J-S05019-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER BEASON,

Appellant

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 1269 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered July 11, 2014,

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, 

Criminal Division, at No. CP-25-CR-0002954-2008.

BEFORE: DONOHUE, SHOGAN, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2015

Appellant, Christopher Beason, appeals from the order denying his 

petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On March 25, 2009, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of 

one count of aggravated assault. On May 12, 2009, Appellant was 

sentenced to a term of eighteen to thirty-six months of imprisonment, 

followed by a period of five years of probation. Appellant filed a direct 

appeal and on March 12, 2010, his judgment of sentence was affirmed by 

this Court. Commonwealth v. Beason, 793 WDA 2009, 996 A.2d 535 (Pa. 

Super. filed March 12, 2010) (unpublished memorandum at 1). 
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On December 20, 2012, Appellant’s probation was revoked and he was 

resentenced to a term of five to ten years of imprisonment, with credit for 

300 days served. Appellant filed an untimely motion to modify his sentence, 

which was denied on April 18, 2013. On September 10, 2013, Appellant 

filed a pro se “petition for case dismissed.” The trial court construed the 

petition as Appellant’s first pro se PCRA petition. Order, 9/20/12, at 1. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel and on October 15, 2013, Appellant filed a 

counseled PCRA petition. The petition included claims that the original 

sentence was illegal and invalid and that the time Appellant served in 

addition to the revocation sentence imposed exceeded “the maximum 

amount of time to which [Appellant] is subject,” thus resulting in an illegal 

revocation sentence. PCRA Petition, 10/15/13, at 2. 

On June 16, 2014, the PCRA court issued an order granting the 

petition in part and denying it in part. The PCRA court granted relief by 

directing that Appellant should be awarded an additional three years of 

credit for time served on his original sentence. Order, 6/16/14, at 1. The 

PCRA court denied Appellant’s challenge on the original sentence and issued 

notice of its intent to dismiss that claim without a hearing. Id. On July 11, 

2014, the PCRA court issued a final order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

This appeal followed. 
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The PCRA court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement, and Appellant complied. Appointed counsel was permitted to 

withdraw on September 4, 2014.1 The PCRA court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion, incorporating and relying upon its reasoning provided in the June 

16, 2014 order and notice of intent to dismiss. 

Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

Whether the lower court erred in denying only partial PCRA 

relief in the nature of provision of time credit and failing to grant 

substantive relief as to the Appellant’s challenge to the legal 

efficacy of the probation revocation itself?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA 

court’s determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 

A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 

A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The PCRA court’s findings will not be 

disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. 

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 

2001)).

We first note that it is with difficulty that we attempt to fully discern 

the basis of Appellant’s argument as presented in his brief. Appellant 

 

1

 Although unclear from the record when it occurred, we note that Appellant 

is represented by counsel on appeal.
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asserts that while he was admitted to a state hospital, a parole agent visited 

Appellant “even though he was not supposed to see a parole officer until 

2017, or upon release from the mental ward where the [A]ppellant was then 

living as a patient.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant further avers that he 

“cannot have violated, and therefore be revoked, on a sentence, when it is 

documented that he was not supposed to see the agent.” Id. at 5. 

Accordingly, Appellant appears to be asserting that there was no basis for 

the probation revocation. Id. Appellant further challenges his original 

sentence on the aggravated assault conviction. Id. at 5. Additionally, 

Appellant states that “he maxed out on the docket for which he is currently 

incarcerated.” Id. Thus, we surmise that Appellant is arguing that the 

subsequent probation revocation resentence was illegal. Id. at 5-6.2 

We first note that Appellant’s challenge to his original sentence is 

untimely and we therefore lack the jurisdiction to consider that claim on the 

merits. A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the 

 

2

 Appellant fails to properly develop his issues or cite to any relevant legal 

authority in support of his claims. Our rules of appellate procedure require 

an appellant to support his or her argument with pertinent analysis, 

including citation to and discussion of relevant authority and facts of record. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119. This court will not become the counsel for an appellant and 

develop arguments on an appellant’s behalf, Commonwealth v. Gould, 

912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006), and waiver of an issue results when 

an appellant fails to properly develop an issue or cite to legal authority to 

support his contention in his appellate brief. Commonwealth v. Williams, 

959 A.2d 1252, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2008). While we could refuse to address 

these issues because Appellant has not developed an argument with citation 

to legal authority, we choose not to find it waived in this instance.
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judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). This time 

requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not 

ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition. Commonwealth v. 

Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 762 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000)). A judgment of sentence “becomes 

final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(3). However, an untimely petition may be received when the 

petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited 

exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.

Our review of the record reveals that Appellant was sentenced on May 

12, 2009. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on March 12, 2010. 

Appellant’s sentence became final after expiration of the thirty days within 

which Appellant could have sought discretionary review with the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). 

Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on April 12, 

2010,3thirty days after the time expired for Appellant to file an appeal with 

 

3

 We note that because April 11, 2010 fell on a Sunday, Appellant had until 

April 12, 2010 to file his motion. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (stating that, for 

computations of time, whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on 
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 

1113(a). Thus, Appellant had until April 12, 2011 to file a timely PCRA 

petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant did not file the instant PCRA 

petition until September 10, 2013. Thus, Appellant’s instant PCRA petition, 

to the extent it challenges his original sentence, is patently untimely. 

Furthermore, Appellant did not plead or prove any of the exceptions under 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii). 

Moreover, while it appears that Appellant is making an illegality-ofsentence claim, we note that such claims must be raised in a timely PCRA. 

“[A]lthough illegal sentencing issues cannot be waived, they still must be 

presented in a timely PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 

462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 

214, 223 (Pa. 1999)). Consequently, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to 

address the claim regarding the original sentence and grant relief. See 

Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding 

that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear untimely petition). Likewise, we 

lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of this claim on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1294 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

 

Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, such day shall be omitted from the 

computation.). See also Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 618 

(Pa. Super. 2004).
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(holding that Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to reach merits of appeal from 

untimely PCRA petition).

We next address Appellant’s assertion that the revocation of his 

probation was illegal. The majority of Appellant’s brief makes claims of the 

impropriety of the probation revocation. Despite Appellant’s assertion that 

there was no legal basis for his probation revocation, Appellant fails to 

properly develop his argument in support of this claim. Somewhat 

disjointedly, Appellant avers that “he was not violated for the offense he was 

charged with (indecent exposure), but rather for threats.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 5. Further, “[A]ppellant argues he cannot have violated, and therefore be 

revoked, on a sentence, when it is documented that he was not supposed to 

see the agent.” Id. In making these allegations of wrongful conduct on the 

part of the probation officer, Appellant fails to make citation to the record or 

to applicable law regarding the impropriety of his probation revocation. 

Appellant’s claim could be dismissed on this basis. Gould, 912 A.2d at 

1258; Williams, 959 A.2d at 1258. 

Moreover, Appellant has not preserved this issue in either his pro se or 

his counseled PCRA petition. As a result, this claim is waived. 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. 2004) (“a claim not 

raised in a PCRA petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”) 
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We next consider the legality of the probation revocation sentence 

imposed. When we consider an appeal from a sentence imposed following 

the revocation of probation, our standard of review is well settled: 

Our review is limited to determining the validity of the probation 

revocation proceedings and the authority of the sentencing court 

to consider the same sentencing alternatives that it had at the 

time of the initial sentencing. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). See also 

Commonwealth v. Gheen, 455 Pa. Super. 299, 688 A.2d 

1206, 1207 (1997) (the scope of review in an appeal following a 

sentence imposed after probation revocation is limited to the 

validity of the revocation proceedings and the legality of the 

judgment of sentence). Also, upon sentencing following a 

revocation of probation, the trial court is limited only by the 

maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally at the 

time of the probationary sentence. Id., 688 A.2d at 1207-1208. 

Accord Commonwealth v. Ware, 737 A.2d 251, 254 (Pa. 

Super. 1999).

Commonwealth v. MacGregor, 912 A.2d 315, 317 (Pa. Super. 2006). It 

is also well settled that the revocation of a probationary sentence is a matter 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that court’s decision 

will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion. MacGregor, 912 A.2d at 317. “[A]n abuse of discretion is 

more than a mere error of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have 

abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised 

was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or illwill.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We reiterate that upon revocation of probation, 

the sentencing court has all of the alternatives available at the time of the 
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initial sentencing. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b); Commonwealth v. 

Mazzetti, 44 A.3d 58, 61 (Pa. 2012). 

Appellant was originally convicted of aggravated assault under 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(3). This conviction was graded a felony of the second 

degree. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(b). A person convicted of a felony of the second 

degree may be sentenced to imprisonment “for a term which shall be fixed 

by the court at not more than ten years.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(2). 

Appellant’s original sentence was a split sentence. “When determining 

the lawful maximum allowable on a split sentence, the time originally 

imposed cannot exceed the statutory maximum.” Commonwealth v. 

Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2010). As a result, Appellant’s 

original sentence of eighteen to thirty-six months of imprisonment, followed 

by a period of probation for five years, was not illegal because it did not 

exceed the statutory maximum.4 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(2). 

Additionally, Appellant’s resentence following probation revocation was 

within the original statutorily allowable sentence. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(2). As 

this Court has noted:

as a general rule, “upon revocation, the sentencing alternatives 

available to the court shall be the same as the alternatives 

available at the time of initial sentencing ....” Normally, “the trial 

 

4

 Although we previously noted that Appellant’s challenge to the original 

sentence was untimely raised, we address the legality of the original 

sentence solely for purposes of our analysis regarding the legality of the 

probation revocation sentence. 
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court is limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have 

imposed originally at the time of the probationary sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 365 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Upon consideration of Appellant’s PCRA petition, though, the PCRA 

court recognized that the total time that Appellant had already served, which 

was three years, in conjunction with the sentence of five to ten years could 

result in Appellant serving a sentence of incarceration in excess of the 

statutory maximum. “The statutory language is clear that a person is 

entitled to credit toward his or her sentence if time is spent in custody.” 

Crump, 995 A.2d at 1284. However, “a defendant [is not] automatically 

granted credit for time served while incarcerated on the original sentence 

unless the court imposes a new sentence that would result in the defendant 

serving time in prison in excess of the statutory maximum.” Id. 

Furthermore, “in a situation where probation is revoked on a split 

sentence . . . a defendant is not entitled to credit for time spent on 

probation.” Id.

In the case sub judice, because the resentence could result in 

Appellant serving time incarcerated in excess of the statutory maximum, the 

PCRA court properly awarded Appellant credit for his total time served. 

Crump, 995 A.2d at 1284. Moreover, Appellant was not entitled to credit 

for time spent on probation. Id. Thus, the sentence imposed following
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probation revocation, as remedied by the PCRA court in granting partial 

relief in response to Appellant’s PCRA petition, does not exceed the 

maximum allowable sentence. As a result, Appellant’s resentence following 

probation revocation was not illegal.

The PCRA court did not err in granting the petition to the extent that it 

afforded Appellant credit for all time Appellant served, as opposed to 

crediting him only with three hundred days as was set forth in the revocation 

sentence. Furthermore, the PCRA court did not err in denying the petition as 

to claims of illegality of the original sentence.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/18/2015