28648 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 101 / Thursday, May 24, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

inability to put out a fire in an engine or in

the APU, accomplish the following:

Inspection

(a) Within 100 flight hours after the

effective date of this AD: Perform a one-time

general visual inspection to detect incorrect

wiring of electrical connectors to the pressure

switches and cartridges on the fire

extinguisher bottles for the engines and the

APU, in accordance with paragraph 3.D. of

the Accomplishment Instructions of

EMBRAER Service Bulletin 145–26–0009,

dated January 26, 2001.

Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a

general visual inspection is defined as: ‘‘A

visual examination of an interior or exterior

area, installation, or assembly to detect

obvious damage, failure, or irregularity. This

level of inspection is made under normally

available lighting conditions such as

daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or droplight, and may require removal or opening of

access panels or doors. Stands, ladders, or

platforms may be required to gain proximity

to the area being checked.’’

(1) If the wiring connections are correct:

Prior to further flight, adjust the length of the

harnesses to the fire extinguisher bottles, in

accordance with the service bulletin.

(2) If the wiring connections are incorrect:

Prior to further flight, re-connect them and

adjust the length of the harnesses to the fire

extinguisher bottles, in accordance with the

service bulletin.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(b) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA.

Operators shall submit their requests through

an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Atlanta ACO.

Note 3: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Atlanta ACO.

Special Flight Permits

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with §§ 21.197 and 21.199 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197

and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a

location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Incorporation by Reference

(d) The inspection, reconnection, and

adjustment shall be done in accordance with

EMBRAER Service Bulletin 145–26–0009,

dated January 26, 2001. This incorporation

by reference was approved by the Director of

the Federal Register in accordance with 5

U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may

be obtained from Empresa Brasileira de

Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER), P.O. Box

343—CEP 12.225, Sao Jose dos Campos—SP,

Brazil. Copies may be inspected at the FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the

FAA, Atlanta ACO, One Crown Center, 1895

Phoenix Boulevard, suite 450, Atlanta,

Georgia; or at the Office of the Federal

Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite

700, Washington, DC.

Note 4: The subject of this AD is addressed

in Brazilian airworthiness directive 2001–04–

01, dated April 23, 2001.

Effective Date

(e) This amendment becomes effective on

June 8, 2001.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 17,

2001.

Vi L. Lipski,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 01–12986 Filed 5–23–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2001–NM–81–AD; Amendment

39–12240; AD 2001–10–14]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing

Model 737, 747, 757, 767, and 777

Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for

comments.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD) that is

applicable to certain Boeing Model 737,

747, 757, 767, and 777 series airplanes.

This action requires repetitive

inspections of any chemical oxygen

generators and/or passenger, attendant,

or lavatory service unit assemblies of

the passenger oxygen system that have

been replaced, to verify correct

installation of the release pin in the

generator firing mechanism of the

oxygen generator; and corrective action,

if necessary. This action is necessary to

find and fix incorrect installation of the

release pin in the generator firing

mechanism, which could result in the

unavailability of supplemental oxygen

and possible incapacitation of

passengers and cabin crew during an inflight decompression. This action is

intended to address the identified

unsafe condition.

DATES: Effective June 8, 2001.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of June 8,

2001.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules

Docket must be received on or before

July 23, 2001.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2001–NM–

81–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays. Comments may be

submitted via fax to (425) 227–1232.

Comments may also be sent via the

Internet using the following address: 9-

anm-iarcomment@faa.gov. Comments

sent via fax or the Internet must contain

‘‘Docket No. 2001–NM–81–AD’’ in the

subject line and need not be submitted

in triplicate. Comments sent via the

Internet as attached electronic files must

be formatted in Microsoft Word 97 for

Windows or ASCII text.

The service information referenced in

this AD may be obtained from Boeing

Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box

3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207.

This information may be examined at

the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington; or at the Office of

the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Susan Letcher, Aerospace Engineer,

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–

130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification

Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington 98055–4056; telephone

(425) 227–2670; fax (425) 227–1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA

has received reports indicating the

incorrect installation of the release pin

in the generator firing mechanism of the

chemical oxygen generator of the

passenger, attendant, and lavatory

service unit assemblies. One report on a

Model 757 series airplane revealed that

11 oxygen generators failed to activate

following a decompression event, due to

incorrect installation of the release pins

in the generator firing mechanism.

Investigation of certain other Model 757

series airplanes revealed additional

generators with incorrectly installed

release pins. Another report on a Model

737 series airplane revealed incorrectly

installed release pins on half the

generators on that airplane. The

incorrect installation is attributed to

inadequate operator maintenance. Such

incorrect installation can prevent

activation of the chemical oxygen

generator, which releases the flow of

supplemental oxygen through the

oxygen masks, and could result in

incapacitation of passengers and cabin

crew during an in-flight decompression.

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 101 / Thursday, May 24, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 28649

Model 737 and 757 series airplanes

are equipped with chemical oxygen

generators that have an in-line firing

mechanism. This type of firing

mechanism is also found on Model 747,

767, and 777 series airplanes equipped

with chemical oxygen generators. The

in-line firing mechanism contains a

safety pin and a release pin, and a

generator with this type of firing

mechanism will only activate if both

pins are removed. The safety pin is

installed in the generator for shipment

and is removed when the generator is

installed on the airplane. The release

pin is attached by lanyards to oxygen

masks located in the passenger service

unit, and flight attendant and lavatory

oxygen boxes. If the passenger

supplemental oxygen system is

deployed in flight, the action of an

individual donning the oxygen mask

will cause the release pin to pull out of

the generator firing mechanism. Such

action will activate the oxygen generator

and subsequently release the oxygen

flow.

Explanation of Relevant Service

Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved

the following Boeing Special Attention

Service Bulletins:

Service bulletin Date Model

737–35–1076 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 737

737–35–1077 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 737

747–35–2111 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 747

757–35–0021 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 757

757–35–0022 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 757

767–35–0043 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 767

767–35–0044 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 767

777–35–0008 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 777

These service bulletins describe

procedures for a detailed visual

inspection of any chemical oxygen

generators, and passenger, attendant, or

lavatory service unit assemblies of the

passenger oxygen system that have been

replaced, to verify correct installation of

the release pin in the generator firing

mechanism; and corrective action, if

necessary. The corrective action

includes relocation of any release pin

incorrectly installed in the safety pin

hole to the release pin hole.

Accomplishment of the action specified

in the service bulletins is intended to

adequately address the identified unsafe

condition.

Explanation of the Requirements of the

Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop on other airplanes of the same

type design, this AD is being issued to

find and fix incorrect installation of the

release pin in the generator firing

mechanism of the oxygen generator,

which could result in the unavailability

of supplemental oxygen and possible

incapacitation of passengers and cabin

crew during an in-flight decompression.

This AD requires accomplishment of the

actions specified in the service bulletins

described previously, except as

discussed below.

Difference Between This AD and the

Service Bulletins

The service bulletins specify a onetime inspection of any chemical oxygen

generators and passenger, attendant, or

lavatory service unit assemblies of the

passenger oxygen system that have been

replaced, to verify correct installation of

the release pin in the generator firing

mechanism; and corrective action, if

necessary; which would eliminate the

need for any further action. However,

this AD requires repetitive inspections

and corrective action following the

replacement of any existing generators

done after the initial inspection and

corrective action required by this AD.

The FAA has determined that these

additional inspections and corrective

action are necessary because expended

or expiring chemical oxygen generators

are routinely removed and replaced by

operators. The manufacturer provides

instructions for the removal and

replacement of the oxygen generators in

the applicable airplane maintenance

manuals, and per these procedures, the

safety pin is removed AFTER the release

pin is installed. But the reports of

erroneous release pin installation have

been attributed to inadequate operator

maintenance practices, and certain

contributing factors include incorrect or

misleading diagrams in certain

maintenance manuals and the

installation of rings/pins in the

generator release pin hole as a means of

preventing activation during shipment.

Determination of Rule’s Effective Date

Since a situation exists that requires

the immediate adoption of this

regulation, it is found that notice and

opportunity for prior public comment

hereon are impracticable, and that good

cause exists for making this amendment

effective in less than 30 days.

Comments Invited

Although this action is in the form of

a final rule that involves requirements

affecting flight safety and, thus, was not

preceded by notice and an opportunity

for public comment, comments are

invited on this rule. Interested persons

are invited to comment on this rule by

submitting such written data, views, or

arguments as they may desire.

Communications shall identify the

Rules Docket number and be submitted

in triplicate to the address specified

under the caption ADDRESSES. All

communications received on or before

the closing date for comments will be

considered, and this rule may be

amended in light of the comments

received. Factual information that

supports the commenter’s ideas and

suggestions is extremely helpful in

evaluating the effectiveness of the AD

action and determining whether

additional rulemaking action would be

needed.

Submit comments using the following

format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue.

For example, discuss a request to

change the compliance time and a

request to change the service bulletin

reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific

change to the AD is being requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or

data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the rule that might suggest a need to

modify the rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report that

summarizes each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this AD

will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this rule must

submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 2001–NM–81–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will

not have a substantial direct effect on

the States, on the relationship between

the national Government and the States,

or on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, it is

determined that this final rule does not

have federalism implications under

Executive Order 13132.

The FAA has determined that this

regulation is an emergency regulation

that must be issued immediately to

correct an unsafe condition in aircraft,

and that it is not a ‘‘significant

regulatory action’’ under Executive

Order 12866. It has been determined

further that this action involves an

emergency regulation under DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

28650 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 101 / Thursday, May 24, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is

determined that this emergency

regulation otherwise would be

significant under DOT Regulatory

Policies and Procedures, a final

regulatory evaluation will be prepared

and placed in the Rules Docket. A copy

of it, if filed, may be obtained from the

Rules Docket at the location provided

under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Incorporation by reference,

Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration amends part 39 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

2001–10–14 Boeing: Amendment 39–12240.

Docket 2001–NM–81–AD.

Applicability: Model 737, 747, 757, 767,

and 777 series airplanes equipped with

chemical oxygen generators, certificated in

any category; as listed in the following

Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins,

as applicable:

TABLE 1.—SERVICE BULLETINS

Service bulletin Date Model

737–35–1076 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 737

737–35–1077 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 737

747–35–2111 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 747

757–35–0021 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 757

757–35–0022 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 757

767–35–0043 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 767

767–35–0044 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 767

777–35–0008 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 777

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To find and fix incorrect installation of the

release pin in the generator firing mechanism

of the chemical oxygen generator, which

could result in the unavailability of

supplemental oxygen and possible

incapacitation of passengers and cabin crew

during an in-flight decompression;

accomplish the following:

Detailed Visual Inspections

Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a

detailed visual inspection is defined as: ‘‘An

intensive visual examination of a specific

structural area, system, installation, or

assembly to detect damage, failure, or

irregularity. Available lighting is normally

supplemented with a direct source of good

lighting at intensity deemed appropriate by

the inspector. Inspection aids such as mirror,

magnifying lenses, etc., may be used. Surface

cleaning and elaborate access procedures

may be required.’’

(a) For airplanes having any chemical

oxygen generator and/or passenger,

attendant, or lavatory service unit assembly

that contains a chemical oxygen generator

that has been replaced: Within 90 days after

the effective date of this AD, do a detailed

visual inspection of the chemical oxygen

generator of the applicable assembly to verify

correct installation of the release pin in the

generator firing mechanism per the

Accomplishment Instructions of the

applicable service bulletin listed in Table 2.,

below. Before further flight, after replacement

of any chemical oxygen generator and/or

passenger, attendant, or lavatory service unit

assembly that contains a chemical oxygen

generator, repeat the detailed visual

inspection.

TABLE 2.—SERVICE BULLETINS

Service bulletin Date Model

737–35–1076 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 737

737–35–1077 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 737

747–35–2111 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 747

757–35–0021 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 757

757–35–0022 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 757

767–35–0043 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 767

767–35–0044 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 767

777–35–0008 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 777

Corrective Action

(1) If no discrepancy (release pin in safety

pin hole) is found after doing the inspection

required by paragraph (a) of this AD, no

further action is required until replacement

of any existing chemical oxygen generator

and/or passenger, attendant, or lavatory

service unit assembly that contains a

chemical oxygen generator.

(2) If any discrepancy is found after doing

the inspection required by paragraph (a) of

this AD, before further flight, do the

corrective action per the applicable service

bulletin listed in Table 2., above.

Note 3: The release pin and safety pin are

located in the generator firing mechanism.

The safety pin hole is the hole in the

generator firing mechanism that is closest to

the main body of the generator. The release

pin hole is the hole in the generator firing

mechanism located furthest from the main

body of the generator. The center axis of the

release pin hole is perpendicular to the

center axis of the safety pin hole.

Note 4: Inspections and corrective action

done before the effective date of this AD, per

Boeing Telex M–7200–00–02474, dated

October 9, 13, 19, or 31, 2000; or Boeing

Telex M–7200–00–03040, dated December

18, 2000; are considered acceptable for

compliance with the initial inspection and

corrective action specified in paragraph (a) of

this AD. However, prior accomplishment of

the inspections and corrective action

specified in the telexes does not eliminate

the need for the repetitive inspections

required by paragraph (a) of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(b) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Seattle

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA.

Operators shall submit their requests through

an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 5: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Seattle ACO.

Special Flight Permits

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with §§ 21.197 and 21.199 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197

and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a

location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Incorporation by Reference

(d) The actions shall be done in accordance

with the following Boeing Special Attention

Service Bulletins, as applicable:

TABLE 3.—SERVICE BULLETINS

Service bulletin Date Model

737–35–1076 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 737

737–35–1077 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 737

747–35–2111 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 747

757–35–0021 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 757

757–35–0022 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 757

767–35–0043 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 767

767–35–0044 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 767

777–35–0008 ....... March 1, 2001 .. 777

This incorporation by reference was

approved by the Director of the Federal

Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)

and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained

from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group,

P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–

2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the

Office of the Federal Register, 800 North

Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington,

DC.

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 101 / Thursday, May 24, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 28651

Effective Date

(e) This amendment becomes effective on

June 8, 2001.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 17,

2001.

Vi L. Lipski,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 01–12987 Filed 5–23–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99–NE–21–AD; Amendment 39–

12168; AD 2001–07–03]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Hartzell

Propeller Inc. Y-shank Series

Propellers; Correction

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

SUMMARY: This document makes a

correction to Airworthiness Directive

(AD) 2001–07–03 applicable to Hartzell

Propeller Inc. Y-shank series propellers

that was published in the Federal

Register on April 4, 2001 (66 FR 17806).

The words ‘‘and those’’ in the first

sentence of the Applicability paragraph

of the regulatory text are incorrect and

must be deleted. This document corrects

the Applicability paragraph. In all other

respects, the original document remains

the same.

DATES: Effective on June 4, 2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Tomaso DiPaolo, Aerospace Engineer,

Chicago Aircraft Certification Office,

FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 2300

East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, IL

60018; telephone (847) 294–7031, fax

(847) 294–7834.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A final

rule airworthiness directive applicable

to Hartzell Propeller Inc. Y-shank series

propellers (FR Doc. 01–8066) was

published in the Federal Register on

April 4, 2001 (66 FR 17806). The

following correction is needed:

§ 39.13 [Corrected]

On page 17808, in the third column,

in the Applicability Section of the

regulatory text of AD 2001–07–03, in the

first paragraph, beginning in the first

line, ‘‘This AD is applicable to all

Hartzell Propeller Inc. Y-shank series

propellers and those identified by hub

serial numbers (SN’s) in Table 1 of this

airworthiness directive (AD).’’ is

corrected to read ‘‘ This AD is

applicable to all Hartzell Propeller Inc.

Y-shank series propellers identified by

hub serial numbers (SN’s) in Table 1 of

this airworthiness directive (AD).’’.

Issued in Burlington, MA, on May 15,

2001.

Diane S. Romanosky,

Acting Manager, Engine and Propeller

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 01–12943 Filed 5–23–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2001–NM–86–AD; Amendment

39–12237; AD 2001–10–11]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell

Douglas Model MD–90–30 Series

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for

comments.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD) that is

applicable to certain McDonnell

Douglas Model MD–90–30 series

airplanes. This action requires an

inspection of the wiring of the primary

and alternate static port heaters for

chafing, loose connections, and

evidence of arcing, and to determine

what type of insulation blanket is

installed in the area of the static port

heaters; and corrective actions, if

necessary. This action is necessary to

ensure that insulation blankets

constructed of metallized MylarTM are

removed or protected from the area of

the static port heater. Such insulation

blankets could propagate a small fire

that is the result of an electrical short of

the static port heater and could lead to

a much larger fire and smoke in the

cabin. This action is intended to address

the identified unsafe condition.

DATES: Effective June 8, 2001.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of June 8,

2001.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules

Docket must be received on or before

July 23, 2001.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2001–NM–

86–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays. Comments may be

submitted via fax to (425) 227–1232.

Comments may also be sent via the

Internet using the following address: .

Comments sent via fax or the Internet

must contain ‘‘Docket No. 2001–NM–

86–AD’’ in the subject line and need not

be submitted in triplicate. Comments

sent via the Internet as attached

electronic files must be formatted in

Microsoft Word 97 for Windows or

ASCII text.

The service information referenced in

this AD may be obtained from Boeing

Commercial Aircraft Group, Long Beach

Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard,

Long Beach, California 90846,

Attention: Data and Service

Management, Dept. C1–L5A (D800–

0024). This information may be

examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at

the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft

Certification Office, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at

the Office of the Federal Register, 800

North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700,

Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Elvin Wheeler, Aerospace Engineer,

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–

130L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft

Certification Office, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California

90712–4137; telephone (562) 627–5344;

fax (562) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As part of

its practice of re-examining all aspects

of the service experience of a particular

aircraft whenever an accident occurs,

the FAA has become aware of an

incident of smoke in the cabin on a

McDonnell Douglas Model MD–88

airplane. An investigation discovered

evidence of a fire adjacent to the rightside alternate static port heater. It was

discovered that the wiring of the static

port heater had shorted, which caused

an ignition source for the metallized

MylarTM (i.e.,

polyethyleneteraphthalate) insulation

blanket directly inboard of the heater

element. Insulation blankets constructed

of metallized MylarTM in the area of the

static port heater, if not corrected, could

propagate a small fire that is the result

of an electrical short of the static port

heater and could lead to a much larger

fire and smoke in the cabin.

The static port heater on McDonnell

Douglas Model MD–90–30 series