* District Judge of the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

1 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g). This opinion will routinely refer to statutory provisions by their

Clean Air Act section numbers (i.e. “section 112”), rather than from the U.S. Code codification

(i.e. “42 U.S.C. § 7412”).

REVISED DECEMBER 10, 2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-51079

SIERRA CLUB, INC.; PUBLIC CITIZEN, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SANDY CREEK ENERGY ASSOCIATES, L.P., 

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges, and LYNN*, District Judge.

FORTUNATO P. BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

The present case requires the Court to determine whether Sandy Creek’s

current and ongoing construction of a coal-fired power plant, for which no MACT

determination has ever been made, violates the Clean Air Act § 112(g).1 Because

we conclude that § 112(g)(2)(B) prohibits the act of construction, and not merely

the commencement thereof, we find that Sandy Creek’s current and ongoing

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 23, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 09-51079

2 Section 112(a)(1) defines “major source” as follows: 

The term “major source” means any stationary source or group of stationary

sources located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits

or has the potential to emit considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per

2

construction of a “major source” without a final MACT determination violates

the plain language ofthe statute. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment, and

remand to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

opinion.

FACTS AND REGULATORY/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Sandy Creek Energy Associates, L.P. (“Sandy Creek”) is

currently constructing a coal-fired power plant in Riesel, Texas. The Texas

Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) would ordinarily perform a

routine case-by-case “MACT determination” prior to the company’s

commencement of construction on a coal-fired power plant, in order to comply

with federal Clean Air Act (“CAA”) requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B)

(“No person may construct or reconstruct any major source of hazardous air

pollutants, unless the Administrator (or the State) determines that the

maximum achievable control technology emission limitation under this section

for new sources will be met. Such determination shall be made on a case-by-case

basis where no applicable emission limitations have been established by the

Administrator.”); see also 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 116.711(5) & (11)

(implementing § 112(g)’s “case-by-case MACT determination” by incorporating

it into the State’s pre-construction permitting process). Because Sandy Creek’s

Riesel plant will emit more than ten tons per year of hydrogen chloride–a listed

hazardous pollutant under the Act–the Riesel plant falls under § 112(g)’s MACT

construction proscription.2
No. 09-51079

year or more of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any

combination of hazardous air pollutants.

The question of whether Sandy Creek’s Riesel plant qualifies as a “major source” under § 112

is not before this Court since both parties agree the plant will emit enough tons of mercury to

qualify the plant as a “major source” under the Act. 

3

In its brief, Sandy Creek conceded that before March of 2005, § 112(g)’s MACT

requirement applied to its Riesel plant. 

4 This agency action became known as the “Delisting Rule,” and will be discussed in

greater detail below.

3

“MACT” refers to “Maximum Achievable Control Technology”–an emission

limitation standard for the listed “hazardous” pollutants Congress ordered the

EPA to regulate in § 112. Section 112 requires major sources, like the Riesel

plant, to “comply with technology-based emission standards requiring the

maximum degree of reduction in emissions EPA deems achievable, often referred

to as ‘maximum achievable control technology’ or MACT standards.” Nat’l Min.

Ass’n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 7412(d)(1)-(2)). Congress noted that § 112’s MACT emissions standards would

“be more stringent” than the standards imposed by other provisions of the

Act–such as New Source Review or Prevention of Significant Deterioration

(“PSD”)–and explained this as necessary since the MACT “program is for the

control of extremely harmful air pollutants.” S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 140 (1989).

Thus, in ordinary circumstances, we would not question whether

§ 112(g)(2)(B)’s requirement of a case-by-case MACT determination applied to

Sandy Creek’s Riesel Plant.3 The present case, however, presents us with an

unusual circumstance. In March of 2005, the EPA issued a rule removing coal

and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units (“EGUs”) from the list of

sources whose emissions are regulated under § 112.4 Thus, although Sandy
No. 09-51079

5 The D.C. Circuit recognized that the plain language in § 112(c) meant that “the only

way EPA could remove EGUs from the section 112(c)(1) list was by satisfying section

112(c)(9)’s requirements.” New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582. The EPA, however, conceded “that

it never made the findings section 112(c)(9) would require in order to delist EGUs.” Id.

Consequently, the New Jersey Court held that “EPA’s purported removal of EGUs from the

section 112(c)(1) list therefore violated the CAA’s plain text and must be rejected under step

one of Chevron.” Id. The vacatur of the Delisting Rule means that EGUs are still legally

obligated to comply with § 112(g)(2)(B)’s MACT requirement for any hazardous pollutant they

emit. Id.

6 Although the CAA’s Citizen Suit Provision, see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (f), gives this Court

jurisdiction over suits asserting that specific “major emitting facilities” violate the

requirements of the CAA, Congress specifically reserved jurisdiction over challenges to EPA’s

administrative rules and regulations implementing the statute as a whole to the D.C. Circuit

Court of Appeals. See id. § 7607(b)(1). Congress’s decision to designate the D.C. Circuit as the

4

Creek submitted an application for a MACT determination to TCEQ, TCEQ

concluded that, as a result of EPA’s Delisting Rule, no such determination was

legally required. On May 25, 2006, TCEQ stated that “[n]o case-by-case MACT

determination for the PC boiler is needed because the type of steam generating

unit (PC boiler) that Sandy Creek is proposing is not subject to MACT

regulation.” Sandy Creek then commenced construction on its coal-fired power

plant in Riesel, Texas, on January 7, 2008. 

One month later, on February, 8, 2008, the D.C. Circuit vacated EPA’s

March 2005 Delisting Rule, declaring that EPA’s decision to remove EGUs from

the list of § 112’s regulated sources violated “the plain text and structure of

section 112.”5 New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Consequently, the D.C. Circuit held that EGUs “remain listed under section

112.” On March 14, 2008, the mandate issued and the Delisting Rule was

officially vacated. As a result of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in New Jersey, 

§ 112(g)’s construction prohibition on “major sources” with no MACT

determination once again became applicable to all coal-fired power plants.6
No. 09-51079

Court with exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to rules such as the Delisting Rule and other

“standard-setting actions by the Administrator was to ensure uniformity in decisions

concerning issues of more than purely local or regional impact.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.

v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Consequently, it is clear, and no party contests,

thatthe D.C. Circuit’s vacatur ofthe Delisting Rule applies unequivocally throughout all ofthe

Federal Circuits.

5

Soon thereafter, on August 8, 2008, Plaintiffs Public Citizen, Inc. and

Sierra Club, Inc. (collectively, “Sierra Club”) filed their complaint in federal

district court. In the complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Sandy Creek’s

construction of its coal-fired plant in Riesel was in violation of CAA 

§ 112(g)(2)(B) because Sandy Creek had never obtained a MACT determination

for the plant. 

Sierra Club filed a motion for summary judgment on March 4, 2009, and

then on April 2, 2009, Sandy Creek filed its cross-motion for summary judgment,

arguing that the district court should abstain from deciding Sierra Club’s

§ 112(g)(2)(B) challenge pursuant to Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).

On September 28, 2009,the district courtissued its Order. Although the district

court declined to abstain pursuantto Burford,the district court determined that

§ 112(g)’s requirement for a MACT determination no longer applied to Sandy

Creek, and consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in Sandy

Creek’s favor and denied Sierra Club’s motion for summary judgment. Sierra

Club timely appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it found that

§ 112(g)(2)(B)’s requirement for a final MACT determination no longer applies

to Sandy Creek. On appeal, Sandy Creek asserts that the district court abused

its discretion when it declined to abstain under Burford. 

We will consider both claims in turn.
No. 09-51079

6

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal

standard as the district court.” Croft v. Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 742 (5th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment should be rendered

if the record demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the

action.” Daniels v. City of Arlington, Tex., 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). “In

deciding whether a factissue has been created,the court must view the facts and

the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Id. Although both parties moved for summary judgment

before the district court, “[t]he mere fact that both appellants and appellee

moved for summary judgment does not warrant the grant of either motion if the

record reflects a genuine issue of fact.” Hindes v. United States, 326 F.2d 150,

152 (5th Cir. 1964).

ANALYSIS

The question before this Court is how to interpret and apply § 112(g) to a

coal-fired power plant still under construction, when the construction on that

plant commenced before the D.C. Circuit’s decision in New Jersey–thatis, where

the construction of the plant began during a time period in which a MACT

determination was not required under the EPA’s unlawful Delisting Rule–and

TCEQ declined to make one. Sandy Creek makes two arguments in support of

its position that it should not be required to obtain a MACT determination now.

First, Sandy Creek argues that when TCEQ issued Sandy Creek its preconstruction permit on May 25, 2006, it actually made a MACT determination.
No. 09-51079

7

In the alternative, Sandy Creek also argues that because § 112(g) did not apply

to it when it commenced construction, § 112(g)’s requirement for a MACT

determination does not apply to its ongoing construction. Neither the record, nor

the plain language of the statute, support these two positions. 

I. TCEQ HAS NOT MADE A MACT DETERMINATION

Sandy Creek asserts that its ongoing construction of a coal-fired plant is

not in violation of § 112(g)(2)(B) because TCEQ did make a MACT

determination. In this regard, Sandy Creek conflates a decision not to make a

MACT determination with an actual final MACT determination that the Act

requires. Because TCEQ declared in its May 2006 Final Order that no MACT

determination was required, and Sandy Creek’s application for a MACT

determination andTCEQ’s preliminary determination were deficient as they did

not contain substantive evaluations of MACT limits or MACT floors for any

hazardous air pollutant, this Court finds that TCEQ did not make a proper

MACT determination in its May 2006 Final Order. 

The district court’s factual findings are ambiguous as to whether or not

TCEQ made a final MACT determination for Sandy Creek’s Riesel plant. The

evidence in the record, however, shows that TCEQ did not make a MACT

determination for Sandy Creek’s Riesel plant. First, the May 2006 Final Order’s

provision that the MACT determination requirement is inapplicable strongly

indicates that TCEQ did not make a MACT determination. The TCEQ provided,

“[n]o case-by-case MACT determination for the PC boiler is needed because the

type of steam generating unit (PC boiler) that Sandy Creek is proposing is not
No. 09-51079

7 Most notably, Sandy Creek’s own engineer told TCEQ at the administrative hearing

that with regard to Sandy Creek’s Riesel plant, the “MACT regulation . . . is no longer

relevant.” R. at 140-41.

8 We note that the record does support Sandy Creek’s assertion that TCEQ conducted

a BACT (“Best Available Control Technology”) review for the Riesel plant’s emission of

hazardous air pollutants, including mercury. See R. at 693 (“[TCEQ] conducted a best

available control technology (BACT) and impacts review.”). We do not, however, agree with

Sandy Creek’s assertion that we should “consider this BACT review as equivalent to MACT

review.” Id. We find § 112’s language is clear in its command that MACT–and not BACT–be

applied to a coal-fired plant’s emissions of hazardous pollutants like mercury. Yet even if the

language of the statute could be construed as ambiguous, that ambiguity would fall in face of

the legislative history reflecting Congress’s intent that the more stringent MACT be applied

to hazardous pollutants–and not the less stringent BACT. See S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 140

(1989) (explaining that previously proposed legislation had “proposed to add a BACT concept

to section 112,” but Congress determined that“the case-by-case BACT determinations . . . were

not sufficiently stringent and in many cases provided no more control than would have been

required through application of new sources performance standards.”). Consequently,

Congress created an “emissions limitation based on section 112(d) [that] will, in most cases,

be more stringent than a new source performance standard for the same category of sources

or pollutants.” Id. In creating MACT, Congress further noted that the “emissions limitation

imposed here, and the standard for control which is its foundation, shall generally be referred

8

subject to MACT regulation.”7 This May 2006 Final Order thus did not contain

a case-by-case evaluation of MACT limits or set a MACT floor for Sandy Creek.

Nothing in the record demonstrates that TCEQ made a MACT

determination. Even though we accept as true Sandy Creek’s contention that

it prepared and submitted an application to TCEQ under the assumption that

a MACTdetermination would be required,that does not constitute evidence that

TCEQ actually made the determination. Moreover, Sandy Creek’s initial

§ 112(g) submissions were deficient, in that the application’s proposed MACT

limits did not include a MACT floor. A BACT limit cannot substitute for a

MACT limit because BACT limits do not include a floor as the MACT limits do.

Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3) (establishing MACT floor) with 42 U.S.C.

§ 7479(3) (defining BACT limits as taking economic costs into account).8
No. 09-51079

to as the ‘maximum achievable control technology’ or MACT to distinguish it from other

requirements in the Act.”). As a result, we find that for purposes of § 112, MACT and BACT

are not equivalent, and a State Agency’s BACT review does not satisfy § 112’s mandate that

“major facilities” receive a MACT determination. 

9

Moreover, a MACT determination requires assessment of every hazardous air

pollutant produced by a plant, including for emissions of arsenic, hydrochloric

acid, selenium, and cadmium, whereas the alleged MACT determination in

Sandy Creek’s permit is limited to mercury. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1). 

In its May 2006 Final Order TCEQ did not acknowledge the deficiencies

in its preliminary decisions, and instead relied on the Delisting Rule to conclude

that no case-by-case MACT determination was necessary for the pulverized coal

boiler. R. at 680. A letter from an employee deeming the MACT determination

requirement satisfied is clearly insufficient to make up for these inadequacies

in the alleged MACTdetermination. Furthermore, Sandy Creek’s argument that

TCEQ’s decision not to make a MACT determination constitutes a MACT

determination is without merit. As such, we conclude that TCEQ never made

a MACT determination for Sandy Creek. 

II. DEFENDANT’S ONGOING CONSTRUCTION VIOLATES § 112(G)(2)(B)

Furthermore, we find that Sandy Creek’s current, ongoing construction of

a coal-fired plant–for which Sandy Creek has received no final MACT

determination–violates the plain language of § 112(g)(2)(B). We reject Sandy

Creek’s argument that because it commenced construction when EPA’s unlawful

Delisting Rule was still in effect in January of 2008, the Delisting Rule should

continue to preclude the application of § 112(g)(2)(B) to its Riesel plant now. 

A plain reading of the statute does not support Sandy Creek’s position.

Instead, a plain reading of § 112(g)’s statutory language leads to the conclusion
No. 09-51079

9

In this regard, Sandy Creek also argues that § 112(g)(2)(B) does not require that a

MACT determination be made now, in 2010, since “both TCEQ’s and EPA’s rules make the 

§ 112(g) case-by-case MACT determination part of the preconstruction permitting process,

[and] not an ongoing, freestanding requirement.” Essentially, Sandy Creek argues that

because TCEQ and EPA have elected to administratively implement the requirements of 

§ 112(g) in regulations that procedurally place MACT determinations in the preconstruction

permitting process, any violation of § 112(g) that occurs outside of this regulatory process is

no longer a violation of the statute itself. This is an incorrect reading of the interplay of

administrative law and statutory interpretation. Even if EPA and TCEQ intended to, they

cannot issue regulations that alter § 112(g)(2)(B)’s explicit requirement that no person

construct a major source without a MACT determination. It is a fundamental precept of

administrative law that an agency action, rule, or regulation “cannot overcome the plain text

enacted by Congress.” New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 583; see also Chevron v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (“[T]he court, as well as the agency, must give effect

to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). Section 112(g) says nothing about a

10

that the date of commencement of construction on a “major source” does not

alter, shift, or eradicate the application of § 112(g)’s prohibition on the

construction of that “major source” until, or unless, a MACT determination has

been made. Notably, § 112(g)(2)(B) states that “no person may construct or

reconstruct any major source of hazardous air pollutants, unless the

Administrator (or the State) determines that the maximum achievable control

technology emission limitation under this section for new sources will be met.”

See also 40 C.F.R. § 63.43(l)(2) (interpreting § 112(g)(2)(B) to mean that

violations are not limited to commencement of construction, but rather, occur

“for whatever period the owner or operator is determined to be in violation of

[MACT] requirements”). 

Thatis, § 112(g)(2)(B) simply states “no person may construct.” It does not

state “no person may begin construction” or “start to construct.” Section

112(g)(2)(B) does not state that prior to beginning construction, the

Administrator (or the State) must determine thatthe MACT emission limitation

has been met.9Instead, § 112(g)(2)(B) simply renders the act of constructing
No. 09-51079

preconstruction permitting process. It simply prohibits the act of constructing a major source

for which no MACT determination has been made. 

10 Judge Ebel, of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, recently came to the same

conclusionwhen, sitting ontheDistrict Court by designation, he reasoned thatwhile ordinarily

the statute and its corresponding regulations “requir[e] an operator to obtain a MACT

determination before ‘construct[ing] or reconstruct[ing]’ a major source, nothing in the text

indicates that the operator is relieved of the responsibility of complying with the statute after

construction begins. ‘[C]onstruct or reconstruct’ are active verbs that have force after the

permit is issued and after construction or reconstruction has begun.” Wildearth Guardians v.

Lamar Utilities Bd., No. 1:09-CV-02974-DME-BNB, 2010 WL 3239242, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug.

13, 2010).

11 March 14, 2008, is the date the D.C. Circuit issued the mandate in New Jersey v.

EPA.

12 Notably, on January 7, 2009, in a letter from Robert J. Meyers, Principal Deputy

Assistant Administrator, the Agency stated that:

11

itself unlawful–unless and until a MACT determination has been made. The day

Sandy Creek actually commenced construction is, therefore, irrelevant to

§ 112(g)(2)(B)’s current application to Sandy Creek’s concurrent and ongoing

construction, since § 112(g)(2)(B) prohibits the act of construction itself– and not

the commencement thereof.10

Thus, the question really is not whether Sandy Creek must comply with

§ 112, but rather, the question is when and how. Because Sandy Creek is

currently constructing a “major source,” we find that § 112(g)’s MACT

requirement for new sources constitutes the most appropriate application of 

§ 112 to the Riesel plant. In so finding, we find it important to note that any

construction Sandy Creek undertook prior to March 14, 2008,11should not be

considered in violation of § 112(g)(2)(B). We agree with the EPA’s position

“[that] consideration [must be given] to the effect of prior construction,

undertaken in reasonable reliance on now-vacated rules.”12 However, the
No. 09-51079

[a]lthough these EGUs may have relied in good faith on rules that EPA issued

that were subsequently vacated, the Agency believes that these EGUs are

legally obligated to come into compliance with the requirements of Section

112(g). . . . We therefore request that the appropriate State or local permitting

authority commence a process under Section 112(g) to make a new-source

MACT determination in each of these cases. . . . Section 112(g) proceedings

ordinarily are concluded before the commencement of any construction activity,

so it is reasonable for the permitting authority– under these unique and

compelling circumstances, and within the bounds of its discretion under Clean

Air Act Section 112(g) and EPA’s section 112(g) regulations– to give

consideration to the effect of prior construction, undertaken in reasonable

reliance on now-vacated rules, in making the case-by-case determination of

applicable MACT requirements. . . . 

Thus, EPA’s interpretation protects the conduct of those who undertook construction in

reliance on what is now a vacated rule, while simultaneously effectuating the congressional

purpose behind § 112(g)–that is, ensuring that these new major sources of congressionally

listed hazardous pollutants will be constructed with “the maximum achievable control

technology emission limitation.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 

12

Delisting Rule has since been vacated, and consequently, Sandy Creek must now

come into compliance with § 112(g)(2)(B). Accordingly, we conclude that Sandy

Creek’s ongoing construction of a coal-fired power plant–for which no MACT

determination has been made–is in violation of § 112(g)(2)(B). 

III. HARPER DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE APPLICATION OF § 112(g)

In coming to the conclusion that § 112(g) does not presently apply to Sandy

Creek’s ongoing construction of a “major source,” the district court erroneously

relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation,

509 U.S. 86 (1993). In Harper,the Supreme Court considered whether a judicial

decision might have retroactive effect, reasoning “that the nature of judicial

review strips [the Court] of the quintessentially legislative prerogative to make

rules of law retroactive or prospective as we see fit . . . .” Id. at 95. The Supreme

Court held thatjudicial decisions will only have retroactive effect on those “cases
No. 09-51079

13 We note that our discussion of Harper is limited to our recognition that the Supreme

Court’s holding in Harper is inapposite to the present case before us. In this regard, we

recognize that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the retroactive application of judicial

decisions is more complex than our analysis herein necessitates. See, e.g., Danforth v.

Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008) (discussing the “confused and confusing ‘retroactivity’

cases decided in the years between 1965 and 1987.”); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416

(2007) (explaining that in the context of criminal appeals, “[a] new rule applies retroactively

in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a watershed rule

of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal

proceeding.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); Rivers v. Roadway Exp., Inc.,

511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (“‘Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a

thousand years.’”) (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J.,

dissenting)). Consequently, it is not our intention to interpret Harper as reciting an exhaustive

list of judicial decisions that enjoy retroactive application and an exhaustive list of those that

do not–and any such reading of our discussion of Harper would be unnecessarily broad and

mistaken. 

13

still open on direct review.” Id. at 97.13 The Harper Court, however, did not

consider–nor did it create–any guidelines for lower courts to apply when

considering the retroactive effect of a restored administrative rule or regulation.

Moreover, the district court seemed to assume that to find a violation of

§ 112(g)(2)(B), it would have to retroactively apply New Jersey, but that is not

the case. Because § 112(g)(2)(B) applies throughout the construction process, the

issue of whether New Jersey can be applied retroactively to make illegal the

construction that began before the D.C. Circuit decided New Jersey is not

determinative. We interpret the plain language of § 112(g)(2)(B) to bar Sandy

Creek from constructing a coal-fired plant without a final MACT determination.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Harper does nothing to absolve Sandy Creek

of its present duty to abide by the requirements in § 112(g)(2)(B). 

Furthermore, in its consideration of Harper, the district court also

concluded that because a Texas state district court affirmed TCEQ’s May 2006

Final Order for the Riesel plant’s PSD permit, the “direct review of TCEQ’s
No. 09-51079

14 In contrast to the permits that implement National Ambient Air Quality Standards,

Congress created§ 112’s technology-based requirement of a case-by-caseMACTdetermination

“to accelerate the regulation of hazardous air pollutants.” S. Rep. No. 101-228 at 133 (1989)

(emphasis added). That is, Congress determined that creating a more stringent program for

certain listed hazardous pollutants in § 112 was “appropriate” since, in contrast to PSD

permits, section 112(g) “is for the control of extremely harmful air pollutants.” Id. at 140.

Consequently, TCEQ’s determination that Sandy Creek was in compliance with the applicable

PSD emission limitations in its permit says nothing about Sandy Creek’s compliance with

§ 112(g)’s MACT requirement. See § 112(b)(6) (“Prevention of significant deterioration: The

provisions of part C of this subchapter (prevention of significant deterioration) shall not apply

14

MACT-related findings and conclusions in the final permit was closed on the

date that the Texas district court rendered its decision on March 29, 2007.” This

particular application of Harper’s “direct review” rule is erroneous. 

That is, for purposes of its “direct review” analysis, the district court has

conflated TCEQ’s granting of a PSD permit, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492, with the

issuance of a final MACT determination. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g). On March 29,

2007, the Texas state district court approved TCEQ’s granting of a PSD permit.

Of course, the state district court’s decision to affirm TCEQ’s granting of Sandy

Creek’s PSD permit closed the door to any future challenges to the legal

legitimacy of that particular PSD permit. The Texas state district court,

however, did not affirm TCEQ’s MACT determination–mainly because TCEQ

never made one. Accordingly, since Sierra Club is challenging Sandy Creek’s

failure to obtain a MACT determination pursuant to § 112(g)(2)(B)–and because

Sierra Club is not challenging the legal legitimacy of Sandy Creek’s PSD

permit–what the Texas state district court affirmed on March 29, 2007,

regarding Sandy Creek’s PSD permit, does not influence our consideration of

Sandy Creek’s statutory obligation to obtain a MACT determination. This is

because the affirmation of this PSD permit said nothing about the legality (or

existence of) a MACT determination pursuant to § 112(g).14
No. 09-51079

to pollutants listed under this section [§ 112].”) (emphasis added).

15

Accordingly, a plain reading of the statute demonstrates that securing a

PSD permit does not obviate the need to comply with § 112, and here, where

Sandy Creek has not yet obtained a final MACT determination, Sandy Creek’s

continued construction of a major source constitutes a violation of 

§ 112(g)(2)(B).

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT NOT TO ABSTAIN

Finally, Sandy Creek asserts thatthe district court should have abstained,

pursuant to Burford, 319 U.S. 315. This Court “generally review[s] abstention

decisions under an abuse of discretion standard.” Sierra Club v. City of San

Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1997). Given this standard of review, and

the applicable law concerning Burford abstention, we would be hard pressed to

conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to abstain in

this case. 

“We start with the command that the federal courts have a ‘virtually

unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’” Wilson v. Valley

Elec. Membership Corp., 8 F.3d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Colorado River

Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). As a result,

“[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the

rule.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813. This Court has recognized five factors for

a courtto weigh when considering whether to abstain under Burford. In Wilson,

the Court listed these five Burford factors as follows:

(1) whether the cause of action arises under federal or state law

(finding abstention inappropriate where the case did not involve a

state-law claim); (2) whether the case requires inquiry into

unsettled issues of state law, or into local facts; (3) the importance
No. 09-51079

15 Notably, Congress designedthis regulatory scheme to specifically grantfederal courts

subject matter jurisdiction over suits like the one presently before us. The CAA’s Citizen Suit

provision, see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (f), gives this Court jurisdiction over suits such as this one,

where citizens challenge the construction of a “modified major emitting facility” id. at a(3), for

which “any requirement under section 7411 or 7412 ofthis title” has not been met. Id. at (f)(3).

16

of the state interest involved; (4) the state’s need for a coherent

policy in that area; and (5) the presence of a special state forum for

judicial review.

Wilson, 8 F.3d at 313 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In the present case, consideration of these five factors support the district

court’s decision not to abstain. The first factor overwhelmingly affirms the

district court’s decision, since no state cause of action is involved in a federal

CAA citizen suit. See New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (holding that Burford abstention is not

appropriate where the plaintiff’s claim “does not involve a state-law claim,” and

rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s declaration that “‘the absence of a state law claim

[is] not fatal’” to the application of Burford abstention) (quoting and overturning

New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 798 F.2d 858, 861-62 (5th

Cir. 1986)). Whereas Burford consisted of a federal constitutional challenge to

a state-created agency action, see Burford, 319 U.S. at 331,the present challenge

raises no federal constitutional concerns about any state-created regulatory

body–but instead utilizes a federal congressionally-created cause of action to

challenge a particular entity’s failure to comply with a federally created

regulatory scheme.15

Furthermore, the remaining factors weigh in favor of the district court’s

decision not to abstain. Although it is true that Congress created in the CAA “a

comprehensive national program that made the States and the Federal
No. 09-51079

16 On June 30, 2010, the EPA announced its formal disapproval of Texas’s state

permitting program run by TCEQ:

Today, EPA announced final disapproval ofthe flexible permit program thatthe

Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) had submitted for

inclusion in its clean-air implementation plan. EPA has determined that this

program does not meet several national Clean Air Act requirements that help

to assure the protection of health and the environment. 

EPA Disapproves Texas Flexible Air Permit Program, News Releases From Region 6, United

States Department of Environmental Protection Agency (Jun. 30, 2010),

http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e8f4ff7f7970934e8525735900400c2e/1d91bf2747c

5682b8525775200626aa6!OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 09, 2010).

17

Government partners in the struggle against air pollution,” GM Corp. v. United

States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990), it is also true that Congress gave EPA the

power to revoke a State’s regulatory authority if that State does not abide by the

CAA’s federal statutory requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1)(B) (granting

EPA the discretion to revoke a State’s air permitting authority if the EPA

“disapproves a State implementation plan submission in whole or in part”).

Recently, the EPA formally announced it has disapproved Texas’s State

Implementation Plan, and consequently, TCEQ’s continued authority to issue

air permits under the CAA will soon (perhaps temporarily) expire.16

Consequently, the present case would make for an odd application of Burford,

given that the federal district court would be abstaining from ruling when the

state-regulatory body may soon lose its federally-granted authority to regulate.

In contrast to Burford and this Court’s decision in Sierra Club v. City of

San Antonio, the regulatory framework at issue here was created by the United

States Congress–not a state legislative body. Further, the legal question

involves the application of federal law–not state law. And finally, any need for

a “coherent policy” is best attributed to the federal government, not the state of
No. 09-51079

18

Texas. One reason Congress decided to amend § 112 in 1990 and create a

federally enforceable MACT requirement was to remedy the states’ widely

divergent approaches to regulating hazardous pollutants nationwide. See H.R.

Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 330 (1990) (noting that “the approaches taken by

States to control air toxics vary considerably” and this has “produced a

patchwork of differing standards”).

Thus, for the reasons described above, we conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion when it refused to abstain under Burford. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court did not err in its

decision not to abstain under Burford, and because we find that Sandy Creek’s

ongoing construction of a coal-fired power plant with no final MACT

determination violates CAA § 112(g)(2)(B), we REVERSE the judgment of the

district court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

opinion.