NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 18a0165n.06 

 Case No. 17-3909 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOSE HERNANDEZ-RUIZ, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO 

BEFORE: GUY, SUTTON, and COOK, Circuit Judges. 

 SUTTON, Circuit Judge. The Government charged Jose Hernandez-Ruiz with illegally 

re-entering the United States after being removed. He challenges the admission of his removal 

order into the criminal proceedings. Because Hernandez-Ruiz knowingly and voluntarily agreed 

to a stipulation of removal, we affirm the admission of his removal order and his conviction. 

 The United States deported Jose Hernandez-Ruiz in March 2011. In September 2016, the 

Government found him in Miami County, Ohio, and charged him with illegally reentering the 

country. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Hernandez-Ruiz moved to suppress the removal order before his 

criminal trial. The district court denied the motion, finding that Hernandez-Ruiz signed a 

stipulation of removal “with full knowledge of his ability to seek counsel or exercise the rights 

he was giving up.” R. 24 at 8. Hernandez-Ruiz entered a conditional guilty plea that preserved 

his right to appeal the decision. 
Case No. 17-3909

United States v. Hernandez-Ruiz

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 We give fresh review to Hernandez-Ruiz’s challenge to his deportation order. United 

States v. Zuniga-Guerrero, 460 F.3d 733, 735 (6th Cir. 2006). In doing so, we defer to the 

district court’s factual findings as long as they are not clearly wrong. United States v. MartinezRocha, 337 F.3d 566, 569 (6th Cir. 2003). 

 Aliens have ample ways to challenge removal orders and related proceedings at the time 

they occur. But their ability to challenge a removal order in a subsequent criminal prosecution is 

circumscribed by 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). Here is what it says: 

(d) LIMITATION ON COLLATERAL ATTACK ON UNDERLYING DEPORTATION ORDER

In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien may not challenge the 

validity of the deportation order described in subsection (a)(1) or subsection 

(b) unless the alien demonstrates that— 

(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been 

available to seek relief against the order; 

(2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly 

deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and 

(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. 

Hernandez-Ruiz agreed, at the time of his March 2011 removal, that he was “an alien 

present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled” and waived “the right to have 

a hearing before an Immigration Judge” and “the right to appeal the Immigration Judge’s written 

order of removal.” R. 36 at 4, 8, 11. This waiver precluded Hernandez-Ruiz from exhausting 

administrative remedies, and § 1326(d) prevents him from obtaining collateral relief today. That 

leaves one option: He may invalidate the waiver on the ground that he did not make it 

knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez-Rocha, 337 F.3d at 569. But he cannot clear that bar. 

The evidence shows that Hernandez-Ruiz executed a valid waiver. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement Officer William Belanich interviewed Hernandez-Ruiz in 2011. Belanich 

speaks Spanish and uses it regularly during removal proceedings. In conducting removal 
Case No. 17-3909

United States v. Hernandez-Ruiz

3 

interviews, he first determines whether the detainee speaks Spanish, and he began this interview 

by doing that. Hernandez-Ruiz speaks Spanish. 

Belanich handed Hernandez-Ruiz a notice of rights written in Spanish informing him that 

he could (1) request a hearing before an immigration judge, (2) assert a claim of fear in front of 

an immigration court, or (3) admit that he was removable and waive any hearing. HernandezRuiz read the document and chose the third option. 

Belanich gave Hernandez-Ruiz a list of free legal service providers and a notice to 

appear, a formal allegation of a violation of immigration laws. Hernandez-Ruiz read the notice 

and signed it. Hernandez-Ruiz received a notice of custody determination, which he read and 

signed, indicating that he did not request a redetermination of his custody decision. 

Belanich gave Hernandez-Ruiz the stipulation of removal, which explained (in English 

and Spanish) the rights he would waive by admitting that he was removable. Hernandez-Ruiz 

told Belanich that he read the Spanish version of the stipulation. In an abundance of caution, 

Belanich asked Hernandez-Ruiz to recite paragraphs 2, 3, 5, and 10 of the stipulation aloud. He 

did so. Hernandez-Ruiz initialed each page of the stipulation and signed the document. On this 

record, Hernandez-Ruiz waived these rights knowingly and voluntarily. 

Hernandez-Ruiz faults Belanich for not making him read paragraphs 6 (“I do not want to 

have a hearing before an Immigration Judge”) and 14 (“I knowingly and willingly waive the 

right to appeal”) of the stipulation aloud. R. 36 at 9, 11. But this argument misunderstands the 

goal of the recitation exercise. The point is to ensure that the detainee can read and understand 

the agreement, not to ratify discrete provisions. Besides, paragraphs 6 and 14 largely duplicate 

paragraph 5, which states that “by signing this Stipulation, I will be giving up . . . the right to 
Case No. 17-3909

United States v. Hernandez-Ruiz

4 

have a hearing before an Immigration Judge [and] the right to appeal the Immigration Judge’s 

decision.” Id. at 8–9. Hernandez-Ruiz recited paragraph 5. 

Hernandez-Ruiz adds that Belanich should have asked about his educational background. 

That may well be a reasonable approach if the detainee seems confused or lost. But no evidence 

shows any such thing happened. So far as the record shows, Belanich took numerous steps to 

ensure that Hernandez-Ruiz could read and understand the stipulation, and Hernandez-Ruiz 

confirmed that he did, through speech and writing alike. A knowing waiver requires no more. 

Hernandez-Ruiz insists that we should invalidate the waiver because he did not have the 

assistance of a lawyer. But Hernandez-Ruiz remained free to call a lawyer during the interview, 

and Belanich gave him a list of free legal services before he agreed to the stipulation. 

Hernandez-Ruiz offers no authority for the proposition that a lawyer still must be on the scene in 

a setting with no “contemplation of any kind of criminal case.” R. 19 at 63. Nor can we come 

up with one on our own. 

We affirm.