* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JUVENILE A, Defendant - Appellant. No. 09-30109 D.C. No. 1:08-cr-00110-RFC-1
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Richard F. Cebull, Chief District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted December 8, 2009 Portland, Oregon Before: FARRIS, D.W. NELSON and BERZON, Circuit Judges. Defendant/Appellant L.G.H. appeals his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent and sentence for aggravat ed sexual assault. We affirm. 1. The violations of the Federal Juven ile Delinquency Act (“FJDA”), 18 U.S.C. § 5033, in this case do not give rise to a due process violation, so dismissal was not 

# FILED
JAN 06 2010 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 required. L.G.H.’s parents were not i mmediately notified of his custody and Miranda rights, but the Government’s failure to advise applied only to L.G.H.’s interrogation, not a hearing on his freedom. See United States v. RRA-A , 229 F.3d 737, 746 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Doe ( Doe V ), 219 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000). Although L.G.H. was not immediately informed of his Miranda rights after arrest, he was so info rmed before interrogation. Id. 2. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering suppression instead of dismissal of the information as a remedy for the statutory violations. Once the district court suppr essed the confession and physical evidence at trial, the FJDA violations were harmless “beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Doe ( Doe II ), 862 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1988). The unlawfully obtained evidence almost certainly did not serve as the basis for the initiation of the criminal proceeding. See United States v. D.L. , 453 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2006). At the time of the federal charging decision, th e Government had available S.G.’s initial statement identifying L.G.H. as the perpet rator and later statements to Agent Weyand about the attack. The presence of this evidence, sufficient to support conviction after trial, makes comparison to United States v. D.L. , 453 F.3d 1115, and United States v. C.M. , 485 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2007), inapposite. Moreover, the original charging decision under Crow tribal law was based only on S.G.’s3 identification of L.G.H. as her assaulter, which bolsters the likelihood that L.G.H.’s confession was not the basis for filing the subsequent federal information. 3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit crossexamination of Dr. Byron. Evidence ot herwise inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 may become admissible at tria l where a party “opens the door” to the introduction of such evidence. S.M. v. J.K. , 262 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the government did not do so here. It asked only about S.G.’s fear of retribution after the attack and about anxiet y that left S.G. unable to sleep at night. It did not put S.G.’s sexual history at issue. 4. Finally, we affirm L.G.H.’s sentence. A “district court [must] weigh[] all of the relevant factors and f[i]nd that the di sposition imposed was the least restrictive means to accomplish a young person’s rehabilitation, given the needs of the child and the community.” United States v. Juvenile , 347 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 2003). The district court weighed the severity of the crime and its impact on S.G., L.G.H.’s improvement after the assault and compliance with conditions of release, L.G.H.’s possible perpetration of a sexua l assault against another intoxicated young girl, and whether L.G.H.’s family support system would promote rehabilitation. The court specifically stated that anything less than detention would not provide the necessary rehabilita tion to “lessen[] the danger [L.G.H.]4 present[ed] to the community.” Finally, th e court considered in detail the services that the detention facility would provi de L.G.H. and concluded that the facility offered the “best treatment and rehabilita tive tools” in the area, while permitting L.G.H. to remain close to his family. The district court’s determination was reasonable and well within its discretion. AFFIRMED.