Filed 11/15/21 P. v. Defelice CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THOMAS DEFELICE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B307326

(Super. Ct. No. 1492983)

(Santa Barbara County)

Thomas Defelice appeals a judgment following his 

conviction of battery causing serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, 

§ 243, subd. (d))

1

(count 1); assault with force likely to produce 

great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count 2); and corporal 

injury to a former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) (count 3). As to 

count 1, the jury found Defelice personally inflicted serious bodily 

injury. As to count 2, the jury found he personally inflicted great 

bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision

(a). As to count 3, the jury found he personally inflicted great 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

bodily injury under domestic violence circumstances. (§ 12022.7, 

subd. (e).)

Defelice fell within the purview of the “Three Strikes” law 

with two prior strike convictions. The trial court sentenced him 

to a determinate term of 15 years plus an indeterminate term of 

25 years to life in prison. 

We conclude, among other things, that 1) substantial 

evidence supports the judgment, 2) the trial court correctly 

instructed the jury on the section 273.5 offense, 3) Defelice’s

counsel was not ineffective, and 4) Defelice may be convicted of 

corporal injury to a former cohabitant and assault with force 

likely to produce great bodily injury and battery causing serious 

bodily injury. We affirm.

FACTS

L.D. had a sexual relationship with Defelice. She was 

homeless, but they had lived together in a hotel and at the beach 

with camping gear. She shared money, food, and camping gear 

with him. He stored his items in her storage unit.

L.D. ended her relationship with Defelice. She met another 

man and lived with him.

Years later L.D. became “reacquainted” with Defelice. She 

testified that as of January 2016, she had had a “casual 

relationship” with Defelice for “three or four years.”

One day when L.D. was living in an apartment, she loaned 

Defelice $20 to buy alcohol. After Defelice returned, he strangled 

L.D. and slammed her head to the floor. L.D. “thought that [she] 

was going to die.” She had to “gasp for air.” The next thing she 

remembered was waking up in the hospital.

Police Officer Yumaira Kirk responded to a dispatch call. A 

neighbor heard “a female yell for help.” Kirk arrived at L.D.’s 
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apartment. Police Officer Justin Hesketh was there. Hesketh 

knocked on the door and said, “Open the front door now.” 

Hesketh heard a male voice say “Be quiet” and “I’m going to jail.” 

He then heard somebody running in the residence. L.D.

eventually opened the door. She was “in shock, confused, in 

pain.” Kirk and Hesketh assisted her out of the residence. L.D. 

told Kirk that she had been kicked in the head several times. 

She was missing “gaps” of hair on her head. Her eyes were 

“extremely swollen.” L.D. said Defelice had hit her in the eyes.

L.D. told Kirk that Defelice was dissatisfied because she 

was “not pretty.” He had threatened to strangle her and kill her 

because of how she looked. Defelice told her, “ ‘You’ll never 

scream. You’ll never get out of here.’ ” Defelice had pulled her 

hair. She said her jaw was “cracked.” She had an “abrasion” on 

“the left back.” She said, “I think he was grabbing my neck.” 

At the hospital L.D. saw that she was missing a front tooth, 

her eyes were “swollen and blackened,” she was “bruised from 

head to toe,” and there were “hand prints around” her neck.

Jason Prystowsky, an “emergency physician,” testified he 

treated L.D. after she was brought to the hospital by ambulance.

She came in with a “cervical collar” spine “immobilization.” A 

“CT scan” showed a “subdural hematoma.” L.D. had a “traumatic 

brain injury” with bleeding “around the brain.” She had an 

“orbital floor fracture” to the bones near her eye, “bilateral 

zygomatic arch fractures” to her cheek bone area, and a “nasal 

bone fracture.” L.D. had a “contusion in the left suboccipital neck 

soft issue” area. She had subsequent surgery for a “bilateral 

zygomatic arch” reduction.
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R.M. testified L.D. had a relationship with Defelice in 2004. 

He broke her arm. In another incident, he hit her in the face. 

She was taken by ambulance to a hospital.

Police Officer Rashun Drayton testified that R.M. wanted 

to leave, but L.D. was afraid to because Defelice told her that “he 

would hurt her or injure her or kill her if she were to leave.” 

In the defense case, Tom Miller, a district attorney 

investigator, testified L.D. told him that her relationship with 

Defelice was “symbiotic.” Defelice provided her “with protection 

in exchange for sexual intimacy.”

Sheriff Deputy Julio Gutierrez testified that in 2011 L.D.

told him that Defelice “beat [her] up.” In a subsequent interview 

she “recanted.”

Kelley Feeley, an “emergency physician,” testified Defelice 

had abrasions on his back, arm, and hand that could be defensive 

wounds. 

DISCUSSION

Substantial Evidence

For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for a 

conviction, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the 

judgment. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) We do 

not weigh the evidence or decide the credibility of the witnesses.

We do not resolve conflicts in witness testimony as that is a 

matter exclusively for the trier of fact.

Defelice contends the evidence is insufficient for a 

conviction under section 273.5 for corporal injury to a former 

cohabitant because there is no evidence that he and his victim 

“regularly share a dwelling.”
5

The People claim “[t]he term ‘former cohabitant’ does not 

require that the parties live together in a dwelling.” (Boldface 

omitted.) We agree. 

Section 273.5, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, 

“Any person who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a 

traumatic condition upon a victim described in subdivision (b) is 

guilty of a felony . . . .” Subdivision (b) of the statute includes 

victims who are “former cohabitant[s],” or “someone with whom 

the offender has, or previously had, an engagement or dating 

relationship . . . .” (§ 273.5, subd. (b)(2) & (3).)

In People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 18, the court 

held, “The term ‘cohabitant’ has been interpreted ‘broadly’ to 

refer to those ‘ “living together in a substantial relationship–one 

manifested, minimally, by permanence and sexual or amorous 

intimacy.” ’ [Citations.] ‘The element of “permanence” in the 

definition refers only to the underlying “substantial relationship,”

not to the actual living arrangement.’ ” The court said, “Although 

the couple’s living arrangements may have been unstable or 

transitory, this did not deprive them of the statutory protection of 

section 273.5.” (Id. at p. 19.) “Nothing in the language of the 

statute excludes cohabitants who do not have a permanent 

residence.” (Ibid., italics added; see also People v. Belton (2008) 

168 Cal.App.4th 432, 438 [“A permanent address is not necessary 

to establish cohabitation, as cohabitation can be found even in 

‘unstable and transitory’ living conditions”]; People v. Moore

(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1334 [the element of permanence in 

the definition does not refer “to the actual living arrangement”].)

Consequently, the statute applies to cohabitants whose 

living arrangements are unstable, transitory, and homeless.

Defelice’s position leaves homeless women without protection
6

which defeats the remedial goal of this legislation. (People v. 

Gutierrez (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 944, 952.) Having a cohabiting

relationship in a permanent dwelling is not required. (People v.

Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 18-19.)

There is also evidence of a substantial cohabiting 

relationship. L.D. testified she had a sexual relationship with 

Defelice. She was homeless, but she shared money, food, and 

camping gear with him. Defelice placed his things in her storage 

unit. L.D. stayed with Defelice for months. For a time she 

stayed with him at a hotel and at the beach “with camping gear” 

that she bought. She testified that when she lived on the street,

she “spent most of [her] waking hours together” with him. (Italics 

added.)

The relationship between Defelice and L.D. was not 

sporadic or short term as Defelice suggests. It was long term. In 

2011, Defelice told Gutierrez that he had a five-month dating 

relationship with L.D. L.D. testified that as of January 2016 she 

had had a “casual relationship” with Defelice for “three or four 

years.” At trial, when asked how long ago did this relationship 

start, L.D. said, “Maybe seven years ago.” The evidence is 

sufficient. (People v. Holifield (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 993, 1002.)

Instructional Error

Defelice contends the trial court erred by giving the jury a 

modified version of CALCRIM No. 840. We disagree.

The trial court gave the jury the following instruction from 

CALCRIM No. 840 on the definition of “cohabitants” for section 

273.5: “The term cohabitants means two unrelated persons living 

together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some 

permanency of the relationship. Factors that may determine 

whether people are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) 
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sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same 

residence, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or 

ownership of property, (4) the parties’ holding themselves out as 

domestic partners, (5) the continuity of the relationship, and (6) 

the length of the relationship. [¶] A person may cohabit 

simultaneously with two or more people at different locations, 

during the same time frame, if he or she maintains substantial 

ongoing relationships with each person and lives with each 

person for significant periods.”

Defelice notes that the trial court added the following 

language to this instruction: “Two people may be cohabitants

even if they do not have a permanent residence.” (Italics added.) 

He claims the court erred. But the court’s addition is consistent 

with People v. Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at page 19.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defelice contends his trial counsel was ineffective under 

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, by not 

challenging the trial court’s addition to the instruction. He has to

show his lawyer “failed to act” as a “reasonably competent”

attorney. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 440.) But not 

challenging a proper instruction is reasonable.

The Williamson Rule

Defelice contends, “If the section 273.5(a) conviction stands 

then the section 243(d) and 245(a)(4) convictions [counts 1 and 2]

must be vacated under the Williamson rule.” (Boldface omitted; 

In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651.) We disagree.

“Under the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes 

the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the 

Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively 

under the special statute.” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th
8

81, 86, italics added.) “On the other hand, if the more general 

statute contains an element that is not contained in the special 

statute and that element would not commonly occur in the 

context of a violation of the special statute, we do not assume 

that the Legislature intended to preclude prosecution under the 

general statute. In such situations, because the general statute 

contemplates more culpable conduct, it is reasonable to infer that 

the Legislature intended to punish such conduct more severely.” 

(Id. at p. 87, italics added.) But courts must also consider the 

legislative goals, and the “entire context surrounding the ‘special’ 

statute.” (People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 503.)

The People contend the Williamson rule does not apply 

because the crimes in counts 1 and 2 involving felony battery and 

felony assault do not involve “the same conduct” and do not have 

the same “elements” as the section 273.5 conviction in count 3. 

They claim counts 1 and 2 require “more culpable conduct” for a 

conviction than the count 3 crime, and not applying the 

Williamson rule furthers the legislative intent. We agree.

“[F]elony battery, section 243, subdivision (d), requires 

‘serious bodily injury’; and, felony assault, section 245, 

subdivision (a), requires ‘force likely to produce great bodily 

injury.’ But, the Legislature has clothed persons of the opposite 

sex in intimate relationships with greater protection by requiring

less harm to be inflicted before the offense is committed. Those 

special relationships form a rational distinction which has a 

substantial relation to the purpose of the statute.” (People v.

Gutierrez, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 952, italics added.)

Consequently, section 273.5 provides vulnerable victims in 

cohabiting relationships with more protection from abusive 

conduct. It added a new crime with different elements covering 
9

different conduct than felony assault and felony battery. (People 

v. Villagran (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 880, 896 [“This distinction 

makes it apparent that ‘the statues cover different conduct,’ and 

so the Williamson rule does not apply”].)

The Legislature added more protection for victims without 

changing criminal liability for other more serious crimes. (People 

v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 119; People v. Vega (1995) 33 

Cal.App.4th 706, 710 [“Section 273.5 was enacted to expand its 

predecessor section, a ‘wife beating’ statute (former § 273d)”].)

Former section 273d prohibited corporal injury to a wife. (People 

v. Gutierrez, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 948.) It did not

supersede or replace the crime of “felonious assault.” (Id. at 

p. 948, fn. 2.) The legislation adding section 273.5 makes no 

reference to superseding any other felony. (Stats. 1977, ch. 912, 

§ 3, p. 2786.) 

“The Legislature has separately defined the three offenses 

of which [Defelice] was here charged and convicted . . . .” (People 

v. Sloan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 119, italics added.) Maintaining 

the separate identity of these three crimes effectuates “the strong 

legislative purpose behind [all three] statutes.’ ” (Ibid.) Courts 

have affirmed convictions of the section 273.5 offense, along with 

felony assault and felony battery convictions. (Sloan, at pp. 110, 

119; People v. Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 18.)

Moreover, the Legislature would not supersede the existing 

protections in the law that protect victims from the more violent 

felony assault and felony battery crimes because that would 

defeat its goal “to deter domestic violence.” (People v. Mora

(1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1355.) “[T]he Legislature has 

continually broadened the scope of this protection.” (Ibid.) 
10

Defelice’s position narrows it, leaving victims with no protection

from the more serious offenses.

Defelice suggests felony battery and felony assault are the 

typical domestic violence crimes. But if that were the case, there 

would have been no need to enact section 273.5 to provide 

protection for a different more common and less violent crime.

Moreover,“ ‘ “[t]o immunize” defendant from conviction of 

[assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury 

and battery with serious bodily injury simply because a great 

bodily injury enhancement was found true under the charge of 

infliction of corporal injury on a spouse] “would be 

irrational . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Sloan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 119.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

PERREN, J.

TANGEMAN, J.
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Thomas R. Adams, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

David Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Stephanie A. 

Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.