I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2023 

To require reports by the Secretary of State and the Director of National 

Intelligence relating to construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 2, 2019 

Mr. HECK (for himself, Mr. CONAWAY, Mr. BARR, Mr. CARSON of Indiana, 

Mr. CHABOT, Ms. CLARKE of New York, Mr. COOK, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, 

Mr. GALLEGO, Mr. HARRIS, Mrs. HARTZLER, Mr. HIMES, Mr. HUDSON, 

Mr. HUFFMAN, Mr. HURD of Texas, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KILMER, Mr. 

KRISHNAMOORTHI, Mrs. RODGERS of Washington, Mr. MEADOWS, Mr. 

OLSON, Mr. QUIGLEY, Mr. ROONEY of Florida, Mr. TURNER, and Mr. 

WEBER of Texas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 

provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To require reports by the Secretary of State and the Director 

of National Intelligence relating to construction of the 

Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protect European En5 ergy Security Act’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress finds the following: 

3 (1) The Russian Federation is constructing a 

4 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, named the 

5 Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the completion of which 

6 could address potential increases in European en7 ergy consumption but also increase European de8 pendence on Russian energy and have destabilizing 

9 effects on the Government of Ukraine if Ukraine 

10 loses energy transit fees as a result of construction 

11 of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. 

12 (2) According to experts, the Nord Stream 2 

13 pipeline would transport 80 percent of Russia’s cur14 rent gas exports to Europe through one single pipe15 line system, which would run counter to the Euro16 pean Union energy policy of energy security and di17 versification of supply. 

18 (3) Section 257(a) of the Countering America’s 

19 Adversaries through Sanctions Act of 2017 (Public 

20 Law 115–44; 22 U.S.C. 9546(a)) states in part that 

21 it is the policy of the United States— 

22 (A) ‘‘to work with European Union mem23 ber states and European Union institutions to 

24 promote energy security through developing di25 versified and liberalized energy markets that 


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1 provide diversified sources, suppliers, and 

2 routes’’; and 

3 (B) ‘‘to continue to oppose [the Nord 

4 Stream 2 pipeline] given its detrimental im5 pacts on the European Union’s energy security, 

6 gas market development in Central and Eastern 

7 Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine’’. 

8 (4) On January 27, 2018, then-Secretary of 

9 State Rex Tillerson stated, ‘‘[T]he United States op10 poses the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. We see it as un11 dermining Europe’s overall energy security and sta12 bility . . .’’. Tillerson further stated that the pipe13 line would allow Putin to use energy as a ‘‘political 

14 tool’’. 

15 (5) On March 11, 2018, German chancellor An16 gela Merkel acknowledged ‘‘political’’ and ‘‘stra17 tegic’’ concerns regarding the Nord Stream 2 pipe18 line and stated that the pipeline ‘‘is not just an eco19 nomic project, but that, of course, political factors 

20 must also be taken into account’’. 

21 (6) Gazprom, a Russian energy company, is 

22 controlled by the Government of the Russian Fed23 eration, which, according to the European Commis24 sion’s Statement of Objections to Gazprom dated 


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1 April 22, 2015, has undertaken efforts to use gas as 

2 a weapon of coercion. 

3 (7) The Department of State, led by the Bu4 reau of Energy of Resources, has worked extensively 

5 with allies, including Denmark, to thwart such Rus6 sian efforts. 

7 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

8 It is the sense of Congress that the United States 

9 should— 

10 (1) continue to oppose construction of the Nord 

11 Stream 2 pipeline and other Russian Federation gas 

12 pipelines in northern Europe; and 

13 (2) take affirmative diplomatic steps to halt the 

14 construction of such pipelines. 

15 SEC. 4. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. 

16 (a) REPORT BY SECRETARY OF STATE.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

18 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

19 of State shall submit to the appropriate congres20 sional committees a report on actions the Depart21 ment of State is taking to implement section 257 of 

22 the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanc23 tions Act of 2017 (Public Law 115–44; 22 U.S.C. 

24 9546). 


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1 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report shall include de2 tails on the following: 

3 (A) Efforts by the Department of State 

4 since August 3, 2017, to work with European 

5 Union member states and institutions to pro6 mote energy security and decrease their depend7 ence on Russian sources of energy, including 

8 use of the Countering Russian Influence Fund 

9 authorized pursuant to section 254 of the 

10 Countering America’s Adversaries through 

11 Sanctions Act of 2017 (Public Law 115–44; 22 

12 U.S.C. 9543). 

13 (B) Diplomatic efforts undertaken by the 

14 Department of State to oppose directly the 

15 Nord Stream 2 pipeline and the Turk Stream 

16 pipeline. 

17 (C) An estimation of European natural gas 

18 supply demand from 2019 through 2023. 

19 (b) REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL20 LIGENCE.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the 

21 enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel22 ligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional com23 mittees a report on the impact of the Nord Stream 2 pipe24 line on— 


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1 (1) United States interests and security objec2 tives; 

3 (2) European energy security and defense pos4 ture; 

5 (3) Russian influence in Europe; and 

6 (4) Ukraine, including the implications of re7 ductions in transit fees as a result of Nord Stream 

8 2 pipeline. 

9 (c) FORM.—The reports required by this section shall 

10 be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a clas11 sified annex. 

12 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

13 DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate con14 gressional committees’’ means— 

15 (1) in the House of Representatives— 

16 (A) the Committee on Armed Services; 

17 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs; 

18 (C) the Committee on Energy and Com19 merce; and 

20 (D) the Permanent Select Committee on 

21 Intelligence; and 

22 (2) in the Senate— 

23 (A) the Committee on Armed Services; 

24 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations; 

25 and 


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1 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence. 

Æ 


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