In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-3281

LINDA ROWLANDS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE –

FORT WAYNE,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division

No. 13-cv-059 — Robert L. Miller, Jr. Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 22, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 24, 2018

____________________

Before FLAUM, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and GETTLEMAN, 

District Judge.∗

GETTLEMAN, District Judge. Linda Rowlands claims that 

United Parcel Service (“UPS”) discriminated against her because she had a disability, failed to accommodate her 

 ∗ Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 17-3281

disability, and retaliated against her when she requested accommodations, all in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 14 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (“ADA”). The district court 

granted UPS’ motion for summary judgment on all of Rowlands’ claims, finding that she did not have a disability, had 

waived her failure to accommodate claim, and failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliation. Rowlands appeals only 

her failure to accommodate and retaliation claims. Because 

there are genuine disputes of fact that are material to Rowlands’ failure to accommodate and retaliation claims, neither 

of which were waived, we reverse and remand. 

I.

On appeal of a district court’s summary judgment decision we summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party, in this case Rowlands, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Malina v. Hospira, Inc., 762 

F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2014).

Rowlands worked for UPS at its Fort Wayne facility for 

more than 25 years before she was fired on July 19, 2012, for 

changing the time on her time card. In response, Rowlands 

filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging discrimination 

based on her age, sex, and perceived disabilities. Rowlands 

also filed a grievance with her union and was ultimately reinstated. During the grievance proceedings Rowlands told her 

boss, Steve Liskey, that she believed that she had been fired 

not for the alleged time card fraud, but because of a knee injury. 

Rowlands had, in fact, suffered a number of injuries in the 

years leading up to her termination, starting in 2005 when she 
No. 17-3281 3

was hit by a semi-truck and needed a hip replacement. Between February and July of 2012 alone Rowlands suffered 

three knee injuries, one of which took place at UPS and required surgery. Over the years Rowlands took significant 

time off from work on multiple occasions to recover from her 

injuries. 

Rowlands returned to work at UPS after being reinstated 

on September 27, 2012. She was still recovering from her knee 

surgery at the time but had been cleared by her doctor to work 

with no restrictions. To aid in her recovery Rowlands wore 

two different knee braces that contained ice packs and elevated her leg whenever possible. Rowlands claims that she 

knew UPS intended to terminate her again because her employee ID was never reactivated in UPS’ computer system, 

which meant that she had to use a supervisor’s ID to process 

packages. 

According to Rowlands, there were other signs that her

days at UPS were numbered. She and her union representative, Steve Harms, claim that UPS established a new set of 

rules that applied only to Rowlands. For example, Rowlands 

was no longer allowed to take breaks with coworkers. Additionally, Rowlands alone was prohibited from moving her car 

from a far, dimly-lit employee parking lot to a closer lot when 

first shift employees left, making parking spaces closer to the 

building available. Harms claims that Rowlands’ supervisors 

put her, and only her, under a microscope and watched her 

constantly, even documenting when she went to the bathroom and for how long. Rowlands was written up on her first 

day back for failing to record all meals and breaks properly. 

She was written up again the following day for leaving without permission, which she denied doing. 
4 No. 17-3281

Rowlands also faced a number of challenges related to her 

knee injuries both before and after she was terminated for 

time card fraud. She claims that she discussed her limitations, 

specifically the severity of her knee pain, with Liskey and that 

she requested accommodations for her knee injuries, but they 

were not granted. For example, Rowlands claims that she 

asked to be trained on computer data entry and forklift operation so she would have to stand less, but was denied. She 

also asked to use a first-floor bathroom, as opposed to the second-floor employee bathroom, because she had trouble 

climbing stairs. Liskey denied that request, telling Rowlands 

that the first-floor bathroom was for management only. 

The employee break room was also on the second floor, 

which meant Rowlands had to sit in the loading dock area to 

ice and elevate her knee on her breaks. She was unable to do 

so elsewhere because she was not allowed to leave the building, as were other UPS employees, and had great difficulty 

navigating the stairs. According to Rowlands, this made it 

nearly impossible to elevate her knee because she had to sit 

sideways. Rowlands further claims that she could not elevate 

her leg at her work station because when she did her 

coworker, Joe Gropengieser, reported her to Liskey for sitting 

on the job. Rowlands also requested repeatedly that the sixfoot cord to her scanner be replaced with a shorter one because it was a hazard. It was not replaced, and Rowlands 

tripped on it, re-injuring her knee. 

UPS fired Rowlands for the second and final time on January 2, 2013. This time Rowlands was fired for violating UPS’ 

“zero tolerance” Crisis Prevention and Workplace Violence 

Prevention Policy (“Policy”). That Policy prohibits “the possession and/or use of weapons by any employee on UPS 
No. 17-3281 5

property” and any “violence related conduct” including 

threats and “comments or behavior that could reasonably be 

interpreted as an intent to do harm to employees.” Rowlands 

allegedly violated the Policy on the night of December 19, 

2012. As she was leaving that night, Rowlands took a taser out 

of her coat pocket, turned it on, looked at Gropengieser, who 

was about ten feet away, and said, “This is so if anyone wants 

to mess with me.” Rowlands then walked out the back door 

and to her car in the far away, dimly-lit parking lot. 

After that exchange Gropengieser reported that Rowlands 

had threatened him. During an investigation of the incident 

Gropengieser submitted a written statement to Liskey claiming that he felt “total[l]y threatened” by Rowlands. The next 

day another UPS employee, and friend of Gropengieser, submitted a written statement to a security guard alleging that he 

saw Rowlands with a taser on December 13, 2012. Rowlands 

also submitted a written statement as part of the investigation. 

Then, on December 27, 2012, an anonymous call was placed 

to the UPS hotline. The caller claimed to have seen Rowlands 

“zap” a taser on December 14, 2012. UPS determined that 

Gropengieser’s complaint was substantiated and that the offense was one of extreme seriousness, warranting immediate 

termination. 

Rowlands does not deny, and has never denied, either carrying a taser or turning it on before leaving UPS. In fact, Rowlands admits to doing exactly that every night at the end of 

her shift for at least ten years. Rowlands’ coworkers corroborated her account and expressed surprise that Rowlands was 

disciplined for carrying a taser after having done so for so 

long. According to Rowlands, she carried the taser not as a 

weapon, but as personal protection while she walked alone 
6 No. 17-3281

through a dark and desolate parking lot late at night. During 

the time that she had worked at UPS, Rowlands’ car had been 

broken into twice and vagrants had been discovered sleeping 

in UPS delivery trucks. These events made Rowlands feel unsafe in the parking lot, particularly after she was told that she 

could no longer move her car closer to the building during her 

breaks. 

Gropengieser’s claim that he felt threatened by Rowlands

was described by UPS employees as “truly, truly laughable” 

if not “an outright lie,” “just so obviously ridiculous,” and 

“truly ironic.” The same UPS employees describe Gropengieser as a nearly six-foot-tall competitive body builder in his 

thirties known for aggression and bullying who had been 

fired by UPS once for fighting with a coworker in a nearby 

parking lot. In fact, Harms claims that Gropengieser threatened him and challenged him to a fight, in Liskey’s office, after he confronted Gropengieser for, as Harms describes it, 

falsely lamenting Rowlands’ termination despite having been 

at least partially responsible for it. According to these employees, it was not possible for Gropengieser to have felt threatened by Rowlands, a woman in her fifties with bad knees.

According to Rowlands, she in no way threatened 

Gropengieser when she took her taser out and turned it on to 

make sure that it was working before she left UPS, as she had

done nightly for more than a decade. Rowlands also claims

that she was unaware that carrying a taser violated the Policy, 

and that other employees carried similar devices, both tasers 

and pepper spray, and even large knives, on a regular basis. 

Rowlands’ understanding was that the Policy prohibited employees from carrying firearms only. This was also corroborated by two of Rowlands’ coworkers, one of whom carried 
No. 17-3281 7

pepper spray, and both of whom believed that UPS prohibited firearms only. Indeed, Harms was so convinced of this 

that he attempted to talk Liskey out of firing Rowlands, suggesting that it was unjustified because there was no documentation in the building indicating that tasers were prohibited,

and it was a first offense. According to Harms, Liskey was unrelenting, responding that Rowlands “has been a constant 

pain in my butt” and “that management has been on me continually about this.”

After she was fired the second time Rowlands filed another Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, this time alleging discrimination based on her knee-related disability, or 

UPS’ regarding her as having a disability, failure to accommodate that disability, and retaliation for engaging in protected conduct. This lawsuit followed. Rowlands attached 

both of her EEOC charges to her complaint filed in the district 

court. UPS moved for summary judgment on all claims except 

for Rowlands’ claim that UPS failed to reasonably accommodate her disability, which went unmentioned. In her response

brief, Rowlands claimed that UPS had conceded this claim by 

failing to respond to it. UPS argued in its reply brief that Rowlands had not asserted a failure to accommodate claim in her 

complaint, and attaching the EEOC charge to the complaint 

was insufficient to put UPS on notice of the claim. Rowlands 

was granted leave to file a sur-reply to that argument, and ultimately lost when the district court granted UPS’ motion for 

summary judgment in its entirety, including the failure to accommodate claim. 

In granting UPS’ motion for summary judgment the district court first found that Rowlands did not have a disability
8 No. 17-3281

when she was fired in January 2013.1 According to the district 

court, no reasonable jury could find otherwise based on the 

medical evidence in the record, specifically Rowlands’ orthopedists’ opinion that she could return to work with no restrictions as of September 2012. The district court then held 

that Rowlands failed to properly state a failure to accommodate claim because, although the 2013 EEOC charge attached 

to the complaint alleged that Rowlands had sought accommodations, it did not explicitly state that UPS denied that request.2 As for Rowlands’ ADA retaliation claim, the district 

court stated that Rowlands attempted to prove it using the 

burden-shifting method and analyzed it accordingly. Under 

such analysis, the district court held that the claim failed because Rowlands had not identified a similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably. 

II.

On appeal, Rowlands argues that the district court committed reversible error when it found that she failed to state a 

failure to accommodate claim because her EEOC charge did 

not explicitly state that her requests for reasonable accommodations were denied. According to Rowlands, the district 

court erred by holding her to a heightened pleading standard, 

and by neglecting to allow her an opportunity to respond to 

that point, which was not raised by UPS or addressed by 

 

1 Because Rowlands appeals the district court’s rulings related only to 

her claims that she requested, but was denied, reasonable accommodations and was retaliated against for making such requests, this court will 

not address the district court’s analysis of any of Rowlands’ remaining 

claims. 

2 Rowlands acknowledged in the district court that she failed to allege 

a failure to accommodate claim in the body of her complaint. 
No. 17-3281 9

either party. Rowlands further argues that the district court 

erred in analyzing her retaliation claim under the burdenshifting framework and ultimately denying her claim for failure to identify a similarly situated employee who was treated 

more favorably.

Our review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo, and we can affirm only if there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and no reasonable jury could find for 

Rowlands. Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 

887, 894 (7th Cir. 2018). We view all the facts and make all reasonable inferences in her favor. Id. at 893. We have stressed in 

the past, and it is worth repeating, that “a court may not make 

credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide 

which inferences to draw from the facts” on summary judgment, and must “avoid[] the temptation to decide which 

party’s version of the facts is more likely true.” Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). This can be a difficult task, particularly 

in fact-intensive cases such as this.

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating 

against qualified individuals due to a disability. Rodrigo v. 

Carle Found. Hosp., 879 F.3d 236, 241 (7th Cir. 2018). Discrimination under the ADA includes failing to make reasonable accommodations to a qualified employee’s disability. Id. The 

ADA also prohibits retaliating against individuals (qualified 

or not) who have engaged in activities protected by the ADA, 

such as filing a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC or 

requesting reasonable accommodations. Id. at 243. A court’s 

conclusion that an individual does not have a disability does 

not foreclose a retaliation claim. Dickerson v. Bd. of Trustees of 

Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 786 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
10 No. 17-3281

A. Failure to Accommodate

To establish a failure to accommodate claim Rowlands 

must show that: (1) she is both qualified and has a disability; 

(2) UPS was aware of her disability; and (3) UPS failed to accommodate her disability. Guzman v. Brown Cty., 884 F.3d 633, 

642 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court found no need to discuss 

the first prong in its analysis because it held that Rowlands 

failed to satisfy the third, but it implicitly found that Rowlands failed to satisfy the first prong when it held that no reasonable jury could find Rowlands disabled for purposes of 

her disability discrimination claim, which is not a subject of 

this appeal. As for the third prong, the district court held that 

Rowlands failed to satisfy it by not explicitly stating in her 

2013 EEOC charge that UPS failed to grant the accommodations she requested. We find both conclusions erroneous.

Taking the second point first, Rowlands sufficiently stated 

a failure to accommodate claim in her 2013 EEOC charge, 

which was attached to her amended complaint and read, in 

pertinent part, as follows:

Complainant tried to engage in the interactive 

process and tried to get reasonable accommodations (such as wearing her knee brace, eliminating the existence of the cord which Complainant 

ultimately tripped over causing more serious 

injuries to her knee).

Complainant [] contends that she was retaliated 

against for having engaged in protected conduct–filing previous Charges of Discrimination 

and trying to engage in the interactive 
No. 17-3281 11

process/making requests for reasonable accommodations.

Rowlands concedes that these sentences were absent from 

her amended complaint, which did not articulate a failure to 

accommodate claim, but argues, as she did in the district 

court, that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) her attached EEOC charges are part of the pleading and sufficient 

to put UPS on notice that she was asserting a failure to accommodate claim. The district court implicitly rejected UPS’ argument to the contrary by analyzing the language contained in 

the EEOC charges, but then held that UPS was not put on notice of the claim because Rowlands did not explicitly state that

her requests for reasonable accommodations were denied. 

The district court properly incorporated the facts articulated in the attached EEOC charges into Rowlands’ complaint, 

but erred in finding that they failed to state a failure to accommodate claim. As Rowlands points out, when a person files a 

charge with the EEOC claiming that they “tried to engage in 

the interactive process and tried to get reasonable accommodations,” it logically follows that those efforts were not fruitful. Otherwise there would be no need to include those details 

in the charge. 

UPS and the district court relied primarily on Hooper v.

Proctor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846 (7th Cir. 2015), to support 

the notion that Rowlands failed to state a failure to accommodate claim. Hooper is easily distinguished. In Hooper the plaintiff failed to assert a failure to accommodate claim in his complaint and, critically, failed to attach his EEOC charge to his 

complaint. Instead, the plaintiff argued that, because his 

“complaint alleged that he was a qualified individual with a 

disability” it “therefore included a failure to accommodate 
12 No. 17-3281

claim because the definition of a qualified individual is one 

who, ‘with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform 

the essential functions of the employment position that such 

individual holds.’” Id. at 851 (emphasis supplied) (quoting 42 

U.S.C. § 12111(8)). Rowlands makes no such argument, and 

need not because her 2013 EEOC charge included a failure to 

accommodate claim and was attached to her complaint. As 

UPS acknowledges, in Hooper there was no mention of the 

EEOC charge until the plaintiff attached it to his response 

brief in opposition to summary judgment. Accordingly, 

Hooper does not control. 

UPS also argues on appeal that Rowlands “may not use 

her opposition to summary judgment as a backdoor technique to amend her complaint,” citing Anderson v. Donahoe,

699 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2012). Anderson is equally inapt. In Anderson the plaintiff asserted a failure to accommodate claim in 

a complaint that he filed pro se, but failed to assert such a claim 

in his counseled second amended complaint. Id. at 997. The 

plaintiff then attempted to assert a failure to accommodate 

claim in his opposition to summary judgment. Id. This court 

recognized that the second amended complaint was the operative complaint and consequently held that the claim was 

waived because “a plaintiff may not amend his complaint 

through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for 

summary judgment.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This 

uncontroversial observation does nothing to further UPS’ position because Rowlands attached her EEOC charge, which articulated a failure to accommodate claim, to her complaint. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) Rowlands was 

required to include in her complaint “a short and plain statement of [her] claim[s]” to give UPS fair notice of each of her 
No. 17-3281 13

claims “and the grounds upon which [they] rest[].” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) 

(internal quotations omitted). Rowlands was not obligated, 

however, to plead “facts that bear on the statutory elements 

of a claim.” Chapman v. Yellow Cab Coop., 875 F.3d 846, 848 (7th 

Cir. 2017). Instead, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “require[] plaintiffs to plead claims rather than facts corresponding to the elements of a legal theory.” Id. (emphasis supplied). 

It is therefore “manifestly inappropriate for a district court to 

demand that complaints contain all legal elements (or factors) 

plus facts corresponding to each.” Id. “It is enough to plead a 

plausible claim, after which ‘a plaintiff receives the benefit of 

imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the 

complaint.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563). 

As the district court recognized, Rowlands’ 2013 EEOC 

charge was incorporated into her complaint, and was therefore a part of it for all purposes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). In that 

charge Rowlands alleged that she “tried to engage in the interactive process and tried to get reasonable accommodations” and that she “was retaliated against for ... trying to engage in the interactive process/making requests for reasonable accommodations.” Those allegations were sufficient to put 

UPS on notice that Rowlands was asserting a failure to accommodate claim. From there, Rowlands “should have receive[d] 

the benefit of imagination” rather than being expected to 

plead each element of an ADA retaliation claim, namely that 

her request for accommodations was denied. Id. This is especially so where, as here, the case proceeded to the summary 

judgment stage “with a full description of the facts,” supporting Rowlands’ contention that her requests for accommodations were denied. Id. 
14 No. 17-3281

Because the facts alleged in Rowlands’ 2013 EEOC charge 

were both adequate to state a failure to accommodate claim 

and incorporated into her complaint, Rowlands did not waive 

the claim. 

As for the first prong of Rowlands’ failure to accommodate claim, the district court erroneously held that she was not 

disabled because she had been cleared to work without restrictions. Under the ADA, a disability is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 

activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing 

manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, 

standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, 

reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A person with such an impairment 

has a disability “even if the impairment is ‘transitory and minor.’” Gogos v. AMS Mech. Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170, 1172 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 12101(3)(B)). 

According to Rowlands, her knee injuries substantially interfered with her ability to walk, stand, squat and kneel. These 

claims are sufficient to support Rowlands’ claim that she has 

a disability. Although UPS would have been entitled to request a doctor’s note verifying Rowlands’ condition as part of 

the interactive process, it does not follow that she did not have 

a disability because her doctor had cleared her to return to 

work without restrictions. Additionally, Rowlands informing 

Liskey of her limitations and needed accommodations was 

sufficient to put UPS on notice that it was expected to engage 

in the interactive process. See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 

417 F.3d 789, 804 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Where notice is ambiguous 

as to the precise nature of the disability or desired 
No. 17-3281 15

accommodation, but it is sufficient to notify the employer that 

the employee may have a disability that requires accommodation, the employer must ask for clarification.”). UPS was 

not entitled, under such circumstances, to simply ignore Rowlands’ requests, regardless of whether she had been cleared to 

work without restrictions. See id. (“[A]n employer cannot 

shield itself from liability by choosing not to follow up on an 

employee's requests for assistance, or by intentionally remaining in the dark.”).

Because Rowlands did not waive her failure to accommodate claim and questions of material fact remain as to whether 

Rowlands had a disability and to what extent she required accommodations, the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment to UPS on this claim.

B. Retaliation

To establish a retaliation claim, Rowlands “must demonstrate that she engaged in protected activity, that she suffered 

an adverse action, and that there is a causal connection between the two.”Rodrigo, 879 F.3d at 243. As mentioned above, 

a plaintiff may pursue a retaliation claim “regardless of 

whether the initial claims of discrimination are meritless.”

Dickerson, 657 F.3d at 601.

The district court analyzed, and rejected, Rowlands’ retaliation claim under the burden-shifting, or “indirect” method 

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 

93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).3 Although we have 

 3 Under the burden-shifting framework a plaintiff must first establish 

that: (1) she “engaged in statutorily protected activity”; (2) she “was performing [her] job satisfactorily”; and (3) she “was singled out for an adverse employment action that similarly situated employees who did not 
16 No. 17-3281

acknowledged that the indirect method can be a “an efficient 

way to organize, present, and assess evidence in discrimination cases,” Advocate Health, 892 F.3d at 894, we have also 

warned that efforts to shoehorn the evidence into either the 

direct or indirect method of proof can “detract[] attention 

from the sole question that matters: Whether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plaintiff] would have kept his job 

if he [did not have the proscribed factor], and everything else 

had remained the same. Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 

F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, the legal standard 

under which we must analyze Rowlands’ claim “is simply 

whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to 

conclude that [Rowlands’ requests for accommodations]

caused the discharge.” Id. at 765. We find that it would. 

To show that retaliation was the “but for” reason for her

termination, Rowlands can use either direct or circumstantial 

evidence. Monroe v. Indiana Dep't of Transportation, 871 F.3d 

495, 503 (7th Cir. 2017). An admission that UPS fired Rowlands in retaliation for her requests for accommodations 

would be direct evidence. Id. Such evidence is, of course, rare. 

More often, plaintiffs present circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Such evidence includes: “(1) suspicious timing; 

(2) ambiguous statements or behavior towards other employees in the protected group; (3) evidence, statistical or otherwise, that similarly situated employees outside of the 

 

engage in protected activity did not suffer.” Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. 

Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806, 814 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). 

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. 

If able to do so, the burden shifts again to the employee to show that the 

reason given was pretext. Id.
No. 17-3281 17

protected group systematically receive[d] better treatment; 

and (4) evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason 

for an adverse employment action.” Id. at 504 (citing Bunn v. 

Khoury Enter., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2014)). This is 

often referred to as the “direct” method of establishing employment discrimination. 

Rowlands relies on the first and fourth categories of circumstantial evidence to support her retaliation claim, arguing 

that she was fired shortly after she returned to work from 

knee surgery, that she constantly requested accommodations 

that were denied up until her discharge, and that UPS’ reason 

for firing her was pretextual. UPS counters that Rowlands 

was fired for a legitimate reason: she threatened Gropengieser 

with a taser, violating the Policy. According to UPS that leaves 

Rowlands with only suspicious timing, which we have held 

is insufficient, by itself, to create a jury issue on the inference 

of retaliation. See Amrhein v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 546 F.3d 

854 (7th Cir. 2008). We have also found, however, “evidence 

of causation sufficient to withstand summary judgment 

where adverse actions against an employee commenced one 

month after she had filed complaints of race and sex discrimination, where the employee had also presented evidence of 

pretext.”Donahoe, 699 F.3d at 996. Because this latter scenario 

more closely resembles Rowlands’ claim, the district court 

erred in granting summary judgment for UPS. 

As discussed above, there is substantial circumstantial evidence, aside from suspicious timing, that would allow a reasonable juror to infer that UPS’ reason for firing Rowlands 

was pretextual: (1) her employee ID was never reinstated; (2) 

she was “put under a microscope” and subjected to new rules 

that applied only to her; (3) she attempted to discuss her 
18 No. 17-3281

limitations with Liskey, but was rebuffed repeatedly; (4) Liskey complained that she “has been a constant pain in my 

butt” and “that management has been on me continually 

about this”; (5) she alone was prohibited from moving her car 

closer to the building during her breaks; (6) she was denied 

access to the first-floor bathroom; and (7) Gropengieser violated the Policy by threatening Harms in front of Liskey, and 

suffered no adverse action as a result. Additionally, Rowlands 

has provided evidence that could allow a reasonable juror to 

infer that tasers were not explicitly prohibited under the policy, and that Gropengieser’s claim that she threatened him 

was not credible. 

We, of course, “cannot second-guess [UPS’] employment 

decisions to the extent that they were innocently unwise or 

unfair.”Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 643 F.3d 190, 200 (7th 

Cir. 2011). “But [Rowlands] has presented sufficient evidence 

from which a finder of fact could genuinely call into question 

[UPS’] honesty.” Id. A reasonable jury could also find that 

Rowlands’ statement to Gropengieser “was not a ‘threat’ at 

all, or that even if [UPS] properly construed it as such, its decision to terminate [Rowlands] was a disingenuous overreaction to justify dismissal of an annoying employee who asserted h[er] rights under the ADA.” Id. “The combination of 

the ambiguity of the asserted threat,” the ambiguity in the 

Policy, Liskey’s comment about Rowlands, the ways she 

claims to have been singled out, “and the timing [of her termination] provided sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable 

trier of fact to infer pretext and retaliatory intent.” Id. at 201.
No. 17-3281 19

“In the end a jury might not credit [Rowlands’] evidence 

and could accept [UPS’] explanations. But given the conflict 

on material issues, a trial is necessary.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766.

REVERSED and REMANDED.