NO. 07-03-0050 -CV IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L A SEPTE MBE R 5, 2003

______________________________ CHARLES F. NELSON, JR., AP PELLANT

V. U.S. POSTAL SERVICE AND AN UNKNO W N CARRIER, APPELLEES

_________________________________ FROM THE251 ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUN TY; NO. 90-014-C; HON ORABLEPATRICK PIRTLE, J UDGE

_______________________________ Before JOHNSON, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPB ELL, JJ.
MEM ORAN DUM OP INI ON1 Nelson is no stranger to this Court. N elson has been deni ed relief in Cause Numbers 07- 00-04 71-CV, 07-01 -0017 -CV, 07- 01-00 74-CV, 07-01-0007-CV, and 07-01- 0284- CV. 2 Byhis sole issue, Charles F . Nelson , Jr. 1 , an inmate proceeding pro se and in f orma pauperis, contends the trial court abused its discretion by rendering a decision arbitrary and
unr eas ona ble in light of the claims and evidence dism issing his action to rec over $6.4 0 against the United States Postal Service and an Unknow n Car rier pursuant to a finding without a hearing, that th e a ct io n wa s frivol ous or malicio us, as authori zed by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem . Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2 003). Based on th e rat ion ale exp ressed herein, w

e revers e and ren der. Initially, we note that even thoug h he is proceeding pro se , Nelson is held to the
sa me standard as a licensed attorney and mu st com ply with the applicable laws, rules, and procedure. Greenstreet v. H eiskell, 940 S.W .2d 8 31, 83 4 (Tex.App. --Am arillo 1997, no writ); see also Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1978) (holding litigants who represent themse l ve s mu st com ply with the procedures established by the rules notwithstanding the fac t t hat th ey are not li censed attorneys) . Accordingl y, notwithstanding Nelson’s im plied plea thathis pleadings and assertions should be given
a liberal i nterpretation, we dec line to relax the rule announced in Greenstreet and Mansfield

.2 Motion for Sum mary Judgm ent filed but never served nor set for ahearing.

3 Nelson filed his suit o n July 2, 2002, b ut according to t he recor d, it appe ars that as of Septem ber 24, 2002, the date of thetria l cou rt’ s or

der of d ism iss al, service had not been
com pleted upon appellees. According to his original petition, he asserts he m ailed three certified pieces of m ail and that two of the items

were not received or otherwise dest royed. He alleged frau d, breac h of co ntract, a DTPA claim , and th eft. Fu rther, by mot ion for
sum m aryjudgm ent, 2 he alleged contractual relations with the United States Postal Service bypaying a consideration to said business for the delivery of cert ified m ail an d th at o nly
one of three let ters was actually de liver ed. Then, by hi s conclusi on in hi s m otion for reinstatement

and/or new

trial, he alleged the am ount paid by him f or the certified mail to be $6.40. Ex

cept for this allegation, neither his pleadings nor m otio ns allege the dollar
amoun tof the dam ages he clai ms to have sustained. As was presented in Arteag a v. Jackson, 994 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1999, pet. denied), Nelson did not alle ge a cause of action that w ould authorize an award of ex emplary or treble dam ages based on any theory of

law. Further, an or dinary br each of contract claim does no t suppo rt recovery under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. La S ara Grain Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Mer ce de s, 67 3 S. W .2 d 5 58 , 5 65 (T ex. 1984). Moreover, by his brief, appellant limited his claim on appeal to a claim for breach of contract

. Before w

e conside r Nelson’s s ole issue, we m ust first address the ques tion of whether appellant’s pleading was effective to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. As3 Seealso Chap a v. Spivey, 999 S .W .2d 833 (Tex.A pp.--Tyler 1999, no pet.)

(holding the minim um jurisdiction am ount to invoke the j uris dict ion of th e dis tric t co urt is $ 500 notwithstanding the revision by the 69t h Legisl ature in 19 85, but otherwise dismissing the inm ate’s action as being below $500. 4 a matter of first consider ation, any

court has the duty to d etermine, sua sponte , w het her it has jurisdiction to hear the case. In Barnes v. Bitum inous Casual ty Corpor ation, 495 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tex .Civ.A pp.--A m arillo 1973, w rit ref’d n.r.e.) , we held that where the claimant soughtto recover only $424 for dental ex penses under a com promise set tlem en t agreemen t, the trial court did not have j urisdiction to entertain a claim for less than $500. Similarl y, in Arteaga , 994 S.W.2d at 343, where Arte aga alleged damages of $200, but by his prayer sought $700, after discussing the legislative chan ges in 1985 reducing the minim um j uris dict iona l lim it of a distr ict cou rt to $2 00, thecou rt h eld t he t rial cour t co uld have properly conclude d tha t the relief sought by Arteaga w as below the j urisdictional mi ni mum. 3
Barnes and Arteaga arecon tro lling h ere . B eca useNel son ’sclai m of $6.40 is below the $20 0 j uris dict iona l m inim umof t he d istr ict cou rt, and hispro se pleading did not allege
a cau se of ac

tion tha t w

ould authorizetreble or exem plarydamages, the action shoul d have been d ismisse d for l ack of juri sdic tion . As an appellate court we have the duty torender the judgm ent the trial court sho uld have rendered. SeeTex. R. A pp. P. 43.2(c ). Accordingl y, the trial court’s or de r o f d is mis sa l b as ed up on Te x. Civ. Prac. & Rem . Code5

Ann. § 14.00 3(a)(2) i s reversed and judgment is hereby re ndered di smissing Nelson’s cause for want of

jurisdiction.
Don H. Rea vis Justice