Filed 4/2/13 P. v. Melendez CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUAN FELIPE MELENDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant. H037581 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. EE907212)

Defendant Juan Felipe Melendez appeals afte r conviction, by jury trial, of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), 1 attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664, 211, 212.5, subd. (c )), possession of a silencer (f ormer § 12520), possession of

material with intent to make a destructive device (form er § 12312), possession of metal knuckles (former § 12020, subd. (a)(1)), diss uading a witness (§ 13 6.1, subd. (c)(1)), and conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182, subd. (a )(1)). The jury found true allegations that he personally used a firear m in the commission of the ro bbery and attempted robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), pers onally used a firearm in the commission of the conspiracy (§ 12022.5, subd. (a )), and was armed with a firearm while dissuading a witness (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Defenda nt pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) He was sentenced to a 16-year prison term and ordered to pay a number of fees and fines.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.2 On appeal, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct that was prejudicial as to count 5, his conviction of possession of material with intent to make a destructive device. (Former § 12312.) We will order the judgment modified to include applicable penalty assessments on the fees and fines, but otherwise affirm.

BACKGROUND As defendant’s argument only concerns his conviction of possession of material with intent to make a destructive device (c ount 5; former § 12312 ), our review of the

evidence will focus on that count. A. Robbery, Attempted Robbery, Conspiracy, and Dissuading Counts Using the name Lucas Rossi, defendant responded to Craigslist ads placed by Lawrence Dauch, who was selli ng an expensive watch, and by Pierre St. Cyr, who was selling a video camera. Defendant arra nged to meet both men on August 18, 2006. A woman using the name Sophia helped defe ndant set up the meeting with St. Cyr. Defendant met Dauch first, robbing him of the watch and then threatened him. A few hours later, defendant attempted to ro b St. Cyr of the video camera. In both instances, defendant used a gun with a silencer. He also wo re a fedora hat, sunglasses,

and a fake mustache in both cr imes. In 2009, defendant was identified by fingerprints

found on the victims’ vehicles.

B. Possession Counts On July 22, 2009, officers executed a search warrant at defendant’s apartment. They located a silencer, a .22-caliber han dgun, three fedora hats, sunglasses, brass knuckles, pills containing MDMA , and a computer. The police also located a plastic bag containing the following items: smokeless gun powder, a roll of electrical tape, a package of rocket motor igniters, two nine-volt batteries , one nine-volt battery wired to a push-button switch, an electrician’s tool, a roll of insulated copper wi re, a roll of gauged3 wire, a four-inch piece of PVC pipe with end caps and a small hole drilled into one end, and a seven-inch piece of PVC pipe w ith a small hole drilled into one end. C. Prosecution’s Expert Sergeant Dustin Davis testified as an expe rt for the prosecuti on. He worked for the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office on the bomb squad. He had investigated explosives 95 times during the pr evious five years and testifie d as an expert twice before. According to Sergeant Davis, a pipe bo mb can be constructed from PVC pipe or galvanized steel. A person would need to place caps on both ends of the pipe. Gun powder or other flammable mate rial would be placed inside the pipe. The material would need to be ignited. A pers on could ignite the bomb with a rocket motor ho oked up to a battery, with wires running thro ugh small holes in the PVC pipes. Thus, the plastic bag found in defendant’s apartment contained en ough materials to construct two completed pipe bombs. Nothing else would be necessary. Sergeant Davis did not believe that the materials were intended to be used for model rocket launching. Rockets typically use solid fuel, not powder, because the fuel needs to burn at a steady rate , so the gun powder would need to be mixed with a solvent and then “ramm[ed]” into the pipe. If the gun powder found in the bag was used as fuel, the rocket would simply explod e rather than launch into f light. Also, the holes drilled into the ends of the pipe were too small to cr eate the necessary thrust. In order to make a rocket from the materials, a person would ne ed additional items, including a nose, fin, and launch pad. A person woul d also need to remove an en d cap. With the materials in the bag, the rocket would not function; it would be “a catastrophic failure.” Sergeant Davis acknowledged that because the spool of wire found in the bag was only about 20 feet long, it would be dangerous for a person to set off a pipe bomb with the materials in the plastic bag. However, the person could protect himself or herself by placing the bomb on the other side of an object such as a wooden desk.4 During Sergeant Davis’s testimony, the ju ry viewed a video of a PVC pipe bomb exploding. In Sergeant Davis’s opinion, the materials found in the plastic bag were intended to “be put together and exploded.” He did not believe there was any other

reasonable use for the items. D. Defense Expert Eugene Richardson testifie d as an expert for the defe nse. He worked as a bomb disposal technician in Florida. Much of his experience with pipe bombs came from his time working on military bases. He had disassembled pipe bombs about eight times. He had not previously testified in court. Richardson had “a little bit” of experience with model rocketry. He had helped his children play with rocket sets that they had purchased from a hobby store. He had friends who were “nuts about playing with mode l rockets,” and he had once attended a “jamboree” where people were setting off m odel rockets. He had reviewed some YouTube videos showing the proc ess of making model rockets. Richardson testified that the concepts behind pipe bombs and model rockets are similar, although they have “[d]ifferent kinds of propulsion systems and different fabrication techniques.” He believed it was “k ind of a crapshoot” as to what could be made from the materials in the plastic bag. The items could be used to make a model rocket, although a person would need to atta ch a wooden dowel to the pipe. A person would also need some clay or cement and something to “solid ify” the fuel. Richardson believed that the length of wire was consistent with an intent to use the items for model rocketry. According to Richardson, the items in th e plastic bag could “[n]ot directly” be used to make a pipe bomb, because there were no “fragmentation-producing devices.” A typical pipe bomb is made out of metal, with metal end caps, not out of PVC pipe, because metal has more potential for destructi on than plastic PVC pipes. However, he admitted that a PVC explosion w ould create shards of plastic, and that a person could put5 nails inside the pipe to make it more destru ctive. He believed a person would need some epoxy cement in order to make a “proper” pipe bomb from the materials in the plastic bag, although he admitted the bomb would still explode withou t being sealed with epoxy. Richardson acknowledged he was being paid for his work on this case. He was paid $50 for his initial opinion and would be paid $69.71 pe r hour, his regular working wage, for all of the other time he had put in. He expected to bill for about 20 hours, which would total about $1,500. He admitted that he probabl y would not be testifying if he was not going to render an opinion that the materials were lik ely intended for model rocketry. E. Charges, Verdicts, and Sentencing Defendant was charged, by first amended information, with second degree robbery (count 1; §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), attempte d second degree robber y (count 2; §§ 664, 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), possession of a silencer (count 3; former § 12520), possession of a controlled substance (count 4; Health & Saf. Code, § 1137 7, subd. (a)), possession of

material with intent to make a destructive device (count 5; former § 12312), possession of metal knuckles (count 6; former § 12020, subd. (a)(1)), dissuading a witness (count 7; § 136.1, subd. (c)(1)), and conspiracy to comm it robbery (count 8; § 182, subd. (a)(1)). The information alleged that defendant person ally used a firearm in the commission of the robbery and attempted robb ery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally used a firearm in the commission of the conspiracy (§ 12022.5 , subd. (a)), and was armed with a firearm while dissuading a witness (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant initially pleaded not guilty, but changed his pl ea to not guilty by reason of insanity prior to trial. During the guilt phase of trial, he pleaded guilty to count 4, possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) After the6 jury found him guilty of all re maining counts and found all enhancement allegations true,

it found him sane at the time of the offenses. 2

On November 3, 2011, the trial court im posed an aggregate 16-year prison term. It imposed the two-year lower term for count 1 (robbery), with a 10-year term for the firearm use enhancement. It imposed a consecutive eight-month term for count 2 (attempted robbery), with a three-year, four-month term for the firearm use enhancement. It imposed concurrent terms fo r counts 3 through 7 (the va rious possession counts), and it stayed the term for count 8 (dissu ading) pursuant to section 654. Also at the sentencing hearing, the tria l court ordered defenda nt to pay restitution to Dauch. It imposed a $2, 000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4 , subd. (b)) and imposed, but suspended, a $2,000 parole re vocation fine (§ 1202.45). It imposed $240 in court operations assessments (§ 1465 .8, subd. (a)(1)), $240 in crim inal conviction assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $259.50 criminal justice administration fee (Gov. Code, § 29550), a $10 theft fine (§ 1202.5), plus $28. 50 in penalty assessments on the theft fine. The trial court waived penalty assessments as sociated with the $50 criminal laboratory fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5, subd. (a )) and the $150 drug program fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7, subd. (a)).

DISCUSSION

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. He claims the pr osecutor impermissibly vouched for the prosecution’s expert witness, while also impermissibly denigrating the defense.

2 The jury was only asked to find whether defendant was sane at the time of counts 1, 2, 7 and 8 – the robbery, attempte d robbery, conspiracy, and dissuading counts.7 1. Proceedings Below In addressing count 5, the prosecutor note d that the jury had “heard evidence from experts.” She noted that Sergeant Davis had testified that the items found in the plastic bag were “intended for use for a pipe bomb.” The prosecutor then argued, “If you be lieve Sergeant Davis – which you should, because he demonstrated to you that he had a very vast knowledge of this – but if you choose to believe him, you believe that he described these materials, that all you needed to do was put the powder in the pipe, screw on the end caps, put the fuse in and light it or set off the igniter, then it’s a pipe bomb. If you believe Sergeant Davis, which you should, count 5 has been met.” Defense counsel did not object to the ab ove argument. The prosecutor continued by emphasizing that defendant had “everything you need in a pipe bomb” and noting that he had also apparently ma de the silencer himself. The prosecutor then discussed the defense theory – that “it’s a rocket” – and noted that the theory was based on the testimony of the defense e xpert. She argued the defense expert had little knowledge about model rockets and noted that he had been “hesitant” to admit that the items could be a pipe bomb. She asked, “Why? Ask yourself. [¶] You’ll get an instruction on judging witness credibility. Bias is one of the ways that you can

determine – is someone biased when they’re being paid by somebody to testify a certain way? [¶] Remember my last question. If yo u come in here and yo u testify and you don’t say it’s a model rocket, you don’t get paid. He ’s a paid expert. You can get experts to come in here in many courts and say whatever they want you to say[.]” Defense counsel objected at that point, bu t the trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor continued her argument by referring once again to Sergeant Davis’s testimony that the items “were sufficient to ma ke two pipe bombs.” She also reiterated, “His testimony is credible and you should believe it.”8 During his closing argument, defense co unsel argued that Sergeant Davis was the biased expert. He argued that “it’s not always a result of money, ne cessarily.” In this instance, he argued, Sergeant Davis’s bias resulted from his position as a public safety officer. Defense counsel argued that Sergea nt Davis saw the world “through cop-colored

lenses.” Defense counsel also argued that there we re two reasonable interpretations of the evidence and that the ju ry had to adopt the on e that pointed to innocence. He noted that if the materials were used for a pipe bomb, they would leave only plastic shrapnel and do little damage. He noted that according to the defense expert, defenda nt would only have

needed a few other items to ma ke a rocket, and that Sergeant Davis had essentially agreed

with that assessment. He re iterated that even if the rocket theory was not “the best explanation,” the jury was required to adopt it as long as it was “a reasonable explanation.” In her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor argued that Sergeant Davis was knowledgeable and that he had identified “ma ny things that are wrong with this being a model rocket.” She then argued, “The mere fact that an expert from Florida – we’re in Silicon Valley. You mean to tell me that you couldn’t find one pers on locally that could say that this is a model rock et? Not one person. Moffett Field’s right there. Not one person would come to this c ourt locally to say those items are a model rocket. Think about that for a second. Why? Why? Because it’s not reasonable.” Defense counsel objected, but the tr ial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor continued her rebuttal and soon re turned to the subject of “the expert testimony from the defense.” She argued, “T hink about his demeanor. Think about his testimony. Think about what he was sa ying. Why would so mebody who is coming here ... testify to you that something is a mo del rocket? What’s his background in that? He went on the Internet? He got his exper tise from YouTube? YouT ube is not a source of expert information.”9 The prosecutor argued that ultimately, the defense expert had agreed that the materials would make a pipe bomb. She argued, “He reluctantly said possibly. Reluctantly, because he knows he’s here to please the pers on who’s paying him.” At the end of her rebuttal, the prosecuto r argued that “the defense[-]hired expert was not reasonable. ... [Defendant] happened to have a – have a bag of items that is the worst model rocket you’ve ever seen because it won’t work. That doesn’t make sense. It’s not logical because it’s just not supported by the evidence.” The following day, defense counsel asked for a jury instruction to address the prosecutor’s argument about the defense expe rt. The proposed instruction stated: “Yesterday, the prosecutor suggested duri ng her closing argument that the defense attorney could hire an expert ... ‘to say wh atever he wanted,’ .... This suggestion was improper. You are instructed to disregard th is remark. You shall not consider this remark in any way duri ng your deliberations.”

Defense counsel noted that he had “made a timely objection” but had not asked for an admonition at the time. He specified that his failure to do so was not a tactical

decision. The trial court declined to give the in struction, but reminded the jury that the “statements by the attorneys du ring the argument are not evid ence.” The trial court also instructed the jury w ith CALCRIM No. 222, wh ich reiterated that the attorneys’ closing arguments “are not evidence.” In addition, the trial cour t instructed th e jury with CALCRIM No. 332, which provid ed guidance for “evaluati ng the believability of an expert witness.” 2. Analysis “ ‘Under California law, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct if he or she makes use of “deceptive or reprehensible meth ods” when attempting to persuade either the trial court or the jury, and it is reasonabl y probable that without such misconduct, an

outcome more favorable to the defendant wo uld have resulted. [Citation.] Under the10 federal Constitution, conduct by a prosecutor that does not result in the denial of the defendant’s specific constitutional rights ... but is otherwise worthy of condemnation, is

not a constitutional violation unless the challe nged action “ ‘so infect ed the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 679.) “If a prosecutorial misconduct claim is based on the prosecutor’s arguments to the jury, we consider how the statement woul d, or could, have been understood by a reasonable juror in the context of th e entire argument. [Citations.]” ( People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106, 111.) “ ‘ “A prosecutor is given wide latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can incl ude reasonable inferences, or deduc tions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may state matters not in evidence, but which are co mmon knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literatu re.” [Citation.] . . .’ ” ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 215 ( Ward ).) “In general, ‘ “ ‘a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion— an d on the same ground—the defendant [requested] an assignment of misconduct a nd [also] requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the im propriety.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1184-1185 ( Young ).) a. Vouching for the Credibility of the Prosecution Expert

Defendant first contends that the prosecutor committe d misconduct by arguing that the Sergeant Davis’s testimony was “credible and you should believe it.” He contends

this constituted im proper vouching.

We first observe that none of defe ndant’s objections below concerned the prosecutor’s remarks about Serg eant Davis’s credibility. Ther efore, this claim may be deemed waived. (See Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1184 -1185.) However, even11 assuming that defendant’s other objections encompassed these rema rks, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct lacks merit. “ ‘[A] prosecutor is prohibited from vouchi ng for the credibility of witnesses or otherwise bolstering the veracity of their te stimony by referring to evidence outside the record. . . . However, so long as a prosecutor’s assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution w itnesses are based on the “facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief,” [her] comments cannot be characteri zed as improper vouching. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 215.) Here, the prosecutor’s argument that Sergeant Davis’s testimony was “credible and you should believe it” did not amount to improper vouching. The prosecutor did not suggest that her belief in th e witness’s credibility was based on any facts outside the record or her own personal knowledge. (Compare People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 433 [prosecutor referred to his prior experience with the witnesses].) In the context of her argument, it was clear that the pr osecutor was referring to Sergeant Davis’s experience when she argued that he was cred ible. The challenged remark followed her argument that the jury should believe Sergeant Davis “because he demonstrated to you that he had a very vast knowledge of this.” Thus, the prosecutor “p roperly relied on facts of record and the inferences reasonably dr awn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or be lief. [Citations.]” ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 757.) b. Impugning the Defense

Defendant next contends that the prosecutor imprope rly denigrated the defense case and trial counsel by emphasizing that th e defense expert, Richardson, was paid to give an opinion that the materi als in the plastic bag were mo re likely to be made into a model rocket than a pipe bomb.12 “A prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel. [Citations.]” ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 832.) “ ‘An attack on the defe ndant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’ [Citation.]” ( Ibid. ) It is not misconduct for a prosecutor to “remind the jurors that a paid witness may accordingly be biased.” ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162.) Thus, our Supreme Court found no misconduct where a prosecuto r commented that a defense expert had been paid significant fees to “ ‘come[] up with something that excuses [the defendant’s] responsibility.’ ” ( People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 566, 613 ( Cook ).) The Cook court rejected the defense claim that the prosecut or’s argument implied that the expert had given “ ‘false testimony for a fee,’ thereby impugning defense counsel’s integrity for having, in effect, bought the expert’s testimony.” ( Id. at pp. 613-614; see also People v. Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 13 35, 1407 [no misconduct where prosecutor referred to “ ‘paid-to-say witnesses’ ”]; People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 743, 783-784 ( Monterroso ) [no misconduct where prosecutor referre d to the “industry of these defense experts that bounce around from trial to trial, state to state, collecting good money for testimony”].) Here, too, the prosecutor’s comments ab out Richardson being paid to give a favorable opinion for the defense were “w ithin the bounds of proper argument.” ( Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 784.) Moreover, the jury instructions made it clear that the prosecutor’s argument was not evidence and that the jury was responsible for evaluating the credibility of the expert witn esses. (See CALCRIM Nos. 222 & 332.) “Defendant offers no reason to believe the ju ry failed to follow [the se] instruction[s]. [Citation.]” ( Monterroso, supra, at p. 784.) In fact, the pr osecutor referred to the jury instructions regarding witne ss credibility when she argued that Richardson was biased because he was a “paid expert.”13 We conclude there was no prosecutorial misconduct.

B. Fines and Fees Our review of the record reveals two juri sdictional errors concerning the fees and fines imposed at the November 3, 2011 sentenci ng hearing. First, the trial court imposed $240 in court operations assess ments (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) – that is, $30 for each of the eight counts. At the time of defendant’s co nvictions, the court operations assessment was $40 per count. (Stats. 2011, ch. 40, § 6, eff. June 30, 2011; see People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 759 [fee imposed pursuant to section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) serves a nonpunitive purpose and thus does not violate federal or stat e prohibitions against ex post facto statutes].) We will order the judgment modified to reflect th e proper amount of the court operations assessments. Second, the trial court waived all penalty assessments associated with the criminal laboratory fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 113 72.5, subd. (a)) and the drug program fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372 .7, subd. (a)). However, th e penalty assessments are mandatory. (See People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151, 1157; People v. Voit (2011) 200 Cal.App. 4th 1353, 1374 ( Voit ).)

In Voit , this court noted that “there are seven assessments, surcharges, and penalties parasitic to an underlying fine.” ( Voit, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.) In this case, they are as follows : (1) a 100 percent state penalty assessment (§ 1464, subd. (a)(1)), (2) a 20 percent state surcharge (§ 1465.7), (3) a 35 percent state courthouse construction penalty (Gov. Code, § 70372), (4) a 70 percent add itional penalty (Gov. Code, § 76000, subds. (a)(1), (e)), (5) a 20 percent additional penalty for emergency medical services (Gov. Code, § 76000.5, subd. (a)(1)), (6) a 10 percent additional penalty “for the purpose of implementing the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act” (Gov. Code, § 76104.6, subd. (a)(1)), and (7) a 10 percent additional14 state-only penalty to finance Department of Justice forensic laboratories (Gov. Code, § 76104.7 [ 3 ] ). We will order imposition of the applicable assessments, surcharges, and penalties. 4

DISPOSITION The judgment is modified in the followi ng respects: (1) To set the amount of the co urt operations assessments at $320. (2) To include the following assessmen ts, surcharges, and penalties on the $50 criminal laboratory fee imposed pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.5, subdivision (a) and the $150 drug program fee imposed pursu ant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.7, subdivision (a): a 100 percent state penalty assessment (§ 1464, subd. (a)(1)), a 20 percent state surcharge (§ 1465.7), a 35 percent state courthouse construction penalty (Gov. Code, § 70372), a 70 percent additional penalty (Gov. Code, § 76000, subd. (a)(1)), a 20 percent additional penalty for emergency medical services (Gov. Code, § 76000.5, subd. (a)(1)), a 10 percent additional penalty (Gov. Code, § 76104.6, subd. (a)(1)), and a 10 percent additional penalty to finance Department of Justice forensic laboratories (Gov. Code, § 76104.7).

3 The Government Code section 76104.7 pe nalty was increased subsequent to the commission of defendant’s offens es. (See Stats. 2009-2010, 8t h Ex. Sess., ch. 3, § 1, eff. June 10, 2010 [increasing penalty to 30 perc ent]; Stats. 2012, ch. 32, § 25, eff. June 27, 2012 [increasing penalty to 40 percent].)

4 Any party wishing to contest this issu e may petition for rehear ing. (Gov. Code, § 68081.)15 The clerk of the superior court is orde red to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting these modifications and to forward a copy to the Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation. As m odified, the judgment is affirmed.

_____________ _______________ _______________ BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________ _____________ ELIA, ACTING P.J.

_____________ _____________ MÁRQUEZ, J.