alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019230EN.01001201.xml

| 8.7.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 230/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.7.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 230/12

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 8 May 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio — Italy) — Antonio Pasquale Mastromartino v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob)

(Case C-53/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Markets in financial instruments - Directive 2004/39/EC - Articles 8, 23, 50 and 51 - Scope - Financial adviser authorised to provide offsite services - Staff member who has become a defendant in criminal proceedings - National legislation providing for the possibility of temporarily prohibiting the exercise of the activity - Fundamental freedoms - Purely internal situation - Not applicable)

(2019/C 230/13)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Antonio Pasquale Mastromartino

Defendant: Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob)

Operative part of the judgment

Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, as amended by Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010, in particular Articles 8, 23, 50 and 51 thereof, Articles 49 and 56 TFEU and the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, a temporary prohibition on exercising the activity of financial adviser authorised to provide offsite services falls neither within the scope of that directive, nor that of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU or that of the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality. In such circumstances, Articles 8, 23, 50 and 51 of that directive, Articles 49 and 56 TFEU and the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality do not preclude such a prohibition.

---

(1)  OJ C 142, 23.4.2018.

---
#### Adams v. Boulware.

1. Attachment: Under the attachment law enacted in 1857, a *bona fide*purchaser of lands for value will take the same, free of the lien of an attachment, which has been levied thereon, unless an abstract of such attachment be entered in the Register’s office of the county.

Oil the 17th clay of June, 1859, Charles F. Holly sold and conveyed to Adams certain lands in Nebraska city, and the deed -was duly recorded on the 30th of June of the same year.

On the 5th of May, 1858, Boulware sued Holly in attachment in the District Court for Otoe county, and caused the writ of attachment to be levied on the same lands.'

At' the June term, 1860, Boulware had judgment in his áction against Holly, and on the 11th of August following, sued out execution thereon, which was, by the sheriff, in pursuance of the attachment and judgment, levied on the same lands. The sale under this execution was advertised and about to take place, when Adams filed his bill in chancery to restrain the sale. The ground' of equity alleged by him was that when he purchased the premises,he Caused the records in the office of the register of deeds to be searched, and that thereby it appeai-ed that the title thereto stood unincumbered in' Holly, and especially that no abstract of the attachment above mentioned was ever entered in that office, and that he was a *bona fide*purchaser without notice of the attachment.

Boulware demurred to the bill for want of equity. This demurrer was sustained by the court and the bill dismissed. The complainant appealed to this court.

*J. M.*Woolworth, for the appellant,

cited 3 *Session Laws, Ohap. XXIX.,'See. 5, page*96, as follows:

“The liens above'authorized continue in force for ten years only from the date of the judgment. Provided, *471abstracts of judgments, mechanic liens, and all securities provided for in this statute shall be recorded as provided for in section thirty-five of chapter.”

2 *.Session Laws, Chap. XXXI., sec. 35, page*86, as follows :

“ The register, when presented with aii abstract of

“ 1. Any judgment; . ...

2. A mechanic’s lien ; .

“3. The service of an attachment;

“4. The levy of an execution, any of which establishes a lien upon real estate ; or with ■

“ 5. A notice of *lis pendens*in chancery, shall enter in a proper book, to be kept for that purpose, the substantial part of such abstract, so as to show the manner of the parties to such liens and notices, the amount of the judgment or indebtedness, by what court the judgment was rendered, or the attachment or execution was issued, and in what court the suit in chancery is pending, together with a general description of the estate to be affected by the lien or notice.”

*W. II Taylor,*for the appellee,

cited 3 *Session Laws, Chap. XXXI., sec.*29, *page*101, as follows :

■ “Property attached otherwise, than by garnishment, is bound thereby from the service of the attachment only.”

The court,

by Miller, J.,

held that, unless an abstract of an attachment is entered in the register’s office, a *bona fide*purchaser for value of lands which have been taken under it, will hold them free of the lien.

Decree reversed.
**Exhibit 32.1** 

 

**Certification of Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer** 

**Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to**

**Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of CountryRoad Acquisition Corp. I (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Andrew Merkatz, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge: 

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

 

 

|   |                        |   |
|--------|-----------------------------|--------|
|   | By: /s/ Andrew Merkatz      |   |
|   | Andrew Merkatz              |   |
|   | Principal Executive Officer |   |
|   | Principal Financial Officer |   |
# C_2019220EN.01001202.xml

| 1.7.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 220/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 220/12

---

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 2 May 2019 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio — Italy) — Lavorgna Srl v Comune di Montelanico, Comune di Supino, Comune di Sgurgola, Comune di Trivigliano

(Case C-309/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Public procurement - Directive 2014/24/EU - Labour costs - Automatic exclusion of a tenderer who has failed to state those costs separately in the tender - Principle of proportionality)

(2019/C 220/16)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Lavorgna Srl

Defendants: Comune di Montelanico, Comune di Supino, Comune di Sgurgola, Comune di Trivigliano

Intervener: Gea Srl

Operative part of the judgment

The principles of legal certainty, equal treatment and transparency, as referred to in Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the failure to state labour costs separately, in a financial tender submitted in a public contract award procedure, entails the exclusion of that tender without the possibility of supplementing or amending the tendering documentation, including in a situation where the obligation to state those costs separately is not specified in the tender specifications, in so far as that condition and that possibility of excluding tenders are clearly provided for by national legislation on public procurement procedures in which explicit reference was made to that legislation. However, if the provisions of the call for tenders do not allow tenderers to state those costs in their financial tenders, the principles of transparency and proportionality must be interpreted as not precluding tenderers being allowed to rectify their situation and fulfil the obligations provided for by national legislation in the field within a time limit set by the contracting authority.

---

(1)  OJ C 268, 30.7.2018.

---
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350








In connection with the American First Financial, Inc. (the “registrant”) on Form 10-K for the year ended March 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “report”), I, J R Stirling, Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer of the registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1) The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.





Date: January 14, 2011
  /s/  J. R. StirlingJ. R. StirlingChief Executive and Chief Financial Officer
(104 So. 837)

#### Ex parte LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.

(5 Div. 920.)

(Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 11, 1925.)

Certiorari *to*Court of Appeals.

Lawrence E. Gerald, of Clanton, for petitioner.

Altman & Taylor, of Birmingham, and Ered G. Koenig, of Columbiana, opposed.

MILLER, J.

Petition of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, to review and revise the judgment and decision there rendered in the case of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Atkinson, 20 Ala. App. 620, 104 So. 835.

Writ denied.

ANDERSON, C. J., and SAYRE and GARDNER, JJ., concur.
Case 1:07-cv-05357-AKH Document 23 Filed 03/17/2008 Page 1 of 2Case 1:07-cv-05357-AKH Document 23 Filed 03/17/2008 Page 2 of 2
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO SECTION 1350 OF CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATESCODE

 

 

                I, George E. Crapple, certifythat (i) the Annual Report of Global Macro Trust (the “Trust”) on Form 10-Kfor the period ending December 31, 2007 fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in such AnnualReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Trust.

 

 
| /s/    | George E. Crapple                  |
|--------|------------------------------------|
|   | George E. Crapple                  |
|   | Co-Chief Executive Officer         |
|   | Millburn Ridgefield Corporation    |
|   | Managing Owner, Global Macro Trust |
|   | March 28, 2008                |

 

 

 

 

----
# C_2017256EN.01003901.xml

| 7.8.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 256/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.8.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 256/39

---

Action brought on 8 June 2017 — La Zaragozana v EUIPO — Heineken Italia (CERVISIA)

(Case T-378/17)

(2017/C 256/44)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: La Zaragozana, SA (Zaragoza, Spain) (represented by: L. Broschat García, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Heineken Italia SpA (Pollein, Italy)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Applicant:

Trade mark at issue: EU figurative mark containing the word element ‘CERVISIA’ — Application for registration No 13 395 397

Trade mark at issue:

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Procedure before EUIPO

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 March 2017 in Case R 1241/2016-5

Contested decision

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision. |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision.

Plea in law

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of article 8 (1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of article 8 (1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

---
# C_2020161EN.01000702.xml

| 11.5.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 161/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 4 March 2020 — CSTP Azienda della Mobilità SpA v European Commission, Asstra Associazione Trasporti

(Case C-587/18 P) (1)

(Appeal - Competition - State aid - Undertaking operating bus route networks in the Regione Campania (Campania Region, Italy) - Compensation for public service obligations paid by the Italian authorities following a judgment of the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy) - European Commission decision declaring the aid measure unlawful and incompatible with the internal market)

(2020/C 161/10)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: CSTP Azienda della Mobilità SpA (represented by: G. Capo and L. Visone, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: G. Conte, P. J. Loewenthal and L. Armati, acting as Agents), Asstra Associazione Trasporti (represented by: M. Malena, avvocato)

Operative part

The Court

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders CSTP Azienda della Mobilità SpA to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders CSTP Azienda della Mobilità SpA to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 399, 5.11.2018.

---
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 102 (Friday, May 25, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 28919]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-13198]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; Notice of 
Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The contract proposals and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the contract proposals, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases Special Emphasis Panel.
    Date: June 14, 2001.
    Time: 1 pm to 5 pm.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate contract proposals.
    Place: 6700-B Rockledge Drive, Room 2103, Bethesda, MD 20892 
(Telephone Conference Call).
    Contact Person: Anna L. Ramsey-Ewing, Scientific Review 
Administrator, Scientific Review Program, Division of Extramural 
Activities, NIAID, NIH, Room 2220, 6700-B Rockledge Drive, MSC 7610, 
Bethesda, MD 20892-7610, 301-496-2550.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.855, 
Allergy, Immunology, and Transplantation Research; 93.856; 
Microbiology and Infectious Diseases Research, National Institutes 
of Health, HHS)

    Dated: May 18, 2001.
LaVerne Y. Stringfield,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 01-13198 Filed 5-24-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EFRAIN REYNAGA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS, an

Oregon corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-35655

D.C. No. 6:11-cv-06282-MC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 25, 2019 

Portland, Oregon

Before: FARRIS, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Efrain Reynaga appeals the District Court’s judgment in his employment

discrimination action against Roseburg Forest Products. Directed verdict was

FILED

NOV 13 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
proper as to Reynaga’s disparate treatment locker search claim, and none of the

challenged procedural or evidentiary decisions were an abuse of discretion.

A directed verdict is proper “‘when the evidence permits only one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.’” Moore v. Local Union 569 of Int’l Bhd.

of Elec. Workers, 989 F.2d 1534, 1537 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting McGonigle v.

Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 1992)). No substantial evidence supported

Reynaga’s contention that he experienced disparate treatment. Witnesses agreed

that management executed the locker search consistently and only opened an

employee’s locker if the dogs “alerted” in front of it. No witness could confirm that

management declined to search any white employee’s locker after the dogs in fact

alerted—a showing upon which Reynaga’s disparate treatment claim depends. See,

e.g., Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Reynaga’s

supplemental excerpts of record do not change this analysis. The only reasonable

conclusion was that Roseburg treated Reynaga the same as other employees.

The District Court’s sequestration order, which prohibited only the

discussion of ongoing testimony during breaks, did not prejudice Reynaga. Cf.

Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281–85 (1989). 

2
We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See Sprint/United

Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008). There was no such abuse

here. The District Court did not err in excluding evidence pertaining to the locker

search, as it could not have given rise to any relevant inference. Nor did it err by

excluding evidence regarding Reynaga’s job assignments. That theory was not

included in the pretrial order. See U.S. v. First Nat’l Bank of Circle, 652 F.2d 882,

886 (9th Cir. 1981). There was no error in the admission of Reynaga’s own racially

derogatory statements. See, e.g., Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co., 358 F.3d

473, 476 (7th Cir. 2004); Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir.

1999). Statements by Reynaga’s son and Mr. Hill regarding firearms and

derogatory language at the mill were irrelevant because Reynaga failed to make an

offer of proof that he was aware of the offered information.

AFFIRMED.

3
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2149 

To amend the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 to include financial 

criminal activities associated with the facilitation of severe forms of 

trafficking in persons within the factors considered as indicia of serious 

and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 9, 2019 

Mr. STEIL (for himself and Ms. DEAN) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 

to include financial criminal activities associated with 

the facilitation of severe forms of trafficking in persons 

within the factors considered as indicia of serious and 

sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking 

in persons, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Exposing the Financ5 ing of Human Trafficking Act’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2149 IH

1 SEC. 2. INCLUSION OF FINANCIAL CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES. 

2 Subsection (b) of section 108 of the Trafficking Vic3 tims Protection Act of 2000 is amended by adding at the 

4 end the following new paragraph: 

5 ‘‘(13) Whether the government of the country 

6 vigorously investigates, seeks to prevent, and pros7 ecutes financial criminal activities associated with 

8 the facilitation of severe forms of trafficking in per9 sons.’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WIRA GUNAWAN,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-71345

Agency No. A095-630-165

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 12, 2011** 

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

Wira Gunawan, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration

judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal,

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction

FILED

JUL 20 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-71345

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, Li v. Ashcroft, 378

F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2004), and we deny the petition for review.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Gunawan established

changed circumstances to excuse his untimely asylum application. See 8 C.F.R. §

1208.4(a)(4); Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 657-58 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Accordingly, his asylum claim fails.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding because

Gunawan’s testimony was inconsistent with his asylum application as to when he

learned he was allegedly on a governmental “black list,” see Li, 378 F.3d at 964

(“[s]o long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence

and goes to the heart of [the] claim of persecution, we are bound to accept the IJ’s

adverse credibility finding”) (internal quotation omitted), and the agency

reasonably rejected his explanation for the inconsistency, see Rivera v. Mukasey,

508 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 2007). In the absence of credible testimony,

Gunawan’s withholding of removal claim fails. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d

1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

Because Gunawan’s CAT claim is based on the same testimony found to be

not credible, and he points to no other evidence the IJ should have considered,

substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT relief. See id. at 1156-57.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.