Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1701-CR-22 | July 19, 2017 Page 1 of 12

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Chandra K. Hein

Deputy Attorney General

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Brandon Mockbee,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 19, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

15A01-1701-CR-22

Appeal from the Dearborn Circuit 

Court

The Honorable James D. 

Humphrey, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

15C01-1607-F5-049

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Brandon Mockbee (“Mockbee”) appeals the trial court’s finding that he was

twice in direct criminal contempt of the court and the trial court’s sentence that 

Mockbee serve one year in jail. Mockbee argues that his behavior did not rise 

to the level of a contemptuous act required for two findings of direct contempt 
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and that the trial court was not authorized to sentence him to more than six 

months in jail for direct contempt without a jury trial. We conclude that the 

trial court did not err in finding Mockbee in direct contempt. However, 

because we conclude that there was only one continuous act of contempt, we 

reverse the trial court’s finding of two acts of contempt and remand to the trial 

court to enter a sentence of six months. 

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions. 

Issue

Mockbee raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as 

whether his behavior constituted a single episode of contempt.

Facts

[3] In July 2016, the State charged Mockbee with two counts of Level 5 felony

burglary and one count of Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit burglary, and it 

alleged that he was an habitual offender. Mockbee was initially represented by 

counsel, but he then chose to represent himself and had two attorneys acting as 

standby counsel. Mockbee filed numerous motions, most of which the trial 

court described as “frivolous and repetitive.” (Tr. 40). As a result, the trial 

court held “almost 40 hours” of hearings on his motions. (Tr. 40). Mockbee 

was removed from the courtroom during those hearings “for disruptive and 

threatening behavior” and was warned about his constant unruly actions. (Tr. 

39). 
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[4] On November 29, 2016, the trial court held a final hearing on Mockbee’s 

pending motions, which included a motion to suppress and a motion to sever. 

Mockbee represented himself, and, during the hearing, he interrupted the judge, 

confused the witnesses, and asked questions that had previously been answered. 

During an attempt to play a video, Mockbee taunted opposing counsel by 

stating, “Get the Discovery, quit hiding it, we’re going to trial on the 5th, are 

you scared? I’m not.” (Tr. 39). The court interjected that it had “had enough” 

of Mockbee’s behavior and noted for the record that Mockbee was “constantly 

interrupting the Court on a continuing basis” and “ha[d] been warned by the 

Court countless times for his disruptive behavior.” (Tr. 39). The trial court 

noted that Mockbee’s behavior was “a deliberate attempt to make a circus of 

our legal system” and found that Mockbee had forfeited his right to selfrepresentation. (Tr. 41). 

[5] The hearing then continued with Mockbee’s standby counsel representing him. 

While Mockbee’s counsel was speaking, Mockbee “ma[de] some kind of 

gesture with his hand or finger” to the trial court, and made “glaring, smirking 

remarks” and “face gestures at the Court.” (Tr. 50). Mockbee again 

interrupted the trial court and counsel during the proceeding and had to be 

reminded that his counsel was now representing him. The trial court warned 

Mockbee that he would be removed from the courtroom if he continued his 

disruptive behavior. Mockbee again interjected when the trial judge was 

speaking and was ordered to leave the courtroom. Mockbee then said, “[f]uck 
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you,” as the officers removed him. (Tr. 51). The trial judge had the officers 

bring Mockbee to the bench where the following exchange occurred:

MR. MOCKBEE: Go ahead; say what you got to say.

THE COURT: The Court is going to say -

MR. MOCKBEE: Say it please; that you’re bias[ed], you[’re]

unprejudicial [sic], you’re scared to give somebody a fair trial in this 

Courtroom! I filed a police report against you and [defense counsel]. 

Please say it, because all the remarks –

THE COURT: Mr. Mockbee –

MR. MOCKBEE: – you make as a Judge when you’re not in control 

and you’re not in the situation – God have mercy on your soul, sir!

THE COURT: Okay, take him out of here. 

MR. MOCKBEE: Now contempt that, please!

THE COURT: Okay, you are found in direct contempt of this Court.

MR. MOCKBEE: Thank you. 

THE COURT: I am going to order, based upon your continued 

misbehavior in this Courtroom –

MR. MOCKBEE: Please do so –

THE COURT: Six months; six months –

MR. MOCKBEE: – because your behavior is what’s been 

distinguished here, sir. 

THE COURT: – make it nine months. 

MR. MOCKBEE: Your very distinguished behavior has been an 

absolute disgrace –

THE COURT: Get him out of here. 

MR. MOCKBEE: – in this Courtroom!

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Mockbee... 

MR. MOCKBEE: And I don’t back down on you for fear of you, sir! 
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THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Mockbee has just got himself another six 

months –

MR. MOCKBEE: Please man. 

THE COURT: – so he’s looking at, I’m going to make it one year 

additional. 

(Tr. 51-53). After Mockbee left the courtroom, the trial court noted that his

“behavior at this time ha[d] continued” and that the trial court was “not going 

to subject the parties or a jury to this kind of behavior . . . .” (Tr. 53). The trial 

court found that Mockbee was in “direct contempt” and that “he w[ould] be 

sentenced accordingly[.]” (Tr. 53). The hearing then continued without 

Mockbee present. 

[6] On December 5, 2016, the trial court entered its order of direct contempt. The 

trial court “found [Mockbee] in contempt and ordered a sentence of one 

hundred and eighty (180) days and ordered an additional one hundred and 

eighty (180) days for continued actions, words, and disruptive behavior.” (App. 

Vol. 2 at 47). The trial court ordered “two separate sentences” of six months 

“based upon defendant’s failure to cease his disruptive behavior after the 

imposition of the first contempt sentence.” (App. Vol. 2 at 49). Mockbee now 

appeals.

1

 

1 Mockbee was later convicted of multiple counts following a jury trial, and he separately appeals those 

convictions under appellate cause number 15A01-1703-CR-483. 
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Decision

[7] Direct criminal contempt citations are available where “the court has firsthand 

and immediate knowledge of acts demonstrating a clear disregard for its 

authority which threaten to undermine the integrity of the judicial process and 

impede the performance of court work.” Hopping v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1296, 

1297 (Ind. 1994). Indeed, “[a]ny act which manifests a disrespect and defiance 

of a court may constitute direct criminal contempt.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

“The power of Indiana courts to summarily punish for direct criminal 

contempt, while specified by statute, rests upon the common law. It is inherent 

in the courts.” Id. at 1296. “On appeal, we afford great deference to trial 

courts’ contempt decisions.” Carroll v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016). Accordingly, we accept as true the statements of facts entered by 

the trial court. Id.

[8] We note that the direct contempt statute provides, in relevant part, that:

(a) Every person who disturbs the business and proceedings of a court:

(1) by creating any noise or confusion;

(2) in a court of record; and

(3) while the court is open and engaged in the transaction of business

is considered guilty of direct contempt of court. 

(b) This section applies to a disturbance caused:

(1) by the commission of a felony, a misdemeanor, or an other unlawful 

act;

(2) by talking, moving about, or by signs, or gestures; or

(3) in any other manner. 
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I.C. § 34-47-2-1. “Indiana courts have long held that ‘[d]isorderly conduct, 

insulting demeanor to the court, and a disobedience of its orders in facie curiae 

constitute a direct contempt.’”

2

 Carroll, 54 N.E.3d at 1086 (quoting Holman v. 

State, 105 Ind. 513, 5 N.E. 556, 557-58 (1886)). “Indiana appellate courts will 

only interfere with a contempt finding ‘where it clearly appears the acts do not

constitute contemptuous acts.’” Id. at 1085-86 (quoting In re Nasser, 644 N.E.2d 

93, 95 (Ind. 1994)). “Contemptuous acts are those in opposition to a court’s 

authority, justice and dignity.” Nasser, 644 N.E.2d at 95. 

[9] Contempt sanctions are essential to ensuring that judicial processes are not 

undermined. Hopping, 637 N.E.2d at 1297. “[W]here no legislative penalty is 

specified and sentencing is left to the discretion of the judge, as is often true in 

the case of criminal contempt, the pettiness or seriousness of the contempt will 

be judged by the penalty actually imposed.” Holly v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1176,

1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “[S]entences up to six months may be imposed for 

criminal contempts without guilt or innocence being determined by a jury.” Id. 

[10] First, it must be noted that from time to time difficult litigants appear in court 

and disturb proceedings with foul and abusive behavior. During those times,

even the most patient judges must use contempt powers to maintain order and 

the dignity of Indiana’s courts. However, contempt powers may not be used to 

“‘heal the wounded sensibilities of a judge; it may be invoked only when the 

 

2

In facie curiae means “[i]n the presence of the court.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 896 (10th ed. 2014).
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offending act impedes or disturbs the administration of justice.’” Grimm v. 

State, 240 Ind. 125, 128, 162 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ind. 1959) (quoting Francis v. 

People of Virgin Islands, 11 F.2d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 1926)).3 When warranted, a 

contempt citation should be imposed promptly, but it must be kept within 

prudential limits. Id. at 457. Where the legislature has “prescribed no 

maximum sentence for criminal contempt, courts have a special duty to 

exercise their extraordinary contempt powers with the ‘utmost sense of 

responsibility and circumspection.’” Matter of Craig, 552 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1990) (quoting United States v. Misenheimer, 677 F. Supp 1386, 1388 (N.D. 

Ind. 1988)). In other words, “a sentence from criminal contempt should reflect 

the least possible power adequate to the end proposed . . . .” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

[11] In this case, the record of the November 29, 2016 hearing is filled with evidence 

of Mockbee’s contemptuous behavior. Mockbee repeatedly interrupted the 

proceedings, made inappropriate outbursts, and directed profanity toward the 

trial court. See Holly, 681 N.E.2d at 1178 (finding of direct contempt affirmed 

when defendant directed profanity at the trial court). However, the issue in this 

case is whether multiple acts of contempt within a single hearing may be 

punished separately or whether they constitute a single episode of contempt. 

 

3 Through this citation, we are not suggesting that the trial court in this case used its contempt powers with 

an improper motive. 
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[12] Other jurisdictions have prohibited multiple punishments for a single episode of 

contempt. Of particular note is the Vermont Supreme Court’s opinion in State 

v. North, 978 A.2d 435, 436 (Vt. 2009). In that case, the court highlighted the 

following exchange between a defendant and trial court after sentencing:

DEFENDANT: Go fuck yourself, Your Honor.

COURT: Bring him back here please. Bring him back here. I’m holding 

the Defendant in contempt of Court. He’ll serve an additional five to six 

months for contempt of Court for cursing at the judge.

DEFENDANT: Go fuck yourself—

COURT: Okay. That’s another five to six months for contempt of Court 

consecutive. Do you want to keep going, Mr. North?

DEFENDANT: [unclear]

COURT: Another five to six months. Fifteen to eighteen months 

consecutive, in addition to the three to twenty years.

North, 978 A.2d at 436. The trial court entered three findings of contempt and 

ordered the sentences served consecutively. The defendant appealed.

[13] In determining whether this series of profane remarks represented “discrete 

contempts” or “a single contemptuous episode,” the Vermont Supreme Court 

focused on “the factors of time and place and whether the offenses were 

motivated by a single criminal objective.” Id. at 439 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). The court concluded that because the verbal exchange 

occurred in one location, lasted a short period of time, and was not interrupted 

by other proceedings, it should be considered one single contemptuous episode. 

“Furthermore, defendant’s original insult and his renewed attack in response to 
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the court’s contempt sentence flowed from the single criminal objective – to 

flaunt his disrespect for authority in open court.” Id. 

[14] We are persuaded that the reasoning of the Vermont Supreme Court is sound

and instructive in this case. Here, Mockbee repeatedly interrupted the trial 

court, made faces and hand gestures that were disruptive, taunted opposing 

counsel, used profanity, and refused to respect the dignity and authority of the 

trial court. It was appropriate for the trial court to find Mockbee in direct 

contempt of court. However, Mockbee’s behavior occurred within a single 

proceeding, lasted a relatively short period of time, was not interrupted by 

another proceeding, and flowed from a single criminal intent – to disrespect and 

disrupt the administration of justice. Even though Mockbee continued to 

behave in a contemptuous manner after the initial contempt citation, his 

continuing behavior was in response to the trial court’s initial contempt citation 

and flowed from the same criminal objective. (App. Vol. 2 at 49) (“The Court 

finds that two separate sentences of 6 months (180 days) were imposed based 

upon defendant’s failure to cease his disruptive behavior after the imposition of 

the first contempt sentence.”). We are aware that determining whether multiple 

acts of contemptuous behavior forms a single contemptuous episode is a fact 

sensitive determination. We can imagine scenarios within a single hearing that 

might justify multiple contempt citations. For example, a litigant whose 

outburst receives a contempt citation might be properly cited again after a 

period of calm behavior within the same proceeding. See Smith v. State, 855 

A.2d 339 (Md. Ct. App. 2004) (three acts of contempt were separate and 
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discrete supporting three convictions). However, where, as here, multiple acts 

of contempt form a single contemptuous episode, we hold that a single 

punishment of not more than six months may be imposed, without a jury trial. 

This rule allows Indiana’s judges to maintain order and dignity while avoiding 

the temptation to become embroiled in a battle of wills with an unruly litigant. 

See United States v. Murphy, 326 F.3d 501, 504 n.3 (4th Cir. 2003) (the potential 

exists for a defendant to amass decades of prison time as the result of a 

prolonged diatribe); Johnson v. State, 642 A.2d 259, 263-64 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 

1994) (series of insults interrupted only by a judge’s pronouncements that 

defendant was guilty of contempt which may have provoked defendant into 

repeated instances of contempt, constituted only one contempt offense). 

[15] As to what should happen to Mockbee’s second contempt citation, the 

reasoning of the Vermont Supreme Court suggests that it should be served 

concurrently with the first citation. North, 978 A.2d at 439-40. However, we 

believe that vacating the second contempt citation is more consistent with our 

reasoning in Matter of Craig, in which we explained, that “a sentence for 

criminal contempt should reflect the least possible power adequate to the end 

proposed . . . .” Matter of Craig, 552 N.E.2d at 56 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Other jurisdictions have followed this approach. See State v. 

Lingwall, 637 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Butler v. State, 330 

So.2d 244 (Fl. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied. As a result, we affirm the trial 

court’s first finding of contempt. However, because we find that Mockbee’s 

behavior constituted a single episode of criminal contempt, we vacate the trial 
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court’s second finding and corresponding six month sentence for contempt. We 

remand and direct the trial court to enter a sentencing order for criminal 

contempt and a six month sentence to be served consecutive to Mockbee’s

sentence from his criminal convictions under cause number 15C01-1607-F5-

049.

[16] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 

May, J., and Brown, J., concur.