2015 UT App 260

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RAYLIN ANDERSEN,

Appellant,

v.

ANDREA DROSSOS ANDERSEN, RYAN L. KELLY, YAIKO OSAKI 

CARRANZA, KELLY & BRAMWELL PC, MOODY BROWN LAW, AND 

ROBERT D. WARREN,

Appellees.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20140885-CA

Filed October 29, 2015

First District Court, Brigham City Department

The Honorable Brandon J. Maynard

No. 140100093

Raylin Andersen, Appellant Pro Se

David C. Blum, Attorney for Appellee Andrea 

Drossos Andersen

Steven M. Kelly, Attorney for Appellees Ryan L. 

Kelly and Kelly & Bramwell PC

Justin D. Caplin, Attorney for Appellees Yaiko Osaki

Carranza and Moody Brown Law

Robert D. Warren, Appellee Pro Se 

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, J. FREDERIC VOROS JR.,

and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Raylin Andersen (Raylin) appeals the district court’s 

separate orders dismissing each of the defendants and the award 

of attorney fees and costs to some of those defendants. We 

affirm.
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20140885-CA 2 2015 UT App 260

¶2 The district court dismissed Raylin’s original complaint 

against Defendant Andrea Drossos Andersen (Andrea) under 

rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to 

state a claim, but the court granted Raylin leave to file an 

amended complaint. The First Amended Complaint added both 

additional claims and additional parties, to wit: (1) Raylin’s exhusband−Robert D. Warren, (2) the attorneys who represented 

Warren during the divorce proceedings−Yaiko Osaki Carranza 

and Moody Brown Law, and (3) the attorneys who represented 

Andrea, who is the ex-wife of Raylin’s current husband, in 

divorce proceedings−Ryan L. Kelly and Kelly & Bramwell, PC.

¶3 Raylin makes three claims on appeal. First, she claims that 

the district court failed to follow the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Second, she claims that the district court did not 

make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to 

support orders granting the motions to dismiss. Third, she 

claims that the district court did not make adequate findings of 

fact and conclusions of law to support an award of attorney fees 

under the “bad faith” statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 

(LexisNexis 2012) (“In civil actions, the court shall award 

reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court 

determines that the action . . . was without merit and not 

brought . . . in good faith . . . .”).

¶4 Raylin claims that timely filing of her notice of appeal 

preserved all of her issues for appeal. This is incorrect. In order 

to preserve an issue for appeal, an appellant must make a timely 

objection that provides the district court with an adequate 

opportunity to correct any claimed errors. “An issue is preserved 

for appeal when it has been presented to the district court in 

such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on that 

issue.” Wolferts v. Wolferts, 2013 UT App 235, ¶ 19, 315 P.3d 448. 

“To provide the court with this opportunity, the issue must be 

specifically raised [by the party asserting error], in a timely 

manner, and must be supported by evidence and relevant legal 
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20140885-CA 3 2015 UT App 260

authority.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). An appellant is required to include a 

citation to the record showing that each issue was preserved in 

the district court. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). Raylin has not 

shown that her issues on appeal were adequately preserved. 

Even assuming that some of her claims of procedural error were 

preserved, the record does not demonstrate that she made any 

challenge in the district court to the adequacy of any findings of 

fact or conclusions of law made in support of the dismissal 

orders or an award of attorney fees and costs.

¶5 To the extent that they may be preserved, Raylin’s claim 

that the district court failed to comply with the rules of civil 

procedure lack merit. The record does not support her claims 

that, as a pro se plaintiff, she was not appropriately notified of 

the recusal of the judges of the Second District Court and the 

transfer to the First District Court or that she was not given 

adequate time to respond to motions. Raylin next claims that 

rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required the 

district court to make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of 

law before granting the motions to dismiss. To the contrary, rule 

52(a) does not require findings of fact and conclusions of law to 

be made by the district court in ruling on motions. See Utah R. 

Civ. P. 52(a). “The court shall, however, issue a brief written 

statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 

under Rules 12(b) . . . when the motion is based on more than 

one ground.” Id. In each of its orders, the district court stated 

that the order of dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state 

a claim was based on the reasons stated in that parties’ motion to 

dismiss. Under the circumstances of this case, this was adequate 

to advise Raylin of the grounds for the court’s decision. 

Furthermore, Raylin neither objected in the district court nor 

asked for clarification of the basis for the court’s ruling. She thus 

failed to preserve a claim that the district court’s brief written 

statement was insufficient to comply with rule 52(a). For the first 

time in her reply brief, Raylin also asserts that the district court 
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20140885-CA 4 2015 UT App 260

was required to treat the motions to dismiss as motions for 

summary judgment and dispose of them accordingly. See id. R. 

12(b). The claim is both untimely because it is raised for the first 

time in her reply brief and unpreserved.

¶6 To the extent that Raylin’s arguments on appeal can be 

construed as claiming that the district court erred in granting 

dismissal of the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a 

claim for relief, the arguments are inadequately briefed. Rule 

24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that 

“[a]ll statements of fact and references to the proceedings below 

shall be supported by citations to the record.” Utah R. App. P. 

24(a)(7). Rule 24(a)(9) requires the argument in an appellant’s 

brief to “contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 

with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 

reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 

citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 

on.” Id. R. 24(a)(9). Raylin’s brief does not contain appropriate 

citations to the record or clear or cohesive argument in support 

of her claims. “An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall 

analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 

research and argument to the reviewing court.” Mercado v. Hill, 

2012 UT App 44, ¶ 11, 273 P.3d 385 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). An appellate court is not a depository 

into which parties may dump the burden of their argument and 

research. See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 

UT 23, ¶ 46, 70 P.3d 904. “[A]lthough we are reluctant to 

penalize self-represented litigants for technical rule violations, 

we will not assume an appellant’s burden of argument and 

research.” Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 9, 194 P.3d 903 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). “An inadequately briefed 

claim is by definition insufficient to discharge an appellant’s 

burden to demonstrate trial court error,” Simmons Media Group, 

LLC v. Wayker, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, ¶ 37, 335 P.3d 885, and we 

therefore conclude that Raylin “has failed to carry [her] burden 
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20140885-CA 5 2015 UT App 260

of persuasion on appeal,” see id. ¶ 40. On that basis, we affirm 

the orders dismissing the First Amended Complaint.

¶7 Raylin also claims that the district court erred in awarding 

attorney fees under Utah Code section 78B-5-825, commonly 

referred to as the bad faith statute. She asserts that the district 

court’s factual findings were inadequate. However, Raylin failed 

to preserve this issue with an appropriate and timely objection to 

the adequacy of the findings of fact during the proceedings 

below. Furthermore, the district court’s findings, although 

minimal, address the requirements of the statute. We therefore 

affirm the award of attorney fees and costs to Andrea.1

¶8 Andrea seeks an award of attorney fees incurred on 

appeal because she was awarded her attorney fees by the district 

court. See Warner v. Warner, 2014 UT App 16, ¶ 63, 319 P.3d 711 

(awarding the prevailing party attorney fees incurred on appeal 

where the basis for the award was the bad faith statute). We 

award Andrea her attorney fees and costs reasonably incurred 

on appeal in an amount to be determined by the district court on

remand. We do not award attorney fees and costs incurred on 

appeal to Yaiko Osaki Carranza and Moody Brown Law because 

they took no steps to effectuate the award under the bad faith 

statute in the district court, and they assert no other basis for an 

award under the appellate rules. We grant Ryan Kelly and Kelly 

& Bramwell PC their attorney fees and costs reasonably incurred 

on appeal in an amount to be determined by the district court on

 

1. Although Yaiko Osaki Carranza and Moody Brown Law 

obtained an order granting attorney fees under the bad faith 

statute, counsel for these parties withdrew two days later 

without taking any steps required to reduce the award to a 

judgment. Because the request for attorney fees was abandoned 

in the district court, we do not consider that potential award.
Andersen v. Andersen

20140885-CA 6 2015 UT App 260

remand, pursuant to their request made under rules 33 and 40 of 

the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

¶9 We affirm the order of dismissal. We remand for the 

determination of attorney fees as specified herein.