United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 23-1894

EUCINEIA SOARES DA SILVA PAZINE,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION 

APPEALS

Before

Gelpí, Thompson, and Montecalvo,

Circuit Judges.

Caitlyn Burgess, with whom Kevin P. MacMurray and MacMurray 

& Associates were on brief, for petitioner.

Neelam Ihsanullah, Trial Attorney, United States Department 

of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, with 

whom Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, and 

Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director, United States Department of 

Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on 

brief, for respondent.

August 27, 2024
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Not all harm that a noncitizen 

suffered or fears suffering in their home country entitles them to 

asylum. Part of the reason for that is asylum law's nexus 

requirement. Here's what we mean by that. By statute, a 

successful asylum applicant must demonstrate that they are a 

"refugee." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). This in turn requires that 

they demonstrate they suffered or have a well-founded fear of 

suffering harm in their home country that amounts to "persecution" 

and that persecution is "on account of" at least one of five 

statutorily protected grounds: "race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group [("PSG")], or political 

opinion." Id. (emphasis added). This "on account of" language 

requires a causal connection (or nexus, as it is most commonly 

dubbed) between the harm the noncitizen suffered or fears suffering 

and one of the five statutorily protected grounds. Without a 

sufficient showing as to nexus, the harm the noncitizen suffered 

or fears suffering isn't a ground for asylum and their asylum claim

will fail right out of the gate. And this nexus requirement is

what today's case is all about. 

Before us, we have an immigration appeal, which rises or

falls on whether Petitioner Eucineia Soares da Silva Pazine

("Soares da Silva Pazine") made a sufficient showing as to nexus. 

An Immigration Judge ("IJ") didn't think so, citing a lack of 

evidence in the record. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" 
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and, collectively with the IJ, "the agency") agreed with that

assessment. Viewing the record quite differently than the agency 

did and hoping to prevent her removal to her home country of 

Brazil, Soares da Silva Pazine filed a petition for review with 

this court. After taking a look ourselves, however, we conclude

that the agency's no-nexus finding is sufficiently supported by 

the record and, therefore, we must deny the petition.

THE WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, AND WHY

To start off today's appeal, we lay out the who, what, 

where, when, and why of Soares da Silva Pazine's journey to the 

United States, her case, and its path to our bench. In doing so, 

we gather our information from the administrative record,

including Soares da Silva Pazine's in-court testimony, see Caz v. 

Garland, 84 F.4th 22, 25 n.2 (1st Cir. 2023), which the IJ found 

"generally credib[le]."

Life in Brazil

Soares da Silva Pazine was born and raised in Resplendor, 

Brazil "and had a good childhood." Around March 2003, when she 

was about sixteen years old, she met Lucas Luiz Pazine ("Pazine"), 

who she married later that year in November. Their first child, 

a boy who we'll refer to as L.E.D.S.P., was born on October 14, 

2004. The three of them lived together in Brazil and, during that 

time, Pazine, while not physically abusive, "was very 

temperamental and would often be aggressive towards" Soares da 
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Silva Pazine. He would at times "make punching motions" in her 

direction "but stop just before coming into contact with" her, 

which she found "terrifying." In 2009, Pazine moved to the United 

States, and, in February 2011, Soares da Silva Pazine followed 

suit with L.E.D.S.P. in tow "to study," "to be with [her] husband," 

and "to have a stable family."

Life in the United States

Upon Soares da Silva Pazine's arrival to the United 

States, Pazine "became much more abusive." As she was now "going 

to school and meeting new people," he became very jealous and 

"would often take [her] phone away and check it, search through 

[her] bag and belongings, and generally tr[y] to keep track of 

everything [she] did."

One night in or around November 2011, Pazine attacked 

Soares da Silva Pazine for the first time. After she came home 

from class, he "grabbed [her] by the throat aggressively," 

"repeatedly hit [her] in the face with a closed fist," and "tried 

to strangle [her]." Soares da Silva Pazine managed to get away 

from him and locked herself in a room, during which time he 

"grabbed a knife and pursued [her] and broke a wall trying to get 

to [her]." While locked in the room, she called his employer, who 

came to their home, "saw the chaos," "protected [her] from 

[Pazine,] and escorted [her] to the hospital." Pazine "insisted 
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on coming to the hospital," which made Soares da Silva Pazine "not 

feel safe to report [him] for attacking [her]."

A few months later, in or around February 2012, Soares 

da Silva Pazine decided to leave Pazine and bought herself an 

airplane ticket back to Brazil. He, however, found out about her 

plan and "contacted both of [their] families, who contacted [her], 

and convinced [her] to give him a second chance." That second 

chance, it turned out, didn't lead to any lasting change in 

Pazine's behavior. 

To the contrary, while he "was a better husband" for 

about a year and a half, "he returned to his abusive ways" by 

September 2013, after their second child, a girl, was born. For 

example, Pazine "became controlling and began to treat [Soares da 

Silva Pazine] cruelly again," such as by "tak[ing] [her] phone and 

look[ing] through it, forbid[ding] [her] from going out of the 

house, and search[ing] [her] belongings." That wasn't even the 

extent of it. He "also began drinking every day," often "com[ing] 

home from a night of drinking and break[ing] items in [their] 

home." To make matters worse, he would also "brag to [her] that 

he was having sexual relations with other women," because she was 

"not fulfill[ing] [her] duties as a wife." Along these same lines, 

he would tell her that she "ha[d] to submit to what he wanted" and 

would sometimes sexually assault her.
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Wanting to escape this torment but financially unable to 

leave Pazine, Soares da Silva Pazine "decided to start saving money 

to build a home for [her] and [her] children in Brazil." Noticing 

that she was working hard and making a decent amount of money, 

Pazine "temporarily changed his ways," only to revert back to his 

abusive tendencies after their third child, another boy, was born 

in October 2017.

Things reached a boiling point in or around May 2020, 

when Soares da Silva Pazine asked Pazine "to leave [their] house 

for good." This request enraged Pazine, who, on May 28, 2020, 

attacked Soares da Silva Pazine again. That night, he chased her 

throughout their home, forcing her to lock herself in a bedroom to 

get away from him. Pazine, nevertheless, broke into the room and 

"began to punch and attack" Soares da Silva Pazine until their 

eldest son L.E.D.S.P. got in between them to protect her. 

L.E.D.S.P. was accidentally hit in the process, prompting Pazine 

to flee their home. Although the Woburn, Massachusetts Police 

Department was eventually called, Soares da Silva Pazine told them 

that she wasn't physically harmed during the attack because she 

feared Pazine would be deported.

Following this attack, Soares da Silva Pazine moved to 

a different apartment with their three children, but Pazine 

continued to call, text, and threaten her. His cousin, Dulce, 

would also call and threaten Soares da Silva Pazine "that [Soares 
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da Silva Pazine] had to see [Pazine] and support [Pazine] or else 

she would make [Soares da Silva Pazine's] life difficult." 

Ultimately, these continued threats convinced Soares da Silva 

Pazine that she had to be as far away from Pazine as possible, so 

she decided to return to Brazil with her three children. After 

receiving written authorization from Pazine to bring the children 

to Brazil, Soares da Silva Pazine and the three children left the 

United States on or around March 15, 2021.

Return to Brazil

Things didn't really improve much for Soares da Silva 

Pazine in Brazil. Although she "reconnected with [her] family and 

[Pazine's] family who [she] was familiar with," he "called his 

family and told them that he would not support [her] financially" 

and "told [their] families that [she] had mental disorders and was 

incapable of watching [their] children." Enraged that Soares da 

Silva Pazine left the United States with their children (even 

though he supposedly gave her written permission to do just that), 

Pazine told her over the phone that he "would do something to take 

the kids" and that he "would harm or kill [her] if he could."

While in Brazil, Soares da Silva Pazine would at times 

allow Pazine's parents to visit the children. During some of these 

visits, Pazine's parents would bring Dulce along, but Soares da 

Silva Pazine never approved of her coming to visit because of 

Dulce's prior threats to her. According to Soares da Silva Pazine, 
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Dulce came to these visits "on behalf of [Pazine] to monitor the 

situation and report on [her]." Dulce would also "threaten" her

during these visits "that [Dulce] was not satisfied that [Soares 

da Silva Pazine and the children] were there" and "[t]hat [Dulce] 

will remove [their] children."

Over the next two months, Dulce began to surveil Soares 

da Silva Pazine's home, though she never harmed her physically. 

Dulce "would walk around the block [Soares da Silva Pazine's] home 

was on and take pictures" and then "would wait outside and monitor 

[her] schedule trying to memorize when and where [she] would be." 

This surveillance took place nearly every day and Dulce frequently 

told Soares da Silva Pazine that she "would not have peace." 

Soares da Silva Pazine also began receiving phone calls from 

someone threatening to kill her and take her children. Although 

she did not recognize the voice on the other line, she believed 

they were connected to Dulce.

These were not the only calls Soares da Silva Pazine 

received during her time in Brazil. She also received calls "every 

day" from lawyers in Brazil who Pazine had hired to "harass" her. 

"One [lawyer] was more threatening and did not identify himself 

while the other was only coercive and would try and pursue [her] 

to sign [her] home [in Brazil which she owns] over to [Pazine]." 

These lawyers also threatened to "accuse [her] of being unfit to 

raise [their] children in an attempt to take [her] home away from 
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[her]." Ultimately, these lawyers wanted her "to sign the 

paperwork for divorce and giv[e] up [her] children and [her] 

house."

"[V]ery fearful" of what would happen to her, Soares da 

Silva Pazine reported all of these calls and threats to the 

Brazilian police who told her that "these were conjugal problems" 

so nothing could be done about them. In light of these continued 

threats, Soares da Silva Pazine, along with L.E.D.S.P., fled Brazil

on or about July 12, 2021 to return to the United States.1

Return to the United States

On or about July 16, 2021, Soares da Silva Pazine and 

L.E.D.S.P. entered the United States. Less than a month later, on 

August 5, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") 

initiated removal proceedings against them both. Over the next 

year or so, Soares da Silva Pazine continued to receive threats 

from Pazine's family and Pazine himself, who had since obtained a 

divorce against her in the United States. While Soares da Silva 

Pazine was unsure of Pazine's exact location, she knew he remained 

in the United States.

The IJ's Decision

Not too long after, on September 14, 2022, Soares da 

Silva Pazine and L.E.D.S.P. went before the IJ to seek immigration 

1 The other two children joined Soares da Silva Pazine and 

L.E.D.S.P. in the United States a few weeks later in August 2021.
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relief and avoid removal back to Brazil. Soares da Silva Pazine 

sought immigration relief through applications for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 

Against Torture ("CAT"), whereas L.E.D.S.P. only sought 

immigration relief through an application for derivative asylum.2 

To corroborate their claims and applications, they filed a trove 

of documents, including a sworn, written affidavit from Soares da 

Silva Pazine, her wedding certificate, L.E.D.S.P.'s birth 

certificate, various letters of support, including one from 

L.E.D.S.P. himself, a report on the effects of trauma, several 

country conditions reports, and a legal memorandum.

2 To paint a crystal-clear picture of what went down at this 

hearing, we offer a few additional points of clarification. 

First, derivative asylum refers to the fact that certain 

family members of asylees can be granted asylum as derivatives (or 

"riders" as they are also sometimes called) of their family 

member's asylum application. Cabrera v. Garland, 100 F.4th 312, 

315 n.1 (1st Cir. 2024). On the other hand, noncitizens cannot 

derive withholding of removal or CAT protection, so in order to 

apply for those forms of relief, they must submit an application 

in their own name. Id. L.E.D.S.P., though, did not submit any 

applications in his own name, so his only path to immigration 

relief was derivative asylum. 

Second, the IJ also considered two motions at the hearing: a 

motion to sever L.E.D.S.P.'s case from Soares da Silva Pazine's 

and a motion for administrative closure on behalf of both 

individuals. Administrative closure is a procedural mechanism 

that temporarily removes a noncitizen's case from an IJ's calendar 

and the BIA's docket but does not constitute a final order. 

Lopez-Reyes v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 2007). For 

reasons not ultimately relevant to the issues on appeal, both 

motions were denied.
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After Soares da Silva Pazine was done testifying in 

accordance with everything detailed above,3 the IJ denied all forms 

of immigration relief and ordered their removal to Brazil in an 

oral decision issued that day. The IJ started off his decision 

with credibility and corroboration. He noted that, even though he 

found Soares da Silva Pazine's testimony "generally credib[le]," 

she failed to provide certain evidence that he "deem[ed] to be 

reasonable, available corroborative evidence"4 and she did "not 

adequately explain[]" the failure to produce such evidence. "Even 

if the[se] corroborative deficiencies . . . did not undermine 

[Soares da Silva Pazine's] ability to meet [her] burden of proof," 

the IJ explained, her asylum claim failed on the merits.

Per the IJ, Soares da Silva Pazine's asylum claim failed 

for several reasons. First, while the IJ lamented "the heinous 

acts of violence and mistreatment that [Pazine] inflicted against 

both [Soares da Silva Pazine] and [L.E.D.S.P.]," he noted that 

that harm occurred in the United States and the "refugee" 

definition outlined above "necessarily requires that the

3 Soares da Silva Pazine was the sole witness to testify 

before the IJ.

4 Specifically, the IJ determined that she failed to provide 

four relevant and reasonably available pieces of evidence: (1) the 

medical records from her hospitalization in 2011, (2) the police 

report from the Woburn Police Department, (3) the written 

authorization Pazine supposedly gave her to take the children to 

Brazil, and (4) the divorce paperwork. 
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persecution occur or that an applicant have a well-founded fear of 

persecution on account of a protected ground in the applicant's 

country of nationality or country of last habitual residence." 

According to the IJ then, "the mistreatment that [Soares da Silva 

Pazine] and [L.E.D.S.P.] suffered at the hand[s] of [Pazine] does 

not constitute past persecution since it occurred in the United 

States." And because Pazine was still in the United States, the 

IJ similarly concluded that Soares da Silva Pazine did not have a 

well-founded fear of future persecution at the hands of Pazine in 

Brazil as the IJ "would only be speculating as to whether or not 

[Pazine] would be returning to Brazil."

Second, the IJ concluded that Soares da Silva Pazine did 

not suffer past persecution nor did she have a well-founded fear 

of future persecution on account of a protected ground by way of 

the threats she received from Dulce and Pazine's lawyers. In 

reaching that conclusion, he first looked to the statutorily 

protected grounds Soares da Silva Pazine advanced in her briefing, 

her membership in three PSGs: "Brazilian Women," "Brazilian 

Females," and "Single Brazilian Mothers." The IJ acknowledged 

that these PSGs "could be legally cognizable and that it appears 

that [Soares da Silva Pazine] may belong to such groups" but 

explained that there was "[in]sufficient evidence in the record 

that a central reason for the harm [from Dulce and Pazine's 

lawyers] was on account of these proposed [PSGs] as opposed to a 
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personal dispute." Rather, the IJ maintained, "the harm directed 

against [her] from [Dulce] and the attorneys appears to be rooted 

in a custody dispute regarding the children and a property 

dispute." Laying it all out on the table, the IJ pointed out that 

"there is no evidence that [Dulce] was motivated to harm [her] 

because of her statuses of Brazilian women or female or as a status 

of a single Brazilian mother as opposed to her taking up a personal 

dispute between her and her husband [Pazine]." Likewise, the IJ 

highlighted that "the attorneys . . . appear to have been motivated 

to carry out [Pazine's] wishes as their client to gain custody of 

the children and [Soares da Silva Pazine's] property."

While the IJ considered the possibility of "any 

potential transferred intent" and noted that Pazine himself may 

have been motivated to harm Soares da Silva Pazine on account of 

her membership in her proposed PSGs, "the key issue," the IJ 

emphasized, was "whether the people that [she] fears, specifically 

[Dulce] or the attorneys of [Pazine], were motivated on account of 

the [PSGs] proposed." And on that key issue, the IJ concluded 

"that the intent of [Dulce] and the attorneys is rooted in their 

desire to help [Pazine] gain custody of the children successfully 

in the divorce and also gain a successful divorce and gain 

property." Without a nexus to a protected ground, the IJ found 

that Soares da Silva Pazine's asylum claim "fail[ed]."
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Trudging along to the other forms of immigration relief, 

the IJ quickly denied withholding of removal because, like asylum, 

it requires a nexus to a statutorily protected ground but, unlike 

asylum, it has a higher burden of proof, which all meant that 

Soares da Silva Pazine's application for withholding of removal 

necessarily failed too. As for CAT protection, the IJ explained 

that there was insufficient evidence in the record that Soares da 

Silva Pazine would more likely than not be tortured in Brazil at 

the hands of or with the consent, acquiescence, or willful 

blindness of a public official. The IJ thought this was especially 

true here, where Soares da Silva Pazine had never been tortured in 

Brazil and "remained in Brazil for a number of months without any 

type of actual physical harm or mistreatment." In light of this 

absence of evidence, the IJ denied CAT protection and ordered

Soares da Silva Pazine and L.E.D.S.P. removed to Brazil.

Soares da Silva Pazine followed up with an appeal to the 

BIA.5

The BIA Decision

The BIA dismissed the appeal a year later, on September 

27, 2023. Starting off with what wasn't being challenged on 

appeal, the BIA noted that Soares da Silva Pazine had not 

5 For reasons unclear from the record, L.E.D.S.P. was not 

included in his mother's appeal to the BIA (nor, for that matter, 

in her petition for review to us). As such, the balance of our 

opinion today will focus on just Soares da Silva Pazine's case. 
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challenged the IJ's denial of CAT protection6 nor the IJ's 

conclusion that the harm Pazine subjected her to did not fall 

within the definition of "refugee" because it occurred in the 

United States, and not in Brazil. It then shifted its focus to 

Soares da Silva Pazine's challenge to the IJ's no-nexus finding as 

it related to Dulce and Pazine's lawyers. It "discern[ed] no clear 

error" in that no-nexus finding, which it found "plausible in light 

of the record." The BIA explained that "[w]hile [Soares da Silva 

Pazine] interprets her evidence differently, her interpretation 

alone is not sufficient to show clear factual error in the [IJ's] 

motive finding." In the absence of any clear error, it agreed 

with the IJ that she had not established the nexus required for

asylum or withholding of removal.7 Furthermore, the BIA noted 

that, for the first time on appeal, Soares da Silva Pazine raised 

a "pattern or practice" theory of persecution,8 which it refused

to address because she had not presented the theory to the IJ.

6 In fact, Soares da Silva Pazine doesn't challenge the denial 

of CAT protection in her briefing to us either. This failure to 

challenge the denial of CAT protection before the BIA and this 

court means she (to the extent she is even still pursuing this 

relief) both failed to administratively exhaust her claim and 

waived it. See Caz, 84 F.4th at 30 n.7 (waiver); Odei v. Garland, 

71 F.4th 75, 78 n.1 (1st Cir. 2023) (administrative exhaustion).

7 Because the no-nexus finding was dispositive of her claims, 

the BIA explicitly declined to address any other findings made by 

the IJ.

8 A "pattern or practice" theory of persecution is a fallback 

for noncitizens who cannot prove that they will personally be 

singled out for persecution on account of a protected ground in 
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A timely petition for review with this court followed

and, with that, we're all up to date on the relevant goings-on and 

need-to-knows.

THE HOW

Up top we previewed that today's appeal will end with a

denial of Soares da Silva Pazine's petition for review. What 

follows is how we get to that particular outcome. With CAT 

protection both unexhausted and waived, all we have left to review 

is the agency's denial of asylum and withholding of removal. And 

since "the BIA did not say that it was adopting the IJ's decision, 

only that the IJ's findings were not clearly erroneous," we limit 

our review to the BIA's decision, Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland, 59 

F.4th 510, 515 (1st Cir. 2023), starting off with asylum and ending 

with withholding.

Asylum

On the asylum front, Soares da Silva Pazine makes many 

arguments on appeal: (1) the harm she suffered in Brazil rose to 

the level of persecution; (2) her proposed PSGs of "Brazilian 

Women," "Brazilian Females," and "Single Brazilian Mothers" are

their home country or country of last habitual residence. See

Balachandran v. Holder, 566 F.3d 269, 272 (1st Cir. 2009). 

Instead, under such a theory, noncitizens can be granted asylum if

they demonstrate "that there is a pattern or practice . . . of 

persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the 

[noncitizen] on account of" at least one of the statutorily 

protected grounds and the noncitizen is a member of that group. 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)-(B). 
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legally cognizable PSGs; (3) the BIA erred in refusing to address 

her "pattern or practice" theory of persecution; (4) the IJ erred 

in his determination that she failed to provide reasonably 

available corroborative evidence, which undermined her ability to 

meet her burden of proof; and (5) the agency erred in concluding 

she had not demonstrated a nexus to a statutorily protected ground. 

We need not reach most of these arguments.

The agency's no-nexus finding was outcome-determinative 

and it is black-letter law that "agencies are not required to make 

findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the 

results they reach," so the agency did not need to address Soares 

da Silva Pazine's harm-amounting-to-persecution argument or the 

validity of her PSGs. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. 

Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (citing Hirabayashi v. United 

States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943)). As for the BIA's alleged error 

in declining to address her "pattern or practice" theory of 

persecution, nowhere in Soares da Silva Pazine's briefing does she 

challenge the BIA's assertion that she failed to raise this theory 

to the IJ, which constitutes waiver. See Caz, 84 F.4th at 30 n.7. 

And, importantly, a "pattern or practice" theory of persecution 

also requires a nexus showing, so the agency's no-nexus finding 

was, again, outcome-determinative. See Balachandran, 566 F.3d at 

272. Lastly, besides the no-nexus finding, the BIA explicitly 

declined to address the IJ's other findings, including the 
- 18 -

determination that Soares da Silva Pazine failed to provide 

reasonably available corroborative evidence. And where the BIA 

declines to address an IJ's alternative finding, that finding "is 

not before us." Bonilla v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 72, 81-82 (1st Cir. 

2008) (citing Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 

12 (2002)).

All that leaves us with just one argument to address 

regarding asylum: Soares da Silva Pazine's challenge to the 

no-nexus finding. And that challenge has two parts to it. First, 

she contends that the agency didn't engage in the proper 

mixed-motive analysis. Second, she contends that the record 

compelled the conclusion that her membership in the aforementioned 

PSGs was one central reason for the harm she suffered and fears 

suffering in the future. These contentions are essentially two 

sides of the same coin, which some background on nexus will help 

put in context.

As we mentioned above, asylum law's definition of 

"refugee" requires a showing of past persecution or a well-founded 

fear of future persecution "on account of" one of the statutorily 

protected grounds, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), and, without that 

on-account-of (or nexus) showing, an asylum claim won't make it 

very far, see Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 217-18 

(1st Cir. 2007). A noncitizen satisfies their burden as to nexus

by demonstrating that a statutorily protected ground "was or will 
- 19 -

be at least one central reason" for the harm they suffered or fear 

suffering. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). This does not require 

the noncitizen to demonstrate that they were or will be targeted 

only because of their protected characteristic. Ordonez-Quino v. 

Holder, 760 F.3d 80, 90 (1st Cir. 2014). Rather, this capacious 

"at least one central reason" language recognizes the universal 

truth that it is common for persecutors to have mixed motivations. 

See id. The upshot of all this is that "the presence of a 

non-protected motivation" does not defeat a noncitizen's asylum 

claim. Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2014). 

Instead, all that is required of a noncitizen is a sufficient 

showing that the protected motivation was not "incidental, 

tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for 

[the] harm." Sánchez-Vásquez v. Garland, 994 F.3d 40, 47 (1st 

Cir. 2021) (quoting Singh v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 

2008)).

With that legal framework in place, we turn back to 

Soares da Silva Pazine's arguments. She essentially argues that 

(1) the BIA didn't properly consider the possibility of mixed 

motives, and (2) the record adequately showed that her membership 

in her PSGs was "at least one central reason" for the harm. But 

before getting to the meat of our analysis of those arguments, 

there are several important clarifications we must make regarding 
- 20 -

which PSGs are at issue here and which persecutor's motivations

are relevant to our nexus analysis.

First, while Soares da Silva Pazine proffered three PSGs 

to the IJ and the BIA -- namely, "Brazilian Women," "Brazilian 

Females," and "Single Brazilian Mothers" -- the substance of her 

briefing only addresses "Brazilian Women" with mere passing 

references to the other two PSGs. We, therefore, deem those other 

two PSGs waived, see Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 33, 40 

n.5 (1st Cir. 2018), and consider her nexus arguments vis-à-vis 

only her "Brazilian Women" PSG. Second, Soares da Silva Pazine 

never challenged in her briefing to us or to the BIA the IJ's 

conclusion that the abuse Pazine subjected her to in the United 

States could not be a basis for asylum because the "refugee" 

definition necessarily contemplates harm in the noncitizen's home 

country. With no argumentation on that point at all, we deem it 

waived and unexhausted, see id. (waiver); Odei, 71 F.4th at 78 n.1

(administrative exhaustion), and do not consider Pazine's 

United-States-based actions in our nexus analysis. Third, Soares 

da Silva Pazine makes a passing argument in her briefing to us 

that "the form of verbal abuse from [Pazine] while they lived 

together in Brazil" amounted to past persecution -- an argument 

which makes its debut before us (not before the IJ and not before 

the BIA). Her failure to properly develop this argument on appeal 

to us and her failure to present this argument to the agency at 
- 21 -

all -- once again -- means the argument is waived and unexhausted. 

See Martínez-Pérez, 897 F.3d at 40 n.5 (waiver); Odei, 79 F.4th at 

78 n.1 (administrative exhaustion). 

What this all means for our purposes here today is that 

the only actors whose motivations are relevant are Dulce and 

Pazine's lawyers and what matters is whether the record 

sufficiently shows that "at least one central reason" for their 

actions against Soares da Silva Pazine was her membership in the 

"Brazilian Women" PSG.

With these important clarifications squared away, we at 

long last finally turn to the nitty-gritty of our analysis of 

Soares da Silva Pazine's appellate arguments. Her first argument 

-- that the BIA failed to engage in a mixed-motive analysis --

boils down to a contention that it applied the wrong legal 

standard, which is an argument we review de novo (or, more simply 

put, with fresh eyes). Jimenez-Portillo v. Garland, 56 F.4th 162, 

166 (1st Cir. 2022). With our de-novo glasses on, we hardly see 

any merit to this argument. The BIA repeatedly cited the "at least 

one central reason" standard in its decision and then ran through 

specific facts in the record that supported the no-nexus finding. 

By doing so, it "necessarily 'acknowledged the possibility of a 

mixed-motive case, but based on the evidence presented, made a 

fact-specific determination that [Soares da Silva Pazine] had not 

shown that the persecution was motivated'" by a protected ground. 
- 22 -

Barnica-Lopez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 520, 529-30 (1st Cir. 2023)

(quoting Villalta-Martinez v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 

2018)). The BIA's decision, therefore, readily reflects that it 

"repeatedly cited to and correctly applied the 'one central reason' 

standard in examining the nexus between that protected ground and 

the harm [Soares da Silva Pazine] suffered."9 Id. at 529.

Finding her first argument unpersuasive, all that 

remains for our review is her second argument that, even assuming 

the agency applied the correct "at least one central reason" 

standard, it erred in determining that her membership in the 

"Brazilian Women" PSG was not "at least one central reason" for 

the harm she suffered and fears suffering from Dulce and Pazine's 

lawyers. This is an argument we review under the substantial 

evidence standard, because whether a protected characteristic is 

a central reason for a noncitizen's persecution is generally a 

question of fact. Singh, 543 F.3d at 4. And under the substantial 

evidence standard, which is not "petitioner-friendly," Ruiz v. 

Mukasey, 526 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2008), we reverse only if any 

reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to the opposite 

9 To the extent Soares da Silva Pazine argues that the IJ did 

not properly apply the mixed-motive standard and the BIA erred by 

failing to correct that error on appeal, we see no merit to that 

contention either for the same exact reasons. The IJ's decision 

reflects multiple invocations of the correct "at least one central 

reason" standard and a careful review of the record evidence as to 

Dulce's and Pazine's lawyers' intentions.
- 23 -

conclusion, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 

U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992). For reasons we'll explain, we do not 

think the record compels the conclusion that Dulce and Pazine's 

lawyers targeted or will target Soares da Silva Pazine on account 

of her membership in the "Brazilian Women" PSG.

Soares da Silva Pazine seems to contend that Pazine 

himself was motivated to harm her on account of her gender and, 

because he "coordinated" the harm Dulce and his lawyers subjected 

her to, their actions are inextricably linked to his own 

motivations. In this way, she appears to be arguing that Pazine's 

motivations are either transferred or imputed to Dulce and his 

lawyers. Setting aside the fact that Soares da Silva Pazine offers 

no caselaw (nor are we aware of any) greenlighting the transferring 

of or imputing of one actor's motivations to another, we'll assume 

(favorably to her, but without deciding) that Pazine was indeed 

motivated to harm her on account of her gender and assume (again 

favorably to her, but without deciding) that such motivations can 

be transferred or imputed to Dulce and his lawyers, because her 

argument fails regardless. See Cabrera, 100 F.4th at 321 (assuming 

"favorably to Petitioners" the viability of their asylum argument 

because the "claim fails anyway").

To explain, even if Dulce and Pazine's lawyers were 

motivated to harm Soares da Silva Pazine at least in part due to 

her gender, she must nevertheless prove that the record compels 
- 24 -

the conclusion that her gender was not "incidental, tangential, 

superficial, or subordinate to another reason for [the] harm." 

Sánchez-Vásquez, 994 F.3d at 47 (quoting Singh, 543 F.3d at 5). 

And that she cannot do. Let's start off with Dulce. Nothing in 

the record compels the conclusion that she was more than 

incidentally or tangentially motivated (if that) by Soares da Silva 

Pazine's gender as opposed to her desire to help her cousin Pazine 

obtain custody of the children -- as the agency concluded. For 

example, every threat Dulce made against her occurred when Soares 

da Silva Pazine was separated from Pazine and had taken their 

children. Moreover, none of the threats referenced her gender or 

used similar gender-based derogatory language that Pazine had 

previously used. There's also nothing in the record to suggest 

Dulce had previously targeted other Brazilian women due to their 

gender. Importantly, Soares da Silva Pazine testified herself 

that Dulce threatened her because "she wanted to do things bad to 

[her], take [her] children, [and] take [her] house," because Dulce 

was "[i]nfluenced by [Pazine]," who "wanted custody of [her] 

children and to take everything [she] had." Nothing in this 

explanation even references her gender as a motivating factor 

behind Dulce's actions. Ultimately, the agency reasonably 

concluded that Dulce was motivated to help her cousin in his 

personal dispute against Soares da Silva Pazine for custody and 

property and we've long recognized that "personal disputes are 
- 25 -

generally not enough to show the required nexus." Sompotan v. 

Mukasey, 533 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2008).

We reach the same conclusion as to the motivations of 

Pazine's lawyers. The only information in Soares da Silva Pazine's 

sworn, written affidavit about the lawyers is the following:

[Pazine] hired two attorneys to harass me 

while I lived in Brazil. Both would call me 

every day. One was more threatening and did 

not identify himself while the other was only 

coercive and would try and pursue me to sign 

my home over to [Pazine]. [Pazine] wanted 

these lawyers to take my home and money from 

me. 

I own a home in Brazil and [Pazine], and his 

attorneys, have threatened to try and take my 

home from me by any means necessary. The 

lawyers were going to accuse me of being unfit 

to raise our children in an attempt to take my 

home away from me. They also were going to 

attempt to take my home through divorce 

proceedings, if those were to proceed.

Needless to say, nothing there even remotely suggests the lawyers' 

were motivated by Soares da Silva Pazine's gender. The same is 

true of her in-court testimony. Indeed, her in-court testimony 

strongly suggests the lawyers were motivated by their 

attorney-client relationship and obligation to do what their 

client, Pazine, hired them to do. She testified that their "calls 

were essentially about custody and money" and "sign[ing] the 

paperwork for divorce and giving up [her] children and [her] 

house." There's also nothing in the record from which we could 

even infer any gender-based motivation on the lawyers' part. For 
- 26 -

example, nothing in their actions or behavior suggests that they 

only take male clients or that they would not have engaged in such 

hard-boiled tactics had their client been Soares da Silva Pazine 

and not Pazine. As such, the agency's conclusion that the lawyers 

were similarly motivated by a personal dispute is well-supported 

by the record.

The only comeback Soares da Silva Pazine offers is that 

the boatload of country conditions evidence in the record 

demonstrates that Brazil is rife with impunity for gender-based 

violence, which (in her mind) supports her contention that Dulce 

and Pazine's lawyers had gender-based motivations. While this 

characterization of life in Brazil may well be true, that 

generalized country conditions evidence hardly illuminates Dulce's 

or the lawyers' specific motivations. See Laurent v. Ashcroft, 

359 F.3d 59, 65 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004) ("But such generalized 

information cannot be allowed to trump the IJ's specific, 

well-substantiated finding . . . ."). This is especially true 

where neither Dulce nor the lawyers outwardly expressed any 

misogynist views.10

10 Other than the country conditions evidence, the only other 

relevant evidence is the aforementioned letters of support from 

various individuals, including L.E.D.S.P. and others familiar with 

what Soares da Silva Pazine and her children lived through. These 

letters, however, provide no insight as to Dulce's or the lawyers' 

motivations as the only reference to them at all in any of these 

letters is the following: "However, while [Soares da Silva Pazine 
- 27 -

To recap, the agency concluded that there was no nexus

between Soares da Silva Pazine's membership in the "Brazilian 

Women" PSG and the harm she suffered from Dulce and Pazine's 

lawyers. For the reasons explained above, we believe substantial 

evidence supports that conclusion and, therefore, the agency did 

not err in denying asylum. 

Withholding of Removal

Neither did the agency err in denying withholding of 

removal, which also requires a nexus showing but imposes a higher 

standard of proof than asylum. Lopez de Hincapie, 494 F.3d at

220. Having failed to satisfy asylum's standard of proof, Soares 

da Silva Pazine necessarily failed to satisfy withholding's 

standard of proof.11 See Cabrera, 100 F.4th at 324.

and the children] were [in Brazil], [Pazine] sent people who 

threatened her and her family with death."

11 We take a beat to note that some of our sister circuits 

disagree as to whether the "one central reason" standard -- as 

opposed to a less stringent "a reason" standard -- applies to 

withholding of removal. Compare Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 

351, 359-60 (9th Cir. 2017) (endorsing "a reason" standard);

Guzman-Vasquez v. Barr, 959 F.3d 253, 272 (6th Cir. 2020) (same) 

with Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 781 F.3d 677, 685 n.6 

(3d Cir. 2015) (endorsing the "one central reason" standard);

Vazquez-Guerra v. Garland, 7 F.4th 265, 271 (5th Cir. 2021) (same);

Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 108-14 (2d Cir. 2022) (same). 

See also Durakovic v. Garland, 101 F.4th 989, 996, 996 n.3 (8th 

Cir. 2024) (noting the circuit split and listing cases but 

declining to resolve the issue); Pineda-Maldonado v. Garland, 91 

F.4th 76, 90 n.5 (1st Cir. 2024) (same); Chavez v. Garland, 51 

F.4th 424, 430 n.4 (1st Cir. 2022) (same). As we've routinely 

applied the "one central reason" standard to withholding of removal 

claims, see, e.g., Barnica-Lopez, 59 F.4th at 528; Marquez-Paz v. 

Barr, 983 F.3d 564, 565 (1st Cir. 2020); Costa v. Holder, 733 F.3d 
- 28 -

THE WRAP-UP

As we wrap up, we wish to note that nothing in today's 

opinion is meant to discount the gravity of what Soares da Silva 

Pazine has lived through both in Brazil and the United States. 

That said, the record-related deficiencies as to nexus require 

that we deny the petition.

13, 16 (1st Cir. 2013), and neither party asks us to resolve the 

issue, we apply the "one central reason" standard here and leave 

the issue for another day.