[Cite as State v. Corrigan, 2012-Ohio-5970.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsDEBRA J. CORRIGAN 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2012-CA-00046 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Licking County 

Municipal Court, Case No. 2012TRD02774 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 14, 2012 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

TRICIA M. MOORE MATTHEW M. BANAL 

Newark Law Director's Office 6805 Oak Creek Drive 

40 West Main Street Columbus, OH 43229 

Newark, OH 40355 
[Cite as State v. Corrigan, 2012-Ohio-5970.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant Debra J. Corrigan [“Corrigan”] appeals her conviction after a 

bench trial in the Licking County Municipal Court on one count of stopping at grade 

crossings, a minor misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4511.63(A). 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} Ohio State Patrol Trooper Robert Franks issued a traffic citation to Debra 

J. Corrigan for a violation of R.C. 4511.63(A) on March 14, 2012. 

{¶3} A trial on the matter was conducted on April 27, 2012 during which the 

following testimony was presented. 

{¶4} Debra J. Corrigan was employed as a bus driver for the North Fork Local 

Schools in Utica, Ohio. Her supervisor in the Transportation Department was Charles 

Dale Broseus. Broseus alleged that in the months prior to March 14, 2012, he received 

complaints regarding Corrigan failing to follow the school bus procedures for railroad 

crossings, as outlined in Ohio Adm. Code 3301-83-12. He also asked the St. Louisville 

Police and Trooper Robert Franks of the Ohio State Highway Patrol to watch Corrigan, 

and any other bus drivers, for railroad crossing violations on Locks Road and Dog 

Hollow Road near St. Louisville, Ohio. 

{¶5} After one of Corrigan's co-workers at North Fork Local Schools began 

clandestinely videotaping her railroad crossings, Broseus and Trooper Franks began 

hiding their vehicles and observing buses crossing the railroad tracks at the Dog Hollow 

Road location. Soon after, they observed the school bus operated by Corrigan 

approaching the railroad tracks. Broseus testified that he observed the bus driven by 

Corrigan approach the railroad crossing briefly stop, open the right door approximately 
Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-00046 3 

half way, and then close immediately, and cross the tracks in one motion lasting less 

than two seconds. Trooper Franks testified that he observed the bus approach tracks, 

slow down, open the door halfway, immediately shut the door and crossed the tracks.

The trooper testified, "With that quick of a motion, I don't see how you could look and 

perceive any danger on the track... as soon as the door went open, it went shut."

Trooper Franks testified that there were children on the bus and that the railroad 

crossing is not marked with flashing lights or a gate. Trooper Franks pursued the school 

bus and executed a traffic stop. He issued her a traffic ticket for a violation of R.C. 

4511.63(A), stopping at grade crossings. 

{¶6} At the close of evidence, the trial judge found Corrigan guilty of the 

violation under R.C. 4511.63(A), a minor misdemeanor. He levied a $100.00 fine plus 

court costs, and signed a corresponding judgment entry that same day. 

Assignments of Error 

{¶7} Corrigan raises two assignments of error, 

{¶8} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DEFINING "DUE CARE" IN § 

4511.63(A) OF THE REVISED CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNAFFILIATED § 

3301-83-12 OF THE OHIO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, AND USING SUCH 

ERRONEOUS DEFINITION AS A BASIS FOR CONVICTION. 

{¶9} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING A MISTAKE OF LAW 

THAT WOULD HAVE ENTITLED DEBRA CORRIGAN TO ACQUITTAL.” 

Analysis 

{¶10} Corrigan’s first and second assignments of error raise common and 

interrelated issues; therefore, we will address the arguments together. 
Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-00046 4 

{¶11} Corrigan’s arguments focus on the "due care" required of her under 

4511.63(A). 

{¶12} R.C. 4511.63 provides, in relevant part, 

 (A) Except as provided in division (B) of this section, the operator of 

any bus, any school vehicle, or any vehicle transporting a material or 

materials required to be placarded under 49 C.F.R. Parts 100-185, before 

crossing at grade any track of a railroad, shall stop the vehicle and, while 

so stopped, shall listen through an open door or open window and look in 

both directions along the track for any approaching train, and for signals 

indicating the approach of a train, and shall proceed only upon exercising 

due care after stopping, looking, and listening as required by this section. 

Upon proceeding, the operator of such a vehicle shall cross only in a gear 

that will ensure there will be no necessity for changing gears while 

traversing the crossing and shall not shift gears while crossing the tracks. 

 (B) This section does not apply at grade crossings when the public 

utilities commission has authorized and approved an exempt crossing as 

provided in this division. 

* * * 

{¶13} In the case at bar, the trial court made the following findings on the record 

at the conclusion of Corrigan’s bench trial, 

 I think the crux of the matter comes down to...the due care 

provision of the statue... 45110.6 or I'm sorry, 4511.63...requires that the 

operator of any bus, school vehicle or vehicle transporting material, 
Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-00046 5 

materials, etcetera, before crossing a grade, any track, or railroad shall 

stop the vehicle and while so stopped, shall listen through an open door or 

window, and look in both directions along the track for any approaching 

train, for signal indicating an approach of a train, and shall proceed only 

upon exercising due care after stopping, looking, and listening as required 

by this section. Um, then it talks about going over without shifting gears, 

that's not at issue here. So, really the crux of the matter is whether or not 

the actions taken by Ms. Corrigan constitute due care and the Court thinks 

it's entirely appropriate to look to the Ohio Administrative Code as to what 

guidance we look for or what procedures we look for as far as exercising 

the due care. That gets into the more detailed information and testimony 

that Mr. Broseus gave um, but it talks about setting a parking brake, 

shifting to neutral, um, things of that nature, which clearly would have 

been impossible based upon the testimony that we heard here today. I'm 

not finding that she is guilty of not setting the parking brake or anything 

like that, um; because frankly, I think had she come to a complete stop, 

not put it in neutral or anything like that, and sat there for five seconds and 

looked both ways she's probably not guilty of the statue, but based upon 

the testimony that the Court heard today that, you know, basically it was 

uh, stop of a very brief duration that the doors barely opened. I believe the 

testimony was half way at most uh, and that uh, that the, they immediately 

closed and the bus proceeded uh, that evidence is sufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt the lack of the exercise of due care that is 
Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-00046 6 

required by the statue. So on that basis I'm going to go ahead and enter a 

Guilty finding. (Emphasis added). 

{¶14} Ohio law gives the right of way to trains, see, e.g., New York, Chicago & 

St. Louis Rwy. Co., 66 Ohio St. 326, 335, 64 N.E. 130 (1902), and places the primary 

burden of avoiding grade crossing collisions on motorists. Woodworth v. New York 

Central R. Co., 149 Ohio St. 543, 549–50, 80 N.E.2d 142 (1948). The Ohio Supreme 

Court elaborated on this duty in Zuments v. Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co., 27 Ohio St.2d 

71, 72, 271 N.E.2d 813, 814(1971), stating that: 

 The driver of a motor vehicle about to pass over a railroad grade 

crossing on a public highway is required both to look and to listen for 

approaching trains, and the looking and listening must be at such time and 

place and in such manner as to be effective for that purpose. 

Accord, Boles v. Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co., 168 Ohio St. 551, 156 N.E.2d 735(1959); 

North v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 9 Ohio St.2d 169, 224 N.E.2d 757(1967). The “looking 

and listening must be at such time and place and in such manner as will be effective to 

accomplish the ends designed thereby.” Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Rusynik, 117 Ohio St. 

530, 159 N.E. 826 (1927). Accord, Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R. Co. v. Rohrs, 114 Ohio 

St. 493, 151 N.E. 714 (1926); Toledo Terminal R. Co. v. Hughes, 115 Ohio St. 562, 154 

N.E. 916(1926); Patton v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 136 Ohio St. 159, 24 N.E.2d 597(1939). 

R.C. 1.49(D) allows courts to consider laws upon same or similar subjects when 

determining intent. 
Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-00046 7 

{¶15} The following testimony supports the trial court’s decision. Charles Dale 

Broseus testified, 

 I saw the bus pull up to the railroad tracks, the door open and close 

all in one motion, and go across the tracks. It was less than two seconds 

in my opinion...The stop, the door opening and closing was all in one swift 

motion. 

(T. 8; 9). Trooper Robert Franks testified, 

 Um, I observed a school bus coming a crossed [sic.] the tracks um, 

as the bus got to the tracks it did slow down. The doors opens [sic.], but 

immediately went shut. Um, if I had to, I’m not familiar with how wide a bus 

opening should be, if I was to estimate how far I thought it was open, if at 

all, it went half way open, and immediately shut...Uh, just the lack of 

stopping and looking for a train. Uh, that quick of a motion, I don’t see how 

you could look and perceive any danger on the track. 

(T. at 16). 

{¶16} Simply going through minimal motions does not equate to due care. The 

statute directed that Corrigan “shall stop the [school bus] and, while so stopped, shall 

listen through an open door or open window and look in both directions along the track 

for any approaching train, and for signals indicating the approach of a train, and shall 

proceed only upon exercising due care after stopping, looking, and listening.” Statues 

such as R.C. 4511.63 are obviously enacted in the interest of children traveling in 

school busses, and not for the protection of the driver. Cf. Kline v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,

9 F.2d 290 (6th Cir 1925). 
Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-00046 8 

{¶17} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our inquiry focuses 

primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence; that is, whether the evidence, if believed, 

reasonably could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. 

Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541, 546. From the 

uncontroverted facts of the record, we find sufficient credible evidence to support the 

finding that Corrigan failed to exercise due care as required pursuant to R.C. 

4511.63(A). 

{¶18} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we 

conclude that a reasonable person could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Corrigan had committed the crime of vehicles required to stop at grade crossings in 

violation of R.C. 4511.63(A). We hold, therefore, that the state met its burden of 

production regarding each element of the crime and, accordingly, there was sufficient 

evidence that Corrigan failed to exercise due care as required pursuant to R.C. 

4511.63(A) to support Corrigan’s conviction. 

{¶19} After reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that this is one of the 

exceptional cases where the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. The trier of 

fact did not create a manifest injustice by concluding that Corrigan was guilty of the 

crime charged. 

{¶20} Corrigan’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. 
Licking County, Case No. 2012-CA-00046 9 

{¶21} The judgment of the Licking County Municipal Court is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Hoffman, J., and 

Farmer, J., concur 

 

 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER 

WSG:clw 1203
[Cite as State v. Corrigan, 2012-Ohio-5970.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

DEBRA J. CORRIGAN : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2012-CA-00046 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of 

the Licking County Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs to appellant. 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER