UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-1323

SAFIA COBEY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PETE GEREN, Secretary of the Army,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:08-cv-00406-LO-JFA)

Argued: January 27, 2011 Decided: April 19, 2011

Before GREGORY and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and Irene C. BERGER, 

United States District Judge for the Southern District of West 

Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Donna Renee Williams Rucker, GEBHARDT & ASSOCIATES, LLP, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Monika L. Moore, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON 

BRIEF: Frazer Walton, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF FRAZER WALTON, JR., 

Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United 

States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Safia Cobey appeals the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment in favor of Pete Geren in this employment 

discrimination action brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 

1973. 29 U.S.C. § 701. Cobey asserts that she is an individual 

with a disability under the Act and that Geren, her employer,

failed to accommodate her disability.

I.

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56(c) if no genuine issue of material fact exists and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). This Court reviews

the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Monumental Paving & Excavating Manufacturer’s Ass’n Ins. Co., 

176 F.3d 794, 797 (4th Cir. 1999). A genuine issue of material 

fact exists when there is a factual dispute that might affect 

the outcome of the case and a reasonable factfinder could find 

in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

Inasmuch as the evidence contained in the record is insufficient 

to create a genuine issue of material fact, we affirm the 

district court’s judgment.
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II.

Cobey was employed as a fabric worker in the Directorate of 

Public Works and Logistics, Services Division, Central Issue 

Facility (CIF) at Fort Myer, Virginia. As a fabric worker, her 

duties included performing alterations and repairs on military 

uniforms. The physical demands of this position included 

standing at work tables, stooping, bending, kneeling and sitting 

for long periods to sew.

On March 14, 2006, she suffered what she describes as an 

“on-the-job injury” and went to the emergency room. She returned 

to work on March 16, 2006, and presented a note from her 

treating physician, Dr. Cho, to her immediate supervisor, Ms. 

Hernandez. The note is hand-written and difficult to read. It 

appears to list some limitations and it states, “Length of 

limitations: 3 weeks, till reevaluated by me or other 

physician.” Cobey was placed on “light duty status” within four

(4) days to a week of her return to work. 

On March 22, 2006, she had an appointment regarding her 

back pain with Dr. Ramler, of Family Practice Woodbridge Clinic.

Her records indicate that she was “released w/o limitations.” On 

April 5, 2006, Cobey was involved in a car accident and injured 

her back. She saw Dr. Doroski, a chiropractor, for that injury. 

Dr. Doroski’s records indicate that Cobey reported that she did 

not have any symptoms of her previous work injury before the car 
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accident occurred and that her prognosis for recovery was 

favorable. When she returned to work on April 19, 2006, she

presented a medical form to Ms. Hernandez detailing her 

limitations. This form stated that Cobey’s “Duration of Total 

Disability” was from April 6, 2006, to April 18, 2006. There is 

some dispute in the record as to whether Dr. Doroski intended 

April 18, 2006, to be the actual ending date for the Plaintiff’s 

limitations. However, a plain reading of the form indicates 

that the limitations were temporary in nature. Cobey asserts 

that Ms. Hernandez refused to accommodate her limitations. 

On April 21, 2006, Cobey called an ambulance from her job 

site and was transported to the hospital. She did not return to 

work after this day. One month later she began treatment for her 

back injury with an orthopedist. She filed a formal EEO 

complaint with the Department of the Army and was denied relief.

She appealed this denial by filing her federal complaint.

III.

Under the Act, an “individual with a disability,” or 

handicap, is defined as one who (i) has a physical or mental 

impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 

person's major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an 

impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.

29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); see Pollard v. 
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High’s of Baltimore, Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 467. In determining 

whether an impairment substantially limits a major life 

activity, the court may consider the “nature and severity of the 

impairment,” the “duration or expected duration of the 

impairment,” and the “permanent or long term impact” of the 

impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2); see Pollard, 281 F.3d at 

467-68 (“An impairment simply cannot be a substantial limitation 

on a major life activity if it is expected to improve in a 

relatively short period of time.”)

The district court found that the record demonstrates that 

Cobey’s injuries were temporary and that her employer had no 

reason to believe she suffered from a permanent disability. The 

district court further found that the restrictions noted by Dr. 

Doroski did not rise to the level of substantial limitation.

IV.

Cobey contends that she meets both (i) and (iii) of the

Act’s definition of a person with a disability because she has 

established that she has a substantially limiting impairment and 

because her supervisors were aware that her condition limited 

her life activities such as standing for a long time, lifting

anything above her shoulders and bending at the waist. The 

evidence in this case demonstrates that Cobey did have some 

limitations to these normal life activities as a result of her 
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on the job injury and accident, but there is nothing in the 

record to suggest that her limitations were other than shortterm. The records from her doctors give positive prognoses for 

recovery, release her from care or note her improvement. When 

Dr. Doroski treated her for the car accident, he noted that her 

symptoms from her previous work injury had disappeared, and 

indicated the temporary nature of her current injury. Six weeks 

after her accident Dr. Doroski reported that she ranked her pain 

as one out of ten, with ten being unbearable pain. Thus, the 

record shows that Cobey did not have an impairment with a 

permanent or long-term impact.

Additionally, Cobey has not established that her 

supervisors perceived her as having such an impairment. The 

doctors’ notes presented to her supervisor contained end dates 

for her limitations. Despite her employer’s stated efforts to 

give Cobey light work, they had no reason to believe she had a 

substantially limiting impairment of a permanent or long-term

nature.

V.

There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

Cobey meets the Act’s definition of disability. None of her 

medical records, including the few relied on by her employer, 

establish that her injuries were more than temporary. Because 
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there is no disability under the Act, Cobey has not met the 

threshold requirement for bringing her claim. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment in 

favor of Geren.

AFFIRMED