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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 23-BG-0764

IN RE DUNCAN K. BRENT

DDN: 2023-D016

A Suspended Member of the Bar of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Bar Registration No. 445234

BEFORE: Deahl and Shanker, Associate Judges, and Fisher, Senior Judge. 

O R D E R

(FILED— February 1, 2024)

On consideration of the certified order from the state of Virginia suspending 

respondent from the practice of law for one-year and one-day with terms by consent; 

this court’s December 7, 2023, order maintaining respondent’s interim suspension

and directing him to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed; 

the statement of Disciplinary Counsel requesting the imposition of substantially 

different discipline in the form of a one-year and one-day suspension with a fitness 

requirement and that the court require reinstatement in Virginia prior to seeking 

reinstatement in this jurisdiction; and it appearing that respondent has not filed a 

response to either the court’s order to show cause or Disciplinary Counsel’s 

statement or filed his D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g) affidavit, it is 

ORDERED that we impose substantially different reciprocal discipline and 

Duncan K. Brent is hereby suspended from the practice of law in the District of 

Columbia for one-year and one-day with reinstatement conditioned upon a showing 

of fitness and his reinstatement in Virginia. Disciplinary Counsel has established by 

clear and convincing evidence that the facts accepted by Virginia would result in a 

substantially different discipline in this jurisdiction. See In re Jacoby, 945 A.2d 

1193, 1199-1200 (D.C. 2008) (describing the two-step inquiry for concluding 

whether the “substantially different discipline” exception applies as determining 

whether the misconduct would have resulted in the same punishment and if the 
No. 23-BG-0764

discipline would be different, whether the difference is “substantial”). Respondent 

admitted to neglecting a legal matter resulting in the client’s claims being dismissed 

with prejudice and then failing to communicate with the client, failing to honor a 

medical provider’s lien in several client matters, and refusing to cooperate with 

Virginia Bar Counsel. In a separate matter, respondent admitted to refusing to 

cooperate with the Virginia disciplinary investigations and has yet to comply with 

an outstanding subpoena in that matter. In this jurisdiction, repeated failure to 

cooperate with disciplinary investigations would require a showing of fitness prior 

to reinstatement. See In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 25-26 (D.C. 2005) (adopting a threepart test for determining whether to impose a fitness requirement when an attorney 

has failed to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation). Therefore, we find that 

Disciplinary Counsel has met the requirement of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(4). In re 

Burton, 236 A.3d 372, 373 (D.C. 2020) (imposing an additional fitness requirement 

as substantially different discipline in a Virginia reciprocal matter involving client 

neglect, dishonesty, and failure to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation). It 

is

FURTHER ORDERED that, for purposes of reinstatement, Mr. Brent’s

suspension will not begin to run until such time as he files an affidavit that fully 

complies with the requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g). 

PER CURIAM