If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

RONALD DUPUIS II,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

May 6, 2021

v No. 351561

Wayne Circuit Court

CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, LC No. 18-005616-CL

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: TUKEL, P.J., and SERVITTO and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff was employed as a sergeant with the Highland Park Police Department (HPPD). 

Plaintiff filed this action under the Whistleblower’s Protection Act (“WPA”), MCL 15.361 et seq., 

after defendant, the city of Highland Park, took disciplinary action by initially suspending him and 

then terminating his employment; plaintiff later was reinstated after a union grievance arbitration 

proceeding, but in this suit sought back pay and benefits, which the arbitrator declined to order. 

Plaintiff now appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendant 

under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 

I. UNDERLYING FACTS

Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully retaliated against for his role in the arrest and 

prosecution of Gregory Yopp (Yopp), the son of Highland Park Mayor Hubert Yopp (the Mayor). 

According to plaintiff’s complaint, in January 2018, an HPPD patrol officer was dispatched to a 

location in Highland Park and found Yopp slumped over the steering wheel in a vehicle. The 

vehicle’s engine was running and the vehicle was in gear. A young child was in the backseat. The 

responding officer consulted plaintiff, who advised the officer to arrest Yopp. After arresting 

Yopp, the officer found marijuana and three prescription pills in his possession. Plaintiff requested 

a warrant for Yopp for child endangerment, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 

of drugs, possession of a controlled substance, driving while license suspended, and driving 

without proof of insurance. After Yopp’s arrest, the Mayor arrived at the police station and was 

permitted to see his son, who eventually was released to the Mayor’s custody. 
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In April 2018, plaintiff was disciplined for his role in an incident unrelated to Yopp’s arrest. 

Plaintiff was on duty when a suspect in custody for a homicide, Joseph Gray, ingested a large 

amount of hand soap. Plaintiff was aware that Gray had been held for 88 hours, well beyond the 

48-hour limit, without being charged. According to plaintiff, there was a staff shortage at the time, 

so he decided to allow emergency medical technicians to take Gray to the hospital without a police 

escort. After Gray was treated at the hospital, he walked away. The detective in charge of the 

Gray investigation acknowledged that he lost track of the amount of time Gray had been held in 

custody and acknowledged that Gray should have been released. Despite the detective taking 

responsibility for the situation, however, only plaintiff was disciplined for the actions relating to 

Gray’s transportation to the hospital and walking away after treatment. Plaintiff was accused of 

intentionally releasing a homicide suspect and criminal neglect or dereliction of duty. He was 

suspended from active duty in April 2018. The matter was referred to the Michigan State Police 

for an independent investigation to determine if criminal charges were warranted. Michigan State 

Police Detective Sergeant Craig MacDonald conducted the investigation and concluded that 

plaintiff did not violate any criminal laws with regard to his decision to authorize Gray’s transport 

to the hospital without a police escort. In fact, MacDonald supported plaintiff’s decision because 

Gray had been held for too long and MacDonald believed that plaintiff may have saved defendant 

from a lawsuit. 

MacDonald’s investigation, however, did not address whether plaintiff violated any HPPD 

rules or policies. In November 2018, plaintiff’s employment with the HPPD was terminated for 

violations of HPPD’s policies related to his handling of Gray’s transport to the hospital without a 

police escort. Plaintiff filed a grievance from that decision and, after a hearing before an arbitrator, 

he was reinstated to his position, but without backpay and benefits for the time he was suspended. 

Plaintiff alleged in this action that his disciplinary action in the Gray matter was actually 

motivated by his involvement in Yopp’s arrest. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for 

summary disposition on the ground that the decision to discipline plaintiff was made solely by 

Police Chief Chester Logan, without any input or involvement of the Mayor, and there was no 

evidence that plaintiff’s involvement in Yopp’s arrest was a factor in the disciplinary action. 

This appeal followed. After plaintiff filed his appeal, this Court allowed plaintiff to expand 

the record to present new information regarding the Mayor’s role in personnel matters involving 

the HPPD on two separate occasions. DuPuis v City of Highland Park, unpublished order of the 

Court of Appeals, entered February 16, 2021 (Docket No. 351561); DuPuis v City of Highland 

Park, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 31, 2021 (Docket No. 351561). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency 

of a complaint and is reviewed de novo. Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 205-206; 

815 NW2d 412 (2012). This Court reviews a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “by 

considering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Patrick v Turkelson, 322 Mich App 595, 605; 913 NW2d 

369 (2018). “The trial court is not permitted to assess credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve 

factual disputes, and if material evidence conflicts, it is not appropriate to grant a motion for 

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).” Barnes v 21st Century Premier Ins Co, ___ Mich 
-3-

App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2020) (Docket No. 347120); slip op at 4. Summary disposition “is 

appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Patrick, 322 Mich App at 605. “There is a genuine issue of 

material fact when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 425; 

751 NW2d 8 (2008). “Only the substantively admissible evidence actually proffered may be 

considered.” 1300 LaFayette East Coop, Inc v Savoy, 284 Mich App 522, 525; 773 NW2d 57 

(2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to 

establish a genuine issue of material fact, but mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient.” 

McNeill-Marks v Midmichigan Med Ctr-Gratiot, 316 Mich App 1, 16; 891 NW2d 528 (2016).

III. ANALYSIS

A. THE WPA

Under the WPA, in pertinent part, “[a]n employer shall not discharge . . . an employee . . . 

because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports . . . a violation or a 

suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to a law . . . to a public 

body, unless the employee knows that the report is false . . . .” MCL 15.362. Stated differently, 

“[t]he WPA provides a remedy for an employee who suffers retaliation for reporting or planning 

to report a suspected violation of a law, regulation, or rule to a public body.” Anzaldua v Neogen 

Corp, 292 Mich App 626, 630; 808 NW2d 804 (2011). “A prima facie case under the WPA arises 

when (1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the plaintiff was 

discharged or discriminated against, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected 

activity and the adverse employment decision.” Id. at 630-631, citing Shaw v Ecorse, 283 Mich 

App 1, 8; 770 NW2d 31 (2009). Only the third element is at issue in this case.

“Because whistleblower claims are analogous to other antiretaliation employment claims 

brought under employment discrimination statutes prohibiting various discriminatory animuses, 

they should receive treatment under the standards of proof of those analogous [claims].” DebanoGriffin v Lake Co, 493 Mich 167, 175-176; 828 NW2d 634 (2013) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted; alteration in original). “Absent direct evidence of retaliation, a plaintiff must rely on 

indirect evidence of his or her employer’s unlawful motivations to show that a causal link exists 

between the whistleblowing act and the employer’s adverse employment action.” Id. at 176. 

“Direct evidence of retaliation is evidence that, if believed, requires the conclusion that retaliatory 

animus was ‘at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.’ ” Rivera v SVRC Indus, Inc, 

327 Mich App 446, 457; 934 NW2d 286 (2019), quoting McNeil-Marks, 316 Mich App at 18. 

Plaintiff does not rely on direct evidence of retaliation in this case.1

 

1

In his brief on appeal, plaintiff refers to unspecified direct evidence. Plaintiff, however, fails to 

make any argument clarifying his supposed claim that direct evidence exists in this case. As such, 

the argument is abandoned. See Cheesman v Williams, 311 Mich App 147, 161; 874 NW2d 385 

(2015) (“An appellant may not merely announce a position then leave it to this Court to discover 
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In light of the lack of direct evidence of retaliation, “this case requires application of the 

burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas [Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 

1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973)].” Debano-Griffin, 493 Mich at 176. “A plaintiff may present a 

rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs from which a factfinder could infer that the 

plaintiff was the victim of unlawful retaliation.” Id. (quotation marks, citation, emphasis, and 

alteration omitted). “[W]hen a plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence of retaliation, the burden 

then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of a causal connection by articulating a 

legitimate business reason for its adverse employment action.” Rivera, 327 Mich App at 458. 

Finally, “[i]f the defendant offers such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that 

a genuine issue of material fact still exists by showing that a reasonable fact-finder could still 

conclude that the plaintiff’s protected activity was a motivating factor for the employer’s adverse 

action . . . .” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, a plaintiff could present 

evidence “that the employer’s articulated legitimate reason was a pretext disguising unlawful 

animus.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Consequently, we must determine whether plaintiff provided sufficient circumstantial 

evidence that he was fired for authorizing Yopp’s arrest. When making such a case, a “[p]laintiff 

must show something more than merely a coincidence in time between protected activity and 

adverse employment action.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 186; 665 NW2d 468 

(2003). In other words, “[t]emporal proximity, without more, is insufficient to prove a causal 

connection between the protected activity and any adverse employment action.” Rivera, 327 Mich 

App at 466.

Plaintiff satisfied the first two elements of his WPA claim by presenting evidence of 

protected activity (i.e., his involvement in Yopp’s arrest), and evidence of an adverse employment 

action (i.e., his suspension and later termination before eventually being reinstated). At issue in 

this case is whether plaintiff can establish a causal connection between this protected activity and 

the adverse employment action that supports an inference of unlawful retaliation. Defendant 

presented evidence that plaintiff’s suspension was solely the result of his handling of the Gray 

matter in April 2018, and that the Mayor was not involved in that disciplinary decision. Although 

plaintiff produced evidence to show that he had a history with the Mayor and that the Mayor might 

have had a reason to retaliate against plaintiff for his involvement in Yopp’s arrest, plaintiff did 

not produce any evidence at the trial court level suggesting that the Mayor was involved in the 

disciplinary action against plaintiff. Chief Logan was an appointee of the Mayor, but there was no 

evidence to support an inference that the Mayor influenced Chief Logan’s decision to suspend and 

subsequently terminate plaintiff. Indeed, according to Chief Logan’s affidavit, the Mayor was not 

involved in plaintiff’s disciplinary action. 

At the trial court level, plaintiff relied principally on evidence suggesting that defendant 

may have targeted him for disciplinary action. MacDonald, the State Police officer who conducted 

the independent investigation of the Gray matter, explained that he believed Chief Logan and 

Lieutenant Jamille Edwards had singled plaintiff out for disciplinary action in that incident because 

 

and rationalize the basis for the appellant’s claims; nor may an appellant give an issue only cursory 

treatment with little or no citation of authority.”).
-5-

although other officers were also involved and Detective Menge admitted that he was at fault for 

keeping Gray in custody too long, plaintiff was the only officer disciplined as a result of the 

incident. Plaintiff, however, also had a record of prior disciplinary actions, which could explain 

why defendant decided to pursue disciplinary action only against plaintiff in the Gray matter, 

without regard to his prior involvement in the arrest of Yopp. It was speculative for plaintiff to 

claim that defendant’s motive for trying to remove him from his position was due to his 

involvement in Yopp’s arrest. 

The record, however, has been expanded on appeal. The new information brought to our 

attention demonstrates the Mayor’s routine involvement in HPPD employment matters. Such 

evidence would allow a jury to infer that the Mayor was behind plaintiff’s disciplinary action and 

the Mayor’s relationship to Yopp presents a clear motive for retaliation. At the trial court level, 

defendant had submitted an affidavit from Police Chief Logan, who averred that the Mayor was 

not consulted on disciplinary decisions regarding midlevel employees of the HPPD, and was not 

involved in the decision to discipline plaintiff. But plaintiff’s new evidence shows that the Mayor, 

who had oversight over Chief Logan, was regularly involved in personnel matters in the HPPD, 

including interviews, promotions, and disciplinary proceedings. According to new Police Chief 

Kevin Coney, who was formerly the fire chief, the Mayor had been similarly involved in 

employment decisions in that department as well. Furthermore, plaintiff has been terminated by 

the HPPD, again, during the pendency of this appeal. The mayor wrote and signed the letter 

terminating plaintiff.2 This evidence supports an inference that the Mayor had a history of 

involving himself in personnel decisions for midlevel employees like plaintiff. 

We believe that this new evidence establishes a question of fact regarding whether the 

Mayor was involved in plaintiff’s disciplinary action. Given the evidence suggesting that the 

reasons for plaintiff’s disciplinary action in the Gray incident were questionable, we believe there 

are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether that disciplinary action was brought in 

retaliation for plaintiff’s involvement with Yopp’s arrest. This new evidence also distinguishes 

this case from Poppy v City of Willoughby Hills, 96 Fed Appx 292 (CA 6, 2004),3in which a city 

 

2 Plaintiff has actually been terminated by the HPPD twice during the pendency of this appeal. 

The first termination letter was written and signed by defendant’s human resources director, but 

plaintiff was later reinstated following an arbitration proceeding. Plaintiff’s reinstatement lasted 

less than one year before the most recent termination. The most recent termination resulted from 

plaintiff dry firing his weapon in the office. The incident resulted in Chief Coney recommending 

terminating plaintiff’s employment with the HPPD. The mayor apparently agreed and fired 

plaintiff shortly thereafter.

3 We address Poppy here for the sole reason that both parties extensively address it in their briefs. 

Poppy was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and, therefore, 

lacks precedential authority. See Sharp v City of Lansing, 464 Mich 792, 802-803; 629 NW2d 

873 (2001) (“[F]ederal case law can only be persuasive authority, not binding precedent, in

resolving the present case, which involves only questions of state law.”). Similarly, in their briefs

on appeal, the parties each relied extensively on unpublished opinions from this court. “An 

unpublished opinion is not precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis.” MCR 
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mayor with a motive to retaliate lacked any authority or control over the terms and conditions of 

the plaintiff’s employment. 

Because defendant offered plaintiff’s involvement in authorizing Gray’s transfer to the 

hospital without a police escort as a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, we also 

consider whether plaintiff can establish that this matter was a pretext for unlawful retaliation. 

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, a defendant may still be 

entitled to summary disposition “if it offers a legitimate reason for its action and the plaintiff fails 

to show that a reasonable fact-finder could still conclude that the plaintiff’s protected activity was 

a ‘motivating factor’ for the employer’s adverse action.” Debano-Griffin, 493 Mich at 175-176. 

As explained by our Supreme Court:

[T]here are three ways a plaintiff can establish that a defendant’s stated legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reasons are pretexts: (1) by showing the reasons had no basis in 

fact, (2) if they have a basis in fact, by showing that they were not the actual factors 

motivating the decision, or (3) if they were factors, by showing that they were 

jointly insufficient to justify the decision. The soundness of an employer’s business 

judgment, however, may not be questioned as a means of showing pretext. [Id. at 

180 (citation omitted).] 

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s decision to authorize Gray transport to the hospital 

without a police escort in April 2018 was a legitimate reason for its disciplinary action against 

plaintiff, unrelated to plaintiff’s involvement in Yopp’s arrest. As previously explained, however, 

plaintiff introduced evidence that his role in Gray’s transportation to the hospital without a police 

escort was the subject of an independent investigation by the State Police. MacDonald, the officer 

who conducted that investigation, noted that his investigation established that plaintiff was the 

only officer disciplined as a result of the Gray matter, despite the fact that other officers were 

involved and Detective Menge admitted that he was at fault for keeping Gray in custody too long. 

MacDonald concluded that plaintiff did not violate any criminal laws when releasing Gray.4 

Although MacDonald did not investigate whether plaintiff’s actions violated any HPPD rules or 

policies, MacDonald concluded that he would have made the same decision that plaintiff did—

meaning sending Gray to the hospital without a police escort—given the circumstances. These 

 

7.215(C)(1). While unpublished opinions can be instructive or persuasive, Paris Meadows, LLC 

v City of Kentwood, 287 Mich App 136, 145; 783 NW2d 133 (2010), we find reliance on them 

unnecessary in this case because published caselaw with precedential force clearly establishes the 

requirements for a WPA claim. Consequently, we decline to address the unpublished cases the 

parties relied on.

4 We express no opinion regarding the admissibility of MacDonald’s opinions regarding 

defendant’s actions that he investigated, but we note that when viewing the record in the light most 

favorable to plaintiff, a rational jury could come to the same conclusions that MacDonald reached. 

It is the underlying facts on which MacDonald’s opinion is based, rather than the fact that he 

reached conclusions, on which our ruling is based.
-7-

facts were sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the proffered 

reason for plaintiff’s discipline was a pretext for unlawful retaliation, contrary to the WPA. 

The evidence that other officers were also involved in Gray’s transport to the hospital 

without a police escort but were not disciplined, and that Detective Menge admitted to being at 

fault for keeping Gray in custody too long, could allow a jury to find that plaintiff’s alleged role 

in that matter was not the actual motivating reason for the decision to discipline plaintiff. The fact 

that an independent investigator concluded that, under the circumstances, he would have made the 

same decision regarding Gray’s transport to the hospital without a police escort also supports this 

conclusion. Although an arbitrator concluded that plaintiff had violated HPPD rules and policies 

because an officer was available who could have accompanied Gray to the hospital, the arbitrator 

also found that termination was too harsh because of mitigating circumstances. Even if this 

evidence could allow a fact-finder to find that there was some justification for disciplining plaintiff, 

it could also allow the fact-finder to find that plaintiff’s actions in that matter were insufficient to 

justify the disciplinary measures that were taken, and that those measures were motivated in part 

by a retaliatory motive. Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether 

the proffered reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext for unlawful retaliation. This 

dispute of material fact precludes any grant of summary disposition at this time.

B. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Although plaintiff also argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel as applied to the 

arbitrator’s findings does not bar his WPA action, the trial court decided this issue in plaintiff’s 

favor. We agree that collateral estoppel does not bar plaintiff’s claim. As the trial court observed, 

although this case and the arbitration proceeding involved similar issues, the issues were not 

identical. The central issues in this case were whether the decisions to discipline plaintiff for his 

role in authorizing Gray’s transfer to the hospital without a police escort, including the extent of 

any discipline, were made in retaliation for plaintiff’s involvement in Yopp’s arrest. Those issues 

were not litigated before or decided by the arbitrator.5 Accordingly, collateral estoppel does not 

apply. See Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682; 677 NW2d 843 (2004) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted) (holding that the first element of collateral estoppel requires that “a 

question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a 

valid and final judgment”).

 

5

Indeed, the arbitrator considered whether the Gray matter established sufficient grounds to 

terminate plaintiff, but it did not consider whether Yopp’s arrest or the Mayor were factors in the 

decision to terminate plaintiff.
-8-

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for 

further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, may tax costs 

pursuant to MCR 7.219.

/s/ Jonathan Tukel 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Michelle M. Rick