alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
***Exhibit32(ii)***

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

** **

In connection with the reporton Form 10-Q of Sonnen Corporation for the quarterly period ended December 31,2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof,I, Costas Takkas, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adoptedpursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of myknowledge and belief:

 

(1)  This report fully complies withthe requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and

(2)  The information contained in thisreport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition ofthe registrant at the end of the period covered by this report and results ofoperations of the registrant for the period covered by this report.

 

 

Date: February 10, 2011

 

 

/s/ Costas Takkas

Costas Takkas

Chief Financial Officer

 

 

This certificationaccompanies this report pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 andshall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, bedeemed filed by the registrant for the purposes of §18 of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, as amended. This certification shall not be incorporated byreference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after thedate of this report), irrespective of any general incorporation languagecontained in such filing.

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by §906 has been provided to the registrant and willbe retained by the registrant and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

----
#### Mills v. Redick.

1. Replevin : *Replevin*will lie. to recover the possession of buildings erected on a lot of ground *by*a party claiming title thereto, who, by judicial determination, has been evicted therefrom, if the buildings were by him set upon blocks, and were not, at the time of eviction, affixed to the soil, notwithstanding another being afterward in possession did affix them to the soil, and they were so affixed when the replevin was brought.

This was an action of replevin brought in the District Court of Douglas county. It was brought to recover the possession of certain houses which had been erected by Mrs. Mills upon the lot, the title to which was the subject of inquiry in *Mills*v. Paynter, *infra*432. Under the judgment in that case she and her husband, who had charge of the property, were evicted, leaving the houses on the lot. It appeared in evidencé that the houses Were set up on blocks as long as Mrs. Mills held possession of the lots. Paynter, the defendant in that case, leased the lots to Shelden, who moved the houses, two in number, together, and made one house of them. He also raised them and built a stone foundation under them, and built a chimney which rested on the soil. After making this lease, Paynter conveyed the premises to Eedick, subject to the estate of Shelden. No defense was interposed on behalf of Shelden, who was impleaded in the cause.

As between Eedick and the plaintiffs, the cause was tried before Honorable William P. Lockwood and a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the defendant for $500 damages, on which judgment was entered. The error complained of was, that the court charged the jury that the property was not subject to the action of replevin, because it was, at the time of bringing the action, affixed to the soil, and was a part of the realty, and that it was immaterial *438what its character was previous thereto. Mills brought this petition to correct this error.

*W. T. Sapp,*for plaintiff in error.

*BedicJc*(6 *Briggs,*contra.

The court,

by Streeter, J.,

held that the instruction was erroneous, that the houses were properly subject to replevin when the possession of them was taken from the plaintiff, and that the defendants could not be deprived of this x-emedy by any thing they had done with it.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Case 7:07-cv-05895-SCR-GAY Document 3-2 Filed 06/21/2007 Page 1 of 3
Case 7:07-cv-05895-SCR-GAY Document 3-2 Filed 06/21/2007 Page 2 of 3
Case 7:07-cv-05895-SCR-GAY Document 3-2 Filed 06/21/2007 Page 3 of 3
Exhibit 15



R&B Falcon Corporation

     We are aware that R&B Falcon Corporation has incorporated by reference
in its Registration Statements No. 333-43475,  333-67755,  333-67757,  333-
68101,  333-81179,  333-81181,  333-81381,  333-88839,  333-88841 and  333-
88843  its  Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2000, which  includes
our  report  dated  May  2, 2000 covering the unaudited  interim  financial
information contained therein.  Pursuant to Regulation C of the  Securities
Act  of  1933,  that  report is not considered a part of  the  registration
statement  prepared  or  certified by our firm  or  a  report  prepared  or
certified by our firm within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the Act.



/s/Arthur Andersen LLP

Houston, Texas
May 11, 2000
# C_2019263EN.01004101.xml

| 5.8.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 263/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 263/41

---

Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2019 — EOS Deutscher Inkasso-Dienst v EUIPO — IOS Finance EFC (IOS FINANCE)

(Case T-583/17) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark IOS FINANCE - Earlier national figurative mark EOS - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2019/C 263/46)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: EOS Deutscher Inkasso-Dienst GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: B. Sorg, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Söder, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: IOS Finance EFC, SA (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: J.L. Rivas Zurdo, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 June 2017 (Case R 2262/2016-2), relating to opposition proceedings between EOS Deutscher Inkasso-Dienst and IOS Finance EFC.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders EOS Deutscher Inkasso-Dienst GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders EOS Deutscher Inkasso-Dienst GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 338, 9.10.2017.

---
Case 1:07-cv-04462-AKH Document 54 Filed 01/24/2008 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:07-cv-04462-AKH Document 54 Filed 01/24/2008 Page 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 32.1





                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of United Financial Corp. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Kurt R.
Weise, Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best
of my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.




/s/ Kurt R. Weise
----------------------------
Kurt R. Weise
Chief Executive Officer



May 13, 2005
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2178 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2178

 To amend title II of the Social Security Act to eliminate the waiting 
  periods for disability insurance benefits and Medicare coverage for 
   individuals with metastatic breast cancer, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 9, 2019

Mr. King of New York (for himself and Ms. Castor of Florida) introduced 
  the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and 
                                 Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title II of the Social Security Act to eliminate the waiting 
  periods for disability insurance benefits and Medicare coverage for 
   individuals with metastatic breast cancer, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Metastatic Breast Cancer Access to 
Care Act''.

SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF WAITING PERIOD FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH METASTATIC 
              BREAST CANCER.

    (a) In General.--Section 223 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
423) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1), in the matter following 
                subparagraph (E), by striking ``or (ii)'' and inserting 
                ``(ii) in the case of an individual who has been 
                medically determined to have metastatic breast cancer, 
                for each month beginning with the first month during 
                all of which the individual is under a disability and 
                in which the individual becomes entitled to such 
                insurance benefits, or (iii)''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (2)(B), by inserting ``or (iii)'' 
                after ``clause (ii)''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply with respect to applications for disability insurance benefits 
filed after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. WAIVER OF 24-MONTH WAITING PERIOD FOR MEDICARE COVERAGE OF 
              INDIVIDUALS WITH METASTATIC BREAST CANCER.

    (a) In General.--Section 226(h) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 426(h)) is amended by inserting ``or metastatic breast cancer'' 
after ``amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS)''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to benefits for months beginning after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit
32.1





Certification of Principal
Executive Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report
of SRKP 15, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31,
2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Richard A. Rappaport, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
my knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Richard A. RappaportRichard
      A. Rappaport
                Principal
      Executive Officer
                April
      23, 2009
(104 So. 756)

#### COX v. STOLLENWERCK.

(3 Div. 692.)

(Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 28, 1925.

Rehearing Denied June 25, 1925.)

1. Appeal and error <&wkey;l009(4) — When judgment or decree, based on question of fact determined ore tenus, will not be disturbed stated.

When the evidence either in equity or in law is ore tenus, or partly so, trial court’s judgment or decree, based on question of fact determined from such evidence, is like verdict oí a jury, and will not be disturbed unless result is plainly and palpably contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

2. Appeal and error <&wkey;!009(3) — Trial court’s decree, based on question of fact determined from conflicting evidence ore tenus, held final.

Trial court’s decree, based on question of fact determined from conflicting evidence ore tenus, *held*final.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery County; Leon McCord, Judge.

. Bill in equity by W. N. Cox against Frank Stollenwerck. From a decree for respondent, complainant appeals.

Affirmed,

S. H. Dent, of Montgomery, for appellant.

Where the testimony of a witness is incredible, the court will reject it. Peters v. Sou. Ry., 135 Ala. 533, 33 So. 332; L. *&*N. v. Moran, 190 Ala. 108, 66 So. 799.

W. A. Jordan, of Montgomery, for appellee.

The witnesses in this case having appeared *i*in person and testified before the trial court, the decree will not be reversed, unless it shocks the sense of justice and right. Cobh v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738; Hatfield v. Riley, 199 Ala. 388, 74 So. 380; Adams v. I Wimbish, 201 Ala. 548, 78 So. 902; Cole v. A. G. S., 201 Ala. 193, 77 So. 719; Conners v. Harless, 202 Ala. 317, 80 So. 399.

ANDERSON, C. J.

[1] This court has repeatedly held that, in equity as well as law, when the evidence before the trial court is ore tenus, or partly so, the trial court had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses, and therefore possessed an advantage over this court in weighing and considering the same, and its judgment or decree was like unto the verdict of a jury, and would not be disturbed unless the result was plainly and palpably contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Senior v. State, 205 Ala. 337, 87 So. 592; Fitzpatrick v. Stringer, 200 Ala. 374, 76 So. 932; Ray v. Watkins, 203 Ala. 683, 85 So. 25, and many cases there cited.

[2] Therefore, pretermitting the authority of the respondent to release the mortgage, and conceding that it would be binding on him if supported by a valuable consideration, his evidence shows that it was without consideration; a mere nudum pactum. This was contradicted by the complainant, who was corroborated in part by his wife, but the trial court saw and heard both the complainant and the respozident testify, and believed the respondent, and the decree must be affirmed, which is accordingly done.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

SOMERVILLE, THOMAS, and BOULDIN, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Oilgear Company (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David A. Zuege, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best
of my knowledge:

          (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Company.


/s/ David A. Zuege
Chief Executive Officer
November 12, 2003

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to The Oilgear Company and will be
retained by The Oilgear Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
Case 1:07-cv-05556-AKH Document 41 Filed 02/06/2008 Page 1 of 3Case 1:07-cv-05556-AKH Document 41 Filed 02/06/2008 Page 2 of 3Case 1:07-cv-05556-AKH Document 41 Filed 02/06/2008 Page 3 of 3
# C_2019065EN.01003601.xml

| 18.2.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 65/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.2.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/36

---

Order of the General Court of 13 December 2018 — Bowles v ECB

(Case T-447/17) (1)

((Civil Service - ECB Staff - Appointment decision concerning the post of Adviser to the President and Coordinator of the Counsel to the Executive Board - No act adversely affecting the applicant - No interest in bringing proceedings - Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law))

(2019/C 65/45)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Carlos Bowles (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) (represented by: L. Levi, lawyer)

Defendant: European Central Bank (represented by: B. Ehlers and F. Malfrère, acting as Agents, and B. Wägenbaur, lawyer)

Re:

Action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union seeking, first, the annulment (i) of the decision of the Executive Board of the ECB of 31 January 2017 to appoint M.S. to the post of Adviser to the President and Coordinator of the Counsel to the Executive Board (ii) of the decision not to appoint the applicant to that post and (iii) of the decision not to allow the applicant to apply for that post and, secondly, compensation for the damage which the applicant claims to have suffered.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law.

| 2. | Mr Carlos Bowles shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mr Carlos Bowles shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 347, 16.10.2017.

---
#### Carlos Alfredo SILVA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-74138.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 2013.*

Filed May 24, 2013.

Fabian C. Serrato, Serrato Law Firm, Santa Ana, CA, for Petitioner.

Liza Murcia, OIL, Shahrzad Baghai, David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, CAC-District Counsel, Esquire, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: NOONAN, WARDLAW, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Carlos Alfredo Silva petitions for review of the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s determination that he was removable and not eligible for cancellation of removal.

Silva argues that the Government failed to prove removability based on his marijuana conviction. Even if he is correct, the BIA also found him removable based on his cocaine conviction. Silva does not challenge this second ground and is, therefore, removable. *See Haile v. Holder,*658 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2011) (denying petition when alien failed to address BIA’s alternative grounds for its decision).

Even if Silva’s argument that he is entitled to cancellation of removal is not waived, Silva is unable to meet his burden of demonstrating that he is eligible, because, even if he is correct that his criminal record check was inconclusive, “an inconclusive record of conviction does not demonstrate eligibility for cancellation of removal,” and “is insufficient to satisfy the alien’s burden of proof.” *Young v. Holder,*697 F.3d 976, 989 (9th Cir.2012) (en banc).

PETITION DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2126 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2126

To prohibit the Secretary of the Treasury and the Board of Governors of 
 the Federal Reserve System from providing bailouts or other financial 
   assistance to a pension plan of a State or political subdivision 
                    thereof, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 8, 2019

  Mr. Babin introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
 Committee on Education and Labor, and in addition to the Committee on 
 Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To prohibit the Secretary of the Treasury and the Board of Governors of 
 the Federal Reserve System from providing bailouts or other financial 
   assistance to a pension plan of a State or political subdivision 
                    thereof, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``State and Local Pensions 
Accountability and Security Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON BAILOUTS FOR STATE AND LOCAL PENSION FUNDS.

    The Secretary of the Treasury and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System may not provide any loan, grant, or other form 
of financial assistance--
            (1) to a pension plan (as defined under section 3 of the 
        Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 
        1002)) established or maintained by the government of any State 
        or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or 
        instrumentality of such a State or political subdivision; or
            (2) to the government of any State or political subdivision 
        thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of such a State or 
        political subdivision, unless such government, agency, or 
        instrumentality certifies that the financial assistance will 
        not be used, directly or indirectly, to fund such a pension 
        plan.
                                 <all>
```