C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEX AS ELPASO, TEXAS

M. C., Ap pe lla

nt,
v. T E X A S D E P A R T M E N T O F F A M ILY AN D PR OT ECT I VE SER VI CES , Appellee
. § § § § § § No. 08-08-00053- CV

Appea l from the 65th DistrictCourt of El Pa so County , T e xas (TC# 2007CM227)

O P I N I O N This is an appea l from a judg ment terminating t h e par ental rig hts of M.C., the child’s biologica l mother
. As a preliminary matter, we a re r eviewingthe trial cour t’s deter mination made pursuant to Section 263.405(d) of the Texas F amily Code that the appea l is fr ivolous. I n addition to alleg ing that the appea l is not frivolous, M.C
. challeng es t he constitutionality of those provisions in t he Te xas F a mil y

Cod e (1 ) w hic h a llo w the tr ia l cou rt – r a the r t

ha n th e a pp e llate c ourt

– to de te rm ine wh e the r t

he a pp e a l is fr ivo lou s, and

(2 ) wh ic h impo se re str ic tio ns on the ri g ht t o a pp e a l, including the statuto ry

require ment that she file a statement of points of er ror. The Texas Depa rtment of F amily

and Regulatory

Service s (the De partment) r esponds th at we are prec luded from conside ring any

of the issues ra ised by

M.C. because she did not timely file a st at ement of points as require d by

Section 263.405(b). F inding that t h e ap p ea l is not frivolous, we re verse the trial court’ s order
. F ACTUAL SUMMA RY On Janu ary 11 , 2 00 7, the De pa

rtme nt fi le d a pet iti on to te rm inate the pa re nta l rig hts of

M. C.T he order was en t i t l ed “ I nt er l ocut ory O r der of T er mi nat i on as t o [M
. C
. ]
. ” 1 and the c hild’s biologica l father
. An associate judg e conduc ted the fina l hear ing on D ece mber 5, 2007. At the conc lusion of t h at hea ring , the associate judg e announc ed in open c ourt that the Dep artme nt h a d p ro ve n b y c le ar a nd c on vin c inge vid e nc e the a lle g a tio ns c on ta ine d in the fi rs t
a me nd e d p e tit ion

and that te rm inatio n o f M .C. ’s pa re nta l r ig hts w a s in

the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st. M
. C
. ’s t ri al at t o rn ey

fi l eda p re m at u re n o t i ce o f ap p ea l o nDe ce m b er 1 2 , 2 0 0 7
. T h e a s s o ci at e j u d ge enter ed an inter locutory

order terminating the par ental rig hts of M.C. on Dec ember 18, 2007, and 1 the cour t appointed an appellate attorney to repre sent M.C. that same day . The district cour t adopted the associate j udg e’s order on Dec ember 20. The a ssociate judg e ente red a n order terminating the pare ntal rig hts of the child’s biolog ical father on January 14, 2008, and the district cour t a dopted that order on J anuar

y 15. On J anuar

y 28 , M
. C
. fi l ed an ame nded notice of appea l and a state ment of points of error . Those points included complaints about the denial of M.C.’s motion for continuanc e, attacks on the sufficie ncy

of t he evidence, and challeng es t o the consti tutionality of Section 263.405. The a ssociate judg e conduc ted a he aringon the statement of points and f ound that the appe al was frivolous. M.C.’s attorney announce d in open court that M.C. wished t o appea l the associate judge ’s d e te r mi n a ti o n . A t o u r

r e qu e s t, th e p arti e s h a v e f il e d b r ie f s r e late d to th e f r iv o lo u s n e s s f

in d in g . We also order ed the c ourt repor ter to file the rec ord from the trial on the merits beca use M.C.’s statement
o f points include challeng es to the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence
. S

e e In re M. R

. J. M. , 1 9 3 S. W. 3 d 6 7 0 , 6 7 6 ( T e x. A p p . - - F o rt Wo rth 2 0 0 6 , n o p e t. ) ( e n b an c ) ( h o ld in g th a t an appellate court ha s the authority to order the prepa

ration of a fre e record of all of the e vidence in a t er m i n at i o nca s e w h en n ec es s ary t o re v i ew a t ri al co u rt ’s d et er m i n at i o nt h at an ap p ea l ra i s i n g a fac tual sufficie ncy

complaint is frivolous). TIM ELIN ESS OF THE ST AT EM EN T OF P OIN TST he Legis l at ure ame nd ed Sec t i o n 26 3
. 4 0 5 i n 20 0 7
. T he new versi o n ap p l i es onl y t o a s ui t af f ect i ng t he 2 par en t
- ch i l d r el at i on s h i p f i l ed on or a f

t er t h e ef f ec t i v e dat e of

t h e Act , J u n e 15, 2007. T h e pet i t i on h er e wa s f i l ed on Jan uar y 11, 200 7. Accordi ng l y , we wi l l appl y t he 20 05 ve r s i on of t he s t at ut e t o t hi s appeal un l es s not ed ot her wi s e. Th e De pa rtme nt c on te nd s th a t w e are pr e c lud e d f ro m c on sid e ri ng

any iss ue s r a ise d b y

M. C. beca use she did not timely file her statement of points. W e under stand the De partment to ar g ue, at le ast in part , th a t th e a

pp e a l is fr ivo lou s b e c a

us e M. C. d id n ot p re se rv e he r i ssu e s f or a pp e llate
re vie w b y c omp ly ing wi th S e c tio n 2 63 .4 05 (b ). Th a t se c tio n p ro vid e s: (b) Not late r than the 15th da y afte r the date a final order is signe d by the trial judg e, a party intending to appea l the order must file with the trial court a statement of the point or points on which the party intends to appea l. The statement may be combined with a mo ti o n f

o r a n e w tr ia l. A c ts 2 0 0 1 , 7 7 th L e g . , R. S. , c h
. 1 0 90, § 9, 2001 Te x.Ge n. L aws 23 95 , 2 39 7- 98 (c ur re nt v e rs ion

fo un d at T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 263.405(b) ( Ver

non Supp. 2008)). 2 Un de r S e c tio n 2 63 .4 05 (i ), a n a pp e llate c ourt

may no t c on sid e r a

ny iss ue that w a s n ot s pe c if ic a lly pr e se nte d to the tr ia l c ourt in a tim e ly fi le d s ta te me nt o f t

he p oi nts on

wh ic h th e pa

rt y int e nd s to appea l or in a statement combined with a motion for new trial. Acts 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 176, § 1 , 2 00 5 T e x.Ge n. L aws 33 2 (c ur re nt ve rs ion fo un d a t T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 263.405(i) (V ernon Supp. 2008)). Citi ng Section 263.401(d), a nd In re T.L.S. , 143 S.W .3d 284, 287 (Tex.App.--Waco 2004, no pet.), the D epar

tment argues that the ter

mination order e ntere d by the associate judg e on De cembe r 18, 2007 was a

final orde r with respe ct to M.C. Section 109.002(b) of the Family Code provides that “[a]n appeal may

be take n by

any party to a suit from a final order rende red unde r this titl e.” T EX . F AM .C ODE ANN . § 109.002(b) ( Ver non 2002). An order i s g ener ally considere d to be interlocutory if it does not dispose of all t he par ties or claims in a c ase. See Lehm ann v. Har-Con Corporation , 39 S.W .3d 191, 1 9 5 & n.12 (Tex. 2001). I t is undisput ed that the ter mination order r ender ed on Dec ember

18, 2007 did not dispose of all the parties and would be considere d an interloc utory orderT h e Le g i s l at u r e r epe al ed Se ct i on 263. 401( d) i n 2007. Ac t s 2007, 80t h Le g . , R. S. , c h
. 866, § 5, 2007 3 T ex . G en . La ws 1837, 1838. B ec au s e t h i s s u i t w as f i l ed pr i or t o t h e ef

f ec t i v e dat e of

t h e ame n dmen t , J u n e 15, 2007, t h e f or mer v er s i on of

Se ct i on 263. 401 a ppl i es t o t h i s a ppea l
. Ac t s 2007, 80t h Le g . , R. S. , c h
. 866, § 6, 2007 T ex . G en . La ws 1837, 1838. un de r t he g e ne ra l r

ule . T he De pa

rtme nt c on te nd s th a t th e or de r t e rm inatin g M. C.’s par e nta l r ig hts is a final and a

ppeala ble order by virtue of Section 263.401(d) , and that the a ppellate timetable be g an to run on Dec ember

18, 2007. Section 263.401 perta ins to the dismiss al of a suit affe cting the par ent-c hild relationship filed b y t h e D e p art m e n t o f F a m i l y an d R e g u l a t o r y S e r v i c e s . S u

b s e c t i o n ( a ) r e qu i r e s t h e t r i a l c ou rtto dismiss a suit filed by

the Depa rtment if the suit has bee n pending for one y ear and the c ourt has not rendere d a fi n al order

or g rante d an extension under subsec tion (b). See T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 263.401(a) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). The f ormer ve rsion of Section 263.401(d) provided: (d ) F or purp os e s o f t

his se c tio n, a

fi na l or de r i s a

n o rd e r t hat: (1 ) r e qu ir e s th a t a

c hil d b e re tur

ne d to the c hil d’ s p are nt; (2) na mes a re lative of the c hild or another p er s o n as t he child’s mana g ing conser vator; (3) without t erminating the par ent-c hild relationship, appoints the depar tment as the mana g ing c onservator of the c hild; or (4) ter minates the par ent-c hild relationship and appoints a re lative o f the child, another

suitable person, or the depar tment a s manag ing c onservator of the child. Ac ts 1 99 7, 75 th L e g ., R.S. , c h. 10 22 , § 90 , 199 7 Te x.Ge n. L aws 37 33 , 376 8- 69
. Un de r s imi lar f a c ts, 3 the Waco Court of Appea ls ha s applied this de finition of “fina l or der” to de termine th at an o rder which t er m i n ated the pare ntal rig hts of one par ent and a ppointed the Depa

rtment as the c hild’s manag ing c onservator was a final o rder

for pur poses of c alculatingthe appe llate timetable, eve n though it did not adjudicate t h e ri gh t s of all par ties to the proce eding or all pendingclaims. In reT.L.S. , 143 S.W .3d at 287-89. The court of appeals di smissed the appeal because the pare nt had not

filed her notice of a

ppeal within twenty

day s after

the “f inal order ” wa s signe d. Id. at 290. W e d ec l i n e t o follow this decision. The cour t failed to consider

that Section 263.401(d) be g ins wi th t

he ph ra se “ F or purp os e s of t his se c tio n . . . .” Th e pla in m e anin g of tha t phra se is t o li mit the application of the definition to Section 2 6 3 .401. I f the L eg islature had intende d for Sec tion 263.401(d)’ s definition of “f inal order ” to apply

elsewhe re, it would not have limit ed its application to Sec tion 263.401. More over, the Dec ember 18, 2007 termination order is not a “final or der” under that section bec ause it appointed the Depa rtment as the c hild’s temporary manag ing c onservator. To constitute a “f

inal order ” under

Section 263.401(d)( 4), the orde r must a ppoint the Depa

rtment as the
c hil d’ s managing conserv ator . We c on c lud e that th e int e rl oc uto ry or de r d id n ot b e c ome fi na l un til the trial cour

t entere d the orde r terminatingthe par ental rig hts of the child’s bi o l o gi cal f ather on Janu ary 14 , 2 00 8. Thus , M .C. tim e ly fi le d h e r s ta te me nt o f p oints. THE FRIVOLOUSNESS F INDING M.C. devotes most of her br ief to c onstitut ional challeng es. The D epar tment contends that her failure to a dequate ly brief the frivolousness finding eff ectively conce des it. We disa g ree . M.C.’s brief a ddre s s e s th e s ta

n d ar d f o r d e te r mi n in g w h e th e r an a

p p e a l is f r iv o lo u s . Wh il e s h e d o e s not illust rate why

eac h point for re view is not frivolous, her br ief a dequate ly raises th e is sue. M.C.’s
a pp ro a c h is log ic a lly c on sis te nt wi th he r c on te nti on that Se c tio n 26 3. 40 5 is un c on sti tut ion a l be c a us e it pe rm its the tr ia l c ourt

rathe r t ha n th e a pp e llate c ourt

to d e te rm ine wh e the r h e r a pp e a l is fr ivo lou s. Fur ther, Sec tion 263.405(g ) does not re quire a n appellant t o ev en file a brief with respec t to the frivolousness finding althoug h the appe llate court may require the parties to file appellate brief s on the issues prese nted. I t is the appellate court’s duty to “ rende r appr opriate or ders a fter r eviewingthe
rec ords and appellate briefs, if a ny .” T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 263.405(g ) (Vernon S upp. 2008). Ourduty

to reviewthe trial cour t’s fri v o l o u s n es s finding is not dependent on the a dequac y of the appellant’ s briefingof the issue. Section 263.405(d)( 3) direc ts the trial court to dete rmine whe ther the a ppeal is f rivolous as p ro v i d edb y

S ec t i o n1 3
. 0 0 3 (b ) o f t h e C i v i l P ra ct i ce an d R em ed i es C o d e. Un d er

t h at s ec t i o n , a j u d ge may consider w hether

the appe llant has prese nted a substantial q u es t i on for a ppellate r eview. T EX .C IV .P R AC . & R EM .C ODE ANN . § 13.003(b) ( Ver non 2002). An appea l is frivolous when it lacks
an arguable basis in law or in fa ct. In re M .N.V. , 216 S.W .3d 833, 834 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2006, no pet.), citing De La Vega v . Taco Cabana, Inc. , 9 74 S.W. 2d 15 2, 15 4 ( Te x.Ap p. -- San A nto nio 1 9 9 8 , n o p e t. )
. We r e v ie w a tr ia l c o u rt’ s f in d in g o f f

r iv o lo u s n e s s f

o r an a b u s e o f discretion. In re M.N.V. , 2 16 S.W. 3d

83 3, 83 4 ( Te x.Ap p. -- San An ton io 20 06 , no pe t.) ; In re K.D. , 202 S.W .3d 860, 86 6 (T e x.Ap p. -- F or

t Worth 20 06 , n o p e t.) ; In re H.D .H. , 127 S.W .3d 921, 923 (Tex.App.--B eaumont 2004, no pet.). I n her state ment of points, M.C. challeng es the constitutionalit y of Section 263.405. Given that one cour

t of appe als has held that Section 263.405(i) is unc onstitut ional beca use it violates the Separation of Powers cla use, we conclude that M.C
. ’s co n s tituti onal ar g uments directe d at that subsection have an ar g uable ba sis in law. S e e I n r e D

. W. , 249 S.W .3d 625 (Tex.App.--F ort Worth), pet. denied , 260 S.W .3d 462 (Tex. 2008). For this reason a lone, we c onclude that the t rial cour t abused its discre tion by

concludingthat M.C.’s appea l is frivolous. W e believe Appellant’ s other constitutional arg uments raise substantial que stions which should be revie wed on the merits. Afte r revie wing the par

ties’ brief

s, M.C.’s statement of points on appea l, the clerk ’s re co rd, and the repor ter’s r ecor d from both the t rial on t he mer its and the Section 263.405(d) he aring , we c onclude that the appe al is not frivolous. We reve rse the tr ial court’s or der a nd direc t that the appea l proce ed
on the me ri ts. Our o pin ion sh ou ld n ot b e re a d a s im pli e dl y ho ldingthat Se c tio n 2 63 .4 05 (i ) i sun c on sti tut ion a l. We ha ve no t re a c he d the me ri ts of any of the c on sti tut ion a l is su e s p re se nte d b y thi s
a pp e a l. M. C. i s d ir e c te d to fi le he r b ri e f o n th e mer it s wi thin thir ty da y s a ft e r t he iss ua nc e of thi s opinion. She may

include in her

brief issues not include d in her stateme nt of point s . Whether our revie w of those issues will be re stricted by application of Sec tion 2 6 3
. 4 0 5 (i ) and whe ther such a
re str ic tio n o f o ur

re vie w i s c on sti tut ion a l is ano the r ma tte r. Th e De pa rtme nt w ill have thi rt

y da y s to file its brie f. After briefing is c ompleted, the appea l w ill be submitt ed, either with or without o ral argument as the pa

rties desire , at the ea

rliest date possible.

Dec ember

11, 2008 ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, J ustice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l u r e , an d R i v e r a , JJ. Rivera, J., not participating