### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 275 -CV

Ja c kie Do ss S m it h , A ppe lla nt

v. Vi r gin ia L ag e r st am , Em il La ge r st am , K at hr yn La ge r st amWil be c k, Vivian L agerst am Savage, and An nik a Lagerstam Kaye , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN40275 3 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

D I S S E N T I N GO P I N I O N Mindful that we may

not relax a movant’s burde n in a summary judgme nt proce eding so as to deprive a litiga

nt of the rig ht to trial by

ju ry , I wo u l d co n clude that this ca se turns on the ina de qu a c y

of the L a g e rs tams’ mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt

— a n i s su e c le arl y

pr e se rv e d o n a

pp e a l. B e c a us e a ma te ri a l f

a c t is su e e xists on

e le me nts of

S mi th ’s ca

us e s o f a c tio n a

nd the L a g e rs tams’ motion is entirely

inadequate with respe ct to Smit h’s c au s e o f action for unilatera l mist ake, I
re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.
BACK GR OUND Sm i t h ’ s f a t h e r , C l a r e n c e T
. D o s s
—

n o w d e c e a s e d

— a n d h i s s ist e r, Vi rg ini a

L a g e rs tam, inherited identica l mineral intere sts to land in Robe rtson County , Texas. Smit h inherited he r father’s interest when he died. In 1984, Smit h and Virg inia L ag erstam lea sed their miner al intere sts to XTOT h e J an u ar y an d F e b r u ar y 2 0 0 4 r o ya l t y c h e c k s w e r e $ 3 2 9
. 9 0 an d $ 3 5 3
. 8 5 , r e s p e c t i v e l y. 1 2 Energy b y

separ ate oil and g as lea ses. These lease s were included in a pooled unit known a s the Big g s Gas Unit. Under

the terms of their lease s and the unit desig nation, Smit h and Virg inia wer e
e a c h e nti tle d to re c e ive a

.0 00 99 01 ro y a lty

int e re st o n p ro du c tio n f

ro m w e lls on

the un it. F ro m 1985 to 200 2, Smith re c e ive d sma ll ro y a lty pa y me nts on the B ig g s G a s U nit , which had one well, the B igg s #1 Well. I n 2002, a sec ond well was drilled on the unit, the Big g s #2, and in 2003, a third well, the B igg s #12 well, was dr illed. I n J anuar y 2004, Smit h and Virg inia wer e both rec eiving roy alty

pay ments on the three wells in the approximate amount of $350 per month. 1 I n Fe bruar

y 2004 , Smit h rec eived a

n unsolicited offe r in the mail from San Saba Roy alty to pur chase her .0009901 roy alty interest in the Big g s Gas Unit f or $6658.99. At about the same time, Smith lear

ned that her disabled son neede d $6000 to pay back tax es on his home. I n her aff idavit in response to the summary judgme nt motion, S mith averre d that she wa s a widow, ha d no other sourc e of inc ome, and ha d been u n ab l e t o help her son. Be cause the offe r provided a n opportunity

for he r to help her

son, she decide d to investigate the off er f urther. K nowing that her aunt Virg inia had a r oy alty interest identica l to hers, and as s u m i n g t hat Virg inia had re ceive d the same offe r , Sm it

h c a ll e d V ir g in ia f o r a d v ic e . Sm it

h a v e r r e d th a t s h e b e li e v e d

V ir g in ia an d h er hu sb and Em il ha d g re a te r bus ine ss kno wl e dg e , p art ic ula rl y a bo ut m a tte rs re la te d to ro y a lti e s and oil and g as. Smit h explained her son’s tax problem and he r desire to help him, and soug ht Virg inia’s advice . Smit h aver

red that Virg inia said she would talk to Emi l an d ca l l S mith back. I n her deposition, Virg inia confirme d that Smit h neede d the m oney for he r son. The pa

rties dispute other
a sp e c ts o f t

he te le ph on e c a ll.3 After d i s cussing the matter w ith Emil , the next day Virg inia contac ted Smith and of fe re d to purc ha se Smith’ s r oy a lty int e re st f

or the same pr ic e of

fe re d b y San Sa ba. Vi rg ini a
e xpla ine d th a t sh e wa

nte d to g ive the in ter e st t o h e r t hr e e da ug hte rs . Sm itha ve rr e d th a t sh e tol d Virg inia that she wa s not awar e she c ould sell her intere st to someone other than the company that had made the offe r. Virg inia assure d her that they could buy

the intere st and expressed her desire that Smit h deed the interest in t he wells direc tly and in equal portions to the daug hters. B eca use she
c o n s i d e r e d t h e s a l e a g o o d w ay t o h e l p h e r s o n an d a l s o t o k e e p t h e r o ya l t y i n t e r e s t i n t h e f a m i l y, Smith a g re e d to se ll h e r i nte re st t o th e L a g e rs tams a nd de e d th e int e re st o ve r t o th e da ug hte rs . Th e L a g e rs tams p ro c e e de d to pr e pa re the pa pe rs . Sm ith rec e ive d h e r l a st r oy a lty chec k befor e sig ning ove r the de eds; the che ck date d Fe bruar y 20, 2004, wa s i n t h e amount of $353.85. On Marc h 9, 2004, Virg inia and Emi l L ag erstam traveled to Austin and met with Smi th. Smit h executed thre e roy alty deeds prepar ed by the L ag erstams’ attorney and re ceive d a che ck fr om the L ag erstams for

$6660. Smit h aver

red that s h e “t ru s t ed Virginia a nd Emil to have the dee ds pr e pa re d to re fl e c t” the ir

a g re e me nt. She un de rs too d th a t sh e wa s se lli ngto the L a g e rs tams e xac tly the sa me int e r e s tt h a tS anS a b a o f f e r e d t o p u r c h a s e
—

h e r r o y a l ty i n t e r e s ti nt h e B i g g s G a s U n i t. Smit h sent the $6660 to her son to pa y his back taxes on his home. Af t er ex ec u t i n g t h e d ee d s , S m i t h re ce i v edt h re e r o y al t y ch ec k s fr o m XT O E n er gy which she unde rstood wer e for production prior to the sa le. On Mar ch 19, she r ece ived a c heck for $510.10 a s roy alt y

on the B igg s #’s 1, 2, and 12 we lls. For the f irst time, however , the chec k included roy alties for a new we ll known as the B igg s #7 well. On Ap ri l 2 0 , s h e rec eived a chec k in the amount of $1025.90 as roy alties for the Big g s #1, 2, 7, and 12 wells, as well as anothe r4

new we ll, the Big g s #4. On May 20, she rec eived a third chec k in the amount of $974.85 as roy alties on produ ct i o n fr o m all five we lls—Big g s #’s 1, 2, 4, 7, and 12. B eca use she thoug ht that the pa y me nt s on th e tw o a dd iti on a l w e lls we re a mis take , s he a tte mpt e d to c on ta c t X TO En e rg y to inq uir e a bo ut t he m. On J u n e 1 0 , 2 0 0 4 , S m i t h re ce i v edb y m ai l (i ) a t ra n s fe r o rd er

fr o m XT O E n er gy sh ow ing the tr ans fe r o f h e r r oy a lty int e re st t o th e L a g e rs tams’ da ug hte rs and

(i i) a ne w o ff e r t o purc ha se he r r oy a lty

int e re st f ro m San Sa

ba —th is o ne fo r $ 62 ,6 51 .3 8. Th e tr ans fe r o rd e r l ist e d a ll five B igg s Gas Unit wells. Smit h immediately contac ted XTO Energ y and obtained c onfirmation that her i n t ere st had included five wells, rathe r than thre e. She also spoke w ith Hal Coons of San Sa ba wh o r e a ff

ir me d th e of

fe r t o p ur c ha se . Sm itha ve rr e d th a t sh e le arn ed for the f ir st t ime throu gh t h es e co n v er sations that there w ere five we lls and that her inter est in all of the we lls had be e n c on ve y e d to the L a g e rs tams’ da ug hte rs . Af te r r e c e ivi ngthe re vis e d Sa n Sa ba of fe r, S mi th con ta c te d V ir g ini a and tol d her ab o u t t h e additional offer a nd the two new w ells. Smi th expl ained the mistake and aske d Vi rg ini a if the y c ou ld “und o” the tr ans a c tio n. Vi rg ini a de c lin e d an d sai d tha t it wa s im po ssi ble to undo the transa ction.

Sm it hs u b s e qu e n tl y

le ar n e d th a t t h e B ig g s # 7 w e ll , o nw h ic h s h e f ir s t r e ceive d
ro y a lt ies on a

pp ro xima te ly

Marc h 1 9, wa s c omp le te d in Janu ary 20 04 and that th e B ig g s # 4 w e ll,
on wh ic h s he fi rs t r e c e ive d r oy a lti e s o n Apr il 2 0, wa s c omp le te d in F e br ua ry 20 04
. Thus , bo th w e lls had bee n completed a

nd wer e produc ing be fore Smit h ag ree d to sell her r o y al t y i n t erest to the L a g e rs tams, bu t she re c e ive d no pa y me nts on the we lls un til a ft e r s he ha d s ig ne d th e de e ds ov e r t o5

the L ag erstam daug hters. Smit h wrote a letter to the thre e daug hters explaining the ba ckg round of the we lls and ho w sh e le arn e d o f t he tw o n e w w e lls . Sh e a dv ise d th e m: “ Ia ssume d th a t I wa s o nly selling a roy alty interest that would pay

$200-$300 per

month. I don’t know if Virg inia knew a bout the two new w ells, but if she did, she didn’t tell me.” Smit h offe red to r efund the purcha se price and t o p ay fo r a n y l ega l fe es n ec es s ary t o t ra n s fe r t h e i n t er es t s t o h er o wn ch i l dre nwh o h adh ada “ t o u gh time e conomically ” and to w hom the additional income would mean a lot. She concluded, “ Ihope y ou can f ind it in y our hea

rt to help me and, more important, my children.” I n her a ffidavit filed in r esponse to the summary judgme nt motion, S mith averre d that sh e did no t kn owof

the tw o a dd iti on a l w e lls wh e n s he sig ne d o ve r t he de e ds . A c c or din g to Vi rg ini a ’s a ff

ida vit in s up po rt

of the L a g e rs tams’ mot ion , n e ith e r d id t he L a g e rs tams:
As of Mar ch 9, 2004, I

had no knowle d ge o f t h e s t atus of the we lls ex isting being drille d an d

/o r b e in g p la

n n e d to b e dr il le d
. M y o n ly kn o w le d g e c o n s is te d o f the inf or ma tio n atta c hed to the m on thl y ro y a lty c he c ks wh ic h w ou ld b e the same inf or ma tio n t hat Pl a int if

f w ou ld r e c e ive . I

ha d n o k no wl e dg e that a dd iti on a l w e lls wer e beingdrilled or had be en drilled, or wer e being planned t o be drilled. I made n o re p re s en t at i o nt o t h e P l ai n t i ff o n an y o f t h es e m at t er s b ec au s e I ha d n o kn o wl ed ge a bo ut t he we lls
. The La wsui t I n two cause s of action, Smit h filed suit to rescind the thre e dee ds on the g rounds that the deeds wer e the result of a mut ual or a unil ater al m istake. Specifica lly , she urge d that the dee ds by mutual mist ake c onvey ed more than the par ties i n t en d ed
. I n her se cond ca use of a ction, she alleg ed that she e x ecute d the deeds in e rror and that the transa ction did not reflec t her unde rstanding and ag ree ment as to the interests beingsold. She alleg ed that she did not fa il to ex erc ise ordinar y6

c ar e u n d e r

t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n s i g n i n g t h e d e e d s a s p r e p ar e d b y h e r a u n tan d u n c l e ’ s a t t o r

n e y. Smit h asked that the deeds be ref ormed to c onvey only her interest in r oy alties on production fr om the B igg s Gas Unit Well #’s 1, 2, and 12 or, in the a lternative, that the transac tion be resc inded.
Sum m ary Judgm ent Motion

I n a on e -a nd -a -h a lf -p a g e mot ion fo r sum mary jud g me nt f

ile d p ur su ant t o Te xas R

ule of Ci v il Pr o c e d

u r e 1 6 6 a ( b ) an d ( i) w it

h n o c it a ti o n to a

u th o r it y , th e L a g e r s ta

ms c o n te n d th a t they
wer e entitled to summary judgme nt beca

use Smit h failed to a dduce a ny evidenc e that the mistake
was mutu a l an d th a t th e L a g e r s ta ms “ n e v e r s a id o r d id an y th in g to in d ic a te th a t th e sale was supposed to be a tr ansfe r only of an inter est that involved a c erta in numbe r of then e x isting we lls.” They as s er t that “[t] he Af fidavit evidenc e conc lusively establishes that the De fenda nts, the Purchase rs of the i ntere st, never intended for their purchase to be any thing other than for the entire int e re st o wn e d b y

Pla int if f, ” and that “[ n] eit he r l aw n or

fa c t su pp or ts the Pla int if

f’ s atte mpt

to
se t a sid e the tr ans a c tio n o n th e ba sis of an a lle g e d unil a te ra l mi sta ke on he r p art .” Atta c he d to the mot ion

are Vi rg ini a’s a ff

ida vit ; Sa n Sa ba ’s F e br ua ry 9, 20 04 le tte rs wi th t

he ini tia l pu

rc ha se of fe r; the thr e e min e ra l and ro y a lty de e ds c on ve y ingSmit

h’ s in te re st t o th e thr e e da ug hte rs ; Emil L ag erstam’ s chec k pay able to Smith in t he amount of $6660; a n offe r to purcha se Virg inia’s interest in the amount of $1087.50, dated Marc h 5, 2004, from anothe r compa ny ; and Smith’s letter to t he da ug hte rs re qu e sti ngre sc iss ion , d a te d July 1, 20 04 . The L a g e rs tams al so su bmi tte d e xce rp ts of the de po sit ion

tr ans c ri pts of

Smith, Vi rg ini a

L a g e rs tam, a

nd Em il L a g e rs tam. To controve rt the L ag erstams’ motion, Smit h filed a r esponse to which she attache d the following evidenc e: Smith’s affidavit appe nding five exhibi ts showing the San Saba offe rs, theAlthough Smith on appea l char acte rized the L ag erstams’ motion for summar y judgme nt 2 as a tra ditional moti on, she neve rtheles s re s p o n d ed to both ty pes of motions. Whi le a pa rty may mov e fo r b oth tr a dit ion a l and no -e vid e nc e su mma ry jud g me nt i n a

sin g le do c ume nt, it i s a dv isa ble to use hea dings to sepa

rate the diffe rent c laims, see Binur v . Jacobo , 1 3 5 S
. W.3d 646, 651 (Tex. 2004), or, at lea st, beca use t he mot ions are distinct and invoke diffe rent standa rds of re view, that the motions be set forth so t h at t h ey g ive ade quate notice of the g rounds on which they are based. Asummary judgme nt must stand or fall on its own merits. I n deter mining whether

g rounds are expressly

prese nted, re liance ma

y not be place d on briefs or summary

judgme nt evidence
. Mc Con ne ll v . S

ou ths ideIn de

p. Sc h. Di

st. , 85 8 S.W. 2d 33 7, 34 1 ( Te x. 19 93 ). F or purp os e s o f t

his dis c us sio n, Ihave a ssume d th a t th e L a g e rs tams a sse rt e d b oth tr a dit ion a l and

no -e vid e nc e mot ion s. 7 conveyancingdocuments, and the division transf er or der a nd XTO Ene rg y

documents showing the additional wells; the aff

idavit a nd resume of Way

man T. Gore , J r., a c onsulting petrole um eng ineer wh o o pin e d a s to the pr e se nt v a lue of Smit h’ s r oy a lty

int e re st i n th e e xistin g and a dd iti on a l w e lls ;
e xce rp ts o f t

he de po sit ion s o f V ir g ini a and Em il L a g e rs tam; a

nd Vi rg ini a ’s a ff

ida vit
. Th e tr ia l c ourt g ra

nte d the L a g e rs tams’ mot ion wi tho ut s pe c if

y ingits g ro un ds . Sm ith now appe als, claiming the trial cour t erre d in gran t i n g s u m m ary judgme nt beca

use the summary judgme nt proof esta

blishes evidence in support of t he elements challeng ed by the motion and, in any
e ve nt, ra ise s g e nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f a c t.
AN AL YSI S On a pp e a l, S mith c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l court e rr e d w he n it

g ra nte d th e L a g e rs tams’ motion because issues of mater ial fac t exi st reg ardingwhether the dee ds should be resc inded on the basis of a

mutual or unilat eral mistake. Citi ng only to Rule 166a(b) a

nd (i) and r elying on
no case law, the L ag erstams’ m o t i o n d o es not otherwise specify the ty pe of summar

y judgme nt they seek. N or do they

join issue on appeal a s to whether the ir motion is a “t ra d i t i o nal” ora noevidenc e motion. Th e y

c la im that the y a lw ay s inte nd e d to a c qu ir e Smit h’ s e nti re ro y a lty

int e re st, 28

that any mistake alleg ed wa s not mutual, and that any unilatera l mist ake w as the re sult of Smith’ s c are le ssn e ss.
Stan dard of Revie w

W e re vie w s umm ary

jud g me nts de novo
. V a l e n c e O p e r a t i n g C o . v . D o rse tt , 16 4 S. W.3 d 6 56 , 6 61 (T e x. 20 05 ). A pa rt y fi lin g a tr a dit ion a l mo tio n f

or su mma ry jud g me nt m

us t pr ov e that “ the re is n o genui ne is su e a s to any ma te ri a l f

a c t and the mov ingpa

rt y is e nti tle d to judgme nt as a matter

of l aw on the i ssues expressly set out in the m otion.” Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgm t. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). I f the movant’s motion
and su mma ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e e sta

bli shits ri g ht to jud g me nt a s a ma tte r o f l aw, the burd e n s hif ts to t he no nmo va

nt to de fe a t su mma

ry jud g me nt. Th e no nmo va nt t he n h a s th e burd e n to re sp on d to the mot ion

and to pres ent to t

he tr ia l c ourt

any iss ue s th a t w ou ld p re c lud e su mma ry jud g me nt. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W .2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). Summary judgme nt is appropriate only when there a re no disputed issues of material fa ct and the movingparty is entitled to judgment a s a matt er o f law. Nixon , 6 90 S.W. 2d a t 54 8. I n d e c idi ngwh e the r t he re e xists a disputed fac t issue prec luding summary judgme nt, we tre at evidenc e fa vorable to the nonmovant as true, a nd we must resolv e ev er y d oubt and indulge all rea sonable infe renc es in the nonmovant’s favor
. Id . at 548-49. The L ag erstams—in their motion—had the bur den to disprove as a matter of law at lea st one essential e lement of e ach of Smit h’s theorie s of re cover y or to p l ead and conclusively

establish eac h element of an af firmative de fense
. S

ee C en teq Realty, I

nc. v. Sie gler , 899 S.W .2 d

1 9 5 , 1 9 7 ( T e x. 1 9 9 5 )
. B e c a u s e th e y d id n o t p le a d o r s e e k to e s ta b li s h ana f

f ir mative d e f e n s e , t h e y w e r e r e qu i r e d

t o d i s p r o v e ane l e m e n to f S m i t h ’ s t h e o r i e s o f

r e c o v e r y.9 Th e pa rt y mov ingfo r n o- e vid e nc e su mma ry jud g me nt m

us t a sse rt on ly that th e re is
no e vid e nc e of

on e or mor e e sse nti a l e le me nts of a c la im or de fe ns e on wh ic h th e no nmo va nt w ou ld have the burden of

proof at trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The burden t hen shifts to the nonmovant to produce evidenc e raising a fac t issue on the challeng ed elements. Id. I n revie wing a no-e vidence motion for summary

judgme nt, we asc erta in whether the nonmovant pointed out summary judgme nt
e vid e nc e of

pr ob a tiv e fo rc e to r a ise a g e nu ine iss ue of fa c t as to the e sse nti a l e le me nts a tta c ke d in the no-evide nce motion. J oh ns on v . B re we r &Pr itc ha rd , P .C. , 73 S.W .3d 193, 206-08 (Te x . 2002). A no-e vidence motion for summary judgme nt must be g rante d if the par ty opposing the motion does
no t re sp on d wi th c omp e te nt su mma ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e that ra ise s a g e nu ine iss ue of ma te ri a l f a c t. Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(i).

A no-e vidence summary

judgme nt is im proper

if the re spondent b ri n gs forth more th an a s c in ti ll a o f p r o b a ti v e e v id e n c e to r a is e a g e n u in e is s u e o f mate r ia l f a c t. Id .; F

o r b es Inc

. v. Granada Bioscience

s, Inc. , 124 S.W .3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003). “L ess than a sc intill a of e vidence exis ts when the e vidence is ‘so weak as to do no more than c reate a mer e surmise or suspicion’ of a fa ct.” King Ranch, Inc. v . Chapman , 1 1 8 S
. W
. 3 d 7 4 2 , 7 5 1 (T ex . 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc

. , 6 50 S.W. 2d 61 , 6 3 ( Te x. 19 83 )) . M or e tha n a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e e xists if

it would allow reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Id . A s w itha Rul e 166a(c ) summary

judgme nt, we take as true all evidenc e favorable to the nonmovant, and we make all rea sonable infe renc es there from in the nonmovant’s fa vor, disreg ardingall contra ry evidenc e and infere nces. Id.10 A s umm ary ju dg me nt m oti on un de r R ule 16 6a (b ) m ay

be c omb ine d w itha

Rul e 166a(i) motion as i t appea rs i t was here. The fact that the L ag erstams as movants attache d evidenc e to the motion does not forec lose it from also asser ting that ther e is no evidence of a particula r element. See B inur v. Jac obo , 135 S.W .3d 646, 650-51 (Te x . 2004).

When, as in this cas e, the orde r g ranting summary judgme nt does not specify the g rounds upon which the tr ial court re lied, we must aff irm the summary

judgme nt if any

of the theories a dvance d in the motion is meritorious. J oe v . Two Thirt

y Nin e J oin t V e ntu re , 145 S.W .3d 150, 157 (Tex. 2004).
Mutu al Mistake

I n their motion for summary judgme nt, the L ag erstams first contend that ther e is no evidenc e that the L ag erstams “ intended for the transa ction to be l i m i t ed as P laintiff claims.” Virg inia’s af

fidavit, they

claim, “c onclusively

establishes that the De fenda nts, the Purchase rs of the interest, neve r intended f

or their pur chase to be any thing other than for the entire interest owne d by the Plaintiff.” The y

asser t that “the most basic ele ment of this c ause of action is that the mistake wa s mutual” and ther e is “no e vidence that the Def endants intende d for the tr ansac tion to be limited as Plaintiff claims.”

Whe n p art ie s h a ve c on tr a c te d b a se d o n mi sc o n c e p t i o n o r i gn o r a n c e o f a f a c t , mutua lly he ld b y the pa rt ie s, wh ic h m ate ri a lly

a ff e c ts the a g re e d- up on

e xch ang e , e ith e r p art

y is e nti tle d to have the transac tion set aside. W ill iam s v . G las h , 789 S.W. 2d 26 1, 26 4 ( Te x. 19 90 ). Th e e le me nts of mutual mistake that must be proved by the plaintiff to p re v ai l at t rial ar e (i) a mistake of fac t; (ii) held mutually

by the par ties; (iii) which materia lly aff ects the ag ree d-upon exchang e.A m ovant m ust establish its entit lement to summary judgme nt, the motion mus t stand on 3 its own merit, and eve n a nonmovant’s f ailure to re spond cannot supply by defa ult the summary judgme nt proof nec essar

y to establish the movant’s rig ht. City of Hou ston v . Cl e ar

Cre e k Ba sin Auth. , 589 S.W .2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). 11 Barker v . Roelke , 1 05 S.W. 3d 75 , 84 (T e x. Ap p. —E a stl and 20 03 , p e t. d e nie d) ; de Mone t v. PERA , 87 7 S. W.2 d 3 52 , 3 57 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 4, no wr it) (c iti ngRe state me nt ( Se c on d) of Con tr a c ts § 152 (1981))
. A motion for summary judgme nt must rest on the g rounds expressly prese nted in the motion. Mc Con ne ll v. So uth sid e In de p. Sc h. Di st. , 858 S.W .2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1993). The motion must state, with specificity , the gro u n d s u p o n which the movant is re ly ing. Brewer &Pritchard, P. C. , 73 S.W .3d at 204. The r ationale f or this require ment is to force the movant to define the issues and g ive the nonmovant ade quate notice for opposing the motion. Mc Con ne ll , 858 S.W .2d at 343- 44. To deter

mine if the g rounds are ex pressly prese nted in the motion, neither the c ourt nor the movant may

rely on supporting br iefs or summar y judgme nt evidence
. Id. at 340-41. By their motion for a tra ditional summ ary judgme nt, the L ag erstams wer e re quired to show that they

wer e entitled to judg ment as a matter of law and that no g enuine issue of materia l fac t e x ists. Se e Pr ov ide nt Life & Ac c ide nt In s. Co. v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215-16 (Te x . 2003). A summary

judgme nt movant bear s this burden only when moving fo r t raditional summary judgme nt. When the movant does not me et its burde n of proof to show its e ntitlement to summary judgme nt, the burden doe s not shift to t he nonmovant to ra ise a fa ct issue. M. D. Anderson Hosp. v. W illri ch , 28 S.W .3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000). 312 I n their motion, the L ag erstams fir st moved for summary judgme nt on Smi th’s cause s of ac tion, seeking to prove with summary judgme nt evidence that Smit h has no ca use of a ction. They asser t that there is no evide nce of mutual m i s t ak e beca

use there is no evidence that the L a g e rs tams i nte nd e d to purc ha se on ly Smith’ s in te re st i n the thr e e we lls on wh ic h th e y

we re bo th
re c e ivi ngro y alt ies
. Th ey a sse rt a s g ro un ds fo r t

he mot ion

that th e y “ ne ve r i nte nd e d f

or the ir purc hase to be anyth ingoth e r t ha n f or the e nti re int e re st o wn e d b y the Pla int if

f. ” B ut S mith is not asserting that the dee ds convey ed more than she intende d to convey ; rather , s h e asserts that the transa ction was founde d o n t h e p ar t i es’ mutually mistaken belief that, at the time of the transac tion, there we re three wells on the Bigg s Gas Unit, when in fac t there wer e five . Thus, the parties prese nt c ontradictory evidenc e as to w hat was know n at the time of c onvey ance and what was intended to be c onvey ed.

I n th e fi rs t in sta

nc e , t he L a g e rs tams d id n ot e sta bli shthat th e y

we re e nti tle d to
su mma ry jud g me nt a s a

ma tte r o f l aw. B y

me re ly dis pu tin g that th e mis take wa s mutua l, t he y did
no t c arr y the ir burd e n to dis pr ov e a t lea st one e le me nt of the pla int if f’ s th e or y of re c ov e ry . A t mo st, the y creat ed a f

a c t is su e . In a

tr a dit ion a l summa

ry jud g me nt m oti on , e vid e nc e and re a so na ble i n f e r e n c e s a r e v i ew edi nt h e l i gh tm o s tfa v o rab l e t o t h e n o n m o v an t , S m i t h , an d we m u s ti n d

u l ge
ever y rea sonable inferenc e and resolve a ll doubts i n Smit h’s favor. See Nixon , 690 S.W .2d at 549. Th e burd e n d id n ot s hif

t to Smith unti l th e L a g e rs tams co nc lus ive ly e sta bli sh e d th e ir

e nti tle me nt t o
s u m m ar y j u dg ment. See M . D. Anderson Hosp. , 2 8 S. W. 3 d a t 2 3
. E v e nth e n , Sm it

h ’ s s u mma ry jud g me nt r e sp on se did

no t ha ve to e sta bli sha fa c t a s a ma tte r o f l aw. Ra the r, Smit h h a d o nly

to r a ise13

an is sue of fac t materia l to the outcome of the c ase. See Te x. R. Civ
. P. 1 66 a (c ); Centeq Realty, Inc

. , 899 S.W .2d at 197.

Acc ording ly , afte r re viewing the evidenc e, I would hold that a fa ct question exist s as to the only

g round asse rted for

summary judgme nt: whether a

ny mistake of fa ct was mutual. In light of the c onclusory

nature of the motion and the que stions of Sm ith’s and Virg inia’s intent, state of mind, and cre dibilit y

on the issues in the ca se, t h es e issues pose classic que stions of fact fo r r e so lut ion

by a jur y . Th e ma

jor ity mis ste ps int o the sh oe s of the fa c t fi nd e r and re so lve s th e se issues without refe renc e to t he re quirement that we resolve suc h doubts and infer ence s in the nonmovant’s favor.

Moreove r, by

urg ing that Sm i th “is put to the burden of pr oving the essential elements” of her

cause s of ac tion and that there is “no evidenc e that the Def endants intended for

the transac tion to be as limit ed as Plaintiff c laims,” the L ag erstams in e ffe ct are asser ting a no-evide nce motion rather than a

traditional motion. And the onl y gro u n d asser ted in the motion is t hat the mis take wa s n ot m

utu a l be c a

us e the be lie f w a s n ot a lso he ld b y the L a g e rs tams. T h e m i s t ak e o f f

ac tal l ege d

b y S m i t h i s t h e n u mb er

o f p ro d u ci n g we l l s o nt h e B i ggs Gas Unit at the time of the sale. Smit h’s aff idavit a nd Virg inia’s af

fidavit ag ree that neither kne w any more about the num ber of wells on the unit than the information provided on their che ck stub from XTO Energ y . Acc ording to the chec k stubs they wer e rec eiving prior to the sale, there wer e three producingwells on the g as unit, paying roy alties to Smi th of approximately $350 per month. The summary

judgme nt evidence is undisputed that ne ither of the pa rties knew a

ny thing a bout the two additional producingwells at the time of the sale. Smit h was only require d to produce more than14

a scintilla of evide nce to de feat summary judgme nt. This evidence alone r aises a fac t issue that there
was a mistake of fa ct held mutually by the par ties. The L ag erstams did not show their entitlement to summary

judgme nt and, in any event, Sm ith raised questions of m ater ial fac t to defeat the motion.
Unilateral Mi

stake Even a ssuming the L ag erstams c arr ied their burde n as to Smit h’s mutual mistake theory , their motion was def icient with res p ect to their se cond g round, which attacked in one senten ce Smi th’s second c ause of action. In their sec ond g round for summary

judgme nt, the L a g e rs tams refer to S mi th’ s a lle g a tio n o f u nil a te ra l mi sta

ke . T he e nti re ty

of the ir mot ion a s to unilatera l mist ake states: “Ne ither law nor fac t supports the Plainti ff’ s attemp t t o set aside the transac tion on the basis of an a lleg ed unilater al mistake on her part.” They

cite n o authorit y

and,
e xce pt f or a re fe re nc e to Vir g ini a ’s a ff ida vit , the y fa il t o p oin t to re le va nt f a c ts. Th is d e c lara

tio n is defic ient and fa ils to satisfy the L ag erstams’ summary judgme nt burden unde r either traditional or
no -e vid e nc e su mma

ry jud g me nt r e qu ir e me nts
. A par ty is entitled to set aside a tra nsaction for unilatera l mist ake if (i) the mistake relates to a mater ial feature of the contra ct, (ii) the mistake is so g reat that to enforc e the c ontrac t would be unconsciona

ble, (iii) the mistake was not the result of a lack of ord i n ar y ca re , and (iv) re scission does not result in p re j u d i ce to the other par

ty , other than the loss of his barg ain. J am es T. Tay lor

& So n, In c . v . A rli ng ton In de p. Sc h. Di

st. , 3 3 5 S .W.2d 371, 373 (Tex. 1960). A contra ct cannot be avoided for unilatera l mistake wher e a party ’s “ig noranc e of the fa ct s wa s t he result of c are lessness, indiffer ence , or inattention.” Roland v. Mc Cullough , 561 S.W .2d 207, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1978, writ re f’d n.r .e.).15 Reg ard l es s o f whether we view the L ag erstams’ motion as to unilatera l mist ake a s a traditional or no-e vidence motion, it is defec tive and insuffic ient. A summary judgme nt motion must clearly

set fo rt h its grounds a

nd meet the r

ule’s re quirements. Binur , 135 S.W .3d at 651. Consist ing of

only a sing le sentenc e, the L ag erstams’ motion cites to no authority and re fer s to no evidentiar y fac ts. Bec ause it fails to show any entitlement to summar y judgme nt, it fails to satisfy the re qu ir e me nts of a tr a dit ion a l summa ry jud g me nt mot ion
. Th e L a g e rs tams’ sin g le se nte nc e did not shift the rule 166a(c ) summary judgme nt burden fr om the L ag erstams, the mova nts, to S mith, the nonmovant. See M

. D. Anderson Hosp. , 28 S.W .3d at 23. I n a dd iti on , th e de c laratio n th a t “ ne ith e r l aw nor fa c ts s up po rt s p la int if f’ s atte mpt

to set aside the tr ansac tion on the basis of” unil ater al m istake i s defic ient to qualify as a 166a(i) motion be c a us e the mot ion

fa ils to s pe c if

y e ith e r t he e le me nts of

the c a us e of a c tio n o r t

he e le me nts challeng ed as lacking evidenc e to support them. Although the mere filing of a pr op e r no-evide nce mot ion sh if ts t he bu rde n to the no nmo va nt, and the mot ion

ne e d n ot b e de ta ile d, it mus t still m ee t ce rt ai n require ments. I t must first st ate the e lements for w hich there is no evidence
. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ); So uth west Elec. Powe r Co. v. Grant , 73 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). A de fenda nt’ s mo tio n mu st s ta te the e le me nts of the pla int if

f’ s c a us e of a c tio n a nd sp e c if ic a lly challeng e the e videntiary support for a

n element of t h at claim. Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(i) cmt.; Lampasas v. Spring Ctr ., Inc. , 988 S.W .2d 428 , 436 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Second, the motion ca nnot be conclusory or g ener ally alleg e that there is no evidence to support the claims. Id
. A motion, as here , that mere ly states that there is no evidence to support16

th e o th e r p a rty ’ s c la im is in s u f f ic ient. See, e .g. , David Hittner a nd L y nne L iberato, Su mm ar

y Judgme nts in T

exas , 4 7 S
. T ex . L
. R ev . 4 0 9 , 4 1 6 (2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Abraham v. Ryland Mortgage Co. , 995 S.W .2d 890, 892 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) and Lampasas , 988 S.W .2d at 436). The L ag erstams fa il both to s pecif y the elemen t s o f Smith’s claim and to state which e lements lacke d
e vid e nti ary

su pp or t. I n any event, a ssuming arg uendo that the L ag erstams’ motion was sufficient in any respe ct, Smith was require d to produce m o re than a sc intill a of e vidence in response to the L a g e rs tams’ 16 6a (i ) m oti on . T his sh e did . Sm ith pr od uc e d a mpl e e vid e nc e on e a c h e le me nt o f t his
cause of ac tion; the L ag erstams did not reply to Smi th’s response
. The mistake a lleg ed by

Smit h—her unde rstanding that there we re three pr oducing wells on the B igg s Gas Unit—re lates t o a material feature of the agr eeme nt. The fa cts as adduc ed by Smit h at least ra ise a fa ct issue as to whe ther Smith showed such ca rele ssness, indiffer ence , inattention or lack o f go od faith to deny her e quitable re lief. The L ag erstams do not dispute that Smith h a d no kno wl e dg e a bo ut m ine ra l in te re sts . V ir g ini a dis pu te s th a t Smi th c a lle d th e L a g e rs tams fo r a dv ic e be c a

us e the y ha d sup e ri or kn ow le dg e of the bu sin e ss of ro y a lty int e re sts and oil and g a s, bu t V ir g ini a

a ve rs tha t th e y did no t in ve sti g a te the status of the B ig g s Ga s Uni t any mor e tha n Sm ith did be fo re a g re e ing to the tr ans a c tio n. Al tho ug h the L a g e rs tams a rgue on a pp e a l th a t Smi th s ho uld have kn ow n tha t her ro y a lty int e re st inv olv e d mult ipl e we lls and that the numbe r of we lls on the un it
wa s in c re a sin g , in

he r a ff ida vit Vi rg ini a a ve rr e d tha t “I ha d no kno wl e dg e of the status of the we lls exis ting be ing dr illed and/or beingplanned to be drilled.” Smit h aver red as to how

she ca me to lear n afte r the tra

nsaction that t wo n ew wells were drilled on the prope rty just prior to the convey ance .17

Th is e vid e nc e a lon e ra ise s a fa c t is su e tha t th e re wa s a

ma te ri a l mi sta

ke of fa c t th a t w a s n ot t

he re su lt of a lack of ordinary car e. Moreove r, the evidenc e shows—and is undisputed—that the mag nitude of the mis take wa s c on sid e ra ble and tha t r e sc iss ion

wo uld no t r e su lt i n p re

jud ic e to the oth e r p a rt

y other than the loss of the barg ain. The L ag erstams fa iled to car ry their summary

judgme nt burden.
CO NC LU SION Iwo uld ho ld t hat th e L ager sta

ms d id n ot c arr

y the ir burd e n to de mon str a te the ir
e nti tle me nt t o su mma

ry jud g me nt, tha

t Smi th d e mon str a te d th a t g e nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f a c t e xist on elements of he r causes of action, and that the di strict court erre d in rende ring summary judgme nt in f a vo r o f t he L a g e rs tams.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Filed: June 1, 2007