alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
151 So. 880

#### LIFE & CASUALTY INS. CO. OF TENNESSEE v. WOMACK.

8 Div. 553.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 1, 1933.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1934.

Moreau P. Estes, of Nashville, Tenn., for petitioner.

Fred S. Parnell, of Florence, opposed.

*71BOULDIN, Justice.

In this cause the respondent moves to strike from the petition for certiorari some ten pages purporting to set out the evidence presented on the trial of the cause in the court below.

That the Court of Appeals is an appellate court, and that a review of its decisions by certiorari in this court is limited to questions of law, which may include misapplication of the law to the facts as found by that court from the record before it, has been too firmly established to call for further discussion or citation of cases. This court looks to the opinion of the Court of Appeals alone for findings of fact. It 'follows that recitals of the evidence found in the record in that court have no place in a petition for certiorari to this court. The motion of respondent to strike these pages from the petition is granted.

 Assignment of error No. 1, considered by the Court of Appeals, and presented in the petition for certiorari, reads: “There is no evidence to support the verdict and judgment of the Lower Court.”

Appellate courts review only questions reserved on the trial, and reverse the lower court only for errors of the court to the prejudice of appellant. The assignment above quoted alleges no error in the trial court. As well known, our statute forbids the trial court giving the jury any charge on the effect of the evidence except upon request in writing. The assignment does not allege error for failure to give any such charge, nor for failure to grant a motion for new trial.

 Petitioner, in argument, seems to contend that, when there is no evidence to support a verdict, it is the duty of appellate courts to so declare, and that a failure to reverse or vacate such a judgment is a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Such position is untenable. It would strike down the entire system of appellate courts, a part of our constitutional system of government. Due process of law is provided when the party is given full opportunity to present the questions of law and fact in the trial court, with the right to reserve questions for review, and have them reviewed by the appellate courts. All this is provided for by law in an orderly administration of justice.

Petitioner further insists defendant’s refused charges 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 were, in effect, affirmative charges for defendant, and should have been so treated by the Court of Appeals. These charges cannot be so construed. They definitely submit to the jury the issue of sound health of the insured when the policy was delivered. The.Court of Appeals correctly held they were covered by the oral charge and given charge 5.

Motion to strike granted; writ denied.

ANDERSON, O. J., and GARDNER and FOSTER, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theresa Sirri MUBANG, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-7067.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 30, 2013.

Decided: Oct. 9, 2013.

Theresa Sirri Mubang, Appellant Pro Se. Steve Alan Liniek, Office of the United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Theresa Mubang appeals a district court order denying her motion to modify restitution payments and her motion to vacate the restitution order. We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand.

In her motion to modify, Mubang was seeking a district court order directing the Bureau of Prisons to modify the payment schedule under the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Because Mubang was challenging the execution of her sentence, such a request should have been made in a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp.2013) petition. *See United States v. Diggs,*578 F.3d 318, 319 (5th Cir.2009). Because Mubang is currently incarcerated at the SFF Hazelton in the Northern District of West Virginia, the district court in this instance did not have jurisdiction to entertain the request to modify the payment schedule because a § 2241 petition must be filed in the district of incarceration. *See*28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a); *In re Jones,*226 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir.2000). However, a district court must “if it is in the interest of justice, transfer [the petition] ... to any other such court in which [it] could have been brought at the time it was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006).

Accordingly, we vacate that part of the order denying Mubang’s motion to modify and remand for the district court to determine whether transferring Mubang’s motion to modify to the proper federal district court would serve the interests of justice, *see*28 U.S.C. § 1631, or whether the action is more appropriately dismissed without prejudice to allow Mubang to file her action in the appropriate district court.

Because Mubang did not establish any reason to grant her motion to vacate the order of restitution, we affirm for the reasons cited by the district court. *United States v. Mubang,*No. 1:01-cr-00252LMB-1 (E.D.Va. June 14, 2013).

Accordingly, we affirm that part of the district court’s order denying the motion to vacate and we vacate that part of the order denying the motion to modify and remand for further consideration by the district court in accordance with this opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*332
      *AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.*
# C_2018022EN.01004001.xml

| 22.1.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 22/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.1.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 22/40

---

Judgment of the General Court of 30 November 2017 — Mackevision Medien Design v EUIPO (TO CREATE REALITY)

(Case T-50/17) (1)

1

((EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark TO CREATE REALITY - Trade mark consisting in an advertising slogan - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 [now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001]))

(2018/C 022/55)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Mackevision Medien Design GmbH Stuttgart (Stuttgart, Germany) (represented by: E. Stolz, U. Stelzenmüller and J. Weiser, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Graul and S. Hanne, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 December 2016 (Case R 995/2016-5) concerning an application for registration of the word sign TO CREATE REALITY as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mackevision Medien Design GmbH Stuttgart to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mackevision Medien Design GmbH Stuttgart to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.

1

---
# fcmdata0204
Case 1:07-cv-05313-AKH Document 34 Filed 08/01/2008 Page 1 of 1
# C_2020137EN.01001301.xml

| 27.4.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.4.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/13

---

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 31 January 2020 — Republic of Slovenia v Republic of Croatia

(Case C-457/18) (1)

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Article 259 TFEU - Jurisdiction of the Court - Determination of the common border between two Member States - Border dispute between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia - Arbitration agreement - Arbitration proceedings - Notification by the Republic of Croatia of its decision to terminate the agreement because of an irregularity alleged by it to have been committed by a member of the arbitral tribunal - Arbitration award made by the arbitral tribunal - Alleged failure by the Republic of Croatia to observe the arbitration agreement and the border established by the arbitration award - Principle of sincere cooperation - Request that a document be removed from the case file - Protection of legal advice)

(2020/C 137/16)

Language of the case: Croatian

Parties

Applicant: Republic of Slovenia (represented by: M. Menard, acting as Agent, and J.-M. Thouvenin, avocat)

Defendant: Republic of Croatia (represented by: G. Vidović Mesarek, acting as Agent, and J. Stratford QC)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Orders that the internal working document of the European Commission relating to the opinion of its Legal Service, which appears at pages 38 to 45 of Annex C.2 to the Republic of Slovenia’s response to the objection of inadmissibility, be removed from the file for Case C-457/18; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Orders that the internal working document of the European Commission relating to the opinion of its Legal Service, which appears at pages 38 to 45 of Annex C.2 to the Republic of Slovenia’s response to the objection of inadmissibility, be removed from the file for Case C-457/18;

| 2. | Declares that the Court of Justice of the European Union lacks jurisdiction to rule on the Republic of Slovenia’s action, brought on the basis of Article 259 TFEU, in Case C-457/18; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Declares that the Court of Justice of the European Union lacks jurisdiction to rule on the Republic of Slovenia’s action, brought on the basis of Article 259 TFEU, in Case C-457/18;

| 3. | Orders the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 399, 5.11.2018.

---
Case 1:07-cv-05346-AKH Document 3 Filed 08/03/2007 Page 1 of 5
Case 1:07-cv-05346-AKH Document 3 Filed 08/03/2007 Page 2 of 5
Case 1:07-cv-05346-AKH Document 3 Filed 08/03/2007 Page 3 of 5
Case 1:07-cv-05346-AKH Document 3 Filed 08/03/2007 Page 4 of 5
Case 1:07-cv-05346-AKH Document 3 Filed 08/03/2007 Page 5 of 5
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 11 (Wednesday, January 17, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 4047]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-1322]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION


Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements Under OMB Review

AGENCY: Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Notice of reporting requirements submitted for OMB review.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 
chapter 35), agencies are required to submit proposed reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements to OMB for review and approval, and to 
publish a notice in the Federal Register notifying the public that the 
agency has made such a submission.

DATES: Submit comments on or before February 16, 2001. If you intend to 
comment but cannot prepare comments promptly, please advise the OMB 
Reviewer and the Agency Clearance Officer before the deadline.

ADDRESSES: Address all comments concerning this notice to: Agency 
Clearance Officer, Jacqueline White, Small Business Administration, 409 
3rd Street, SW., 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20416; and OMB Reviewer, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and 
Budget, New Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20503.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jacqueline White, Agency Clearance 
Officer, (202) 205-7044.
    Copies: Request for clearance (OMB 83-1), supporting statement, and 
other documents submitted to OMB for review may be obtained from the 
Agency Clearance Officer.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Title: 8(a) SDB Applications.
    No's: 1010, 1010B's and 1010C.
    Frequency: On Occasion.
    Description of Respondents: 8(A) Companies.
    Annual Responses: 6,103.
    Annual Burden: 21,460.

Jacqueline White,
Chief, Administrative Information Branch.
[FR Doc. 01-1322 Filed 1-16-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-U
Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-27897 18-MAR-2011 01:04 PM

SCWC-27897 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI ' I
STATE OF HAWAI ' I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. LLOYD PRATT, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (ICA NOS. 27897, 27898 and 27899) (CR. NOS. HC04-147, HC04-169 AND HC04-299 - CONSOLIDATED) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FILED MARCH 14, 2011 AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (By: Nakayama, J.) Upon consideration of Petitioner’s motion to withdraw application for writ of certiorari filed March 14, 2011 at 3:45 p.m. in errata and substitute correct application filed on March 15, 2011 at 2:42 pm and the record herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the motion is granted. The application for writ of certiorari filed on March 14, 2011 is withdrawn.It appearing that the March 15, 2011 application for writ of certiorari exceeds the page limit imposed by Rule 40.1(d) of the Hawai ' i Rules of Appellate Procedure, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Daniel G. Hempey, counsel for Petitioner Lloyd Pratt, shall, within 10 days after entry of this order, show cause as to why he should not be sanctioned and the application dismissed. Failure to respond or to show good cause will result in sanctions. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai ' i, March 18, 2011. /s/ Paula A. Nakayama Associate Justice

2
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Veryl Norquay, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Winchester International Resorts
          Inc. for the period ended September 30, 2010 (the "Report") fully
          complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of Winchester International Resorts Inc.

Dated: November 22, 2010

                                 /s/ Veryl Norquay
                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                 Veryl Norquay
                                 President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
                                 (Principal Executive Officer)
                                 Winchester International Resorts Inc.


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Winchester International Resorts
Inc. and will be retained by Winchester International Resorts Inc. and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
# C_2020433EN.01000602.xml

| 14.12.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 433/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.12.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 433/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 28 October 2020 — Pirelli & C. SpA v European Commission, Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl

(Case C-611/18 P) (1)

(Appeal - Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - European market for power cables - Market allocation in connection with projects - Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 - Article 23(2) - Powers of the European Commission in the area of fines - Imputability of the infringement - Presumption of actual exercise of decisive influence - Obligation to state reasons - Fundamental rights - Beneficium ordinis seu excussionis - Unlimited jurisdiction)

(2020/C 433/05)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Pirelli & C. SpA (represented by: M. Siragusa and G. Rizza, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: L. Malferrari, P. Rossi, C. Sjödin and T. Vecchi, acting as Agents), Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl (represented initially by C. Tesauro and L. Armati, avvocati, subsequently by V. Roppo and P. Canepa, avvocati)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders Pirelli & C. SpA to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Pirelli & C. SpA to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

| 3. | Orders Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 408, 12.11.2018.

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leron J. FULLER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-4939.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 13, 2013.

Decided: May 28, 2013.

Harry D. Harmon, Jr., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, M. Jennifer Nora-ko, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Leron J. Fuller appeals the district court’s order revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a six-month sentence with no further term of supervised release. The only issue Fuller raises on appeal is whether the district court committed a procedural error rendering his sentence plainly unreasonable. Because his appeal is moot, we dismiss the appeal.

Fuller was convicted of obstruction of justice, in violation of Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-460(B) (2009), as assimilated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13 (2006), Count Four of a superseding indictment. The court imposed a sentence of four months’ imprisonment, followed by one year of supervised release. Supervision began on February 1, 2012.

On August 27, 2012, the probation officer filed a petition for revocation of supervised release with three violations of conditions: failure to satisfactorily participate in mental health treatment, failure to work regularly, and possession of marijuana. After a hearing, the court revoked Fuller’s supervised release, finding that Fuller committed all three violations. The court sentenced Fuller to six months of imprisonment. After imprisonment, the supervision was to be terminated. Because Fuller has completed serving his sentence, his argument that the district court procedurally erred in imposing his sentence is moot. *See Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap,*290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir.2002) (whether the court is “presented with a live case or controversy is a question [the court] may raise *sua sponte*since mootness goes to the heart of the Article III jurisdiction of the courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Assistant Secretary of the Commission for FOI, 

 Privacy and Sunshine Acts Compliance 

U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

April 9, 2019 

4 

ACTIVE 242123947

SCHEDULE A 

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 

Document Subject to Request for 

Confidential Treatment Pursuant to 

§145.9 

Identifying Number and Code 

IGDL-2019-R-2 – Exhibit A IGDL_0000550

IGDL-2019-R-2 – Exhibit C IGDL_0000551 – IGDL_0000554 

IGDL-2019-R-2 – Exhibit D IGDL_0000555 – IGDL_0000561
EXHIBIT 32


BWI HOLDINGS, INC.


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


S ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of BWI Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Bruce Milroy, as Principal Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: December 27, 2010
By:
/s/Bruce MilroyName:
Bruce MilroyTitle:
Principal Financial Officer




A signed original of this written statement required by Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Report pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K and Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code and, accordingly, is not being filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as part of the Report and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made before or after the date of the Report, irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.)
142 So. 534

#### GARDEN CITY HEADING CO. v. THOMAS.

6 Div. 79.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 19, 1932.

Rehearing Denied June 23, 1932.

Miller, Graham & Wingo and John S. Poster, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

A. A. Griffith and W. Marvin Scott, both of Cullman, for appellee.

ANDERSON, O. J.

The right of the plaintiff to com> pensation is not questioned by this petitioner, the Heading Company, but it is insisted that the allowance was excessive, first, that the trial court erroneously found that the impairment of the use of the arm was 50 per cent.; and; second, in fixing the amount of the plaintiff’s previous earnings. We may concede that the weight of the evidence supports the petitioner’s contention, but the question, in cases of this character, is not where lies the- weight of the evidence, but is there any evidence or reasonable inference in support of the finding or conclusion of the trial court? Greek v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 207 Ala. 219, 92 So. 458. It is sufficient to say that, while the medical men testified on the trial that the use of the arm was impaired from 20 to 40 per cent., two of them had given previous statements that the injury was as high as 75 per cent., and the conclusion of the trial court that the extent of the injury was 50 per cent, finds support in the evidence. It may also be noted that, while the time sheets and earnings as set out upon the trial may have shown that the plaintiff had not earned as much as $15 per week for the year preceding the injury, yet the manager of the defendant, Kinser, reported to the "Workmen’s Compensation Commission” that the average weekly earnings of the plaintiff for the past fifty-two weeks was $15 a week, and this was a fact or inference to support the finding of the trial court.

The writ is denied, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.,

GARDNER, BOULDIN, and POSTER, JJ., concur.