Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 23, 2001 / Notices 28593

ACTION: Notice and request for

comments.

SUMMARY: In order to comply with the

requirements of the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1995 concerning

proposed extensions of information

collection requirements, FinCEN is

soliciting comments concerning

Treasury Form TD F 90–22.49,

Suspicious Activity Report by Casinos

(‘‘SARC’’), which is used by Nevada

casinos to file reports with the U.S.

Department of the Treasury of

potentially suspicious transactions and

activities that may occur by, at, or

through a Nevada casino.

DATES: Written comments must be

received on or before July 23, 2001.

ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments

to the Financial Crimes Enforcement

Network, Office of Compliance and

Regulatory Enforcement, Attn.: SARC

Comments, Suite 200, 2070 Chain

Bridge Road, Vienna, VA 22182–2536.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Requests for additional information or

for a copy of the SARC form should be

directed to Leonard C. Senia, Regulatory

Program Specialist (Team Leader),

Office of Compliance and Regulatory

Enforcement, (202) 354–6412; or Stacie

A. Larson, Office of Chief Counsel, (703)

905–3590. A copy of the SARC form can

be obtained through the Internet at

http://www.treas.gov/fincen/

forms.html. (Also, comments may be

submitted by electronic mail to the

following Internet address:

‘‘regcomments@fincen.treas.gov’’ with

the caption in the body of the text,

‘‘Attention: PRA Comments—SARC’’).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

gaming regulation of the State of Nevada

requires certain casinos licensed by that

state to report suspicious transactions to

the Treasury Department. See, Nevada

Gaming Commission Regulation 6A,

Section 100, effective October 1, 1997.

Regulation 6A applies to all Nevada

casinos with gross annual gaming

revenue in excess of $10 million and

having an annual table games statistical

win in excess of $2,000,000. TD F 90–

22.49 is the form used to make the

report.

Information collected on the SARC

will be made available, in accordance

with strict safeguards, to appropriate

criminal law enforcement and

regulatory personnel in the official

performance of their duties. The

information collected is used for

regulatory purposes and in

investigations involving money

laundering, tax violations, fraud, and

other financial crimes.

This notice proposes no changes to

the current text of the TD F 90–22.49 or

its instructions.

In accordance with requirements of

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,

44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A), and its

implementing regulations, 5 CFR 1320,

the following information concerning

the collection of information on TD F

90–22.49, is presented to assist those

persons wishing to comment on the

information collection. The estimates

below are based on FinCEN’s experience

with SARC forms that were filed during

calendar year 2000.

Title: Suspicious Activity Report by

Casinos (‘‘SARC’’).

Form Number: TD F 90–22.49.

OMB Number: 1506–0006.

Type of Request: Extension of a

currently approved information

collection.

Description of Respondents:

Businesses.

Estimated Number of Respondents:

110.

Estimated Number of Annual

Responses: 107.

Frequency: As required.

Estimate of Burden: Reporting average

of 31 minutes per response;

recordkeeping average of 5 minutes per

response.

Estimate of Total Annual Burden on

Respondents: Reporting burden

estimate=55 hours; recordkeeping

burden estimate=9 hours. Estimated

combined total of 64 hours.

Estimate of Total Annual Cost to

Respondents for Hour Burdens: Based

on $20 per hour, the total cost to the

public is estimated to be $1,280.

Estimate of Total Other Annual Costs

to Respondents: None.

Request for Comments

FinCEN specifically invites comments

on the following subjects: (a) Whether

the proposed collection of information

is necessary for the proper performance

of the mission of FinCEN, including

whether the information shall have

practical utility; (b) the accuracy of

FinCEN’s estimate of the burden of the

proposed collection of information; (c)

ways to enhance the quality, utility, and

clarity of the information to be

collected; and (d) ways to minimize the

burden of the collection of information

on respondents, including through the

use of automated collection techniques

or other forms of information

technology.

In addition, the Paperwork Reduction

Act of 1995 requires agencies to

estimate the total annual cost burden to

respondents or recordkeepers resulting

from the collection of information.

Thus, FinCEN also specifically requests

comments to assist with this estimate. In

this connection, FinCEN requests

commenters to identify any additional

costs associated with the completion of

the form. These comments on costs

should be divided into two parts: (1)

Any additional costs associated with

reporting; and (2) any additional costs

associated with recordkeeping.

Responses to the questions posed by

this notice will be summarized and

included in the request for Office of

Management and Budget approval. All

comments will become a matter of

public record.

Dated: May 15, 2001.

James F. Sloan,

Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement

Network.

[FR Doc. 01–13059 Filed 5–22–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4820–03–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency

[Docket No. 01–10]

Preemption Determination

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller

of the Currency (OCC) is publishing its

response to a written request for the

OCC’s opinion of whether Federal law

would preempt a Michigan statute, as

interpreted by the Michigan Financial

Institutions Bureau, that limits the

ability of national banks to make loans

to finance motor vehicle sales. The OCC

has determined that the state law, as

interpreted, would be preempted under

Federal law.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

MaryAnn Nash, Counsel, or Mark

Tenhundfeld, Assistant Director,

Legislative and Regulatory Activities

Division, (202) 874–5090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

request for a preemption opinion was

submitted by two national banks,

headquartered in Ohio, that are engaged

in the business of motor vehicle

financing in Ohio and other states

(collectively, the Requesters). As part of

that business, the Requesters engage in

motor vehicle sales financing through

automobile dealers. In these

arrangements, the Requesters enter into

agreements with dealers under which

the dealers act as the Requesters’ agents

for the purpose of soliciting loans to

finance motor vehicles, taking

applications for the vehicle loans,

28594 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 23, 2001 / Notices

1 In the Matter Of: Request by Rodney D. Martin

on Behalf of National City Bank for a Declaratory

Ruling on the Applicability of the Motor Vehicle

Sales Finance Act to Certain Transactions (January

1, 2000).

2Section 2 of the MVSFA defines an ‘‘installment

sale contract’’ as one ‘‘for the retail sale of a motor

vehicle, or which has a similar purpose or effect,

under which part or all of the price is payable in

2 or more scheduled payments subsequent to the

making of the contract * * *.’’ Michigan Compiled

Laws (MCL) 492.102(9); Michigan Sales Act (MSA)

23.628(2)(9).

3MCL 492.103(a)and (b); MSA 23.628(3)(a) and

(b).

4These include, for example, provisions

concerning the form and contents of an installment

sales contract, disclosures that must be made to the

buyer, the amount and computation of fees and

finance charges, and prohibited charges. See MCL

492.112–492.134.

5See 65 FR 63917 (October 25, 2000)(the Notice).

As stated in the Notice, section 114 of the RiegleNeal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency

Act of 1994 (the Riegle-Neal Act) (Pub. L. 103–328,

sec. 114, 108 Stat. 2338, 2366–68 (1994), codified

at 12 U.S.C. 43) requires the OCC to publish notice

in the Federal Register before issuing a final written

opinion about the preemptive effect of Federal law

in the areas of community reinvestment, consumer

protection, fair lending, and the establishment of

interstate branches. Without making a

determination as to whether section 114 applies to

this preemption opinion request, the OCC decided

that it was appropriate to use notice and comment

procedures given the significance of the legal issues

presented.

preparing loan documentation, and

obtaining the buyers’ signatures. The

Requesters prescribe the terms of the

loan, including the interest rate, fund

the loan, and issue loan approvals in

Ohio.

In a ruling dated January 1, 2000, the

Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau

(FIB) issued a declaratory ruling in

which it concluded that the proposed

arrangement between the Requesters

and the dealers would result in

‘‘installment sales contracts’’ governed

by the Michigan Motor Vehicle Sales

Act (MVSFA). Compliance with the

MVSFA effectively would prohibit the

Requesters from originating motor

vehicle loans using dealers as agents.

The Requesters have asked for the

OCC’s opinion on whether the National

Bank Act would preempt the MVSFA as

interpreted by the FIB. The Requesters

note that the National Bank Act

expressly authorizes national banks to

make loans as well as to engage in

activities incidental to lending. 12

U.S.C. 24 (Seventh). The Requesters

assert the FIB’s characterization of its

proposed program as an ‘‘installment

sales contract’’ subject to the provisions

of the MVSFA impairs their ability to

exercise a Federally authorized power.

As is explained in greater detail in the

response, the OCC agrees that national

banks are authorized under 12 U.S.C. 24

(Seventh) to engage in the business of

lending, either directly or through an

agent. The OCC further agrees that the

Michigan law, as interpreted by the FIB,

would be preempted. It frustrates the

Requesters ability to exercise their

lending authority by limiting the

Requesters’ use of agents, it prohibits

the Requesters from charging interest

rates permitted by their home state as

authorized by 12 U.S.C. 85, and it seeks

to apply a state licensing requirement to

national banks, as a precondition to

their exercise of powers granted under

Federal law.

Section 114 of the Riegle-Neal

Interstate Banking and Branching

Efficiency Act of 1994 generally requires

the OCC to publish notice in the Federal

Register of requests for preemption

opinions in one of the four specified

areas: community reinvestment,

consumer protection, fair lending, or the

establishment of intrastate branches. 12

U.S.C. 43. Section 114 also requires the

OCC to publish any final opinion letter

in which the OCC concludes that

Federal law preempts a state law in one

of these four areas. Without expressly

determining whether section 114

applied to this request, the OCC

published a Notice of Request for

Preemption Determination dated

October 25, 2000 (65 FR 63917). The

OCC is publishing its response to the

request as an appendix to this notice.

Dated: May 15, 2001.

John D. Hawke, Jr.,

Comptroller of the Currency.

Appendix

Thomas A. Plant

Senior Vice President, Assistant General

Counsel, National City Bank, 1900 East

Ninth Street, Cleveland, OH 44114–3484

Daniel W. Morton

Vice President and Senior Counsel, The

Huntington National Bank, Legal

Department, 10th Floor, Huntington

Center, Columbus, OH 43287

Re: Michigan Motor Vehicles Sales Finance

Act

Dear Messrs. Plant and Morton: This

responds to your letters dated September 14,

2000 and September 21, 2000 (collectively,

the Letters) on behalf of National City Bank,

Cleveland, Ohio and The Huntington

National Bank, Columbus, Ohio (collectively,

the Banks). In the Letters, you request

confirmation by the Office of the Comptroller

of the Currency of your view that Federal law

preempts a Michigan statute, as interpreted

by the Michigan Financial Institutions

Bureau (FIB), that limits the ability of

national banks to make loans to finance

motor vehicle sales. For the reasons

discussed below, we conclude that Federal

law would preempt the Michigan statute as

interpreted by the FIB.

Background

The Banks are national banks

headquartered in Ohio with offices in several

other states. The Banks are engaged in the

business of motor vehicle financing in Ohio

and other states. The Banks typically engage

in motor vehicle sales financing through

automobile dealers. In these arrangements,

the Banks enter into agreements with the

dealers under which the dealers act as the

Banks’ agents for the purpose of soliciting

loans to finance motor vehicles, taking

applications for the vehicle loans, preparing

the loan documentation, and obtaining the

buyers’ signatures on all required documents.

The Banks prescribe the terms of the loan,

including the minimum interest rate, and

fund the loans and issue loan approvals in

Ohio.

Because of questions regarding the

interpretation of Michigan law, the Banks

first sought a declaratory ruling from FIB on

the applicability of the Michigan Motor

Vehicle Sales Act (the MVSFA) to this

proposed arrangement. In a ruling dated

January, 1, 2000 (the Ruling),1 the FIB

concluded that, the proposed arrangement

between the banks and Michigan motor

vehicle dealers would result in ‘‘installment

sale contracts’’ subject to the MVSFA.2

However, in order for a motor vehicle

installment sale contract to comply with the

MVSFA: (1) The dealer must originate the

loan as a licensed installment seller of motor

vehicles; and (2) the bank may only purchase

the loan as a licensed sales finance

company.3 The transaction must also comply

with the several other requirements of the

MVSFA that apply to installment sale

contracts.4 This interpretation of the MVSFA

effectively prohibits a national bank from

originating motor vehicle loans using a dealer

as the bank’s agent. You asked our view on

whether Federal law would preempt the

MVSFA as interpreted by the FIB.

The OCC published a notice of your

request in the Federal Register,5 and invited

interested parties to comment. The OCC

received thirteen comments in response to

the notice. Several commenters opined that

Federal law does preempt the state law in

question. These commenters cited the

authority of national banks under 12 U.S.C.

24(Seventh) to engage in lending activities

and other activities necessary to carry on the

business of banking. These commenters also

noted that Federal law preempts state laws

that purport to regulate an activity that is

authorized by Federal law and that insured

depository institutions are free to engage in

the full range of permissible activities in

accordance with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Act

(GLBA).

The remaining commenters opined that

Federal law should not be viewed as

preempting the MVSFA as interpreted by the

FIB. One of these commenters, the Michigan

Commissioner of the Office of Financial and

Insurance Services, submitted a lengthy

comment restating the conclusions reached

by the FIB in its Declaratory Ruling and

raising several other arguments opposing

Federal preemption of what the State

regulator views as a State consumer

protection act. The other commenters

asserted, variously, that the Riegle-Neal Act

requires a national bank to establish a branch

in order to lend money in another state, that

the OCC should not issue any opinion stating

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 23, 2001 / Notices 28595

6This is not a situation where a loan product has

been developed by a non-bank vendor that seeks to

use a national bank as a delivery vehicle, and where

the vendor, rather than the bank, has the

preponderant economic interest in the loan.

7See also OCC Interpr. Ltr. No. 822 (February 17,

1998), reprinted in (1997–1998 Transfer Binder)

Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) P 81–265 (identifying

circumstances, not applicable here, under which

national banks must use rates permitted by a state,

other than its main office state, in which the bank

has a branch).

8As mentioned above, several commenters

questioned the permissibility of the Banks activities

under the Riegle-Neal Act. These commenters

argued that, under the Riegle-Neal Act, the Banks

would be required to establish branches in

Michigan in order to lend money there and that

Michigan state consumer protection laws would

apply to the branches. Nothing in the Riegle-Neal

Act, however, requires that a bank have a branch

in a state as a prerequisite to lending in that state.

(We note that both banks have branches in

Michigan. Consequently, the provision of the

Riegle-Neal Act relating to the applicability of state

law to a branch of an out-of-state bank is discussed

subsequently in this letter.)

or implying that non-bank entities may

benefit from the preemptive effect of the

National Bank Act when they act as agents

for national banks, and that the OCC should

defer to Michigan regulator’s interpretation of

the Michigan statute. One commenter

adopted a more neutral stance and

encouraged the OCC to be mindful of the

vital interests of states in the area of

consumer protection.

Analysis

Permissibility of the Activity

The threshold question in any preemption

analysis is whether the activities in question

are permissible for a national bank under

Federal law. If they are not, then there is no

preemption issue.

The Banks’ proposed activity is fashioned

from three component parts: The Banks

propose to engage in the business of lending,

they seek to use third-party agents in

connection with that business, and they seek

to apply the interest rates permissible in their

home state to these motor vehicle loans. All

three activities are permissible under Federal

law.

First, section 24(Seventh) specifically

authorizes national banks to make loans.

Thus, a national bank need look no further

than the express language of the statute for

authorization to make loans. Section

24(Seventh) also authorizes national banks to

engage in the more general ‘‘business of

banking’’ and activities incidental thereto.

The Supreme Court has made clear that the

‘‘business of banking’’ authorized by section

24(Seventh) is a broad, flexible concept that

allows the National Bank Act to adapt to

changing times. See NationsBank of North

Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.

Corp., 513 U.S. 251, 258, n.2 (1995) (‘‘We

expressly hold that the ‘‘business of banking’’

is not limited to the enumerated powers in

section 24 Seventh and that the Comptroller

therefore has discretion to authorize

activities beyond those specifically

enumerated.’’). An activity will be deemed

‘‘incidental’’ to the business of banking if it

is ‘‘convenient or useful in connection with

the performance of’’ a power authorized

under Federal law. Arnold Tours, Inc. v.

Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1972).

Second, the authority of national banks

under section 24(Seventh) permits a national

bank to use the services of agents and other

third parties in connection with a bank’s

lending business. Federal banking

regulations specifically provide that a

national bank may ‘‘use the services of, and

compensate persons not employed by, the

bank for originating loans.’’ 6 12 CFR

7.1004(a). Likewise, the regulations permit

national banks to utilize the services of third

parties to disburse loan proceeds. 12 CFR

§ 7.1003(b). These agents may undertake

these activities at sites that are neither the

main office nor a branch office of the bank

provided the requirements of those

regulations are satisfied. 12 CFR §§ 7.1003(b),

7.1004(b).

Finally, under 12 U.S.C. 85, national banks

may charge interest in accordance with the

laws of the state where the bank’s main office

is located without regard to where the

borrower resides and despite contacts

between the loan and another state. The U.S.

Supreme Court has specifically upheld this

authority. Marquette National Bank v. First of

Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).7

Based on this analysis, it is clear that each

of the component activities that together

comprise the Banks’ proposed activities

through Michigan automobile dealers is

permissible under well-settled authority.8

Preemptive Effect of Federal Law

In our opinion, Federal law preempts the

MVSFA as interpreted by the FIB in its

Declaratory Ruling, because the statute, as

interpreted, conflicts with Federal law

authorizing the Bank to engage in the

activities in question and with the OCC’s

exclusive visitorial powers over national

banks. These points are addressed in more

detail below, following a brief summary of

the law governing preemption and the OCC’s

visitorial powers.

Preemption and Visitorial Powers

When the Federal government acts within

the sphere of authority conferred upon it by

the Constitution, Federal law is paramount

over, and may preempt, state law. U.S. Const.

art. VI, cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause); Cohen

v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414

(1821) (Marshall, C.J.). Federal authority over

national banks stems from several

constitutional sources, including the

Necessary and Proper Clause and the

Commerce Clause of the United States

Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, section 8, cl.3,

cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4

Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819).

The United States Supreme Court has

identified several bases for Federal

preemption of state law. First, Congress may

expressly state that it intends to preempt

state law. E.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430

U.S. 519 (1977). Second, a Federal statute

may create a scheme of Federal regulation

‘‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the

inference that Congress left no room for the

States to supplement it.’’ Rice v. Norman

Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).

Third, the state law may conflict with a

Federal law. See, e.g., Franklin National

Bank, 347 U.S. 373 (1954); Davis v. Elmira

Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275 (1896). In

elaborating on this third test, the Supreme

Court has stated—

Federal law may be in ‘‘irreconcilable

conflict’’ with state law. Rice v. Norman

Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).

Compliance with both statutes, for example,

may be a ‘‘physical impossibility,’’ Florida

Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373

U.S. 132, 142–143 (1963); or, the state law

may ‘‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress.’’ Hines

v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).

Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31

(1996). The Court in Barnett went on to state

that—

In defining the pre-emptive scope of

statutes and regulations granting a power to

national banks, these cases (i.e., national

bank preemption cases) take the view that

normally Congress would not want States to

forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise

of a power that Congress explicitly granted.

To say this is not to deprive States of the

power to regulate national banks, where

* * * doing so does not prevent or

significantly interfere with the national

bank’s exercise of its powers.

517 U.S. at 33.

A conflict between a state law and Federal

law need not be complete in order for Federal

law to have preemptive effect. Where a

Federal grant of authority is unrestricted, for

example, state law that attempts to place

limits on the scope and exercise of that

authority will be preempted. See, e.g., New

York Bankers Association, Inc. v. Levin, 999

F. Supp. 716 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). Thus, Federal

law preempts not only state laws that purport

to prohibit a national bank from engaging in

an activity permissible under Federal law but

also state laws that condition or confine the

exercise by a national bank of its express or

incidental powers.

As the Court stated in Barnett,

* * * where Congress has not expressly

conditioned the grant of ‘‘power’’ upon a

grant of state permission, the Court has

ordinarily found that no such condition

applies. In Franklin Nat. Bank, the Court

made this point explicit. It held that Congress

did not intend to subject national banks’

power to local restrictions, because the

Federal power-granting statute there in

question contained ‘‘no indication that

Congress [so] intended * * * as it has done

by express language in several other

instances.’’

517 U.S. at 34 (citations omitted; emphasis in

original).

Application of Federal Law to State Statutes

As noted above, it is well established that

a national bank may engage in the business

of lending, either directly or through an

agent. See 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh). In our

view, the FIB’s interpretation of Michigan

law to include bank originated loans within

the definition of ‘‘installment sales contracts’’

subject to the MVSFA conflicts with Federal

law and significantly interferes with the

Banks’ ability to exercise their lending

authority in three distinct ways.

28596 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 23, 2001 / Notices

9See also OCC Interpr. Ltr. No. 866 (Oct. 8, 1999),

reprinted in [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed.

Banking L. Rep. (CCH) P 81–360 (state law

requirements that purport to preclude national

banks from soliciting trust business from customers

located in states other than where the bank’s main

office is located would be preempted); OCC Interpr.

Ltr. No. 749 (Sept. 13, 1996), reprinted in [1996–

1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)

P 81–114 (state law requiring national banks to be

licensed by the state to sell annuities would be

preempted); OCC Interpr. Ltr. 644 (March 24, 1994),

reprinted in [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.

Rep. (CCH) P 83,553 (state registration and fee

requirements imposed on mortgage lenders would

be preempted).

10 In addition, we note under the circumstances

that section 85 permits the bank to charge interest

in accordance with Ohio law and preempts any

state law requirement that Michigan usury law

applies to the loans at issue. See OCC Interpr. Ltr.

822, supra n. 6. Because the activities in question

do not involve insurance, the unique preemption

standard established under the McCarran-Ferguson

Act is not at issue 12 U.S.C. 1012. Nor are the

recently enacted provisions of the GLBA. 15 U.S.C.

6701.

First, the FIB’s interpretation of Michigan

law prohibits banks from using automobile

dealers as agents to originate loans. Congress

intended to permit national banks to have

‘‘all such incidental powers as shall be

necessary to carry on the business of

banking.’’ 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh). Federal

regulations expressly interpret this grant to

include the authority to use agents to

originate loans. See 12 CFR § 7.1004. To the

extent that a state asserts the right to restrict

or condition a national bank’s exercise of the

Federally granted powers, that state’s law

will be preempted. Barnett, supra, at 34;

Franklin, supra, at 378; Bank of America

National Trust & Savings Ass’n. v. Lima, 103

F. Supp. 916, 918, 920 (D. Mass. 1952)

(exercise of national bank powers is not

subject to state approval; states have no

authority to require national banks to obtain

a license to engage in an activity permitted

to them by Federal law).9

Second, by effectively prohibiting the

Banks from originating loans at an

automobile dealership in Michigan, the FIB’s

interpretation of the MVSFA prevents the

Banks from exercising its power under 12

U.S.C. 85, as previously discussed, to charge

the interest rates permitted by its home state,

Ohio. To the extent the FIB interprets the

MVSFA to subject the Banks to interest rate

limitations of other states, it is preempted by

Federal law.

Finally, it is our opinion that the FIB’s

interpretation of the MVSFA that would

require a national bank to obtain a state

license and treat the transaction as a loan

purchase from a dealership also is preempted

by the Federal law giving the OCC exclusive

visitorial authority over national banks. A

state requirement that a national bank obtain

state approval or license to exercise a power

authorized under Federal law is an assertion

by the state that it has supervisory or

regulatory authority over national banks.

This is in direct conflict with the Federal law

providing that the OCC has exclusive

visitorial powers over national banks except

as otherwise provided by Federal law. 12

U.S.C. 484; 12 CFR 7.4000. A state law that

purports to vest this authority in a state is

preempted. In this case, it is our opinion that

the FIB’s application of the state licensing

requirement to national banks would be

preempted on this basis as well.

The characterization by several of the

commenters of the MVSFA as a consumer

protection statute does not alter this

conclusion. With respect to banks with

interstate branches, the Riegle-Neal Act

provides:

[t]he laws of the host State regarding

community reinvestment, consumer

protection, fair lending, and establishment of

intrastate branches shall apply to any branch

in the host State of an out-of-state national

bank to the same extent as such state laws

apply to a branch of a bank chartered by that

State except—

(i) When Federal law preempts that

application of such state laws to a national

bank * * *

12 U.S.C. 36(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

Thus, the Riegle-Neal Act does not protect

state consumer laws to the extent that they

are preempted by Federal law and, as

discussed, it is our opinion that the MVFSA

is preempted by Federal law.10

Conclusion

To the extent the FIB interprets the

MVSFA to limit the Banks’ proposed motor

vehicle financing arrangement, it is our

opinion that it is preempted by Federal law.

We trust that this is responsive to your

inquiry. Our conclusions are based on the

facts and representations made in your

letters. Any material change in facts or

circumstances could affect the conclusions

stated in this letter.

Sincerely,

Julie L. Williams,

First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief

Counsel.

[FR Doc. 01–12946 Filed 5–22–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810–33–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

Proposed Collection; Comment

Request for Form 1116

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS),

Treasury.

ACTION: Notice and request for

comments.

SUMMARY: The Department of the

Treasury, as part of its continuing effort

to reduce paperwork and respondent

burden, invites the general public and

other Federal agencies to take this

opportunity to comment on proposed

and/or continuing information

collections, as required by the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,

Public Law 104–13 (44 U.S.C.

3506(c)(2)(A)). Currently, the IRS is

soliciting comments concerning Form

1116, Foreign Tax Credit.

DATES: Written comments should be

received on or before July 23, 2001 to be

assured of consideration.

ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments

to Garrick R. Shear, Internal Revenue

Service, room 5244, 1111 Constitution

Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20224.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Requests for additional information or

copies of the form and instructions

should be directed to Allan Hopkins,

(202) 622–6665, Internal Revenue

Service, room 5244, 1111 Constitution

Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20224.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Title: Foreign Tax Credit.

OMB Number: 1545–0121.

Form Number: 1116.

Abstract: Form 1116 is used by

individuals (including nonresident

aliens), estates, or trusts who paid

foreign income taxes on U.S. taxable

income, to compute the foreign tax

credit. This information is used by the

IRS to determine if the foreign tax credit

is properly computed.

Current Actions: There are no changes

being made to Form 1116 at this time.

Type of Review: Extension of a

currently approved collection.

Affected Public: Individuals or

households.

Estimated Number of Respondents:

779,773.

Estimated Time Per Respondent: 3

hours, 38 minutes.

Estimated Total Annual Burden

Hours: 2,837,771.

The following paragraph applies to all

of the collections of information covered

by this notice:

An agency may not conduct or

sponsor, and a person is not required to

respond to, a collection of information

unless the collection of information

displays a valid OMB control number.

Books or records relating to a

collection of information must be

retained as long as their contents may

become material in the administration

of any internal revenue law. Generally,

tax returns and tax return information

are confidential, as required by 26

U.S.C. 6103.

Request for Comments

Comments submitted in response to

this notice will be summarized and/or

included in the request for OMB

approval. All comments will become a

matter of public record. Comments are

invited on: (a) whether the collection of

information is necessary for the proper

performance of the functions of the

agency, including whether the

information shall have practical utility;

(b) the accuracy of the agency’s estimate

of the burden of the collection of