*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 29, 2006*

Decided November 29, 2006

Before

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-4779

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM SLATE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 05-CR-153-1

Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, 

Judge.

O R D E R

William Slate pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2113(a). In his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his sentence,

and was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. 

In addition, he was ordered to make restitution under the Mandatory Victims

Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, of $81,000, the amount he stole from

the bank. The district court ordered that payment of this monetary penalty was

due “in full” to begin “immediately.” But the court did not consider Slate’s financial

condition or otherwise set a payment schedule.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-4779 Page 2

On appeal, Slate argues that the district court erred when it failed to

consider his financial situation and establish a specific payment schedule as

required by United States v. Day, 418 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2005). Slate is indigent; he

has been incarcerated since 2005, has no assets, and has earned only minimal

income in the past. Slate did not object to the restitution order before the district

court, however, so our review is for plain error. See United States v. Thigpen, 456

F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2006).

 

As the government concedes, the district court plainly erred when it failed to

impose a restitution payment schedule. We have emphasized in recent cases that

the MVRA “requires a sentencing court to set a payment schedule, taking into

account the defendant’s financial resources, obligations, and projected earnings.” 

Id.; Day, 418 F.3d at 761; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). The district court’s failure

to consider Slate’s resources and set a schedule effectively delegated its

responsibility to the probation office, which is inconsistent with the MVRA. See

Thigpen, 456 F.3d at 771; Day, 418 F.3d at 761; United States v. Pandiello, 184 F.3d

682, 688 (7th Cir. 1999). Such a delegation deprives the defendant of a substantial

right and constitutes plain error warranting, as the government agrees, a remand. 

Thigpen, 456 F.3d at 771; see also Pandiello, 184 F.3d at 688; United States v.

Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1438-39 (7th Cir. 1995). And, as the government also

does not dispute, Slate’s appeal waiver in his plea agreement does not foreclose this

appeal because his waiver applied only to the conviction and sentence, and not to

the order of restitution. See United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th

Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM Slate’s sentence, but VACATE the restitution order

and REMAND for the imposition of a restitution schedule consistent with our

opinion in Day.