alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Exhibit 23.1

# CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in this Registration
Statement on Form S-3 of our report dated January 17, 2006 relating to the financial statements, managements assessment of
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting,
which appears in Longview Fibre Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended October 31, 2005. We also consent to
the reference to us under the heading Experts in such Registration Statement.

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Portland, Oregon
September 8, 2006

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Charles MCALISTER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-50793.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 7, 2006.*

Decided June 8, 2006.

*614U.S. Attorney Office, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Zaki Zehawi, Esq., Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: THOMAS and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER,** Senior District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable *614for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

David Charles McAlister pleaded guilty to importation of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960, and was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release, subject to all standard and mandatory terms and conditions. McAlister argues on appeal that he lacked sufficient notice that drug testing would be a mandatory condition of his supervised release and that the condition was factually unjustified. Since McAlister did not raise these objections before the district court, we review them for plain error. *United States v. Jordan,*256 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir.2001).

McAlister possessed sufficient notice that he would be subject to drug testing. McAlister’s drug testing condition is mandated by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). *615The presentenee report expressly recommended that the district court not waive the required condition. The court adopted this recommendation at the sentencing hearing, holding that “all standard and mandatory terms and provisions [of supervised release] will apply.” Finally, McAlister demonstrated awareness of the mandatory supervised release conditions through his presentence objection to the DNA testing condition, imposed under § 3583(d), the same statute requiring the challenged drug testing condition.

The district court also possessed a sufficient factual basis for the drug testing condition. The Ninth Circuit has upheld such mandatory conditions even when the prosecution presents no evidence of the defendant’s drug use and the defendant’s conviction is not drug-related. *United States v. Jackson,*189 F.3d 820, 825 (9th Cir.1999); *United States v. Carter,*159 F.3d 397, 400 (9th Cir.1998). Here, McAlister was charged with a drug-related offense, upon which the presentence report based its recommendation for drug testing. Moreover, McAlister presented no evidence at sentencing that he posed a low risk for future substance abuse.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 0**  **9 -**  **7 991** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appell ee ,
v.
N UCHON DELON CARMICHAEL, a/k/a Nu , Defendant

– Appell ant .

Appeal from the United States District Court f or the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville
. Malcolm J. Howard , Senior District Judge. ( 5 : 97

- c r - 00 1 33

- H

- 1 )

Submitted : Febr uary 25 , 2010 Decided: March 4, 2010

Before DUNCAN and A GEE , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Affirme d by un published per curiam opinion
.
Nuchon Delon Carmichael , Appellant Pro Se
. An n e Margaret Hayes, Rudolph A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney s , Raleigh, North Carolina , for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Nuchon Delon Carmichael appeals the district court ’ s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2006) motion for reduction of sentence . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for th e reasons stated by the district court. United States v. Carmichael , No. 5:97

- cr - 0133

- H

- 1 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2009) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu ment would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
# C_2019187EN.01002601.xml

| 3.6.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 187/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 187/26

---

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom — United Kingdom) — SM v Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section

(Case C-129/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Citizenship of the European Union - Right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States - Directive 2004/38/EC - Family members of a citizen of the Union - Article 2(2)(c) - ‘Direct descendant’ - Child in permanent legal guardianship under the Algerian kafala (provision of care) system - Article 3(2)(a) - Other family members - Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Family life - Best interests of the child)

(2019/C 187/29)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Supreme Court of the United Kingdom

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: SM

Respondents: Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section

in the presence of: Coram Children’s Legal Centre (CCLC), AIRE Centre

Operative part of the judgment

The concept of a ‘direct descendant’ of a citizen of the Union referred to in Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC must be interpreted as not including a child who has been placed in the permanent legal guardianship of a citizen of the Union under the Algerian kafala system, because that placement does not create any parent-child relationship between them.

However, it is for the competent national authorities to facilitate the entry and residence of such a child as one of the other family members of a citizen of the Union pursuant to Article 3(2)(a) of that directive, read in the light of Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by carrying out a balanced and reasonable assessment of all the current and relevant circumstances of the case which takes account of the various interests in play and, in particular, of the best interests of the child concerned. In the event that it is established, following that assessment, that the child and its guardian, who is a citizen of the Union, are called to lead a genuine family life and that that child is dependent on its guardian, the requirements relating to the fundamental right to respect for family life, combined with the obligation to take account of the best interests of the child, demand, in principle, that that child be granted a right of entry and residence in order to enable it to live with its guardian in his or her host Member State.

---

(1)  OJ C 134, 16.4.2018.

---
================================================================================

Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report of  Bonfire  Productions, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2007 as  filed  with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on  the  date  hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, in  the  capacities  and  on  the  dates  indicated  below,  hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

1.     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
       of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in  all material
       respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
       Company.


Date:  February 5, 2008

/s/ Alexander Kulyashov
---------------------------
Alexander Kulyashov
President, Chief Executive
Officer, and Director
#### STATE v. MARECEK

No. 362P98

Case below: 130 N.C.App. 303

Petition by Attorney General for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 30 December 1998.
# C_2018152EN.01001401.xml

| 30.4.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 152/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.4.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 152/14

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Judecătoria Oradea (Romania) lodged on 8 February 2018 — CV v DU

(Case C-85/18)

(2018/C 152/15)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Referring court

Judecătoria Oradea

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CV

Applicant:

Respondent: DU

Respondent:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Is the concept of habitual residence of the child, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 (1), to be interpreted as meaning that such habitual residence corresponds to the place where the child has demonstrated some degree of integration into the social and family environment, irrespective of the fact that a ruling has been made in another Member State, after the child moved with his father to the territory of the State, where the minor has integrated into that social and family environment? If that is the case, should Article 13 of Regulation No 2201/2003, which determines jurisdiction based on the child’s presence, be applied? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is the concept of habitual residence of the child, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 (1), to be interpreted as meaning that such habitual residence corresponds to the place where the child has demonstrated some degree of integration into the social and family environment, irrespective of the fact that a ruling has been made in another Member State, after the child moved with his father to the territory of the State, where the minor has integrated into that social and family environment? If that is the case, should Article 13 of Regulation No 2201/2003, which determines jurisdiction based on the child’s presence, be applied?

1

| 2. | Is the fact that the minor has the nationality of the Member State in which he lives with his father, in circumstances where his parents have Romanian nationality only, relevant for the purpose of determining habitual residence? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is the fact that the minor has the nationality of the Member State in which he lives with his father, in circumstances where his parents have Romanian nationality only, relevant for the purpose of determining habitual residence?

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1).

1

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shane WILLIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-1873.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 7, 2013.

Filed: Nov. 15, 2013.

David A. Harris, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fort Smith, AR, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Angela Lorene Pitts, Assistant, John B. Schisler, Assistant, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Fayetteville, AR, for Defendant-Appellant.

Shane Willis, Fayetteville, AR, pro se.

Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Shane Willis directly appeals after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and the district court1 sentenced him as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. His counsel has moved to withdraw, and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the prison term imposed by the district court is unreasonable. In a letter filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), counsel draws our attention to *Alleyne v. United States,*— U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013).

Counsel’s challenge to the reasonableness of Willis’s sentence is unavailing because the district court had no authority to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum. *See*18 U.S.C. § 924(e); *United States v. Watts,*553 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir.2009) (per curiam); *United States v. Gregg,*451 F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir.2006). *Alleyne*does not apply to Willis’s sentence, because his status as an armed career criminal was based on prior convictions. *See Alleyne,*133 S.Ct. at 2160 n. 1. Further, having independently reviewed the record under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, *731109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, subject to counsel informing Willis about procedures for seeking rehearing or filing a petition for certiorari.

1

. The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
# C_2020068EN.01002001.xml

| 2.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 68/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 68/20

---

Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 17 December 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Giudice di pace di L’Aquila (Italy) — Gabriele Di Girolamo v Ministero della Giustizia

(Case C-618/18) (1)

(Request for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Fixed-term employment - ETUC-UNICE-CEEP - Definition of a ‘fixed-term worker’ - Giudice di Pace - Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Manifest inadmissibility)

(2020/C 68/19)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Giudice di pace di L’Aquila

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Gabriele Di Girolamo

Defendant: Ministero della Giustizia

intervening party: Unione Nazionale Giudici di Pace (Unagipa)

Operative part of the order

The request for a preliminary ruling from the Giudice di pace di L’Aquila (Magistrates Court, L’Aquila, Italy), made by decision of 19 September 2018, is manifestly inadmissible.

---

(1)  OJ C 25, 21.1.2019.

---
#### Stephen J. DONELL, Permanent Receiver for Learn Waterhouse, Inc., its subsidiaries and affiliates, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randy TEINERT; Cathy Teinert, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 11-56432.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 14, 2013.*

Filed May 23, 2013.

Peter Alan Davidson, Ervin Cohen & Jessup, LLP Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Randy Teinert, pro se.

Cathy Teinert, pro se.

Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Randy and Cathy Teinert appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment in an action seeking avoidance and recovery of fraudulent transfers under California law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion to set aside entry of default. *United States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle,*615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir.2010). We vacate and remand.

In its order granting default judgment and denying the Teinerts’ motion to set aside default, the district court “omitted any mention of the ‘extreme circumstances’ requirement for judgment by default.” *Id.*at 1091. Its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion. *See id.*at 1091-92 (absent such extreme circumstances, judgment by default is inappropriate); *see also id.*at 1089 (“Our rules for determining when a default should be set aside are solicitous towards movants, especially those whose actions leading to the default were taken without the benefit of legal representation.”).

Accordingly, we vacate the entry of default judgment and remand for reconsideration in light of *Signed Personal Check No. 730.*

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 101 (Thursday, May 24, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 28756]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-13111]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders; 
Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute on Deafness and Other 
Communications Disorders Special Emphasis Panel.
    Date: June 5, 2001.
    Time: 1 p.m. to 3 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: 6120 Executive Blvd., Suite 400C, Rockville, MD 20852.
    Contact Person: Stanley C. Oaks, Jr., Scientific Review Branch, 
Division of Extramural Research, Executive Plaza South, Room 400C, 
6120 Executive Blvd., Bethesda, MD 20892-7180, 301-496-8683.
    This notice is being published less than 15 days prior to the 
meeting due to the timing limitations imposed by the review and 
funding cycle.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.173, 
Biological Research Related to Deafness and Communicative Disorders, 
National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: May 17, 2001.
LaVerne Y. Stringfield,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 01-13111 Filed 5-23-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
# C_2020230EN.01000802.xml

| 13.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 230/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 230/8

---

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 2 April 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberverwaltungsgericht Rheinland-Pfalz — Germany) — Landkreis Südliche Weinstraße v PF and Others

(Case C-830/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Freedom of movement for workers - Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 - Children of frontier workers - Social advantages - System for reimbursement of school transport costs - Requirement of residence in a Land - Exclusion of children attending school in that Land and residing in a Member State other than that of the school attended - Exclusion of nationals residing in other Länder)

(2020/C 230/10)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberverwaltungsgericht Rheinland-Pfalz

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Landkreis Südliche Weinstraße

Defendant: PF and Others

Other party to the proceedings: Vertreter des öffentlichen Interesses

Operative part of the judgment

| 1. | Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union must be interpreted as meaning that national legislation which makes the payment of school transport costs by a Land subject to a requirement of residence in the territory of that Land constitutes indirect discrimination, in that it is intrinsically liable to affect frontier workers more than national workers; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union must be interpreted as meaning that national legislation which makes the payment of school transport costs by a Land subject to a requirement of residence in the territory of that Land constitutes indirect discrimination, in that it is intrinsically liable to affect frontier workers more than national workers;

| 2. | Article 7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011 must be interpreted as meaning that practical difficulties linked to the effective organisation of school transport within a Land do not constitute an overriding reason in the public interest that is capable of justifying a national measure categorised as indirect discrimination. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Article 7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011 must be interpreted as meaning that practical difficulties linked to the effective organisation of school transport within a Land do not constitute an overriding reason in the public interest that is capable of justifying a national measure categorised as indirect discrimination.

---

(1)  OJ C 131, 8.4.2019.

---
142 So. 918

#### Lollie Bell TOLES v. ALABAMA BY-PRODUCTS CORP.

6 Div. 59.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 26, 1932.

S. R. Hartley and W. M. Williamson, both of Birmingham, for appellant.

Cabaniss & Johnston and L. D. Gardner, Jr., all of Birmingham, for appellees.

THOMAS, J.

Writ denied; affirmed.

ANDERSON; C. J., and BROWN and KNIGHT, JJ., concur.