NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HUGO A. MARTINEZ

- DAVALOS , Petitioner ,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH , Attorney General Respondent

. No. 15

- 71935 Agency No. A092

- 232

- 127

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 5 , 2016 Pasadena, California Before: REINHARDT, WARDLAW , and OWENS, Circuit Judges. Hugo A. Martinez

- Davalos, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) denial of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT” ). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We grant the petition and remand for further proceedings consisten t with this disposition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

OCT 13 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 1. As a preliminary matter, we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)

. See Pechenkov v. Holder , 705 F.3d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that jurisdiction rem ains where the immigration judge “denies relief on the merits , for
fa ilure to demonstrate the requisite factual grounds for relief, rather tha n in reliance
on the conviction ”). We decline the government’s request to revisit our decision in
Pechenkov

. 2. In the first iteration of this case, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found
Mart inez credible, and held that he met his burden to show that it is more likely
than not he would be tortured if he returns to Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Thus , the IJ granted Martinez CAT relief. The BIA vacat ed that decision on appeal and the case was then appealed to this court

. We granted the government’s unopposed motion to remand in light of intervening case law. During the second iteration, on r emand proceedings in front of the same IJ , Martinez presente d additional personal and expert witness testimony clarifying the extent of police corruption in Mexico and corroborating his claims that the Mexican police would acquiesce to his torture if he returned

. Despite the additional evidence supporting the appl ication fo r deferral of removal, the IJ
reversed his previous decision. The IJ again found Martinez credible, but this time
held that Martinez had not met his burden to show that it is more likely than not
that he would be tortured if he returned to Mexico. As such, the IJ denied3 Martinez CAT relief. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial. On remand, the IJ and BIA discus sed the evidence that led to their denial of Martinez’s application for deferral of removal under the CAT, but never discussed
the IJ’s opposite interpretation of essentially the same , if not stronger, fac ts in the remand proceeding. If the agency fails “to engage in a substantive analysis of its decision, we have no ability to conduct a meaningful review of its decision.”
Arrendon d o v. Holder , 623 F.3d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 2010) ; see also Su Hwa She
v. Holder , 629 F.3d 958, 963

– 64 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Rather than countenance a decision that leaves us to speculate based on an incomplete analysis, we remand
the case to the BIA for clarif ication.”)

. Because the agency in this case gave no reasoned explanation f or why stronger support for Martinez’ s application for
deferral of removal under the CAT led the agency to reach a different conclusion
the second time , we remand for reconsideratio n or a reasoned explanation by the IJ of why he reaches a decision contrary to his first.
GRANT ED and REMAND ED .