SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4613-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAHMAI S. JAMES, a/k/a

JAHMAI SUDANI JAMES,

and JAHMAI JAMES,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted October 14, 2020 – Decided 

Before Judges Fisher and Moynihan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Essex County, Accusation No. 15-06-

0195.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Robert K. Uyehara, Jr., Designated Counsel 

on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Catlin A. Davis, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 25, 2020
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PER CURIAM

Defendant Jahmai S. James appeals from the denial of his postconviction relief (PCR) petition, arguing:

POINT I 

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S PCR CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

FAILING TO FIND THAT DEFENDANT 

RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE 

PLEA AND SENTENCING 

REGARDING HIS IMMIGRATION 

CONSEQUENCES.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

DENYING DEFENDANT AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

Reviewing the factual inferences drawn by the trial court and its legal 

conclusions de novo because the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary 

hearing, State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016), we are 

compelled to reverse and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing. Not 

only did the trial court mistakenly analyze the PCR petition under the test for 
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plea withdrawal instead of the Strickland-Fritz standard,1the record reveals 

defendant established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel so 

as to warrant an evidentiary hearing. 

Defendant supported his PCR petition with a certification averring his 

plea counsel knew he was born in Jamaica; counsel never discussed "that there 

were immigration consequences to the plea and that [defendant] would surely 

be deported" after he pleaded guilty on June 5, 2015 to two counts in 

Accusation 15-06-195: second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon 

1

 To establish a PCR claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 

must satisfy the two-pronged test formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 

N.J. 42, 58 (1987), first by "showing that counsel made errors so serious that 

counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth 

Amendment," then by proving he suffered prejudice due to counsel's deficient 

performance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. 

Defendant must show by a "reasonable probability" that the deficient 

performance affected the outcome of the proceeding. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.

A defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea is analyzed under the 

four-factor test announced in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009): "(1) 

whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the 

nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of 

a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal [will] result in unfair prejudice to 

the State or unfair advantage to the accused."

Not only are the tests different, so is our standard of review. We review 

a trial court's decision in a plea-withdrawal appeal for abuse of discretion

because that court makes "qualitative assessments about the nature of a 

defendant's reasons for moving to withdraw his plea and the strength of his 

case and because the court is sometimes making credibility determinations 

about witness testimony." State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015).
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(handgun), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count seven), and fourth-degree aggravated 

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4) (count eight) 2; defendant was not given the 

opportunity to obtain advice from an immigration attorney; and if he knew he 

could be deported, he would not have pleaded guilty and proceeded to trial. 3

Although bare assertions are "insufficient to support a [prima facie] case

of ineffectiveness," State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 171 (App. Div. 

1999), the record presents sufficient facts, viewed in the light most favorable 

to defendant, to establish such a case, see State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-

63 (1992); see also R. 3:22-10(b).

Defendant's Jamaican citizenship was evident throughout proceedings 

before the trial court. It was a factor in setting defendant's bail and was noted 

on the presentence report.

Defendant answered question seventeen of the plea form, stating: he was 

not a United States citizen; understood he had the right to seek legal advice 

about a guilty plea's impact on his immigration status; and had discussed 

2

 The judgment of conviction erroneously lists the charge and statute for count 

eight as "UNLAW PURPOSE – FIREARMS" and "2C:39-4[a]" in both the 

original and final charges. We direct the trial court, on remand, to enter a 

corrected judgment.

3

 Defendant also claimed his plea counsel did not review discovery with him. 

That argument was not briefed on appeal. We consider it abandoned. See

Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011). 
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potential immigration consequences with counsel. But he did not answer 

questions asking if he would like an opportunity to discuss the consequences 

with counsel and, importantly, "[h]aving been advised of the possible 

immigration consequences and of [his] right to seek individualized legal 

advice on [his] immigration consequences," if he still wanted to plead guilty. 

The trial court did not explore the reason why these questions were not 

answered. Moreover, the trial court did not make any inquiry of defendant 

about immigration issues during the plea colloquy.

These lacunas compel a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary 

hearing to determine if defendant's allegations are true, and if he established 

the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel—under both prongs of the 

Strickland-Fritz standard—recognizing, "[t]he weight of prevailing 

professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise [a] client 

regarding the risk of deportation." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 

(2010). "To provide effective assistance of counsel, post-Padilla, a defense 

attorney is required to address, in some manner, the risk of immigration 

consequences of a noncitizen defendant's guilty plea." Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 

at 295. A noncitizen defendant considering whether to plead guilty to an 

offense must "receive[] correct information concerning all of the relevant 
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material consequences that flow from such a plea." State v. Agathis, 424 N.J. 

Super. 16, 22 (App. Div. 2012). The failure to so advise renders counsel's 

performance deficient. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 380 (2012); see also

Blake, 444 N.J. Super. at 296.

We discern no link, however, between plea counsel's suspension from 

the practice of law, In re Roberts, 231 N.J. 187 (2017), and defendant's

allegations. The suspension came some four months after defendant pleaded 

guilty and was based on grounds unrelated to those advanced by defendant's 

PCR petition.

The trial court, without an evidentiary hearing, made credibility findings 

in analyzing the Slater factors: "[T]he [c]ourt does not credit [defendant's] 

current claim that he was not . . . advised of the immigration consequences of 

his guilty plea." Findings on disputed issues should generally be made after a 

court hears testimony, not on certifications. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63; 

State v. Gaitan, 419 N.J. Super. 365, 370 n.3 (App. Div. 2011), rev'd on other 

grounds, 209 N.J. 339 (2012); State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 

1998). "Assessment of credibility is the kind of determination 'best made 

through an evidentiary proceeding with all its explorative benefits, including 
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the truth-revealing power which the opportunity to cross-examine bestows.'" 

State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 347 (2013) (quoting Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. at 51). 

Defendant's assertion was not belied by his prior record testimony; the 

trial court did not elicit any such testimony at the plea hearing. We, therefore, 

direct this matter be heard on remand before a different judge. See R.L. v.

Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 306 (2009) ("Because the trial court previously made 

credibility findings, we deem it appropriate that the matter be assigned to a 

different trial court."); see also R. 1:12-1(d).

Despite the trial court's plea-retraction analysis, defendant did not seek 

to withdraw his plea and did not endeavor to establish or critically explore the 

Slater factors. We decline to consider the undeveloped issue. See State v. 

Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19-20 (2008).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.