Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed August 2, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-1056

Lower Tribunal No. 18-25764

________________

Miami-Dade County,

Appellant,

vs.

Keisha Guyton,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto 

Diaz, Judge.

Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Leona 

N. McFarlane, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.

Roberts & Basnuevo, P.A., and H. Clay Roberts and Javier A. 

Basnuevo; Fornaris Law Firm, and Martha M. Fornaris, for appellee.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ. 

EMAS, J.
2

In September 2006, Keisha Guyton began working for Miami-Dade 

County as a part-time bus operator. She was eventually promoted to a fulltime position, but, in 2017, suffered work-related injuries for which she made 

valid claims for workers’ compensation benefits. Over a year after her injury, 

the County formally dismissed Guyton for long term absenteeism. Upon her 

dismissal, Guyton sued the County in a one-count complaint, alleging that 

the County violated section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2018), because it 

terminated her employment “by reason of” her valid claim for workers’

compensation benefits following her on-the-job injury.

1

The County responded, asserting that it had a legitimate business 

reason for terminating Guyton’s employment—her inability to return to work 

for over a year following her injury (from March 2017 to June 2018). During 

the proceedings below, the trial court denied the County’s motion for 

summary judgment and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury ultimately 

returned a verdict in favor of Guyton, finding that Miami-Dade discharged 

1 Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2018), provides: “No employer shall 

discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by 

reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim 

compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law.” To establish a claim 

under this statute, the employee must prove (1) she engaged in a statutorily 

protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) the 

adverse employment action and the employee’s protected activity were 

causally related. Ortega v. Eng’g Sys. Tech., Inc., 30 So. 3d 525, 528 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2010).
3

Guyton by reason of her valid workers’ compensation claim, and awarding 

her damages in the total amount of $230,000. Final judgment was entered 

for that amount, and this appeal followed. 

On appeal, the County challenges the trial court’s ruling on summary

judgment and the trial court’s denial of the County’s motion for directed 

verdict (and subsequent motion for judgment in accordance with its earlier 

motion for directed verdict), arguing Guyton presented no evidence her 

termination was causally related to her claim for workers’ compensation 

benefits or that the County’s provided reason was a pretext for retaliation.

Guyton responds that she provided “abundant evidence” her termination was 

pretextual, specifically that the County failed to follow its own policies and 

procedures following her on-the-job injury and eventual dismissal.

While we apply de novo review to these rulings, in reviewing the trial 

court’s denial of the County’s motion for directed verdict (and motion for 

judgment in accordance with its earlier motion for directed verdict) “[a]n 

appellate court must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party, drawing every reasonable inference flowing from the 

evidence in the nonmoving party's favor, and “[i]f there is conflicting evidence 

or if different reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, then 

the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury for resolution.” Miami-
4

Dade Cty. v. Eghbal, 54 So. 3d 525, 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (citations 

omitted). A directed verdict should only be granted (or affirmed on appeal) 

“where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Banco Espirito Santo Int'l, Ltd. v. BDO Int'l, B.V., 979 So. 

2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (quoting Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, 

Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 329 (Fla. 2001)). “A directed verdict is proper only when 

the record conclusively shows an absence of facts or inferences from facts 

to support a Jury verdict, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” Medina v. Peralta, 802 So. 2d 376, 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2001). Because there were disputed issues of material fact at the summary 

judgment stage—particularly whether the County’s discharge of Guyton was

causally related to Guyton’s workers’ compensation claim, see e.g.,

Hornfischer v. Manatee Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 136 So. 3d 703, 710 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2014) (observing: “Generally speaking, an employer does not 

announce or state in writing that it is discharging an employee because he 

or she has filed a workers' compensation claim” and, consequently,

“employee actions for a retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 are often 

ill suited to final disposition on a motion for summary judgment”)—we affirm 
5

the trial court’s denial of the County’s motion for summary judgment.

2 And 

because the evidence admitted at trial, viewed in a light most favorable to 

Guyton, supported the jury’s verdict, we affirm as well the trial court’s denial 

of the County’s motion for directed verdict and motion for judgment in 

accordance with its earlier motion for directed verdict. 

Affirmed. 

2 Guyton contends on appeal that the denial of a pretrial motion for summary 

judgment is unreviewable after a full trial and judgment on the merits and 

that the scope of this court’s review should be limited to the sufficiency of the 

evidence presented at trial to determine if it supports the jury’s verdict. For 

this proposition, Guyton cites Lind v. UPS, 254 F.3d 1281, 12846 (11th Cir. 

2001) (“Recently, we simply stated that the denial of a motion for summary 

judgment is not reviewable after a trial on the merits has occurred” (citing 

Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, 223 F. 3d 1340, 1344 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(“[O]nce a trial on the merits has occurred, . . . the denial of [a motion for 

summary judgment] is unreviewable on appeal”)). The Eleventh Circuit in 

Lind further noted that at least ten circuits have held that the denial of 

summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal after a full trial and final 

judgment on the merits. See Pahuta v. Massey-–Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 

125, 130 (2d Cir.1999); Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster 

Eng’g Corp., 51 F. 3d 1229, 1234 (4th Cir.1995); Watson v. Amedco Steel, 

Inc., 29 F.3d 274, 277-–78 (7th Cir.1994); Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 

568, 570-–72 (5th Cir.1994); Johnson Int'l Co. v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 

19 F.3d 431, 434 (8th Cir.1994); Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 476 n.5 (1st 

Cir.1994); Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc., 974 F.2d 1248, 1250-–51 (10th Cir.1992); 

Jarrett v. Epperly, 896 F.2d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir.1990); Locricchio v. Legal 

Servs. Corp., 833 F.2d 1352, 1358-–59 (9th Cir.1987); Glaros v. H.H. 

Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573 & n. 14 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Because we 

find no error in either the denial of the motion for summary judgment or in 

the denial of the motion for directed verdict, we need not reach this issue.