## In t he Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 23

- 00078

- CR

MICHAEL PAUL GARRETT , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 6th District Court Red River County, Texas Trial Court No. CR02939

B efore Stevens , C.J., van Cleef and Rambin , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens2 

### ME MORANDUM OPINION
Michael Paul Garrett was convicted of robbery

. After the trial court found the State’s punishment

- enhancement alleg ation true, it sentenc ed Garrett to sixty years’ imprisonment. In his sole point of error on appeal, 1 Garrett argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the tria l court’s finding of guilt. Because we find the evidence sufficient, we affi rm the tria l court’s j udgme nt. I. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding of Guilt A. Standard of Review “In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment to de ter mine wh ether any ra tiona l [fact

- finder] could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Willia mson v. State , 589 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2019 , pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex . C rim. App . 2010) (pl urali ty op.) ; Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hartsfield
v. State , 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App

. — Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). “Our rigorous [ legal sufficiency ] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented. ” Id

. (cit ing Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 917

– 18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction
of the Bro oks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the [fact

- finder] ‘to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, t o w eigh the evidence, and t o draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. ’ ” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3 d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) )

.

1 In our companion cause number 06

- 23

- 0007 7

- CR, Garrett appeals his conviction for family violence assault by occlusion

.3

“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothe tically co rrect jury charge.” Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetic ally correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnec ess arily increase t he State ’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id

. (quoting Malik , 953 S.W.2d at 240)

. Here, the State alleg ed that Garrett, “w hil e in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, int entionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to Dora Smith

- Garrett by striking the complainant with his
f ist .” The victim name d by the State’s indictment is Garrett’s mother.
B. The Evidence At trial, Dora testified that she had loaned money to Garrett, which Garrett had repaid a few days before the incident

. On the day of the incident, Garrett spoke t o D ora on the front
po r ch o f her house and a gain asked to borrow money. Dora locked the front door due to Garrett’s “personality ” and explained , while standing outside , that she had bills to pay and could not loan him more money. According to Dora, she was putting her key in t he door lock to go inside when Garrett “attacked [her] . . . . on the side of [her] face .” She testified that she was knocked off balance , tha t Garrett was wrestling with her in the yard , and that “h e kept trying to choke [her]

. ” Dor a testified that she pas sed out becaus e she could not breathe and that, when she woke up in the yard, Garrett and her keys were gone. Dora went to a neighbor’s house and called the police.4

Samantha Manrique testified that she was dispatched to Dora ’s neighbor’s house an d sa w Dora with “obvious physical injuries to her face [,]

. . . neck ,” and “all over her body.” Dora was transported to the hospital by ambulance

. Me anwhile, Manrique went to Garrett’s house , which was a separate residence lo cated o n Dora ’s property, an d r ec overed Do ra’s house and car keys from Garrett’s pocket. Dora and Manrique confirmed that Garrett took the keys without Dora’s
p ermission. 2 In his defense, Garrett testified that he did no t assault Dora, despite the evidence ind icatin g otherwise, an d c la imed that he had the keys before her assault

. 3 As the trier of fact, the trial court found Garrett’s cl aim incredible. In making its finding of guilt, the trial court determined that Garrett had taken Dora’s keys and t hat “ the keys were t he means to th e money , ” which “ had to either be in the car or in the house.” C. Analysis A person commits robbe ry “if, in the course of committing theft

. . . and with intent to obta in or maintain control of the property, he . . . in tentionally, knowingly , or reck l es sl y causes bodily injury to another.” T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 29.02 (a)(1)

. A person commits theft “if h e unlawfully app ropriates property with intent to deprive the own er of property.” T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 31.03 ( b)(1 )

. “Appropriation of pr operty is un la wful if

. . . i t is without the owner’s effective consent.” T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 31. 0 3

.

2 Dora t es tified that Garret t d i d not take any money or other property from inside the house and did not take her car.

3 During the State’s cross

- examination, Garrett denied knowledge of his prior judgments of conviction for theft, family violence assau lt causi n g bodily injury, ass a ult against an elderly individual, and resisting arres t.5

Garrett cites to his own self

- serving testimony claiming that he had Dora’s ke ys before the assault and argues that, as a resul t, “there was no evide nce that G ar re tt took the key s with the intent to deprive his mother of them.” We disagree. The evidence at trial showed that Dora spoke with Garrett outside of her home af ter she “[l]ocked the door behind [her]” because of Garrett’ s “personality.” Beca use of Ga rre tt ’s demeanor, Do r a “thought it would be more public [and safer] for [her] to come outs ide.” Dora testified that, a fter she denied Garrett’s request for money, Garrett assaulted her as she “commenced to putting the key in the door.” Dora test ified tha t G ar rett took he r h o use and car keys without her permission during th e assault. Manrique testified that Dor a asked her to retrieve the keys, which she found in Garrett’s pocket.
We find that the record provided ample evid ence to show that Garr ett appro p ri at ed Dora’s ho use and car keys without her effective consent and th at, under the totality of the circumstanc es , the trial court was free to infer that Garrett’s appropriation of the keys was made with the intent to depri ve Dora of them. This est ablishe d t ha t Garrett comm itt e d theft. We also find that Dora ’ s and Manrique’s t estimony showed that Garrett intentiona lly or knowingly assaulted Dora while committing the theft. As a result, we conclude that that trial court, a s a rational fact

- finder, co uld h a ve f ound the essenti al e lements of robbery beyond a reaso nable doubt. Consequently, we overrule Garrett’s sole point of error on appeal.6

III. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice Date Submitted: A ugust 29 , 202 3 Date Decide d: August 30 , 202 3
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