alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2017129EN.01003901.xml

| 24.4.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 129/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.4.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 129/39

---

Action brought on 10 March 2017 — Emcur v EUIPO — Emcure Pharmaceuticals (EMCURE)

(Case T-165/17)

(2017/C 129/59)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Emcur Gesundheitsmittel aus Bad Ems GmbH (Bad Ems, Germany) (represented by: K. Bröcker, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Emcure Pharmaceuticals Ltd (Bhosari, India)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Applicant:

Trade mark at issue: EU word mark ‘EMCURE’ — Application for registration No 12 269 049

Trade mark at issue:

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Procedure before EUIPO

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 December 2016 in Case R 790/2016-2

Contested decision

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

---
142 So. 98

#### SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. THOMAS.

7 Div. 97.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 12, 1932.

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1932.

Pettus, Fuller & Lapsey, of Selma, and W. W. Wallace, of Columbiana, for appellant.

L. H. Ellis, of Columbiana, for appellee;

ANDERSON, O. J.

The only question argued and insisted upon for a reversal of this case is the refusal of the trial court to grant the defendant’s motion for a new trial because the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence. While the evidence shows several trains passing Bamford the morning of the fire, the only evidence which tends to show an emission of sparks that could possibly set fire to the plaintiff’s house was a northbound freight train which passed shortly before the fire on the roof was discovered, about 11 a. m., and as testified to by the plaintiff’s witness, William Harkins. Indeed, the trial court, by the given charges, confined the plaintiff’s right to recover upon the sole theory that the fire was communicated by said train. The defendant introduced much evidence to the effect that no such train was scheduled to pass Bamford going north at the time testified to by Harkins, and that no such train did in fact pass. This denial was established by the testimony of the train dispatcher and by the records kept by him, but all of which was not first-hand information, and the accuracy of some of his testimony was dependent upon the correctness of reports made to him by the agents. This denial was also established by the agent at Gurnee and in part by other witnesses, including the section foreman. On the other hand, Harkins was corroborated as to the passing of such a freight train going north, just before the fire appeared on the roof of the plaintiff’s house, by the plaintiff and one Evans. This was such a conflict as should have been reconciled by the jury, and under the rule laid down in Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738, 740, and often cited and followed, we are not prepared to hold that “the preponderance of the evidence against the verdict is so decided as to clearly convince the court that it is wrong and unjust,” and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GARDNER, BOULDIN, and FOSTER, JJ., concur.
#### William B. Clarke, Respondent, v Rafael Rodriguez, Appellant.

Submitted November 7, 2011;

decided January 5, 2012

Reported below, 73 AD3d 677.

Motion for reargument dismissed as untimely *(see*Rules of Ct of Appeals [22 NYCRR] § 500.24 [b]) *[see*16 NY3d 815 (2011)].
An LSEG Business

LCH | 10 Paternoster Square | London EC4M 7LS | T: +44 (0)20 7426 7000 | F: +44 (0)20 7426 7001 | lch.com

LCH Group Holdings Limited | LCH Limited | Banque Centrale de Compensation | LCH.Clearnet LLC

LCH Group Holdings Limited. Registered in England No. 4743602 Registered Office: 10 Paternoster Square, London, EC4M 7LS

CORPORATE

VIA EMAIL TO: FOIAsubmissions@CFTC.gov 

06 September 2023

Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Attention: FOIA Compliance Office 1155 21st Street NW

Three Lafayette Centre

Washington, DC 20581

RE: FOIA Request for Confidential Treatment

Dear Sir/Madam,

In accordance with Commission Regulation 145.9(d), LCH Limited (“LCH”) respectfully requests 

confidential treatment under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, for Appendix I 

of the §40.6(a) rule filing submission submitted via the CFTC Portal on 05 September 2023, titled 

“Confidential App I – LCH Margin Collateral Haircut Schedule” including any subsequent emails and 

replies between LCH and Commission staff (the “Information”) under §39.18(g)(1).

LCH is requesting confidential treatment for the Information pursuant to Commission Regulation 

145.9(d)(ii), which provides that confidential treatment may be requested on the grounds that 

disclosure would reveal trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. LCH further 

requests that the information receives confidential treatment in perpetuity. 

This request is not to be construed as a waiver of any other protection from disclosure or confidential 

treatment accorded by law, and LCH will rely on and invoke any such confidentiality protection. LCH 

requests notification from the Commission in advance of any disclosure of the Information pursuant 

to the FOIA or the Commission’s Rules of Practice so that this request for confidential treatment may 

be substantiated.

Yours sincerely,

Ebba Andersson

Senior Compliance Officer

LCH Limited
145 So. 140

#### CITY OF BIRMINGHAM v. WHEELER et al.

6 Div. 229.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 22, 1932.

W. J. Wynn and T. A. McFarland, both of Birmingham, for appellant.

Jim Davis and Herbert Etheridge, both of Birmingham, for appellees.

ANDERSON, C. J.

The complaint was brought under the Act of 1931, p. 370, authorizing an action of ejectment by the purchaser at a mortgage sale, and is identical with form 30 of section 9531 of the Code of 1923, and which said form is expressly prescribed by section 2 of said Act of 1931. The complaint was not therefore subject to the defendants’ demurrer going to the form of same.

The other grounds of demurrer go to the constitutionality of the Act of 1931. The act applies to all counties now having, or which may have according to any future census, 300,000 inhabitants. This was a single classification, and was not a mere designation, and was not, under our previous decisions, a local law. State ex rel. Gunter v. Thompson, 193 Ala. 561, 69 So. 461, Crenshaw v. Joseph, 175 Ala. 759, 57 So. 942.

The act does not violate section 45 of the Constitution. It deals with but one general subject, to wit, the right of the purchaser at a mortgage sale of real property to recover possession by an action of ejectment and to regulate the proceedings in such action. The objections argued to the different sections relate to the proceedings and which are germane and cognate to the title. Nor do we think the act violates the due process or equal rights clause of the Constitution.

The trial court erroneously sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the complaint.

The other question argued by counsel was not considered or decided by the trial court, and we do not feel disposed to pass on same as an original proposition. This is a court of appellate jurisdiction, with few exceptions, and we are not disposed to pass on questions upon appeal not considered or decided by the trial court.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

GARDNER, BOULDIN, and FOSTER, JJ., concur.
153 So. 441

#### W. H. KELLER v. WESTERN RAILWAY OF ALABAMA.

3 Div. 70.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Jan. 18, 1934.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1934.

Walter S. Smith, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Steiner, Crum & Weil, of Montgomery, for appellee.

KNIGHT, Justice.

This appeal was argued and submitted along with the appeal in the case of Bell v. Western Railway of Alabama, 153 So. 434. The same questions are presented in each .case.

The case is affirmed upon the authority of Bell v. Western Railway of Alabama, ante, p. 328, 153 So. 434, this day decided. .

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, O. J., and THOMAS and BROWN, JJ., concur.
# C_2019112EN.01000902.xml

| 25.3.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 112/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.3.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 112/9

---

Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 30 January 2019 — Verein Deutsche Sprache eV v European Commission

(Case C-440/18 P) (1)

((Appeal - Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Access to documents - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - Documents relating to a Commission decision concerning the alteration of the appearance of the press room in the Berlaymont Building to display only the French and English languages - Refusal to grant full access))

(2019/C 112/13)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Verein Deutsche Sprache eV (represented by: W. Ehrhardt, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: F. Erlbacher and F. Clotuche-Duvieusart, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The appeal is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The appeal is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

| 2. | Verein Deutsche Sprache eV is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Verein Deutsche Sprache eV is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

---

(1)  OJ C 294, 20.8.2018.

---
Exhibit 4.2


 


ChinaCache International Holdings Ltd.


Incorporated in the
Cayman Islands


 


	
  REGISTERED

  	
   

  	
  REGISTERED

  
	
  SHARE CERTIFICATE

  	
   

  	
  SHARE CERTIFICATE

  



 


	
  CERTIFICATE
  NO.

  	
  NO. OF SHARE(S)

  



 


This is to Certify that                                              of                        is/are
the Registered Holder(s) of Ordinary Share(s) of USD 0,0001
each
numbered                              inclusive
in the above-named Company, subject to the Memorandum and Articles of
Association of the Company.


 


Given under the Common Seal of the said Company


 


this                 day
of


 


 


	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Director
exv10w4






EXHIBIT 10.4




Outside Director Compensation Policy



On June 25, 2009, the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Spectrum Group International, Inc. (the
“Company”), upon the recommendation of its Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and after
consultation with an outside compensation consulting firm, revised the compensation policy for
outside members of the Board (each, an “Outside Director”) as follows:





	 	1.	 	Each Outside Director will receive a cash retainer of $31,000 and equity having a
value of $38,000.
	 
	 	2.	 	The Outside Directors will not be paid for meeting fees for the first six Board
meetings occurring during the year, but will be paid a meeting fee of $1,000 in cash for
any additional Board meeting attended.*
	 
	 	3.	 	Each Outside Director serving on a committee of the Board will receive a cash
retainer of $5,000.
	 
	 	4.	 	Each Outside Director serving as the chairman of a committee will receive an
additional $5,000 in cash.
	 
	 	5.	 	Each Outside Director will receive a meeting fee of $1,000 in cash for each committee
meeting attended.*
	 
	 	6.	 	The new policy is effective as of July 1, 2009.




In addition, the Board also implemented a policy of rotating committee chairman once every three
years, and adopted director ownership guidelines requiring Outside Directors to hold stock worth
three times annual cash retainer within later of policy implementation or three years of initial
election to Board and five times within five years thereof.






 




			
	*	 	In calculating the amount of meeting fees, the following shall apply:






	 	•	 	100% of regular fee shall be payable for in-person meetings regularly scheduled and
specially called by the Chairman at which business transacted/discussed and minutes taken.
	 
	 	•	 	50% of regular fee shall be payable for regularly scheduled and specially called
mandatory telephone meetings at which business transacted/discussed and minutes taken;
provided that 100% of the regular fee shall be payable for any such telephonic meeting
that exceeds one hour.
# C_2017277EN.01005101.xml

| 21.8.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 277/51 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.8.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 277/51

---

Action brought on 27 June 2017 — Vienna International Hotelmanagement v EUIPO (VIENNA HOUSE)

(Case T-403/17)

(2017/C 277/73)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Vienna International Hotelmanagement AG (Vienna, Austria) (represented by: M. Zrzavy, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Mark at issue: EU figurative mark containing the word elements in red ‘VIENNA HOUSE’ — application No 14 501 308

Mark at issue:

Contested decision: decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 April 2017 in Case R 332/2016-4

Contested decision:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

Pleas in law

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 207/2009.

---
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 102 (Friday, May 25, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 28941]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-13232]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Declaration of Disaster #3340; Amendment #1]


 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

    In accordance with a notice received from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, dated May 17, 2001, the above-numbered Declaration 
is hereby amended to include the municipalities of Adjuntas, Rincon and 
Sabana Grande in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as disaster areas 
caused by severe storms, flooding and mudslides beginning on May 6, 
2001 and continuing.
    In addition, applications for economic injury loans from small 
businesses located in the municipalities of Aguada, Anasco, Ponce and 
Utuado in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may be filed until the 
specified date at the previously designated location. Any 
municipalities contiguous to the above named primary municipalities and 
not listed here have been previously declared.
    All other information remains the same, i.e., the deadline for 
filing applications for physical damage is July 15, 2001 and for 
economic injury the deadline is February 15, 2002.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 59002 and 
59008)

    Dated: May 21, 2001.
Herbert L. Mitchell,
Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. 01-13232 Filed 5-24-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
[925 NE2d 577, 898 NYS2d 539]

#### David Belding, Respondent, v Verizon New York, Inc., et al., Appellants.

Decided February 18, 2010

*752APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Cozen O’Connor,*New York City *(Edward Hayum*of counsel), for appellants.

*Kelner & Kelner,*New York City *(Gail S. Kelner*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed with costs. The certified question should be answered in the affirmative.

Applying the bomb blast film to the lobby windows, in and of itself, qualifies as a significant alteration *(see*Labor Law § 240 *753[1]; *Joblon v Solow,*91 NY2d 457, 465 [1998]). BlastGARD significantly altered the configuration or composition of the structure by changing the way the lobby windows react to explosions, impacts and the elements. The effects of this one-time security enhancement distinguish the activity from affixing an advertisement on a billboard, a more frequent change that has less structural effect *(see Munoz v DJZ Realty, LLC,*5 NY3d 747 [2005]).

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur in memorandum.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order affirmed, etc.
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Randolfo Diaz, Respondent.

Submitted February 14, 2012;

decided February 16, 2012

Reported below, 85 AD3d 1047.

*913Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Lynn W.L. Fahey, Esq., Appellate Advocates, 2 Rector Street, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10006 assigned as counsel to the respondent on the appeal herein.
**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**


**OF
      THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





EXHIBIT
      32.1





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of MAJIC WHEELS CORP. (the “Company”) On
      Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (“Report”), I, Lavi Krasney,
      President and Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350,
      as
      adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best
      of
      my knowledge:





i.  The
      certifications required by Rule 13a-14(b) (17 CFR 240.13a-14(b)) or Rule
      15d-14(b) (17 CFR 240.15d-14(b)) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18
      of
      the United States Code (18 U.S.C. 1350).





ii.A
      certification furnished pursuant to this Item will not be deemed “filed” for
      purposes of section 18 of the Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the
      liability of that section. Such certification will not be deemed to be
      incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act or the
      Exchange Act, except to the extent that the small business issuer specifically
      incorporates it by reference.





/s/
                Lavi KrasneyLavi
                Krasney


President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry Morris HAYES, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-4135.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 13, 2013.

Decided: Oct. 3, 2013.

*282Jorgelina E. Araneda, Araneda Law Firm, P.C., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Frank J. Chut, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before AGEE, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Henry Morris Hayes pled guilty to two counts of embezzlement by a bank officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656 (2006), and was sentenced to twenty-seven months in prison. On appeal, Hayes argues that the district court erred by: (1) enhancing his offense level two levels under *U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*(“USSG”) § 3B1.3 (2011), because the district court determined that Hayes abused a position of trust; and (2) refusing to grant him a downward departure sentence based on his alleged “extraordinary acceptance of responsibility.” We affirm.

We find no clear error in the district court’s decision to enhance Hayes’ offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. *See United States v. Ebersole,*411 F.3d 517, 535-36 (4th Cir.2005) (providing standard). Rather, the record reveals that Hayes’ business banker position aided his crimes and provided him with authority beyond “an ordinary bank teller.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n. 1 (2011).

Moreover, we decline to review the district court’s denial of Hayes’ motion for a downward departure because the district court gave no indication that it did not understand its authority to depart downward. *See United States v. Brewer,*520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir.2008) (“We lack the authority to review a sentencing court’s denial of a downward departure unless the court failed to understand its authority to do so.”). In fact, the district court explicitly acknowledged the reasons Hayes believed he was entitled to a departure sentence and, although the district court stated it took these reasons into account, it explained that it believed a sentence at the top of Hayes’ Guidelines range was more appropriate because of the nature and circumstances of the offense. Because the district court clearly understood its authority to depart from Hayes’ Guidelines range, but nonetheless rejected Hayes’ request that it impose a lesser sentence, we will not disturb the district court’s refusal to impose a departure sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with this Report of AVAX Technologies, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Richard P. Rainey, President (as such, the principal executive officer and principal financial officer) of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



(1)
        The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






/s/ Richard P. RaineyRichard P. Rainey
President
(Principal Executive Officer and
Principal Financial Officer)
November 14, 2006


---
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2336 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 29, 2019 

Received 

AN ACT 

To amend title 11, United States Code, with respect to 

the definition of ‘‘family farmer’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 2336 RDS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Family Farmer Relief 

3 Act of 2019’’. 

4 SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF FAMILY FARMER. 

5 Section 101(18) of title 11, United States Code, is 

6 amended by striking ‘‘$3,237,000’’ each place that term 

7 appears and inserting ‘‘$10,000,000’’. 

8 SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS. 

9 The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of 

10 complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, 

11 shall be determined by reference to the latest statement 

12 titled ‘‘Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation’’ for this 

13 Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record 

14 by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, pro15 vided that such statement has been submitted prior to the 

16 vote on passage. 

Passed the House of Representatives July 25, 2019. 

Attest: CHERYL L. JOHNSON, 

Clerk. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS