Filed 8/20/14 In re S.M. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re S.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B251450

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK96544)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SA. M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Anthony Trendacosta, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed. Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deput y County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________ ___________2 Sa. M. (Mother) appeals from the orders of the juvenile court removing her infant son, S.M., from her custody and gran ting a restraining order barring her from approaching her husband, Timothy M., and the baby. Mother contends neither order was supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND Mother and Timothy married in January 2012, and Moth er became pregnant soon

thereafter. Due to strains in their relationship, Mother moved into a shelter two months

before S.M.’s birth in November 2012 at an Orange County hospital. Two days after S.M.’s birth, the Orange County Social Se rvices Agency (OCSSA ) received a referral from the hospital because Moth er had tested positive for cocaine. She denied using drugs, and both she and S.M. test ed negative nine hours later. A second referral the same week allege d Mother had severely neglected S.M. during her interactions with him at the hosp ital. Hospital staff told an OCSSA social worker Mother became agitated and refused to feed the baby claiming he was too fat. She also ignored the baby and refused to feed him until she had showered. Although nurses had instructed her how to change and diaper the baby, they found his clothes and bedding soaked in urine. On one occasion a nurse saw Mo ther place S.M. on a bed and walk away despite staff warnings; on another Mother covered S.M.’s face with her hand to quiet him when he cried a lthough S.M.’s breathing was a pparently unaffected. Mother criticized hospital staff and asked that a wh ite American pediatrician care for S.M. because she believed the Filipino doc tors were “experimenting” on her. 1 Citing her

1 Mother informed the worker she had emigrated to the United States from Pakistan in 2002. She had married a Pakistani man, but their marriage ended after nine years. Mother married Timothy in Ja nuary 2012. She had not identified Timothy on the birth certificate but said he knew of S.M.’s birth. Once contact ed, Timothy admitted he had a criminal history that included an arrest for domestic violence, used marijuana and had two daughters, now grown, who had been detained by the juve nile court when they were younger, resulting in the termination of pare ntal rights. Timothy confirmed he and Mother were married but said he had asked Mother to leave their apartment because she was not paying her share of the bills. He la ter admitted he asked her to leave because she had attacked him.3 “paranoid delusions and thoughts,” a hospital ps ychiatrist placed Mother on a psychiatric hold pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. 2 OCSSA filed a petition to declare S.M. a dependent child of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect or inability to provide regular care due to mental illness or substance abuse) and (j) (risk of abus e or neglect based on abuse of siblings), based on Mother’s positive cocaine test and behavior in the hospital, and Timothy’s criminal history, past use of marijuana and alcohol and prior experience with the dependency system with his other ch ildren. At the November 29, 2012 detention hearing the juvenile court found a prima faci e showing had been made that S.M. came

within section 300 and there was a substantial danger to his physical health and no reasonable means to protect him without removi ng him from his parents’ custody. S.M. was placed in the temporary care and custody of OCSSA, and the agency was ordered to provided services to Mother and Ti mothy including monitored visitation. OCSSA filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on January 2, 2013 describing a

number of interviews with Moth er and Timothy, who were ag ain living together. Mother told the social worker she had been discharg ed from the hospital after two days and there was nothing wrong with her. She also told the worker she had filed a police report against a doctor at the hospital who she belie ved had prematurely in duced her labor. She complained about hosp ital staff, especially “fat” ones banging the doors and causing her baby to jump, but denied she had acted strange ly with him at the hospital, saying she had been upset because his skin wa s not lighter like his father’s. She denied using drugs and

2 Mother was discharged from the hospita l after 48 hours and moved into Timothy’s apartment. Her discharge in structions identify a prelimin ary diagnosis of “psychotic disorder NOS” (not otherwise specified ), meaning her doctors could not make a definitive diagnosis with out further evaluation. Her releas e signified she did not meet the criteria for retention under section 5150, subd ivision (d), requiring a showing of probable cause that she was, “as a result of a mental he alth disorder, a danger to others, or to . . . herself, or gravely disordered.” Statutory references are to the Welfar e and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.4 agreed to drug test but expressed concern her sample would be switched with someone who used cocaine. She tested negative for dr ugs on four occasions in December 2012. OCSSA also reported Mother had asked that S.M. be plac ed with a Muslim family

and accused the worker of wantin g to turn S.M. into a Chris tian. In one meeting Mother

told the social worker “I want my baby back. If you want to keep him then you need to sacrifice.” During her monitore d visits she asked the foster parents about their care of S.M. and their religion and complained variousl y that he looked too small, they were not feeding him enough, his hair was falling out a nd he was not sufficiently alert. Despite her initial worry the foster family was not Mu slim and was not feeding S.M. properly, she agreed to leave him in th at home but then changed her mind and demanded a more culturally appropriate home closer to Los Angeles. During this period the OCSSA

received three calls from state and local law enforcement agencies recounting complaints

from Mother about the care S.M. was receiv ing and claiming his life was in danger. After an early January 2013 vis it, Mother accused the foster father of bringing a different baby and demanded a blood test to prove the baby was hers.

In his interview with the social worker Timothy deni ed having a substance abuse problem and explained he drank occasionally and used marijuana tw ice a week to help him fall asleep after long work days. Accord ing to Timothy, Mother ’s erratic behavior had been triggered by cocaine, but he also agreed there were cultural and translation

issues. In his view she had difficulties with social skills, and her paranoia was related to an inability to assimilate and understand so cial cues. However, he expressed concern about Mother’s ability to parent S.M. in his absence. Du ring visits he spent much of the time calming her anxiety and assuring her everything would work out. The OCSSA recommended the ju venile court sustain the petition and transfer the case to Los Angeles County for disposition based on the parents’ place of residence. At a January 2, 2013 hearing the court found Ti mothy to be the presumed father. At a subsequent hearing the court recorded th at Timothy and Mother had submitted on the petition as amended and transfe rred the case to Los Angeles County. On February 11, 2013 the Los Angeles juvenile court accepted the transfer of jurisdiction from Orange5 County, appointed counsel and ordered S.M. to remain in shelter care while the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) assessed Timothy’s home for placement. The Department was also given discretion to liberalize visitation “up to include release to father.” A disposition report prepared by the De partment disclosed Timothy had asked Mother to leave the apartment during her pregnancy because she had attacked him on several occasions. Timothy showed the social worker photographs from wounds he said had been inflicted by Mother. Because of Mother’s sometimes violent behavior and hostility toward him during visits with S.M., Timothy asked that her visits with the child take place separately out of the apartment and urged that, once Mother had left the apartment, S.M. could be pl aced with Timothy. Mother agreed with the proposed placement of S.M. with Timothy: “Please give my child to the fathe r. I will do what the court wants me to do so I can have my baby ba ck. You people should not have my child. He is starving to death; you are trying to make him a Christian and a Hispanic.” Mother’s anxiety and contentiousness during monitored visits with S.M. 3 led the Department to recommend the baby remain in shelter care until Mother had left Timothy’s apartment and S.M. co uld be placed with his fath er. Placement with Mother

was not recommended due to he r previous psychotic behavi or and failure to obtain recommended counseling and evaluation. 4 On the eve of the h earing, however, due to Timothy’s continued marijuana use and failure to take recommended parenting classes, the Department withdrew its recomme ndation S.M. be placed with him.

3 During an April 2013 visit Mother beca me agitated while trying to feed S.M., argued with the social worker and placed an emergency call claiming S.M. was ill. She verbally abused responding pa ramedics, who asked that she be removed from the room. The paramedics checked the baby and found nothing wrong.

4 Mother went for an assessment at a co mmunity mental health center but failed to report any previous psychiatri c history or present symptoms . The center determined she failed to meet agency criteria and gave her a letter stating so. A Los Angeles County health facility similarly denied services because of Mother’s denial of any symptoms or history.6 The disposition hearing bega n on April 17, 2013. Timo thy’s attorney filed a request for a restraining order against Moth er based on threats she had made against Timothy and his landlords, who sometimes car ed for S.M. Mother’s counsel sought

relocation of visits to a lo cal mosque with a culturally sensitive monitor. The court granted those requests 5 and released S.M. to Timothy over the Department’s objection. The court also ordered Mother to undergo an Evidence Code 73 0 evaluation by Daniel Kramon, a psychologist. The hearing was then continued to June 11 , 2013 for Mother’s contest. It was ultimately completed on August 29, 2013. On May 9, 2013 Mother was allowed to vi sit with S.M. at her mosque. The visit was monitored by an East Asian social worke r. According to the m onitor, Mother fed the baby at 3:20 p.m. and when he started to fu ss 20 minutes later, tried to feed him again. When the monitor suggest ed she should tr y to soothe the baby by walking or playing with him rather than feeding him ag ain, Mother became defensive and stated, “you are not his mother,” and “who are you to tell me what to do?” Resisting the monitor’s efforts to calm her, Mother telephon ed Timothy and another social wo rker to compla in the monitor would not let her feed S.M. She then yelled at the monitor, “You d on’t have children, so you don’t know how to take care of my ch ild,” and accused her of being jealous of Mother’s husband and baby. S.M. began cryi ng; and Mother refused to let him sleep, saying he should not sl eep during her visit. The monito r persuaded Mother to allow her to hold S.M., who soon fell asleep, prompti ng Mother to accuse th e monitor of showing off; she then attempted to se ize S.M. from the monitor’s ar ms. When Mother continued to yell at the monitor, the dire ctor of the mosque told the monitor the mosque would no longer host Mother’s visits because her outbursts were interrupting those who were praying. After the visit the monitor reco mmended Mother receive additional parenting

classes because she was incapable of caring for her child. The monitor also stated she would not be able to monitor any furthe r visits between Mother and S.M.

5 Because Timothy’s counsel failed to make corrections to the restraining order as directed by the court, this order was never is sued. The court grante d a second request for a restraining order on June 11, 2013.7 Dr. Kramon contacted Mother by telephone and interviewed he r on May 10, 2013, the day after the visit at the mosque. Accord ing to Kramon, Mother “presented as alert, oriented, relatively logical and although she wa s coherent during the interview, there was an occasional tendency towards bizarre conten t reflective of paranoid, suspicious type ideations. . . . She also appeared to be anxi ous, and it is plausibl e that her degree of paranoia and suspiciousness can be greatly exacerbated when she is experiencing acute anxiety.” Mother denied ha ving suspicious thoughts or pa nic attacks but described her recent visit at the mosque and how angry she became at the monito r. While she spoke her voice escalated and, “by the end of her description . . . , [she] was yelling on the telephone.” Mother justified reports of he r yelling in the presence of her son on the ground, “in my country, people talk louder” and, when upset, “louder still.” Mother confirmed earlier reports of her suspicions the doctors had tried to harm her and the wrong baby had been brought to an earlie r visit. Kramon concluded that, despite Mother’s pleasant demeanor, “the cont ent of much of her communication was characterized by suspicious ty pe thinking, paranoid and biza rre ideations, likely distortion of reality and obsessive and rigi d type thinking. . . . It is likely that when she perceives herself to be in a stressful situation, he r anxiety significantly escalates, therefore exacerbating and intensifying the paranoid sy mptoms.” Kramon note d the possibility of extended postpartum depressi on, but concluded (citing Moth er’s report of hearing her mother’s voice in 2002 shortly after arriving in the United States), “there are indications of paranoid tendencies that can be associated with a Paranoid Person ality Disorder and/or Paranoid Schizophrenia.” “A more specific diagnosis would be best determined by a more extensive evaluation, involving psychiatric/psyc hological consultations on a protracted basis but . . . , there are no curre nt indications that the agitated/acting-out

behavior . . . would be moderated without si gnificant mental hea lth intervention.”

Kramon recommended Mother receive individua l psychotherapy and be evaluated for possible psychotropic medication; continue to have monitored visits with S.M.; that “all

efforts be made to find a monitor with whom she feels compatible”; and reunification be deferred until there are reports of stabilization of her symptoms.8 Throughout the months of May and June 2013 Mother lodged numerous complaints with the court, as well as the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), accusing the Department of abusing her child and discriminating against her. 6 She sought new counsel through a Marsden motion and, when that was denied, filed a section 388 petition seeking modification (rec onsideration) of that decision. She solicited letters of recommendation from others in her shelter, atte nded parenting classes, participated in counseling and was prescribed psychotropic medication by mental health providers. She continued to test negative for illicit drug use. Meanwhile, Timothy tested positive for marijuana and failed to attend parenting classe s ordered by the court. In a supplemental report, the Department recommend ed S.M. be suitably placed. At the August 29, 2013 continued dis position hearing, the court appointed new counsel for Mother and proceed ed to make final disposition orders. The court removed S.M. from Mother’s custody and, notwithstanding the Department’s recommendation, ordered him placed with Timothy. 7 The court also extended th e existing restraining order for a period of one year.

DISCUSSION

1. Substantial Evidence Suppo rted the Disposition Orde r Removing S.M. from Mother’s Custody Section 361, subdivision (c)(1), authoriz es removal of a child from his or her parent’s custody only if the juvenile cour t finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a s ubstantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of the child if the child were returned home and “there are no reasonable means by which the [child]’ s physical health can be protected without removing” the child from his or her parent’s cu stody. “The parent need not be dangerous

and the child need not have be en actually harmed for rem oval to be appropriate. The

6 After one such report, an officer advise d a social worker to be careful around Mother, as something ab out her was “off.”

7 S.M. was subsequently removed from Timothy’s custody at a section 387, subdivision (b), hear ing in March 2014.9 focus on the statute is averting harm to the child. [Citations.] In this regard, the court may consider the parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances.” ( In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917; see In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215-1216.) We review the juvenile court’s dispositio n orders for substantial evidence. ( Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Fa mily Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 966; In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.A pp.4th 930, 940.) 8 Under this standard “[w]e review the reco rd to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusions, and we resolve all conflicts and make all

reasonable inferences from the evidence to uphold the court’s orders, if possible.” ( In re

David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828; accord, In re Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216; In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 763; In re

Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393.) Mother contends, in light of her lack of any history or diagnosis of a specific mental disorder, the juvenile court lacked ad equate evidence to warrant removal of S.M. from her custody. While Mother is correct no definitive diagnosis of a mental disorder had yet been made, Dr. Kramon’s report st ated his opinion Mother had disturbing symptoms that would require “significant ment al health intervention ” to enable her to cope with her paranoid thought processes. In his view Mother was not stable enough to allow her to parent S.M. That report, c oupled with the multiple witness accounts of

8 “The burden of proof at the jurisd iction phase in the juvenile court is preponderance of the evidence; the burden of proof at disposition is clear and convincing evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a) [jurisdiction fi ndings by preponderance of evidence]; § 361, subd. (c) [disposition findings by clear and convincing evidence].) Nonetheless, we review both jurisdiction findi ngs and the dispositio n order for substantial evidence. (See Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880-881 [‘The “clear and convincing” standard . . . is for the edification and guidance of the trial court and not a standard for appellant review. [Citations.] “‘The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determ ine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the de termination is not open to review on appeal.’”’].” ( In re Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216, fn. 4.)10 Mother’s agitation around S.M., her viol ent outbursts toward Timothy and her antagonism toward anyone in a position of authority, provided the court with ample evidence to remove S.M. from her custody. As devoted as Mother was to S.M., her paranoia and anxiety gave rise to serious concern among the prof essionals who observed her as to her mental stability around an infant. (See In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 [Cases finding a substantial physical danger to a child “tend to fall into two factual patterns. One group involves an identified, specific hazard in the child’s environment—typically an adult with a proven record of abus iveness. [Citations.] The second group involves children of such tend er years that the absence of adequate supervision and care poses an inherent risk to their physical health and safety.”].) As numerous courts have recognized, a juvenile c ourt need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps nece ssary to protect the child. (See, e.g., In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 165; In re Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216.)

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Issuing the Restraining Order Section 213.5, subdivision (a), permits a juvenile court to issue an order “enjoining any person from molesting, attacki ng, striking, stalking, threatening, . . . harassing, telephoning, . . . dest roying the personal property, cont acting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of any parent . . . .” Section 213. 5 has been analogized to Family Code section 6340, which governs restraining orde rs under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). (See In re C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 363-364; In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 194.) That statute “perm its the issuance of a protective order under the [DVPA] in the first instance, if ‘failure to make [the order] may jeopardize the safety of the petitioner . . . .’ (Fam. Code, § 6340, su bd. (a); see also Fam. Code, § 6320.)” ( In re B.S., at p. 194.) A restraining order issued after notice and hearing may remain in effect up to three years. (§ 213.5, subd. (d)(1).)11 In determining whether to issue the restraining order, the court may review and consider the contents of the Department’s fi le, including the caseworker’s written reports. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(d)(1).) “Issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5 does not require ‘evidence th at the restrained person has previously molested, attacked, stru ck, sexually assaulted, stalked, or battered the child.’ [Citation.] Nor does it require evidence of a reasonabl e apprehension of future abuse.” ( In re C.Q. , supra , 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 363, quoting In re B.S. , supra , 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 193.) An appellate court applies the substantial ev idence standard of review to the trial court’s factual findings in support of the order ( Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 822) and an abuse of discretion standa rd to review the grant or denial of the restraining order. (See Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420 [DVPA].) The trial court abus es its discretion when its ruling exceeds the bounds of reason. ( Ibid .) “‘When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’” ( Ibid. , citing Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 48 Cal.3d 474, 478-479.) 9 In this case the Department’s reports cited instances of Mother’s attacks on Timothy, her antagonism towards monitors a nd other professionals engaged in oversight

of S.M. and her threats toward the landlords as evidence of her violent tendencies and potentially unstable behavior. Again, the la w does not require a court to wait until an

9 In re Cassandra B . (2004) 125 Cal.App.4t h 199, 210 to 211, c ited by both parties, applied a substantial evidence standard of re view to an order granting a restraining order under section 213.5, subdivision (a). In re Cassandra B. cited In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545, as authority for applying that standard of review. In re Misako R. , however, involved appellate review of a re unification plan in a dependency action, not a restraining order. In light of both the genera l rule that a grant or denial or injunctive relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion ( Gonzalez v. Munoz, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 420) and the use of the abuse of discreti on standard of review in other dependency matters requiring the weighing of evidence (see In re Stephanie M . (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317-318), we question whether In re Cassandra B. ’s application of the substantial evidence standard of re view is correct.12 attack occurs before an action is taken to pr otect a child and his or her caregivers. The juvenile court did not a buse its discretion in issuing the restraining order.

DISPOSITION The juvenile court or ders are affirmed.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

ZELON, J.

SEGAL, J. *

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superi or Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.