### In th e



# United States Court of Appeals Forthe Seventh Cir c uit

No. 16-3112

U NI T E D S TAT E S OF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

D E AN G E L O A ND E RS ON

, Defendant-Appellant.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the

Ea stern Di stri ct o f Wi sco n si n. No . 2 :1 4 -cr-0 0 1 8 6 -LA — Lynn A de lma n, Judg e.

A RGU E D N OV E MB E R 7, 2 017

— D E C I D E D F E B R UAR Y 2 , 2 018

Befor e E A S T E R

B R OO K , R OVN E R

, and H AMI L TON

, Circuit Judges

. R OVN E R , Cir cuit Judge. On S eptember 23, 2014, a gr and j ur y
r etur n ed a fi v e-count indi ctment agai nst Deangelo Ander son, char gi ng hi m in counts one a n d tw o wi th ar m ed r obber y of a bank and br andi s hing a fi r ear m in f ur ther ance o f a c r im e of

v i olence (i

. e. the bank r obber y), and in counts thr ee, four and2 No. 16-3112
fi v e wi th unlawful possessi on of a fi r ear m as a f elon, p ossessi on of cr ack cocaine wi th intent to di str ib u te, and possessi on of a fi r ear m in fur ther ance of a dr ug tr affi cking offense. He w as tr i ed befor e a j u r y on Apr i l 4 and 5, 2016, and on Apr i l 5 the j ur y r etur ned a v er di ct acqui tti ng hi m of counts one and tw o, and conv i ctin g h i m of counts thr ee, four a nd fi v e. The di s tr i ct
cour t sentenced hi m to 96 months’ im p r isonment, compr i sed of 36 months on counts thr ee and four , to be ser v e d c o nc u r r e n t l y , and si xty months on count fi v e, to b e ser v ed consecuti v ely to the sentence on counts thr ee and four

. Ander son n ow appeals that conv i cti on and sentence to thi s cour t. He ar gues that he is enti tled to a n ew tr i al because he

w as deni ed h i s S i xth Amendment r i ght to a publi c tr i al when the pr o c eedings c onti nued bey ond the hour s when the
cour thouse w as open. In addi ti on, h e c o n tests hi s sentence,
asser ti ng tha t t h e di str i ct c our t based hi s sentence on an
er r oneous under standing of the law

. The facts under lyi ng Ander son’s c onv i cti on ar e la r gely i r r elev ant to the d i s posi ti on of h i s c lai ms in thi s a ppeal, and ther efor e w e li mi t our di scussi on to a b r i ef r ecap. On August 12, 2014, thr ee masked indi v i duals r obbed a bank at gunpoi nt in Mi lw a ukee, Wi sconsin, and fled wi th $4,737 in a whi te Honda Ci v i c wi th li cense plat e s 4 80-TNG. The next day , Mi lw aukee poli ce offi cer s stopped that v ehi cle, of whi ch Deangelo Ander son w as the d r i v e r a nd sole occupant. When the offi cer appr oached the v ehi cle, Ander s o n fled in the c ar and w as pur sued at hi gh s peed unti l he c r a shed into another

v ehi cle. H e w as ev entually taken into custody , and a sear ch of the Ci vi c r ev e a l e d a bag contain ing 39 indi v i d u ally-wr apped baggi es of cr a c k c ocaine and a loaded 9 m m pi stol, as well asNo. 16-3112 3

r ed dy e stains consi stent wi th a dy e pack p l a n t e d wi th the stolen money to explode. The tr i a l began on Apr i l 4, 2016, and concluded wi th a j ur y
v er di ct on Apr i l 5. After the v er di ct, Ander son fi led a moti on for a new tr i al based on a clai m that the tr i al cour t v i olated hi s S i xth Amendment ri ght to a p ubli c tr i al by allowing the tr i al to pr oceed on both days bey ond the ti me at whi ch the c our thouse

w as l ocked for the ni ght. The cour t deni ed t h e m o ti on, and Ander son appealed. The fi r st day of tr i al included j ur y s e l e c ti on, opening stat e m ents, and the testi mony of thi r teen wi tnesses. S peci fi

cally , the gov er nment soli c i ted the testi m ony of: tw o employees fr om the bank that w as r obbed; a ci ti zen wit n e ss who di scov er ed dy e-stained money on the str eet; a detecti v e who inv esti gated the r obber y; four poli ce o f fi c er s inv olv ed in the chase, stop, a nd ar r est of Ander son and the sei zur e of ev i dence fr om hi s v ehi c le; a detecti v e who in ter v i ew ed Ander son after hi s ar r est; a for ensi c inv esti gator who took p hot o g r a p h s and

r e co v e red dy e samples fr om Ander son’s v ehi cle; a detecti v e inv ol v e d in the r ecov er y of dy e-stained money who also di r ected the fo r e n s i c e xaminer ’s w or k as to Ander son’s v ehi cle;

a for ensi c sci enti st who tested the dy e ev i dence; and a for ensi c inv esti gator who pr ocessed the fin ger pr ints and D NA as to the fi r e a r m a nd plasti c bag sei zed fr om Ander son’s car
. The testi mony of the last thr ee wi tnesses extended bey ond the 5:00 p.m. ti me at whi ch the door s to the cour thouse—but not to the
cour tr oom—w er e l ocke d

. The detecti v e’s testi mony , whi ch

r egar ded chain-of-custody matter s, began a t 4:58 p.m. and ended a t 5:21 p.m. He w as follow ed by a for ensi c s ci enti st, who testi fi ed fr om 5:22 p.m. to 5:34 p .m. confi r ming that dy e stains4 No. 16-3112
in the Honda Ci v i c contained chemi c als commonly associ ated wi th b ank dy e p a c ks. Fi nally , the for ensi c inv esti gator who concluded the testi mony for the day , te s t if ie d on d i rect and
cr oss-examinati on fr om 5:38 p.m. to 6 :18 p.m
. r egar ding hi s unsuccessful effor ts to locate finger pr ints and obtai n D NA fr om the fi r ear m, ammuni ti o n a nd cr ack cocain e baggi es
r ecov er ed fr om Ander son’s v ehi cle. P r io r to the testi mony of each of the last tw o wi tnesses, the tr i al c our t hel d s id e -bar
con fe r e n ces, but no obj ecti on to the testi mony w as r a i sed a t those ti mes. On the following day , the gov er nment pr es e n t e d the testi mony of s ev en addi ti onal wi tnesses, a nd t h e c our t also enter tai ned closing ar guments, follow ed by the j ur y instr ucti ons, deliber ati ons, a n d v e r di ct. All of the wi tnesses testi fi ed befor e 5 :00 p.m. Closin g a r guments by the gov er nment began at 4:01 p
. m. a nd concluded a t 4 :38 p.m. The defense c ommenced i ts closing ar guments at 4 :39 p .m., fin i shing a t 5:21 p.m. The gov er n ment r ebuttal occur r ed fr om 5:22 p
. m
. unti l 5:38 p.m., and th e c o u r t in str ucted the j ur y i mmedi ately after w a r d. The j ur y r e t ir e d to deliber a te a t 6 :09 p.m., but the
cour t br i efly w ent on r ecor d at 6:40 p.m. a nd a gai n a t 7:56 p.m. to addr ess notes fr om the j ur y
. The jur y repor ted a v er di ct a t 9:16 p.m., and was di schar ged at 9:20 p.m. The S i xth Amendment to the Uni ted S tates Constituti on pr ov i d es that “[i ]n a ll cr i minal pr osecuti ons, the accused shall enj oy the r ig ht t o a s peedy and publi c tr i al.” U.S

. Const. Amend. V I. Publi c tr i als ar e vi ew ed as pr eser v in g the integr i ty of the j usti ce system, by deter r ing the use o f t h e c o u r ts as a means of per secuti on, e n c o ur agi n g unknown wi tnesses to
come for w ar d, p r ev enti ng p e r j u r y , and i mbuing the pr oceed-No. 16-3112 5
ings wi th the gr av i tas and sense of r e s p o n si bi li ty that faci li tates
a j ust pr ocess. S ee W

alton v
. Briley, 361 F .3d 431, 432 (7 t h C ir

. 2004). A v i olati on of the r i ght to a publi c tr i al i s a str uctur al
er r or , and ther efor e i f obj ected to at tr i al, can be r ev er sed wi thout any n e ed to show pr ej u di ce. W eaver v
. Massachusetts , 137 S

. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017). Ander son di d not obj ect at tr ia l to the continuati on of pr o c e edings b ey ond 5:00 p.m. Although the gov er nment
ar gues that An d er son ther eby w ai v ed the ar gument, the di str i ct cour t made no findings as to whether Ander son or hi s counsel w a s aw ar e that the cour thouse w ould b e locked at 5:00 p.m. At least as to t h e f ir st day of tr i al, that aw ar eness i s not obv i ous fr om the r ecor d, and ther efor e the i ssue i s not w ai v ed. By the second day of tr i al, how ev er , Ander son’s counsel w ould hav e been aw ar e that the cour thouse w as locked. The secur i ty guar d had to unlo c k the door to allow the j ur y and defense counsel to leav e at the close of pr oceedings at 6:18 p .m. on the fi r st d ay of tr i al, and when defense couns e l h a d to leav e the
cour thouse to fulfi ll hi s ci v i c obli gati on to v ote on the sec ond ni ght, the guar d had to let hi m o u t o f t he b ui lding and back into i t. Nev er theless, no obj ecti on w as made dur ing t he tr i al. Ander son alleges on appeal that, despi te the fai lur e to obj ect, automati c r e v e r s al i s r equi r ed because the er r or i s str uctur al and w as r ai s ed in the tr i al cour t i n a post-tr i al moti on. W e agr ee wi th the gov er nment th a t the plain er r or standar d set for th in Feder al Rule of Cr i min al P r ocedur e 52(b) a ppli es in thi s case. Under the plain er r or standa r d , “ a n appellate cour t may , in i ts di scr eti on, cor rect an er ror not rai sed at tr i al only wher e the appellant demonst r ates that (1) ther e i s an er r or ; (2) the er r or i s clearor obv i ous, r ather than s ubj ect to r eason-6 No. 16-3112
able di spute; (3) the er r or affected the appellant's substanti al

r i ghts, whi ch in the or dinar y case means it affected the outcome of the d is t r ic t cour t pr oceedings; and ( 4) the er r or ser i ously affect[s] the fai r n ess, integr i ty or publi c reputati on of j udi ci al pr oceedin gs.” United States v
. Marcus , 560 U.S

. 258, 262 (2010) (in ter nal quotati on mar ks omi tted). The S upr eme Cour t in Johnson v
. United States , 520 U.S

. 461, 466 (1997), held that the plain er ror standar d appli ed to er r or s for whi ch no obj ecti on w as made at tr i al, includin g str uctur al
er r or s. Numer ous other co u r t s hav e appli ed the plain er r or standar d to unpr eser v ed clai ms that the defendant w as deni ed the r i ght to a publi c tr i al. See United States v
. Negron-Sostre, 790 F .3d 295, 301 ( 1st Ci r
. 201 5 ) ; United States v
. Cazar es , 788 F .3d 956, 966 (9th Ci r
. 2 015); United States v
. G omez, 7 0 5 F

. 3 d 68, 74–75 (2d Ci r
. 2013). That deter minati on i s consi stent wi th the plain language of Rule 52(b), and pr ev ent s t h e subver si on of the tr i al p r ocess that w ould r esult i f an u npr eser v ed str uctur al
er r or w er e in ter pr eted a s guar anteei ng an automati c r ev er sal. In such a scenar i o, d efense counsel w ould hav e a n incenti v e to i gnor e the er r or and allow the tr i al to p r oceed t o c o n c l u si on, wi th the knowledge that the defendant has a fr ee pass to a new tr i al i f the outcome i s not fav or able. A s t he S upr eme Cour t
r ecogni zed, “the contempor aneous-obj ecti on r ule pr ev ents a li ti gant fr om ‘sandbagging’ the cour t—r emaining si lent about hi s obj ecti on a nd belatedly r ai sin g t h e e r r o r only i f the case does not conclude in hi s fav or .” Puckett v
. Unite d S tates , 556 U.S

. 129, 134 (20 0 9 )

. In addi ti on, a cour t n ot appr i sed of a potentia l e r r or d u r ing tr i al i s depr i v ed of the oppor tuni ty to
cor rect i ts mi s take a nd pr ov i de a tr i al that confor ms wi th the Consti tuti on. Id

. Rule 52(b) eli min ates those danger s b yNo. 16-3112 7

r equi r ing t h e de fendant to demonstr a te plain er r or to obtai n
r eli ef on unpr eser v ed er r or s, and i t a ppli es to str uctur al er r or s
as well. That sai d, ther e i s a questi on a s to whether the thi r d pr ong of the plain er r or test i s met automati cally in cases of str uctur al
er r or
. That pr ong r equi r es that “the er r or affected the appellant's s ubstanti al r i ghts, whi ch in the or dinar y c ase means i t affected the outcome of the di str i ct co u r t pr oceedin gs,” and ther efor e i s analogous to the har mless er r or standar d whi ch i s inappli c ab l e to pr eser v ed clai ms of str uctur al er ror s. S tr uctur al
er r or s ar e the t y p e of er ror s that can be cor rected on appeal

r egar dless of thei r effect on the outcome. United States v
. Cotton , 535 U.S

. 625, 6 32 ( 2 002). The S upr eme Cour t r epeatedly has

r eser v ed the qu esti on as to whether str uctur al er r or s affect substanti al r i ghts under that test r egar dless of any actual i mpact on the tr i al. See Marcus , 560 U.S

. at 263; Puckett, 556 U.S

. at 140; Cotton , 535 U.S

. at 632. W e n eed not deci d e that questi on h e r e, because ev en assuming that the thi r d pr ong i s met, Ander son cannot demonst rate plain er ror because he f ai ls under the fi r st tw o pr ongs of the test, i n that he cannot establi s h a c lear and ob v ious er r or that v i olates the S i xth Amendment. The S i xth Amendment ri ght t o a publi c tr i al i s not an absolute one th a t fo rb i d s any exclusi on of spectator s r egar dless
o f c ontext. In fact, cour ts hav e upheld the c losur e of th e cour tr oom in a n u mber of ci r cumstances, such as wher e
secur i ty or safety concer n s r equi r e i t. Peterson v
. W illiams , 85 F .3d 39, 42 ( 2d C ir cui t 1996); Presley v
. Geor ge, 558 U.S

. 209, 213–15 ( 2010). Mor eov er , w e h av e r ecogni zed tha t s ome exclusi ons of spectator s fr om a t r i al si m p ly do not r i s e to the8 No. 16-3112
lev el of a v i olati on of the r i ght to pub l ic tr i al. Braun v
. Powell , 227 F .3d 908, 918 (7th Ci r
. 2000). As w e noted in Braun (adopting the appr oach of Peterso n ) , thi s tr i v i a li ty standar d di ffer s fr om a har mless er ror assessment: A tr i v i ali ty standar d, pr oper l y un d e r s t o o d, does not di smi ss a defendant’s c lai m on the gr ounds that the defendant w as gui lty anyw ay or that he di d not suffer “pr ej udi ce” or “speci fi c inj ur y .” It is , in other w or ds, v er y di ffer ent fr om a har mless er ror inqui r y

. It looks, r ather

, to whether the acti ons of the cour t and the effect that they had
on the conduct of the tr i al d epr i v ed the defendant—wh e th e r o th e r w i se innocent or gui lty—of the pr otecti ons c onfer r ed by the Six th Amendment. Braun , 227 F .3d at 918, quoti ng P eterson , 85 F .3d a t 42. In assessin g whether a closur e r i ses to the lev el of a S i xth Amendment v i olati on, we con s id e r t he extent to whi ch the closur e i mpli c a tes the v alues under lyi ng the publi c tr i al r i ght: “(1) to
ensur e a fai r tr i al; ( 2) to r emind t h e p r o secutor and j udge of thei r r esponsi

b i li ty to the accused and the i mpor tance of thei r funct io n s ; (3) to encour age wi tnesses to come for w ar d; and (4) to di scour age per

j ur y .” Peterson , 85 F .3d a t 43, ci ti n g W aller
v
. Geor g ia , 467 U.S

. 3 9 , 4 6 –47 (1984); Braun , 227 F .3d at 918. A tr i v i al vi olati on that does not r un afoul of those v alues wi l l not pr esent a S i xth Amendment v i olati on. Ander son ack n owledges those p r inci ples, but ar gues that his c a s e is gov er ned by our d eci si on in W alton , in whi ch w e found a v i olati on of the r i ght to a p ubli c tr i al, and h e ur ges theNo. 16-3112 9

same r esult h er e. 361 F .3d 431. In W alton , t h e t r i al cour t conducted the fi r st tw o sessi ons of the tr i al, encompassing the enti r ety of the pr osecutor ’s case, after the cour thouse had b een closed a nd locked for the ni ght. Id

. at 432. Th e pr oceedings may hav e l asted unti l after 10:30 p.m. Id. at 433. Ther e w as no questi on as to whether that acti on r esulted in the exclusi on of spectator s fr om the tr i al. W alton’s fi a ncée twi ce a t tempted to attend hi s tr i al and w as pr ev ented fr om doi ng so, and a confi denti a l infor mant inv olv ed in the case w as si mi lar ly unable to a ttend the tr i al as a r esult of the locked cour thouse. Id

. at 432. The di str i ct cour t found that the lateness of the hour for eclosed the attendance of the p ubli c for the fi r st tw o sessi ons and that the enti rety of the pr osecutor ’s ev i dence w as ther eby closed to the publi c. Id

. a t 4 3 3. W e h eld that those factual findings w er e not clear ly er r oneous, and w er e suffi cie n t to demonstr ate a v i olati on of W a lton’s r i ght to a publi c tr i a l

. Id

. That case i s star kl y d i ffer ent than the one befor e us. The di str i ct cour t in that case found that the enti r e pr esentati on of
ev i dence by the pr osecuti on occur r ed at a ti me in wh ic h t he publi c w as n ot a llow ed to access the cour tr oom, and t h a t indi v i duals who sought to attend w e r e excluded. A tr i v i al exclusi on i s one that i s li mi ted in d ur ati on and scope, and the exclusi on in W

alton w as nei ther

. The W alton cour t expli ci tly recogni zed that the r esult mi ght be di ffer ent in a si tuati on such as i s pr esented h er e. The W alton
cour t addr essed United States v
. Al-Smadi, 15 F .3d 153, 154 (10th Ci r
. 1994), in whi ch “the cour t w as closed to the publi c si m p ly because the tr i al, whi ch star ted when the cour thouse w as sti ll open, r an late,” and held t h at “w e make no finding as to10 No. 16-3112
whether or n ot the facts in Al

- Smadi w ould consti tute a S i xth Amendment v i olati on in thi s Ci rcui t.” W alton , 361 F

. 3d at 433 n.1. That i ssue w as ther efor e r eser v ed in W al t on , not pr eor dain ed by i t. In contr ast to the facts in W alt on , h e r e ther e w as n o total exclusi on of spectator s fr om th e cour t, nor di d the locki ng of the cour thouse i m pact a si gni fi ca n t p o r t i on of the c ase. The door s of the cour thouse w er e locked at 5 :00 p .m. as par t of the
secur i ty measur es for the cour thouse. The door s to the cour tr oom i tself r emained open, an d a n y per sons who w er e in the bui lding pr i or to 5:00 p.m. could attend the tr i al in i ts enti r ety

. Nor d i d the lateness of the hour r e nder that unli kely

. On the fi r st d ay of the tr i al, the testim ony extended for j ust ov er an hour past 5:00 p.m., ter minating at 6:18 p.m. Although Ander

son poi nts to the testi mony of thr ee wi tnesses that extended bey ond 5:00 p.m. that d a y , the testi mony of the fi r st wi tness began pr i or to 5:00 p.m. and ended at 5:21 p.m. A n y o ne wi shing to be pr esent for that testi m ony could hav e hear d i t b y
ar ri ving when that testi mony began at 4 :58 p.m. P o t e n t i al spectator s ar r i v ing after 5:00 p.m. w ould hav e h e a r d li ttle of the testi mony r egar dless, a s they w ould hav e to n a v i g ate the
nor m al cour thouse electr oni c secur it y a nd p r oceed to the
c o u r t r o o m, and the testi mony ended at 5:21 p.m. The only potenti a l i mpact w as on t he abi li ty to attend the testi mony of the for ensi c w i tnesses who testi fi ed fr om 5:22 p.m. to 6:18 p .m., and Ander son does n o t ev en ar gue that thei r testi m ony concer n ing the chemi cals used in dy e packs and the inabi li ty to obtai n fin ger pr int or D NA e v i dence w a s a si gni fi cant par t of the tr i al. S ee Gonzalez v
. Quinones , 2 1 1 F

. 3 d 735, 739 ( 2d Ci r
. 2000) (noti ng that any exclusi on dur ing a chemi st’s testi m onyNo. 16-3112 11

w ould be tr i vi al because “the testi mony
... w as br i ef ( u nder 20 minutes), per functor y

, and uncontested”). S i mi lar ly , the c losing ar guments in the case began w ell befor e the cour thouse d o o r s w er e locked at 5:00 p.m. The gov er nment concluded at 4:38 p.m., and defense commenced at 4:39 p
. m
. As the defense concluded by 5:21 p.m., any one seeki ng to attend pr esuma b l y w ould hav e enter ed the bui lding by 5:00 p.m. Only the gov er nment r ebutta l, and the subsequent j ur y instr ucti ons, response to questi ons, and announcing of the

v er di ct, occur r ed after 5 :00 p.m. It i s an insi gni fi cant possi bi li ty that per sons w ould seek to attend the tr i al only to w i tness the gov er nment r ebuttal and subsequent j ur y i n ter acti on. And as the di str i ct cour t noted, Ander son “makes no clai m that any s pectator s pr esent in the cour tr oom w er e r equi r ed to leav e at 5:00 p.m., that any o n e tr i ed to attend after 5:00 p.m. but could not get in, or that any one w a s actually excluded fr om t h e cour tr oom a t any ti me.” Ther efor e, w e a r e not pr esent e d wi th a c ase in whi ch fr i ends or r elati v es of the defendant, or any one else for that matter , w er e actually excluded because the
cour thouse w as locked at 5:00 p.m. S ee In re Oliver, 333 U.S

. 257, 2 71–72 (1948) (noti ng that all cour ts hav e held that a defendant i s enti tled to hav e fr i ends and relati v es attend hi s tr i al); Braun , 227 F .3d at 9 1 7 ( s a me); United States v
. Perry, 479 F .3d 885, 890–91 (D.C. Ci r
. 2007). W e n oted in B r a un that, in assessin g the v alues pr otected by the r i ght to a publi c tr ia l, i t
w as “not w it h out si gni fi cance” that the exclusi on di d not inv olv e a r elati v e or fr i end of the defendant. 227 F

. 3d at 919. In fact, i t i s not ev en clear that ther e w as any effectiv e closur e a t all in thi s case, as opposed to mor e str ingent secur i ty measur es to nav i gate pr i or to obser v ing the tr i al. Although the cour t-12 No. 16-3112
house i s locked at 5:00 p.m. as a secur i ty measur e, the f acts in thi s case in di cate that a guar d w as av ai lable to allow p er sons
access to and fr om the cour thouse after hour s. A cour t secur i ty offi cer w as p r esent in the b ui ldin g, because t h e o f fi cer let the j ur y and defense c ounsel out of the bui lding a t the end of the fi r st d ay after the d oor s w e r e l ocked. And on the second day , the secur i ty offi cer let defense counsel out and back in to the
cour thouse after hour s when defense c ounsel had to l eav e after 5: 0 0 p.m. to v ote. If a guar d w as indeed av a i lable to pr ov i de access, then the r equi r ement to go thr ough that guar d to enter the bui lding w ould not be consti tuti onally di ffer ent than the

r equi r ement to go thr ough elec t r o ni c s e cu r ity in th e c o u r thouse dur ing the nor mal oper ati ng hour s pr i or to pr oceeding to the
cour t r oom. But w e do not hav e any factual findings by the di str i ct cour t as to the av ai labi li ty o f that access gener ally , s o
w e do not base our deci si on on that. Nev er theles s, t h e closur e in thi s c ase w as a min i mal one b e cause a ny one in the bui lding befor e 5 :00 p.m. could a tten d the tr i al i n i ts totali ty

, and ther e w er e only mini mal pr oceedings after 5:00 p.m. In that r espect, i t w as cr it ic a l ly di ffer ent than the after -hour s scenar i o addr essed by the Fi r st Ci r cui t in United States v
. Candelario-Santana, 834 F .3d 8 (1st Ci r
. 2016). In that case, the tr i al cour t faced a wi tness w h o w a s r eluctant to testi fy in open cour t, but who r ej ected both the gov er nment’s offer to r elocate the wi tness a nd the cour t’s offer of pr otecti on. Id. a t 21. The cour t h eld an in-chamber s confer ence at 5:20 p.m. to addr ess the i ssue. Id. at 20. At that ti me, the cour thouse i tself

w as alr eady closed to the publi c because i t w as after 5:00 p .m., although the cour tr oom r e m ained open. Id. at 22. The cour t then dev i sed a plan wher eby the cour t secur i ty offi cer s w ouldNo. 16-3112 13

announce th a t the cour t w as adj our ning for the day , and

w ould then r esume wi th the wi tness once the cour t w as
v acated, wi th the wi tness being allow ed to face aw ay fr om the defendant and to i denti fy the defendant usin g a p h otogr aph. Id

. a t 21. Ov er defense counsel’s obj ecti on, the plan w a s i mplemented. The Fi r st Ci r cui t held that “[a]lthough the door s to the actual cour tr oom r emain ed unl o c k e d, th e an n o un c e m e nt t h a t the cour t w as a dj our n ing, the attor neys’ feint at pa c k i n g up, and the a f t e r - hour s ti me at whi ch the c our t r econv ened effected a closur e
... [ and] [b]e c a u s e nothi ng in the r ecor d suggests that a ny par t of the pr oceeding r emained open or any member of the publi c r emained, i t w as a complete c losur e.” Id. at 23. The closur e w as deliber ate r ather than in adv er t e n t and the tr i al c our t fai led to c onsi der the W alle r f a c t o r s in enacting the closur e including the i den t i f icati on of an ov er ri ding inter est, and ther efor e the Fi r s t Ci r cui t concl ud e d that the closur e v i olated the S i xth Amendment. Id

. In contr ast to Candelario-Santana, th e r e wa s n o effor t to close the cour tr oom in thi s case to any one who w as ther e at or after 5:00 p.m. or to any one who w as in the bui lding at 5:00 p.m. or who gai ned access to the b ui lding after that ti me. The pr oceedings wh i c h o c cur r ed after 5:00 p.m. w er e m inor in the tr i al as
a whole. Th e i mpact on the abi li ty of any one to attend the tr i al

w as ther efor e l i mi ted in scope and shor t in dur a ti on, and at no ti me d i d i t pr esent a total pr ohibi ti on on the abi li ty of ei ther the publi c as a whole or any indi v i dual to attend. W e si m p ly cannot conclude t h a t the par ti al closur e of only the outsi de door s in thi s case, wi th the tr ia l s ti ll accessi ble to those in the bui lding a nd wi th r elati v ely min i mal p r o c e e d in g s a ft e r c l o s u r e, i mpli c a ted the v alues of the S i xth Amendment such as ensur-14 No. 16-3112
ing a fai r tr i al, r eminding t h e p r o secutor and j udge of thei r
r e sponsib i li ty

, encour agi ng wi tnesses to come for w a r d, and di scour agi ng per

jur y
. Peterson , 85 F .3d at 43, ci ti ng W aller, 467 U.S . at 46–47; Braun , 227 F .3d at 918. In li ght of the law in thi s
ar ea establi shing that tr i v i al v i olati ons do not r u n awr y of the S i xth Amendment, Ander son has fa i l e d to demonstr ate an
er r or that i s “plain” or “obv i ous” as r equi red under the plain
er r or standar d

. Cer tai nly , d i s tr i c t cour t j u d ges seeki ng to continue cr i minal pr oceedings bey ond the c losin g hour s of a c our thouse should
ensur e that m ember s of the publi c h a v e a m eans of a ccess to that cour thouse. In some cases, such as in W alton , the fai lur e to do so wil l v io l ate the S i xth Amendment. The closur e in thi s
case w a s tr i vi al and di d not v i olate thos e S ix th Amendment

r i ghts, but to av oi d su c h questi ons in the futur e, the cour t should ensur e that some means of access to the cour thouse i s
av ai lable fortr i als that r un afterhour s
. Ander son r ai ses a challenge to hi s sentence as w ell, ar guing that he i s enti tled to a new sentencing hear ing because of the S u pr e m e Cour t’s deci si on in Dean v
. United States, 137 S

. C t

. 1170 (2017). At sentencing, the defenda n t asked the di s tr i ct
cour t to offset the consecutiv e ter m that w a s s tatutor i ly mandate d by § 924(c) by reducing the ter m of i mpr i sonment on the other char ges. The cour t stated that “the ar gument Defendant makes her e i s in some tensi on wi th cases li ke

... Roberson

... and

... Ikegwuonu

... whi ch hold that sentencing Judges may not r educe a pr i son ter m for an u nder lyi ng cr i me to offset the consecutiv e t er m that i s S tatutor i ly mandated for fi ling 924(c).” T r anscr i pt of S en tencing at 27. S ubsequent to sentencing,No. 16-3112 15
how ev er , United States v
. Roberson , 474 F .3d 432 (7th Ci r
. 2007), and United States v
. Ikegwuonu , 8 26 F .3d 408 ( 7 th Ci r
. 2016), whi ch r eaffi r m e d Roberson, w er e abr ogated by the Supr eme C o ur t’s deci si on in Dean , whi ch holds that sentencing cour ts may consi der a m andator y mini mum sentence when choosing the appr opr i ate sentence for the pr edi cate offenses. S ee United States v

. Fox, 8 7 8 F

. 3d 574, 579–80 (7th Ci r
. 2 017); United States
v. Wheeler, 857 F .3d 742, 745 (7th Ci r . 2017). Ther e i s some ambi gui ty in the s e nt e n c ing hear ing as to whether the di str i ct cour t nonetheless consi d er ed the mandator y sentence in deter minin g i t s s e nt e n c e d e s p i t e i ts r ecogni ti on th a t R oberson contr olled, b ut w e cannot be cer tai n that the Roberson holdin g di d n o t i mpact the sentence. T o the extent that the di s tr i ct cour t felt bound in i ts sentencing b y our sinceab r o g a t e d d e c i s i o n in Roberson , a l i mi ted r emand i s appr opr i a t e to ascer tai n whether the di str i ct cour t w ould be inc l in e d to sentence Ander son di ffer ently in li ght of the Supr eme Cour t’s deci si on in Dean

. Cf. United States v
. Pa l adino , 401 F .3d 471, 483–84 (7th Ci r
. 2005); see Wheeler, 857 F

. 3d at 745 (noti ng that

r esentencing w ould be necessary “[i ] f ther e wer e some r eason to thi nk that the di str i ct cour t had felt compelled b y R oberson to set [the defendant’s] total sentence a t 2 28 months r ather than a shor ter ter m”). W e ther efor e or der a li m i ted remand so that the di s tr i ct
cour t can deter mine whether i t w ould hav e i mposed the same sentence on Ander son, kno w in g t hat i t can c onsi der the16 No. 16-3112
mandator y sentence in li ght of Dean

. W e shall ret a in j u r i sdi cti on ov er thi s appeal pendin g the di str i ct cour t’s r esponse to
our inqui r y

. AFFIRMED i n par t and REMANDED.