In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 04-3662

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARK A. REED,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00 CR 562—Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

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ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2005—DECIDED APRIL 7, 2006

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Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and ROVNER, Circuit

Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Mark Reed entered a conditional

guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute in excess of 50

kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,

841(a)(1). In that plea, Reed reserved the right to appeal

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress which

had sought to exclude incriminating statements he made to

law enforcement authorities. This is his second appeal to

this court on that issue. The first resulted in a remand to

the district court for it to determine when he was arrested,

whether the officers possessed probable cause at the time of

that arrest and, if not, whether the confession was suffi-
2 No. 04-3662

ciently attenuated from that illegal arrest, applying the

proper factors. See United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457 (7th

Cir. 2003) (Reed I). 

The facts underlying the criminal case are set forth in

Reed I, and will be repeated only as is necessary to understand the legal issues before us in this case and to incorporate the findings by the district court on remand. Reed was

one of three persons in a pickup truck that was towing a

horse trailer on Interstate 57 when Illinois State Trooper

C.G. Fifeld stopped the truck for speeding. The horse trailer

contained two horses and was heavily padlocked. Fifeld

determined that the driver of the truck, Alfonso Garnica,

was driving with a suspended license. Garnica was arrested, but allowed to immediately post a $100 cash bond

and was released at the scene. In the meantime, Fifeld ran

background checks on Reed and the other passenger (and

truck owner) Thomas Martin, to determine if either of them

was permitted to drive the truck. In the course of that

check, Fifeld learned that both men possessed valid driver’s

licenses but also had prior arrests for drug activity. Although Reed disputes that Fifeld actually knew of the drug

arrests, the transcript supports the district court’s determination that he learned of those arrests at the time of the

background checks. 

Fifeld talked with Martin, Garnica and Reed during the

course of the stop. The district court apparently credited

Officer Fifeld’s testimony as to the statements made by the

three men during that time. Because the men produced

driver’s licenses from Wisconsin, Texas and Indiana, Fifeld

asked them what they were doing in Illinois. Martin stated

that he was in Illinois to buy horses, but neither Martin nor

Garnica could tell him where they had acquired the horses

or who had provided them. Reed, on the other hand,

responded that Martin had traveled to Illinois to finalize a

divorce, and that he accompanied Martin because Martin

had suffered health problems recently. After Martin moved
No. 04-3662 3

into the driver’s seat to depart, Fifeld asked him whether

there were any guns, drugs or money in the truck, which

Martin denied. Martin then consented to a search of the

vehicle. At approximately 4:00 p.m., the officers searching

the vehicle found two bundles of cash wrapped in pink

cellophane, totaling $93,981. The bundles were located in

the gooseneck of the horse trailer, under the hay for the

horses and beneath plywood boards. When confronted with

the discovery, Martin stated that the cash represented the

proceeds of an inheritance. The men were then transported

to the police station.

In light of the substantial evidence indicating that Reed

would not have felt free to refuse to accompany the officers

to police headquarters and end the interrogation, the

district court assumed that Reed was under arrest as of

that point in time. The sole question, then, is whether the

district court properly held that the officers had probable

cause at that time to effectuate an arrest. 

Probable cause exists if an officer reasonably believes, in

light of the facts known to her at the time, that a suspect

had committed or was committing an offense. United States

v. Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2001). It is a fluid

concept that relies on the common-sense judgment of the

officers based on the totality of the circumstances. United

States v. Breit, 429 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2005). In determining whether suspicious circumstances rise to the level

of probable cause, officers are entitled to draw reasonable

inferences based on their training and experience. Id.;

Carrillo, 269 F.3d at 766. 

It matters not that the officers were apparently correct,

by Reed’s own admission, in their belief that Reed was not

an innocent bystander. There are undoubtedly situations in

which the passenger is not so involved. But this is not a

post hoc determination. Subsequent evidence of guilt cannot

validate the probable cause determination, nor can evidence
4 No. 04-3662

of innocence invalidate it. Prescience is not required of the

officers. Instead, courts must focus on the real world

situation as known to the officer at that time. The question

is whether they had a reasonable belief at the time. 

Reed argues that the existence of a large sum of money,

and the manner of its concealment, cannot alone support a

finding of probable cause. That is the holding in a number

of cases and is not called into question here. See e.g., United

States v. $506,231 In U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 452 (7th

Cir, 1997) and cases cited therein. Reed’s conclusion that

the money is therefore irrelevant to the probable cause

determination, however, is untenable. In Maryland v.

Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), the Supreme Court addressed

a similar argument. In Pringle, drugs were found in the

backseat of a car, and $768 in currency was discovered in

the glove compartment. The appellate court had dismissed

the $768 as a factor in the probable cause determination

under the view that “ ‘[m]oney, without more, is innocuous.’”

Id. at 372 n.2, citing Maryland v. Pringle, 370 Md. 525, 546,

805 A.2d 1016, 1028 (2002). The Supreme Court, however,

held that the court erred in considering the money in

isolation rather than as a factor in the totality of the

circumstances. Id. Accordingly, although the existence of

the large amount of cash and its concealment in the

floorboards of the trailer does not alone establish probable

cause, it is a relevant circumstance that must be considered

along with all aspects of the situation confronting the

officers.

Taken as a whole, the circumstances were sufficient to

support a reasonable belief that Reed was involved in

criminal activity. At the time of the arrest, the officers knew

that the three men had traveled from outside the state, but

were evasive and contradictory as to the nature of their

trip. Reed indicated that the purpose of the trip was so that

Martin could finalize a divorce, but Martin indicated it was

to purchase horses. Despite the presence of the horses in
No. 04-3662 5

the trailer, indicating that the purchase had been completed, they were unable to tell the officers where the

horses were acquired or from whom they were purchased.

The inconsistencies and vagueness of the stories would

cause a reasonable person to believe that they were intentionally being evasive and deceptive about the nature of the

trip. Equally significant, there was no reason to believe that

the deception was limited to one person. 

When asked whether there were guns, drugs, or large

sums of money in the vehicle, Martin denied it. If the

currency later discovered was truly the proceeds of inheritance, there was no reason for him to lie in response to that

question. And the explanation was rendered more incredible

because no one had indicated that the purpose of the trip

was to collect an inheritance. Therefore, Martin’s explanation required the officers to believe that he had previously

collected on an inheritance, and that he chose to store those

proceeds under plywood in a horse trailer and leave it there

even as he embarked on an out-of-state trip. 

Moreover, the currency was concealed in a manner that

is typical for currency related to illegal drug transactions.

It is common for such currency to be wrapped in cellophane

so as to minimize the ability for a drug-sniffing dog to

detect the drug residue often found on such currency, and

to secrete it in a hidden area of a vehicle to escape detection. This does not mean that there cannot be an innocent

reason to conceal currency, such as to thwart would-be

thieves, but it is a relevant consideration in the totality of

the circumstances. United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582,

587 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that the mere existence of

innocent explanations does not necessarily negate probable

cause, and finding that probable cause existed where many

circumstances of the situation made innocent explanations

unlikely and even implausible). In addition, the officers

knew that two of the travelers in the vehicle had prior drug
6 No. 04-3662

arrests, which further supports the reasonableness of the

belief that the currency was the proceeds of illegal activity.

Reed asserts that the facts establish probable cause only

as to Martin, the owner of the vehicle, and not to him as a

passenger. For that argument, he relies on the Supreme

Court’s decision in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), in

which the Court held that officers executing a warrant on

a tavern lacked probable cause to search all patrons of that

tavern at the time. The Court rejected the notion that a

person’s “mere propinquity” to others independently

suspected of criminal activity would support probable cause

as to that person as well. Id. at 91. The Supreme Court’s

decision in Pringle, however, is more closely on point. In

Pringle, the Court considered whether police officers had

probable cause to arrest the front-seat passenger of a car in

which the officers found $768 in rolled-up cash in the glove

compartment and five glassine baggies of cocaine behind

the back-seat armrest. 504 U.S. at 368. The Court recognized that the presence of a passenger in a vehicle is

different than that of a patron in a bar. “ ‘[A] car passenger—unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra—will

often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver,

and have the same interest in concealing the fruits of the

evidence of their wrongdoing.’ ” Id. at 373, quoting Wyoming

v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999). In Pringle, the

Court held that it was reasonable for the officer to infer a

common enterprise among the three occupants of the car.

The Court held that “[t]he quantity of drugs and cash in the

car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise

to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent

person with the potential to furnish evidence against him.”

540 U.S. at 373. 

Although we lack the presence of drugs in the vehicle as

was the case in Pringle, the totality of the circumstances in

this case similarly leads to an inference of a common

enterprise to which an innocent person would not likely be
No. 04-3662 7

admitted. This was not a quick trip to a grocery store in

which Reed was an unwitting passenger. This was a trip

out-of-state. It is less likely that an innocent person would

be allowed to accompany persons for such a trip. Moreover,

Reed’s own conduct furthered that inference of a common

enterprise, in that his response to the purpose of the trip

was also contradictory. His explanation that the purpose of

the trip was so that Martin could finalize his divorce was

inconsistent with Martin’s explanation, and he too provided

no explanation as to the origin of the horses. His prior drug

arrests did nothing to dispel the suspicion that he was

involved in a common enterprise to conceal the proceeds of

illegal activity. The evidence was sufficient to support a

finding of probable cause in this case, and therefore the

district court did not err in granting the motion to suppress.

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—4-7-06