure to disclose a con fl ict of intere st. Bec ause of the emphasis on the conf

li ct of intere st theory

in the jury instructions and i n t h e closing arguments, we find that the
e rr or a ff e c te d th e Ap pe lla

nts ’ s ub sta

nti a l r ights

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 20

T he i nd i ct m ent l i st s several st at e and l o cal d i scl o sur e l aws pert ai ni ng 8 t o p ub l i c o f

f i cials. It also all eg es sch em e s i nv o l ving fail ure s t o d i sclo se va riou s co nfl i cts o f

i ntere st , i nc l ud i ng R o b l es’s f ail ure to d i sclo se a t l ea st $ 6 5 , 0 0 0 i n fi nanci al b enef i t s (i

. e. a plat i num m em b ers hi p i n t he A nt ho ny R o b b ins F o u n d a tio n ) t h a t h e re c e ive d fro m E sp ino z a ; R o b le s’s failu re to d i scl o se to th e c i t y co unci l t he f i nanci al be nef

i t he and hi s f

ri end s and fam ily w o u ld re c e ive fro m the S o u thla n d C o m p a n ie s a n d P S O M A S c ity
co nt ract s; R o b l es’ s f

ai l ure t o dis cl o se t he f i nanci al be nef

i t hi s f ri end G a rr id o w o u ld re c e ive fro m the c o n tra c t gr a n te d b y the c ity to K listo ff & Sons ; an d R ob l es ’ s f

ai l ur e t o re p ort K l i s t of f ’ s ac ces s t o t he conf

i dent i al i nterv i ew q ue st i o ns an d co nfi d en t i al b i d s.

a. The Indictme nt
We f ind the ind ic tme nt a

mbi guo us at be st. I t argua bly encompa sses both theori es of hone st service s fra ud: (1) bribery and kickba cks, and (2) a failure to disclose a conf lict of int e re st. Th e va st m a

jority of the a lle g atio ns app ear to supp or t o n l y an un d i s c l o s e d c o n f l i c t of int e re st. 8 Ne ve rt he le ss, be c a

us e the ind ic tme nt co uld be re a d to at le a st imp ly a br ibe ry or kic kb a c k s chem e , it

is n ot p os sib le to conclude on the basis of the indictment a lone which theor y or the or ie s th e jur

y may have e mbrace d in

re nd e ri ng

a guil ty ve rd ic t on

the § 1 34 6 h on e st s e rv ic e s c ha rg e s.
b. The Jury I

nstructions
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s § 134 6 jur y ins tr uc tio ns inc lud e d o nly a sing le re fer ence to bribery and kickba cks in its example of scheme s that could amou nt to honest service s fra ud (“ a c c e pti nga

br ibe , ta kin ga kic kb a c k, or

re c e ivi nga

be ne fi t from an undisclosed conflict of intere st”). The overwhelming
w e igh t o f

th e in s tr

u c ti o n s s u

p p o rt o n ly

th e un d is c lose d conflict of inter est theory , rathe r t h an a bribery or kickba ck theory . The tra

nscript of t he jury

instructions devoted nineU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 21

M cNa i r l i s t s t h e f

ol l owi n g c as es i n s up p o rt o f it s h ol di n g t h at § 666 9 do es not r equi r e a qui d pr o quo :

Uni t ed St at es v. A bb ey , 5 6 0 F.3d 51 3 , 52 0 (6t h C i r. ),
cer t

. deni ed , 130 S. Ct

. 739, 175 L. Ed. 2d 520 ( 2009) (s t at i ng “ t he t ext s ays nothi ng o f a qui d pro quo r equi r ement t o s us t ai n a co nv i ct i on” and “ whi l e a q u id pr o quo o f m o ney f

o r a specif

i c l egi sl at i ve ac t i s s u f f i ci en t t o v i ol at e [ § 666( a) ( 1) ( B ) or ( a) ( 2) ] , i t i s n ot
n e c e ssa ry” ) (q u o ta tio n m a rk s o m itt e d ); Uni t ed St at es v. G ee , 432 F. 3d 71 3, 71 4- 15 ( 7t h C i r
. 200 5) ( hol di ng t hat “[ a] qui d pr o quo o f

m o ney f

o r a s p eci f

i c l egi sl at i ve act ” i s not ne ces s ar y un der § 66 6(a) ( 1)( B ) a nd t hat an exc han ge of

mo ney f

or t he of f i ci al ’ s “ i nf

l ue nc e” was e n o u g h ); Uni t ed St at es v

. Agos t i no , 132 F. 3d 1183, 11 90 ( 7t h Ci r
. 199 7) ( “ W e d ec l i ne t o i mp ort an addi t i onal , s peci f

i c qui d pr o quo requir em ent in to t he
e le m e n ts o f § 6 6 6 (a )( 2 ).” ); bu ts ee Uni t ed St at es v. Je nni ngs , 16 0 F

. 3d 1006, 1014 ( 4t h Ci r
. 1998) ( con cl u di n g t h e “ cor r u pt i n t en t ” el eme n t i n § 666
r equi r es t he gover nment t o prove a q ui d pr o quo , but
s t at i ng t he “ qui d pr o quo req u ir e m e n t i s sati sf i ed so pag es to state and loc al laws g overnin ga public off icial’s duty to disc lose various contr ibutions, gifts, and c onflicts of int e re st.
I n c ontr a s t t o th e d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f th e f a i l ur e to disclose theory , the district court did not define either “b r i b e ry ” o r “ k i ck

b ac k ” i nth e § 1 3 4 6 co nt ex t

. Al th o u gh br ibe ry wa s d e fi ne d in

the 18 U. S.C. § 6 66 jur

y ins tr uc tio ns , § 666 does not requir e a jury to f ind a specific quid pro quo

. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . M c Nai r , 605 F .3 d 1 15 2, 11 87 –8 9 ( 11 th Cir . 2 01 0) (c on c lud ingthat § 6 66 do e s n ot r e qu ir e a sp e c if ic quid pro quo ); see also id. at 1189 (c ollectin g case s from other c ircuits whi ch h old that § 666 does not require a qu id pro quo ). A quid pro quo in br ibe ry is the “ sp e c if

ic int e nt t o 9U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 22

l on g a s t h e ev i den ce s h ows a ‘ cou r s e of co nd u ct of f avor s an d gi f

t s f l owi ng t o a publ i c of

f i ci al i n e xc hange f or a p a tter n o f o ff

ic ia l ac tio n s fav o ra b le to the d o n o r’”
an d “ t h e i n t en ded ex ch an g e i n br i ber y c an be ‘ t h i s f or the se ’ o r ‘the se fo r th e s e ,’ no t ju st ‘t h is fo r th a t’” (ci t at i o ns o m i t t ed ).

M c N a ir , 60 5 F.3d at 11 8 9 (al t erat i o ns i n ori gi nal ).

R o b le s w a s c o n v ic te d o n a s e p a r a te su b sta n tive c o u n t o f b rib e ry in 10 vi ol at i on of

18 U

. S. C

. § 66 6. H owever , provi ng bri bery un der § 66 6 do es no t ne ce ssaril y pro ve b ribe ry und er § 1 3 4 6 ho ne st serv i ce s f rau d b ec au se t h e g ov er n men t mu s t prove at l ea s t a n i mpl i ed qui d pr o quo t o pro ve bri bery un der § 13 46 , but t he gover nment do es not nee d t o prove a q u id pr o quo un der § 66 6 bri bery

. T hu s , i f t he gove r nment d i d not prove a q u id pr o quo , t h e j u r y c ou l d n ot h av e con v i ct ed Robl es of br i ber y u n der § 1346 h on es t s er v i ce s f

r au d, bu t t h e j u r y c ou l d s t i l l ha ve con v i ct ed Robl es of b rib e ry u n d e r § 6 6 6 . T h e re fo re , w e c a n n o t ex tra p o la te fro m R o b le s’s § 6 6 6 b ribe ry c o nv i cti o n t ha t the j ury c o nv i cted R o b l es o f § 1 3 4 6 ho ne st
s er vi ces f

r aud on a b ri b ery t heor y (as o pp ose d t o an un di s cl ose d conf l i ct
o f i n te r e s t the o ry)

. C

f

. Uni t ed St at es v. Wi l kes , 6 6 2 F .3 d 5 2 4 , 5 4 4 (9 th C ir. 2 0 1 1 ) ( h o ld ing tha t t h e ju ry’s c o n v ic tio n o f W ilke s o n a se p a ra te
s u bs t an t i v e cou n t of

br i ber y u n der ano t h er s t at u t e, 18 U

. S. C. § 201, “conf i rms be y o nd any reas o nab l e d o ub t t hat t he jur y wo uld have convi ct ed” W i l kes un der § 1346 hones t s er vi ces f r aud on a bri ber

y t heo ry becau s e § 201 , l i ke § 13 46 bri bery , r equi r es proof of a qui d pr o quo ). g ive or rec eive something of value in exc hange for a n officia l act.” U n i te d S ta tes v

. S u n
-D i a m o n d

G ro w e r s o f C a l i f o rn ia , 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999). Section 1346 honest servic es convictions on a bribery theory , on the other hand, re quire at least an implied quid pro quo

. Kincaid-Chauncey , 556 F.3d 10
at 94 3; see Section I I I .A. below f or fur ther discussion.
Th e re is e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d th at c ou ld s uppo rt a br ibe ry or kic kb a c k c onvic tio n. Ap pe lla nts do not disp ute that pa y me nts andin- kin d c ontr ibutio ns we re ma de to Robles’s family

and friends, including Garrido. For example,U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 23
Es pin oza te sti fi ed that

Rob le s in str

uc te d h im t o f

unne l w e ll
ov e r h a lf o f th e p r o c e e d s o f

h is c it y c o ntr a c t t o Ro b le s’s sister-in-law . Neve rtheless, it is impossi ble to conclude that the jur y c onvic te d Ro ble s and

Ga rrido ba se d o n th e ir participation in either a bribery or a kickbac k scheme instead of base d on Skilling ’s u n co n s tituti onal fa ilure to disclose a
c on fl ic t of

int e re st.

c

. TheClo sing A rgum e nts
The prosec utor’s closing argument leave s littl e doubt that i t s c a s e f o c u s e d a l m o s t e nt i r e l y o n a f a i l ur e t o d i s c l o s e th e o r

y. The prose cutor repeate dly invoked the public’s right to know when its public officia ls stand to be nefit fr om expenditures of public funds. Alt houg h the prosec utor ref err ed to financ ial
arr ang ements b e tw e e n

Robles and ce rtain contra ctors (e .g . the Southland Companies, PSOMAS, and Kl i stoff & Sons), the prosec utor did not a

rgue that they wer e the building blocks of a bribery or kickba ck sche me. Rather, suc h financ ial
arr ang ements we re c onsistently offe red t o show that Robles had conf licts of interest which w ere n ev er disclosed to the
vo te rs or to o the r o ff

ic ia ls o f t he Ci ty of South G ate . T hu s, the prosec utor’s closingargu m en t strongly sug g ests that the
case was pre sented to the jury as a f ailure t o d i s close a
c on fl ic t of

int e re st, wh ic h is pr e c ise ly wh at the Sup re me Court found unconstitutional in Skilling

. Simi larly , the transcript f

rom Robles’s closingargument sug g ests he believe d he was fighting undisclosed c onflict of int e re st c ha

rg e s. Hi s c los ingargume nt f oc us e d a lmo st e nti rely on wh e the r h e ha d a

duty to d isc los e the pa

y me nts , whether the pay ments fell within the ambit o f state or loca l
c on fl ic t of

int e re st p ro vis ion s, and wh e the r t

he pa y me nts wer e political “c ontributions” (which w ere not require d to beU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 24
disclosed on Robles’s persona l conflict of inter est For m 700) or whe ther they

wer e “g ifts” (whic h had to be disclosed)

. The indictment, the jury instructions, and the closing arguments at trial wer e per meated with the prohibited failure to disclose theory . Upholding the convictions wher e neither the g overnme nt nor the Appellants argued their c ases on a constitutionally

valid theory

constitutes a miscarr i ag e of jus tic e wh ic h wo uld “ se ri ou sly a ff e c t[] the fa ir

ne ss, int e gri ty or public reputation of

judicial proce eding s.” Marcus , 1 30 S. Ct. at 2164. Thus, Appellants have me t their burden unde r the pl ain e rr or

sta nd ard of re vie w t o s ho w that th e re wa s a rea sonable proba

bility that the i nstructional error affe cted the outcome of the trial and that the e rror seriousl y aff ecte d the fa ir ne ss, int e gri ty

or pu bli c rep utatio n o f j ud ic ia l pr oc e e din g s.
There fore , we r ever se Robles’s honest services mail and wire fra ud convictions and reve rse Ga rrido’s hone st service s mail fraud c onvictions. Further more, Counts 16, 22, and 27 fail for additional rea sons, which we tur n to now.
B. Robles’s § 1346 Honest Service s Co nviction on Count 16 and Rob l es ’s an d Garr ido’s § 1346 Honest Service s Convictions on Coun ts 22 and 27 Robles’s § 1346 conviction on C ount 16 and Robles’s and Gar rido’s § 1346 convictions on Counts 22 and 27 we re e ach based on a

failure to disclose a conflict of inter est in a Ca lif or nia F or m 70 0, State me nt o f E c onomi c Inte re sts , disclosure for

m. Pursuant to Skilling , fa i l ure to disclose a conflict of interes t in a state disclosure form ca nnot support a § 1346 honest services c onviction. See Section I I .A. above

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 25
Mo re ov e r, a s th e g ov ernment c on c e de s, the re is insufficient e vidence to support the convictions on Counts 16 and 27 under any theory

. Count 16 alleg ed that Robles fa iled to disclose that he r ece ived from Espinoza a $65,000 plat i num membership in the Anthony Robbins Foundation. Purely intrastate telephone calls fa ll outsi de the r eac h of wire fra ud under § 1343. Un ite d States v. I zy do re , 167 F.3d 213, 219–20 (5th Cir. 1999). B eca use the for

m was fax ed fr om South Gate, Califo rnia to Sacr amento, California , the g overnmen t concedes that we should rever se Robles’s conviction on Count 16 beca use t he gover

nment never

proved that the form tra

veled in interstate commerc e.
Count 27 refe rs t o a California For m 700 signe d by Robles on April 2, 2002 for ca l en d ar year 2001, in which Robles failed t o disclose a g ift of copy ing se rvice s rec eived fr om Klis tof

f. Th e g ov e rnme nt a lso c on c e de s th at w e sh ou ld
reve rse the Count 27 convic tion becau se there was ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e that th e c op yingse rv ic e s w e re g if ts.
B e c a us e the se c onvic tio ns c ann ot b e up he ld p os t- Skilling , we r ever se Robles’s convic tion on Count 16 and Robles’s and Gar rido’s convic tions on Count s 22 and 27.
C. Ro ble s’ s § 19 57 M one y La unde r ingCo nvi c ti ons
B e c a us e we re ve rs e Rob le s’ s § 13 46 ho ne st s e rv ic e s ma il and wire fraud convictions, his convictions on Counts 18 through 2 1 fo r m oney

laundering unde r 18 U.S.C. § 1957 must also be reve rsed. Convictions under § 1957 require the g overnme nt to prove that t h e off ender “eng ag e[d] or atte mpt [ed ] to e ng a g e in a mon e tary tr ans a c tio n in

c ri min a lly derive d proper

ty . . . derive d from sp ecified unlawful activity .” 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). The indictment alleg ed thatU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 26

T he Indi ct m ent charged R o b l es w ith “corrupt l y accep t [i ng] and 11 agree[i ng] t o accep t

. . . pa ym e nt s f o r goo d s and s ervi ces and cam p ai gn con t r i bu t i on s f

r om M i ch ae l K l i s t of

f an d Al l Ci t y Se r v i ce s , i n t en di n g t o be i nf l uen ced an d re war ded i n c onnec t i on wi t h a t r ans act i on o f [ a l ocal g ov er n men t ]

. . . n ame l y , t h e aw ar di n g of a mu l t i pl e- y ea r r ef

u s e col l ec t i on a n d re c yc ling c o n tra c t i n S o u th G a te w o rth a p p ro x im a te ly $ 4 8 m ill io n .”

T h e Sou t h G at e M u n i ci pal Code pr ov i des t h at “ [ t ] h e pr i mar y f u n ct i on 12 of t h e c i t y t r e a s u r e r i s t o di s bu r s e mo n i e s on de ma n d w h i c h h ave been p rop erl y aud i t ed and ap p roved , s uch t hat onc e t he p rop er p roce d ures have b e e n fo llo w e d , th e d u ty o f t h e c ity tre a su r e r t o d isb u rse th e fu n ds is the “c riminally

derive d proper

ty” wa s money

derive d from Robles’s honest servic es fraud. Ac cording ly , beca use the § 1 34 6 h on e st s e rv ic e s c onvic tio ns we re c on sti tut ion a lly defe ctive under Skilling , so too w e re the § 1 95 7 c onvic tio ns
. III
. A. Ro ble s’ s 1 8 U .S. C. § 6 66 Br ibe r y C onv ic ti ons (Counts 33–37) Counts 33 through 37 c harg ed Robles alone with bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 in connec tion with the wasteha uli ngc ontr a c t. Robles contends that § 666 require s a qu id

11 pro quo —a specific intent to rec eive a bribe in exchang e for an off icial ac t. Robles argues that there was insuffic i ent evidenc e to convict him of briber y under § 666 be cause there is no evidence that he intended to be , o r even could have be e n, inf lue nc e d in

his pe rf or manc e of on e of his official dutie s. Rob le s cla ims that, as Tr e a sure r of South G ate , h e did
no t ha ve the a uth or ity to a pp ro ve the wa ste -h a

uli ngc ontr a c t; ra the r t hat a uth or ity wa s v e ste d in

the c ity

c ounc il. Moreove r, as Tr easur er, he was re qui re dto disburse monies p r o p e r l y a

p p r o v e d b y th e c i ty. 12U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 27

m a n d a t o ry a n d n o td i sc re t i o n a ry
. ” Sou t h G at e M u n i ci pal Code § 1. 05. 050( A) ( emph as i s a dded)

. T h e t reasur er i s a l s o r es pon s i bl e f or recei vi ng cash recei p t s and d ep o si t i ng t hem i nt o t he ap p rop ri a te c ity
a c c o u n t. I

d. a t § 1 .0 5 .0 5 0 (B ). T h is d u ty i s n o t a “p o licy d e c isio n ,” b u t i s i ns t ead “ adm i ni s t r at i ve and mi ni s t er i al

. ” I d. “‘Claims of insuffic ient evidenc e are reviewe d de novo.’” United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967, 974 ( 9th Cir. 2008) (qu o t i n g United States v. Shipsey , 3 63 F .3 d 9 62 , 9 71 n. 8 ( 9th Cir. 2004)). The re is suff

icient evidenc e if, “ afte r viewingthe
ev idence in the light most favor able to the pr osecution, any ra tio na l trie r of fa c t cou ld have fo un d the e sse nti a l e le me nts o f th e c r im e b e yo n d a r e a s o n a b le d oubt.” Jack

son v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Section 666 conce rns briber y in c onnection with state and local entities rec eiving fede ral funds. An offici al v i olates § 666 if the off

icial “ corr

uptly solicits or demands for the benef it of any person, or acc epts or agree s to acc ept, any thing of value from any p er s o n , intending to be influence d or
rew arde d in connec tion with any bu s i n ess, t ransa ction, or series of transac tions” of an e ntity (in thi s ca s e, t he City

of South Gate) , if the ex chang e invol ves at least $5,000 and the
e nti ty re c e ive s fe de ra l f

un ds in e xce ss o f $ 10 ,0 00 . 1 8 U .S. C. § 666(a) (1)( B) , (b). The purpose of the statute is to “ protec t fede ral funds by prese rving the integ rity of the entit i es that
rec eive the f

eder al funds.” United States v. Simas , 937 F.2d 4 5 9 , 4 6 3 (9 thC i r. 1 9 9 1 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. W estmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, 578 ( 5th Cir. 1988)).
Ro b l es’s a

rgument that § 666 require s an off icial ac t “conf uses influenc e with [the] p o wer to act unilatera lly .” United States v. Ge e , 432 F.3d 713, 715 ( 7th Cir. 2005). A jury could re asonably

find th at R o bles intended to beU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 28
influence d in conn ection with the city ’s awa rd of the w astehaulingcontra ct eve n though the authority to awar d the contra ct was not p ar t of Robles’s off icial duties. The g overnme nt presente d evidenc e that Robles showed Klistoff a dra ft reque st for proposa ls for the c ontrac t, and that the fina l reque st for proposa ls incorporated Klistoff’s sug g estion that the wa ste -h a

uli ng c ontr a c t awa

rd on e c omp any

both residential a

nd commerc ial waste- haulingservice s. Robles assigned h i s fr iend Moret to wor k as fa cilitator for the bid d in gp r o c e s s f

o r th e w a s te

- h a

u li n gc o ntr a c t. Ro bles further instructed More t that h i s “horse in the rac e” w as Klistof f & So n s
. D ur in gth e s e le c ti o np r o c e s s , Ro b les communicated w ith Moret fre quently and More t told R obles information that was not available t o the public. Robles
re qu e ste d th at Mo ret re c omm e nd a c on su lta nt t o a ssi st Klistoff & Sons in i ts presentation for the bid, but he did not reque st assistance f

or any other bidder s. Kl i s toff & Sons hired the rec ommended consultant. Robl es showed Klistoff the other c ompanies’ c ompeting bids, e ven though the inf or matio n w a s c on fi de nti a l du ri ngthe bidd ingpr oc e ss. Moret provide d Robles and Klistoff & Son ’s co nsultant the confide ntial questions the selection committee would ask the bidders in adva

nce of the pre sentations, an adva ntag e no other bidder rec eived. Thus, there was ample evidenc e that Robles
acc epted br ibes from Klistoff with t h e intention to be inf lue nc e d in

c onne c tio n w iththe wa ste -h a uli ngc ontr a c t. Robles indeed used his conside rable influence exclusively for Klistoff’s bene fit. Klistoff & Sons was awa rded the contra ct despite not beingthe lowest bidder.

In support of his ar gument that § 666 require s the g ov e rnme nt t o p ro ve that Rob le s int e nd e d to b e inf lue nc e d in
connec tion with an of

ficial a ct as tre asure r, Robles urg es the court to adopt the standa rds ar t i culated in United States v.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 29
Su n- Di amond Gro we rs o

f Ca lif or nia , 526 U.S. 398 (1999). We find Sun-Diamond inapposite. Sun-Diamond conce rned a sepa rate fede ral statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, and the r easoning for re qu ir ingan o ff

ic ia l a c t un de r § 20 1 is ina pp lic a ble to § 6 6 6

. S ec t i o n2 0 1 (b ) d ef i n es b ri b ery

as th e a cto f gi v i n g, of fe ri ng , o r p ro mis ingso me thi ngof va lue in o rd e r “ to inf lue nc e any

of fi c ia l ac t” or re c e ivi ng so me thi ng of va lue in return f or “be ing inf

luenced in the perf

ormanc e of a

ny of fi c ia l a c t.” 18 U. S.C. § 2 01(b )( 1) (A ), (2 )( A) ; SunDiamond, 5 26 U. S. at 40 4. Th e te rm “ of fi c ia l a c t” is expressly and broa dly

define d in § 201 as “a

ny d ec i s i o n or action on any

question, matter, ca

use, suit, p roceedingor controve rsy , whi ch may

at any time be pending , or which may by law be br oug ht before any p ub l i c official, in such of fi c ia l’ s of fi c ia l c a pa c ity , o r i n s uc h o ff

ic ia l’ s p la c e of

tr us t or p ro fi t.” 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)( 3). B ribery under § 201(b), there fore , expressly

require s “a q u id pro quo —a sp e c if ic intent to give or

rec eive somethingof value in e x c hange for an off icial ac t.” Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404–05.
Importantly , Sun-Diamond wa s pr ima ri ly c on c e rn e d w ith limit ing the scope of

illega l gr atuities under § 2 01(c)

. Id. at 405

– 1 4

. Be cause § 201(c) criminalizes the g iving of

“ any thi ngof va lue ,” wi th n o thr e sh old

mon e tary re qu ir e me nt, un d er l yi n g Sun-Diamond was a need to dist inguish be tween illega l gr atu i t i es and “toke n g ifts” g iven “by rea son of the
rec ipie nt’s mere tenure in office .” Id . at 40 6, 40 8. Thus , requ i ri ngan off

icial ac t under § 201(c ) wa s nece ssary beca use “a contra ry holding would c riminaliz e a w ide ar ray of pre sumptively l ega l g ift g iving, like g iving of ficials a hat or a hot dog.” United States v. Abbe y , 560 F .3 d 513 , 521 (6 th Cir. 2009) (discussingthe re asoningin Su n
- D iamond ). Unde r § 201(c) , an off

icial ac t is therefor e the “ li m i t i n g principle”U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 30

R o b le s c ites to se v e ra l ca se s fro m th e S e c o n d C irc u it in su p p o rt o f his 13
ar gu ment t hat § 66 6 re qui r es a qui d pr o quo , an exchange f o r a sp e c ifi c o f f ic ia l a ct

. M o st of o ur s i st er ci rcui t s, how ever, have reject ed t he
a r g u me n t t h a t § 66 6 r e qu i r es a q u i d pr o quo
. S e e M c N a ir , 605 F. 3d at 1 1 8 7

– 8 8 ; A bb ey , 5 6 0 F .3 d a t 5 2 0

– 2 1 ; G ee , 4 3 2 F .3 d a t 7 1 4

– 1 5 ; see a lso Uni t ed St at es v. B oend er , 649 F. 3d 650 , 6 54 (7t h Ci r
. 201 1) ( not i ng t hat t he Seven t h Ci r cui t “ l i ke mo s t ot her s , does not r equi r e a s peci f i c q u i d p ro quo ” un d e r § 6 6 6 ); s upr a n .9 . M o re o v e r, it is p o ssib le fo r a c o u rt to
r equi r e a qui d pr o quo b u t no t re q u ire tha t t h e e x c h a n g e b e fo r a sp e c ifi c o ff ic ia l ac t. S e e Un ited S ta te s v . R e d zic , 627 F. 3d 683, 692 ( 8t h Ci r
. 2010) that d is ti n gu is h e s “ anil le g a l gr atu it y f r o m a le g a l o n e .” Un ite d S tates v . Gan im , 510 F.3d 134, 146 ( 2d Cir. 2007).
Sectio n 6 6 6 , o n th e o th e r h an d , ma k e s n o me nti o n of an

“ of fi c ia l a c t” or

a re quir ement

tha t any thi ngbe g ive n in exchang e or r eturn for an o fficial act. Section 666 does not defi n e or eve n use the ter m “offic ial act.” Section 666 “swe eps more broadly than either §§ 201(b) or

(c) .” Mc Nai r , 605 F.3d at 1191. Be cause the plain languag e of § 666 doe s not use the term “off

icial act,” we must not insert thatt erm into our rea ding of

the statute. Id

. at 1192 (n o t i n g t hat d efendants fa iled “to show that the statutory language cr i m inalizes innocent behavior” ). More over, the need f or a “limiting principle” to dist i nguish betwee n illega l and leg al gratuities, as expressed in Sun-Diamond, is “ no t r e le va nt [t o violations of § 666] beca use § 666 conta ins both a corr upt intent re qu i re ment and a r equire ment that the illeg al g ift or bribe be worth over $5,000.” Abbey , 56 0 F .3 d at 52 1. Th us , we de cline to adopt § 201’s of ficial a ct re quirement for § 666.

In so holding, we join our sister circ uits, the Thir d, Six th, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, who have a ll held § 666 does
no t r e qu ir e that a br ibe be g ive n o r r e c e ive d w iththe int e nt t o inf lue nc e the pu

bli c of fi c ial in an o ff

ic ia l a c t. See U

nited 13U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 31

( s t at i ng “ t he gover nment mus t pre s ent evi dence o f a qui d pro quo, but an i l l eg al br i be may be pa i d w i t h t h e i n t en t t o i n f l u en ce a g en er al c ou r s e of
co nd uct ”). Sta te s v . A nd re ws , 681 F.3d 509, 529- 530 (3d Cir. 2012) (holdingthat for a

conviction unde r § 6 6 6 , Har ris “did not have to p os se ss a c tual a uth or ity ov e r t he bu sin e ss, tr ans a c tio n, or se ri e s of tr ans a c tio ns , that And re ws so ught t o inf lu e n c e [; ] [r ]ath e r , th e G o v e r nme nt h a d

to p r o v e o n ly

that An dr e ws intended, by offe ringa bribe to Harris, to influence the se we r c ontr a c t” (c itatio n o mitte d) ); Mc Nai r , 605 F.3d at 1191 (explaining § 666 “ requires only that money

be g iven wi th i nte nt t o in fl ue nc e or rewar d a g ov e rnme nt a g e nt ‘ in
c o nn e c ti o n w it

h any b u s in e s s , tr an s a c ti o n , o r s e r ie s of tr ans a c tio ns ,’ ” and

“ do e s n ot s ay

‘o ff ic ia l a c t’ ” ); Abbey , 560 F.3d at 515, 519–21 (aff irm i n g § 666 conviction wher e the g overnme nt asserte d that “Abbe y used his influence and position t o assist Riz zo with sever al l and developments” but

“ d id n o t i ntr o d

u c e any e v id e n c e e s ta

b li s h in gth at .

. . Ri zzo and Abbe y

had an e x press a g ree ment for a s p ec ific off

icial
a c t to be do ne in r e tur

n f or Rizzo’ s g if

t” ); Gee , 432 F.3d at 715 (af firming§ 666 conviction wher e a jur y could find that

“ m o n e y
. . . w a s e xc h an g e d f o r G e o r g e ’ s i n f

l u e nc e ” in direc ting c ontrac ts towards the org aniz at i on, beca use eve n tho ugh G e or g e did

no t hav e the po we r t o a

wa rd the c ontr a c ts

“ Ge or g e ha d ple nty of

c lout and us e d it to [the or g anizatio n’ s] benef it”).
Al tho ugh Sec on d Ci rc uit c a se s r e fe r t o b ri be ry in
connec tion with an official a ct, the Second Circ uit has not squar e ly h e ld th at o f

f ic ia l a c ts o r d

uti e s ar e r e qu ir e d f

o r aU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 32

In G a n im , t h e Se con d Ci r cu i t “ pr es u me[ d] t h at t h e s ame s t an dar d f or 14 p roving a q ui d p ro q uo e xi st s und er bo t h 18 U

. S.C

. § 6 6 6 and § 2 0 1 (b)(1),
as ne i t her par t y ha [ d] a rgu ed t hat t her e i s , or s houl d be, an y di f f er enc e

. . . . ” G a n im , 510 F. 3d a t 148 n

. 7. § 666 conviction. In Un ite d States v . F or d, the cour

t stated 14 that the defe ndant “a ccepted [free media] service s ‘intending to be influenc ed’ in her official duti es .” 4 3 5 F. 3 d 204, 212 (2nd Cir. 2006) (e mphas i s added) . The primar y focus of Fo rd, h ow e ve r, wa s a dd

re ssi ngwh e the r the jur

y wa s p ro pe rl y instructed that the “ rec ipient [ of the bribe ] must have
acc epted t h e thi ngof value while ‘intendingto be influence d.’” Id. at 212–14. Althoug h Ford sug g ests that the word “ corr

uptly” in § 666 implies a brea ch of some of ficial duty , id. at 211, the Eleventh Circuit ha s interpre ted the wor d “cor ruptly” to mean “dishonestly seeking an il leg al goal or a leg al go al illega lly .” Mc Nai r , 605 F.3d at 1188. We agree with t he Eleve nth Circuit that “[t ]he require ment of a ‘cor rupt’ intent in § 666 . . . narr ow[s] th e conduct that
v io late s § 6 6 6 b ut d o e s n o t i mp o s e a s p e c if ic q u i d p ro quo require ment.” Id. at 1188.
In Un ite d S

tates v . B on ito , the Second C i rc u it upheld a jury instruction which “ m ade clear that the cor

rupt agree ment, offe r or pa

y ment must prece de the official act to be influenc ed or r ewa

rded.” 57 F.3d 167, 171 (2nd Cir. 1995) (em p h as is added). Bonito assumes “of ficial duties” a

re appropriate in a jury

instruction, but the court had no
occa sion to addre ss the issue beca use that par

ticular ter m was not in disput e. Id. at 171–74. Fur ther, the cour

t’s aff irmance of B onito’s § 666 conviction sug g ests that the cour t did not require that the public offic ial have a ctual authority over the business Bonito sought to infl u ence—there , the purc hase of Bonito’s prope rty . Rather, mu ch li ke Robles did here , theU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 33

It m ay si m p l y be t he case t hat i n ref erri ng t o “ o f

ficia l dut i es, ” t he 15 Se co nd C i rc ui t “ was not p o si t i ng an ad d i t i o nal el em ent t o t he st at ut o ry def i ni t i on of

t he cr i me, but i ns t ead was ex pl ai ni ng t he s i ne q u a non o f a vi ol at i on o f

§ 666

. ” Uni t ed St at es v

. Agos t i no , 1 3 2 F .3 d 1 1 8 3 , 1 1 9 0 (7 th C i r
. 199 7) ( expl ai ni ng t hat al t houg h a pri or Seven t h C i r cui t cas e r ef er r ed t o a “ ‘ q ui d pro quo ’ ” as b e ing a n “ ‘ ess ent i al el em ent ’ ” o f § 6 6 6 , t he “el em e n ts o f the o f

f ense r em ai n t ho se t hat are s et f o rt h i n t he st at ut o ry l ang uag e” ( ci t at i on om i t t ed)). A s a prac t i cal mat t er , mo s t bri bery ca s es

“ i n v ol v e an i den t i f

i abl e an d pa r t i cu l ar i ze d of f i ci al a ct , bu t t h at i s n ot
re q u ire d to c o n v ic t” un d e r § 6 6 6

. M c N a ir , 6 0 5 F .3 d a t 1 1 8 8 ; G ee , 43 2 F. 3d a t 71 4 ( “ A qui d pr o quo of m oney f or a s peci f

i c l egi s l at i ve act i s s uf f i ci ent to vio la te [1 8 U .S .C . § 6 6 6 ], b u t i t i s n o t n ec essa ry
. ”). public officia l B onito bribed “under took a rang e of a ctivities that inh e r e d to B o n it o ’ s f

in an c ia l b e n e f

it ” wh ic hin c lu ded
se tti ngup me e tin g s f

or B on ito , b e c omi nginvo lv ed in neg otiations for the pu rc hase of Bonito’s prope rty , and contac ting of

ficials “to push t h e deal through.” Id. at 170, 17 4. Th e re wa s no e vid e nc e that de mon str ate d th at th e pu bli c of f ic ia l a lo n e c o u ld

a p p r o v e th e p ur c h a s e o f B o n it o ’s proper ty

. Id. at 17 3– 74 ; see also United States v . Bahel , 6 6 2 F. 3 d 6 1 0 , 6 3 7

– 3 8 (2 d C i r. 2 0 1 1 ) ( d i s cu s s i n g Ford and Bo nito ). 15

For the fore g oing r easons, we are n o tpersua ded by Robles’s arguments. We hold that § 666 does not require that Robles intended to be influenc ed in an officia l act. We thus
a ff ir m Ro ble s’ s § 66 6 b ri be ry c onvic tio ns
. IV.
I N SU M:
We RE VE RSE Ro bles’s § 1346 honest ser vices fr aud
co nv i ct i o n s wi thre s p ec tt o C o unt s 1 thro u gh 1 1 , 1 3 thro u ghU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AR R I DO 34
15 , 1 7, and

23 thr ou gh 2 5, and Gar ri do ’s § 1 34 6 h on e st s erv i ce s fr au d

co nv i ct i o n s wi thre s p ec tt o C o unt s 2 3 thro u gh 25 beca use, under Skilling , th e jur y ins tr ucti on s e rr on e ou sly permitted convic tions o nthe unconstitutional theory of a fa ilure to d isc los e a

c on fl ic t of

int e re st.
We RE VE RSE Robles’s § 1346 honest s ervic es fr aud convictio ns with respec t to Count s 16, 22, and 27 and Ga rrido ’s § 1 34 6 h on e st s e rv ic e s f ra ud c onvic tions wi th respe ct t o Counts 22 and 27, and AC QU IT Rob le s o n Co unts 16, 22, and 27 and AC QU IT Gar rido o n C o unts 22 and 27 beca use these c ounts are based on Skilling ’s unconstitutional the o r y o f a f a i l ur e t o d i s c l o s e a

c o n f l i c to f i nt e r e s ti na

s ta te dis c los ur e fo rm , a

nd be c a us e the re is ins uf

fi c ie nt ev ide nc e to support Counts 16 and 27.
We REVER SE Robles’s § 1957 money laundering
c onvic tio ns wi th r e sp e c t to Counts 18 thro ugh 2 1 b e c a us e they are predic ated on the f lawed hone st s ervices fra ud
c onvic tio ns
. We AF FI RMRob le s’ s § 66 6 b ri be ry c onvic tio ns wi th respe ct to Counts 33 through 37 be cause § 666 convictions do not require the def

endant intende d to be in fl u en ced in a n of fi c ia l a c t.
We REMAND this c ase to the D istrict Court for furthe r proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. Thus, United States v. Garrido , N o. 06 -507 17 , is RE VE RSE D and RE M AN DE D ; and United States v. Robles , N o. 06 -5 07 18 , is RE VE RSE D in part, AF F IRM ED in part, and RE M AN DE D

.