### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE June 29, 200 6 S es sio n ROD NEY SHA NE CU RTIS v. C HRIS TY SU Z AN NE HILL (C UR TIS)

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Law renceCounty No. 9982-00 JimT. Hamilton, Chancellor

No. M2005- 2230-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on Au gust 7, 2006
This is a post-divorce chang e of custody case . The trial court chang ed custody of the parties’ two minor children f

rom the mother to the f

ather . We hold that the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that th ere had bee n a ma te ri a l c ha ng e of

c ir c ums ta nc e s to jus tif

y a c ha ng e in custody in the absenc e of proof that the m other’s sex ual i ndiscretions and othe r alleg ed misconduct had af fec ted or would a ffe ct the childre n in an adve rse way . We the ref ore reve rse the judg ment of the tr ia l c ou rt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t R e ve r se d; Case Re m anded
S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined. C. Tim Tisher, Columbi a, Te nnessee , for the A ppellant, Christy Suz anne H ill (Curtis).
Paul A . B a te s, L a wr e nc e bu rg , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e , Ro dn e y

Sha ne Curtis

. OP IN ION
I. Bac kg ro und After seven a nd a half

y ear s of marriag e, the pa rties we re divorc ed in J une of 2000. The parties’ marital dissolution agr e e me n t, w h ic h was incor porate d into the divorce de cre e, provide d that Ms. Curtis wa s the primary residential pare nt of the parties’ children: B ay lee Da wn Curtis (born June 27 , 199 4) a nd Gr a c ie L ou ise Curtis (b orn Se pte mbe r 3 , 1 99 7) . M r. Curtis ha d s ha re d p are nti ng tim e one nig ht per we ek and on a lternate wee kends. Mr. Curtis filed a petition on J une 27, 2005, alleging that a material chang e of c ircumstance s ha d o c c ur re d a ndse e kin g c us tod y

of the c hil dr e n. Spe c if

ic a lly , Mr

. Curtis a lle g e d th a t Ms . Cu rt is was living out of wedlock with he r para mour, J eff Ker steins; that prior to her c ohabitation with Mr.-2-

Ker steins, she had “ cohabitate d with two other pa ramours w ithout the benefit of we dlock”; that Mr. Ker steins “ver

bally berates” the minor children; that Ms. Curtis had not fostere d a positive fathe rdaug hte r r e la tio ns hip be tw e e n h im a nd the c hil dr e n, a ndthat sh e “ do e s n ot atte ndc hu rc h r e g ula rl y an d d o es n o ten co u ra ge t h e c h i l d re n s p i ri t u al l y . ” M s . C u rt i s an s we re d , d en y i n g a ma t er i al ch an ge of circ umstances ha d occur red, and filed a counter -petition asserting that Mr. C urtis’s income had incre ased substantially

and that she w as entitled to an incr ease in child support. Following a hearing at which the trial court hear d the testimony of the pa rties, Mr. Curtis’s sister, and the childre n in c am e ra , the court enter ed an order concluding that a chang e of c ustody was wa rr a nte d d ue to a

ma te ri a l c ha ng e of

c ir c ums ta nc e s a ndstatin g a s f oll ow s: [T] he Petition for C hang e of Primary Custodial P are nt filed by the fathe r, Rodney

Shane Curti s s h ould be g rante d and the CounterPetition fil ed by

the mother, Christy

Suz anne H ill (Curtis) should be dismiss ed.
I t f urthe r a pp e are d to the Cou rt

hav in g h e ard

the te sti mon y

of bo th parties and the children that a material chang e of circumstanc es has oc c ur re d a nda ft e r c on du c tin g a c omp arativ e fi tne ss ana ly sis in acc ordanc e with T .C.A. § 36-6-404, the Court finds that it would be in the best interest of the minor children for the f ather to become the primary residential pa

rent. The trial court made no f

indings of f

act supporting its conclusions that a cha ng e of c ircumstance s ha d o c c ur re d a ndthat th e c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st w a s se rv e d b y the c ha ng e of

c us tod y . M s. Curtis appea ls the trial court’s de cision.
II. Issu e Prese nted
Th e iss ue be fo re us is w he the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d i n r

uli ng that a

ma te ri a l c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s o c c ur

re d th a t ne c e ssi ta te d c ha ng ing prima ry c us tod y of the c hil dr e n fr om M s. Curtis to Mr. Curtis.

III. St andard of Review

I n a no n- jury c a se , o rd ina

ri ly ou r r e vie w i s de novo upon the record of the proc eeding s below, with a pre sumption of corre ctness as to the trial court' s fac tual determinations that we must honor un le ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s ag a ins t th os e fi nd ing s. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; W right v . City of Knoxville, 89 8 S. W.2 d 1 77 , 1 81 (T e nn . 1 99 5) ; Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) . The trial c ourt' s conclusions of law are acc orded no such pre sumption. Cam pb e ll v. Florida Stee l Corp., 91 9 S. W.2 d 2 6, 35 (T e nn . 1 99 6) ; Pre sle y v . B e nn e tt, 860 S.W .2d 857, 859 (T e nn . 1 99 3) . In th e pr e se nt c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt ma de no fi nd ing s of fa c t. Whe n th e tr ia l c ou rt fa ils-3-

to make fa ctual finding s, there is nothing to which the pre sumption of co rr ectness can attach. Hickm an v. Continental Baking Co., 14 3 S. W.3 d 7 2, 75 (T e nn . 2 00 4) ; Kesterson v. Varner, 172 S.W. 3d55 6, 56 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 5) ; Archer v . Archer, 90 7 S

. W

. 2 d 4 1 2 , 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 95 ). Un de r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, “ we mus t c on du c t our ow n inde pe nd e nt re vie w o f the re c or d to determine wher e the pr eponder ance of the e vidence lies.” Br oo k s v . B ro ok s, 992 S.W .2d 403, 405 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ; Kendrick v . Shoemake, 90 S.W. 3d 56 6, 57 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; Dev orak v. Patterson , 907 S.W .2d 815, 818 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

T ri al courts ar e veste d with wide discre tion in matters involving custody of childre n. Ed war ds v . E dwa rd s, 5 0 1 S

. W

. 2 d 2 8 3 , 2 9 1 (T en n . C t

. Ap p . 1 9 7 3 ). Ac co rd i n gl y , a tri al co u rt 's decision re g arding custody or vi sitation should be set aside only when it “f

alls outside the spectrum of ruling s that might re asonably result from a n applicatio n o f t h e co rre ct leg al standar ds to the evidenc e found in the r ecor d.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W .3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)

.
IV . Ana ly sis

We be g in our revie w by rea ffirming the premise that custody and visitation dec isions are among the most important decisions that courts make. Steen v. Steen, 61 S.W .3d 324, 327 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 01 ); Ad

e lsp e rg e r v . A de lsp e rg e r, 970 S.W .2d 482, 484 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Promoting the c hil d' s w e lf

are by c re a tin g a n e nv ir on me nt that pr omo te s a nu rturing re latio ns hip wi th b oth p ar en t s i s t h e c h i ef

p u rpose in custody

decisions. Aaby v . Strange, 924 S.W .2d 623, 629 (Tenn. 1996)

. Be cause children a

re more likely to thrive i n a st able environment, the courts favor e x isting custody arr ang ements. Id. a t 62 7; T ay l o r v . T ay lor , 84 9 S .W. 2d31 9, 33 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; Hoalcraft v. Smithson, 19 S.W .3d 822, 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Acustody decision, once made a nd implemented, is considere d re s ju dic ata upon the fa cts in exi stence or re asonably fore seea ble when the decision wa s made. Y oung v. Smith, 19 3 T e nn . 4 80 , 4 85 , 2 46 S.W. 2d93 , 9 5 ( 19 52 ); Steen, 61 S.W. 3da t 32 7; Solima v. Solima, 7 S.W .3d 30, 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). The g overning statute in t h is case, T .C.A. § 36-6-101(B ), provides that in cases whe rein a party seeks t o modify

an existi ng custody

arr ang ement, the thre shold issue is whether a materia l chang e in circ umstances ha s occur red since the initial custody determination: (B ) I f the issue befor e the court is a modification of the c ourt' s prior d e c r e e p e rt a i n i n g t o c u s t o d y, t h e p e t i t i o n e r m u s tp r o v e b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e a materia l c hang e in circ umstance. A materia l chang e of c ircumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of har m t o the child. A material chang e of c ir c ums ta nc e ma y

inc lud e , b ut i s n ot l imi te d to , fa ilu re s to adh e re to the par enting plan or a n order of custody

and visitation or c ir c ums ta nc e s th a t ma

ke the parent ing plan n o lo ng e r i n th e be st interest of the child.-4- (i ) In e a c h c ontes ted case, the c ou rt sh a ll m ake su c h a

fi nd ing a s to the re ason and the fac ts that con s t i t u te the basis for the custody determination. T.C.A. § 36-6-101( B)

. We rec og nize that the ci rc u m s t an ces of children a nd their par ents cha ng e – childre n g row older, their ne eds cha ng e, one or both parties re marry . But not all chang es in the circ umstances of the parties and the c hild warrant a cha ng e in custody . There are no hard and fast rule s for whe n there has bee n a chang e of c ircumstance sufficie nt to just ify a chang e in custody

. Cranston v. Combs, 106 S.W. 3d64 1, 64 4 ( Ten n. 20 03). A c ou rt ' s d e c isi on wi th r e g ardto m od if ic a tio n o f c us tod y

is conting ent upon the cir cumstance s prese nted, and the c ourt should consider whe ther: 1) the c hang e occ urre d afte r the e ntry of the orde r soug ht to be modified, 2) the c hang ed cir cumstance s were not r easona bly anticipated w hen the unde rly ing de cre e was e ntere d, and 3 ) t h e c h a n g e i s o n e t h a ta f f e c t s t h e c h i l d ' s w e l l

- b e i n g i n a m e a n i n g f

u l w a y. Ke n d r ick, 90 S .W.3da t 57 0; Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W. 3d13 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; Cranston, 106 S.W. 3da t 64 4. Cus tod y de c isi on s ar e no t inte nd e d, a nd sh ou ld not be de sig ne d, to r e wa rdpa re nts for prior virtuous c onduct, nor to punish them for their human fra ilties or past missteps. Oliver v

. Oliver, No. M2002-02880-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 892536 at * 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., Apr. 26, 20 04 ); Kesterson, 17 2 S. W.3 d at 56 1; Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W .3d 877, 885 (Tenn. Ct. App

. 2 000). The pa rty seeking to chang e an e x isting custody arr ang ement has the burden of proving that there has been a materia l c hang e of circ umstances. T.C.A. § 36- 6-101(B ). I f the pe rson see king the chang e of c ustody

cannot de monstrate that the c hild's c ircumstance s have chang ed in some material way , the trial court should not reexamine the compar ative fitness o f t he par ents, Caudill v. Foley, 2 1 S

. W

. 3 d 2 0 3 , 2 1 3 ( T e n n . C t

. A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) , o r e n g a g e i n a

“ b e s ti n t e r e s t s o f

t h e c h i l d ” a n a l y s i s . In the abse nce of

proof of a material chang e in the child 's circ umstances, the trial court should not chang e custody

. Ho alc ra ft, 19 S.W .3d at 828. Apply ing the above analy sis to the present case , our review of the re cord pe rsuade s us that the evidence p re p o n d er ates a g ainst a conc lusion that Mr. Curtis has proven a mate rial cha ng e of c ir c ums ta nc e s a ff

e c tin g the c hil dr e n’ s w e ll- be ing in a ma te ri a l w a y

that w ou ld j us tif

y the “ dr a sti c reme dy ” of chang ing custody

. See O liver, 20 04 WL 89 25 36 a t *5 ; Pe re z v . Ko rn be rg , No. M2004- 01 90 9- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 6 WL 15 40 25 4 a t *1 6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . W. S., June 6, 20 06 ). We a dd re ss the alleg ations of the complaint, and the proof at the hearing supporting them, individually

. Reg arding Ms. Curtis’s history of l iving with men out side marria g e, she te stified that afte r t h e d i v o rc e, s h e l i v ed wi t h J o h n T o wn s en d fo r a p er i o d o f t i m e b ef o re m arry i n g h i m . He r m arri ageM s. C urt i s’ s b ri ef s t at es t hat s he and M r. K ers t ei ns have go t t en m arri ed s i nce t he heari ng. 1
-5- to Mr. Townsend laste d approximately two months. Ms. Curtis testified that Mr. Townsend g ot very abusive with her while the children w ere with Mr. Curtis, and that she had him ar rested f or abuse , divorce d him and “the kids neve r saw him ag ain.” Ms. Curtis admit ted that at the time of the hea ring , she wa s living with Mr. Ke rsteins outside wedlock. She testified without contradic tion that at t hose t imes when the children a re pr esent at her 1 residenc e, Mr. Ke rsteins alway s sleeps on the couch. Ms. Curtis stated that since the divorc e, two oth e r m e n h a d s pe nt the nig ht at her re sid e nc e , but not wh e n the c hil dr e n we re pr e se nt. Mr . Cu rt is sim ila rl y a dmi tte d to ha vin g ov e rn ig ht g ue sts of the op po sit e se x whe n th e c hil dr e n w e re no t pr e se nt. A custodial par en t ’s n o n -m ar i t al s exual activities may be appr opriately

considere d in the context of a custody decision. Earls, 42 S.W .3d at 890. Howe ver, “ we ha ve re peate dly pointed out that cohabitation alone does not nec essarily provide g rounds for chang ing c ustody when ther e is no proof that it has or will adver sely aff ect the c hildren.” Id.; se e Varley v. Varley, 934 S.W .2d 659, 66 6- 67 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 6) ; Sutherland v. Sutherland, 831 S.W .2d 283, 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 91 ); Nelson v. Nelson, 66 S.W. 3d89 6, 90 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 001) ; Fa in v . F ain , No. M1999- 02261-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1879548 at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. E.S., Dec. 29, 2000). A pare nt’s se xua l c on du c t, i f p ra c tic e d in app ro pria te ly or ind isc ri min a te ly , c a n a dv e rs e ly a ff e c t a c hil d’ s w e llbeing and in those ca ses, such c onduct ca n be an importa nt f actor in c ustody

determinations. Be rry v. Be rry, No. E2004-01832-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1277847 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., May 31, 2 0 0 5 ) . I n Parke r v . P ar

k e r, 986 S.W .2d 557, 563 (Tenn. 1999) , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court acknow ledg ed that “se x ual indiscretion does not, by itself, disqualify a pare nt f rom being awa

rded custody , but it may be a rele vant fa ctor if it involves the neg lect of the child.” See also Lock miller v . Lo c k mi lle r, N o . E 2 0 0 2

- 0 2 5 8 6

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 2 0 0 3 W L 2 3 0 9 4 4 1 8 a t* 5 , 2 0 0 3 T e n n . A p p . LE X IS 953 at *14 (Te nn. Ct. App. E.S., Dec. 30, 2004).

The re cord be fore us offe rs no proof that Ms. Curtis negle cted the c hildren bec ause of sexual indiscretion, nor that they suffe red a ny

adver se conse quence beca use of the pr esenc e of Mr

. Ker steins at her residenc e. The re is proof in the rec ord supporting the conc lusion that the children are g e ne ra lly

he a lth y , w e ll- a dju ste d, a nddo ing we ll i n s c ho ol i n th e prima ry c us tod y of Ms. Curtis

. Th e te sti mon y

in the re c or d d oe s n ot s up po rt Mr . Cu rt is’ s a lle g a tio n th at Mr. Ke rs te ins “ ve rb a lly berates” the c hildren, althoug h it doe s show that he “ra ises his voice” to them on oc casion. We do no t c on do ne Ms. Curtis ’s c ho ic e to c oh abit a te wi tho ut b e nefit of marria g e ; bu t, s ta nd ing a lon e , it c l e ar l y d o e s n o t r i s e t o t h e l e v e l o f a m a t e r i a l c h a n g e i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s w arr a n t i n g c h a n g e o f c u s t o d y. Reg arding Mr. Curtis’s alleg ation that Ms. Curtis had not foste red a positive father -daug hter relationship between him and the c hildren, the pa rties testified about a single incident which mig ht arg uably support this a ssertion. Mr. Curtis, who coac hes his daug hters’ softball teams, testified a s fo llo ws abo ut this inc ide nt:-6- A: The a ltercation that we had on the ba ll field was t h e fi rs t that’s happene d at a ball field. But no, she’s tried to keep me f rom coa ching in the pa st.
Q: So there wa s an alter cation ac tually on the field?

A: I t w a sn ’t

on . Sh e wa s s it tin g in the sta nd s. I wa s o n th e fi e ld co ac h i n g. *** A: Okay

. Well, B ay lee was g etting f rustrate d. She was pitching . She was g etting f

rustrate d with herself

beca use she c ouldn’t thr o w a strike. So she stomped the g round. Her mother y ells at her from the stands. Iturned a

round to her mother

and said, “ You ca n’t do that beca use it’s y our fault the way she’s a cting , the way

she is.”
Q: So y our daug hter stomped the g round in disgust a nd ang er on the field. He r mother y elled at he r to not act that way . You turned around a nd confr onted her mother and said, “You c an’t say anything b e c a u s e i t ’ s y o u r

f a u l ts h e ’ s t h a tw a y ?”

A: Yes.
Q : Y o u t h i n k

t h a tw a s h e r

m o t h e r ’ s f

a u l t ?

A: You wouldn’t let me t el l the example of why . But y es, it’s her mother’s fa

ult.

Mr. Curtis further stated that Ms. Curtis “g ave me an ultimatum that I had to quit coaching or she wa s g oin g to m ake the g ir ls q uit play ing .” Whil e Ms. Curtis didno t den y makin g a state me nt to this e ff e c t, the re is no ev ide nc e that she c arrie d out the thr e a t to make he r d a ug hte rs sto p p la y ing so ft ba ll. I n s umm ary , the re c or d re fl e c ts that the pa rt ie s’ re la tio ns hip ha s n ot b e e n h arm on iou s, bu t Mr . Cu rt is ha s no t pr e se nte d e vid e nc e that Ms. Curtis ha s be ha ve d in su c h a way a s to un derm in e his r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s d a u g h t e r s , p ar t i c u l ar l y n o t t o a d e g r e e t h a t w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e tr i a l c ou rtto ree x amine the parties’ compar ative fitness, or to make a chang e in the existi ng custodial situation.

Re g ard ing Mr . Cu rt is’ s a lle g a tio n that Ms. Cur tis do e s no t e nc ou ra g e the c hil dr e n s piritu a lly an d d o e s n o t ta

k e th e m to c h u r c h r e g u la r ly , M s . Cu r ti s s tate d th a t s h e d id n o t a tte nd churc h on a-7-

reg ular basis, either with or without the children. Whil e this de cision may not be one that a court approve s or condone s, we do not believe that it is an appropriate role of the courts to punish a parent for suc h a dec ision by taking custody of his or her c hildren aw ay . There was no e vidence that the decision not to reg ularly

attend chur ch re prese nted a c hang e of c ircumstance s from the time of the execution of the MDA.

V . Conclu sion

For the af

o r e me n ti o n e d r e a s o n s , w e h o ldth a t th e e v id e n c e p r e p o n d e r a te s a g a in s t th e trial court’s f inding that ther e had be en a materia l c hang e of circ umstances to justify a chang e in custody a ndthe re fo re the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in c ha ng ing prima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt status fr om M s. Curtis to Mr. Curtis. Thejudgme nt of the trial court is rever sed, and the case rema nded for a dete rmination of Mr . Cu rt is’ s c hil d su pp ort ob lig a tio n, pu rs ua nt to the Te nn e sse e Chi ld Sup po rt Gu ide lin e s. Cos ts on app e a l are a sse sse d to the Ap pe lle e , Ro dn e y Sha ne Curtis

.

_________________________________________ SHARON G. LEE, J UDGE