[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 98 (Monday, May 21, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 28027]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-12717]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration


Pipeline Safety: Emergency Plans and Procedures for Responding to 
Multiple Gas Leaks and Migration of Gas Into Buildings

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice; issuance of an advisory bulletin.

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SUMMARY: The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is issuing this advisory 
to owners and operators of gas pipeline distribution systems. Owners 
and operators should review their emergency plans and procedures to 
determine whether the procedures prompt the appropriate actions for gas 
leaks caused by excavation damage near buildings, and whether the 
procedures adequately address the possibility of multiple leaks and the 
underground migration of gas into nearby buildings.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marvin Fell, (202) 366-6205, or by e-
mail, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6e030f1c18070040080b02022e1c1d1e0f400a011a40090118"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="81ece0f3f7e8efafe7e4ededc1f3f2f1e0afe5eef5afe6eef7">[email protected]</span></a>. This document can be viewed at the OPS 
home page at http://ops.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    On January 22, 1999, while excavating a trench behind a building in 
the downtown area of Bridgeport, Alabama, a backhoe operator damaged a 
natural gas service line. This resulted in two leaks on the natural gas 
service line, which was operating at a pressure of 35 pounds per square 
inch (psig). One leak occurred where the backhoe bucket contacted the 
gas service line and pulled it aboveground. Although the second leak 
was not visible, the ensuing investigation revealed that the natural 
gas service line was separated at an underground joint near the gas 
meter, and close to a building. As a result, natural gas migrated into 
the building. The gas ignited, destroying three downtown buildings in a 
two square block area. The incident resulted in four fatalities and 
five injuries.
    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated this 
incident and determined that the probable cause of the accident was (1) 
the failure of the construction contractor to establish and follow safe 
procedures for excavation activities, resulting in damage to the \3/4\-
inch steel natural gas service line and (2) the failure of the operator 
to provide appropriate emergency response to the subsequent natural gas 
leak.
    The operator's written emergency procedures in effect at the time 
of the accident instructed service personnel to ``* * * evaluate the 
extent of the emergency, request assistance as needed, and to inform 
the manager if necessary.'' However, the procedures did not instruct 
employees responding to a reported leak to consider the possibility of 
multiple leaks, check for gas accumulation in nearby buildings, and, if 
necessary, take steps to promptly stop the flow of gas.

II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-01-02)

    To: Owners and Operators of Gas Distribution Systems.
    Subject: Emergency Plans and Procedures for Responding to Multiple 
Gas Leaks and Migration of Gas into Buildings
    Purpose: To advise owners and operators of gas distribution 
pipeline systems to review their emergency plans and procedures to 
determine whether the procedures prompt the appropriate actions for gas 
leaks caused by excavation damage near buildings, and whether the 
procedures adequately address the possibility of multiple leaks and the 
underground migration of gas into nearby buildings.
    Advisory: Owners and operators of gas distribution systems should 
ensure that their emergency plans and procedures require employees who 
respond to gas leaks to consider the possibility of multiple leaks, to 
check for gas accumulation in nearby buildings, and, if necessary, to 
take steps to promptly stop the flow of gas. These procedures should be 
communicated to both employee and contractor personnel who are 
responsible for emergency response to pipeline incidents.

    Issued in Washington, DC on May 16, 2001.
Jeffrey D. Wiese,
Manager, Program Development, Office of Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 01-12717 Filed 5-18-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P


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