UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

KEITH D. GEARY, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION, 

 Respondent. 

No. 17-9522 

(SEC No. 3-17406) 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, HARTZ, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Keith D. Geary seeks review of a ruling by the Securities and Exchange 

Commission (SEC or Commission) affirming disciplinary action taken against him by 

the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).1

 Exercising jurisdiction under 

15 U.S.C. § 78y(a), we deny the petition for review. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 FINRA is “a quasi-governmental agency responsible for overseeing the 

securities brokerage industry.” ACAP Fin., Inc. v. U.S. SEC, 783 F.3d 763, 765 

(10th Cir. 2015). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 9, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Geary was the owner, president, and chief executive officer of a former 

FINRA-member firm, Geary Securities, Inc. (GSI). Under the SEC’s net capital rule 

and GSI’s FINRA member agreement, the firm was required to maintain at least 

$250,000 in net capital at all times. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(i); Admin. R., 

Vol. 2 at 443. The SEC found that in May 2009 and again in February 2010, 

Mr. Geary permitted GSI to operate while it lacked the required net capital, in 

violation of the net capital rule and FINRA Rule 2010, which requires FINRA 

members and associated persons to “observe high standards of commercial honor and 

just and equitable principles of trade.”2

A. First Net Capital Violation 

GSI’s first net capital violation occurred on May 28 and 29, 2009. In the 

spring of that year, Mr. Geary began pursuing a plan to purchase, repackage, and 

resell collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) in connection with a Credit 

Enhanced Mortgage Pool (CEMP). In early May, he discussed his CEMP plans with 

GSI’s primary financial and operations principal, Norman Frager, who warned 

Mr. Geary, “We can’t do this in the broker-dealer [GSI]. We don’t have the capital. 

You have to set up a special purpose entity.” Admin R., Vol. 1 at 125 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 2

 FINRA Rule 2010 applies to associated persons through FINRA 

Rule 0140(a). 
3 

Nonetheless, on May 28, Mr. Geary caused GSI to buy CMOs from Frontier 

State Bank for approximately $77 million. At that time, GSI had approximately 

$1 million in net capital. Mr. Geary purchased the CMOs for GSI on that date 

without a customer re-purchaser in mind. Id., Vol. 2 at 358. Instead, he intended 

that GSI’s clearing firm, Pershing LLC, would hold the CMOs in GSI’s account, 

awaiting the closing of the CEMP transaction. Id. at 359. But on May 29, when 

Pershing discovered it had paid Frontier for the CMOs but had not received payment 

from GSI, Pershing issued GSI a $31.8 million margin call for the purchase. 

Mr. Geary requested financing from Pershing, but Pershing refused. Mr. Geary did 

not direct GSI to cease conducting securities business on May 28 or 29, 2009. 

Mr. Geary did not discuss this specific CMO purchase with Mr. Frager 

beforehand. Id. at 361-62. When he told Mr. Frager about it the following Monday, 

June 1, Mr. Frager responded that GSI could not hold the CMOs. Id. at 364. 

Mr. Geary understood from this discussion with Mr. Frager that his CMO trade had 

created a net capital violation. Id. at 361. Later that day, Mr. Geary arranged for 

Frontier’s president, Joseph McKean, to repurchase the CMOs at the original 

$77 million price. The resales of the CMOs occurred on June 1 and June 3. GSI’s 

net capital report for May 2009, prepared by Mr. Frager, did not reflect the CMOs in 

GSI’s account or any net capital deficiency. 

During an examination of GSI in November 2009, FINRA concluded that GSI 

had erroneously excluded the CMO purchases from its May 2009 net capital 

calculation. FINRA determined that the purchase of the CMOs resulted in an 
4 

approximately $11 million net capital deficiency. It therefore asked GSI to file a net 

capital deficiency notice, but Mr. Frager refused, indicating that he would instead ask 

Pershing to change its trading records to reflect that GSI had resold the CMOs to 

Mr. McKean as of May 28, instead of June 1 and June 3, 2009. Pershing ultimately 

agreed to change the recorded trade date for the resales to May 28. Mr. Geary 

characterized Mr. Frager’s action as “backdat[ing] the [trade] tickets to make the 

capital violation go away.” Id. at 368 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based 

upon this after-the-fact revision of the recorded trade date, Mr. Geary disputes the 

SEC’s finding of a net capital violation on May 28 and 29, 2009. 

B. Second Net Capital Violation 

GSI’s second violation occurred over a period of fifteen days in February 

2010.3

 In late 2009 and early 2010, GSI’s finances were declining, in part due to the 

failure to close a CEMP transaction in December. Mr. Frager warned Mr. Geary in 

January 2010 that GSI’s net capital was deteriorating and the firm was getting close 

to a violation. Id. at 371-72. Mr. Frager outlined several steps that GSI could take to 

avoid a capital deficiency, including closing the anticipated CEMP deal, obtaining a 

capital infusion of at least $500,000 from another source, or amending GSI’s FINRA 

membership to lower its applicable net capital requirement from $250,000 to 

$100,000. Id. at 393-94. Mr. Geary assured Mr. Frager that he would pursue a bank 

loan to address GSI’s net capital issues. Id. at 394. At that time, Mr. Frager 

 3

 Although Mr. Geary challenges the sanctions imposed, in part, based on a 

second net capital violation by GSI in February 2010, he does not dispute the SEC’s 

finding of a net capital violation at that time. 
5 

specifically warned Mr. Geary about the implications of violating the net capital rule, 

advising him “if you violate, you have to cease doing business,” in other words, “stop 

taking orders,” which would mean “you might as well go out of business.” Id. at 398 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 335 (Mr. Geary’s testimony 

acknowledging this warning). 

The CEMP deal did not close in January 2010, and as of January 31, GSI had a 

net capital deficiency of approximately $55,000. Mr. Geary was aware of the 

deficiency by February 4, 2010. He transferred $75,000 of his personal funds to GSI 

and also began pursuing a short-term $750,000 bank loan. But Mr. Geary’s 

hoped-for loan was delayed through most of February and the infused funds were not 

sufficient to eliminate the net capital deficiencies. The SEC found that GSI violated 

the net capital rule on fifteen days in February 2010, yet GSI continued its operations 

throughout that month. Mr. Geary admitted it was ultimately his responsibility to 

stop the firm from doing business with deficient net capital. Id. at 378. 

C. Disciplinary Action 

FINRA found that Mr. Geary knowingly, or at least recklessly, permitted GSI 

to operate with deficient net capital in May 2009 and again in February 2010, in 

violation of the SEC’s net capital rule and FINRA Rule 2010.4

 FINRA barred him 

from acting in a principal or supervisory capacity with any FINRA member firm, 

suspended him for 30 business days in all capacities, and fined him $20,000. The 

 4

 FINRA also brought charges against Mr. Frager, which were ultimately 

settled. 
6 

SEC affirmed FINRA’s findings regarding the net capital violations and upheld the 

sanctions imposed on Mr. Geary. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standards of Review 

The SEC’s factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial 

evidence. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(4). “Substantial evidence is a minimum quantity of 

relevant evidence objectively adequate to support the findings when viewed in light 

of the record as a whole. If the evidence is capable of rational interpretation that 

would favor either side, the SEC’s findings will not be overturned on appeal.” 

Rooms v. SEC, 444 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). We review the Commission’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.

In applying sanctions, “the Commission has broad discretion and in the 

absence of clear abuse of that discretion the court will not substitute its views as to 

what the punishment shall be for [a] violation.” Don D. Anderson & Co. v. SEC, 

423 F.2d 813, 817 (10th Cir. 1970). “[W]e may interfere with a sanction imposed by 

the SEC pursuant to its statutory authority only if it is beyond the law, unsupported 

factually, or completely lacking reasonableness such that it is an abuse of the SEC’s 

discretion.” ACAP Fin., Inc. v. U.S. SEC, 783 F.3d 763, 765 (10th Cir. 2015) 

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. Net Capital Violation on May 28 and 29, 2009 

Mr. Geary contends that the SEC erred in finding that GSI had a net capital 

violation on May 28 and 29, 2009. He concedes that “the critically important 
7 

question was whether [GSI] had a liability associated with the CMO purchases as of 

May 29. If yes, a net capital deficiency occurred. If no, a net capital deficiency did 

not occur.” Aplt. Br. at 13. Mr. Geary argues that the SEC’s decision that a 

violation occurred is not based on substantial evidence because it ignored the 

testimony of FINRA’s net capital expert that a firm’s liability for purchasing a 

security, such as the CMOs here, arises on the trade date, and correspondingly, a 

firm’s liability ceases on the trade date for the sale of the security to a customer. See

Admin. R., Vol. 2 at 308-09, 310-11 (FINRA expert’s testimony). Pointing to the 

revised trade date for GSI’s sales of the CMOs to Mr. McKean, he argues that GSI’s 

liability for the CMOs arose and disappeared on the same date—May 28. Thus, he 

urges, zero liability existed on that date and no deficiency or violation occurred. 

Mr. Geary fails to demonstrate that the SEC’s finding of a net capital violation 

in May 2009 lacks substantial evidentiary support. The SEC acknowledged the 

FINRA expert’s testimony, but concluded that “[t]he backdated trade date was 

irrelevant to the calculation of GSI’s net capital and its net capital violation” because 

“the repapering of the trade date did not reflect the reality of the transaction.” 

Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). The SEC found that: 

Geary admitted, and the contemporaneous records and e-mails confirm, that 

GSI held all of the CMOs on May 28 and May 29 in its own Pershing 

proprietary account; that Geary ordered the purchase intending to hold the 

CMOs for two to three weeks (not to immediately resell them); and that 

Geary did not discuss a CMO repurchase with McKean until June 1. GSI’s 

success, after the fact, in amending the recorded trade date in no way 

changes the reality that GSI—and not McKean or Frontier—held the CMOs 

on May 28 and May 29 and was required to include them in calculating its 

net capital. 
8 

Id. at 25-26. And the FINRA expert’s testimony supports, rather than contradicts, the 

SEC’s conclusion. She testified that the revised trade date did not reflect the reality 

of the transaction and that a firm is not permitted to remove a liability from its books 

on the basis of a retroactive change in the trade date with no legitimate basis. 

See id., Vol. 2 at 311-12. 

Nor does Mr. Geary show any error of law in the SEC’s violation 

determination. He cites no precedent for his contention that backdating trading 

records can alleviate a previous net capital deficiency, while the SEC relied on its 

own prior decisions rejecting post-dated, after-the-fact evidence. See id., Vol. 1 at 26 

& n.19. Moreover, Mr. Geary’s contention is incompatible with the purpose of the 

net capital rule “to protect investors” by “requir[ing] broker-dealers to maintain a 

position of liquidity in their assets sufficient to permit them to meet the reasonable 

demands of customers.” Don D. Anderson & Co., 423 F.2d at 816 (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 570 (1979) 

(describing the net capital rule as “the principal regulatory tool by which the 

Commission and the Exchange monitor the financial health of brokerage firms and 

protect customers from the risks involved in leaving their cash and securities with 

broker-dealers.”). Thus, what matters, for purposes of the rule, was the reality of the 

CMO transaction and GSI’s actual net capital situation in May 2009. 

Mr. Geary also argues there was no evidence that he had any knowledge, 

awareness, or suspicion on May 28 or 29, 2009, that GSI was in violation of the net 

capital rule. But the SEC found—and he admitted—that as GSI’s president he was 
9 

responsible for the firm’s compliance with the net capital rule. And the evidence 

showed that his own purchase of the CMOs, contrary to Mr. Frager’s clear warning 

not to do so, led to GSI’s May 2009 violations. The SEC rejected his contention that 

he lacked the knowledge base to understand that the CMO purchase would trigger a 

net capital violation, holding instead that “Geary had to know that Frager’s 

instruction was linked to net capital concerns even if Frager did not expressly state 

the net capital ramifications.” Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 27 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The SEC found, in any event, that Mr. “Geary’s actions reflect[ed] a 

reckless disregard for the clear purpose of the net capital rule,” id., because he “well 

knew, when he acquired the CMOs, that the firm unquestionably lacked the funds to 

pay the $77 million purchase price or even meet Pershing’s impending margin call,” 

id. at 28. The SEC’s finding that Mr. Geary acted at least recklessly is supported by 

substantial evidence.5

C. Sanctions 

Mr. Geary argues that the SEC abused its discretion in affirming the sanctions 

imposed by FINRA. He contends the SEC: (1) improperly disregarded numerous 

mitigating factors applicable under the FINRA Sanction Guidelines that are 

supported by the evidence, and (2) failed to sufficiently identify a remedial purpose 

 5

 Mr. Geary also contends there is no evidence he was responsible for GSI 

filing an inaccurate monthly report for May 2009 or Mr. Frager’s refusal to file a net 

capital deficiency notice in November 2009. But as the SEC noted, FINRA’s 

violation findings were based not on these actions but “solely on his responsibility 

for allowing the firm to operate without required net capital.” Admin. R., Vol. 1 

at 28. 
10 

for the sanctions.6

 We reiterate that our review of sanctions imposed by the SEC is 

“seriously circumscribed.” ACAP Fin., 783 F.3d at 765. “[I]n the absence of a clear 

abuse of . . . discretion the court will not substitute its views as to what the 

punishment shall be for [a] violation.” Don D. Anderson & Co., 423 F.2d at 817. 

1. FINRA Sanctions Guidelines and Sanctions Imposed 

 FINRA applied its published 2015 Sanctions Guidelines in imposing sanctions 

on Mr. Geary. See, generally, 

https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2015_Sanction_Guidelines.pdf.7

 For 

violations of the SEC’s net capital rule and FINRA Rule 2010, the guidelines 

recommended a fine of $1,000 to $73,000 and a suspension in any or all capacities 

for up to 30 business days. Add. at 29. For egregious violations by individuals, the 

guidelines recommended a lengthier suspension of up to two years, or a bar. Id.

FINRA found that Mr. Geary’s conduct was egregious and that he was directly 

responsible for the net capital violations. FINRA barred him from acting in a 

principal or supervisory capacity with any FINRA member firm, suspended him for 

 6

 We address the contentions of error that Mr. Geary develops in Section IV of 

his appeal brief. In Section III, he makes general, undeveloped assertions that the 

sanctions imposed are contrary to both the evidence and the FINRA Sanctions 

Guidelines; the sanctions are punitive; the SEC’s arbitrary application of the 

Sanctions Guidelines deprived him of due process; and the SEC’s analysis was not 

reasoned, logical, or rational. We decline to address these perfunctory allegations of 

error, which are insufficient to invoke our appellate review. See Kelley v. City of 

Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802, 819-20 (10th Cir. 2008). 

 

7

 The SEC included relevant provisions of the 2015 FINRA Sanction 

Guidelines in an Addendum to its appeal brief. For ease of reference, we will cite to 

the pertinent pages of that Addendum (Add.). 
11 

30 business days in all capacities, and imposed a $20,000 fine. In upholding these 

sanctions, the SEC noted FINRA’s focus on “the large amount of the 2009 net capital 

deficiency that [Mr. Geary’s] own trading triggered, the extended 2010 deficiency 

period, and the short time between the two deficiency periods, which demonstrated a 

pattern of misconduct.” Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 29. 

2. The SEC Did Not Disregard Mitigating Factors 

 Mr. Geary argues that the SEC erred in its consideration of numerous 

mitigating factors under the Sanctions Guidelines that are supported by the record. 

He contends that the SEC recognized some of these factors while disregarding others, 

and essentially attributed no weight to any mitigating factors. The SEC agreed with 

FINRA that “the factors he identified were either not mitigating or were outweighed 

by other, aggravating factors and therefore did not justify lesser sanctions.” Id. at 30. 

On appeal, Mr. Geary largely ignores the SEC’s reasoning as to the factors he claims 

were mitigating. 

 He first notes that relevant disciplinary history is a principal consideration 

under the Sanctions Guidelines, which call for “progressively escalating sanctions on 

recidivists.” Add. at 18; see also id. at 22. He complains that the SEC failed to 

assign mitigating weight to his lack of a disciplinary history. But the SEC correctly 

held that while disciplinary history is an aggravating factor, the absence of prior 

discipline is not mitigating. See Rooms, 444 F.3d at 1214; see also Add. at 22 & n.1 

(noting “the presence of certain factors may be aggravating, but their absence does 

not draw an inference of mitigation, citing Rooms). This is so, as the SEC observed, 
12 

“because an associated person should not be rewarded for acting in accordance with 

his duties as a securities professional.” Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 31 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 Nor did the SEC ignore Mr. Geary’s cooperation in FINRA’s investigation. 

See Add. at 23 (listing as considerations “substantial assistance” in the investigation 

and the lack of delay tactics, concealed information, and inaccurate or misleading 

evidence). Rather, the SEC noted that nothing in the record indicated that Mr. Geary 

“took any steps beyond complying with FINRA’s rules requiring him to cooperate 

with staff inquiries into issues that others had brought to FINRA’s attention.” Id. at 

32. Thus, the SEC rejected his mitigation argument because “[he] had an 

unequivocal responsibility to fully cooperate with FINRA.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Neither his cooperation with FINRA’s investigation nor his truthful 

testimony necessitated a lighter sanction. See Rooms, 444 F.3d at 1214-15. 

 Noting that timely acceptance of responsibility and corrective actions are also 

principal considerations under the Sanctions Guidelines, see Add. at 22, Mr. Geary 

describes his actions upon learning of GSI’s net capital deficiency in February 2010, 

including his attempts to obtain a bank loan and his contribution of his own private 

funds to GSI. But he does not advance any argument why the SEC erred in declining 

to conclude these measures were mitigating factors. The SEC decided that his 

acknowledgement of responsibility was not mitigating because he continued to blame 

others for the violations, insisting “that he was largely uninvolved and therefore not 

responsible.” Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 31. It found that Mr. Geary’s response to the net 
13 

capital violations “indicates a disturbing approach to regulatory compliance and its 

role in protecting customers.” Id. The SEC also gave no mitigating weight to his 

efforts to obtain additional capital in February 2010 because he nonetheless 

knowingly permitted GSI to continue its operations while it had a net capital 

deficiency. Moreover, the evidence showed that Mr. Frager had warned Mr. Geary in 

January 2010 about the imminent deficiency, but he failed to take any action until 

GSI had actually fallen out of compliance the following month. We see no abuse of 

discretion in the SEC’s rejection of this mitigation argument. 

 Mr. Geary next contends that the SEC failed to consider that he had not 

engaged in “a pattern of misconduct . . . over an extended period of time.” Add. at 

22. But the SEC found a pattern of misconduct here. It pointed to the considerable 

size of GSI’s net capital deficiency in May 2009, followed by the extended 

deficiency period in February 2010, emphasizing the short amount of time between 

these two deficiency periods. See Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 29; see also id. (noting 

Mr. Geary’s “repeated failures to heed clear warnings”); id. at 31 (declining to 

characterize Mr. Geary’s conduct as “aberrant” “given GSI’s violations on multiple 

days, in successive years”). Mr. Geary cites nothing precluding the SEC from 

finding an extended pattern of misconduct based on the substantial evidence 

presented. 

 Contrary to his assertion, the SEC also did not ignore the lack of customer 

complaints against Mr. Geary since 2009. It held that “[h]is compliance during a 

limited period of heightened supervision does not provide any meaningful assurance 
14 

as to future violations, particularly when he continues to shift responsibility for the 

violations that occurred.” Id. at 34. The SEC distinguished the case that Mr. Geary 

relies on in support of his contention, which involved facts not present here (an 

inexperienced respondent with a minor role in a larger scheme), suggesting that 

future violations were unlikely. Mr. Geary ignores the SEC’s reasoning and fails to 

show it did not properly consider this factor. 

 He next argues that the SEC failed to consider that no customer suffered any 

financial loss, nor did he personally profit from his misconduct. See Add. at 22, 23. 

But the SEC did address these factors. It found the lack of customer losses not 

mitigating because Mr. Geary still subjected GSI’s customers to undue risks by 

disregarding the net capital rule. He argues this is supposition and a clear disregard 

of the Sanctions Guidelines’ focus on injury. But as we have observed, “the net 

capital rule is one of the most important weapons in the Commission’s arsenal to 

protect investors.” Don D. Anderson & Co., 423 F.2d at 816 (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 570 (noting the rule is 

meant to “protect customers from the risks involved in leaving their cash and 

securities with broker-dealers”). In light of the purpose of the rule, we cannot say 

that the SEC was required to reduce Mr. Geary’s sanctions because no customer 

suffered a financial loss as a result of his misconduct. As to his lack of profit, the 

SEC held that the absence of this aggravating factor is not a mitigating factor. We 

see no abuse of discretion in the SEC’s consideration of these factors. 
15 

 Mr. Geary argues that the SEC effectively ignored that he had been sanctioned 

for the same misconduct by an Oklahoma agency. See Add. at 23. He claims that the 

SEC dismissed these prior sanctions as a mitigating factor solely because they were 

imposed through a settlement. Not so. The SEC held that the Oklahoma sanctions 

did not sufficiently remediate Mr. Geary’s misconduct due to their limited 

geographic scope—reaching only Oklahoma—as compared to FINRA’s nationwide 

jurisdiction. 

 Next, Mr. Geary cites nothing supporting his proposition that his conduct was 

not egregious because he did not act with intent. The SEC addressed and rejected his 

contention that a finding of egregious conduct requires fraud or a high level of 

scienter, holding that the Sanctions Guidelines do not require such a showing. We, 

too, have observed that the SEC “has never understood the term ‘egregious’ to 

require proof of intent, knowledge, or a breach of a fiduciary duty.” ACAP Fin., 

783 F.3d at 766. 

 Finally, Mr. Geary argues that the SEC failed to properly consider the 

evidence of his inability to pay the fine imposed. He points to his own testimony 

about his family’s financial circumstances. But the SEC held that FINRA is entitled 

to require documentation of a bona fide inability to pay, and Mr. Geary failed to 

document his income, assets, or expenses. The SEC’s conclusion is consistent with 

the Sanctions Guidelines. See Add. at 21 (“The burden is on the respondent to raise 

the issue of inability to pay and to provide evidence thereof. . . . Adjudicators should 

require respondents who raise the issue . . . to document their financial status through 
16 

the use of standard documents that FINRA staff can provide[].”); see also ACAP Fin., 

783 F.3d at 768 (noting the SEC’s rejection of a claim of inability to pay due to a 

lack of information about financial circumstances). 

 Mr. Geary fails to demonstrate that the SEC abused its discretion in rejecting 

any of his mitigation arguments. 

3. The Sanctions Do Not Lack a Remedial Purpose 

 Mr. Geary contends that the SEC failed to articulate a remedial purpose for the 

sanctions imposed, which he claims are impermissibly punitive. But the SEC 

explained that the sanctions were necessary to protect investors. In holding that 

significant sanctions were warranted, the SEC noted Mr. Geary’s “troubling attitude” 

regarding regulatory compliance, his display of “a disturbing lack of understanding 

and ignorance of FINRA rules,” his repeated failure to heed warnings regarding 

protecting GSI’s capital, and “concerns about his ability to comply with regulatory 

requirements generally.” Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 29, 32, 33 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Because Mr. Geary continues to work in the securities industry, the SEC 

decided that an all-capacities suspension was appropriate to impress on him the need 

to comply with regulatory requirements, rather than addressing violations after they 

occur. He has not demonstrated that the sanctions imposed lack a remedial purpose.8

FINRA imposed, and the SEC affirmed, sanctions that are within the ranges 

recommended by FINRA’s Sanctions Guidelines. Because Mr. Geary fails to show 

 8

 Mr. Geary also baldly asserts that the sanctions “are clearly excessive.” Aplt. 

Br. at 30. We decline to address this perfunctory contention. 
17 

that these sanctions are “beyond the law, unsupported factually, or completely 

lacking reasonableness,” ACAP Fin., 783 F.3d at 765 (brackets and internal quotation 

marks omitted), we will not impede the SEC’s considerable discretion in determining 

the appropriate remedy for his violations. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 The petition for review is denied. 

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge