J-S70041-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

NATHANIEL RHODES, JR.

 Appellant

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

: 

: No. 1327 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 11, 2014, 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-46-CR-0008491-2003

BEFORE: LAZARUS, MUNDY, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 25, 2014

Nathaniel Rhodes, Jr. (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order 

entered April 11, 2014, dismissing his third petition filed pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We affirm.

Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year from the 

date a judgment becomes final. There are three exceptions to 

this time requirement: (1) interference by government officials 

in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and 

(3) an after-recognized constitutional right. When a petitioner 

alleges and proves that one of these exceptions is met, the 

petition will be considered timely. A PCRA petition invoking one 

of these exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the 

claims could have been presented. The timeliness requirements 

of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA 

court cannot hear untimely petitions. 

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

 

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on January 

23, 2006, 90 days after the expiration of the time for seeking discretionary 

review with the United States Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); 

U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. The instant petition, filed on March 25, 2014, is patently 

untimely.2 The PCRA court had no jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s 

petition unless he pled and offered proof of one or more of the three 

statutory exceptions to the time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). 

Appellant failed to do so.3 Accordingly, the PCRA court properly dismissed 

his petition.

Order affirmed.

 

2 The PCRA court determined that the instant petition, entitled 

“Motion/Petition for Modification of Sentence Nunc Pro Tunc”, was a PCRA 

petition. We find no error in this determination. It is well-settled that “the 

PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining collateral review, and that any 

petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as 

a PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Evans, 866 

A.2d 442 (Pa. Super. 2005) (concluding motion for reconsideration or 

modification of sentence required treatment under the PCRA). 

3 To the extent that Appellant purports to challenge the legality of his 

sentence, we note that, “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject to 

review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits 

or one of the exceptions thereto.” Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 

586, 592 (Pa. Super. 2007).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/25/2014