### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 27, 200 5 S es sio n

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . JO HN CALVIN SI PE, JR.

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham blen Coun ty No. 04-CR -040 & 04- CR-041 Jam es Edw ard Beckner, Judge

No. E2005-00039-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Dece m ber 16, 2005

A Hamblen County

jury convicted the defe ndant of theft of property , $500-$1,000, and f org ery of assig nment of title. On appe al t he defenda nt prese nts three issues: (1) Whether there was suff

icient evidenc e to support the jury ’s ver dict; (2) whe ther the trial court erre d in ref using to g rant a

retria l based upon ne wly

discovere d evidenc e; and ( 3) whe ther the tria l court imposed an e x cessive
sentenc e. We have revie wed the r ecor d and have found all of the de fenda nt’s issues to be without

me ri t. T he re fo re , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

D. Clif ton B arn e s, A s s ist a nt P ub lic De fe nd e r, Mo rrist ow n, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, John Ca lvi n Sipe, J r..

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Da vidE. Coe ne n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; C. Ber keley Be ll, District Attorney

Gene ral; and K im L ane, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I n F e b ru ar y , th e v ic ti m, Sh ar o n K

. L in d s e y , p u r c h a s e d a 1 9 9 2 O ld s mo b il e f rom the defe ndant. She g ave the defe ndant a check for $1,000 made out to him, and a chec k for $144 made out to Morristown Auto Sales, where the defe ndant worke d, for taxes and tag s. The def endant ne ver g ave the victim a ti tle or a bill of sale . She asked se vera l times, but he told her the title was at the

car lot, and he would have to pick it up. The def endant br oug ht her the ta g s and the re g istration, but she neve r re ceive d the title.-2-

On Dec ember

6 and 7, 2 0 0 2
, t h e victim was moving out of her a partment. He r apa

rtment

was owne d by

the def endant’ s mother. She stated at trial that she was trying to sne ak her stuff out of the apartment be cause she was afr aid that some of her belong ings would be taken. She loaded he r

car and her broth er ’s t ru ck fu l l of her belong ings. The victim then went to her job a t Wal-Mart without unloading he r ca

r. At this point she had had the car for about nine m onths. The de fenda nt never said that the victim owed him more mone y , and neve r threatened to re possess the ca r. On Dec ember

7, 2002, the victim left her job at Wal-Mart a t 6:15 in the morning. When she c ame out to the parking lot, her car was gone. She called the police. The police eve ntually informed he r that the def en dant had r epossessed he r ca r. The vic tim attempted to call the def endant to discuss the reposse ssion of her c ar. Event u al l y t h e victim called the police beca use she maintaine d that the defe ndant stole her car

. At trial, the victim wa s shown a c opy of the title to the ca

r. She said that he r n a me didind e e d ap pe ar on the tit le

. Th e re wa s a sig na tur e on the tit le that app e are d to be he rs , howeve r, the victim denied tha t the signature wa s hers.

Ab du lla Al -g ha nd i, the ow ne r of Mo rrist ow n Aut o Sa le s a ndthe de fe nd a nt’ s e mpl oy e r a lso
te sti fi e d a t tria l. H e state d th a t he re me mbe re d th e c ar tha t the vi c tim bo ug ht f ro m th e de fe nd a nt. Mr. Al-g handi stated that they purcha sed the c ar at auction in Abing don, Virg inia. The de fenda nt then purc hased the vehicle f rom Morristown Auto Sales for $400. The car had a bad eng ine, and the defe ndant had to ha

ul it to his house beca

use it c ould not be driven. Mr. Al-g handi stated that the defe ndant did not reg ister the ca r to the def

endant’ s mother. He also stated that he rec eived a chec k for $144 f

or tax and tag s for the c ar. The defe ndant told Mr. Al-gh an d i t h at he sold the ca r for $1,000.

Rick Har mon, a detec tive with the Morristown Police Depa rtment, investigated the thef t of the victim’s car

. He include d in his report that the c ar ha d been stolen f rom the Wal-Mart pa

rking lot and was then “ reportedly reposse ssed by

[t he def endant] from the owne r.” D etec tive Harmon learned that the victim neve r re ceive d the title to the car . Detec tive Harmon then contac ted the Tenne ssee Hig hway

Patrol, Criminal I nvestig ation Division. He was assisted by Ag ent Ter

ry Wolfe.

Terry Wolfe is a specia l a g ent in the Criminal Investig ation Division of th e T en nessee D e p ar t m e n t o f S a f

e t y. H e o b t a i n e d a t i t l e h i s t o r y f o r t h e v e h i c l e f

r o m t h e D e p ar t m e n t o f

S a f e t y. Ag ent Wolfe found that the title had been issued to Sharon L indsey
, the victim, with the defenda nt reg istered a s the lienholder. The price of the c ar w as listed as $1,000. Age nt Wolfe also found that the ca r wa s then sold a nd re- reg istered to Christopher and Amber

McCullough. The title was issued April 1, 2003 to the McCulloughs. The M cCulloughs we re r enting an apa rtment from the defe ndant’s mother at the time. The title also indicated that the da te of sale was De cembe r 6, 2002, the same day

the ca r had be en stolen fr om the victim. Age nt Wol fe state d t h at there would be no need for a lien on the car beca use the victim had appar ently paid for the vehicle in f

ull. Age nt Wol fe seized the ca

r fr om the McCulloughs, a nd rele ased the car to the vi ctim. Ag ent W olfe then c harg ed the de fe nd a nt w ith fo rg e ry a ndthe ft

. Assistant Spec ial Ag ent Billy Grooms also works in the Criminal I nvestig ation Division of the Tenne ssee Hig hway Patrol. He participated in the i nvestig ation of the thef t of the victim’s ca

r-3-

and the forg ery

of the title to the victim’s car . He inter viewed the defe ndant af ter his ar rest. Dur ing the int e rv ie w, the de fe nd a nt a dmi tte d that he sig ne d the vic tim ’s na me on the tit le a ndpu t hi mse lf down as lienholder. The de fenda nt told Age nt Grooms that the victim did not owe him money for the ca r, but instead owe d money for ba ck re nt. After a

new title was issued in th e v i ct im’s name, Ag e nt G ro oms pe rs on a lly too k th e tit le to the vic tim

. Special Ag ent Tim Ry an with t he Tennessee Hig hway Patrol worke d with Detec tive Har mon and Specia l Ag ent Grooms in i n v es t i gat ing the case , arr esting the def endant, a nd taking the defe ndant ’s s t at ement. S pecia l Ag ent Ry an testified that he took the defe ndant’s stateme nt. The defe ndant told Spec ial Ag ent Ry an that he and the victim ha d ag ree d to a $2,000 price on the ca r and ag ree d to a wee kly

$50 pay ment. When the defe ndant receive d no further pay ment, he re possessed the victim’s car in the W al-Mart parking lot. L ater in the interview, the defe ndant admitted that he signe d the title to the victim’s car.

The de fenda nt did not testify on his own behalf at trial, but he did prese nt two witnesses at trial. The f

irst witness, Cha

rles Goodwin, knew both the defe ndant and the victim. He stated that

on Ma rc h 2 , 2 00 2, he ov e rh e arda c on ve rs a tio n b e tw e e n the defe nd ant a ndthe vic tim . I n th is

c on ve rs a tio n h e he ardthe de fe nd a nt a sk the vic tim if it wa s all ri g ht with h e r i f h e sig ne d h e r n a me to the tit le or

re g ist ratio n so it wo uld be in the vic tim ’s na me

. Mr . Goo dw in sta te d tha t th e vic tim replied tha t it would be all rig ht with her if the de fenda nt signe d her na me. The w itness also testified that the victim paid the def endant a portion of the purc hase price o f t h e car a nd that is why the defe ndant put a lien on the c ar.

The de fenda nt’s second witness was Da vid Richards. Mr. Richar ds knew the de fenda nt from

wo rking a t th e de fe nd a nt’ s moth e r’ s hou se

. He a lso ov e rh e ard a dis c us sio n in vo lvi ng the pu rc ha se of the Oldsmobile. The witness stated that the purcha se price was $2,000 a nd that the victim was to pay the mecha nic for work on the m otor. Mr. R ichar ds saw the victim hand the de fenda nt a che ck and then the de fenda nt told the victim t hat he ne eded he r to sign s o m e p ap ers. The witness then he ardthe vic tim

te ll the de fe nd a nt t o s ig n th e pa pe rs ne e de d to g e t he r t a g s.

After the pre s en t at i o n of the e vidence , the jury retire d to delibera te. The jury found the defe ndant g uiltyof theft of property for $500-$1,000 and forg ery of the a ssignment of

title. The trial court he ld a sentenc ing he aring November 30, 2004. As a re sult of that hearing, the trial court sentenc ed the de fenda nt as a Rang e I I multipl e of

fe n d er t o t hree y ear s for e ach c onviction, to be

se rv e d c on c ur

re ntl y . T he de fe nd a nt a

pp e a ls the se jud g me nts

.

AN AL YSI S

The de fenda nt bring s three a rg uments to this C ourt o n appea l: (1) Whether ther e wa s sufficie nt evidence to support the jury ’s ver dict; (2) whe ther the trial court erre d in refusing to gr ant

a re trial based upon newly discovere d evidenc e; and (3) whether the trial court im posed an ex cessive
sentenc e.-4- Suf fi ciency of the Evidence

When a defenda nt challeng es t he suff iciency of the e vidence , this Court i s oblige d to review that claim ac cording to certain well-settled prin ci p les. A ver dict of g uilty , rende red by a jury and

“ app ro ve d b y

the tr ia l ju dg e , a c c re dit s th e tes ti mony of the ” Sta te ’s wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s a ll conflicts in the testi mony in favor of t he st ate. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992) . Thus, althoug h the ac cused is orig inally cloake d with a presumption of i nnocenc e, the jury verdic t of g uiltyremove s this presumption “and re place s it with o n e o f gu ilt.” State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). He nce, on a ppeal, the burden of proof r ests with the defe ndant to demonstrate the insufficienc y of the c onvicting e vidence

. I d. Th e re le va nt q ue sti on the re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t a ns we r i s w he the r a ny ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have f ound the ac cused g uiltyof every element of the offe nse bey ond a re asonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Ha

rris, 839 S.W.2d at 75. I n making this decision, we ar e to ac cord the State “the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence as we ll as all rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces tha t may be d ra wn there from.” See Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d at 914. As such, this C ourt is prec luded from r eweig hing or rec onsidering the evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morg an, 929 S.W. 2d38 0, 38 3 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); Sta te v. Ma tth e ws , 8 05 S.W. 2d77 6, 77 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1990). Moreover, we may not substit ute our own “ infere nces f or those dra wn by

the trier of fac t from circ umstantial evidence .” Matthew s, 805 S.W .2d at 779. Further, questions concerning the cr edibilityof the witnesses and the weig ht a nd value to be g iven to e vidence
, as well as all fac tual iss ue s ra ise d by su c h ev ide nc e , ar e re so lve d by the tr ie r of fa c t and no t the app e llate c ou rt s. Sta te v. Pruett, 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

. The jury convicted the defe ndant for the ft of prope rty $500-$1,000 and f

org ery of assig nment

o f ti tl e

. T h e f

t o f p r o p e r ty is f o u n d a t T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d s e c ti o n 3 9

- 1 4

- 1 0 3

. T e n n e s s ee Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 14 -1 03 state s, “ [a] p e rs on c omm its a the ft of pr op e rt y if , w ith int e nt t o de pr ive the ow ne r o f p ro pe rt y , th e pe rs on kn ow ing ly ob ta ins or e xer c ise s c on tr ol o ve r the pr op e rt y without the owner’ s eff

ective c onsent.” F org ery of assignment of title is found at Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 55-5-116, whic h states, “[i] t is a Class E felony for any person to

. . . (2) Alter or falsify with fraudule nt intent or forg e any assig nment upon a ce rtificate of title; . . . .”

The evidenc e at tria l showed that the victim g ave the defe ndant a c heck f or $1,000 for

the

car in question. The victi m t es t i fi ed t h at this was the full purcha se price of the c ar a nd other evidenc e esta

blished that the price was $1,000. The defenda nt never asked for additi onal money or g a ve a ny wa rn ing that he wa s abo ut to re po sse ss the c ar. Th e de fe nd a nt al so ne ve r g a ve the vic tim a bill of sale or

the title to the c ar. After the victim ha d had the car for about nine months she left her j o b a t W a l- M ar t t o f in d th a t h e r

c ar , c o n ta in in g a ll h e r

b e lo n g in g s , w a s g o n e

. T h e p o lice discovere d that the def

endant ha d taken the c ar, c laiming it was la wfully reposse ssed. The sa me day that the def

endant took t h e car, he sig ned the victim’s name to the title and sold the car to a third pa rt y . T he de fe nd a nt l a te r t oldthe la w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs wo rking on the case that the vic tim
actua lly owed him money

for ba ck re nt rather than t he car. Healso admitted to the offic ers that he signe d the victim’s name to the title.-5-

Th e de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e vic tim ’s c he c k f or $1 00 0 w a s n ote d to be fo r a c ar p a y me nt. He a lso points t o another

chec k for $75 noted to be for a car pay ment. At trial, the victim arg ued that thi s c he c k w a s a c tua lly

fo r a c ar p art . A pp arent ly
, th e de fe nd a nt i s a tte mpt ing to a rg ue that th is additional pay ment is proof that the vi ctim owed the defe ndant additional money for the c ar. The defe ndant also states that the State did not prove that the de fenda nt intended to harm the vic tim. He also arg ues that the fa ct that he sig ned the victim’s name to the title was not a crime.

The arg uments raised by the defendant are not leg al questions, but instead questions of fa ct

conce rning whet h er the evidenc e met the e lements of the c rimes of whic h the def endant wa s convic t ed . As we state d above, que stions of fact, a s well as dete rminations of the cr edibilityof witnesses, ar e re serve d for the jury

. I t is obvious in this c ase that the jury cre dited the testimony

of the State’s witnesses.

We conclude th at t h er e was sufficient e vidence to support the finding that the def endant

wr on g fu lly sig ne d the vic tim ’s na me to the tit le a ndwr on g fu lly too k th e vic tim ’s ve hic le . T he re is ample ev i dence for a

rational trier

of fa ct to determine that the def endant is g uiltyof both theft of property and for g ery

of assig nment of title.

Th e re fo re , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

Newly-Discover ed Evid ence

T h e d e f e n d a n ta l s o ar g u e s t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u r t e rr e d i n n o t g r a n t i n g a n e w t r i a l b a s e d o n n e w l ydiscovere d evidenc e. A hearing on the defendant’s moti on for a new trial was he ld on Dece mber 17, 2004. At tha t h e ar in g th e d e f e n d a n t p r e s e n te d a

w it n e s s , T o n y a

Jo n e s , w h o is th e v ic ti m’ s s o n ’s g irlfriend, a s well as the mother of the victim’s g randc hildren. She stated that the vic tim did i ndeed kn ow that th e re wa s a

lie n h e ld b y

the de fe nd a nt o n h e r ve hic le

. Th e wi tne ss te sti fi e d that sh e did

no t kn ow that the tr ia l wa s sti ll pe nd ing on the ma tte r i n q ue sti on un til sh e sa w the vic tim in the ha ll, while the witness wa s in custody as a truste e. She also stated that she has neve r spoke n t o the de fe nd a nt.

At the c on c lus ion of the he ari ng , the tr ia l c ou rt ma de the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s w ith re g ardto the newly -discover ed evide nce:

The c ase w as primarily

a who- are -y ou-g oing- to-believe case , and it’s bee n char acte rized by

defe nse counsel as a close case and, y et, the jury came back w ith one of the quicke st verdicts that I ’ve e ver know n them to come bac k with. The j u ry didn’t perc eive it to be a very close case on the issues of cr edibility , and I don’t think

a ny of the jur or s kne w Mr . Sipe or sa id the y ’d e ve r kno wn him bu t the y ve ry qu ic kly disbelieved him and be lieved Ms. L indsey

. So that very well could make this iss ue more g erma ne than it would ot herw ise. Howeve r, t his witness, who has sworn under oath that these thing s happene d, herse lf is impeacha ble by prior off

enses involving truth or dis – involving dishonesty and fa lse statement. And he r cr edibilityis very-6-

suspect with a jury that was able to so quickly decide the issue of c redibility in favor of the state.

And, two, it is cumulative, and it is corrobor ative of othe r evide nce that was prese nted to the jury

and is not a sing ular ty

pe of e vidence that would stand out by i t self bec ause the re w ere other witnesse s that indicated that the vic tim knew of the lien and the c ircumstance s and wha t the witness was saying w as not true.

Newly discovere d evidenc e requires, of course , that it be something that even af t er due dilige nce a

person c ould not discover prior to the time it was discove red afte r the trial. Ms. Jones was here in custody and wa s , i n fac t, was assig ned in the upstairs portion here adjoining the courtroom and in this courtroom to clea ning a nd doing things in and a

bout the halls of the courtroom; and that’s appa rently wher e she

sa w the vic tim

du ri ng the c ou rs e of

thi s tria l. I t wou ld se e m tha t du ri ng the c ou rs e of that trial that it would have been appropriate for the evidenc e to be revea led at that time, and I

rea liz e that def

ense c ounsel corr ectly

say s that doesn’t help him out any if it s ho uld ’v e be e n d on e , b ut i t is e vid e nc e it s e e ms to me that it c ou ld a ndsh ou ld

un de r a ll c ir c ums ta nc e s p ri or to the tim e that it

wa s r e ve a le d p os t- tr ia l.

F or a ll tho se re a so ns , I be lie ve that no dif fe re nt re su lt wo uldhav e or c ou ld have oc curr ed than that did occur and, ther efor e, the motion for ne w trial is overr uled

. . . .

To re c e ive a

ne w t ri a l on the g ro un d o f n e wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e , a

de fe nd a nt m us t demonstrate “ (1) r easona

ble dilige nce in se eking the newly discovere d evidenc e; (2) materia lityof the e vid e nc e ;” a nd (3 ) the lik e lih oo d tha t the e vid e nc e wo uld c ha ng e the ou tc ome of the tr ia l. S ta te v. Nichols, 877 S

. W .2d 722, 737 (Tenn. 1994) (citing State v. Goswick, 656 S.W.2d 355, 358-60 (Tenn. 1983) ). Additionally , the dec ision reg arding whether to gr ant or de ny a motion for a ne w trial predic ated on ne wly

discovere d evidenc e “r ests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 395 (Te nn. 1995). More over, the trial court is authorized to asc erta in the

c re dib ili ty

of ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e fo r w hic h th e ne w t ri a l is de sir e d, a ndthe mot ion sh ou ld b e d e n i e d u n l e s s t h e c o u r th a s a s s u r e d i t s e l f t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y w o u l d b e w o r t h y o f b e l i e f b y t h e j u r y. I d. As a gen er al rule, “ newly discovere d impeachme nt evidence will not constit ute g rounds for a new tria l. . . . But if the impeaching evidenc e is so cruc ial to the defe ndant’s g uilt or innocence that its admissi on will probably result i n an acquittal, a new trial may be ordered.” State v. Singleton, 853 S.W .2d 490, 496 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Rosenthal, 292 S.W .2d at 4-5; State v. Rogers, 703 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); Evans v. State, 557 S.W .2d 927, 938 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977)).

We find no abuse of discretion in the t rial court’s denial of the defendant’s moti on for ne w trial based upon ne wly

discovere d evidenc e. As the t rial court stated, ot her w itnesses who testified for the de fenda nt at trial also stated that the vic tim did i ndeed know that the def endant plac ed a lien-7-

on the c ar. Th e re fo re , we a g re e wi th the tr ia l cou rt that the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d by thi s w itn e ss w ou ld be c umu la tiv e. I n add iti on , w e be lie ve the tr ia l c ou rt ’s a sse ssm e nt tha t th e wi tne ss’ s c re dib ili ty would be seriously

questioned bec ause of

previous convic tions invol ving dishone sty . Considering the above two conclusions, we f ind i t h i ghly

unlikely that this evidence would have c hang ed the outcome at tria l. As for the de fenda nt’s diligenc e in discovering this evidence , we unde rstand that this evidence may

have be en diffic ult for the def endant’ s attorney

to discover. Ho we v er , to be

su c c e ssf ul i n o bta ini ng a

ne w t ri a l ba se d u po n n e wl y -d isc ov e re d e vid e nce, th e defe nd a nt m us t de mon str a te a ll thr e e of

the re qu ir e me nts lis te d a bo ve . I n th is case , w e c on c lud e the e vid e nc e in question is cumulative to that presente d at trial as we ll as very unlikely to chang e the outcome of the
tr ia l.

Th e re fo re , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

Se nt e nc ing

The de fenda nt was sentenc ed to three y ears fo r each of his two c onvictions to be run

concur rently , with a re lease elig ibilit y of 35% a s a Rang e I I

multipl e off

ender . The de fenda nt’s arg ument with reg ard to his sentenc e rea ds, in its entirety
, as follows, “The appellant asks this court to review the sentenc ing pur suant to it authority as set forth in T.C.A. § 40-35-401.”

Ru le 27 (a )( 7) of

the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re pr ov ide s th a t a br ie f s ha ll contain “[an] arg ument . . . setting f orth the conte ntions of the appellant with r espec t to the issues pr e se nte d, a ndthe re a so ns the re fo r, inc lud ing the re a so ns wh y the c on te nti on s r e qu ir e app e llate relief , wi t h citations to the authorities and a ppropriate ref

ere nces to the r ecor d . . . relied on.” Tenne ssee Court of Criminal Appe als Rule 1 0(b) state s that “[i] ssues which a re not supporte d by

arg ume nt, c itatio n to a uth or iti e s, or app ro pr ia te re fe re nc e s to the re c or d will be tr e a te d as wa ive d in this court.” See a lso St ate v. Sande rs, 842 S .W.2d 257 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (dete rmining tha t iss ue wa s w a ive d whe re de fe nd a nt ci te d no au tho ri ty to sup po rt his c omp la int ). Th e app e lla nt f a ils
to p r e s e n t a n y ar g u m e n t t o t h i s C o u r t a s t o h i s s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g h i s s e n t e n c e

. We

c on c lud e that th e abo ve g e ne ra l st a te me nt doe s n ot c on sti tut e a n a rg ume nt. Th e re fo re , th is i ssu e is waived f or fa ilure to prese nt an ar g ument.

CO NC LU SION

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE