Filed 4/24/13 P. v. Hebrard CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
LEANDRE HEBRARD,
Defendant and Appellant. B239269
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA377622)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert J. Schuit, Judge. Affirmed. Sarah A. Stockwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D.
Matthews and David E. Made o, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________ ________________2 INTRODUCTION LeAndre Hebrard appeals from his convi ction, following a jury trial, of second degree robbery. He contends (1) the trial court erred in allowing a gang expert to testify about gang members l eaving a gang, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancements , and (3) the court erred in sentencing him to separate consecutive terms for the firearm and gang enhancements. Finding no error, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE A jury found appellant guilty of s econd degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). 1 It found true the allegation that appellant personally used a firearm to commit the robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and that the cr ime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang with the intent to promote, further, and assist the gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced appellant to a total of 23 years in prison, consisting
of the midterm of th ree years for the robbery convict ion, plus 10 years consecutive for the personal use firearm enhancemen t, and 10 years consecutive for the gang enhancement. The one-year fir earm enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1) was imposed and stayed , pursuant to section 654. Appellant timely appealed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS In October 2010, Kristopher Sallico ow ned and operated Jimmy’s Cleaners on Martin Luther King Boulevard in Los A ngeles. Sallico testif ied that on October 27, 2010, at around 2:00 p.m., he was robbe d by appellant and codefendant Andre

1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unle ss otherwise stated.3 McClelland. 2 Sallico knew the two men as “Touc he” and “4-Leaf,” respectively. He had spoken with the two men “numerous ” times, mainly to advise them to become productive citizens. When appella nt and McClelland entered his store, Sallico approached them. McClelland said to Sallico, “Pops, give me the money.” Sallico replied, “Are you joking?” Appellant, who was standing about three feet behind McClelland, lifted his shirt and sh owed Sallico the handle of a handgun. Sallico became frightened and walked to th e cash register. He took out the money and gave it to McClelland. Appellant and McClelland walked out, got into a car, and drove away. After the men left, Sallico tr ied to contact his son bu t could not reach him. About an hour later, he called the police. When the police arrived, Sallico told an
officer that he had been robbed in hi s store by two Black men who were Rolling 40’s gang members. He identified the firs t man as “4-Leaf” and the second man as
“Touche” and “LeAndre.” La ter that day, Sallico positively identified appellant
and McClelland as the robbers in a si x-pack photographic lineup. He also identified appellant and McClelland as the robbers at the preliminary hearing and
at trial. At trial, Sallico testified he believed that appellant and McClelland were affiliated with a gang. The area surr ounding his store was a gang area, and gang members had repeatedly “tag g[ed]” his door and walls. Sallico testified that two months after the robbery, he sold the bus iness because he “wanted to get [his] family out of the environment.” He also testified his son was friends with the robbers. He stated he was “unhappy with my son being affiliated with gangs,” and that he wanted to get his son away from “the gang and th e lifestyle.”

2 The jury also convicted McClella nd of second degree robbery.4 Los Angeles Police Department Officer Guillermo Espinoza, the prosecution’s gang expert, testified that the Rolling 40’s Neighborhood Crips is a criminal street gang with about 850 memb ers. Gang members have particular symbols, clothing, and tattoos they us e to identify themselves. The primary activities of the gang include murder, shootings , robberies, assault, and drug sales. Officer Espinoza testified that gang memb ers need to put in “work” -- committing crimes for the gang -- to “keep their name or status elevated.” Officer Espinoza stated that Sallico’s store was in Rolling 40’s territory, and Sallico was the father of a Rolling 40’s gang member. Officer Espinoza knew appellant as an active Rolling 40’s gang member. He had had “ numerous contacts” with appellant and
had arrested him before. Officer Es pinoza also knew McClelland as a selfadmitted Rolling 40’s gang member who had gang tattoos a nd was known by his gang moniker of “4-Leaf.” Given a hypothetical fact pattern base d on the facts of this case, Officer Espinoza opined that the robbery was committe d for the benefit of a criminal street gang, the Rolling 40’s. He explained that gang members commit robberies to generate income and to ins till fear in the community. The fear deters victims from reporting the crimes to the pol ice. It also helps the ga ng recruit new members. On cross-examination, McClelland’s counsel elicited te stimony from Officer Espinoza that it was “unusu al” for a member of a gang to go out and rob the business of the father of a fellow gang me mber. Appellant’s counsel asked Officer Espinoza what the police policy was to determine when a person was no longer considered an “active” gang member. Offi cer Espinoza stated there was no written policy, but that it would include whethe r the gang member had a normal job and was living away from the gang’s territory. Counsel then elicited testimony that5 appellant was living with his mother in an area outside the Rolling 40’s gang territory. On redirect examination, over defens e objections, Officer Espinoza testified that gang members looked down on member s who attempt to leave the gang. These members could be disciplined, beaten up, or killed. When a gang member leaves the gang, his family may also be targeted.
DISCUSSION Appellant contends (1) the court erre d in admitting, over defense objection, testimony by the prosecution’s gang expert about the possible repercussions suffered by members attempting to leav e the gang, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement allegation, and (3) the court improperly imposed both a firearm personal use e nhancement and a gang enhancement.
A. Gang Expert Testimony Appellant contends the trial court abus ed its discretion in allowing Officer Espinoza to opine about the possible repe rcussions that a member attempting to leave a gang could suffer. He contends the testimony should have been excluded
under Evidence Code section 352 because it was irrelevant and speculative, as
there was no evidence that Sallico’s son was attempting to leave the Rolling 40’s gang. We disagree. Here, the gang expert’s testimony a bout the repercussions facing gang members who attempt to leav e was relevant to explain or rebut adverse testimony and inferences developed durin g cross-examination. (See People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 746 [redirect exam ination’s “‘principal purposes are to explain or rebut adverse testimony or inferences developed on crossexamination . . . .’”].) On cross-examin ation, McClelland’s attorney had elicited testimony from Officer Espinoza that it wa s unusual for gang members to target6 the business of the father of another ga ng member, suggesting that the robbery was not gang-related. Sallico had testified that he wanted his son to leave the gang, and had encouraged appellant to become a productive citizen. Officer Espinoza’s testimony on redirect tended to show that the robbery was intended to intimidate Sallico and to discourage him from advi sing gang members to leave the gang. Thus, the testimony was relevant to appe llant’s motive and intent in committing the robbery. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193.) In addition, while cross-examining the officer, appellant’s a ttorney had elicited testimony from which it could be inferred that appellant was no longer an active member of the Rolling 40’s gang, as he was no longer living in the gang’s territory at the time of the crime. Evidence tending to show the disi ncentives for leaving a gang was relevant to rebut this inference. In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the gang expert’s testim ony on redirect examination. In any event, any error was harm less beyond a reasonable doubt. Sallico positively identified appellant as the r obber. Even had the challenged testimony been excluded, the evidence, as discusse d below, was sufficient to establish that the robbery was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Thus, it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have occurred absent the alleged error. ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1195.)
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Appellant contends the evidence wa s insufficient to support the gang enhancement allegation. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a special allegation, this court examines “‘the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- from which a
reasonable trier of fact could have f ound the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable7 doubt’ [citation], ‘presum[ing] in support of the judgme nt the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably dedu ce from the evidence’ [citation].” ( People v.
Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 161.) E xpert testimony may be used to prove the elements of a gang enha ncement allegation. (See, e.g., People v.
Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 621; People v. Martinez (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1332-1333.) Here, the jury found true the allegati on that appellant committed the robbery for the benefit of a criminal street ga ng within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). “The section 186. 22(b)(1) enhancement re quires the jury to
find that the crime was committed for the bene fit of a criminal street gang and with the specific intent to promote the criminal street gang.” ( People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 849 ( Ramon ).) We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings that the cr ime was committed for the benefit of the Rolling 40’s gang, and that appellant had the specific intent to promote the gang
when he robbed Sallico. The crime wa s committed by acknowledged Rolling 40’s gang members in territory claimed by the ga ng. The crime victim told the police he had been robbed by Rolling 40’s gang me mbers. Officer Espinoza opined that the robbery increased the co mmunity’s fear of the Rolling 40’s gang, and that the gang would benefit from community members’ fear and reluctance to report crimes committed by gang members. As our S upreme Court has observed, “[e]xpert opinion that particular criminal c onduct benefited a ga ng by enhancing its reputation for viciousness can be sufficien t to raise the inference that the conduct was ‘committed for the benefit of . . . a[] criminal street gang’ within the meaning of section 186.22(b)(1).” ( People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 63; accord People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 619 [from expert testimony that assault was “‘classic’” gang activity that fright ened residents and secured gang’s drug-8 dealing stronghold in the area, jury coul d reasonably conclude charged offense was committed for benefit of gang and with speci fic intent of promoting its criminal
activities under section 186.22, subd. (b)(1)]; People v. Vazquez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 347, 351, 354 [reasonable ju ry could infer from expert testimony
that violent crimes incr eased respect for gang and intimidated neighborhood residents, and from other evidence in record that murder was committed with specific intent to promote gang’s criminal activities]; People v. Ferraez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 925, 930- 931 [jury coul d reasonably infer crime was gangrelated from expert testimony c oupled with other evidence].) Appellant’s reliance on Ramon is misplaced. In that case, the defendant was convicted of possession of a stolen vehicle and possession of an unregistered
firearm. When asked how these crimes would benefit a criminal street gang, a gang expert testified that tw o gang members being together in a stolen vehicle with an unregistered firearm benefitted their gang because they could commit crimes
that would be in furthe rance of the gang. ( Ramon , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 847-848.) The appe llate court found this evidence insufficient to establish that the defendants had the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by other gang members. ( Id . at p. 851.) Ramon is distinguishable from
the instant case because in Ramon , there was no evidence the crime victim knew her vehicle had been stolen by gang memb ers and thus no permissible inference that they had intended to intimidate her. ( Id . at pp. 846-847.) Here, Sallico knew he was being robbed by gang members; it was one of the first things he reported to the police, and he was sufficiently intimidat ed to move his family away from the gang’s territory. In short, there wa s sufficient evidence to support the gang
enhancements.9 C. Sentencing Error Appellant contends one of the two 10-year enhancements (the section 12022.53 personal use firear m enhancement and the 186.22 gang enhancement) must be stricken, as the imposition of two enhancements in the instant matter violates section 1170.1, subdivision (f), as interpreted by the California Supreme
Court in People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501 ( Rodriguez ). Specifically, appellant contends that section 1170.1, subdivision (f) prohibits the imposition of both enhancements, where the 10-year ga ng enhancement was imposed due to the personal use of a firearm during a crime. We conclude that both enhancements were properly imposed. Section 1170.1, subdivision (f) provides in pertinent part: “When two or more enhancements may be imposed for be ing armed with or using a dangerous or deadly weapon or a firearm in the commission of a single offense, only the greatest of those enhancements shall be imposed for that offense. . . .” Thus, in Rodriguez
, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be subjected to a gang
enhancement under section 186.22 and a firearm enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). ( Rodriguez
, supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 504.) Appellant, however, was subjected to a firearm personal use enhanc ement under section 12022.53. Subdivision (e)(2) of that s ection provides: “An enhancement for participation in a criminal street gang pursuant to Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 186.20) of Title 7 of Part 1 shall not be imposed on a person in addition to an enhancement imposed pursuant to this subdivision, unless the person personally used or personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the offense.” In People v. Brookfield (2009) 47 Cal.4th 583, the S upreme Court explained that under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(2), “[a] defendant who personally uses or discharges a firearm in the commission of a gang-related offense is subject to both10 the increased punishment provided for in section 186.22 and the increased punishment provided for in section 12022.53.” ( Id . at p. 590.) Because section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(2) is the more specific statute, it prevails over the conflicting language in secti on 1170.1, subdivision (f). ( People v. Robinson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 259-260.) Appellant personally used a firearm to commit the robbery when he showed Sallico a han dgun during the crime. Thus, appellant was properly subject to both the firear m enhancement and th e gang enhancement because he personally used a handgun to commit the gang-related crime. The court did not err in imposing the two enhancements.
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

MANELLA, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

WILLHITE, J.