### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-30050

HERBERT ALLEN MCKNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant
v. DRESSER, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee

------------------------ ------------------------ ------------------------ ------------------------ ------------ consolidated with Case No. 11-30072 HABEN LACHNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant
v. DRESSER, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee

------------------------ ------------------------ ------------------------ ------------------------ ------------ consolidated with Case No. 11-30104 FOSTER L. ANDERSON; JASON J. AYMOND; HARRY BONTON; QUINCY C. BOYD; BILLY G. BRUNSON; ET AL, Plaintiffs-Appellants
v. DRESSER, INCORPORATED, U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D March 28 , 20 12 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk Case: 11-30050 Document: 00511803175 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/28/2012No. 11-30050 Defendant-Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

Before GARZA, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge: In a consolidated appeal, Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that the district court erred in denying t h e i r m o tions to remand and in dismissing their workplac e s a f

ety claims as time-barred. For the following reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of th e district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I Defendant-Appellee Dresser, Inc., (“Dresser”) is an i n dustrial valve manufacturer with facilities in the state of Louisiana. Appellants all worked for D r e s ser at some point in the last four decades, their respective employment s t e rminating at various times between 1977 and 2009. In 2010, Pla i n t i f f s Appell a nt s H erbert Allen McKnight, Haben J. Lachney, and Foster L. Anderson, along with 42 other plaintiffs, filed three separate suits in Louisiana state court against Dresser. McKnight’s and Lachne y’ s c o m p l ai nts alleged that Dresser had been negligent in failing t o m ai ntain a safe workplace, and Anderson’s complaint alleged negligence, strict liability, and fraud u l e nt misrepresentation. In all three suits, Appellants claimed that Dresser failed to pro p e r l y m onitor and mitigate exposure to loud noise at Dresser’s in d u strial facility, and that these failures led to long-term hearing loss. Appellants sought damages f o r t h e se injuries. Dresser removed the actions t o f e d e r a l court pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), which grants federal j u r i sdiction

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over state law claims that require i n terpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Dresser asserted that the state court could not adjudicate Appellants’ tort claims without interpret i n g t h e parties’ CBA, and that the 1 district court therefore had jurisdiction under § 301. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc. , 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988) (“[A]n application of state law is preempted by § 301 of t h e [LMRA] only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.”). Appellants filed motions to remand, contending that their tort claims were independent of the CBA. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 471 U.S. 202, 212-213 (1985) (holding that § 301 does not preempt state law claims based on non-negotiable, independent rights). The district court adopt e d t h e recommendation of the magistrate judge and denied Appellants’ motions to remand, citing Navarro v. Excel Corp. , 48 F. App’x 481 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished) (h o l d i n g that § 301 preempted plaintiff’s state law claims because the parties’ CBA imposed duties

on the employe r w i t h r e gard to workplace safety, and the court would have to interpret the CBA to ascertain the employer’s dut i e s )

. The district court then granted Dresser’s Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, concluding that Appellants’

The CBA in this cas e pr ovide d, amo ng othe r things , th a t D r e s se r wo uld (1) fur nis h 1 all requ ired saf

ety equi p m e n t , ( 2) ins tit ute reas onable and nece ss ary pr ecau tio ns for saf eguard ing healt h and safet y, (3) not ded uctpay for union safet y rep res enta tives bas ed on tim e sp ent car rying out the ir dut ies , and ( 4) co nduc t a joint saf ety ins pec tio n wi th the union
on the 15th of every mo nth. The CBA als o st ipul ated that mat ter s of occ upat ional saf ety and healt h wo uld be handl ed betw e e n e m p loyees and thei r sup ervis ors , and if the mat ter s rem ainedunr es olved , they wo uld be rep ort ed to the union saf ety rep res enta tive. 3 Case: 11-30050 Document: 00511803175 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/28/2012No. 11-30050

complaints were untimely under the applicable federal statute o f l imitations. 2 Appellants filed notices of appeal, and the three actions were consolidated. We review the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motions to remand, the propriety of removal under § 301, and the existence of subject matter jurisdiction

as interrelate d questions of law subject to de novo review. See Oviedo v. Hallbauer , 655 F.3d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2011) (ci t ing Kollar v. United Transp. Union , 83 F.3d 124, 125 (5th Cir. 1996)). II Appellants’ prim a ry contention on appeal is that the district court erred in re l yi ng on Navarro because this case involves non-waivable Louisiana workplace safety claims, rather than waivable Texas claims. Specifica l l y, Appellants urge this cour t t o adopt the reasoning of the Eastern District of Louisiana in Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp. , No. 03-3588, 2004 WL 574718 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2004). See id. at *4 (holding that § 301 did not preempt Louisiana plaintiff’s state workplace safety claims, even though the p arti e s ’ C BA a d dr e s s ed workplace safety, because plaintiff was as s e r ting independent, nonnegotiable state law rights). Dresser counters that this co u rt’s decision in Espinoza v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. , 622 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2010), is controlling. See id. at 442-44 (citing N

a v a r ro a nd holding that § 301 preempted Texas plaintiff’s state workplace safety claims because the CBA helped define employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace).

The d ist ric t cour t, c itin g De lCos tell o v
. Int’l Bhd. of Tea ms ters , 462 U. S. 151 (1983) , 2 app lied a fed eral st atut e of lim itat ions of six mo nths fr om the dat e the App ell a n t s r ece ived noti ce of thei r injurie s and conc lude d that App ellant s’ clai ms we re untim e l y o n t heir fac e. App ellant s cont end on app eal that the dis tri ct cour t sho uld have ins tead app lied Louis iana’ s one- year pr es cri pt ion for tor t act ions

. Becaus e we ulti mat ely conc lude that the dis tri ct cour t sho uld have grant ed App ellant s’ mo tio ns to rem and and wa s wi thou t juris dic tio n to grant the
mo tio ns to dis mi ss , we d o n ot add res s this is sue
. 4 Case: 11-30050 Document: 00511803175 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/28/2012No. 11-30050 A Congress has dictated that federal courts have jurisdiction over all cases “ari s ing under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Additionally, the “well-pleaded complaint” rule requires that, for

a federal court to have “arising under” jurisdiction, the pl a i n t i f f ’ s federal law

c l a i m s must appear on the face of the complaint. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v
. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). Thus, if a complaint pleads only state law claims, a federal court generally does not have jurisdiction over that complaint,

even if the defendant asserts preemption as an affirmat ive defense. Gutierrez v. Flores , 543 F.3d 248, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2 008). However, the complete preemption doctrine presents a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Johnson v. Baylor Univ. , 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Congress may so completely preempt a particular area that
any civil complaint raising t h is select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.”) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor , 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987)). Unlike ordinary preemption, complete preem p tion is jurisdictional in nature, and “[a]s such, it authorizes removal to federal court even if the comp l a i n t i s artfully pleaded to include solely state law claims

. . . .” Id. (quoting Heimann v. Nat’l Elevator Indus. Pension Fund , 187 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 199 9)). The Supreme Court has applied complete preemption in a small number of areas, one of wh i c h i s c a s e s involving § 301 of the LMRA. Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). Enacted by Congress to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of CBAs, § 301 provides: Suits for violat i o n of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce
. . . may be brought i n a n y district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . . .

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29 U.S.C. § 185(a). In Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. , 369 U.S. 95 (1962), the Court explained that, “in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules.” Id. at 104. Thus,
any state court suit alleging violation of a labor contract must be brought under § 301 and resolved under federal law. See id. at 103. The Supreme Court has also held that § 301 preemption may apply to tort c l a i m s a s well. See AllisChalmers , 471 U.S. at 210-11. The Court in Allis-Chalmersreasoned that:

If the policies that animate § 301 are to be given their proper range

. . . the pre-emptive effect of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations.

. . . [Q]uestions relating to what the parties to a l ab o r a gr eement agreed, and what legal cons e qu e nc e s w e r e i nt e n d e d to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether s u c h questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract o r i n a s u it alleging liability in tort.
Id. Ho w e v e r , the Allis-Chalmers Court limited its holding to tort suits involving “state-law rights and obligations that d o not exist independently of private agreements.” Id. at 212-13 (“[I]t would be incons i s t e n t with congressional intent under that s e c tion to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.”). The Court explained that § 301 pre e m p t i o n of state tort claims is only proper where “resolution of [the] state-law claim is substantially d e pendent upon analysis of the terms of [the] a gr e e m e n t made between the parties in a labor contract

. . . .” Id. at 220. The focus of such an analysis is whether the state tort action “confers nonnegotiable state-law r i gh t s
. . . independent of any right established by contr act” or instead “evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” Id. at 213.

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The narrow issue for our review is thus whether (1) Appellants’ claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA, i n which case the district court was correct to deny Appellants’ motion to remand, or (2) Appellants’ claims are based

on independent, non-negotiable state law rights, in which case the district court was without jurisdiction and erred in denying the motion to remand. B Ap pellants contend that Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp. , No. 03-3 5 8 8 , 2 0 0 4 WL 574718 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2004) provides the proper analysis. In Arceneaux , the plaintiffs brou gh t Louisiana state law claims seeking damages for gradual hearing loss under LA

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. § 23:13, which requires all Louisiana employers to pro v i de a “reasonably safe” workplace. Id. at *1. The employer removed the case to federal court, asserting § 301 preemption. Id. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, reasoning as follows: To establish a violation of Section 23:13 against an emp l o y e r , a plaintiff must establish “that her accident and injuries were caused by an unreasonable risk of harm cre a t e d by the employer’s failure to properly fulfill the duties imposed by the

. . . statute.” Jones v. Trailer , 636 So. 2d 1112, 1116 (La. Ct. App. 1994). Here, not one allegation in plaintif

f s ’ complaint relies on or refers to the CBA. Indeed, plaintiffs’ complaint specifically alleges that defendants did not comply with state and federal regulations concerning workplace exposure to noise. Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants violated the applicable health and safety provisions o f t h e CBA. To determine whether defendants v iolated their duty to plaintiffs, a court need look only as far as Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:13. As noted by the Louisiana courts of appeals, to determine whether an employer has violated Section 23:13, the court must e x amine only whether the employer fulfilled his duties imposed by the statute

. See Jones , 636 So. 2d at 1116. Contract inte r p r e tation is not required here to determine whether the employer is liable in tort.
Id. at *4. Appellants contend that they, like the plaintiffs in Arceneaux , brought independent claims under Louisiana law which the state court may adjudicate without interpreting the parties’ CBA.

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Dresser counters that this court’s decision in Espinoza is dispositive. In Espinoza , the plaintiff brought a negligence claim under Texas law against her employer Cargill after suffering a hand injury while operating a company saw. Espinoza , 622 F.3d at 437. This court concluded that § 301 authorized removal of Espinoza’s state law claim because ascertaining Cargill’s duties and Espinoza’s remedies would involve interpreting the terms of the CBA. Id. at 445. The Espinoza court explained that “the CBA [did] not ‘merely acknowledge [ ] Cargill’s duty to p rovide a safe workplace for its employees’; instead, it help[ed] define that duty by mandating such things as plant inspections, safety committees for each shift, and the provision of safety equi p m e n t .” Id. at 444. As Dresser notes, the CBA in the present case similarly contains specific duties such as the duty t o p r o vide safety equipment, to institute precautions, not to deduct pay for union sa f e t y representatives for time spent carrying out their duties, and to conduct safety inspections. According to Dresser, Espinoza stands for the proposition that, if a CBA elaborates on workplace safety in this way, adjudication of a state workplace safety claim requires interpretation of the CBA. However, the Espinoza court also found it significant that Espinoza h ad waived her state law claims, as Texas law allows. Id. at 443 (“[S]tate-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private agreements, and that

as a result can be waived or altered by agreement of the parties, are pre-empted by those agreements.”) (quoting Allis-Chalmers , 471 U.S. at 21 3 ) (emphasis added)). I n thi s w ay , Ap p e ll a nts’ Louisiana workplace safety claims are different from the Texas law claims in Espinoza

. Unlike Texas, Louisiana not only places 3

Dr es se r and the d i s t r i c t c o urt als o cit ed the line of cas es lead ing to Espi noza , 3 inclu ding Na va rro
. But Na va rro , and allof the Fift h Circuitcase s on w hich Na va rro reli ed, involved plai ntif

fs wh o, lik e Esp inoza, we re lim ite d to clai ms unde r the CBA beca use they had
wa ived thei r st ate law c l a i m s
. Se e Na va rro , 48 F. App ’x at *1 (“ The CBA’s dis abilit y plan requ ires an em plo yee to wa ive her right to sue in ret urn for Excel’ s pr ovidi ng a clai ms 8 Case: 11-30050 Document: 00511803175 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/28/2012No. 11-30050

a duty on employers to provide a safe work environment, it expressly forbids the waiver of that duty in a CBA. See LA

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. § 23:13 (“Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be reasonably safe for the employees therein.”); id. at § 23:1033 (“No contract, rule, regulation or device whatsoever shall operate to relie v e the employer, in whole or in part, from any liability created by this Chapter except as herein provided.”). In other words, Louisi a na workplace safety claims are based on precisely the type of independent, non-negotiable state law rights and obligations which the Supreme Court excepted from § 301 preemption. This distinction is no less important be c a u s e a c laim raises the

4

same questions and implicates the same facts as a claim under the parties’ CBA. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10 (“[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement i t s e l f, t he claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.”). Alternatively, Dre s s e r c o ntends that, even if the state law rights are independent, interpretation of t h e CBA is necessary because Louisiana law provides no “objective standard” for determining whether Dresser has provided

pr oce dur e for dis abilit y benef its .” ); Cupi t v. Wal ts , 90 F.3d 107, 109 (5t h C ir. 1996) (“ In lieu of sub sc ribi ng to the Texas Wor ke rs ’ Com pens atio n Act, t h e C o m pany agree s to pr ovide dir ect ly to its em plo yees the com pens atio n and benef its othe rw ise availabl e
. . . .” ); Ric hter v. Me rch

. Fast Motor Line s, Inc. , 83 F.3d 96, 97 (5t h Cir. 1996) (“ The CBA at iss ue pr ovide s the exclus ive rem edy for se ttl ing dis put es involving negligenc e on the par t of the Com pany
. . . .” ).
Dr es se r cont ends that , beca use the Nat ional Labor Relat ions Act (“NLRA” ) requ ires 4 bargain i n g o v er wo rk plac e saf ety, Louis iana’ s right to a saf e wo rk plac e canno t be “non

negot iable .” See 29 U. S. C. § 158( d) ; NLRB v. Gu lf Pow er Co. , 384 F.2d 822, 825 (5t h Cir. 1967) (ho ldi ng that “s afe ty rules and prac tic es
. . . ar e u ndoubted ly condi tio ns of emp loym ent, and

. . . Sec tio n 8(d) requ ires good fai th bargain ing as a mut ual obligat ion of the em plo yer and the Unio n in conne cti on wi th suc h mat ter s” ). Ho we ver , t h e f act that the NLRA requ ires
em p loyer s to bargain healt h and saf ety pr ovis ions in a CBA doe s not me an that a st ate lik e Louis iana may not als o grant em plo yees inde pend ent, non- negot iabl e st ate law right s and forbid em plo yers f

rom bar gaining thos e r ights aw ay. 9 Case: 11-30050 Document: 00511803175 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/28/2012No. 11-30050

a reasonably safe work environment. We disagree. First, Louisiana statutory law articulates a duty which goes beyond a vague mandate for workplace safety: Every em p l o y e r s h all f

urni s h e m p l o y m ent which shall be reasonably safe for the em p l o y e e s therein. They shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, shall adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render such employment and the place of employment safe in accordance with the accepted and ap p roved pra c t i c e in such or similar industry or places of employment considering the normal hazard of such employ m ent, and shall do every other thing re a s onably necessary to protect the life, health, safety and welfare of such employees.
LA

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. § 23:13. Second, a substantial body of Louisiana and Fifth Circuit

case law applies § 23:13 and general tort principles to negligence claims in the complete absence of a CBA. In other words, Louisiana law not o n l y s tates an 5 employer’s duty under § 23:13, but also fleshes out the contours of that duty in specific fact scenarios. Resort to the p a r t i e s’ contract is not required to determine whether Dresser violated these independent, non-negotiable duties. Lastly, Dresser expresses concern that, if we adopt the analysis presented in Arceneaux , a l l L ouisiana safety claims arising under any CBA in Louisiana

See, e. g. , Jones v. Tr a i l or , 93-2 144 (La. App

. 4 Cir. 4/28/94) ; 636 So. 2d 1112, 1116 5 (ho ldi ng that, to es tabl ish a violat ion of § 23: 13, a pla inti ff mus t es tabl ish“thather acci dent and injurie s we re caus ed by an unrea so nable ris k of harm cre ated by the em plo yer’s f ailur e to pr ope rly fulf

ill the dutie s im pos ed by the . .

. s tat ute” ); Ve ga v. S. Sc ra

p Ma teri alCo. , 517 F.2d 254, 258- 59 (5t h Cir. 1975) (“ Sout hern Scr ap had a dut y as em plo yer to pr ovide dec ede nt wi th a saf

e plac e to w ork , LA

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. 23:1 3; .

. . . [T] he brea ch of the dut y im pos ed by the
em plo ymen t or agency rela tio nshi p may, unde r genera l tor t pr incip les , be act i o n a b le negligenc e beca use of the cre atio n or mai nten ance ther eby of an undue ris k of harm to othe rs .” ); Kav ana ugh v. Or le ans Pari sh Sch. Bd. , CA 4588 (La. App
. 4 Cir. 4/11 /86) ; 487 So. 2d 533, 533 (ho ldi ng t hat liabil ity unde r § 23:1 3 requ ires an analys is of the for es eeabi lity of harm ); Lytel l v. Hu shf ie ld , 81-2 117 (La. 1/25 /82) ; 408 So. 2d 1344, 1347- 48 (ho ldi ng that an em plo yer’s dut y unde r § 23:1 3 i n clud es pr ovidi ng saf e equip me nt use d in conne cti on wi th
wo rk); Gu idr

y v. Coregis Ins. Co. , 04-3 25 (La. App

. 3 Cir. 12/2 9/04 ); 896 So. 2d 164, 178- 79 (ho ldi ng t h a t a c o m p any wa s liable for danger ous pow er lines beca use they pos ed a norm al hazard to em plo yees and the danger wa s a fr e q u e nt top ic of conver sat ion amo ng its
em plo yees ); Mi ller v. Em p’rs Mut. Li ab. Ins. Co. of Wis

. , 13302 ( La. App . 2 Cir. 8/29/ 77); 349 So. 2d 1353, 1363 (hold ing t hat fai lure of emp loyerto use ext raor dina ry care and tak e every pr ecau tio n agai nstinjury d oes no t cons tit ute act ionabl e n egligenc e). 10 Case: 11-30050 Document: 00511803175 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/28/2012No. 11-30050

will be subject to state law analysis rather than a common body of federal law. These concerns are misplaced. The fact that Louisiana state l a w e stablishes non-negotiable rights and obligations with respect to workplace safety does not prevent employers and employ e es from contracting for other rights and obligations outside those found in Louisiana law, and enforc i ng them with a contract suit. If this takes place, § 301 will require that those claims be heard in federal court. Likewise, a tort claim that incorporates specific duties from a CBA may also be subject to removal under § 301, even if such a claim is labeled

as a negligence claim. But where a plaintiff, like Appellants in this case, brings a negligence claim based on independent, non-negotiable state law rights, and his com p l a i n t n e i t her refers to nor relies on the CBA, such a claim will not be subject to § 301 preemption. 6 On the other hand, deciding this case under Espinoza would allow Louisiana employers to remove all state workplace safety claims to federal court

as long as the governing CBA made reference with some specificity to workplace safety, even though Louisiana law prevents the waiver of state law claims. This

was not the intent o f § 301. See Allis-Chalmers , 471 U.S. at 211-12 (“Nor is ther e a n y s uggestion that Congress, in adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of private agreements the force of federal law.

. . . Such

a rule of law would delegate to unions a n d u n ionized employers the power to

Dr es se r poi nts to no sp ecif ic language in App ellant s’ com plai nts wh ich wa s borr ow ed 6 fr om the CBA, neit her doe s our revie w of the com plai nts revea l a n y . Inst ead , Dr es se r att em pt s to tie dut ies fou nd in the CBA to variou s dis sim ilar d u t i e s allege d in App ellant s’
com plai nt. For exam ple , Dr es se r cont ends that the com plai nts ’ allegat ions that Dr es se r had
a dut y “to se e that Plaint iffs per for me d the dut ies per taini ng to his wo rk in a pr ope r, saf e and
wo rk man lik e m a n n e r” or “to se e that pr ope r saf ety rule s we re ado pt ed, pr om ulgate d, and enf orc ed as conc erne d the us e o f h e aring pr ote cti on devic es and othe r pr ote ctive equip me nt for all individual s ente ring its fac ilit ies ” are real ly ref ere nces to the dut y cont ained in the CBA to pr ovide for joint saf

ety ins pec tio ns on the 15th of every mo nth. See App ellant s’ Br. at 32-3 4. We do not think that thes e com par iso ns, or the othe rs mad e by Dr es se r, betw een App ellant s’
com plai nts and the CBA dem ons tra te t h a t App ellant s we re me rely mas quer adin g cont rac t clai ms as t ortc laim s. 11 Case: 11-30050 Document: 00511803175 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/28/2012No. 11-30050

e xempt themselves from whatever state labor standards they disfavored. ” ) ; Arceneaux , 2004 WL 574718, at *3 (“To hold otherwise would provide employers and labor unions the opportunity to place broad terms such as ‘health and safety’ in a CBA in order to skirt liab i l ity under state law. This is not the purpose of Section 301 preemption.”). III In conclusion, D resser owed Appellants duties under the CBA and simultaneously owed non-negotiable, independent duties under Louisiana tort law. These d u ties formed the bases for two distinct types of claims—contract and tort—either of which Appellants may have brought before the district court. Appellants chose to sue in tort, without reference t o the CBA, and their claims
may be adjudicated by sole resort to Louisiana tort law. Applying the Supreme Court’s construction of § 301, the district co u r t w a s without jurisdiction and therefore erred in denying the motions to remand and in granting the motions to dismiss. Accordingly, the judgment is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this ruling.

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