[Cite as State v. Rognon , 2021-Ohio-4564.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT LOGAN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-21-24

v. CAMERON ROGNON, O P I N I O N

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR 18 08 0242 Judgment Affirmed Date of Decision: December 27, 2021

APPEARANCES: 

### Cameron Rognon, Appellant



### Alice Robinson-Bond for AppelleeCase No. 8-21-24

-2- MILLER, J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Cameron Rognon, appeals the June 21, 2021 judgment of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition for postconviction relief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Background {¶2} We have previously recited much of the factual and procedural background of this case, and we will not duplicate those effort s here. State v. Rognon , 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-14, 2019-Ohio-4222, ¶ 1-6. Relevant to this appeal, on October 9, 2018, the Logan County Grand Jury indicte d Rognon on eleven counts in a superseding indictment, including Count Five of gross sexual imposition against K.H. in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a t hird-degree felony and Count Ten of gross sexual imposition against D.R. in violat ion of R.C. 2907.05(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony. Id. at ¶ 3. On January 25, 2019, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Rognon withdrew his previously ent ered pleas of not guilty and entered pleas of guilty to Counts Five and Ten of th e superseding

indictment. Id. at ¶ 4. The trial court accepted Rognon’s guilty pleas and fo und him guilty. Id. At the request of the State, the trial court dismissed the re maining counts in the superseding indictment. Id. On February 28, 2019, the trial court sentenced Rognon to 60 months in prison on Count Five and 12 mo nths in prison on Count Ten to be served consecutively. Id. at ¶ 5.Case No. 8-21-24

-3- {¶3} On March 27, 2019, Rognon filed a notice of appeal. In his dir ect appeal, Rognon raised three assignments of error. First, he al leged that Logan County was not the proper venue to litigate Count Ten. Next, R ognon argued that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Final ly, Rognon alleged the trial court erred with respect to his sentence for Count Fi ve because it was not consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes by similar offenders. This court rejected Rognon’s arguments and affirmed the judgment and sentence of the

trial court. Rognon at ¶ 34. {¶4} On June 1, 2021, Rognon filed a motion to vacate a void sentenc e. In the motion, Rognon alleged that his sentence was void because t he trial court disregarded the applicable statute when pronouncing a “mandator y” sentence and lacked the statutory authority to pronounce a “mandatory” sente nce. Further, Rognon argued that his claims were not barred by res judicata b ecause his sentence is void. On June 11, 2021, the State filed a memorandum in opp osition to Rognon’s

motion to vacate a void sentence. {¶5} On June 21, 2021, the trial court filed its judgment entry deny ing Rognon’s motion. The trial court considered Rognon’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief and held that Rognon’s petition was not t imely and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.Case No. 8-21-24

-4- {¶6} Rognon filed his notice of appeal on July 20, 2021. He raises two assignments of error which we address together. Assignment of Error No. I

The trial court abused its discretion when it misconstrued the appellant’s motion to vacate void sentence as a post-conviction motion. Assignment of Error No. II The trial court erred when it pronounced a mandatory sentence with disregard for the statute that would have precluded that pronouncement. {¶7} In his first assignment of error, Rognon argues the trial court erred by treating his filing titled “Motion to Vacate Void Sentence” as a petition for postconviction relief. Specifically, Rognon argues that becaus e his sentence is void, the trial court erred by construing his motion as a petition fo r postconviction relief and determining that his petition was untimely and barred by re s judicata. {¶8} We first address Rognon’s contention that his sentence is void. As an initial matter, we note that Rognon’s motion to vacate void sen tence, as well as his appellate brief, rely on outdated case law. The Supreme Court of Ohio recently realigned its jurisprudence regarding void and voidable sentenc ing and held that “[a] judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” State

v. Henderson , 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 43. Even if a sentenceCase No. 8-21-24

-5- imposed is not authorized by law, the sentence would only be vo idable as long as the trial court possessed both subject-matter and personal juri sdiction. Id. {¶9} Here, Rognon argues his sentence is void because the trial cour t allegedly disregarded the applicable statute when it pronounced a mandatory sentence. However, the error Rognon alleges, even if true, is not jurisdictional in nature so as to be capable of rendering his conviction and sent ence void. See State

ex rel. Davis v. Turner , 164 Ohio St.3d 395, 2021-Ohio-1771, ¶ 11 (“[S]entencing errors are not jurisdictional * * *.”) Because Rognon does not identify any defect that would have deprived the trial court of subject-matter or p ersonal jurisdiction, the trial court correctly determined that Rognon’s conviction a nd sentence are not

void. {¶10} Having determined that Rognon’s sentence is not void, we next t urn to his contention that the trial court erred by characterizing his filing titled “Motion to Vacate Void Sentence” as a petition for postconviction relie f. The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “[c]ourts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the m otion should be judged.” State v. Schlee , 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, ¶ 12. Additionally,

in State v. Reynolds , the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that a motion styled as “Motion to Correct or Vacate Sentence” was properly classified as a petition for postconviction relief because it “(1) was filed subsequent to [ the defendant’s] directCase No. 8-21-24

-6- appeal, (2) claimed a denial of constitutional rights, (3) soug ht to render the judgment void, and (4) asked for vacation of the judgment and s entence.” State v. Reynolds , 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160 (1997). Rognon’s “Motion to Vacate Vo id

Sentence” fits each of the criteria outlined in Reynolds . Therefore, the trial court did not err by treating Rognon’s motion to vacate his sentence as a petition for postconviction relief. See State v. Parker , 157 Ohio St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-3848, ¶ 16-17 (finding that the trial court properly recast Parker’s fi ling styled “motion to vacate” as a petition for postconviction relief); State v. Bender , 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-64, 2021-Ohio-1933, ¶ 13 (holding that the trial court did not err by treating Bender’s motion to vacate his conviction and sentence as a peti tion for postconviction relief). {¶11} Consequently, Rognon’s first assignment of error is overruled. {¶12} In Rognon’s second assignment of error, he argues the trial cou rt erred by pronouncing a mandatory sentence that is contrary to law. S pecifically, Rognon argues that the trial court erred by imposing a “mandatory” sen tence. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. {¶13} “R.C. 2953.21 governs petitions for post-conviction relief.” State v.

Wine , 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-15-07, 2015-Ohio-4726, ¶ 10. The sta tute sets forth who may petition for postconviction relief and specifies, in re levant part, that “[a]ny person who has been convicted of a criminal offense * * * and w ho claims that thereCase No. 8-21-24

-7- was such a denial or infringement of the person’s rights as to render the judgment

void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitutio n of the United States” “may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence , stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set a side the judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief.” R.C. 2953.21(A )(1). {¶14} “We review the trial court’s dismissal of a post-conviction pet ition without a hearing for abuse of discretion.” State v. Jeffers , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1112, 2011-Ohio-3555, ¶ 23. An abuse of discretion sugges ts the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When the abuse of discretion stand ard applies, an appellate court is not to substitute its judgment for that of t he trial court. State v. Thompson , 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-16-10, 2017-Ohio-792, ¶ 11. {¶15} The trial court dismissed Rognon’s petition after concluding, i n part, that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. “Although a defendant may challenge his conviction and sentence by either a direct appeal or a petition for postconviction relief, any claims raised in a postconviction re lief petition will be barred by res judicata where the claim was or could have been r aised on direct appeal.” State v. Schwieterman , 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-09-12, 2010-Ohio-102, ¶ 23. “‘[U]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating inCase No. 8-21-24

-8- any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant * * * on an appeal from that judgment.’” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Troglin , 3d Dist. Union No. 14-09-04, 2009-Ohio-5276, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Perry , 10 Ohio St.2d 175 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. The doctrine “promo tes the principles of finality and judicial economy by preventing endless relitiga tion of an issue on which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportun ity to be heard.” State

v. Saxon , 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. WillysOverland Co. v. Clark , 112 Ohio St. 263, 268 (1925). Thus, the doctrine of res judicata bars all claims except those that were not avai lable at trial or on appeal because they are based on evidence outside the record. See State v. Jones , 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-07-02, 2007-Ohio-5624, ¶ 19. {¶16} Here, Rognon asserts the trial court erred by erroneously stati ng that his sentence with respect to Count Five was mandatory. Specific ally, Rognon alleges that the conditions outlined in R.C. 2907.05(C)(2) that must be met in order for the trial court to impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to a violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) were not present. Therefore, Rognon reasons that the trial court erred by stating at the sentencing hearing that his sentence with res pect to Count Five was mandatory.Case No. 8-21-24

-9- {¶17} However, Rognon’s claim that the trial court erred by imposing a mandatory prison term, which is not based on any evidence outsi de the record, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it could have be en raised on direct appeal. See Troglin at ¶ 13; Jones at ¶ 19. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying his petition for postconviction relief on the basis of res judicata. Moreover, because the claims raised in Rognon’s petition are ba rred by res judicata, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing his petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. State v. Lewis , 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-08, 2019-Ohio-3031, ¶ 13 (“If res judicata applies to a claim raise d in a petition for postconviction relief, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted on the matter.”) {¶18} Further, even if his claim was not barred by res judicata, his claim is without merit. Indeed, the trial court stated at the sentencin g hearing that Rognon’s sentence with respect to Count Five was mandatory. (Feb. 28, 2 019 Tr. at 14-15). However, in the judgment entry of sentence, the trial court doe s not state that any portion of Rognon’s sentence is mandatory. (Doc. No. 123). “[ T]he axiomatic rule is that a court speaks through its journal entries.” State v. Miller , 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-5705, ¶ 12. “When statements made at the senten cing hearing are inconsistent with the sentence stated in the journal entry, the entry will control.”

State v. Brown , 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-06-66, 2007-Ohio-1761, ¶ 3. Consequentl y, because the judgment entry of sentence does not state that any portion of Rognon’sCase No. 8-21-24

-10- sentence is mandatory, he was not sentenced to a mandatory pris on term. Thus, Rognon’s argument that the trial court erred by erroneously imp osing a mandatory prison term is without merit. {¶19} Rognon’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion {¶20} For the foregoing reasons, Rognon’s assignments of error are overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Logan County Court

of Common Pleas. Judgment Affirmed ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur. /jlr