IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

September 27, 2005 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOHN CALVIN SIPE, JR.

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamblen County

No. 04-CR-040 & 04-CR-041 James Edward Beckner, Judge

No. E2005-00039-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 16, 2005

A Hamblen County jury convicted the defendant of theft of property, $500-$1,000, and forgery of

assignment of title. On appeal the defendant presents three issues: (1) Whether there was sufficient

evidence to support the jury’s verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a retrial

based upon newly discovered evidence; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive

sentence. We have reviewed the record and have found all of the defendant’s issues to be without

merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed

JERRY L. SMITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE OGLE, and ALAN

E. GLENN, JJ., joined. 

D. Clifton Barnes, Assistant Public Defender, Morristown, Tennessee, for the appellant, John Calvin

Sipe, Jr..

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; David E. Coenen, Assistant Attorney General;

C. Berkeley Bell, District Attorney General; and Kim Lane, Assistant District Attorney General, for

the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

In February, the victim, Sharon K. Lindsey, purchased a 1992 Oldsmobile from the

defendant. She gave the defendant a check for $1,000 made out to him, and a check for $144 made

out to Morristown Auto Sales, where the defendant worked, for taxes and tags. The defendant never

gave the victim a title or a bill of sale. She asked several times, but he told her the title was at the

car lot, and he would have to pick it up. The defendant brought her the tags and the registration, but

she never received the title. 
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On December 6 and 7, 2002, the victim was moving out of her apartment. Her apartment

was owned by the defendant’s mother. She stated at trial that she was trying to sneak her stuff out

of the apartment because she was afraid that some of her belongings would be taken. She loaded her

car and her brother’s truck full of her belongings. The victim then went to her job at Wal-Mart

without unloading her car. At this point she had had the car for about nine months. The defendant

never said that the victim owed him more money, and never threatened to repossess the car. On

December 7, 2002, the victim left her job at Wal-Mart at 6:15 in the morning. When she came out

to the parking lot, her car was gone. She called the police. The police eventually informed her that

the defendant had repossessed her car. The victim attempted to call the defendant to discuss the

repossession of her car. Eventually the victim called the police because she maintained that the

defendant stole her car. At trial, the victim was shown a copy of the title to the car. She said that

her name did indeed appear on the title. There was a signature on the title that appeared to be hers,

however, the victim denied that the signature was hers. 

Abdulla Al-ghandi, the owner of Morristown Auto Sales and the defendant’s employer also

testified at trial. He stated that he remembered the car that the victim bought from the defendant.

Mr. Al-ghandi stated that they purchased the car at auction in Abingdon, Virginia. The defendant

then purchased the vehicle from Morristown Auto Sales for $400. The car had a bad engine, and the

defendant had to haul it to his house because it could not be driven. Mr. Al-ghandi stated that the

defendant did not register the car to the defendant’s mother. He also stated that he received a check

for $144 for tax and tags for the car. The defendant told Mr. Al-ghandi that he sold the car for

$1,000.

Rick Harmon, a detective with the Morristown Police Department, investigated the theft of

the victim’s car. He included in his report that the car had been stolen from the Wal-Mart parking

lot and was then “reportedly repossessed by [the defendant] from the owner.” Detective Harmon

learned that the victim never received the title to the car. Detective Harmon then contacted the

Tennessee Highway Patrol, Criminal Investigation Division. He was assisted by Agent Terry Wolfe.

Terry Wolfe is a special agent in the Criminal Investigation Division of the Tennessee

Department of Safety. He obtained a title history for the vehicle from the Department of Safety.

Agent Wolfe found that the title had been issued to Sharon Lindsey, the victim, with the defendant

registered as the lienholder. The price of the car was listed as $1,000. Agent Wolfe also found that

the car was then sold and re-registered to Christopher and Amber McCullough. The title was issued

April 1, 2003 to the McCulloughs. The McCulloughs were renting an apartment from the

defendant’s mother at the time. The title also indicated that the date of sale was December 6, 2002,

the same day the car had been stolen from the victim. Agent Wolfe stated that there would be no

need for a lien on the car because the victim had apparently paid for the vehicle in full. Agent Wolfe

seized the car from the McCulloughs, and released the car to the victim. Agent Wolfe then charged

the defendant with forgery and theft.

Assistant Special Agent Billy Grooms also works in the Criminal Investigation Division of

the Tennessee Highway Patrol. He participated in the investigation of the theft of the victim’s car
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and the forgery of the title to the victim’s car. He interviewed the defendant after his arrest. During

the interview, the defendant admitted that he signed the victim’s name on the title and put himself

down as lienholder. The defendant told Agent Grooms that the victim did not owe him money for

the car, but instead owed money for back rent. After a new title was issued in the victim’s name,

Agent Grooms personally took the title to the victim.

Special Agent Tim Ryan with the Tennessee HighwayPatrol worked with Detective Harmon

and Special Agent Grooms in investigating the case, arresting the defendant, and taking the

defendant’s statement. Special Agent Ryan testified that he took the defendant’s statement. The

defendant told Special Agent Ryan that he and the victim had agreed to a $2,000 price on the car and

agreed to a weekly $50 payment. When the defendant received no further payment, he repossessed

the victim’s car in the Wal-Mart parking lot. Later in the interview, the defendant admitted that he

signed the title to the victim’s car. 

The defendant did not testify on his own behalf at trial, but he did present two witnesses at

trial. The first witness, Charles Goodwin, knew both the defendant and the victim. He stated that

on March 2, 2002, he overheard a conversation between the defendant and the victim. In this

conversation he heard the defendant ask the victim if it was all right with her if he signed her name

to the title or registration so it would be in the victim’s name. Mr. Goodwin stated that the victim

replied that it would be all right with her if the defendant signed her name. The witness also testified

that the victim paid the defendant a portion of the purchase price of the car and that is why the

defendant put a lien on the car.

The defendant’s second witness was David Richards. Mr. Richards knew the defendant from

working at the defendant’s mother’s house. He also overheard a discussion involving the purchase

of the Oldsmobile. The witness stated that the purchase price was $2,000 and that the victim was

to pay the mechanic for work on the motor. Mr. Richards saw the victim hand the defendant a check

and then the defendant told the victim that he needed her to sign some papers. The witness then

heard the victim tell the defendant to sign the papers needed to get her tags.

After the presentation of the evidence, the jury retired to deliberate. The jury found the

defendant guilty of theft of property for $500-$1,000 and forgery of the assignment of title. The trial

court held a sentencing hearing November 30, 2004. As a result of that hearing, the trial court

sentenced the defendant as a Range II multiple offender to three years for each conviction, to be

served concurrently. The defendant appeals these judgments.

ANALYSIS

The defendant brings three arguments to this Court on appeal: (1) Whether there was

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant

a retrial based upon newly discovered evidence; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive

sentence.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is obliged to review

that claim according to certain well-settled principles. A verdict of guilty, rendered by a jury and

“approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the” State’s witnesses and resolves all

conflicts in the testimony in favor of the state. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994);

State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, although the accused is originally cloaked

with a presumption of innocence, the jury verdict of guilty removes this presumption “and replaces

it with one of guilt.” State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, the

burden of proof rests with the defendant to demonstrate the insufficiency of the convicting evidence.

Id. The relevant question the reviewing court must answer is whether any rational trier of fact could

have found the accused guilty of every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn.

R. App. P. 13(e); Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 75. In making this decision, we are to accord the State “the

strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may

be drawn therefrom.” See Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914. As such, this Court is precluded from reweighing or reconsidering the evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morgan, 929

S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1990). Moreover, we may not substitute our own “inferences for those drawn by the trier of

fact from circumstantial evidence.” Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 779. Further, questions concerning

the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to evidence, as well as all factual

issues raised by such evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact and not the appellate courts. State

v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990).

The jury convicted the defendant for theft of property $500-$1,000 and forgery of assignment

of title. Theft of property is found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103. Tennessee

Code Annotated section 39-14-103 states, “[a] person commits a theft of property if, with intent to

deprive the owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property

without the owner’s effective consent.” Forgery of assignment of title is found at Tennessee Code

Annotated section 55-5-116, which states, “[i]t is a Class E felony for any person to . . . (2) Alter or

falsify with fraudulent intent or forge any assignment upon a certificate of title; . . . .”

The evidence at trial showed that the victim gave the defendant a check for $1,000 for the

car in question. The victim testified that this was the full purchase price of the car and other

evidence established that the price was $1,000. The defendant never asked for additional money or

gave any warning that he was about to repossess the car. The defendant also never gave the victim

a bill of sale or the title to the car. After the victim had had the car for about nine months she left

her job at Wal-Mart to find that her car, containing all her belongings, was gone. The police

discovered that the defendant had taken the car, claiming it was lawfully repossessed. The same day

that the defendant took the car, he signed the victim’s name to the title and sold the car to a third

party. The defendant later told the law enforcement officers working on the case that the victim

actually owed him money for back rent rather than the car. He also admitted to the officers that he

signed the victim’s name to the title.
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The defendant argues that the victim’s check for $1000 was noted to be for a car payment.

He also points to another check for $75 noted to be for a car payment. At trial, the victim argued that

this check was actually for a car part. Apparently, the defendant is attempting to argue that this

additional payment is proof that the victim owed the defendant additional money for the car. The

defendant also states that the State did not prove that the defendant intended to harm the victim. He

also argues that the fact that he signed the victim’s name to the title was not a crime.

The arguments raised by the defendant are not legal questions, but instead questions of fact

concerning whether the evidence met the elements of the crimes of which the defendant was

convicted. As we stated above, questions of fact, as well as determinations of the credibility of

witnesses, are reserved for the jury. It is obvious in this case that the jury credited the testimony of

the State’s witnesses. 

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the defendant

wrongfully signed the victim’s name to the title and wrongfully took the victim’s vehicle. There is

ample evidence for a rational trier of fact to determine that the defendant is guilty of both theft of

property and forgery of assignment of title.

Therefore, this issue is without merit.

Newly-Discovered Evidence

The defendant also argues that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based on newlydiscovered evidence. A hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial was held on December 17,

2004. At that hearing the defendant presented a witness, Tonya Jones, who is the victim’s son’s

girlfriend, as well as the mother of the victim’s grandchildren. She stated that the victim did indeed

know that there was a lien held by the defendant on her vehicle. The witness testified that she did

not know that the trial was still pending on the matter in question until she saw the victim in the hall,

while the witness was in custody as a trustee. She also stated that she has never spoken to the

defendant.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made the following findings with regard to

the newly-discovered evidence:

The case was primarily a who-are-you-going-to-believe case, and it’s been

characterized by defense counsel as a close case and, yet, the jury came back with one

of the quickest verdicts that I’ve ever known them to come back with. The jury

didn’t perceive it to be a very close case on the issues of credibility, and I don’t think

any of the jurors knew Mr. Sipe orsaid they’d ever known him but they very quickly

disbelieved him and believed Ms. Lindsey. So that very well could make this issue

more germane than it would otherwise. However, this witness, who has sworn under

oath that these things happened, herself is impeachable by prior offenses involving

truth or dis – involving dishonesty and false statement. And her credibility is very
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suspect with a jury that was able to so quickly decide the issue of credibility in favor

of the state.

And, two, it is cumulative, and it is corroborative of other evidence that was

presented to the jury and is not a singular type of evidence that would stand out by

itself because there were other witnesses that indicated that the victim knew of the

lien and the circumstances and what the witness was saying was not true.

Newly discovered evidence requires, of course, that it be something that even

after due diligence a person could not discover prior to the time it was discovered

after the trial. Ms. Jones was here in custody and was, in fact, was assigned in the

upstairs portion here adjoining the courtroom and in this courtroom to cleaning and

doing things in and about the halls of the courtroom; and that’s apparently where she

saw the victim during the course of this trial. It would seem that during the course

of that trial that it would have been appropriate for the evidence to be revealed at that

time, and I realize that defense counsel correctly says that doesn’t help him out any

if it should’ve been done, but it is evidence it seems to me that it could and should

under all circumstances prior to the time that it was revealed post-trial.

For all those reasons, I believe that no different result would have or could

have occurred than that did occur and, therefore, the motion for new trial is overruled

. . . .

To receive a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must

demonstrate “(1) reasonable diligence in seeking the newly discovered evidence; (2) materiality of

the evidence;” and (3) the likelihood that the evidence would change the outcome of the trial. State

v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 737 (Tenn. 1994) (citing State v. Goswick, 656 S.W.2d 355, 358-60

(Tenn. 1983)). Additionally, the decision regarding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial

predicated on newly discovered evidence “rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v.

Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 395 (Tenn. 1995). Moreover, the trial court is authorized to ascertain the

credibility of newly discovered evidence for which the new trial is desired, and the motion should

be denied unless the court has assured itself that the testimony would be worthy of belief by the jury.

Id. As a general rule, “newly discovered impeachment evidence will not constitute grounds for a

new trial. . . . But if the impeaching evidence is so crucial to the defendant’s guilt or innocence that

its admission will probably result in an acquittal, a new trial may be ordered.” State v. Singleton,

853 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Rosenthal, 292 S.W.2d at 4-5; State v. Rogers, 703

S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); Evans v. State, 557 S.W.2d 927, 938 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1977)).

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for new

trial based upon newly discovered evidence. As the trial court stated, other witnesses who testified

for the defendant at trial also stated that the victim did indeed know that the defendant placed a lien
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on the car. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the evidence presented by this witness would

be cumulative. In addition, we believe the trial court’s assessment that the witness’s credibility

would be seriously questioned because of previous convictions involving dishonesty. Considering

the above two conclusions, we find it highly unlikely that this evidence would have changed the

outcome at trial. As for the defendant’s diligence in discovering this evidence, we understand that

this evidence may have been difficult for the defendant’s attorney to discover. However, to be

successful in obtaining a new trial based upon newly-discovered evidence, the defendant must

demonstrate all three of the requirements listed above. In this case, we conclude the evidence in

question is cumulative to that presented at trial as well as very unlikely to change the outcome of the

trial.

Therefore, this issue is without merit.

Sentencing

The defendant was sentenced to three years for each of his two convictions to be run

concurrently, with a release eligibility of 35% as a Range II multiple offender. The defendant’s

argument with regard to his sentence reads, in its entirety, as follows, “The appellant asks this court

to review the sentencing pursuant to it authority as set forth in T.C.A. § 40-35-401.”

Rule 27(a)(7) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a brief shall

contain “[an] argument . . . setting forth the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues

presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require appellate

relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the record . . . relied on.”

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b) states that “[i]ssues which are not supported by

argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in

this court.” See also State v. Sanders, 842 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (determining that

issue was waived where defendant cited no authority to support his complaint). The appellant fails

to present any argument to this Court as to his specific question concerning his sentence. We

conclude that the above general statement does not constitute an argument. Therefore, this issue is

waived for failure to present an argument. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

 ___________________________________ 

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE