[Cite as State v. Toran , 2022

- Ohio

- 2796.] 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO , Plaintiff

- Appell ee ,

vs.
JAMIE TORAN , Defendant

- Appell ant

. :

:

:

:

: APPEAL NO

. C

- 210 431 TRIAL NO

. B

- 1905672

O P I N I O N

.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Co urt of Common Pleas Judgmen t Appealed From Is : Reversed and Cause Remanded Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 12, 2022

Joseph T. Deters, Ham ilton County Pro secuting Attorney , and Philip R. Cummings , Assistant Prosecuting Attorney , for Plaintiff

- Appell ee , Brian A. Smith Law Fir m, LLC , and Brian A. Smith , for Defendant

- Appell ant

.OHIO FIRST DI STR ICT COURT OF APPEALS

2 M YER S , Presiding J udge. 

### {¶1} D efendant

- appell ant Jamie Toran was ar rested and charg e d with carrying a concealed weapon , impro per handling of a firearm in a moto r vehicle , and having a weapon while under a disability after police conducted a warrant less search of a vehicle during a tra ffic stop and found a loaded revolver in the inte rior panel of the passenger door

. Toran fi led a motion to supp ress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, and the trial court overruled the motion after a hearing. Following
Toran ’ s p leas of no contest , the trial court found Toran guil ty of the c harge s and

sentence d him to five years of community control

. T oran now appeals. 

### {¶2} Although the traffic stop was proper , b ecause the search of t he vehicle

was not justified under an exception to the Fourth Amendment ’ s warrant requirement, we hold that the trial c ourt erred in deny ing the motion t o suppress , and we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I. The Suppre

ssion Hearing 

### {¶3} A t the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that the search of the vehicle Toran w as driving was conducted without a warrant. The burden then shifte d to the state to establ ish that the search was nonetheless prop er. 

### {¶4} Hamilton County Sheriff ’ s Deputy Kevin Singleton tes tified that he conducted a tra ffic stop of a Chevrolet truck for improper display of a temporary lice nse pla card

. He said that th e vehicle had a partially tinte d window , and that the temporary license pla card was “ pushed down ” in the bottom right corner o f the vehicle ’ s rear window and was “ obscured. ” Du e to the tinting of the win dow and the positioning of the placard, the deputy testif ied, the placard w as not in plain view

. 

### {¶5} Toran, the driv er, was the sole occupant of the vehicle. He verbally iden tified him self to the deputy, but he had no license or government

- issued identifi cation on his person

. 

### {¶6} The deputy verified Toran ’ s ide ntity and learned that he had not had a valid driver ’ s license for three years . In addition, the deputy learned that Toran hadOHIO FIRST DI STR ICT COURT OF APPEALS

3 recently been stopped by another police agency for driving the same vehicle while he

was under a lic ense suspension

. The d eputy cited Toran for dri ving under suspension and for impro per display of a temporary lic ense placard. 

### {¶7} The deputy determined th at the vehi cle had to be towed because no licensed driver was present at the scene of the t raffic stop to drive the vehic le. The deputy testified:
Due to the stop and the statu s [of Toran ’ s suspended license] , what our
p olicy is, an inventory searc h of that veh icle wa s conducted, any damage, anything. I have been doing this occupa tion, road patrol, just sho rt of 20 years. I am systematic about how we do the tows because, if there i s damage all over the car, valuables can be in the car, and officers need to be accountable. 

### {¶8} The officer conducted a search of the vehicle and discovered a loaded revolver in the interior panel o f the pa ssenger door. Toran w as arrested and c harged with ca r rying a concealed weapon , impro per handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle , and having a weapon while under a dis ability

. II. The Trial Court ’ s Decision 

### {¶9} T he trial court denied th e motion to supp ress. In its oral comments explaining its decision, the court found that the traffic stop of the vehicle for improper display of a temporary license plac ard was pr oper . The court found that because of the tinted window a nd the positioning of the placard, the officer had probable cause to believe that a violation of the law requ iring tempo rary lic ense placar ds to be di spla yed in plain view had occurred. 

### {¶10} In addition , the court found that the d eputy was not able to release the vehicle to Tora n because h e did not have a driver ’ s license and had previously been stopped driving the vehicle while under suspension. T he court determined th at the warrantless search was conducted pursuant to the inventory

- sear c h exception to theOHIO FIRST DI STR ICT COURT OF APPEALS

4 warrant requirement, and that Toran ’ s Four th Amendment rights were no t violated

. The court denied Toran ’ s motion to suppress.
III. The Trial Court Erred by Deny ing the Motion to Suppress 

### {¶11} In two assignments of error, Toran argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppre ss
. In his fir st assignment of error, he challe nges the traffic stop, and in his second, he challenges the vehicle search. He ar gues that both the stop and the search violate d the Fourth and Fourteen th Amendments to the United S tates Const itution and Arti c le I, Section 14 , of the Ohio Constitution. 

### {¶12} Appellate review of a motion to sup press presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside , 1 00 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003

- Ohio

- 5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. We must accept the trial court ’ s factual findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but we review de nov o the trial court ’ s application of the law to those facts. Id. A. The Traffic Stop 

### {¶13} In his first assignment of error, Tora n argues that the tr i a l court erred
in ov erruling his mot ion to suppress where the traffic stop of his vehicle was not supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation or other criminal activity had occurred. 

### {¶14} The Fo u rth Amendment to the United States Constitution , as made applicable to th e states by the Fourt eenth Amendment, and Section 14 , Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and

se izures. See State v. Leak , 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016

- Ohio

- 154, 47 N.E. 3d 821, ¶ 13.
Be cause a traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment ’ s reasonableness requirement. State v. H owell , 2018

- Ohio

- 591, 106 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.) ; Whren v. United S tates , 517 U.S. 806, 809

- 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1 35 L.E d.2d 89 (1996).OHIO FIRST DI STR ICT COURT OF APPEALS

5 

### {¶15} When an officer witnesses a specific violation of the traffic code , a stop of the vehicle is supported by probable cause. Howe ll at ¶ 11

. “ The test is whether an objectively reaso nable police officer w ould believe that a traffic violation has occurred based upon the totality of the circumstances. ” I d. at ¶ 15 , quoting State v. Cronin , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C

- 100266, 2011

- Ohio

- 14 79, ¶ 11. 

### {¶16} In addition, even in the absen ce of probable cau se , an officer m ay in itiate a traffic stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime or a traffic violation has been, or is being, committed. Id. at ¶ 12; State v. Mays , 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008

- Ohio

- 4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204 , ¶ 7

. An inve stigator y traffic stop is permitted in such a sit uation for the officer to confirm or refute her or his suspicions

. Howell at ¶ 12. A court must examine the to tality of the circumstances to determine whether an officer had a reasonable articulab l e suspicion to i nitiate a traffic stop. Id. 

### {¶17} Probable cause is a stric ter standard tha n reasonable articulable
susp ici on. Mays at ¶ 23

. “ The former subsumes the latter . * * * An officer who has probable cause necessarily has a reasonable and ar ticulab le suspicio n , wh ich is all the officer needs to justify a stop. ” Id. 

### {¶18} Former R. C . 4503. 21(A )(3), in effect at the time of Toran ’ s traffic stop, allowed a temporary license plac ard to be displayed on th e rear wi ndow of the vehicle if the placard was in plai n view from the rear o f the vehicle and w as not covered by any material that obstructed the placa rd ’ s visibility : No person to whom a temporary license placard or windshield sticker
has been issued for the use of a motor vehicle under section 4503.182 of
the Revised C ode , and no operator of that motor vehicle, shall fail to display the temporary license placard in plain view from the rear of the
vehicle either in the rear window or on an external rear surface of the motor vehicle, or fail to display th e windshield sti cker in plain view onOHIO FIRST DI STR ICT COURT OF APPEALS

6 the rear window of the motor vehicle. No temporary license placard or windshield sticker shall be covered by any material that obstructs its visibility. 

### {¶19} The Twelfth District recently considered the same ve rsion of R.C. 4503.21(A)(3) i n State v. Smith , 12th Di st. Madison No. CA2021

- 11
- 020, 2022
- Ohio

23 8 3, ¶ 3, and explained:

“ The intent of the law is to require that license plates be visible to law enfor cement person nel and others who may have reason to not e the number f

or identificatio n purposes
. ” State v . An derson , 11 th Dist. Lake No. 2017

- L

- 127, 2018

- Ohio

- 2455, ¶ 18, citing State v. Durfee , 11th Dist. Lake No. 96

- L

- 198, 1998 Ohio App . LEXIS 865, *8 (Mar. 6, 1998)

. Because of this , the definition of “ plain view ” as us ed in that st atu te contemplates “ actually being able to read the letters and numbers ” on the temporary license placard being displayed from the rear of one ’ s vehicle. See Wilmington v. Connor , 144 Ohio App .3d 735, 739 [, 761 N.E.2d 663 ] (1 2th Dist.20 01) ( “ [ t ]he d efinition of ‘ plain view ’ contempl ates actually being able to read the letters and numbers on the license plate ” ), citing State v. Hanna , 6th Dist. Williams No. WM

- 99
- 016, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 879, * 7 (Mar. 10, 2000). 

### {¶20} At the suppression heari ng, the deputy testifie d that h e conducted a

tra ffic stop of the truck drive n by Toran because of the improper display of a temporary license “ plate. ” He testified that the temporary license placar d was pushed down into the bottom right corner of the rear window of the truck ’ s cab and that it was obscu red by the tint ing of th e wi ndow. Due to the tinting of the window and the p ositioning of the placard, he testified that the placard “ was ab solut ely not in plain v iew ” from the

r ear of the truck

.OHIO FIRST DI STR ICT COURT OF APPEALS

7 

### {¶21} Considering the tot ality of the cir cumstances, an objectivel y reasonable police officer would believe that Toran violated former R.C. 450 3.21(A) (3) because the temporary license placard was not in plain v ie w from the rear of the ve hicle. Ther efore, the deputy not only had a reaso nable arti culable suspicion to stop Toran, but he also had prob able cause to believe that a violation of the statute occurred
. Therefore, we hold that the trial court p roperly concluded that the tr affic stop was constituti onally valid

. We overrule the first assig n me nt of error.
B. The Veh

icle Search 

### {¶22} In his second assignment o f error, Toran argues that the tria l court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress because the warrantless vehicl e search w as not a proper inventory search. He argue s that the evide nce failed to show that the search w as conducted in accor dance with standard police procedure, and t ha t t he state did not provi de evidence of a standardized inv entory

- sear ch policy. 

### {¶23} The s tate asser ts that Toran fai led to raise the issue of an inventory

sea rch policy below and that he can not raise it on appeal. However, Toran ’ s motion to suppress sufficien tly alleged that a warrantless inventory search of his vehicle was conducted during a n improper traffic stop

. In addition, at the beg inni ng of the
suppre ss ion hearing, defense counsel asserted that there was no exc eption to the search

- warrant requ irement that would allow the deputy to lawfully search the vehicle

. 

### {¶24} Moreover, wh en the partie s stip ulated that t he deputy did not have a search w a rrant when he se arched the vehicle, “ [a]t that point, the state had the burden

to establish that there was an exceptio n to the war rant requirement that allowed [the deputy ] to search the vehicle. ” S ee S tate v . Beasley , 1st Di st. Hamilton No. C

- 180152,

201 9
- Ohio

- 3936, ¶ 1 5. The s tate ha d to establish which exception it was relying on ; Toran did not have to go forward wit h a n y argument or evidence until the state offe red evidence of an exception. Here, t he state ar gued be low, and the trial court found, tha t no Fourth Amen dment violation occurred because the evidence was discovered during an inventory sear ch of the vehicle

.OHIO FIRST DI STR ICT COURT OF APPEALS

8 

### {¶25} In genera l, warrantless searches are p er se unr easonable under the
Fo urth Amendment , subject to a few well

- established exceptions. Katz v. United
State s , 38 9 U.S. 347, 35 7, 88 S. Ct . 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). An inventory search of

a v ehicle is one of the well

- establish ed exception s to the Fourth Amendment ’ s warrant requirement. Stat

e v
. Banks

- Harvey , 152 Ohio St.3d 368, 201 8

- Ohio

- 201, 96 N. E .3d
26 2, ¶ 20
. “ An inventory search is not subject to the Fou r th Amendment ’ s warrant requirement or a pro babl e - cause review , because it is a search that is made for admi nis tra tive reason s and is u nrelated to a criminal investigatio n
. ” Id. The pur pose is to make a record of what is found in and on the vehicle. The inventory search of a vehicle protects an owner ’ s property while it remains in polic e custody, protects po lice against claim s of lost, stolen , or damage d pro perty , a nd prot ect s police fr om dan gerous i te m s
. See i d. at ¶ 21 ; South Dakota v. Opper man , 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 100 0 (1976 ). 

### {¶26} An in ventory search of a vehicle must follow a lawful im pound ment of that vehicle a nd must not be a pretext for an evidentiary search. Leak , 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016

- Ohio

- 154, 47 N.E. 3d 821, at ¶ 30. An inventory search must be conducted
in good faith and in accor danc e with rea sonable standardized procedures o r established routines. State v. Hath man , 65 Ohio St.3d 403, 604 N.E.2d 74 3 (1992),
paragrap h one of the syllabus

. “ While th ose procedures need not be in writing, the state must show that the po lice de partment has a standardized rout ine policy, and that the officer ’ s conduct con f ormed to that policy. ” State v. Smith , 1st Dist. H amilton No.
C

- 20 0 352 , 20 21
- Ohio

- 2654, ¶ 35, quoting State v. Ojile , 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C

110 677 and C

- 110678 , 2012
- Ohio

- 6 015, ¶ 66. 

### {¶27} In State v. Beasley , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C

- 180152, 2019

- Ohio

- 393 6, this court held that t he state failed to demonstr ate that a warra n tless search of a vehicle was conducted pur suant to a proper inventory search where no evidence was
pr esented regarding the polic e departme nt ’ s inventory

- search policy

. “ The policy was

n ot intro duced at the [suppressi on] hearing, and [the officer] did no t test ify to itsOHIO FIRST DI STR ICT COURT OF APPEALS

9 details. ” Beasley at ¶ 14. We said that, at most, the officer ’ s testimony reflected that his department had a policy under which: [W]e inventory the vehicle to make sur e that we write down any pertinent belongings that m ight be in the v e hicle so that [ an occupant ’ s ] objects an d items in the vehicle are protected when it goes to the tow l ot to make sure all of those ite ms are returned. Id. 

### {¶28} We held that not only was the of ficer ’ s testimony insufficient, but the video eviden ce did not indic a te “ that the officers followed eve n this ‘ procedure ’ as neither officer is seen writing anything down, an d no writing was introduced at the hearing. ” Id. We held that without evidence o f the department ’ s inventory

- sea rch policy, whether by introduction o f the poli cy itself or by an officer ’ s te st imony about the poli cy ’ s details, the state d id not meet it s burden to demonstrate that an exception to the warrant requirement allowed the offi cer to search the vehicle

. Id. at ¶ 15. We

reverse d the appellant ’ s conviction and the de cision of the trial court denying the motion to suppress. I

d . at ¶ 16. 

### {¶29} Similar to Beasley , in this case , the state did not present evidence regarding the policy tha t the deputy was relying u pon for the vehicle searc h

— the
p olicy was not introduced into evidence, and the deputy ’ s testimony did not set forth
any d eta il s about the sheri ff ’ s dep artment inventory

- search policy

. At most, the dep uty ’ s testimony as to a she riff ’ s department policy , as set forth above, was th at h e conducted a n “ inve ntory search ” of the vehicle, that in his nearly 20 years a s a pa trol officer, he was “ systemat ic about how we do the tows because, if the re is da mage all over the car, valuables c an be in the car, and officers need to be accountabl e. ” In short,

t h ere was no evidence as to what the policy or procedures were

. 

### {¶30} Th e evidence pres ented by the state was insufficient to demonstrate th at the inventory search of the vehicle was made in acco rdance with standardized procedures of the she riff ’ s dep artment. Co n sequently, the state failed to meet itsOHIO FIRST DI STR ICT COURT OF APPEALS

10 burden to demonstrate that there was an exception to the Fourt h Amendment ’ s warrant requirement that allowed the deputy to search the ve hicle. See Beasley , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C

- 180 152 , 2019
- Ohio

- 3936, at ¶ 15. We hold that th e deputy ’ s warrantless search of the vehicle was not reaso nable under the Fourth Amendm ent and that the trial court erred by fail ing to suppress the evidence se ized in the search. We sustain the second assignment of error.
IV. Conclusion 

### {¶31} Cons e quently, we reverse T oran ’ s convictions and the decision of the trial court denying his motion to supp ress. We remand this case for furth er
proce edings in accordance with the law and thi s opinion. Judgment re versed and cause remanded

.
B E RGERON and B OCK , J J ., concur.
Pl ease note: The c ourt has recorded its own entry this date.