[Cite as State v. Toran, 2022-Ohio-2796.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 vs.

JAMIE TORAN,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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APPEAL NO. C-210431

TRIAL NO. B-1905672

 

 

 O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 12, 2022

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummings,

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Brian A. Smith Law Firm, LLC, and Brian A. Smith, for Defendant-Appellant.
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MYERS, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jamie Toran was arrested and charged with 

carrying a concealed weapon, improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, and 

having a weapon while under a disability after police conducted a warrantless search 

of a vehicle during a traffic stop and found a loaded revolver in the interior panel of 

the passenger door. Toran filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during 

the traffic stop, and the trial court overruled the motion after a hearing. Following 

Toran’s pleas of no contest, the trial court found Toran guilty of the charges and 

sentenced him to five years of community control. Toran now appeals.

{¶2} Although the traffic stop was proper, because the search of the vehicle 

was not justified under an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, 

we hold that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress, and we reverse 

the judgment of the trial court.

I. The Suppression Hearing

{¶3} At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that the search of the 

vehicle Toran was driving was conducted without a warrant. The burden then shifted 

to the state to establish that the search was nonetheless proper.

{¶4} Hamilton County Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Singleton testified that he 

conducted a traffic stop of a Chevrolet truck for improper display of a temporary 

license placard. He said that the vehicle had a partially tinted window, and that the 

temporary license placard was “pushed down” in the bottom right corner of the 

vehicle’s rear window and was “obscured.” Due to the tinting of the window and the 

positioning of the placard, the deputy testified, the placard was not in plain view.

{¶5} Toran, the driver, was the sole occupant of the vehicle. He verbally

identified himself to the deputy, but he had no license or government-issued 

identification on his person. 

{¶6} The deputy verified Toran’s identity and learned that he had not had a 

valid driver’s license for three years. In addition, the deputy learned that Toran had 
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recently been stopped by another police agency for driving the same vehicle while he 

was under a license suspension. The deputy cited Toran for driving under suspension 

and for improper display of a temporary license placard.

{¶7} The deputy determined that the vehicle had to be towed because no 

licensed driver was present at the scene of the traffic stop to drive the vehicle. The 

deputy testified:

Due to the stop and the status [of Toran’s suspended license], what our 

policy is, an inventory search of that vehicle was conducted, any 

damage, anything. I have been doing this occupation, road patrol, just 

short of 20 years. I am systematic about how we do the tows because, if 

there is damage all over the car, valuables can be in the car, and officers 

need to be accountable.

{¶8} The officer conducted a search of the vehicle and discovered a loaded 

revolver in the interior panel of the passenger door. Toran was arrested and charged 

with carrying a concealed weapon, improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, 

and having a weapon while under a disability.

II. The Trial Court’s Decision

{¶9} The trial court denied the motion to suppress. In its oral comments 

explaining its decision, the court found that the traffic stop of the vehicle for improper 

display of a temporary license placard was proper. The court found that because of 

the tinted window and the positioning of the placard, the officer had probable cause 

to believe that a violation of the law requiring temporary license placards to be 

displayed in plain view had occurred.

{¶10} In addition, the court found that the deputy was not able to release the 

vehicle to Toran because he did not have a driver’s license and had previously been 

stopped driving the vehicle while under suspension. The court determined that the 

warrantless search was conducted pursuant to the inventory-search exception to the 
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warrant requirement, and that Toran’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. 

The court denied Toran’s motion to suppress.

III. The Trial Court Erred by Denying the Motion to Suppress

{¶11} In two assignments of error, Toran argues that the trial court erred in 

failing to grant his motion to suppress. In his first assignment of error, he challenges 

the traffic stop, and in his second, he challenges the vehicle search. He argues that 

both the stop and the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14, of the Ohio Constitution.

{¶12} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of 

law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, 

¶ 8. We must accept the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by 

competent, credible evidence, but we review de novo the trial court’s application of the 

law to those facts. Id.

A. The Traffic Stop

{¶13} In his first assignment of error, Toran argues that the trial court erred

in overruling his motion to suppress where the traffic stop of his vehicle was not 

supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation or other 

criminal activity had occurred.

{¶14} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as made 

applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 14, Article I of the 

Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. See State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 13. 

Because a traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment, the traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment’s 

reasonableness requirement. State v. Howell, 2018-Ohio-591, 106 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 11

(1st Dist.); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 

89 (1996).
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{¶15} When an officer witnesses a specific violation of the traffic code, a stop 

of the vehicle is supported by probable cause. Howell at ¶ 11. “The test is whether an 

objectively reasonable police officer would believe that a traffic violation has occurred 

based upon the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Cronin, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton No. C-100266, 2011-Ohio-1479, ¶ 11.

{¶16} In addition, even in the absence of probable cause, an officer may 

initiate a traffic stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a 

crime or a traffic violation has been, or is being, committed. Id. at ¶ 12; State v. Mays, 

119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7. An investigatory traffic 

stop is permitted in such a situation for the officer to confirm or refute her or his 

suspicions. Howell at ¶ 12. A court must examine the totality of the circumstances to 

determine whether an officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic 

stop. Id. 

{¶17} Probable cause is a stricter standard than reasonable articulable

suspicion. Mays at ¶ 23. “The former subsumes the latter. * * * An officer who has 

probable cause necessarily has a reasonable and articulable suspicion, which is all the 

officer needs to justify a stop.” Id.

{¶18} Former R.C. 4503.21(A)(3), in effect at the time of Toran’s traffic stop, 

allowed a temporary license placard to be displayed on the rear window of the vehicle

if the placard was in plain view from the rear of the vehicle and was not covered by any 

material that obstructed the placard’s visibility: 

No person to whom a temporary license placard or windshield sticker 

has been issued for the use of a motor vehicle under section 4503.182 of

the Revised Code, and no operator of that motor vehicle, shall fail to 

display the temporary license placard in plain view from the rear of the 

vehicle either in the rear window or on an external rear surface of the 

motor vehicle, or fail to display the windshield sticker in plain view on 
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the rear window of the motor vehicle. No temporary license placard or 

windshield sticker shall be covered by any material that obstructs its 

visibility.

{¶19} The Twelfth District recently considered the same version of R.C.

4503.21(A)(3) in State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2021-11-020, 2022-Ohio2383, ¶ 3, and explained:

“The intent of the law is to require that license plates be visible to law 

enforcement personnel and others who may have reason to note the 

number for identification purposes.” State v. Anderson, 11th Dist. Lake 

No. 2017-L-127, 2018-Ohio-2455, ¶ 18, citing State v. Durfee, 11th Dist. 

Lake No. 96-L-198, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 865, *8 (Mar. 6, 1998). 

Because of this, the definition of “plain view” as used in that statute 

contemplates “actually being able to read the letters and numbers” on 

the temporary license placard being displayed from the rear of one’s 

vehicle. See Wilmington v. Connor, 144 Ohio App.3d 735, 739[, 761 

N.E.2d 663] (12th Dist.2001) (“[t]he definition of ‘plain view’

contemplates actually being able to read the letters and numbers on the 

license plate”), citing State v. Hanna, 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-99-

016, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 879, *7 (Mar. 10, 2000).

{¶20} At the suppression hearing, the deputy testified that he conducted a 

traffic stop of the truck driven by Toran because of the improper display of a temporary 

license “plate.” He testified that the temporary license placard was pushed down into 

the bottom right corner of the rear window of the truck’s cab and that it was obscured 

by the tinting of the window. Due to the tinting of the window and the positioning of 

the placard, he testified that the placard “was absolutely not in plain view” from the 

rear of the truck.
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{¶21} Considering the totality of the circumstances, an objectively reasonable 

police officer would believe that Toran violated former R.C. 4503.21(A)(3) because the 

temporary license placard was not in plain view from the rear of the vehicle. Therefore, 

the deputy not only had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Toran, but he also 

had probable cause to believe that a violation of the statute occurred. Therefore, we 

hold that the trial court properly concluded that the traffic stop was constitutionally 

valid. We overrule the first assignment of error.

B. The Vehicle Search

{¶22} In his second assignment of error, Toran argues that the trial court erred 

in failing to grant his motion to suppress because the warrantless vehicle search was 

not a proper inventory search. He argues that the evidence failed to show that the

search was conducted in accordance with standard police procedure, and that the state 

did not provide evidence of a standardized inventory-search policy.

{¶23} The state asserts that Toran failed to raise the issue of an inventorysearch policy below and that he cannot raise it on appeal. However, Toran’s motion 

to suppress sufficiently alleged that a warrantless inventory search of his vehicle was 

conducted during an improper traffic stop. In addition, at the beginning of the 

suppression hearing, defense counsel asserted that there was no exception to the 

search-warrant requirement that would allow the deputy to lawfully search the vehicle.

{¶24} Moreover, when the parties stipulated that the deputy did not have a 

search warrant when he searched the vehicle, “[a]t that point, the state had the burden 

to establish that there was an exception to the warrant requirement that allowed [the

deputy] to search the vehicle.” See State v. Beasley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180152, 

2019-Ohio-3936, ¶ 15. The state had to establish which exception it was relying on; 

Toran did not have to go forward with any argument or evidence until the state offered 

evidence of an exception. Here, the state argued below, and the trial court found, that 

no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because the evidence was discovered during 

an inventory search of the vehicle.
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{¶25} In general, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment, subject to a few well-established exceptions. Katz v. United 

States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). An inventory search of 

a vehicle is one of the well-established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement. State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-Ohio-201, 96 N.E.3d 

262, ¶ 20. “An inventory search is not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement or a probable-cause review, because it is a search that is made for 

administrative reasons and is unrelated to a criminal investigation.” Id. The purpose 

is to make a record of what is found in and on the vehicle. The inventory search of a 

vehicle protects an owner’s property while it remains in police custody, protects police

against claims of lost, stolen, or damaged property, and protects police from 

dangerous items. See id. at ¶ 21; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 

S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

{¶26} An inventory search of a vehicle must follow a lawful impoundment of 

that vehicle and must not be a pretext for an evidentiary search. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 

165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, at ¶ 30. An inventory search must be conducted 

in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standardized procedures or 

established routines. State v. Hathman, 65 Ohio St.3d 403, 604 N.E.2d 743 (1992), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. “While those procedures need not be in writing, the 

state must show that the police department has a standardized routine policy, and that 

the officer’s conduct conformed to that policy.” State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. 

C-200352, 2021-Ohio-2654, ¶ 35, quoting State v. Ojile, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C110677 and C-110678, 2012-Ohio-6015, ¶ 66.

{¶27} In State v. Beasley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180152, 2019-Ohio-3936,

this court held that the state failed to demonstrate that a warrantless search of a 

vehicle was conducted pursuant to a proper inventory search where no evidence was 

presented regarding the police department’s inventory-search policy. “The policy was 

not introduced at the [suppression] hearing, and [the officer] did not testify to its 
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details.” Beasley at ¶ 14. We said that, at most, the officer’s testimony reflected that 

his department had a policy under which:

[W]e inventory the vehicle to make sure that we write down any 

pertinent belongings that might be in the vehicle so that [an occupant’s] 

objects and items in the vehicle are protected when it goes to the tow lot 

to make sure all of those items are returned.

Id.

{¶28} We held that not only was the officer’s testimony insufficient, but the 

video evidence did not indicate “that the officers followed even this ‘procedure’ as 

neither officer is seen writing anything down, and no writing was introduced at the 

hearing.” Id. We held that without evidence of the department’s inventory-search 

policy, whether by introduction of the policy itself or by an officer’s testimony about 

the policy’s details, the state did not meet its burden to demonstrate that an exception 

to the warrant requirement allowed the officer to search the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 15. We 

reversed the appellant’s conviction and the decision of the trial court denying the 

motion to suppress. Id. at ¶ 16.

{¶29} Similar to Beasley, in this case, the state did not present evidence

regarding the policy that the deputy was relying upon for the vehicle search—the 

policy was not introduced into evidence, and the deputy’s testimony did not set forth

any details about the sheriff’s department inventory-search policy. At most, the 

deputy’s testimony as to a sheriff’s department policy, as set forth above, was that he 

conducted an “inventory search” of the vehicle, that in his nearly 20 years as a patrol 

officer, he was “systematic about how we do the tows because, if there is damage all 

over the car, valuables can be in the car, and officers need to be accountable.” In short, 

there was no evidence as to what the policy or procedures were.

{¶30} The evidence presented by the state was insufficient to demonstrate that 

the inventory search of the vehicle was made in accordance with standardized

procedures of the sheriff’s department. Consequently, the state failed to meet its 
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burden to demonstrate that there was an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 

warrant requirement that allowed the deputy to search the vehicle. See Beasley, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton No. C-180152, 2019-Ohio-3936, at ¶ 15. We hold that the deputy’s 

warrantless search of the vehicle was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 

and that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence seized in the search. 

We sustain the second assignment of error.

IV. Conclusion

{¶31} Consequently, we reverse Toran’s convictions and the decision of the 

trial court denying his motion to suppress. We remand this case for further 

proceedings in accordance with the law and this opinion.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

BERGERON and BOCK, JJ., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its own entry this date.