NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE 

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STANLEY F. STAZENSKI and PATRICIA STAZENSKI, 

husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants, 

v.

J. JEFFREY COUGHLIN and HEIDI COUGHLIN, husband and wife; 

J. JEFFREY COUGHLIN, PLLC, an Arizona professional limited liability 

company; BOYLE, PECHARICH, CLINE, WHITTINGTON & 

STALLINGS, P.L.L.C., an Arizona professional limited liability company, 

Defendants/Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0401 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County 

No. P1300CV201200199 

 P1300CV201200200 

 P1300CV201200201 

 P1300CV201200202 

 (Consolidated) 

The Honorable Patricia A. Trebesch, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Christopher Jacobson LLC, Phoenix 

By Jay C. Jacobson 

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
2 

Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC, Phoenix 

By James R. Broening, Kerry L. Beringhaus, Richard E. Chambliss, and 

 Kevin R. Myer 

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Coughlins & J. Jeffrey Coughlin PLLC 

Renaud Cook Drury Mesaros PA, Phoenix 

By Denise J. Wachholz 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Boyle et al. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined. 

K E S S L E R, Judge: 

¶1 Plaintiffs/Appellants Stanley and Patricia Stazenski 

(“Stazenskis”) appeal the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of Defendants/Appellees J. Jeffrey and Heidi Coughlin (“Coughlin”), 

J. Jeffrey Coughlin, PLLC (“Coughlin Firm”) (collectively “Coughlin 

Defendants”), and Boyle, Pecharich, Cline, Whittington & Stallings, PLLC 

(“Boyle Firm”). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 In 2005, before becoming Coughlin’s clients, the Stazenskis 

bought a 431-acre parcel and a 10-acre parcel, with street addresses located 

on Mule Shoe Ranch Road and Iron Horse Road respectively, from the 

Lindahls for $1.2 million. These contiguous parcels are accessed using Mule 

Shoe Ranch Road which crosses a neighbor’s property. Stazenski v. Lindahl, 

1 CA-CV 14-0001, 2015 WL 1456658, at *1, ¶¶ 2-4, n.2 (Ariz. App. Mar. 31, 

2015) (mem. decision). 

¶3 Several years before the Stazenskis’ 2005 purchase, Coughlin 

represented the Lindahls in obtaining a quit claim deed for a grant of an 

easement from the neighbor (“Quit Claim Easement”) for use of Mule Shoe 

Ranch Road. The neighbor had already acknowledged the existence of a 

 

1 We view the facts, including legitimate inferences, in the light most 

favorable to the Stazenskis. See Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 312, ¶ 3, 44 P.3d 

990, 992 (2002).
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

3 

prescriptive easement, but the Quit Claim Easement clarified the width of 

the easement. Id. at *1, ¶ 3. The Quit Claim Easement was properly 

recorded and before the Stazenskis purchased the properties in 2005 the 

Lindahls gave them a copy of the recorded Quit Claim Easement. Id. at *5, 

¶ 19. 

¶4 In February 2006, the Stazenskis hired Coughlin, who was 

working at the Boyle Firm, for advice about the easement and access to the 

parcels. According to the Stazenskis, Coughlin did not disclose to them that 

the recorded Quit Claim Easement was defective because it allegedly was 

nontransferable and fell 212 feet short of the parcels. 

¶5 In 2007, without consulting Coughlin, the Stazenskis 

borrowed $920,000 from Country Bank using one or both of the two parcels 

as collateral and granted a deed of trust to Country Bank to secure the loan 

(“Trust Deed”).2 The Stazenskis used part of the loan to buy an adjacent 13-

acre parcel from the Havens for $300,000. Like the 431-acre and 10-acre 

parcels, the 13-acre parcel was also accessed using Mule Shoe Ranch Road 

via the prescriptive easement. Id. at *1-2, ¶¶ 2, 4, 8. However, the Quit 

Claim Easement did not apply to the 13-acre parcel. Id. at *6, ¶ 20. 

¶6 The Stazenskis’ loan matured in 2009, they failed to pay the 

loan off, and the bank noticed a trustee sale for the property described in 

 

2 The first page of the Trust Deed states that the property is described in 

Exhibit A to the trust. Underneath that statement, the Trust Deed states the 

property is commonly known as 3050 Mule Shoe Ranch Road and gives the 

tax identification number for that property, which is the identifying 

information for the 431-acre parcel. Exhibit A, however, lists two parcels 

(Parcel I and II) by their legal descriptions without providing street 

addresses or tax identification numbers. Exhibit A describes both the 431-

acre parcel and the 10-acre parcel. Exhibit A to the Trust Deed is identical 

to Exhibit A to the deed the Stazenskis received from the Lindahls when 

buying the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels in 2005. 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

4 

the Trust Deed (“Sale Notice”).3 Because the Sale Notice included both the 

431-acre and 10-acre parcels, but according to the Stazenskis was not 

supposed to include the 10-acre parcel, the Stazenskis hired Coughlin, who 

by then had opened his own law firm, to object to Country Bank’s efforts to 

sell the 10-acre parcel.

¶7 Without Coughlin’s involvement, the day before the 

scheduled trustee sale, the Stazenskis entered a March 24, 2010 agreement 

with Country Bank. The Bank agreed to not pursue the Stazenskis for any 

deficiency on the loan if the trustee sale netted less than the balance owed 

(“Deficiency Agreement”).4 The Deficiency Agreement was conditioned 

upon the Stazenskis’ payment of $25,000 to Country Bank and the trustee 

sale netting at least $930,000.5 The Stazenskis signed the agreement, paid 

Country Bank $25,000, and the next day a third party (the “Sachs”) bought 

both the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels for $930,001 at the trustee sale. 

¶8 In July 2010, the Stazenskis learned that the recorded Quit 

Claim Easement for the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels was not valid because 

 

3 Like the Trust Deed, the Sale Notice stated the property for sale was 3050 

Mule Shoe Ranch Road, listed the tax identification number for the 431-acre 

parcel, and also incorporated an attached Exhibit A providing the legal 

description. Exhibit A to the Sale Notice had the same description of Parcel 

I and II as Exhibit A attached to the Trust Deed that listed the legal 

descriptions for both the 431-acre and the 10-acre parcels. 

4 The subject line of the Deficiency Agreement referenced both the 431-acre 

parcel and 10-acre parcel by their street addresses on Mule Shoe Ranch 

Road and Iron Horse Road respectively. It also referenced the Sale Notice 

described supra at Footnote 3. 

5 By the time of the Deficiency Agreement, the Stazenskis owed 

approximately $1,003,000. 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

5 

it allegedly did not provide complete access to the two parcels and might 

not have been transferable with the land to them as the new owners.6 

¶9 In February 2012, the Stazenskis filed complaints against the 

Lindahls, Havens, a real estate agent and her brokerage firm, as well as the

Coughlin Defendants and the Boyle Firm.7 As it relates to the Boyle Firm 

and Coughlin Defendants, the Stazenskis asserted three claims: (1) 

malpractice, (2) negligent misrepresentation, and (3) breach of fiduciary 

duty. Each claim is premised on various alleged breaches of the standard 

of care by Coughlin. Ultimately, the Stazenskis contended that those 

breaches resulted in Coughlin: (1) failing to advise the Stazenskis that the 

recorded Quit Claim Easement was defective thus causing them to buy the 

13-acre parcel with no valid easement for access; (2) failing to advise them 

to make title insurance claims on the title policy covering the 431-acre and 

10-acre parcels so those claims became time-barred; and (3) abandoning the 

 

6 It is unclear in the record whether the Stazenskis were referring to Quit 

Claim Easement access to all three properties or just access to the 431-acre 

and 10-acre parcels. For purposes of resolving this appeal, however, it is 

inconsequential because we have previously concluded they had access to 

all three parcels through the prescriptive easement. Lindahl, 2015 WL 

1456658, at *1-2, ¶¶ 2, 4, 8, n.2. 

7 The matters were eventually consolidated and final judgments as to all 

defendants were entered at different times. The claims involving the 

Lindahls and Havens concluded previously, were separately appealed and 

were resolved on March 31, 2015, affirming summary judgment granted in 

favor of the Lindahls and Havens on the basis that the Stazenskis had access 

to all three parcels by a prescriptive easement and had marketable title to 

those parcels. Lindahl, 2015 WL 1456658, at *1-2, 5, ¶¶ 4-8, 17. That appeal 

became final on May 7, 2015, when the mandate issued. See Tucson Gas & 

Elec. Co. v. Superior Court In & For Pima County, 9 Ariz. App. 210, 212, 450 

P.2d 722, 724 (1969) (stating “the final decision of an intermediate appellate 

court, when not reviewed or otherwise set aside by an appellate court of 

higher authority, has the same finality as a decision of the highest court”). 

After the superior court’s final judgment in this matter, a judgment on the 

claims against the real estate agent and her firm was entered and has been 

separately appealed and is not at issue here. 

 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

6 

Stazenskis and failing to object to the inclusion of the 10-acre parcel in the 

trustee sale.8 

I. Summary Judgment for Coughlin and the Boyle Firm Based on a 

Lack of Damages Because None of the Properties are Landlocked

¶10 All defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment 

(“MSJ”) arguing that the Stazenskis had actual or constructive notice of any 

alleged defects in/of the recorded Quit Claim Easement, but in any event 

were not damaged because all three parcels were accessible and not 

landlocked, the 13-acre parcel by a prescriptive easement and the 431-acre 

and 10-acre parcels by both a prescriptive easement and the recorded Quit 

Claim Easement. In addition, the Boyle Firm filed a separate MSJ in which 

Coughlin joined. In that separate motion, they also argued that they had 

no duty to the Stazenskis in drafting the Quit Claim Easement, that the Quit 

Claim Easement did not pertain to the 13-acre parcel, that none of their 

alleged acts caused any damages based on the 2005 or 2007 purchases or 

the dealings with Country Bank, and that the claims were barred by the 

statute of limitations as to the Boyle Firm. 

¶11 The Stazenskis opposed the MSJ, asserting Coughlin caused 

“$300,283 in damages in April of 2007 when the Stazenskis bought the [13-

acre] parcel (which would not have occurred with proper disclosures [from] 

Coughlin).” Specifically, the Stazenskis argued that because Coughlin did 

not disclose that the “recorded easement” was defective, the Stazenskis 

bought the 13-acre parcel and “assumed that they could use the easement 

to get to this new parcel.” The Stazenskis attached a report from their 

standard of care expert, containing opinions based upon Coughlin’s 

 

8 The Stazenskis have abandoned two other alleged sources of 

damages―sale of the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels to the Sachs, and lost title 

insurance claim for the 13-acre parcel. In their complaint, the Stazenskis 

alleged that they were damaged by the misconduct of the Boyle Firm and 

the Coughlin Defendants in the sale of the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels to 

the Sachs. Eventually, the Stazenskis clarified that they were not asserting 

any damages against Coughlin related to the sale of the properties to the 

Sachs, and the superior court entered summary judgment for Coughlin. 

The Stazenskis do not appeal the court’s judgment related to that issue. In 

addition, the Stazenskis alleged in their complaint that they were damaged 

by Coughlin not advising them to file a claim on the title insurance policy 

for the 13-acre parcel’s alleged lack of access. The Stazenskis do not make 

any claim for such alleged loss in their opening brief and we have found no 

evidence in the record to support such a claim. 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

7 

failures in relation to the allegedly defective Quit Claim Easement. They 

attached a report from their damages expert, stating that “without legal 

easement for access” the Stazenskis would not have obtained the Country 

Bank loan using their existing property as collateral nor bought the 13-acre 

parcel. Their damages expert also contended that the Stazenskis incurred 

an additional $4000 in damages in attorneys’ fees apparently related to the 

purchase of the 13-acre parcel, although the exhibit referenced is not in the 

statement of facts filed by the Stazenskis. Thus, the claimed damages were 

premised on the lack of access to the parcels. 

¶12 The Stazenskis asserted $150,000 in damages “caused by 

Coughlin in February of 2006 for failure to advise them to make a title 

claim” on the policy covering the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels. They 

attached a report from their title insurance expert, who opined they “would 

have had a valid claim against the title company [as to the 431-acre and 10-

acre parcels] for up to $1.2 million because the title policy specifically 

insures the right of access to and from their property and, according to the 

appraisal of [another expert], the value of the property without an easement 

is $0.”9 Thus, the claim as to the title insurance was premised on the lack of 

access as well. 

¶13 In reply, the Boyle Firm and Coughlin Defendants argued that 

even assuming some defect of the recorded Quit Claim Easement, the policy 

did not insure the Quit Claim Easement and only insured losses based on 

lack of access. They attached a report from a their own expert that opined: 

(1) there was access through Iron Horse Road directly to the 10-acre parcel; 

(2) there was no actual damage or loss that would trigger the policy; and (3) 

even assuming the policy was triggered, the title company would have 

opted to cure the defect and not made a payment to the Stazenskis.10 The 

Boyle Firm also noted there was no dispute that the Quit Claim Easement 

does not pertain to the 13-acre parcel. 

¶14 After oral argument the superior court determined the parcels 

were not landlocked and granted judgment for Coughlin and the Boyle 

 

9 The appraisal determined the market value of each of the three parcels 

with and without an easement. 

10 The Stazenskis provided another report from their title insurance expert 

stating his opinions were unchanged upon review of the defense expert 

report. 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

8 

Firm finding the Stazenskis could not make a prima facie case on any claims 

based on Coughlin’s work while at the Boyle Firm due to a lack of evidence 

of resulting damages.11 The court did not enter a final appealable judgment. 

See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

II. Summary Judgment for the Coughlin Defendants Related to the 

Inclusion of the 10-Acre Parcel in the Trustee Sale 

¶15 The Coughlin Defendants moved for summary judgment on 

the claim dealing with the trustee’s sale arguing that the Stazenskis 

voluntarily entered an agreement with Country Bank conditioned on the 

sale of both the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels and benefitted from the 

agreement. The Coughlin Defendants contended they could not be held 

liable for acts over which Coughlin had no involvement or control. 

¶16 The Stazenskis responded, arguing that there were disputed 

material facts, but did not address the Coughlin Defendants’ argument that 

by voluntarily entering the Deficiency Agreement without Coughlin’s 

involvement the Stazenskis compromised their claim that they were 

damaged by Coughlin’s alleged failure to object to the sale of the 10-acre 

parcel. 

¶17 The superior court determined that the Stazenskis had no 

claim against the Coughlin Defendants for failing to object to the inclusion 

of the 10-acre parcel in the trustee sale because the Stazenskis “of their own 

volition, entered into a deficiency agreement with Country Bank to proceed 

with the trustee’s sale that included both parcels.” 

¶18 The court entered a final appealable Rule 54(b) judgment in 

favor of the Coughlin Defendants, and the Boyle Firm. The Stazenskis filed 

a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2014). 

DISCUSSION 

¶19 The Stazenskis assert that evidence presented to the superior 

court was sufficient to state a claim and survive summary judgment as to 

every claim asserted against the Coughlin Defendants and the Boyle Firm. 

 

11 The court also granted judgment for the Lindahls and Havens as to all 

claims against them and partial summary judgment for the real estate 

agent. 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

9 

¶20 We review de novo whether summary judgment is warranted, 

including whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the 

superior court properly applied the law. Dreamland Villa Cmty. Club, Inc. v. 

Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 46, ¶ 16, 226 P.3d 411, 415 (App. 2010). We will affirm 

the superior court if its determination “is correct for any reason, even if that 

reason was not considered” by the court. Hill v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 

191 Ariz. 110, 112, 952 P.2d 754, 756 (App. 1997); accord Gary Outdoor Adver. 

Co. v. Sun Lodge, Inc., 133 Ariz. 240, 242, 650 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1982) (stating 

“trial court will be affirmed when it reaches the correct conclusion even if 

it does so for an incorrect reason”). Summary judgment “should be granted 

if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little 

probative value, given the quantum of the evidence required, that 

reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the 

proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309, 

802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). A “scintilla” of evidence, or evidence that creates 

the “slightest doubt,” is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Id. 

¶21 Each of the Stazenskis’ claims for legal malpractice, 

negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty require that the 

breach of the standard of care cause resulting damages. Glaze v. Larsen, 207 

Ariz. 26, 29, ¶ 15, 83 P.3d 26, 29 (2004) (stating party asserting legal 

malpractice must prove defendant’s negligence caused the injury; actual 

injury/damage caused by lawyer’s negligence is critical to claim of legal 

malpractice); Lane Title & Trust Co. v. Brannan, 103 Ariz. 272, 278, 440 P.2d 

105, 111 (1968) (stating a claim of breach of fiduciary duty requires proving 

that the breach caused the loss); KB Home Tucson, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. 

Co., 236 Ariz. 326, 332-33, ¶ 30, 340 P.3d 405, 411-12 (App. 2014) (stating 

elements of claim for negligent misrepresentation and reaffirming that 

claim is governed by principles of law of negligence requiring damages 

resulting from breach of duty). The Stazenskis make broad arguments that 

sufficient evidence was presented to show genuine issues of material fact 

as to breach of duty, and we assume for purposes of appeal that there were 

genuine factual issues about the standard of care and any breach thereof. 

The dispositive issue central to the viability of these claims, however, is 

whether such breaches caused any damages to the Stazenskis. 

I. Collateral Estoppel 

¶22 We allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs 

addressing the effect of Stazenski v. Lindahl, 1 CA-CV 14-0001, 2015 WL 

1456658 (Ariz. App. Mar. 31, 2015) (mem. decision) on the Stazenskis’ 

appeal in this matter and whether collateral estoppel applies to any issues 

on appeal. In their supplemental brief, the Stazenskis argue that the 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

10 

decision in that case has no bearing on their damages related to the 

purchase of the 13-acre parcel because but for Coughlin’s negligence, they 

would not have bought that parcel. The Stazenskis also argue that Lindahl

does not affect their claim for damages related to the title insurance on the 

431-acre and 10-acre parcels because the insurer denied their claim on the 

basis of it being time-barred and the Stazenskis’ experts had opined that 

they would have had a valid claim under the policy. The Coughlin 

Defendants and Boyle Firm argue that the Stazenskis are collaterally 

estopped from arguing that the properties are inaccessible, that they did not 

receive marketable title, and that they bought the properties without notice 

of title defects. The parties agree the trustee’s sale issue is not collaterally 

estopped by Lindahl. 

¶23 “Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, binds a party to a 

decision on an issue litigated in a previous lawsuit if the following factors 

are satisfied: (1) the issue was actually litigated in the previous proceeding, 

(2) the parties had a full and fair opportunity and motive to litigate the 

issue, (3) a valid and final decision on the merits was entered, (4) resolution 

of the issue was essential to the decision, and (5) there is common identity 

of the parties.” Campbell v. SZL Properties, Ltd., 204 Ariz. 221, 223, ¶ 9, 62 

P.3d 966, 968 (App. 2003). Common identity of the parties is not necessary 

if collateral estoppel is invoked “defensively,” as it is here, to prevent a 

plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff previously litigated 

unsuccessfully. Id. at ¶ 10. 

¶24 Because these elements are satisfied, we determine the 

Stazenskis are collaterally estopped from relitigating accessibility, 

marketable title, and notice of title defects. Each of those issues was 

conclusively resolved in Lindahl, when we held that the Stazenskis had 

access to the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels through a prescriptive easement, 

have access to the 13-acre parcel by that same prescriptive easement, had 

marketable title to the property bought from the Lindahls and the Havens, 

and had notice of the alleged title defects. Lindahl, 2015 WL 1456658 at *2, 

5-6, ¶¶ 8, 17-19. Moreover, we rejected the Stazenskis’ claim that they could 

not enforce their access by a prescriptive easement without joining the 

neighboring landowner who owned the servient estate over which the 

prescriptive easement ran, see, e.g., supra ¶¶ 3, 5. Id. at *2-3, ¶¶9, 12, n.6. 

Thus, as established by Lindahl, the Stazenskis had or have access to all three 

properties by the prescriptive easement and marketable title. 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

11 

II. Claims Related to Damages in the Form of a Lack of Access to the 

Properties / Lack of Marketable Title 

A. Purchase of the 13-Acre Parcel / Lost Investment 

¶25 The Stazenskis’ claims that they have been damaged by the 

lost investment in the 13-acre parcel in 2007 hinge on Coughlin’s purported 

failures to tell the Stazenskis about the allegedly defective nature of the 

recorded Quit Claim Easement. All three claims based on this damage are 

barred by collateral estoppel. 

¶26 In support of that argument, the Stazenskis stated in response 

to the motions for summary judgment that “[i]n light of Coughlin not 

disclosing . . . before March of 2007 . . . that the recorded [Quit Claim] 

[E]asement to the [431-acre and 10-acre parcels] was not transferable and 

fell short of the property . . . the Stazenskis proceeded to buy [the 13-acre 

parcel] . . . assum[ing] that they could use the [Quit Claim] [E]asement to 

get to this new parcel.” Mr. Stazenski’s affidavit was attached to the 

statement of facts wherein he avowed “[w]e would not have purchased this 

real estate if we knew the properties had no valid easement for access.” The 

reference to “this real estate” related to all three parcels. The Stazenskis’ 

damages expert opined that the damages were $300,283 based on the 

assumption that the Stazenskis would not have purchased the 13-acre 

parcel “had [the Stazenskis] known that a legal easement did not exist, or if 

the lack of easement was not cured, for the [431-acre] and the [10-acre 

parcels].” This expert also referred to $4000 in attorneys’ fees, apparently 

in relation to the purchase of the 13-acre parcel which would not have been 

incurred if the Stazenskis had known the parcel was landlocked. On 

appeal, the Stazenskis characterize that $4000 as upkeep expenses for 

maintaining the 13-acre parcel.

¶27 The superior court did not err in granting summary judgment 

against the Stazenskis on these claimed damages because the Stazenskis 

had access to all three properties through the prescriptive easement. 

Lindahl, 2015 WL 1456658, at *2, ¶ 8. Each of the claims against the Coughlin 

Defendants and the Boyle Firm require a showing of damages to the 

Stazenskis caused by the alleged improper acts and omissions by these 

defendants. See supra ¶ 21. 

¶28 Because the Stazenskis have access to the 13-acre parcel, they 

can show no resulting damages, meaning their claims on this issue fail as a 

matter of law. 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

12 

¶29 Beginning in their motion for reconsideration, the Stazenskis 

began articulating their argument slightly differently―that they would not 

have bought the 13-acre parcel but for Coughlin’s failures to tell them that 

access to the 13-acre parcel was based on a prescriptive easement. 

Likewise on appeal, they maintain they “did not bargain for a prescriptive 

easement [and] do not want to litigate it,” and “would not have purchased 

the 13 acres if Coughlin had disclosed to them that the 13 acres (or the two 

other properties purchased) had no valid recorded easement or that access 

was based wholly or partially on a prescriptive easement.” This argument 

fails for several reasons. 

¶30 First, a party may not assert new facts in a motion for 

reconsideration after a court has granted summary judgment unless the 

new facts constitute newly discovered evidence. Tilley v. Delci, 220 Ariz. 

233, 238, ¶ 17, 204 P.3d 1082, 1087 (App. 2009). Similarly, we will not 

consider on appeal new arguments made in a motion for reconsideration. 

Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. Western Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15, 

159 P.3d 547, 550 (App. 2006). In response to the superior court’s holding 

on summary judgment that the Stazenskis have access to the 13-acre parcel 

by the prescriptive easement, the Stazenskis cannot assert new facts by 

declaration and argue that they would only have bought the 13-acre parcel 

with access by the recorded Quit Claim Easement and not a prescriptive 

easement. 

¶31 Second, even under their revised theory that they would not 

have bought the 13-acre parcel unless they had access through a recorded 

easement, no reasonable factfinder could determine that Coughlin caused 

damage of a lost investment. The Stazenskis’ experts based their damage 

opinions on claims of lack of access to the 13-acre parcel, not lack of access 

by a recorded easement. See supra ¶¶ 11-12, 26. Access by a prescriptive 

easement is still access by any other name. Nor can we infer that the lack 

of a recorded easement to the 13-acre parcel affected their title. Our decision 

in Lindahl forecloses a determination that they suffered damage by buying 

an inaccessible/unmarketable property or that they would have to litigate 

the prescriptive easement with the owners of the servient estate. In Lindahl

we affirmed the superior court’s determination that the owner of the 13-

acre parcel has and had vested, perfected prescriptive easement rights in 

South Mule Shoe Ranch Road for ingress and egress and marketable title. 

2015 WL 1456658, at *2, 5, ¶¶ 8, 17. Thus, even assuming that Coughlin’s 

alleged failures caused the Stazenskis to buy the 13-acre parcel, without 

proof of the damage of an inaccessible/unmarketable property, the 

Stazenskis cannot prove their claims against the Coughlin Defendants or 

Boyle Firm related to the purchase. 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

13 

¶32 Finally, in Lindahl, we determined that the Stazenskis had 

constructive knowledge of any defects in the Quit Claim Easement when 

they purchased the first two parcels. 2015 WL 1456658, at *5, ¶ 19. “[T]he 

Stazenskis purchased the 431 and 10-acre parcels [in 2005] with full 

knowledge of the alleged Quit Claim Deed defect.” Id. Thus, their claim 

that they would not have purchased the 13-acre parcel had they known the 

recorded Quit Claim Easement was defective and that there was only a 

prescriptive easement cannot withstand summary judgment because they 

had the same knowledge when they purchased the 13-acre parcel in 2007 

notwithstanding any of Coughlin’s alleged disclosure failures.12 

¶33 The superior court was correct that the Stazenskis cannot 

carry their burden to show the Coughlin Defendants or the Boyle Firm 

caused the Stazenskis’ damage and summary judgment was warranted on 

the claims related to the purchase of the 13-acre parcel. 

B. Lost Claim for Title Insurance Benefits for the 431-acre and 

10-acre Parcels 

¶34 The Stazenskis assert that because Coughlin did not advise 

them to make a title insurance claim on their policy insuring access to the 

431-acre and 10-acre parcels before ceasing to own the properties, they lost 

between $150,000 and $1.2 million in title insurance benefits. To support 

this claim, the Stazenskis’ title insurance expert opined that the Stazenskis 

“would have had a valid claim against the title company” on the policy 

insuring the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels because the “title policy 

specifically insures the right of access to and from their property” and “the 

value of the property without an easement is $0.” 

¶35 This claim for damages also fails because the expert’s opinion 

was based on the assumption that the properties had no easement for 

access. See supra ¶ 12. In Lindahl, we held that the Stazenskis had a 

prescriptive easement for ingress and egress to these properties, thus 

foreclosing a claim that there was no easement for access to the properties. 

2015 WL 1456658, at *1-2, ¶¶ 4, 8. There is no evidence in the record that 

the Stazenskis would have recovered any monetary benefit under any title 

 

12 In Lindahl we determined that the recorded Quit Claim Easement “did 

not, on its face, have anything to do with the 13-acre parcel.” 2015 WL 

1456658, at *6, ¶ 20. Therefore, even assuming Coughlin failed to tell them 

about the allegedly defective Quit Claim Easement or that there was only a 

prescriptive easement, such failures cannot be the cause of the Stazenskis’ 

purchase of the 13-acre parcel. 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

14 

insurance policy when they had vested, perfected prescriptive easement 

access. 

¶36 This conclusion is further supported by the terms of the policy 

itself. The policy expressly limited the coverage to loss caused by lack of 

access to the properties or unmarketable title. In Lindahl, we held the 

Stazenskis had access to the properties through the prescriptive easement 

and had marketable title to the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels.13 Id. at *1-2, 5, 

¶¶ 4, 8, 17. 

¶37 Even assuming Coughlin failed to advise the Stazenskis to file 

a title insurance claim, they cannot prove damages caused by such failure 

when they had both access and marketable title and the policy coverage 

was for lack of access or lack of marketable title. 

III. Claims Related to Damages Premised Upon Trustee Sale 

¶38 The Stazenskis’ final argument is that the superior court erred 

by granting summary judgment on the claims related to the trustee sale of 

the 10-acre parcel. The Stazenskis contend the court improperly found that 

they voluntarily entered the Deficiency Agreement with Country Bank to 

proceed with the trustee sale that included both parcels. The Stazenskis 

maintain that the court could not have made this determination had it 

considered Mr. Stazenski’s affidavit filed in opposition to Coughlin’s MSJ. 

The Stazenskis direct us to the part of the affidavit that states when they 

signed the Deficiency Agreement, it was Mr. Stazenski’s understanding the 

sale would be rescheduled to a later date so the Stazenskis had time to sell 

to the Sachs. 

¶39 It is unclear what, if any, significance the fact that the 

Stazenskis thought the sale would be rescheduled by Country Bank has 

upon the question of whether Coughlin caused them damages in the loss of 

the 10-acre parcel by not objecting to the trustee sale. 

¶40 In any event, the Stazenskis never asserted that but for 

Coughlin’s alleged failures to enjoin the sale prior to the Deficiency 

 

13 We note that although the defense expert opined that the Stazenskis had 

access by Iron Horse Road to the 10-acre parcel and the Stazenskis’ title 

insurance expert averred that did not change his opinion on the title claim 

as to the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels, this does not preclude summary 

judgment on the title claim. We determined that the Stazenskis had access 

to the 431-acre and 10-acre parcels insured by the title company through 

Mule Shoe Ranch Road. Lindahl, 2015 WL 1456658 at *2, ¶ 8. 
STAZENSKI v. COUGHLIN 

Decision of the Court 

15 

Agreement they would not have entered into the Deficiency Agreement. 

The Stazenskis also never asserted that Coughlin was involved or was 

supposed to be involved in the Deficiency Agreement or in the alleged 

rescheduling of the sale date. Nor have they asserted that as a matter of 

law the Deficiency Agreement somehow prevented Country Bank’s ability 

to sell the 10-acre parcel at the trustee sale or that they would have 

recovered the value of the property due to an alleged wrongful foreclosure. 

In short, the record supports that the Stazenskis voluntarily entered the 

Deficiency Agreement without Coughlin’s involvement, and the Stazenskis 

do not challenge the superior court’s legal determination about the effect of 

the Deficiency Agreement or that it compromised their claim against 

Coughlin for failing to object to the sale. 

¶41 No reasonable factfinder could determine that but for 

Coughlin’s alleged failure to object, either before or after the Deficiency 

Agreement, the Stazenskis would not have lost the 10-acre parcel at the sale 

or would have recovered the value of the property due to an alleged 

wrongful foreclosure. 

CONCLUSION 

¶42 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the summary 

judgments for the Coughlin Defendants and the Boyle Firm.14 We will 

award the Coughlin Defendants and the Boyle Firm their taxable costs on 

appeal upon timely compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate 

Procedure 21. 

 

14 Given the analysis and resolution of the issues above, we do not address 

the other arguments made by the parties.