### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE SU BM IT T E D O N BR IE FS JU L Y 14, 200 5

IN TH E MATTE R OF J.L.C., V.R.C., an d E.R.C. JO HN RICH ARD SIMMO NS, ET AL 

### . v. J AMES CORDEL L, ET AL 

### .

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for G rundy Cou nty No. A-111 Je ff

rey F . Stewart, Chancellor

No. M2004- 00538-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 28, 2005

DI SSEN TIN G OP IN ION

I write sepa

rate ly to voice my

dissent to the holding re ache d by the majority

in this case. Th e ma jority c on c lud e s th a t F a the r e xpre ssl y wa ive d th e iss ue of

wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt

c or re c tly determined him to be voluntarily unemploy ed. Althoug h Father did state in his brief that he is not challeng ing the trial court’ s determination that he is voluntarily unemploy ed on appea l, I believe the issue should none theless be addre ssed. I n doing so, I would hold that the trial court e rre d in finding that F a the r w a s v olu nta

ri ly un e mpl oy e d a ndin i mpu tin g po te nti a l in c ome to F a the r o n whi c h to ba se a n a wa rdof c hil d s up po rt

. Rul e 13 (b ) o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: (b) Consideration of I ssues Not Presented for Review.

— R eview g ener ally will e x tend only to those issues prese nted for r eview. T he
app e llate c ou rt sh a ll a lso c on sid e r wh e the r the tria l a nd app ellate court ha v e j u risdiction over the subjec t matter, whe ther or not p r e s e n t e d f

o r r e v i e w , a n d m a y in its di scretion consider othe r issues in order, among othe r re asons: (1) to pre vent nee dless litigation, (2) to preve nt injury

to the interests of t h e publi c, and ( 3) to preve nt pre jud ic e to t

he jud ic ial

proc e ss
.
Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 13 (b ) (2 00 5) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he Ad vis ory Com mis sio n Co mme nts to the Rul e pr ov ide a s f

oll ow s:

T h i s s u bdivision deals with the very difficult question of whe n an app e llate c ou rt

sh ou ld c on sid e r an is su e no t r a ise d b y the pa rt ie s. Gene rally speaking , control over

the issues should reside in the-2- parties, not in the court. Accor dingly , this subdivi sion provides that
re vie w w ill ty

pic a lly e xten d o nly

to the iss ue s set

fo rth in the brie fs

. Only the absenc e of subject-matter jurisdiction, whe ther at the trial or
app e llate le ve l, mus t be co ns ide re d by the app e llate c ou rt re g ard le ss of whe ther it is presen ted for r eview. Ca ses appe aled to the wr ong app e llate c ou rt

mus t be tr a ns fe rr e d p ur su a nt t o Ru le 17 of the se ru le s. I n a ll the oth e r situatio ns de sc ri be d in thi s su bd ivi sio n, the app e llate
co urt has discre tion to decide whe ther it will consider a matter not
raise d b y the pa rt ie s. I t is in ten ded that th is d isc re tio n b e sp ari ng ly exercised.

I a mm i n d f

u l o f o u r n e e d t o u s e t h e d i s c r e t i o n v e s t e d i n t h i s C o u r tu n d e r R u l e 1 3 ( b ) c o n s e r v a t i v e l y.
There is no gr eate r nee d for this Court to ex erc ise its discretion to re v i ew an issue not prese nt ed fo r re v i ew, however , than when a trial court e nters a f

inding in dire ct contra vention of established pre cede nt, thereby causing prejudice to the judicial proce ss. See , e.g. , Pa nze r v . King , 743 S.W .2d 612, 616 (Tenn. 1988) (re cog nizi ng that neither of the pa rties ra ised the issue of whe ther a tr i al court wa s corr ect in g ranting a new trial, our supre me court stated that “[w]e are pr esente d wi th a c la ssi c c a se for the a

pp lic a tio n o f T .R. A. P. 1 3( b) that e xpre ssl y g rants the app e llate c ou rt s a uth ority to c on sid e r i ssu e s n ot b ro ug ht u p f or re vie w b y

a ny pa rt y ” ); In re Z. J. S. , No. M2002-02235-COA- R3-J V, 2003 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 415, at *14–27 (Tenn. Ct. App. J une 3, 2003) (e xer c isi ng ou r d isc re tio n u nd e r R ule 13 (b ) t o v a c a te the te rm inatio n of the fathe rs ’ p are nta l r ig hts du e to s e ri ou s p ro c e du ra l ir re g ula ri tie s) ; Wa te rho use v . Cumbe rla nd Co unty Bank , Nos. 03A01- 91 02 -C H- 00 05 6, 03 A0 1- 91 06 -C H- 00 07 9, 19 91 Te nn

. Ap p. LEX I S 80 8, a t *4 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . O c t. 8, 1991) (r ecog nizi ng that neither pa rty raised the issue of whe ther the tria l court er red in finding tha t the plaint if

f faile d to me e t c e rt a in re qu ir e me nts fo un d in the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re , th is Cou rt un de rt oo k a n e xami natio n of the iss ue pu rs ua nt t o Ru le 13 (b )) ; Mo ore v . M oo re , No. 1, 1986 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 3201, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1986) (noting that, even thoug h the parties did not appeal the issue of whether a valid mar

riag e existed in the first instance, the parties’ appar ent disreg ard of the rules g overning the marria g e proce ss w arr anted our examination of the issue under Rul e 13 (b )) . T he lim ite d e xer c ise of dis c re tio n I e sp ou se in thi s ins ta nc e pr omo te s thi s Cou rt ’s ro le in corre cting clea

r leg al er rors by the trial courts of thi s state so that we do not c ondone the establishment of an inc orre ct pre cede nt, the reby preve nting confusion for the bench and the bar that would ultimately

ensue should we allow such e rror s to stand.

After rea ding the trial court’ s order in this case, ther e is no mistaking the f act that the trial court c oncluded that F ather was volu n t ar i l y u n employ ed due sole ly to his incarce ration. I f any
a mbi g uit y did e xist in the or de r, it w ou ld b e re so lve d b y re fe re nc e to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s state me nts to the parties at the conc lusion of the hearing in this matter:

I think first I

would like to point out and say for the r ecor d I

do find that Mr. Cordell has voluntarily put him s el f i n a posi tion of not
e arn ing a ny inc ome

. He did n’ t c e rt a inl y qu it a job bu t h e certainl y-3- participated in illega l activity that broug ht about losing his job and be c omi ng inc arc e rate d a ndpu t us in this po sit ion

. No on e ma de him p ar t i ci p at e in that. It appea rs he voluntarily

chose to do that. So I find t h at h e volunt arily

unemploy ed himself. The question is what could he earn and what could he pa y as fa r as support is conc erne d?

. . . T he qu e sti on of

wh a t he c ou ld e arn is r e a lly so me wh a t in dis pu te and diffic ult for this Court to determine based upon the proof be fore it. An d o ne o f th e reason s I a sk abo ut the se prior

fa rm inc ome re c or ds is that I

thi nk that w ou ld h a ve e sta

bli sh e d w hat he wa s a

ble to e arn of f o f t his fa rm

. The trial court’s finding of voluntary unemploy ment in its order , which is ba sed on this faulty line of re asoning , constitutes clear err or in direc t contrave ntion of our exist ing c ase la w. “Althoug h there is no require ment that a par ent intended t o avoid their c hild support oblig a ti o n s b y th e ir a c ti o n s , w e d o th in k th a t w il lf u l o r v o lu n ta

r y u n e mp lo y ment or
un de re mpl oyme nt must result from an intent on the part of the parent to reduce or terminate his or her income .” Wilson v. Wilson , 43 S.W. 3d49 5, 49 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T his Court has previously

had occ asion to addre ss the corr ectne ss of a trial court’s finding of willful and voluntary unemploy ment b y an o b ligor pare nt under c ircumstance s simil ar to those in the pr esent
ca s e. In P e nn in gto n v . P e nn ington , No. W2000-00568-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Te nn. App. LEXI S 192, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2001), a wife f iled for divorce from her husband in 1999 and soug ht
c hil d s up po rt

fo r the pa rt ie s’ c hil dr e n. I n 1 99 4, the hu sb a nd , a do c tor , w a s in c arc e rate d f or ill e g a lly writing presc riptions for control l ed substances. Id. at *2–3. The husba nd was re lease d in 1996, ho w e v e r , h e w a s s u b s e q u e n tl y arr e s te d in 1 9 9 8 f o r p o s s e s s io n o f c o c a in e a n d s e n te n c e d to a new prison term. Id. a t *3 . T he hu sb a ndre ma ine d in c arc e rate d w he n th e div or c e pr oc e e din g s b e g a n in the lower court. Id. at *2. The tria l court conc luded that the amount of the husba nd’s child support
o b l i gat i o n s h o u l d b e ba s ed u p o n h i s p o t en t i al ea rn i n g ca p ac i t y , u t i l i z i n g t h e a v er age o f h i s ea rn i n gs in the five y ear s prec eding his first arre st in 1993. Id. at *7. Howe ver, the trial court did not make a finding of w i l l fu l an d v o l u ntary unemploy ment on the part of the husband. Id. at *10. Having fa i led to do so, this C ourt conduc ted a de novo r e v ie w o f th e r e c o r d to d e te r mi n e w h e th e r the husband wa s, in fact, willfully and voluntarily

unemploy ed. Id. I n concluding that the husband wa s no t w ill fu lly

a ndvo lun tari ly

un e mpl oy e d, we he ld a s f oll ow s:
The c ase at hand is analog ous to [ W ilson v. W ilson , 43 S. W

. 3 d 495 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)]. I n W ilson , Ms. Wi lso n a

rg ue d th a t be c a us e Mr. Wils on’s criminal acts wer e willful and v o luntary , he wa s willfullyand voluntarily

undere mploy ed. Likewise, in th e ca s e at hand, Ms. Penning ton a sserts that bec ause Mr . Pennington’ s criminal act, using cocaine, was willful and volunt ary , and bec ause this ac t led to his incarce ration and r esulting une mploy ment, he wa s willfullyand voluntarily

unemploy ed. We dec line to m ak e this conclusion. Mr

. Pennington did not intend to become incarce rate d and unemploye dT hi s ca s e c ame t o be hea r d i n t he cha nce r y cour t pri or t o t he ena ct ment of t he new “ i ncome s har es ” mod el 1

o f t he chi l d s up p o rt gui d el i nes, whi ch t o o k ef fect i n January of 2 0 0 5

. I am co gni zant o f t he l i m i t ed evi d ence ad d res si ng Fat her ’ s i ncome i n t he y ear s pri or t o hi s i nca r cer at i on, wh i ch t he Ap pel l ant s at t emp t ed t o prove i n t he procee di ng s bel ow. If , on rem and , t he chancell o r were unabl e t o ascert ai n Fa t her’ s net i nco m e fo r t he p eri o d i n que st i o n, t he chi l d s up p o rt g u id e line s in e x isten c e w h e n this c a se c a m e to b e h e a rd b e lo w p ro v id e fo r su c h a c o n ting e n c y. See T e n n . C o m p . R . & R egs. 12 4 0

- 2

- 4

- . 0 3 (3)(e) (19 9 4 ) ( p rovidi ng t he am o unt of i nco m e t o b e used when t he o b l i go r f ai l s t o pro d uce suf f i ci ent evi d ence o f

i nco m e).
-4- when he mad e the choice to use coc aine; thus, the rec ord does not
su pp or t a f ind ing tha t M

r. Pe nn ing ton was will

ful ly an d v olu nta ril

y unemploye d . Consequ en tly , the trial court’s awa rd of c hild support based on Mr . Penn i n gt o n ’s potential income r ather than his net income is reve rsed. We re m an d this case to the tria l court for a determination of Mr. Penning ton’s net income and to make an a war d of child support base d on Mr. Penning ton’s net income.

Id. at * 1 3 ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d ); see also Coates v. Coates , No. M2001-01928-COA- R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXI S 803, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2002) ( “This court has reje cted the pr oposition t hat
a pa re nt’ s d ish on e st a c t s w h i c hl e d t o u n e mp l o yme nt c on sti tut e wi llf ul andvo lun tary

un e mpl oy me nt. As a logic al extension of that principle, we have a lso held that unemploy ment or under employ ment resulting from inca

rce ration is not willful and voluntary .” (c itations omi tted)))

. As in Pennington , there is nothing in the re cord be fore this Cour t t o i n d i cate that Father intended to bec ome incar cer ated a nd unemploy ed in an e ff o rt t o reduc e or te rminate his income. Thus, the cha ncellor’ s calc ulation of Father’s c hild support obligation base d upon his potential income constitutes a clea

r err or of law which this Court should a ddress to preve nt prejudice to the judicial proce ss. Accor dingly , I would reve rse the trial court’s holding and rema nd this case to the chanc ery court for

a dete rmination of Fat her’ s net income, c onsistent with the child support g uidelines in eff

ect whe n t h i s ca s e was tried be low, and the e ntry of a c hild support awar d based 1 up on su c h a mou nt.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE