## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S

Appellate Court

People v . Woodrom e , 2013 IL App (4th) 130142

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff- A ppellant, v. TI MOTHY RAY WOODROME, De fenda nt-Appellee

.

District & N o. Four th District

Docke t No. 4-13-0142

Filed September 11, 2013

Held
( Note : Th i s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of
the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed
b y the Repo rt er o

f

D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The tria l c ourt err ed in g ranting defe ndant’s motion to suppress the
evidenc e discovere d by the police while investiga ting an anony mous tip
that a person at a cer

tain addr es s wa s b urning plastic-enc ased copper wire, since the office rs involved wer e in a place wher e they had a rig ht to be when they observe d the evidence in plain view, after which they left
the scene to obtain a war rant; there fore

, no violation o f t h e fourth
amendment oc curr ed.

Dec ision Under

Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of J erse y County

, No. 11-CF -1 5 5 ; t h e Hon. Eric S. Pistorius, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d and re manded f or fur ther proc eeding s.Counsel on

Appea l Be njamin Goett en , State’s Attorney

, of J erse y ville (Patrick Delfino,
Robert J

. Bide rman, and Perry L

. Miller, a l l of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prose cutor’s O ffice , of counse l), for the People.

Ted E. B ary

lske, of Alton, for a

ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE TURNER delivere d the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.

J ustices Knec ht and Holder Whit e concur r ed i n the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 I n September 2011, the State char g ed def endant, Timothy Ray Woodrome, with single

counts of theft and criminal damag e to proper ty

. I n Marc h 2012, defe ndant filed a motion to suppress evide nce, w hich the trial c ourt g rante d.
¶ 2 On appea l

, t h e S t at e ar gu e s the trial court err ed in g ranting defe ndant’s motion to suppress evide nce. We r ever se and r emand f or fur ther proc eeding s.

¶ 3 I . BA CKGROUND
¶ 4 I n September 2011, the State char g ed defe ndant by information with one count of theft ( 7 2 0 I L CS 5 /1 6

- 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( We s t 2010)), alleg ing he knowing ly exerted unautho r iz e d c o n tr o l

over proper

ty of AT& T, being copper wire having a total va lue in e x cess of $500, with the
intent to perma

nently deprive AT& T of the use of the prope rt y

. The State also char g ed
defe ndant with one count of criminal damag e to proper ty (720 I L CS 5 / 2 1 -1 (1)( a) (West 2010)), alleg ing he knowing ly damag ed proper ty of AT& T, being telephone wire, with the damag e being in excess of $300 but not in excess of $10,000. Def endant pleade d not g uilty

. ¶ 5 I n Marc h 2012, defe ndant filed a motion to suppress evide n ce

. Def endant claimed

the
State intended to introduce into evidenc e items seized by police in the execution of a sear ch

war rant perta ining to his residenc e at 10783 Chestnut L ane in Godfre y

. Def endant stated the
aff idavit and complaint for sear ch war rant filed by Sheriff’ s Deputy Mark Marsha ll set forth
three matters in support of the issuance of the war rant, including that (1) the police rec eived
information reg arding an individual burning plastic-en ca sed copper wire at defe ndant’s
residenc e a nd no identity as to the informant and his/her reliability was provided; (2) the police had knowledg e of copper wire thefts within the same are a in the previous three day s; and (3) the aff

iant, De p u t y Marsha ll, while on defe ndant’s proper ty ear lier in the day in question o b s er v ed a small burn pile containing plastic-enc ased copper wire and sever al
sections of telephone cable on the floor of defe ndant’s detac hed g ara g e. Def endant claimed

-2-Deputy Marsha ll did not have a war rant or defe ndant’s consent to sear ch when he made the
observa tions prior to prepa ring his aff

idavit. Thus, the observa tions made by Deputy
Marsha ll in his aff

idavi t an d co m p l a int for sear ch war rant wer e a product of his prior
unlawful ent ry a nd insufficient for the issuance of a sear ch war rant based upon probable

cause

. ¶ 6 I n M ay 2 0 1 2

, the trial court conducte d a hear ing on the motion to suppress. Depu t y Marsha ll testified to his aff idavit and complaint for a sear ch war rant, the sear ch war

rant, and
the evidenc e/prope rty repor t. He ag ree d the aff

idavit did not indicate the identification of the

person who provided the information of an individual burning plastic-enc ased copper wire.

He arr ived at defe ndant’s residenc e at 12:34 p.m. to investiga te. Fr om the roadw ay , he could

see smoke from the fire approximately 100 fee t from his position but could not see what was in the fire. Serg eant Tim Chappell arr ived at the same time as Marsha ll. Def endant was out in the y ar d an d quickly went ins ide after C happell called hi s name. Marshall proce eded to
the front door of the residenc e. There afte r, “we went around the residenc e, knocking on the doors, try ing to ge t somebody

to come bac k to the door, makin[g] sure he wasn’t climbing

out the back window.” During this ch ec k

, M ar shall observe d telephone cable next to the
residenc e. Chappell then advised Marsha ll to look in the burn pile. Upon ap p ro aching the fire, he could see copper

wire the rein. Mar shall looked throug h anopen door in the g ara g e and observe d telephone cable s that matched th e descr iption of the plastic-enc ased copper wire. Marsha ll testified he later motioned an AT& T employ ee, who had been waiting down
the street, to defe ndant’s proper ty to identify the wire. Marsha ll stated defe ndant never g ave his consent to allow any one to be on the property

. Marsha ll used t he information obtained
from his observa tions to secure the sear ch wa rra nt. ¶ 7 On cross-e x amination, Deputy Marsha ll testified there had been sever al co p p er wi re thefts in the vicinity during that particula r time period. He stated he saw the fire while off of
the premises. As he pulled into the drivewa y , he observe d defe ndant turn awa y and g o inside
the residenc e. Marsha ll e ventually left the scene to take def endant to jail at 12:59 p.m. and

to secure the sea

rch w arr ant. ¶ 8 On re direc t examination, M arsha ll stated he we nt to the front door of the residenc e but
had not obse rved any copper wire. As he walked around the side of the house to make sure

no one was attempting to exit

, he observe d copper wire. After he looked in the burn pile, he looked in the open door

of the g ara g e and obse rved c opper w ire in plain view.
¶ 9 Serg eant Tim Chappell testified he rec eived a phone call fro m s o m eo n e wi s h ing to

rema in anony

mous who was awa

re of copper wire having been stolen in the are a and seeing
the ty pe of telephone cable that was stolen. L ooking to in v es t iga te the copper wire thefts, Chappell arr ived at defe ndant’s residenc e at approximate l y 12:30 p.m. and observe d him
walk toward the residen ce

. Knowing defe ndant from prior law-e nforc ement contac ts, Chappell called out “He y , Tim,” but defe ndant enter ed the residenc e without acknow ledg ing
the statement. Chappell knocked on the f ro n t d o or but did not rec eive a response

. He

proce eded to the side of the house and knocked on another door. He observe d telephone wire
and asked Deputy Marsha ll to look in the burn pile, which was approximately 25 to 30 y ards
f rom the house. He later told Marsha ll to transport defe ndant and then secur e a s ea rc h

war rant. Chappell called the AT& T employ ee, who had been s e r v ic in g th e are a involved with

-3-the stolen wire, a nd asked him to come to the pr operty and look at the wir e. ¶ 10 I n Dec ember 2012, the trial court issued its written order and found, in part, as follows:

“B ased upon the anony

mous phone call, Deputies Marsha ll and Chappell trave led to defe ndant’s proper

ty wher e smoke could be seen from a fire, which was approximately
100 fee t from the roadw ay , but the materia l that was being burned could not be identified
from that loca tion. Office r Mar shall stated that it was only when he was withi n 20 fee t of the fi re t h at h e could tell it was plastic enca sed copper wire. Finally

, the Sheriff’ s depar tment de p u t i es we r e awa re that there had been repor ts of stolen plastic enca sed telephone w ire in the a

rea within three da

y s prior to the ar

rest. The que stion before this c ourt is w hether those three fac ts (anony mous call, smoke
from a fire seen from the roadw ay and knowledg e of plastic enca sed copper wire thefts
in are a) are sufficie nt for the office rs to conduct a war rantless sear ch of the defe ndant’s

proper ty

. I llinois law rec og nizes that probable cause can be based on an anony mous tip
which is sufficie ntly detailed to establis h the reliability of the informant’s basis of knowledg e and it was sufficie ntly corr oborate d to demonstrate his v er ac i ty

. People v. Gates

, 85 I ll. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981). Under the fac ts of this case , the court does

not believe that there was sufficie nt detail in the information provided by the informant to permit a wa

rra ntless searc h based solely on the information g iven.

This finding

, howeve r, does not end the discussion. I llinois courts have gone on to

note that an insufficient informant’s tip may be cure d by independe nt partia l

corr oboration by the officers investigating the allega tions co n tained in the i nformant’ s tip. ( People v. Smith

, 101 I ll. App. 3d 772, 428 N.E.2d 641 (4th Dist. 1981). As noted in People v. Smith ‘Where all the information in a tip has been indep en d en t l y verifie d, independe nt corr o b o r ation may establish the basis of knowledg e. There is no perilous
relianc e on ‘an amalg am of und er wo rl d ru m o r and barr oom g ossip (19 Md. App. 507, 531, 313 A.2d 847, 862), if a ll facts have been ve rified.’

I n People v. Smith

, the office rs, ‘Ac ting on a tip indicating wher e the perpe trators of

a rec ent burg lary and their bounty could be found, the poli ce we n t t o investiga te. The
defe ndant was found at t he specified location, standing in front of a n open storag e bay containing an air compre ssor g en e r a ll y matching the descr iption of the one stolen.’ Whil e these fac ts appea

r to be simil ar to the fac ts in the case befor e us, there is one signific ant differ ence ; as noted by the Appellate Court in the Smith case , the arr esting office r observe d the compre ssor from the proper ty of a private enter

prise which was open to the public. I n th e wo rd s o f t he Appellate C ourt, ‘he was i n a place where he had a rig ht to be.’ ( People v. Smith

, at 428 N.E.2d 645) Under the fac ts of this case , while the office rs in question observe d smoke from the roadw ay , which was approximately 100 fee t from
the fire, they could not deter mine what was the source of the fire until they enter ed on the
defe ndant’s prope rty

and g ot within 20 feet of the f ire.

A s such, the office r’s corr oboration and there fore the establishment of p r o b a b le c a u s e

occur red only afte r they

enter ed upon his proper

ty without unlawful [ sic ] authority .”

The c ourt g rante d defe ndant’s motion to suppress evidenc e. ¶ 11 I n J anuar

y 2013, the State filed a motion to rec onsider, claiming exigent circ umstances

-4-exis ted to justify a war rantle s s entry

. I n Fe bruar y 2013, the trial court held a hear ing and
denied the m otion. T h er ea ft er , the S tate filed a certifica te of impairment. See I ll. S. Ct. R. 604(a) (1) ( eff

. Fe b. 6, 2013). This appe al followed.

¶ 12 I I . ANAL YSI S ¶ 13 The State arg ues the trial court err ed i n gra n t i n g defe ndant’s motion to suppress. The
State contends the police office rs had probable cause to e n t er u p o n d efe ndant’s proper ty

, their entry on the proper

ty was lawful based on exigen t circ umstances, and the evidenc e discovere d on the prope rty would have be en inevitably discovere d.

¶ 14 A. Standard of Review a nd Bur den of Proof
¶ 15 On re view of a motion to suppress, this c ourt is pr esente d with mixed questions of law
and fac t. People v. McQ uown , 407 I ll. App. 3d 1138, 1143, 943 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (2011).

“When revie wing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we will acc ord g rea t defe renc e to the trial court’s fac tual finding s and will reve rse those finding s only if they

are ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e; but w e will r eview de novo the cour t’s
ultimate decision to g rant or deny the motion.” People v. Close

, 238 I ll. 2d 497, 504, 939 N.E.2d 463, 467 (2010)

. ¶ 16 On a motion to suppress evidenc e, the defe ndant has the burden of proving the sear ch and
seizure wer e unlawful. 725 I L CS 5/114-12(b) (West 2012); People v. Barker

, 369 I ll. App.
3d 670, 673, 867 N.E.2d 10 2 1

, 1 0 23 (2007). “The burden of producing evidenc e, or the
burden of production, rests with the defe ndant.” People v. Mott , 389 I ll. App. 3d 539, 542,
906 N.E.2d 159, 163 (2009). “ ‘Howe ver, once the defe ndant makes a prima facie showing
of an illega l sear ch and seizure, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidenc e justify ing
the i n t rusion.’ ” People v. Reatherford

, 345 I ll. App. 3d 327, 334, 802 N.E.2d 340, 347 (2003) (quoting People v. Ortiz

, 317 I ll. App. 3d 212, 220, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (2000))

.

¶ 17 B. The Four th Amendment
¶ 18 The fourth amendment to the United Stat es C onstitut ion g uara ntees “[t] he rig ht of

the people to be secur e in their persons, houses, paper s, a nd eff ects, ag ainst unrea sonable

sear ches a

nd seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. I V. Simi larly

, the I llinois Constit ution affor ds
citizens with “the rig ht to be secur e in their persons, houses, paper s[,] and other possessions

ag ainst unrea sonable sear ches [and] seizures.” I ll. Const. 1970, art. I

, § 6. Our supreme court has interpre ted the sear ch-a nd-seizure clause of the I llinois Constit u t i o n i n a manner consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s fourth-a mendment jurisprudenc e. See People v . Caballes , 221 I ll. 2d 282, 335-36, 851 N.E.2d 26, 57 (2006).
¶ 19 The g ener al rule is that sear ches and seizures are unrea sonable u n l ess conducte d

pursuant

to a judicial war

rant issued by a neutra l mag istrate afte r a finding of probable cause

. Illinois

v. Mc A r t hur

, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). However

, if there is no unrea sonable gove rn m en t intrusion, “ther e is no sear ch and seizure subject to t he war rant clause of the [fourth]
amendment.” People v . Neal , 109 I ll. 2d 216, 221, 486 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1985).

-5-¶ 20 I n the case sub judice

, the trial court g rante d defe ndant’s motion to suppress, finding the

i n formation provided by the anony mous caller was not sufficie ntly detailed to p er m i t a

war rantless sear ch and the corr oboration of the call by the office rs was invalid beca use they

enter ed upon d ef

en d a nt’s proper

ty without lawful authority

. We disag ree with the court’s
decision beca

use the office rs wer e conducting a lawful investiga tion and no violation of the
fourth ame ndment occur

red a s no warr antless sea

rch took plac e. ¶ 21 Police may stop a person to investiga te possible cr i m i n al b eh av i o r b as ed o n an informant’s tip wher e the information rec eived has some indicia of reliability and establishes
the nece ssary quantum of suspicion. People v. Lee

, 214 I ll. 2d 476, 487, 828 N.E.2d 237, 246 (2005). Where police obtain corr oboration of the information, it establishes the informant’s

vera city and supports the infere nce th at t h e informant obtained his information reliably

. People v . W

illiams , 147 I ll. 2d 173, 210, 588 N.E.2d 983, 995 (1991).
¶ 22 We find the reliability of the anony mous caller is of littl e rele vance in this case beca use

no suspicionless stop or arr est was made and no war rantless sear ch or seizure occur red based

on the tip. See People v. S co tt
, 249 I ll. App. 3d 597, 602, 619 N.E.2d 809, 814 (1993) (finding the reliability of the tip was irrele vant in the fourth-a mendment analy sis wher e there

was no initial stop of the defe ndant based on the tip). Her e, an anony mous caller repor

ted the

t h ef t of copper wire and that an indi vidual was unlawfully burning plastic-enc ased copp e r wire at 10783 Chestnut L ane

. P o l ice office rs wer e also awa re of copper wire thefts in the vicinity

. Whil e these two fac ts alone would not have be en sufficie nt to secur e a sear ch

war rant, the of

fice rs wer e not pre vented from conducting their investig ation at the addr ess in question. As they approa che d t h e s u b j e ct proper

ty on a public road, the deputies saw defe ndant outside near a burn pile. Whil e this observa tion would not have g iven office rs the authority to arr est defe ndant or sear ch the proper ty

, it did corr oborate the ca l ler’s tip and
allow for f

urther inve stiga tion.
¶ 23 “An office r may lawfull y ap p ro ac h t h e fr o n t d o o r o f a residenc e to conduct an investiga tion–refe rre d to by many courts as a ‘knock and talk’–so long as the office r enter s

an are a impliedly open to the public.” People v. Redman

, 386 I ll. Ap p

. 3 d 4 09, 418, 900
N.E.2d 1146, 1155 (2008); see also Florida v. Jardines

, 569 U.S.

___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409,
1416 (2013) (stating “a poli ce office r n o t arme d with a warra nt may approa ch a home and knock, prec isely beca

use that is ‘no more than any private citizen migh t d o ’ ” ( quoting Kentucky v. King

, 563 U.S.

___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1849

, 1 8 6 2 (2011)) ); United States v. Taylor

, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating t hat “ ‘[a]bsent express order s from
the person in possession,’ an office r may ‘wa lk up the steps and knock on the front door of

any man’s “ca stle,” with the honest intent of asking questions of the o cc u p a nt there of’ ” (quoting Davis v. United States

, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964)))

. Moreove r, “[a]n office r
may g o bey ond the front door to investiga te by approa ching t h e b ac k d o o r of a residenc e–either when no one answe rs a knock on the front door or wher e a leg itimate rea son is shown for approa ching the back door.” Redman

, 386 I ll. Ap p

. 3 d at 418, 900 N.E.2d at
1156.
¶ 24 I n this case , the office rs left the roadw ay and turned into defe ndant’s drivewa y

. See Scott

, 249 I ll. App. 3d at 603, 619 N.E.2d at 815 (stating “a drivewa y on private proper

ty

, like the

entra nce to a private home, can be considered a public pla ce ”)

. D efe ndant s tarted walking

-6-awa y from the bur

n pile as he remove d his g loves. As defe ndant walked toward the house, Serg eant Chappell exit ed his car and called out, “He y , Tim.” Def endant did not acknow ledg e Cha p p el l a nd went inside. The office rs then went to the front door and knocked. As this
action was in further ance of the investiga tion, it was a leg itimate rea son for approa ching the
front door. See Taylor

, 458 F.3d at 1204 (finding no fourth-a mendment violation wher e “the
office r enter ed the proper

ty

, proce eded down the drivewa y that provided acc ess to the house,

went to the front door and knocked on it in order to investiga te the suspicious and troubling
911 calls”)

. Deputy Marsha ll also went around to the back of the residenc e to knock on doors
and to make sure defe ndant “w as n ’t cl imbing out the back window.” These wer e also leg itimate rea sons for approa ching the rea r of the house. See Redman

, 386 I l l

. Ap p

. 3d at 418, 900 N.E.2d at 1156.
¶ 25 “Onc e an office r is leg itimately on the proper ty

, he or she may p ro p er l y observe any ‘evide nce ly ing about in the open.’ [C itation.] A sear ch does not occur when office rs observe
what is in open view.” Redman

, 386 I ll. App. 3d at 419, 900 N.E.2d at 1156; see also People

v. Berg

, 67 I ll. 2d 65, 68, 364 N.E.2d 880, 881-82 (1977) (“it is not a sear ch to observe that
which is in open view”) ; United States v. H a t f i el d

, 3 3 3 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2003) (“ ‘[W ]hen the police come on to private proper ty to conduct an investiga tion

... and restric t their movements to place s visitors could be expected to g o (e.g

., walkwa y s, drivewa

y s, porche s), observa tions made from such vantag e point s a re not cover ed by the Four th
Amendment.’ ” (quoting 1 Way ne R. L aF ave, Searc h and Seizure § 2.3(f)

, at 506-08 (3d ed. 1996)))

. ¶ 26 Her e, the office rs wer e awa re of rec ent copper wire thefts in the are a. Marsha ll stated he

saw multipl e sections of telephone cable s next to the residenc e. When Chappell was on the
side of the house to knock on the side door, he saw telephone wire. After being asked to do

so, Marsha ll looked i n t h e b u rn pile and saw burnt copper wire. At some point in time, he looked in the open door

of the g ara g e and sa

w coppe r wire in plain view.
¶ 27 The evidenc e i n d i ca t es t h e o ff icer s’ decision to enter the proper ty and approa ch the house, as we ll as the manner in which they did so, constituted rea sonable police actions in
the midst of a criminal investiga tion. Procee ding around the house to knock on doors and/or

to make sure defe ndant did not attempt t o fl ee we r e also rea sonable and proper actions.
Whil e the office rs wer e in a place wher e they had a lawful rig ht to be, they observe d in plain
view telephone cable that matched the descr iption of the stolen copper wire. Offic ers did not have to look in any container s or open any doors to do so. Cf. People v. Payton

, 317 I ll. App. 3d 909, 914, 741 N.E.2d 302, 306 (2000) (finding a four th-amendme nt violation where a n office r discovere d coca ine and canna bis afte r lifting the lid of a barbe cue g rill located on the
f ront porch)

. Moreove r, no arg ument can be made based on the evidenc e prese nted th a t simply looking in the burn pile constituted an unrea sonable g overnme nt intrusion since the
office rs wer e lawfully on t h e p ro p e rty and had alre ady observe d suspected stolen copper wire. See People v. Nielson

, 187 I ll. 2d 271, 283, 718 N.E.2d 131, 140 (1999) (finding a burn pile located outside a trailer’ s curtilag e was “prote cted by neither the U n i t ed States
Constit ution nor the I llinois Constit ution ag ainst unrea sonable sear ches and seizures”); see also Oliver v. United States

, 466 U.S. 170

, 1 8 1 (1 9 8 4 ) (holding “an individual has no l eg itimate expectation that open fields will rema in fre e from war rantless intrusion b y

-7-g overnme nt office rs”)

. On a fi n a l note, the office rs’ reque st to have the AT& T employ ee

come to defe ndant’s proper ty is of no conseque nce beca use the evidenc e indicated the employ ee did nothing more than ide ntify the wire

. ¶ 28 Her e, no fourth-a mendment violation occur red. The office rs wer e in a place wher e they lawfully had a rig ht to be and they observe d evidenc e of a crime in plain view. Even then,
the office rs did not seize the evidenc e but secur ed a sear ch war rant based on the information
known to them. As the office rs wer e not on the proper ty unlawfully and they did not conduct

a wa rra ntless searc h, the trial cour t erre d in gr anting defe ndant’s motion to suppress.

¶ 29 I I I . CONCL USI ON
¶ 30 For the rea sons s t at ed

, we re v er s e the trial court’s judgme nt and rema nd for further

proce eding s.

¶ 31 Reverse d and re manded f or fur ther proc eeding s.

-8-