No. 13725 

IN THE SUPREMI3 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

AMOS A. PLOUFFE, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

FARM & RANCH EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 

a corporation, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial 

District, 

Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

McKittrick and Duffy, Great Falls, Montana 

Joseph Duffy argued, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Burton and Waite, Great Falls, Montana 

Charles M. Cruickshank, I11 argued, Great Falls, 

Montana 

Submitted: September 13, 1977 

Decided : NT 2 5 1977 

Filed: ?CT 2 5 !QV 
Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the opinion of the Court. 

A former employee filed a civil action against his employer to recover overtime wages and vacation pay, statutory 

penalties, attorney fees and costs. The district court of Cascade 

County denied him summary judgment and dismissed his complaint. 

He appeals. 

Plaintiff is Amos A. Plouffe who was employed for over 

three years as a farm equipment mechanic by defendant Farm & 

Ranch Equipment Company, a corporation, engaged in sales and 

repair of farm equipment. Plouffe claims that between July 15, 

1971 and July 28, 1972, he worked a total of 438-3/4 hours in 

excess of 40 hours per week for which he was paid straight time 

rather than the overtime rate of time and a half. He claims he 

is entitled to an additional $669.39 overtime pay, a statutory 

penalty in an equal amount, attorney fees of $350 and costs. He 

bases his overtime pay claim on Montana's Minimum Wages and Hours 

Act, section 41-2301 et seq., R.C.M. 1947. He bases his civil 

suit for collection of the overtime pay, statutory penalties, 

attormy fees and costs on Montana's Wage Payment Act, section 

41-1301 et seq., R.C.M. 1947. 

Plouffe also claims an additional 80 hours vacation pay 

in the sum of $240, a statutory penalty in an equal amount, and 

costs. 

On August 5, 1972, Plouffe filed his claim with the 

Montana Department of Labor and Industry, Labor Standards ~ivision. 

Subsequently, at a date unclear from the record before us, the 

department denied his claim. 

On February 23, 1973, Plouffe filed his complaint in the 

district court of Cascade County seeking recovery by civil suit 

of the amounts set forth above. His employer answered by a general 

denial and plead the affirmative defenses of (1) exemption from 
payment under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USCA, 

Sec. 201 et seq. as amended, and (2) the bar of the statute 

of limitations. His employer also sought an award of $350 

attorney fees as the prevailing party. 

Following pretrial discovery, plaintiff Plouffe moved 

for summary judgment. Thereafter the district court entered 

findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to the effect 

that defendant employer, by the nature of its business, is exempt from the wage and overtime provisions of Montana's Minimum Wages and Hours Act and dismissed plaintiff's entire complaint. 

Plaintiff now appeals. 

The ultimate issue for review is whether the judgment of 

the district court is correct. The underlying issues can be 

summarized as follows: 

(1) Is the employer exempt from payment of overtime wages 

under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act? 

(2) Is the employer exempt from payment of overtime 

wages under Montana's Minimum Wages and Hours Act? 

(3) Does the federal Fair Labor Standards Act preempt 

the field of wage and hour regulation to the exclusion of Montana's 

Minimum Wages and Hours Act? 

(4) Should plaintiff's entire complaint have been dismissed? 

We hold that the federal Fair Labor Standards Act expressly 

exempts the employer in this case from paying overtime wages to 

plaintiff. Section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides 

that no employer shall employ any of his employees for a workweek longer than 40 hours unless such employee receives time and 

a half his regular rate of pay for the excess. Section 213 provided : 

"Exemptions * * * 
" (b) The provisions of Section 207 of this title 

shall not apply with respect to-- * * * 

"(10) Any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily 

engaqedn selling or servicing automobiles, trailers, 

trucks, farm implements, or aircraft if employed by 

a nonmanufacturinq establishment primarily engaged 

in the business of sellinq such vehicles to ultimate 

purchasers." (Emphasis added.) Act of September 23, 

1966, P.L. 89-601, 80 Stat. 836 (1966) (Current 

version at 29 U.S.C. S 213(b) (10) (Supp.1V 1974)). 

This exemption from payment of overtime wages clearly applies 

under the admitted facts of this case. 

We further hold that the employer in this case is not 

exempt from the payment of overtime wages under Montana's Minimum Wages and Hours Act. This Act provides: 

"41-2303. Compensation. (a) Except as may otherwise be provided pursuant to this act, every 

employer shall pay to each of his employees wages 

at a rate not less than provided in subsection (1) 

and (2) save and except for farm workers as herein 

defined: 

"(b) No employer shall employ any of his employees 

for a work week longer than forty (40) hours, unless 

such employee receives for his employment in excess 

of forty (40) hours in a work week at a rate of not 

less than one and one-half (1-1/2) times the hourly 

wage rate at which he is employed. No overtime provision shall apply for farm workers * * *." 

Farm worker as defined in section 41-2302(f) " * * * means any 

person employed to do any service performed on a farm or ranch." 

Thus the situs of the work performed is the basis of 

the exemption. Here the work was not performed on a farm or 

ranch; the exemption does not apply; and the employee is entitled 

to overtime wages at the rate of 1-1/2 times his regular hourly 

rate of pay for the hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 

The employer argues that it is exempt from Montana's 

Minimum Wages and Hours Act because: 

(1) The employer is subject to all the provisions of the 

Fair Labor Standards Act except the overtime pay provisions indicating a congressional intent to substantially cover him by its 
provisionsand grant him an exemption therein, (2) the Minimum 

Wages and Hours Act exemption of "farm workers", and (3) the Montana Labor Department ruling that the employer is not covered by 

our Minimum Wages and Hours Act. 

The first argument is answered hereafter in our discussion of preemption. The second argument has already been answered 

by the definition of "farm worker" in our Minimum Wages and Hours 

Act. The short answer to the third argument is that the Montana 

Labor Department's ruling that the employee is not covered by 

Montana's Minimum Wages and Hours Act is incorrect. As heretofore 

noted, the language of the Minimum Wages and Hours Act requires 

payment of overtime wages to all employees and there is no exemption covering this case. 

The exemption of overtime wages under the federal Fair 

Labor Standards Act and the absence of such exemption under Montana's Minimum Wages and Hours Act posits the principal issue on 

appeal: Does the federal Fair Labor Standards Act preempt the entire 

field of wage and hour regulation precluding state legislation on 

this subject? 

It is conceded that Congress has the power to preempt 

under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. It 

is equally clear that where Congress preempts the field, state 

laws to the contrary must yield. The supremacy clause, Art. VI, 

United States Constitution provides: 

"This constitution and the laws of the United 

States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, 

and all treaties made, or which shall be made, 

under the authority of the United States, shall 

be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in 

every state shall be bound thereby, anything in 

the constitution or laws of any state to the 

contrary notwithstanding." 

The question in this case is whether Congress did in fact preempt 

the entire field of wage and hour regulation by enactment of 

the Fair Labor Standards Act. The issue turns on the legislative 
intent of Congress. 

The employer asserts that when Congress moved to regulate 

commerce by enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act it preempted the entire field of wage and hour regulation and the 

states are precluded from enacting legislation concerning the 

same subject matter. The employer argues that it is covered by 

all provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act except the overtime pay provision indicating an intention by Congress to occupy 

the whole field and in so preempting to grant it a specific 

exemption from payment of overtime wages based on a legislative 

policy to protect agriculture, a financially fragile industry. 

The time is long past for this contention to prevail. The 

language of the Fair Labor Standards Act itself indicates a congressional intent not to preempt to the exclusion of state wage 

and hour laws. 

"Section 218. Relation to other laws. 

"(a) No provision of this chapter or of any order 

thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any 

Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum 

wage established under this chapter or a maximum 

workweek lower than the maximum workweek established under this chapter * * *." 

Case law interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act likewise destroys the employer's contention of congressional preemption. Maneja v. Waialua Agri. Co., 349 U.S. 254, 99 L ed 1040, 

75 S.Ct. 719 (1955); Divine v. Levy, 36 F.Supp. 55 (1940); 

Eastern Sugar Associates v. Pena, 222 F.2d 934 (1955), cert.den. 

355 U.S. 900. Perhaps the best example of denial of the employer's 

preemption argument and at the same time establishing state power 

to eliminate exemptions granted in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 

is the following holding: 

"This section [Sec. 218, FLSA] expressly contemplates that workers covered by state law as well as 

the FLSA shall have any additional benefits provided by state law--higher minimum wages; or lower 
maximum work week. By necessary implication it 

permits state laws to operate even as to workers 

exempt from the FLSA." Williams v. Transit Co., 

472 F.2d 1258 (1972) 

State courts have similarly held no federal preemption by 

the Fair Labor Standards Act: 

"Anticipating such an apparent conflict between 

the federal act and similar state legislation, 

the congress provided in 29 USCA Section 218(a) * * * for enforcing compliance with a state minimum wage higher and a state 'maximum workweek' 

lower than that established by the federal act, 

i-e., the statute specifically prohibits preenption, by the federal act, of any state minimum wage 

or maximum hour/overtime ('maximum workweek') provision more favorable to the employee than that 

prescribed by the federal act." State v. Comfort 

Cab, Inc., 118 N.J. Super. 162, 286 A.2d 742. 

To the same effect see Hendrix v. Delta Airlines, La.App. 234 So.2d 

93; Yellow Cab Co. v. New Jersey, 126 N.J.Super. 81, 312 A.2d 870. 

The Montana attorney general has ruled likewise: 

"Since the Montana Constitution and statutes enacted 

pursuant thereto set a lower maximum hour standard 

than does the Federal Act it follows as a matter 

of course that the Montana Eight Hour Law takes 

precedence and must be complied with regardless of 

the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act." 

Opinion 89, Opinions of the Attorney General, Feb. 

8, 1950. 

In summary, we hold that the Fair Labor Standards Act does 

not preempt the subject of wage, hour or overtime regulation to 

the exclusion of Montana's Minimum Wages and Hours Act; that the 

employer here is not exempt from payment of overtime wages under 

either the Fair Labor Standards Act exemption or Montana's 

Minimum Wages and Hours Act; and that the employee is entitled 

to overtime pay of $669.39 pursuant to our Minimum Wages and 

Hours Act under the admitted facts of this case. Accordingly, 

the district court was in error in dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 

The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment of 

the district court are vacated. The case is remanded to the 

district court with directions to reinstate plaintiff's complaint; 

grant plaintiff partial summary judgment in the amount of $669.39 
for overtime wages; for a hearing and determination of the amount 

to be awarded plaintiff as reasonable attorney fees; for such 

further proceedings as may be necessary to determine plaintiff's 

right to vacation pay and the statutory penalties in section 41- 

1302, R.C.M., on his overtime pay award and his claim for vacation pay, and for the determination and award of such costs and 

disbursements to plaintiff as are authorized by statute. 

Justice