Filed 7/15/13 In re Z.P. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re Z.P., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B245935

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK95157)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Sherri 

Sobel, Referee. Affirmed.

Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Office of the County Counsel, John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, 

Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

R.P. (father), the father of minors Z.P. and K.P. (collectively the children), appeals 

from the juvenile court‟s jurisdiction and disposition orders.1 According to father, 

because the jurisdiction order was based on a single incident between him and mother 

and no such similar incidents had occurred during the six month period prior to the 

jurisdictional findings, there was insufficient evidence to support that order. Father also 

contends that because he was not living with mother at the time of the incident and had 

no relationship with her at the time the disposition order was entered, there was no factual 

basis upon which the juvenile court could order the removal of the children from him.

The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) cross-appeals from the 

juvenile court‟s order dismissing the allegations in paragraph a-1 of the dependency 

petition. DCFS contends that because the allegations in paragraph a-1 were identical to 

the allegations of another paragraph that the juvenile court found true, the court erred in 

dismissing the allegations of paragraph a-1. 

We hold that substantial evidence supported the jurisdiction and disposition orders 

and that, because we affirm the juvenile court‟s jurisdiction, we do not need to reach the 

jurisdictional issue raised by the cross-appeal. We therefore affirm the jurisdiction and 

disposition orders from which father appeals. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a detention report, a children‟s social worker (CSW) reported that Z.P. and her 

family came to the attention of DCFS as the result of a domestic violence incident 

involving mother and father. Mother and father engaged in an argument that escalated 

into a physical altercation. Father scratched mother, causing bruising to her forearm. 

 

1 As discussed below, the children‟s mother, S.G. (mother), did not appeal from the 

jurisdiction and disposition orders.
3

Father was arrested by the Whittier Police Department and mother filed for a temporary 

restraining order. Father was released from jail later that evening. 

As part of DCFS‟s investigation into the incident, a CSW interviewed mother who 

stated that the allegations concerning the incident were “partially” true. Mother 

explained that because she had no income, she filed for welfare assistance which required 

that she “put . . . father‟s information down.” When a social worker from the welfare 

office contacted father to verify that the children were his, father became “extremely 

angry” because he had three older children and “would not be able to afford to pay back 

what [the welfare agency] would be giving [mother] for assistance.” Father came to 

mother‟s residence and asked her to discontinue her welfare benefits. Mother refused, 

saying she needed the assistance. Although mother and father engaged in an argument 

over the issue, she denied that any physical altercation occurred. Mother admitted that 

father grabbed her and bruised her arm, but added that father‟s actions were not violent. 

Mother did not understand why father had been arrested and did not want to press 

charges, but the police were forcing her to press charges. 

According to mother, father was not living with her and the children, and she only 

communicated with father by telephone. The children, however, were present during her 

argument with father. 

The CSW observed and assessed Z.P. and K.P., and they appeared to be in good 

health and did not show any signs of abuse or neglect. Due to the ages of the children, 

the CSW was unable to obtain any statement from them regarding the alleged incident. 

The CSW obtained and summarized a copy of the Whittier Police Department‟s 

report on the incident, including mother‟s statements to the police that father had a 

history of methamphetamine use; had arrived home the night before his arrest under the 

influence of methamphetamine with a glass pipe in his pocket; and had physically 

assaulted her causing injury to her arm. 

Upon reviewing the police report, the CSW attempted to locate the family, but 

discovered that mother had moved out of her apartment and into her father‟s home 

without notifying DCFS. The CSW eventually contacted mother and asked her to come 
4

to the CSW‟s office to discuss additional concerns the CSW had based on the information 

contained in the police report. Mother came to the office with the children and her father, 

the children‟s maternal grandfather. Mother stated that she had been honest with the 

CSW during her initial interview, and denied making the statements in the police report 

that she found a glass pipe in father‟s pocket and observed father acting strangely as if 

under the influence of methamphetamine. Mother did admit that father had a history of 

abusing methamphetamine, but she was not aware if he was currently using it. Mother 

claimed she did not hit father as the police had reported. When CSW informed mother 

that the CSW needed to interview father again, mother stated that although she had 

maintained telephone contact with father, he did not have any contact with the children 

and she would not allow contact unless and until he contacted DCFS. 

The CSW then interviewed the maternal grandfather who was “blown away” by 

the allegations of domestic abuse. When he asked mother about the allegations, she told 

him that she did not have any concerns about father‟s drug use and denied that she and 

father had any altercations. The maternal grandfather informed the CSW that his 

grandchildren were not at risk of harm by father because they had moved in with him, 

along with mother. 

About two weeks later, father came to the CSW‟s office unannounced and asked 

to speak to the CSW about the allegations of domestic abuse. Father was angry with the 

CSW and told her he did not understand “what was going on.” The CSW explained the 

allegations to father and told him she had reviewed the police report on the incident. 

Based on the report, the CSW told father that she had concerns about his substance abuse 

issues. When she asked father if he would be willing to submit to on-demand drug 

testing, he refused to agree to participate in such testing and told the CSW that he was not 

under the influence of drugs and that testing would be a waste of time. Father also 

declined to answer questions about his substance abuse history. He complained that he 

did not understand why the DCFS investigation was still ongoing when the police had 

released him and did not charge him due to a lack of evidence. He continued to voice 
5

concerns about how DCFS was treating him based on his past.2 Father wanted the DCFS 

investigation closed. The CSW explained that DCFS had concerns about his children‟s 

safety and well-being because he and mother appeared to be “minimizing” the incident. 

Specifically, the CSW informed father that DCFS was concerned that mother had found a 

methamphetamine pipe in his pocket, that he had an “extensive criminal history regarding 

charges of possession of illegal substances . . . ,” and that the children were present 

during his physical and verbal altercation with mother. Father agreed that mother would 

have full custody of the children and understood that DCFS would attempt to obtain an 

order to that effect through the juvenile court. He also agreed that the children would be 

released to mother and detained from him. 

The detention report attached a police report of the domestic abuse incident which 

brought the family to the attention of DCFS and that contained the following information. 

On June 2, 2012, at approximately 2:51 p.m., Whittier police officers responded to a call 

regarding an argument between a man and a woman. When they arrived at the location, 

they heard a man and woman arguing in the middle of the courtyard of the apartment 

complex. The officers observed a large amount of men‟s clothes lying in a pile on the 

ground in front of the open door to an apartment. As they approached the door, they 

could hear a man, whom they later identified as father, yelling obscenities at a woman, 

identified as mother. They noticed father cleaning the top of the kitchen table and mother 

sitting on one of the chairs. 

The officers asked father to step outside to be interviewed. As father approached 

them, he turned around and yelled at [mother] “because the police were at their 

apartment.” The officers saw a female baby—K.P.—in a “rocker” on the sofa and a fouryear old female toddler—Z.P.—standing in front of the couch. There were several holes 

in the hallway wall and additional clothing lying around the living room floor. As one of 

 

2

The jurisdiction/disposition report showed that father had an extensive criminal 

record dating back to 1994, including several drug-related offenses, and that 

approximately six months prior to the incident in question, father again had been 

convicted of possession of a controlled substance and placed on probation. 
6

the officers interviewed father in the courtyard, he continued to yell obscenities at mother 

in front of the children. 

Father told the officer that mother cut up his clothes with a pair of scissors and 

threw them in the courtyard. Father said mother did it because of an argument they had 

the night before. According to father, when he arrived home the night before, mother 

started yelling at him and accused him of being with another woman. He laid down on 

the couch and moments later, mother hit him several times in the head with her cell 

phone. Father stood up and told mother to stop hitting him. In response, mother began to 

push father. Father tried to hold mother‟s arms, but then pushed her away because she 

was becoming more violent. Father denied hitting mother and told the officer that she 

continued to approach him and yell at him. Father took a shower, went to bed, and fell 

asleep. When he woke up in the morning, mother continued to yell at him and argue with 

him about being with another woman. The police responded to that second argument, 

and, after speaking with officers, father left the apartment to allow mother to “cool 

down.” When he returned home several hours later, mother had his clothes in the living 

room and they were “all cut up.” Father became upset and started throwing his clothes 

out the front door because they were ruined. 

The officer then interviewed mother who told him that when father came home the 

night before, he was not acting normally. She said father was under the influence of 

narcotics and she found a methamphetamine glass pipe in his pocket. According to 

mother, before she married father, he used methamphetamine, but he stopped when they 

were married and he had been sober for several years.3 When mother questioned father 

about using methamphetamine, they began to argue. Mother stated that “they were 

physical with each other” and then father pushed her into the hallway causing injury to 

her forearm. The officer observed a bruise with swelling and several scratches on 

mother. 

 

3 As noted, father‟s criminal record included a conviction for drug possession 

approximately six months before the incidents in question.
7

Mother told the officer that before father arrived home that day, she took his 

clothes out of the closet and cut them with scissors. When father arrived home, he threw 

the clothes out the front door into the courtyard. Father and mother began to argue again, 

and later noticed that the police had arrived for the second time that day. 

The police arrested father and, after he was advised of his Miranda4rights at jail, 

he confirmed that the night before, when he arrived home, mother began to hit him in the 

head with her cell phone while he was sleeping. He stood up, attempted to stop her, and 

was able to take the cell phone away from her and break it. Father did not have any 

bruises or scratches on the back of his head where he claimed mother had hit him. Father 

explained that he could have called the police on mother or inflicted serious injury on her, 

but he did not do so because they “always argued” and then “made up.” Father did not 

consider the incident serious. 

DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3005alleging in 

counts a-1, b-1, and b-2 that: “a-1: On 06/02/2012, the children [Z.P and K.P‟s] mother, 

[S.G.], and father, [R.P.], engaged in a violent altercation in the children‟s presence. The 

father grabbed the mother‟s arms and pushed the mother into a wall, inflicting marks and 

bruises to the mother‟s arm. The mother pushed the father and struck the father‟s head 

with a phone. The mother destroyed the father‟s clothing. On 06/02/12, the father was 

arrested for Inflict Corporal Injury on Spouse/Cohabitant. Such violent conduct by the 

mother and the father endangers the children‟s physical health and safety and places the 

children at risk of physical harm, damage and danger.” 

“b-1: On 06/02/2012, the children [Z.P and K.P‟s] mother, [S.G.], and father, 

[R.P.], engaged in a violent altercation in the children‟s presence. The father grabbed the 

mother‟s arms and pushed the mother into a wall, inflicting marks and bruises to the 

mother‟s arm. The mother pushed the father and struck the father‟s head with a phone. 

The mother destroyed the father‟s clothing. On 06/02/12, the father was arrested for 

 

4 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

5 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise indicated.
8

Inflict Corporal Injury on Spouse/Cohabitant. Such violent conduct by the mother and 

the father endangers the children‟s physical health and safety and places the children at 

risk of physical harm, damage and danger.” 

“b-2: The children, [Z.P. and K.P.‟s] father, [R.P.], has a history of substance 

abuse, and is a current abuser of methamphetamine, which renders the father unable to 

provide regular care and supervision of the children. On 06/02/12, the father was under 

the influence of illicit drugs while the children were in the father‟s care and supervision. 

On 06/02/12, the father possessed a drug pipe within access of the children. The father 

has a criminal history of a conviction of Possession of Controlled Substance and 

Possession of Controlled Substance Paraphernalia. Such substance abuse by the father 

endangers the children‟s physical health and safety and places the children at risk of 

physical harm, damage and danger.” 

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found that DCFS had made a prima 

facie case for detaining the children and showing that they were persons described in 

section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The juvenile court further found that a substantial 

danger existed to the physical or emotional health of the minors, that reasonable efforts 

had been made to prevent removal of the minors from the home, and that there were no 

reasonable means to protect the minors without removal. Temporary placement and 

custody of the minors was vested in DCFS. The juvenile court ordered the children 

detained in shelter care pending further court order, ordered family reunification services, 

and granted mother monitored visitation rights. 

In a jurisdiction/disposition report, a CSW reported that during a subsequent 

interview, mother: denied that any physical altercation occurred between her and father; 

denied hitting father with her cell phone; denied destroying father‟s clothes; denied ever 

having a physical altercation with father; denied that father had drug arrests; and denied 

having any knowledge of father‟s drug use until she learned of his criminal record in 

connection with this case. 

During a subsequent interview with a CSW, father: denied engaging in a physical 

confrontation with mother; denied injuring her; denied that his clothes were “scattered 
9

around” on the day of his arrest; and denied being in possession of or using drugs. When 

asked about his criminal history, father stated, “[I]t doesn‟t matter” and indicated that his 

drug use took place prior to the birth of his children.6

In a last minute information for the juvenile court, a CSW reported that after three 

unsuccessful attempts to make an unannounced visit to mother‟s home, the CSW made an 

unannounced visit and found no problems. During that visit, mother told the CSW that 

she had not had any contact with father. The CSW also reported that father had not 

visited the children and, during an interview with father, he told her he did not want his 

visits with his children monitored. Father was not enrolled in any programs, but he told 

the CSW that he would consider enrolling in anger management classes. Father 

continued to refuse to drug test. 

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court admitted into 

evidence without objection the detention report, the jurisdiction/disposition report, and 

the last minute information. Mother called her sister to testify. According to the sister, 

she witnessed the end of the incident leading to father‟s arrest and did not see mother or 

father become physical with one another or hear them “yelling.” The sister also stated 

that mother and father were not in a relationship and that during the prior year, she had 

not seen them argue or become physical with one another. 

During oral argument, mother‟s counsel contended that because the evidence 

showed only a one-time incident, it was insufficient to establish the allegations in 

paragraphs a-1 and b-1. Father‟s counsel joined in mother‟s arguments and also argued 

that the evidence was insufficient to support the drug abuse allegations in paragraph b-2. 

The children‟s counsel urged the juvenile court to sustain the petition in its entirety. 

Following argument, the juvenile court sustained the petition as to paragraphs b-1 

and b-2, finding that the children were dependents of the juvenile court under those 

paragraphs, but dismissed the allegations in paragraph a-1. The juvenile court then 

 

6

See footnote 3, ante. 
10

issued its disposition orders, including an order placing the children with mother, 

removing them from father, and granting father monitored visitation rights. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“„In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted 

or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; 

we review the record in the light most favorable to the court‟s determinations; and we 

note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” (In re Heather 

A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 315].) “We do not reweigh the 

evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient 

facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] „“[T]he [appellate] court must 

review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine 

whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 

[that the order is appropriate].”‟ [Citation.]” (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 

315, 321 [247 Cal.Rptr. 100].)‟ (See In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924 [171 

Cal.Rptr. 637, 623 P.2d 198].)” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “Evidence from 

a single witness, even a party, can be sufficient to support the trial court‟s findings. (In re 

Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 426]; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 

Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 429]; In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587, 

598 [207 Cal.Rptr. 728].)” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)

B. Jurisdiction

Father contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court‟s 

jurisdictional findings as they related to him. According to father, the single incident 

between father and mother was insufficient to find jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of 
11

section 300 because the children lived with mother who had no relationship with father at 

the time of the jurisdiction hearing. Father also contends that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the jurisdiction finding under the drug use allegations in paragraph b2 of the petition because father was a noncustodial parent and his past drug usage was 

unrelated to the reason for the dependency proceeding.

DCFS argues that it is unnecessary for us to reach father‟s challenges to the 

jurisdictional findings as they relate to father. According to DCFS, because mother did 

not challenge on appeal the jurisdictional finding related to her, the juvenile court‟s 

jurisdiction will continue even if father‟s challenges are successful, citing In re Alysha S. 

(1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397.

We agree with DCFS that the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction based on the 

jurisdictional finding related to mother, regardless of the outcome on father‟s 

jurisdictional challenges. “„[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good 

against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent 

bring [him] within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent. [Citations.] This 

accords with the purpose of a dependency proceeding, which is to protect the child, rather 

than prosecute the parent.‟ (In re Alysha S.[, supra,] 51 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 397 [58 

Cal.Rptr.2d 494]; accord, In re Alexis H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 11, 16 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 

242].) The child thus remains a dependent of the juvenile court.” (In re X.S. (2010) 190 

Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161.)

In cases where the juvenile court retains jurisdiction regardless of the outcome of a 

parent‟s challenge to the jurisdictional findings as to him or her, we nevertheless have the 

discretion to hear the appeal if those jurisdictional findings may have an impact upon 

future proceedings. “„When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its 

assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court‟s jurisdiction, a reviewing 

court can affirm the [trial] court‟s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the 

statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by 

substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any 

or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the 
12

evidence.‟ (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 44].) 

However, we generally will exercise our discretion and reach the merits of a challenge to 

any jurisdictional finding when the finding (1) serves as the basis for dispositional orders 

that are also challenged on appeal (see, e.g., In re Alexis E., supra, at p. 454; (2) could be 

prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency 

proceedings (In re D.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1015 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 795]; see In 

re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494 [134 Cal.Rptr.3d 441]); or (3) „could have 

other consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction‟ (In re I.A., supra, at p. 1493 

[not reaching the merits of an appeal where an alleged father „has not suggested a single 

specific legal or practical consequence from this finding, either within or outside the 

dependency proceedings‟]).” (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763.)

But even assuming, without deciding, that the jurisdictional findings relating to 

father could have an impact upon some future proceeding in this action involving his 

rights, we nevertheless conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court‟s 

jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b) relating to him. “[S]ection 300, 

subdivision (b), invokes the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and permits it to declare a 

child a dependent of the court when „[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk 

that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . the willful or 

negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, 

clothing, shelter, or medical treatment . . . .‟ DCFS has the burden of showing 

specifically how the child has been harmed or will be harmed. (In re Matthew S. (1996) 

41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 139]; see In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 

295, 303 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 851 P.2d 826] [§ 300‟s purpose is „to limit court 

intervention to situations in which children are threatened with serious physical or 

emotional harm‟].) To declare a child a dependent of the court under section 300, the 

juvenile court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations are true. 

(In re Matthew S., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318; see § 355, subd. (a).)” (In re X.S., 

supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1159-1160.)
13

“[S]ection 300 does not require that a child actually be abused or neglected before 

the juvenile court can assume jurisdiction. The subdivisions at issue here [including 

subdivision (b)] require only a „substantial risk‟ that the child will be abused or 

neglected. The legislatively declared purpose of these provisions „is to provide 

maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, 

or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, 

protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that 

harm.‟ (§ 300.2, italics added.) „The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused 

or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.‟ (In re 

R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 772].)” (In re I.J., supra, 56 

Cal.4th at p.773.)

Contrary to father‟s characterization of the evidence before the juvenile court, the 

jurisdictional findings as to him were not based on a single, isolated incident of domestic 

abuse unrelated to his substance abuse issues. When viewed in a light most favorable to 

the juvenile court‟s findings—as we are required to do—there was evidence supporting a 

reasonable inference that father had serious substance abuse issues that directly 

contributed to the multiple incidents in question. It was undisputed that father had a 

history of methamphetamine abuse and multiple criminal convictions for drug-related 

offenses, including a conviction for possession of a controlled substance for which he 

was placed on probation just six months prior to the incidents. It was also undisputed 

that father refused DCFS‟s request to drug test voluntarily and that he would not answer 

questions about his past drug usage. There was evidence that on the night before his 

arrest, he arrived home under the influence of methamphetamine with a glass pipe in his 

pocket. According to mother‟s statements to police, the couple began to argue about his 

drug use and that argument escalated into a physical confrontation in which both parties 

participated. The next morning the couple continued to argue, prompting a police 

response. Father left the home to allow mother to cool down, but when he returned, yet 

another argument erupted because mother had purposely ruined father‟s clothing and 

scattered it in the living room. This third argument in less than 24 hours prompted 
14

another police response. The responding officers heard the couple arguing and heard 

father yell obscenities at mother in the presence of the children. Even after the police 

arrived and attempted to interview father, he continued to yell obscenities at mother in 

the children‟s presence. This third incident caused father‟s arrest and, at the jail, he told 

an interrogating officer that he and mother “always argue.”

This evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the allegations in paragraphs 

b-1 and b-2 were true. As to paragraph b-1, the couple‟s verbal and physical 

confrontations in the home while the children were present, which according to father 

occurred frequently, supported a reasonable inference of a substantial risk of physical and 

emotional harm to the children. Mother not only hit father in the head with her cell 

phone, she cut up all of his clothes in an apparent act of retaliation. Father grabbed 

mother causing scratches to her arms and pushed her into a hallway causing bruising and 

swelling to her arm. Such evidence was sufficient to show physical acts of violence that 

not only created a risk of physical harm to the children, but also created a risk of 

emotional harm to them because they occurred in their presence. 

Similarly, that same evidence supported an inference that the allegations in 

paragraph b-2 concerning father‟s drug use were true. The evidence established that 

father‟s drug abuse issues were not, as he and mother contended, a thing of the past. 

While on probation for a drug possession offense committed several months earlier, 

father came home the night before his arrest under the influence of methamphetamine 

with a glass pipe in his pocket. The couple argued over father‟s drug use and became

physically violent toward one another as a result. Thereafter, father refused to drug test 

or discuss his past drug use, all of which supported a reasonable inference that father had 

current drug abuse issues that created a substantial risk of physical or emotional harm to 

the children.

C. Disposition

Father contends that because he was aggrieved by the juvenile court‟s disposition 

order removing the children from his custody, he can appeal from that order. Therefore, 
15

he contends on appeal that the removal order was not supported by sufficient evidence 

because mother had primary custody of the children and, at the time of the removal order, 

there had been no instances of domestic abuse for six months.

Even if father is correct and he is aggrieved by the removal order, it was supported 

by substantial evidence. “The juvenile court has wide latitude in making orders 

necessary for the well-being of a minor. By statute, the court may make „all reasonable 

orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child . 

. . .‟ (§ 362, subd. (a).) However, the same statute limits such orders to those that are 

designed to eliminate the conditions that brought the minor to the attention of the court. 

(§ 362, subd. (c).)” (In re Jasmine C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 177, 180.)

Father asserts that without the removal order, he would have been entitled to 

physical and legal custody of the children, with an interest in the companionship, care, 

custody, and management of their lives, including the right to make major life decisions 

for the children. Based on the evidence of father‟s drug abuse issues, including his 

history of methamphetamine abuse, drug-related criminal history, methamphetamine 

intoxication on the night before his arrest, and refusal to drug test, discuss his drug abuse 

issues, or enroll in drug treatment programs, the juvenile court could reasonably have 

concluded that the removal order was necessary to protect the children from father‟s drug 

abuse and related violent behavior. As the jurisdiction/disposition report made clear, 

father‟s family would visit with the children occasionally, and sometimes he would pick 

the children up for those visits. Moreover, when the children were with father‟s family, 

mother was unsure whether father also visited with them. Thus, but for the removal 

order, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to assume that the children would be at risk 

of harm from father‟s drug abuse issues and related behaviors during such visits with his 

family. Based on father‟s refusal to drug test and enroll in drug treatment programs, it 

was also reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that the removal order was 

necessary to ensure that father adequately addressed and resolved his drug abuse issues 

prior to exercising his right to parental custody and control of them.
16

D. Cross-Appeal

Based on our conclusion that the juvenile court‟s jurisdictional findings as to 

father were supported by substantial evidence, there is no need to reach DCFS‟s 

contention on cross-appeal that the jurisdictional allegations under dismissed paragraph 

a-1 were also supported by substantial evidence. “„When a dependency petition alleges 

multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court‟s 

jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court‟s finding of jurisdiction over 

the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the 

petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need 

not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are 

supported by the evidence.‟ (In re Alexis E.[, supra,] 171 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 451 [90 

Cal.Rptr.3d 44].)” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)

DISPOSITION

The jurisdiction and disposition orders from which father appeals and DCFS 

cross-appeals are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MOSK, J.

We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

KRIEGLER, J.