See Lo urcey v. E st at e o f Sca rl et t , 14 6 S.W

. 3 d 48 , 55

- 5 6 (T enn. 2 0 0 4 ) (H o l d er, J

. , c o ncurri ng); B urr o ughs v. 1 M a g e e , 1 1 8 S .W .3 d 3 2 3 , 3 3 8 -3 9 (T e n n . 2 0 0 3 ) (H o ld e r, J ., co n c u rr ing a n d d isse n ting ); S ta p le s v . C B L & A sso c s., In c ., 15 S. W

. 3d 83, 92- 93 ( T en n . 2000) ( H ol der , J

. , c on cu rr i n g ) ; Ri ce v . Sa bi r , 979 S. W

. 2d 305, 310- 11 ( T en n . 1998) (H o l d er, J. , dis sent i ng); C o l n v. Sava nnah, 96 6 S.W

. 2 d 34 , 46

- 4 7 (T enn. 19 9 8 ) ( H o l d er, J. , co ncurri ng). 1 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON A pr il 6, 200 5 S es sio n SHI RLEY HALE v. ERW IN OS TROW , ET AL 

### . App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Appe als Circuit Court

for Sh elby County No. 302252 Rita L. Stotts, Judge

No. W2003-01256-SC- R11-CV - F iled Jul y 1, 2005

J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J

. , co n cu rr i n g an d d i s s en t i n g. I ag ree with the majority opinion that the defe ndants owed a duty to the plaintiff and, view ing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the plaintiff, that there are g enuine issues of material fa ct as to cause in fac t and proxim ate or leg al cause. I

continue, howe ver, to a dhere to my previous po sit ion that the ma

jority ’s a na ly sis blu rs the lin e be tw e e n d uty a ndle g a l c aus a tio n b y

imp ro pe rl y encour ag ing “ the trial court to usurp the rol e o f the jury in weig hing the rea sonablene ss of the defe ndant’s conduc t.” B urroug hs v. Mag ee, 1 1 8 S.W .3d 323, 339 (Tenn. 2003) (Holder , J ., concur ring and dissenting ). 1 As a que stion of law, the exis tence of a duty is to be determined by

the trial court. Staples v. CBL & A ssocs., I nc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000). In this case, I would hold that the defe ndant ha d a du ty to us e re a so na

ble c are no t to c aus e ha

rm to pe de stria ns us ing the wa lkw a y . B ur ro ug hs , 11 8 S. W.3 d at 33 8 ( “ Th e re is a br oa d d uty

to e xer c ise re a so na

ble c are to a vo id c aus ing fo re se e able injury to others.”) . Once a duty o f care is established, it is for the trie r of f act to dete rmine the exis tence of cause in fac t and proxim ate cause as well as brea ch of duty and injury

or loss. L ource y v. Estate of Sca

rlett, 146 S.W .3d 48, 55-56 (Te nn. 2004) (Holde r, J., concurring ). Th e a na ly sis us e d by the ma jority to fi nd a du ty of c are , how e ve r, re qu ir e s th e tr ia l c ou rt to we ig h th e fo re se e abil ity

a ndg ra vity

of the po te nti a l ha

rm a g a ins t th e bu rd e n o f p re ve nti ng the ha rm . I n a na ly zing du ty , th e ma jority op ini on state s:2 I t was entire ly

fore seea ble that overg rown bushes emanating f rom the Ostrows’ pr operty

which obstructed the sidewa lk would impede pe de stria ns us ing the sid e wa lk. I t w a s a lso fo re se eab le that a pe de stria n w ou ld b e fo rc e d to g o aro un d the ob str uc tio n, a s Ms . H a le a lle g e s th a t sh e wa s requir e d to do he re , a ndthat th e de tou r c ou ld re su lt in a n in

jury to the plaint if

f. Th e bu rd e n inpr e ve nti ng the ha rm , ho we ve r, wa s mi nim a l — s imp ly tr imm ing or

re mov ing the bu sh e s. A jury must consider the same fa ct s i n d etermining proximate or leg al causation. The majority ’s dis c us sio n o f the iss ue of pr oximate or le g a l c aus a tio n p ro ve s th is p oin t by e sse nti a lly

re pe a tin g its discussion of “duty ”:

I t was entire ly

fore seea ble that a pe destrian mig ht trip and be injured, e ith e r b y a tte mpt ing to t

ra ve rs e the bu sh e s or b y

g oin g aro un d th e m. Even thoug h it might not hav e b ee n fore seea ble that a pe destrian would trip on broken concr ete in g oing a round the bushes, the injury was n ev er t h eless of the type to be e x pecte d from permitti ng the bushes to overg row the sidew alk. Th e ma jority ’s du ty

a na ly sis imp ro pe rl y

“ e nc omp a sse s the we ig hin g pr oc e ss that is n orma lly rese rved to the jury

in neg lige nce case s.” Rice v. Sabir, 979 S.W .2d 305, 310 (Tenn. 1998) (Holder , J ., dissenting) . Further, this balanc ing te st complicates the job of the trial judg e by confusing the trial court’ s determination of the exis tence of a duty with the trier of

fac t’s determination of whether a duty was bre ache d. See B urroug hs, 118 S.W .3d at 339. I wo uldno t r e qu ir e a

tr ia l c ou rt

to m ake a

de te rm inatio n co nc e rn ing fo re se e abil ity that is mor e pr op e rl y

le ft to a jury . I wo uld ho ld, a s a

ma tte r o f l a w, that a

pr op e rty ow ne r o we s a

du ty to us e re a so na

ble c are no t to c aus e ha

rm to p e de stria ns us ing the sid e wa lk i n q ue sti on . I wo uldpe rm it a jury to determine w hether

the landowne r bre ached t h at d u t y and whe ther the a ctions of the pedestria n and her

subsequent injuries we re a rea sonably

fore seea ble consequence of any

brea ch of d u t y f o u n d b y t h e j u r y.

___________________________________ JANI CE M . H OLDE R, JUS TI CE