NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2021 IL App (3d) 190430-U 

Order filed June 23, 2021

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IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2021 

In re MARRIAGE OF

MAY S. YAZEJI, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

and

BASSAM A. ASSAF, 

Respondent-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 14th Judicial Circuit, 

Rock Island County, Illinois.

Appeal No. 3-19-0430 

Circuit No. 13-D-481 

The Honorable

Peter W. Church, 

Judge, presiding.

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE DAUGHERITY delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment.

Justice Holdridge also specially concurred. 

Justice Wright specially concurred. 

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ORDER

¶ 1 Held: In an appeal in a dissolution of marriage case, the appellate court found that the 

trial court erred by imposing Supreme Court Rule 137 sanctions on the former 

husband for filing a motion to stay enforcement of the parenting plan after the 

husband had already filed a notice of appeal. The appellate court, therefore, 

reversed the trial court’s imposition of sanctions and remanded the case with 

directions to the trial court to enter an order requiring that the sanctions amount be 

refunded to the former husband, if the sanctions amount had already been paid. 
2 

¶ 2 In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, respondent, Bassam A. Assaf, filed notices of 

appeal to challenge the trial court’s dissolution judgment and parenting plan. After doing so, 

Assaf later filed in the trial court a motion to stay the enforcement of the parenting plan while his 

appeals were pending, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305(b) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

Petitioner, May S. Yazeji, filed a motion to strike and dismiss Assaf’s request for a stay, and 

sought to have Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) sanctions imposed against Assaf for 

filing a “meritless” motion. Following a hearing, the trial court found that it did not have 

jurisdiction to rule upon Assaf’s stay request because Assaf had already filed a notice of appeal. 

The trial court, therefore, granted Yazeji’s motion to strike and dismiss and imposed sanctions on 

Assaf of nearly $5000 for the attorney fees that Yazeji had incurred defending against the stay 

request. Assaf appeals. We reverse the trial court’s imposition of sanctions and remand this case 

with directions to the trial court to enter an order requiring that the sanctions amount be refunded 

to Assaf, if the sanctions amount has already been paid.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The parties, Yazeji and Assaf, were both medical doctors. They were married in 2001

and had four children together over the next several years. In October 2013, Yazeji filed a 

petition for dissolution of the parties’ marriage. More than five years later, in March 2019, the 

trial court entered a judgment of dissolution, an opinion and order explaining its decision at 

length, and a detailed parenting plan. In the parenting plan, the trial court granted all of the 

significant decision making authority to Yazeji. The trial court also granted to Yazeji the 

majority of the parenting time, which had previously been split equally between the parties. 
3 

¶ 5 In April 2019, Assaf filed an initial notice of appeal to challenge the dissolution judgment 

and the parenting plan. A second notice of appeal was filed in June 2019.1 Three days after he 

filed the second notice of appeal, Assaf filed a motion to stay in the trial court, pursuant to 

Supreme Court Rule 305(b), seeking to stay the enforcement of the parenting plan and to restore 

the prior equal parenting time allocation while his appeals were pending. In the motion, Assaf 

alleged that the parties’ children had “deteriorated” after the parenting plan had been 

implemented. 

¶ 6 Yazeji filed a motion to strike and dismiss (motion to strike) Assaf’s motion to stay. In 

her motion to strike, Yazeji asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule upon Assaf’s 

stay request because Assaf’s filing of the second notice of appeal divested the trial court of 

jurisdiction and, alternatively, that Assaf’s stay request lacked merit. Yazeji asked the trial court 

to dismiss or deny Assaf’s stay request and to award Yazeji the attorney fees she had incurred in 

defending against the request.

¶ 7 Assaf filed a response and opposed the motion to strike. In the response, Assaf argued

that his request to stay was a collateral matter that the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule 

upon, despite Assaf’s filing of a notice of appeal. 

1 The record in this appeal does not clearly indicate why Assaf filed two notices of appeal in the 

trial court. Therefore, we have taken judicial notice of the record in respondent’s other appeal 

(respondent’s appeal of the dissolution judgment and parenting plan) to the extent necessary to answer 

that question. See People v. Jimerson, 404 Ill. App. 3d 621, 634 (2010) (indicating that the reviewing 

court may take judicial notice of public records and other judicial proceedings and taking judicial notice 

of the record in a codefendant’s appeal where the defendant and codefendant had received severed, but 

simultaneous, jury trials). The record in the other appeal shows that after respondent filed his initial 

notice of appeal, the parties both filed motions in the trial court asking the trial court to reconsider 

portions of its judgment. Respondent, thereafter, filed a motion in this court in the other appeal, pursuant 

to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017), to hold the other appeal in abeyance until the 

motions to reconsider were resolved. This court granted that motion. After the motions to reconsider 

were resolved in the trial court, respondent filed his second notice of appeal, and the abeyance was lifted.
4 

¶ 8 In July 2019, a hearing was held on Assaf’s stay request. After listening to the arguments 

of the attorneys, the trial court found that it had no jurisdiction to rule upon Assaf’s stay request 

because the trial court had been divested of jurisdiction when Assaf filed his second notice of 

appeal. The trial court, therefore, denied the stay request and imposed Rule 137 sanctions upon 

Assaf for filing a motion that was “frivolous and patently without merit.” In so doing, the trial 

court commented that it would be obvious to a reasonable practitioner that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to rule upon Assaf’s stay request. After Yazeji’s attorneys submitted itemized 

statements of their fees related to the stay request, which totaled nearly $5000, the trial court 

ordered Assaf to pay that amount as a sanction within 21 days. Assaf appealed. 

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, Assaf raises two issues. First, Assaf argues that the trial court erred in 

imposing Rule 137 sanctions upon him. Assaf asserts that sanctions should not have been 

imposed because his motion to stay was not frivolous since the trial court either had jurisdiction 

to rule upon Assaf’s motion to stay or, at the very least, Assaf had a good faith basis to believe 

that the trial court had jurisdiction. Second, Assaf argues, in the alternative, that even if 

sanctions were properly imposed, the amount of sanctions that the trial court ordered in this case 

was excessive. For those reasons, Assaf asks that we reverse or vacate the trial court’s 

imposition of sanctions and that we order the amount of sanctions that Assaf paid be refunded to 

Assaf. Although not stated, we presume that in the alternative, Assaf would have us remand this 

case for a new determination as to the appropriate sanctions amount.

¶ 11 Yazeji argues that the trial court’s ruling was proper and should be upheld. Yazeji asserts 

that the trial court correctly found that it had been divested of jurisdiction when Assaf filed his 

notice of appeal and that it lacked jurisdiction to rule upon Assaf’s motion to stay. Yazeji asserts 
5 

further that the sanctions imposed in this case were not excessive. For those reasons, Yazeji asks 

that we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 12 Supreme Court Rule 137's purpose is to prevent the filing of false and frivolous lawsuits. 

Peterson v. Randhava, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (2000). Rule 137 authorizes the trial court to impose 

sanctions against a party or attorney who files a motion or pleading that does not have a wellgrounded factual basis; that is not supported by existing law or a good-faith argument for the 

extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; or that is brought for an improper purpose. 

Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018); Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 6-7. In determining whether 

to impose Rule 137 sanctions, the trial court will apply an objective standard and will consider 

what was reasonable under the circumstances as they existed at the time the pleading or motion 

was filed. Whitmer v. Munson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 501, 514 (2002). The rule is not intended to 

penalize litigants and their attorneys merely because they were zealous but unsuccessful in 

pursuing an action. Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 7. Because the rule is penal in nature, it must

be strictly construed. Id.

¶ 13 A trial court's ruling on a request for Rule 137 sanctions will not be reversed on appeal,

absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 14. The threshold for finding an abuse of discretion is a 

high one and will not be overcome unless it can be said that the trial court's ruling was arbitrary, 

fanciful, or unreasonable, or that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the 

trial court. See Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 36 (2009); In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 460 

(2008). More specifically, when reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for sanctions, the 

reviewing court should consider whether the trial court made an informed decision, whether the 

trial court’s ruling was based on valid reasoning, and whether the trial court’s ruling followed

logically from the facts. Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 14. 
6 

¶ 14 The trial court’s sanction order in the instant case was based upon its finding that it 

lacked jurisdiction to rule upon Assaf’s motion to stay after Assaf filed his second notice of 

appeal. A notice of appeal is a procedural device that when timely filed with the trial court, vests 

jurisdiction in the appellate court to permit review of the trial court’s judgment. General Motors 

Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 173 (2011). Once a notice of appeal is filed, the jurisdiction of 

the appellate court attaches instanter, and the cause of action is beyond the trial court’s 

jurisdiction. Id. The trial court, however, retains jurisdiction after the notice of appeal is filed to 

determine matters that are collateral or incidental to the judgment. Id. at 173-74. The question 

here is whether a motion to stay is such a matter.

¶ 15 Supreme Court Rule 305(b), which allows for the filing of the stay request in the instant 

case, does not state whether a motion to stay is collateral or incidental to the judgment or 

whether the trial court may rule upon such a motion after an appeal has been filed. See Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 305(b) (eff. July 1, 2017). Our supreme court, however, has previously indicated that a stay 

of judgment is collateral to the judgment and does not alter the issues on appeal. Pappas, 242 Ill. 

2d at 174; Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 526 (2001). We must conclude, 

therefore, that a trial court may rule upon a motion to stay after a notice of appeal has been filed. 

See Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d at 173-74; Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 526.

¶ 16 In the present case, Assaf’s stay request was collateral to the trial court’s dissolution 

judgment and parenting plan. See Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d at 174; Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 526. 

The trial court, therefore, retained jurisdiction to rule upon Assaf’s motion to stay and was not 

divested of jurisdiction to do so by Assaf’s filing of the second notice of appeal. See Pappas, 

242 Ill. 2d at 173-74; Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 526. The trial court’s ruling to the contrary was 

legally incorrect. See Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d at 173-74; Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 526. Assaf’s 
7 

motion to stay was not false or frivolous and could not serve as a basis for Rule 137 sanctions. 

See Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018); Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 7. Thus, the trial court 

abused its discretion when it imposed Rule 137 sanctions upon Assaf. See Blum, 235 Ill. 2d at 

36; Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460. 

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of sanctions and remand 

this case with directions to the trial court to enter an order requiring that the sanctions amount be 

refunded to Assaf, if the sanctions amount has already been paid. 

¶ 19 Reversed and remanded with directions. 

¶ 20 JUSTICE WRIGHT specially concurring:

¶ 21 I specially concur on separate grounds. At the outset, it is understandable that the trial 

court found Assaf’s notice of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction. Due to 

unconventional timing, Assaf’s first notice of appeal created a jurisdictional issue that most trial 

courts, and practitioners appearing regularly before the trial court, never encounter. Nonetheless, 

I agree the trial court’s order, striking Assaf’s motion to stay and imposing Rule 137 sanctions, 

must be reversed as a matter of law. 

¶ 22 Here, the confusing procedural posture of this appeal is the direct consequence of errors 

that are not attributable to the trial court. First, Assaf’s counsel filed a premature notice of 

appeal. Second, Assaf’s counsel compounded that error by failing to recognize the notice of 

appeal was premature and ineffective. Consequently, Assaf’s counsel did not discover the case 

law, cited below, that would have allowed the trial court to swiftly resolve the merits of the 

motion to strike. 
8 

¶ 23 Importantly, this court has held that when a party files a notice of appeal before the 

expiration of the 30-day deadline and then also files a timely postjudgment motion or claim, the 

result is an undisputedly premature and initially ineffective notice of appeal. See In re Estate of 

Hanley, 2013 IL App (3d) 110264, ¶ 43. Simply stated, an ineffective notice of appeal does not 

divest the trial court of jurisdiction. See id. 

¶ 24 A strong argument could be made that Assaf’s purported motion to stay did not involve a 

collateral matter but instead functioned as a postjudgment motion directed at core issues 

pertaining to the judgment, such as the best interests of the children, pursuant to section 2-1203 

of the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2018). A request for sanctions 

constitutes a postjudgment claim for purposes of section 2-1203. See Hanley, 2013 IL App (3d) 

110264, ¶ 43. 

¶ 25 Regardless, whether we view Assaf’s motion to stay as a simple motion to stay, based on 

collateral matters, or consider the motion to stay as a timely postjudgment motion, the outcome 

is the same. Namely, under either scenario, the trial court was not divested of jurisdiction due to 

an ineffective notice of appeal. See id. 

¶ 26 This separate decision should not be misconstrued as an indication of my view of the 

merits of the motion to stay or the appropriateness, or lack thereof, of Rule 137 sanctions. I 

would simply reverse and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings on the 

pending motion to stay, unless the parties are able to reach an agreement on the motion to stay 

and the propriety of sanctions following remand. 

¶ 27 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring:

¶ 28 I join the majority’s judgment. I agree with Justice Daugherity’s analysis and with 

Justice Wright’s analysis, both of which yield the same result.