This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6
NATIONAL CITY BANK, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 29,658 9 BOB MORROW, 10 MARLENE MORROW, 11 Defendants-Appellants. 12

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COLFAX COUNTY 13 Sam B. Sanchez, District Judge 14 Susan C. Little & Associates, P.A. 15 Karen Howden Weaver 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellee 18 Carol A. Neelley, P.C. 19 Carol A. Neelley 20 Taos, NM 21 for Appellants 22 MEMORANDUM OPINION 232 WECHSLER, Judge. 1 Defendants appeal the denial of their motion to set aside the default judgment 2 entered in this foreclosure action. We i ssued a calendar notice proposing to affirm the 3 district court’s decision. In respons e, Defendants have filed a memorandum in 4 opposition. After careful consideration of Defendants’ arguments, we affirm the 5 decision of the district court. 6 Defendants continue to claim that theywere not provided with proper notice of 7 the foreclosure action, and therefore the district court erred in entering default 8 judgment in favor of Plaintiff. As disc ussed in our calendar notice, the evidence 9 presented to the district court shows that Pl aintiff made great efforts to provide notice 10 to Defendants. Those efforts included res earch on the internet, searches of motor 11 vehicle and court records, credit report searches, inquiries with the post office, visits 12 to the property, visits to an apartment complex where one Defendant was believed to 13 reside, visits to the other Defendant’s place of employment, telephone calls, notice by 14 mail to the property, interviews with neighbors, posting notice at the property, and 15 publication in “a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the action 16 was pending.” [MIO 4, fn 1] SeeNMSA 1978, § 39-5-1 ( 1895) (describing notice 17 requirements for foreclosure sales, including providing notice in county where 183 property “is situate”). 1 Attached to Plaintiff’s response toDefendants’ petition are a number of 2 documents, including requests for informati on, internal memoranda, and affidavits, 3 that refer to efforts made to provide notice to Defendant s. Defendants challenge the 4 validity of these documents, claiming that the affidavits contain hearsay and the 5 documents were not authenticated. De fendants claim that the evidence was not 6 introduced at the hearing on their petition toset aside the default judgment, and they 7 had no opportunity to refute the information contained in the documents. Although 8 Defendants’ claim they had no opportunity to challenge the documents attached to 9 Plaintiff’s response, the response was file d over three weeks prior to the hearing on 10 the petition to set aside the default judgment. Nothing in the tape log shows that 11 Defendants objected to or moved to strike the attachments to the response or 12 attempted to present evidence to refute the information containe d in the attachments. 13 We hold that this claim was not properly preserved for purposes of appeal. See 14 Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. , 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56, 146 15 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791 (stating that a timely and specific objection must be made to 16 apprise the district court of the nature of the claimed error, provide an opportunity for 17 the opposing party to respond, allow the distri ct court to make an intelligent ruling on 184 the claim, and create a record for appeal). 1 Defendants claim that they had a meritorious defense because they had “a right 2 to reinstate and a right of redemption.” [M IO 6] Defendants cite to no authority to 3 support their claim that the right to reinstate or the right to redeem qualifies as a 4 meritorious defense to foreclosure. In fact , a right to redemption arises after a decree 5 of foreclosure on property is entered and provides a debtor one last opportunity to 6 reclaim the property. See NMSA 1978, § 39-5-18(A) (2007). Based on the statute, 7 a right to redemption is not a defense to the foreclosure itself, but only arises after the 8 foreclosure is completed. We will not consider propositions that are unsupported by 9 citation to authority. See ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 1998- 10 NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969. Therefore, we will not consider this 11 argument. 12 Defendants claim that they did not need to set forth a meritorious defense 13 because, where proper notice of the foreclos ure action was not provided to them, the 14 default judgment was “constitutionally infirm .” [MIO 6] In support of their 15 argument, Defendants cite to Capco Acquisub, Inc. v. Greka Energy Corp. , 2008- 16 NMCA-153, 145 N.M. 328, 198 P.3d 354, which cites to a United States Supreme 17 Court case that originated in Texas. We note that the discussion in Capcoconcerned 185 a rule governing amendment of pleadings, id. ¶ 41, and not a foreclosure action, and 1 the Supreme Court case applied Texas law. See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc. , 2 485 U.S. 80, 86 (1988). Those cases do not s upport Defendants’ claim that they were 3 not required to set forth a meritorious defens e in this case. Our case law requires that, 4 for relief under Rule 1-060(B) NMRA, a party petitioning to set aside a default 5 judgment must show grounds for vacating the judgment and a meritorious defense. 6 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ferri , 120 N.M. 320, 323, 901 P.2d 738, 741 (1995). 7 Moreover, as discussed above and contrary to Defendants’ claim that there had been 8 no service of process, Plaintiff made every effort to provide notice to Defendants even 9 though, as the district court stated, Defendants avoided contact with Plaintiff. [RP 10 154] We reject Defendants’ argument that notice of the foreclosure action was not 11 sufficient. 12 For the reasons discussed herein and in our calendar notice, we hold that the 13 district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ petition to set aside 14 the default judgment in this case. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16

_______________________________ 17 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 186 WE CONCUR: 1

____________________________ 2 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 3

_____________________________ 4 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 5