J-S30025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JARON AMBROSE 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2473 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008198-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2023

Jaron Ambrose appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his serial petition filed pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon 

our review, we affirm.

Ambrose was convicted of first-degree murder and related charges

stemming from an incident that occurred on July 1, 2010, in which he 

approached a group of people sitting on a porch on Marvine Street in 

Philadelphia and shot two of them, wounding one fatally. The third person 

present on the porch, Shaquita Morton, witnessed the shooting. Later that 

afternoon, Morton provided a description of the shooter to the police. Morton 

told police he had on a white t-shirt, brown Adidas sweatpants with an orange 

stripe on the side, and tan Timberland boots. She stated that his hair was 

“low cut” and he had “light skin.” N.T. Trial, 12/4/12, at 133. She described 
J-S30025-23

- 2 -

him as “five-foot-eight, maybe six feet” with a “muscular buil[d]” and stated 

that he was “[b]etween 18 and 25” years old. Id. at 134. 

Later that same evening, a vigil was held for the victim on Morton’s 

block, which she attended. During the vigil, Morton was approached by the 

victim’s cousin and shown a picture from Facebook. Morton was asked “is this 

[the shooter]?” to which her reaction1 was “Oh, my God. Yes.” Id. at 146. 

Morton testified that she was certain that the individual in the Facebook photo 

was the shooter. See id. at 147. Morton did not, however, contact the police

to tell them she had seen a photograph of the shooter, as she “wanted to be 

done with this” and thought she had given the police “all they needed to 

know.” Id. at 148-49. 

The police subsequently learned that Morton had identified the gunman 

from a photograph at the vigil and contacted her for a further interview, which 

Morton attended voluntarily. While there, police presented Morton with a 

photographic array consisting of Ambrose’s photograph and seven other 

people. Morton identified Ambrose in the array and also confirmed her 

identification of the Facebook photo as Ambrose. 

Shikeda Johnson also testified at trial. She stated that she was present 

at the vigil on the evening of the shooting and saw Morton there, but that she 

was “drunk and high” and, thus, did not really remember anything. N.T. Trial, 

12/5/12, at 28-29. Johnson testified that she later gave a statement to two 

____________________________________________

1 Morton could not recall whether she actually said those words out loud. See

N.T. Trial, 12/4/12, at 146-47.
J-S30025-23

- 3 -

detectives, one of whom was former detective James Pitts, who was 

subsequently fired from the force for misconduct. Johnson claimed that the 

detectives pressured her into speaking with them and told her that if she did 

not sign the statement they had prepared, “they were going to take [her] 

daughter and lock [Johnson] up.” Id. at 35. The statement Johnson signed, 

purportedly under duress, stated, in relevant part:

[Johnson:] We were all out on Marvine because there was a vigil 

out there. I know there was a lot of people out there talking about 

who killed [the victim]. Someone said the name of the guy that 

shot [the victim]. I recognized the name when they said it then 

but I really don’t remember it now. Anyway, my friend Chuck was 

out there, too. When they said the name, Chuck was like, [“]Wait 

a minute.[”] He seemed shocked by the name and wanted to see 

if it was the guy he knew. So he asked if somebody could get on 

Facebook. We went over to [Morton’s] steps. And she was there 

with Robin and maybe some other people. And I asked if someone 

could let Chuck pull up the photo. When Chuck got on, he pulled 

up a photo and [Morton’s] eyes got real wide. And she was 

like[, “]That’s him. That’s him.[”] She said that she never 

would forget his face. 

Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).

Then-detective Pitts testified at trial regarding, inter alia, his interactions 

with Johnson. He stated that Johnson “didn’t want to be involved,” as she 

was “fearful for her safety, her child’s safety.” N.T. Trial, 12/6/12, at 26. Pitts 

testified that Johnson ultimately agreed to give a written statement, which he 

recorded, “verbatim,” and she signed. Id. at 27, 32. Pitts did not interview 

Morton, nor was he involved in presenting her with the photographic array in 

which she identified Ambrose as the shooter. 
J-S30025-23

- 4 -

On December 7, 2012, a jury convicted Ambrose of first-degree murder 

and related offenses. That same day, the court sentenced Ambrose to life 

imprisonment, plus concurrent sentences for the remaining convictions. This 

Court affirmed Ambrose’s judgment of sentence on December 4, 2013, see 

Commonwealth v. Ambrose, 93 A.3d 500 (Pa. Super. 2013) (Table), and 

he did not seek allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

On January 31, 2014, Ambrose filed his first pro se PCRA petition. 

Court-appointed counsel filed an amended petition raising, inter alia, an afterdiscovered-evidence claim based on a newspaper article that former detective 

Pitts had engaged in misconduct in other cases. The PCRA court denied relief 

and this Court affirmed. With regard to Ambrose’s after-discovered-evidence 

claim concerning Pitts, the Court concluded that, because Johnson had 

testified at trial as to Pitts’ alleged misconduct during her interview, Ambrose 

failed to establish “why any testimony regarding possible police misconduct 

could not have been obtained before the conclusion of trial by the exercise of 

reasonable diligence.” Id., 2227 EDA 2015, at *6 (Pa. Super. filed 8/3/17) 

(unpublished memorandum decision). The Supreme Court rejected Ambrose’s 

petition for allowance of appeal. See id., 174 A.3d 569 (Pa. 2017) (Table).

Ambrose filed a second, counseled PCRA petition on December 29, 

2017. In that petition, Ambrose sought relief based on what he asserted was 

newly-discovered evidence regarding Pitts’ “habitual pattern, practice, and 

routine of coercing witnesses into signing false statements.” Id., 1464 EDA 

2018, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed 7/23/19) (unpublished memorandum decision). 
J-S30025-23

- 5 -

The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely, and Ambrose appealed to 

this Court. On appeal, we rejected Ambrose’s attempt to circumvent the PCRA 

time-bar pursuant to the newly-discovered-facts exception, holding that 

“[b]ecause Ambrose raised this claim in a prior PCRA petition, he cannot 

establish that the ‘fact’ upon which he based his 2017 PCRA petition was 

[previously] unknown to him.” Id. at *4. Accordingly, we affirmed the PCRA 

court’s dismissal of his petition, and our Supreme Court denied discretionary 

review. See id., 227 A.3d 870 (Pa. 2020) (Table). 

Ambrose, acting pro se, filed this, his third PCRA petition, on May 16,

2022. After the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to 

dismiss, current counsel entered his appearance and filed a response 

requesting leave to file an amended petition, which the court granted. In the 

amended petition, counsel argued that Ambrose was entitled the benefit of 

the newly-discovered-fact and governmental-interference exceptions to the 

jurisdictional PCRA time bar, as well as substantive relief in the form of a new 

trial, as a result of a Brady2 violation by the Commonwealth. Specifically, 

counsel asserted that the Commonwealth failed to disclose two instances of 

sustained Internal Affairs (“IA”) findings against former detective Pitts. This 

information was provided to Ambrose by a fellow inmate, Derrill Cunningham,3

____________________________________________

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

3

In PCRA proceedings initiated by Cunningham, the Commonwealth conceded 

that his constitutional rights under Brady had been violated because it had 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S30025-23

- 6 -

in March 2022, and Ambrose filed his pro se petition two months later, in May 

2022. 

On August 11, 2022, the PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice of intent to 

dismiss. The court concluded that: (1) Ambrose’s claim did not satisfy the 

newly-discovered-fact exception, as he had long been aware of Pitts’ 

propensity for witness intimidation and had previously sought PCRA relief on 

that basis; (2) Ambrose failed to satisfy the governmental interference 

exception, as he presented no evidence that the government interfered with 

his ability to access the information and had never requested the information; 

(3) Ambrose failed to establish due diligence, as he had been aware of Pitts’ 

misconduct since Johnson testified at trial; and (4) even if Ambrose’s claim 

could be considered timely, he failed to demonstrate how evidence of Pitts’

misconduct was material to his guilt, given that it would not have undermined 

Morton’s identification testimony. See Rule 907 Notice, 8/11/22, at 2-4. 

Ambrose did not file a response to the Rule 907 notice and, on 

September 15, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Ambrose filed a 

timely notice of appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. He raises the following claims 

for our review:

____________________________________________

failed to disclose material misconduct committed by Pitts in Cunningham’s 

case and in other matters. See Amended PCRA Petition, 8/4/22, at Exhibit A 

(Commonwealth’s Answer to Cunningham’s Second Amended PCRA Petition). 
J-S30025-23

- 7 -

1. Did the PCRA court err in finding that the governmental 

interference exception to the time[ ]bar in the form of a Brady

violation did not apply to [Ambrose’s] amended petition?

2. Did the PCRA court further err when it dismissed [Ambrose’s] 

amended PCRA petition on the basis that he had no established 

that he would be entitled to substantive relief because materiality 

had not been established?

Brief of Appellant, at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

Before we reach the merits of Ambrose’s claims, we must address

whether this PCRA petition was timely filed. It is well-established that “the 

PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and must be 

strictly construed; courts may not address the merits of the issues raised in a 

petition if it is not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 

591 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Generally, a PCRA petition 

“including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of 

the date the judgment of sentence becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking the review. See id. at § 9545(b)(3).

However, Pennsylvania courts may consider the merits of an untimely 

PCRA petition if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of the three 

exceptions enumerated in section 9545(b)(1), which are: (1) the petitioner’s 

inability to raise a claim as a result of governmental interference; (2) the 

discovery of previously unknown facts or evidence that would have supported 

a claim; or (3) a newly-recognized constitutional right that has been held to 

apply retroactively by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania. See id. at § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petition invoking 
J-S30025-23

- 8 -

an exception under section 9545(b)(1) must be filed within one year of the 

date the claim could have been presented. See id. at § 9545(b)(2).

Here, Ambrose’s judgment of sentence became final on January 3, 2014, 

when the thirty-day period for seeking discretionary review in our Supreme 

Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Thus, Ambrose had until 

January 3, 2015, to file a timely PCRA petition. Ambrose’s instant petition, 

filed on May 16, 2022, is facially untimely and, thus, Ambrose must satisfy 

one of the PCRA timeliness exceptions to establish jurisdiction.

Ambrose attempts to invoke the governmental interference exception, 

asserting that the Commonwealth’s failed to disclose the Brady material 

regarding Pitts. Ambrose claims that he learned of this information in March 

2022 and filed his petition raising the claim within one year, on May 16, 2022. 

He argues that: 

[T]he [PCRA] court’s position that the government never 

interfered with [Ambrose’s] access to former detective Pitts’ 

Internal Affairs files is directly undermined by its next sentence 

that “[a] petitioner is not entitled to a police officer’s [IA] file, 

since it is a part of the officer’s personnel file. Commonwealth 

v. McFalls, 251 A.3d 1286, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2021) [] (citing 

Commonwealth v. Meja-Arias, 734 A.2d 870 (Pa. Super. 

1999).” [PCRA Court Opinion, 9/15/22, at 6.]

Indeed, it is true that criminal defendants are not entitled to police 

officers’ IA files. Consequently, criminal defendants, like 

[Ambrose], have no ability to “access this information.” Thus, the 

[PCRA] court’s observation that [Ambrose] “never requested” this 

information is a red herring. What good would it have done for 

[Ambrose], at the time of his trial in 2012, to request or subpoena 

these files? None, because he is not entitled to them. 

Consequently, the only way for [Ambrose] to receive former 
J-S30025-23

- 9 -

detective Pitts’ IA files would have been for the Commonwealth to 

furnish them to the defense. This has never been done.

Brief of Appellant, at 14-15. 

Our Supreme Court has provided that, in order to establish a Brady

violation:

a defendant must show that: (1) evidence was suppressed by the 

state, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was 

favorable to the defendant, either because it was exculpatory or 

because it could have been used for impeachment; and (3) the 

evidence was material, in that its omission resulted in prejudice 

to the defendant. However, the mere possibility that an item of 

undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might 

have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 

materiality in the constitutional sense. Rather, evidence is 

material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is 

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 

Commonwealth v. Willis, 46 A.3d 648, 656 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). “[T]o be entitled to a new trial for failure to 

disclose evidence affecting a witness’ credibility, the defendant must 

demonstrate that the reliability of the witness may well be determinative of 

his guilt or innocence.” Commonwealth v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 308-09 

(Pa. Super. 2011).

Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental 

interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the 

failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference 

by government officials, and the information could not have been 

obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Section 

9545(b)(1)(ii)’s exception requires the facts upon which the 

Brady claim is predicated were not previously known to the 

petitioner and could not have been ascertained through due 

diligence. In [Commonwealth v.] Bennett, [930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 

2007),] we clarified that § 9454(b)(1)(ii)’s exception does not 
J-S30025-23

- 10 -

contain the same requirements as a Brady claim, noting “we 

made clear the exception set forth in subsection (b)(1)(ii) does 

not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim. Rather, 

the exception merely requires that the ‘facts’ upon which such a 

claim is predicated must not have been known to appellant, nor 

could they have been ascertained by due diligence.” Bennett, 

[930 A.2d] at 1271.

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (some 

citations omitted). 

Here, even assuming, arguendo, that Ambrose satisfied the 

governmental interference exception to the PCRA time bar, he would be 

unable to establish a substantive Brady violation, as he cannot demonstrate 

the materiality of the evidence, i.e., that its omission resulted in prejudice to 

him. Willis, supra. Ambrose claims that “the evidence implicating 

[Ambrose] was weak, at best,” Morton’s “identification of [Ambrose] was 

highly suspect,” and “Johnson’s recantation of the details [in the statement 

purportedly coerced by Pitts] pertaining to Morton’s ‘eyes [getting] wide’ and 

her saying that she’d ‘never forget that face’ was a crucial point.” Brief of 

Appellant, at 22. These claims are unsupported by the record. As the PCRA 

court correctly noted, Johnson’s testimony was “limited to what happened at 

the vigil after the murder occurred. Other witnesses testified about what 

happened at the vigil, including [] Morton. Even if the jury believed [] 

Johnson’s recantation, her testimony did not negate the circumstances of [] 

Morton’s identification of [Ambrose’s] Facebook photograph at the vigil.” 

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/15/22, at 8. 
J-S30025-23

- 11 -

Our review of the record further confirms the court’s conclusions that, 

contrary to being “highly suspect,” Brief of Appellant, at 22, Morton’s 

identification was based on an “ample opportunity, in close proximity, to 

observe [Ambrose].” PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/15, at 8. Rather than giving 

a “vague” description, Brief of Appellant, at 3, Morton provided a highly 

detailed description of the shooter, in which she correctly described his 

clothing, approximate height and weight, complexion, age, build, and 

hairstyle. See N.T. Trial, 12/4/12, at 132-34. Morton testified at trial that 

she was “certain” that the individual in the Facebook photograph she saw on 

the night of the vigil was the same person who shot the victim and stated that 

her reaction to being shown the image was: “Oh, my God. Yes.” Id. at 146-

47. Morton never wavered in her identification of Ambrose, and she identified 

him on no fewer than five separate occasions: (1) at the vigil on the day of 

the shooting, see id. at 146; (2) six months after the shooting, on January

24, 2011, when shown a photo array4 by police, see id. at 153; (3) later on 

January 24, 2011, when shown a Facebook photo of Ambrose by police, see 

id. at 156; (4) at Ambrose’s preliminary hearing, see id. at 158, and (5) at 

trial. See id. at 120.

____________________________________________

4 Ambrose claims that the photo array shown to Morton was “suggestive” 

because, while Ambrose was wearing “civilian clothes, . . . every other subject 

wore a white t-shirt[.]” Brief of Appellant, at 4. This assertion is belied by 

the record. At trial, the jury was shown the photo array; of the seven other 

individuals pictured in the array, two were described for the record as wearing 

white shirts, three as wearing black shirts, one as wearing no shirt, and one 

as wearing a light blue shirt. See N.T. Trial, 12/6/12, at 52-53.
J-S30025-23

- 12 -

In the face of Morton’s clear, unwavering, and accurate identification of 

Ambrose, the purportedly false statement attributed to Johnson in the 

statement taken by former detective Pitts—that Morton’s “eyes got wide” 

when she saw the Facebook photo at the vigil and she stated she would “never 

forget [Ambrose’s] face”—simply cannot be deemed material to Ambrose’s 

guilt. Indeed, Morton’s own testimony as to her reaction upon first seeing the 

Facebook photo of Ambrose—“Oh my God. Yes.”—conveys the same level of 

certainty as the statement attributed to her in Johnson’s allegedly false 

statement. 

In light of the foregoing, Ambrose is unable to demonstrate that the 

omission of evidence pertaining to misconduct engaged in by former detective 

Pitts prejudiced him. Ambrose’s conviction was based on Morton’s eyewitness 

identification testimony. Accordingly, evidence tending to undermine the 

credibility of Pitts—who neither interviewed Morton nor showed her the photo 

array—would not have made a difference in the outcome of trial. Likewise, 

even if Ambrose could have conclusively demonstrated that Johnson’s 

statement had been coerced by Pitts, there is no reasonable probability that 

the result of the proceedings would have been different. Accordingly, we 

affirm the order of the PCRA court. 

Order affirmed.
J-S30025-23

- 13 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/21/2023