UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-4772

WALTER J. MOBLEY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge.

(CR-01-595-L)

Submitted: April 17, 2003

Decided: May 5, 2003

Before WIDENER, WILKINSON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Daniel W. Stiller, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.

Thomas M. DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Philip S. Jackson,

Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Walter J. Mobley appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm

after a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000).

The district court sentenced him to thirty months of imprisonment to

be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Finding no

error, we affirm. 

Mobley contends that the district court erred when it denied his

motion to suppress the statements he made to police during the execution of a search warrant at his residence. After police had recovered

a handgun located in a bag in the bedroom, Mobley spontaneously

stated, "I got that from a crack dealer down the street." Police then

gave Mobley his Miranda1 warnings, and Mobley repeated his selfincriminating statement. 

We review the district court’s factual findings underlying a motion

to suppress for clear error, and the district court’s legal determinations

de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United

States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). When a suppression motion has been denied, we review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government. See United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d

542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). 

Mobley contends that the statements he made to police were not

voluntary because they were made soon after police had deployed a

"flash-bang"2 designed to disorient and confuse him. For a statement

to be deemed involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, it must be obtained by (1) threats or violence; (2) direct

or implied promises; or (3) the exertion of improper influence. United

States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777, 782-83 (4th Cir. 1997). The voluntariness of a statement is determined by the totality of the circumstances,

1Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

2A "flash-bang," also known as a noise flash diversion device, is a

light and sound device that gives a very loud explosive noise and a bright

flash of light when released, and is designed to temporarily disorient and

confuse an individual so that police can gain a tactical advantage. 

2 UNITED STATES v. MOBLEY
including the characteristics of the defendant, the setting of the interview, and the details of the interrogation. United States v. Wertz, 625

F.2d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir. 1980). The key question is whether the

defendant’s will was "overborne" or his "capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired." United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d

1067, 1071-72 (4th Cir. 1987). 

We conclude that the district court properly found that Mobley

made the incriminating statements voluntarily. Two detectives present

at the scene testified that Mobley did not appear to be disoriented in

any way. In addition, Mobley stated to one of the detectives that the

"flash-bang" had no effect on him because he dove to the floor as

soon as he saw the device. Although Mobley’s statements may have

been ill-advised, there was no evidence that they were made as a

result of duress or coercion. Instead, Mobley’s statements were likely

an attempt to explain the presence of the handgun that police had just

found. 

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. MOBLEY 3