# C_2017112EN.01004701.xml

| 10.4.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 112/47 |
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10.4.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 112/47

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Action brought on 17 February 2017 — JPMorgan Chase and Others v Commission

(Case T-106/17)

(2017/C 112/66)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicants: JPMorgan Chase & Co. (New York, New York, United States), JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (Columbus, Ohio, United States), J.P. Morgan Services LLP (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: D. Rose, QC, J. Boyd, M. Lester, D. Piccinin and D. Heaton, Barristers, and B. Tormey, N. French, N. Frey and D. Das, Solicitors)

Applicants:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | annul the European Commission decision C(2016) 8530 final, in case AT.39914 — Euro Interest Rate Derivatives — (the ‘Decision’), of 7 December 2016, in so far as it applies to the applicants; |
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annul the European Commission decision C(2016) 8530 final, in case AT.39914 — Euro Interest Rate Derivatives — (the ‘Decision’), of 7 December 2016, in so far as it applies to the applicants;

| — | in the alternative, reduce the penalty imposed on the applicants; |
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in the alternative, reduce the penalty imposed on the applicants;

| — | order the Commission to pay the applicants’ costs. |
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order the Commission to pay the applicants’ costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on six pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the Commission has failed to show that the applicants’ conduct pursued the object of manipulating EURIBOR tenors or EONIA (benchmark interest rates); the evidence shows that the applicants did not pursue any anti-competitive object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (‘Article 101’). |
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1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission has failed to show that the applicants’ conduct pursued the object of manipulating EURIBOR tenors or EONIA (benchmark interest rates); the evidence shows that the applicants did not pursue any anti-competitive object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (‘Article 101’).

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that, further or alternatively, the Commission erred in law in finding that the object of the alleged manipulation of EURIBOR tenors or EONIA is an object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition within the meaning of Article 101. |
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2.

Second plea in law, alleging that, further or alternatively, the Commission erred in law in finding that the object of the alleged manipulation of EURIBOR tenors or EONIA is an object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition within the meaning of Article 101.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the challenged decision does not find, and the Commission cannot now argue or establish, any other anti-competitive object against the applicants than manipulating EURIBOR tenors or EONIA. |
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3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the challenged decision does not find, and the Commission cannot now argue or establish, any other anti-competitive object against the applicants than manipulating EURIBOR tenors or EONIA.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law alleging that, in the alternative, the Commission has failed to establish that the applicants participated in a single and continuous infringement. In particular, the conduct found by the Commission to infringe Article 101 did not pursue a single aim; alternatively the applicants were not aware of the infringing conduct of the other parties and could not reasonably have foreseen it; and alternatively the applicants did not intend to contribute by their conduct to a common plan with an anti-competitive object. |
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4.

Fourth plea in law alleging that, in the alternative, the Commission has failed to establish that the applicants participated in a single and continuous infringement. In particular, the conduct found by the Commission to infringe Article 101 did not pursue a single aim; alternatively the applicants were not aware of the infringing conduct of the other parties and could not reasonably have foreseen it; and alternatively the applicants did not intend to contribute by their conduct to a common plan with an anti-competitive object.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law alleging that the Commission has acted contrary to the fundamental principles of EU law, good administration, the presumption of innocence, and the applicants’ rights of defence, by having pre-judged the case against them in the way it applied the ‘hybrid’ settlement process, and by expressions of pre-judgment by Commissioner Almunia. |
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5.

Fifth plea in law alleging that the Commission has acted contrary to the fundamental principles of EU law, good administration, the presumption of innocence, and the applicants’ rights of defence, by having pre-judged the case against them in the way it applied the ‘hybrid’ settlement process, and by expressions of pre-judgment by Commissioner Almunia.

| 6. | Sixth plea in law alleging that, further or alternatively, the Commission has erred in calculating the fine imposed on the applicants in a number of ways and the Court should reduce it. The Commission (a) should have applied greater mitigation and lower gravity and ‘entry fee’ adjustments to reflect the applicants’ peripheral and different role as found by the Commission; (b) failed to apply the same method for calculating value of sales to each party, with the result that the applicants have been treated less favourably without objective justification; (c) should have applied a greater discount in relation to the applicants’ cash receipts figures to reflect their relative economic strength; and (d) should not have included EONIA sales in its value of sales calculations. |
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6.

Sixth plea in law alleging that, further or alternatively, the Commission has erred in calculating the fine imposed on the applicants in a number of ways and the Court should reduce it. The Commission (a) should have applied greater mitigation and lower gravity and ‘entry fee’ adjustments to reflect the applicants’ peripheral and different role as found by the Commission; (b) failed to apply the same method for calculating value of sales to each party, with the result that the applicants have been treated less favourably without objective justification; (c) should have applied a greater discount in relation to the applicants’ cash receipts figures to reflect their relative economic strength; and (d) should not have included EONIA sales in its value of sales calculations.

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