FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTIAN LONGORIA, a single man, 

on behalf of himself as son of 

decedent Manuel O. Longoria, on 

behalf of all statutory beneficiaries 

of decedent Manuel O. Longoria; 

JOSHUA R. WALLACE, as the personal 

representative of the Estate of 

Manuel O. Longoria; MANUEL 

LONGORIA, JR., a single man; 

LYNNETTE LONGORIA, a single 

woman; P. C. L., a minor, T. A. L., a 

minor; K. R. L., a minor; SANISYA 

LOTT, a single woman; T. L., a 

minor; and A. L., a minor,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

PINAL COUNTY, a political 

subdivision of the State of Arizona;

PAUL R. BABEU, in his official 

capacity as Sheriff of Pinal County, 

Arizona; and HEATH RANKIN, in his 

individual capacity as a Deputy 

Sheriff of Pinal County, Arizona,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15606

D.C. No.

2:15-cv-00043-

SRB

OPINION
2 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 6, 2017

Pasadena, California

Filed October 10, 2017

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Alex Kozinski, Circuit 

Judges, and Terrence Berg,

* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of qualified 

immunity on summary judgment in favor of Pinal County 

Deputy Sheriff Heath Rankin and affirmed the dismissal of 

claims brought by family members in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

action alleging that Rankin used excessive deadly force 

when he shot Manuel Longoria in the back and killed him 

following a car chase. 

 * The Honorable Terrence Berg, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 3

The panel stated that it was required to assess Rankin’s 

reasonableness in using deadly force against Longoria, who 

was unarmed, was surrounded by law enforcement officers, 

had been shot by bean bag rounds and a taser, and was in the 

process of putting his hands over his head reflexively or in 

an effort to surrender. Rankin alleged that when Longoria 

turned to raise his hands he threatened him or his fellow 

officers with a “shooter’s stance.” The panel held that 

because of the many material, disputed facts in this case, 

Rankin’s credibility or the accuracy of his version of the 

facts was a central question that had to be answered by a jury. 

Because there was a material issue of fact as to whether 

Rankin violated Longoria’s clearly established 

constitutional right, defendants were not entitled to qualified 

immunity. The panel therefore reversed the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment and remanded for a jury to 

determine whether Rankin’s use of deadly force was lawful.

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 

Longoria’s family-members’ § 1983 claims. The panel held 

that only Longoria’s estate could bring a § 1983 for the 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; his family 

members had no standing to sue on their own behalves.

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on plaintiffs’ wrongful-death claim brought under 

Arizona Revised Statute § 12-611. The panel held that 

summary judgment was not appropriate because there was a 

material dispute of facts as to whether or not Rankin’s use of 

deadly force was reasonable.
4 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

COUNSEL

Joel B. Robbins (argued), Robbins & Curtin PLLC, Phoenix, 

Arizona; Joseph M. Leal III, Cole & Leal, Casa Grande, 

Arizona; Darius Bursh, McCain & Bursh PLC, Scottsdale, 

Arizona; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Nicholas D. Acedo (argued) and Kathleen L. Wieneke,

Struck Wieneke & Love P.L.C., Chandler, Arizona, for 

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Pinal County Deputy Sheriff Heath Rankin fired two 

shots into Manuel Longoria’s back and killed him just as he 

was raising his hands above his head. Rankin’s shots 

followed the use of non-lethal force by police officers from 

the City of Eloy who were charged with arresting Longoria.

When Longoria’s estate (hereinafter “Longoria”) sued 

Rankin under § 1983, the district court held that Rankin was 

entitled to qualified immunity and entered summary 

judgment in his favor. We reverse and remand for further 

proceedings.1

BACKGROUND

Distraught over his relationship with the mother of three 

of his children, Manuel Longoria stole his brother-in-law’s 

car and began driving around the city of Eloy, Arizona. Eloy 

 1 We discuss infra the remainder of the action filed by Plaintiffs.
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 5

police officers saw him and initiated a traffic stop, but 

Longoria fled and led officers on a chase that lasted for more 

than 70 minutes.

The Eloy Police Department (“EPD”) asked the Pinal 

County Sheriff’s Office (“PCSO”) to be on “standby” in case 

Longoria left Eloy’s jurisdiction. PCSO informed its officers 

that Longoria was driving a stolen vehicle and (mistakenly) 

that he was armed. PCSO Deputy Heath Rankin and his 

partner, Deputy J. Rice, joined the pursuit and participated 

for more than 40 minutes.

During the chase, Longoria stopped his vehicle and 

spoke with the pursuing officers several times, but continued 

to ignore commands to surrender. During one of these stops, 

Longoria got out of the car and was seen holding and kissing 

purple or dark-colored rosary beads which he held in his 

hand. During another, he got out of the car for a brief period 

and held his wallet behind his back. EPD Detective Salazar 

saw that Longoria was holding a wallet, not a gun, behind 

his back and shouted this out to the other officers on the 

scene. That information was also dispatched on an EPD 

radio frequency that Rankin was monitoring. Rankin 

maintains that he did not hear that part of the broadcast.

Longoria exhibited other erratic behavior. He threw 

money and various objects out of the vehicle while driving 

and told officers that he had nothing to live for and wanted 

to die. Longoria asked officers to give his money to his 

family members, and at times even joked with officers 

pursuing him that they would scratch their vehicles if they 

kept pulling so close to him. While driving, he waved his 

hand out of the car, sometimes making a gun with his fingers 

and pointing his fingers at his head as though gesturing for 

officers to shoot him. EPD Officer Dean reported over the 

radio that Longoria was simulating a gun with his fingers. 
6 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

As Longoria continued to drive, onlookers gathered and he 

laughed, pointed, waved, and even flashed a peace sign at 

civilians on the streets.

Shortly before the chase ended, Pinal County Lieutenant 

Villegas ordered Rankin and other Pinal County deputies to 

stand down from the pursuit. Rankin heard this command 

and initially followed it. Rankin’s Sergeant then directed 

him to form a perimeter at the intersection of Main and 

Battaglia Streets, which he did.

A few minutes later, Eloy police officers halted the chase 

by disabling Longoria’s car with a PIT maneuver.2 Rankin 

was standing around the corner about a half-block away. 

After hearing the crash, he abandoned the perimeter, grabbed 

his assault rifle, and ran towards the scene, followed by his 

partner Rice.3

While Rankin was sprinting to the scene, Longoria got 

out of his vehicle and stood facing the Eloy officers with one 

hand behind his back near the car. Eight officers surrounded 

him and drew their guns. Longoria initially did not comply 

with police commands to show his hands. Eloy Sergeant 

Tarrango shouted for officers to use “less lethal,” or less than 

lethal, force at least twice. Other Eloy officers shouted that 

 2 A PIT (Pursuit Intervention Technique) maneuver is a method of 

forcing a fleeing car to abruptly turn sideways, which causes the driver 

to lose control and stop. It involves officers using a patrol car to veer into 

the rear half of either the driver’s side or passenger’s side of a suspect’s 

car.

3 Rankin asserts that the order to form a perimeter meant that he was 

to actively assist with getting Longoria into custody if and when the 

chase ended. No PCSO officers other than Rice abandoned the perimeter 

and followed Rankin in his pursuit of Longoria.
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 7

Longoria had only a wallet behind his back. Still more 

shouted to tase Longoria.

Rankin ran behind Longoria—across what would have 

been the line of fire had the Eloy officers needed to shoot—

and joined the other officers near the point of collision. 

Rankin asserts that he did not hear the commands to use less 

than lethal force while he was running towards the collision.

Rankin stopped running and took up a position between 

25 to 45 feet to Longoria’s right, to the side and further away 

from Longoria than all of the other officers who had their 

weapons drawn. Longoria was facing the other officers, and 

continued to stand with one hand behind his back near his 

disabled car. Shortly after Rankin stopped sprinting, some of 

the other officers fired beanbag rounds at Longoria, striking 

him. An officer tased him, hitting him with one dart. 

Longoria flinched and moved erratically. He then turned 

halfway around to his right—towards and past Rankin—to 

face his car and put his empty hands up above his head, his 

back to the officers and Rankin. Rankin fired two rounds 

from his assault rifle into Longoria’s back, killing him.

The § 1983 suit ensued, as did the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

and qualified immunity de novo. Hughes v. Kisela, 862 F.3d 

775, 779 (9th Cir. 2016).
8 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

DISCUSSION

I. Qualified Immunity

Longoria challenges the district court’s entry of 

summary judgment in favor of Rankin on the ground of 

qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity

protects government officials from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Qualified immunity exists to shield an 

officer from liability for “mere mistakes in judgment, 

whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law.” Butz v. 

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). The doctrine’s 

purpose is to strike a balance between the competing “need 

to hold public officials accountable when they exercise 

power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform 

their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. “In 

determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified 

immunity, we consider (1) whether there has been a violation 

of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was 

clearly established at the time of the officer’s alleged 

misconduct.” Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th 

Cir. 2014).

“Consequently, at summary judgment, an officer may be 

denied qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action ‘only if 

(1) the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the 

party asserting injury, show that the officer’s conduct 

violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was 

clearly established at the time of the incident such that a 

reasonable officer would have understood [his] conduct to 

be unlawful in that situation.’” Hughes, 862 F.3d at 783
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 9

(quoting Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th 

Cir. 2011)). Our analysis must be from the perspective of a 

“reasonable officer on the scene” and “allo[w] for the fact 

that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 

rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is 

necessary in a particular situation.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 

134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 

490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)).

We acknowledge at the outset that in the last five years, 

the Supreme Court has reversed a number of federal courts, 

including ours, in qualified immunity cases because we 

failed to abide by the longstanding principle that “‘clearly 

established law’ should not be defined at a high level of 

generality.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551–552 (2017) 

(per curiam). This has been a particular problem in cases 

presenting novel factual circumstances involving car chases. 

Here, although preceded by a car chase, the shooting 

occurred after the pursuit ended and Longoria’s vehicle was 

disabled, as described above. This is not one of those cases 

occurring mid-pursuit against a “hazy legal backdrop.” See 

Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (per curiam) 

(discussing the factual circumstances in Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 

at 2012; Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Brosseau v. 

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam)). Nor is this like 

other recent cases the Court has reversed. We do not rely on 

a factor mentioned in prior case law but not clearly 

established such that a reasonable officer would be on notice 

to conform his conduct accordingly, see, e.g., White, 137 S. 

Ct. at 552, or define a constitutional violation at too high a 

level of generality to be clearly established, see, e.g., 

Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308–09.
10 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

Here we must assess Rankin’s reasonableness in using 

deadly force against Longoria, who was unarmed, was 

surrounded by law enforcement officers, had been shot by 

bean bag rounds and a taser, and was in the process of putting 

his hands over his head reflexively or in an effort to 

surrender. Rankin claims that when Longoria turned to raise 

his hands he threatened him or his fellow officers with a 

“shooter’s stance.” Because of the many material, disputed 

facts in this case, Rankin’s credibility or the accuracy of his 

version of the facts is a central question that must be 

answered by a jury. We cannot decide as a matter of law that 

qualified immunity is appropriate at the summary judgment 

phase.

A. Constitutional Violation

Plaintiffs argue that Rankin violated Longoria’s Fourth 

Amendment rights when he used excessive force to shoot 

Longoria dead. We must evaluate such a claim through the 

Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, considering 

“whether the officers’ actions [we]re ‘objectively 

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances 

confronting them.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. In our 

analysis, we weigh the “nature and quality of the intrusion” 

against the “countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 

Id. at 396.

“The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force 

is unmatched.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9, (1985). 

Rankin deprived Longoria of the “fundamental interest in his 

own life.” Id.

“The strength of the government’s interest in the force 

used is evaluated by examining three primary factors: 

(1) ‘the severity of the crime at issue,’ (2) ‘whether the 

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 11

or others,’ and (3) ‘whether []he is actively resisting arrest 

or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Hughes, 862 F.3d 

at 779 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The second factor 

is the most important, but we are not limited to these three; 

rather, we must consider the “totality of the circumstances.” 

Id. Here the district court made impermissible factual 

inferences in favor of Rankin in its analysis of the second 

factor as well as other factual circumstances.

The “most important” factor is whether Longoria posed 

an immediate threat. Id. Rankin shot Longoria after the car 

chase had ended. Longoria’s car was fully immobilized; he 

was surrounded by armed officers, and his erratic driving no 

longer posed any threat to bystanders. He had been hit by 

several bean bag rounds shot from close range as well as a 

taser dart. Viewing the circumstances in the light most 

favorable to Longoria, the inquiry is thus whether he posed 

an immediate threat to Rankin or the many officers around 

him, or whether a reasonable officer would have perceived 

Longoria to be an immediate threat, after the non-lethal force 

was used but before Rankin shot him dead.

We are aided in our reasonableness analysis by two 

videos of the moments right before Longoria’s death, one 

from a dashboard camera of an EPD cruiser and the other 

from a bystander’s iPhone video recorded from over 200 feet 

away. Viewed in real-time, as officers—including Rankin—

would have experienced the event,4 the videos depict 

 4 Neither party asserts that the videos portray the events from 

Rankin’s exact perspective when he fired his weapon. They were taken 

from locations different from where Rankin stood. His precise position 

and perspective is an additional fact that would be relevant to a rational 

jury in finding the facts, but it remains unclear based on the varying 

accounts from Rankin, Rice, other officers, and the location of the 

casings from Rankin’s rifle precisely what Rankin saw. The one thing 
12 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

Longoria flailing his arms and moving erratically before 

turning around and raising his empty hands above his head 

in the several seconds before Rankin shoots and kills him. 

Defendants argue that Rankin reasonably perceived a black 

or silver weapon in Longoria’s hands and then saw Longoria 

assume a “shooter’s stance.” The district court relies on a 

single frozen frame from one of the videos to find that 

“uncontroverted video evidence shows that Mr. Longoria 

came up with both hands in front of him facing Defendant 

Rankin’s direction.” It does not mention any black or silver 

weapon.

Deputy Rankin did not however see a frozen frame, 

disaggregated from the context of the rest of the footage. He 

watched events unfold in real-time as the two videos played 

at their ordinary speed portray. These videos provide some 

of the most important evidence as to what occurred before

and during the shooting and what Rankin actually saw. This 

evidence alone raises material questions of fact about the 

reasonableness of Rankin’s actions and the credibility of his 

post-hoc justification of his conduct. See Johnson v. Bay 

Area Rapid Transit Dist., 724 F.3d 1159, 1177 n.7 (9th Cir. 

2013) (observing that a video, even when an imperfect 

account of an officer’s perspective, is relevant to his 

credibility). Viewing the two videos in the light most 

favorable to Longoria, the moment Rankin describes as a 

“shooter’s stance” is not perceptible. While Rankin relies on 

a single frozen frame of the iPhone video to illustrate the 

“shooter’s stance,” all that demonstrates is the existence of a 

 

we do know is that he saw the events in real-time, just as the two videos 

recorded them, not as they were depicted in a frozen frame.
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 13

genuine dispute of material fact.5 The full record only 

heightens this and other factual disputes.

The most important question in this case is whether 

Rankin reasonably perceived that Longoria assumed a 

threatening or “shooter’s stance.” “If [he] did, [he] w[as] 

entitled to shoot; if [he] didn’t, [he] [was]n’t.” Cruz v. City 

of Anaheim, 765 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining 

 5 Using frozen frames to bolster the perspective of law enforcement 

is not a new phenomenon. Twenty-five years ago in the 1992 Simi Valley 

state court trial of the officers who beat Rodney King:

Frame-by-frame stills of the video were mounted on 

clean white illustration boards and then used as the 

basis for questions to “experts” on prisoner restraint. 

Each micro-moment of the beating of King was 

broken down into a series of frozen images. As to each 

one, the defense attorneys asked the experts whether 

King assumed a compliant posture, or might a police 

officer reasonably conclude that King still posed a 

threat to resist. Once the defense broke the video into 

frames, each still could then be re-weaved into a 

different narrative about the restraint of King. Each 

blow to King represented, not [a] beating . . . but a 

police approved technique of restraint complete with 

technical names for each baton strike (or “stroke”).

Kimberle Crenshaw and Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 Denv. 

U. L. Rev. 283, 285 (1993).

The state court jury acquitted the officers. See id. at 290.

Subsequently, in a federal court trial for the violation of King’s federal 

civil rights, the federal jury convicted two of the four officers charged. 

See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 88 (1996). These inconsistent 

results demonstrate why the probative value of real-time videos and 

frozen frames is more appropriately a matter for a jury to view and 

evaluate, not a matter for a court to resolve on summary judgment.
14 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

that a case in which multiple officers shot an unarmed man 

turned on whether or not officers perceived the suspect reach 

for a gun in his waistband). In Cruz, four officers testified 

that the decedent reached for a weapon in his waistband, but 

we nevertheless reversed the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment because circumstantial evidence cast 

doubt upon the officers’ credibility. Id. at 1078–80. Here, the 

evidence supporting Rankin’s version of events is even 

slimmer. No other officers saw Longoria assume a 

“shooter’s stance” and responded accordingly. In fact, the 

Eloy officer who Defendant argues can be seen in the cell 

phone footage visibly “ducking” in response to the 

“shooter’s stance” stated that he cannot remember 

responding in such a manner to such a threat. Instead, other 

officers gave statements that it appeared that at the time 

Rankin killed him, Longoria was moving towards his car 

after being shot by non-lethal rounds, flailing in response to 

the impact of the bean bags and taser, or moving his hands 

to his chest as if checking whether he had been shot. 

Longoria’s expert in police practices could not discern 

Longoria assuming a “shooter’s stance” from the iPhone 

video reviewed in real-time.6 The material dispute over these 

facts alone is enough to deny summary judgment. See Lopez 

v. Gelhaus, No. 16-15175, slip op. at 26, 28 (9th Cir. Sept. 

22, 2017) (affirming denial of qualified immunity where 

officers gave differing accounts as to whether decedent 

 6 “We have held en banc that ‘[a] rational jury could rely upon such 

[expert] evidence in assessing whether the officers’ use of force was 

unreasonable.’” Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 877 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 703 (9th Cir. 

2005) (en banc) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment)).

Here, although the expert’s report is far from clear, we view it in the light 

most favorable to Longoria. Moreover, here as in Lopez, both sides had 

experts who disagreed as to whether the officer could have perceived the 

alleged threatening gesture. Lopez, slip op. at 8, 19.
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 15

turned towards them and what turned out to be a toy weapon 

resembling an AK-47 appeared to be rising and pointing 

towards them).

The record reveals many other facts in dispute that are 

material to the determination of whether a reasonable officer 

would have perceived that Longoria posed any immediate 

threat. The real-time videos highlight these competing 

inferences rather than “blatantly contradict[ing]” or “utterly 

discredit[ing]” Longoria’s version of events. See Scott, 

550 U.S. at 380–381. In addition to the question whether 

Rankin actually perceived that Longoria assumed a 

“shooter’s stance” when he shot and killed him, there is, inter 

alia, a material dispute as to: whether Rankin heard 

commands to use non-lethal force or the other officers’ 

shouts that Longoria was holding his wallet behind his back; 

whether Rankin, who has 20/20 vision, reasonably perceived 

a weapon in Longoria’s hands from his position as he said 

he did; whether Longoria was in fact reacting to the nonlethal force deployed by other officers rather than assuming 

a “shooter’s stance”; and whether, as a matter of fact, Rankin 

could have had enough time to perceive the alleged 

“shooter’s stance” at the moment he claims to have done so 

and then shoot Longoria in response to that observation at 

the time the videos show he shot him.7 The district court 

resolved all of those disputed facts in favor of Rankin. 

Viewing all of these facts in the light most favorable to 

Longoria, a reasonable jury could conclude that Rankin 

knew or should have known that Longoria was not armed, 

 7 There is also a question of fact as to whether, even if Rankin did 

perceive a “shooter’s stance,” Longoria’s abandoning of that stance and 

his turning and raising his hands happened so quickly thereafter that a 

reasonable officer would not have had enough time to shoot before 

knowing that he should hold his fire.
16 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

that Rankin never perceived a “shooter’s stance,” and that 

Rankin knew or should have known that Longoria was either 

surrendering in response to the non-lethal force of the bean 

bag rounds and taser or reacting in some manner to their 

effects upon him but was by no means threatening to shoot 

at Rankin or any of the other officers.

When a suspect is killed and cannot himself provide an 

account of what took place, we must examine “whether the 

officers’ accounts are ‘consistent with other known facts.’” 

Cruz, 765 F.3d at 1080 n.3 (citation omitted); see also 

Newmaker v. City of Fortuna, 842 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 

2016). This is consistent with our duty to review the record 

“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 

490 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added). Rankin’s assertion that he 

perceived a “shooter’s stance” is refuted by the two real-time 

videos, other officers’ accounts, Longoria’s expert, and most 

notably, Rice, his partner who ran to the scene of the 

collision behind him and had an almost identical perspective. 

Rice “observed the suspect reach behind his back and it 

appeared he was attempting to return inside the vehicle.”8

We may consider the conflicting accounts of Rice and other 

officers—none of whom related that they saw Longoria 

assume a “shooter’s stance”—in assessing Rankin’s claim of 

reasonableness, as well as circumstantial evidence, like the 

 8 Rankin’s account of interactions with Longoria differs from Rice’s 

in other ways. For example, Rankin alleges that Longoria pointed 

something that appeared to be a gun at him out of the car window while 

driving earlier in the pursuit. Rice, like other officers observing these 

repeated gestures, observed that “the suspect driver . . . plac[ed] his left 

hand out the window making the shape of a handgun with his thumb and 

pointer finger.” Rankin also asserts that Longoria threatened him directly 

during this interaction; Rice, who sat next to him in the vehicle, reported 

no such threat.
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 17

fact that Longoria was actually unarmed. A reasonable jury 

is far less likely to credit Rankin’s perception of a “shooter’s 

stance” with the knowledge that Longoria did not have a 

gun. See Cruz, 765 F.3d at 1079 (“In this case, there’s 

circumstantial evidence that could give a reasonable jury 

pause. Most obvious is the fact that Cruz didn’t have a gun 

on him, so why would he have reached for his waistband? 

. . . [F]or him to make such a gesture when no gun is there 

makes no sense whatsoever.”).

In assessing the reasonableness of the use of force, we 

must consider the “totality of the circumstances.” Glenn, 

673 F.3d at 871 (citation omitted). It is undisputed that 

Longoria was emotionally disturbed, acting out, and at times 

inviting officers to use deadly force to subdue him. See 

Hughes, 862 F.3d at 781. Our precedent establishes that in 

these circumstances, a reasonable jury could conclude “that 

there were sufficient indications of mental illness to diminish 

the governmental interest in using deadly force.” Id. Other 

officers appear to have been aware of this and prepared to 

respond accordingly by employing only non-lethal weapons. 

And like many other similarly tragic encounters with 

mentally ill or emotionally disturbed individuals, the 

situation facing Rankin was “far from that of a lone police 

officer suddenly confronted by a dangerous armed felon 

threatening immediate violence.” Deorle v. Rutherford, 

272 F.3d 1272, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001). Rankin had an 

opportunity to observe Longoria for more than forty minutes 

before he killed him. See id. During that time, Longoria 

neither brandished a gun nor shot at anyone.

Another circumstance to be considered is that Rankin 

was monitoring the EPD and PCSO radio frequencies 

throughout the incident. Despite this, Rankin claims he did 

not hear portions of the police broadcast earlier in the pursuit 
18 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

that conveyed Longoria was unarmed, nor did he hear the 

commands to use less than lethal force and the shouts that 

Longoria was unarmed in the seconds before the shooting. 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Longoria, 

Rankin disobeyed orders to maintain a perimeter and 

sprinted towards the scene—through the line of fire. Rankin 

knew that other officers were in better positions to see and 

respond to Longoria, had their weapons drawn, and were in 

the process of using non-lethal force. The totality of 

circumstances does not support the conclusion that Rankin’s 

conduct was objectively reasonable. Rather it raises a 

genuine issue of material fact to be determined by a jury.

The immediacy of the threat and Rankin’s objective 

reasonableness in the totality of the circumstances depend 

upon the resolution of disputes of material facts that must be 

resolved against Rankin at this stage of the proceedings. We 

cannot say as a matter of law that Rankin acted reasonably. 

The question of whether a constitutional violation occurred 

is therefore a matter for the jury to determine.

B. Clearly Established Right

We next proceed to the second question in assessing 

qualified immunity: whether the right at issue was clearly 

established. “The ‘dispositive inquiry in determining 

whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be 

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in 

the situation he confronted.’” Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 

2003, 2008 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 

533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). Our analysis “is limited to ‘the 

facts that were knowable to the defendant officers’ at the 

time they engaged in the conduct in question.” Id. (quoting 

White, 137 S. Ct. at 550). Because we are making a 

determination at summary judgment, we must view any 

disputed facts in the light most favorable to Longoria.
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 19

To determine whether the law was clearly established, 

we do not “require a case directly on point, but existing 

precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question 

beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 

(2011). We have acknowledged that qualified immunity may 

be denied in novel circumstances. See Mattos v. Agarano, 

661 F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 

536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). “Otherwise, officers would 

escape responsibility for the most egregious forms of 

conduct simply because there was no case on all fours 

prohibiting that particular manifestation of unconstitutional 

conduct.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1286; see also Brosseau, 

543 U.S. at 199 (stating that “in an obvious case, [general] 

standards can ‘clearly establish’ the answer, even without a 

body of relevant case law”).

The law governing this case is clearly established: “A 

police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous 

suspect by shooting him dead.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.

While locating the outer contours of the 

Fourth Amendment may at times be a murky 

business, few things in our case law are as 

clearly established as the principle that an 

officer may not “seize an unarmed, 

nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead” 

in the absence of “probable cause to believe 

that the suspect poses a threat of serious 

physical harm, either to the officer or to 

others.”

Torres, 648 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11); 

see also Adams v. Spears, 473 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Thus, Longoria’s Fourth Amendment right not to be shot 

dead while unarmed, surrounded by law enforcement, and in 

the process of surrendering is clearly established such that a 
20 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

“it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct 

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”9 Hernandez, 

137 S. Ct. at 2008. If, however, Rankin reasonably perceived 

that Longoria posed a threat of serious physical harm to 

Rankin or other officers, then he could have lawfully used 

deadly force. There is no dispute in this case about these 

propositions.

We are presented here with a pure question of fact and 

not a question of law or of mixed fact and law. Rankin 

contends that he in fact perceived that Longoria assumed a 

“shooter’s stance” and that Longoria appeared to be armed. 

Longoria, on the other hand, asserts that Rankin did not see, 

nor could he in fact have seen, what he claimed caused him 

to believe that Longoria assumed a “shooter’s stance” and 

that he appeared to be armed.

“Where the facts are disputed, their resolution and 

determinations of credibility ‘are manifestly the province of 

a jury.’” Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (quoting Santos, 287 F.3d at 852). This case turns 

on disputed facts, including the credibility of Rankin. 

Rankin’s account of an earlier interaction with Longoria 

during the car pursuit is inconsistent with that of his partner, 

Rice. Rankin heard some information on the radio dispatches 

of both the EPD and the PSCO, but he claims not to have 

heard any of the information relayed over those radio 

frequencies that would be helpful to Longoria. Unlike other 

PCSO officers, Rankin interpreted the command to maintain 

a perimeter as a command to run towards Longoria and the 

 9 Within the specific context of Longoria’s death, shot with his 

empty hands in the air above his head, this constitutional right is so 

clearly established that it has become the anthem in many protests of 

other police shootings: “Hands up, don’t shoot!”
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 21

Eloy officers after a PIT maneuver totally disabled 

Longoria’s car. Rankin likewise asserts that he did not hear 

any of the commands to use non-lethal force immediately 

prior to the shooting, nor did he hear officers shouting that 

Longoria was unarmed. This is inconsistent with the 

accounts of many other officers on the scene. Most 

important, no one else saw Longoria assume a “shooter’s 

stance,” including Rice, who was just behind him at the time. 

The two videos show that anyone who saw the events in realtime, including Rankin, would not have seen Longoria adopt 

what would have appeared to be a “shooter’s stance.”

A jury must determine Rankin’s credibility in light of 

conflicting accounts from his partner, other officers, 

Longoria’s expert, and the videos in real-time. See Cruz, 

765 F.3d at 1080 (“We make no determination about the 

officers’ credibility, because that’s not our determination to 

make. We leave it to the jury.”). If a jury concluded that 

Rankin reasonably perceived Longoria to be armed and 

threatening, it could find he had reason to use deadly force 

and thus there was no violation of Longoria’s clearly 

established constitutional right. See Act Up!/Portland v. 

Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he facts and 

circumstances within an officer’s knowledge . . . are matters 

of fact to be determined, where genuine disputes of a 

material nature exist, by the fact finder.”). However, a 

reasonable jury could also conclude that Rankin knew or 

should have known that Longoria was not holding a gun and 

that he did not assume a “shooter’s stance” and could find 

that Rankin’s statements to the contrary were not credible. A 

jury resolving these questions in Longoria’s favor could thus 

find that Rankin violated Longoria’s clearly established 

right. We may not usurp the jury’s role as the arbiters of fact, 

nor can our analysis at summary judgment change simply 

because the videos that show these disputed events unfolding 
22 LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY

in real-time may be called into question by a single frozen 

frame that does not represent what an officer actually saw at 

the time the events unfolded. See Lopez, slip op. at 45 

(finding that a jury must determine the facts relevant to 

qualified immunity: whether the officer could have 

reasonably perceived the decedent turning while holding a 

toy AK-47 as a “harrowing gesture”).

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 

because there is a material issue of fact as to whether Rankin 

violated Longoria’s clearly established constitutional right. 

We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment and remand for a jury to determine whether 

Rankin’s use of deadly force was lawful.

II. Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) Motion

Plaintiffs challenge the denial of their Rule 56(d) motion. 

This challenge is moot because on remand the parties will be 

entitled to conduct further discovery.

III. Family-Member Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claims

Longoria challenges the dismissal of the family-member 

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Only Longoria’s estate may bring 

a § 1983 for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; 

his family members have no standing to sue on their own 

behalves. The Supreme Court has made this abundantly 

clear. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) 

(“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . .

may not be vicariously asserted.”). Moreover, the Court has 

recently reaffirmed this principle. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at

2022 (“Our cases make it clear that Fourth Amendment 

rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously 

asserted.”) (citations omitted). We therefore affirm the 
LONGORIA V. PINAL COUNTY 23

district court’s dismissal of the family-members’ § 1983 

claims.

IV. State Wrongful Death Claim

Plaintiffs brought a wrongful-death claim under Arizona 

Revised Statute § 12-611 against Rankin, as well as Pinal 

County Sheriff Paul Babeu (in his official capacity) and 

Pinal County under a respondeat superior theory of liability. 

Because we find a material dispute of facts as to whether or 

not Rankin’s use of deadly force was reasonable, we reverse 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the state 

cause of action as well.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s order 

granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment is 

REVERSED. The district court’s order dismissing the 

family-member Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims is AFFIRMED, 

and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.