IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30200

SHARON INGRAM MARCHMAN, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

BRIAN E. CRAWFORD; LAWRENCE W. PETTIETTE, JR.; JAMES D. 

CALDWELL; CARL V. SHARP; FREDERIC C. AMMON; J. WILSON 

RAMBO; BENJAMIN JONES; ALLYSON CAMPBELL, 

 Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:16-CV-515

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case involves allegations by Louisiana State Judge Sharon Ingram 

Marchman that Defendant Allyson Campbell engaged in unethical and illegal 

activity during her tenure as a law clerk for Louisiana’s Fourth Judicial 

District Court (“Fourth JDC”). Judge Marchman alleges that after an ongoing 

dispute among Fourth JDC judges and staff about how to address Campbell’s 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 12, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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actions, Judge Marchman was ostracized, was accused of disclosing 

confidential information, and ultimately resigned from her position as chair of 

the personnel committee. Judge Marchman sued Campbell, Campbell’s 

attorneys, several Fourth JDC judges, and others under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 

1985, and 1986 alleging retaliation for exercising her First Amendment right 

to free speech and a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 

protection. Because Judge Marchman fails to sufficiently allege a violation of 

her constitutional rights, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Judge Marchman has been a duly-elected judge of Louisiana’s Fourth 

JDC, including the Morehouse and Ouachita parishes, since 2000. Allyson 

Campbell served as a law clerk for the Fourth JDC. Judge Marchman’s

complaint arises from Campbell’s alleged wrongdoings, her “attempts to expose 

Campbell’s actions,” and the defendants’ “cover-up.” Judge Marchman alleges 

that Judges Amman, Sharp, Jones, and Rambo (“Defendant Judges”)

retaliated by “threatening, intimidating, coercing, ridiculing, taunting, 

harassing, alienating, and making false accusations of wrongdoing against 

Judge Marchman,” preventing her from performing her duties as chair of the 

personnel committee, and forcing her to resign the position. 

Judge Marchman first became aware of Campbell’s misconduct in 2010 

when a law clerk complained to her about Campbell’s absenteeism from work. 

She notified Defendant Judges Rambo and Amman, for whom Campbell 

worked, but they were dismissive of Judge Marchman’s complaint. Judge 

Marchman insisted that Court policy required employees to work from the 

courthouse. 

In 2012, Cody Rials complained to Defendant Judge Sharp that 

Campbell, Judge Sharp’s law clerk, shredded Rials’s proposed judgment in a 

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case pending before Judge Sharp. Judge Sharp investigated the incident, found 

Rials’s complaints to be reasonable, and removed Campbell from matters 

involving Rials. Judge Rambo was notified, but Judge Marchman was not. 

In 2013, Stanley Palowsky III filed suit in the Fourth JDC against his

former business partner, W. Brandon Cork.1 The case was assigned to Judge 

Rambo. On August 13, 2014, Palowsky’s counsel, Sedric Banks, claimed that 

multiple pleadings were filed but missing and that information was withheld 

from Judge Rambo. Banks questioned Laura Hartt, the Court Administrator 

at the time, about Rials’s earlier complaint. Judge Rambo discussed Banks’s 

complaint in a personnel committee meeting, but stated that no documents 

were missing. Instead, the lost documents were attributed to a filing procedure 

error. 

On April 1, 2014, Hartt became aware that she could obtain key fob 

reports indicating when employees entered and exited the courthouse. Hartt 

notified Judge Marchman, who sought authorization from the chief judge to 

investigate Campbell’s key fob reports and corresponding video footage. The 

judicial administrator’s office reviewed Campbell’s attendance and hours 

logged and found that Campbell reported working hours on days she was not 

present. Judge Rambo and Judge Amman had approved Campbell’s false 

timesheets. Hartt determined that an employee’s absence from work when 

reported present was payroll fraud. On April 15, 2014, Jon K. Guice, an 

attorney who advised judges on the Fourth JDC, asked Hartt whether the court 

was an “auditee” under Louisiana law, requiring the agency head to 

immediately notify the legislative auditor and district attorney if she became 

aware of any misappropriation of funds. No such notification was ever made.

 

1 See Palowsky v. Cork, Fourth JDC Docket No. 13-2059. Judge Marchman’s attorneys 

in the instant action, Joseph Ward and Sedric Banks, also represented Palowsky in Palowsky 

v. Cork. 

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The judges met several times to discuss the matter, and they implemented new 

measures to prevent payroll fraud. Law clerks were required to sign in and out 

each time they entered or left the building. But Campbell refused to comply 

and falsified her sign-in sheet. The judges of the Fourth JDC met en banc on 

April 24, 2014, and agreed “to remove Campbell from the position of ‘senior law 

clerk,’ to terminate her stipend, and to suspend her for one month without 

pay.” 

After April 24, 2014, while Campbell was suspended, 52 post-conviction 

relief applications assigned to Campbell, but not yet processed, were 

discovered in her office. Campbell provided no explanation for why the 

applications were in her office. Campbell gave the employee who found the 

applications a $200 gift card. Although Judge Marchman would have been the 

one to investigate the incident as head of the personnel committee, she recused 

herself on June 17, 2014, from matters involving Campbell because Campbell 

was rumored to support an electoral opponent to Judge Marchman. Defendant 

Judge Jones discussed the issues at a personnel committee meeting on July 8, 

2014, but no action was taken against Campbell. 

On August 10, 2014, Judge Marchman first heard of Rials’s earlier 

complaints regarding Campbell. Rials read a column in a local newspaper, The 

News-Star, authored by Campbell. Rials interpreted the column as “goading

him” with the fact that Campbell shredded his document and evaded 

punishment. Rials complained to Judge Marchman, and Judge Marchman 

notified the chief judge. The chief judge directed Rials to submit a written 

complaint to the court. The investigation into Campbell was reopened, and 

Campbell admitted to shredding the document, but no action was taken 

against her. 

The Fourth JDC met en banc on September 12, 2014, to discuss the 

issues related to Campbell. Judge Marchman was not present, but voted by 

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proxy to terminate Campbell. The other judges decided instead to reprimand 

Campbell rather than terminate her. 

On September 22, 2014, Banks questioned the thoroughness of the 

investigation into his complaints. He also asked about “sealed evidence of 

criminal activity” that Banks provided Judge Rambo “but which still had not 

been seen by Judge Rambo weeks later.” On October 23, 2014, Palowsky filed 

a motion to recuse Judge Rambo from presiding over Palowsky v. Cork, which 

Judge Rambo granted. Campbell e-mailed Judge Sharp in November 2014 

requesting that he contradict Rials’s allegations. In an e-mail response, Judge 

Sharp stated he found no misconduct, and that Campbell never shredded 

anything. 

Around December 2014, the legislative auditor discovered that some 

employees were paid for time that they had not actually worked. The judges 

held a special meeting to discuss the issue. Judge Jones retired from the bench 

on December 31, 2014, replacing Hartt as Court Administrator after she 

resigned. Between February and March 2015, Johnny Gunter, a reporter with 

another local paper, The Ouachita Citizen, submitted a series of public records 

requests to the court requesting records related to Campbell, including 

personnel records and timesheets. The Fourth JDC only partially produced the 

requested documents, citing employee privacy. On March 3, 2015, The NewsStar reported that some Fourth JDC employees might have been paid for hours 

which they had not worked. 

The judges of the Fourth JDC met again on March 13, 2015. Judge 

Marchman again moved to terminate Campbell, but no one seconded her

motion. Judge Amman “screamed” at Judge Marchman that “she only wanted 

to fire Campbell because of what was being written . . . in the newspapers.” 

The judges also discussed the public records requests from The Ouachita 

Citizen. Judge Jones informed the judges that before the meeting, Campbell 

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gave him a folder with three documents. The documents contained “outright 

accusations and thinly-veiled threats against Judge Marchman,” a statement 

that Campbell had never worked on the Palowsky v. Cork case, and a 

statement that Judge Rambo had informed the attorneys that Campbell had 

not worked on the case. This was the first time Judge Marchman saw these 

documents. 

On March 20, 2015, Gunter filed a criminal complaint against the court 

for its failure to fully comply with his public records requests. At an emergency 

meeting not attended by Judge Marchman, the judges decided to file a petition 

for declaratory judgment against The Ouachita Citizen seeking a ruling that 

some of the requests contained confidential material that should not be 

disclosed.2 On April 14, 2015, the judges discussed what documents to produce 

to the presiding ad hoc judge in the declaratory judgment action. Judges 

Winters and Jones “were adamant that they would only produce the Rials 

letter and an outside consultant’s report.” Judge Jones stated: “There will be 

no testimony. Testimony will not be good for us,” in reference to an upcoming 

hearing. Judge Marchman repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, urged Judge 

Winters to reconsider this position and instead produce all documents related 

to Campbell.

On May 19, 2015, the ad hoc judge held a hearing at which Campbell’s 

counsel, not a defendant in this action, and Guice argued that documents 

related to Campbell were not subject to production. Guice and Campbell’s 

counsel also argued that there were no eyewitnesses to Campbell’s actions. But 

Judge Marchman alleges that Guice “knew full well that was not the case.” 

 

2 See Winters v. Hanna Media, Inc., Fourth JDC Docket No. 15-0770. Winters, on 

behalf of the Fourth JDC, argued that “Campbell’s right to privacy with regard to her 

employment file was stronger than the public’s right to know if its tax funds were being used 

to pay someone who was accused of committing payroll fraud.” 

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The ad hoc judge eventually ruled that the Fourth JDC’s response to the public 

records request was proper. 

On July 22, 2015, now-Chief Judge Winters and Defendant Judge Jones, 

serving as Court Administrator, met with Judge Marchman to request her 

recusal from an investigation of an unnamed employee. Judge Marchman 

refused, stating that she would not recuse herself unless they provided an 

explanation. Judge Marchman felt it was “abundantly clear” that “she was 

being prohibited from doing her job as the chair of the personnel committee.” 

She had to “get permission from the chief judge or Defendant Jones for 

anything she needed to do” and “was not allowed to do anything without Judge 

Jones’ involvement, and he became the de facto head of the personnel 

committee.” Because Judge Jones concealed problems from her and the 

personnel committee, Marchman resigned from her position as chair and 

member of the committee on July 27, 2015. 

Palowsky filed a civil suit against Campbell in state court accusing her 

of criminal conduct in destroying or otherwise improperly handling documents 

in Palowsky v. Cork.3 Then-Louisiana Attorney General Caldwell appointed 

Pettiette to serve as Special Assistant Louisiana Attorney General to represent 

Campbell. Campbell also retained a private attorney, Crawford, to represent 

her. Defendant Judges’ “hostile and demeaning treatment of Judge Marchman 

continued,” with the conflict between Judge Marchman and Campbell being 

referred to as a “cat fight.” On August 10, 2015, Judge Sharp accused Judge 

Marchman of leaking information to Palowsky in the Palowsky v. Cork case. 

On August 17, 2015, Palowsky served Judges Sharp, Jones, Winters, and 

Marchman with subpoenas duces tecum to produce documents related to the 

investigation of Campbell in connection with an upcoming hearing to recuse 

 

3 See Palowsky v. Campbell, Fourth JDC Docket No. 15-2179.

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the Fourth JDC from Palowsky v. Cork. Guice filed a broad motion to quash 

that arguably included Judge Marchman, “even though she had not sought 

relief.” Judge Marchman confronted Judge Sharp about the subpoena, and 

Judge Sharp told Judge Marchman that he granted the motion to quash after 

discussing the matter with Judge Jones. Judge Marchman and Judge Sharp 

apparently agreed that the order quashing the subpoena did not apply to Judge 

Marchman. On August 20, 2015, Judge Sharp presided over Palowsky’s motion 

to recuse the Fourth JDC from Palowsky v. Cork. At the hearing, Judge 

Marchman spoke up to make her return on the subpoena duces tecum. In 

response, Judge Sharp “spoke to Judge Marchman in a threatening tone and 

accused her of misinterpreting or ‘misremember[ing]’ what he had said the day 

before.” Judge Sharp then stated, “[c]omply with the subpoena if you wish. 

Give it to the litigants.” Judge Sharp directed Palowsky’s counsel to “do with 

it what you will.” Guice then approached Judge Sharp and had an off-therecord discussion before Judge Sharp terminated the hearing. 

Subsequently, on September 2, 2015, Judge Sharp told Judge Marchman 

that he intended to request that she be admonished at an upcoming en banc 

meeting for “that little stunt she pulled in his courtroom the other day.” The 

next day, Judge Rambo “glared at [Marchman], refused to speak to her, and 

[intentionally] walked into [her] as he was getting off the elevator.” At the en 

banc meeting on September 4, there was a matter marked “confidential” on the 

agenda, but Judge Sharp passed the matter, and no formal disciplinary action 

was taken against Judge Marchman. 

On November 2, 2015, Campbell and her attorneys, Defendants 

Crawford, Pettiette, and Caldwell, filed pleadings in Palowsky v. Campbell

accusing Judge Marchman of “improperly disclosing information about 

Campbell.” Judge Marchman alleges that Defendant Guice “encouraged and 

worked with Defendant Judges’ counsel to make these false allegations against 

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Judge Marchman.” The attorneys asserted that in her compliance with the 

subpoena duces tecum, Judge Marchman disclosed Campbell’s confidential 

information in violation of the ad hoc judge’s order in Winters v. Hanna Media. 

Judge Marchman disputed the allegations, and she claimed that the only 

disclosure of Campbell’s personnel records was in response to a valid subpoena 

duces tecum. 

On December 4, 2015, during the court’s monthly en banc meeting, Judge 

Amman sought a new local rule requiring court approval for all photographs 

and video taken at the courthouse. Judge Marchman claims that Judge 

Amman’s motion was designed to retaliate against her for the positive press 

she was receiving. The motion passed as modified to require approval by the 

chief judge only. 

In a January 2016 e-mail exchange, Chief Judge Winters requested that 

Judge Sharp and another judge notify Judge Marchman of committee meetings 

that were called. Judge Sharp replied that “he was not willing to notify Judge 

Marchman of meetings and that he would not serve on any committees with 

her.” Judge Marchman alleged that Judge Sharp intended to “undermine [her] 

authority and standing as a duly-elected judge.” Defendant Judges and 

Campbell “continue to retaliate” against Judge Marchman. Judge Marchman 

claims that she was singled out for disparate treatment, and is a “virtual 

pariah at the courthouse” “[s]imply because [she] tried to do the right thing 

and stop the cover-up of Campbell’s payroll fraud and document destruction.” 

She also alleges that she has “become extremely uncomfortable in her place of 

work,” is “ignored,” and is “being disparaged in the courthouse and in the 

community.” 

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B. Procedural Background

Judge Marchman filed suit against Defendant Judges, Crawford, 

Pettiette, Caldwell, Campbell, and Guice4 seeking monetary damages under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants deprived her of her First 

Amendment right to freedom of speech and her Fourteenth Amendment right 

to equal protection. She also brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, claiming 

that defendants conspired to violate her rights, and § 1986, claiming that 

defendants refused to stop the conspiracy. Her amended complaint also 

included claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

injunctive relief to prevent future violations of her First and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights and declaratory relief that defendants’ past actions violated 

the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, Judge Marchman brought a 

claim for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 

Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). On 

February 17, 2017, the trial court granted all Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. 

The court concluded that Judge Marchman failed to state a claim because she 

did not allege any violation of her constitutional rights, and dismissed her 

claims with prejudice. Judge Marchman timely appealed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo, 

“accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ibe v. Jones, 836 F.3d 516, 524 (5th Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 2013)). Generally, a court 

ruling on a motion to dismiss “may rely only on the complaint and its proper 

attachments.” Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 286 

 

4 Judge Marchman and Guice reached a settlement agreement. Guice did not 

participate in this appeal.

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(5th Cir. 2006). But a court may rely on “documents incorporated into the 

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” 

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). To 

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when a 

plaintiff pleads facts “allow[ing] the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[R]ecitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state actors who violate 

an individual’s rights guaranteed under federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To 

prevail on her § 1983 claim, Judge Marchman must first show a constitutional 

violation. Doe v. Columbia-Brazoria Indep. Sch. Dist. by & through Bd. of Trs., 

855 F.3d 681, 687–88 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting James v. Tex. Collin Cty., 535 

F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008)). Judge Marchman’s complaint alleges two 

possible violations of her constitutional rights by defendants. First, that 

defendants retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment right to 

free speech when she “tried to do the right thing and stop the cover-up of 

Campbell’s payroll fraud and document destruction.” Second, that defendants 

violated “her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by singling her 

out for unfavorable treatment without adequate justification.” The district 

court considered and dismissed her equal protection claim. Judge Marchman 

does not appeal the district court’s ruling on her Fourteenth Amendment claim. 

The survival of Judge Marchman’s complaint thus depends on the viability of 

her First Amendment claim.

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Defendants argue that Judge Marchman’s § 1983 claim fails because she 

has not shown any violation of her First Amendment rights. The district court 

concluded that “[a]t most, taking Marchman’s allegations as true, some 

Defendants’ actions in the instant matter may constitute unfriendly, rude, or 

perhaps less than professional conduct . . . . These actions simply do not 

constitute adverse employment actions under the relevant jurisprudence.” We 

agree. Judge Marchman fails to allege any retaliation for exercising protected 

speech under the First Amendment.

Judge Marchman claims that she meets the standard for First 

Amendment claims by public employees established in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 

U.S. 410 (2006), but she also argues that her claim should instead be governed 

by an alternative framework. First, she contends that her response as a 

witness to a lawful subpoena duces tecum was speech as a private citizen. 

Second, she claims First Amendment protection as an elected official as 

determined by this Court in Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2007). 

In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the district court addressed 

Judge Marchman’s arguments that her First Amendment claim is governed by 

an alternative framework, but it did not decide which framework applied. We 

need not repeat that analysis here, and we similarly need not decide which 

framework governs Judge Marchman’s claim. Under any retaliation 

framework, Judge Marchman failed to allege an adverse action in response to 

the speech claimed as protected.

For public employees, adverse action is an element that must be shown

to establish a retaliation claim. See Howell v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515, 522 

(5th Cir. 2016). For private citizens, the “requirement of an adverse 

employment action serves the purpose of weeding out minor instances of 

retaliation.” Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 

Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 510, 514 (5th Cir. 1999)). Adverse actions 

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include “discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and 

reprimands.” Pierce v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146,

1149 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also Sharp v. City of Hous., 164 F.3d 

923, 933 (5th Cir. 1999).5 The action must be objectively adverse; “[a] plaintiff’s 

subjective perception that a demotion has occurred is not enough.” Alvarado v. 

Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 614 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Forsyth v. City of Dall., 

Tex., 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 1996)). And cases involving elected officials 

impose strict scrutiny for content-based regulation of speech by elected officials 

when there are formal consequences in the form of censure or reprimand. See

Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 557–58, 560 (Order of Public Censure by the Texas 

Commission on Judicial Conduct imposed on an elected judge); Rangra v. 

Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 520–22 (5th Cir. 2009) (criminal penalties imposed on 

elected city council members), vacated on other grounds en banc, 584 F.3d 206 

(5th Cir. 2009); Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 204–05, 212 (5th Cir. 1990)

(formal public reprimand of an elected state justice of the peace by Texas 

Commission on Judicial Conduct). “[M]ere criticisms do not give rise to a 

constitutional deprivation for purposes of the First Amendment.” Harrington 

v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 1997).

We find that Judge Marchman has not alleged any formal reprimand or 

sanction for exercising her First Amendment rights. First, she claims that she 

was “publicly accused [] of illegally disclosing documents” by filing pleadings 

in Palowsky v. Campbell, and accused by Judge Sharp of leaking information 

to Palowsky. But the filing of pleadings alone cannot support a retaliation 

claim. “[F]alse accusations, verbal reprimands, and investigations [are] not 

 

5 The Supreme Court has suggested that the scope of harm actionable under the First 

Amendment may be broader than actual or constructive discharge from employment. See 

Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 74, 75 n.8 (1990); Sharp, 164 F.3d at 933. This 

Court has declined to expand actionable adverse actions beyond this list while recognizing 

that it is not exclusive. See Benningfield v. City of Hous., 157 F.3d 369, 376 (5th Cir. 1998).

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actionable adverse employment actions.” Colson, 174 F.3d at 511 (citing 

Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 376). Second, she argues that Judge Sharp 

threatened to seek Judge Marchman’s admonishment at an en banc meeting.

Judge Marchman’s admonishment by her colleagues could have constituted 

adverse employment action. See Scott, 910 F.2d at 212–13; Colson, 174 F.3d at 

511. But Judge Sharp never introduced such a motion, the judges never 

considered a motion to admonish, and she was never formally reprimanded. 

Third, Judge Marchman alleges that, as a result of defendants’ 

interference with her duties, refusal to serve on committees with her, and 

request to recuse herself from an investigation, she was forced to resign as 

member and chair of the personnel committee. Resignation could potentially

support a First Amendment claim as a constructive demotion. See Sharp, 164 

F.3d at 934. According to Judge Marchman, she resigned “after being 

pressured to recuse herself from a particular investigation, after having 

existing problems concealed from her, after having Defendant Judges refuse to 

discover or address potential problems, after being prohibited from doing her 

job without getting approval from Defendant Judge Jones first.” But 

defendants did not remove Judge Marchman from this position, and they 

lacked the power to do so. And Judge Marchman was pressured to recuse 

herself by Chief Judge Winters, who is not a defendant in this action, and 

Judge Jones, who at the time was the Court Administrator, an employee and 

subordinate of the judges. The recusal request was not only not an adverse 

action, but also not an action by an employer. Judge Marchman similarly 

resigned her position as chair of the personnel committee before she sought to 

comply with the subpoena duces tecum. Thus, her compliance with the 

subpoena could not have motivated her recusal or resignation. 

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Finally, Judge Marchman’s remaining allegations include various

interactions with other judges on the Fourth JDC.6 Many of her allegations 

amount to ostracism or unprofessional behavior rather than formal 

reprimands. This conduct may be unprofessional or perhaps even amount to a 

violation of state law, but that alone does not suffice to assert a constitutional 

violation. In the Title VII context, this Court observed that “boorish remarks

and childish horseplay,” though “undoubtedly offensive,” were “not sufficiently 

severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile or abusive work 

environment” and could not constitute adverse employment actions. McCoy v. 

City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557–58 (5th Cir. 2007). Similarly, we have 

found that in the Title VII context, ostracism is not grounds for a retaliation 

claim. See Brazoria Cty., Tex. v. EEOC, 391 F.3d 685, 693 (5th Cir. 2004). Judge 

Marchman appears to highlight a disagreement among the Fourth JDC 

regarding how to handle professional matters. And “retaliatory criticisms, 

investigations, and false accusations that do not lead to some more tangible 

adverse action are not actionable under § 1983.” Colson, 174 F.3d at 513.

Speaking out against perceived injustices at the risk of damaging working 

relationships no doubt requires substantial courage, but not every consequence 

suffered in connection with speech amounts to a constitutional violation.

Judge Marchman fails to show that she suffered any adverse action, a 

necessary element of her First Amendment retaliation claim. Thus, her § 1983

claim was properly dismissed because she failed to allege a violation of the 

Constitution. Accordingly, her related claims were also properly dismissed. See 

 

6 For example, Judge Marchman alleged that other judges on the Fourth JDC referred 

to the conflict between Campbell and Judge Marchman as a “cat fight,” Judge Sharp spoke 

to Judge Marchman in a “threatening tone,” Judge Amman “screamed” at her in a meeting, 

and Judge Rambo “glared at her, refused to speak to her, and [intentionally] walked into 

Judge Marchman as he was getting off the elevator.” She also alleged that Judge Sharp 

refused to include her on his e-mails or serve on committees with her.

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42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, 1988; see also Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652–

53 (5th Cir. 1994) (Section 1985).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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