NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ZACHARY PILZ; BRENDA CONTINE; 

JUAN LOPEZ; AARON KELLER; ADAM 

BOGLE; ALEX CARBAJAL; ALEX 

MURILLO; AMBER ROSKAMP; ANNA 

TRAWCZYNSKI; BENJAMIN SWENSON; 

BLAINE SCHIESS; BRIAN PATERIK; 

CANDACE KENNEDY; CATHY 

BECKNER; DANIEL LITTLE; DAVID 

DAHLIN; DAVID A. LAWTON; DAVID 

TAYLOR; DAVID WALTERS; DAWN 

ANDERSEN; GARRETT RAULSTON; 

GWENDOLYN AUMAN; HALEIGH SEE; 

HEATHER SWENSEN; HERIBERTO 

MENDOZA; HOLLY VERNER; JAIME 

KELLOGG; JAMES PALMER; JEFFREY 

COWGILL; JENI VENABLES; JENNIFER 

BARNES; JENNIFER TEMPLETON; 

JENNIFER ZEHRUNG; JESSE GORHAM; 

JODIE DEWEY; JOE DEGROAT; JONAH 

KUHN; JOSEPHINE SWENSON; JOSH 

GIBBS; JUDY CARPENTER-ROSS; 

KAMALDEEP BHACHU; KARA 

COALMAN; KARI LYNN DOHRMAN; 

KATHERINE GALANGA; KATHLEEN 

POKORNY; KAYLA BERG; KIMBERLY 

SCOTT; KRIS WAIDLEY; KYLEE 

BALLENSKY; LADONNA HEBERT; 

LAURA COLEMAN; LESIYA DROZDOV; 

LORI AUCKLAND; LORI SMITH; 

LYNNETTE MATHIAS; MARSHA 

No. 22-35508 

D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05735-BJR 

MEMORANDUM*

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

DEC 22 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

LASKY; MATTHEW REINKE; MELISSA 

STEELE; MICHAEL FAULK; MICHAEL 

HAMILTON; MICHAEL JOHNSON; 

MICHAEL URIBE; MISTY COX; MONTY 

LEE WHITEAKER; NICHOLAS 

AUCKLAND; NICHOLAS BLACKBURN; 

NICOLE KINREAD-SINCLAIR; NIZA 

PUCKETT; PAMELA COFFELL; 

RONALD KESSLER; ROSEMARIE 

BECKER; RYAN HOGAN; SANDRA 

DOLAN; SANDRA OLERICH; SCOTT 

FLEMING; SCOTT MILLENBACH; 

SHANNON AYERS; SHEILA 

HOLLINGSWORTH; TAMMY 

KENNEDY; TERA GREEN; TERESA 

FOX; THOMAS CORRIN; THOMAS 

DELONG; TIFFANY BROWN; TIMOTHY 

HENNING; TODD HUMPHREYS; 

TRAVIS EILERTSON; TYLER CORRIN; 

TYLER RATKIE; TYLER 

TUERSCHMANN; WADE FAIRCLOTH; 

WARREN SCOTTER; WAYNE 

JOHNSON; WILLIAM CLEARY; ZANA 

CARVER; JAMAL GEORGE; BRAD 

OTTO; VENUS BAILEY; STEPHANIE 

ADAMS; BRANON SNYDER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

JAY ROBERT INSLEE, Governor of the 

State of Washington; JOHN BATISTE, 

Chief of the Washington State Patrol; 

CHERYL STRANGE, Secretary of the 

Washington State Department of 

Corrections; ROGER MILLAR, Secretary of 

the Washington State Department of 

Transportation; DEREK SANDISON, 

Director of the Washington Department of 
3 

Agriculture; ROSS HUNTER, Secretary the 

Washington State Department of Children, 

Youth and Families; UMAIR A. SHAH, 

Secretary of the Washington State 

Department of Health; JOEL SACKS, 

Director of the Washington State Department 

of Labor and Industries, 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 14, 2023 

Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, R. NELSON, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge COLLINS.

Proclamation 21-14 and Proclamation 21-14.1 (together, “Proclamation”), 

issued by Washington Governor Jay Inslee, required workers for state agencies,

healthcare providers, and educational settings to be fully vaccinated against COVID19 by October 18, 2021. Plaintiffs, former Washington State employees who sought 

medical or religious exemptions from the vaccination requirement, sued the 

Governor and other state officials for violating (1) their right to privacy under the 

Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution; (2) the 

Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; (3) separation of powers under 

Washington law; and (4) the Contract Clause of the federal and Washington 
4 

constitutions. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

1. This case is not moot because we may still grant effective relief. See 

Brach v. Newsom, 38 F.4th 6, 11 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). The Governor’s 

rescission of the Proclamation moots claims for declaratory or injunctive relief, but 

Plaintiffs seek reinstatement and damages. An injunction requiring reinstatement 

could provide the relief Plaintiffs seek, see Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 

131 F.3d 836, 839–42 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. 

San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 82 F.4th 664, 696 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc), 

as could an award of damages, Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 872

(9th Cir. 2002). So those claims are not moot.

2. Sovereign immunity does not bar the damages claims because we 

“presume[] that officials necessarily are sued in their personal capacities where those 

officials are named in a complaint, even if the complaint does not explicitly mention 

the capacity in which they are sued.” Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th 

Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Amendment does not “bar claims for damages against 

state officials in their personal capacities.” Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 

442 (9th Cir. 2016). 

3. Plaintiffs forfeited their privacy claim under the federal constitution—

whether it is raised as a substantive due process right or as a Fourth Amendment 
5 

right. Starting with the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiffs waived that right by failing to 

“specifically and distinctly argue[]” the issue in their opening brief. Koerner v. 

Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Ullah, 976 

F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1992)). We “have repeatedly admonished that we cannot 

‘manufacture arguments for an appellant.’” Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 

350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). “It is no accident that the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure require the opening brief to contain the ‘appellant’s contentions 

and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on 

which the appellant relies.’” Id. at 929–30 (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A)). 

We decline to do Plaintiffs’ work for them.

The result is the same if Plaintiffs raise their privacy claim as a Fourteenth 

Amendment substantive due process right. Plaintiffs abandoned any such claim by 

failing to address substantive due process in response to the motion for judgment on 

the pleadings below. B&G Foods N. Am., Inc. v. Embry, 29 F.4th 527, 538 (9th Cir. 

2022).

Our dissenting colleague challenges this conclusion, explaining the ways that 

the opening brief discusses substantive due process. He thus concludes that 

“Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim must be remanded.” But—perhaps 

recognizing that substantive due process was a dead letter after they abandoned it 

below—Plaintiffs raised no such claim on appeal. Instead, they style their privacy 
6 

claim as a Fourth Amendment claim. Despite framing the issue under the Fourth 

Amendment, the brief only mentions the Fourth Amendment to distinguish the 

Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections from the privacy right protected by the 

Washington Constitution. Plaintiffs cannot sustain an issue by not talking about it 

or by only mentioning it in fleeting references to other issues. Nor will we construct 

an argument not succinctly presented by stringing together unrelated pages and 

propositions that litter the lines of the brief. 

Moreover, Plaintiffs quote Potter v. City of Lacey, 46 F.4th 787, 791 (9th Cir. 

2022), to explain that we should not decide the federal constitutional issue because 

“[i]t is well established that [this Court] should avoid adjudication of federal 

constitutional claims when alternative state grounds are available . . .[] even when

the alternative ground is one of state constitutional law.” The opening brief then 

details the privacy right under the Washington constitution. Thus, the federal 

privacy claim has been waived. Further, as we explain below, we lack jurisdiction 

to grant any relief on that state-law privacy claim. 

4. The Proclamation does not facially violate the Free Exercise Clause. 

“[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a 

compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of 

burdening a particular religious practice.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 

v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). “As this is a facial challenge, we 
7 

consider only the text of the [Proclamation], not its application.” Calvary Chapel 

Bible Fellowship v. Cnty. of Riverside, 948 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2020).

1

 On its 

face, the Proclamation is neutral because it neither “infringe[s] upon [n]or restrict[s] 

practices because of their religious motivation.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533. The 

Proclamation is also generally applicable, as it applies to all relevant employees 

unless they can show that they are legally entitled to an exemption. See Doe v. San 

Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1173, 1177–78, 1180 (9th Cir. 2021). Unlike 

cases in which “the State has in place a system of individual exemptions” and 

“refuse[s] to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship,’” Fulton v. City of 

Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (2021) (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. 

of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)), the Proclamation on its face exempts 

those with a sincerely held religious belief and does not purport to grant discretion 

to deny exemptions, see Proclamation 21-14 at 4; Proclamation 21-14.1 at 5–6.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the Proclamation is evaluated under the 

rational basis standard. See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1075–76 

(9th Cir. 2015). During the relevant timeframe, the Supreme Court held that 

“[s]temming the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling interest.”

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020). Because 

1 Although the complaint raised an as-applied Free Exercise challenge, Plaintiffs 

abandoned that challenge on appeal. 
8 

requiring vaccination of state agency and healthcare workers is rationally related to 

that goal, the Proclamation survives Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge.

5. To the extent Plaintiffs seek injunctive or declaratory relief based on 

violations of state law, we lack jurisdiction to grant such relief. See Pennhurst State 

Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117–23 (1984). The Governor did not 

issue the challenged Proclamation, as Plaintiffs argue, “without any authority 

whatever” under state law, thereby triggering Pennhurst’s narrow exception. See id. 

at 101 n.11 (citation omitted). To the extent other relief is sought for alleged 

violations of their rights under the Washington Constitution, the “Washington courts 

have consistently refused to recognize a cause of action in tort for violations of the 

state constitution.” See Janaszak v. Washington, 297 P.3d 723, 723–24 & n.48 

(Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (internal citation omitted).

6. Plaintiffs forfeited their Contract Clause argument by failing to make 

the argument “specifically and distinctly in [their] opening brief.” Indep. Towers of 

Wash., 350 F.3d at 929 (citation omitted).

AFFIRMED. 
Zachary Pilz, et al. v. Jay Inslee, et al., No. 22-35508

COLLINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in the court’s memorandum disposition to the extent that it holds 

that this case is not moot; that sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiffs’ § 1983 

claims for damages against Defendants in their personal capacities; that we lack 

jurisdiction to grant available relief for violations of the Washington Constitution;

and that Plaintiffs forfeited their Contract Clause claims by failing to develop any 

argument in support of those claims in their opening brief. I write separately to 

address Plaintiffs’ substantive due process and Free Exercise Clause claims. 

1. The majority wrongly holds that Plaintiffs “forfeited their privacy claim 

under the federal constitution—whether it is raised as a substantive due process 

right or as a Fourth Amendment right.” Memo. Dispo. at 4–5. 

The majority contends that Plaintiffs forfeited any substantive due process 

claim “by failing to address substantive due process in response to the motion for 

judgment on the pleadings below.” See Memo. Dispo. at 5. That is incorrect. The 

district court’s opinion discussed two distinct claims that might be characterized as 

falling within the rubric of substantive due process. The first was a peculiar hybrid 

claim that the State “violated [Plaintiffs’] substantive due process rights because 

the Proclamation exceeded the Governor’s authority under state law,” and the 

district court correctly held that that “substantive due process claim” was 

FILED

DEC 22 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

“abandoned” because it had not been “raised in [Plaintiffs’] opposition to 

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.” But the district court then 

proceeded to discuss, and to reject on the merits, a distinct “[r]ight to [p]rivacy” 

claim based on, inter alia, “[c]onstitutional . . . rights to bodily integrity and 

autonomy.” 

The majority alternatively asserts that Plaintiffs’ opening brief in this court

“raised no such claim” either. See Memo. Dispo. at 5. That too is wrong. 

Plaintiffs’ opening brief explicitly argues that there is a “fundamental right” to 

refuse forced medical treatment, and on that score the brief cites the Supreme 

Court’s statement that “[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting 

person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.” 

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990). The brief further asserts that this 

right survives the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s 

Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022). The brief recognizes that, in contrast to 

compelled medical treatment for the recipient of medication (as in Harper), the 

State has appropriate power under Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 

(1905), to require vaccination against a disease for the purpose of preventing the 

transmission of serious illness to third parties. The brief argues that the Jacobson

power is inapplicable here, because it was assertedly known at the time that the 

Proclamation was adopted that the Covid vaccines that were being mandated were 
3

not effective in preventing transmission in the way that Jacobson posits. As a 

result, Plaintiffs contend, the Proclamation’s requirement was not a third-partyprotection public health measure, but a first-party requirement to take a particular 

medical treatment for one’s own benefit. Plaintiffs’ brief recognizes that the State 

vigorously disputes the proposition that the mandated vaccines do not protect 

against transmission in the way that the smallpox vaccine in Jacobson did, but 

Plaintiffs argue that this disputed issue could not properly be resolved on the 

pleadings. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ brief also squarely addresses the sole ground 

provided by the district court for rejecting this claim—namely, that (according to 

the district court) threatening to fire employees who refuse state-mandated 

injections “does not compel anyone to be vaccinated without their consent.” 

The majority seizes on the fact that the opening brief at one point refers to 

this asserted “right to refuse medical treatment” as being a right “protected by the 

Fourth Amendment,” but that comment does not somehow justify our ignoring the 

substance of the argument as set forth in the brief. Likewise, the opening brief’s 

argument that the court should rely on “available” state law grounds to avoid 

unnecessary federal decisions does not forfeit those federal arguments—and that is 

particularly true where, as here, those state law grounds are not available in light of

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117–23 (1984).

For all of these reasons, the majority’s assertion that Plaintiffs forfeited their 
4

federal privacy/substantive-due-process claim is plainly incorrect. Accordingly, I 

think that we need to address this issue on the merits.

2. Turning to the merits, I think that the district court’s limited analysis was 

flawed. The district court seemed to think that, because vaccination here was a 

condition of employment—rather than a direct mandate on the populace—the 

resulting requirement was wholly insulated from any constitutional scrutiny. That 

is wrong. See, e.g., Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19, 34 n.16 (2d Cir. 2022) (agreeing 

that conditioning a benefit “on a basis that infringes [the plaintiff’s] 

constitutionally protected interests” would violate the “unconstitutional conditions 

doctrine,” but holding that, under Jacobson, the measles vaccination condition for 

school attendance in that case “does not unconstitutionally infringe upon Plaintiffs’ 

substantive due process rights”); see also O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of 

Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 720 (1996) (“[W]e considered it settled that to fire a 

public employee as a penalty for refusing a request for political and financial 

support would impose an unconstitutional condition on government 

employment.”); cf. BST Holdings, LLC v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 

17 F.4th 604, 618 & n.21 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that a federal Covid vaccine 

mandate “threatens to substantially burden the liberty interests of reluctant 

individual recipients put to a choice between their job(s) and their jab(s)” (footnote 

omitted)). The State notes that two circuits have observed that Jacobson—which 
5

upheld a direct vaccination mandate—necessarily validates a less intrusive 

conditional mandate, see We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 293–

94 (2d Cir. 2021), clarified on other grounds, 17 F.4th 368 (2d Cir. 2021);

Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2021), but those 

two decisions both rested on the premise that Jacobson did supply the correct 

standard of review. As noted earlier, that point is disputed here, and the district 

court did not address it. Accordingly, I would vacate the district court’s decision 

on this claim and remand for further proceedings.

3. Because I think that Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim must be 

remanded, I would likewise vacate and remand, for further consideration, the 

district court’s decision rejecting Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Clause claim. In light of 

my conclusion on the substantive due process claim, it would be premature, in my 

view, to say how Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), applies to 

the Proclamation. Under Smith, a “hybrid” claim that is based on “the Free 

Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections” is not subject 

to Smith’s rational-basis standard. Id. at 881–82; see also Danville Christian 

Acad., Inc. v. Beshear, 141 S. Ct. 527, 529 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., joined by Alito, J., 

dissenting) (“[U]nder this Court’s precedents, even neutral and generally 

applicable laws are subject to strict scrutiny where (as here) a plaintiff presents a 

‘hybrid’ claim—meaning a claim involving the violation of the right to free 
6

exercise and another right”). Although we have expressed uncertainty concerning 

this “hybrid rights exception,” see Parents for Privacy v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1210, 

1238 (9th Cir. 2020) (declining to decide “whether the hybrid rights exception 

exists and requires at least a colorable companion claim, or whether it does not 

really exist at all”), we have not definitively resolved the issue. Given that I think 

that the substantive due process claim must be remanded, I would leave it for the 

district court to consider this aspect of Smith in the first instance on remand.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in sections 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the 

memorandum disposition, but I respectfully dissent from sections 3 and 4.