NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

STEVEN DEAN FRONCZAK, Appellant. 

Nos. 1 CA-CR 19-0308, 1 CA-CR 19-0309

(Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Nos. CR2003-026177-001, CR2004-036181-001

The Honorable Nicole M. Brickner, Judge Pro-Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael O’Toole

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Joel M. Glynn

Counsel for Appellant

Steven Dean Fronczak, Tucson

Appellant

FILED 5-14-2020
STATE v. FRONCZAK

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Steven Dean Fronczak appeals the superior court’s revocation 

of his probation and imposition of prison sentences. Fronczak’s counsel 

filed a brief per Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 104 

Ariz. 297 (1969) advising us there are no meritorious grounds for reversal.

Fronczak filed a supplemental brief in propria persona, raising issues we 

address. We further review the entire record for reversible error. State v. 

Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999). After reviewing the entire record, 

we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2005, Fronczak pleaded guilty to aggravated DUI and 

forgery, both class four felonies, brought in separate causes of action. The 

superior court suspended the sentences for both convictions, placing 

Fronczak on five years’ probation for aggravated DUI and three years’ 

probation for forgery, running concurrently.1 Fronczak’s probation began 

following his release from custody on an unrelated charge.

¶3 In 2007, after failing to report on six occasions and changing

residences without prior approval, the probation department filed petitions 

to revoke Fronczak’s probation and the court issued warrants for his arrest. 

Fronczak’s whereabouts remained unknown until he was arrested in 2019.

Following a probation violation hearing, the court found Fronczak violated 

two terms of probation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to 

concurrent prison terms of 2.5 years.

2 Fronczak timely appealed. We have 

1 As a term of probation for the aggravated DUI conviction, Fronczak was 

ordered to complete four months of imprisonment and given 432 days of 

pre-sentence incarceration credit.

2 The court gave Fronczak pre-sentence incarceration credit of 495 days for 

the aggravated DUI conviction and 457 days for the forgery conviction.
STATE v. FRONCZAK

Decision of the Court

3

jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, and 

A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A), 13-4031 and 13-4033.

DISCUSSION

¶4 Our obligation is to review the entire record for reversible 

error, Clark, 196 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999), viewing the “evidence in the 

light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s findings,” State v. 

Tatlow, 231 Ariz. 34, 39-40, ¶15 (App. 2012). “We will not reverse a trial 

court’s determination that a defendant violated a term of probation unless 

the court’s finding is ‘arbitrary and unsupported by any theory of the 

evidence.’” Id. at 39, ¶ 15 (quoting State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 72, 79 (1985)). 

Fronczak raises several issues in his supplemental brief; we address each of 

his arguments.

I. Sixth Amendment Violation

¶5 The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the 

right to counsel at all critical stages of a case. See U.S. Const. amend. VI;

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.1. The right attaches once formal 

criminal proceedings begin, and, absent express waiver, renders any 

statements “deliberately elicited” from defendant inadmissible in the 

prosecution’s case in chief. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); 

see also State v. Hackman, 189 Ariz. 505, 507 (App. 1997). 

¶6 Following Fronczak’s arrest, the court appointed Fronczak

counsel on April 13, 2019. Four days later, the probation department

contacted Fronczak in jail via video conference without Fronczak’s attorney 

present. After the conversation Fronczak contacted his attorney, who 

promptly filed a motion to suppress Fronczak’s statements made during 

the video conference on Sixth Amendment grounds. The court granted 

Fronczak’s motion to suppress, thereby precluding any statements 

Fronczak made from being mentioned or considered at any subsequent 

hearing. The superior court properly remedied the violation. No prejudice 

resulted.

II. Identification Not Under Oath

¶7 At the arraignment hearing on April 19, 2019, with counsel 

present, Fronczak stated his full name and date of birth for the court. A 

recording of Fronczak’s self-identification was played at the probation 

violation hearing two-and-a-half weeks later as evidence, in part,

establishing identity. Fronczak contends the court erred in considering his
STATE v. FRONCZAK

Decision of the Court

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statement of identification because he was not “under oath” when he made 

the statement. Fronczak provides no law to support his position. 

¶8 Statements made against a declarant’s proprietary or 

pecuniary interest are admissible. See Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(3); State v. 

Dominguez, 236 Ariz. 226, 230, ¶ 10 (App. 2014) (“[A] hearsay statement 

[may] be admitted if it is contrary to the declarant’s penal interest or 

subjects him to criminal liability such that ‘a reasonable person in the 

declarant’s position would have made [the statement] only if the person 

believed it to be true.’”) (quoting Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)). Fronczak’s

statement of self-identification was properly admitted and considered.

III. Photograph Evidentiary Issue

¶9 In addition to using Fronczak’s statement of selfidentification, the State also introduced a photograph from Fronczak’s 

probation file to establish identity. Fronczak argues the court erred by 

admitting the photograph into evidence because “there was no name or 

date of birth” on the “xerox[ed] copy of [the] photo.” 

¶10 “We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence for a clear abuse of discretion,” State v. McCurdy, 216 Ariz. 567, 

571, ¶6 (App. 2007), and “will not reverse unless unfair prejudice resulted . 

. . or the court incorrectly applied the law,” Larsen v. Decker, 196 Ariz. 239, 

241, ¶6 (App. 2000) (citation omitted). 

¶11 Here, the court allowed the admission of the photograph into 

evidence after finding the photograph met the business record exception to 

the rule against hearsay. Arizona Rule of Evidence 803(6) allows evidence 

to survive a hearsay objection when the record is: (1) made at or near the 

time of its entry, (2) kept in the ordinary course of business, (3) made as a 

regular practice, (4) testified to by a qualified witness, and (5) the opponent 

does not show the source of information lacks trustworthiness. 

¶12 Here, the record supports a practice within the probation 

department of placing a photograph of each probationer in the 

probationer’s individual file at the time he or she is placed on probation. 

The photograph assists probation department employees in identifying a 

probationer when there may be a change in assignment within the 

department. The photograph of Fronczak from his probation file was 

admitted into evidence. Although another judicial officer may have, in their 

discretion, excluded the photograph, we cannot say the superior court 

abused its discretion in admitting the same.
STATE v. FRONCZAK

Decision of the Court

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IV. Inability to Match Fingerprints

¶13 The State was unable to match Fronczak’s fingerprints to 

fingerprints from previous minute entries because the minute entry prints 

contained insufficient detail. Because of this, Fronczak argues the court 

erred in finding him to be the Defendant. Fronczak provides no law to 

support his argument.

¶14 The court found the State established Fronczak’s identity by 

clear and convincing evidence after considering Fronczak’s prior statement 

of self-identification, the probation department’s photograph of Fronczak, 

and the name and birthdate from Fronczak’s jail identification bracelet 

which Fronczak’s counsel read to the court. The court committed no error.

V. Probation Reinstatement

¶15 Finally, Fronczak argues he should have his probation 

reinstated because he has family in Arizona, a residence, and a place of 

employment. 

¶16 “Probation is a matter of grace and not a matter of right,” and 

“lie[s] within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Sanchez, 19 

Ariz. App. 253, 254 (1973). Here, the court was within its discretion in 

revoking Fronczak’s probation after determining him unable and/or 

unwilling to comply with the terms of probation when he absconded for 

more than a decade. 

VI. Other Issues

¶17 The record reflects no fundamental error in the proceedings. 

Other than the meeting with the probation officer that the superior court 

properly resolved, Fronczak was represented at all critical stages of the 

proceedings. The evidence presented at the hearings supported the court’s 

findings and sentences. The proceedings were conducted in compliance 

with Fronczak’s constitutional and statutory rights, as well as the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

CONCLUSION

¶18 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none; therefore, we affirm Fronczak’s convictions and sentences.
STATE v. FRONCZAK

Decision of the Court

6

¶19 After this decision’s filing, defense counsel’s obligation 

pertaining to Fronczak’s representation in this appeal will end. Defense 

counsel need do no more than inform Fronczak of this appeal’s outcome 

and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds “an issue 

appropriate for submission” to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for 

review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984). On the Court’s own 

motion, Fronczak has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if 

he wishes, with an in propria persona motion for reconsideration or petition 

for review.