In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 13, 2024

S24A0440. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.

 PINSON, Justice.

Henry Lenard Johnson was convicted by a jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with shooting and killing two 

people.1 On appeal, pro se, he contends that the trial court erred by 

1 On January 10, 2018, a Chatham County grand jury returned indictment number SPCR 18-0051-J1, which charged Johnson with the malice murder and felony murder of Dennis Coleman, Jr., who died in September 2007. 

On August 22, 2018, a Chatham County grand jury returned indictment number SPCR18-01748-J1, which charged Johnson with malice murder and other 

crimes related to the death of Matthew Harrington in October 2017. On February 27, 2019, a Chatham County grand jury returned a superseding indictment that combined the charges in the two 2018 indictments and charged 

Johnson as follows: malice murder of Coleman (Count 1), felony murder of 

Coleman (Count 2), malice murder of Harrington (Count 3), felony murder of 

Harrington (Counts 4, 5), aggravated assault of Harrington (Count 6), possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies against Harrington 

(Counts 7, 8, 9), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 10). 

Between January 2018 and September 2022, Johnson was represented 

by three different attorneys before he asked to waive his right to counsel and 

represent himself. On September 20, 2022, after a hearing pursuant to Faretta

v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (95 SCt 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975), Johnson was 

permitted to represent himself and appointed standby counsel. Johnson, pro 
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dismissing an untimely statutory demand for a speedy trial filed by 

his former counsel rather than considering whether his right to a 

speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution was violated.2 He says that the statute that sets 

out the procedure for making a speedy trial demand under state law, 

OCGA § 17-7-171, “regulates the speedy trial matter differently 

from” the Sixth Amendment, so that statute is “preempted” by the 

se, proceeded to a jury trial from October 10 to 14, 2022. The jury returned 

guilty verdicts on Counts 1-9. Count 10 was not presented to the jury and was 

nolle prossed. 

After the verdict was read but before sentencing, Johnson asked to be 

appointed counsel to represent him at sentencing and on appeal; this request 

was granted. On December 2, 2022, the trial court sentenced Johnson to concurrent sentences of life without parole for the malice murders (Counts 1, 3) 

and a consecutive five-year prison sentence for possession of a firearm during 

the commission of a felony (Count 7); the remaining counts merged for sentencing or were vacated by operation of law. Johnson, through his appointed counsel, timely filed a motion for new trial on the same day as sentencing and later 

filed an amended motion for new trial and brief in support. The trial court 

convened a hearing on the motion for new trial on September 26, 2023, and 

Johnson said at the start of the hearing that he wanted to fire his appointed 

counsel and represent himself going forward. After a colloquy with Johnson, 

the trial court granted that request. Johnson expressly declined to adopt his 

former counsel’s amended motion for new trial, filed his own amended motion 

in open court, and orally argued in support of that motion Johnson’s motion for 

new trial, as amended, was denied on September 29, 2023, and Johnson timely 

filed a notice of appeal on October 27, 2023. His appeal was docketed to the 

April 2024 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2 Johnson does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the statutory demand was untimely.
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Sixth Amendment. Put another way, Johnson appears to contend

that the demand statute’s deadline for filing a speedy trial demand 

conflicts with the Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy trial, and so 

the trial court should have considered whether his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated instead of dismissing his statutory demand.

Johnson’s claim fails. The demand statute is “in aid and implementation of the State constitutional right to a speedy trial.” State 

v. Varner, 277 Ga. 433, 434 (589 SE2d 111) (2003) (emphasis added) 

(cleaned up). That statute “provides no assistance in relation to the 

federal constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Henry v. State, 263 Ga. 

417, 418 (434 SE2d 469) (1993). So when a trial court dismisses a 

statutory speedy trial demand as untimely, it does not preclude the 

defendant from seeking to vindicate his Sixth Amendment speedy 

trial right. See Johnson v. State, 300 Ga. 252, 256-258 (2)-(3) (794 

SE2d 60) (2016) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s statutory 

demand for a speedy trial as untimely but remanding for the trial 

court to enter an order with findings of fact and conclusions of law 
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as to the defendant’s demand for a speedy trial under the federal 

constitution); Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 898 (2) (252 SE2d 397) 

(1979) (noting that Georgia’s former speedy trial demand statutes, 

Ga. Code Ann. §§ 27-1901 and 27-1901.1, afforded the defendant a 

“means of asserting one’s right to a speedy trial after indictment” 

but that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 

trial that attached at arrest). Absent a demonstrated conflict with 

the Sixth Amendment, Johnson’s argument that his untimely demand under OCGA § 17-7-171 should have been treated as a timely 

assertion of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment 

fails. See Castillo-Solis v. State, 292 Ga. 755, 763 (5) (740 SE2d 583) 

(2013) (setting out possible bases for federal preemption, including 

direct conflict, conflict with the “purposes and objectives” of Congress, and “field” preemption) (citation and punctuation omitted).

And because Johnson never asserted his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, the trial court did not otherwise err in 

not considering such a speedy trial claim on the merits. Cf. Johnson, 

300 Ga. at 256-258 (2)-(3) (remanding for the trial court to address
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the alleged violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 

speedy trial where the defendant filed a speedy trial demand invoking both OCGA § 17-7-171 and the Sixth Amendment, which the 

trial had court dismissed as untimely on statutory grounds alone). 

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.