*

 The HONORABLE CHARLES R. WOLLE, Chief United States

District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by

designation.

 1 The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Chief United States

District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.

___________

No. 95-2677

___________

Rasberry Williams, *

 *

 Appellant, *

 *

 v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

State of Iowa and * Northern District of Iowa

Gerardo Acevedo, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

 Appellees *

___________

Submitted: December 15, 1995

Filed: January 17, 1996 ___________

Before BOWMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and WOLLE*, District

Judge. ___________

PER CURIAM.

 Rasberry Williams, an Iowa inmate, appeals from the judgment

of the district court1 denying his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). Williams is serving a

sentence of life imprisonment following his conviction for first

degree murder and the affirmance of that conviction on direct

appeal. State v. Williams, 243 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1976). Three
2

postconviction petitions were denied by Iowa courts. We affirm the

denial of his habeas petition.

 On July 20, 1974, Williams shot and killed Lester Givhan

outside George's Pool Hall in Waterloo, Iowa. At trial Williams

argued he shot Givhan in self-defense, testifying Givhan displayed

a gun inside the pool hall after Williams demanded the return of

$30.00 Givhan owed him. Williams went to his car to get his

pistol, confronted Givhan again outside the pool hall, and shot him

after further argument about the debt and after Givhan again

displayed a gun. From the trial testimony, the jury could

reasonably have found that Williams deliberately confronted Givhan

outside the pool hall and killed him with malice, not in selfdefense.

 Williams raises three grounds for habeas relief. First, he

contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel and due

process of law when his trial attorneys failed to object to jury

instructions that equated the element of specific intent with the

separate elements of premeditation, deliberation, and willfulness.

Second, Williams contends that he was denied due process of law,

equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel when Iowa

courts denied his requests for a psychiatric examination at public

expense. Finally, Williams argues that the district court erred in

denying his request for a psychiatric examination and an

evidentiary hearing in this federal habeas action.

 I. In ruling against Williams on his first claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court adopted the

findings of the state courts that held Williams was not prejudiced

when his trial counsel failed to object to jury instructions

setting forth the elements of the offense. To prevail on claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioners seeking habeas

relief are required to show that counsel's performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness, and that it is reasonably
3

probable the result of the proceeding would have been different

without counsel's unprofessional efforts. See Wilson v.

Armontrout, 962 F.2d 817, 819 (8th Cir.) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.

383 (1992).

 Williams has not shown the result of his trial in the Iowa

court would have been different if his trial counsel had objected

to the marshaling instruction presented to the jury. The record

contains ample evidence that Williams had acted with premeditation,

deliberation, and willfulness. We agree with the Iowa courts and

the district court in holding Williams has not satisfied the

prejudice requirement of this ineffectiveness claim. It is denied.

 II. The Iowa trial court denied Williams' pretrial requests

that he be provided a psychiatric examination at government

expense. His first requests were denied as too conclusory and

indefinite. When Williams' counsel renewed the request and

submitted medical records regarding a previous head injury, the

trial court ordered an examination by a neurologist. Williams

contends his trial counsel should have presented more persuasive,

fact-supported requests to the trial court. Williams also contends

denial of his requests for evaluation by a psychiatrist violated

due process and equal protection.

 The district court in this habeas action denied this second

claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel because Williams'

conclusory allegations of mental disorder did not satisfy Ake v.

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1984). We agree. Ake requires a petitioner

seeking a psychiatric examination to make a preliminary showing

that sanity at the time of the offense would likely be a
 2

Like the district court we pass the question whether Ake

applies retroactively to the state court's denial of a

psychiatric evaluation at public expense.

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significant factor at trial. Id. at 74.2 The district court

emphasized that the state trial court had provided Williams an

examination by a neurologist who was qualified to provide a

competent opinion regarding the location of the head injury and its

probable effect on mental functioning. Williams has not shown his

trial counsel could have obtained facts to support an adequate Ake

request for a psychiatric examination. Moreover, Williams has not

shown that a psychiatric examination would have disclosed facts

that probably would have changed the outcome of the trial. Thus,

this second ineffectiveness claim does not satisfy the Strickland

prejudice requirement.

 III. Before denying Williams' habeas petition, the district

court denied Williams' request that he be examined by a

psychiatrist at government expense and also denied his request for

an evidentiary hearing. In one of the three state postconviction

proceedings, the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing, but

Williams failed to develop facts in that proceeding to show that he

was entitled to a psychiatric examination. Williams satisfied

neither Ake requirements nor the requirement that a petitioner

requesting an evidentiary hearing show cause for the failure to

develop facts in state court and likely prejudice resulting from

that failure. Keene v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1, 118

L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). The district court correctly denied Williams'

request for a further evidentiary hearing and psychiatric

examination in this federal habeas proceeding.

 We have carefully reviewed the record and the parties, briefs.

We affirm the well-reasoned decision and judgment of the district

court.
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AFFIRMED

A true copy.

 Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.