## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

NO. P D- 1113-07
CA RL OS RIVAS , A ppe lla nt

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS
On D isc r e ti ona r y R e vie w of Ca se 04 -0 6- 00 37 5- CR of t he F our th Co ur t o f Appe als , Bexar County
W O M ACK , J ., de liv e re d th eop ini on for a u na nim ou s Co ur t.
I
. The issue in this case is whether the appellant’ s objections to the State’s evidenc e we re
su ff ic ie nt t o p re se rv e the tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g s f or a pp e a l. A l uc id s tate me nt o f t

he re qu ir e me nts fo r o bje c tio ns wa s ma de in t his c ourt ’s op ini on

in Lan k sto n v . S tate , 827 S.W .2d 907, 908–09 (1992). Our s y ste m of

jus tic e is c ha

ra c te ri sti c a lly

a dv e rs ari a l. O ne c on se qu e nc e is that ma ny su bs tanti ve and

pr oc e dura l f

e atur e s, e sp e c ia lly

mos t e vid e nti ary

ru le s, are rea lly optional with the parties. Although we may speak of evidenc e as inadmissible, it i s more pre cise, if not more corr ect, to say that the rules make(R iv as - 2)

su c h e vid e nc e ob

je c tio na ble . Ind e e d, thi s is jus t ano the r w ay of c a lli ngatte nti on

to the fa c t th at no iss ue c on c e rn ingthe a dmi ssi bil ity of e vid e nc e e ve r a

ri se s unle ss on e of the pa rt ie s o bje c ts t o it
. It follows that the trial judg e’s r ole in the admission and exclusion of evidenc e is g ener ally

not called into play

unless a dispute deve lops betwee n the parties c oncer

ning the proper

application of a

n evidentiar

y rule. And be cause , absent a ny such dispute, our sy stem g ener ally expects him not t o interfe re w ith the prese ntation of evidenc e, it likewise does not fa ult him for refusingto interfer e when a party fails to make the ba sis for his objection known. B eyond this, there are no technica l considerations or form of wor ds to be used. Straightforwa rd communication in plain Eng lish will alway s suffice
. The standa

rds of proc edura l defa

ult, therefor e, ar e not to be implemented by sp littin gha ir s in

the a pp e llate c ourt s. As re g ard s sp e c if ic ity , a ll a pa rt y ha s to do to avoid the forf

eiture of a complaint on appe al is to let the trial judge know wh ath e w an t s , wh y

h e th i nk s h i m s el f e nt i t l edt o i t , an d t o d o s o cl earl y

en o u gh for the judg e to under stand him at a time when the trial court is in a prope r po sit ion to d o s ome thi nga

bo ut i t. O f c ours e , whe n it se e ms f ro m c onte xt that a pa rt y fa ile d e ff e c tiv e ly to c omm un ic ate his de sir e , th e n r e vie wi ngc ourt s sh ou ld not hesitate to hold that appellate complaints arisingfrom the e vent have been lost. But otherwise, the y

should reac h the merits of those c omplaints without requiringthat the par

ties rea d some specia l script to make their w ishes known. We k e e p th e se pr inc ipl e s in min d a s w e tur

n to the c a se be fo re us . I I
. T ri al P ro ce ed i n gs The trial wa s on five counts of a g gravated sexual assault of a c hild and one count of ind e c e nc y wi th a c hil d b y c onta c t. In July 20 03 , th e se ve n- ye ar- old c hil d w a s e xami ne d b y

Anne tte Santo s, a

Se xua l A ssa

ult Nurse E x aminer at the Alamo Children’s Advoc acy Center in San Antonio, followingan investigation by

Child P rotec tive Service s and the San Antonio Police De partment. The examination consisted of three pa rts: (1) a history

obtained fr om the child, (2) a head- to-toe phy sical examination of the child, and ( 3) an e x amination of the c hild’s ge nitals and anus. All of the phy sical examinations resulted in normal finding s. Santos’s written repor t of the history

is the
e vid e nc e in q

ue sti on fo r t his a pp e a l.(R iv as - 3)

The history

section of the r eport c ontained the c hild’s descriptions of more incidents of sexual assault, and greater de tail, than she testified to in court. The child repor ted that she wa s
se ve n whe n th e a

pp e lla nt c ame int o h e r r oo m on many oc c a sio ns . Sh e sa id “ it” ha pp e ne d “ lot s” of times in his room, in her room, and in the livingroom, and that the a ppellant told her that she couldn’t tell anyone about wha t happene d, or “me and mommy wouldn’t be tog ether .” She repor ted that “it” hur

t and that it made her

sad bec ause she didn’t like it. S he reported that the appellant licke d her “ front private” a nd “bac k private” and would make her lick “ his private,” and that if she did not, he w ould be “r eally mean” to her mother a

nd to her. Ac cordingto the medical history , the appe llant penetrated the child’s va g ina with his finge r and a nally penetr ated her w ith his penis. The victim also reported that the appellant’ s semen drippe d over he r torso by saying, “ the white stuff w ould come out of his private on me (motions hands over c hest and stomach ar eas) .” At the be g inn ingof

the tr ia l, t

he Di stric t Co ur

t gra nte d th e a pp e lla nt’ s thre e mot ion s in limine which order ed the State not to mention or allude to a total of seven matters in the pre sence of the jury

until a hear ing ha d been “ held outside the pre sence of the jury and prior to the Court’ s deter mination of releva

ncy as spec ified in th[ese] m otion[ s].” Two of the matters wer e: 1
. “a l l t es t i m o ny

wh i chco n s t i tut es i mp erm i s s i b l e b o l s t er i n g Black, 6 3 4 SW2 nd @ 358,” (sic ) and 2. “in the abse nce of

phy sical evide nce of

sexual abuse, any

expert testimony
conce rningthe diagnosis of sexual abuse based sole ly on the self r eporte d medical history of the c omplainant. Sa lin as v . S tate , 166 SW 3d 368, 369.”(R iv as - 4)

See R. E V ID . 8 0 3 (“T h e fo llo w ing a re no t ex c lud e d b y the he a rs a y ru le , ev e n tho u g h the d e c la ra n t i s 1 avai l ab l e as a wi t ness : ... (4) St at em ent s m ad e f o r purpo ses of m ed i cal diagnosi s o r t reat m ent and de scr i b i ng m ed i ca l hist o ry, o r p ast o r p rese nt sy m p t o m s, p ain, o r sensa t i o ns, or t he i nc ep t i o n o r ge ne ral cha rac t er o f t he ca use T h e a p p e l l antr a i s e d

th e s e tw o m att e r s wh e nth e S t at e c a l l e d S ant o s i ni t s c a s e - i n - c h i e f
. In the “ his tor

y” po rt ion

of he r r e po rt , s he ha d wri tte n d own what th e c hil d to ld h e r, ve rb atim , in quotation marks. She also jotted down, in pare ntheses, thing s the child was doingas she talke d. Outside the pre sence of the jury , the appe llant made ten objec tions (to which we have added some underliningand fr om which we ha ve omitted counsels’ r epeated uses of “ Your Honor” and “Judge ” in addr essingthe Court): First objection. “Well, we ar e g oing to a sk ... what she’ s expected to testify to reg arding
our M oti on

in L imi ne . T he y

are g oin gto c la im i t’ s a

me dic a l e xce pti on . We are g oin gto c la im absent – e ven with the medica l exception, in the absence of phy sical [evidence ], they ’re not allowed to testify .” (Empha sis added.) Second obje ction. After

the State told the court what the witness’s testimony would be (“Ms. Santos ... took a history , she did a he ad-to-toe , and she did a g enital exam. And that’s the basis of her

testimony”), the appellant objec ted furthe r: “Any statement that the c hild may have made in her

examination for purposes of whether or not it is or is not t he pre sence of sexual abuse c onstitut es impermissible bolsteringof this child subject to a showingof impeac hment.” (Emphasis adde d.) Th e c ourt a sk e d f or , a nd the a pp e lla nt p ro vid e d, c op ie s o f t

wo a pp e llate op ini on s to
su pp or t hi s o bje c tio ns . The State a

rgued that the medic al history was a dmissibl e hea

rsay pursuant to the exception for dec larations made for me dical diagnosis and treatment. It said that the appe llant’s 1(R iv as - 5)

o r ext ernal s o urce t hereo f i nsof ar as reas o nab l y pe rt i nent t o diagnosi s o r t reat m ent ”). prec edents we re not on point; one of them ha d to do with the admissibil ity of a me dical witness’s conclusion as to whe ther the c hild was sexually abused, a nd the other w ith a witness’s conc lusion as to whethe r the c hild was fanta siz ing. T he State said it would not ask Santos about either of tho se matte rs . Third obj ection. Th e a

pp e lla nt r e pli e d, “ Ho we ve r t

ha t’ s n ot t he pr inc ipl e . T he pr inc ipl e is, in the absence of phy sical evide nce of abuse, a statement or opinion whethe r a c hild has been phy sically

abused or

not, and all of the othe r information, constitut es impermissible bolsteringof the child’s testimony .” (Empha sis added.) Th e c ourt sa id, and the wi tne ss c on fi rm e d, that th e wi tne ss w ou ld n ot t e sti fy that th e c hil d was tellingthe truth. Fourth objection. Th e a

pp e lla nt t he n s a id, “ Wel l, t

he n le t’ s d e mon str ate wh e re the c hil d has bee n impeache d for the pur poses of he r allowingthem to rea d in her pre vious statement.” T h e c o urta s k e d , “ W h atar e yo ut a l k i n ga b o utn o w ?” Fifth objection. The a

ppellant re plied, “Well, that’s what she’ s g oing to do. She’ s g oing to rea d all her c omments about what the c hild told her and what she did, et ce tera , ultimately lead to a diagnosis or conclusion of sexual assault or not. They are back- dooringthat very case .” The c ourt overr

uled that objection. Sixth objection. The a

ppellant said, “F or purpose s of the examination, if you examine the document, ther e is a c onclusory statement in there conce rningsexual abuse. It’s a bac k door. You cannot do it.”(R iv as - 6)

When the State pointed out that the repor t said the examination was “norma l” and contained no c onclusion that sexual abuse had oc curr ed, the a ppellant re plied, “It doesn’t disallow it either. So it’s a bolsteringof sexual abuse by a phy sician and a

medical pe rson.” The c ourt overr

uled that objection. Seve nth objection. Th e a

pp e lla nt p re se nte d a

no the r a pp e llate op ini on , whic h th e State dis tin guis he d o n th e g ro un d th at it inv olv e d a

dia gno sis , whic h th e State wo uld no t a sk fo r i n th is
case . The a

ppellant re plied, “That is a back door .” T h e c o urts a i d , “ P ar d o nm e ?” Th e a pp e lla nt r e pli e d, “ Se e , in

that pa rt ic ula r c a se , th e re wa s a

c on fi rm atio n b e c a

us e it
was c onsistent. W e see that ever y day . In this particular c ase, the y are g oing to r

un the little girl’s t e s t i m o ny i na s t o wh ats h e s a i d h a p p e n e d , b o l s t e r i n gh e r

c r e d i b i l i ty, b o l s t e r i n gh e r t e s t i m o ny, and she ha sn’t been impea ched. F or that I would object bec ause that is improper bolstering .” Eighth objection . Santos told t he jury more a bout her tra ining a

nd experience , she identified her

written re port, and she te stified that her e x amination was pe rfor med for me dical purp os e s. Whe n th e State of

fe re d th e repo rt , th e a

pp e lla nt o bje c te d “ fo r t

he re a so ns pr e vio us ly state d r e g ard ingc a se s th at are pr e se nte d, and in t he Mo tio n in

L imi ne , whic h d ir e c tly

state it constitutes impermissibl e bolstering , constitutes hear say , and more importantly in this particular
case contains statements that may or may not have be en made entirely by the child as it perta ins to cer tain observations, and contains comments by the child and it’s impermissible bolsteringand(R iv as - 7)

he ars ay a s it pe rt a ins to t

he a lle g atio n. Un de r 4 04 and 40 3 it s p re

jud ic ia l va lue c e rt a inl y outweighs its probative value, c onsideringthe fa ct that we ha d a child her e who ha s testified.” The c ourt overr

uled the objec tion and admitted the re port. Ninth obj ection. When the State asked Santos to re ad from the repor t what the child had told her, the a

ppellant g ave the court a

n appellate opinion “that say s unless you impeach he r, you
c an’ t bringit i n, and

sh e ha s n ot b e e n im

pe a c he d. ... T he y

c an’ t r e a d h e r o wn

te sti mony . It is bolstering .” The c ourt overr

uled the objec tion. The a ppellant said he w as “g oing to r enew my objection eve ry

time and to ever

y line.” The c ourt said, “That’s fine.” Tenth objection . After

a fe w more que stions about the method of makingthe re port, the State asked Santos to re ad the history to the jury . The a

ppellant said, “I

object to the for

m. I object to the conte nts. Iobject that it’s impermissible bolsteringfor the r easons the c ases c ited. Mo st i mpo rt antl y , 4 03 ve rs us 40 2, pr e jud ic ia l va lue outw e ighs the pr ob ativ e va lue fo r t he of fe ns e as cha rg ed – as c harg ed, and I

would like a runningobjection to ever y line.” The c ourt grante d a runningobjection, but did not otherwise rule
. S ant o s r e a d

th e h i s t o r

y p o rt i o no f

th e r e p o rtt o th e j ur

y. The jury found the a

ppellant guilty

of four counts of ag gravated sexual assault and of the indece ncy with a child count. It assessed punishments of twe nty -five year s’ conf inement and a $2,000 fine on e ach c ount of ag g ravated sexual assault, and twelve year s’ conf inement and a $2,000 fine for

indece ncy

with a child.(R iv as - 8) I I I . Co ur t of Ap pe a ls On appe al, the appe llant’s first point of err or wa s that “the e vidence constituted improper bo lst e ri ngof

the c omp la ina

nt’ s te sti mony .” He argue d ( B ri e f at 17 -1 8, e mph a sis a dd e d) : B o l s t e r i n go c c ur s “ wh e no n e i t e mo f e v i d e n c e i s i mp r o p e r l y u s e d b y a party to add cr edenc e or w eight to some earlier unimpeache d piece of evide nce offe red by

the same pa

rty .” Coh n v . S

tate , 849 S.W .2d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 9 9 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Sle dgev . S tate , 686 S.W .2d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). When a sexual abuse examination is at issue, and there is no phy sical evidenc e of a

buse, the testimony

of the sexual assault examiner “c an only be see n as an attempt to directly

bolster the cr edibility

of the c omplainant and a dir ect comment on the complaina nt’s truthfulness.” Sa lin as v . S tate , 166 S.W .3d 368, 371 (Tex. App. – For

t Worth 2005, pet. ref’d)
. The line of que stions to Annette Santos reg ardingC.C.’s declar ations duringthe SANE exam was improper bolstering . No aspe ct of C.C.’s dec larations had bee n impeache d prior to the State’s que stions, and her de clar ations in the SANE examination were c onsistent with her prior testimony – if more de tailed and c omp le te . T he qu e sti on s in the repo rt

“ un de rl ine d” the c hil d’ s c re dib ili ty to the jury , to the extent that thi s evidenc e cove red items about whic h she had alre ady testified. ... The c ourt abused its discre tion when it overrule d the objection. Th e Court

of Ap pe a ls o ve rr

ule d th e po int

of e rr or , s aying : A g ener al objection to “bolstering ,” howe ver, is not suffic ient to preser ve er ror, beca use it does not sufficie ntly inform the trial c ourt of the nature of the objection. In re J

.G. , 195 S.W .3d 161, 183 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2006, no pet.). Be fore the adoption of the Rules of E vidence , “bolstering ” wa s a prope r objec tion wh e n o ne ite m of

e vid e nc e wa s u se d b y

a pa rt y to a dd c re de nc e or

we ight t o s ome earlier unimpeac hed evide nce that the same pa rty had off ere d. ... Montoya v

. Sta te , 43 S.W .3d 568, 573 n.2 (Tex. App.–Waco 2001, no pet.). “ Under case law e xistin gpr ior

to t he pr omu lg atio n o f t

he Rul e s o f E vid e nc e , b ols te ri ngan unim

peac hed witness wa s ‘automatica lly ’ er ror.” Montoya , 43 S.W .3d at 573 n.2. Howeve r, although the Texas Rules of Evidence incorporate some conc epts from
“ bo lst e ri ng ” in R

ule s 6 13 (c ) a

nd 60 8( a ), the Rul e s d o n ot c onta in a sp e c if ic ru le perta ining to or pr ohibiting “bolstering .” See id. Indeed, “ nothing in the Rules preve nts a party

from addingcre dence to an unimpeac hed witness or a dding cre dence to other evide nce a s long a s that additional evidenc e is rele vant.” Id. “ In fac t, the Rules favor a dmissibi lity .” Id. (citingTEX. R. EVID. 402, 403). “ Given the fo c us of

the Rul e s f

avo ri nga dmi ssi on , a s w e ll a s th e la c k o f a sp e c if ic pr oh ibi

tio n o f t his ty pe of e vid e nc e , a

n o bje c tio n th at c e rt a in e vid e nc e is ‘ bo lst e ri ng ’ i n(R iv as - 9)

R iv a s v . S ta te , s l i p op. a t 6, 2007 T ex . App. LEX I S 4395, a t 8–9 ( T ex . App. –Sa n An t on i o 2007) ( n ot 2 d esi gnat ed f

o r pub l i cat i o n). P l es s v. St at e, 576 S. W
. 2d 83, 84 (T ex. Cr. Ap p. 197 8) ( “ ‘ B ol s t er i ng ’ occu r s wh en one i t em of ev i dence 3 i s i mpr oper l y u s ed by a pa r t y t o a dd c r ede n ce or w ei g h t t o s ome ea r l i er u n i mpea ch ed pi ec e of e v i den ce of

f er ed by the sa m e p a rty.” ); see a lso S le d g e v . S ta te , 6 8 6 S.W
. 2 d 12 7 , 12 9 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 8 4 ). I d. 4 See gene r al l

y Cohn , 8 4 9 S .W .2 d , at 8 1 8 ; R o u sse a u , 8 5 5 S .W .2 d , at 6 8 1 ; Z a c h a ry v . S ta te , 20 0 8 T ex. 5 A p p . L E X IS 7 2 1 8 (T e x . A p p .– H o u sto n 2 0 0 8 ); R e y e s v . S ta te , 2 0 0 8 T e x . A p p . L E X IS 5 9 2 1 (T e x . A p p .– S a n A n to n io 2008) ; I n r e J

. G. , 1 9 5 S .W .3 d , at 1 8 3 ; G a rza v . S ta te , 2 0 0 7 T e x . A p p . L E X IS 7 1 9 4 (T e x . A p p .– C o rp u s C h risti 2 0 0 7 ); D a v idso n v . S ta te , 2 0 0 6 T e x . A p p . L E X IS 9 1 7 8 (T e x . A p p .– D a llas 2 0 0 6 ); Ha tter v . S ta te , 2006 T ex . App. LE X IS 4 5 1 6 (T ex. A p p
– A ust i n 20 0 6 ); M on t oya , 43 S. W
. 3d, a t , 573. no way invokes the Rules or informs the tria l court of the ba sis for exclusion under the Rules.” Id. As such, a pa rty ’s objection must inform the trial cour t why or on what basis the otherwise a dmissibl e evide nce should be excluded. Id. ; see als o Co hn v . S

tate , 849 S.W .2d 817, 819-21 (Te x . Crim. App. 1993). Her e, at trial, Rivas did not identify which Rule of Evide nce, if any , was violated by

the admission of the nurse’ s repor t. As such, he f

ailed to pre serve his objection for a pp e a l. 2 IV. Discussion A. “B o l s t er i n g” The lawof “bolster ing” exis ted bef ore this state’s Rules of E vidence wer e adopte d. At 3 one time, this term of ar

t conveyed an obje ction that was unifor mly rec ognized by

the cour ts. As 4 the law e volved, howeve r, most of our evide ntiary terms bec ame c odified, first in the Te x as Rules of Criminal Evidence in 1985, a nd finally in the unified Texas Rules of Evidenc e, pr omu lg ate d in

19 98 . Wh ile the te rm

“ bo lst e ri ng ” is s low ly

dyinga s a

n o bje c tio n o n it s f

a c e , it ha s n ot ye t e xpir e d, de sp ite the fa c t th at th e te rm its e lf fa ile d to surv ive the a do pti on of the Rul e s. Its continued lifeline is evidenc ed by the application of “bolstering ” objec tions at trials in many dis tr ic ts i n T e xas. 5(R iv as - 10)

See Cohn , 849 S. W
. 2d, a t 819- 21. 6 849 S. W
. 2d , at 819
- 20
. I t s houl d be not ed t hat Rul e 613 ( c) was pre vi ous l y Rul e 612 ( c) at t he t i me Cohn 7 w a s d e live re d , sinc e the R u le s w e re a g a in a d o p te d in 1 9 9 8 , f ive ye a rs fo llo w ing the d e c isio n . S e e a lso R o u sse a u , 855 S .W .2 d , at 6 8 1
.

Cohn , 84 9 S.W
. 2 d , at 81 9
- 2 0 (emp hasi s i n ori gi nal ). 8 R . E V ID . 6 0 8 (a ); s ee al s o Cohn , 849 S. W
. 2d, a t 820. 9 Cohn, 84 9 S.W
. 2 d , at 82 0 (f o o t no t e 8 ). 10 R . E V ID . 61 3 (c). 11 Af un d am e nt a l p r o b l e mw i thano b j e c t i o nt o “ b o l s t e r i n g ” i s i t s i nh e r e ntamb i gu i ty. “B o l s t er i n g” ap p ears t o h av e r o o t s i ns ev er al ev i d en t i ary ru l es . T h i s co urtd i s cu s s ed“b o l s t er i n g”

6 in Cohn v. State, acknow ledg ing the term as a n objection that containe d the substance of Rules 608(a) and Rule 612(c ). Cohn define d “bolstering ” as “ any evidenc e the so lepurpose of which 7 is t o c onvin c e the fa c tf

ind e r t hat a pa rt ic ula r w itn e ss o r s ourc e of

e vid e nc e is w or

thy of c re dit , without substantively

contributing‘to make the exis tence of a f act that is of c onsequenc e to the de te rm inatio n o f t

he a c tio n mo re or

le ss p ro ba

ble tha n it wo uld be wi tho ut t

he e vid e nc e .’ ” Thus ,

8 Rule 608(a) , which allows opinion or re putation evidence as to the cha rac ter of a

party ’s own witness for truthfulne ss, but only afte r the witness’s c hara cter for truthfulne ss has alre ady been attacke d by

the opposingparty , appea rs to be enc ompassed by

the g eneric “bolstering ” objec

9 tion. Additionally , Rule 613(c) , seems to be c overe d under the “bolstering ” objec tion “to the extent itpreve nts the use of prior consistent statements of a witness for the sole purpose of enhanc ing his c redibility .” Rule 613(c) makes inadmissible any prior consistent stateme nt of a 10 wi tne ss whic h is c on sis te nt w iththe te sti mony , e xce pt a s p ro vid e d b y Rul e 80 1( e )( 1) (B ). Th is 11(R iv as - 11)

Se e Cohn , 849 S. W
. 2d, a t 820. 12
In re J .G ., 1 9 5 S .W .3 d , at 1 8 3 ; M on t oya , 43 S. W
. 3d, a t 573. 13 Cohn, 8 4 9 S .W .2 d , at 8 2 1 (c o n c u rr e n c e b y C a m p b e ll). 14 R i va s, 2 0 0 7 T e x . A p p . L E X IS 4 3 9 5 , at 7 -8 ; se e a lso In re J .G ., 195 S. W
. 3d, a t 183. 15 rule e x cludes prior

consistent statements as substantive e vidence , thus reiterating the principles
o f h e ar s ay. 12 Be cause of the multifarious orig ins of “bolstering ,” cour ts have found c oncer

n with it as an objec tion on its fac e. Many appellate courts have cited the Cohn c on c ur re nc e a s a uth or ity to abandon “bolstering ” as a valid objection to prese rve e rror for r eview. “A pa

rty ’s objection 13 must inform the trial court why or on what basis the otherwise a dmissibl e evide nce should be excluded.” The Court of Appe als relied on this principle in the instant c ase when it held that “a

14 g e ne ra l ob

je c tio n to ‘b ols te ri ng ’ i s n ot s uf fi c ie nt t o p re se rv e e rr or , b e c a us e it d oe s n ot s uf

fi c ie ntl y inform the trial c ourt of the nature of the objection.” 15 B. Ob j ec t i o n s M o re S p ec i fi c th an“B o l s t er i n g” But the a ppellant’s objec tions were not just g eneral objections to “bolstering .” We set out his objections at some leng th above. Seve ral grounds other tha n “bolstering ” we re spe cified. One wa s that the medica l exception to the hearsa y rule did not apply

in the absenc e of phy sic a l e vid e nc e of

a bu se . T his wa s sp e c if

ie d in the a pp e lla nt’ s f ir st a nd thi rd ob je c tio ns . An oth e r w a s th at th e e vid e nc e wa s in a dmi ssi ble be c a us e the c hil d h a d n ot b e e n im

pe a c he d. Th is w a s sp e c if ie d in the se c on d, fo ur

th, se ve nth , a

nd ninth o bje c tio ns . Yet anothe r wa s connec ted to an appe llate opinion (or opinions) on which the a ppellant
re lie d, wh ic h ( he sa id) sto od fo r t he pr op os iti on

that th e c hil d’ s st ate me nts wo uld be us e d a s a(R iv as - 12)

ba sis fo r t he nurs e ’s “ ba c k d oo r” dia g no sis or op ini on that se xua l a

bu se ha d o c c ur

re d. Th is ground wa s made whe n he pre sented the opinions to the cour t and when he made his fifth, sixt h,
and te nth ob je c tio ns . C. Requirement to I dentify a Rule of Evide nce? The Court of Appe als’ stateme nt that, beca use he “ did not identify

which Rule of Ev ide nc e , if

any , w a s v iol ate d b y

the a dmi ssi on

of the nurs e ’s repo rt

... h e fa ile d to pr e se rv e his objection for a

ppeal,” is one with which we do not agree . As we sa id in Lan k sto n, su pra , “Straightforwa

rd communication in plain English will alway s suffice .” Refe renc e to a Rule may
save an o bje c tio n th at mi g ht o the rw ise be ob sc ur e , b ut a n o bje c tio n is no t de fe c tiv e me re ly beca use it does not identify

a Rule of Evide nce. The issues we re discusse d by both attorney s, and ruling s were made by the judg e seve ral times. The appe llant fulfilled the re quirements of Rule of Appellate Proc edure 33.1, thus prese rvingthis error f

or re view. V
. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appe als and re mand the ca se to that court f or further considera

tion.
Deliver ed January

28, 2009. Publis h.