J-S57023-18

____________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellee

v.

KERRY RANSOME 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2268 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 16, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0003919-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., PLATT*, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2018

Appellant, Kerry Ransome, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his bench conviction of aggravated assault, burglary, 

criminal trespass, simple assault, possession of a firearm prohibited, firearms 

not to be carried without a license, carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, 

possession of an instrument of crime, and recklessly endangering another 

person (REAP).1 We vacate Appellant’s conviction of firearms not to be carried 

without a license and carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, and affirm in 

all other respects.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 3502(a)(1)(i), 3503(a)(1)(ii), 2701(a), 

6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108, 907(a), and 2705, respectively.
J-S57023-18

- 2 -

The trial court aptly set forth the factual and procedural background as 

follows:

At 7:30 P.M. on March 11, 2016, [Appellant] kicked open 

the door to Rashida Butler’s residence, pointed a gun at her and 

her friend, and struck Ms. Butler in the head with the firearm 

before running away. [Appellant] and Ms. Butler had dated in the 

past but were no longer dating at the time of this incident. Ms. 

Butler was taken to the hospital by ambulance for a laceration to 

her forehead.

The [c]ourt found [Appellant] guilty of the above offenses 

and deferred sentencing for completion of a presentence 

investigation. Because [Appellant] had previously been convicted 

of robbery, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of [not less 

than ten nor more than twenty] years of incarceration for the 

burglary conviction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9714. On June 

16, 2017, the [c]ourt imposed the mandatory minimum sentence, 

as well as concurrent terms of [not less than five nor more than 

ten] years of incarceration for the aggravated assault conviction 

and the violation of section 6105 [(possession of a firearm 

prohibited)]. The [c]ourt ordered no further penalty on the 

remaining offenses, for an aggregate sentence of [not less than] 

ten [nor more than] twenty years. [Appellant] appeals.[

2]

(Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/17, at 1-2) (record citation omitted).

Appellant raises two questions for our review.

[1.] Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to convict 

[Appellant] of the crimes of possessing a firearm without a license 

and carrying a firearm in Philadelphia as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 6106 and 6108 of the Crimes Code where the evidence of 

record does not establish that the item allegedly used by 

[Appellant] had a barrel length or overall length which satisfied 

the definition of firearm as that term is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6102?

____________________________________________

2 Appellant filed a timely statement of errors complained of on appeal on 

August 7, 2017. With the court’s permission, he also filed supplemental 

statements on August 10, 2017 and August 29, 2017. The court filed an 

opinion on December 19, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
J-S57023-18

- 3 -

[2.] Should the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the 

trial court under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 be vacated, and this matter 

remanded for a new sentencing hearing, due to the fact that § 

9714 is unconstitutional as currently drafted insofar as it violates 

[Appellant’s] rights under the Fifth and/or Sixth Amendment to 

the U.S. Constitution (made applicable in this matter by the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) and Article I, § 

9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 5).

In his first issue, Appellant maintains that the evidence was insufficient 

to prove that he violated sections 6106 (firearms not to be carried without a 

license) and 6108 (carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia) of the Uniform 

Firearms Act because “there is no evidence of record that [he] possessed a 

‘firearm’ as that term is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102.” (Id. at 19). The 

court and the Commonwealth agree that the convictions on these two counts 

should be vacated, but maintain that the case need not be remanded for 

resentencing because it does not affect the overall sentencing scheme. (See 

Trial Ct. Op., at 3; Commonwealth’s Brief, at 2). We agree.

Our standard of review of this matter is well-settled.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the 

fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may 

be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 
J-S57023-18

- 4 -

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact [,] while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Davison, 177 A.3d 955, 957 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted).

The Crimes Code provides, in pertinent part, that a person is guilty of 

firearms not to be carried without a license if: “Except as provided in 

paragraph (2), [he] carries a firearm . . . concealed on or about his person, 

except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and 

lawfully issued license under this chapter[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). 

Further, “[n]o person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time upon 

the public streets or upon any public property in a city of the first class unless:

(1) such person is licensed to carry a firearm[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(1). 

Pursuant to this Firearms Act, “firearm” is defined, in relevant part, as “[a]ny 

pistol or revolver with a barrel length less than 15 inches, any shotgun with a 

barrel length less than 18 inches or any rifle with a barrel length less than 16 

inches, or any pistol, revolver, rifle or shotgun with an overall length of less 

than 26 inches.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102.

Here, as conceded by the trial court, the Commonwealth did not 

establish the length of the gun possessed by Appellant. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 
J-S57023-18

- 5 -

3).3 After our independent review of the record, we agree. Although Ms. 

Butler described the color of the weapon, the Commonwealth presented no 

evidence of its size. (See N.T. Trial, 2/17/17, at 15). Accordingly, we agree 

with the court and Appellant that the evidence was not sufficient to establish 

that he possessed a firearm as defined by section 6102. See Davison, supra

at 957. Hence, we vacate Appellant’s conviction for violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 6106 and 6108. However, because the court did not impose penalties on 

these convictions, our disposition does not affect the overall sentencing 

scheme, and we decline to remand for resentencing. See Commonwealth 

v. Demor, 691 A.2d 958, 963 n.9 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 704 A.2d 

1380 (Pa. 1997) (“[I]t is unnecessary for us to remand this case for 

resentencing since our decision did not alter the lower court’s sentencing 

scheme.”) (citation omitted).

In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the court imposed an illegal 

mandatory minimum sentence on his charge of burglary “because [section] 

9714 is unconstitutional as currently drafted.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 26). This 

issue does not merit relief. 

The scope and standard of review applied to determine the 

legality of a sentence are well established. If no statutory 

authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is 

illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be 

vacated. In evaluating a trial court’s application of a statute, our

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth also agrees that these convictions should be vacated. 

(See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 2).
J-S57023-18

- 6 -

standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining 

whether the trial court committed an error of law.

Commonwealth v. Dixon, 161 A.3d 949, 951 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted).

Section 9714 of the Judicial Code provides, in pertinent part: 

Any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth 

of a crime of violence shall, if at the time of the commission of the 

current offense the person had previously been convicted of a 

crime of violence, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least 

ten years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other 

provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. . . .

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(1).

Instantly, Appellant maintains that imposing a mandatory minimum 

sentence pursuant to section 9714 violates Alleyne v. United States, 570 

U.S. 99 (2013), in which the United States Supreme Court held that any fact 

that increases a mandatory minimum sentence must be found beyond a 

reasonable doubt by the fact-finder. See Alleyne, supra at 103; (see also

Appellant’s Brief, at 26-47). However, Appellant acknowledges that, in 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777 (Pa. Super. 2015), this Court held 

that “Alleyne did not overturn prior precedent that prior convictions are 

sentencing factors and not elements of offenses.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 26) 

(quoting Reid, supra at 784 (record citation omitted)). In fact, he expressly 

concedes that, “following Alleyne, this Honorable Court held in . . . [Reid]

that [section] 9714 is not constitutionally infirm in the wake of Alleyne.” (Id. 

at 38). In spite of this concession, he urges this Court to “change [] existing 
J-S57023-18

- 7 -

law[,]” and conclude that section 9714 is unconstitutional. (Id. at 26; see id.

at 26-47).

We decline Appellant’s invitation because this Court is “an error 

correcting court[.]” Commonwealth v. Snyder, 60 A.3d 165, 178 (Pa. 

Super. 2013), appeal denied, 70 A.3d 811 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). 

Therefore, “we will affirm trial court decisions which are in accord with 

principles of law adopted by prior appellate court decisions.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

Here, at the time of committing the crimes in this case, Appellant had a 

prior conviction for robbery, a crime of violence. Therefore, the trial court did 

not commit an error of law in imposing a mandatory minimum sentence 

pursuant to section 9714 where this was “in accord with principles of law 

adopted by prior appellate court decisions.” Id. (citation omitted); see also

Dixon, supra at 951; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/7/18