No. 80-249 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1981 

MARJORIE B. KEISER, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

STATE BOARD OF REGENTS OF 

HIGHER EDUCATION and WILLIAM TIETZ, 

Respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Gallatin. 

Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Gregory 0. Morgan argued, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Roger N. Flair argued, Bozeman, Montana 

- 

Submitted: February 20, 1981 

Decided: May 1, 1981 

Filed: - 1 1981 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Marjorie B. Keiser, petitioner, sued the respondents in 

District Court, Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin 

County, for mandamus and declaratory judgment. She contended 

that the "continuous tenure" term of her last contract as 

Director of the School of Home Economics at Montana State 

University entitled her to receive the salary and the terms 

of that last contract, though she was no longer employed as 

the Director. After a nonjury trial, her petition for 

mandamus and declaratory judgment was denied. She has 

timely appealed. 

The issue for us to decide is what the term "continuous 

tenure" meant in the contracts between these parties. 

Under a contract dated January 15, 1968, Marjorie 

started her employment with the Montana State University, as 

a "Professor and Director" of the School of Home Economics. 

Her appointment was for the remainder of the academic year 

(January 15, 1968 to June 30, 1968). Her tenure status 

described on the contract was "annual" and her salary was 

fixed at $18,000 for the academic year. 

On April 8, 1968, she signed a contract of employment 

for the 1968-1969 academic year (September 1, 1968 to June 

30, 1969) as "Director, School of Home Economics". She was 

assigned the rank of "Professor" and her tenure status was 

described as "annual" with a salary of $18,000. 

On April 14, 1969, Marjorie again signed the contract 

of employment for the 1969-70 academic year (September 1, 

1969 to June 30, 1970) as "Director, School of Home Economics" 

at Montana State University. Her rank was that of "Professor" 

and her tenure status was "annual", with a salary of $18,600. 
During the 1969-70 academic year, while Marjorie was on 

academic year appointment, she was recommended for "continuous 

tenure" with a rank of a full "Profes~or.~ 

On April 14, 1970, she signed a contract of employment 

for the 1970-71 academic year (September 1, 1970 to June 

30, 1971) as "Director" of the School of Home Economics at 

Montana State University; again she held the rank of "Professor", 

and her tenure status was described as "permanent" with a 

salary of $19,700. 

On July 13, 1971, she signed a further contract of 

employment for the 1971-72 academic year (September 1, 1971 

to June 30, 1972) as "Director, School of Home Economics" at 

Montana State University. Her contract stated she held the 

rank of Professor, that her tenure status was "permanent" 

and that her salary was $19,800. 

On April 11, 1972, petitioner entered into a contract 

for employment for the 1972-73 academic year (September 1, 

1972 to June 30, 1973) as "Director" of the School of Home 

Economics at the university; her contract gave her the rank 

of full "Professor", her tenure status was "permanent" and 

her salary was $20,450. 

On April 24, 1973, she entered into a contract for 

employment for the 1973-74 academic year (September 1, 1973 

to June 30, 1974) as "School Director" of the School of Home 

Economics at the university; her contract stated that she 

possessed the rank of "Professor", that her tenure status 

was "permanent" and her salary was $21,465. 

On May 20, 1974, Marjorie again contracted for employment 

year 

during the 1974-75 academic X~eptember 1, 1974 to June 30, 

1975) as "School Director" of the School of Home Economics 

at Montana State University. Again, the contract stated 

that she held the rank of "Professor" and her tenure status 

was "permanent" with a salary of $23,533. 
Each year of her employment as Director of the School 

of Home Economics, petitioner had been making status reports 

to her supervising dean. The administrative load of the 

school, particularly as it related to her, was a continuing 

subject of those status reports. Particularly on December 

16, 1974, she reported that the increasing demands of administrative responsibility and the heavy teaching loads imposed 

on others in her school had been a burden and it had been 

impossible to get the help of any of the others to carry out 

some administrative responsibility. She pointed out that 

the ten-month academic term (AY) did not give her the flexibility 

needed nor sufficient time for both research and her administrative 

duties. She suggested that she ought to be given a twelvemonth contract (FY) and an assistant director to aid in the 

administrative duties. Probably as a result, petitioner was 

given a contract of employment for FY 1975-76 (extending from 

July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1976). She was again denominated 

the "School Director" of the School of Home Economics. Her 

contract stated she held the rank of "Professor" and that 

her tenure status was "continuous", with a salary of $27,500, 

of which $2,000 was noted to be "for directorship." 

On June 7, 1976, she again contracted with Montana 

State University for employment for FY 1976-77 (July 1, 1976 

to June 30, 1977) as "School Director" of the School of Home 

Economics. Again her contract gave her the rank of "Professor" 

and her tenure status was "continuous"; her salary was 

$28,850 of which $2,000 was "for directorship." 

On July 11, 1977, petitioner entered into her last 

contract of employment as a director, for FY 1977-78 (~uly 

1, 1977 to June 30, 1978) of the School of Home ~conomics, 

Her contract stated that she held the rank of "~rofessor", 
that her tenure status was "continuous" and that her salary 

was $30,000. It was noted that she was "on assignment to 

USDA from 9/1/77 through 6/1/78 with full costs to be reimbursed 

by USDA." No allocation of salary for directorship appears 

in the July 11, 1977 contract. 

In 1978, Dr. William J. Tietz, as president of Montana 

State University, reorganized the administrative hierarchy 

in such manner that the directorship of home economics was 

no longer open to petitioner. In consequence, on May 30, 

1978, she was offered a contract of employment for AY 1978- 

79 (September 1, 1978 to June 30, 1979) as "Professor of 

Home Economics"; her offered contract said that she held 

the rank of "Professor of Home Economics", that her tenure 

status was "continuous" and her salary would be $25,000 for 

the academic year. On June 19, 1978, petitioner signed the 

contract "under protest", stating that the contract offered 

was a violation of her rights as a tenured faculty member 

with a salary of $30,000 for FY 1978-79. 

Petitioner's subsequent contracts have been for the 

ensuing academic year and have likewise been signed under 

protest by her under her continuing contention that she was 

tenured as a faculty member for a salary of $30,000 since 

June 30, 1978. 

It is suitable now to set out the contract upon which 

petitioner bases her claim of tenure: 

"MONTANA UNIVERSITY SYSTEM 

Helena, Montana 

PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 

Date July 11, 1977 

THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF 

THE STATE OF MONTANA, on behalf of the named 

institution, hereby enters into a contract of 
employment with the employee hereinafter 

named, such contract to be by and between the 

institution and the individual and subject to 

the following stated terms and conditions, and 

in the case of tenurable professionals, subject 

also to the rules and regulations of the Board 

of Regents of Higher Education governing tenure 

and termination. 

Institution Montana State University 

Name Marjorie B. Keiser 

Title School Director 

Academic Rank Professor 

Department School of Home Economics 

Tenure : Probationary Appointment 

Continuous Tenure X 

Non-Tenurable 

Term of Contract: Academic Year 

From To 

Fiscal Year X 

From July 1, 1977 

To June 30, 1978 

Other 

Annual Salary $30,00O(FY)* 

Payable in 12 installments 

Special Conditions * - On assignment to 

USDA from 9/1/77-6/1/78 with full cost 

to be reimbursed by USDA. 

/s/ W G Walter /s/ Lawrence H. Pettit 

President Commissioner of Higher 

Education 

This contract, when used for tenurable professionals, 

is made subject to the rules and regulations of the 

Board of Regents of Higher Education governing tenure 

and termination of employment. A copy of these rules 

is attached and made a part hereof. Your acceptance 

of this contract constitutes an acknowledgment and 

acceptance of all provisions of these rules. 

Date Aug. 12, 1977 /s/ Marjorie Keiser 

Signature of Employee 

To be valid this acceptance of employment 

must be returned with the proper signature 

to the president of the above institution 

within twenty-one (21) days of the date of 

notice of professional employment. " 

Attached to that contract as an integral part is the 

following: 
"Board of Regents of Higher Education Rules for 

Tenure and Termination 

TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENTS: . . . 

9. Terminations -- Not for Cause. . . 

(b) Financial exigency - or discontinuance of 

program or department. In a termination of 

appointment based upon bona fide financial 

exigency, or bona fide discontinuance of a 

program or department of instruction, the dismissal procedures established in Section ll(a) 

shall apply. 

In every case of termination related to financial 

exigency or bona fide discontinuation of a program 

or department of instruction, a member of the 

professional staff will be given notice of termination as soon as practible, but in no case less 

notice than specified in Section 3 above. In the 

event that such notice is not given, the professional 

staff member shall be entitled to severance salary 

for the period of required notice, dating from the 

time written notice was given. 

Before terminating an appointment because of 

financial exigency or discontinuance of a program 

or department of instruction, the institution will 

make every effort to place the affected member of 

the professional staff in another academic position 

for which he is qualified in the institution. If 

an appointment is terminated before the end of the 

period of appointment because of financial exigency, 

or bona fide discontinuance of a program or department of instruction, the released professional 

staff member's position will not be filled by a 

replacement within a period of two years, unless 

the released member has been offered reappointment 

and a reasonable time within which to either accept 

or decline." 

The District Court found, among other things, that 

department heads, directors, deans and vice presidents at 

Montana State University, as well as the president, have an 

opportunity to acquire tenure status - to academic positions 

to which they have "retreat rights." Essentially, these 

rights give to the possessor thereof the right to be offered 

employment on the academic (instructional-research) staff 

upon resignation or removal (except for cause) from their 
respective administrative positions. The court further 

found that neither the Board of Regents nor the University 

provided or intended that administrators exercising "retreat 

rights" would have the right to demand that they continually 

receive their administrative salaries or be employed for the 

FY term of their administrative positions. The court also 

found that throughout petitioner's employment, she understood 

that her primary responsibilities were administrative and 

not professorial, that the conversion of her contract from 

AY to FY status with its corresponding increase in salary 

was directly related to her employment as Director of the 

School of Home Economics and not as a Professor, and that 

the conversion of her employment contract to an FY status 

was based upon her request because of her burdensome administrative duties. The District Court therefore concluded 

that her tenure rights did not give her a right to be employed 

for the FY term nor for the salary for which she was employed 

under her 1977-78 employment contract, as Director of the 

School of Home Economics. On that basis, the court dismissed 

the petition for mandamus and denied declaratory judgment, 

and granted the respondents the right to recover their costs 

in defending the action. 

In addition to what we have set forth above respecting 

the contract for 1977-78, that contract and each other 

contract included the following paragraph 5 under "CONDITIONS 

OF EMPLOYMENT" : 

"5. Continuous Tenure Appointments. The 

appointment of a member of the professional 

staff beginning his or her eighth year or 

its equivalent of full-time service constitutes 

an award of continuous tenure status. . . The 

appointment of a member of the professional staff 

beginning his or her fifth year or its equivalent 

of full-time service at the institution in the 

rank of associate professor or of professor 

constitutes an award of continuous tenure status. 
"Once the professional staff member qualifies for 

and is granted tenure, his professional faculty 

contract of employment, and his tenure, shall be 

with the appropriate institution within the Montana 

University System and not with the Montana University 

System. I' 

The contract further provides in paragraph 8, "Terminations", that a termination of faculty member with continuous 

tenure may be "effected" by the institution "either for 

adequate cause, or not for cause as defined below". Terminations 

"not for cause" include retirement by virtue of age or 

termination by virtue of financial exigency or discontinuance 

of a program or department. 

The term~"continuous tenure" is not defined in the 

1977-78 contract, nor in any of petitioner's employment 

contracts, although the meaning of that term is the kernel 

of this case. All of her employment contracts since 1970 

have denoted her tenure status as "continuous" or "permanent". 

It was incumbent upon the District Court, and now upon us, 

to determine what the parties meant in the use of "continuous 

tenure" as applied to the petitioner. 

When the terms of the agreement have been reduced to 

writing by the parties, it is to be considered as containing 

all the contractual terms. Section 28-2-905(1), MCA. If 

there is an extrinsic ambiguity in the terms, resort may be 

had to other evidence. Section 28-2-905(2), MCA. An 

ambiguity exists when the contract taken as a whole in its 

wording or phraseology is reasonably subject to two different 

interpretations. S-W Co. v. Schwenk (1977), 173 Mont. 481, 

568 P.2d 145, also printed in 176 Mont. 546. In the construction 

of contracts, courts may look not only to the language 

employed but to the subject matter and the surrounding 

circumstances, and may avail themselves of the same light 

which the parties possess when the contract is made. Kintner 

v. Harr (1965), 146 Mont. 461, 408 P.2d 487. 
The District Court concluded that the 1977-78 employment contract did not give petitioner tenure as to salary 

or as to the FY term. Those conclusions were derived from 

evidence outside the contract, because nothing in the last 

1977-78 employment contract reflects anything but that 

petitioner's tenure, with rank of professor, is for a salary 

of $30,000 and a FY term. Unlike its predecessor FY contracts, 

no allocation of salary appears in the 1977-78 contract for 

her administrative duties. To determine whether the District 

Court was entitled to those conclusions, we must ourselves 

look to the subject matter, that is the meaning of continuous 

tenure, and the surrounding circumstances, in the "sane light 

which the parties possessed when the contract was made." 

Kintner v. Harr, supra. 

There is no constitutional or statutory right to tenure 

for professionals in the university system in Montana. Tenure 

rights, if they exist, must be found in the contracts of 

employment between the university system and the professional. 

The evidence here is, agreed to by both parties, that at 

Montana State University, each professional contract is 

individually negotiated. Since the contracts are individually 

negotiated, resort to other contracts of other professionals 

for evidence of their terms gives us little guidance as to 

what Montana State University and the petitioner meant when 

they negotiated and executed the 1977-78 employment contract. 

Tenure, in its ordinary meaning, is the fact, manner, 

or means of holding possession or control of that which is 

296 I11.App. 310, 

one's own. People v. McCahey (1938),/15 N.E.2d 988, 993. 

A common characteristic of all employment tenure agreements 

is that the institution makes a general commitment for employment which is generally expected to continue, with the 
employee's consent, until his death or retirement. Hennessey 

v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. (5th Cir. 1977), 564 

F.2d 1136, 1142. Tenure is the status which protects a 

professional from dismissal, except for incompetence or 

serious misconduct. Collins v. Parsons College (Iowa 1973), 

203 N.W.2d 594. Academia and both parties here seem to 

agree that: 

"Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: 

(a) Freedom of teaching and research and of 

extramural activities, and (b) A sufficient 

degree of economic security to make the profession 

attractive to men and women of ability. Freedom 

and economic security, hence tenure, are indispensable to the success of an institution in 

fulfilling its obligations to its students and to 

society." American Association of University 

Professors and the American Association of Colleges, 

Statement of Principles - on Academic Freedom and 

Tenure (1940) . 

If then academic freedom and economic security are the 

goals of tenure, we determine that the parties had these 

goals in mind when the 1977-78 employment contract was 

executed. The three essential ingredients of that employment 

contract which were subject to tenure are: (1) The professional 

rank, (2) the salary, and, (3) the number of months contracted 

(the FY term). 

Here the respondents carztend that only the professional 

rank of professor was tenured, and that even as to that, 

petitioner was guaranteed only due process in holding that 

rank in subsequent years. Although the 1977-78 employment 

contract contains nothing with respect to an allocation of 

salary for her administrative duties, the respondents here 

unliaterally assigned a reduction of her salary to represent 

that component when they offered petitioner the 1978-79 AY 

contract. If "continuous tenure" allows that, then tenure 

means little or nothing and the goal of economic security, 

as important as the goal of academic freedom, no longer exists. 
We are aided in our determination in this case that 

tenure included both salary and the FY term by the fact 

that respondents drew the contracts and had it completely 

within their power to describe the tenure rights otherwise. 

We see no harm to the university system from such a construction of this contract. Since each professional contract 

is individually negotiated, nothing prevents the institutions 

now or in the future from negotiating the ingredients of 

tenure as to form and extent. In the negotiating process, 

the professional rank will draw the least argument. That 

would ordinarily be the first step taken. With regard to 

salary and AY or FY terms, the institutions can set forth 

particularly what is tenured and what is not. In the 

petitioner's case, the terms of the 1977-78 employment contract 

are better construed in favor of the professional, since it 

was within the power of the institution to specify on the 

contract any deviation from continuous tenure of her full 

salary or the full fiscal year term. 

We see no hardship in requiring the institution to 

hire the petitioner for the full FY term. She was employed 

by the institution during the summer of the 1978-79 year, 

for which she was paid $5,431 by the institution. 

Having so determined the ingredients of petitioner's 

tenured status, we must reverse the District Court decision 

here. We remand the cause to the District Court with 

directions to grant the writ of mandamus for which she 

prayed, and to fix and determine the damages, if any, to which 

she is entitled. In that connection, her tenured status 

would entitle her to such increments as would ordinarily 

accrue following the 1977-78 year to professors of her 

rank and status in the institution. She is further entitled 

to her costs in prosecuting this action. 
------ 

Justice 

We Concur: 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: 

I would affirm the complete and thorough findings of 

fact and conclusions of law and judgment of the District 

Court in this matter. We are not considering a question of 

tenure . Both parties admit that the tenure question is 

part of Dr. Keiser's contract with the University. The 

question is whether appellant is entitled to the salary of 

an administrative position which she no longer holds. 

When the language of appellant's 1977-1978 employment 

contract is examined, there is no question that the 

University had a right to refuse to reemploy Dr. Keiser in a 

director's job, to refuse to give her a director's salary, 

or to hire her for a director's term. The rules and 

regulations of the Montana Board of Regents of Higher 

Education have been carefully examined, and I find no 

substantial evidence upon which the majority can rest its 

opinion. My review has not revealed any authority on which 

Dr. Keiser could rely to retain her present salary; nor can 

I find case law on any known statutory tenure within this 

State or otherwise which would support either the salary or 

the term of Dr. Keiser's contract. 

A search of the treatises involved in this subject 

matter fails to reveal any authority indicating that a 

concept of nonstatutory tenure provides a guarantee of a 

particular salary or a term of contract. On the contrary, 

the persuasive authorities indicate a general consensus 

among the scholars and academicians that while there is no 

precise, universally-accepted definition of the nonstatutory 

tenure concept, the rights accorded by the latter are 

essentially procedural, i .e., tenure assures against a 
refusal to reappoint the faculty unless and until certain 

"due process" procedures are adhered to. See Statement of 

Principles on Academic Freedom andTenure, American 

Association of University Professors and the American 

Association of Colleges (1940); Legal Handbook for 

Educators, P. Hollander, 132 Westview Press (1978). 

Dr. Keiser failed to prove that she placed any 

reliance on any generally promulgated or accepted concept of 

tenure which supports her position that her "tenure rights" 

give her the right of receiving the director's salary or to 

be employed for the director's term in view of the fact that 

she no longer was employed as the director of the school of 

home economics. Concerning the question of her salaried 

rights in an already recognized tenured position as a 

professor, there is ample authority that supports the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment of the 

District Court. 

The case of Barnes v. Washington State Community 

College Dist. No. 20 (1975), 85 Wash.2d 90, 529 P.2d 1102, 

fully addresses the question of the interpretation and the 

application of nonstatutory tenure in the State of 

Washing ton. There the Supreme Court refused to extend 

tenured rights to departmental chairmen and, in so doing, 

held that such a refusal was "consistent with the accepted 

purposes of tenure." The question of the meaning and the 

purpose of tenure brought this response: 

". . . The interpretation we have given them 

[the teacher tenure statutes] is the most 

reasonable to us in light of their language 

and apparent purpose. Most importantly, this 

interpretation is consistent with the 

accepted purpose of tenure, which is the 

primary concern of these statutes. The most 

authoritative source regarding the meaning 
and the purpose of tenure is the American 

Association of University Professors. In 

1940, the Association issued a Statement of 

Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure 

which made clear that the purpose of tenure 

is to protect the faculty member in the 

classroom and in scholarly research. As 

quoted in C. Byse & L. Joughin, Tenure in 

American Higher Education: Plans, Practices, 

and the Law (1959) at pages 172 and 173: 

"'Institutions of higher education are 

conducted for the common good and not to 

further the interest of either the individual 

teacher or the institution as a whole. The 

common good depends upon the free search for 

truth and its free exposition. 

"'Academic freedom is essential to those 

purposes and applies to both teaching and 

research. Freedom in research is fundamental 

to the advancement of the truth. Academic 

freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental 

for the protection of the rights of the 

teacher in teaching and of the student to 

freedom in learning. It carries with it 

duties correlative with rights.' 

"These purposes would not be served by 

extending tenure to department heads in their 

positions as such, and administrative 

considerations militate against such an 

extension. In a statement adopted in 1966, 

the American Association of University 

Professors said: 

"'The chairman or head of a department, who 

serves as the chief representative of his 

department within an institution, should be 

selected either by departmental election or 

by appointment following consultation with 

the members of the department and of related 

departments; appointments should normally be 

in conformity with department members' 

judgment. The chairman or department head 

should not have tenure in his office; his 

tenure as a faculty member is a matter of 

separate right. AAUP, Policy Documents and 

Reports 38 (1973). ' " Barnes v. Washington 

State Community College Dist. No. 20, supra, 

529 P.2d at 1104. 

This rationale was adopted in a recent Florida Court 

of Appeals decision involving a departmental chairman of the 

University of Miami. Kirsner v. University of Miami 
(Fla.App. 1978), 362 So.2d 449, cert. denied, 367 So.2d 

1124. This case is substantially on all fours with the 

present case. In Kirsner a tenured faculty member of the 

University of Miami brought a declaratory judgment action 

against the University, seeking a declaration that the 

latter was obligated to pay him the same salary he received 

as a department chairman, notwithstanding the fact that he 

no longer held that position. Ruling in favor of the 

University, the Florida Court of Appeals aff irmed and cited 

with approval the Florida District Court's conclusion of law 

which held in part: 

"3. The fact that Plaintiff has tenure as a 

member of the University's faculty does not 

affect the University's right to reduce that 

portion of his salary paid to him for 

performing the duties of a Department 

Chairman since the tenure does not apply to 

administrative duties and positions." 

The rationale of the Washington and Florida courts in 

denying faculty tenure to an administrative position or to 

its salary has been recently recognized by this Court in a 

case involving a "manager of services." Sibert v. Community 

College of Flathead County (1978) , - Mont. - , 587 P.2d 

26, 35 St.Rep. 1780. Admittedly, that case dealt with the 

interpretation and application of statutory language 

(section 20-4-203, et seq. MCA) which covered teacher 

tenure; however, the reasoning articulated therein is 

instructive and applicable to the case at bar. 

Faculty tenure at Montana State University is not an 

inherent employment right, nor is it one which has been 

created or defined by statute. It is a right which results, 

if at all, from an express grant (via regulation, contract 

or otherwise) of the governing body of the Montana 
university system, which is the Board of Regents of Higher 

Education. That Board of Regents receives its powers from 

the Montana Constitution. Therefore, we must look to the 

actions and the enactments of this governing body of the 

university system to find if such a grant has been made, 

and, assuming it has, to the language and/or circumstances 

of the grant to determine the nature and extent of the 

rights that have been accorded. 

The Board of Regents of Higher Education, under Art. 

X, Sec. 9, 1972 Mont. Const., is the governing body of the 

university system. As such, it is vested with "full power, 

responsibility, and authority to supervise, coordinate, 

manage and control the Montana university system. . ." 

Pursuant to this power and authority, the Board of Regents 

has provided for the granting of "tenure" to academic, i.e., 

instructional and research faculty at Montana State 

University under certain circumstances. The procedure by 

which "tenure" is granted, and the rights accorded 

thereunder, are set forth in the Board of Regents of Higher 

Education Rules for Tenure and Termination. These rules 

appear in toto on Dr. Keiser's 1977-1978 employment contract 

and, additionally, were printed in the faculty handbook for 

Montana State University and considered by the trial judge 

in his findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

Paragraph 7, "Transfer of Titles," of the contract 

tenure rules provides: 

"Transfer of Titles. The offices and titles 

of deans, assistant deans, directors, heads 

of departments, and chairmen may be 

transferred by the president of- the 

institution, in his discretion, from one 

member of the professional staff to another 

as the interests of the institution may 

require." (Emphasis added.) 
There is no question that Dr. Keiser held the office 

of the Director of School of Home Economics at the 

"discretion" of the president of the Montana State 

University. She, like other administrators, did not and 

could not acquire tenure to the position, salary, contract 

term or any other privilege of that office. 

By her contract, when Dr. Keiser ceased being 

employed as a director, with the director's salary and term, 

she once again became a tenured professor entitled to the 

salary accompanying that position. 

For the above reasons I would affirm the opinion of 

the District Court.