[Cite as State v. Urbanski , 2023 - Ohio - 3966.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L

- 22

- 1 304 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202102409

v. Brian Urbanski DECISION AND JUDG MENT Appellant Decided: October 27, 2023 * * * * * Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Laurel A. Kendall , for appellant.

* * * * * OSOWIK, J. {¶ 1} T his is a n appeal from the judgm ent by the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, which sentenced appellant , Brian W esley Urbanski , to a n indefinite prison term of eight to twelve year s for aggravated vehicular homicide aft er the tria l court denied appellant ’ s motions to dismiss and t o suppress, accepted his no - contest plea , and convicted him for the offense

. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court

.2

. I. Backgr ound

{¶ 2} On September 7 , 20 2 1 , a Lucas County Grand Jury indicted appell ant with
two felo nies , count Nos. one and two, and two mi sdemeanor offenses , count Nos. three and four : one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, in violation of R.C. 29 03

. 06 ( A )( 1 ) (a) and 2903.06 ( B ), a first

- degree felony ; on e count o f aggravated vehicular homicide, in

v iolation of R.C. 29 03

. 06 (A)( 2 ) (a) and 2903.06 ( B ), a second

- degree felony ; one count of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse , or a com binati on of them, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A) (1)(a) and 4511.19(G)(1)(a) , a first

- degree misdemeanor ; and one count of operating a vehi cle while under the influence of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled subst a nce , in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(

j ) (iii), 4 511.19(G )(1) and 4511.19(G)(1)( d ) , a first

- de gree misdemeanor

. {¶ 3} The indictments arose from an incident at 11: 30 a.m. on Saturday, March 6, 2021 , in Springfield Township , Lucas County, Ohio . The morning was clear and sunny

. A ppellant , while driving a borrowed 2009 H onda Civic 1 without a valid license a nd impaired by drugs

- o f

- abuse, including coca ine , struck a b icyclist in the roadway, dragged the victim on to the adjacent grass, flung the victim further into t he grass after the vehicle

s t opped , and instantly ki lled th e victim

. A witness called 9

- 1

- 1.

1 The car ’ s title o wner , John Martin, was app ellant ’ s deceased uncle

. Five days earl i er, a ppellant’s adopted grand father, also called h is grandfathe r , hel d Mr. Martin ’ s power of attorney and took possession of the vehicle

. Appellant ’ s grandfather appeared at the scene and announced t o T rooper Skinner he gave appellant permission to drive t he v ehicle as the current vehicle owner

.3

. {¶ 4} Th e following timeline of events are relevant to the assignments of error in

this appeal. The Toledo Post of the Ohio State Highway Patrol responded to the scene an d found the bicyclist ’ s body on the grass n ear where the vehicle came to a stop with the bicyc le under the vehicle ’ s right front co rn er . Emergency medical personnel a ttempted to revive the victim with no success. T h ree state highway trooper s , Troopers Skin ner, Gonzales, and Ha rk ey, along with a superv isor, respo nded and collectively secured the

s ce ne ; interview ed witness es ; took photos ; made a field sk etch of the scene with the final resting place of the body, vehicle, bicycle and other objects , and with reference point s for any measure ments ; arrange d for removal and preservation of the victi m ’ s bic ycle ; inventoried and seized syringes and drug paraphernali a from the vehic le , where o ne of the seized syringe s had a bent, used needle with fresh blo od on i t ; arrange d for towing of the vehicle to a tow lot ; collected data for reconstruction analysis; a nd made the roadway safe for traffic

. The tow truck operator , who is also the tow lot owner , testified that in steering the vehicle to straighten it to be loaded onto the tow truck, and when , after unloading it at the tow lot, in steering it to the parking s pot , he had no proble m with the vehicle ’ s st eering and suspension. {¶ 5} Trooper Skinner administer ed a field sobriety test to appellant because he appeared impaired

. Trooper Skinner observed appellant was restless and agitat ed, and after plac ing him in the back of the patrol vehicle, observed him fall as leep , which he twice rep e ated at the station

. T rooper S kinner testified that appellant “ knew h e was impaire d. He did not do this intentionally, but it was the drugs in his bod y that made him do this act. ”4

. {¶ 6} T rooper Skinner left the sc ene with appellant one hour and forty minutes later

for the station and arrived within 12 minutes. At the station, T rooper Skinner prepared appellant ’ s w ritten statement , and appellant si gn ed it

. App ellant allege d that w hile driving , th e vehic le ’ s steering sud denly veered left

- of

- center , which he could not correct or adequately brake , causing the direct hit of the victim. Troopers Skinner, Gonzales, and Harkey testified there were no skid or tire mark s to corrobo rate appellant ’ s s tatemen t
. T rooper Gonzales testified, “ The reason there [are no skid marks on the field sketch is ] because the vehi cle was free rolli ng on all the tires. There was no yaw of the tires. ” Trooper Skinner testified t h e vehicle ca me to rest on the gr ass from the actu al impact with the victim , not from braking

. Trooper Harkey testified , “ There really wasn ’ t any evidence on the roadway that s howed any t y pe of evasi v e act ion, that showed any type of braking , nothing of tha t sense. ” {¶ 7} A t the station, T rooper Skinner secured and packaged t he seized items from the vehicle to send to the state highway cr ime lab. W ithout the benefit of a form document or support staff on a Saturday , T rooper Skinner typed “ from scratch ” the search warrant to

o btain appellant ’ s blood sample , which took an hour. T rooper Skinner th en researched the personal phone numbers of judges to sign the search warrant

. On t he fifth attempt , T rooper Skinner found an available judge from t he Sylvania Municipal Cour t , who cam e down to the station to review the sea rch warrant before sign ing it at 4:45 p .m. Then , by 5:02 p.m., T rooper Skinner departed with appellant for a nearby hospital , arriving within 20 minutes. T rooper Skinner provided the phlebotomist with the st ate highway patrol ’ s standard blood

-5

.

draw kit to c ollect the evidence

. The actual blood draw s for two vials occurred twenty

sev en and twenty

- eight minutes later , respectively , or by 5:48 p.m

. After the phlebotomist secured the vials of blood, T rooper Skinner took po s se ssion of the m and immediately placed identification label s and tamper

- detecting seal s on them , packaged them, and then placed by 6:30 p.m. the package in a designated mail drop to the state highway crime lab , which received i t five days later

. {¶ 8} W ithin t wo weeks of the March 6, 2021 in cident, a ppellant and/or the vehicle

owner contacted the tow lot owner to obtain the vehicle , and repeatedly did so thereafter

. On April 22, T rooper Skinner concurrently notifi ed the tow lot owner and the vehicle

owner that the hold on the vehicle was released

. Ra ther than pick up the vehicle , and without visiting the vehicle, on May 6, the vehicle owner signed the ve hicle ’ s title over to the tow lot owner in lieu of the accrued tow lot storage fees , and th e tow lot o wner tit le d the vehicle in its name on May 1 3 . T he vehicle remained in the tow lot

. Meanwhile, on September 7, a grand jury indicted appellant with the four off enses. After some cosmetic repairs from the impact with the victim , t he tow lot owner sold the vehicle t o a new owner
o n September 29. The new o wner drove the vehicle o ut of the tow lot without incident

. S ince purchasing the vehicle , the new owner testified that the vehicle functions normally and only needed routine replacement of the brake pads

. {¶ 9} Appellant e nte red not

- guilty pleas at his arraignme nt , and the matter proceeded to trial

. On May 16, 2022, appellant filed a motion to dism iss each count of aggravated vehicular ho micide , count Nos. one and two, arguing that a ppellee, state of6

.

Ohio, viol at ed his due pro cess rights by not preserving the veh icle as material ly exculpatory evidence of his mechanical

- defect defense

. Appellee oppos ed the motion . A t the two

- day hearing held on July 18 and on July 27 , the trial court admitted four documents into evidence and rec eived testimony from six witnesses : T roopers Skinner, Harkey, and Gonzales , the tow lot owner, the new vehicle owner , and appellant ’ s grandfather

. T he tri al
court announced its decision to deny appellan t ’ s motion to dism iss on Sep tember 21

. 2 Appellant r ej e cted all plea offers, and t he trial d ate was set for October 2 4 , and then reset for November 28

. {¶ 10} O n the afternoon o f November 22, 2 022 , which was the last business day before the Thanksgiving break, appellant filed a motion to suppress and/or motion in lim ine for the blood samples appellee ob tained fr om him on Marc h 6, 2021

. Appellant argued the blood samples were not p roperly obtained , stored , o r deliver e d for crime

- lab testing in violation of R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) and Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 3701

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. Appel l ee opposed the motion, and the hearin g was hel d on November 28 , in lieu of the trial . T he trial c ourt received testimony from Trooper Skinner , who was involv ed with the collection

a nd handling of the blood samples up through plac ing them in transit to the state highw ay crime lab , and from the state hi ghway crime lab toxicology analyst who received the blood samples, conducte d tests on them , and prepa red a report of the findings. After hearing extensive argumen ts by the parties , the trial court deni ed the mo tion that day

.

2 The trial court ’ s decis ion and judgment entry was journalized on Nov ember 22, 2022.7

. {¶ 11} P lea nego ti ations ensu ed that s ame day , and appellant pled no contest to

amended count No. one , a lesser

- included off ense of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 29 03

. 06 (A)( 1 ) (a) and a second

- degree felony unde r R.C. 2903.06 ( B )

. A ppellee agreed to dismiss the rema ining thr ee counts
. {¶ 12} The trial court accepted appel l ant ’ s no - contest plea to amended count No.

one , found appellant guilty of the offense, and sentenced appellant to serve a mandatory,

m inimum term of eight years with a maximum, indefinite term of 12 years. The tria l cour t summarized at sentencing:

Mr. Urba n ski, I look at your record, and you started as a little boy and it has been non

- stop. * * * Nothing * * * has derailed your * * * disregard for rules, for humanity. Yo u just do whatever you want. And whet her or no t you had a hard life, whe ther o r not drug s have been a problem for you, you also made yourself a weapon. And every time you got in to that vehicle and did whatever you wanted , you were no different to me than a bullet going into a crowd. Because a t some po int you we re going to connect and victimiz e somebody. * * * Every time I listen to your statements or read in reports or however this is brought b efore the Court with regard to your trying to rely on mechanica l malfunctions in your car, and you k eep relyi ng on the fact that you heard some clunkin g noises and metal under your vehicle, and I do think8

. that ’ s true. But I think it was a human being and a b icycle. And I think that ’ s

when your body first registered so mething was happening. Don ’ t kid your self , Mr. Urbanski, that you ’ re not at fault. Don ’ t kid yourself that your car was at fault. * * * Y ou are a drug addict. You used. You once again got behind the wheel. You pu t other people in danger . And on that parti c ular day, [ it was the victim simply b ecause] h e chose to go on a bike ride. {¶ 13} Appella nt timely ap pealed the trial court judgment set ting forth four assignment s of error : 1. Appellant ’ s constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when th e State failed to preserve the automo bile invo lved in this matter as exculpatory ev idence. 2. The State ’ s failure to preserve the veh i cle as evidence rises to the level of bad faith, even if the evidence is only potentially useful, and therefore violates Appe llant ’ s con stitutional rights to due process a nd a fair trial 3. The release of the ve hicle was ar guably a violation of OSHP Evid e nce Control procedure 103.07(F). and therefore, a violation of appellant ’ s rights to due process and a fair trial. 4. The trial cour t a bused its discretion when it denie d Appella nt ’ s Motion to Suppress and/or Motion in Limine.

I I. Du e Process9

. {¶ 14} Appellant ’ s first , second, and third assignments of error each allege

violations of his due process right to a fair trial with respect to one pie ce of alleged ly exculpatory evidence: the vehi cle he drove that struck and killed the bicyclist o n March 6, 2 0 21. Appellant argues the vehicle was materially exculpatory evidence of a mechanical d efect that caused the accident, and appellee failed to prese rve th e vehicle “ for further investig ation by defense experts during the litigation process ” when it released i t to the owner, his grandfather

. Appellant admits the vehicle owner knew of the mechanical defect, when his grandfather testified that he experie nced a similar, sudden, loss of contr ol three days before the in cident , 3 but ref used to autho rize any rep airs

. {¶ 15} Appellee responds th at appellant ’s due process rights w ere not violated for three reasons. First, appellan t failed to show that the vehicle was m aterially exculpatory evidence or tha t appe lle e acted in bad faith, i f the vehicle was potentially exculpatory evidence , when it released the vehicle to his grandfather

. Second, appellant invited any alleged error by the trial court because “ [b]ut for the family ’ s numerous requests for releas e [of th e vehicle to the highway patrol and to the t ow lot o wner], and the n signing over the title , the Honda would have been available for inspection by the defense expert. ” Third, the alleged mechanical failure at the m omen t of the accident is irrel evant in the face of the

3 Appellant ’ s grandfather testified that on March 3, 2021, a similar , sudden cat astrophic steer i ng prob lem occurred , where the ve hicle stopped running, kept rolling over a median at a shopping ma ll, and then could not be restarted. He had i t towed by AAA to their service center. “ They were going to try to fix the car , and I said no. ” Instead, he b r ou ght it to Belle Tire and had them install two new tires

.10

.

s trict liability offe nse of aggravated vehicular homicide

. As explained by appell ee , “ The mechan ical condition of [the] Honda could not and would not have shown that Appellant did not commit the stri c t liabi lity offense of Aggravated Ve hicular Homicide, while under the influence of drugs. ” {¶ 16} “ [W] hen reviewing a trial court ’ s ruling on a motion to dismiss arising from an alleged due process violation based on destroyed or missing evidence, we defer to th e factual findings of the trial court while applying a de novo review of the trial court ’ s application of the facts to the law. ” State v. Walker , 2022

- Ohio

- 1 684, 192 N.E.3d 1159, ¶ 33 ( 10th Dist. )

. “ The defendant bears the burden to show that the evidence was materially exculpatory

. ” State v. Powell , 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012

- Ohio

- 2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 74

. As discussed below , w e find that appellant ’ s motion to d ismiss fails for a num ber of

reaso ns . {¶ 17} First, we find that appellant failed to meet his burden th at the los t or destroyed vehicle was either material ly exculpatory evidence , i.e., its exculpatory valu e is apparent on its face , or that appe llee a cted in bad faith if the vehicle was at least potentially exculpatory , i.e., a dishon est purpose, moral obli quity, conscious wrongdoing, ulterior motive or ill will to breach a known duty , or actual intent to mislead or deceive

. Id

. at ¶ 73

- 81

. {¶ 18} Second , i t is undisputed that at no point did appellant request the state pres erve the vehicle as materially exculpato ry evide nce until he filed his moti on to dismiss , which was o ne year after appellant ’s grandfather voluntarily relinquished title to the11

.

vehicle. S ee S tate v. Fox , 2012

- Ohio

- 4805, 985 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 26 ( 4th Dist. ) ; State v. Williams , 11th Dist. Portage No. 2022

- P

- 0 053, 2023

- Ohio

- 3526 , ¶ 3 2

- 33 (distinguishing a timely request to the prosecution to preserve a motorcycle from obtaining evidence to support the defense)

. The trial court found that a ppellant ’s self

- servin g statements of sudden, catastroph ic mechan ical fai lure immediately prior to vic tim impact were not supported by : (1) witness testimon ies of normal functioning of the vehicle since the accident ; (2) the wi tnesses who observed the final resting orientati on of the vehicle, b icycle, and victim at the crash sc ene ; (3 ) the absence of t ire marks to indicate braking or efforts to evade the collision ; (4) the drug paraphernalia seized from the vehicle and appellant ’s drug

- impai red conduct at the crime sc ene and at the station ; and (5) appellant ’s

own eviden ce indic ating m ere ly two new tires we re purchased and installed two days prior to the incident, despite an allegedly similar mechanical failure three days prior to the incident

. The speculation that the vehicle co uld have exculpated appellant if the vehicl e had be en tested for the alleged mec hanical defe c ts is not enough to r ise to a due process violation

. See City of Toledo v. Sanders , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L

- 21

- 1260, 2023

- Ohio

- 2092, ¶ 39

. {¶ 19} Third, appellant cites to no legal authority for h is conclusion that a vi olation of section No. 103.07(F ) of the Ohio Highway Patrol ’s policy on disposal of recovered and evi den tiary prop erty also violates his due process rights . S ection No. 103.07(F)(2) required reasonable efforts by the a gency to locate the “ persons entit l ed to possession of th e property , to notify them of when and where it may be claimed, and to return the proper ty12

.

to them at the earliest pos sible time (see R.C 2981.11). T he evidence or property may then be released or discarded depending on the owner ’ s r esponse. ” {¶ 20} The trial court found that is what happened

. T rooper Skinner testified that the recovered vehi cle , a pi ece of tangible property in volved in an aggravated vehicular homicide , was held at the tow lot only so long as necessary . W hen the investigati on of it

w as completed , the vehicl e w as released to the owner. T rooper Gonzales d id not mark t he vehicle as evidence on the crash report beca use, “ it was o ut of a crash, and we had nothing to indicate in any way, shape , or form that it looked like we need to take this as evidence at the scene . We even had su pervisors out there. * * * We had no indic ation for us to take it as evidence at that ti me. ” Tro oper Harkey testified , “ Nothing indicated there was any type of defect with this vehicle

. ” H e gather ed cras h scene reconstr uction data with spec ialized equip ment and forwarded the data file to District 1 ’ s t wo, f ull

- t ime accident reconstructionists

. T he air bags did not deploy

. He “ was really surprised how there was (sic.) no marks on the roadway ” to indicate b rakes lockin g up or hard steering to avoid the collision. Once the reconstructionists completed their ana l ysis, the vehicle was ready to be

r eleased , in compliance with the stat e highway policy. {¶ 21} F ourth , the mech anic al functionality of the vehicle is irrele vant to the essential elements of the aggravated vehicular homicide offense to which appellant pled no
contest
. A no - contes t plea is not an admission of guilt, but an admission of the tru th of the facts alleged in t he indictmen t
. Crim.R. 11(B)(2)

. Neverthe less, “the plea of no contest doe s no t preclude a defendant from asserting upon appe al that the trial court prejudicially13

.

erred in ruling on a pr etrial motion, including a pretrial motion to suppress evidence. ” Crim .R. 12(I). However, appellant does not ar gue prejudice , and prejudice is n ot a utomatic even if the trial court had improperly denied the motion to dismiss

. See State v. LaRosa , 165 Ohio St.3d 346, 2021

- Ohio

- 4060, 179 N.E.3d 89 , ¶ 50. {¶ 22} H ere, appellant pl ed n o contest to violating R.C. 2903.06(A)(1) (a) , which
state s for aggravated vehi cular homicide , “ No person, wh ile operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle , * * * shall cause the death of another * * * in any of the following ways: ( 1)(a ) As the proximate result of committing a violation of [R.C. 4511.19(A)

. ] ” In turn, R.C. 4511.19( A)(1)(a) , s tates, “ No person shall operate any vehicle * * * within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the following apply: (a) The perso n is under the influence of alcohol, a drug o f abuse, or a combination of them. ” R .C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a) is a stri ct

- liability offense

. State v . Hohenberger , 189 Ohio App.3d 346, 2010

- Ohio

- 4053, 938 N.E.2d 419, ¶ 44

- 46 ( 6th Dist. ) Thus, the alleged m echanica l fa ilure of the vehicle is not a defense to the essential elements of aggravated vehicular homicide

. {¶ 23} Upon de novo review of the trial court ’ s application of the facts to the law , we find no du e process violatio n and no error with the trial court ’ s denial of a ppell ant ’ s motion to dismiss cou nt Nos. o ne and two. A ppellant ’s first, second , and third assignme nts of error are found not well

- taken. I II. Motion to Suppress {¶ 24} In support of his fo urth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in den ying his motion to su ppress and/or m otion in limine and in admi tt ing the14

.

laborator y test results from his blood samples as evidence of his drug impairment at the time of the incident

. Appellant argues a ppellee failed to substantially comply with applicable law and re gulations, citing State v. Mayl , 1 06 Ohio St.3d 207, 2005

- Ohio

- 4 629, 83 3 N.E.2d 1216, ¶ 3 ( “ We conclude that in a criminal pros ecution for aggravated vehicular homicide that depen ds upon proof of an R.C. 4511.19(A) violation, labora tory test res ults

are admissible only if the state shows s ubstantial compliance with R .C. 4511. 19(D)(1) and Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 3701

- 53 , even if the test was conducted in an accredited hospital laborat ory. ” )

. Appellant specifically argues appellee did not substantial ly c omply with R.C. 4 5 11.19(D)(1)(b) , which m andates a blo od draw occur within thr ee hours of the alleged incident , not six hours as actually occurred

. {¶ 25} Appellee respon d s that the evidence was admissible, citing State v. Hassler , 115 Ohio St.3d 322, 2007

- Oh io

- 4 947, 875 N.E. 2d 46 , syllabus ( “ A blood sa mple taken outside the time frame set out in R.C. 4511.19(D) is admissible to prove that a person is under the influence of [a drug of abuse ] as proscribed by R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1)(a) in the prosecution fo r a viola tion of R.C. 2903.06, provided that the adm in istrative requirements of R.C. 4511.1 9(D) are substantially complied with and expert testimony is offered

. ” )

. First, there was detailed testimony by T rooper S kinner and by the crime

- lab toxicology analyst of sub s tan tial compliance wi th the forensic testing requirements under R.C. 4511. 19(D)(1 )(b) and Ohio Adm.Code 3701

- 53

- 06 with respect t o the collection , handling, and testing of appellant ’ s blood samples. Second, the blood sample test results by the15

.

crime

- lab t oxi c ology analyst 4 sho wed the presence of coc aine , amphetamine, and methadone , and any blood collection delay from three

- to six

- hour s would be to appellant ’ s benefit : “ the on ly thing that I know that could possibly happen is degradation o f the sample,

mea ning the results might be lower than what th e y would have been. ” {¶ 26} During the he arin g, the tria l court determined that appellant failed to

“ establish any prejudice ” with respect to failures to comply with the statutory and

a dministrative guidance for the col lect ion , handling , and testi ng of appellant ’ s blo od samples. The trial court ’ s sub sequent jou rnalized entry states, “ The court finds the State o f Ohio has substant ially complied with the requ irements of the Ohio A dministrative Code and met its burden to m a inta in the blood evidence for the impairment purposes. ” The trial court then denie d appellant ’ s motion to suppress and /or motion in limine. {¶ 27} We review the trial court ’ s de nial of appel lant ’ s m otion to suppress as a mixed question of fact and law

. LaRosa , 16 5 Oh io St.3d 346, 2021

- Ohio

- 4060, 179 N.E.3d 89 , at ¶ 17, citing State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003

- Ohio

- 5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8 . We accept the trial court ’ s factual findings if th ey are supported by competent, credible evidence, but review de no vo t he trial court ’ s legal conclusion s . Id

. {¶ 28} W e rev iewed the record and find t here is competent, credible evidence to support the trial court ’ s factual findings that appellee substantially co mplied with the

4 Appellee infor med the trial court that, rathe r than have the trial court dee m the cri me lab toxicology analyst an expert both at the suppression hearing and at trial, the formal expert

qualification process wou ld occur at trial.16

.

administrative re quirements under R.C. 4511. 19(D)( 1)(b ) and Ohio Adm.Code 3701

- 53

- 06

. The recor d contains no indication of intention al delays by Trooper Skinner to obtain appellant ’ s blood samples and then send th em to the state highway cri me lab for analysis , where any delays only benefitted appellant

. T he p resence of drugs of abuse were reported b y the crime

- la b toxicology analyst, w ho te sted appellant ’ s blood samples. {¶ 29} U pon de novo review, we further find that appellant was not prejudiced by the six

- hour blood draw delay. Nor by the five days of unrefrig erat ed transit of the bloo d

s amples to the st ate highway crime lab , which is speci fically authorize d by O hio A dm. C o de 3701

- 53

- 0 6(G)

. The toxicology test results o f drug co ncentrations from delayed testing of his blood samples would have benefit ted appellan t , n ot prejudiced appe l lant. Having found the blood test results presumptively adm issible, a ppellant failed t o meet his burden of showing prejudice from such less

- than

- st rict compliance for the initial blood draw , and the trial court did n ot err in denying his motion to suppress and/or motion in limi ne . State v. Owens , 6th Dist. Lucas N o. L

- 15

- 1215, 2016

- Ohio

- 3092, ¶ 28

. {¶ 30} Appellant ’ s four th assignment of error is not well

- t aken.

I V . Conclusio n {¶ 31} On consideration whereof, t he judgment of the Lucas County Court of C ommon Pleas is affirmed

. Appellant is ord ered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgment affirmed.17

. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App. R. 4.

Tho mas J. Osowik , J.

_____________ _______________ JUDGE Christi ne E. Mayle, J.

_____________ _______________ Myron C. Duhart , P. J. JUDGE CONCUR.

____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the S upreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Deci sions. Parties interested in viewing the fin al reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.