PRESENT: All the Justices 

THE LAMAR COMPANY, LLC, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 042904 JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 

 November 4, 2005 

BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge 

The Lamar Company, LLC, Eastern Heights, LLC, and Liberty 

Broadcasting Network, Inc. (collectively “Lamar”) appeal from 

the judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg, 

affirming the decision of the Lynchburg Board of Zoning Appeals 

denying Lamar’s request to change the location of two 

billboards. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 

In November 2003, Lamar contacted Lynchburg zoning 

officials requesting approval to remove two billboards and reerect those billboards approximately ten yards from their 

present locations.1

 The present and proposed billboard locations 

were on parcels of land zoned as B-5 (General Commercial) 

districts under the Lynchburg City Code. The pertinent 

Lynchburg code section regarding billboards in a B-5 district 

provides: 

 1

 Lamar also planned to remove one additional billboard, but 

because that billboard would not be re-erected, it is not at 

issue in this case. 
2

No person shall cause to be constructed or erected in 

a B-5 district any billboard except a billboard that 

replaces a then existing billboard in a B-5 district. 

Any billboard existing in a B-5 district at the time 

of enactment of this ordinance, and any replacements 

and any billboard existing in an I-2 or I-3 district 

at the time of the enactment of this ordinance shall 

not be considered as a nonconforming billboard 

provided said billboard is in compliance with this 

ordinance. All other billboards existing at the time 

of enactment of this ordinance shall be deemed 

nonconforming billboards. 

Lynchburg City Code (hereinafter “City Code”) § 35.1- 

26.1(1).2

City Code § 35.1-26.1(1) does not define the term 

“replaces,” but § 35.1-11.1(a) provides that any undefined words 

in the zoning ordinance shall be defined according to Webster’s 

Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 

Unabridged (Phillip B. Gove, Ph.D., ed., Merriam Webster, Inc., 

Springfield, Mass. 1961) (hereinafter “Webster’s Third 

Dictionary”). See City Code § 35.1-11.1(a). That dictionary 

defines “replace” as follows: 

1 : to place again : restore to a former place, 

position, or condition <replaced the card in the file> 

<replaced the king on the throne> 2 : to take the 

place of : serve as a substitute for or successor of :

SUCCEED, SUPPLANT <the saw and sawmill rapidly replaced

the ax –Amer. Guide Series: Mich.> <the dried wood 

. . . has long been replaced by steel and concrete –

T.H. Matthews> 3 : to put in place of : provide a 

substitute or successor for <necessary to ~ all the 

machinery in the plant> 4 : to fill the place of :

supply an equivalent for <a broken toy should not be 

 2

 The current provisions of the Lynchburg City Code 

governing billboards can be found in City Code § 35.1-26.13. 
3

immediately replaced –Bertrand Russell> <promised to ~ 

the money he had stolen>. 

Id. at 1925. 

Using the first definition, the City of Lynchburg Zoning 

Administrator concluded that new billboards would only satisfy 

the City Code if they were in “the exact same location” as (i.e. 

the footprint of) the existing billboards. Since Lamar’s 

proposed billboards would not be in the footprint of the 

existing billboards, the Zoning Administrator denied Lamar’s 

request to move the billboards. 

Lamar appealed the Zoning Administrator’s decision to 

Lynchburg’s Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA). The BZA heard from 

representatives of both parties regarding the desired change of 

location for the billboards, the ordinance’s general purpose, 

and its specific application in this case. The BZA also 

considered the desire for uniform interpretation of the 

ordinance, recognizing several past instances where the BZA 

determined that a replacement billboard must be in the identical 

or “footprint” location of its predecessor. Discussion centered 

on the definition of “replaces” and whether the Zoning 

Administrator properly interpreted that term to require 

footprint placement. Finding that the footprint interpretation 

of “replaces” was consistent with the definition found in 
4

Webster’s Third Dictionary and prior applications, the BZA 

affirmed the Zoning Administrator’s decision. 

Lamar appealed the BZA decision to the Circuit Court of the 

City of Lynchburg, as authorized by Code § 15.2-2314. Neither 

party introduced evidence beyond the record from the BZA 

proceeding. Lamar specifically represented to the trial court 

that “the facts are not in dispute” and “[t]he issue here is 

what the word replaces means in [City Code] Section 35.1-26.1.” 

After reviewing the Zoning Administrator’s interpretation 

of the term “replaces,” the trial court affirmed the BZA’s 

decision in a letter opinion, incorporated in its final order. 

The trial court held: 

The [BZA’s] decision is presumed to be correct, 

Virginia Code Section 15.2-2314. The petitioners have 

not rebutted that presumption. This Court cannot find 

that the Board “. . . applied erroneous principles of 

law or was plainly wrong and in violation of the 

purposes and intent of the zoning ordinance”, Higgs v. 

Kirkbride, 258 Va. 567, 573 (1999).

 We awarded Lamar this appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 On appeal to this Court, Lamar raises three assignments of 

error, which can be condensed to the following two issues. 

First, whether the trial court erred by reviewing the BZA’s 

decision under a standard of “appl[ying] erroneous principles of 

law or [being] plainly wrong” when Code § 15.2-2314 does not use 

that standard. And second, whether the trial court erred in 
5

sustaining the BZA decision because “that decision was not 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

This case presents the first occasion for our review of 

paragraph five of current Code § 15.2-2314, which was added to 

the statute in 2003.3 This new language provides as follows: 

In the case of an appeal from the board of zoning 

appeals to the circuit court of an order, requirement, 

decision or determination of a zoning administrator or 

other administrative officer in the administration or 

enforcement of any ordinance or provision of state 

law, or any modification of zoning requirements 

pursuant to § 15.2-2286, the decision of the board of 

zoning appeals shall be presumed to be correct. The 

appealing party may rebut that presumption by proving 

by a preponderance of the evidence, including the 

record before the board of zoning appeals, that the 

board of zoning appeals erred in its decision.

Code § 15.2-2314 (emphasis added). 

Prior to the foregoing 2003 amendment, the common law 

standard of review provided that the presumption of correctness 

of a BZA decision was rebutted only when the BZA applied 

“erroneous principles of law” or its interpretation was “plainly 

wrong and in violation of the purpose and intent of the zoning 

ordinance.” See, e.g., City of Suffolk v. Board of Zoning 

Appeals, 266 Va. 137, 142, 580 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2003). 

Lamar argues that the trial court erred when it affirmed 

the BZA’s decision because the trial court opined it could not 

 3

 The 2003 amendments to Code § 15.2-2314 made minor 

cosmetic changes to the existing statute and added the fifth and 

sixth paragraphs. 
6

“find that the [BZA] ‘applied erroneous principles of law or was 

plainly wrong and in violation of the purposes and intent of the 

zoning ordinance.’ ” Lamar contends that even though the trial 

court cited to the proper statute, it used the prior standard of 

review, “erroneous principles of law or . . . plainly wrong,” 

instead of the new statutory standard of review, “that the board 

of zoning appeals erred in its decision.”4

 Lamar argues it did 

rebut the presumption that the BZA decision was correct by 

showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the BZA erred. 

In response, the BZA argues that the trial court correctly 

relied on the existing statute, as evidenced by the citation in 

its opinion letter to Code § 15.2-2314 as the basis of review. 

In addition, the BZA argues that the “preponderance of the 

evidence” burden of proof applies only to disputed issues of 

fact, and thus is inapplicable to the case at bar, which 

presents a purely legal question – interpreting the term 

“replaces” in the Lynchburg City Code. Accordingly, the BZA 

avers that if the trial court did not err in the resolution of 

that legal question, then it properly applied the presumption of 

correctness. We agree with the BZA. 

While Lamar is correct in the abstract as to the statutory 

change to the standard of review under Code § 15.2-2314, its 

 4

 The parties agree that Code § 15.2-2314, as amended in 

2003, was in effect and is the applicable statute in the case at 
7

argument has no nexus to the issue before the trial court in 

this case. The “preponderance of the evidence” standard is used 

in analyzing the sufficiency of the record to prove a particular 

claim of fact.5 Thus, in Code § 15.2-2314, a “preponderance of 

the evidence” may rebut the presumption of correctness when 

there is a factual dispute and the truth and sufficiency of 

those facts must be weighed. In this respect, the 2003 

amendments to Code § 15.2-2314 changed the standard of review 

where issues of fact are before the trial court. 

But the case at bar does not involve disputed issues of 

fact. The parties agreed no questions of fact were before the 

trial court and neither party presented additional evidence. 

The sole issue before the trial court was a question of law – 

whether the BZA correctly interpreted the term “replaces” under 

City Code § 35.1-26.1(1). The trial court had no need or basis 

to apply the statute’s “preponderance of the evidence” burden of 

 

bar. 

5

 See, e.g., Northern Virginia Power Co. v. Bailey, 194 Va. 

464, 471, 73 S.E.2d 425, 430 (1952) (quoting Sargent v. 

Massachusetts Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1940)), where 

this Court stated that “preponderance of the evidence” is the 

power to convince the tribunal which has the 

determination of the fact, of the actual truth of the 

proposition to be proved. After the evidence has been 

weighed, that proposition is proved by a preponderance 

of the evidence if it is made to appear more likely or 

probable in the sense that actual belief in its truth, 

derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or minds 

of the tribunal, notwithstanding any doubts that may 

linger there. 
8

proof standard because no issue of fact was before it for 

resolution. In that regard, the preponderance standard has no 

bearing on the trial court’s consideration as to whether the BZA 

“erred in its decision” on a principle of law. 

The trial court begins its review with the presumption, 

unchanged by the 2003 amendments, that the BZA decision is 

correct. Code § 15.2-2314. In order to rebut the presumption 

under the facts in this case, Lamar was required to establish 

that the BZA erred in determining the legal question of the 

proper interpretation of the term “replaces” in City Code 

§ 35.1-26.1(1). 

In the case at bar, the Zoning Administrator chose from 

amongst the possible definitions of “replaces,” an 

interpretation that he determined best reflected the meaning of 

the word within the context of the ordinance. Although the 

“footprint” requirement may not have been the only possible 

interpretation, it certainly falls within the reasonable scope 

of the Webster’s Third Dictionary definition required by City 

Code § 35.1-11.1(a). Both the Zoning Administrator and the BZA 

had previously interpreted City Code § 35.1-26.1(1) to require 

“footprint” replacement. Both were familiar with the use of the 

word “replaces” in comparison to the use of this and similar 

words (e.g., “relocate”) throughout the City’s zoning 

ordinances. 
9

Nothing in the amendments to Code § 15.2-2314 eliminates 

the long-standing desire for consistent interpretation of zoning 

ordinances, an objective best accomplished by those charged with 

enforcing such ordinances. “A consistent administrative 

construction of an ordinance by the officials charged with its 

enforcement is entitled to great weight.” Masterson v. Board of 

Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 44, 353 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1987); see 

also Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Gloria Mfg. Corp., 222 Va. 279, 

281, 279 S.E.2d 166, 168 (1981) (discussing the deference given 

to agencies interpreting regulations). 

 Deference to such administrative construction in such 

circumstances is appropriate for several reasons. Zoning 

ordinances establish and maintain order within local areas, see

Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 

S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959); in turn, uniform application and 

interpretation of specific zoning ordinances furthers this 

objective. Zoning administrators and boards of zoning appeals 

charged with applying zoning ordinances are able to ensure 

consistent application consonant with a local government’s 

intent for specific ordinances. Such agencies develop expertise 

in the relationship between particular textual language and a 

local government’s overall zoning plan. 

Each of these factors supports an appellate court’s 

deference to the decision of a zoning administrator or board of 
10

zoning appeals in interpreting an ordinance unless that body 

“erred in its decision” concerning a matter of law. Moreover, 

these factors also reflect that the trial court did not err in 

affirming the BZA’s application of the term “replaces” as a 

matter of law in requiring footprint location for replacement of 

the subject billboards. 

Lamar further argues that the BZA’s interpretation of the 

use of the word “replaces” in City Code § 35.1-26.1(1) is 

internally inconsistent and also inconsistent with another 

provision in the City’s zoning ordinances. First, Lamar 

contends that City Code § 35.1-26.1(1) “broadly using the 

article ‘a’ to describe the district (rather than ‘the,’ ‘that,’ 

etc.) indicates that a replacement for a billboard in one B-5 

district may be placed in any B-5 district, without limitation.” 

Second, Lamar avers that City Code § 35.1-26.1(10), which 

prohibits billboards from being “erected, rebuilt, altered or 

relocated without a permit from the city’s division of 

inspections . . .” implies that “replaces” in subsection (1) 

must be the equivalent of “relocate.” This is so, it argues, 

because nonconforming billboards cannot be moved, so the only 

billboards that could possibly be “relocated” under this 

subsection must be those billboards, such as the ones at issue 
11

in the present case, that are conforming billboards under City 

Code § 35.1-26.1(1).6

Lastly, Lamar argues that City Code § 35.1-27 calls the 

BZA’s interpretation of City Code § 35.1-26.1(1) into question 

because City Code § 35.1-27 specifically prohibits 

“nonconforming uses [from being] moved, in whole or in part, to 

any other portion of the lot or parcel of land occupied by such 

nonconforming use at the time of the adoption of this 

ordinance.” City Code § 35.1-27(e)(2). Because the City Code 

unambiguously prohibits the relocation of nonconforming 

structures, Lamar contends the term “replaces” in City Code 

§ 35.1-26.1(1) cannot properly be interpreted to prohibit 

relocation of a conforming use without creating an inconsistency 

between the ordinances. 

None of these arguments are convincing. Lamar’s arguments 

view the language of the ordinances it cites in isolation and 

not in light of the texts’ context within each ordinance. City 

Code § 35.1-26.1 is a general ordinance relating to billboards. 

Subsection 1, however, specifically addresses billboards located 

in B-5, I-2, and I-3 districts. By focusing on the subsection’s 

use of the general modifier “a” versus a specific modifier such 

as “the” or “that,” Lamar overlooks the significant word choice 

 6

 The parties agreed that the existing billboards were a 

conforming use under the City Code. 
12

in this section – the use of the word “replaces” and ignores the 

distinctly different meanings of the words “replace” and 

“relocate.” 

In addition, subsection 1 applies narrowly (only to 

billboards in B-5, I-2, and I-3 districts), while subsection 10 

applies to all billboards. While a B-5 replacement billboard 

might be “rebuilt” as a replacement and receive a permit under 

subsection 10, an I-2 billboard might be relocated. This 

distinction shows not that the local government intended 

“replace” and “relocate” to be equivalent terms, but to be terms 

of distinct meaning. 

A similar distinction is found between subsection 1 of City 

Code § 35.1-26.1, which is limited to billboards in B-5, I-2, 

and I-3 districts, and City Code § 35.1-27, which applies to all

nonconforming uses. City Code § 35.1-26.1(1) is the specific 

ordinance dealing with a conforming use billboard. As such, 

City Code § 35.1-27 would not apply as it deals with a different 

subject matter – all nonconforming uses. The language of City 

Code § 35.1-26.1(1) is the local government’s expression of 

restriction barring relocation of a conforming use. Indeed, 

since a nonconforming use could not be relocated, City Code 

§ 35.1-26.1(1) is logically written as it is so as to restrict 

the otherwise conforming use billboard from claiming a right to 

relocate. Moreover, even if one assumed a conflict between the 
13

two ordinances, the more specific ordinance, City Code § 35.1-

26.1, would control. Natrella v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 

Va. 451, 461, 345 S.E.2d 295, 302 (1986). 

III. CONCLUSION 

The trial court, under the facts of this case, did not apply 

an incorrect standard of review under Code § 15.2-2314 as it 

solely resolved a question of law. Because Lamar did not assign 

error to any factual basis of the trial court’s decision, the 

presumption of the correctness of the BZA’s decision is not at 

issue as to any factual matter. Therefore, finding no error in 

the judgment of the trial court, we will affirm that judgment. 

Affirmed.