[Cite as State v. Shutway , 2020-Ohio-5035.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

v. JOHN ANTHONY SHUTWAY Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2018-CA-39

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-77 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 23rd day of October, 2020.

. . . . . . . . . . . JANE A. NAPIER, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant Prosecuting A ttorney, Champaign County Prosecutor’s Office, 200 North Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee JOHN ANTHONY SHUTWAY, 3832 Township Road 165, West Liberty, Ohi o 43357 Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J.-2- {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, John Anthony Shutway, appeals pro se from his conviction in the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas after a jury found him guilty of one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer and one count of obstructing official business. For the reasons outlined bel ow, Shutway’s conviction

will be affirmed.

Facts and Course of Proceedings {¶ 2} On March 20, 2018, Officer Chad Duncan of the Tremont City Poli ce Department was on duty monitoring traffic with his radar gun on Valley Pike in Clark County, Ohio, when he observed a minivan traveling 36 miles per hour in a 25 miles per hour zone. Upon observing this speeding violation, Officer Dun can activated the siren and overhead lights on his marked patrol cruiser and pulled beh ind the minivan to initiate a traffic stop. The driver of the minivan, Shutway, refused to pull his vehicle over and continued to drive northbound on Valley Pike toward Champaign C ounty. As a result, Officer Duncan radioed dispatch and advised that he was pursuin g a vehicle that would not pull over and that the vehicle was headed toward Champaign County. {¶ 3} The Champaign County Dispatch Center was notified of the pursui t and called out the pursuit over the radio. In response, Champaign County Sheriff’s Deputies Zac Prickett and Brandon Fenwick joined Officer Duncan in pursu it of Shutway near the intersection of State Route 560 and U.S. Route 36 in Champaign County. Deputies Prickett and Fenwick eventually took the lead in the pursuit, w hich went on for 12 to 13 miles at speeds of 55 to 60 miles per hour. During the pursuit , Shutway drove in a dangerous and reckless manner, as he nearly collided with Deput y Prickett’s vehicle and-3- caused Prickett to swerve off the road. {¶ 4} The pursuit ended in a rural area on Church Road in Champaign C ounty. The officers managed to block the roadway and force Shutway to stop his vehicle. Despite being stopped, Shutway would not comply with the verbal orders and commands of the officers. The officers ordered Shutway multiple times t o exit his vehicle and he refused. Shutway also refused to roll down his window and unlo ck his door. In light of Shutway’s resistance and failure to comply with the officers’ c ommands, Deputy Fenwick broke the window out of the driver-side door of Shutway’s vehic le. {¶ 5} After Deputy Fenwick broke the window, Deputy Prickett reached inside Shutway’s vehicle in an attempt to unlock the door and unbuckle Shutway’s seatbelt. Shutway, however, still refused to comply and began to struggle with Deputy Prickett. Upon observing Deputy Prickett struggling with Shutway, Deputy Fenwick pulled out his taser and tased Shutway. Only then was Deputy Prickett able to unbuckle Shutway’s

seatbelt and remove him from the vehicle. Once removed from th e vehicle, the officers placed Shutway into custody. {¶ 6} Shutway was subsequently charged in the Champaign County Munici pal

Court for two counts of felonious assa ult, one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, and one count of obstructing offici al business. Approximately two weeks later, a Champaign County grand jury returned an indi ctment charging Shutway with one count of failure to comply with an order or si gnal of a police officer and one count of obstructing official business. Both of these coun ts included a specification for the forfeiture of Shutway’s minivan. The indicted charges and specifications pertained to the same conduct that Shutway was charged for in t he Champaign Municipal-4- Court. {¶ 7} Shortly after Shutway’s indictment, the State moved to dismiss the charges in municipal court. The municipal court granted the State’s mo tion and dismissed the case against Shutway subject to the jurisdiction of the Champai gn County Court of Common Pleas. With regard to the indicted charges, Shutway ple d not guilty and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. Before Shutway’s case was su bmitted to the jury, the State dismissed the two forfeiture specifications. After heari ng the testimony and evidence presented by the parties, the jury found Shutway guilt y of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer and obstructing official business. At sentencing, the trial court ordered Shutway to complete five years of community control sanctions. The trial court also suspended Shutway’s driver’s license for 13 ye ars and ordered Shutway to pay a fine of $2,750 and court costs. {¶ 8} Shutway now appeals from his conviction, raising four assignmen ts of error for review. Before we address Shutway’s assigned errors, we no te that in proceeding with his appeal, Shutway filed a reply brief with three exhibit s attached thereto. The exhibits include a traffic ticket issued to Shutway on March 20 , 2018; an audio recording containing various radio communications between an unidentified police officer and a dispatcher; and a copy of an e-mail correspondence between the Tremont City police chief and the 9-1-1 coordinator of the Clark County Sheriff’s O ffice. The State filed a motion to strike these exhibits because they were not part of t he record on appeal. {¶ 9} Upon review, the State’s motion to strike is granted. “[I]n re viewing the trial court’s judgment, we are limited to the record before the trial court.” Williams v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28524, 2020-Ohio-397, ¶ 16, citing Kahler-5- v. Eytcheson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23523, 2012-Ohio-208, ¶ 23. “ ‘An ex hibit merely appended to an appellate brief is not part of the record , and we may not consider it in determining the appeal.’ ” Id ., quoting State v. Grant, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 12AP650 and 12AP-651, 2013-Ohio-2981, ¶ 12. Accord State v. Wilson , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-2, 2020-Ohio-2962, ¶ 29. Therefore, for purposes of de termining the merits of this appeal, we will not consider the new documents that Shutwa y attached to his reply

brief.

First Assignment of Error {¶ 10} Under his first assignment of error, Shutway contends that the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer and obstructing official business was invalid because the verdict f orm signed by the jurors did not include a finding that Champaign County was the correct ven ue. We disagree. {¶ 11} As a preliminary matter, we note that during his trial, Shutway did not object to the verdict forms on the basis that they failed to include a finding as to venue. As a result, Shutway has waived all but plain error with regard to t hat issue. See State v. Ropp , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2018-CA-44, 2020-Ohio-824, ¶ 47; State v. Shedwick , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-709, 2012-Ohio-2270, ¶ 43. To pre vail under the plain error standard, Shutway “must demonstrate both that there was a n obvious error in the proceedings and that but for the error, the outcome of [his] tr ial clearly would have been

otherwise.” State v. Satterfield , 2017-Ohio-5616, 94 N.E.3d 171, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Noling , 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 61-62. {¶ 12} We find no obvious error with regard to the jury verdict form s at issue.-6- “ ‘[W]hen a court submits a verdict form containing a statutory description of the offense, it commits reversible error if the description omits essential elements of that offense .’ ” (Emphasis added.) State v. Harwell , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25852, 2015-Ohio-2966, ¶ 59, quoting State v. Lampkin , 116 Ohio App.3d 771, 774, 689 N.E.2d 106 (6th Dist.1996). While venue is a fact that must be proven at trial , it “is not a material element of any offense charged.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Draggo , 65 Ohio St.2d 88, 90, 418 N.E.2d 1343 (1981). Accord State v. Richardson , 2016-Ohio-8081, 75 N.E.3d 831, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.); State v. Weber , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25508, 2013-Ohio-3172, ¶ 32 (venue is not a material element of a charged offense). Rather, “[t]h e elements of the offense charged and the venue of the matter are separate and distinct.” (Citations omitted.) Draggo at 90. {¶ 13} Even if jury verdict forms were required to mention the jury’s finding as to venue, we would still not find an obvious error in the verdict forms at issue. The language used in the verdict forms sufficiently established tha t the jury found Shutway’s offenses were committed in Champaign County, Ohio. Specificall y, the first verdict form contains the heading “Count One” followed by the proper statuto ry definition for the offense of failure to comply with an order or signal of a polic e officer. The second verdict form contains the heading “Count Two” followed by the proper st atutory definition for the offense of obstructing official business. While charging the j ury, the trial court explained each of these counts in relation to the corresponding verdict f orms by stating the following:

Count One. The Defendant is charged with Failure to Comply with an Order or Signal of a Police Officer. Before you can find th e Defendant guilty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or abou t the 20th-7- day of March, 2018, in Champaign County, Ohio , the Defendant operated a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or fell a police offic er after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring his motor vehicle to a stop.

* * *

Count Two . The Defendant is charged with Obstructing Official Business. Before you can find the Defendant guilty, you must f ind beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 20th day of March, 2018 , and in Champaign County, Ohio , the Defendant, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a pub lic official of any authorized act within his official capacity, did an act that hampered or impeded the public official in the performance of his lawful duties.

* * * You’ll open the Verdict Form Folder and within the verdict form s there are two sheets of paper. One sheet of paper is for Count One. One sheet of paper is for Count Two. Each document has the same case caption at the top. Meaning, * * * one is labeled Count One and the other is labeled

Count Two. (Emphasis added.) Trial Tr. Vol. II, p. 487, 490, and 493. {¶ 14} When reading the foregoing jury instructions along with the lan guage found in the verdict forms, it is clear that by indicating Shutway wa s guilty on the verdict forms the jury had found that Shutway committed the offenses at issue in Champaign County,

Ohio. See Shedwick , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-709, 2012-Ohio-2270, at ¶ 43-44-8- (finding no plain error with respect to venue in a jury verdict form where the language in the verdict form specified that the jury found appellant guilty of each count as it was charged in the indictment and where the jury instructions provi ded that in order to find the appellant guilty of the charged offenses the jurors must find b eyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed in Franklin County, Ohio). Th erefore, Shutway’s claim that the jury verdict forms did not provide the jury’s finding as to venue lacks merit. {¶ 15} Shutway’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Second Assignment of Error {¶ 16} Under his second assignment of error, Shutway contends that the trial court erred by permitting the State to present the failure to comply and obstructing official business charges to a grand jury before a preliminary hearing w as completed for the charges in the Champaign County Municipal Court. According to Shutway, holding a grand jury proceeding before the conclusion of the preliminary hearing in municipal court violated Crim.R. 5(B)(8) and rendered the common pleas court wi thout jurisdiction over the matter. We disagree. {¶ 17} Shutway’s preliminary hearing for the municipal court charges w as scheduled to take place on March 22, 2018. The preliminary hea ring was then continued to March 29, 2018, at Shutway’s request. The day of the prelim inary hearing, Shutway appeared and moved to disqualify the municipal court judge pres iding over the matter. In response to this request, the judge explained what would hap pen if he disqualified himself and stated the following: COURT: Ok. So I would have to call the Supreme Court, and they-9- would appoint somebody to come down here and do that.* * * When they appoint one, then you would have a preliminary hearing if you can still have a preliminary hearing on that matter. In between now and then, you could go to the grand jury, and then you wouldn’t even be in this court. Do you

understand all that? SHUTWAY: Yes, Your Honor. COURT: Is that what you want me to do? SHUTWAY: Your Honor, Yes. Hearing Tr. (Mar. 29, 2018), p. 6. {¶ 18} Four days later, a Champaign County grand jury indicted Shutway for the offenses at issue. The case pending against Shutway in municip al court was then dismissed. The matter then proceeded to an arraignment hearing in the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas. During that hearing, Shutway arg ued that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the matter due to the prel iminary hearing not having been completed in municipal court. The common pleas court judg e disagreed and

stated as follows: I believe [the municipal court case] was dismissed prior to a preliminary hearing. And as you may know, in Ohio you can go w ith a direct indictment with a Grand Jury indictment. Which I believ e is what happened in this case. * * * Correct. [The preliminary hearing] was continued. * * * I am just going to say that the recollection of what shows on t he-10- municipal court website is that you were before Judge Weithman on the 29th of March. And that was set for a preliminary hearing. An d at that time, you asked Judge Weithman to recuse himself, which he did. And, therefore, the preliminary hearing was continued. But prior to that preliminary hearing taking place this indictment was returned a nd, therefore, the municipal court proceedings were moot. Hearing Tr. (May 10, 2018), p. 5-6. {¶ 19} The aforementioned statement by the common pleas court was corr ect. Crim.R. 5(B)(1) specifically provides that: “The preliminary he aring shall not be held, * * * if the defendant is indicted.” In addition, the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that “once an indictment has been returned by the grand jury a preli minary hearing before a magistrate is no longer necessary.” State v. Minamyer, 12 Ohio St.2d 67, 232 N.E.2d 401 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Accord State v. Garland , 2d Dist. Darke No. 933, 1976 WL 190412, *1 (Jan. 20, 1976) (“if indicted, a prelim inary hearing is no longer necessary”); State v. Kinney , 4th Dist. Ross No. 96CA2176, 1996 WL 571394, *2 (Oct. 3, 1996) (“there is no constitutional right to a preliminary heari ng once an indictment has been returned against a defendant since a probable cause determ ination has already been made by the grand jury”); State v. Jackson , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 62671, 62672, 1993 WL 462879, *6 (Nov. 10, 1993) (the return of a grand jury indictment extinguishes any right to a preliminary hearing). “[N]o rights or defenses are lost for failure to hold a preliminary hearing.” State v. Leach , 9th Dist. Summit No. 22369, 2005-Ohio-2569, ¶ 30, citing White v. Maxwell , 174 Ohio St. 186, 188, 187 N.E.2d 878 (1963). (Other citatio ns omitted.) Therefore, Shutway incorrectly claims that a prelimi nary hearing on the-11- municipal court charges was required before he could be indicte d in the common pleas

court. {¶ 20} We also note that Shutway’s claim that the trial court violated Crim.R. 5(B)(8) lacks merit. Crim . R. 5(B)(8) provides that: A municipal or county court retains jurisdiction on a felony ca se following the preliminary hearing, or a waiver thereof , until such time as a record of the appearance, docket entries, and other matters req uired for

transmittal are filed with the clerk of the court in which the defendant is to

appear. (Emphasis added.) By its terms, Crim.R. 5(B)(8) concerns the r etention of a municipal court’s jurisdiction after a preliminary hearing has been held or after the waiver of a preliminary hearing. Since Shutway was indicted prior to a preliminary hearing being held or waived in municipal court, Crim.R. 5(B)(8) was inapplic able and does not support Shutway’s assignment of error. {¶ 21} Although it does not pertain to his assigned error, Shutway als o argues that the trial court imposed excessive bail in violation of his cons titutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The record indicates that th e trial court initially imposed a $25,000 bail bond following Shutway’s indictment. Fi ve days later, the trial court modified Shutway’s bond to a personal recognizance bond. Shutway claims that the personal recognizance bond imposed by the trial court was e xcessive because he had previously bonded himself out of jail after the municipal c ourt imposed a $15,000 bond for the same offenses. As a result, Shutway claims that h e was improperly subjected to a second bond.-12- {¶ 22} Shutway provides no case law supporting his excessive bail clai m. Furthermore, “[t]he proper remedy for excessive bail is habeas corpus, not [an] appeal

from the defendant’s conviction.” State v. Smith , 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2019- 0005, 2019-Ohio-4645, ¶ 27. See also Chari v. Vore , 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 325, 744 N.E.2d 763 (2001) (“Habeas corpus is the proper remedy to raise the claim of excessive bail in pretrial-release cases.”); In re DeFronzo , 49 Ohio St.2d 271, 273, 361 N.E.2d 448 (1977) (“It is well established that habeas corpus is the prope r remedy to raise the claim of excessive bail.”); State v. Foster , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-523, 2008-Ohio-3525, ¶ 5 (“Customarily, challenges to excessive bond are reviewed un der an abuse of discretion standard by means of an original action in habeas co rpus.”). This court has held that “[a]fter conviction, any error concerning pretrial ba il is moot, and this issue may not be raised on direct appeal from a conviction.” State v. Knisley , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22897, 2010-Ohio-116, ¶ 25, citing State v. Towns , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88059, 2007-Ohio-529, ¶ 20. Therefore, Shutway’s excessive bail claim is moot and was not properly raised in this appeal. {¶ 23} In addition to excessive bail, Shutway further argues that he w as prejudiced by his alleged inability to challe nge the array of grand jurors due to his counsel’s absence at the grand jury proceedings. Shutway claims that the State h ad a duty to notify his counsel that the matter was being brought to the grand jury. {¶ 24} Shutway once again provides no authority to support his claim. It has been held that there is no obligation on the part of government coun sel to notify the defendant’s counsel that the defendant was subpoenaed before the grand jury

. United States v.

Levinson , 405 F.2d 971, 980 (6th Cir.1968). Furthermore, “the Sixth Am endment right-13- to counsel does not attach when an individual is summoned to ap pear before a grand jury, even if he is the subject of the investigation.” United States v. Williams , 504 U.S. 36, 49, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992), citing United States v. Mandujano , 425 U.S. 564, 581, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976). Accord United States v. Taylor , S.D.Ohio No. 2:12-CR-218, 2013 WL 3270381, *1 (June 26, 2013), quoting Mandujano at 581 (“Since the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not at tach until an indictment, * * * a Grand Jury witness “ ‘cannot insist, as a matter of Con stitutional right, on being represented by his counsel.’ ”); State ex rel. Ramos v. White , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 96CA006511, 1997 WL 72091, *2 (Feb. 7, 1997) (“there is no righ t to counsel at a grand jury proceeding”). Moreover, pursuant to Crim.R. 6(B)(2), Shut way could have filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on objections to the arr ay of grand jurors, but he failed to do so. Therefore, Shutway’s claim that he was unable to challenge the array of grand jurors lacks merit. {¶ 25} Finally, Shutway also raised a claim of selective prosecution. Specifically, Shutway claims that the State engaged in selective prosecution because it did not prosecute him for the underlying speeding charge that arose in Clark County. We fail to see how this amounts to selective prosecution. A selective-pro secution claim is an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought a charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution, such as race, religion, or another arbitrary classification. See State v. Getsy , 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 203, 702 N.E.2d 866 (1998), citing United States v. Armstrong , 517 U.S. 456, 463, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996); Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski , 85 Ohio St.3d 524, 531, 709 N.E.2d 1148 (1999). The fact that the State chose not to prosecute an offense that occurred in another jurisdiction does not amount to selective-14- prosecution or any other error that Shutway may be claiming in this appeal. {¶ 26} For all the foregoing reasons, Shutway’s second assignment of e rror is

overruled.

Third Assignment of Error {¶ 27} Under his third assignment of error, Shutway contends that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by withholding certain disco very in violation of Crim.R. 16(A). Specifically, Shutway claims that the State wit hheld a Use of Force Report prepared by law enforcement and an audio recording from the Clark County 9-1- 1 Dispatch Center. According to Shutway, these items contained exculpatory evidence and could have been used to impeach two of the State’s witnesse s. Shutway’s claim fails for multiple reasons. {¶ 28} “The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecuto r’s conduct was improper and, if so, whether that conduct prejudicially aff ected substantial rights of

the accused.” State v. St. John , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27988, 2019-Ohio-650, ¶ 109, citing State v. Martin , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22744, 2009-Ohio-5303, ¶ 15. Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct related to violations o f Crim.R. 16 “result in reversible error only when there is a showing that (1) the pros ecution’s failure to disclose was willful, (2) disclosure of the information prior to trial w ould have aided the accused’s defense, and (3) the accused suffered prejudice.” State v. Jackson , 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981, 836 N.E.2d 1173, ¶ 131, citing State v. Parson , 6 Ohio St.3d 442, 445, 453 N.E.2d 689 (1983); State v. Joseph , 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 458, 653 N.E.2d 285 (1995). {¶ 29} With regard to the Use of Force Report, the record indicates th at on July 26,-15- 2018, Shutway issued a subpoena to the Champaign County Sheriff ’s Office for purposes of obtaining the Use of Force Report and other items that were not included in the State’s discovery packet. Trial Tr. Vol. II, p. 367. Shutway claimed that an officer from the sheriff’s office advised him that there was no Use of Force Rep ort and that the officer directed him to Tremont City. Id. at 374. Shutway indicated that he was thereafter able to obtain a Use of Force Report from the Tremont City Police De partment. Id

. {¶ 30} At trial, the prosecutor for the State explained that when he l earned of Shutway’s subpoena, he went to the sheriff’s office to express his concern that Shutway had improperly used a subpoena to request public records. Id. at 349. The prosecutor claimed that in the interest of fairness, he instructed the she riff’s office to provide him with the requested documentation so that he could deliver it to Shut way. Id . The record indicates that on July 30, 2018, the day before trial, the pros ecutor obtained two Use of Force Reports prepared by Deputy Prickett and Deputy Fenwick as well as a Taser Use Report. See State’s Exhibit No. 7. The record indicates that the prosecuto r then emailed this documentation to Shutway the same day it was receiv ed. Id . The prosecutor advised the trial court that he had no knowledge of the Use of Force Report that Shutway allegedly obtained from Tremont City. Trial Trans Vol. II, p. 376. {¶ 31} Shutway admitted on the record, as well as in his brief, that h e received the Champaign County Use of Force Reports from the prosecutor the d ay before his trial.

Id. at 378-379. He also clarified on the record that he was able to obtain the Tremont City Use of Force Report prior to trial. Although it is unclea r from Shutway’s brief which Use of Force Report he is referring to, even if we were to assu me that the prosecutor willfully withheld all the Use of Force Reports discussed herei n, Shutway cannot establish-16- that the reports would have aided his defense or that he was pr ejudiced by the delay in receiving the reports. This is because the trial court held, a nd we agree, that the information contained in the reports was irrelevant since Shutw ay’s actions constituting the offenses of failure to comply and obstructing official busi ness were already completed by the time the officers had to use force against him. Id. at 371-373, 378-379. Furthermore, because Shutway received the Use of Force Reports prior to trial, he could

have moved for a trial continuance based on the late disclosure . Had he done so, any prejudice that Shutway believes he sustained from the delay in receiving the documents

could have been cured. See State v. Williams , 9th Dist. Summit No. 23176, 2007-Ohio622, ¶ 19. {¶ 32} We next turn to the audio recording from the Clark County 9-1-1 Dispatch Center. Shutway claims that the State provided him with dispat ch audio recordings from Champaign County’s 9-1-1 dispatch center, but never provided hi m with dispatch audio recordings from Clark County’s 9-1-1 dispatch center. The Stat e maintains that it never received the Clark County audio recordings, and thus was unable to provide them to Shutway. Shutway asserts that the Clark County audio recording s were exculpatory in that they established that Officer Duncan: (1) was in Champaign County when he first made radio contact with the dispatcher; (2) never requested ass istance from the Champaign County Sheriff’s Office; and (3) never stated to the dispatcher that a Champaign County Sheriff’s vehicle was forced off the road or t hat a Champaign County

officer was outside his vehicle. Even if we assume that the fo regoing information was provided in the Clark County audio recordings (as they are not part of the record on appeal), we fail to see how any of this information was exculpa tory or how it might have-17- changed the outcome of Shutway’s trial. {¶ 33} More importantly, the record establishes that Shutway obtained the Clark County audio recordings prior to his trial. Specifically, the record establishes that Shutway subpoenaed the Clark County audio recordings from the T remont City Police Department, and that the department’s police chief, Greg Nelson , delivered the requested audio recordings to Shutway the day before his trial. See Notice of Affidavit in Support of State’s Opposition to Defendant’s Request for New Trial: Aff idavit of Greg Nelson (Oct. 12, 2018). In his affidavit, Chief Nelson specifically averred that he obtained the audio recordings from the Clark County Sheriff’s Office and delivered the recordings to Shutway on July 30, 2018. Id . Because Shutway had the opportunity to review the Clark Coun ty audio recordings prior to trial, he could have used the informa tion on the recordings to formulate his defense strategy, or, at the very least, he could have requested a trial continuance. Therefore, we do not find that Shutway was prejud iced by the State’s failure to provide him with the Clark County audio recordings. {¶ 34} Shutway’s third assignment of error is overruled.

Fourth Assignment of Error {¶ 35} Under his fourth assignment of error, Shutway contends that his indictment was void and did not confer jurisdiction on the trial court bec ause it was not signed by the grand-jury foreperson. We disagree. {¶ 36} Crim.R. 6(C) outlines the duties of a grand-jury foreperson, an d it requires the foreperson to “sign all indictments.” R.C. 2939.20 also re quires the grand-jury foreperson to sign the indictment, as well as indorse the indic tment with the words “A true-18- bill.” This court has stated that “ ‘[a] multiple-count indict ment containing the words “a true bill” and signed by the foreperson of the grand jury is su fficient when the entire indictment is provided to the defendant, notwithstanding that e ach count of the indictment is not separately signed by the foreperson.’ ” State v. Bray, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2010-CA14, 2011-Ohio-4660, ¶ 54, quoting State v. Ballow , 9th Dist. Medina No. 2527-M, 1996 WL 365020, *3 (July 3, 1996). This court has also found that “ [t]here is no requirement in the Criminal Rules or the Revised Code that the grand jury f oreperson sign every page and/or count in a multiple count indictment.” Id

. {¶ 37} In this case, the record establishes that the indictment in que stion was comprised of three pages. The first two pages included a descr iption of the two indicted charges and specifications followed by the prosecutor’s signatu re. The third page of the indictment was the “Summary of Indictment” that included the gr and-jury foreperson’s signature under the he ading “A True Bill.” {¶ 38} The “Summary of Indictment” included the following statement be neath the grand-jury foreperson’s signatur e: “This Bill of Indictment fou nd upon testimony Sworn and sent before the Grand Jury at the Request of the Prosecutin g Attorney.” This statement indicated that the document to which the foreperson’s signature was affixed was part of the indictment. Because the “Summary of Indictment ” was part of Shutway’s indictment, and because it contained the grand-jury foreperson’ s signature with the words “A True Bill” indorsed on it, the indictment was compliant with Crim.R. 6(C) and R.C. 2939.20. Therefore, contrary to Shutway’s claim otherwise, the indictment was not

defective and does not warrant the reversal of his conviction. {¶ 39} Shutway’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.-19-

Conclusion {¶ 40} Having overruled all four assignments of error raised by Shutwa y, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

FROELICH, J. and HALL, J., concur.

Copies sent to: Jane A. Napier John Anthony Shutway Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio