IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

ALAN KAHN, 

Plaintiff, 

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v. 

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C.A. No. 12498-VCG 

MICHAEL D. STERN, EDWARD A. 

STERN, JOSEPH P. DALY, JOHN W. 

POLING and JEFFREY P. BACHER, 

Defendants. 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Date Submitted: May 11, 2017 

Date Decided: August 28, 2017 

Larry R. Wood, Jr., David A. Dorey, Adam V. Orlacchio, of BLANK ROME LLP, 

Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendants. 

Jessica Zeldin, of ROSENTHAL, MONHAIT & GODDESS, P.A., Wilmington, 

Delaware; OF COUNSEL: James S. Notis, Jennifer Sarnelli, of GARDY & NOTIS, 

LLP, New York, New York; Harold B. Obstfeld, of HAROLD B. OBSTFELD, P.C., 

New York, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff. 

GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor 

 
 1

This matter involves a motion to dismiss allegations of breach of fiduciary 

duty by way of a corporate merger, under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The 

complaint itself, if not opaque, is not entirely transparent in its allegations, as 

demonstrated at oral argument. There, even following full briefing centering on the 

complaint, the Plaintiff stockholder and Defendant fiduciaries were unable even to 

agree on what claims were being advanced. 

 In The Lady of Shallot,

1

 Tennyson (presumably unknowingly) provides the 

ideal metaphor for the task of a bench judge addressing such a motion to dismiss. 

The eponymous Lady, of course, exists in a tower on a river island, with the charge 

of weaving a web representing the passing scene along the bank. She may not survey 

this scene directly, lest she suffer the consequences of a mysterious curse; her view 

is limited to the reflections in a mirror, and those reflections are themselves limited 

by the frame of the window out of which the Lady is, again, forbidden to look.2

 So it is with this Motion to Dismiss. I am charged with evaluating the 

Plaintiff’s claim. The true facts from which that claim arises are, at this stage, 

forbidden to me; I am limited to the facts as reflected from the point of view of the 

Plaintiff in his complaint. But that scenario is itself severely limited, constrained as 

it is to those facts the Plaintiff can muster without discovery and the development of 

 

1 See Lord Alfred Tennyson, Poems (W. D. Ticknor, 1842), available at 

https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/45360/the-lady-of-shalott-1842. 

2

 “‘I am half sick of Shadows,’ said/ The Lady of Shallot.” Id.
 2

the record. Only if the Motion is denied may discovery and forensics proceed to 

disclose, not the limited reflection, but the actual view. 

 In the poem, the Lady finds a particular reflection3 so compelling that she 

abandons her mirror, turns to the window, and takes in the full and undistorted view 

(with dolorous consequence).4 I have carefully reviewed here the causes of action 

alleged in the complaint. I am not compelled to proceed to a developed view of the 

facts here. I find that, accepting the well-pled allegations as true and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, the Complaint fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted. I describe the facts as the limited perspective of the 

pleading standard allows me to perceive them, below; I then give my rationale. 

I. BACKGROUND5

This action arises from the sale of a small aerospace manufacturing company, 

Kreisler Manufacturing Corporation (“Kreisler” or the “Company”), and purported 

insider side-deals (the “Side Deals”) in connection with the sale, along with alleged 

disclosure deficiencies to stockholders regarding the sales process. Before the sale, 

the Company was shopped to dozens of potential acquirers, several bidders emerged, 

 

3

 The sight of Sir Lancelot, and/or his horse. See id. 

4

 “Out flew the web and floated wide;/ The mirror crack’d from side to side;/ ‘The curse is come 

upon me,’ cried/ The Lady of Shallot.” Id. 

5

 The facts, except where otherwise noted, are drawn from the well-pled allegations of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint (the “Complaint” or “Compl.”) and exhibits or documents incorporated by 

reference therein, which are presumed true for purposes of evaluating the Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss. 
 3

a fairness opinion was rendered and a special committee ultimately recommended 

the sale to the Board. The transaction was approved by written consent of a majority 

of the shares outstanding and a block of shares of just over fifty percent executed a 

stockholder support agreement providing for approval of the transaction (the 

“Merger”). There are no allegations advanced that a controlling stockholder was 

present. As the Merger was approved via written consent, there was no stockholder 

vote, and an Information Statement was provided to stockholders to inform them 

about the transaction and permit a determination by stockholders whether to seek 

appraisal. 

As discussed below, a majority of the Company’s board of directors (“the 

Board”) are independent and disinterested, and the Company’s charter contains an 

exculpation provision. In light of the foregoing and the absence of a controlling 

stockholder implicating the entire fairness standard of review, the Complaint must 

plead that a majority of the Board acted in bad faith. Two theories are pursued: first 

the existence and effect of the Side Deals on the merger process and price; second, 

alleged misstatements and omissions in the Information Statement provided to 

stockholders. The allegations of the Complaint are recited below, drawing all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. Scattered within the Complaint are 

conclusory statements which I have attempted to exclude from the factual recitation, 

but to the extent such statements are included, I have endeavored to flag them. 
 4

A. The Parties 

The Plaintiff, Alan Kahn, was a stockholder of the Company at all relevant 

times.6 The Plaintiff held his shares in “street name,” that is, he was not a record 

owner of Kreisler shares.7 The Plaintiff purports to bring this direct action as a class 

action on behalf of all other similarly situated stockholders.8 

Each Defendant is a director of the Company. Defendant Michael D. Stern 

“was a director of the Company and its Co-President, CEO, and Treasurer.”9 

Defendant Edward A. Stern “was a director of the Company and its Co-President, 

Chief Corporate Officer, and Corporate Secretary.”10 I refer to Michael Stern and 

Edward Stern here as the “Stern Defendants.” As the beneficiaries of the allegedly 

improper Side Deals, I assume for purposes of this Motion that they were 

“interested” in the Merger. 

Defendant Joseph P. Daly was a director of the Company, and the Complaint 

states, in conclusory fashion, that Daly was “not considered an independent director 

by the board for purposes of the Merger.”11 John W. Poling and Jeffery P. Bacher 

 

6

 Compl. ¶ 6. 

7

Id. 

8 See id. ¶¶ 48–54. 

9

Id. ¶ 7. 

10 Id. ¶ 8. 

11 See id. ¶ 9. 
 5

were both directors of the Company and there is no dispute that they were 

independent for purposes of the Merger.12 

B. The Company, the Sterns and the Transaction 

1. Kreisler Company 

Kreisler is a Delaware corporation with its principal offices in New Jersey, 

engaged in the manufacture of components for industrial and aerospace products.13 

At the time of the Merger, Kreisler was a small, thinly-traded, public company.14 

Kreisler was not subject to “typical SEC-reporting requirements” and was instead 

listed on the so-called “pink sheets.”15

The Company was co-founded in 1918 by the Stern Defendants’ greatgrandfather.16 Throughout the Company’s history various members of the Stern 

family have managed Kreisler.17 The Stern Defendants served as “the sole executive 

officers of the Company” at all relevant times.18 Following the death of Michael and 

Edward Stern’s father, stock was transferred to Michael and Edward Stern as well 

as their two siblings, Jeffery R. Stern and Jody Stern.19 These Stern family members 

 

12 See id. ¶¶ 10–11. 

13 See id. ¶¶ 1, 13. 

14 Id. ¶ 1. 

15 Id. ¶ 14. 

16 Id. ¶ 13. 

17 See id. 

18 Id. 

19 See id. 
 6

collectively owned 42.6% of the Company’s shares.20 The Stern Defendants, 

Michael and Edward, each owned 12.3% whereas Jody and Jeffery each owned 

9%.21

2. Alleged Stern Family In-fighting and Possible Sale of Kreisler 

AB Value Partners LLC (“AB Value”), which owned through affiliates 11.6% 

of Kreisler, attempted a proxy contest in December of 2014. AB Value intended to 

replace half of the Board with its own nominees.22 However, AB Value missed the 

advance notice deadline in Kreisler’s bylaws; it unsuccessfully sought a temporary 

restraining order in the Court of Chancery to block the operation of the advance 

notice bylaw, and ultimately was unsuccessful in unseating the incumbents.23 The 

Complaint in this action alleges that Jeffery Stern supported the AB Value slate and 

the removal of Edward Stern and John Poling as directors of the Company.24 

Ultimately, an annual meeting was held on January 5, 2015 and the incumbent 

directors were reelected.25 The Complaint avers that, during the year of the dispute 

 

20 Id. 

21 Id. 

22 See id. ¶ 15. AB Value sought to remove Edward Stern and John Poling. Id. At the time of AB 

Value’s activism in 2014, Kreisler’s board only had four members: Edward Stern, John Poling, 

Michael Stern, and Joseph P. Daly. Id. 

23 See id. ¶ 16; see also AB Value Partners, LP v. Kreisler Mfg. Corp., 2014 WL 7150465 (Del. 

Ch. Dec. 16, 2014). 

24 Compl. ¶ 16. 

25 Id. ¶ 17. 
 7

with AB Value, the Company increased the base salary of the Stern Defendants by 

57%.26 

Despite AB Value’s failure to place its slate on the Board at Kreisler, it 

continued to hold a large stake in the Company. The Stern Defendants, shortly after 

avoiding the proxy fight, began a “process of exploring a sale of the Company.”27 

The Complaint alleges that given the Company’s status—that it traded only on the 

pink sheets—exit for bulk holders of Company stock presented difficulties.28 

The Complaint states, in conclusory fashion, that: 

[a]ny sale would have to accommodate those members of the Stern 

family seeking an end-stage exit while also permitting [Michael] 

Stern’s continued equity participation and management position in the 

business. Potential buyers who would not accommodate those differing 

interests would not be considered.29

In this vein, the Complaint asserts that before a special committee was formed, the 

Stern Defendants “first hired bankers and lawyers and set the parameters for the sales 

process and an acceptable merger partner.”30 The Complaint points to a meeting 

between the Stern Defendants and SunTrust Robinson, Inc. (“Robinson 

Humphrey”), and the Stern Defendants’ retention of Robinson Humphrey before the 

 

26 Id.; see id. at n.1. Per the numbers provided, it appears the board increased the Stern Defendants 

salary from $175,000 to $275,000. 

27 Id. ¶ 18. 

28 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1, 18. 

29 Id. ¶ 18. 

30 Id. ¶ 19. 
 8

formation of a special committee (the “Special Committee”).31 That is, the 

Complaint alleges that “[o]nly after [the Stern Defendants] hired and discussed the 

sales process with Robinson Humphrey and developed the Confidential Information 

Memorandum was the Special Committee formed.”32 

 Following the Stern Defendants’ initial interactions with Robinson 

Humphrey, on August 21, 2015, the Board elected an additional member, Defendant 

Jeffery B. Bacher, and established a Special Committee to consider strategic 

alternatives, consisting of Defendants Poling and Bacher.33 The Special Committee 

did not retain “any advisors independent of the Company” but used Robinson 

Humphrey as its financial advisor, and Blank Rome LLP, Kreisler’s “main outside 

counsel,” as the Committee’s legal counsel.34 The Complaint avers that Bacher’s 

election to the board was “prompted by the perceived need for another director that 

the Board could consider as ‘independent.’”35 That is, the Plaintiff argues that 

because Daly was not appointed to the Special Committee, I must infer that he was 

not independent in considering the Merger.36 The basis of Daly’s lack of 

independence, according to the Complaint and Plaintiff’s briefing,37 is that he 

 

31 See id. ¶ 19 n.2. 

32 Id. ¶ 20. The Confidential Information Memorandum was a document prepared “for potential 

bidders.” Id. ¶ 19. 

33 Id. ¶ 21. 

34 Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 

35 Id. ¶ 22. 

36 See id. ¶ 23. 

37 See id.; Pl’s Answering Br. 10 n.10, 24 n.20 (citing Compl. ¶ 23). 
 9

favored a sale of the Company, aligned himself with AB Value, and was not subject 

to replacement via AB Value’s slate.38 

 In October 2015, it appeared that AB Value might again attempt a proxy 

contest. On October 19, 2015, AB Value nominated two directors for election at the 

2015 annual meeting, which was ultimately never held.39 Two days after AB Value 

announced it would renew its efforts to partially overturn Kreisler’s Board, the Stern 

Defendants entered into new employment agreements with the Company.40 

3. The Sales Process and the Stern Defendants’ Side Deals 

 From late October through December 2015, potential bidders conducted due 

diligence on Kreisler. Through the sales process, Robinson Humphrey contacted 

“approximately 55 parties” and entered into twenty-seven non-disclosure 

agreements with potential bidders.41 The Company received seven “indications of 

interest.”42 Each of those seven interested parties were invited to participate in 

presentations by the Company’s management in October through December, 2015: 

following the presentations four bidders withdrew, leaving three remaining.43 Those 

three remaining parties submitted bids ranging from $14.23 to $18.25 per share.44 

 

38 See Compl. ¶ 23. The Complaint also notes that Daly agreed to a five-year non-compete and 

non-solicitation provision—the same terms to which Michael Stern agreed. See id. 

39 Id. ¶¶ 24–25. 

40 See id. ¶ 26. 

41 Defs’ Opening Br. Ex. A (the “Information Statement”) at 9. 

42 Id. 

43 Id. 

44 Id. at 10. 
10

Ultimately, “the Special Committee directed Robinson Humphrey to secure best and 

final bids.”45 At this point, one bidder declined to increase and two revised bids 

were submitted.46 Arlington Capital Partners (“Arlington”) was the high bidder with 

a bid of $18.75 per share, as of January 6, 2016.47 Arlington’s bid, however, was 

conditional; “subject to adjustments.”48 

 The Complaint alleges that after Arlington made the $18.75 bid, the Stern 

Defendants “negotiated extra benefits for themselves” and such extra benefits were 

not fully “explained” to stockholders in the Information Statement.49 Specifically, 

the Complaint alleges that while the Company was engaged in negotiations with 

Arlington regarding the Merger, Michael Stern negotiated to secure employment 

with the post-Merger entity, and to rollover a portion of his equity in Kreisler to a 

new equity position in Arlington’s subsidiary, United Flexible Technologies, Inc. 

(“United Flexible”).50 Ultimately, Michael Stern entered into a “Rollover 

Agreement” with United Flexible, and an “Employment Agreement” with Kreisler 

and Arlington at the same time the Merger Agreement was executed.51 Pursuant to 

the Employment Agreement, Michael Stern would be “President and a director of 

 

45 Compl. ¶ 27. 

46 See Information Statement at 10. 

47 Compl. ¶ 28. 

48 Id. 

49 Id. ¶ 29. 

50 Id. ¶ 30. 

51 Id. 
11

post-Merger Kreisler.”52 Similarly, the Complaint alleges that Edward Stern, while 

Kreisler was negotiating the Merger Agreement, negotiated with the Company’s 

Board for an amendment to his (only several month old) Employment Agreement 

“in order to obtain better benefits upon his desired termination from the Company 

when the Merger was completed.”53 Edward Stern and Kreisler entered into an 

amendment to Edward’s Employment Agreement on May 3, 2016.54

 In addition, while the Company was negotiating the Merger Agreement, the 

Stern Defendants both negotiated for a “Sale Bonus Agreement” with Kreisler, that 

was ultimately entered into on April 11, 2016.55 Pursuant to the Sale Bonus 

Agreement both Stern Defendants would “receive up to a $105,000 payment 

(roughly a 38% bump over their annual salary), depending on the Company’s cash 

balance as of the closing of the Merger.”56 The Plaintiff alleges that the cash 

balances necessary to trigger the Sale Bonus Agreement were not adequately 

disclosed.57

 The Complaint concludes that Arlington lowered its bid as a result of the Side 

Deals.58 Arlington’s initial bid of $18.75, “subject to adjustments,” ultimately 

 

52 Id. 

53 Id. ¶ 31. 

54 Id. 

55 Id. ¶ 32. 

56 Id. 

57 Id. ¶ 33. I note, however, that information regarding cash balances to trigger the Sale Bonus 

Agreement is disclosed in the Information Statement. See Information Statement at 19–20. 

58 See Compl. ¶ 34. 
12

resulted in a Merger Agreement at $18.00 per share.59 Although the initial bid was 

“subject to adjustments,” the Information Statement issued to stockholders in 

connection to the Merger does not disclose how or why the reduction occurred.60 

The Complaint concludes that “it appears that the adjustment from $18.75 to $18 

was made in part due to costs associated with the side deals for [the Stern 

Defendants] . . . .” The Plaintiff, via calculations he does not make clear, concludes 

that “the sale bonuses alone cost $0.11 per share.”61 That is, the Complaint requests 

the pleading stage inference that the Side Deals caused the reduction in merger 

consideration. I note the trading price for Kreisler shares the last day before the 

Merger announcement was $11.46 per share.62 

 The full Kreisler Board met on May 26, 2016 and was provided with drafts of 

both the Merger Agreement and the Information Statement.63 The next day, the 

Board met again and received a fairness opinion from Robinson Humphrey before 

unanimously approving the Merger Agreement.64 The Information Statement 

provides that the “Special Committee unanimously approved, and recommend[s] for 

the Board’s approval, the Merger Agreement” prior to the Board approving the 

 

59 Id. 

60 Id. 

61 Id. (emphasis added). 

62 Information Statement at 4. 

63 Compl. ¶ 34. 

64 Id. 
13

Merger.65 The Merger was approved by stockholders via written consent, without a 

stockholder vote.66 The Complaint asserts that the Stern Defendants, Daly, Poling, 

and AB Value (together holding 53.2% of Kreisler) entered into a Stockholder 

Support Agreement and delivered the written consent.67 The Complaint alleges that 

the Special Committee did not meet independently of the full Board on May 26 or 

May 27, 2016, the days “when the final agreements and presentations were being 

considered.”68

4. Merger Terms, Disclosures and Subsequent Events 

The Merger Agreement contained an “Appraisal Out” provision that relieved 

United Flexible from its obligation to consummate the Merger if more than ten 

percent of Kreisler’s outstanding shares sought statutory appraisal.69 The Complaint 

alleges that “all” the Defendants were “pushing to complete the Merger” and “agreed 

to unusual provisions in the Merger Agreement,” and concludes that the Board 

“knowingly failed to provide” certain disclosures in the Information Statement to 

stockholders to minimize appraisal activity which could thwart the Merger.70 

Specifically, the Complaint points to a provision in the Information Statement 

indicating that: 

 

65 Information Statement at 4. 

66 See Compl. ¶ 34. 

67 See id. 

68 Compl. ¶ 35; see Information Statement at 4. 

69 Compl. ¶ 36. 

70 See id. ¶ 36. 
14

a copy of the Merger Agreement . . . is available for review (upon the 

execution of a confidentiality agreement in case of the request to review 

the Company Disclosure Schedule), but not duplication, solely in 

person, at the offices of Blank Rome LLP in Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, upon the request of any stockholder.

71

The Complaint concludes that “[f]orcing stockholders to travel to Philadelphia to 

look at (but not copy) the Merger Agreement is evidence of Defendants’ intentional 

efforts to create unreasonable barriers to stockholders seeking material 

information.”72 Beyond the physical inspection requirement, the Plaintiff points to 

“another unusual provision” in the Merger Agreement which limited access to view 

a copy of the Merger Agreement at Blank Rome’s office in Philadelphia to 

stockholders of record.73 The Plaintiff asserts that the representation in the 

Information Statement that the Merger Agreement was available for review by “any 

stockholder” was “false,” since it was not, according to Plaintiff, explicit that 

“stockholder” in the Information Statement was limited to stockholders of record. 

He concludes, therefore, that the Defendants “knowingly misrepresented the terms 

of the Merger Agreement.”74 The Plaintiff, a beneficial owner,75 learned of this 

stockholder of record limitation when he attempted to view the Merger Agreement.76 

 

71 Id. ¶ 37 (emphasis added). 

72 Id. 

73 Id. 

74 See id. ¶¶ 37, 39. 

75 See id. ¶ 38. 

76 See id. ¶ 37. 
15

 Along with the allegation of a false statement regarding access to the Merger 

Agreement, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants, via inadequacies in the 

Information Statement, hid “material facts about the Company.”77 Specifically, the 

Complaint points to the following alleged omissions: 

 The purported absence of a “fair summary” of the financial advisor’s analysis, 

or current financial information for the Company since the Information 

Statement “only” discloses the results of Robinson Humphrey’s Discounted 

Cash Flow (“DCF”) analysis “in three sentences” and allegedly omits 

information on the “selected companies analysis” and “precedent transactions 

analysis” as well as information about the Company’s order backlog.78 The 

Complaint also alleges that the most recent quarterly financial results were 

withheld until the deadline to seek appraisal had passed.79

 The Defendants’ failure to disclose in the Information Statement the 

“Company’s five-year financial projections provided to Robinson 

Humphrey,” only indicating that they were “favorable.”80

 

77 Id. ¶ 40. 

78 Id. ¶¶ 41–42. 

79 See id.

80 Id. ¶ 43. 
16

 The Defendants alleged failure to provide adequate “disclosure of the sidedeals,” specifically the details of the Rollover Agreement, the Sale Bonus 

Agreement and the New and Amended Employment Agreements.81

 The Defendants alleged failure to explain “how, why, or when” any 

adjustments were made regarding the drop in price per share from $18.75 to 

$18, and any relation it might have with respect to the “timing” of the “selfinterested” Side Deals.82

The Plaintiff’s theory with respect to the disclosure issues outlined above is 

that the Company withheld information to “intentionally prevent[] stockholders 

from making an informed decision with respect to their rights in connection with the 

Merger.”83 The Plaintiff’s theory with respect to the entire transaction, that is, both 

process and disclosure issues, is that the transaction was 

an underpriced Merger designed to meet the various selfish needs of 

different members of the Stern family. Insiders competed for merger 

consideration, secured side deals for themselves, did not engage in a 

value maximizing process, and intentionally thwarted public 

stockholders from determining the higher value of the Company and 

learning of the Defendants’ defective sales process.84

 

81 Id. ¶ 44. 

82 See id. ¶ 45. 

83 Id. ¶ 46. 

84 Id. ¶ 47. 
17

C. Procedural History 

Certain events prior to the filing of this action are worth observing here. As 

noted above, the Merger was announced on May 31, 2016, the Information 

Statement was mailed the same day, and the deadline to seek appraisal was June 20, 

2016.85 The Plaintiff requested a copy of the Merger Agreement on June 15, 2016.86 

That same day it was explained to the Plaintiff that only stockholders of record could 

review the Merger Agreement.87 The Plaintiff did not exercise statutory appraisal 

rights by the June 20, 2016 deadline. 

Instead, the Plaintiff initiated this action via his Verified Class Action 

Complaint on June 23, 2016. The Plaintiff did not seek to block the Merger or 

request any other emergency or expedited relief. The Defendants moved to dismiss 

the initial complaint on August 29, 2016. The Plaintiff then filed a Verified 

Amended Class Action Complaint (the “Complaint”) on October 27, 2016. The 

Defendants again moved to dismiss, and the parties fully briefed the Defendants’ 

Motion. 

The Complaint pleads one count against all the Defendants for breach of 

fiduciary duty. The Complaint states three grounds for its sole count. First, the 

Complaint alleges that the “Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by knowingly 

 

85 See id. ¶ 3. 

86 See id.; Defs’ Opening Br. Ex. B. 

87 See Compl. ¶ 37; Defs’ Opening Br. Ex. C. 
18

engineering and/or approving a sales process designed to benefit the particular 

selfish interests of Company insiders rather than engage in an open process 

reasonably designed to maximize stockholder value.”88 Next, the Complaint alleges 

that the “Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by knowingly competing for 

merger consideration or permitting other insiders to compete for merger 

consideration by securing or approving lucrative deals for M[icheal] Stern and 

E[dward] Stern, all of which resulted in [a] lower Merger price.”89 Finally, the 

Complaint alleges that the “Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by knowingly 

withholding and/or [misrepresenting] material information from stockholders. 

Defendants were presented with the Information Statement, knew that the 

Information Statement omitted material information and made material 

misstatements, and yet approved its dissemination to Kreisler’s public 

stockholders.”90 The Complaint concludes that these actions “unfairly deprived 

Plaintiff and other members of the Class of the true value of their investment in 

Kreisler, as well as their ability to make a fully informed decision as to whether to 

pursue an appraisal, making quasi-appraisal damages an available remedy for the 

Class.”91 The Plaintiff’s theory of breach of duty attacks the process and price of 

 

88 Compl. ¶ 57. 

89 Id. ¶ 58. 

90 Id. ¶ 59. 

91 Id. ¶ 60. 
19

the transaction as well as the disclosures made in connection with the Merger.92 

Among other remedies, the Plaintiff seeks quasi-appraisal for the deprivation of the 

information needed to determine whether to bring an appraisal action, as well as 

rescissory damages, disgorgement and an accounting.93

Oral argument was held on the Defendants’ Motion on May 4, 2017. Shortly 

thereafter, on May 11, 2017 the Defendants submitted a letter requesting the Court 

to review supplemental authority in support of their arguments. What follows is my 

decision on the Defendants’ Motion. 

II. ANALYSIS 

The Defendants have moved to dismiss this action pursuant to Court of 

Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) 

(i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; (ii) even 

vague allegations are well-pleaded if they give the opposing party 

notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the nonmoving party; and (iv) dismissal is inappropriate 

unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any 

reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.94

However, I need not “accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts or 

. . . draw unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”95

 

92 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1–5, 57–59. 

93 Id. at Prayer For Relief. 

94 Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002) (footnotes and internal quotations 

omitted). 

95 Price v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011). 
20

Rendering a decision on the pending Motion is problematic, as the parties 

failed to coincide in briefing about what this Complaint actually pleads.96 At oral 

argument, there was a fundamental disagreement between the parties as to whether 

this action is simply a quasi-appraisal suit for false or omitted disclosures, or rather 

a standalone breach of fiduciary duty action directed at the Side Deals. Each side 

accuses the other of mischaracterization of the Complaint.97 The Defendants framed 

this action as purely about appraisal rights and whether, in bad faith, the Defendants 

failed to make sufficient disclosures in the Information Statement to inform pursuit 

of such rights. The Plaintiff characterized the action at oral argument as primarily 

pleading a substantive process claim whereby certain insiders were competing for 

consideration with stockholders, and that the Director Defendants permitted the Side 

Deals in breach of the duty of loyalty.98 

I find, on review of the Complaint, that the Plaintiff has attempted to plead 

both process and disclosure claims. Specifically, paragraphs fifty-seven and fiftyeight of the Complaint, which are both nested within the sole Count alleged for 

breach of fiduciary duty, assert that the Board knowingly engineered and approved 

a sales process to benefit particular insiders, and knowingly competed for merger 

 

96 See, e.g., Draft Oral Argument Tr. (May 4, 2017) at 23–29 (discussing, on behalf of the Plaintiff, 

the failure to join issue on the process claim); see also id. at 44 (arguing on behalf of the 

Defendants, that the Complaint “essentially, after you get past the background, starts on paragraph 

36 to 47. So it's a ten-paragraph complaint. It's skeletal of a complaint . . . .”). 

97 See, e.g., id. at 25. 

98 See id. at 21–22. 
21

consideration or permitted insiders to compete for merger consideration in violation 

of their fiduciary duties.99 Accordingly, I review both process- and disclosurerelated claims under the motion-to-dismiss standard. I turn to that analysis now. 

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks damages from directors for breach of 

fiduciary duty by way of a merger, and the directors (as here) are protected by an 

exculpatory charter provision,100 any claims against them must be dismissed unless 

those claims sufficiently allege a breach of the duty of loyalty. That is, the 

Company’s decision to employ an exculpation provision under 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) 

shields the directors from duty-of-care claims; therefore, to survive this Motion, the 

Plaintiff must point to facts alleged in the Complaint implicating a breach of the duty 

of loyalty.101 To state a claim for a breach of the duty of loyalty in this action, the 

Complaint must contain “sufficient facts to show that a majority of the Board of 

directors breached the fiduciary duty of loyalty . . . .”102 That is, in the absence of a 

controller, the fact that claims might otherwise be stated against a minority of 

members of the board of directors “would not be controlling.”103

 

99 See Compl. ¶¶ 57–58. I note factual allegations about the particular agreements executed are 

contained in various other paragraphs of the Complaint. See e.g., id. ¶¶ 2, 29–35. 

100 See Defs’ Opening Br. Ex. D. 

101 See Nguyen v. Barrett, 2016 WL 5404095, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2016).

102 In re NYMEX S'holder Litig., 2009 WL 3206051, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009) (emphasis in 

original). 

103 See id. 
22

Here, the burden on the Plaintiff is to plead facts from which the Court can 

reasonably infer that a majority of the Director Defendants were interested in the 

transaction, or dominated or controlled by an interested party, or that the majority of 

the Board failed to act in good faith.104 At this post-closing damages stage of 

proceedings, the Plaintiff must clear this pleading hurdle,105 with respect to both his 

process and disclosure claims.106 The Plaintiff has advanced in briefing two theories 

that a breach of the duty of loyalty is sufficiently pled: first, that a majority of the 

Board was “interested in the transaction;”107 and second that the majority of the 

Board acted in bad faith with respect to the mal-disclosures and omissions, and in 

approving the Merger with the Side Deals. I address each in turn, below. 

A. The Complaint Fails to Allege a Majority of the Board is Interested 

It is undisputed that two of the five directors, the Stern Defendants, were 

interested in the Merger. It is also undisputed that two of the five directors, Poling 

and Bacher, were not interested. Thus, whether the majority of the Board was 

 

104 See id.; see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 24–25 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“In order to rebut the 

presumptions of the business judgment rule, [a plaintiff] must allege facts that would support a 

finding of interest or lack of independence for a majority . . . of the Board members.”). 

105 I conclude that, at this stage, enhanced scrutiny is inapplicable. At oral argument the Plaintiff 

clarified that he is not seeking such a standard of review under Revlon. Draft Oral Argument Tr. 

(May 4, 2017) at 39–40. 

106 See, e.g., Nguyen, 2016 WL 5404095, at *3 (explaining that “when asserting a disclosure claim 

for damages against directors post-close, a plaintiff must allege facts making it reasonably 

conceivable that there has been a non-exculpated breach of fiduciary duty by the board in failing 

to make a material disclosure,” that is, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that a majority of the board 

was not disinterested or independent, or that the board was otherwise disloyal because it failed to 

act in good faith, in failing to make the material disclosure”) (citations omitted). 

107 See Pl’s Answering Br. 24 n.20. 
23

interested turns solely on whether the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Director 

Daly was interested.108 Generally, a director is considered interested when she “will 

receive a personal financial benefit from a transaction that is not equally shared by 

the stockholders.”109

Resolution of this issue,110 to my mind, is clear: The Plaintiff has failed to 

adequately allege that Daly was interested. The sole allegations pled and 

“advanced” in briefing (albeit only in footnotes) regarding Daly’s alleged interest 

are that he “had a large, illiquid block of shares, favored a sale of the Company, had 

aligned himself with AB Value who was agitating for a sale, and was excluded from 

the Special Committee.” I turn to whether the actual facts pled demonstrate that Daly 

suffered from a disabling interest in the transaction. 

The Plaintiff points to Daly’s alleged “illiquid block” as a basis for his interest, 

along with his purported prior alignment with AB Value. The record reflects that 

Daly owned approximately 19.1% of the Company’s outstanding shares, making 

him, apparently, the largest single stockholder.111 Notably absent from the 

 

108 I note while there are cursory allegations that the Sterns were controlling stockholders of the 

Company in the Complaint, the Plaintiff has not pursued this matter as an entire fairness action 

triggered by the existence of a controller. To the extent this allegation was well-pled in the 

Complaint, I consider it waived as it was not advanced in briefing. 

109 In re Alloy, Inc., 2011 WL 4863716, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2011) (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 

634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993)). 

110 To the extent it was not waived. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2003 WL 21003437, at 

*43 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2003) (stating “[i]t is settled Delaware law that a party waives an argument 

by not including it in its brief”) (citations omitted). 

111 Information Statement at 49. 
24

Complaint is any allegation that Daly received different or unique consideration. 

Nor does the Complaint allege that he faced a liquidity crisis or a particular exigent 

need that would necessitate a fire sale of his interest.112 Absent such a circumstance, 

it is apparent that his incentives were the same as that of common holders: to 

maximize the value of his investment. The Complaint fails to plead a disabling 

interest. 

To the extent that the Plaintiff argues that Daly is not independent with regard 

to the Merger, such that he was unable to bring his business judgment to bear on 

behalf of the Company, that argument is unavailing as well. In order to successfully 

plead a lack of independence, a Plaintiff must plead facts that, if true, overcome the 

presumption of a director’s faithfulness to her fiduciary duties. This Complaint is 

lacking in that regard, and fails to raise a reasonable doubt that Daly was unable to 

“objectively make a business decision” concerning the Merger.113 While the 

Complaint states that “Daly was not considered independent [presumably by his 

fellow directors] for purposes of the Merger,”114 that is simply a conclusion asserted 

in the Complaint devoid of any factual support.115 It appears to me that the Plaintiff 

wishes that I infer Daly was, in fact, not independent because he was considered not 

 

112 See In re Cyan, Inc. Stockholders Litig., 2017 WL 1956955, at *10; see also Draft Oral 

Argument Tr. (May 4, 2017) at 50 (conceding on behalf of the plaintiff that a fire-sale or liquidity 

crisis is not pled). 

113 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004). 

114 See Pl’s Answering Br. 10 n.10, 24 n.20 (citing Compl. ¶ 23). 

115 See Compl. ¶ 9. 
25

independent by the Company or Board itself; that inference, in turn, is (theoretically) 

implied by the fact that he was not appointed to the Special Committee.116 The 

Plaintiff points to no facts in support of the conclusion that Daly lacked 

independence, and I do not consider this bare allegation well-pled in light of the 

Plaintiff’s failure to point to any specific facts supporting it.117

B. The Complaint Fails to Allege Bad Faith by a Majority of the Board 

In the face of a majority disinterested and independent board, and an 

exculpatory charter provision, to survive this Motion and pursue a post-closing 

damages claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the Plaintiff must plead facts making it 

reasonably conceivable that the majority of the Board acted in bad faith.118 

“[B]ad faith will be found if a ‘fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face 

of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.’”119 

Similarly, bad faith will be found when “the decision under attack is so far beyond 

the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any 

ground other than bad faith.”120 As this Court recently noted, “[t]his is a difficult 

standard to meet.”121 The Plaintiff points to two sets of allegations, that in his view, 

 

116 See Pl’s Answering Br. 10 n.10, 24 n.20 (citing Compl. ¶ 23). 

117 See Pl’s Answering Br. 24 n.20. 

118 See In re NYMEX S'holder Litig., 2009 WL 3206051, at *6. 

119 Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. 

Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)). 

120 In re Cyan, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2017 WL 1956955, at *8 (quoting Crescent/Mach I P'rs, L.P. 

v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 981 (Del. Ch. 2000)).

121 See In re MeadWestvaco S’holders Litig., 2017 WL 3526326, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2017). 
26

rise to the level of bad faith: the Defendants’ approval of the Merger with knowledge 

of the Side Deals, and the alleged omissions and misstatements in the Information 

Statement. Each set of allegations is addressed in turn below. 

a. Approval of the Merger 

The Plaintiff asserts in briefing that in approving the Merger the Board took 

action that “lacked rational corporate purpose and should be deemed to be the 

product of bad faith.”122 Plaintiff’s theory appears to be that the purported decision

of the Defendants to “favor the side agreements over the payment of additional 

consideration to stockholders is bad faith.”123 Specifically, the Plaintiff points to the 

Stern Defendants’ receipt of the Sale Bonus Agreement, Edward Stern’s amended 

Employment Agreement providing “benefits” upon completion of the Merger, and 

Michaels Stern’s new Employment Agreement for continued tenure and the Rollover 

Agreement.124 The Plaintiff concludes that the Stern Defendants provided no 

“consideration” for these benefits, and that these side agreements deprived 

stockholders of value.125 The Plaintiff requests the pleading stage inference that the 

bid of “$18.75, subject to adjustments,” was adjusted downward by some amount to 

 

122 See Pl’s Answering Br. 22–23. 

123 Id. at 25. 

124 Id. at 24. 

125 Id. 
27

reflect the cost of the Side Deals.126 The Plaintiff calculates that the “sale bonuses 

alone cost $0.11 per share.”127

The Defendants observe that the Complaint and briefing are devoid of any 

allegations supporting a reasonable inference that directors Daly, Poling, or Bacher 

were involved in the Side Deals or engaged in bad faith conduct themselves.128 The 

Defendants contend, correctly, that to withstand their Motion the Complaint must 

allege that the Board’s approval of the Merger, in the face of the Side Deals, was so 

far beyond the bounds of reasonable business judgment that it is inexplicable on the 

grounds other than bad faith: otherwise, the process allegations must be dismissed. 

This is a high standard indeed. At the pleading stage, I must determine whether the 

Complaint contains sufficient allegations that could reasonably lead to an inference 

that the decision of the Board is inexplicable absent bad faith.129

 The Plaintiff points to the initial offer of “$18.75, subject to adjustments,” the 

final sales price of $18.00, and relies on an inference that some of this reduction 

resulted from the Side Deals. Such an inference alone is unavailing, it must be 

reasonably conceivable that such portion of reduction allocable to the Side Deals, if 

 

126 See id. at 24–25. I note the sole allegation of the Complaint cited in Plaintiff’s briefing in 

opposition to the Motion to Dismiss involves only the Stern Defendants’ actions in negotiating the 

Side Deals with the acquirer. See id. at 22–25 (citing only Compl. ¶ 31). 

127 See Compl. ¶ 34. 

128 The briefing is rather sterile regarding the process allegations, presumably because the 

Defendants read the Complaint as stating principally, or only, disclosure claims, and the Plaintiff’s 

Answering Brief was largely responsive to the Defendants’ arguments regarding disclosure. 

129 See Alidina v. Internet.com Corp., 2002 WL 31584292, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 2002). 
28

any, makes Board approval inexplicable absent bad faith. Here, the Complaint falls 

short. 

The Complaint contains a single relevant section, titled “Arlington Lowers its 

Bid as a Result of the Side Deals.”130 That portion of the Complaint provides in 

pertinent part, however, simply that: 

[t]he Information Statement does not disclose how Arlington’s bid of 

‘$18.75 per share, subject to adjustments’ was changed into a Merger 

Agreement at $18 per share, though it appears that the adjustment from 

$18.75 to $18 was made in part due to costs associated with the side 

deals for [the Stern Defendants] (the sale bonuses alone cost $0.11 per 

share).131

 To the extent I can consider the merger-reduction facts laid out above as nonconclusory allegations, the Plaintiff’s Complaint still does not plead facts creating a 

reasonable inference of bad faith, because the amount of the reduction actually 

arising from the Side Deals, and hence its materiality, is never pled; more 

importantly, pleadings to negate the good faith of the independent directors 

approving the Merger in light of the Side Deals are absent. 

The Plaintiff points to several cases as supportive of his argument132 that this 

majority independent Board must have acted in bad faith here, relying primarily on 

 

130 Compl. ¶ 34 (emphasis in original). 

131 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 3 (concluding “these side deals prompted the lower bid 

accepted by Defendants”). 

132 See Draft Oral Argument Tr. (May 4, 2017) at 27–32; see also Pl’s Answering Br. 23. 
29

Alidina v. Internet.com Corporation.133 The Plaintiff asserts134 that the cases he cites 

“build on the Supreme Court decision in Parnes [v. Bally Entertainment 

Corporation]”

135 which stands for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, 

even in the absence of a controller, a majority disinterested Board can breach the 

duty of loyalty when it approves an unfairly negotiated transaction that benefits an 

insider at the expense of other stockholders, and that is inexplicable in reference to 

business judgment.136 This proposition is true enough; it is the well-pled facts 

supporting such a conclusion that are absent here. The standard for overcoming the 

presumption of loyalty, supporting an inference of bad faith, is necessarily high. The 

cases the Plaintiff relies on make this clear. For example, Alidina explains that the 

bad faith theory the Plaintiff seeks to invoke here is really a “narrow escape hatch” 

to be employed “in those rare cases where the decision under attack is so far beyond 

the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any 

ground other than bad faith.”137 The Alidina Court then highlights that to meet this 

standard, “[t]he decision must be egregious, lack any rational business purpose, 

 

133 2002 WL 31584292. 

134 See Draft Oral Argument Tr. (May 4, 2017) at 27. 

135 722 A.2d 1243 (Del. 1999). 

136 See Alidina, 2002 WL 31584292, at *4–5 (citing Parnes, 722 A.2d 1243; Crescent/Mach I 

Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2000)).

137 Id. at *4 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
30

constitute a gross abuse of discretion, or be so thoroughly defective that it carries a 

badge of fraud.”138

Alidina involved alleged actions by the interested party that constituted 

conduct “so egregious” that the independent Board “likely could not have approved 

the Transactions in good faith.”139 Specifically, the complaint in Alidina alleged that 

the Board “knew” that the interested party sought out the merger partner, “dictated 

the terms of the Transaction, secured a valuable asset of the company at a grossly 

unfair price, and diverted funds away from the company to himself.”140 The valuable 

asset secured by the insider, and acquiesced to by the Board, was the sale of a 

subsidiary of the target to the CEO of the target who was also a member of the 

target’s Board and a 26% stockholder.

141 This side-deal to the insider was 

“demanded” in exchange for his approval of the overarching merger and it was 

alleged with particularity that the side-deal diverted substantial funds away from the 

company to the insider.142 Importantly, there were favorable changes in the 

valuation of the subsidiary to the insider’s benefit—he was able to receive 80.1% of 

the subsidiary for $18 million where the initial letter of intent indicated the sale 

 

138 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). I note the Alidina decision predates this 

Court’s and the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Disney line of cases which speak to the bad faith 

standard under Delaware law. 

139 Id. at *6. 

140 Id. 

141 See id. at *1, 6. 

142 See id. at *1. 
31

would be 50% for $15 million.143 The transaction was approved sans a special 

committee, and five months after the transaction the subsidiary completed an initial 

public offering selling 3.4 million shares at $14 a share (implying a valuation of at 

least $47.6 million).144 On these facts the Alidina Court found it reasonably 

conceivable that bad faith was implicated by the side-deal where it was alleged a 

“grossly inadequate” purchase price was paid by a fiduciary “demanding” he be sold 

a valuable asset “on the cheap” and thereby caused a diversion of “significant funds 

from the Company to [the insider] . . . .”145 In light of the sufficient allegations that 

the self-dealing CEO “tainted the entire process,” and the directors’ acquiescence to 

the process, the Alidina Court found that the complaint pled facts indicating that the 

insider CEO’s “conduct would have been so egregious that the [target’s] board likely 

could not have approved the Transactions in good faith.”146

Thus Alidina, as with the cases that it follows,147 involves extreme sets of facts 

making it reasonably conceivable that an independent board intentionally 

disregarded its fiduciary duties, or took an action inexplicable on any grounds other 

than bad faith in approving a merger in the face of side-deals.148 Parnes, for 

 

143 See id. at *2. 

144 Id. at *3. 

145 Id. at *5–6 (emphasis in original). 

146 Id. at *6. 

147 See id. at *5–6 (discussing Parnes, 722 A.2d 1243 (Del. 1999) and Crescent/Mach I Partners,

L.P. 846 A.2d 963). 

148 See Parnes, 722 A.2d at 1245–47 (finding the numerous side-deals pled evinced sufficiently 

egregious conduct to imply bad faith by the board).
32

example, included a pleading that the CEO, the interested beneficiary of the sidedeals in that case, “tainted the entire process of finding an interested merger partner 

and negotiating the transaction by demanding a bribe” such that it was “inexplicable 

that independent directors, acting in good faith, could approve the deal.”149 The 

CEO “informed all potential acquirers that his consent would be required” and to 

obtain his consent that they would have to pay him “substantial sums of money and 

transfer to him valuable . . . assets,” all while the CEO had no authority to demand 

such payments and asset transfers.150 The complaint in Parnes set out, with 

specificity, several inappropriately extracted side-deals that garnered the insider tens 

of millions of dollars that otherwise would have flowed to the stockholders. 

Similarly, In Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner,

151 the merger process 

was so tainted that the Court found the remaining disinterested directors essentially 

“aided and abetted” the conflicted party’s breach of his duty of loyalty.152 The 

circumstances in Crescent were that a CEO and Chairman of the board secured 

upwards of five separate, and favorable, side-deals for himself that provided him 

“substantial benefits” not available to minority stockholders.153 The Crescent Court 

found the circumstances such that the self-interested side-deals, as alleged in the 

 

149 Id. at 1246–47.

150 Id. at 1245–46.

151 846 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2000). 

152 Id. at 981–83. 

153 See id. at 982–83. 
33

complaint, rose to the level of tainting the entire merger process such that it was 

reasonably conceivable the independent directors acted in bad faith to enable the 

majority stockholder to wrongfully benefit at the expense of the corporation.154 

In contrast, in In re Alloy,

155 the Court found certain side-deals alleged were 

reasonable conditions to the merger that failed to rise to the level of tainting the 

entire process. The side-deals in Alloy included the following for two insiders: “(1) 

continued employment as CEO and COO, respectively, (2) an exchange of their 

existing Alloy shares for shares in Alloy's new parent company, and (3) an initial 

profits interest grant in that parent.”156 The Alloy Court observed that the “terms can 

be explained on grounds other than bad faith” finding that 

“[o]ne plausible, and legitimate, explanation is that [the acquirer] 

wanted to ensure that those members of Alloy's management with the 

best knowledge and expertise regarding the Company continued to 

manage its affairs after the Merger and that they were properly 

incentivized to do so. Given this plausible and legitimate explanation 

for the board's decision to approve the benefits to [two insiders], I 

cannot reasonably infer that doing so was so far beyond the bounds of 

reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any 

ground other than bad faith.”157 

In so holding, the Alloy Court distinguished Parnes and Crescent, finding that the 

circumstances in Alloy did not support a reasonable inference that approval of the 

 

154 See id. 

155 See In re Alloy, Inc., 2011 WL 4863716 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2011). 

156 Id. 

157 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
34

side-deals rose to the level of being “so far beyond the bounds of reasonable 

judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad 

faith.”158

Here, the question is whether facts pled imply that the Side Deals were not 

reasonable conditions of the Merger, but instead are inexplicable in the interest of 

the Company and its stockholders so that I must infer bad faith. The context here is 

a sales process involving a lengthy and wide-ranging attempt to generate best price. 

I find that in light of the scant facts pled and argued here that there is an absence of 

circumstances redolent of actions without the corporate interest, such that it is 

reasonably conceivable that the Board took action inexplicable on grounds other 

than bad faith. With respect to the Sales Bonus Agreement (conditioned on 

performance), and the benefits (including the roll-over of stock and continuing 

employment) flowing to Michael Stern, a potential rational business purpose exists: 

to incentivize proper management of the Company through and after the Merger, as 

in Alloy. If I find a sufficient pleading of bad faith, then, it must be regarding the 

amendments to the Employment Agreement with respect to Edward Stern. Because 

Edward did not contemplate continuing employment, this benefit is problematic. 

The Complaint falls short of pleading facts with respect to Edward’s benefits, 

however. Necessary details to reach the Plaintiff’s desired inference, that no good-

 

158 See id. at *11–12 (citation omitted). 
35

faith ground existed to approve the Merger with these benefits included, are wholly 

lacking. Such a pleading would include, for example, details about the nature and 

materiality of the benefits provided to Edward Stern in his amended Employment 

Agreement. The Complaint simply states he obtained “better benefits” upon his 

desired termination.159 Without more, I cannot infer that the benefits were unearned, 

material in light of the merger consideration, or otherwise were “so far beyond the 

bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground 

other than bad faith.”160 

In sum, I find that the facts pled in regard to the Side Deals fail to rise to such 

a level that I may reasonably infer bad faith on the part of the majority of the Director 

Defendants in approving the Merger. 

I now turn to the disclosure claims, and Plaintiff’s request for quasi-appraisal 

damages. 

b. Disclosure Omissions and Misstatements 

If this were a request for injunctive relief, pre-close, my analysis of the 

disclosure allegations would be quite different. In that situation, I would employ 

enhanced scrutiny in review of the disclosure allegations, not to determine damages 

owed any plaintiff, but to afford equitable relief in aid of the stockholders pursuing 

 

159 Compl. ¶ 31.

160 See In re Alloy, Inc., 2011 WL 4863716, at *11–12 (citations omitted). 
36

statutory voting or appraisal rights. Equity would be employed to remedy any 

material insufficiency in the disclosures. 

Post-close, the focus is not simply on whether material deficiencies exist with 

the disclosures; rather, my analysis must turn on whether the Defendants, here the 

directors of the acquired entity, are conceivably liable to the stockholder Plaintiff for 

damages. “[W]hen asserting a disclosure claim for damages against directors postclose, a plaintiff must allege facts making it reasonably conceivable that there has 

been a non-exculpated breach of fiduciary duty by the board in failing to make a 

material disclosure.”161 Here, to state a non-exculpated claim the Plaintiff cannot 

simply point to erroneous judgment in the failure to make a disclosure, implicating 

the duty of care, but rather must point to facts in the Complaint supporting an 

inference that the Board acted in bad faith in issuing the disclosure, implicating the 

duty of loyalty. 

As discussed, a showing of bad faith requires an “extreme set of facts to 

establish that disinterested directors were intentionally disregarding their duties or 

that the decision . . . [was] so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it 

seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.”162 In briefing, 

the Plaintiff has pointed to the following as indicia of bad faith: (1) that the 

 

161 Nguyen, 2016 WL 5404095, at *3 (emphasis in original). 

162 Id. (quoting In re Chelsea Therapeutics Int'l Ltd. S'holders Litig., 2016 WL 3044721, at *7 

(Del. Ch. May 20, 2016)) (alteration supplied by the Court in Nguyen). 
37

Information Statement contained an affirmative misrepresentation about access to 

the Merger Agreement, (2) the Information Statement’s purported failure to include 

a “fair summary” of the financial advisor’s valuations, as well as to provide financial 

projections that management provided to the financial advisor, and (3) the purported 

failure of the Information Statement to provide details of the negotiations with the 

Stern Defendants regarding the Side Deals.163 

It is, I believe, worth stating with specificity what I have limned above. If the 

Plaintiff or another stockholder had sought injunctive relief prior to closing, the issue 

before me would be whether the Information Statement withheld or misstated 

information material to the decision of the stockholders to approve the Merger, or to 

seek appraisal. The pleading standard would be enhanced scrutiny. In such a 

context, failure to inform stockholders that only stockholders of record could view 

the Merger Agreement (or the decision, itself, to so limit access) might well be 

inimical, in a material way, to stockholders considering whether to accept the merger 

consideration. Similarly, the decision to withhold management projections and other 

elements leading to the fairness opinion has been held, in appropriate circumstances, 

to merit injunctive relief. Those circumstances, as well as the alleged deficiencies 

in the explanation of the Side Deals, were all known to stockholders here pre-close. 

Injunctive relief could have been, but was not, pursued. 

 

163 See Pl’s Answering Br. 29–41. 
38

The situation before me is very different. I have found the majority of the 

Board to have been disinterested and independent in recommending the Merger. The 

directors are protected by an exculpation clause. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff seeks the 

opportunity to receive damages from the directors. To do so, it is insufficient to 

plead material defects in the Information Statement; he must plead facts that, if true, 

make it reasonably conceivable that the deficiencies in the Information Statement 

resulted from the directors’ bad faith.164 Independent and disinterested directors are 

presumed to have acted in good faith; to meet his pleading burden, the Plaintiff must 

demonstrate knowing disregard of a duty, or point to disclosure deficiencies 

permitted by the directors, where that permission is inexplicable otherwise than as 

promoting an interest inimical to the Company. 

A director’s decision to limit access to the merger agreement and valuation 

metrics could have a valid business purpose. An omission of material disclosures 

could be the result of director negligence, or even gross negligence. Such misdisclosures are not actionable here. The Plaintiff alleges only that material 

deficiencies exist, and points to nothing that would explain the deficiencies in a way 

that implicates bad faith. He points to nothing in the disclosures withheld that would 

have been adverse to the deal. Pleading material disclosure deficiencies, without 

 

164 See Nguyen, 2016 WL 5404095, at *3.
39

more, is not sufficient for a pleading that independent, disinterested directors 

breached a duty of loyalty. 

The most problematic of the disclosure allegations involves the Side Deals. I 

have already found that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the directors 

for approving the Merger in light of the Side Deals. The Plaintiff urges me to 

consider both that process claim and what he characterizes as the improper 

disclosure with respect to the Side Deals as, cumulatively, raising a reasonable doubt 

that the Defendants acted in good faith. He points out that the disclosures omit the 

relationship, if any, between the Side Deals and the ultimate consideration paid to 

stockholders. The Plaintiff argues in briefing that the Defendants acted in bad faith 

by failing to “provide any detail surrounding the negotiation” of the Stern 

Defendants’ Side Deals.165 He points to the fact that the Merger Agreement 

contained an “out” for the buyer if appraisal demand reached ten percent of shares 

outstanding, and argues that in light of that fact, less than full disclosure of the Side 

Deals implicates bad faith. 

The Information Statement provides a detailed recitation of the Merger 

negotiations, which spanned several months, and includes the range of initial offers, 

and the process followed in securing the best and final bids.166 Further, the 

 

165 Id. at 38–41. 

166 See Information Statement at 9–11. 
40

Information Statement highlights in the summary section that certain insiders have 

interests in the Merger—the Side Deals—that may be different from that of 

stockholders.167 The Information Statement dedicates approximately four singlespaced pages168 to delineating the “interests of [the] executive officers and directors 

in the merger,” including that the “Company’s executive officers and directors have 

interests that are different from, or in addition to, the interests of the stockholders of 

the Company generally” and that “[t]he Board was aware of these interests and 

considered them, among other matters, in approving the Merger Agreement.”169 The 

“Executive Employment Agreements” subsection describes in detail the termination 

provisions and any severance payments triggered thereby.170 A separate subsection 

details the “Sale Bonus Agreements” to each of the Stern Defendants, including that 

“sale bonuses will be paid if the Closing Cash is in excess of $6,100,000” minus 

certain other defined types of cash.171 Options given to the Stern Defendants and 

others are explained by number and exercise price.172 The “Indemnification and 

Exculpation of Directors and Executive Officers” is given its own section.173 Lastly, 

 

167 Id. at 3. 

168 See Information Statement at 18–22. 

169 Id. at 18. 

170 Id. at 18–19. 

171 Id. at 19–20. 

172 Id. at 20–21. 

173 Id. at 35. 
41

the “New Arrangements with Parent” and the Stern Defendants are explained, 

including extensive details about the new Employment and Rollover Agreements.174 

The Plaintiff argues that, despite the elaborate explanation of the Side Deals 

described above, the Information Statement omits the “why,” that is, the business 

purpose for the Side Deals, and omits the play-by-play of the negotiation of the Side 

Deals. Such information, no doubt, would be of interest175 to stockholders. Even 

assuming its materiality, however, to my mind the disclosures, made or omitted, fall 

short of implying bad faith. The directors recommended a merger that included 

bonuses to executives and an employment agreement, post-close, for one of them. 

Both the existence and the operation of these Side Deals were disclosed in detail. 

To the extent the Plaintiff’s theory is that the Board was trying to cover up the Side 

Deals to discourage appraisal demands, in light of the ten percent appraisal “out,” 

the detailed disclosures belie that intent. There is simply nothing, in light of the 

 

174 Id. at 21–22. For example, the Employment Agreement subsection includes information on 

smaller matters such as “an all-inclusive automobile allowance of $600 per month.” 

175 This Court has repeatedly noted that lack of information as to why actions were taken, the blowby-blow descriptions of transactions, and other information of potential interest to stockholders 

regarding a merger, do not in themselves establish material disclosure deficiencies. See In re Saba 

Software, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 2017 WL 1201108, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2017), as revised

(Apr. 11, 2017); Globis Partners, L.P. v. Plumtree Software, 2007 WL 4292024, at *14 (Del. Ch. 

Nov. 30, 2007) (finding that full and fair disclosures do not require a “play-by-play description of 

merger negotiations”) (citation omitted). I note that, here, the disclosures made were not in aid of 

a vote, as the Merger was to be approved via written consent: they were made to inform 

stockholders to permit an informed choice whether to seek appraisal. See Information Statement 

at Cover Letter. 
42

description of the Side Deals in the Information Statement, that suggests a cover-up 

or is otherwise redolent of bad faith on the part of the directors. 

In a pre-close action, it is possible, even likely, that some disclosure 

deficiencies alleged—failure to disclose management projections relied on in the 

fairness opinion, for instance—would be found material and support injunctive 

relief. In this damages action, the same disclosure deficiencies are insufficient to 

state a claim; “[n]othing in the record creates an inference that the Defendants 

deliberately withheld the information or disregarded a manifest duty.”176 

III. CONCLUSION 

The Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED, for the reasons outlined above in this 

Memorandum Opinion. An Order is attached. 

 

 

176 Nguyen, 2016 WL 5404095, at *6 (emphasis in original). 
43

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

ALAN KAHN, 

Plaintiff, 

)

)

)

v. 

)

)

)

C.A. No. 12498-VCG 

MICHAEL D. STERN, EDWARD A. 

STERN, JOSEPH P. DALY, JOHN W. 

POLING and JEFFREY P. BACHER, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER

AND NOW, this 28th day of August, 2017, 

The Court having considered the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and for the 

reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion dated August 28, 2017, IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. 

SO ORDERED: 

 /s/ Sam Glasscock III 

 Vice Chancellor