### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 1, 200 5

RIC HAR D A . E MM ITT v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 84-W-91 Ste ve R. Doz ier, Judge

No. M2004- 00564-CCA -R3-P C - F iled March 16, 2005

The pe titioner, Richard A. Emmit t, was convicted i n 1984 of assault with intent to commit second deg ree murder, a g g ravated kidnapping , ag g ra vated r ape, a rmed robbe ry , and first de g ree burg lary

a ndre c e ive d a n e ff

e c tiv e se nte nc e of

12 5 y e ars . H is c on vic tio ns we re a ff ir me d o n d ir e c t app eal

. Th e p e t i t i o n e r f

i l e d a p e t i t i o n f

o r p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f o n Ja n u ar y 2 1 , 2 0 0 4 , w h i c h t he po stconviction court dismi ssed as untimely . The pe titioner appea ls, claiming the statute of limitations was tolled. F ollowing our revie w, we a ffirm the dismissal of the pe tition.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivered t h e o pinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Richard A. E mmitt , Pikeville, Tennessee , Pro Se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Preston S h ip p , A s s is ta n t A tt o rn ey

Gene ral; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; an d P am el a Ande rson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

F AC TS

The fa cts of this c ase wer e set out in the opinion of this c ourt on direc t appea l affirming the pe tit ion e r’ s c on vic tio ns :

These of fense s arose from an e pisode that occ urre d in N ashville on or about J anuary 12, 1984, when the [petitioner] and a c odefe ndant, Dew ay ne Hay nes, broke

a nde nte re d th e re sid e nc e of 82 -y e ar- oldEl ois e Jord a n a ndvic timiz ed her a s w ill here inafter

be more fu l l ydetailed. The y procur ed fr om her a

chec k in the sum of-2-

$1,500.00 draw n on the Third National Ba nk and made pay able to " Cash." We have

on ly the app e a l of

Em mit t be fo re us

. The [petitioner] int roduce d no evidenc e at tria l. T h eSt ate ' s e vidence reve aled that a sec ond code fe n d ant, S tuart B rown, pre sented the $1,500.00 c heck to a teller at the Third National Ba nk at appr ox imately 8:30 A.M. on J anuary

13, 1984. Br own produce d a birth ce rtificate but no driver' s license f or identificat i o n and the teller

re fe rr e d h im t o a

ba nk of fi c e r, B ob bie Ki nc a id. Ms. Ki nc a id re fe rr e d the ma tte r t o
a ba nk inv e sti g a tor , Sa m N e a l.

Mr. Nea l testified that Br own told him that another man had g iven the che ck to him and pr omised to pay him $100.00 for c ashing it. The man told Br own that he had no identification. Brown pointed out the [petitioner], wh o wa s prese nt in the bank, as the man who had hir ed him to cash the c heck.

When M r. Neal interviewe d the [petiti oner], he wa s told that he (the [petit ioner]) was g iven the che ck for wo rk t h at h e did " for this lady ." When Ne al expressed incre dulity , the [peti t i o n er] then stated that " the other ma n g ave me the chec k." T he " other man" was the c odefe ndant, Haynes, who wa s also in the bank. Haynes told Nea l that he had f ound the che ck on the stre et alre ady made out. Ne al turned the thre e men ove r to the police.
At approx imately

10:30 A.M. on J anuary 13, 1984, the morning of the attempt to c ash the chec k at the bank, police office rs went to the residenc e o f t he

v i ct i m , M s

. J o rd an

. Of

fi ce r Au b re y T u rn er t es t i fi ed t h at u p o n en t er i n g M s

. J o rd an 's

apart men t, he fo un d th a t dr e sse r- dr a we rs ha d b e e n p ull e d o ut andthe c on te nts du mpe d on the fl oo r. Th e e nti re apa rt me nt wa s r a ns a c ke d. A w ind ow pa ne fr om a wooden ba ck door w as missing. Of fice r Turne r wa s unable to loca te Ms. J ordan.
The proof

established that seve ral det ec t ives ca me to the apa rtment that morning to investiga te. One of the detec tives found M s. J ordan inside a hall closet

a ndini tia lly

tho ug ht h e r t o b e de a d, a lth ou g h it wa s late r d isc ov e re d th a t sh e wa s n ot. When found, the victim was nake d above he r knee s, her pa nts having b ee n pulled down below he r knee s. She was bound with an e lectric al cor d that had been pla ced in a position which made it imp o ssible for her to move her ha nds or fe et. Another

c or d ra n f ro m he r h a nd s to he r f

e e t a nda nk le s. A thir d c or d w a s ti e d a ro un d h e r a

rm s
a ndpla c e d a

ro un d h e r mou th a ndthr oat in su c h mann e r that a ny mov e me nt w ou ld have r esulted in strang ulation. Clot h had bee n stuffed into the victim' s mouth. I t was discovere d that entry

into the victim's apartment had been g ained by the re moval of a windowpa ne fr om the back door

. The victim described her assailants to the off

icer s as " a blac k g uy

and a blonde -hea ded g uy ."-3- Th e [p e t i t i o n e r ] g a v e D e t e c t i v e T i mA l l e n a c o n f e s s i o n a f t e r w a i v i n g h is Miranda rights. In the conf ession, the [petiti oner] d es cr i b es how he a nd "Slim", a black ma le ( the def endant De wayne Hay nes), g ained e ntry into the victim's apa

rtment by removing a window from a back door at a pproxi mately

9:00 P.M. on t he eve ning of Janu ary 12 . T he [pe tit ion e r] s ta te d a s f oll ow s:

"H e we nt in f

irst. He g rabbe d her. I

tied her ha nds, Sli m tied her fe et wi th a p h o n e c o r d

. B e f

o r e w e t i e d h e r u p , h e m a d e h e r wr ite so me
c he c ks ou t. We bo th we nt thr ou g h the ho us e loo kin g fo r m on e y . Just befor e we l eft, we put her in the c loset. We left throug h the bac k door. W e left about eleven o'clock. We had one c olored g uy cash the chec k fo r u s at the Third National Ba nk. The c heck w as for $1,500.00. The ba nk sat us down and c alled the police

.
Whil e sh e was in the bedroom, Slim pull ed her pants down. I touched he r pussy . I

put m y fi n ger into t he first joint. Sli m spread her a part with his hands inside her ."

After obtaining the written statement, a n in t er v i ew of the [petitioner] was

rec orded. The tape wa s play ed for the jury . I n the re corde d statement, the [petit ioner] describe s in detail t he robbery of, and the attack upon, the victim. After ty ing the victim's ha nds and pulling dow n her pa nts, she was for ced to wri t e out chec ks. The [petitioner] claimed that Haynes had struck the victim in the face . The [petit ioner] also acknow ledg ed having place d his finge r inside the victim' s vag ina beca use " we fig ured that may

be if she thoug ht we we re g oing to r ape he r, may be she would tell us where the money was at." The victim had be en beaten in the fa ce and had also be en tied bef

ore she wrote the che cks. A portion of the oral stateme nt is as fo llo ws :

"D ETECTI VE ALLEN: Okay

. All rig ht. She's still in the bedroom

a n d s h e ' s w r i t t e n t h e c h e c k s o u t , w h a th ap p e n s n e x t ?
[THE PETI TI ONER]: Well, then he we nt--af ter she w rote the c heck out, he went a nd tied her mouth and then he was g etting r eady to re tie he r b ac k up wi th t he te le ph on e c or

d , and I said no, I

done put that around he r hands, we ' ll just use a piece of cloth, to not tie he r hands with a pi ece of cloth, and then he gra bbed the back and I

g rabbe d the front and pic ked her up and put her in the c loset, then shut the closet and we both went out the door." (Emphasis supplied)

Th e [pe tit ion e r] s ta te d tha t he did no t kn ow wh e the r H a y ne s h a d r ape d M s. J ordan but that he saw Hay nes spre ad her vag ina " pretty

wide" with his hands. The victim could not screa m because she ha d a sock in he r mouth.“ D r

. ” M cCary i s a fel l ow i nmat e of t he pet i t i oner

. I n an af f i davi t at t ach ed t o t he pet i t i on, M cCary s t at es t hat 1
hi s t i t l e der i ves f

r om hi s honor ar y doct orat e f r om “ C ovi ng t on Co l l ege

. ”
-4- State v. Richard A. E m m i t t , No

. 85-105-I I I , 1986 WL 2309, at **1-2 (T enn. Crim. App. Fe b. 21, 1986).

On J anuary

21, 2004, nearly

eig hteen y ear s after h i s convictions had bec ome final, the petitioner filed a pro s e pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f b y “ ne xt f ri e nd ,” pa ra le g a l D r. Do na ld C

. McCary , alleg ing, int e r a lia , ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, that the S tate withheld exculpatory

1

e vid e nc e a t tria l, a ndthat th e tr ia l cou rt e rr e d in instr uc tin g the jury

. An tic ipatin g a re sp on se that hi s ple a din g wa s u nti me ly , h e a sse rt e d th a t th e statut e of lim itatio ns ha d b e e n to lle d b e c a us e : ( 1) thi s court ha d established a c onstitut ional rig ht c oncerning jury instructions not recog nized as exi sting at the time of trial; (2) he was not mentally competent to file a

petition; and (3) trial c ounsel failed to appea l to the Tennesse e Supreme Court the decision of t h is court af firming the petitioner’s convictions.

On Fe bruary

3, 2004, the post-conviction court enter ed an or der summarily dismiss ing the petition on the gr ounds that it was barr ed by the one- y ear

statute of limitations and the asserte d g rounds for r elief did not fall within any of the e x ceptions to the limitation period. The petitioner the n f ile d a tim e ly a pp e a l to thi s c ou rt , c ha lle ng ing the dis mis sa l.

AN AL YSI S

D u ring the twenty

y ear s betwee n the petitioner’s c onvictions and his seeking post-conviction relief , seve ra l p o st-conviction statutes wer e ena cted and supplemented by subsequent statutes, as explained in Seals v. St ate, 23 S.W .3d 272, 275-76 (Te nn. 2000). The Post-Conviction Procedur e Act of 1967 did not i nclude a statute of limitations for seeking relief , allowing a petition to be filed “at a ny time after [a petitioner] ha[d] exhausted his appellate reme dies and before the sentenc e ha[d] expired or had be en fully satisfied.” Te nn

. C o d e An n . § 40-30-102 ( 1982) (r epea led 1986). Ho we ve r, the 19 86 Pos t- Con vic tio n A c t e sta bli sh e d a thr e e -y e ar s ta tut e of

lim itatio ns : A p ri so ne r in c us tod y un de r se nte nc e of a c ou rt of thi s st a te mus t pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction r el ief unde r this chapter within three (3) y ear s of the date of the fina l action of the highe st state appellate court to which a n appea l is taken or conside ration of such pe tition s hall be bar red.

T en n

. Code Ann. § 40-30- 102 (1990) ( repe aled 1995) . “To e nsure that the c onstitut ional

re qu iremen t o f reas on abl e no ti ce was ob ser ved , t he T enn ess ee S up rem e C ou rtrul ed t hat th ose w ho se
c on vic tio ns we re fi na l be fo re the e ff e c tiv e date of the a c t ha d thr e e y e ars fr om July 1, 19 86 to f ile a post-convic tion claim.” Robert L

. Smit h, J r. v. Judge Sterling Gra y , No. 01CO1-9610-CR-00450, 1997 WL 672664, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 1997) (c iting Abston v. State, 749 S.W .2d 487, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) , perm. to appea l denied (Tenn. Mar. 16, 1998). Thus, in the prese nt-5-

matter, be cause the petitioner’s c onvictions were aff irmed by this court on Fe bruary 21, 1986, and no application for

permission to a

ppeal to the state supreme court was filed, the statute of limitations for se eking post-conviction re lief as to the pe titioner’s sentenc es bega n to run on J uly 1, 1986, and expired on J uly

1, 1989. The petition wa s filed on J anuary 21, 2004, near ly

fiftee n y ear s after

the statute had run.

I n 1995, the leg islature enac ted the curr ent post-conviction relief act, eff ective May

10, 1995, which provide s that post-conviction petit ions are untimely unless they

are filed “w ithin one (1) y ear of the da te of the final action of the hi g hest state appellate court to which an appe al is taken or, if no appea l is taken, within one (1) y ear of the date on which the judg ment became fin al

. . . .” Te nn. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 30 -1 02 (a ) ( 20 03 ). Sin c e the statut e of lim itatio ns app lic able to the pe tit ion e r’ s p os tconviction claims had e x pired be fore the ena ctment of the 1995 Post-Conviction Procedure Act, that subsequent ac t did not give him additional time within which to file such cla ims. S ee Ca rter v. State, 952 S.W .2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1997)

.
Th e pe tit ion e r c la ims thr e e ba se s fo r the tol lin g of the statut e of lim itatio ns , w hic h w e wi ll

c on sid e r. F ir st, he arg ue s th a t th e statut e of lim itatio ns sh ou ld b e tol le d p ur su a nt t o a n e xce pti on in the 1995 Post-Conviction Procedur e Ac t, codified at Tennesse e Code Annota ted sec tion 40-30- 10 2( b) (1 ), pr ov idi ng that un tim e ly po st- c on vic tio n p e tit ion s may be c on sid e re d if

“ the pet iti on is based upon a

final ruling of an a

ppellate c ourt establishing a constitutional righ t t h at was not
rec og nized as exi sting at the time of trial, if re trospective a pplication of that right is require d.” Seeking to app l y t h i s principle and r ely ing on our opinion in S tate v. Robert F . Smy thers, No. E2001-02806-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21145428 (Tenn. Crim. App. Ma y 19, 2003), perm. to appeal denied ( Tenn. Oc t. 27, 2003), t he petiti oner arg ues t hat the trial c ourt’s jury instructions in his 1984 tr ia l we re inc omp le te be c a us e the y fa ile d to def ine or inc lud e the e le me nt of “ kn ow ing ” a ndthat hi s ri g ht t o s uc h a n in str

uc tio n is a

ne wl y re c og nize d c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht.

An eleme nt of the off

ense of second deg ree murder, as it is currently codified at Tennesse e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 1 0 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 3 ) , i s t h a tt h e d e f e n d a n ta c t e d “ k n o w i n g l y

. ” In addition, voluntary manslaug hter require s that a defe ndant’s conduct be “ intentional or knowing .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-211(a ) (2003) . At the time of the pe titioner’s 1984 trial, howeve r, sec ond deg ree murder, a s defined in Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-2-211 ( repe aled 1989), did not

re qu ir e that the pe tit ion e r a c t “ kn ow ing ” or “ kn ow ing ly ,” bu t in ste a d th a t he a c t w ill fu lly a ndwi th

ma lic e . Se e F arr

v. Sta te , 59 1 S.W. 2d44 9, 45 1 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 79 ). Ad dit ion a lly , at th e tim e of his trial, voluntary manslaug hter was define d as “the unlawful and intentional killi ng by one of

a no the r, wi tho ut m a lic e , b ut u po n a su dd e n h e a t or

pa ssi on pr od uc e d by prov oc a tio n a de qu a te to obscure the re ason of an ordinary man.” Smit h v. State, 212 Tenn. 510, 515, 370 S.W .2d 543, 545 (1963); Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-2- 221 (re peale d 1989 ). T h u s , what he views as new ly rec og nized constitut io n a l r ig h ts ar e , in f a c t, me r e ly d if

f e r e n t ju r y in s tr

u c ti o n s b e c a u s e o f r e d e f in it io n s of

c ri min a l off

e ns e s. Ac c or din g ly , h is f

ir st b a sis fo r t oll ing the statut e of lim itatio ns is w ith ou t me ri t.

As a se c on d b a sis , h e a sse rt s that he wa s me nta lly inc omp e te nt, bo th d uring a nda ft e r h is t ri a l, and thus unable to timely file a pe tition for post-conviction relief

.-6-

The 1995 Post-Conviction Procedure Act conta ins a specif ic anti-tol ling statute. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) ( 2003) (pr oviding that “ [t ]he statute of limit ations shall not be tolled for any rea son, including a ny

tolling or saving p ro v ision otherwise ava ilable at law or equity ”). Howeve r, in Seals, 23 S.W .3d at 279, our supreme court recog nized that due process re quires that the post-conviction s t atut e of limitations be tolled during periods of a petitioner’s menta l incompetenc y . I n State v. Nix , 40 S.W .3d 459, 463 (Tenn. 2001), our supre me court, addre ssing the issue of wha t specific sta ndard of mental incompetenc e must be sa tisfied to requiretolling, explained t h at “d u e p roce ss require s tolli ng of the post-c onviction statute of limitations only if a pe titioner shows that he is unable e ither to manag e his persona l affairs o r t o u n d erstand his leg al rig hts and liabiliti es.” I d. The Nix court stressed that the burden is on the petit ioner to include spec ific fa ctual alleg ations in his petiti on to support his claim of mental incompetenc e: We emphasize that to make a prima facie showing of incompetenc e re quiring tolling of the limitations period, a post-convic tion petition m ust i n clude spe cific f actua l alleg ations that demonstrate the petitioner' s inability to manag e his persona l affairs or und er s tand his leg al rig hts and liabiliti es. Unsupporte d, conclusory , or g ener al alle g a ti o n s o f

me n ta l i ll n e s s w il l n o t b e s u f f ic ie n t t o r e q u ir e to ll in g a n d p r e vent
s u m m ar y dismiss al under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-206(b) & ( f). The required pr im a fa c ie sh owi ng ma y be sa tis

fie d b y att ac hin g to the pe tit ion aff ida v its , depositions, medical r eports, or other credible evidenc e that contain specific factual allegations show ing the petitioner's i ncompe tence . Whil e af fidavits and depositions of mental he alth profe ssionals ma y be utiliz ed, they are not e ssential, and a pe titioner

ma y rel y upon a ff

ida vit s a ndde po sit ion s f ro m f a mil y me mbe rs , p ri so n o ff

ic ia ls, attorney s, or any

other pe rson who has knowledg e of fac ts that demonstrate e ither the pe tit ion e r' s in abil ity

to m a na g e his pe rsona l aff a ir s o r the pe tit ion e r' s in abil ity to
un de rs ta ndhis le g a l r ig hts a ndlia bil iti e s.

I d. at 464 (c itations omi tted) (e mphasis added)

.
I f the pe titioner was compe tent for a total of three y ear s from F ebrua ry 21, 1986 to May

9, 1 9 9 5 , t h e t h r e e

- ye ar s t a t u e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o f

t h e 1 9 8 9 A c te x p i r e d ; a n d t h e p e t i t i o n w a s n o tt i m e l y. See Alvin L . Smit h v. State, No. 01C01-9808-CC-00343, 1999 WL 810229, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 1999) (explaining that a post-conviction petition wa s not timelyif petitioner wa s competent for a total of either three y ear s or one y ear , depending on whether the three -y ear statute of limitations

u n d e r t h e 1 9 8 9 A c t , o r t h e o n e

- ye ar s t a t u e o f l i m i t a t i o n s u n d e r t h e 1 9 9 5 A c t , ap p l i e d )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, the petition in this appeal wa s t i m el y o n ly if the petitioner wa s not competent for a total of thre e y ea rs fr o m February

21, 1986 to May

9, 1995 and w a s n o t c o mp e te n t f o r a to ta l o f o n e y e ar from May 10, 1995 to J anuary

21, 2004. See id.
As proof of

mental i n co m petenc e, the pe titioner asserte d that he has a seventh g rade education and an I Q of 55, that he was verba lly and phy sically abused by his alcoholic father whe n he wa s a c hil d, a ndthat he ha s n e ve r h a d a drive r’ s li c e ns e or

a ba nk a c c ou nt as a n ad ult

. He a lso claims that “[a]ll of hi s life he has suffere d from appare nt psy cholog ical impairment a nd an unsoundT h e ev en t s r es u l t i n g i n t h e i n ca r ce r at i on of i n mat e M cCa r y a r e s et out i n St at e v

. M cCa r y , 119 S. W

. 3d 226 2 ( T enn

. Cri m. Ap p. 200 3), wh i ch we n ot e beca us e h e s ubmi t t ed hi s af f i davi t i nt ended t o es t abl i s h t he pet i t i oner ’ s al l ege d

m en t al d i sab i l i t i es.
-7- m i n d

. ” H o w e v e r , t h e o n l y “ p r o o f ” i n t h e r e c o r d o f a n y o f t h e s e c l a i m s i s t h e a f f i d a v i to f M c C ar y, the “ne x t friend” and fe llow inmate of th e p et i t i o n er. The re cord doe s not contain aff idavits or 2 de po sit ion s f

ro m f a mil y me mbe rs , me nta l he a lth pr of e ssi on a ls, priso n o ff

ic ia ls, or a tto rn e y s. Additionally , it does not include medica l reports or te st results which would show any incompetenc e on the part of the petit ioner, and there is no indication of a history of t reatment or confinement i n any sort of mental he alth fac ility

. We c annot conclude that the aff idavit of a fe llow inmate is the type of cr edible evide nce e nvisioned in N ix by our supre me court. We note that in our opinion on direct appea l, contrary

to the petitioner’s c laim in this proce eding that he has an I Q of 55, we stated that while t he petiti oner was a “ slow learne r,” “ [t ]here wa s also evidenc e that the [petitioner] had score d fr om 7 0 to 85 on I .Q . te sts .” Ric ha rdA. Em mit t, 1 986 W L

23 09 , at *1 0. Ac c or din g ly , th is b a sis fo r t oll ing the statut e of

lim itatio ns , li ke wi se , is wi tho ut m e ri t.
As his final arg ument for tolling the statute of limit ations, the petitioner asserts that counsel fa ile d to se e k a

pp lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ion to a

pp e a l th is c ou rt ’s de c isi on a ff ir min g his c on vic tio ns to the Tenne ssee Supre me Court. In his petition, he alleg ed that counse l did not “make petitioner a war e he c ou ld app e a l ” t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h i s c o u r t t o t h e s u p r e m e c o u r t a n d “ d i d n o t w i t h d r a w a s h is counsel” pursuant to T en n es s ee Supre me Court Rule 14, and this inaction tolled the statute of limit ations for filing a post-convi ct i o n p eti tion. I n the alternative, he a rg ues that he should be g rante d a delay ed appe al of his convictions to the supre me court.
The pe titioner’s convictions became final in 1986 and he did not seek post-conviction re lief, inc lud ing a sk ing fo r the fi lin g of a n a pp lic a tio n fo r pe rm iss ion to app e a l to the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt , u nti l 20 04 , s ome e ig hte e n y e ars la te r. As fa r as we c a n te ll f

ro m hi s p le a din g s, thi s is the fi rs t tim e he ha s e xpre sse d a

de sir e to f

ile a n a pp lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ion to app e a l. He do e s n ot e xpla in why only now does he wish to do so.

I n Wil liams v. St ate, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001), a majority of our supreme court concluded that “due pr ocess considerations m ay have tolled the l imitations period” for f iling a post-c onviction petition wh en the pe titioner’s appointed c ounsel misled the petitioner into believing that counsel wa s continuing the direc t appe al p ro ce s s

. I d. at 471. Counsel’s ac tions must be more than mere neg lige nce and must rise to the level of misrepre sentation befor e relief from the statute of limitations wi ll b e g ra nte d. I d. a t 46 8 n .7 . I n Wa lla c e v. Sta te , 12 1 S.W. 3d 65 2, 65 6 (T e nn

. 20 03 ), ou r s up re me court e x plained that a de fenda nt may re ceive a dela y ed appe al wher e he w as denie d the ef fec tive assistance of counse l.

Unlike the situation in W illiams, where c ounsel misled the petitioner to believe he wa s continuing the appea l proce ss, or Wallace, in which counsel had neg lected to f ile a motion for

new trial, the petitioner in the pr esent a ppeal ha s waited e ighte en y ear s to claim t hat he wishes t o appea l this matter to our supreme court. The re is no indication that he w as under the mistaken impression-8-

that trial counsel continued to repre sent him after this court aff

irmed his convictions, and the a ppeal simplywas taking nearly

two deca des. I n Crawf

ord v. State, 151 S.W .3d 179 (Tenn. Crim. App.) , perm. to appe al denied ( Tenn

. 2 0 0 4), we interpre ted Will iams as “limit[ ing] claims of attorney misrepre sentation tolling the statute of limit ations to tim es whe n counsel ha s made misrepre sentations direc tly rela ted to filing a

defe ndant’s appe al.” I d

. at 184. We ag ree with the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

that th e pe tit ion e r’ s p le a din g s a re ins uf fi c ie nt i n th is r e g ard , a s w e ll.

CO NC LU SION

We affirm the post-conviction court’s dismiss al of the pe tition as ti me-ba rre d.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE