IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 42 / 06–2030 

Filed September 5, 2008 

STATE OF IOWA, 

 Appellee, 

vs. 

RONNIE JAMES ISAAC, 

 Appellant. 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. 

Price, District Associate Judge. 

 Defendant claims there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction of indecent exposure. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 

VACATED. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED. 

 Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant 

Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Susan C. Cox, 

Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 2

TERNUS, Chief Justice. 

 The district court convicted the appellant, Ronnie Isaac, of 

indecent exposure after a police officer caught him masturbating outside 

a woman’s bedroom window. On appeal, Isaac claims there was 

insufficient evidence to support his conviction because he exposed his 

genitals only to the officer and that exposure was inadvertent. The court 

of appeals rejected this argument, and we granted Isaac’s application for 

further review. Upon our consideration of the governing statute, we hold 

the State must prove that, at the time Isaac exposed himself to the 

officer, he did so for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual 

desires of himself or the officer. Because there is insufficient evidence 

that Isaac’s exposure of his genitals to the officer was for this purpose, 

the State has failed to prove Isaac committed the crime of indecent 

exposure. We therefore vacate the court of appeals’ decision, reverse the 

district court’s judgment of conviction, and remand this case for 

dismissal of the indecent exposure charge. 

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings. 

 On June 29, 2006, Micaela went to bed at 1 a.m. at her 

condominium in Ankeny. About twenty minutes later, Micaela heard 

knocking on her bedroom window. She heard a man moaning in a 

sexual manner and repeating sexually explicit exclamations. She did not 

open the window or look through the blinds. Micaela woke up her 

roommate who heard a male voice say “oh baby.” The women called the 

police. 

 Ankeny police officers Robert Kovacs and Brian Huggins responded 

to the women’s call. After the officers failed to find anyone outside the 

residence, they went inside to speak with the women. 
 3

 Meanwhile, Jennifer, who lived in another condominium nearby, 

had just gotten into bed. She heard heavy breathing outside her 

bedroom window and what sounded like something rubbing against the 

window screen. She did not attempt to look outside her window. 

 Officer Kovacs left Officer Huggins with Micaela and went back 

outside to further search the area. As he walked around one of the 

buildings in the complex, Officer Kovacs saw a man standing in front of 

Jennifer’s window. The man was looking into the window with his left 

hand on the wall and his right hand on his crotch. Officer Kovacs 

testified it appeared the man was masturbating or fondling himself. 

 Officer Kovacs shined a flashlight on the man, identified himself as 

a police officer, and asked the man what he was doing. The man, Ronnie 

Isaac, turned toward the officer. Officer Kovacs noticed the zipper of 

Isaac’s blue jeans was down and his penis was outside his pants by his 

hand. Officer Kovacs could not tell whether Isaac’s penis was erect. 

 Isaac took off running. Officer Kovacs chased after him while 

repeatedly yelling “stop, police.” Officer Kovacs caught up with Isaac and 

tackled him as Officer Huggins came outside to assist. Officer Kovacs 

placed Isaac in handcuffs and noticed Isaac’s hands were oily. A bottle 

of baby oil was found in Isaac’s back pocket. The officers turned Isaac 

over and saw his flaccid penis outside his pants. Officer Kovacs put 

Isaac’s penis back into his jeans and zipped up his pants. 

The State charged Isaac with indecent exposure, interference with 

official acts, and two counts of harassment in the third degree. Isaac 

waived his right to a jury. After a trial, the district court found him 

guilty on all counts. Isaac appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence with respect to the indecent exposure conviction. He did not 
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appeal the convictions on the other counts. The court of appeals 

affirmed. We granted further review. 

II. Scope of Review. 

Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed for 

correction of errors at law. State v. Quinn, 691 N.W.2d 403, 406 (Iowa 

2005). The district court’s findings of the required elements of an offense 

are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. State v. 

Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Evidence is substantial if it 

would convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2001). 

 III. Merits. 

The issue before us is whether there was sufficient evidence to 

convict Isaac of indecent exposure. Iowa Code section 709.9 (2005) 

defines this crime. It states in relevant part: 

 A person who exposes the person’s genitals or pubes 

to another not the person’s spouse . . . commits a serious 

misdemeanor, if: 

 1. The person does so to arouse or satisfy the sexual 

desires of either party; and 

 2. The person knows or reasonably should know that 

the act is offensive to the viewer. 

Iowa Code § 709.9. 

Because indecent exposure is “ ‘essentially a visual assault 

crime,’ ” State v. Bauer, 337 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1983) (quoting 

Kermit L. Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code: Part II, 29 Drake L. 

Rev. 491, 541 (1979–80)), the State needed to produce a victim who saw 

Isaac’s exposed genitals. See Iowa Code § 709.9 (prohibiting the 

exposure of a person’s genitals “to another” when the person knows or 

reasonably should know the act is offensive “to the viewer”). Neither 

Micaela nor Jennifer saw Isaac or his penis. Thus, the State relies on 
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Isaac’s exposure of his genitals to Officer Kovacs to support Isaac’s 

conviction of indecent exposure. On appeal, Isaac claims there was 

insufficient evidence to prove he exposed himself to Officer Kovacs for the 

purpose of arousing his sexual desires or the sexual desires of the officer. 

We agree. 

 Previously, we have broken down the crime of indecent exposure 

into four elements: 

 1. The exposure of genitals or pubes to someone other 

than a spouse . . .; 

 2. That the act is done to arouse the sexual desires of 

either party; 

 3. The viewer was offended by the conduct; and 

 4. The actor knew, or under the circumstances should 

have known, the victim would be offended. 

State v. Adams, 436 N.W.2d 49, 50 (Iowa 1989) (citing Bauer, 337 

N.W.2d at 212).1 “ ‘It is only exposure with a sexual motivation, inflicted 

upon an unwilling viewer, which will constitute the offense.’ ” Bauer, 

337 N.W.2d at 211 (quoting 4 John J. Yeager & Ronald L. Carlson, Iowa 

Practice: Criminal Law and Procedure § 217, at 63 (1979)) (emphasis 

omitted). Thus, even deliberate exposure done without a sexual motive, 

such as streaking, nude protesting or urinating in public, is outside the 

proscription of section 709.9. Id. at 211–12. 

 In the present case, the State satisfied the first element of the 

offense by proving Isaac exposed his penis to Officer Kovacs. The 

problematic element is the second one: Was this exposure to Officer 

Kovacs done for the purpose of arousing Isaac’s or the officer’s sexual 

 1The necessity that the victim actually be offended has been questioned. See 

State v. Newell, No. 06-0528, 2007 WL 1062943, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2007) 

(Vogel, J., specially concurring). Isaac does not challenge this element on appeal, so we 

do not reconsider whether proof that the viewer was offended is required. 
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desires?2 It is not sufficient that prior to this exposure Isaac sought to 

satisfy his sexual desires. Our statute requires such a purpose at the 

time of exposure to the viewer. See Iowa Code § 709.9 (requiring that 

“[t]he person [expose his genitals or pubes to someone other than a 

spouse] to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either party”); see also 

State v. Plenty Horse, 741 N.W.2d 763, 765 (S.D. 2007) (holding “the 

prosecution must link the exhibition of one’s genitals to the intent to 

seek sexual gratification”). Whether a defendant’s exposure of his 

genitals to another person was done for the purpose of arousing the 

sexual desires of himself or the viewer can be inferred from the 

defendant’s conduct, his remarks, and the surrounding circumstances. 

After examining the record in the present case, we find no conduct, 

remarks, or circumstances from which an inference can be drawn that 

the required purpose existed at the time Isaac exposed his genitals to 

Officer Kovacs. Officer Kovacs testified that Isaac had his back to the 

officer when the officer first spotted Isaac outside Jennifer’s window. The 

officer stated he could not see Isaac’s penis at that point, but he believed 

Isaac’s right hand was in the area of Isaac’s crotch. The officer testified 

that he then shone a flashlight on Isaac and yelled “police” at which 

point Isaac “turned his body towards [Officer Kovacs], looked at [Officer 

Kovacs], and then immediately took off running around the side of the 

building.” The officer further testified that, when Isaac “turned and faced 

[Officer Kovacs], he still had his hand down, and when he saw [Officer 

Kovacs], his hand came off.” The officer could not tell whether Isaac’s 

penis was erect. 

 2The State argues the issue in this case is whether the statute requires exposure 

to a specific person or simply to another person. We disagree. The determinative issue 

here is whether the exposure to another person must be for the purpose of satisfying 

the sexual desires of that person or the defendant. 
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 These facts do not support an inference that Isaac exposed himself 

to Officer Kovacs to satisfy his or the officer’s sexual desires. First of all, 

there are no facts indicating Isaac’s exposure of his penis to the officer 

was anything other than inadvertent, occurring as a result of Isaac 

turning in response to the officer’s call. Secondly, Isaac immediately 

removed his hand from his crotch and fled. These actions suggest his 

sexual desires evaporated, rather than continued, when he was 

discovered by the officer. Finally, there was no evidence that Isaac 

became sexually aroused when he turned to face the officer or that he 

masturbated while exposing himself to the officer, circumstances and 

conduct that could support an inference that his exposure to the officer 

was sexually motivated. 

 The State would have us combine Isaac’s intent when he was 

masturbating out of sight with his subsequent exposure to Officer 

Kovacs. To interpret section 709.9 as the State suggests would ignore 

the statutory requirement that the exposure be to another for the 

purpose of sexual gratification. This point is illustrated by a comparison 

of the Iowa statute with the indecent exposure statute drafted by the 

American Law Institute. The model provision states: 

 A person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of 

arousing or gratifying sexual desire of himself or of any 

person other than his spouse, he exposes his genitals under 

circumstances in which he knows his conduct is likely to 

cause affront or alarm. 

See Model Penal Code § 213.5, at 405 (1980). Notably, the model 

provision does not require exposure “to another” as the Iowa statute 

does. See Iowa Code § 709.9 (“A person who exposes the person’s 

genitals or pubes to another not the person’s spouse . . . commits a 

serious misdemeanor . . . .” (Emphasis added.)). Thus, under the 
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narrower Iowa statute, mere public exposure is not sufficient. See 4 

John J. Yeager & Ronald L. Carlson, Iowa Practice: Criminal Law and 

Procedure § 217, at 63 (1979) (“Exposure per se is not prohibited by 

§ 709.9.” (quoted in Bauer, 337 N.W.2d at 212)). Our statute requires 

exposure to another person; it also requires that this exposure be for the 

purpose of sexual gratification. The required concurrence of the 

exposure to Officer Kovacs and the defendant’s sexual purpose is missing 

in the record before us. 

 IV. Conclusion. 

We find insufficient evidence to support Isaac’s conviction for 

indecent exposure. Because there are no facts to support a finding that 

Isaac exposed his penis to Officer Kovacs for the purpose of arousing or 

satisfying the sexual desires of himself or the officer, Isaac’s conviction 

must be reversed. We therefore vacate the contrary decision of the court 

of appeals and reverse the district court’s judgment of conviction. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED. 

All justices concur except Cady and Streit, JJ., who dissent, and 

Baker, J., who takes no part. 
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 #42/06-2030, State v. Isaac 

STREIT, Justice. (dissenting)

 I respectfully dissent. Isaac’s conduct is the type of behavior 

the legislature intended to outlaw with section 709.9. His actions 

indicate he wanted to be observed sexually gratifying himself. 

The facts of this case are straightforward. A man was 

masturbating outside various bedroom windows of a condominium 

complex. He was making sexual noises and saying sexually explicit 

things while rubbing or tapping the windows with one hand and 

masturbating with the other. The woman inside heard Isaac repeatedly 

say “show me your tits” and “oh, f___, I’m going to come.” Clearly, he 

was attempting to awaken the occupants so they might come to the 

window to see him. Instead, Isaac was seen by a police officer, grasping 

his penis with his oily hands. From these simple facts, it is fair to infer 

he did it for sexual purposes, even though the majority cannot imagine 

such a happening and rules as a matter of law Isaac would not want to 

show himself to the police officer. 

The majority analyzes the facts through the lens of a reasonable 

person unaffected by the prurient thoughts and desires of a sexually 

deviant person. In doing so, it forecloses any possibility that someone 

who would engage in such behavior could also derive sexual gratification 

from exposing himself to a police officer and running from a pursuing 

officer with his penis protruding from his pants. Yet, the actions by 

Isaac in this case were not those of a reasonable person, but a person 

with a sexually perverted mind. The majority simply fails to consider 

that nonsexual activity in the eyes of a normal person may be sexual 

activity to a sexually perverted person. The approach taken by the 

majority places an unfair burden on the State in prosecuting the crime of 
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indecent exposure and means the most bizarre cases of indecent 

exposure will likely escape prosecution, as in this case. 

Isaac cannot avoid conviction by claiming the particular person 

who saw his penis while he was masturbating was not the intended 

victim.3 Cf. United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 665 (8th Cir. 2007) 

(finding probable cause to arrest defendant for violating Iowa Code 

section 709.9 where an off-duty police officer came upon defendant 

masturbating while walking along a trail in a park); State v. Bauer, 337 

N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1983) (holding Iowa Code section 709.9 is not 

unconstitutionally vague on its face where a woman observed defendant 

kneeling on the floor in a library facing book shelves while masturbating). 

As it was obvious Isaac was attempting to get the attention of the people 

inside, he knew or should have known his actions would cause someone 

to investigate by either opening the window covers or going outside. 

Isaac should be held responsible for the natural and foreseeable 

consequences of his actions. 

Moreover, it is irrelevant Isaac stopped masturbating after turning 

toward the officer. There is evidence to suggest Isaac could view the 

moment the police officer saw him as an opportunity to achieve sexual 

gratification. Isaac was not forced to turn around and expose himself to 

the officer. Nothing prevented Isaac from using the same hand he was 

using to masturbate to place his penis back into his pants before turning 

around to face the officer. The trial court was completely free to 

conclude his failure to do so was circumstantial evidence of a perverted 

sexual desire to expose himself at that moment to anyone in sight. See 

State v. Talbert, 622 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Iowa 2001) (recognizing the 

 3There is no evidence to suggest Isaac knew who lived in the apartments. The 

women both testified they had never seen him before. 
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evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the 

findings of the trial court are construed liberally to uphold the result 

reached, and the district court’s findings of fact are binding on appeal 

unless not supported by substantial evidence). Similarly, it is equally 

understandable that a reasonable mind would conclude that a person 

would not engage a police officer in a pursuit to arouse or satisfy his 

sexual desires. 

It is a fundamental tenet of law enforcement investigation that it is 

sometimes necessary to think like a criminal to catch a criminal. The 

majority not only overlooks this commonsense adage, but fails to give 

deference to the role of the district court as fact finder in this case. I 

would affirm the decision of the court of appeals and the judgment of the 

district court. 

Cady, J., joins this dissent.