United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 04-1168

LOUIS J. GIULIANO; GTWO, LLC,

A Massachusetts Limited Liability Company,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

STANLEY FULTON; MY WAY HOLDINGS, LLC;

ANCHOR PARTNERS, LLC.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Torruella, Circuit Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Howard, Circuit Judge.

Robert S. Ovoian for appellants.

Thomas A. Reed, with whom J. Owen Todd, David H. Rich, and

Todd & Weld LLP were on brief, for appellees.

March 7, 2005
1Although the amended complaint refers mostly to an entity

named Anchor Gaming, Inc., it appears that Anchor Gaming was a

subsidiary controlled by Anchor Partners, LLC. Because the

distinction is not critical to our disposition, we refer to both

entities as “Anchor.”

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HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Louis Giuliano and GTWO, LLC

(“GTWO/MA”) brought this civil action alleging that defendants

Stanley Fulton, Anchor Partners, LLC (“Anchor”),1 and My Way

Holdings, LLC (“My Way”) conspired to participate and participated,

through repeated acts of mail and wire fraud, in an illegal

racketeering scheme in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(b)-(d). The

district court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state

a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We affirm.

I.

We take as true the facts alleged in the complaint when

reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Soto-Negrón v.

Taber Partners I, 339 F.3d 35, 36 (1st Cir. 2003). At the heart of

this lawsuit is a joint venture gone sour. We note that the

parties who were principally involved in the venture, and in the

subsequent conduct that has been alleged to constitute a RICO

violation, are not defendants in this action. Indeed, the

defendants here are accused of financing and furthering the

racketeering scheme only after it had already been initiated by

these other parties, who have been sued by the plaintiffs in state
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court, and whom we shall, at times, refer to as the “alleged

conspirators.”

The dispute centers around a 92-acre property in

Massachusetts that Giuliano and an associate, Gary Piontkowski,

discussed purchasing in 1997 for the purpose of operating a harness

racing track. Piontkowski entered into a purchase and sale

agreement with the owner of the property and, in 1998, formed

Plainville Racing Company, LLC (“PRC”) to operate the proposed

racetrack. Shortly thereafter, Piontkowski assigned his rights in

the property to Giuliano with the understanding that Giuliano,

through his company GTWO/MA, would secure financing to complete the

purchase of the property and to build the necessary facilities.

Before acquisition of the property was complete, Giuliano executed

a sublease whereby PRC leased, for the purpose of operating the

racetrack, a 52-acre portion of the property from GTWO/MA for

below-market rent. An addendum to the sublease granted PRC the

right to exercise an option to purchase the subleased premises for

fair market value.

Following execution of the sublease, the Massachusetts

Racing Commission (“Commission”) granted PRC a 1999 harness racing

license (racing licenses are awarded annually by the Commission)

conditioned on Giuliano completing acquisition of the property by

December 1, 1998. Giuliano obtained the necessary financing and a

deed to the property was executed in favor of GTWO/MA on November
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16, 1998. Shortly after closing, however, and less than two weeks

before expiration of the purchase and sale agreement, Giuliano's

lender threatened to back out if the loan was not restructured

under new terms. Given that both the Commission's deadline and the

expiration of the purchase and sale agreement were fast

approaching, Giuliano agreed to the new terms.

Under the restructured loan, a nominee of the lender, a

limited liability company formed by the lender under Rhode Island

law, GTWO, LLC (“GTWO/RI”), took title to the property. Giuliano

received an option to purchase the property and a master lease

giving him control of the property during the pendency of the

option. Giuliano could exercise the option, at any time before

January 28, 2000, by paying back his loan advancement in full plus

interest. The lender required GTWO/MA and PRC to execute a First

Amendment to Lease (“First Amendment”) to confirm that the sublease

between GTWO/MA and PRC was subordinate to the master lease between

GTWO/RI and GTWO/MA. The First Amendment also converted PRC's

option to purchase the subleased premises into an option to

purchase GTWO/MA's one-year leasehold interest. Giuliano and

Piontkowski signed the First Amendment with Russell Paige, an

employee of GTWO/MA, serving as an attesting witness. 
2While Giuliano's rent accrued at a rate of $180,000 per month

under the master lease, he only collected $81,000 per month from

PRC under the sublease.

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Shortly after the restructuring, and in response to the

negative cash flow created by PRC's below-market rent,2 Giuliano

insisted that Piontkowski provide him with an option to purchase

all of Piontkowski's shares of PRC stock for $1 million.

Piontkowski agreed and a stock purchase agreement was executed in

favor of Giuliano. When Giuliano subsequently learned that another

Piontkowski-owned company was also a part-owner of PRC, Giuliano

had Piontkowski execute a second stock purchase agreement that gave

Giuliano the option to purchase all of the shares of that company.

Piontkowski then asked Giuliano to sign a Lease Confirmation and

Acknowledgment agreement (“Lease Confirmation”) that essentially

stated, in contravention of the First Amendment, that PRC's option

to purchase the subleased premises was binding upon GTWO/RI.

Giuliano refused to sign the Lease Confirmation, believing that he

did not have authority to sign for GTWO/RI.

Beginning in June of 1999, PRC began breaching its

obligations under the terms of the sublease and GTWO/MA provided

PRC with several written notices of default. According to

Giuliano, this is when Piontkowski hatched a scheme to seize

Giuliano's property. On June 25, 1999, Piontkowski sent a letter

to Giuliano asserting PRC's purported right to purchase the

subleased premises. Attached to the letter was a copy of the Lease
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Confirmation (that Giuliano had previously refused to sign, but

which seemingly bore his signature), that PRC asserted created

privity between PRC and the record title owner of the property.

Giuliano denied the authenticity of the document, alleging that it

was a “switched-page” forgery -- the attached signature page

actually coming from the First Amendment that Giuliano had

previously signed for his lender. 

In two separate letters in the fall of 1999, Giuliano

notified Piontkowski first, of his intent to exercise his options

under the stock purchase agreements to acquire all of Piontkowski's

interests in PRC and in the other Piontkowski-owned entity, and

second, of the termination of PRC's sublease due to PRC's defaults.

Piontkowski, however, refused to sell his ownership interest in PRC

and refused to surrender the subleased premises.

In late September 1999, Piontkowski called a meeting of

PRC's investors to discuss PRC's application, to be filed in

competition with Giuliano, for a year 2000 racing license. After

the investors concluded that the switched-page Lease Confirmation

was not authentic, Paige, now employed by PRC, manufactured a new

version of the Lease Confirmation by cutting and pasting Giuliano's

signature onto a blank Lease Confirmation form. Paige forwarded

this “cut-and-paste” forgery to Piontkowski, who later circulated

it to the PRC investors.
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In October 1999, PRC submitted a year 2000 application

stating that PRC had long-term control of the subleased premises.

At a series of Commission hearings in October and November 1999,

Piontkowski and PRC presented the switched-page forgery as evidence

of PRC's rights to the property. Piontkowski and Paige testified

that Piontkowski had never signed the First Amendment and had never

agreed to subordinate PRC's sublease to Giuliano's master lease.

Moreover, they testified that Giuliano had signed the Lease

Confirmation, which acknowledged that PRC had a 30-year lease with

an option to purchase the premises. Piontkowski asserted that it

was Giuliano who had perpetrated the fraud by attaching the

signature page from the Lease Confirmation onto the First

Amendment. When the authenticity of the switched-page Lease

Confirmation was questioned, Piontkowski submitted the cut-andpaste Lease Confirmation. Relying on the forged documents and

perjured testimony, the Commission concluded that PRC's sublease

had not been subordinated to the master lease and thus PRC had a

long-term right to control of the premises. Accordingly, on

November 15, 1999, the Commission granted a year 2000 racing

license to PRC.

Piontkowski and PRC then filed a complaint in

Massachusetts state court seeking a declaration that PRC had

validly exercised its option to purchase the subleased premises.

On November 1, 1999, PRC used the cut-and-paste forgery and
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perjured testimony to obtain a Memorandum of Lis Pendens from the

court that effectively clouded title to the property. Throughout

the course of these state proceedings, PRC submitted numerous

fraudulent filings to the court. The state court relied on these

fraudulent misrepresentations in denying Giuliano's motion to

dismiss.

On November 12, 1999, Giuliano filed his own

Massachusetts state court action against Piontkowski and PRC

seeking specific performance of the stock purchase agreements. In

their answer, Piontkowski and PRC again relied on the cut-and-paste

forgery. Because the ultimate objective of the racketeering scheme

was to unite the alleged conspirators' control of both the racing

license and the racetrack property, and since PRC was the entity

they were using to achieve that end, the alleged conspirators'

misrepresentations in this state action were intended to further

the scheme by preventing Giuliano from seizing control of PRC.

In December 1999, anticipating the expiration of

Giuliano's option, Alfred Ross, one of PRC's investors, solicited

financing from Stanley Fulton and Anchor. Fulton and senior

management from Anchor met with Ross and Piontkowski in Arizona

later that month to discuss financing the acquisition of the

property. Fulton was apprised of the fraudulent basis of PRC's and

Piontkowski's claims against Giuliano and was made aware of the

means and objectives of the illegal scheme. Despite this
3In June of 2000, Giuliano was granted summary judgment by the

Massachusetts court as to his right to enforce the stock purchase

agreements.

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knowledge, Fulton and Anchor agreed to provide $5 million toward

acquisition of the property. Mindful of Giuliano's outstanding

claims under the stock purchase agreements, the alleged

conspirators formed a straw holding company to shield the property

from the potential reach of Giuliano. All of PRC's investors,

including Ross and Piontkowski, combined with Fulton and Anchor to

create Ourway Realty, LLC (“Ourway”). 

The scheme was successful. With the lis pendens clouding

record title, Giuliano was unable to obtain the financing necessary

to exercise his option before it expired on January 28, 2000.

Shortly thereafter, PRC released, without consideration, its claim

against GTWO/RI that it had a 30-year lease with an option to

purchase, thus lifting the cloud on title. The alleged

conspirators then acquired the property, Ourway took title, and PRC

entered into a series of one-year leases with Ourway. PRC did not,

however, pay any rent to Ourway, and the leases explicitly provided

for the automatic termination of PRC's leasehold interest should

Giuliano gain control of PRC.3

According to Giuliano, the alleged conspirators have

persisted in their misrepresentations to the state courts and to

the Commission. In the three years following Ourway's acquisition

of the property, PRC and Piontkowski continued to deny falsely, in
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state court and Commission filings, any knowledge concerning the

origin of the cut-and-paste forgery. These misrepresentations were

allegedly made with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the

defendants.

On October 1, 2003, Ourway filed an application for a

year 2004 racing license. The application stated Ourway's

intention to purchase all of PRC's assets in exchange for a

cancellation of debt owed by PRC to Ourway for accrued unpaid rent.

Ourway's application stated that Piontkowski would continue as the

manager of the racetrack. The proposed transfer of PRC's assets to

Ourway is the most recent ploy to defeat Giuliano's efforts to

reacquire control of the property.

On October 10, 2003, Giuliano and GTWO/MA (henceforth

“Giuliano”) moved to file an amended complaint in Massachusetts

federal district court alleging that the defendants were

conspirators and active participants in a pattern of racketeering

activity whereby mail and wire communications were used to defraud

the plaintiffs of valuable property in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

1962(b)-(d). The district court allowed the amended complaint, but

nevertheless dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The

court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a pattern of

racketeering activity sufficient to make out a RICO claim because

the alleged predicate acts did not “amount to or pose a threat of

continued criminal activity.”
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In this appeal, Giuliano argues that the district court

minimized or ignored three important factors: (1) that the alleged

illegal scheme was carried out over a period of more than four

years; (2) that the alleged scheme was both extensive and complex;

and (3) that the alleged scheme posed a “societal threat” because

it perpetrated a fraud on the Massachusetts state courts and on the

Commission. According to Giuliano, having overlooked these

factors, the court failed to comprehend the true breadth and depth

of the alleged racketeering activity.

II.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a

complaint for failure to state a claim. Soto-Negrón, 339 F.3d at

38. When reviewing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, “[w]e

accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the

complaint, draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the

plaintiff's favor and determine whether the complaint, so read,

sets forth facts sufficient to justify recovery on any cognizable

theory.” Martin v. Applied Cellular Tech., Inc., 284 F.3d 1, 6

(1st Cir. 2002).

To state a RICO claim, plaintiffs must allege four

elements: “(1) conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a

pattern, (4) of racketeering activity.” Kenda Corp. v. Pot O'Gold

Money Leagues, Inc., 329 F.3d 216, 233 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)).
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“Racketeering activity” means any act that violates one of the

federal laws specified in the RICO statute, see 18 U.S.C. §

1961(1), including the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§

1341 and 1343. At least two acts of racketeering activity must

occur within ten years of each other to constitute a “pattern.”

Id. § 1961(5). The Supreme Court has construed the pattern element

as additionally requiring a showing that “the racketeering

predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of

continued criminal activity.” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.

Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). This is the so-called “continuity

plus relationship” standard. Efron v. Embassy Suites (P.R.), Inc.,

223 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2000). 

The Supreme Court has identified two methods for

establishing continuity. Under the “closed-ended” approach,

continuity is established by showing “a series of related

predicates extending over a substantial period of time” that

“amount to” a threat of continued criminal activity. H.J., 492

U.S. at 242. Because the RICO statute was only intended to reach

long-term criminal conduct, “[p]redicate acts extending over a few

weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not

satisfy [the continuity] requirement.” Id. Under the “open-ended”

approach, a RICO plaintiff need not wait for a long-term pattern to

develop, but may state a claim so long as the alleged “racketeering

acts themselves include a specific threat of repetition extending
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indefinitely into the future [or] . . . are part of an ongoing

entity's regular way of doing business.” Id.

In this case, the district court declined to find either

“open-ended” or “closed-ended” continuity. The court concluded

that the plaintiffs failed to establish open-ended continuity

because the only scheme alleged in the amended complaint, “to take

over certain valuable real estate . . . in Massachusetts,”

presented no danger of continuing racketeering activity

“indefinitely into the future.” Relying on Efron, 223 F.3d at 18,

the court also concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown closedended continuity because the alleged racketeering activity

concerned a single scheme with a closed group of targeted victims.

Because the parties focus their arguments on the correctness of the

court's closed-ended continuity holding, we begin our analysis

there.

Giuliano's primary appellate argument is that the amended

complaint alleged numerous predicate acts extending over four years

and that these allegations of temporal duration and extensive

conduct satisfy the requirement for closed-ended continuity. He

points out that a closed-ended pattern sometimes can be established

by examining only the number of alleged predicate acts and the

duration of the alleged racketeering activity. See H.J., 492 U.S.

at 242. This is because, where the temporal duration of the

alleged activity and the alleged number of predicate acts are so
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extensive that “common sense compels a conclusion of continuity,”

closed-ended continuity should be found. Efron, 223 F.3d at 18;

see also Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441, 446-47 (1st Cir.

1990) (holding that an allegation of 95 fraudulent mailings over a

period of four and one-half years is sufficient, without more, to

state a pattern of racketeering activity).

Conversely, where only a few predicate acts are alleged,

or where the period of time is short, continuity can never be

established. See Sion, 893 F.2d at 447. This is because “[t]oo

few acts would suggest that the defendants were engaged in only

'sporadic activity,' . . . and too short a period of time would

suggest that defendants were not engaged in 'long-term criminal

conduct.'” Id. (quoting H.J., 492 U.S. at 239, 242). 

Some cases, however, fall into a middle ground where the

duration and extensiveness of the alleged conduct does not easily

resolve the issue. In these cases, we examine other indicia of

continuity, see Efron, 223 F.3d at 17 (where plaintiff alleged 17

acts of wire and mail fraud over 21 months, the time frame was “not

so long[,]” nor were the predicate acts “so many[,]” that “other

indicators of continuity--or the lack of them--are without

significance”), including whether the RICO allegation concerns only

a single scheme that is not far reaching, see Kenda Corp., 329 F.3d

at 233; Apparel Art Int'l, Inc. v. Jacobson, 967 F.2d 720, 723-24

(1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer, C.J.). In such cases, we decline to find
4The defendants also contend that the plaintiffs failed to

allege a conspiracy adequately, and thus we should not consider any

acts committed by the non-defendant conspirators. They also say

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the requisite continuity. See Sys. Mgmt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 303

F.3d 100, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2002) (“RICO is not aimed at a single

narrow criminal episode, even if that single episode involves

behavior that amounts to several crimes.”). 

In light of these principles, our first task is to

determine whether the duration of the alleged racketeering conduct

is either so long or so short that the continuity determination can

be resolved on that basis alone. In performing this task, we

evaluate the complaint through the particularity prism of Fed. R.

Civ. P. 9(b), see New England Data Servs., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d

286, 290 (1st Cir. 1987), considering “only those predicate acts

specifically alleged” in the complaint, Efron, 223 F.3d at 16.

Also, we do not credit generic allegations of common law fraud that

do not implicate the mails or wires, as these acts do not

constitute racketeering activity under RICO. See Sion, 893 F.2d at

445; see also Efron, 223 F.3d at 20 (noting that “RICO claims

premised on mail or wire fraud must be particularly scrutinized

because of the relative ease with which a plaintiff may mold a RICO

pattern from allegations that, upon closer scrutiny, do not support

it”).

With this in mind, we give the amended complaint the

required scrutiny.4 Many of the specific allegations of fraud do
that misrepresentations made to the state courts and to the

Commission, as well as the attempts to conceal underlying

racketeering activity through fraudulent misrepresentations, are

not predicate acts under RICO. Because the amended complaint fails

to state a viable RICO claim even if these allegations are taken

into account, we bypass these arguments.

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not implicate the mail or the wires. For example, it is claimed

that Piontkowski submitted the switched-page forgery and testified

falsely concerning that document at an October 21, 1999 Commission

hearing. While this allegation, if true, may constitute fraud or

other common law or statutory violations, it does not amount to a

RICO predicate act because Piontkowski is not alleged to have

utilized the mail or the wires. We will not imply or read into the

amended complaint the mail or wire connection where it is not

alleged specifically. See Sion, 893 F.2d at 444 (we have “no duty

to conjure up unpled allegations in order to bolster the

plaintiff's chances of surviving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

With respect to the actual named defendants, the most we

are told is that “[t]he arrangements for the Arizona meeting [with

Piontkowski and Ross], the agreements calling for Fulton [and

Anchor] to provide financing in furtherance of the Illegal Scheme,

[and] the actual transfer of the funds Fulton provided for the

financing were all accomplished through the use of the mail and

interstate wire communications.” We are also told that “[o]n

multiple occasions on and after December of 1999, Fulton consulted
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and communicated by mail, telephone and interstate wire

transmission with the other participants in the Illegal Scheme, to

discuss the planning and to make decisions about the method and

strategy of carrying out the Illegal Scheme.” These vague

allegations do not satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). See North Bridge

Assocs., Inc. v. Boldt, 274 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2001) (RICO

plaintiff must state “the time, place and content of the alleged

mail and wire communications perpetrating” the fraud) (internal

quotation marks omitted); Sion, 893 F.2d at 444-45.

The attempt to establish the ongoing nature of the

racketeering activity also falls short. Giuliano alleges that the

alleged conspirators maintained their misrepresentations, with the

full knowledge and acquiescence of the defendants, throughout the

pendency of the two state court proceedings and each year, from

1999 to 2003, when the Commission considered racing license

applications. But even assuming these misrepresentations could be

actionable under RICO, all of Giuliano's post-1999 allegations fall

well short of satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). For example, the

amended complaint alleged that “[c]ontinuously since the start of

the state court litigation between the parties in 1999, and after

Fulton, Anchor Partners and My Way joined the Illegal Scheme

shortly thereafter, Piontkowski [and] PRC have made innumerable

fraudulent misrepresentations to the state court and to the
5Giuliano's appellate brief asserts that the allegedly

fraudulent transfer was indeed consummated after the amended

complaint was filed.

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Commission.” No specificity is provided with regard to the time,

place or content of these alleged misrepresentations.

Giuliano additionally alleges that Ourway's October 1,

2003 filing with the Commission, stating its intention to purchase

all of PRC's assets, establishes a proposed fraudulent transfer of

assets designed to frustrate Giuliano's efforts to regain control

of the racetrack.5 However, a proposed or anticipated fraudulent

act cannot be counted as a predicate act in furtherance of a

closed-ended racketeering scheme. Cf. Lincoln House, Inc. v.

Dupre, 903 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming the dismissal

of a RICO claim as unripe where the plaintiff's alleged injury was

“contingent on events that may not occur as anticipated or may not

occur at all”).

Having pruned the amended complaint to its properly

pleaded allegations, we are left with an alleged scheme that is far

less extensive than portrayed by the plaintiffs. On June 25, 1999

Piontkowski and PRC allegedly sent correspondence to Giuliano via

mail and fax asserting the right under the forged Lease

Confirmation to purchase the subleased premises. Similar

correspondence was sent to Giuliano by mail on October 1 and again

on October 5, 1999. Around this time, Paige allegedly faxed the

cut-and-paste forgery to Piontkowski, who then faxed it to the
6Given the vagueness inherent throughout the amended

complaint, even after culling it to its properly plead allegations,

it is difficult to come to a precise figure. For example, it is

alleged that Piontkowski faxed the cut-and-paste forgery to the PRC

investors. The amended complaint does not quantify exactly how

many PRC investors this document was sent to. Elsewhere the

amended complaint mentions at least four people who were PRC

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other PRC investors. Paige also allegedly e-mailed PRC's attorney

a draft of the false statement that he planned to deliver to the

Commission at the November 1999 hearings. Regarding the allegedly

fraudulent PRC filings, the amended complaint provided details on

three: (1) a post-hearing submission sent by mail to the

Commission and Giuliano on November 9, 1999; (2) PRC's request to

the state court for a lis pendens sent by mail in December 1999;

and (3) PRC's opposition to Giuliano's motion to remove the lis

pendens sent by mail in December 1999. 

Finally, the amended complaint alleged that PRC and

Piontkowski attempted to conceal the underlying fraud through (1)

an affidavit by Piontkowski, denying any knowledge of the

forgeries, that was faxed to the state court in a December 1999

opposition to Giuliano's motion to dismiss the lis pendens action,

and (2) a written discovery response, sent by mail to Giuliano's

counsel sometime in 2001, falsely omitting any reference to the

draft statements created for Paige's November 1999 Commission

testimony.

Thus, we are left with approximately 16 alleged predicate

acts6 conducted almost exclusively between June and December of
investors at around that time. For the sake of our analysis,

therefore, we will assume that Piontkowski faxed the forgery four

times on this occasion.

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1999, the only exception being the allegedly misleading discovery

response in 2001. Our case law suggests that the commission of 16

predicate acts over a six-month period is inadequate to establish

a closed-ended pattern of racketeering activity. See Loiselle, 303

F.3d at 106 (21-month scheme involving mail fraud was not

actionable under RICO); Boldt, 274 F.3d at 43 (two acts of mail

fraud over four months insufficient to support a RICO claim).

But even assuming that this case falls into the middle

ground, the plaintiffs have failed to allege a pattern of

racketeering activity with the required closed-ended continuity.

As discussed above, where a case falls into the middle ground, we

have consistently declined to find continuity where the RICO claim

concerns a single, narrow scheme targeting few victims. See Efron,

223 F.3d at 19 (“[C]ombination of single scheme, single injury, and

few victims . . . makes it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to

state a RICO claim.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). At most,

the plaintiffs' amended complaint establishes a situation similar

to Efron, where we held that the plaintiff's allegation that his

business partners engaged in a series of 17 predicate acts over a

21-month period failed to state a pattern of racketeering activity.

We concluded that while the 21-month period fell into the middle

ground, the claim failed because all of the alleged acts of
7The allegedly fraudulent 2001 discovery response does nothing

to extend the scheme, as a “pattern is not formed by sporadic

activity.” H.J., 492 U.S. at 239.

8Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion, we do not view the

Massachusetts state courts or the Commission as “victims” of the

alleged racketeering scheme. Moreover, merely alleging that the

defendant used a governmental body as a tool for facilitating a

racketeering scheme that ultimately harmed the plaintiff is not

enough to transform a narrow scheme into a broad and far reaching

scheme. See Apparel Art, 967 F.2d at 721-24 (finding no pattern of

racketeering activity and placing no import on the plaintiffsubcontractor's allegation that the defendant-contractor's scheme

to obtain a government contract included submission of false

statements to the United States Department of Defense); see also

Loiselle, 303 F.3d at 105-06 (finding the absence of a broad and

far reaching racketeering scheme where the defendant had secured

and maintained a contract with a state-run college system through

several acts of mail fraud). 

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deception “were aimed at the single goal of transforming the

ownership of the [business]” and harmed only three named victims.

Efron, 223 F.3d at 18; see also Apparel Art, 967 F.2d at 723. So

too here. The amended complaint alleges a six-month scheme7 to

fraudulently procure ownership of a single piece of property from

one individual victim and his company.8 Their only injury was the

loss of the property and the accompanying racetrack. There is no

allegation that anything broader or more far reaching was

attempted. Thus, this case falls squarely within our precedent

rejecting closed-ended continuity. See Efron, 223 F.3d at 21

(“Taken together, the acts as alleged comprise a single effort,

over a finite period of time, to wrest control of a particular

[business venture] from a limited number of [victims]. This cannot

be a RICO violation.”). 
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The district court's ruling that there was no open-ended

continuity is similarly unassailable. The amended complaint did

not allege a specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely

into the future, nor did it allege that the racketeering acts were

a part of the defendants' regular way of doing business. To the

contrary, it acknowledged that all of the racketeering activity was

focused on the singular objective of wresting control of the

racetrack away from Giuliano. Once achieved, the illegal scheme,

as alleged, would end. The amended complaint does not suggest that

the defendants or the alleged conspirators would “seek to repeat

their fraud in other . . . similar business settings,” or that they

would “employ mail and wire fraud indefinitely” in their future

racing or gaming operations. Id. at 19.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court concluded

correctly that the plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged neither a

closed-ended nor an open-ended pattern of racketeering activity.

Therefore, the amended complaint was properly dismissed.

Affirmed.