Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

DAN J. MAY CRAIG PERSINGER

Kokomo, Indiana Marion, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN RE THE PATERNITY OF: )

L.M.J. b/n/f )

)

D.R.D., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 34A02-1305-JP-458

)

C.A.J., )

) 

Appellee-Petitioner. )

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Thomas C. Perrone, Special Judge

Cause No. 34C01-9507-JP-72

December 11, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge
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CASE SUMMARY

Appellant-Respondent D.R.D. (“Mother”) and Appellee-Petitioner C.A.J. (“Father”) 

are the parents of L.M.J. (“Daughter”). In 1998, the trial court issued an order (the “1998 

Order”) regarding the support of Daughter. Under the terms of the 1998 Order, Father was 

obligated to pay $94.00 weekly in child support. Father was also obligated to pay additional 

child support when certain conditions were met. In October of 2011, Mother filed a motion 

for a rule to show cause, claiming that Father had failed to pay child support beyond his 

$94.00 weekly obligation pursuant to the terms of the 1998 Order. Mother appeals following 

the denial of her request for summary judgment on this issue. We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother and Father are the parents of Daughter who was born on October 3, 1994. In 

an order dated July 10, 1998, the trial court determined that Father’s weekly gross income

was $448.00. Based on this weekly gross income, the trial court ordered Father to pay child 

support in the amount of $94.00 weekly. The trial court also recognized that Father had a 

history of earning additional income due to overtime opportunities and bonuses, and set forth 

certain conditions under which Father would become obligated to pay additional child 

support. 

On October 25, 2011, Mother moved for a rule to show cause, claiming that Father 

had failed to pay child support beyond his $94.00 weekly obligation pursuant to the terms of 

the 1998 Order. Mother subsequently filed a motion seeking summary judgment on her 

motion for a rule to show cause. On November 14, 2012, the trial court heard argument from 
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the parties regarding Mother’s summary judgment request. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the trial court took the matter under advisement. 

On February 26, 2013, the trial court issued an order denying Mother’s request for 

summary judgment. In doing so, the trial court stated that it was “not persuaded by 

[Mother’s] interpretation of [the 1998 Order] and submission of how to do the calculation of 

the support due.” Appellant’s App. pp. 18-19. The trial court further stated that “an 

additional hearing is needed to determine the proper amounts to be included in a calculation 

of overtime opportunities and/or bonuses.” Appellant’s App. p. 19. Mother subsequently 

sought, and was granted, permission to bring the instant interlocutory appeal.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Mother contends that the trial court erroneously denied her motion for summary 

judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 56(C) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, summary 

judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 

when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When 

reviewing a decision to grant summary judgment, this court applies the same 

standard as the trial court. Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702, 

705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). We must determine whether there is a genuine issue 

of material fact requiring trial, and whether the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Id. Neither the trial court nor the reviewing court 

may look beyond the evidence specifically designated to the trial court. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden to make a prima 

facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. American Management, Inc. v. 

MIF Realty, L.P., 666 N.E.2d 424, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Once the moving 

party satisfies this burden through evidence designated to the trial court 

pursuant to Trial Rule 56, the non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings, 

but must designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine 

issue for trial. Id. 
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Heritage Dev. of Ind., Inc. v. Opportunity Options, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 881, 887-88 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2002). Upon review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment, this 

court stands in the shoes of the trial court and considers only those materials properly 

designated before the trial court pursuant to Trial Rule 56. Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 

N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. 2010). The party appealing the trial court’s denial of summary judgment 

bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court erred. New Albany-Floyd Cnty. Educ. 

Ass’n v. Ammerman, 724 N.E.2d 251, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

In challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion for summary Judgment, Mother 

claims that the language of the 1998 Order is unambiguous. Mother also claims that the only 

reasonable interpretation of the language of the 1998 Order was that proffered by Mother, 

and that by rejecting Mother’s proffered interpretation, the trial court impermissibly modified 

the 1998 Order. We disagree.

Although, like a divorce decree, an order establishing a parent’s child support 

obligation may be considered final, in the case of an alleged ambiguity, we must interpret the 

order as we do any other contract. See Overholtzer v. Overholtzer, 884 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2008).

The interpretation and construction of contract provisions is a function for the 

courts. On appeal, our standard of review is essentially the same as that 

employed by the trial court. Unless the terms of a contract are ambiguous, they 

will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Niccum v. Niccum, 734 N.E.2d 

637, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The terms of a contract are not ambiguous 

merely because controversy exists between the parties concerning the proper 

interpretation of terms. Id. Where the terms of a contract are clear and 

unambiguous, the terms are conclusive and we will not construe the contract or 

look at extrinsic evidence, but will merely apply the contractual provisions. Id.
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Id. Furthermore, when trying to ascertain the intent of the parties, the court will read the 

contract as a whole and will make all attempts to construe the language in the contract so as 

not to render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless. The Winterton, LLC v. 

Winterton Investors, LLC, 900 N.E.2d. 754, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. “The 

court must accept an interpretation of the contract that harmonizes its provisions rather than 

one that causes the provisions to conflict.” Id.

Here, the relevant portions of the 1998 Order read as follows:

5. The Court finds that [Father’s] child support obligation herein 

should be and is herein modified to the sum of ninety-four dollars ($94.00) per 

week, which sum is determined by an application of the Indiana Child Support 

Guidelines to the following findings:

a. [Father’s] weekly gross income based on a 40 hour work 

week is $448.00[.]

...

7. The Court further finds that [Father] has a history of earning 

additional income due to overtime opportunities and/or bonuses, and that in 

addition to his regular weekly support of $94.00 per week, he shall pay 

additional sums for support on a periodic basis. Said additional sums shall be 

calculated as follows: 15% of [his] gross income in excess of $448.00 per 

week. Said additional support shall be paid no less than quarterly, with

payment due for the preceding quarter within ten (10) days of January 1, April 

1, July 1, and October 1 of each year.

Appellant’s App. pp. 21-22.

Mother argues that paragraph seven provides that Father was required to pay 

additional child support in the amount of 15% of all gross income in excess of $448.00, 

irrespective of how said gross income was earned. Mother’s argued interpretation of Father’s 

child support obligation would require the court to read the provisions of paragraph seven 

separately, as opposed to as a whole. This we should not do. Again, in trying to interpret 
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contractual language, this court reads the document as a whole and attempts to construe the 

language therein so as not to render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless. 

See Winterton, 900 N.E.2d at 759. In doing so, we accept the interpretation of the document 

that harmonizes its provisions rather than cause them to be in conflict. Id.

Reading all relevant portions of the 1998 Order together, we are convinced that the 

additional support obligation set forth in the 1998 Order is dependent upon additional gross 

income that was earned through “overtime opportunities and/or bonuses.” Appellant’s App. 

p. 21. The first sentence of paragraph seven explicitly states that Father “has a history of 

earning additional income due to overtime opportunities and/or bonuses, and that in addition 

to his regular weekly support of $94.00 per week, he shall pay additional sums for support on 

a periodic basis.” Appellant’s App. pp. 21-22. The court used the word “and” to connect the 

explanation of how Father earned the additional income to its statement he shall pay 

additional support on a periodic basis. This connection leads to the reasonable interpretation 

that the trial court intended to base the additional child support obligation upon the earning of 

additional income through overtime opportunities and bonuses. 

The second sentence of paragraph seven goes on to state that “[s]aid additional sums 

shall be calculated as follows: 15% of [his] gross income in excess of $448.00 per week.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 22. The second sentence clearly refers back to the first sentence. As 

such, when read together, these sentences indicate that Father’s obligation to pay additional 

child support was dependent upon his earning additional gross income through “overtime 

opportunities and/or bonuses.” Appellant’s App. p. 21. Acceptance of Mother’s contrary 
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interpretation would, in effect, amount to a retroactive modification of the 1998 Order 

through an unreasonable interpretation of the language.

Because we conclude that the 1998 Order, when read as a whole, indicates that 

Father’s obligation to pay additional child support is dependent upon his earning additional 

gross income through bonuses and/or overtime opportunities, we conclude that the trial court 

did not err in denying Mother’s request for summary judgment. Furthermore, it is important 

to note that had Mother believed that Father’s base gross pay had increased at any time after 

the 1998 Order went into effect, Mother could have raised the issue with the trial court by 

requesting a modification of the 1998 Order. Mother, however, chose not to do so. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

MATHIAS, J., and PYLE, J., concur.