### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on

Briefs J anuary 8, 2002 STATE O F TENNESSEE v. THADD EUS MO RRIS Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County Nos. 00-12635, 00-12636, 00-12637, 00-12638 Chris Craft, Judge

No. W2001-01691-CCA-R3-CD - Filed February 15, 2002

The defendant, Thaddeus Morris, was convicted of thre e counts of assault, three counts of reckle ss aggravated

assault, one count of aggra vatedrobbery, a

nd one count of carjacking following a jury trial. The tria

l court me rged th e three assault c onviction s with the t hree reckless aggravated

assault convictions and the aggrava ted robbery

conviction with the carjacking conviction. The defe ndant was sentence d to se ven years, si x months for e ach of th

e reckl ess agg

ravate d assault

convicti ons, withtwo of the sentences to be ser ved conc urrently and the th ird to be served consecutively . For the carjac kin g convicti on, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twelve y ears to be served consecu tively to the third reckless aggrava ted assault sentence, for an effective se nt en ce of tw en tyseven years in the D epartment of Correction. On appeal, the defe ndant argues: (1) the

evidence was insufficient

to support his convictions for carjackingand aggravated robbe ry; (2) the tria

l court erred by not includ

ing “mor al certa inty ” in its jur

y in struction

on reaso nable dou

bt; (3) cumulative error occurr ed during the trial ; and (4) the trial court er red in impo sing co nsecu tive s enten cing. After a caref ul review of the r

ecord, w e affir

m the judgment of the

trial cou rt. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
A LAN E. G LENN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVID G. H AYES and J OE G. R ILEY , JJ., joined.
Juni S. Ganguli, Memphis, Tennessee, f or the ap pellant, Thaddeu s Morris.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter ; Angele M

. Gregor y, Assista nt Attorne y Gener al; William L . Gi bbons, District Attorney General; and James Lammey, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Te nnessee. OPINION FACTS-2-

On April 24, 2000, Mary Austin, wh o wa s o n h er wa y ho me fr om ch ur ch wi th he r f am il y, stopped at an aut

omated te ller machine (“A

TM”) on Po

plar Ave nue nea r Palisad e Street in Memphis to obt ain cas h t o pu rch ase foo d fo r th e fa mi ly’s di nne r. In the vehicle with Mrs. Austin were her husband, Michael Austin; her two children, Antionette Jackson and Michael Jackson; and her niece, Jurie Austin. Mrs. Austin was driving the vehicle; Mr. Austin was in the front passenger seat; and the three children were in the backseat. The Austins had purchased their 1999 Gr and Cherokee Laredo for approxima

tely $23,000 le ss than a m

onth befo re the c arjack

ing occurred, a

nd the veh

icle still had the drive- out tag d isplay ed on it.
Mrs. Au stin testifi ed at tria l that whe

n she stopp ed at the

ATM, she p arked he

r vehicl e directly in front of the door to the ATM and left the engine running and t he he adlights on. Mr. Austin and the childre

n remained in the v ehicle, listening and sing ing along to go spel music . Mrs. Austin opened the driver’s side door, which caused the vehicle’s interior

lights to come on, retrieved her purse fr om the re ar of the

vehicle , and th en entered the ATM. After she completed he r transaction and turnedaroun d to go out, she sa w Mr. A usti n runn ing beh ind t heir v ehicl e and yell ing, “[N]o, no, no, sto

p. No, stop .” Mr. Au stin told he r that a ma

n had gotten into th

eir vehicle, and the children were still inside the vehicle. Mrs. Austin bega n chasing the vehic le as well. As the ve hicle was exitin g out of the parking lot, the driver slammed on the brakes and one of the ba ck doors open ed. Mrs. Austin saw her daughter, with one leg out of the vehicle, attempting to get out, bu t before she could

get completely

out, the driver took off and she fell out onto the grass. While Mrs. Austin was checking on her

daughter, she saw the rear door on the driver’s side of the vehicle open and her son and niece come out “like rolling in the street.” Mrs. Austin estimated the vehicle was traveling twenty-five to thirty miles per hour when her son and niece fell out. The driver of the vehicle then turned onto Poplar Avenue and that was the last Mrs. Austin saw of her vehicle until it was returned to her three day s later. Mrs. Austin testifi ed that she did not see who took her vehicle.
Michael Austin testified that just before Mrs. Austin got out of their vehicle at the ATM, he observed, from the rearview mirror, a person across the street. Mr. Austin was sitting in the front passenger seat with his door ajar which ha d caused the interior lights to come on. Moments later, a man, whom

Mr. Austin

identified in the courtroom a s t he defendant, approached the ve hicle, openedthe drive

r’s side d oor, and demande d Mr. Austin to get o ut of the v ehic le or be shot. A ltho ugh he did not s ee a gun, Mr. Au stin said th e defendant, who

was wea ring da rk pants a nd a black hooded jacket, had his hand inside his jacket pocket. Mr. Austin asked the defendant, “What’s going on?” The defendant again t old Mr. Au stin to ge

t out or he

would s hoot. Believing that the defendant had a we apon, Mr. Austin re luctantly got out of the vehicle, and the defendant proceeded to drive away with the children still in the backseat. Mr. Austin gave chase but could not catch the vehicle. Mr. Austin did not see the children fall out of the vehicle and, believing that they were sti ll inside, ran out onto Poplar Avenue and flagged down a passing motorist. The motorist allowed Mr. Austin into his car, and together they pursued the defendant but were un able

to catch him beca use he was driving at a h

igh rat e of speed. As Mr. A

ustin and t

he motoris twere returning to the ATM parking lot, they

saw two police off

icers a t a near by s ervice station and stopped t

o ask for assistance.-3-

The of ficers drove Mr. Austin back to the ATM parking lot where he then sa w the children and realized they had ma

de it out of the vehicle.
Jurie Austin, who was 17 yea rs old at the time of

the trial , testifie d that she was living

with her uncle and aunt , Michael and Mary A ustin, on April 24, 2000. She said that when her aunt stopped at the ATM that evening, she was sitting in the backse at behind the driver’s seat and noticed a man comin g towar

d their ve hicle fr om her left. The ma

n got into the vehicle, and her uncle got outof the vehicle and was try ing to make his way

to the driv er’s side

door whe

n the man b egan to drive away. She did not see a weapon, but the man had his right hand in his right jacket pocket and “it fit like something was in his pocket.” The man told her and her cousins to “get out or I ’m going to kill y ’all.” T

he childr en were unable to

get out o n their fi

rst attem p t becau se of the vehicle’s automatic child saf ety locking sys tem. Her

cousin, A ntionette Jackson, ma

naged to jump out of the vehicle when it “braked hard and stopped.” Be lieving that she would die if she did not get out of the vehicle, Jurie grabbed her other cousin, Michael Jackson, and “f ell” out of the vehicle

while it was moving. Jurie testified she was taken to the hospital by ambulance , and that she “messed up [her] hand and [her] side was bruisedve ry b ad . M ai nl y [h er ] s id e. ” S he sa id th at sh e s us ta in ed an in ju ry, approxima

tely twelve inches long, to her left side around her hip. She testified that she could not identify the defe ndant fr om a photog

raphic li ne -u p t he da y af

te r t he in ci de nt bu t w as “m ayb e s ix tyfive percent sure” at trial that the defenda nt was the man who got into the vehicle and threatened her life.
Antionett

e Jackson, age 14 at the time of trial, testified she was riding in the backseat of the vehicle behind the passenger seat on the night of

the incident. She said that a man, whom she identified as the defendant, opened the driver’s side door and told her father, Mr. Austin, to get out or h e would shoot him. Antionette said that the defendant was pointing “something,”which sh e believedto be a g

un in his pocket, at Mr. Austin when he told him to get out. The defendant got in the vehicle, started driving fast, and then looked ba ck to her, her brother, and her cousin in the backseat and told them to get out or he would kill them. When the d efendant “braked hard” a nd stopped the vehicle, Antionette attempted to get out, but the defendant started drivingagain which caused her to fall out onto the grass. She said that the vehicle hit her a nd cause d a “shar

p sting” in her left leg.
Michael Jackson, a

ge 11 a t the time o f the tria

l, testified that he was sitting in the middle of the backseat

of the vehicle when

the incident occurred. A man got in the vehicle on the driver’s side and told his father to get

out or he w ould shoot h

im. Michae

l said he d idnot see a gun, but the man had his hand in his pocket when he ordered his father to g et out. Mich ael testified that his sister, Antionette, fell out of

the vehic le while

it was “skeeting off.” He and his cousin mana ged to jump outof the vehic le and ro lled into th e stree t. Michae l said that his righ t hand wa s injured

as a res ult and that he was taken to the hospital. Michael identified thedefendant from a photographic line-up shown to him the da

y a fter the incident as the man who took the vehicle. He also identified the defenda nt in the c ourtroom

.-4-

Officer Cleaven Fos te r of the Memphis Police Department testified that he stopped the defendant on April 25, 2000, the day after the incident, for a traffic violation. When he asked the defendant for his driver’s license, the defe ndant re plied tha t he did not have one in his possession, so Officer Foster detained the def endant. A search of the defenda nt’s person revealed a

green leafy substance in his right front pocket and Michael Austin’s driver’s lice nse. The defendant told Foster that Austin was his cous in. No weap on was found on the defendant’s person or in the vehicle

. Foster had the vehicle identification n umber on the vehicle the defendant was driving checked, which came back showing the vehicle had be en stolen. Foster testified that as he was handcuffing th e d ef en da nt , t he de fe nd an t t ol d h im th at he ha d t ak en th e v eh ic le th e p re vi ou s d ay. The defenda

nt, a twen ty- one-y ear-ol d high school dropout at the time of trial, testified that he had been receiving trea tment for mental problems and had just gotten out of the hospital the day before the incident. He admitted that on April 24, 2000, he was walking on Poplar Avenue looking for a car to steal but denied having a gun. He notice d the Austins’ vehic le beca use the motor was running and the headlights and taillights were on. When he saw someone get out of the vehicle, he ran across t

he stree t to the ve

hicle and opened

the driv er’s door. He d enied saying or waving anything at Micha el Austin a

nd said tha

t he did not

have eit her of hi s hands i n hi s pockets. The defendant said he did not see the children in the backseat initially

. He testified that he began driving the vehicle with both hands and then heard the children in the backsea t. He said

he hit the brakes hardand stopped to let the childrenout of the vehi cle. He denied e ver thre atening

the child ren if they d id not get ou t of the vehicle. He then left the parking lot of the A TM and proceeded down Poplar Avenue. The def

endant sa id he slep t in the ve

hicle that night an d w as ar re st ed th e n ex t d ay. The defenda

nt admitte d that he g ave a sta tement to the police wherein he confessed to taking the Austins’ vehicle. When asked if he believed himself to be a thief, the defenda nt replie d, “Most lik

ely I would, y

es, sir.”
ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of Evidence
The defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to justify a finding of guilt beyond a reasona ble doubt of agg ravated robbery a nd carjacking. However, since the aggravated r

obbery conviction was m erged into the carjacking conviction, it is necessary for us to consider the sufficiency

of the evidence only

as to the latter.
In considering this issue, we apply the familiar rule that where sufficiency of the convicting evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favo

rable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense charged be yond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v . Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See also State v. Evans , 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn. 1992 ); State v. Anderson , 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) ; Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to sup port th e findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasona ble doubt.”) . All question s involving the cre dibility of

witnesse s, the we

ight and va

lue to-5-

be given the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier

of fact. See State v. Pappas , 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our supreme court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-se

ttled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the jury see the witnesses face to face, he ar the ir testi mony and observe their demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credi bility to b e given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alon e is th ere human atmosphere and the totality of the evidenc e canno t be repr

oduced with a writt

en reco rd in this Court. Bolinv. State , 219 Tenn. 4, 11, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966) (citing Carroll v . State , 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W.2d 523 (1 963)). A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant is initially c loaked a

nd repla ces it with

one of guilt, so that

on appea

l, a convi cte d defendant has the burden of

demonstrating that

the evidence is insufficient. See State v. Tu ggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). When the c redibilit y of the witne sses was r

eso l ved by

the jury in favor of the Sta

te, the a ppellate court “may not

reconsider the jury ’s credibility assessments.” State v. Carruthers , 35 S.W.3d 516, 558 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied , ___U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001). Carjacking is “the intentional or knowing taking of a motor vehicle from the possession of another by use of: (1) [a] deadly we apon; or (2) [f]orce or intimidation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 404 (1997). The indictment in this matter alleged that the defenda nt obtaine d po ssession of the motor vehicle from Michael Austin “by use of intimidation.”
The defendant asserts that there is no proof he possessed a dea dl y weapon t

o support h

is conviction for carjacking and that Michae l Austin’s testimony that he was i ntimidated by the defendant “is rebu tted by [Austin’s] own stateme

nts.” Aus tin testifi ed that the defendant twi ce threatened

to shoot him if he did not get out of the vehicle. Th e o nl y reason A ustin then got out, leavin g the chil dren insi de, was b ecause he “thoug

ht [the def

endant] ha

d a weap on.” By

their verdict , it is obvious that th e j ur y be li ev ed th is te st im on y, as was their right, and resolved any alleged inconsistencies in favor of the State. Accordingly , we conclude that theevidence presented at trial was su ffici ent to sust ain th e conv icti on for carjac king. II. Jury Instruction
The defendant

complains that the trial court failed to instruct the jury as to the term “mor al certainty”in its reasonable doubt instruction.1 Although the trial tran script d oes n ot inc lude the jur y instru ction s, they are co ntain ed in the tec hnical recor d. -6- In this matter, the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury as to “rea sonabl e doubt”: 1 Reasona

ble doubt is thatdoubt created by an investigation of all the proof in the case and

an inability after such investig ation to let the m ind rest easily upon the c ertainty of g uilt. Reasonable doubt does notmean a doubt that

may arise fr om possibility. Absolute

certain ty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any c

riminal charge, butmoral ce

rtaint y isrequire d and this c ertainty is requir ed as to every e lement of proof needed to constitute the offense.

This langua

ge is ne arly

identical to the “reasonable doubt” instruction set out in the fifth and sixth editions of the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instr uctions, T .P.I. –Crim. 2.03 . As to the instructions given, the defe

ndant ar gues tha t “the tri al court

erred in faili ng to ch arge ‘moral certainty ’ within the charge for rea sonable d

oubt.” Al

though th e trial tr anscrip t include s a discus si o n of the jury instructions to be given, it does not include comments regarding the re asonable doubt instruction. Thus, assuming that

the printed instructions in the technical record are those g iven to the jury, the trial court did include the phrase “moral certainty ” when instructing as to r

easonab le doubt. T

hus, we conc lude that

this assignment is without meri t. III. Cumulative Error
The defendant

asserts t hat the cumulative

effec t of the a

foreme ntioned e rrors e ntitles him

to a new tria l. The Stat

e counte rs that the defenda nt has only

raised o ne trial- related error, the trial court’s fail

ure t o inc lude “moral ce rtai nty ” in it s jury

instr uctio n on r

easo nabl e dou

bt. We agree with the State that only one trial er ror has been raised, and this claimed error has no merit. There is no cumulativ e effe ct from on e assig nment of e

rror. Th us, this issu e is withou

t merit.
IV. Conse cutive Se

ntencing Citing State v. Wilkerson

, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in orderin g consecutive se ntences , in that, the trial court failed to find that the length of the total term of imprisonment was necessary to protect

the public against further criminal conduct by the defendant and that consecutive sent ences reasona

bly related to the se

verity of the off

enses committed. The State counters that the trial court clearly considered

the requ isite factors in

imposing consecutive sentences and determined that confinement wasne cessary to protect society fr

om the defendant’s actions and reasonably related to the severity

of the offenses.
The party cha

llenging the sentences imposed by the trial court

has the burden of establishing that the sente nce is errone ous. Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 40 -35-401, Sentencing Commiss ion Cmts.; State2 An tione tte Jacks on jumped out of the ve hicl e fi rst , fol lowed soon t he reaf ter by Jurie Aust in and Michael Jacks on. -7- v. Ashby , 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . T hus , in this case, the defendant has the burden of illustrating the se

ntence imposed by

the trial court is e rroneou s. The trial court sentenced the defendant, as a Range I, standard offe nder, to twelve years f

or the carjac king co nvict ion an d, as a Range II , multiple o ffende r, to seve n ye ars, six

months for each reckle ss aggravated assa

ult conviction, o rdering that the reckless aggra vated assault convictions involving Michael Jackson and Antionette Jackson be served concurrently . However, the trial court ordered that the sentence for the reckless ag gravated assault upon Jurie Austin be served consecu tively to th e concu rrent sente nces i nvol ving M ich ael Ja ckson and Antoinette Jackson, for a total of fifteen y ears, and that thetwelve- ye ar sente nce for carjac king be served c onsecuti vely

to the fifteen-y

ear sen tence, f or an ef fective sentenc e of twen

ty- seven y

ears. In determining that the defendant’s sentence s should be served consecutively , the trial court stated:
I

find that he ’s a

dangerous offender, his beha vior indicates littleor no regard for human life, a nd no hesitation about committing a crime for wh ich the r

is k to human l

ife is hig h, not only

from his violentpast as a

juvenile but also because in

this case he threatened this m an’s life . And after the man left and he got in his car he then pulled off at a high rate of speed a nd one of the ch

ildren tr ied to get out of the car.
Jurie J-u-r-i-e Austin testified. She said, “I tri ed to push him outbut he just kept driving. He ha d hi s hand in hi s pocket, I fe lt I would die if I didn’t get out of the vehic le.” And she tried to g et out, he sped away a

nd she rolled in the street, was injured, her side w a s bruised very badly

and her hand was messed up. And then after she jumped out he had a

chanceto stop and let the other two children out and he still re

fused to a

gain. Drove off

withth ose other two children. 2
Michael Jackson – Michael Jackson, who was 10 years old a t the time, injured his hand. Antionette Jackson was not injured. But looking at the Defendant’s testimony about he didn’t know they wer

e there, well, Antionette, for instance– . . ., testified at the trial that the Defend ant seem

ed to know that they wer

e there and

never indicated he was in the least surprised that the kids were in the car.-8- And I find that Mr. Morris just didn’t ca re ab ou t a nyb od y, he didn’t ca re about the children or what would happen to them. An d that’s pretty scar

ey [sic]. I

n addition to his other matters I also find in 4035.115 [sic] that Mr. Morris is a Defendant who’s an offender , his record of criminal activity is extensive. I’m awa

re of ou r case holdings , the consecutive sentences shouldn’t be routinely imposed, the aggrega

te maximum of consecutive ter ms mu st be rea sonably related to the severity

of the offenses.
And I f ind that proof is established that the record of th e Defendant’s behavior indicated little or n o regard for human life. I didn’tfind that e

nhance ment f acto r for purposes of sentencing because the Legislature ha

d taken into account, but in finding whether or not it should be cons ecutive I do find that he had little reg ard for human life.
He didn’t he sitate

about com

mitting a crime in w

hich the r isk to human life was high in this case. The circumstance s surrounding the commission

of the of fense w ere ag grava

ted, in my opinion, w ith the childre

n and the w ay

he was g oing – the

childre n’s age and their helpless ness, even t hough they weren’ t particu

larly vulnera ble as far as sen tenci ng. I also feel that confinement for an e xtended pe

riod of tim

e is necessary to protect society. I

think as soon as we let Mr. Morris out he is, althou gh he c ould

work, he ’s going

to choose to steal, and looks like he ’s becom

ing viole nt in his ste aling. A

nd also the

aggr egate length of the sentences, if they ’re consecutive I think they

reasona bly relate to the offenses except

for the last two kids. I think the last two ki ds , t he 10 yea r o ld an d A nt io ne tt e s ho ul d b e r un co nc ur re nt ly.
But Jurie, J-u-r-i-e, was injured, and the father who had to see Mr. Morr is drive o ff with hi s childre n and thei r friend , I think those sentences should be run consecutively. A 36 y ear sentence or a

30 in this case, a

34 and a h alf

yea r sentence I think would be a little too much to reasonably r

elate to the severity

of the offenses commi tted for those last two children in the car.
So I’m going

to order that the 12 ye ar sentence for the carjacking run consecutively to Jurie Austin’s indictment of the seven and a half y ear sentence, which would be Indictment No. 00-12636, and that that should be run conse cutively to the othe

r two indictments which should be concurrent with each other.3 At the senten cing hear ing, L aw renc e Ru ssell W hite, a S helb y C oun ty assistan t pub lic defender, t esti fied t hat he was in the court

room w ith t

he defendant on January 12, 2001, when the defen dan t beca me ang ry an d “h ighly agit ated” wh ile on the stan d. W hite said t ha t whe n the de fe nd an t ca me dow n fro m th e stand , he w alked beh ind th e table where Wh ite and Kathryn L . Mozing o, another assistant public defender, were se ated. The defendant tol d Ms. Mozingo, “Stu pid a ss bitch , I’m goin g to k ill you .” -9-

For a total s en tence of

12 y ears plu s seven a

nd a half ye ars, plus two 7 and a

half yea r sentences consecutive, which would be 27 ye ars. I’m

also going to run those 26 y ears consecutive to the

10 day sentence that I gave Mr

. Morris for contempt of court when he cursed at me after threatening Ms. Mozingo. 3
“A trial cou

rt may impose consecutive sentences when a defe ndant has an extensive record of criminal activity or whe

n a defendant is sentenced for an offe nse committed while on probation.” Statev. Adam s , 45 S.W .3d 46, 62 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 115(b)(1) & (6)), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 2 001). Cons ecutive sentenc es may

be impose d if “‘[t]he defendant is a dangerous offe nder whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high.’” Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4)) . Furthermore, “‘consecutive sente nc es cannot be imposed unless the term s reasona

bly relate t o the seve

rity of the of fenses c ommitted a

nd are ne cessar y in order to protect the public from further serious criminal conduct by the de fen dant.’” Id. (quoting State v. Wilkerson , 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995)).
This record

reflects that the

trial cou rt, in impos ing con se cutive sent ences, followed the statutory sentenc ing proc edures, made app ropriate findings of fact, and

gave proper consideration to the sentencing principles. Therefore , our review of the imposition of consecutive sentencing by the trial cou

rt is de novo with a presumption of correctness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0-3 5-401(d); Adams, 45 S.W.3d at 62. Applying the foregoing, we conc lude that the record supports the trialcourt’s imposition of consecu tiv e senten ces. The trial court found that the defendant has a n extensive criminal record, including acts of

violence ; thus, the

defenda nt is a dan gerou s offend

er from w hom the pub lic needs pro tection. In sentencing the defendant to consecutive terms, partially based on hi s bein g a dangerous offender, the t

ri al court made the necessary “specific findings rega

rding the severity

of the offenses and the necessity to protect society,”as re qu ir ed by Statev. Lane , 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999). The defendant’s criminal history and

his failure to abide by the

terms of probation are factors that bea

r upon his rehabilitation. The defendant has failed to meet his burden in that the trial court er red in impo sing con secutive sentenc es. This is sue is without merit.-10- CONCLUSION
Based upon the f

orego ing authoriti es and re aso ning, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE