UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

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JERRY GOSS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

KELLY CATHEY, an individual; 

OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING 

COMMISSION, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 20-5031

(D.C. No. 4:18-CV-00304-TCK-JFJ)

(N.D. Okla.)

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before LUCERO, HOLMES, and EID, Circuit Judges.

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Jerry Goss appeals from the district court’s denial of his post-judgment motion 

seeking to reopen his case to amend his complaint. Exercising jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

January 12, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court
2

BACKGROUND

After the appellees terminated Mr. Goss’s employment as a horse-racing 

steward, he brought suit in Oklahoma state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state 

law. The appellees removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Mr. Goss responded that his allegations adequately pleaded 

both his federal and state claims. Identifying certain deficiencies in the pleading of 

the federal claims, the district court dismissed those claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and 

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.

Mr. Goss then filed a post-judgment motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 

60(b). Noting that the case originally was filed in state court, he asserted, “Now that 

heightened federal pleading standards apply, basic fairness tilts in favor of this Court 

granting leave to amend.” Aplt. App. at 87. Although he claimed he could remedy 

the deficiencies the court had noted, he identified no new facts or law that he would 

include in an amended complaint. The defendants-appellees opposed reopening, 

arguing that amendment would be futile because Mr. Goss’s § 1983 claims fail as a 

matter of law. The district court denied the post-judgment motion in a minute order, 

without explanation. 

DISCUSSION

Mr. Goss appeals only from the district court’s denial of his post-judgment 

motion. We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) or a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of 

discretion, see Walters v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 703 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 
3

2013), which also is the standard of review for a denial of leave to amend, see Foman 

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

1

Mr. Goss argues that denying leave to amend without giving any reason or 

justification is itself an abuse of discretion. See id. (“[O]utright refusal to grant the 

leave [to amend] without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an 

exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the 

spirit of the Federal Rules.”); Triplett v. LeFlore Cty., 712 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir. 

1983) (applying Foman in the context of a request to amend contained within a 

motion to reconsider a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). But while acknowledging this 

general rule, this court also has held that a failure to explain a denial of leave to 

amend “can be harmless error where the reason is apparent.” Pallottino v. City of Rio 

Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

appellees suggest that apparent reasons include undue delay, lack of justification, and 

futility. 

We are persuaded that the district court’s failure to explain why it denied the 

post-judgment motion was harmless error. The motion baldly asserted that Mr. Goss

could remedy the deficiencies the court had identified. It did not discuss any specific 

new facts or law that he would cite and did not attach a proposed amended complaint. 

1 Technically, the district court did not deny a motion for leave to amend; it denied a 

post-judgment motion under Rule 59(e) and/or Rule 60(b). The parties’ arguments 

treat the motion effectively as one for leave to amend, however, as this court did in 

similar circumstances in Triplett v. LeFlore County, 712 F.2d 444, 445-47 (10th Cir. 

1983). We therefore analyze the district court’s disposition in this light. 
4

It therefore gave the district court no grounds to evaluate the propriety of allowing 

amendment. “[W]e do not require district courts to engage in independent research 

or read the minds of litigants to determine if information justifying an amendment 

exists.” Calderon v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1187 

(10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Computerized Thermal 

Imaging, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 312 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[H]aving

produced no showing of how it would properly amend its pleadings or how newly 

discovered evidence warranted relief from dismissal, [the plaintiff] remains bound by 

the record it created.”). Mr. Goss’s failure to identify any specifics distinguishes this 

case from Triplett, in which the motion to reconsider explicitly identified and 

discussed proposed theories of recovery that that were within the bounds of 

established law. See Triplett, 712 F.2d at 447; see also Calderon, 181 F.3d at 1186

(recognizing that the post-judgment motion in Triplett demonstrated “the particular 

grounds for the amendment”).

CONCLUSION

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Allison H. Eid

Circuit Judge