IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael Daniels, :

Petitioner :

: No. 520 C.D. 2023

v. :

: Submitted: July 5, 2024

Pennsylvania Parole Board, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE DUMAS FILED: October 4, 2024

Michael Daniels (Petitioner), pro se, has petitioned this Court to review 

a decision of the Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board), mailed April 21, 2023, denying 

his request for administrative relief. Petitioner challenges the timeliness of his 

parole revocation hearing. Upon review, we reverse and dismiss Petitioner’s parole 

violation charges with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND1

Petitioner was serving a two and one-half to five-year sentence with a 

maximum sentence date of December 18, 2019. He was paroled on June 18, 2017,

with 913 days of his original sentence remaining. On September 11, 2018, he was 

arrested for new criminal charges related to sexual contact with a minor and confined 

in Philadelphia County. On the same day that bail was set, the Board’s detainer was 

1 Unless otherwise stated, we base the recitation of the facts on the Board’s response, mailed 

April 21, 2023, to Petitioner’s correspondence that was considered an administrative appeal. See 

Bd.’s Response, 4/21/23.
2

lodged against Petitioner. Petitioner remained confined pending the new charges 

past his original maximum sentence date. At the expiration of Petitioner’s maximum 

sentence date, the Board lifted the detainer and found Petitioner delinquent for 

control purposes. Eventually, on February 21, 2020, after the Board’s detainer was 

lifted, Petitioner posted bail and was released from custody. 

On March 17, 2022, Petitioner was convicted of some of the offenses 

charged. The Board received official verification of Petitioner’s conviction on April 

1, 2022. Criminal Arrest and Disposition Report, 10/7/22, at 2. On June 29, 2022, 

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of county incarceration and paroled that same 

day. Petitioner was contacted by his parole agent on July 12, 2022, and informed 

that he had to turn himself in. Supervision History, 10/7/22, at 2. However, 

Petitioner did not surrender to the Board until August 9, 2022. Id.2 At that time, the 

Board re-lodged its detainer and took custody of Petitioner.

The Board held a revocation hearing on November 10, 2022, and 

recommitted Petitioner as a convicted parole violator (CPV). The Board 

recalculated his maximum sentence date from December 18, 2019, to February 7, 

2025. 

Petitioner filed an administrative appeal, challenging the timeliness of 

the Board’s revocation hearing. An administrative appeal panel affirmed the 

Board’s decision, concluding that the hearing was timely held, and that Petitioner’s 

2 The events in the period between Petitioner being contacted by his parole agent and turning 

himself in were recounted in the Supervision History, which was adopted by the Board. See Bd. 

Dec., 11/30/22, at 1; Supervision History, 10/7/22, at 2. Petitioner’s state parole agent contacted 

him on July 12, 2022, and told Petitioner to turn himself in by July 14, 2022. Supervision History, 

10/7/22, at 2. Petitioner failed to report and informed his parole agent that he was caring for his 

elderly mother. Id. Petitioner was then given until July 18, 2022, to report but failed to do so. Id. 

On July 20, 2022, a warrant was issued for Petitioner. Id. On July 26, 2022, Petitioner informed

his parole agent that he had COVID-19 and would turn himself in when he recovered. Id. 

Thereafter, Petitioner turned himself in on August 9, 2022. 
3

maximum sentence date was correctly calculated. Thereafter, Petitioner pro se

petitioned this Court for review.3

II. ISSUE

Petitioner raises a single issue for our review.4 The parties dispute 

whether 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1) or 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i) is the applicable regulation 

to determine whether Petitioner’s revocation hearing was timely. 

III. DISCUSSION5

Petitioner asserts that the Board committed an error of law and violated 

his due process rights by failing to provide a timely revocation hearing. Pet’r’s Br. 

at 13-14. Specifically, according to Petitioner, the Board must hold a revocation 

hearing within 120 days of receiving official verification of a parolee’s conviction. 

Id. at 16-18, 22-23. Thus, Petitioner submits, the Board erred in reasoning that it 

had 120 days from the date that Petitioner returned to a state correctional facility. 

Id. In response, the Board maintains that the 120-day period did not begin until 

Petitioner was back in custody at a state correctional facility; thus, his revocation 

hearing was timely. Bd.’s Br. at 10-12. 

“It has long been established that due process requires that parolees 

receive a hearing within a reasonable time after they are taken into custody for a 

parole violation.” Taylor v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 931 A.2d 114, 117 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2007) (en banc) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). To 

satisfy due process, the Board has issued regulations concerning the timeliness of a 

3 Although Petitioner filed his petition for review pro se, his brief was prepared by counsel. 

4

In his petition, Petitioner also asserted that the Board improperly recalculated his maximum 

sentence date. Pet., ¶ 7. However, Petitioner does not address this issue in his brief. See generally

Pet’r’s Br. Thus, we decline to address it. 

5 Our standard of review is limited to determining whether the Board committed an error of 

law, whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence, and whether its decision violated 

constitutional rights. Fisher v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 62 A.3d 1073, 1075 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2013); see also Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.
4

parole revocation hearing. See Lawson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 977 A.2d 85, 

87 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“[d]etermining whether a revocation hearing was timely is 

a straightforward inquiry that is governed by Board regulation”).

For example, when a parolee is convicted of a new criminal offense, 

the Board must hold a revocation hearing within 120 days from the date the Board 

received official verification of that disposition.6 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1). The general 

rule is subject to the following, relevant exception: 

(i) If a parolee is confined outside the jurisdiction of the 

Department of Corrections [(DOC)], such as confinement 

out-of-State, confinement in a Federal correctional 

institution or confinement in a county correctional 

institution where the parolee has not waived the right to a 

revocation hearing by a panel in accordance with 

Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, [] 314 A.2d 

842 ([Pa.] 1973), the revocation hearing shall be held 

within 120 days of the official verification of the return of 

the parolee to a State correctional facility.

37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i). “This [custodial exception] is based upon the principle 

that the 120[-]day period does not begin to run until the Board acquires jurisdiction 

over the parolee.” Barnes v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 203 A.3d 382, 387 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2019) (citation omitted). 

Once a parolee challenges the timeliness of a revocation hearing, the 

Board bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the hearing 

was timely. Burno v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 67 A.3d 1280, 1283 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2013). “If the Board does not present substantial evidence to establish the timeliness 

of a revocation hearing, the parole violation charges are dismissed with prejudice.” 

Brown v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 184 A.3d 1021, 1025 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)

6

“Official verification” is defined as “[a]ctual receipt by a parolee’s supervising parole agent 

of a direct written communication from a court in which a parolee was convicted of a new criminal 

charge attesting that the parolee was so convicted.” 37 Pa. Code § 61.1.
5

(citation omitted). Additionally, when the Board fails to produce evidence that it 

had the burden to produce, it “does not have the right to a second hearing to make 

the case it should have made in the first instance.” Gair v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 

948 A.2d 884, 889 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008); see also Mack v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 

654 A.2d 129, 131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (reversing the decision of the Board and 

dismissing the parole violation charges with prejudice because the revocation 

hearing was untimely). 

In finding that Petitioner’s revocation hearing was timely, the Board 

interpreted its own regulations. We generally defer to the Board’s interpretation 

provided it is consistent with statutory authority and not clearly erroneous. Jackson 

v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 885 A.2d 598, 601 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Here, the 

Board interpreted 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i) to mean that it had 120 days from the 

date that Petitioner returned to state custody. However, this custodial exception

applies only “[i]f a parolee is confined outside the jurisdiction of the [DOC] . . . .”

37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i) (emphasis added). It is typically applicable in cases where

the parolee is transferred to the DOC’s custody after serving a period of incarceration 

in another jurisdiction. 

For example, in Dill v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 

186 A.3d 1040, 1042 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), a parolee was convicted of charges in 

federal court. Shortly after sentencing, the Board received official verification of 

the parolee’s federal conviction. Id. at 1042. About 20 years later, the parolee was 

released from federal prison to the Board’s detainer. Id. at 1043. The parolee’s 

revocation hearing was held within 120 days of the parolee returning to a state 

correctional facility. Id. Upon review, this Court held that the hearing was timely

because the parolee’s federal confinement placed him outside of the DOC’s 

jurisdiction. Id. at 1046; see id. at 1045 (“The Board’s regulation is clear. So long 
6

as a parolee is in federal custody, the Board’s duty to hold a revocation hearing is 

deferred until the parolee is returned to state custody, regardless of when the Board 

received official verification of his new conviction.”). 

Similarly, in Barnes, 203 A.3d at 387, the official verification of a

parolee’s conviction preceded his return to a state correctional facility. However, 

the 120-day period commenced upon his return because the parolee had been

confined in a county correctional institution. See id. (citing 37 Pa. Code § 

71.4(1)(i)).7 Therefore, the parole revocation hearing was timely. 

Conversely, in the instant case, Petitioner was not confined in another 

jurisdiction. Rather, after receiving new charges, Petitioner was released from his 

pretrial detention on February 21, 2020. This was after his original maximum 

sentence expired on December 18, 2019. Thereafter, following his conviction, the 

trial court granted Petitioner credit for time served and immediately paroled him. 

Petitioner was not detained at this time and did not return to the DOC’s custody until 

his surrender on August 9, 2022. The Board has not cited, and we are unaware of 

any case in which 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i) has applied under similar circumstances. 

We therefore conclude that it does not control here. 

Absent an applicable exception, the general rule applies. Thus, the 

Board was required to establish that it held a revocation hearing within 120 days of 

receiving official verification of Petitioner’s conviction. Burno, 67 A.3d at 1283; 37 

Pa. Code § 71.4(1). It failed to do so in this case. Here, the Board received official 

verification of Petitioner’s conviction on April 1, 2022. See C.R. at 21, 77. The 

revocation hearing was held 223 days later, on November 10, 2022. On this record, 

7 We note that “this regulation is not applicable where the parolee is at all times within the 

jurisdiction of the Board and is being held in a county institution, not at the request of the county 

authorities but at that of the Board itself.” Murray v. Jacobs, 512 A.2d 785, 789 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1986) (cleaned up). 
7

we are constrained to conclude that the Board was unable to prove that it timely held 

Petitioner’s revocation hearing.8 Further, the Board is not entitled to a second 

opportunity to establish the timeliness of the hearing. See Gair, 948 A.2d at 889. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In this case, the Board’s interpretation of its regulations was clearly 

erroneous. Here, the custodial exception set forth in 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i) is 

inapplicable because Petitioner was not confined outside the jurisdiction of the DOC. 

Per the general rule, the Board was required to establish that it held a revocation 

hearing within 120 days of receiving official verification of Petitioner’s conviction. 

See Burno, 67 A.3d at 1283. It did not. Consequently, the Board’s order is reversed, 

and Petitioner’s parole violation charges are dismissed with prejudice. See Gair, 

948 A.2d at 889; Brown, 184 A.3d at 1025. 

______________________________

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

8 The Board had confined its arguments to an erroneous interpretation of the custodial 

exception; it does not argue on appeal that the hearing was timely held within 120 days of receiving 

official verification of Petitioner’s conviction. See Bd.’s Br. at 7-12. Nevertheless, for the sake 

of completeness, we note the following. A revocation hearing that occurs beyond the 120-day 

period may be deemed timely if certain dates are excluded from the time calculation. Most notably, 

dates are excluded when a delay is attributable to “[t]he unavailability of a parolee[.]” 37 Pa. Code 

§ 71.5(c)(1). In our review of the record, we discern that Petitioner may have been “unavailable” 

to the Board for 28 days – from July 12, 2022, when Petitioner’s parole agent directed Petitioner 

to turn himself in, until August 9, 2022, when he eventually did so. See Supervision History, 

10/7/22, at 2 (detailing these events). However, even excluding these 28 days, the revocation 

hearing was not timely. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael Daniels, :

Petitioner :

: No. 520 C.D. 2023

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Parole Board, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4

th day of October, 2024, the Pennsylvania Parole 

Board’s order, entered on April 21, 2023, is REVERSED. Petitioner’s parole 

violation charges are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

______________________________

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge