Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2789 | May 17, 2019 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kevin Wild

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Samantha M. Sumcad

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jasmine McCoy,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 17, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2789

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G10-1712-CM-47916

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2789 | May 17, 2019 Page 2 of 4

Statement of the Case

[1] Jasmine McCoy appeals her conviction for battery, as a Class A misdemeanor, 

following a bench trial. McCoy raises a single issue for our review, namely, 

whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut her defense of selfdefense. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 12, 2017, Luther Starks was working as a cashier at a Dollar 

General store in Indianapolis. While Starks was checking McCoy out of the 

store, McCoy “was exhibiting rude behavior” toward Starks, and in response 

Starks refused “to double bag” some of the items McCoy was purchasing. Tr. 

at 4. They then got into a “verbal argument” before one of Starks’ managers 

sent him “to the back.” Id. at 5.

[3] As Starks was heading to the backroom, McCoy “came over . . . and was 

bumping into [him]” and “essentially trying to fight” him. Id. Starks then 

“decided to put her in a headlock” to avoid, he later testified under oath, 

“further harm” from coming “to either” of them. Id.

[4] “[A]fter a minute” of having McCoy in a headlock, another man intervened, 

Starks released McCoy, and the third party placed himself between McCoy and 

Starks. Id. at 6. Nonetheless, McCoy “decided to mace” Starks at that point, 

which caused Starks severe pain. Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2789 | May 17, 2019 Page 3 of 4

[5] The State charged McCoy with battery as a Class A misdemeanor for her use of 

pepper spray against Starks. At her ensuing bench trial, she asserted that she 

had acted in self-defense. The trial court rejected her defense and found her 

guilty. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] On appeal, McCoy argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 

rebut her claim of self-defense. Self-defense is a valid justification for an 

otherwise criminal act. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1999). A 

defendant must establish that she was in a place where she had the right to be, 

acted without fault, and was in reasonable fear or apprehension of death or 

great bodily harm. Id. at 699-700. However, self-defense is unavailable to a 

defendant who “provoke[s], instigate[s,] or participate[s] willingly in the 

violence.” Brooks v. State, 683 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind. 1997).

[7] Once a defendant claims self-defense, the State bears the burden of disproving 

at least one of the elements of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Miller, 

720 N.E.2d at 700. It may meet its burden by rebutting the defense directly, by 

affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by relying on 

the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Id. Whether the State has met its burden 

is a question for the trier of fact. Id.

[8] When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut her claim 

of self-defense, the standard of review remains the same as for any sufficiency of 

evidence claim. Id. at 699. We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2789 | May 17, 2019 Page 4 of 4

credibility of witnesses but look solely to the evidence most favorable to the 

judgment with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. We will 

affirm a conviction where such evidence and reasonable inferences are 

substantial evidence of probative value sufficient to support the judgment. Id.

[9] The State readily presented sufficient evidence to negate McCoy’s claim of selfdefense. Starks testified that, after his manager had intervened at the cash 

register and sent Starks to a back room, McCoy pursued him. He further 

testified that, after he had released McCoy from the headlock and a third party 

had positioned himself between Starks and McCoy, McCoy then peppersprayed Starks by reaching around the third party. That testimony was 

sufficient to show that McCoy provoked, instigated, or willingly participated in 

the acts that precipitated the headlock, and it was also sufficient to show that, at 

the time she pepper-sprayed Starks, McCoy was no longer in reasonable fear for 

her own safety. McCoy’s argument on appeal is merely a request for this Court 

to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. We affirm her conviction for 

battery, as a Class A misdemeanor.

[10] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.