# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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## N O


## . 12-0047

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# C A R L A 

# S T R IC K L A N D 

# , P E T IT IO N E R 

# ,

v . 

# K A T H R Y N A N D 

# J E R E M Y 

# M E D L E N 

# , R E S P O N D E N T S

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## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## S E C O N D 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



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## Argued January 10, 2013

J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court. * 

## Beauty without Vanity, Strength without

Insolence

, Courage without

Ferocity, And all the Virtues of Man without his Vices 1


## Texans love their dog s. Throug hout the L one Star State, canine companions a r e tr e a te d

— a nd
trea sured—not as mere persona l proper ty but as beloved friends and confida nts, even family members. Given the richne ss that companion animals add to our ever y day lives, losing “man’ s best

C H IE F J U S T IC E J E F F E R S O N j o i n s a l l b u t f o o t n o t e 5 8 a n d P a r t I I

- C o f t h i s o p i n i o n . J U S T IC E J O H N S O N j o i n s a l l * b u t P a r t I I

- C

.

L o r d B y r o n , I

n s c r i p t i o n o n t h e M o n u m e n t o f a N e w f o u n d l a n d D o g , i n 7 T H E W O R K S O F L O R D B Y R O N : W IT H 1 H IS L E T T E R S A N D J O U R N A L S , A N D H IS L IF E 2 9 2

– 9 3 n . 2 ( T h o m a s M o o r e e d

. , 1 8 3 2 )

.

## friend” is undoubtedly sorrowf ul. Even the g ruff

est among us tear s up (eve ry time) at the end of Old
Y eller

. 2 

## This case conce rns the ty pes of damag es available for the loss of a family pet. I f a cher ished dog i s n egl i gentl y killed, can a dollar value be place d on a hear tsick owner ’s hear

tfelt aff ection?
More pointedly , may a bere aved dog owner rec over emotion-based damag es for the loss? I n 1891,

we eff ectively said no, announcing a “true rule” that cate g orized dog s as persona l proper ty , thus 3 

## disallowing non-ec onomic damag es. I n 2011, howeve r, a court of appea ls said y es, eff ectively 4



## cre ating a novel—and expansive—tort claim: loss of companionship for the wrong ful death of a pet. I n today ’s case , involving a family dog that was acci d en t all y euthanized, we must decide whether to adher e to our restric tive, 122-y ear -old prec edent classify ing pets as proper

ty for tort-law
purposes, or to instead rec og nize a new common-law loss-of-c ompanionship claim that allows noneconomic damag es rooted solely in emotional attachme nt, a reme dy the common law has denied those who suffe r the wrong ful death of a spouse, pare nt, or child, and is available in Texas only by 5


## statute. 6


## W e acknow ledg e the g rief of those whose companions are neg lige ntly killed. Relatio n al attachme nt is unquestionable. But it is also u n co m p en sable. We rea ffirm our long- settled rule,

O L D Y E L L E R ( W a l t D i s n e y 1 9 5 7 )

. 2

H e i l i g m a n n v
. R o s e , 1 6 S

. W

. 9 3 1 , 9 3 2 ( T e x . 1 8 9 1 )

. 3
3 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d 5 7 6 , 5 8 1

. 4
S e e R u s s e l l v
. I

n g e r s o l l

- R a n d C o
. , 8 4 1 S

. W

. 2 d 3 4 3 , 3 4 5 ( T e x . 1 9 9 2 ) ( “ c o m m o n l a w r u l e ” w a s t h a t “ n o c a u s e 5
o f a c t i o n [ c o u l d ] b e b r o u g h t f o r t h e d e a t h o f a n o t h e r p e r s o n ” )

. T E X
. C IV
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 7 1

. 0 0 2

. 6 

### 2

## which trac ks the overw helming weig ht of authority nationally , plus the bulk of amicus curia e briefs

from sever al pet-we lfare org anizations (who understand the deep emotional bonds betwee n people and their animals): Pets are proper ty in the ey es of the law, and we decline to permit non-ec onomic d amag es rooted solely in an owner’s subjective fee lings. True, a beloved companion dog is not a fung ible, inanimate object like, say , a toaster. The term “prope rty ” is not a pejora tive but a leg al descr iptor, and its use should not be misconstrued as discounting the emotional attachme nt that pet

owner s undeniably fee l. Neve rtheless, under established leg al doctrine, rec overy in pet-de ath case s is, barring leg islative rec lassification, limited to loss of value , not loss of relationship.
We reve rse the c ourt of appe als’ judg ment and re nder judg ment in favor of the Petitioner.
I. F actual and Proc edural Backgroun d
I n J une 2009, Aver

y , a mix ed-br eed dog owned by Kathry n and J ere my Medlen, esca ped the family ’s backy ard and was promptly picked up by Fort W o rt h an i mal control. J ere my went to retrie ve Av er y b u t l acked enoug h money to pay the require d fee s. The shelter hung a “hold for

owner ” tag on Aver

y ’s cag e to aler

t employ ees that the Medlens wer e coming for Aver y and ensure he was not euthanized. Despite the tag , shelter worke r Carla Strickland mistakenly place d Aver y on the euthana sia list, and he was put to sleep.
J ere my and his two children lear ned of Ave ry ’s fa te a f

ew day s later when they returne d to retrie ve him. Deva stated, the Medlens sued Strickland fo r causing Aver y ’s death and soug ht “sentimental or intrinsic value” damag es since Aver y had littl e or no marke t value and “[could not] b e r e p la c e d

. ” Strickland specia lly excepted, contending such damag es are unrec o v e r a b le in p e t- d e a

th

case s. The trial c ourt direc ted the Medle ns to a mend their pleading s to “ state a claim for damag es
3

## rec og nized at law.” The Medlens amende d their petition to drop the words “sentimental value” but

rea lleg ed dama g es for

Aver y ’s “intrinsic value .” Strickland spec ially excepted on the same ba sis, and the tria l court, sure that Texas law bar red suc h damag es, dismissed the suit with prejudice. The court of appea ls reve rsed, becoming the first Texas court to hold that a dog owner may

recover intang ible loss-of-c ompanionship damag es in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value
proper ty damag es. Addre ssing our 1891 decision i n Heiligmann v. Rose , which pegg ed dog-loss 7 

## damag es to marke t value or a value asce rtained from the dog ’s “usef ulness and service s,” the court of appea ls stated, “Te x as law has chang ed g rea tly since 1891” and “sentimental damag es may now be recove red for .

. . all ty pes of personal property .” Specifica lly , the court said our m ore rece nt, 8 

## non-dog proper

ty case s “explicitl y

held that wher e per sonal proper ty has littl e or no marke t value, and its main value is in sentiment, damag es may be aw arde d based on this intrinsic or sentimental value.” The court of appea ls pivoted, too, on our expression in Heiligmann that the dog s “we re of

9


## a spec ial value to the owne r,” and took f rom this phra se that spec ial value “ may be der ived from 1 0 

## the attachment that an owner feels for his pet.” Emphasizing these iron truths—that “[d] og s are 1 1 

## unconditionally devoted to their owner s” and owne r s , r e c iproca lly , have a deep attachme nt “to their 1 2

1 6 S

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3 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 7 6

– 8 0

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. a t 5 7 8

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. a t 5 8 0 ( q u o t i n g H e i l i g m a n n , 1 6 S

. W

. a t 9 3 2 )

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## b el o v ed family pets” —the court of appea ls decla red “the specia l value of ‘man’s best frien d ’ 1 3 

## should be protec ted.” Thus, g iven “the specia l position pets hold in their family , we see no rea son 1 4 

## why exis ting law should not be interpre ted to allow rec overy in the loss of a pet at least to the same
extent as any other pers o n al p ro perty .” Reinstating the Medlens’ claim, the court of appea ls 1 5 

## conclude d: “B eca

use an o wn er may be awa rded damag es based on the sentimental value of lost
persona l proper

ty , and beca

use d o gs ar e persona l proper ty , the trial court err ed in dismiss ing the Medlens’ a ction ag ainst Strickland.” 1 6 

## This appea l followed, posing a s i ng le, y et signific ant, issue: whether emotional-injury damag es ar e re cover able f or the ne g lige nt destruction of a dog

. 1 7

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T h o u g h n o o n e d i s p u t e s t h a t S t r i c k l a n d w a s a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l e m p l o y m e n t , s h e 17 d i d n o t m o v e f

o r d i s m i s s a l u n d e r s e c t i o n 1 0 1

. 1 0 6 ( f ) o f t h e T e x a s T o r t C l a i m s A c t , T E X
. C IV
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 1 0 1

. 1 0 6 ( f

) , t o w h i c h s h e w o u l d h a v e b e e n e n t i t l e d , F r a n k a v
. V e l a s q u e z , 3 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d 3 6 7 ( T e x . 2 0 1 1 ) , a s t h e M e d l e n s c o n c e d e . I n s t e a d , s h e s o u g h t d i s m i s s a l b a s e d o n h e r s p e c i a l e x c e p t i o n s , w h i c h t h e t r i a l c o u r t s u s t a i n e d

. D i s m i s s a l u n d e r s e c t i o n 1 0 1

. 1 0 6 ( f

) i s n o t a u t o m a t i c ; S t r i c k l a n d w a s r e q u i r e d t o f i l e a m o t i o n . U

n i v
. o f T e x
. S w
. M e d

. C t r
. a t D a l l a s v
. E s t a t e o f A r a n c i b i a , 3 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d 5 4 4 , 5 5 1 ( T e x . 2 0 1 0 ) ; s e e a l s o U n i v
. o f T e x
. H e a l t h S c i

. C t r
. a t S a n A n t o n i o v
. B a i l e y , 3 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d 3 9 5 , 4 0 1 ( T e x . 2 0 1 1 ) ( “ S u b s t i t u t i o n o f t h e [ g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y ] a s t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s n o t a u t o m a t i c ; [ p l a i n t i f f ] w a s r e q u i r e d t o f

i l e a m o t i o n . ” )

. A t t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s , S t r i c k l a n d r a i s e d a c r o s s - p o i n t u r g i n g d i s m i s s a l o n i m m u n i t y g r o u n d s u n d e r s e c t i o n 1 0 1

. 1 0 6 ( f )

. 3 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 8 1

. S h e r e q u e s t e d t h a t i f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s r e i n s t a t e d t h e M e d l e n s ’ a c t i o n , i t s h o u l d r e m a n d t h e c a s e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t w h e r e s h e w o u l d f i l e t h e r e q u i r e d m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s . I d

. T h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s , h o w e v e r , w e n t s t r a i g h t t o t h e m e r i t s a n d d e c l i n e d t o r e a c h S t r i c k l a n d ’ s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s s u e , r e a s o n i n g t h a t i t w a s r e m a n d i n g a n y w a y b y s u s t a i n i n g t h e M e d l e n s ’ s o l e i s s u e o n a p p e a l

. I d

. T h i s a p p e a l f

o l l o w e d

. A s S t r i c k l a n d h a s n o t s a t i s f i e d s e c t i o n 1 0 1

. 1 0 6 ( f

) ’ s p r e r e q u i s i t e s f

o r d i s m i s s a l , w e p r o c e e d t o t h e o n l y i s s u e b e f o r e u s , t h e m e r i t s : w h e t h e r e m o t i o n - b a s e d d a m a g e s a r e r e c o v e r a b l e . 

### 5

## II. Discussion

Americ a is home t o 308 milli on humans and 377 milli on pets. I n fact , “A merica n pets 1 8 1 9



## now outnumber Americ an children by more than four to one .” I n a nation wher e roug hly 62% of 2 0 

## households own a pet—with about 78 milli on dog s and 86 milli on cats (and 160 milli on fish) —it 2 1 

## is unsurprising tha t many animal owner s view their pe ts not as mere persona l propertybut as fullfledg ed fa mily members, a

nd trea t them as such:

• A study

found that 70% of

pet owner s thought of the ir pets as fa mily members. 2 2



## • 45% of dog owner s take their pe ts on vaca tion. 2 3



## • Over 5 0 % of pet owner s say they would rathe r be stranded on a deser ted island with a dog or ca t than with a human. 2 4



## • 50% of pet owner s repor t being “ver

y likely ” to put their own lives in dang er to save their pe ts, and 33% ar e “some what likely ” to risk their lives. 2 5

S t a t e a n d C o u n t

y Q u i c k F a c t s , U

. S

. C E N S U S B U R E A U ( M a r . 1 4 , 2 0 1 3 , 1 1 : 1 7 A M ) , 18 h t t p : / / q u i c k f

a c t s . c e n s u s . g o v / q f

d / s t a t e s / 0 0 0 0 0

. h t m l ( l i s t i n g t h e 2 0 1 0 U

. S

. p o p u l a t i o n a s a l m o s t 3 0 9 m i l l i o n )

. P e t I n d u s t r

y M a r k e t S i z e & O w n e r s h i p S t a t i s t i c s , A M
. P E T P R O D S
. A S S ’ N , 1 9 h t t p : / / w w w . a m e r i c a n p e t p r o d u c t s . o r g / p r e s s

_ i n d u s t r y t r e n d s . a s p ( l a s t v i s i t e d A p r . 3 , 2 0 1 3 )

.

J O N A T H A N V

. L A S T , W H A T T O E X P E C T W H E N N O O N E ’ S E X P E C T IN G : A M E R IC A ’ S C O M IN G D E M O G R A P H IC 20 D IS A S T E R 2 ( 2 0 1 3 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t a s b i r t h r a t e s p l u m m e t i n A m e r i c a

— t h e s o - c a l l e d “ b a b y b u s t ” g e n e r a t i o n

— p e t o w n e r s h i p s o a r s )

. P e t I

n d u s t r y M a r k e t S i z e & O w n e r s h i p S t a t i s t i c s , s u

p r a n o t e 1 9

. 21
W i l l i a m C

. R o o t , “ M a n ’ s B e s t F r i e n d ” : P r o p e r t y o r F a m i l

y M e m b e r ? A n E x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e L e g a l 22 C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f C o m p a n i o n A n i m a l s a n d i t s I m p a c t o n D a m a g e s R e c o v e r a b l e f o r T h e i r W r o n g f u l D e a t h o r I

n j u r y , 4 7 V IL L
. L

. R E V
. 4 2 3 , 4 3 6 ( 2 0 0 2 )

.

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## • I n 2012, Americ ans spent roug hly $53 billion on t heir pe ts. 2 6 

## The human-a

nimal bond is indeed power ful. As the Medlens’ second amende d petition
states: “The entire Medlen family was devastated by the loss of Aver y , who was like a family member to them.” Count l es s T ex as families share this pets-as- family view, but Texas law, for a
centur y -plus, has labe led them as “ proper ty ” for purposes of tor

t-law re cover

y . A. Our P rec edent Lim its Dam ages in Dog-Deat h Tort Cases to “M arket V alue, If the Dog Has Any,” or “Sp ecial or P ecuniary Value” Link ed to the Dog’ s “Useful ness and Service s” 1. Our 1891 Heilig mann Dec ision T ies “Special Value” to a Dog’s Econom ic Attributes, Not Subjective or Emotional Considerations Our analy sis beg ins with Heiligmann v. Rose , our 1891 case upholding $75 in damag es for 2 7 

## the poisoning of three “we ll trained” Newf oundland dog s. Heiligmann ar t i cu l at ed some key valuation principles for animal case s . Fi rs t, we classified dog s as persona l proper ty for damag es purposes, not as something g iving rise to persona l-injury damag es. Second, we decla red a “true 2 8 

## rule” for damag es that flag s two elements: (1) “mar ket value, if the dog has any ,” or (2) “some 2 9 

## specia l or pecunia

ry value to the owner , that may be asce rtained by ref ere nce to the usefulness and service s of the dog .” 3 0

P e t I n d u s t r y M a r k e t S i z e & O w n e r s h i p S t a t i s t i c s , s u

p r a n o t e 1 9

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## I n Heiligmann , the dog s “we re of fine bree d, and well trained,” with one using differ ent barks

to sig nal whether an approa ching person was a man, woman, or child. Whil e the owner could sell

eac h dog for $5, they had no marke t value bey ond that, but the Court uphe ld damag es of $25 eac h: There is no evidenc e in this case that the dog s had a marke t va lue, but the evidenc e is ample showing the usefulness and service s of the dog s, and that they wer e of specia l value to the owner . I f the jury from the evidenc e should be satisfied that the dog s wer e service able and useful to the owner , they could infer their value when the owner , by evidenc e, fixes some amount upon which they could form a

basis. 3 1 

## The Medlens insist that Heiligmann does not limit rec overy to an amount based solely on the dog ’s economic usefulness and service s. Rather, whe n the Court mentioned cer tain dog s lacking marke t value but having “a specia l value to the owner ,” we meant something far broade r and distinct from the dog s’ commerc ial attributes. Simi larly , arg ue the Medlens, when the Court in Heiligmann noted a dog ’s “spec ial or pecunia ry value to the o wner ,” the word “or” indicates two distinct
cate g o ri es o f non-marke t value dog s—those with a specia l value to the owner , and those with a pecunia ry value to the owne r. We disag ree . Given its ord in a

r y , c o n te xtu a l me a

n in g , H e il igm ann tied the rec overy of “spec ial or pecunia ry value” to the dog s’ “usef

ulness and service s” —their economic value, not their sentimental value. 3 2 

## Whil e we ref

ere nced evidenc e “showing the usefulness and service s of the dog s, and that they wer e of a spe cial value to the owner ,” the next conditional sentence pe g s the jury ’s valuation dec ision 3 3


## to the dog s’ economic attributes: “I f the jury from the evidenc e should be satisfied that the dog s wer e

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## service able and useful to the owner . . . .” The decision never ref ere nces, even by implication, any 3 4 

## evidenc e re g arding companionship or owne r af fec tion. Thu s , a d o g’s “spec ial or pecunia ry value” ref

ers not to the dog -human bond but to the dollars-a nd-ce nts value trac eable to the dog ’s usefulness a n d s e r v ic e s . Such value is economic value,
not emotional value based on aff ection, attachme nt, or companionship. I n short, Heiligmann ’s use of the word “spec ial” does not authorize “spec ial damag es” and does not ref er g ener ically to a dog ’s ability to combat loneliness, ease depre ssion, or provide secur ity

. Th e v al u ation criter ia is not emotional and subjec tive; rather it is commercial and obje ctive. 2. Our Post- Heilig mann Cases Do Not Relax the No Emotional-Injury Dam ages Rule for Animal-Death Cases Alterna tively , the Medlens asser t that three post- Heiligmann decisions— City of Tyler v. Likes , Porras v. Craig , and Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc. —viewed collective l y , en t i tle

3 5 3 6 3 7


## proper ty owner s to se ek intrinsic or sentimental-va lue damag es for cer tain destroy ed prope rty

that lacks marke t value or “spec ial or pecunia ry ” value. Be cause dog s are considere d proper ty under
Texas law, they should be trea ted no differ ently , arg ue the Medlens. Acc ording ly , Aver y ’s intrinsic value to them, including companionship, is rec overa ble. We decline to stretch our post- Heiligmann decisions this far.

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. 2 d 4 8 9 ( T e x . 1 9 9 7 )

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6 7 5 S

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### 9

## Our decision a half-ce ntury ag o in Brown involved irrepla cea ble fa mily

heirlooms such as

a wedding veil, pistol, jewelr y , hand-ma de bedspre ads and other items go i n g b ac k sever al
g ener ations—in other words, family keepsa kes that “have their primary value in sentiment.” Such 3 8


## one-of -a- kind memorabilia have a “spec ial value

. . . to their owner ,” and damag es may fac tor in “the fee lings of the owner for such proper ty .” Notably , on the same day we decide d Brown fifty y ear s 3 9


## ag o, we rea ffirme d i n another case the defa ult damag es rule for destroy ed non-heirloom proper ty lacking marke t or repla ceme nt value: “the actua l worth or value of the ar t i cles to the owner . . . excluding any

fanc iful or sentimental consider ations.” 4 0 

## Whil e they rely chief

ly on Brown , the Medlens also cite our decisions in Porras and Likes , but neither offe rs much pertinent g uidance here

. I n Porras , a landowner sued someone for clea ring

sever al l arg e trees from his land. The landow ner te stified about what the l and meant to him and 4 1 

## his wife, not in marke t terms but in personal terms. We rec og nized that the landowner had bee n 4 2 

## injured by the destruction of tree s, even though the proper ty ’s overa ll marke t value may have actua lly increased

. We rema

nded for a new trial to deter mine the “intrinsic value” of the felled tree s—that 4 3

I d

. a t 3 0 4

– 0 5

. 38

I d

. a t 3 0 5

. 39
C r i s p v
. S e c
. N

a t ’ l I n s
. C o
. , 3 6 9 S

. W

. 2 d 3 2 6 , 3 2 8 ( T e x . 1 9 6 3 )

. 40
6 7 5 S

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. 2 d a t 5 0 4

. 41

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. a t 5 0 5

. 42

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. a t 5 0 6

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### 1 0

## is, its orname ntal (ae sthetic) value and its utili ty (shade ) value

. That asse ssment c oncer ning rea l 4 4


## proper ty is not rooted in an owner ’s subjective emotions, as here

. Whil e Porras permitted rec overy of t he “intrinsic value” of t he trees, t he plainti ff did not seek, nor did the C ourt discus s , t h e tree s’ sentimental value. Her e, the Medlens have suffe red lost companionship and are seeking , as a form of “intrinsic value” proper ty damag es, rec overy for Aver y ’s role as a cher ished family member. The court of appea ls rea d too much i nto Porras , which did not import sentimental considerat i o n s i n to

meas u ri n g “i ntrinsic value.” And we decline to expand Porras ’s notion of “intrinsic value” to animal ca s es, specific ally to include the subjective value a dog owner place s on his pet’s companionship, particula rly when Porras itself excluded such subjective notions. Likes is likewise uninstructive. I n Likes , the plaintiff alleg ed that a municipality neg lige ntly flooded her house and destroy ed “many persona l irrepla cea ble i tems.” The principal issue was

4 5 

## whether mental-a

ng uish damag es are rec overa ble for the neg lige nt destruction of persona l proper ty

. We answe red no, though we acknowledg ed Brown ’s s entimental-va lue rule for prope rty of which the “gr eate r value is in sentiment and not in the m arke t place .” Ag ain, m ental anguish is a form 4 6 

## of persona l-injury damag e, unrec overa ble in an ordinary proper ty -dama g e case . The Medlens’ emotion-based claim is, like the mental-a ng uish claim in Likes , based wholly on neg lige nt damag e
to persona l proper

ty

. But Likes bars persona l-inju ry -t y p e damag es in a case alleg ing neg lige nt
proper ty damag e. I n short, neither Porras nor Likes provides the Medlens much support. Distill ed

S e e i d

. 44
9 6 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 9 3

. 45

I d

. a t 4 9 7 ( q u o t i n g B r o w n , 3 6 9 S

. W

. 2 d a t 3 0 4

– 0 5 )

. 46 

### 1 1

## down, the pivotal question today is straig htforwa rd: whether t o extend Brown ’s specia l rules for family heirlooms to neg lige ntly

destroy ed pets. Heiligmann rema ins our lone ca se direc tly on point, and afte r a centur y -plus we are loathe to disturb it. An owner’s fondne ss for a one-of -a- kind, f amily heirloom is sentimental, exi sting a t the time a keepsa

ke is a cquire d and based not on the item’s attributes but ra ther on the nostalg ia it evokes, but a

n owner ’s attachme nt to a beloved pet is more: I t is emotional, formed over time and based on the pet’s specific attributes, namely the rich companionship it provided. Pets aff ord here

and-now benef

its—company , rec rea tion, protection, etc.—unlike a passed- down heirloom kept around chief

ly to commemora te past events or passed family members. We ag ree with the amicus brief submitt ed by the Americ an Kenne l Club (joined by sever al other pet-we lfare g roups): “While

no two pets are alike, the emotional attachme nts a person establishes with eac h pet cannot be shoehorned into keepsa

ke-like sentimentality for litigation purposes.” Finally , as explained below, permitting sentiment-base d damag es for destroy ed heirloom proper ty portends nothing rese mbling the vast public-policy

impact of a llowing suc h damag es in animal-tort c ases. L oss of companionship, the g rava men of the Medlens’ cla i m , i s fu n damentally a form of personal-injury damag e, not proper ty damag e. I t is a component of loss of consortium, including the loss of “love, aff

ection, protec tion, emotional s u p p o rt , service s, companionship, car e, and society .” L oss-of-c onsortium damag es are available only for a few espec ially close fa m i l y

4 7

R e a g a n v
. V

a u g h n , 8 0 4 S

. W

. 2 d 4 6 3 , 4 6 7 ( T e x . 1 9 9 0 )

. 47 

### 1 2

## rela tionshi p s , an d to allow them in lost pet case s would be inconsistent with these limit ations. 4 8 

## There fore , like courts in the overw helming majority of other states, the Restatement of the L aw of 4 9

S e e , e
. g
. , R o b e r t s v
. W i l l i a m s o n , 1 1 1 S

. W

. 3 d 1 1 3 , 1 1 8 ( T e x . 2 0 0 3 ) ; F o r d M o t o r C o
. v
. M i l e s , 9 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d 48 3 7 7 , 3 8 3

– 8 4 ( T e x . 1 9 9 8 ) ; R e a g a n , 8 0 4 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 6 7

.

S e e M i t c h e l l v
. H e i n r i c h s , 2 7 P

. 3 d 3 0 9 , 3 1 2

– 1 4 ( A l a s k a 2 0 0 1 ) ; K a u f m a n v
. L a n g h o

f e r , 2 2 2 P

. 3 d 2 7 2 , 2 7 8

– 7 9 49 ( A r i z . C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 9 ) ; M c M a h o n v
. C r a i g , 9 7 C a l

. R p t r . 3 d 5 5 5 , 5 6 6

– 6 8 ( C a l

. C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 9 ) ; M y e r s v
. C i t

y o f H a r t f o r d , 8 5 3 A

. 2 d 6 2 1 , 6 2 6 ( C o n n . A p p . C t

. 2 0 0 4 ) ; N a p l e s v
. M i l l e r , 2 0 0 9 W L 1 1 6 3 5 0 4 , a t * 2

– 4 ( D e l

. S u p e r . C t

. A p r . 3 0 , 2 0 0 9 ) , a f f ’ d , 9 9 2 A

. 2 d 1 2 3 7 ( D e l

. 2 0 1 0 ) ; K e n n e d y v
. B y a s , 8 6 7 S o . 2 d 1 1 9 5 , 1 1 9 8 ( F l a . D i s t

. C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 4 ) ; G i l l v
. B r o w n , 6 9 5 P

. 2 d 1 2 7 6 , 1 2 7 7 ( I d a h o C t

. A p p . 1 9 8 5 ) ; J a n k o s k i v
. P r e i s e r A n i m a l H o s p
. , L t d

. , 5 1 0 N

. E

. 2 d 1 0 8 4 , 1 0 8 7 ( I l l

. A p p . C t

. 1 9 8 7 ) ; L a c h e n m a n v
. S t i c e , 8 3 8 N

. E

. 2 d 4 5 1 , 4 6 1 ( I n d

. C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 5 ) ; N i c h o l s v
. S u k a r o K e n n e l s , 5 5 5 N

. W

. 2 d 6 8 9 , 6 9 1 ( I o w a 1 9 9 6 ) ; A m m o n v
. W e l t y , 1 1 3 S

. W

. 3 d 1 8 5 , 1 8 7

– 8 8 ( K y . C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 2 ) ; K l i n g v
. U

. S

. F i r e I n s
. C o
. , 1 4 6 S o . 2 d 6 3 5 , 6 4 2 ( L a . C t

. A p p . 1 9 6 2 ) , o v e r r u l e d i n p a r t b y H o l l a n d v
. B u c k l e y , 3 0 5 S o . 2 d 1 1 3 , 1 1 4 ( L a . 1 9 7 4 ) ; K r a s n e c k y v
. M e f f e n , 7 7 7 N

. E

. 2 d 1 2 8 6 , 1 2 8 9

– 9 0 ( M a s s . A p p . C t

. 2 0 0 2 ) ; K o e s t e r v
. V C A A n i m a l H o s

p
. , 6 2 4 N

. W

. 2 d 2 0 9 , 2 1 1 ( M i c h

. C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 0 ) ; F a c k l e r v
. G e n e t z k y , 5 9 5 N

. W

. 2 d 8 8 4 , 8 9 1

– 9 2 ( N e b

. 1 9 9 9 ) ; H a r a b e s v
. B a r k e r y , I n c
. , 7 9 1 A

. 2 d 1 1 4 2 , 1 1 4 5

– 4 6 ( N

. J

. S u p e r . C t

. L a w D i v . 2 0 0 1 ) ; W i l c o x v
. B u t t ’ s D r u g S t o r e s , I n c
. , 3 5 P

. 2 d 9 7 8 , 9 7 9 ( N

. M

. 1 9 3 4 ) ; D e J o y v
. N i a g a r a M o h a w k P o w e r C o r p
. , 7 8 6 N

. Y

. S

. 2 d 8 7 3 , 8 7 3 ( N

. Y

. A p p . D i v . 2 0 0 4 ) ( m e m . ) ; S h e r a v
. N

. C

. S t a t e U n i v
. V e t e r i n a r y T e a c h i n g H o s

p
. , 7 2 3 S

. E

. 2 d 3 5 2 , 3 5 7

– 5 8 ( N

. C

. C t

. A p p . 2 0 1 2 ) ; P a c h e r v
. I n v i s i b l e F e n c e o

f D a y t o n , 7 9 8 N

. E

. 2 d 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 2 5

– 2 6 ( O h i o C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 3 ) ; O b e r s c h l a k e v
. V e t e r i n a r y A s s o c s
. A n i m a l H o s

p
. , 7 8 5 N

. E

. 2 d 8 1 1 , 8 1 2

– 1 5 ( O h i o C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 3 ) ; L o c k e t t v
. H i l l , 5 1 P

. 3 d 5 , 7

– 8 ( O r . C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 2 ) ; D a u g h e n v
. F o x , 5 3 9 A

. 2 d 8 5 8 , 8 6 4

– 6 5 ( P a . S u p e r . C t

. 1 9 8 8 ) ; R o w b o t h a m v
. M a h e r , 6 5 8 A

. 2 d 9 1 2 , 9 1 2

– 1 3 ( R

. I

. 1 9 9 5 ) ; S c h e e l e v
. D u s t i n , 9 9 8 A

. 2 d 6 9 7 , 7 0 0

– 0 4 ( V t

. 2 0 1 0 ) ; G o o d b y v
. V e t p h a r m , I n c
. , 9 7 4 A

. 2 d 1 2 6 9 , 1 2 7 3

– 7 4 ( V t

. 2 0 0 9 ) ; K o n d a u r o v v
. K e r d a s h a , 6 2 9 S

. E

. 2 d 1 8 1 , 1 8 7 ( V a . 2 0 0 6 ) ; S h e r m a n v
. K i s s i n g e r , 1 9 5 P

. 3 d 5 3 9 , 5 4 8 , 5 4 9 n . 9 ( W a s h

. C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 8 ) ; C a r b a s h o v
. M u s u l i n , 6 1 8 S

. E

. 2 d 3 6 8 , 3 7 0

– 7 1 ( W

. V a . 2 0 0 5 ) ; R a b i d e a u v
. C i t y o f R a c i n e , 6 2 7 N

. W

. 2 d 7 9 5 , 7 9 8

– 9 9 , 8 0 1

– 0 2 ( W i s . 2 0 0 1 )

. B u t s e e K n o w l e s A n i m a l H o s p
. , I n c
. v
. W i l l s , 3 6 0 S o . 2 d 3 7 , 3 8 ( F l a . D i s t

. C t

. A p p . 1 9 7 8 ) ( p e r c u r i a m ) ; B a r r i o s v
. S a f e w a y I n s
. C o
. , 9 7 S o . 3 d 1 0 1 9 , 1 0 2 2

– 2 4 ( L a . C t

. A p p . 2 0 1 2 ) ; C o r s o v
. C r a w f o r d D o g & C a t H o s

p
. , I n c
. , 9 7 M i s c . 2 d 5 3 0 , 5 3 0

– 3 1 ( N

. Y

. C i v . C t

. 1 9 7 9 )

. 

### 1 3

## Torts, and the other Texas courts of appea ls that have considere d this question, we reje ct emotion- 5 0 5 1 

## based liability

and prohibit rec overy

for loss of the huma

n-animal bond. We do not dispute that dog s are a spec ial form of persona l pr operty

. That is pr ecise ly why
Texas law forbids animal crue lty g ener ally (both civilly and criminally ), and bans dog fig hting 5 2 5 3 5 4 

## and unlawful restra ints of dog s specific ally —beca use animals, though proper ty , are unique. Most 5 5 

## dog s have a simple job descr iption: provide devoted companionship. We have no need to overr ule
Brown ’s narr ow heirloom exception today ; neither do we broade n it to pet-de ath case s and enshrine

R E S T A T E M E N T ( T H IR D ) O F T O R T S : L IA B
. F O R P H Y S IC A L & E M O T IO N A L H A R M § 4 7 c m t

. m ( 2 0 1 2 ) ( e m p h a s i s 50 i n o r i g i n a l ) :
R e c o v e r y f

o r e m o t i o n a l h a r m r e s u l t i n g f r o m n e g l i g e n t l y c a u s e d h a r m t o p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i s n o t p e r m i t t e d u n d e r t h i s S e c t i o n . E m o t i o n a l h a r m d u e t o h a r m t o p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i s i n s u f f i c i e n t l y f r e q u e n t o r s i g n i f

i c a n t t o j u s t i f

y a t o r t r e m e d y . W h i l e p e t s a r e o f t e n q u i t e d i f

f e r e n t f r o m o t h e r c h a t t e l s i n t e r m s o f e m o t i o n a l a t t a c h m e n t , a n a c t o r w h o n e g l i g e n t l y i n j u r e s a n o t h e r ’ s p e t i s n o t l i a b l e f o r e m o t i o n a l h a r m s u f

f e r e d b y t h e p e t ’ s o w n e r . T h i s r u l e a g a i n s t l i a b i l i t y f o r e m o t i o n a l h a r m s e c o n d a r y t o i n j u r y t o a p e t l i m i t s t h e l i a b i l i t y o f v e t e r i n a r i a n s i n t h e e v e n t o f m a l p r a c t i c e a n d s e r v e s t o m a k e v e t e r i n a r y s e r v i c e s m o r e r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e f o r p e t s . A l t h o u g h h a r m t o p e t s ( a n d c h a t t e l s w i t h s e n t i m e n t a l v a l u e ) c a n c a u s e r e a l a n d s e r i o u s e m o t i o n a l h a r m i n s o m e c a s e s , l i n e s

— a r b i t r a r y a t t i m e s

— t h a t l i m i t r e c o v e r y f o r e m o t i o n a l h a r m a r e n e c e s s a r y . I n d e e d , i n j u r y t o a c l o s e p e r s o n a l f r i e n d m a y c a u s e s e r i o u s e m o t i o n a l h a r m , b u t t h a t h a r m i s s i m i l a r l y n o t r e c o v e r a b l e u n d e r t h i s C h a p t e r . H o w e v e r , r e c o v e r y f

o r i n t e n t i o n a l l

y i n f l i c t e d e m o t i o n a l h a r m i s n o t b a r r e d w h e n t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s m e t h o d o f i n f

l i c t i n g h a r m i s b y m e a n s o f c a u s i n g h a r m t o p r o p e r t y , i n c l u d i n g a n a n i m a l

. S e e § 4 6 , C o m m e n t d

. I n t h e 1 2 2 y e a r s s i n c e H e i l i g m a n n , f i v e T e x a s c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s h a v e d e c i d e d d o g - d e a t h c a s e s , a n d a l l b u t 51
o n e ( t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s i n t h i s c a s e ) h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t T e x a s l a w p r o h i b i t s n o n - e c o n o m i c d a m a g e s . S e e P e t c o A n i m a l S u

p p l i e s , I n c
. v
. S c h u s t e r , 1 4 4 S

. W

. 3 d 5 5 4 ( T e x . A p p . — A u s t i n 2 0 0 4 , n o p e t

. ) ; Z e i d v
. P e a r c e , 9 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d 3 6 8 ( T e x . A p p . — E l P a s o 1 9 9 7 , n o w r i t ) ; B u e c k n e r v
. H a m e l , 8 8 6 S

. W

. 2 d 3 6 8 ( T e x . A p p . — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 1 9 9 4 , w r i t d e n i e d ) ; Y

o u n g ’ s B u s L i n e s , I

n c
. v
. R e d m o n , 4 3 S

. W

. 2 d 2 6 6 ( T e x . A p p . — B e a u m o n t 1 9 3 1 , n o w r i t )

. T E X
. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E § § 8 2 1

. 0 2 1

– . 0 2 6

. 52

T E X
. P E N A L C O D E § 4 2

. 0 9

– . 0 9 2

. 53

I d

. § 4 2

. 1 0

. 54

T E X
. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E § § 8 2 1

. 0 7 6

– . 0 8 1

. 55 

### 1 4

## an expansive newrule that a llows recove ry for what a ca

nine companion mea

nt to its owner . The Medlens find it odd that Texas law would permit sentimental damag es for loss of an heirloom but
not an Aireda le. Strickland wo u l d fi n d i t o d d if Texas law permitted damag es for loss of a Saint
Be rnar d but not for a brother Be rnar d. The law i s n o s t ra n ger to incong ruity , and we need not jettison Brown in order to r efuse to ext end it to categ ories of pr operty bey ond heirlooms. The “true rule” i n T exas rema ins this: Where a dog ’s marke t value is unasce rtainable , the

correc t d am ages measure is the dog ’s “spec ial or pecunia ry value” (that is, its actua l value) —the economic value derive d from its “usef ulness and service s,” not value draw n from companionship 5 6 

## or other non- commerc ial considerations. 5 7


## We rec og nize that the benef it of most family dog s like Aver y is not financ ial but rela tional, and spring s entirely from the pet’s closene ss w ith its human companions. Measur ing the worth of

a beloved pet is unquestionably an emotional deter mination—what th e a

n im al means to y ou and y our family —but me asuring a pet’ s value is a leg al deter mination. We a

re focuse d on the latter, and as

H e i l i g m a n n , 1 6 S

. W

. a t 9 3 2

. 56

I d

. T h e T e x a s r u l e f

a l l s s q u a r e l y w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n a l m a i n s t r e a m , w h i c h c u t s o v e r w h e l m i n g l y a g a i n s t 57
s e n t i m e n t a l

- d a m a g e s r e c o v e r y . A s n o t e d e a r l i e r , m o s t o t h e r s t a t e s l i k e w i s e d o n o t a l l o w p e t o w n e r s t o r e c o v e r e m o t i o n a l

i n j u r y d a m a g e s . S e e s u

p r a n o t e 4 9

. “ F a i r m a r k e t v a l u e ” r e m a i n s t h e p r e d o m i n a n t m e a s u r e o f d a m a g e s n a t i o n a l l y . S o m e c o u r t s , t h o u g h , h a v e a d o p t e d a n “ a c t u a l v a l u e ” a p p r o a c h w h e n m a r k e t v a l u e f o r t h e a n i m a l ( 1 ) i s n o n e x i s t e n t , ( 2 ) c a n n o t b e a s c e r t a i n e d , o r ( 3 ) i s n o t a t r u e m e a s u r e o f i t s w o r t h

. S e e , e
. g
. , M i t c h e l l , 2 7 P

. 3 d a t 3 1 3

– 1 4 ; J a n k o s k i , 5 1 0 N

. E

. 2 d a t 1 0 8 7 ; B r o u s s e a u v
. R o s e n t h a l , 4 4 3 N

. Y

. S

. 2 d 2 8 5 , 2 8 6 ( N

. Y

. C i v . C t

. 1 9 8 0 ) ; S h e r a , 7 2 3 S

. E

. 2 d a t 3 5 7

– 5 8 ; S o k o l o v i c v
. H a m i l t o n , 9 6 0 N

. E

. 2 d 5 1 0 , 5 1 3 ( O h i o C t

. A p p . 2 0 1 1 ) ; M c D o n a l d v
. O h i o S t a t e U n i v
. V e t e r i n a r y H o s p . , 6 7 O h i o M i s c . 2 d 4 0 , 4 2

– 4 3 ( O h i o C t

. C l

. 1 9 9 4 )

. O t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s h a v e p e r m i t t e d p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s w h e r e t h e w r o n g d o e r i n j u r e d o r k i l l e d a n a n i m a l w i t h m a l i c e . S e e C A L
. C IV
. C O D E § 3 3 4 0 ( W e s t 2 0 1 2 ) ; M a r t i n e z v
. R o b l e d o , 1 4 7 C a l

. R p t r . 3 d 9 2 1 , 9 2 6 ( C a l

. C t

. A p p . 2 0 1 2 ) ; P l o t n i k v
. M e i h a u s , 1 4 6 C a l

. R p t r . 3 d 5 8 5 , 6 0 0 ( C a l

. C t

. A p p . 2 0 1 2 ) ; B r u i s t e r v
. H a n e y , 1 0 2 S o . 2 d 8 0 6 , 8 0 7 ( M i s s . 1 9 5 8 )

. 

### 1 5

## a matter of law an owner ’s aff ec tion for a dog (or fer ret, or para

keet, or tara

ntula) is not
compensa ble. 5 8


## B. Com pellin g P et We lf are and Social-P olicy Reasons Counsel Again st P erm itting Em otion-Based Dam ages in Dog-Deat h Cases This is a signific ant case not only for pet owner s but also, as sever al animal-we lfare g roups undersc ore, for pets themselves

. A p p r e c ia ti n g th is c a s e’s signific ant implications, numerous animaladvoca cy org anizations have submitt ed amicus curia e briefs. And while there is no unanimous “propet” position—orga

nizations committed to animal well-be ing are arr ay ed on both sides —the vast 5 9 

## majority of pet-fr iendly g roups oppose the Medlens’ reque st for emotion-based damag es, lest 6 0

W h i l e a c t u a l v a l u e c a n n o t i n c l u d e t h e o w n e r ’ s “ f e e l i n g s , ” u n l i k e B r o w n ’ s n a r r o w e x c e p t i o n f o r o n e - o f

- a - k i n d 58 h e i r l o o m s , 3 6 9 S

. W

. 2 d a t 3 0 5 , i t c a n i n c l u d e a r a n g e o f o t h e r f a c t o r s : p u r c h a s e p r i c e , r e a s o n a b l e r e p l a c e m e n t c o s t s ( i n c l u d i n g i n v e s t m e n t s s u c h a s i m m u n i z a t i o n s , n e u t e r i n g , t r a i n i n g ) , b r e e d i n g p o t e n t i a l ( i f a n y ) , s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g , a n y p a r t i c u l a r e c o n o m i c u t i l i t y , v e t e r i n a r y e x p e n s e s r e l a t e d t o t h e n e g l i g e n t i n j u r y , a n d s o o n . S e e M i t c h e l l , 2 7 P

. 3 d a t 3 1 3

– 1 4 ; s e e a l s o H e i l i g m a n n , 1 6 S

. W

. a t 9 3 2 ( t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t b r e e d a n d s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g i n d e t e r m i n i n g d a m a g e s ) ; N i c h o l s , 5 5 5 N

. W

. 2 d a t 6 9 2 ( “ I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e m e a s u r e o f d a m a g e s f o r i n j u r i e s t o a d o g , f

a c t o r s i n c l u d e i t s m a r k e t v a l u e , w h i c h m a y b e b a s e d o n p u r c h a s e p r i c e , r e l a t i v e l y l o n g l i f e o f b r e e d , i t s t r a i n i n g , u s e f u l n e s s a n d d e s i r a b l e t r a i t s . ” ( q u o t i n g 4 A M
. J U R
. 2 d A n i m a l s § 1 6 2 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ) )

. E m o t i o n a l a t t a c h m e n t , h o w e v e r , i s n o t a c o m p o n e n t o f a c t u a l v a l u e .

S u p p o r t i n g t h e M e d l e n s ( a n d t h u s f a v o r i n g e m o t i o n a l

- i n

j u r y d a m a g e s ) a r e t h e T e x a s D o g C o m m i s s i o n ( T D C ) 59
a n d a g r o u p o f l a w p r o f e s s o r s . T h e T D C s a y s t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ’ d e c i s i o n f

o l l o w s H e i l i g m a n n a n d t r a c k s p r e v a i l i n g l a w . T h e l a w p r o f

e s s o r s s a y H e i l i g m a n n d i v i d e d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s , “ b a s e d o n w h e r e t h e g r e a t e s t v a l u e o f t h e p r o p e r t y l i e s ”

— ( 1 ) p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y w i t h m a r k e t v a l u e , ( 2 ) p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y w i t h u s e v a l u e , a n d ( 3 ) p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y t h a t h a s s e n t i m e n t a s i t s p r i m a r y v a l u e

— “ a n d c r e a t e d a d i f f e r e n t d a m a g e s t e s t f

o r e a c h

. ” T h i s c a s e , t h e y c o n t e n d , f

a l l s n e a t l y w i t h i n c a t e g o r y t h r e e i n l i g h t o f o u r p o s t

- H e i l i g m a n n c a s e s t h a t a l l o w i n t r i n s i c v a l u e w h e n m a r k e t o r p e c u n i a r y v a l u a t i o n s a r e o u t o f p l a c e .

S u p p o r t i n g S t r i c k l a n d ( a n d t h u s o p p o s i n g e m o t i o n a l

- i n j u r y d a m a g e s ) a r e t h e T e x a s M u n i c i p a l L e a g u e , t h e 60 T e x a s C i t y A t t o r n e y s A s s o c i a t i o n , a n d t h e C i t y o f A r l i n g t o n , T e x a s ( c o l l e c t i v e l y “ M u n i c i p a l A m i c i ” ) ; t h e A m e r i c a n K e n n e l C l u b , C a t F a n c i e r s ’ A s s o c i a t i o n , A n i m a l H e a l t h I n s t i t u t e , A m e r i c a n V e t e r i n a r y M e d i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , N a t i o n a l A n i m a l I n t e r e s t A l l i a n c e , A m e r i c a n P e t P r o d u c t s A s s o c i a t i o n , a n d P e t I n d u s t r y J o i n t A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l ( c o l l e c t i v e l y
“ A K C ” ) ; t h e T e x a s V e t e r i n a r y M e d i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n ( T V M A ) ; t h e T e x a s C i v i l J u s t i c e L e a g u e ( T C J L ) ; a n d t h e P r o p e r t y C a s u a l t y I n s u r e r s A s s o c i a t i o n o f A m e r i c a , A m e r i c a n I n s u r a n c e A s s o c i a t i o n , a n d N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n o f M u t u a l I n s u r a n c e C o m p a n i e s ( c o l l e c t i v e l y “ I n s u r e r A m i c i ” )

.

T h e M u n i c i p a l A m i c i a r g u e t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ’ r u l i n g e s s e n t i a l l y a l l o w s “ w r o n g f u l d e a t h ” d a m a g e s f

o r d o g s t h a t a r e b a r r e d f

o r h u m a n b e i n g s . A l s o , s u c h d a m a g e s w o u l d i r r a t i o n a l l y e x p o s e t o u n r e s t r i c t e d d a m a g e s m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , v e t e r i n a r i a n s , a n d o t h e r s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s w h o m u s t m a k e d i f f i c u l t , o n - t h e - f

l y d e c i s i o n s i n t h e f

i e l d

. T h e A K C w a r n s t h a t a l l o w i n g s u c h l i a b i l i t y w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y i n c r e a s e t h e c o s t s o f p e t “ h e a l t h c a r e , p e t p r o d u c t s , a n d o t h e r p e t s e r v i c e s . ” 

### 1 6

## g rea ter liability raise the cost of pet owner ship and ultimately cause companion animals more harm

than g ood. Severa l animal-we lfare g roups—org anizations that understand the intense g rief and despair

occas i o n ed by a pet’s death—insist that rela tional-injury damag es would adver sely impact pet welfa re. For example, the Americ an Kenne l Club, joined by the Cat Fa ncier s’ Association and other
pro-a nimal nonprofits, worry that “pet litigation will become a cottag e industry ,” exposi ng
veter inarians, shelter and kennel wo rk ers, animal-re scue worke rs, even dog sitters, to incre ased liability : “L itigation would arise when pets are injured in ca r ac cidents, police actions, veter inary visits, shelter incidents, protec tion of livestock and pet-on-pe t ag g ression, to name a few .” As risks and costs rise, there would be few er fre e clinics for spay ing and neuter ing, few er shelters taking in animals, few er service s like walking and boarding , and few er p eople adopting pets, leaving more animal s abandoned and ultimately put down. The Texas Veter inary Medica l Association sounds alar ms of “vast unintended conseque nces,” asser ting its mem b er s wo u l d have no choice but to
prac tice defe nsive medicine “to safe g uard ag ainst potential claims of malprac tice.” The unfortunate
out co m e, they contend, would be highe r price s for veter inary car e, thus few er owner s bring ing in their pets for neede d trea tment. Families, particula rly lower- income families, will avoid preve ntive

car e for their pets, not see k neede d car e for ill or injured pets, and be more apt to euthanize a pet.

T h e T V M A s a y s a l l o w i n g e m o t i o n - b a s e d d a m a g e s m a y a c t u a l l y h a r m p e t s “ b y d r i v i n g u p t h e b a s i c c o s t s o f p e t o w n e r s h i p , ” a n d t h a t l i t i g a t i o n a n d i n s u r a n c e c o s t s w i l l c a u s e v e t e r i n a r i a n s t o b o o s t p r i c e s t o o f f s e t t h e t h r e a t o f n o n e c o n o m i c d a m a g e s . T h e T C J L c o n t e n d s s u c h d a m a g e s o f f e n d w e l l

- s e t t l e d l a w , p u t T e x a s j u r i s p r u d e n c e f a r o u t s i d e t h e m a i n s t r e a m , a n d f

o r c e a r a d i c a l p o l i c y c h a n g e b e t t e r l e f t t o t h e L e g i s l a t u r e . T h e I n s u r e r A m i c i a s s e r t t h a t a l l o w i n g s u b j e c t i v e , e m o t i o n a l

- i n j u r y d a m a g e s f

o r h a r m e d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y w i l l s k e w “ t h e u n d e r w r i t i n g o f r i s k , t h e s e t t i n g o f r a t e s , a n d t h e p a y m e n t o f c l a i m s . ” T h i s a b r u p t i m b a l a n c e , t h e y a r g u e , w i l l i m p a c t n o t o n l y v e t e r i n a r y i n s u r a n c e , b u t i n s u r a n c e m o r e g e n e r a l l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y h o m e o w n e r ’ s a n d a u t o m o b i l e c o v e r a g e . 

### 1 7

## The Texas Municipal L eag ue and other g overnme nt associations worry about police office rs and

animal-ser

vice employ ees being second- g uessed fo r split-second decisions they must make in the field when they encounte r loose and potentially dang erous animals. Not all dog s are g ood-nature d, they war n, and g overnme nt worke rs must be fre e to take swift action to pr otect citizens rathe r than
worry ing about lawsuits that, even if succe ssfully defe nded, drain finite taxpay er resour ces. Var ious insurance g roups caution that expanded damag es would spike the cost of insurance acr oss the board,
not just for veter inarians but also for homeowner s and automobile drivers, “inflat[ing] the value of
proper ty loss far above that which insurance contract s have been written to cover with serious
conseque nces f

or the a ffor dability

and ava ilability

of insuranc e in Texas.” The opposing amici, including the Texas Dog Commi ssion and eleve n Texas law profe ssors, emphasiz e t h at the court of appea ls’ judgme nt is consistent with our post- Heiligmann proper ty

valuation prec edent, which they contend allows for sentimental-value damag es for the loss of a dog

. On this heirloom point, the Medlens pose a unique hy pothetical, asserting they could seek sentimental damag es if a taxidermied Aver y had been neg lige ntly destroy ed. I f proper ty is proper

ty , and if they could s eek sentimental value for a stuffed Avery destroy ed long after death, why can’ t they rec over for a euthanized Aver y destroy ed while alive? For the rea sons stated above and below,

we a re unpe rsuade d.
A deca de ag o we explained: “When rec og nizi ng a new cause of action and the acc ompany ing expansion of duty , we must perf orm something akin to a cost-bene fit analy sis to assu re t h at this

1 8

## ex p an s i on of liability is justified.” On this score , the pet-we lfare amici make a forc eful ca s e. 6 1 

## Whil e rec og nizi ng that dog s are trea sured companions whose deaths g ener ate tremendous sorrow,

we are persua ded that allowing loss-of-c ompanionship suits raises wide-r eac hing public-policy implications that leg islators are better suited to calibra te. Our car efulne ss is aug mented by two leg alp o licy conce rns: (1) the anomaly of eleva ting “man’ s best friend” over multipl e valuable human rela tionships; and (2) the open- ended nature of suc h liability

. The court of appea ls’ decision works a peculiar result, eff ectively allowing “wr ong ful death” damag es for pets. L oss of companionship is a co mponent of loss of consortium —a form of 6 2


## persona l-injury damag e, not proper ty damag e—and something we have “nar rowly cabine d” to two building-bloc k human rela tionships: husband-wif e and pare nt-child. The Medl en s reque st 6 3 6 4 

## something rema

rkable : that pet owner s have the sam e leg al footing as those who lose a spouse,
pare nt, or child.
Moreove r, they seek damag es they plainly could not seek if other close rela tives (or friends)

wer e neg lige ntly killed: siblings, step-childre n, g randpa rents, dear friends, and others. Our case s 6 5 

## reje ct l oss-of-c onsortium rec overy for suc h losses. L osing one ’s pet, eve n one considered family ,

R o b e r t s , 1 1 1 S

. W

. 3 d a t 1 1 8

. 61
S e e R e a g a n , 8 0 4 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 6 7

. 62
W h i t t l e s e y v
. M i l l e r , 5 7 2 S

. W

. 2 d 6 6 5 , 6 6 7 ( T e x . 1 9 7 8 )

. 63
C a v n a r v
. Q u a l i t

y C o n t r o l P a r k i n g , I

n c
. , 6 9 6 S

. W

. 2 d 5 4 9 , 5 5 1 ( T e x . 1 9 8 5 ) ( a l l o w i n g a c h i l d t o r e c o v e r l o s s 64
o f

- c o m p a n i o n s h i p d a m a g e s w h e n a p a r e n t d i e s ) , o v e r r u l e d i n p a r t o n o t h e r g r o u n d s b y J o h n s o n & H i g g i n s o

f T e x
. , I n c
. v
. K e n n e c o E n e r

g y , I n c
. , 9 6 2 S

. W

. 2 d 5 0 7 , 5 3 3 ( T e x . 1 9 9 8 ) ; S a n c h e z v
. S c h i n d l e r , 6 5 1 S

. W

. 2 d 2 4 9 , 2 5 2

– 5 3 ( T e x . 1 9 8 3 ) ( a l l o w i n g a p a r e n t t o r e c o v e r s u c h d a m a g e s w h e n a c h i l d d i e s )

.

S e e M i l e s , 9 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d a t 3 8 2

– 8 4 ( r e f u s i n g t o a l l o w l o s s - o f

- c o n s o r t i u m r e c o v e r y b y s i b l i n g s a n d s t e p - p a r e n t s )

. 65 

### 1 9

## should not invite damag es unavailable if an actua l human family member wer e lost. Put differ ently ,

the Medlens seek emotion-based damag es for the death of “man’ s best friend” when the law denies such dama g es for

the dea th of a human be st friend. For all their noble a

nd praisew orthy

qualities, dogs are not human being s, and the Texas common-law tort sy stem should not prioritize humananimal rela tionship s over intimate human-human rela tionships, particula rly familial ones. Analog ous would be anoma lous.
I t would also invite seeming ly arbitra ry judicial line-dra

wing

. Ce rt ai n l y , i f we anointed a common-law claim for loss of pet companionship, we could presc ribe limit s, but the issue is not whether the Court can draw lines, but whether it should

. After all, people form g enuine bonds with

a menag erie of animals, so which “belove d family pets” (the court of appea ls’ descr iption ) would 6 6 

## merit such pref

err ed t reatment? Domesticate d dog s and cats only (as in a Tenne ssee statute )? 6 7


## Fur ry , but not finned or fea there d? What about goldfish? Py th o n s ? Cockatiels? There seems to be no cog ent stopping point, at lea st none that doesn’t re semble judicial leg islation. Simi larly , while statutory damag e caps exis t in various ty pes of case s involving people, the

cour t o f ap p eals’ decision leave s matters wholly unconfine d. Such broad, unstructure d liability would invite peculiar results. Under Heiligmann , for example, if a Westmi nster best-of- bree d champion with a $20,000 marke t va lue is ne g lige ntly destroy ed, that would be its owner ’s top-end

rec overy . But if a 15-y ear -old fra il dog with no marke t value dies, the owner could sue for unlimit ed

3 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 8 0

. 66

T E N N
. C O D E A N N
. § 4 4

- 1 7

- 4 0 3 ( 2 0 1 2 )

. 67



### 2 0

## emotional-injury damag es. We could impose damag es limit s, but such fine-tuning is m ore a

leg islative function than a judicial one. The Medlens and a mici urg e a damag es model based on a pet’s primary value, but that, too, invites g amesmanship. The owner of a we l l-trained dog with leg itimate ma

rket or pecunia

ry value, like a service animal, would be better off say ing his be loved pet was a “worthless mutt” (to avoid a less -r ew ar d i n g recovery under Heiligmann ), y et a lovable, part-of -the-f amily mutt that the owner adore d with all his hear t (to maxi miz e sentimental damag es under Brown ). Our t o rt sy stem cannot countena nce liability so imprecise, unbounded, and manipulable. C. The Legislature Is Best Equi pped to Weigh an d In itiate Broad Changes to Social and Civil-Justice P olicy, Includ ing Wh ether to Liberalize

Dam ages Re cover y in Pe t-De ath Cases
T h e M e d le n s s e e k a s w e e p ing altera tion of Texas tort-law principles, upending a centur y -plu s of settled rig hts, duties, and responsibilities. The judiciary , howeve r, while well suited to adjudicate individual disput es , i s an imperfe ct forum to examine the my riad policy trade -off

s at stake here

. Questions abound: who can sue, who can be sued, for what missteps, for what ty pes of damag es, for how much money ? And what of the societa l ri p p l e effects on veter inarians, animal-medic ine

ma n u f a c tu r e r s , h o me o w n e rs and drivers seeking insurance , pet owner s, pet car etake rs, a n d u lt im a te ly pets themselves? Animal-dea th suits portend fundame ntal chang es to our civil-justice sy stem, not incre mental adjustments on a case -by -ca se basis. They require detailed finding s and elig ibilit y criter ia, which in turn require the car eful balanc ing of a rang e of views from a rang e of perspe ctives, something best left to our 181-member L eg islature. I f lawmake rs wish, they can hold hear ings and

2 1

## then, afte r hea ri ng testimony and weig hing arg uments, cra ft meticulous, product-of -compromise leg islation that allows non-economic da mag es to a c ontrollable and pr edictable deg ree . We also draw counsel from the history of Texas common law, which, though it has allowed sentimental damag es for the loss of an heirloom, h as n o t done so for the loss of a person, instead defe rring to the L eg islature. One explanation is that with heirlooms, the value is sentimental; with people, the valu e is emotional. The rea son the common law historically declined to cre ate a
wrong ful-dea

th action is not beca

use the common law is incapa ble of setting rea sonable para meters,

or beca use such p ar am eters are impossibl e or nece ssarily capr icious. Rather it is beca use such
para meters are most optimally informed by policy - and value- laden judgme nts the L eg islature is best equipped to make. The difficulties of measuring damag es for the loss of human life and identify ing the benef iciarie s entitled to rec over wer e d eeme d by the common law too g rea t. Be cause the judiciary was an imperfe ct decide r, courts decide d leg islatures should decide

. And our L eg islature did so, authorizing a statutory wrong ful-death action for rea sons it was b et t er s u i ted to g aug e. 6 8 

## Having historically declined to rec og nize a common-law action for the loss of a human, the common law should not, for mostly the same r easons, r ecog nize one for the loss of a pet. Our prec edent on the leg al valuation of companion animals has endur ed for 122 y ear s, and while we decline today to expand the damag es available to bere aved pet owner s, we understand the streng th of the human-a

nimal bond. Fe w Texans consider t h ei r p et s throw-a way commodities. Perhaps the L eg islature will enac t a more g ener ous valuation formula for family pets

. Va l uation

S e e T E X
. C IV
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § § 7 1

. 0 0 1

– . 0 1 1 ( c u r r e n t v e r s i o n o f t h e T e x a s w r o n g f u l

- d e a t h s t a t u t e )

. 68 

### 2 2

## derive s fundame ntally from values, and elec ted leg islators may favor scra pping the “prope rty ” label and rec lassify ing companion pets as s omething more eleva ted. The L eg islature has passed a
wrong ful-dea

th statute for humans; it has not (y et) for animals. Given the competing public-policy considerations, we believe if there is to be expanded rec overy in pet-dea th case s, it, too, should be confr onted leg islatively , not judicially

. I n 2000, Tenne ssee enact ed leg islation authorizing non-ec onomic damag es, up to $5,000, when someone neg lige ntly or intentionally kills a companion animal. The T-B o L aw (name d for 6 9 7 0 

## the senate sponsor’s beloved Shih Tzu) narr owly define s “pet” as a domesticated dog or cat, limit s 7 1



## r e c o v e r y to “the dece ased pet’s owner or car etake r,” and immuniz es veter inarians an d a n im a l s h e lt e r s from neg lige nce liability

. The M ar y l an d L eg islature has likewise limit ed damag es in pet case s, 7 2 

## restric ting damag es to fair marke t value plus the nece ssary costs of veter inary car e, not to ex ce ed $7,500 total. An I llinois statute allows non-ec onomic damag es, but it, too, tries to narrow the m,

7 3 

## allowing emotional-distress rec overy only in case s of ag g rava ted crue lty or torture o r w h e n an animal is injur ed o r killed in bad faith when seized or impounded. That is, it forbids non-ec onomic 7 4 

## damag es for

acts of or dinary

neg lige nce.

T E N N
. C O D E A N N
. § 4 4

- 1 7

- 4 0 3 ( 2 0 1 2 )

. 69
2 0 0 0 T e n n . P u b

. A c t s C h

. 7 6 2

. 70
S e e S u s a n C o v e r , M a i n e B i l l W o u l d R a i s e S t a t u s o

f P e t s T h a t A r e K i l l e d , P O R T L A N D P R E S S H E R A L D ( F e b

. 71 1 5 , 2 0 1 3 ) , h t t p : / / w w w . p r e s s h e r a l d

. c o m / p o l i t i c s / b i l l

- w o u l d

- r a i s e - s t a t u s - o f

- p e t s - t h a t

- a r e - k i l l e d

_ 2 0 1 3

- 0 2

- 1 6

. h t m l

. T E N N
. C O D E A N N
. § 4 4

- 1 7

- 4 0 3

. 72

M D
. C O D E A N N
. , C T S
. & J U D
. P R O C
. § 1 1

- 1 1 0 ( 2 0 1 2 )

. 73
5 1 0 I L L
. C O M P
. S T A T
. A N N
. 7 0 / 1 6

. 3 ( W e s t 2 0 1 3 )

. 74 

### 2 3

## As a matter of Texas common law, emotion-based damag es are unrec overa ble, but whether
to permit such liability statutorily is a quintessential leg islativ e j udg ment. Societal attitudes inexorably chang e, and shifting public views may persua de the L eg islature to extend wrong ful-death actions to pets. Amid compet i n g p o licy interests, including the inhere nt subjectivity (and in f la ta b ility ) of emotion-based damag es, lawmake rs are best positioned to decide if such a p o te n ti a ll y costly expansion of tort law is in the State’s best interest, and if so, to structure an appropr iate

reme dy

. III. Conclusi on To his dog, every m an is Napoleon; hence the constant popularity of dogs. 7 5


## I t is an inconvenient, y et i nesca pable, truth: “Tort law

. . . cannot remedy ever y wrong .” 7 6


## L ines, seeming ly arbitra

ry , are require d. No one disputes that a family dog—“in life the firmest friend” —is a treasure d companion. But it is also persona l proper ty , and the law draws s ensib l e, 7 7 

## policy -base d distinctions betwee n ty pes of pro p er t y . The majority rule throug hout most of
A me r ic a

— in c lu d in g T e xa s s inc e 1891—leave ns war m-h e a r te d n e s s w it h s o b e r - mi n d e d

n e s s , a p p ly in g

a rational rule rathe r than an emotional one. For the rea sons discussed above, we declin e to (1) jettison our 122-y ear -old prec edent classify ing dog s as o rd i n ary proper ty , and (2) permit noneconomic da

mag es rooted in r elational attac hment.

A l d o u s H u x l e y , a s q u o t e d i n R O B E R T A N D R E W S , T H E C O N C IS E C O L U M B IA D IC T IO N A R Y O F Q U O T A T IO N S 8 3 75 ( 1 9 9 0 )

. R o b e r t s , 1 1 1 S

. W

. 3 d a t 1 1 8

.

76

L o r d B y r o n , s u

p r a n o t e 1 , a t 2 9 3

. 77 

### 2 4

## Under Texas common law, the human-a ni mal bond, while undeniable, is uncompensa ble,

no matter how it is conce ived in litigation—as a measure of proper ty damag es (including “intrinsic value” or “spec ial value

. . . derive d from the attachme nt that an o wn er fe el s fo r his pet” ), as a 7 8


## p ersona l-injury claim for loss of companionship or emotional distress, or any other theory

. Th e packa g ing or labeling matters not: Recove ry rooted in a pet owner ’s fe eling s is prohibited. We understand that limit ing rec overy to marke t (o r ac t u al) value seems incommensurate with the emotional harm suffe red, but pet-de ath actions compensa ting for such harm, while they can cer tainly be leg islated, are not something Te x as common law should enshr ine.
We reve rse the c ourt of appe als’ judg ment and re nder judg ment in favor of Strickland.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Don R. Wi llett J ustice

OP INION DELIVERED: April 5, 2013

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