ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

People v. Woodrome, 2013 IL App (4th) 130142

Appellate Court

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

TIMOTHY RAY WOODROME, Defendant-Appellee.

 District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-13-0142

Filed September 11, 2013

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress the

evidence discovered by the police while investigating an anonymous tip

that a person at a certain address was burning plastic-encased copper

wire,since the officers involved were in a place where they had a right to

be when they observed the evidence in plain view, after which they left

the scene to obtain a warrant; therefore, no violation of the fourth

amendment occurred.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jersey County, No. 11-CF-155; the

Hon. Eric S. Pistorius, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Counsel on

Appeal

Benjamin Goetten, State’s Attorney, of Jerseyville (Patrick Delfino,

Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller, all of State’s Attorneys

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Ted E. Barylske, of Alton, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Knecht and Holder White concurred in the judgment and

opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 In September 2011, the State charged defendant, Timothy Ray Woodrome, with single

counts of theft and criminal damage to property. In March 2012, defendant filed a motion to

suppress evidence, which the trial court granted.

¶ 2 On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to

suppress evidence. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In September 2011, the State charged defendant by information with one count of theft

(720 ILCS5/16-1(a)(1)(A)(West 2010)), alleging he knowinglyexerted unauthorized control

over property of AT&T, being copper wire having a total value in excess of $500, with the

intent to permanently deprive AT&T of the use of the property. The State also charged

defendant with one count of criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a) (West

2010)), alleging he knowingly damaged property of AT&T, being telephone wire, with the

damage being in excess of $300 but not in excess of $10,000. Defendant pleaded not guilty.

¶ 5 In March 2012, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. Defendant claimed the

State intended to introduce into evidence items seized by police in the execution of a search

warrant pertaining to his residence at 10783 Chestnut Lane in Godfrey. Defendant stated the

affidavit and complaint for search warrant filed by Sheriff’s Deputy Mark Marshall set forth

three matters in support of the issuance of the warrant, including that (1) the police received

information regarding an individual burning plastic-encased copper wire at defendant’s

residence and no identity as to the informant and his/her reliability was provided; (2) the

police had knowledge of copper wire thefts within the same area in the previous three days;

and (3) the affiant, Deputy Marshall, while on defendant’s property earlier in the day in

question observed a small burn pile containing plastic-encased copper wire and several

sections of telephone cable on the floor of defendant’s detached garage. Defendant claimed

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Deputy Marshall did not have a warrant or defendant’s consent to search when he made the

observations prior to preparing his affidavit. Thus, the observations made by Deputy

Marshall in his affidavit and complaint for search warrant were a product of his prior

unlawful entry and insufficient for the issuance of a search warrant based upon probable

cause.

¶ 6 In May 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress. Deputy

Marshall testified to his affidavit and complaint for a search warrant, the search warrant, and

the evidence/property report. He agreed the affidavit did not indicate the identification ofthe

person who provided the information of an individual burning plastic-encased copper wire.

He arrived at defendant’s residence at 12:34 p.m. to investigate. From the roadway, he could

see smoke from the fire approximately 100 feet from his position but could notsee what was

in the fire. Sergeant Tim Chappell arrived at the same time as Marshall. Defendant was out

in the yard and quickly went inside after Chappell called his name. Marshall proceeded to

the front door of the residence. Thereafter, “we went around the residence, knocking on the

doors, trying to get somebody to come back to the door, makin[g] sure he wasn’t climbing

out the back window.” During this check, Marshall observed telephone cable next to the

residence. Chappell then advised Marshall to look in the burn pile. Upon approaching the

fire, he could see copper wire therein. Marshall looked through an open door in the garage

and observed telephone cables that matched the description of the plastic-encased copper

wire. Marshall testified he later motioned an AT&T employee, who had been waiting down

the street, to defendant’s property to identify the wire. Marshall stated defendant never gave

his consent to allow anyone to be on the property. Marshall used the information obtained

from his observations to secure the search warrant.

¶ 7 On cross-examination, Deputy Marshall testified there had been several copper wire

thefts in the vicinity during that particular time period. He stated he saw the fire while off of

the premises. As he pulled into the driveway, he observed defendant turn away and go inside

the residence. Marshall eventually left the scene to take defendant to jail at 12:59 p.m. and

to secure the search warrant.

¶ 8 On redirect examination, Marshall stated he went to the front door of the residence but

had not observed any copper wire. As he walked around the side of the house to make sure

no one was attempting to exit, he observed copper wire. After he looked in the burn pile, he

looked in the open door of the garage and observed copper wire in plain view.

¶ 9 Sergeant Tim Chappell testified he received a phone call from someone wishing to

remain anonymous who was aware of copper wire having been stolen in the area and seeing

the type of telephone cable that was stolen. Looking to investigate the copper wire thefts,

Chappell arrived at defendant’s residence at approximately 12:30 p.m. and observed him

walk toward the residence. Knowing defendant from prior law-enforcement contacts,

Chappell called out “Hey, Tim,” but defendant entered the residence without acknowledging

the statement. Chappell knocked on the front door but did not receive a response. He

proceeded to the side of the house and knocked on another door. He observed telephone wire

and asked Deputy Marshall to look in the burn pile, which was approximately 25 to 30 yards

from the house. He later told Marshall to transport defendant and then secure a search

warrant.Chappell called the AT&T employee, who had been servicing the area involved with

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the stolen wire, and asked him to come to the property and look at the wire.

¶ 10 In December 2012, the trial court issued its written order and found, in part, as follows:

“Based upon the anonymous phone call, Deputies Marshall and Chappell traveled to

defendant’s property where smoke could be seen from a fire, which was approximately

100 feet from the roadway, but the material that was being burned could not be identified

from that location. Officer Marshall stated that it was only when he was within 20 feet

of the fire that he could tell it was plastic encased copper wire. Finally, the Sheriff’s

department deputies were aware that there had been reports of stolen plastic encased

telephone wire in the area within three days prior to the arrest.

The question before this court is whether those three facts (anonymous call, smoke

from a fire seen from the roadway and knowledge of plastic encased copper wire thefts

in area) are sufficient for the officers to conduct a warrantless search of the defendant’s

property. Illinois law recognizes that probable cause can be based on an anonymous tip

which is sufficiently detailed to establish the reliability of the informant’s basis of

knowledge and it was sufficiently corroborated to demonstrate his veracity. People v.

Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981). Under the facts of this case, the court does

not believe that there was sufficient detail in the information provided by the informant

to permit a warrantless search based solely on the information given.

This finding, however, does not end the discussion. Illinois courts have gone on to

note that an insufficient informant’s tip may be cured by independent partial

corroboration by the officers investigating the allegations contained in the informant’s

tip. (People v. Smith, 101 Ill. App. 3d 772, 428 N.E.2d 641 (4th Dist. 1981). As noted in

People v. Smith ‘Where all the information in a tip has been independently verified,

independent corroboration may establish the basis of knowledge. There is no perilous

reliance on ‘an amalgam of underworld rumor and barroom gossip (19 Md. App. 507,

531, 313 A.2d 847, 862), if all facts have been verified.’

In People v. Smith, the officers, ‘Acting on a tip indicating where the perpetrators of

a recent burglary and their bounty could be found, the police went to investigate. The

defendant was found at the specified location, standing in front of an open storage bay

containing an air compressor generallymatching the description of the one stolen.’ While

these facts appear to be similar to the facts in the case before us, there is one significant

difference; as noted by the Appellate Court in the Smith case, the arresting officer

observed the compressor from the property of a private enterprise which was open to the

public. In the words of the Appellate Court, ‘he was in a place where he had a right to

be.’ (People v. Smith, at 428 N.E.2d 645) Under the facts of this case, while the officers

in question observed smoke from the roadway, which was approximately 100 feet from

the fire, they could not determine what wasthe source of the fire until they entered on the

defendant’s property and got within 20 feet of the fire.

Assuch, the officer’s corroboration and therefore the establishment of probable cause

occurred only after they entered upon his property without unlawful [sic] authority.”

The court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.

¶ 11 In January 2013, the State filed a motion to reconsider, claiming exigent circumstances

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existed to justify a warrantless entry. In February 2013, the trial court held a hearing and

denied the motion. Thereafter, the State filed a certificate of impairment. See Ill. S. Ct. R.

604(a)(1) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 The State argues the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress. The

State contends the police officers had probable cause to enter upon defendant’s property,

their entry on the property was lawful based on exigent circumstances, and the evidence

discovered on the property would have been inevitably discovered.

¶ 14 A. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof

¶ 15 On review of a motion to suppress, this court is presented with mixed questions of law

and fact. People v. McQuown, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1138, 1143, 943 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (2011).

“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we will accord great

deference to the trial court’s factual findings and will reverse those findings only if they

are against the manifest weight of the evidence; but we will review de novo the court’s

ultimate decision to grant or deny the motion.” People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 504, 939

N.E.2d 463, 467 (2010).

¶ 16 On a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant has the burden of proving the search and

seizure were unlawful. 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 2012); People v. Barker, 369 Ill. App.

3d 670, 673, 867 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (2007). “The burden of producing evidence, or the

burden of production, rests with the defendant.” People v. Mott, 389 Ill. App. 3d 539, 542,

906 N.E.2d 159, 163 (2009). “ ‘However, once the defendant makes a prima facie showing

of an illegal search and seizure, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidence justifying

the intrusion.’ ” People v. Reatherford, 345 Ill. App. 3d 327, 334, 802 N.E.2d 340, 347

(2003) (quoting People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (2000)).

¶ 17 B. The Fourth Amendment

¶ 18 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. Similarly, the Illinois Constitution affords

citizens with “the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers[,] and other possessions

against unreasonable searches [and]seizures.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. Our supreme court

has interpreted the search-and-seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in a manner

consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s fourth-amendment jurisprudence. See

People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 335-36, 851 N.E.2d 26, 57 (2006).

¶ 19 The general rule is that searches and seizures are unreasonable unless conducted pursuant

to a judicial warrant issued by a neutral magistrate after a finding of probable cause. Illinois

v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). However, if there is no unreasonable government

intrusion, “there is no search and seizure subject to the warrant clause of the [fourth]

amendment.” People v. Neal, 109 Ill. 2d 216, 221, 486 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1985).

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¶ 20 In the case sub judice, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress, finding the

information provided by the anonymous caller was not sufficiently detailed to permit a

warrantless search and the corroboration of the call by the officers was invalid because they

entered upon defendant’s property without lawful authority. We disagree with the court’s

decision because the officers were conducting a lawful investigation and no violation of the

fourth amendment occurred as no warrantless search took place.

¶ 21 Police may stop a person to investigate possible criminal behavior based on an

informant’stip where the information received has some indicia of reliability and establishes

the necessary quantum of suspicion. People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 487, 828 N.E.2d 237, 246

(2005). Where police obtain corroboration of the information, it establishes the informant’s

veracity and supports the inference that the informant obtained his information reliably.

People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 210, 588 N.E.2d 983, 995 (1991).

¶ 22 We find the reliability of the anonymous caller is of little relevance in this case because

no suspicionless stop or arrest was made and no warrantless search orseizure occurred based

on the tip. See People v. Scott, 249 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602, 619 N.E.2d 809, 814 (1993)

(finding the reliability of the tip was irrelevant in the fourth-amendment analysis where there

was no initial stop of the defendant based on the tip). Here, an anonymous callerreported the

theft of copper wire and that an individual was unlawfully burning plastic-encased copper

wire at 10783 Chestnut Lane. Police officers were also aware of copper wire thefts in the

vicinity. While these two facts alone would not have been sufficient to secure a search

warrant, the officers were not prevented from conducting their investigation at the address

in question. As they approached the subject property on a public road, the deputies saw

defendant outside near a burn pile. While this observation would not have given officersthe

authority to arrest defendant or search the property, it did corroborate the caller’s tip and

allow for further investigation.

¶ 23 “An officer may lawfully approach the front door of a residence to conduct an

investigation–referred to by many courts as a ‘knock and talk’–so long as the officer enters

an area impliedly open to the public.” People v. Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d 409, 418, 900

N.E.2d 1146, 1155 (2008); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409,

1416 (2013) (stating “a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and

knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do’ ” (quoting

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011))); United States v.

Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that “ ‘[a]bsent express orders from

the person in possession,’ an officer may ‘walk up the steps and knock on the front door of

any man’s “castle,” with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof’ ”

(quoting Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964))). Moreover, “[a]n officer

may go beyond the front door to investigate by approaching the back door of a

residence–either when no one answers a knock on the front door or where a legitimate reason

is shown for approaching the back door.” Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 418, 900 N.E.2d at

1156.

¶ 24 In this case, the officersleft the roadway and turned into defendant’s driveway. See Scott,

249 Ill. App. 3d at 603, 619 N.E.2d at 815 (stating “a driveway on private property, like the

entrance to a private home, can be considered a public place”). Defendant started walking

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away from the burn pile as he removed his gloves. As defendant walked toward the house,

SergeantChappell exited his car and called out, “Hey, Tim.” Defendant did not acknowledge

Chappell and went inside. The officers then went to the front door and knocked. As this

action was in furtherance of the investigation, it was a legitimate reason for approaching the

front door. See Taylor, 458 F.3d at 1204 (finding no fourth-amendment violation where “the

officer entered the property, proceeded down the driveway that provided access to the house,

went to the front door and knocked on it in order to investigate the suspicious and troubling

911 calls”). DeputyMarshall also went around to the back of the residence to knock on doors

and to make sure defendant “wasn’t climbing out the back window.” These were also

legitimate reasons for approaching the rear of the house. See Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d at

418, 900 N.E.2d at 1156.

¶ 25 “Once an officer is legitimately on the property, he or she may properly observe any

‘evidence lying about in the open.’ [Citation.] A search does not occur when officers observe

what isin open view.” Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 419, 900 N.E.2d at 1156; see also People

v. Berg, 67 Ill. 2d 65, 68, 364 N.E.2d 880, 881-82 (1977) (“it is not a search to observe that

which is in open view”); United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2003)

(“ ‘[W]hen the police come on to private property to conduct an investigation ... and restrict

their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways,

porches), observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth

Amendment.’ ” (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 506-08 (3d ed.

1996))).

¶ 26 Here, the officers were aware of recent copper wire thefts in the area. Marshall stated he

saw multiple sections of telephone cables next to the residence. When Chappell was on the

side of the house to knock on the side door, he saw telephone wire. After being asked to do

so, Marshall looked in the burn pile and saw burnt copper wire. At some point in time, he

looked in the open door of the garage and saw copper wire in plain view.

¶ 27 The evidence indicates the officers’ decision to enter the property and approach the

house, as well as the manner in which they did so, constituted reasonable police actions in

the midst of a criminal investigation. Proceeding around the house to knock on doors and/or

to make sure defendant did not attempt to flee were also reasonable and proper actions.

While the officers were in a place where they had a lawful right to be, they observed in plain

view telephone cable that matched the description of the stolen copper wire. Officers did not

have to look in any containers or open any doors to do so. Cf. People v. Payton, 317 Ill. App.

3d 909, 914, 741 N.E.2d 302, 306 (2000) (finding a fourth-amendment violation where an

officer discovered cocaine and cannabis after lifting the lid of a barbecue grill located on the

front porch). Moreover, no argument can be made based on the evidence presented that

simply looking in the burn pile constituted an unreasonable government intrusion since the

officers were lawfully on the property and had already observed suspected stolen copper

wire. See People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 283, 718 N.E.2d 131, 140 (1999) (finding a burn

pile located outside a trailer’s curtilage was “protected by neither the United States

Constitution nor the Illinois Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures”); see

also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (holding “an individual has no

legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion by

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government officers”). On a final note, the officers’ request to have the AT&T employee

come to defendant’s property is of no consequence because the evidence indicated the

employee did nothing more than identify the wire.

¶ 28 Here, no fourth-amendment violation occurred. The officers were in a place where they

lawfully had a right to be and they observed evidence of a crime in plain view. Even then,

the officers did not seize the evidence but secured a search warrant based on the information

known to them. As the officers were not on the property unlawfully and they did not conduct

a warrantless search, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further

proceedings.

¶ 31 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

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