Filed 9/3/13 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

KEVIN BANUELOS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
LA INVESTMENT, LLC, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. B239123
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TC023725)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County. Rose Hom, Judge. Reversed in part; affirmed in part. Law Office of Spix & Martin, Richard L. Spix and D. Elizabeth Martin for Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Offices of Douglas W. Beck & Associates and Douglas W. Beck for Defendants and Respondents.

________________ _______________ _____________

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exceptio n of parts III and IV of the Discussion.2 The trial court dismissed Kevin Banue los’s third amended complaint after sustaining the defendants’ demurrer to all cause s of action without leave to amend. We hold the complaint states a cause of action for retaliatory eviction under Civil Code
section 1942.5 and that this cause of acti on is not barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). We affirm the judgment as to the remaining
causes of action. FACTS AND PROC EEDINGS BELOW Background: Banuelos I

. In 2008, Banuelos brought an action ag ainst the owners and managers of Park Granada, a mobile home park in Carson. Banuelos alleged that he was the owner of a mobile home located on Space 23 at Park Granada and that defendants refused to accept his application for tenancy of the space in vi olation of Civil Code section 798.74, which limits the right of a mobile home park owner to refuse tenancy to a “purchaser” of a mobile home in the park. 1 According to Banuelos’s co mplaint, defendants refused to accept his rent applications for the space in or der to force him to sell them his mobile
home for little or no consideration since it w ould be practically impossible for him to move it from the space. Banuelo s sued the defendants for viol ation of section 798.74 and
various torts.

1 Statutory references are to the Civil C ode unless otherwise not ed. Section 798.74, subdivision (a) states in relevant part: “T he management may require the right of prior approval of a purchaser of a m obilehome that will remain in the park and that the selling homeowner or his or her agent give notice of the sale to the management before the close of the sale

. Approval cannot be withheld if the purchaser has the fina ncial ability to pay the rent and charges of the pa rk unless the management reas onably determines that, based on the purchaser’s prior tenancies, he or she will not comply with the rules and regulations of the park . . . . If the approva l of a prospective homeowner is withheld for any reason other than those stated in this article, the management or owner may be held liable for all damages proxim ately resulting therefrom.”3 The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary ju dgment as to each
cause of action and we affirmed the judgment in an unre ported opinion ( Banuelos I ). 2
We held that Banuelos could not state a caus e of action under section 798.74 for failure to approve his tenancy because he had receiv ed the mobile home as a gift and therefore he was not a “purchaser.” Similarly, we held that he could not state a cause of action for negligence against the defendan ts because they owed him no duty under section 798.74.
We further held that Banuelos could not st ate a cause of action for landlord retaliation
under section 1942.5 because there was no landlord-tenant re lationship between Banuelos and the park at the time of th e alleged retaliatory actions. Background: Banuelos II

. In May 2009 a new owner of Park Granad a rejected Banuelos’s application for tenancy. Notwithstanding that rejection, Ba nuelos tendered monthly space rental checks
to the owner. The owner return ed each check. In May 2010, Banuelos sent a check for $4,200 to the owner’s attorn ey, accompanied by a letter sta ting that the check was for 14 months space rent commencing April 2009. The owner’s attorney did not return this check but deposited it in his client trus t account. The following month, however, the owner filed an unlawful detainer action agai nst Banuelos seeking posse ssion of Space 23. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a general verd ict with special findings in
favor of Banuelos. Banuelos maintains hi s tenancy commenced in May 2010 when defendants accepted his rent check.

2 Banuelos v. Butler (Dec. 22, 2010, B22 3120 [nonpub. opn.].)4 Background: Banuelos III

. Prior to the verdict in Banuelos II, Banuelos filed this action against 218 Properties and LA Investment, LLC, whic h he alleged to be the joint owners of
Park Granada. Banuelos also sued the managers of the property. The third amended complaint, filed in August 20 11, following the verdict in Banuelos II , charges defendants with statutory and common law retaliation, bad faith, intentional and negligent interference with economic advantage and negligence. Defendants demurred to each count of the complaint on the gr ound that it failed to state fa cts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The trial court sustaine d the demurrers without leave to amend and
dismissed the action as to all defendants except 218 Properties, which had a pending cross-complaint against Banuelos. Banuelos filed a timely appeal. DISCUSSION I. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF AC TION FOR RETALIATION UNDER SE CTION 1942.5 BUT NOT UNDER THE COMMON LAW.
A. Retaliation Under Section 1942.5
Under section 1942.5 it is unlawful for a lessor to “bring an action” against a lessee to “recover possession . . . for the purpos e of retaliating against the lessee because he or she . . . has lawfully and peacea bly exercised any rights under the law.” In his first cause of action, Banuelos allege d that he was a tenant of Park Granada as of May 2010. Defendants served him with a five-day notice to va cate on or about June 1, 2010, and soon after filed an eviction action against him. He alleged that these acts
violate section 1942.5 and the common law of California because they were done in retaliation for, among other things, complaini ng orally and in writing to the City of
Carson and the courts about the defendants’ alleged unlawful acts and omissions. The complaint states a cause of action for retaliation under section 1942.5. Banuelos’s right to complain to the city about defendants’ alleged wrongful acts and to file a lawsuit are both protected under the law.5 B. Retaliation Under The Common Law
Banuelos cannot state a common law cause of action for retaliatory eviction because that cause of action applies only to cond uct that causes the te nant to involuntarily vacate the premises. ( Glaser v. Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 777.) Banuelos does not allege that he vacated Space 23.
II. THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE DOES NOT BAR BANUELOS’S SUIT UNDER SECTION 1942.5 FOR RETALIATORY EVICTION BASED ON THE DEFENDANTS ’ ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES.
Section 1942.5, subdivision (c) creates a cause of ac tion against a landlord who “bring[s] an action to recover possession . . . for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because he or she has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees’ association or an organization advocating lessees’ rights or has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law.” Subdivision (f) of th e statute states, “Any lessor or agent of a
lessor who violates this section shall be liable to the lessee in a civil action for all of the following: [¶] (1) The actual da mages sustained by the lessee. [¶] (2) Punitive damages in
an amount of not less than one hundred do llars ($100) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000) for each retaliatory act wher e the lessor or agent ha s been guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice with respect to that act.” The landlord can defend against an action for retaliatory eviction by showing that it acted for “any lawful cause” (§ 1942.5, subd. (d)) or “in good faith” ( id ., subd. (e)). 3

3 The provisions of section 1942.5, subdivisions (c) through (g) state as follows: “(c) It is unlawful for a lessor to increase rent, decrease se rvices, cause a lessee to quit involuntarily, bring an action to recover possession , or threaten to do any of those acts, for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because he or she has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees’ association or an organization advoca ting lessees’ rights or has lawfully and peaceably exerci sed any rights under the law. In an action brought by or against the lessee pursuant to this subdivision, the lessee shall bear the burden of producing evidence that the lessor’s conduct was, in fact, retaliatory. [¶] (d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way the exercise by the lessor of his or her rights under any lease or agreement or any law pertaining to the hiring of property or6 Tenants’ protection from retaliation by th eir landlords for exercising their rights under California law developed simultaneous ly from legislation, section 1942.5, subdivision (a) (Stats. 1970, ch. 1280), and the decision by the California Supreme Court
in Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal. 3d 507, 513 ( Schweiger ), as an affirmative
defense to an eviction action. 4 Schweiger arose from a tenant’s use of the “repair and deduct” remedy afforded him under sections 1941 and 1942 to repair two broken
windows and a broken back doo r. The landlord retaliated against the tenant the next month by more than doubling th e tenant’s rent and, when the tenant failed to pay the increased amount, brought an unl awful detainer action to evic t the tenant. In upholding the tenant’s right to assert an equitable de fense of retaliation to the landlord’s eviction action, Justice Mosk stated that, “[i]f we fail to recognize a reas onable limitation on the punitive power of landlords to increase rent s and evict tenants, th e salutary purposes

his or her right to do any of the act s described in subdivision (a) or (c) for any lawful

cause

. Any waiver by a lessee of his or her rights u nder this section is void as contrary to public policy . [¶] (e) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, a lessor may recover possession of a dwelling and do any of the other acts descri bed in subdivision (a) within the period or periods prescribed therei n, or within subdivision (c), if the notice of termination, rent increase, or other act, a nd any pleading or statement of issues in an arbitration, if any, states the ground upon which the lessor, in good faith, seeks to recover possession, increase rent, or do any of the other act s described in subdivision (a) or (c). If the statement is controverted, the lessor sha ll establish its truth at the trial or other hearing. [¶] (f) Any lessor or agent of a lessor who viol ates this section shall be liable to the lessee in a civil action for all of the following: (1) The actual damages sustained by the lessee. (2) Punitive damages in an amount of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000) for each retaliatory act where the lessor or agent has been guilty of fraud, oppression, or ma lice with respect to th at act. [¶] (g) In any action brought for damages for retaliatory eviction, the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party if e ither party requests attorney’s fees upon the initiation of the action.” (Italics added.)

4 The petitioner in Schweiger was not covered by secti on 1942.5 because it did not apply to rental agreements entered into prior to the e ffective date of the statute, January 1, 1971. ( Schweiger , supra , 3 Cal.3d at p. 510, fn. 1.) For the text of the original version of section 1942.5, see Note, California’s New Legislati on On A Landlord’s Duty To Repair (1971) 3 U.C. Davi s L.Rev. 131, 156.7 sought to be achieved by the Legislature in enacting Civil Code s ections 1941 and 1942 will be frustrated.” ( Ibid .) Less than a year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Schweiger , the same
landlord was before the court in Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278. Again the tenants petitioned the landlord to repair unsaf e conditions in their apartment and again the landlord responded by raising the tenant ’s rent—this time from $75 a month to $145 a month. Instead of waiting to be sued in an unlawful detainer ac tion, the tenants sued the landlord for retaliatory eviction claiming th at the rent increase constituted an actual eviction and seeking an injunction to prev ent the landlord from enforcing the rent increase or instituting an action for unlawfu l detainer. The trial court denied a preliminary injunction and sustained the la ndlord’s demurrer to th e complaint without leave to amend. Relying on Schweiger , the Court of Appeal reversed. The court
reasoned: “We can discern no rational basis fo r allowing . . . a substantive defense while denying an affirmative cause of action. It would be unfair and unr easonable to require a tenant, subjected to a retaliatory rent incr ease by the landlord, to wait and raise the matter as a defense only, after he is confront ed with an unlawful detainer action and a possible lien on his personal property . . . . Accordingly, we conclude on the authority
of Schweiger that the complaint stat ed a cause of action for retaliatory eviction.” ( Id . at p. 281.) The Suprem e Court denied review. In 1979 the Legislature affirmed th e right of a tenant to sue a landlord for retaliatory eviction by repealing and reen acting section 1942.5 (S tats. 1979, ch. 652). As part of that reenactment, the Legislature specifically provided that “[i]t shall be unlawful for a lessor to . . . bring an action to recover possession . . . for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because he or sh e has . . . lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law” and that “[a]ny less or or agent of a lessor who violates this
section shall be liable to the lessee in a ci vil action[.]” (§ 1942.5, subds. (c) & (f).) Our Supreme Court has described secti on 1942.5 as reenact ed in 1979 as “a remedial statute aimed at protecting tenants fro m certain types of abuses. It is to be8 ‘liberally construed to effect its objectives and to suppress, not encourage, the mischief at which it was directed. [Citation.]’” ( Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244, 251.)
In Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803, 812, the appellate court held that the cause of action for retaliation recognized by section 1942.5 applies to tenants of a mobile home park. The court reasoned: “By their terms, subdivisions (c) and (f) of section 1942.5 give a right of action to any lessee who has been subjected to an act of unlawful retaliation. Thus, on its face the statute provides protection to mobilehome park tenants who own their own dwellings an d merely rent space from their landlord.”
Defendants maintain that insofar as secti on 1942.5 purports to allow a tenant to sue a landlord for “bring[ing] an action to recover possession” it is trumped by the “litigation privilege” provision of section 47, subdivision (b). “The usual formulation” of the litigati on privilege is that it “applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-j udicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logica l relation to the action.” ( Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) The priv ilege applies without regard to the defendant’s “motives, morals, ethics or intent.” ( Id . at p. 220.) Despite its broad scope, our high court has recognized that “the Legislature
remains free to create exceptions to the litiga tion privilege[.]” ( Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1247 ( Action Apartment ).) The question is whether the Legislature did so in enacting section 1942. 5, subdivisions (c) and (f).
In Action Apartment , the Supreme Court considered a challenge under the litigation privilege to a city ordinance that penalized a landlord who brought an action to recover possession of a rental unit “without a reasonable factual or legal basis.” ( Action Apartment , supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 1239.) The Court he ld that this provision of the city ordinance was “inimical to the important pu rposes of the litigation privilege” including9 “‘afford[ing] litigants and witnesses . . . the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subseque ntly by derivative tort actions.’” ( Id . at p. 1243.) Therefore, the litigation privilege “conflicts with and thus preempt s” that portion of the city ordinance “regarding filing an acti on to recover possession of a rental unit.” ( Id. at p. 1237.) The holding in Action Apartment is not controlling here because the conflict in that case was between a statute and a city or dinance while our case involves a conflict between two co-equal statutes. Neverthe less, much of the Court’s analysis in Action Apartment is applicable to the case before us. The Court began its analys is by noting that it has gi ven the litigation privilege “a broad interpretation” in order to achieve its “‘principal purpose’” to afford litigants
and witnesses “‘the utmost freedom of acce ss to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by deri vative tort actions.’” ( Action Apartment , supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1241.) Recognizing that invocation of the privilege “has its costs,” the court observed that “‘avoiding an un ending roundelay of litigation [justifies] an occasional unfair result.’ [Citation.]” ( Id . at p. 1244.) The Court acknowledged, however, that a lthough the litigation privilege has been described as “absolute” the privilege “is not without limit” and cited the examples of private actions for malicious prosecution an d government actions including criminal prosecutions and regulatory actions br ought pursuant to state statutes. ( Action Apartment , supra , 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1242, 1245; see also Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 330 [debt collector’s unlawful conduct
under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practic es Act (§§ 1788, et se q.) is not shielded by the litigation privilege].) “[ T]hese exceptions,” the Co urt pointed out, “have all involved suits brought under state laws, each of which makes clear that the Legislature
did not intend its enforcem ent to be barred by the litigation privilege.” ( Action Apartment , at p. 1245.)10 The Legislature “makes clear” that it does not intend the enforcement of a statute to be barred by the litigation privilege when the statute “i s more specific than the litigation privilege and would be significantly or wholly inoperable if its enforcement were barred when in conflict with the privilege.” ( Action Apartment , supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 1246.) The cause of action for retalia tory eviction authorized by section 1942.5, subdivisions (c) and (f) meet s both prongs of this test. 5 Subdivision (c) of section 1942.5 specific ally makes it “unlawfu l” for a lessor to “bring an action to recover possession” in re taliation for a tenant’s exercise of “rights under the law.” Subdivision (f) of the statut e states that “[a]ny lessor or agent of a
lessor who violates this section shall be liable to the lessee in a civil action[.]” Additionally, subdivision (e) gives the landlor d a defense of “good faith” to an action under subdivision (c), which, if controverted by the lessee, “the lessor shall establish . . . at the trial or other hearing.” The statute’ s reference to a landlord’s liability “in a civil action” for bringing “an action to recover posse ssion” in retaliation for a tenant’s exercise of rights coupled with the provision recogn izing a good faith defense “at the trial or other hearing” demonstrates that the Legislat ure intended to create a cause of action for retaliatory eviction that is not barred by th e litigation privilege. If the litigation privilege trumped a suit for retaliatory eviction un der section 1942.5 the privilege would “effectively immunize conduct th at the [statute] prohibits” ( Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. , supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 338) ther eby encouraging, rather than suppressing, “‘the mischief at which it was directed. [Citation.]’” ( Barela v. Superior
Court , supra , 30 Cal.3d at p. 251.) Moreover, the right of tenants to be fre e from eviction actions brought by their landlords because the tenants “lawfully and peaceably exercised [their] rights under the law” (§ 1942.5, subd. (c)) would be “significan tly or wholly inoperab le if its enforcement

5 The court in Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 339-340 applied this sa me test in determining a debt collector’s litigation activities that violated the Rosent hal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (§§ 1788, et seq.) were not i mmunized by the litigation privilege.11 were barred [by the litigation privilege].” ( Action Apartment , supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 1246.) The Legislature made the judgment that raising retaliation as a defense to an
unlawful detainer action and a suit for malici ous prosecution are not adequate remedies for retaliatory eviction. Section 1942.5, su bdivision (h) states that “[t]he remedies provided by this section shall be in addition to any other re medies provided by statutory
or decisional law.” Two court of appeal opinions, purporting to follow Action Apartment , have held that the litigation privilege bars a tena nt from suing a landlor d under section1942.5, subdivisions (c) and (f) for bringing a reta liatory action to recover possession. We
decline to follow them.
In Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467 ( Feldman ), the landlord brought an unlawful detainer action against the tenants and the tenants cross-complained for retaliatory eviction under section 1942.5 based on the landlord’s alleged violation of the city’s rent control ordina nces. The Court of Appeal held that the landlord’s “filing of the unlaw ful detainer action clearly fell within the litigation privilege. Th e Supreme Court in [ Action Apartment ] held the litigation privilege of Civil Code sec tion 47 preempted the provision of the Santa Monica tenant
harassment ordinance that authorized civ il and criminal penaltie s against a landlord bringing any action to recover possession of a rental unit without a reasonable factual or legal basis.” ( Id . at p. 1486.) The appellate court di d not discuss the distinction between a tenant suing under a city ordinance, as in Action Apartment , and a tenant suing under the authority of a co-equal state statute, nor did it analyze section 1942.5 to determine
whether it “makes clear” that it is not barred by the litigation privilege. ( Action Apartment , supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 1246.)
In Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1213, the appellate
court held that “as a matter of law” the te nant-plaintiffs had no cause of action under section 1942.5 “for wrongful eviction based on the unlawful detainer action or three-day12 notice, in light of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).”
Like Feldman , the court cited but did not discuss or analyze Action Apartment and the litigation privilege nor did it distinguish between a city ordinance and a state statute when resolving the conflict issue. Defendants cite two Supreme Court opini ons in which the court found that the plaintiffs’ statutory causes of action were barred by th e litigation privilege. Both opinions are distinguishable from our case.
In Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, residents of a mobile home park sent a written complaint to the owner listing 23 alle ged defects in the ope ration of the park. The owner sued the park resi dents and their attorney for unfair business practices under
the Business and Professions Code. The Su preme Court held the owner’s suit was barred by the litigation privilege. Rubin involved a conflict between section 47, subdivision (b), the litigation privilege, which appl ies to any “publication or broadcast” made as part of a “judicial proceeding,” and Busi ness and Professions Code se ction 17200, which defines “unfair competition” to include “any unlaw ful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” 6 The Court held that it would violate the principal purpose of the litigation privilege—to afford litigants utmost freedom of access to the courts—if the park owner were allowed to “plead arou nd” the privilege by simply relabeling his common law suit
for interference with contractual relations as a statutory suit for unfair competition. ( Id . at pp. 1191, 1201-1203.) Permitting the owne r’s claim, the Court explained, “would upset the carefully constructed balance betwee n ‘the freedom of an individual to seek
redress in the courts and the interest of a potential defendant in being free from unjustified litigation’ [citation] by effectively destroying the av ailability of the privilege’” in any case in which a party to litigation was prompted to claim that his opponent was engaging in an unfair business practice. ( Id . at pp. 1203-1204.) The Court concluded by

6 Business and Professions Code sections 17203 and 17204 author ize private actions for injunctive relief and damages for violation of section 17200.13 noting its analysis “is reinfo rced by the fact that the policy underlying the unfair competition statute can be vindicated by multip le parties other than plaintiff” including the Attorney General, district attorn eys and certain city attorneys. ( Id . at p. 1204.)
Rubin was preceded by Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355 in which the plaintiff sued a person who had admitted during an arbitrati on hearing that she eavesdropped on a telephone conversation between plaintiff and hi s former wife. Plaintiff based his suit, in part, on Penal Code secti on 637.2, which provides fo r a private cause of action by any person “injured” by anot her’s violation of the Priv acy Act, which prohibits eavesdropping, wiretapping and unauthorized recording of communications under a multitude of circumstances. (Pen. Code, §§ 630-637.9.) The de fendant relied on the litigation privilege as her defense. The Su preme Court held the defense had merit. “[N]othing indicates that in enacting Penal Code section 63 7.2 the Legislature intended
to immunize causes of action under that st atute from the [litiga tion privilege].” ( Ribas , at p. 365.) Thus, the Court concluded, to th e extent the plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he suffered injury solely as a result of the defendant’s testimony at the arbitration hearing, it is barred by the litigation privilege. ( Ibid. )
Rubin and Ribas both addressed statutes that c over a broad spectrum of conduct, none of which specifically relates to litigation. It was only because the facts that gave
rise to the causes of action in those cases happened to involve litiga tion activities that the privilege was implicated. Neither statute “woul d be significantly or wholly inoperable if
its enforcement were barred when in conflict with the privilege.” ( Action Apartment , supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 1246.) On the contrary, in Rubin the Court obse rved that the policy underlying the unfair co mpetition statute could be vind icated by parties other than the plaintiff, including the Attorney General, district attorn eys and certain city attorneys. ( Rubin v. Green , supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1204.) Section 1942.5, unlike the unfair competiti on and privacy statutes, specifically creates a cause of action for, am ong other things, bringing a certain kind of lawsuit. Subdivision (c) of section 1942.5 makes it “unl awful” for a lessor to “bring an action to14 recover possession” in retaliation for a tenant ’s exercise of “rights under the law.” Subdivision (f) of the statute states that “[a]ny lessor or agent of a lessor who violates this
section shall be liable to the lessee in a civ il action.” The Legislat ure presumably would not have included these protections in secti on 1942.5 if it intended th at they be nullified by the litigation privilege. We do not believe the Legislature intended to do a useless act.
III. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STAT E A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BAD FAITH. The complaint alleges that “[d]efendant s[’] continuous actions from May 2009 through the present unfairly and in bad faith in terfere with plaintiff’s right to receive the benefits of residency in Park Granada.” Defendants’ actions include “delaying and discouraging [Banuelos’s tenancy] applica tions in 2009; refu sing to process his applications, in 2009, as re quired by law” and acquiescing in his occupancy and repairs of his mobile home, accepting his $4,200 rent payment and then serving him with an
eviction notice.
A cause of action for bad faith cannot be based on defendants’ delaying, discouraging or refusing to process Banuelo s’s 2009 application to rent Space 23. The protection against delay and denial of such applications contained in section 798.74 did not apply to Banue los because he was not a “purch aser” of the mobile home until June 1, 2010. Contrary to Banuelos’s assertion there is no common law duty on the part of a lessor of residential property to act reasonably and in good faith in ex ercising its right to approve or disapprove the tran sfer of a leasehold. ( Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 488, 492, fn. 1, 506-507.) Even if such a duty could be established (see Coskran, Assignment And Sublease Restrictions: The Tri bulations Of Leasehold Transfers (1989) 22 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 405, 48 0), it would not apply here because the lease of Space 23 was not transferable from th e former lessee to Banuelos. Rather, a lessee’s conveyance of title to a mobile home terminates the ground lease and requires a
new lease between the new owner and th e park. (§ 798.75, subd. (a).)15 Banuelos alleges that defendants acted in bad faith when they stood by and allowed him to make improveme nts on his mobile home, then accepted his $4,200 rent payment, and later attempted to evict him. We need not decide whether defendants’ conduct would otherwise give rise to a cau se of action for bad faith because here Banuelos cannot show that he suffered any ha rm. The mobile home belongs to Banuelos so any improvements he made to it benefited him, not defendants. The $4,200 represents
the amount Banuelos admits was the fair va lue of 14 months of rent and utilities for Space 23. The defendants’ a ttempt to evict Banuelos failed, the court awarded him $95,000 in attorney fees and the ju dgment was affirmed on appeal. ( Banuelos II .) IV. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL OR NE GLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE.
Banuelos’s causes of action for inten tional and negligent interference with economic advantage suffer from the same defect. They fail to allege that Banuelos has an economic relationship with a poten tial buyer of his mobile home.
The first element in a clai m of interference with prospective economic advantage is the existence of an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff. ( Edwards v. Arthur Andersen
LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937, 944 .) Banuelos’s complaint a lleges that defendants are interfering with his ability to one day sell hi s mobile home to some unidentified buyer. This claim falls directly into the impermis sible category of “‘lost opportunity’” or “speculative expectation that a potentially bene ficial relationship will eventually arise.” ( Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 523-524.) Accordingly, Banuelos’s failure to allege an economic relationship with a prospective buyer dooms his causes of acti on for intentional and negligent interference with economic advantage. ( Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 832, 840-841 [no cause of action for wrongful interference with prospective economic advantage when plaint iff’s business relationship was w ith a class of as yet unknown purchasers of lots in a subdivision].)16 V. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO ST ATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE. Banuelos alleges that the defendants “neg ligently refused to approve [p]laintiff’s tenancy and negligently refuse to acknowledg e the rightful tenancy created by defendants in favor of Banuelos for Space 23 in viol ation of Civil Code section 798.74 and the
common law of the state of Califor nia.” (Block capitals omitted.) As we explained above the owners and ma nagers of Park Gran ada had no statutory duty to Banuelos under section 798.74. Banuelos does not explain what common law duty defendants breached in refusing to acknow ledge his “rightful tenancy” in Space 23. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed as to the ca use of action for retaliatory eviction and affirmed as to the remaining causes of acti on. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PART IAL PUBLICATION

.

ROTHSCHILD, J. We concur:

MALLANO, P. J.

JOHNSON, J.