# C_2017318EN.01002501.xml

| 25.9.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 318/25 |
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25.9.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 318/25

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Action brought on 7 August 2017 — Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube v Commission

(Case T-500/17)

(2017/C 318/32)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube Co. Ltd (Huangshi, China) (represented by: E. Vermulst and J. Cornelis, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/804 of 11 May 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron (other than cast iron) or steel (other than stainless steel), of circular cross-section, of an external diameter exceeding 406,4 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2017 L 121, p. 3) at least as far as the applicant is concerned; and |
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annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/804 of 11 May 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron (other than cast iron) or steel (other than stainless steel), of circular cross-section, of an external diameter exceeding 406,4 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2017 L 121, p. 3) at least as far as the applicant is concerned; and

| — | order the European Commission to pay the applicant’s costs. |
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order the European Commission to pay the applicant’s costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated Articles 3(2) and (3) Basic Regulation (1) as well as Articles 3.1 and 3.2 WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement in determining price undercutting. According to the applicant, the Commission merely conducted a mathematical comparison between prices for the year 2015 only without undertaking a dynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship between imported prices and domestic prices. The applicant further puts forward that the Commission also did not establish price undercutting for the product as a whole. |
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1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated Articles 3(2) and (3) Basic Regulation (1) as well as Articles 3.1 and 3.2 WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement in determining price undercutting. According to the applicant, the Commission merely conducted a mathematical comparison between prices for the year 2015 only without undertaking a dynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship between imported prices and domestic prices. The applicant further puts forward that the Commission also did not establish price undercutting for the product as a whole.

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| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated Article 3(6) Basic Regulation (and Article 3.5 WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement) in basing the causation analysis on an illegal undercutting determination. |
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2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated Article 3(6) Basic Regulation (and Article 3.5 WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement) in basing the causation analysis on an illegal undercutting determination.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that in establishing a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury to the Union industry, the Commission committed a manifest error in finding that (1) there was a correlation between the dumped imports and the injury to the Union industry; and (2) that other factors (decrease in export performance and demand and an increase of imports from other countries) did not individually or collectively break this causal link. |
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3.

Third plea in law, alleging that in establishing a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury to the Union industry, the Commission committed a manifest error in finding that (1) there was a correlation between the dumped imports and the injury to the Union industry; and (2) that other factors (decrease in export performance and demand and an increase of imports from other countries) did not individually or collectively break this causal link.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission breached its obligation of due diligence and proper administration by refusing to engage in an injury and causation analysis by segment, thereby failing to ensure that its injury and causation findings were not distorted. |
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4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission breached its obligation of due diligence and proper administration by refusing to engage in an injury and causation analysis by segment, thereby failing to ensure that its injury and causation findings were not distorted.

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(1)  Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ 2016 L 176, p. 21).

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