The Honor able Sidney H. Stein, of the United States District Court for the Southern * District of Ne w York, sitting by desig nation. 08- 2426- cv M oor e v. A ndre no UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m200 8 (Argued J une 17, 2009 Decide d July 27, 2009) M ot io n D ecid ed N ov emb er

2, 2 009 ) Do cket No . 08 -2 426 -c v

RI C HA R D B. M O O RE , Plainti ff-App ellee ,
– v . – T HE C O UN TY O F D ELAWARE , J OS EP H A. A NDR EN O , Delaw are County Deputy Sheriff, and K UR T R. P AL MER , Delaw are County Deputy Sheriff, Defenda nts-Cross-Claim ants-Ap pellan ts .

B ef or e C AB RA N E S and H ALL , Circuit Jud ges , and S T E IN , District Judge
. * By O rde r da te d Ju ly

27 , 2 00 9, thi s C ou rt re ve rse d th e d ist ric t c ou rt’ s de ni a l o f A pp el la nts’ motion for

summary judgment and entered judg ment in Appell ants’ favor. Appella nts, as the prevailing parties, now move for an awa rd of cos ts pur suant to Fed. R. App. P. 39. For the reasons set for th below, w e deny

that motion, and we clarify that, while a n awa rd of cos ts t o a prevai ling party pursuant to Rule 39 is customary, this Court retains discretion to deny costs when, in the exercise of its discr etion, it determines taxation is not appropriate
.Fr ank W. Mill er , T he L aw F ir m o f F r ank W. Mill er , Eas t S yr acus e, N Y, for pla intiff-a ppellee
. Cath er in e E. S tu ckar t, B in gha mt on , N Y, for defendan ts-app ellants
.

P ER C URI AM : Def endants-c ross-cla imants-appellants Joseph A. Andreno, K urt R. Palmer, and the County of De lawar e (c ollectively , “appe llants”), as pr evailingparties be fore this Court, see Moore v . Andreno , 08-2426-c v, 2009 U.S. App. L EXI S 16452 (2d Cir. J uly 27, 2009), now move to rec over c osts incurred in litigating their appea l. SeeFe d. R. App. P. 39. P laintiff-a ppellee Ric ha rd B . M oo re ha s f

ile d o bje c tio ns to t

hat mo tio n, c on te nd ingpr inc ipa lly that c os ts s ho uld not be imposed bec ause Moor e is “ne arly destitute.” Be cause we f

ind that equitable conside rations militate ag ainst tax ing c osts ag ainst Moore, we de ny appellants’ motion. We write brie fly to clarify that, while an a

war d of costs to a preva iling par

ty pursuant to Rule 39 is a customary and ofte n routine proc edure , this Court
re ta ins dis c re tio n to de ny c os ts whe n, in t

he e xer c ise of

its dis c re tio n, it d e te rm ine s taxati on is not appropriate. I. Bac kgr ound Whil e the fu ll f

a c tua l and

pr oc e dura l hi sto ry

of thi s a c tio n h a s b e e n c omp re he ns ive ly detailed by

two panels of this Court, Moore v . Andreno , 505 F.3d 203, 205- 07 (2d Cir. 2007); Mo or e , 2 00 9 U .S. Ap p. L EX I S 16 45 2, a t *1 -7 , w e re vis it that hi sto ry he re on ly ins of ar a s it is rele vant to the instant motion.This action stems from a w arr antless sea rch of Moore’ s persona l study

conducte d by appellants Andr eno and Palmer , both Delawa re County Deputy Sheriffs, in Apr il 2002. That
sear ch uncove red e vidence of drug s and drugpara pherna lia which lea d to Moore’s indictment on
sever al counts of possession of a controlled substanc e. Mo or e , 505 F.3d at 205-06. A state c ourt subsequently

suppressed that evidence and dismissed the indictment. Id. at 206-07. Moore then initiated this ac tion asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and state la

w. Appellants moved f

or summary

judgme nt in their favor , contendingthat even if Moore’ s constitutional rights had be en violated by the sea rch, the Deputy

Sheriffs we re entitled to qualified immunity . The United States District Court for the Northe rn District of Ne w York (T homas J . McAvoy , Judge ) denie d that motion, but a panel of this Court reve rsed, f inding that w hil e a

pp e lla nts ’ s e arc h v iol a te d M oo re ’s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts , th os e ri g hts we re no t c le arl y established at the time of

the violation. Id. at 214-16. On re mand, howeve r, rather than e nteringjudgme nt in appellants’ fa vor, the district cour

t enter tained a ne w theory

of Moore ’s ca se involving a differ ent constitutional violation, one that Moore c ontended wa s clea rly established at the time of the sea rch. A ppellants ag ain moved for summary judgme nt, the district court ag ain denied that motion, and this Court ag ain re verse d, fi nd ingthat a

pp e lla nts we re e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity

and the e ntr y of jud g me nt i n th e ir favor
. Mo or e , 2009 U.S. App. L EXI S 16452, at *10. Appellants now move to re cover taxable costs pursuant to Rule 39 as the pre vailing pa rt ie s and have su bmi tte d a ve ri fi e d b ill of

c os ts t o th e Cle rk

of Court se e kin g re imb ur se me nt i n the amount of $2,572.18. Moore filed timely objections to that bill of costs, seeF e d. R. A pp . P. 39(d)( 2) , ar g uing that tax ation would be unduly burdensome g iven his limi ted financ ial
re so ur c e s. Al te rn a tiv e ly , M oo re argue s th a t an a wa rd of c os ts t o a pp e lla nts wo uld imp ro pe rl ychill future litigation of section 1983 claims, there by preve nting c itiz ens such a s Moore fr om
se e kin g jus tic e in t

he fe de ra l c ourt

sy ste m. II. Discussion F e de ra l Ru le of

Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure 39 g ov e rn s th e ta xati on of a pp e llate c os ts, pr ov idi ng , a s a

g e ne ra l r ule , th a t a pa rt y pr e va ili ngon

a pp e a l ma y re c ov e r c os ts f

ro m it s
a dv e rs ary . Purs ua

nt t o th at Ru le , a

pr e va ili ngpa

rt y se e kin g to r e c ov e r a llo wa ble c os ts mus t f

ile an itemized and ver ified bill of costs with the Clerk of Court. F ed. R. App. P. 39(d)(1) . Be fore the Cle rk may a pp ro ve c os ts, ho we ve r, Rul e 39 (d )( 2) e nti tle s a n o pp os ingpa

rt y to f ile ob je c tio ns , and losing parties c ommonly object to spec ific costs they contend a

re not prope rly

taxable. See, e.g. , Phansalkar v. Ande rsen, W einroth & Co., L.P. , 3 56 F .3 d 1 88 (2 d Ci r. 20 04 ); Maida v. Callahan , 148 F.3d 190 ( 2d Cir. 1998). Moore’ s objections, howeve r, ar e of a differ ent var iety
. Rather than c halleng ing spe cific c osts, Moore conc edes the costs soug ht by appellants a

re allowable but instea d seeks to avoid taxation altoge ther on e quitable grounds. Whil e we have not ha d fre quent occ asion to addre ss tax ation pursuant to Rule 39 in any detail, we ha

ve pre viously

found that a pr evailingparty is presumptively

entitled to an awa

rd of costs. Fu rm an v . Ci rri to , 7 82 F .2 d 3 53 , 3 54 (2 d Ci r. 19 86 ); se e als o 20A J ames Wm. Moore et al. , Moore’

s Federal Prac tice § 339.20 (3d ed. 2008) (“I n g ener al, costs ar e aw arde d to the pr e va ili ngpa

rt y and ta xed a g a ins t th e los ingpa

rt y .” ). As we have e xpla ine d, an a wa rd of c os ts i s the rule, not the e x ception, bec ause c osts are c onsidered “ an incident of judgme nt” rather than a “punitive measur e.” Furman , 782 F.2d at 354. Nonethele ss, we have also observe d that the Rule aff ords “wide discretion in the taxation of costs,” inc luding discr etion to deny costs altog ether
. DLC

Mg mt . Co rp . v . To wn o

f H y dePa rk, 17 9 F .3 d 6 3, 64 (2 d Ci r. 19 99 ). Th a t f ind ingbo th c omp or

ts w iththe pla in l angua g e of the Rul ewh ic h p ro vid e s f or an a wa rd of fe e s “ un le ss . . . the c ourt or de rs oth e rw ise ,” F e d. R. A pp . P. 39(a) , and mirror s the finding s of seve ral other Circuit Courts of Appeals that have re cog nized the discre tionary

nature of Rule 39. See, e .g. , Tung Mung Dev . Co. v. United States , 354 F.3d 1371, 1381-2 (F ed. Cir. 2004) (“ [Rule 39] . . . leaves the a war ding of

costs to the discretion of the cour t . . . . No decision of the Supre me Court or of our own cour t require s that costs be
ro uti ne ly awa rd e d to the pr e va ili ngpa

rt y .” ); Golden Door J

ewelry Creations v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass’n , 117 F.3d 1328, 1341 ( 11th Cir. 1997) (“Rule 39(a ) plac es dis c re tio n in

the a pp e llate c ourt .” ); McD onald v. Mc Carthy , 966 F.2d 112, 115 ( 3d Cir. 1992) (“ I n o rd e ri ngthat e a c h p art y be ar i ts o wn

‘c os ts’ thi s c ourt

wa s c le arl y

and pr op e rl y e xer c isi ngits dis c re tio n und e r R

ule 39 (a ). ” ); Square Constr. Co. v. W ash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 800 F.2d 1256, 1266 (4th Cir. 1986) (“ Under [Rule 39], an appellate court ha s wide discre tion in the ta xati on of c os ts . . . .” ); Kelly v. Me tro. County Bd. of Educ. , 773 F.2d 677, 681 n.4 ( 6th Cir. 1985) (“ Whil e F ed. R. App. P. 39(a) sets forth g ener al guidelines for the awa rd of c osts on
a pp e a l . . . it

a lso a llo ws the a

pp e llate tr ibu

na l w ide dis c re tio n in

re imb ur sin g a

pa rt y fo r i ts expenses.”). As a pr e lim ina

ry matte r, we re a ff

ir m th a t w hil e an a

wa rd of c os ts t o a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y is the no rm and no t th e e xce pti on , Ru le 39 no ne the le ss a ff or ds thi s Co ur

t di sc re tio n to de ny

c os ts even if otherwise pr operly

taxable. I n exercising that discretion—which this Court has previously

descr ibed as “ equitable” in nature, Furman , 782 F.2d at 355—we look to many of the
same fa c tor s th a t guid e a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e qu ita

ble dis c re tio n in

awa rd ingor de nyingc os ts pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 54. Id . Whil e we do not and nee d not compile an exhaustive list of tho se fa c tor s h e re , d e nia l of c os ts m ay

be a pp ro pr iate wh e re a

los ingpa rt y c an d e mon str a te misconduct by

a pre vailing pa

rty , the public importance of the c ase, the difficulty of the issues6

prese nted, or its own limited financial re source s. W hit fie ld v . S c ull y , 241 F.3d 264, 270 ( 2d Cir. 20 01 ); se e als o Transatl antic Marine Claims Agency , Inc. v . AceShipping Corp. , 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (de nying c osts to prevailing party to “emphasize” the Court’s disapproval of “[the preva iling par

ty ’s] cavalier

disreg ard of

ear lier proc eeding s in this case”)
. Ex erc ising that discr etion in light of the f acts pre sented by

this case, we deter

mine that equitable c onsiderations wa rra nt denying a

ppellants’ re quest to rec over c osts. I n particula r, Moore’ s meag er f

inancial r esourc es and his g ood faith prose cution of cla ims alleg ing g overnme nt misconduct by appellants—misconduct sig nificant e noug h to convince a state trial judge to suppress evidenc e and to lea d a pane l of this Court to find a constituti onal violation—counsel in favor of re quiring appellants to bea r their own c osts. III. Conclusi on Acc ording ly , appellants’ motion to rec over c osts pursuant to Rule 39 is denied.