UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. 

JEFFREY SABOL, 

Defendant. 

Crim. Action No. 21-35-1 (EGS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Defendant Jeffrey Sabol (“Mr. Sabol”) has been charged in a 

federal indictment with eight serious misdemeanor and felony 

offenses arising from his participation in the events at the 

U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. See Superseding Indictment, ECF 

No. 23. After Mr. Sabol was arrested in New York on January 22, 

2021, a magistrate judge on the United States District Court for 

the Southern District of New York held a detention hearing and 

ordered Mr. Sabol detained pending trial due to his “risk of 

flight/danger.” See Min. Entry, 7:21-mj-866-UA-1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 

22, 2021). Pending before the Court is Mr. Sabol’s Motion for 

Pretrial Release, which seeks his release from custody to the 

Pretrial Services Agency’s High Intensity Supervision Program 

(“HISP”). Def.’s Mot. Pretrial Release (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 

17. The Court held a hearing on Mr. Sabol’s motion on April 8,

2021. See Min. Entry (Apr. 9, 2021).
2 

Upon careful consideration of the motion and opposition, 

the arguments set forth at the April 8, 2021 hearing, the 

applicable law, and the entire record herein, Mr. Sabol’s motion 

is DENIED. 

I. Background

Mr. Sabol and four co-defendants are alleged to have 

forcibly assaulted, resisted, opposed, impeded, intimidated, or 

interfered with Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers 

while they were attempting to help the U.S. Capitol Police 

maintain the security of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. 

See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 23 at 1-4.1 The sixteen-count 

superseding indictment, filed March 12, 2021, charges Mr. Sabol 

with the following offenses: (1) Assaulting, Resisting, or 

Impeding Certain Officers Using a Dangerous Weapon, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and (b); (2) Assaulting, Resisting, or 

Impeding Certain Officers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

111(a)(1); (3) Civil Disorder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

231(a)(3); (4) a second count of Civil Disorder, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3); (5) Entering and Remaining in a 

Restricted Building or Grounds with a Deadly or Dangerous 

Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1752(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A); 

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document. 
3 

(6) Disorderly and Disruptive Conduct in a Restricted Building

or Grounds with a Deadly or Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1752(a)(2) and (b)(1)(A); (7) Engaging in Physical

Violence in a Restricted Building or Grounds with a Deadly or

Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1752(a)(4) and

(b)(1)(A); and (8) Act of Physical Violence in the Capitol

Grounds or Buildings, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(F).

Id. at 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9.

The Court sets out below the evidence proffered by the 

government in support of its opposition to Mr. Sabol’s motion, 

and in favor of his continued pretrial detention, as well as a 

brief overview of the procedural history of this case.2

A. Mr. Sabol’s Conduct on January 6, 2021

Mr. Sabol has admitted to law enforcement that he was in

Washington D.C. and at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, the 

day a joint session of the U.S. Congress convened to certify the 

Electoral College vote count and the 2020 Presidential Election. 

See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 3. According to the government, 

Mr. Sabol believed that “there was no question” that the 2020 

Presidential Election was “stolen.” Id. On January 6, 2021, Mr. 

Sabol equipped himself with a helmet, steel-toe boots, zip ties, 

2 At a detention hearing, the government may present evidence by 

way of a proffer. See United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 

1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
4 

a radio, and an ear piece, and he traveled to Washington D.C. to 

watch then-President Trump speak at a rally and to participate

in the protest against the election results, which ended in a 

riot at the U.S. Capitol. Id. 

Mr. Sabol told law enforcement that when he reached the 

U.S. Capitol, he heard flashbangs going off and “recognized that 

a ‘battle’ was already occurring,” which he believed was started 

by members of the left-wing anti-fascist political movement 

Antifa as the “perfect set-up.” Id. He “had to be on the front 

line” of the “battle” because he is a “warrior.” Id. Mr. Sabol’s 

cell phone records place him in the area around the U.S. Capitol 

as of 3:29 p.m. that day. Id. 

At approximately 4:20 p.m., MPD officers assumed a post in 

an archway at the access point of the U.S. Capitol’s lower 

western terrace. Id. at 4. Among the MPD officers at that post 

were Officer A.W., Officer B.M., and Officer C.M. Id. Shortly 

after assuming the post, all three officers were “brutally” 

assaulted by rioters who were part of a mob that had gathered 

outside of the U.S. Capitol. Id. Video footage provided by the 

government displays the violent attacks that left the officers 

wounded and in need of medical care. See Exs. 2, 3, 5A to 

Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20. Officer A.W. sustained a laceration 

that caused him to bleed from the head and required staples to 

close, and Officer B.M. sustained an abrasion to his nose and 
5 

right cheek and minor bruising to his left shoulder. See Gov’t’s 

Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 8-9.

The government proffers evidence in support of charges 

against Mr. Sabol for his participation in the assault of 

Officer A.W. and Officer B.M. Id. at 4-9. At around 4:27 p.m., 

an unknown individual charged at Officer A.W., grabbed at his 

face, and knocked him to his feet. Id. at 4. While Officer A.W. 

was on the ground, Mr. Sabol climbed up the U.S. Capitol steps 

to where Officer A.W. was laying and yanked Officer A.W.’s baton 

out of his hand. Id. at 4-5 (citing Officer A.W.’s Body Worn 

Camera (“BWC”) Video Footage, Exhibit 2 to Gov’t’s Opp’n). The 

government provides additional video footage that “shows that 

Sabol used so much force in snatching [Officer] A.W.’s baton out 

of his hands that when he succeeded in wrestling it away from 

Officer A.W., [Mr.] Sabol fell back down the steps.” Id. at 5 

(citing Storyful3 Video Footage, Ex. 3 to Gov’t’s Opp’n). 

Meanwhile, another individual, alleged to be Mr. Sabol’s codefendant Mr. Jack Wade Whitton, began striking Officer B.M. 

with a crutch and then pulled him by the head and helmet over 

Officer A.W. and down the steps into the large crowd. Id. Mr. 

3 According to its website, Storyful is a “news and intelligence 

agency” owned by News Corp. that was founded as “the first 

social media newswire . . . to break the news faster and utilize 

social content to add context to reporting.” See About Storyful, 

Storyful, https://storyful.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 14, 

2021). 
6 

Sabol then “rushed back up the steps, put his hand on Officer 

B.M.’s backside, and with his right hand, held the baton that he 

stole from Officer A.W. up against Officer B.M.’s neck” before 

helping drag Officer B.M. face-first down the steps and into the 

mob. Id. at 5-6 (citing Storyful Video Footage, Ex. 3 to Gov’t’s 

Opp’n; Officer C.M.’s BWC Video Footage, Ex. 5A to Gov’t’s 

Opp’n). After Mr. Sabol and other rioters dragged Officer B.M. 

into the crowd, co-defendant Peter Stager repeatedly struck 

Officer B.M. with a flagpole. Id. at 8. Rioters also dragged 

Officer A.W.—who was at that point without the baton that Mr. 

Sabol had taken from him—down into the mob where rioters ripped 

off his helmet, maced him, took his gas mask and MPD-issued cell 

phone, kicked him, struck him with poles, and stomped on him. 

Id. at 8-9. 

B. Mr. Sabol’s Conduct Between January 6, 2021, and His Arrest 

on January 22, 2021 

On January 7, 2021, Mr. Sabol returned to his home in 

Colorado. Id. at 9. There, “paranoid that he was going to be 

charged with sedition,” he “fried” electronic devices in his 

microwave, destroyed anything that could be “misconstrued as 

antigovernment,” and moved two firearms that he kept at his home 

to an associate’s residence. Id. 

Between January 9 and 10, 2021, Mr. Sabol traveled from 

Colorado to Boston, Massachusetts. Id. Mr. Sabol planned to fly 
7 

from Boston to Switzerland to avoid extradition for any crimes 

arising from his conduct at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. 

Id. He has admitted to law enforcement that he planned to ski 

while in Switzerland to make his trip “look natural.” Id. But 

while at the airport in Boston, Mr. Sabol saw police officers 

and “thought they mentioned his backpack.” Id. He left the 

airport, rented a vehicle, and began driving south. Id. Because 

Mr. Sabol thought law enforcement was tracking him, he discarded 

his cell phone out of a window and over a bridge while he was 

driving. Id. 

On January 11, 2021, officers from the Clarkstown Police 

Department in New City, New York responded to a vehicle that was 

driving erratically. Id. at 10. They located the vehicle, which 

Mr. Sabol was driving, and discovered that he was covered in 

blood from severe lacerations on his thighs and arms. Id. at 10. 

Mr. Sabol has admitted to law enforcement that he had attempted 

to take his own life. Id. When the Clarkstown officers found Mr. 

Sabol, he made spontaneous statements, including “I am tired, I 

am done fighting”; “My wounds are self-inflicted”; “I was 

fighting tyranny in the D.C. Capitol”; and “I am wanted by the 

FBI.” Id. An inventory search of Mr. Sabol’s vehicle uncovered 

razor blades, a note with instructions and password to a 

computer, electronic devices, his passport and Social Security 

Card, an airline e-ticket, a rental car agreement, and a green 
8 

backpack and tan Carhartt jacket similar to the backpack and 

jacket depicted in video footage of the attacks on the MPD 

officers at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Id. 

On January 12, 2021, Mr. Sabol spoke with law enforcement 

officers while he was recovering from his self-inflicted wounds 

at the Westchester Medical Center. Id. In addition to the 

admissions discussed above, Mr. Sabol also admitted to law 

enforcement officers that he was at the U.S. Capitol on January 

6, 2021, wearing a brown Carhartt jacket, a black or grey 

helmet, a green backpack, and black gloves. Id. Regarding the 

events that took place that day, Mr. Sabol admitted he had 

grabbed an MPD officer’s baton, but he alleged that he was there 

only to save the officers who he saw “needed help.” Id. 

On January 13, 2021, Mr. Sabol spoke with law enforcement 

again and was asked to review video footage and still photos 

depicting the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Id.

at 11. Mr. Sabol admitted the following: (1) he was the person 

in the Storyful video wearing a grey/black helmet, black gloves, 

and the tan/brown Carhartt jacket and green backpack that were 

found in his vehicle; (2) he had run up the steps of the U.S. 

Capitol, jumped over a barricade, and dragged an MPD officer 

down the steps; and (3) he is the individual shown positioned 

over an MPD officer who is lying face down on the ground in the 

still photo that is Exhibit 4 to the government’s opposition. 
9 

Id. Mr. Sabol maintained, however, that he was trying to assist 

the officer who he helped drag down the steps, and he was 

“patting him on the back” and saying “we got you man.” Id. He 

claimed that he covered the officer to protect him from rioters 

who were trying to hit the officer with poles. Id. But he also 

acknowledged, with respect to the image depicted in the 

government’s Exhibit 4, that he could not recall if he hit the 

officer with the baton he was holding against the back of the 

officer’s neck because “he was in a fit of rage” and the details 

were “cloudy.” Id. He also stated that during the mayhem, a 

“call to battle was announced” and he “answered the call because 

he is a patriot warrior.” Id. Mr. Sabol further admitted that 

once he believed law enforcement was looking for him, he deleted 

numerous text messages and other communications, including a 

video he had taken of himself and sent to an associate on 

January 6, 2021, in which he said he had been pepper sprayed but 

“we are going back in.” Id. Law enforcement recovered the video 

as well as a text message from Mr. Sabol advising the associate 

to delete the video. Id. 

C. Procedural Background

Mr. Sabol was first charged with Civil Disorder in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) on January 15, 2021. See 

Criminal Complaint, ECF No. 1. He was arrested and had an 

initial appearance and detention hearing before a magistrate 
10 

judge on the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York on January 22, 2021. See Min. Entry, 7:21-

mj-866-UA-1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2021). Following the detention 

hearing, the magistrate judge ordered Mr. Sabol detained pending 

trial because he was deemed a “risk of flight/danger.” Id. 

On January 29, 2021, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. 

Sabol, along with two co-defendants, for Civil Disorder and 

other offenses arising from their actions at the U.S. Capitol, 

including Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers 

Using a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) 

and (b). Indictment, ECF No. 8. On March 12, 2021, the 

superseding indictment was filed. See Superseding Indictment, 

ECF No. 23. The sixteen-count superseding indictment names Mr. 

Sabol and now four co-defendants, all of whom are alleged to 

have participated in the assault of MPD officers at the U.S. 

Capitol on January 6, 2021. Id. 

After his detention hearing, Mr. Sabol was transported to 

the D.C. area, and he is currently in custody at the D.C. Jail. 

Mr. Sabol filed the pending motion for pretrial release on 

February 23, 2021, the government filed its opposition on March 

9, 2021, and Mr. Sabol did not file a reply. 

II. Legal Standard 

The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., provides 

that a hearing shall be held to determine whether a defendant 
11 

should be detained pretrial upon a motion by the government if

the defendant is charged with an offense falling in one of five 

enumerated categories. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)-(E). As 

relevant here, a detention hearing shall be held pursuant to 

Section 3142(f)(1)(A) if a defendant is charged with a “crime of 

violence,” which is “defined broadly as an offense having as an 

element the attempted, threatened, or actual use of physical 

force against a person or property of another, or a felony 

offense that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 

physical force against the person or property of another may be 

used in the course of committing the offense.” See United States 

v. Chrestman, No. 21-mj-218 (ZMF), 2021 WL 765662, at *4 (D.D.C. 

Feb. 26, 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(A)-(B)). A 

detention hearing shall also be held upon a motion by the 

government or a judicial officer’s own motion if the defendant 

poses a serious risk of flight or of attempting to obstruct 

justice or threaten, injure, or intimidate a witness or juror. 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A)-(B). 

If a detention hearing is held pursuant to Section 3142(f), 

a judicial officer “shall” detain a defendant pending trial if 

the judicial officer determines that “no condition or 

combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance 

of the person as required and the safety of any other person and 

the community.” Id. § 3142(e). “In common parlance, the relevant 
12 

inquiry is whether the defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger 

to the community.’” United States v. Munchel, No. 21-3010, 2021 

WL 1149196, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2021) (quoting United 

States v. Vasquez-Benitez, 919 F.3d 546, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2019)). 

When the basis for pretrial detention is the defendant’s danger 

to the community, the government is required to demonstrate the 

appropriateness of detention pursuant to subsection (e) by clear 

and convincing evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). When the basis 

for pretrial detention is the defendant’s risk of flight, the 

government is required to demonstrate the appropriateness of 

detention pursuant to subsection (e) by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See United States v. Xulam, 84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996). 

Certain conditions and charged offenses trigger a 

rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of 

conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any person and 

the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2)-(3) (providing that a 

rebuttable presumption arises pursuant to subsection (e)(2) if 

the defendant committed a “crime of violence” while on release 

pending trial for another offense and not more than five years 

after the date of conviction or the release of the person from 

imprisonment for that offense, or pursuant to subsection (e)(3) 
13 

if there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed 

one of a subset of offenses listed in that section).4

In cases that do not involve the conditions and charged 

offenses that trigger a rebuttable presumption of detention, the 

Court considers the following factors to determine whether 

detention is required to ensure the appearance of the person and 

the safety of any other person and the community: 

1. The nature and circumstances of the offense 

charged, including whether the offense is a 

crime of violence; 

2. The weight of the evidence; 

3. The history and characteristics of the 

person, including 

A. The person’s character, physical 

and mental condition, family 

ties, employment, financial 

resources, length of residence in 

the community, community ties, 

past conduct, history relating to 

drug or alcohol abuse, criminal 

history, and record concerning 

4 The subset of offenses triggering a rebuttable presumption 

under subsection (e)(3) include the following: “(A) an offense 

for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is 

prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act . . . the Controlled 

Substances Import and Export Act . . . , or chapter 705 of title 

46; (B) an offense under section 924(c), 956(a), or 2332b of 

this title; (C) an offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of 

title 18, United States Code, for which a maximum term of 

imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed; (D) an offense 

under chapter 77 of this title for which a maximum term of 

imprisonment of 20 years or more is prescribed; or (E) an 

offense involving a minor victim under section 1201, 1591, 2241, 

2244(a)(1), 2245, 2251, 2251A, 2252(a)(1), 2252(a)(2), 

2252(a)(3), 2252A(a)(1), 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(a)(3), 2252A(a)(4), 

2260, 2421, 2422, 2423, or 2425 of this title.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3142(e)(3)(A)-(E). 
14 

appearance at court proceedings; 

and 

B. Whether, at the time of the 

current offense or arrest, the 

person was on probation, on 

parole, or on other release; and 

4. The nature and seriousness of the danger to 

any person or the community that would be 

posed by the person’s release. 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); see also Munchel, 2021 WL 1149196, at *4. 

If a magistrate judge orders a defendant detained, the 

defendant “may file, with the court having original jurisdiction 

over the offense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the 

order.” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). Although the Court of Appeals for 

the District of Columbia Circuit (the “D.C. Circuit”) has not 

squarely decided the issue of what standard of review a district 

court should apply to review of a magistrate’s detention order, 

see Munchel, 2021 WL 1149196, at *5; courts in this district 

have held, in line with courts across the country, that such 

detention decisions are reviewed de novo. See United States v. 

Hunt, 240 F. Supp. 3d 128, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2017) (referencing 

cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 

Eighth, Ninth, tenth, and Eleven Circuits that support this 

proposition); see also Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, at *5-*6. The 

Bail Reform Act also provides that a detention hearing “may be 

reopened . . . at any time before trial if the judicial officer 

finds that information exists that was not known to the movant 

at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on” 
15 

the Section 3142(g) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); see also 

United States v. Peralta, 849 F.2d 625, 626-27 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 

Accordingly, the Court will review the decision to detain Mr. 

Sabol de novo and will consider new information presented by Mr. 

Sabol that he contends has a material bearing on the Court’s 

evaluation of his flight risk and/or danger to the community. 

III. Analysis 

A. Mr. Sabol is Eligible for Pretrial Detention Pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) 

As a threshold matter, the government correctly argues, and 

Mr. Sabol does not dispute, that Mr. Sabol is eligible for 

pretrial detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A). See 

Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 12. Under the Bail Reform Act, 

unless a defendant poses a serious risk of flight or of 

attempting to obstruct justice, he is only eligible for pretrial 

detention if he is charged with an offense listed in one of the 

five enumerated categories of Section 3142(f)(1)—i.e., “the most 

serious” crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)-(B), (f)(2); 

United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 

(“Congress limited pretrial detention of persons who are 

presumed innocent to a subset of defendants charged with crimes 
16 

that are ‘the most serious’ compared to other federal offenses.” 

(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987))). 

The Court finds that Mr. Sabol is charged with a crime of 

violence, which is the first category of crimes that makes a 

defendant eligible for detention under Section 3142(f)(1). See 

id. § 3142(f)(1)(A). As relevant here, a “crime of violence” is 

either: 

(A) an offense that has as an element of the 

offense the use, attempted use, or threatened 

use of physical force against the person or 

property of another; [or] (B) any other 

offense that is a felony and that, by its 

nature, involves a substantial risk that 

physical force against the person or property 

of another may be used in the course of 

committing the offense. 

Id. § 3156(a)(4)(A)-(B). The Supreme Court, in interpreting the 

definition of “crime of violence” under a different federal 

criminal statute—18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)—has held that 

“physical force” means “violent force—that is, force capable of 

causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. 

United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 

In this Circuit, courts identify crimes of violence on a 

categorical basis by reference to the elements of the charged 

offenses, rather than on a case-by-case basis through a factintensive analysis of the defendant’s alleged conduct. 

Singleton, 182 F.3d at 10-12. When employing the categorical 

approach, whether a charged offense is a crime of violence under 
17 

Section 3142(f)(1)(A) is a question of law and is “ascertainable 

by reference to [the crime’s] elements, either because these 

elements entail the use of violence, see § 3156(a)(4)(A), or the 

risk of violence, see § 3156(a)(4)(B).” Singleton, 182 F.3d at 

12. Courts will employ a “modified categorical approach,” 

looking at “a limited class of documents” such as the 

indictment, if the statute at issue is “divisible”—that is, if 

it defines multiple separate crimes. Mathis v. United States, 

136 S.Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). 

Mr. Sabol is charged with, among other crimes, Assaulting, 

Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers Using a Dangerous 

Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and (b). See 

Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 23 at 2. Subsection 111(a)(1) 

provides that anyone who “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, 

impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any [designated federal 

officer, or person assisting a designated federal officer]5 while 

engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties,” 

is exposed to a maximum term of imprisonment of one year if the 

violation constitutes simple assault or eight years if the 

violation involves physical contact with the victim or the 

intent to commit another felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1).6 The 

5 See 18 U.S.C. § 1114. 

6 As relevant here, under Subsection 111(b), “the use of a deadly 

or dangerous weapon [is] sufficient . . . to boost the crime 
18 

D.C. Circuit has determined that “the adverb ‘forcibly’ in the 

first element of the offense modifies each of the prohibited 

acts specified in the second element: that is, a defendant does 

not violate the statute unless he forcibly assaults or forcibly 

resists or forcibly opposes, etc.” United States. V. Arrington, 

309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. 

Kleinbart, 27 F.3d 586, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Subsection 111(b) 

increases the maximum term of imprisonment to 20 years for 

anyone who “in the commission of any act described in subsection 

(a), uses a deadly or dangerous weapon . . . or inflicts bodily 

injury.” Id. § 111(b). When a defendant is charged under the 

first prong of Section 111(b)—for use of a dangerous weapon— 

“intent to use the weapon is a necessary element” of the 

offense. See Arrington, 309 F. 3d at 45. Courts have observed 

that to violate Section 111(b), a defendant “must have committed 

one of the acts described in § 111(a), i.e., ‘forcibly 

assault[ed], resisted[ed], oppose[d], impede[d], intimidate[d], 

or interefere[d] with’ a [federal officer] in specified 

circumstances;’ and “in committing the act,” either (a) “’use[d] 

a deadly or dangerous weapon’” or (2) “’inflict[ed] bodily 

above the level of ‘simple assault.’” United States v. Duran, 96 

F.3d 1495, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
19 

injury.’” Gray v. United States, 980 F.3d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 

2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1), (b)). 

In consideration of the elements of these offenses, Section 

3156(a)(4)’s definition of a crime of violence, and the relevant 

case law, the Court concurs with numerous other courts in 

holding that a defendant charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) 

and (b) is charged with a crime of violence.7 See Gray, 980 F.3d 

at 266 (“[W]e hold that a § 111(b) offense is a categorical 

crime of violence.”); United States v. Kendall, 876 F.3d 1264, 

1270 (10th Cir. 2017) (“To determine if every violation of § 

111(b) is a crime of violence, then, we need only determine 

whether both an assault that causes bodily injury and an assault 

with a deadly weapon involve the use, threatened use, or 

attempted use of violent physical force. They both do.”); United 

States v. Taylor, 848 F.3d 476, 492-493 (1st Cir. 2017) (“In 

assessing whether the enhanced versions of § 111(b) are crimes 

of violence, we do not write on a clean slate. In fact, every 

7 In other cases brought in this district, the government has 

taken the position that a Capitol Riot defendant charged only 

under Section 111(a) is not charged with a crime of violence, 

but a defendant charged under 111(a) and (b)—the “enhanced 

version of the statute”—is charged with a crime of violence. See 

United States v. Fitzsimmons, No. CR 21-158-KBJ, ECF No. 14 at 2 

(D.D.C.). Here, Mr. Sabol is charged under both 111(a) and (b), 

so the Court need not reach whether 111(a), on its own, triggers 

a detention hearing under the “crime of violence” category of 

3142(f). 
20 

court we are aware of that has considered the issue has found 

that it is because the elements of the enhanced offense require 

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force capable of 

causing pain or injury.”); United States v. Juvenile Female, 566 

F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that an assault involving 

a deadly or dangerous weapon under Section 111 “is, 

categorically, a crime of violence”). A judicial colleague in 

this district, Judge John D. Bates, recently reached the same 

conclusion. See United States v. Klein, No. CR 21-236, ECF No. 

29 at 7-12 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2021). 

Accordingly, because using a deadly or dangerous weapon 

while assaulting a federal officer (or, in this case, an MPD 

officer assisting a federal officer) is a crime of violence, Mr. 

Sabol is eligible for pretrial detention under 18 U.S.C. § 

3142(f)(1)(A).8

B. No Condition or Combination of Conditions Will Reasonably 

Assure Mr. Sabol’s Appearance as Required and the Safety 

of Any Other Person and the Community 

Having found that Mr. Sabol is eligible for pretrial 

detention, the Court must determine whether any “condition or 

8 The government also argues that Mr. Sabol is eligible for 

detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) “because he is a 

flight risk and there is a serious risk that he will obstruct or 

attempt to obstruct justice.” Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 12. 

The Court addresses Mr. Sabol’s risk of flight and attempt to 

obstruct justice in Section III, Part B. But the Court need not 

address these risks as a basis for Mr. Sabol’s eligibility for 
21 

combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance 

of [Mr. Sabol] as required and the safety of any other person 

and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). With respect to the 

danger Mr. Sabol presents to the safety of any other person and 

the community, the Court “must identify an articulable threat 

posed by the defendant to an individual or the community,” 

though “[t]he threat need not be of physical violence, and may 

extend to ‘non-physical harms such as corrupting a union.’” 

Munchel, 2021 WL 1149196, at *7 (quoting United States v. King, 

849 F.2d 485, 487 n.2 (11th Cir. 1988)). “The threat must also 

be considered in context,” and “[t]he inquiry is factbound.” Id.

(citing United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 888 (1st Cir. 

1990)). Mr. Sabol and the government agree that in determining 

whether Mr. Sabol is a flight risk and/or danger to the 

community, the Court considers the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) factors 

including: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense 

charged”; (2) “the weight of the evidence”; (3) “the history and 

characteristics” of the defendant; and (4) “the nature and 

seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that 

would be posed by the [defendant’s] release.” 18 U.S.C. § 

pretrial detention, as a threshold matter, because he is 

eligible for detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A). 
22 

3142(g); see Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 3-4; Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF 

No. 20 at 12. 

In considering these requisite factors, as set forth below, 

the Court concludes that clear and convincing evidence supports 

a finding that no condition or combination of conditions will 

reasonably assure the safety of the community, and a 

preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that no 

condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure 

Mr. Sabol’s appearance as required. Accordingly, the Court 

orders that Mr. Sabol remain detained pending trial. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) 

1. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

The first factor the Court must consider is the nature and 

circumstances of the offense charged, “including whether the 

offense is a crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). 

Mr. Sabol admits that he has been charged with forcibly 

assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, and 

interfering with MPD Officer A.W., and he acknowledges that the 

government alleges he struck Officer B.M. with a police baton. 

See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 4. At the April 8 hearing, 

however, Mr. Sabol argued he never used the police baton as a 

weapon as the government alleges. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 53 at 6:24-

25, 7:21-22. As for the remaining counts in the indictment, Mr. 

Sabol avers they “arise from this alleged conduct and Mr. 
23 

Sabol’s general presence outside of the U.S. Capitol on January 

6th.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 4. While Mr. Sabol concedes that 

“this alleged conduct is serious,” he argues that “it appears to 

have arisen in the context of a hysterical throng” and took 

place over a matter of mere seconds. Id.; Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 53 

at 7:16-17. His attorney also contends that Mr. Sabol now 

understands that his beliefs about the legitimacy of the 2020 

Presidential Election were “misguided” and “wrong,” and he was 

“lied to about the election being stolen.” Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 53 

at 8:5-7. He was caught up inappropriately and made “some really 

bad decisions,” he argues, in “the frenzy” of the events that 

transpired on January 6, 2021, and by “things that were said to 

the crowd of people by people like Roger Stone and Rudy Guiliani 

and the President himself.” Id. at 8:7-15. He points out that 

“[t]he President of the United States of America was telling 

citizens something evil has happened and you all have to go fix 

it.” Id. at 9:11-13. 

Mr. Sabol also suggests that he may have been trying to 

prevent his fellow rioters from attacking the MPD officers. 

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 3. Mr. Sabol alleged at the April 8 

hearing that video evidence (showing events that transpired 

about an hour before the attacks on Officers B.M. and A.W.) 

shows him “waving his hands like a referee” and instructing 

other rioters not to hurt law enforcement officers. See Hr’g 
24 

Tr., ECF No. 53 at 39:14-21, 38:12-17, 40:5-10. He argues that 

these acts reveal his intentions and should inform the Court’s 

interpretation of the later attacks on the MPD officers. Id. at 

41:2-10. In addition, Mr. Sabol attaches to his motion character 

letters from his friends and family members, which he argues 

“indicate that any alleged violent conduct by Mr. Sabol would be 

out of character for him.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 4. 

The government, for its part, paints a grimmer picture of 

the events the nation watched unfold at the U.S. Capitol on 

January 6, 2021, and Mr. Sabol’s participation in those events. 

The government emphasizes that during the “siege of the U.S. 

Capitol, multiple law enforcement officers were assaulted by an 

enormous mob, which included numerous individuals with weapons, 

bulletproof vests, and pepper spray who were targeting the 

officers protecting the Capitol.” Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 

12. The government asserts that Mr. Sabol “was involved in some 

of the most violent assaults on law enforcement that occurred” 

that day, and for his active participation in the riots and the 

attacks on MPD officers, he has been charged with “multiple 

counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b) and 18 U.S.C. 

231(a)(3), which are serious felony offenses.” Id. 

The government points the Court to Chief Judge Beryl 

Howell’s recent decision concerning the appropriateness of 

pretrial detention for another participant in the January 6 
25 

events at the U.S. Capitol (a “Capitol Riot defendant”) for an 

articulation of how the Court should evaluate the nature and 

circumstances of offenses arising from the events that 

transpired that day: 

Grave concerns are implicated if a defendant 

actively threatened or confronted federal 

officials or law enforcement, or otherwise 

promoted or celebrated efforts to disrupt the 

certification of the electoral vote count 

during the riot, thereby encouraging others to 

engage in such conduct. These factors measure 

the extent of a defendant’s disregard for the 

institutions of government and the rule of 

law, qualities that bear on both the 

seriousness of the offense conduct and the 

ultimate inquiry of whether a defendant will 

comply with conditions of release meant to 

ensure the safety of the community. 

Id. at 13 (quoting Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, at *8). The 

government argues that Mr. Sabol did not just “actively 

threaten[] or confront[] federal officials or law enforcement,” 

but that he assaulted MPD officers, impeded their ability to do 

their job, and interfered with their ability to help a protestor 

who had been trampled and injured by the crowd. Id. Moreover, 

Mr. Sabol participated in the riots with the express intent of 

protesting the results of the 2020 Presidential Election, and he 

then “acted on his beliefs that the 2020 election was fraudulent 

and engaged in multiple violent assaults . . . on the law 

enforcement officers trying to protect Congress’s certification 

of the 2020 Presidential election.” Id. at 13-14. As a result of 
26 

Mr. Sabol’s actions, the government asserts, Officer A.W. needed

staples to his head “to close the laceration he sustained during 

the cumulative assaults he endured,” and he and Officer B.M. 

“could have easily been seriously injured, if not killed.” Id.

at 14. And in fact, someone was killed. The protestor who had 

been trampled by the mob, who the government alleges Officers 

A.W. and B.M. were trying to aid when Mr. Sabol interfered and 

attacked them, later died from her injuries. Id. 

Regarding Mr. Sabol’s prior statements to law enforcement 

in which he claimed he was only patting Officer B.M. on the back 

and saying “we got you,” the government counters by referencing 

BWC video footage that purportedly shows Mr. Sabol held a baton 

to the back of Officer B.M.’s neck while he had another hand on 

his back “as he dragged Officer B.M., face down into the crowd, 

away from the outstretched arms of Officer B.M.’s colleagues who 

were trying to help Officer B.M.” Id. at 13. The government 

argues that Mr. Sabol went to the U.S. Capitol on January 6th

“ready for a fight.” Id. He equipped himself with a helmet, 

steel-toe boots, zip ties, and a radio and ear piece. Id. at 3. 

Once he was at the U.S. Capitol, Mr. Sabol “ran to the front 

lines of the ‘battle’ . . . [s]tole the baton from an officer 

who had already been attacked and knocked to the ground by one 
27 

of Sabol’s fellow rioters, . . . [and] proceeded to use that 

stolen baton to assault” Officer B.M. Id. at 12-13. 

The gravity of Mr. Sabol’s offenses is undeniable, and the 

Court is persuaded that the nature and circumstances of the 

offenses weigh in favor of his continued pretrial detention. To 

start, the gravity of the conduct that occurred at the U.S. 

Capitol on January 6, 2021 cannot be understated. Judge Randolph 

Moss summarized the day’s events powerfully: 

[The defendant] and hundreds of others took 

over the United States Capitol; caused the 

Vice President of the United States, the 

Congress, and their staffs to flee the Senate 

and House Chambers; engaged in violent attacks 

on law enforcement officers charged with 

protecting the Capitol; and delayed the solemn 

process of certifying a presidential election. 

This was a singular and chilling event in U.S. 

history, raising legitimate concern about the 

security—not only of the Capitol building—but 

of our democracy itself. 

United States v. Cua, No. 21-107 (RDM), 2021 WL 918255, at *3 

(D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021). Nonetheless, and despite the serious and 

chilling nature of the events that took place that day, the D.C. 

Circuit has made clear that detention is not appropriate in all 

cases involving Capitol Riot defendants. Munchel, 2021 WL 

1149196, at *8. The Court considers the specific offenses with 

which each defendant is charged and the conduct underlying those 

offenses. Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, at *7. The Court must 

“adequately demonstrate that it considered whether [Mr. Sabol] 
28 

pose[s] an articulable threat to the community in view of [his] 

conduct on January 6, and the particular circumstances of 

January 6.” Munchel, 2021 WL 1149196, at *8. To aid in this 

consideration, Chief Judge Howell has articulated “guideposts” 

for assessing “the comparative culpability of a given defendant 

in relation to fellow rioters.” Id. The Court finds these 

guideposts persuasive for the purpose of differentiating among 

Capitol Riot defendants: (1) whether the defendant has been 

charged with felony or misdemeanor offenses; (2) the extent of 

the defendant’s prior planning, “for example, by obtaining 

weapons or tactical gear”; (3) whether the defendant used or 

carried a dangerous weapon; (4) evidence of coordination with 

other protestors before, during, or after the riot; (5) whether 

the defendant played a leadership role in the events of January 

6, 2021; and (6) the defendant’s “words and movements during the 

riot”—e.g., whether the defendant “remained only on the grounds 

surrounding the Capitol” or stormed into the Capitol interior, 

or whether the defendant “injured, attempted to injure, or 

threatened to injure others.” Id. at *7-*8. These factors, 

“[t]aken together, as applied to a given defendant, . . . are 

probative of ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense 

charged,’ 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1), and, in turn, of the danger 
29 

posed by the defendant,” as relevant to the fourth Section 

3142(g) factor. Id. at *9. 

Four of the six Chrestman factors strongly support a 

finding that Mr. Sabol’s comparative culpability in relation to 

his fellow rioters is high. First, Mr. Sabol has been charged 

with multiple felonies. See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 23. 

“Felony charges are by definition more serious than misdemeanor 

charges; the nature of a felony offense is therefore 

substantially more likely to weigh in favor of pretrial 

detention than the nature of a misdemeanor offense.” Chrestman, 

2021 WL 765662. Moreover, Section 3142(g)(1) specifically 

directs the Court to consider whether a defendant has been 

charged with a crime of violence, and at least one of the 

charged felonies—using a deadly weapon while assaulting an MPD 

officer who was assisting federal officials protect the U.S. 

Capitol—is a crime of violence. See supra Section III, Part A. 

Second, Mr. Sabol engaged in prior planning that suggests 

his assaultive conduct and civil disorder did not merely arise 

“in the context of a hysterical throng,” as Mr. Sabol claims. 

See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 4. When Mr. Sabol went to the 

U.S. Capitol, he believed the 2020 Presidential Election had 

been stolen from former-President Trump and that the election 

results confirming that President Biden had won were fraudulent. 

See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 14. He brought tactical gear, 
30 

including a helmet, steel-toe boots, zip ties, a radio and an 

ear piece. Id. at 3. He later admitted to law enforcement that 

he had equipped himself with this gear because he anticipated 

encountering counter-protesters. See id. at 3. He also 

maintained, even days after the riot when he believed he was 

wanted by the FBI, that he had been “fighting tyranny in the 

D.C. Capitol.” Id. at 10.9 As was true of a similarly-situated 

fellow rioter in Chrestman, this amount of prior planning and 

intentionality “suggests that he was not just caught up in the 

frenzy of the crowd, but instead came to Washington, D.C. with 

9 At the April 8 hearing, Mr. Sabol’s counsel emphasized that the 

helmet and steel-toe boots that Mr. Sabol brought to the U.S. 

Capitol are irrelevant to the dangerousness analysis because Mr. 

Sabol did not intend to fight with the government or stop 

democracy, he only wore that gear because he thought counterprotesters would be present at the rallies. See Hr’g Tr., ECF 

No. 53 at 11:12-20. But whether Mr. Sabol arrived prepared to 

engage in violence against the government or against counterprotesters is a distinction that is of little significance when 

evaluating the danger he poses to the community. The Court is 

also not persuaded by Mr. Sabol’s argument that his zip ties and 

two-way radio should not be considered as part of the Court’s 

analysis of the Chrestman prior-planning factor because the zip 

ties were only “little wire cable ties that he carries with him 

everywhere he goes”—not like the type of zip ties used to 

restrain people—and the two-way radio was not intended to be 

used in a coordinated way with fellow rioter, and it did not 

work in any event. See Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 53 at 11:21-13:5. 

Regardless of the opponent, and despite his claims that certain 

tactical gear had alternative uses, Mr. Sabol’s own admissions 

reveal that he planned and prepared for a fight against 

perceived tyranny and then did in fact engage in violence 

against law enforcement officers protecting the U.S. Capitol on 

January 6, 2021, and the Court is not persuaded that the 

tactical gear was not brought for that purpose. 
31 

the intention of causing mayhem and disrupting the democratic 

process, mandated under the U.S. Constitution, of counting and 

certifying Electoral College votes.” Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, 

at *8 (citing U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3). This prior 

planning also differentiates Mr. Sabol from fellow rioters who 

are not being detained pretrial, like Mr. Frederico Klein who 

Judge Bates recently released. See Klein, No. CR 21-236, ECF No. 

29 at 13-14 (considering that Mr. Klein did not carry any items 

that evinced an expectation that the need to engage in violence 

might arise, and a witness testified that she was unaware of Mr. 

Klein having any plans for violence while attending the “Stop 

the Steal” rally outside the White House). The Court is 

ultimately unpersuaded by Mr. Sabol’s argument that he did not 

plan to commit violence or disrupt the electoral process on 

January 6, 2021, but rather was caught up in the “frenzy” that 

was created in part by then-President Trump’s, and his 

associates’, words and actions. See Hr’g Tr. ECF No. 53 at 8:5-

15. 

To be sure, to what extent President Trump’s words and 

actions led to the violent and shocking storming of the U.S. 

Capitol on January 6, 2021 is an important question, and one 

that could still have legal consequences for the former 

President and his prominent supporters. See Thompson v. Trump, 

No. 21-cv-400-APM (D.D.C.) (civil lawsuit against President 
32 

Trump, Rudy Giuliani, Proud Boys International LLC, and Oath 

Keepers alleging violations of the Ku Klux Klan Act for 

“plot[ing], coordinat[ing], and execut[ing] a common plan to 

prevent Congress from discharging its official duties in 

certifying the results of the presidential election”). But 

President Trump’s culpability is not before this Court. To the 

extent Mr. Sabol raises this issue to suggest he has a complete 

defense to the criminal charges he faces based on President 

Trump ostensibly or actually giving the rioters permission to 

use violence to interfere with the peaceful transition of power, 

that argument fails for the reasons clearly and thoughtfully 

articulated by Chief Judge Howell in Chrestman. 2021 WL 765662, 

at *10-*14. Indeed, “even if former President Trump in fact 

. . . ‘told the assembled rabble what they must do’ (i.e., 

attack the Capitol and disrupt the certification of the 

electoral vote count) and ‘ratified their actions,’ . . . he 

acted ‘beyond [his] power’ as President, . . . and his 

statements would not immunize defendants charged with offenses 

arising from the January 6 assault on the Capitol from criminal 

liability.” Id. at *13. If, on the other hand, Mr. Sabol raises 

this issue not as a complete defense but rather in an attempt to 

show that he is not a danger to his community because he did not 

plan to participate in a violent attack on the U.S. Capitol and 

only did so because President Trump directed him and other 
33 

members of the crowd to do so that day, that argument also 

fails. As Judge Royce Lamberth explained, even if a Capitol Riot 

defendant “truly believes that the only reason he participated 

in an assault on the U.S. Capitol was to comply with President 

Trump’s orders, this shows defendant’s inability (or refusal) to 

exercise his independent judgment and conform his behavior to 

the law. These are not qualities of a person who can be trusted 

on conditional release.” United States v. Chansley, No. 21-cr-3 

(RCL), 2021 WL 861079, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2021). This same 

rationale applies, with even greater force, if Mr. Sabol was not 

acting out of a perceived need to comply with the President’s 

orders but rather because he was simply “caught up 

inappropriately in the moment.” See Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 53 at 

8:13-14. 

Third, Mr. Sabol used a dangerous weapon, a police baton, 

during the riot. Although he did not bring the baton with him to 

the U.S. Capitol and claims he did not use it as a weapon once 

he acquired it there, the fact that he took the weapon from a 

vulnerable MPD officer and subsequently wielded it while helping 

drag another officer into the violent mob where he sustained 

prolonged beatings is sufficient for the Court to find that this 

factor weighs against Mr. Sabol. Mr. Sabol admits that he 

obtained the weapon after a “call to battle was announced.” 

Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 11. In view of Mr. Sabol’s 
34 

admission that he “answered the call [to battle] because he was 

a patriot warrior,” see id., and considering the context of the 

moment at which Mr. Sabol snatched the baton from Officer A.W.—

as the officer was laying on his back in the midst of a brutal 

physical assault from other rioters with little more than that 

baton to protect himself, see Officer A.W. BWC Video Footage, 

Ex. 2 to Gov’t’s Opp’n at 00:22 to 00:25—Mr. Sabol cannot 

plausibly maintain that he stole the baton for any reason other 

than to arm himself for “battle.” Even if he believed that the 

“battle” was started by Antifa as the “perfect set-up,” see 

Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 3; the Court is persuaded that he 

forcibly took Officer A.W.’s baton to injure or intimidate 

others—whether it was Antifa, law enforcement, members of 

Congress, or anyone else he viewed as his enemy. Mr. Sabol even 

admits that it was “evil” that made him snatch the baton. Id. at 

10. Then, Mr. Sabol wielded the baton in one hand as he pushed 

Officer B.M. down the U.S. Capitol steps with his other hand, 

helping co-defendant Mr. Jack Wade Whitton feed the officer to 

the crowd of rioters. See Storyful Video Footage, Ex. 3 to 

Gov’t’s Opp’n at 00:14-00:22. During this encounter, Officer 

B.M. was lying face-down, and Mr. Sabol held the baton against 

the back of the officer’s neck and back. Id. The video evidence 

may not show Mr. Sabol striking the officer with the baton, but 

it certainly shows him using it during this violent encounter. 
35 

Mr. Sabol’s willingness to strip a vulnerable law enforcement 

officer of his weapon so he could use it to forcibly push 

another officer into a violent mob speaks to the gravity of the 

offenses with which he has been charged as well as the danger he 

poses not just to his community, but to the American public as a 

whole. See Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, at *8. 

Fourth, Mr. Sabol’s words and movements during the riot 

indicate he acted deliberately and dangerously. In charging him 

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and (b), the grand jury charges Mr. 

Sabol with using a “deadly or dangerous weapon, that is, a 

baton, . . . to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, 

intimidate, and interfere with” Officer B.M. while he was 

protecting the U.S. Capitol from violent rioters, many of whom 

were attempting to subvert a democratic election and prevent the 

peaceful transition of power. See Superseding Indictment, ECF 

No. 23 at 2. “It cannot be gainsaid that the violent breach of 

the [U.S.] Capitol on January 6 was a grave danger to our 

democracy, and that those who participated could rightly be 

subject to detention to safeguard the community.” See Munchel, 

2021 WL 1149196, at *8. For purposes of evaluating a Capitol 

Riot defendant’s dangerousness, the D.C. Circuit has drawn a 

distinction between Capitol Riot defendants who, like Mr. Sabol, 

engaged in violence at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, and 

those who, like the defendants in Munchel, did not. See Munchel, 
36 

2021 WL 1149196, at *8 (“[T]hose [rioters] who actually 

assaulted police officers and . . . those who aided, conspired 

with, planned, or coordinated such actions, are in a different 

category of dangerousness than those who cheered on the violence 

or entered the Capitol after others cleared the way.”). In 

Munchel, two Capitol Riot defendants had appealed the district 

court’s detention decision, and the D.C. Circuit remanded the 

case for further consideration of the defendants’ dangerousness. 

Id. In so doing, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the record 

lacked evidence that the defendants committed any violence or 

vandalized any property. Id. In comparison, “[g]rave concerns” 

are implicated by Mr. Sabol’s conduct, which included using 

physical force to strip Officer A.W. of his police baton, 

assisting other rioters in pulling Officer B.M. into the mob, 

and assaulting Officer B.M. with the baton he had stolen from 

Officer A.W. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 13 (citing 

Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, at *8). This conduct sets him apart 

from other rioters who engaged with law enforcement but have 

been granted pretrial release. See, e.g., Klein, No. CR 21-236, 

ECF No. 29 at 16, n.8 (distinguishing Mr. Klein’s actions from 

rioters who “clearly sought to incapacitate and injure members 
37 

of law enforcement,” identifying Mr. Sabol specifically in that 

comparison). 

To the extent Mr. Sabol maintains that he was attempting to 

help, not hurt, Officer B.M. when he joined other rioters in 

pulling the officer down the U.S. Capitol steps and into the mob 

while holding the stolen baton against the back of his neck, the 

evidence tells a different story. The Court has reviewed the 

chilling video footage provided by the government and Mr. Sabol. 

The government’s Exhibit 3 is a one-minute, 41-second clip of a 

video posted by Storyful to YouTube.10 In the video, a person in 

a tan jacket wearing a green backpack and a dark helmet is seen 

moving quickly up the U.S. Capitol steps through the large, 

screaming crowd as rioters at the top of the steps are swinging 

objects including a crutch and a hockey stick toward law 

enforcement gathered under the U.S. Capitol’s western terrace 

archway. Storyful Video Footage, Ex. 3 to Gov’t’s Opp’n at 

00:01-00:08. Mr. Sabol has confirmed to law enforcement that he 

is that person. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 11. When Mr. 

Sabol reaches the top of the steps, he then reaches toward the 

ground before falling backwards down a few steps with a black 

baton in his left hand. Storyful Video Footage, Ex. 3 to Gov’t’s 

10 Available at Storyful Rights Management, Pro-Trump Protesters 

Beat Police Officer Protecting Capitol Entrance, YouTube (Jan. 

10, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aEGthdTzedk. 
38 

Opp’n at 00:08-00:11. A few seconds later, another rioter at the 

top of the steps wearing a grey backpack and white ball cap, who 

has now been identified as Mr. Sabol’s co-defendant Mr. Jack 

Wade Whitton, appears to begin forcefully pulling an officer, 

who is on the ground at that point, away from the archway and 

into the mob. Id. at 00:14-00:19. Mr. Sabol seems to observe 

this, and he moves back up the steps and joins Mr. Whitton in 

dragging Officer B.M. face-first down the U.S. Capitol steps and 

away from the other officers as rioters continue to relentlessly 

swing and throw objects at the officers in the archway and at 

Officer B.M. on the ground, all while members of the large crowd 

yell and chant “U-S-A, U-S-A.” Id. at 00:14-00:22. Mr. Sabol can 

be seen using his left hand to push Officer B.M. down the steps 

while he is bending over the officer and holding the black baton 

in his right hand against the officer’s back and neck. Id.; see 

also Ex. 4 to Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 5. Seconds later, 

another rioter repeatedly slams what appears to be a wooden 

flagpole bearing the American flag toward the ground where 

Officer B.M. seems to be laying, now in the middle of the crowd 

on the steps. See Storyful Video Footage, Ex. 3 to Gov’t’s 

Opp’n, at 00:23-00:28. The government’s Exhibit 5A is a clip 

from Officer C.M.’s BWC video footage that shows some of these 

events from a different angle. Officer C.M. BWC Video Footage, 

Ex. 5A to Gov’t’s Opp’n. In the video, officers gather under the 
39 

archway seemingly trying to fend off the throng of violent 

protesters who are attacking them. Id. About halfway through the 

clip, co-defendant Mr. Whitton is seen grabbing an officer’s 

head and lurching him forward over another officer who is laying 

on the ground. Id. at 00:33-00:35. The government proffers that 

those officers are B.M. and A.W., respectively. See Gov’t’s 

Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 5-6. Mr. Sabol comes into the frame at 

about 35 seconds into the video. See Officer C.M. BWC Video 

Footage, Ex. 5A to Gov’t’s Opp’n at 00:35; see also Ex. 5B to 

Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 6. Although the events unfold 

quickly, and the image of Mr. Sabol is choppy and occasionally 

blocked as Officer C.M. appears to be jostled around and other 

officers block the frame, Mr. Sabol can be seen helping push 

Officer B.M. down the U.S. Capitol steps while holding the black 

baton against Officer B.M.’s back and neck. Officer C.M. BWC 

Video Footage, Ex. 5A to Gov’t’s Opp’n at 00:35-00:37. 

The video evidence that Mr. Sabol submits to cast doubt on 

the nefariousness of his conduct during Officer B.M.’s violent 

attack is unconvincing, at least as it pertains to the Court’s 

consideration of the nature and circumstances of the charged 

offenses and Mr. Sabol’s request for pretrial release. Mr. Sabol 

offers a one-minute, 36-second video of unknown origin as 

Exhibit 2 to his motion. Video Footage, Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot., 

ECF No. 17-2. He points out that “a voice can be heard” in the 
40 

video “urging others to not attack officers.” Def.’s Mot., ECF 

No. 17 at 3. An unnamed “witness” who “has known Mr. Sabol for 

over 10 years . . . says the voice in the video is that of Mr. 

Sabol.” Id. At the April 8 hearing, Mr. Sabol also introduced a 

second video exhibit that shows Mr. Sabol waving his hands 

horizontally, in what he contends is a gesture a referee might 

make to indicate action needed to stop, as other members of the 

mob appear to be attacking law enforcement officers. See Hr’g 

Tr. 40:5-11. In light of Mr. Sabol’s exhibits, he argues “the 

government’s video is ambiguous as to whether the individual in 

the video believed himself to be helping, rather than harming, 

the officer B.M.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 3. 

The Court is not persuaded. The Court’s review of the first 

video reveals that Mr. Sabol’s unnamed “witness” appears to be 

mistaken in believing that the voice in the video heard telling 

rioters not to attack the cops is Mr. Sabol’s. A person begins 

saying “Don’t hurt the police” around 30 seconds into the video 

clip. Video Footage, Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17-2 at 

00:30. At that point, Mr. Sabol is about three or four rows of 

people away from the person who is filming. Id. He appears to be 

moving forward further into the crowd toward the officers and is 

positioned above other rioters, suggesting he is on a step or 

other raised surface. Id. Seconds before a voice is heard 

calling for other rioters not to hurt the police, a hand enters 
41 

the immediate foreground of the video holding a white Pyle 

megaphone. Id. at 00:25. The megaphone is passed to a man

wearing a red shirt who is positioned right in front of the 

person who is filming. Id. From there, it seems the man in the 

foreground with the microphone wearing a red shirt, who is not 

Mr. Sabol, is the person who repeatedly says “don’t hurt the 

cops,” while a female voice also yells “don’t hurt the cops” and 

“stop it.” Id. at 00:30-00:50. The second video does depict Mr. 

Sabol waving his hands horizontally, as Mr. Sabol argues, but 

there are no discernable statements made by Mr. Sabol in the 

video that reveal what this gesture meant in the context of the 

mob attacks on law enforcement. Moreover, the government avers 

that the videos depict events that occurred approximately one 

hour before the attacks on Officers B.M. and A.W., meaning that 

even if the Court accepts Mr. Sabol’s interpretation of the 

events that transpired at that time, the assaults on law 

enforcement for which Mr. Sabol is charged occurred an hour 

later. Mr. Sabol’s video evidence is therefore ineffective in 

countering the government’s proffer of video evidence that 

depicts conduct intended to harm, rather than help, the MPD 

officers, including: (1) taking Officer A.W.’s police baton by 

force while the officer was laying on the ground after having 

been attacked by other rioters, see Officer A.W. BWC Video 

Footage, Ex. 2 to Gov’t’s Opp’n; and (2) helping drag Officer 
42 

B.M. away from his fellow officers and into the mob by using his 

left hand to push Officer B.M. down the steps while bending over 

him and holding Officer A.W.’s baton in his right hand against 

Officer B.M.’s back and neck. See Storyful Video Footage, Ex. 3 

to Gov’t’s Opp’n at 00:14-00:22; Still Photo, Ex. 4 to Gov’t’s 

Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 5; Officer C.M. BWC Video Footage, Ex. 5A 

to Gov’t’s Opp’n at 00:35-00:37; Still Photo, Ex. 5B to Gov’t’s 

Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 6. 

Finally, while Mr. Sabol’s friends and family believe that 

this violent conduct is “out of character for him,” see Def.’s 

Mot., ECF No. 17 at 4; those views expressed in character 

letters supporting Mr. Sabol, no matter how credible or 

persuasive, do not change the nature and circumstances of the 

offenses the grand jury has charged him with. The fact is that 

the grand jury determined that Mr. Sabol’s conduct at the U.S. 

Capitol on January 6, 2021 supported not only charges for civil 

disorder, disorderly and disruptive conduct, and violent entry 

and disorderly conduct, but also assault on a federal officer 

with a deadly weapon. See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 23. 

The two remaining Chrestman factors—evidence of 

coordination with other rioters and whether the defendant 

assumed a leadership role in the assault—do not appear to be 

implicated in this case. The government has not proffered any 

evidence of Mr. Sabol communicating before, during, or after the 
43 

riot with anyone else in an attempt to amplify or assure the 

success of the U.S. Capitol breach. And while Mr. Sabol 

voluntarily admitted that when he arrived at the U.S. Capitol on 

January 6, 2021, he sought to be on the front line of the 

“battle,” see Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 3; the government has 

not proffered any evidence that suggests Mr. Sabol urged other 

rioters to advance on the U.S. Capitol or attack law 

enforcement, other than his conduct, which arguably was leading 

by example. 

Nonetheless, in view of all of these considerations, the 

Court is convinced that the nature and circumstances of Mr. 

Sabol’s offenses evince a clear disregard for the law, an 

aversion to the fundamental ten ts of our democracy, and a 

willingness to act violently when he believes he is “fighting 

tyranny,” all of which indicate that he poses a danger to the 

community. See Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, at *9. Accordingly, 

this factor weighs heavily in favor of detention on the basis 

that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably 

assure the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1); 18 

U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). Likewise, in view of the substantial term 

of imprisonment to which Mr. Sabol is exposed for his offenses, 

this factor also weighs in favor of Mr. Sabol’s continued 

detention on the basis that no condition or combination of 
44 

conditions will reasonably assure Mr. Sabol’s appearance as 

required. Id.; see also Chansley, 2021 WL 861079, at *14.

2. Weight of the Evidence Against the Defendant 

The second factor the Court must consider is the weight of 

the evidence against Mr. Sabol. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2). 

As discussed supra Section III, Part B.1, Mr. Sabol submits 

video evidence that he believes lessens the effectiveness of the 

government’s evidence against him. Video Footage, Ex. 2 to 

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17-2. He argues that these videos cast 

doubt as to whether he “believed himself to be helping, rather 

than hurting, the officer B.M.” in the videos proffered by the 

government. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 4. 

The government, on the other hand, has proffered video 

evidence, cell phone evidence, physical evidence recovered from 

Mr. Sabol’s vehicle, and testimonial evidence from Mr. Sabol 

himself in support of the charged offenses. The government 

describes the video evidence—Exhibits 2, 3, and 5A to the 

government’s opposition—as “objective and unwavering.” Gov’t’s 

Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 14. The video evidence, according to the 

government, “shows precisely how [Mr.] Sabol stole Officer 

A.W.’s baton, and then dragged Officer B.M. into the violent 

crowd.” Id. Cell phone records “corroborate the defendant’s 

presence near the U.S. Capitol.” Id. Physical evidence recovered 

from Mr. Sabol’s vehicle includes Mr. Sabol’s green backpack and 
45 

tan Carhartt jacket that he is seen wearing in the video 

exhibits during the attacks on the MPD officers. Id. Mr. Sabol 

also confirmed to law enforcement that he is the person in the 

video footage wearing that attire, and he confirmed that he took 

the baton of an officer who was laying on the ground. Id. The 

government contends that Mr. Sabol’s “self-serving statements 

that he was trying to help officers” is shown by the video 

evidence to “clearly not [be] the case.” Id. 

For the reasons discussed more fully supra Section III, 

Part B.1, video footage clearly shows Mr. Sabol using physical 

force against Officer A.W. and physical force with a dangerous 

weapon against Officer B.M. in a manner that is inconsistent 

with Mr. Sabol’s suggestion that he intended to help the 

officers. The government also confirmed Mr. Sabol’s presence at 

the U.S. Capitol during the January 6, 2021 riots with cell 

phone records, and Mr. Sabol admitted he was present and 

identified himself to law enforcement as the person wearing a 

tan jacket, dark-colored helmet, and green backpack in the 

government’s video and still photo exhibits. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, 

ECF No. 14 at 11, 14. Law enforcement recovered the jacket and 

backpack from Mr. Sabol’s vehicle. Id. at 10, 14. And Mr. Sabol 

made numerous admissions to law enforcement that not only 

corroborate his presence at the U.S. Capitol and involvement in 

the assaults, but that shed light on his frame of mind and 
46 

motives. See id. at 3, 10-11 (proffering that Mr. Sabol told law 

enforcement officers that (1) there was no question the 2020 

Presidential Election was stolen; (2) he “was fighting tyranny 

in the D.C. Capitol”; (3) during the riot, a “call to battle” 

was announced, and he “answer the call because he was a patriot 

warrior”; (4) it was “evil” that took the baton from Officer 

A.W. during the attack; and (5) he could not recall if he hit 

Officer B.M. with the stolen police baton because he was in a 

fit of rage). 

In consideration of the strength of the government’s 

evidence against Mr. Sabol and the lack of evidence presented to 

corroborate Mr. Sabol’s self-serving statements that he did not 

intend to harm MPD officers during the siege on the U.S. 

Capitol, the Court finds that the second 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) 

factor weighs against Mr. Sabol and in favor of his continued 

pretrial detention on the basis that no condition or combination 

of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the 

community, see Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, at *10; and on the 

basis that no condition or combination of conditions will 

reasonably assure Mr. Sabol’s appearance as required, see 

Chansley, 2021 WL 861079, at *14 (“The overwhelming weight of 
47 

the evidence may further prompt defendant to flee and thus 

weighs in favor of pre-trial detention.”). 

3. The History and Characteristics of the Defendant

Under the third factor, the Court must consider Mr. Sabol’s 

history and characteristics. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3). The Court 

considers Mr. Sabol’s “character, physical and mental condition, 

family ties, employment, financial resources, length of 

residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, 

history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and 

record concerning appearance at court proceedings,” 18 U.S.C. § 

3142(g)(3)(A); and “whether, at the time of the current offense 

or arrest, [Mr. Sabol] was on probation, on parole, or on other 

release, Id. § 3142(g)(3)(B). 

Here, Mr. Sabol relies heavily on the character letters 

submitted to the Court by his friends and family. Mr. Sabol 

points out that his friends and family “say he is a peaceful and 

nonviolent person” and he is a “responsible person who has 

strong support from his friends and family.” Def.’s Mot., ECF 

No. 17 at 4. Those who wrote letters in support of Mr. Sabol’s 

release expressed surprise at the allegations against Mr. Sabol, 

and they “indicate that it would be an aberration at the very 

least,” for probable cause for these offenses to exist. Id. at 

4-5. In addition, Mr. Sabol has strong community ties in both 

New York and Colorado—his family resides in New York, and he and 
48 

his long-time girlfriend live in Colorado. Id. at 4. Mr. Sabol 

asserts that he “volunteers in his community” and “takes an 

active role in his community by helping neighbors and friends 

when they need it.” Id. Mr. Sabol has three children, and he 

states that he is “close with his family.” Id. at 5. Mr. Sabol 

also has steady employment. He is a Senior Geophysical Manager 

at a company at which he has been employed for over six years, 

and before that he worked for two other companies for a combined 

total of 14 years. Id. Mr. Sabol is 51 years old. Id. Finally, 

he contends at “[a]t the time of his arrest, [he] had reached a 

mental breaking point,” but he “has recovered from the episode 

and is focused on resolving this case responsibly.” Id.

The government acknowledges that many letters of support 

have been written on Mr. Sabol’s behalf and that Mr. Sabol does 

not have a criminal history. Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 15. 

However, the government returns to Mr. Sabol’s actions on 

January 6, 2021, and in the days thereafter. “[T]he defendant’s 

actions, as demonstrated by his apparent willingness to prepare 

for and engage in what he perceived to be a battle, weigh 

against his release,” the government argues. Id. The government 

contends that he engaged in this violent behavior, which 

included assaulting police officers, because he did not believe 

the results of the 2020 Presidential Election were valid, and 

“[i]f released, [he] would have even more opportunities to 
49 

unleash violence against those in ‘battle’ against him.” Id.

Moreover, the government points out that Mr. Sabol has already 

admitted to “succeed[ing] in destroying evidence and asked 

others to delete incriminating videos he made,” and that he 

would have more opportunities to “obstruct the proceedings 

against him” in this manner if he were released. Id. 

In consideration of all pertinent information presented by 

the parties concerning Mr. Sabol’s history and characteristics, 

the Court is persuaded that this factor weighs against Mr. Sabol 

and in favor of his continued pretrial detention. The Court 

agrees with the government that Mr. Sabol’s willingness to act 

violently during what he perceived to be a “battle” and a fight 

against tyranny is extremely troubling. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF 

No. 20 at 15. That he acted violently against law enforcement 

protecting the peaceful transition of power based on a belief 

that the 2020 Presidential Election was stolen is also very 

alarming. Id. This recent conduct indeed raises concerns about 

Mr. Sabol’s character and the danger Mr. Sabol may present to 

the community if he were released. See Chrestman, 2021 WL 

765662, at *14. 

To Mr. Sabol’s credit, however, his friends and family 

appear to think very highly of his character, and their letters 

asking for his release from custody are both credible and 

persuasive. See Character Letters, Ex. 1 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 
50 

17-1. Thirty family members and individuals were willing to 

write letters on Mr. Sabol’s behalf, which is indicative of Mr. 

Sabol’s ability to establish and maintain strong, meaningful 

relationships. The letters also demonstrate that Mr. Sabol’s 

social circle includes individuals with political viewpoints 

different than his own, as well as a law enforcement officer, 

former military officers, and a practicing attorney working for 

a federal government agency. Despite the nature and 

circumstances of his charges, these individuals were willing to 

write letters to the Court on his behalf. See ECF No. 17-2 at 6-

7, 9, 11, 20, 31. As Mr. Sabol points out, many of the people 

who wrote letters expressed their surprise that Mr. Sabol could 

have engaged in the type of conduct with which he has been 

charged because it is inconsistent with his peaceful and 

nonviolent nature and his respect for law enforcement. See, 

e.g., id. at 2 (“Never would I characterize Jeff as someone who 

would hurt others. Never. He is the peacekeeper. He is that guy 

who steps in and breaks up a fight, not the participant. The 

events, of January 6 are completely inconsistent with Jeff and 

how he has lived his life.”); 4 (“He is the most honest, 

peaceful, non violent person I have ever met. He is loving, 

giving, and always willing to help others.”); 10 (“When I heard 

the news . . . I was in shock. The Jeff Sabol that I know is not 

a violent man or an instigator at all.”); 11 (“His respect for 
51 

both law enforcement and our military have always been not just 

laudable, but exemplary.”); 18 (“Never in the years that I have 

known him have I ever heard Jeff talk about starting violence . 

. . We have all seen videos from January 6th and I cannot 

imagine the friend I volunteered with participating in that 

violence.”); 20 (“I cannot explain his presence at the Capitol 

on January 6, and I disagree strongly with the notion that the 

2020 presidential election was ‘stolen,’ but Jeff is—without 

exaggeration—the last person I would expect to harm a police 

officer.”); 31 (“The portrayal of Jeff by the media is 

inconsistent with the good moral character of the Jeff I know. 

Of all people, I understand the seriousness of this incident, 

especially as it relates to my Brother’s in Blue; however, I 

hope the court will show some leniency on Jeff Sabol.”). 

The letters also confirm that Mr. Sabol is an active 

volunteer in his community, he regularly helps people in need, 

and he cares deeply about his family. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 

17 at 4-5. Other factors the Court notes in Mr. Sabol’s favor 

are that he has maintained steady employment for decades and has 

no criminal history. See id. Altogether, these factors have 

persuaded the Court that Mr. Sabol’s nature and characteristics 

are inconsistent with a person who would present a danger to his 

community if released, though it is a very close call given the 

severity of his offenses and the extremely troubling conduct he 
52 

displayed at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. See Cua, 2021 

WL 918255, at *4-*5.

But the Court’s inquiry is not finished. In addition to 

considering these factors in relation to the danger Mr. Sabol 

may pose to his community if released, the Court must also 

consider Mr. Sabol’s history and characteristics in relation to 

his flight risk. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); Chansley, 2021 WL 

861079, at *14-*15. The government has proffered evidence 

regarding Mr. Sabol’s past attempts to avoid prosecution that 

cannot be ignored. In the days after January 6, 2021, Mr. Sabol 

planned an escape to Switzerland where he believed he could 

avoid extradition for his criminal offenses. Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF 

No 20 at 9. To effectuate that plan, he traveled from Colorado 

to Boston and was at the airport before abandoning the plan when 

he believed law enforcement had spotted him. Id. He then drove 

from Boston to New York where he was ultimately located by local 

law enforcement in New City, New York. Id. at 10. Among the 

items found in his car were his passport and an airline eticket. Id. And regrettably, Mr. Sabol’s mental and emotional 

state was such that he had attempted to take his own life. Id. 

When found by local law enforcement in New City, he was covered 

in blood and suffering from severe self-inflicted lacerations. 

Id. Mr. Sabol asserts that he had “reached a mental breaking 

point,” but he “has recovered from the episode and is focused on 
53 

resolving this case responsibly.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 5. 

The Court sincerely hopes that is true. But the Court cannot 

ignore that Mr. Sabol presents a flight risk nonetheless. 

Considering the steps he took to flee to Switzerland to avoid 

arrest, Mr. Sabol is the epitome of a flight risk. The Court is 

unpersuaded by Mr. Sabol’s argument, made at the April 8 

hearing, that he only wanted to go to Switzerland for a short 

time to give himself an opportunity to find video evidence to 

counter the videos that were being circulated by the media at 

the time. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 53 at 9:2-21. For one thing, before 

traveling to Boston, Mr. Sabol engaged in the destruction of 

evidence—having “fried” electronic devices at his home, directed 

an associate to delete incriminating video evidence, and 

destroyed anything that could be construed as antigovernment. 

See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 20. The fact that he destroyed 

evidence is inconsistent with the behavior of someone trying to 

legitimately and honestly clear their name; instead, it is 

consistent with someone trying to avoid prosecution. In 

addition, the Court cannot condone a criminal defendant’s 

attempt to circumvent the criminal justice system and 

independently clear their name from the safety of a perceived 

non-extradition country. Mr. Sabol’s attempted flight and his 

destruction of evidence that could be used against him in a 
54 

criminal prosecution unquestionably weighs against pre-trial 

release. See Chrestman, 2021 765662, at *14-*15. 

In sum, the Court finds that the third Section 3142(g) 

factor weighs in favor of Mr. Sabol and against his continued 

pretrial detention on the basis that no condition or combination 

of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the 

community, but only by a slim margin. See Cua, 2021 WL 918255, 

at *4-*5. However, the Court finds that this factor weighs 

strongly against Mr. Sabol and in favor of his continued 

pretrial detention on the basis that no condition or combination 

of conditions will reasonably assure his appearance as required. 

See Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, at *14-*15. As a result, the 

Court concludes that this factor weighs against Mr. Sabol and in 

favor of his continued pretrial detention overall. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(g). Cf. Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, at *15 (concluding 

that the defendant’s history and characteristics weighed in 

favor of pretrial detention where defendant posed a clear danger 
55 

to the community, but his risk of flight was minimal, though not 

zero). 

4. The Nature and Seriousness of the Danger Posed by 

Defendant’s Release

The final factor the Court must consider is the “nature and 

seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that 

would be posed by the person’s release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4). 

Mr. Sabol states that although the charge for assaulting a 

federal officer with a deadly weapon carries a maximum penalty 

of 20 years, “none of the offenses have mandatory minimums.” 

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 5. In his motion, Mr. Sabol states 

that, if released, he would return to Colorado, which is “a long 

distance from the location of the alleged crime and victims, who 

are strangers to Mr. Sabol, in this case.” Id. In Colorado and 

elsewhere, he has “a long record of living as a productive and 

positive member of society.” Id. At the April 8 hearing, Mr. 

Sabol presented an alternative release plan: he would live in 

Waterville, New York under house arrest and subject to 

electronic GPS monitoring in a home owned by his girlfriend that 

is next door to his parent’s residence, under the supervision of 

the probation office in the Northern District of New York. Hr’g 

Tr., ECF No. 53 at 14:5-15:24. Finally, Mr. Sabol points out 

that the “pretrial service report in New York recommended 

release on an unsecured bond with conditions to include 
56 

surrendering his passport, GPS monitoring, and restricted travel 

to his home and the District of Columbia for court.” Def.’s 

Mot., ECF No. 17 at 5. For these reasons, he argues, “[r]elease 

with strict conditions is appropriate in this case.” Id. 

The government raises concerns about both Mr. Sabol’s 

danger to the community based on his actions on January 6, 2021, 

as well as his risk of flight based on his effort to flee the 

country and his attempt to take his own life when he believed he 

was under FBI investigation. Id. at 15-16. With respect to the 

danger Mr. Sabol poses to the community if released, the 

government again emphasizes that Mr. Sabol used physical force 

against MPD officers. Id. at 15. Again, rioters, with the 

assistance of Mr. Sabol, dragged Officer A.W. and Officer B.M. 

from their post outside the U.S. Capitol into a violent mob, not 

only subjecting the officers to severe physical danger but also 

preventing them from tending to a wounded protestor who had been 

crushed by the mob and subsequently died of her injuries. Id. at 

15-16. Moreover, “[t]he charged offenses involve assaultive 

conduct aimed to stop the functioning of the United States 

government, specifically to derail the certification of the 

electoral process, a cornerstone of our democracy.” Id. at 15. 

With respect to Mr. Sabol’s risk of flight, the government 

points out that he has already attempted to avoid prosecution by 

drastic means, and now, considering the evidence and charges 
57 

against him, which expose him to a significant term of 

imprisonment, “he has an even more compelling incentive to 

flee.” Id. 

For many of the reasons already addressed above, the Court 

finds that this factor also weighs against Mr. Sabol and in 

favor of his continued pretrial detention. “Consideration of 

this factor encompasses much of the analysis set forth above, 

but it is broader in scope,” requiring an “open-ended assessment 

of the ‘seriousness’ of the risk to public safety.” Cua, 2021 WL 

918255, at *5 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 289 F. Supp. 3d 

55, 70 (D.D.C. 2018)). “Because this factor substantially 

overlaps with the ultimate question whether any conditions of 

release ‘will reasonably assure [the appearance of the person as 

required] and the safety of any other person and the community,’ 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), it bears heavily on the Court’s analysis.” 

Id. 

As discussed in detail above, the nature and circumstances 

of Mr. Sabol’s offenses evince not just a clear disregard for 

the safety of others and law enforcement in particular, but also 

a willingness to engage in “battle” when he believes he is 

“fighting tyranny.” See supra Section III, Part B.1; see also 

Chrestman, 2021 WL 765662, at *9. On January 6, 2021, that 

“battle” took place at the U.S. Capitol, and Mr. Sabol’s role in 

it resulted in two MPD officers being wounded and a protester 
58 

dying after not receiving needed medical care because the MPD 

officers were prevented from coming to her aid. See Gov’t’s 

Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 15. Though Mr. Sabol suggests that he may 

not have intended to hurt Officer A.W. and Officer B.M. during 

the riot, the Court carefully reviewed Mr. Sabol’s video 

evidence alongside the government’s video evidence and concluded 

that the Court cannot construe Mr. Sabol’s video as supporting 

his claim at this juncture. See supra Section III, Part B.1. The 

Court does acknowledge that the character letters sent on Mr. 

Sabol’s behalf are compelling. The letters provide the Court 

with a longer and fuller view of Mr. Sabol’s life and character, 

and the Court appreciates that based on those letters, it 

appears that his character is inconsistent with the chilling 

behavior he displayed on January 6, 2021. See supra Section III, 

Part B.3. But a lifetime view of Mr. Sabol’s history and 

characteristics is not the only consideration when determining 

whether today Mr. Sabol poses a danger to his community if he 

were to be released pending trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). His 

history of a productive and peaceful life did not prevent him 

from committing horrific acts on January 6, 2021, and those acts 

inform the Court’s view of his propensity for further violence 

if he were to be released pending trial. 

In determining whether Mr. Sabol poses a danger to his 

community, neither the video evidence offered by Mr. Sabol nor 
59 

the character letters submitted on his behalf outweigh the fact 

that he displayed an extremely troubling disregard for the law 

and an aversion to the fundamental ten ts of our democracy 

based on what appears to be a sincerely held, but tremendously 

misguided, belief that he was acting valiantly and patriotically 

to fight against a tyrannical government that “stole” a 

presidential election. And Mr. Sabol did not simply hold these 

misguided beliefs; he acted on them. He traveled across the 

country to the U.S. Capitol equipped with battle gear. When 

“called,” he stepped up to battle because he believed himself to 

be “a warrior.” To arm himself, he stripped a vulnerable police 

officer of his police baton. He then used that stolen police 

baton to force another officer away from his post and into a mob 

of rioters who proceeded to viciously attack him, leaving him 

bleeding from the head. Mr. Sabol himself has admitted much of 

this, and the weight of the evidence against him is strong. For 

these reasons, the Court is convinced that Mr. Sabol would pose 

a danger to his community and the broader community of American 

citizens if he were to be released pending trial. 

The Court reaches this conclusion having considered, as it 

must, whether the danger Mr. Sabol poses to the community is 

concrete and continuing. See Munchel, 2021 WL 1149196, at *4 

(“[A] defendant’s detention based on dangerousness accords with 

due process only insofar as the district court determines that 
60 

the defendant’s history, characteristics, and alleged criminal 

conduct make clear that he or she poses a concrete, prospective 

threat to public safety.”). While the circumstances of January 

6, 2021 were unique, and the day has passed, it cannot be said 

that every Capitol Riot defendant is no longer a danger because 

those exact circumstances are unlikely to arise again. The D.C. 

Circuit certainly did not say as much; instead, the court 

observed that for the defendants in that case who “did not 

vandalize any property or commit violence, the presence of the 

group was critical to their ability to obstruct the vote and to 

cause danger to the community.” Id. at *8. Mr. Sabol, on the 

other hand, did commit acts of violence. In this regard, Mr. 

Sabol is also different from Capitol Riot defendants like Mr. 

Frederico Klein who engaged in “forceful conduct” but did not 

direct that conduct toward inflicting injury. See Klein, No. CR 

21-236, ECF No. 29 at 24 (“[Mr. Klein’s] most forceful conduct 

was directed to advancing and maintaining the mob’s position in 

the tunnel, not toward inflicting injury, and outside that 

context, the nature of his actions and the force that he 

employed would not have had the same effect.”). The Court is 

also influenced by Mr. Sabol’s admissions to law enforcement 

which were made after the events of January 6 and reflect what 

motivated him to engage in violence. Thus while it may be true 

that some Capitol Riot defendants no longer pose a threat to the 
61 

community because the unique circumstances of January 6 have 

passed and “the specific concerns in the wake of the January 6 

events over future protests and violent attacks on the 

government . . . have dissipated to some degree now three months 

later,” see Klein, No. CR 21-236, ECF No. 29 at 25; the Court 

finds that the presence of the group at the U.S. Capitol was not 

necessary for Mr. Sabol to cause danger to the community. He 

appears to have been motivated to act violently that day not 

solely by the presence of the group or President Trump’s 

encouragement, but also by his belief that he is a “warrior” in 

a fight against perceived tyranny, and there is ample reason to 

believe that fight is not finished for Mr. Sabol and others like 

him, making the threat of further violence present, concrete, 

and continuing. See Mark Niquette, Trump Rips Into Mitch 

McConnell in Speech to Party Donors, Bloomberg (Apr. 10, 2021), 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-10/trump-toutsappeal-to-new-voters-as-path-for-gop-return-to-power (reporting 

that former President Trump repeated false claims about the 2020 

Presidential Election being stolen and criticized former Vice 

President Pence for not rejecting the certification of the 

election results); David Jackson, “Radical Left CRAZIES:” Trump 

issues Easter greetings by attacking political rivals, griping 

about election loss, USA Today (Apr. 4, 2021) (reporting on a 

written statement issued by former President Trump that stated, 
62 

“Happy Easter to ALL, including the Radical Left CRAZIES who 

rigged our Presidential Election, and want to destroy our 

Country!”).11

Moreover, a danger exists that, if released, Mr. Sabol may 

again try to flee or otherwise attempt to prevent his 

prosecution from moving forward. See supra Section III, Part 

B.3. When Mr. Sabol tried to flee previously, he feared being 

caught by the FBI. Now Mr. Sabol is facing a potential twentyyear prison sentence for assaulting Officer B.M. with a deadly 

weapon and is charged with seven other felony and misdemeanor 

offenses. See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 23. As noted, the 

evidence against him is strong. And he has already destroyed 

incriminating evidence and directed others to do so as well. 

Finally, releasing Mr. Sabol from custody and allowing him 

to return to Colorado or move to New York with strict conditions 

of home incarceration, as Mr. Sabol proposes and as he says the 

Pretrial Services Agency in New York recommended, would be 

insufficient to mitigate Mr. Sabol’s danger to the community and 

the risk that he would flee or try to obstruct justice. Mr. 

11 The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of news 

articles. See Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 291 

(D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of the 

existence of newspaper articles in the Washington, D.C., area 

that publicized [certain facts].”); Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 

81 n.1, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (taking judicial notice of facts 

generally known as a result of newspaper articles). 
63 

Sabol argues that in Colorado he would be “a long distance from 

the location of the alleged crime and victims, who are strangers 

to Mr. Sabol.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 17 at 5. The same could be 

said of home confinement in New York. But Mr. Sabol was in 

Colorado before he committed the instant offenses. He was in 

Colorado with his girlfriend, not in Washington D.C., when he 

planned his participation in the protests; when he acquired the 

tactical gear he brought with him to the U.S. Capitol; and when 

he developed the beliefs that ultimately led him to the U.S. 

Capitol on January 6, 2021. Mr. Sabol’s actions demonstrate that 

he is willing to follow his beliefs, and act on them violently, 

no matter how far they take him from his home and no matter what 

“strangers” are on the other side of the “battle” he intends to 

wage in violation of the laws designed to protect our democracy. 

While the Court appreciates that living in New York with his 

girlfriend and near his family may provide him the type of 

support and oversight needed to improve his mental health 

conditions, the Court is not persuaded that this proposed home 

confinement plan would mitigate his continued danger to the 

community based on his demonstrated willingness to engage in 

violence in furtherance of his beliefs and in a perceived battle 

against tyranny. As was true in Chrestman, “[t]ogether, these 

factors demonstrate that he cannot be trusted to abide by any 
64 

conditions of release that might be imposed instead of pretrial 

detention.” 2021 WL 765662, at *16. 

IV. Conclusion 

After considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 

3142(g), the Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure 

the safety of any other person and the community were Mr. Sabol 

to be released pending trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The Court 

further finds, after considering the factors set forth in 18 

U.S.C. § 3142(g) and by a preponderance of the evidence, that no 

condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure 

Mr. Sabol’s appearance as required if he were to be released 

pending trial. Id. Accordingly, Mr. Sabol’s Motion for Pretrial 

Release, is DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: /s/ 

Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 April 14, 2021