alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Amendment to Deposit Account Agreement



 EXHIBIT 10.1 

AMENDMENT TO DEPOSIT ACCOUNT AGREEMENT 

THIS AMENDMENT TO DEPOSIT ACCOUNT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is made as of the
13th day of November, 2008 by and between The Bank of New
York Mellon, in its capacity as trustee of the
CurrencySharesSM Euro Trust, a trust formed under New York
law (the “Trust”) and the London Branch of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (the “Bank”). 

W I T N E S S E T H 

WHEREAS, The Trust and the Bank are parties to that certain Deposit Account Agreement dated November 30, 2005 (the
“Agreement”); and 
 WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend the Agreement on the terms and conditions set
forth below. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the terms and conditions contained herein, the parties hereto agree
as follows: 
 1. Definitions. All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed
thereto in the Agreement. 
 2. Amendment. Section 6.4 of the Agreement is hereby amended to read as follows:

 “The Bank reserves the right not to accept, and to return without interest to the remitter of funds, the amounts
received for deposit to the Interest Account on any Bank business day, if the aggregate deposit liability of the Bank to the Trust following the deposit of such amounts would exceed the Euro Currency equivalent of $8.0 BILLION U.S. Dollars
calculated at the Euro Currency/U.S. dollar exchange rate as determined by WM/Reuters at 4:00 PM (London time) on each Bank business day (the “Closing Spot Rate”) or another recognized market rate for the Euro Currency if the
Closing Spot Rate is not available on the bank day such deposits are received by the Bank.” 
 3. Counterparts. This
Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all such counterparts together shall constitute one and the same instrument. 

4. Other. In the event of any conflict between the terms of this Amendment and the terms of the Agreement, the terms of this
Amendment shall control. All other terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
 [Signature
Page Follows] 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have signed and delivered this Amendment as of the date
hereof. 
  

			
	CURRENCYSHARES EURO TRUST,
		
	By:	 	The Bank of New York, in its capacity as Trustee of the CurrencyShares Euro Trust and not in its individual capacity.
		
	By:	 	/s/ Andrew Pfeifer
	Name:	 	Andrew Pfeifer
	Title:	 	Vice President
	
	JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., LONDON BRANCH
		
	By:	 	/s/ Michael G. Davisson
	Name:	 	Michael G. Davisson
	Title:	 	Vice President
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eduardo CRUZ-CASTILLO, aka Everardo Cruz-Castillo, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-10177.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 5, 2010.*

Filed April 21, 2010.

Brent Landis, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Everardo Cruz-Castillo, Lovejoy, GA Adrian Paulino Fontes, The Law Offices of Adrian P. Fontes, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.

Eduardo Cruz-Castillo, pro se.

Before: RYMER, MCKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Eduardo Cruz-Castillo appeals from his guilty-plea conviction and 24-month sentence for illegal re-entry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Cruz-Castillo’s counsel has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided the appellant with the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80-81, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 22-2316

___________________________ Glenda Sue Gardner, Individually and As Personal Representative of The Estate of Jacob Gardner; David Gardner lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v. Frederick D. Franklin; Donald W. Kleine; Douglas County Attorney's Office,

Douglas County, Nebraska; Does 1-2 lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln

____________ Submitted: February 24, 2023 Filed: March 9, 2023 [Unpublished]

____________ Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM.David Gardner and Glenda Gardner--individually and as representative for the

estate of her son, Jacob--appeal the district court’s 1 dismissal of their civil rights action raising claims under federal and state law. Following a careful review, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing the case. See Plymouth Cty. v. Merscorp, Inc., 774 F.3d 1155, 1158 (8th Cir. 2014) (de novo review). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

1 The Honorable John M. Gerrard, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska. -2-
Exhibit 32

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO18 U.S.C. §1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of CyberOptics Corporation (the Company)
on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned,
Kathleen P. Iverson, Chief Executive Officer, and Jeffrey A. Bertelsen, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, each certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|1. |  | The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|2. |  | The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material           respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|      |                        
|----- | -----------------------
|     
|     
|Date: | November  7, 2005      
|      | Kathleen P. Iverson    
|      | Chief Executive Officer

|      |                        
|----- | -----------------------
|     
|     
|Date: | November  7, 2005      
|      | Jeffrey A. Bertelsen   
|      | Chief Financial Officer

---
#### Eaton v. Bender.

X. A party who furnishes material for the building of a house, but does not follow the directions of the mechanics’ lien law, has no lien on the premises entitling him to redeem a mortgage made thereon, nor does he acquire any interest in the premises by reason of his recovery of judgment against the mortgagor after foreclosure and sale.

This was a bill in chancery, filed in the district court for Douglas county. The complainants were four judgment creditors of Henry, who claimed to have furnished to him the materials with which a brick block was built by him on the premises in question. The judgments were recovered upon the indebtedness so incurred; About the time the building was being erected, Henry borrowed from Bender $8,000, to secure which he gave a mortgage on the premises ; Henry having made default in the payment of the mortgage, Bender commenced his suit of foreclosure, in which he had a decree of sale. Upon the sale by the piaster, Bender purchased the premises. This sale being confirmed, a deed was made to Bender, and he went into possession. After all this, the judgments sued on were recovered. The validity of the mortgage and of the proceedings for its foreclosure were charged in the bill to have been fraudulent as to Henry’s creditors ; but the question thus raised was determined on the evidence, which is too voluminous to set forth. The question most insisted upon was whether, by reason of the fact that the debts for which the judgments were recovered were for materials used in erecting the building on the premises, the plaintiffs had not liens which required them to be made parties to the foreclosure suit in order to cut off their right to redeem even after the sale. A decree was rendered dismissing the bill, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.

*Rediclc*& Briggs, for appellant.

*G. B. Lake,*contra.

*427The court,

by Lockwood, J.,

held that, inasmuch as the plaintiffs did not assert their liens as the same were given under the mechanics’ lien law, they had no interest in the premises at any time before the foreclosure sale, by which they were entitled to be made defendants to that suit; that by virtue of judgments recovered afterward, they acquired no interest in the premises; that the proofs showed that the mortgage and the proceedings for its foreclosure were not made or had to defraud creditors, but were valid and effectual to vest a good title in Bender.

Decree affirmed.
# C_2019016EN.01004101.xml

| 14.1.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 16/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.1.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 16/41

---

Judgment of the General Court of 15 November 2018 — Mabrouk v Council

(Case T-216/17) (1)

((Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia - Measures taken against persons responsible for misappropriation of State funds and associated persons and entities - Freezing of funds - List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds - Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list - Insufficient factual basis - Manifest error of assessment - Error of law - Principle of good administration - Reasonable time))

(2019/C 16/49)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Mohamed Marouen Ben Ali Ben Mohamed Mabrouk (Tunis, Tunisia) (represented by: J.-R. Farthouat, N. Boulay and S. Crosby, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: V. Piessevaux and J. Kneale, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/153 of 27 January 2017 amending Decision 2011/72/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia (OJ 2017 L 23, p. 19), and Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/141 of 29 January 2018 amending Decision 2011/72/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia (OJ 2018 L 25, p. 38), in so far as those decisions concern the applicant.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mr Mohamed Marouen Ben Ali Ben Mohamed Mabrouk to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr Mohamed Marouen Ben Ali Ben Mohamed Mabrouk to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union.

---

(1)  OJ C 195, 19.6.2017.

---
##### 



EXHIBIT 12.1 ARCHSTONE-SMITH TRUST
COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES (Dollar amounts in thousands) Years Ended December 31,2004(1)
    
    
    2003(1)
    
    
    2002(1)
    
    
    2001(1)
    
    
    2000(1)Earnings from operations
    
    $
    131,797
    
    
    $
    116,932
    
    
    $
    137,947
    
    
    $
    100,078
    
    
    $
    101,887Add:Interest Expense
    
    
    175,249
    
    
    
    160,871
    
    
    
    149,538
    
    
    
    34,223
    
    
    
    53,781Earnings as adjusted
    
    $
    307,046
    
    
    $
    277,803
    
    
    $
    287,485
    
    
    $
    134,301
    
    
    $
    155,668Fixed Charges:Interest expense
    
    $
    175,249
    
    
    $
    160,871
    
    
    $
    149,538
    
    
    $
    34,223
    
    
    $
    53,781Capitalized interest
    
    
    23,572
    
    
    
    26,854
    
    
    
    32,377
    
    
    
    29,186
    
    
    
    37,079Total fixed charges
    
    $
    198,821
    
    
    $
    187,725
    
    
    $
    181,915
    
    
    $
    63,409
    
    
    $
    90,860Ratio of earnings to fixed charges
    
    
    1.5
    
    
    
    1.5
    
    
    
    1.6
    
    
    
    2.1
    
    
    
    1.7
  (1)
    Net earnings from discontinued operations have been reclassified for all periods presented.
# C_2017178EN.01003102.xml

| 6.6.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 178/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.6.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 178/31

---

Action brought on 12 April 2017 — Pfalzmarkt für Obst und Gemüse v EUIPO (100 % Pfalz)

(Case T-220/17)

(2017/C 178/46)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Pfalzmarkt für Obst und Gemüse eG (Mutterstadt, Germany) (represented by: C. Gehweiler, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark containing the word elements ‘100 % Pfalz’ — Application for registration No 15 085 475

Trade mark at issue:

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 February 2017 in Case R 1549/2016-1

Contested decision

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009;

| — | Infringement of Article 75(1) of Regulation No 207/2009. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 75(1) of Regulation No 207/2009.

---
#### David Morton, in Equity, *versus*Charles E. Barrett *& al.*

The certificate of a consul of the death of an individual abroad, is not sufficient proof of that fact.

This was a bill in equity. A preliminary question arose as to the sufficiency of the proof establishing the death of Charles D. Morton, which was submitted to the Court.

To prove that fact the counsel for the complainant read a Jotter purporting to be from said Charles to his father, by mistake dated June 7,1837, but which in fact was of the date of January 7, 1837, in which he described him as sick —that his hands and feet had been frozen — and that lie was then in want, at the house of one Nolens, at No. 8, Little George street, minories, London — likewise, the certificate of the sexton of the parish, of the death and burial of Charles Morion — likewise, that of the American consul at London, from which it appeared that he had applied to and received assistance from him as a sick American sailor, and in which the time of death was stated. His death was asserted in the bill to have taken place on the 3d Eeb. ¡037, and was not denied by the answer.

*F. O. J. Smith,*

referred the Court to st. of U. S. 1792, c. 24, *§> 2, 7, 9, which prescribes the duties of consuls. Wharton’s Dig. 231. The certificate of the register of the burial ground is sufficient. 1 Stark. Ev. 174; *Sawyer*v. *Baldwin,*20 Pick.

*J. Adams,*for Barrett.

This defendant holds the property in trust, and he requires either indemnity or protection. If indemnified, he is willing to surrender the property intrusted to him. But the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish the fact of death. The American consul is not a certifying officer. *Levy*v. *Bailey, 2*Sum. 355; l Story’s Conf. of Laws, ¡03.

*W. F. Preble,*for Hanson.

The death of Morton is not denied in the answer. That states that it is so reported, but. that the trustee does not know it. Death may be proved by reputation. The evidence offered is sufficient to establish that fact.

*110*Per Curiam.*

The consular certificate is not evidence of the facts therein contained. The certificate of the sexton would probably be received in England. There is no proof that the person signing as a sexton, was so in fact. Reputation is evidence of death, but only so after a lapse of time. The Court have no doubt of the death of Morton, but the safest course for the trustee is that there should be further proof of that fact.
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 100 (Wednesday, May 23, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 28453]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-12959]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RP01-225-003]


Gulf South Pipeline Company, LP; Notice of Compliance Filing

May 17, 2001.
    Take notice that on May 14, 2001, Gulf South Pipeline Company, LP 
(Gulf South) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, Sixth 
Revised Volume No. 1, the following tariff sheets, to become effective 
March 1, 2001:

Substitute First Revised Sheet No. 100
Substitute First Revised Sheet No. 300
Substitute First Revised Sheet No. 400
Substitute First Revised Sheet No. 500
Substitute First Revised Sheet No. 603
Second Sub Original Sheet No. 1416
Second Sub Original Sheet No. 2902
Second Sub Original Sheet No. 2903

    In its Order on Compliance filing and Rehearing, issued April 27, 
2001, in Docket No. RP01-225, the Commission required Gulf South to 
refile certain aspects of its open tap and open season tariff 
provisions, consistent with its directives. This compliance filing 
incorporates the required changes to the appropriate tariff sheets.
    Any person desiring to protest said filing should file a protest 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with section 385.211 of the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such protests must be filed in 
accordance with section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. 
Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the 
appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants 
parties to the proceedings. Copies of this filing are on file with the 
Commission and are available for public inspection in the Public 
Reference Room. This filing may be viewed on the web at http://www.ferc.fed.us/online/rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for assistance). 
Comments, protests and interventions maybe filed electronically via the 
internet in lieu of paper. See, 18 CFR 385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the 
instructions on the Commission's web site at 
http://www.ferc.fed.us/efi/doorbell.htm.

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 01-12959 Filed 5-22-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
Exhibit 32   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   In connection with the Annual Report of Hutton Holdings Corporation, a Nevada corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-KSB for the year ended June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Douglas Goff, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to my knowledge:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.    Date: November 13,  2006 /s/ Douglas Goff Douglas Goff Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
**OFFICE OF**  **THE ATTORNEY**  **GENERAL OF**  **TEXAS AUSTIN** 
May **18, 1939** 

Bon. GeorgeVan Fleet, Potuary Board of InauranoeComnlssioners Austin, Texas Dear Sir: OpinionNo. O-661

of April 19, 19 .$hisdepartment the purpose of set out the pt of your letter st the opinion of in presented. For

h the State Treaes, which deposit ets4982 to 4986, ted Federal Land Bank The Bank has know whether or not, if they o, theymay have their bonds tamped, **as provided**  **in Article**  d Civil Statutes of 1925. opinion is respectfully requested ether or not the securities ifi question, whioh are deposlted in accordance v:ith the articlesreferred to, may be endoreed or stanped as provided for **In Artiole**  **2530,** Chapter 1, Title 47, Revised Civil Statutes of 1C25.wHon. GeorgeVan Fleet,May 18, 1939, Page 2

Artioles 4982 to 4986;both inclusive,constituteSeotion 2, Chapter 16, Title 78,Revised CIrll Statutes of Texas 1925, end dealwith insurance companies and the right of oertaln type organizations therein described to.assume and exerciseadditional powers and privilegespermitted thereby.

The $50,000.00 In securitiesdepositedwith the state treasurerby the SecondNational Bank of Houston, Texas, were de ited In accordanoewith the requirement

t % or Article 4 ,Revised CIiil Statutes, for the pur ose of enabling such bank to qualify to exeroise the additional rights end privileges~afforded by Article 4982, Revised Civil Statutes.

Paragraph (3) of Article 2530,Revised Civil Statutes of Texas 1925, reads in part es follows:

"Any bank making deposits of bonds or other securitieswith the treasurer under the provisions of this actmay Cause such bonds or other securities to be endorsed or stamped,as theymay deem proper, so as to show that they are deposited as collateral and not transferable,except as hereinprovided."
It Is to be noted that It Is specificallyprovided that the act of endorsing or stamping securities is limited to a bank making deposits "underthe provisions of this act.*

Article 2530, above quoted from, is a part of Chapter 1, Title 47, dealing with statedepositories. It is apparent therefore, that the phrase "under the provisions of this act* has reference only to Title 47, Revised Civil Statutes, dealing Qith deposftoriesand has no oonneotionuIth Section 2, Chapter 16,Title 78, Revised **Civil Statutes**  **of** Texas.

It is therefore the opinion of this departmentHon. George Van **Fleet, May**  **18, 1939,**  Page 3

and you **are** so advised that the provisions for endorsing or stampingbonds contained fn Article 2530, supra, have no application to the eecurltiesrequired by Article 4983. aunra and that the SecondNetional Bank of Houston, Texas, will'not be privileged to avail itself of such pight. Trusting that this satisfactorily.- answers your inquiry,we are Very truly yours ATTORNEY CXrERAL OF TEXAS (signed) Lloyd Armstrong
BY Lloyd Armstrong

Assistant

LA:AW APPROVED: (signed)Gerald C.Mann ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS