UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ PAMELA McKENNA, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. COMMISSIONER, SSA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 18-6063 (D.C. No. 5:17- CV-00157-M) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , McKAY , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Pamela McKenna appeals from the district court’s order denying her application for social security disability insurance benefits a nd supplemental security income benefits. Exercising juri sdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 129 1 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we affirm. Ms. McKenna worked as a senior programmer analyst until June 3, 2011, when she was laid off. At the time of the hearing befo re an administrative law judge ( ALJ)

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously to honor the parties ’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir . R. 34.1(G). The case is ther efore submitted without oral argument. T his order and judgment is no t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, an d collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 23, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 she was 55 years old. She claime d she became disabled on the d ate she was laid off because of various phy sical impairments and depressive disorder . The sole testimony at the ALJ hearing was by Ms. Mc Kenna and a vocational expert ( VE). On June 4, 2015, the ALJ determined that Ms . McKenna had the residual func tional capacity (RFC) to perform light work lim ited by, among other things, an ability to stand and/or walk for only a total of two hours during an eight-hour workday, the need for an assistive walking device, and the need to alternate sitting and standing at the workstation. At step four of th e controlling five-step sequent ial evaluation process,
see Wall v. Astrue , 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir . 2009) (explaining the five-ste p framework for determining disab ility), the ALJ concluded that M s. McKenna could perform her past work as a senior programmer analyst and she th erefore was not disabled under the Social Secur ity Act. The Appeals Council de nied review, and the district court affirmed. Because we review de novo the dist rict court’s rulings in a soc ial security case, “we independently determine wheth er the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and supported by substa ntial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation ma rks omitted). “[W]e neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for th at of the agency.”
Bowman v. Astrue , 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir . 2008) (internal quotation mark s omitted). Ms. McKenna challenges the ALJ’s determination of her ability t o sit or stand while working. Although she acknow ledges that “[t]he ALJ’s RFC allowed for the option to alternate sitting and st anding positions at the works tation,” Aplt. Br. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitte d), she argues that the ALJ fai led to specify the frequency of the need to sit or s tand, so a remand to the ALJ i s necessary for clarification. She relies on SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7, which states that “[t]he RFC assessment must be specific as to the frequency of t he individual’s need to alternate sitting and standi ng.” But the Ruling applies onl y to people with sedentary, unskilled occupations. See id. **4-5 (explaining that the Ruling’s purpose is to provide guidelines for evaluating whether a claimant can perform “sedentary unskilled occupations”); see also id. at *7 (observing that the need to alternate sitting and standing may erode “the occ upational base for a full range of unskilled sedentary work”). Ms. McKenna’s past wo rk, however, was skilled work. Moreover, at step four it is Ms. M cKenna’s burden to establish that she is unable to perform her job as a s enior programmer analyst both a s she actually performed that work in the past a nd as it is generally performe d in the national
economy. See O’Dell v. Shalala , 44 F.3d 855, 859-60 ( 10th Cir. 1994). The VE testified that because the essen tial function of Ms. McKenna’s past work is cognitive, it allows for flexibility in phys ical positioning. And Ms. McK enna does not claim that her past work does not allo w her to alternate sitting and standing as needed. Thus, the ALJ was not required to be more specific concerning M s. McKenna’s sit-stand requirements.4 We affirm the district court’s judgment.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge