# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 13 , 201 9

Decided March 13 , 201 9

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN

, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER

, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE

, Circuit Judge

No. 18

- 1608

UNITED STA T ES OF AMERICA

, Plaintiff

- Appellee

,

v

.

NATHANIEL FORD

, Defendant

- Appellant

. Appeal from the United States
District Court for Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division

.

No. 3:16CR020

- 001

Jon E. DeGuilio

, Judge

.

O R D E R

Nathani e l Ford was convicted by a jury of drug

- distribution and
firearms

- dealing charges , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, § 841(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B),
and 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), (g)(1), § 924(a)(2), and was eventually sentenced to
168 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release. He later admitted to violating the conditions of his supervision ( he had resumed dealing cocaine , for which
he pleaded guilty to a new state charge) and blamed his probation officer for the
violations. T he district court revoked his supervised release and re sentenced him to
18 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to his state prison term. Ford appeals

, but his appointed counsel has concluded that the appeal is frivolous and moves to NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 18

- 1608 Page 2

withdraw under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Ford has not responded to the
motion. See C IR

. R. 51(b).

At the outset we note that “ the Anders safeguards do not govern our review of
counsel’s motion to withdraw.” United States v. Wheeler , 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016).

T he Constitution does not provide a right to counsel in a revocation proceeding wher e, as here, the defendant concedes the alleged violations and does not dispute the appropriateness of revocation or assert substantial and complex arguments in mitigation

. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778 , 787 (197 3 ); United States v. Eskridge

, 445 F.3d 930, 932

– 33 (7th Cir. 2006)

. Nevertheless, in practice we still apply the Anders
framework

. Wheeler , 814 F.3d at 857. Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that a case of this kind might be expecte d to
involve. Because her analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects she discusses. See United States v. Bey , 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014)

.

Counsel first notes that Ford does not want to challenge the admissions on which
his revocation was based , and thus she properly refrains from discussing whether Ford’s admissions were knowing and voluntary. See Wheeler , 814 F.3d at 857 ; United States v. Knox , 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002)

.

Counsel next questions whether Ford could argue that his term of reimprisonment is plainly unreasonable but correctly concludes that this challenge
would be frivolous

. The parties stipulated that Ford’s conviction for dealing cocaine
constituted a Grade A violation and that his criminal history category was II, corresponding to a reimprisonment range of 27 to 33 months

. S ee U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1); § 7B1.4 . (They also agreed that the sentence should be 27 months. ) Because t he district court accepted these calculations without objection, our review is only for plain error.
See United States v. Brown , 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). We see no fault in these calculations and agree with counsel that any challenge would be frivo lous.

Counsel also considers but rightly rejects an argument that the district court failed to consider the pertinent factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and Ford’s arguments in mitigation. A sentence, like Ford’s, that falls below the policy

- statement range is presumptively reasonable on appeal. See United States v. Jones , 774 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Poetz , 582 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the court explained the sentence based on the Chapter 7 policy statements and relevant § 3553(a)
factors

, see 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a), highlighting the seriousness of the violations ( Ford had relapse d into using and selling drugs), the need to promote respect for the law ( he hadNo. 18

- 1608 Page 3

“reentered the drug business” after serving significant ti me for dealing drugs )

, the need to protect the public (in light of his continued drug dealing and gun possession), and Ford’s history and characteristics ( his “unquestionably ... difficult” childhood circumstances, his lengthy sentence on state gun and drug charge s , his violent tendencies and severe substance abuse, and his high risk of recidivating )

.

Finally, c ounsel notes that challenging the imposition of Ford’s federal
revocation sentence to run consecutively to his state prison term would be pointless.

T he Sentencing Commission has instructed that consecutive terms be imposed when revocation of supervised release results from a new prison sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) & Application Note 4; see also United States v. Peterson , 852 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2017). Moreover, the court acknowledge d that § 7B1.3(f) was advisory, but emphasized that “ only a consecutive sentence would adequately account for the
various [§] 3553(a) factors and avoid unwarranted sentence disparities .”

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw

, and DISMISS Ford ’s appeal.