IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: World Communications :

Charter School, A Non-Profit :

Corporation :

 : No. 1374 C.D. 2021

Appeal of: World Communications : Submitted: September 9, 2022

Charter School :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: November 17, 2023

World Communications Charter School (WCCS) appeals from a Final Decree

of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Orphans’ Court Division 

(orphans’ court), dated April 26, 2021, granting summary judgment in favor of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) and directing Urban Affairs 

Coalition (UAC) to distribute the assets remaining in the World Communications 

Charter School Education Fund (the Fund) to the School District of Philadelphia 

(SDP). Also before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss or Quash as Moot (Motion to 

Dismiss)

1

filed by the Commonwealth and UAC seeking to dismiss or quash the 

appeal on the basis the assets were already distributed as ordered by the orphans’

court. Upon review, we grant the Motion to Dismiss on the basis the appeal is moot. 

The following facts are not in dispute. In 1997, WCCS formed a charter 

school that operated within the SDP. (Commonwealth’s “Petition to Approve 

1 The Commonwealth and UAC sought, as alternative relief, in their Motion to Dismiss a 

stay of the briefing schedule pending disposition of the mootness issue. By order dated June 9, 

2022, the Motion to Dismiss was listed for disposition with the merits of the appeal and the 

Commonwealth and UAC were directed to file briefs. 
2

Dissolution of the World Communications Charter School Education Fund and 

Distribution of Assets to the School District of Philadelphia” (Petition)2 & WCCS’s 

Answer3thereto ¶ 4.) In June 2016, WCCS sold property it owned at 512-520 South 

Broad Street in Philadelphia for $10 million. (Petition & Answer ¶ 7.) The Fund 

was established from the net proceeds of the sale.4(Petition & Answer ¶ 9.) In 

November 2016, the School Reform Commission accepted WCCS’s decision to not 

renew its charter and cancelled a revocation hearing that was scheduled. (Petition 

& Answer ¶ 13.) On June 30, 2017, WCCS ceased operations. (Petition & Answer 

¶ 14.) 

On August 9, 2019, the Commonwealth, acting in its capacity as parens

patriae, filed the Petition seeking to approve dissolution of the Fund and distribution 

of its assets to SDP. The Commonwealth asserted that under the Charter School 

Law (CSL), 24 P.S. §§ 17-1701-A–17-1751-A,

5 a charter school may only receive 

and distribute funds for charter school purposes, and upon dissolution, the charter 

school’s assets are to be proportionally distributed to its students’ home schools, 

here SDP. (Petition ¶¶ 15-18.) The Commonwealth asserted the Fund was not

established for charter school purposes and thus its assets should be transferred to 

SDP in accordance with the CSL. (Id. ¶¶ 19-22.) The Petition indicated that UAC 

consented to the distribution. (Id. ¶ 23.)

WCCS initially filed preliminary objections to the Petition asserting the 

Commonwealth failed to join an indispensable party, which the orphans’ court 

2 The Petition appears in the Reproduced Record at pages 24a through 50a.

3 The Answer appears in the Reproduced Record at pages 51a through 57a.

4 While the parties agree the Fund was established, as discussed more fully below, they 

dispute to whom the donation was made. 

5 The CSL is part of the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as 

amended, added by Section 1 of the Act of June 19, 1997, P.L. 225.
3

overruled. (9/10/19 Orphans’ Court Order, Original Record (O.R.) Item 3.)6 

Thereafter, WCCS filed an Answer opposing the Petition. Therein, WCCS denied 

the net proceeds of the sale of its property were donated to UAC, as the 

Commonwealth averred, (see Petition ¶ 9), and instead asserted they were donated 

to World Communications Education Foundation (WCEF), “a separate organization 

operating under [Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. 

§] 501(c)(3) [] and [the] supervision of UAC,” (Answer ¶ 9).

In August 2020, the Commonwealth filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 

which the orphans’ court denied without prejudice for failure to conform to the rules

of court. (10/20/20 Orphans’ Court Order, O.R. Item 9.) In November 2020, the 

Commonwealth filed its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, to which WCCS 

responded.7

Following briefing, the orphans’ court issued its Final Decree dated April 26, 

2021, granting the Commonwealth’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and 

ordering UAC to distribute the remaining assets of the Fund, specifically 

$6,457,052.30 plus any additional interest earned, within 30 days of the order 

becoming final. In its accompanying opinion, the orphans’ court examined the CSL

and determined that pursuant to the CSL, upon dissolution, WCCS’s assets could be 

disbursed for “charter school purposes only,” a term that was not defined by the 

CSL. (Orphans’ Court Opinion (Op.) at 9-10.) However, based on the definition of 

6 The orphans’ court order also directed the assets of the Fund be distributed to SDP within 

20 days, but distribution was subsequently stayed. (See 9/20/19 Orphans’ Court Order, O.R. Item 

5.)

7 The Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and WCCS’s Response thereto are in the 

Reproduced Record at pages 69a through 128a and 60a through 67a, respectively.
4

“[c]harter school,”8the orphans’ court concluded “it is not terribly vexing to discern 

the meaning of ‘charter school purposes only.’” (Id. at 10.) “Guided by the specific 

language of Section []1703-A and the rules of statutory construction,” the orphans’ 

court concluded “it is possible . . . to determine as a matter of law if the facts are 

undisputed whether funds have been dispersed for charter school purposes only.” 

(Id.) The orphans’ court determined there were two critical issues, whether the 

distribution to UAC was for a “charter school purpose only” and whether the Fund 

was a separate legal entity from UAC, both of which were questions of law in its 

opinion. (Id. at 10-11.) The orphans’ court noted UAC did not oppose the Petition, 

which “supports the conclusion that UAC’s ‘purpose’ is not a ‘charter school 

purpose only,’” but found it was “not necessary . . . to rely on th[at] inference[]” as 

the documentary evidence “provide[s] clear evidence that the charitable purpose of 

[] UAC is considerably broader than ‘charter school purposes only.’” (Id. at 11.) 

The orphans’ court explained:

In particular, UAC’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws . . . outline 

the broad charitable purposes of UAC as follows:

The purpose of the corporation is to conduct exclusively 

charitable and educational activities within the meaning of 

[S]ection 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986

. . . relating primarily to the promotion of social welfare 

and the quality of life in the Philadelphia metropolitan 

area.

The corporation shall have the power and authority to 

engage in all activities which support its purposes, 

8 Section 1703-A of the CSL defines “[c]harter school” as “an independent public school 

established and operated under a charter from the local board of school directors and in which 

students are enrolled or attend. A charter school must be organized as a public, nonprofit 

corporation. Charters may not be granted to any for-profit entity.” 24 P.S. § 17-1703-A. Section 

1703-A was added by Section 1 of the Act of June 19, 1997, P.L. 225.
5

especially programs designed to promote equal justice and 

racial harmony, equality of opportunity, basic education 

and youth employment, and neighborhood and business 

development, and raising funds for such activities and 

programs whether conducted by the corporation or by 

other organizations which are qualified to receive such 

support.

(Id. (quoting Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2).) 

The orphans’ court continued: “Clearly, the broad mandate of [] UAC to 

promote equal justice, racial harmony, equality of opportunity, basic education[,]

and youth employment goes beyond ‘charter school purposes only.’” (Id.) The 

orphans’ court found WCCS’s assertion that the donation was made to a separate 

entity was “belied” by the record, which included a Fiscal Sponsorship Agreement 

between UAC and WCEF, under the terms of which UAC retained control over its 

program partners, such as WCEF. (Id. at 11-12.) 

WCCS filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal,9 WCCS argues the orphans’ 

court erred or abused its discretion by granting summary judgment because the term 

“charter school purpose” is not defined by the CSL and a trier of fact could have 

determined the distribution was for a “charter school purpose.” (WCCS’s Brief (Br.) 

at 14-17.) It contends the orphans’ court usurped the role of the jury as factfinder. 

(Id. at 17-18.)

On May 3, 2022, the Commonwealth and UAC filed the Motion to Dismiss. 

Therein, the Commonwealth and UAC assert WCCS never sought reconsideration 

of the Final Decree nor did it seek a stay pending appeal. (Motion to Dismiss ¶¶ 8-

9 The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is limited to deciding 

whether the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Wise v. Huntingdon Cnty. 

Hous. Dev. Corp., 212 A.3d 1156, 1159 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). “Summary judgment may be 

granted only in those cases in which the record clearly shows that there are no genuine issues of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In Re Est. of Ross, 

815 A.2d 30, 34 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (emphasis and citation omitted).
6

9.) Thus, when the orphans’ court order became “final,” UAC complied with its 

terms and delivered the entire amount of the funds at issue to SDP on or about July 

1, 2021. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Because there was no actual case or controversy remaining 

and “the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt lacks the power to undo what has been done,” the 

Commonwealth and UAC request this Court dismiss and/or quash WCCS’s appeal 

as moot. (Id. ¶¶ 11-14.) WCCS did not file an answer to the Motion to Dismiss.10 

In their respective briefs, the Commonwealth and UAC reiterate the matter is 

moot based upon the assets being distributed pursuant to the Final Decree. 

(Commonwealth’s Br. at 11-12; UAC’s Br. at 5-8.) As to the merits, the 

Commonwealth argues there was no usurpation of the jury’s role as WCCS had no 

right to a jury trial. (Commonwealth’s Br. at 14-15.) Moreover, the Commonwealth 

and UAC argue the evidence demonstrates UAC’s purpose is broader than for 

charter school purposes only. (Commonwealth’s Br. at 15-17; UAC’s Br. at 8-11.)

Before turning to the merits, we must first address a threshold issue: whether 

the instant appeal is moot based upon UAC’s payment of the disputed funds to SDP. 

Courts generally will not decide moot cases. Costa v. Cortes, 142 A.3d 1004, 1016 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). It is well established that courts “do not render decisions in the 

abstract or offer purely advisory opinions.” Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. 

Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa. 2005). Stated another way, our courts “are 

not in the business of pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable 

continuing effect were right or wrong.” Mistich v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 863 

A.2d 116, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 

10 WCCS also did not respond when counsel for UAC sought concurrence prior to filing 

the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 3707 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

Pa.R.A.P. 3707. (Motion to Dismiss ¶ 15.) Nor did WCCS file a reply brief addressing the 

mootness issue, which the Commonwealth and UAC raised again in their principal briefs. 
7

(1998)). “[A]n actual case or controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not 

merely at the time the [appeal] is filed” in order to avoid mootness. Pap’s A.M. v. 

City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 599-600 (Pa. 2002). An intervening change in facts or 

the law may render an issue moot. In re Gross, 382 A.2d 116, 119-20 (Pa. 1978).

Here, the orphans’ court directed the funds be distributed within 30 days of its 

adjudication becoming final. Importantly, WCCS neither sought reconsideration of 

that decision with the orphans’ court nor sought for it to be stayed pending WCCS’s

appeal to this Court. Instead, the Final Decree was permitted to take effect and UAC, 

pursuant to the orphans’ court directive, distributed all of the assets of the Fund to 

SDP. This intervening change in facts has rendered this matter moot. In re Gross, 

382 A.2d at 119-20. Accordingly, we grant the Commonwealth’s and UAC’s 

Motion to Dismiss and dismiss WCCS’s appeal.11 

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

Judge Dumas did not participate in the decision of this case.

11 There are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, but WCCS does not assert any would 

apply here and the Court cannot discern any that would. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: World Communications :

Charter School, A Non-Profit :

Corporation :

 : No. 1374 C.D. 2021 

Appeal of: World Communications : 

Charter School :

O R D E R

NOW, November 17, 2023, the Motion to Dismiss or Quash Appeal as Moot 

filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Urban Affairs Coalition, to which 

no response was filed, is GRANTED. The appeal filed by World Communications 

Charter School is dismissed as moot.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge