UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4444

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MIGUEL ELOIZA ARELLANO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,

Chief District Judge. (3:00-cr-00212-FDW-2)

Submitted: March 30, 2016 Decided: April 13, 2016

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Matthew Collin Joseph, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Anthony J. 

Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Miguel Eloiza Arellano appeals the revocation of his 

supervised release and resulting 30-month sentence. Arellano 

argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

dismiss the “Petition for Warrant for Offender Under 

Supervision,” alleging he was deprived of due process when the 

hearing was not held within a “reasonable time” as required by 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2). We affirm.

Due process requires that a revocation hearing “be tendered 

within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into 

custody” for violating the conditions of parole. Morrissey v. 

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972). The same protections granted 

those facing parole revocation are extended to those facing the 

revocation of supervised release. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b);

United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). The 

Supreme Court has also stated that, because “the loss of liberty 

as a parole violator does not occur until the parolee is taken 

into custody,” there is “no constitutional duty to provide [the 

parolee] an adversary parole hearing until he is taken into 

custody as a parole violator.” Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 

87-89 (1976).

Rule 32.1 requires that a court “hold the revocation 

hearing within a reasonable time in the district court having 

jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2). Arellano argues 
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that a “delay of approximately six (6) years and seven (7) 

months between the filing of the petition and a final supervised 

release hearing was not within a ‘reasonable time’” as required 

under . . . Rule 32.1(b)(2) particularly when [his] whereabouts 

were known the entire time.” 

The Government contends Arellano did not have a 

constitutional right to an adversarial hearing until he was 

taken into custody pursuant to the alleged violation. Indeed, 

the execution of a warrant for a parole violation and the taking 

into federal custody of the parole violator “is the operative 

factor in triggering the availability of the revocation hearing” 

required by Morrissey. See Moody, 429 U.S. at 87-89. Other 

circuits also have concluded that the revocation hearing 

required by Rule 32.1(b) must be held within a reasonable time 

after the offender is taken into federal custody for violating 

the conditions of his probation or supervised release. See 

United States v. Pardue, 363 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2004)

(“Rule 32.1 exists to protect the probationer from undue federal 

incarceration and to protect the probationer’s ability to defend 

the violation allegations. . . . Because of Pardue’s pending 

state charges, no undue federal incarceration occurred.”);

United States v. Chakledar, 987 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1993)

(“[T]here is ‘no constitutional duty to provide petitioner an 

adversary parole hearing until he is taken into custody as a 
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parole violator.’” (quoting Moody, 429 U.S. at 89)); McDonald v. 

N. M. Parole Bd., 955 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting 

“hearing requirements and time limitations” applicable to a 

final revocation hearing “must be adhered to only after the 

parolee is taken into custody as a parole violator”). Arellano 

points to no legal authority holding otherwise. 

Arellano was taken into custody pursuant to the Petition on 

March 25, 2015. After making an initial appearance on April 15, 

he appeared for a preliminary hearing before a magistrate judge 

on April 20, 2015. His supervised release hearing was held on 

July 7, 2015. Arellano does not argue, nor do we find, that the 

time between being taken into federal custody on the violation 

until the hearing was unreasonable under Rule 32.1(b)(2).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED