### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00214- CV

Lu A nn N ye , A ppe lla nt

v. Millicent Buntin , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WILLI AMSO N COUNTY , 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 00-5 55- C26, H ONO RAB LE BI LLY RAY STUB B LEF IELD, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Lu A nn Ny e app eal s from a

jud g me nt a

wa rd inghe r $ 25 0 f

or los t e arn ing s in
connec tion with personal injuries ar ising fr om an automobile collision. She complains (1) that the distric t c o u rt e r

r e d b y f a il in g to a d mi t h e r

me d ic a l c o s t a f

f id a v it s in to e v id e n c e , an d ( 2 ) th a t t he jury ’s damag e aw ard of

only $250 was not supported by leg ally or fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence and
wa s ma nif e stl y un jus t. We a ff

ir m. At a bo ut 7 a .m. on

No ve mbe r 1 1, 19 98 , N y e ’s pic ku p wa s r e ar- e nd e d b y a sp ortutilit y vehi cl e d ri v en by

Milli cent B untin. The parties diff ere d on the re lative movement of the vehicles at the time of the collision. Ny e testified that she was stopped a s the fourth or f ifth in a line of c ars wa iti nga t a

sto pli g ht wh e n sh e wa s hit
. B un tin te sti fi e d that th e c ars we re tr a ve lin g a t le a st forty -five miles pe r hour whe n Ny e bra ked unexpectedly . The police repor t refle cted that the
acc ident occur

red two- tenths of a mile fr om the intersec tion. Buntin testified that her brake s worked2

at first, but then fa iled. Her front bumper

went under

the re ar bumpe r of Ny e’s pickup. A fter the
c oll isi on , th e be d o f t

he pic ku p re ma ine d ab ou t two inc he s d isp la c e d f ro m it s p re vio us a lig nme nt. Ny e ’s pic ku

p w a s d ri ve n a wa y fr om t he a c c ide nt. Ny e testified that the forc e of the collision c aused her to hit her head on the back of the pi ckup cab ( s ix t o e ig h t i n c h e s f r o m h e r n o r ma l d r iv in g p o s it io n ) , le a v in g a kn o t o nh e r

h e a d. She missed a day

of work, wh ich cost her

$226. Ny e testified that she had seve re he adac hes for about ten months that aff

ecte d her thinking. She claimed she also had pain in her ne ck, shoulders and upper back, lowe r bac k, rig ht hip, and rig ht knee. There was e vidence of other pa in-inducing incidents in Ny e’s life . She had bee n sid e sw ipe d o n a

n icy freeway

in 1 99 4, and

c la ime d ma

ny of the same ty

pe s o f i nju

ri e s sh e c la ims in t his c a se . Sh e te sti fi e d th a t sh e be lieve d th at th e 19 94 inj ur ie s ma de he r m or e su sc e pti ble to muscle injuries. B untin presented e vidence that Ny e wa s rec eiving treatment for pain in 1994 and 1995 and that, in 1996, Ny e had te sts for pain in her lower back a nd rig ht hip and leg . Ny e pulled muscles in her ba ck whe n moving he r belong ings to a new house in 1997. Buntin also pre sented
e v i d e n c e t h a t , i n 1 9 9 7 , N y e s o u g h tt r e a t m e n tf o r a t w i s t e d r i g h tkn e e an d

a b r o k e ne l b o w . N ye te sti fi e d th a t, b y

19 98 , s he wa s mos tly pa in- fr e e fr om the 19 94 inj ur ie s, a lth ou g h s he oc c a sio na lly pulled muscles that she tre ated by taking pain medication. Other evide nce show ed Ny e re ported chronic lower ba ck pain at an examination in April 1998, and that she soug ht pain medication for a pinche d nerve in h er back on Nove mber 2, 1998—nine da y s befor e the c ollisi on with Buntin. After the ac cident, she twic e injured muscles in her back while moving patients as part of he r job as an x-ray technicia n.3 Ny e testified r eg ardingthe impact of injuries from the collision on her life. She wa s unable to do simple household chor es for months after the acc ident. S h e d i d not make as muc h
mon e y fr om h e r c le anin g bu sin e ss ( wh ic h s he ha d in a dd iti on to h e r x-r ay te c hn ic ian w or k) be c a us e she had to hire outside worker s. She missed attending ma ny of her daug hter’s a ctivities during he r senior y ear of 1998-99. Ny e’s da ug hter testified that Ny e cr ied a lot from the pa in and depr ession
and that un pa id m e dic a l bi lls c a

us e d c oll e c tor s to ha

ra ss t he m. Th e c oll e c tiv e pr e ssu re str a ine d th e ir previously

close re lationship. Ny e testified that she still suffe rs some fr om the injuries she incurr ed in the wr eck. She testified that her

rig h t h i p an d knee bothe r her . She also testified that she pa id a chiropr actor $3000 for tre atments and pa id $2452 for an e lectric al pain relief device , massag e thera py , and the installation of a jacuzzi tub t hat she uses twic e a da y to relieve stiffness and a ches. N y e attempted to introduce c ost affidavits reflec ting $14,562.92 in medical costs associate d with treatment for her
c omp la int s p urs uan t to Te xas C ivi l Pr a c tic e and Re me die s Co de Anno ta te d s e c tio n 1 8. 00 1 ( Wes t 1997). Howe ver, N y e fa iled to serve the se af fidavits timely

under s ec tion 18.001(d) and the tr ial court did not admit them into evidence
. Se e id . § 18.001(d).

The jury found that B untin’s ne g lige nce cause d the ac cident and a war ded Ny e $250 for lost income. The jury

found t hat Ny e suffere d no damag e for future lost income or for pa st and future phy sical pain, menta l ang uish, phy sical impairment, and me dical ca re. Although N y e has se vera l points on appeal, her complai n t s are two-fold. She
c omp la ins that th e me dic a l c os t a ff ida vit s e xclu de d b y

the tr ia l c ourt

be c a us e the y we re no t ti me ly
serve d on Buntin should have be en admitted bec ause the lateness was harmless. She also contends4

that the evidenc e is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to support the jury ’s failure to find that she
su ff e re d d a ma g e s b e y on d $ 25 0, re su lti ngin a n unju st v e rd ic t. We reviewa trial c ourt’s dec ision on the admission of evidence for a n abuse of discretion. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone , 9 72 S.W. 2d 35 , 4 3 ( Te x. 19 98 ); Taylor v. Te x as De p’ t of Pr ote c tiv e & Re

gu lator ySe rv s. , 1 60 S.W. 3d 64 1, 65 2 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 05 , p e t. denied) . A t ri al co u rt abuses its discre tion when it rules without reg ard f or any g uiding r ules or principles. City of Browns ville v. Alv arado , 897 S.W .2d 750, 754 (Tex.1995). An appe llate cour t
m u s tu p h o l d t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ev i d en t i ary ru l i n g i f t h er e i s an y

l egi t i m at e b as i s fo r t h e r u l i n g. Malone , 972 S.W .2d at 43 (c i t i n g S t a t e Bar of Texas v . Evans , 7 7 4 S. W. 2 d 6 5 6 , 6 5 8 n . 5 ( T e x. 19 89 )) . We wi ll n ot r e ve rs e a tr ia l c ourt fo r an e rr on e ou s e vid e nti ary ru lin g un le ss t

he e rr or pr ob a bly
cause d the re ndition of an improper judg ment. Id .; Tex. R . App. P. 44.1(a).

Nye’ s m ed i ca l co s taf

fi d av i t s we re ex cl u d edb ec au s e t h ey we re s er v edon Buntin af

ter the statut or

y de a dli ne . Ci vil pr a c tic e and re me die s c od e se c tio n 1 8. 00 1( d) re qu ir e s th a t “ [t]he pa rt y offe ring the af

fidavit in evidenc e or the party ’s attorne y must file the aff

idavit with the cler

k of the court a nd serve a copy

of the a ffidavit on ea ch other party to the case at least 30 day s befor e the day
o n wh i ch evidenc e is first pre sented at the trial of the c ase.” Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001(d). Although Ny e filed her affidavits with the clerk’s off ice on August 27, 2004 (more than t h i rt y d ays b e f

o r e t r i a l ) , s h e d i d n o t s e r

v e t h e m o nB u n t i nu n t i l S e p t e mb e r 7 , 2 0 0 4 ( w i t h i nt h i rt y d ays of tr ia l) . A ft e r r e c e ivi ngthe c os t a ff ida vit s o n Sep te mbe r 7 , B un tin fi le d a nd se rv e d a n a ff ida vit controve rting Ny e’s c ost affidavits on September 13, 2004. Evidence was fir st presente d at trial on5

September 28, 2004. N y e conc edes that she did not meet the statut o ry d ea d l i n e for service under section 18.001(d)
. Se e id
.

I n points o f er ro r two and ele ven, Ny e ar g ues that the trial c ourt should not have excluded the cost af

fidavits beca

use the purpose of the statute’ s thirty -day ser v i ce d eadline was
serve d. She contends that the purpose is to g ive the defe ndant an adequate opportunity to respond befor e trial. Bec ause B untin filed an af fidavit controve rting the cost af fidavits on September 13, 2004—actua ll y

w it h in th e statutory

timeframe for suc h responsive a ffidavits—Ny e conte nds that her tard ine ss i n s e rv ingthe c os t a ff ida vit s did no t ha

rm B un tin
. Ny e a lso c on te nd s th a t B un tin ’s tim e ly filing a nd service of the c ontrovertingaff idavit constituted a waive r of the r ight to cha lleng e the admissibili ty

of the cost aff

idavits on timeliness g rounds. Acc ording ly , Ny e ar g ues, the district cour t
e rr e d b y e xclu din g he r a ff

ida vit s. The district cour

t did not abuse its discretion by excluding the cost aff idavits. The L eg islature set out the deadline for service of cost aff idavits in mandatory

lang uag e. See id. Whil e
e xclu sio n is no t e xpre ssl y the on ly po te nti a l c on se qu e nc e of no nco mp li anc e , it is a re a so na ble sanction bec ause of

the re quirement that a

n aff idavit “must” be serve d timely . The fa ct that B untin’s controve rt ing a ffidavit wa s timely filed does not cur e the untimeliness of the se rvice of Ny e’s aff idavits. Nor does the f

act that t h e controverting a ffidavit wa s filed prove that Buntin wa s not harme d by

the late se rvice of Ny e’s c ost affidavits. We f ind no support for the pr oposition t hat the timely filing of controve rting aff

idavits waives the r ight to conte st the admis sion of untimely filed
c os t affidavit s. Th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a c t w ith ou t r e g ard

to guid ingru le s and

pr inc ipl e s in concluding that Ny e’s failure to comply with the s tatute re ndere d the af fidavits inadmissible to prove6

rea sonablene ss and nec essity
. See Rodriguez-Narrera v. Ridinger , 19 S.W
. 3 d 5 3 1 , 5 3 3 ( T e x. App.—For

t Worth 2000, no pet.). We overrule points two and e leven. I n point of err or three , Ny e conte nds that her c ost affidavits shoul d not have be en excluded beca

use the ser

vice wa s late due to the “ virtual l as t -m i n u t e cance llation of the pretr ial confere n ce . ” W hile the ca ncellation of the pretria l confe renc e may have thwa

rted he r intended persona l service of the doc uments at the hea ring , neither N y e’s brief nor the re cord e x plains why the
canc ellation of the pre trial confe renc e dela y ed the se rvice of documents by some other method f or
mor e tha n a we e k. Th e c anc e llatio n o f t he pr e tr ia l c on fe re nc e do e s no t e xcu se the fa ilure to c omp ly with se ction 18.001(d). There fore , it doe s not make the exclusion of the untimely cost aff idavits an abuse of discretion. We over

rule point three
. By points of error

eig ht and nine, Ny e argues that the district court e rre d by failing to r e c on sid e r a

nd re ve rs e the e xclu sio n o f t

he c os t a ff ida vit s b e c a us e B un tin ’s c on t

r ov e rt inga ff

ida vit pr oo f w a s in a de qu a te . B y po int s o f e rr or

te n a nd fo ur te e n, sh e c on tends that th e c os t a ff ida vit s should have be en admitted whe n it became clea r that the evidence at t rial was about t o close without qualified proof

rebutting her c ost affidavits. Ny e ar g ues that the inade quacy of the c ontroverting aff idavit to rebut her una dmitted c ost affidavits should result in t he admission of her aff idavits. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 18 .0 01 (f ) (We st 19 97 ). Th e ru le , o f c ours e , c ann ot w or k th is way . Neither the cost aff

idavits nor the controve rting aff idavit w ere admitted, so any inadequa cies in t he c on tr ov e rt inga ff

ida vit are imm a te ri a l. E ve n if the me re me nti on of the c on tr ov e rt inga ff

ida vit somehow af

fec ted the jury , any

inadequa cy

of the c ontrovertingaff

idavit does not alter the tardySe c tio n 1 8. 00 1 ma ke s su c h h e ars ay

a ff ida vit s a dm is si bl e if

a lit ig ant c omp lie s w ithits 1 proce dures. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 1 8. 00 1 ( Wes t 19 97 ); see also Be auchamp v

. Hambrick, 901 S.W .2d 747, 749 (Tex. A pp.—Eastland 1995, no writ). Absent complianc e with the 7 service of the c ost affidavits or t h e propriety of their e x clusion and ca use their a dmission t o be mandatory . We overrule points eight, nine, te n, and four teen. By point of err or seve n, Ny e re iterate s her pr evious arguments conce rning the exclusion of the cost aff

idavits a nd the inadequa cy of the controve rting aff idavit and contends that the trial cour

t erre d by overr uling he r motion for mistrial based on those as s er t i ons. We review a trial court’s denial of a mistrial unde r an abuse of discre tion standard. Lewis v. United Parcel Serv ., Inc. , 175 S.W .3d 811, 815 (Tex. App.—Ho u s t o n [ 1 s t Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) . Ny e moved f or a mis tr ia l be c a

us e sh e wa s n ot ab le to examin e Dr . Bi ll Tur pin , Bunti n’ s a ff

iant, in c ourt . D r. Turp in
was desig nated as a witness in 2001 but ne ver de posed. B untin’s counsel re prese nted at trial without
co n t ra d i ct i o nt h at Dr
. T u rp i nwa s u n ab l e t o at t en d t h e t ri al b ec au s e h e s u ff er ed a b ra i nh em o rrh age the day befor e he w as to testify . Most critical to the m erits of the motion, Dr. Tur pin’s controve rting af fi d av i twa s n o tad m i t t ed i n t o ev i d en ce . T h er e wa s n o erro r b y t h e co u rt t o co rr ec tb y d ec l ar i n g a mistrial. W e over

rule point seven. By points of error twelve and thirteen, Ny e contends that the t rial court erre d by not admitting t h e co s t af

fidavits for the limited purpose of showing the g enuinene ss of her pa in and suffe ring and supporting the cr edibility of her complaints. An appellate court must uphold the trial court’s e videntiary

ruling if there is any

leg itimate basis for the ruling
. Malone , 972 S.W .2d at 43; Evans , 7 7 4 S. W. 2 d a t 6 5 8 n . 5
. E v e n if N y e o f f e r e d th e a f

f id a v it s f o r th e li mi te d p u r

p o s e of bolstering her te stimony , the af fidavits are hear say . Ny e’s arg ument that the affidavits support the 1timeliness section 18.001(d), such a ffidavits ar e hea rsay and mus t qualify under an exception to the hear say rule to be a dmissibl e. See Tex. R. Evi d. 801-04. 8 cre dibilit y

of evide nce that she suffe red be cause of t his acc ident depends on the jury ’s ac cepta nce of the tr uth of the state me nts that the tr e a tme nts we re re a so na ble and ne c e ssa

ry . T hu s, the a ff

ida vit s
are out-of-c ourt statements offere d for the truth of t he matter asser ted and a re ina dmissibl e. See T e x. R. E vi d. 801( d) , 8 02 . T he re is n o s ho wi ngthat th e c os t a ff ida vit s are a dmi ssi ble de sp ite the ir hear say nature aside from their use as cost aff idavits unde r section 18.001. The district cour t did not
err by ex cl u d i n g t h em fr o m ev i d en ce as s u p p o rt fo r Ny e’ s t es t i m o n y ab o u t h er p ai n an d s u ff er i n g. We overrule points twelve and thirtee n.

The ove rruling of these points requires that we overrule Ny e’s fourth point of err or, by which she ur g es g ener ally that excluding the c ost affidavit proof, re n d er i ng judgme nt on the
e vid e nc e a dmi tte d, and

ov e rr uli nghe r m oti on fo r n e w t ri a l w a s e rr or . T he re wa s n o e rr or in excluding the e vidence . There fore , rende ring judgme nt without the cost affidavits as par t of the
rec ord and ove rruling her motion for new trial based on the exclusion of the aff idavits was not err or. By points of err or five and six , Ny e cha lleng es the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the evidenc e to support t he jury ’s verdict. She contends that the $250 awa rd i s ag ainst the gre at weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e and ma

nifestly wrongand unjust. She argues that the ve rdict that the $2 50 awa

rd is n ot s up po rt e d b y

any e vid e nc e that sh e wa s no t inj ur e d a nd dam ag e d, and

is instead contra

ry to the overw helming w eig ht of the evide nce. Parties attacking the leg al sufficie ncy of an adve rse f inding on a

n issue on which they have the burden of

proof must furthe r demonstrate that the evide nce c onclusively established all vital9

fac ts in support o f t he issue. Do w Ch e m. Co. v . F ra nc is , 4 6 S. W. 3 d

2 3 7 , 2 4 1 ( T e x. 2 0 0 1 )
. We examine the rec ord for

evidenc e supporting the finding that rea sonable juror s could b el i ev e, disreg arding all contra

ry evidenc e that re asonable jurors could ig nore. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005). I f the proposition contra ry to the verdic t is established as a matter of law, we must render

judgme nt for that proposition. Dow , 46 S.W .3d at 241. I f a ju r y ’ s v e r d ic t i s s o a g a in s t t

h e g r e a t w e ig h t a

n d p r e p o n d e r an c e o f

th e e v id ence as to be manifestly unjust, we must rever se the judg ment. Se e In re Kin g’ s E sta te , 244 S.W .2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951). A jury

may not ignor e undisputed facts and ar bitrarily fix an amount of da

mag es that is unf air or unjust. Horton v. De nny’s, I nc. , 1 28 S.W. 3d

25 6, 26 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —T y le r 2 00 3, pe t. denied) . I n revie wing a fa ctual suff iciency point, we must consider a ll of the evidenc e in the re cord. S e e O r ti z v. Jones , 9 1 7 S
. W .2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996). We cannot set a side a judg ment on appea l
mere ly beca use this Court would have we ighe d the evide nce dif fer ently or re ache d another conclusion, but only

if it is so aga inst the gr eat we ight a nd preponde ra n ce of

the evidenc e to be manifestly

wrongand unjust. See Cropper v . Caterpillar Tractor Co. , 7 5 4 S. W. 2 d 6 4 6 , 6 5 1 ( T e x. 1988). Nye’s c ontention that the collision cause d h er i m m ed i at e a n d

l as t i n g i n j u ri es u n d er l i es her da mag e cla ims. S he conte nds that the jury should have awa

rded her damag es for past and future phy sical pain a

nd mental angui s h , phy sical impairment, and me dical ca re. She c laims that her pickup’s bed w as twisted by the forc e of the acc ident, demonstratingthat a sig nificant for ce hit her
. She argues t h at , althoug h she had suf fer ed similar injuries bef ore the collision at issue and took pr e sc ri pti on

pa in m e dic a tio n in te rm itt e ntl y , s he wa s pai n- fr e e be fo re the a c c ide nt. She te sti fi e d th a t,10

within the day

afte r the c ollisi on, s he had a lump on her hea d from hitting it on the bac k window, tightness in her

shoulders, and pa in in her nec k, lower back, right hip, and right kne e. She testified that, for the ne x t ten months, she had seve re he adac hes that interf ere d with her a

bility to think. S he eventua lly

soug ht a neur ologist’s he lp in diag nosing the cause , but a n MRI did not reve al a sourc e for her pain. Some pa in-killing drug s wer e inef fec tive. Others, take n by

pill and injection, reduc ed the pa in b ut d id n ot e lim inate it. S he us ed an ele c tr ic a l pa in c on tr ol d e vic e . B y the tim e of

tr ia l, some six y ear s after

the colli sion, she t estified that, although she w as mostly rec overe d, she still had joi nt a nd ba c k p a in a

nd tig ht s ho uld e r m

us c le s. B un tin c on te nd s th a t su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e s u

p p o r t s t h e j u r y ’ s r e f u s a l t o a wa rd dama g e s. She relies on evidence from the scene , Ny e’s pr evious and subseque nt injuries, and the subjec tive nature of the e vidence supporting N y e’s c laim. She points out that Ny e did not report injuries at the
scene and wa s not transporte d by emer g ency service s to a hospital. She ref ers to the police repor

t of minimal damag e to the vehic les and the f act that Ny e’s truck was dr iven, not towed, fr om the
scene . Buntin re lies on Ny e’s testimony about her pre- collision pain and impairment in the are as she comp l ai n s we re injure d in the collision with Buntin—especia lly the complaints of pain a nd impairment arising from the 1994 collision. Buntin prese nted testimony and evide nce f rom doctors who treated Ny e for

simil ar injuries suf

fered in the 1994 collision. Buntin also ref ers to Ny e’s
a dmi ssi on

of po st- a c c ide nt i nju

ri e s ari sin g fr om o the r s ourc e s. Wh i l e a j u ry

cannot ig nore obje ctive evide nce of injury , it may

reje ct subjective claims of pain. Gonzalez v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 14 3 S. W.3 d 1 18 , 1 23 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio11

20 04 , no pe t.) . T he jur

y may a lso we ig h te sti mony

re g ard ingpr e vio us or

su bs e qu e nt i nju

ry and its eff ect on the c omplaining pa rty
. Id
. The jury had ample te stimony

from Ny e re g ardingthe pain she suf fer ed both bef

ore
and a ft e r the a c c ide nt. Th e jur y re c e ive d su

bs tanti a l e vid e nc e of pr e vio us and su bs e qu e nt i nju

ri e s. I n r eachi ng a ver dic t awa rd ingno thi ngon

the se me a sure s o f d a ma g e s, the jur y ma de c re dib ili ty deter minations that we ca

nnot look behind or overturn. There is no showing that the j ury was biase d or pre judiced. The rec ord conta ins more t h an a s cint illa of evidenc e fa voring the ver dict. The verdic t is not aga inst the gr eat we ight a nd preponde ra n ce o f t he evide nce. We ove rrule points of
e r r o r f iv e an d s ix. By her r emaining p o i n t s o f error, Ny e conte nds that the err ors asser ted in her br ief independe ntly and cumulatively require the re versa l of this judgment. Having f ound no err or whe n consideringNy e’s other

points of error , we ove rrule N y e’s points of er ror one and fifte en. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.

G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 11, 2006