NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0134 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS520308

The Honorable Keelan J. Bodow, Judge, Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones LLC, Mesa

By H. Clark Jones

Counsel for Appellant

Stuart & Blackwell PLLC, Chandler

By Cory A. Stuart

Counsel for Appellees

FILED 01-18-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr., and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Kara C. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

granting Tyler C.’s (“Father’s”) petition to terminate her parental rights as 

to their minor child, L.C. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 L.C. was born in 2012 in Indiana. Father was only minimally

involved with L.C. for the first few years of L.C.’s life, during part of which

Father was attending college in Arizona. He did not provide any child 

support for L.C. until the Indiana court established paternity and ordered 

child support in 2016. 

¶3 In October 2016, Indiana Department of Child Services

responded to an allegation that Mother neglected L.C. after alleged 

domestic violence incidents between Mother, her husband at the time J. 

Horner, and Horner’s mother. In January 2017, an Indiana court granted 

Father emergency custody of L.C. The Indiana Department of Child 

Services put Mother on a program of informal adjustment, which she did 

not complete. 

¶4 In July 2017, Mother and Father mediated a parenting 

agreement. Father retained sole legal custody and primary physical custody

of L.C. and Mother was entitled to unsupervised visitation during breaks

in the school year. However, Horner was not to be present during Mother’s 

visitation. Mother was also entitled to three weekly telephone calls with 

L.C., which Father was to help coordinate. 

¶5 Father claimed Mother rarely sought to exercise her phone 

and in-person visitation, and Mother contended Father prevented her from 

doing so. Father testified Mother was angry and aggressive in the phone 

calls with L.C. The last time she saw L.C. was at an in-person visit in July

2018, and the last time she spoke with L.C. was by phone in January 2019. 

According to Father’s testimony at the termination hearing, L.C. disclosed 

that Horner had been present at his July 2018 visitation with Mother, in 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.

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violation of the mediated agreement. Mother denied Horner was present at 

the July 2018 visit, claiming L.C. mistook her brother for Horner. Mother 

also claimed Father prevented her from calling L.C. at all after January 2019

and he threatened to have her “arrested for harassment.”

¶6 In October 2018, Father filed in Arizona to modify the 

parenting plan. In June 2019, the Indiana circuit court issued an order 

declaring Arizona had jurisdiction over the case going forward. In July 

2019, the Arizona juvenile court modified the parenting plan, permitting 

Mother supervised parenting time in Arizona, suspending the telephonic 

visitation, and imposing child support of $235 per month on Mother. The 

order required Mother to work through L.C.’s therapist if she desired to 

resume telephone calls. Mother provided no testimony that she attempted 

to work with L.C.’s therapist to resume calls and Father testified that, to his 

knowledge, Mother never did so.

¶7 Father testified that since July 2019, Mother never contacted 

him to exercise her visitation rights or to ask about L.C. He presented an 

email from her, also from July 2019, stating she was “willing to sign over 

[her] full rights” so Father’s wife could adopt L.C., although Mother denies 

sending that email and believes Horner may have sent it instead. Father

further testified Mother never paid child support. He also received a card 

and a letter in the mail and a virtual card from Mother for L.C. In January 

2022, Mother emailed Father to inform him she was back in the military and 

could add L.C. to her insurance. 

¶8 Father filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights in 

February 2022 on abandonment grounds pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(1). The court conducted trial and, in June 2023,

terminated Mother’s parental rights on the abandonment grounds. It found 

that she had abandoned L.C. for a period of at least six months, that Father 

did not cause the abandonment, and that termination was in L.C.’s best 

interests because L.C. was adoptable and continuing a relationship with 

Mother would be detrimental to L.C. 

¶9 Mother timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under 

Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-

120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Our review requires that we “evaluate all the statutory 

elements found by the juvenile court.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 

Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 26 (2023). To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.

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must “find by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for 

termination exists” under A.R.S. § 8-533(B), and then “determine by a 

preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the child’s best 

interests.” Id. at 477 ¶ 20 (citations omitted). In reviewing the termination 

of parental rights, we accept the court’s factual findings “if reasonable 

evidence and inferences support them” and will affirm the court’s legal 

conclusions “unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 478–79 ¶¶ 30–31 

(citations omitted). 

¶11 A parent may petition to terminate the parental rights of 

another parent who has abandoned their child in common. A.R.S. § 8-

533(A), (B)(1). The petitioning parent must prove the other parent failed to 

“provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, 

including providing normal supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). A parent’s 

failure to maintain a “normal parental relationship with the child without 

just cause” for six months creates a rebuttable presumption of 

abandonment. Id. The non-petitioning parent may rebut that presumption 

by showing just cause, including that the other parent “persistently and 

substantially restricted [her] interaction with their child.” Calvin B. v. 

Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 293 ¶ 1 (App. 2013). However, a parent must act 

persistently to pursue the parent-child relationship beyond merely 

“minimal efforts,” and a court evaluates the parent’s conduct, not her 

subjective intent. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249–50 

¶¶ 18, 22 (2000). 

¶12 Citing Calvin B., Mother contends the juvenile court “may not 

prove abandonment based on evidence that [Mother] has had only limited 

involvement” with L.C. because Father interfered with her relationship 

with L.C. 232 Ariz. at 293 ¶ 1. But the juvenile court found “Father’s actions 

do not rise to the level of interference required to establish a defense to 

abandonment” and “Mother made an insufficient showing that she actively 

sought more involvement than the other parent would allow.” Reasonable 

evidence supports these findings.

¶13 In Calvin B., we held the record “lack[ed] evidence sufficient” 

to prove abandonment because the father in that case had “actively sought 

more involvement with [the parties’] son than [the mother] would allow”—

including up to ten visits a year—despite the mother’s strong opposition, 

such as filing multiple orders of protection against the father. Id. at 297–98

¶¶ 21–27. Here, by contrast, Father testified Mother never contacted him or 

L.C.’s therapist to set up visitation after July 2019, and Mother did not 

submit any documentation to refute that testimony. And Father waited 

until February 2022 to petition to terminate her rights, a substantially longer 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.

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period than the six months necessary to establish a rebuttable presumption 

of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1). 

¶14 Father conceded Mother mailed a card and a letter and sent 

one virtual card to L.C. since July 2018, though Mother testified she sent 

more letters. She also provided text messages and emails showing conflict 

between the parents as to her visitation. Mother further argues she did not 

always have correct contact information for Father, or that he blocked her, 

but she was able to email him in January 2022 about adding L.C. to her 

insurance. Moreover, she did not present evidence of any effort to enforce 

her parental rights. Nor has she paid any child support, resulting in over 

$10,000 in arrears. Though there may be conflict in the evidence, “[w]e will

not reweigh the evidence.” See Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 

Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004). On this record, we conclude there is reasonable 

evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that Father’s actions did 

not rise to the level of interference required to establish a defense to 

abandonment and Mother’s actions were insufficient to rebut the 

presumption of abandonment.

¶15 We further conclude there is reasonable evidence supporting 

the court’s termination based on abandonment. Per Father’s testimony,

Mother had not attempted to set up any visits or initiated any contact with 

L.C. since 2019, and we will not reweigh that evidence. Id. Therefore, the 

court did not err in finding Mother abandoned L.C. without just cause. 

¶16 Mother did not contest the court’s finding that termination of 

her parental rights was in L.C.’s best interests. She has therefore waived the 

argument. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 234 ¶ 14 

n.6 (App. 2011) (holding failure to develop argument on appeal constitutes 

waiver of that argument). Nevertheless, there is reasonable evidence to 

affirm the court’s best-interests finding. Mother testified Father’s wife has 

taken good care of L.C. and intends to adopt L.C. Because there is 

reasonable evidence L.C. is adoptable and his needs are being met, we find 

no error in the court’s best-interests finding. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 579 ¶ 10 (App. 2017) (holding that a child being 

adoptable is sufficient to find termination of parental rights is in the child’s 

best interests).
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¶17 Accordingly, the court did not err in terminating Mother’s 

parental rights as to L.C. 

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm.