[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11150

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

IRA KLEIMAN, 

as the Personal Representative of the 

Estate of David Kleiman,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

W&K INFO DEFENSE RESEARCH, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

versus

CRAIG WRIGHT, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cv-80176-BB

____________________

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal involves an ownership dispute stemming from 

the origins of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. The Estate of David Kleiman (“Estate”) sued Craig Wright, an Australian computer scientist and self-described inventor of Bitcoin, claiming that (David) 

Kleiman and Wright, who were friends, formed a partnership to 

develop the original Bitcoin protocol, to mine bitcoin, and to develop related blockchain technology. The Estate asserts that it is 

entitled to half of the bitcoins—purportedly worth billions—mined 

through the alleged partnership. A jury ultimately found that no 

partnership existed and returned a verdict against the Estate, which 

now appeals.1 

On appeal, the Estate asserts that the verdict should not 

stand for three reasons. First, in the Estate’s view, the district 

court’s instructions on partnership formation did not accurately reflect current law under Florida’s Revised Uniform Partnership Act

of 1995 (“FRUPA”), Fla. Stat. §§ 8001 et seq. Second, according to 

1 The jury also returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff W&K Info Defense Research, LLC, on its conversion claim in the amount of $100 million. That verdict is not at issue, and W&K is not a party to this appeal. 

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the Estate, the court applied the wrong legal standard and abused 

its discretion when it vacated sanctions imposed by the magistrate 

judge that would have deemed as true essential factual elements of 

the Estate’s partnership claim. And third, the Estate maintains that 

the district court abused its discretion by denying a new trial based 

on opposing counsel’s repeated violations of an in limine order prohibiting evidence of the “sibling relationship” between David Kleiman and Ira Kleiman, David’s brother and the personal representative of the Estate. We consider each argument in turn, but ultimately, we affirm.

I. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

In evaluating jury instructions, our standard of review is 

“simultaneously de novo and deferential.” Bhogaita v. Altamonte 

Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014). That 

is, “[w]e review jury instructions de novo to determine whether 

they misstate the law or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 

objecting party but give the district court wide discretion as to the 

style and wording employed.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Under longstanding Florida law, a “partnership is created 

only where both parties contribute to the labor or capital of the 

enterprise, have a mutuality of interest in both profits and losses, 

and agree to share in the assets and liabilities of the business.” Williams v. Obstfeld, 314 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation 

marks omitted); see Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1957). 

In other words, a partnership “must consist of the following elements: (1) a common purpose; (2) a joint proprietary interest in the 

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subject matter; (3) the right to share profits and duty to share losses; 

and (4) joint control or right of control.” Williams, 314 F.3d at 

1275–76. “These requirements are strictly construed and the absence of even one is fatal to the finding of a partnership.” Dreyfuss 

v. Dreyfuss, 701 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); see Austin v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 657 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). 

The Estate admits that the district court’s instructions to the 

jury were consistent with this caselaw, notably Williams and Dreyfuss. But, in the Estate’s view, these decisions are not controlling 

because the alleged partnerships at issue predated FRUPA, which 

took effect in 1995. The Estate maintains that FRUPA replaced the 

strict common-law test, which required four or five factors to be 

proven, “with a totality of the circumstances test, under which no 

single factor is dispositive.”

Florida law requires statutes enacted “in derogation of the 

common law [to] be strictly construed.” Ady v. Am. Honda Fin. 

Corp., 675 So. 2d 577, 581 (Fla. 1996). “[A]ny legislative intent either 

to abolish or to limit the common law must indicate such change 

clearly, or else the rule of common law stands.” Larmoyeux v. Montgomery, 963 So. 2d 813, 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). 

Here, the Estate has failed to show that FRUPA abrogated 

the common law or otherwise changed the rules of partnership formation relevant to its claim. FRUPA’s general rules for partnership 

formation are largely unchanged from the Uniform Partnership 

Act (“UPA”), which Florida adopted in 1972. Pinellas Cnty. v. Lake 

Padgett Pines, 333 So. 2d 472, 474 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); see generally 

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John Larson, Florida’s New Partnership Law: The Revised Uniform 

Partnership Act and Limited Liability Partnerships, 23 Fla. St. U. L. 

Rev. 201, 205–06 (1995). 

For instance, the Estate relies on FRUPA’s definition of a 

partnership: “[T]he association of two or more persons to carry on 

as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or 

not the persons intend to form a partnership.” Fla. Stat. 

§ 620.8202(1). But UPA similarly defined a partnership as “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business 

for profit.” Larson, supra at 205 n.9. FRUPA merely added the 

clause, “whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership,” 

and “recast” UPA’s “definition” as an “operative rule of law.” Fla. 

Stat. § 620.8202, cmt. n.1. Notably, “[n]o substantive change in the 

law [was] intended” by these modifications. Id. 

The Estate also cites FRUPA’s profit-sharing presumption. 

Among its rules for “determining whether a partnership is 

formed,” FRUPA provides that “[a] person who receives a share of 

the profits of a business is presumed to be a partner.” Fla. Stat.

§ 620.8202(3)(c) (emphasis added). That marked a changed from 

UPA, which stated a person’s receipt of profits of a business was 

“prima facie evidence” that the person was a partner. Larson, supra

at 205 n.9. Thus, FRUPA “recast[s]” the sharing of profits as a “rebuttable presumption of a partnership, a more contemporary construction, rather than as prima facie evidence thereof.” Fla. Stat. 

§ 620.8202, cmt. n.3. Beyond that, though, “no substantive change 

[was] intended” to the profit-sharing rule. Id. 

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These minor revisions cannot sustain the Estate’s claim that 

FRUPA substituted a new test for determining partnership formation, let alone clearly so. See Larmoyeux, 963 So. 2d at 820. After 

all, “[l]ike its predecessor, [F]RUPA makes no attempt to answer in 

every case whether a partnership is formed.” Fla. Stat. § 620.8202, 

cmt. n.3. While FRUPA revised UPA’s partnership definition to 

clarify that intent to form a partnership is not relevant to formation, intent is not one of the four required factors Williams identifies for establishing a partnership. 314 F.3d at 1275–76. It does 

not follow that, because intent is not relevant, courts must evaluate 

the other factors under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. 

Nor is such an approach required because FRUPA “recast” 

the sharing of profits as a “rebuttable presumption of a partnership, 

. . . rather than as prima facie evidence thereof.” Fla. Stat. § 

620.8202, cmt. n.3. As the party asserting its existence, the Estate 

bore the burden of establishing the formation of a partnership by a

preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Watson Realty Corp. v. 

Quinn, 435 So. 2d 950, 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (“[P]laintiff's burden 

of proof is that of a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.”). And the application of a rebuttable presumption is not 

inconsistent with requiring a jury to apply the four partnership factors listed above, since it’s up to the jury to determine whether any 

such presumption has been rebutted.

Notably absent from the Estate’s briefing is any Florida 

caselaw that supports its position. The Estate cites one Florida case 

that cites FRUPA but is otherwise silent about the issues here. See 

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Rafael J. Roca, P.A. v. Lytel & Reiter, Clark, Roca, Fountain & Williams, 856 So. 2d 1, 5–6 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (distinguishing but not 

criticizing Dreyfuss). The Estate’s other cases that do address similar issues are from out of state and of limited persuasive value.2 

Even assuming we would endorse a more flexible approach as a 

matter of first impression, we are governed by existing Florida law. 

And we see no indication that Florida courts have moved away 

from the common-law test. 

For these reasons, FRUPA did not abrogate prior caselaw on 

partnership formation insofar as it required proof of certain factors. 

See Larmoyeux, 963 So. 2d at 820. Accordingly, we reject the Estate’s claim that the district court erred in instructing the jury on 

partnership formation.

II. SANCTIONS

“We review a district court’s order denying a motion for 

sanctions for abuse of discretion.” Fuentes v. Classica Cruise Operator 

Ltd., Inc., 32 F.4th 1311, 1321 (11th Cir. 2022). This standard gives 

the district court a “range of choice” so long as the court does not 

rely on an erroneous legal standard or make a clear error of judgment. Id.; see Higgs v. Costa Crociere S.P.A. Co., 969 F.3d 1295, 1304 

2 For example, Ingram v. Deere concerns the Texas Revised Partnership Act, 

which expressly listed five factors that indicated partnership formation and 

therefore “contemplate[d] a less formalistic and more practical approach to 

recognizing the formation of a partnership.” 288 S.W.3d 886, 895 (Tex. 2009). 

No similar list is contained in FRUPA, so we cannot draw a similar inference. 

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(11th Cir. 2020). “In other words, a district court has broad, yet not 

unbridled, discretion in deciding whether to impose evidentiary 

sanctions.” Fuentes, 32 F.4th at 1321 (quotation marks omitted). 

A. Background

During litigation, the Estate sought discovery from Wright 

about his bitcoin holdings, which it believed were relevant to establish the universe of bitcoin mined during the alleged partnership 

between David Kleiman and Wright. A magistrate judge broadly 

agreed and, on March 14, 2019, ordered Wright to produce a list of 

his bitcoin holdings as of the last day in 2013, the year David died.

Wright resisted, asserting that the information was impossible to produce. The gist of his position, as developed over several 

filings and in testimony at an evidentiary hearing, was as follows. 

In 2011 or 2012, Wright transferred ownership of all bitcoin he had 

mined or acquired or would acquire to the Tulip Trust, of which 

he was both a trustee and beneficiary. Information about the 

Trust’s bitcoin was locked in an encrypted file protected by a “Shamir’s Secret Sharing Algorithm”—an algorithm created by Adi Shamir to divide a secret, such as a private encryption key, into multiple parts. The key to the encrypted file was split into fifteen “key 

slices” and distributed through the Trust. Wright controlled seven 

of the eight key slices required to access the bitcoin address information, and so was without access on his own. Nonetheless, 

Wright indicated that, based on an arrangement with David before 

his death, he expected to receive another key slice by bonded courier in 2020.

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Following an evidentiary hearing on the Estate’s motion to 

compel, during which Wright testified, the magistrate judge entered an order imposing sanctions against Wright under Rule 37, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. The magistrate judge completely rejected Wright’s 

story of his inability to comply, finding that he had offered willfully 

false testimony, supported by fraudulent documents, about the 

Trust and the encrypted file as “part of a sustained and concerted 

effort to impede discovery into his bitcoin holdings.” 

The magistrate judge then turned to the “question of a 

proper remedy.” The magistrate judge found that Wright’s “willful and bad faith pattern of obstructive behavior” had prejudiced 

the Estate by preventing it from obtaining evidence relevant to its 

partnership claim. Finding that “[n]o lesser sanction would suffice,” the magistrate judge awarded reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees and “deem[ed] the following facts to be established for 

purposes of this action” (the “Deemed Facts”):

(1) Dr. Wright and David Kleiman entered into a 

50/50 partnership to develop Bitcoin intellectual 

property and to mine bitcoin; 

(2) any Bitcoin-related intellectual property developed by Dr. Wright prior to David Kleiman’s death 

was property of the partnership, 

(3) all bitcoin mined by Dr. Wright prior to David 

Kleiman’s death (“the partnership’s bitcoin”) was 

property of the partnership when mined; and 

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(4) Plaintiffs presently retain an ownership interest in 

the partnership’s bitcoin, and any assets traceable to 

them. 

The magistrate judge also struck certain affirmative defenses to 

conform to the Deemed Facts.

Wright appealed to the district court, arguing that the magistrate’s judge’s order was without evidentiary support, exceeded 

the scope of the matters before the magistrate judge, and would 

deprive Wright of his rights to due process and a fair trial.

In an order entered on January 10, 2020, the district court

denied relief in part and granted relief in part. The court agreed 

with the magistrate judge’s decision to discredit Wright’s testimony, which was “the sole evidence put forward to establish [his] 

claim of impossibility.”3 Concluding that Wright had “willfully obstructed” the discovery process and denied the Estate evidence relevant to its claim, the court found that sanctions were warranted

in the form of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.

But the district court agreed with Wright that the sanctions 

deeming certain facts as true, and striking certain affirmative defenses as a result, were “improperly imposed.” The court stated 

that, in its view, the sanctions were not “specifically related to the 

3 The district court also stated that, even if his testimony was true, Wright still 

failed to show he made “in good faith all reasonable efforts to comply” with 

his discovery obligations, warranting sanctions.

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particular discovery abuse at issue,” and did little to “cure” that discovery abuse—that is, Wright’s failure to identify the extent of his 

bitcoin holdings. Accordingly, the court found that these sanctions 

were “not proper.”

Notably, the district court agreed to “indulge” Wright’s representations that a bonded courier could soon arrive with the key 

slices necessary to generate a list of his bitcoin holdings. The court 

indicated that, if “this mysterious figure has appeared from the 

shadows” and Wright produced a list of his holdings, then no additional sanctions would be imposed. But if the courier did not arrive, and the Estate was not given access to information “directly 

relevant” to their claims, the court found that “additional sanctions 

would be warranted.” The court specifically noted that it would 

inform the jury of Wright’s failure to disclose the information 

sought by the Estate, extend the discovery period, and consider any 

renewed discovery requests by the Estate. 

Just four days later, Wright filed a notice stating that “a third 

party has provided the necessary information and key slice to unlock the encrypted file,” and that he had “produced a list of his 

bitcoin holdings, as ordered by the [m]agistrate [j]udge, to plaintiffs 

today.” 

After discovery closed and Wright had moved for summary 

judgment, the Estate filed an “Omnibus Sanctions Motion.” The 

Estate accused Wright of an ongoing and unrepentant campaign of 

forgery, perjury, and obstruction, making a mockery of the proceeding and preventing the Estate from proving its claims. The 

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Estate requested that the district court invoke its inherent authority 

to sanction Wright by imposing judgment by default, or by effectively reinstating the Deemed Facts. 

In a June 2020 order, the district court reviewed the Estate’s 

allegations in detail and denied the motion for sanctions. The court 

was sympathetic to the Estate, stating that it depicted “unsettling 

issues” about whether Wright had “committed perjury, produced 

forgeries, and engaged in judicial abuse” since the court’s January 

2020 order. But the court explained that “significant factual disputes abound” over these issues, which would ordinarily be within

the province of the jury to decide, and it found insufficient cause to 

remove the case from the jury. The court also declined to impose 

lesser sanctions.

B. Discussion

The Estate contends that the district court abused its discretion when it vacated the Deemed Facts sanctions that the magistrate judge imposed. In support of this contention, the Estate 

claims that the court applied an erroneous legal standard that conflicts with Rule 37, and that, even if it applied the correct standard, 

the court failed to account for the prejudice to the Estate’s case. 

We start with a point of clarification. Although the Estate 

references the June 2020 order denying its omnibus sanctions motion, and the allegations made therein, the Estate does not plainly 

and prominently appeal that ruling. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian 

Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A party fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not plainly and prominently 

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raise it, for instance by devoting a discrete section of his argument 

to those claims.” (quotation marks omitted)). Rather, the substance of its argument relates almost entirely to the January 2020 

order vacating the Deemed Facts sanctions imposed by the magistrate judge. Accordingly, the Estate has abandoned any appeal of 

the June 2020 ruling. See id. 

Thus, this appeal concerns only the January 2020 ruling. As 

to that ruling, the district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating sanctions that the magistrate judge imposed that would have 

deemed as true essential factual elements of the Estate’s partnership claims. The Estate has not shown that the court relied on an 

erroneous legal standard or made a clear error of judgment. 

Rule 37(b) gives “district judges broad discretion to fashion 

appropriate sanctions for violation of discovery orders.” Consumer 

Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Brown, 69 F.4th 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2023) 

(cleaned up). Such sanctions may include “directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as 

established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party 

claims,” or “striking pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(b)(2)(A). 

“The broad discretion of the district court to manage its affairs is governed, of course, by the most fundamental safeguard of 

fairness: the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Serra 

Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.3d 1137, 1151 (11th Cir. 

2006). “To comply with the Due Process Clause, a court must impose sanctions that are both ‘just’ and ‘specifically related to the 

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particular ‘claim’ which was at issue in the order to provide discovery.” Id.

First, we are not convinced that the district court relied on 

an erroneous legal standard. The court accurately quoted and described Serra Chevrolet, where we vacated a Rule 37 sanction on 

due-process grounds for lack of a “relationship with the discovery

abuse,” not just the claim more broadly. 446 F.3d at 1152. 

Moreover, the district court’s order reflects that its sanctions 

decision was an exercise of its broad discretion in discovery matters, not a determination that the Deemed Facts sanctions necessarily violated due process. The court described the sanctions as 

“not proper,” rather than “not authorized,” or the like. The court 

also gave Wright another chance to comply and indicated it would 

impose additional sanctions if he again failed to provide a list of his 

bitcoin holdings, which reflects that the court was yet to make a 

final sanctions decision in relation to that discovery issue.

Second, the district court did not make a clear error of judgment in vacating the magistrate judge’s Deemed Facts sanctions. 

When the court issued its January 2020 ruling, there was a possibility, however remote, that Wright would soon comply with the 

magistrate judge’s discovery order and provide the Estate with the 

information it had requested, mitigating any prejudice to its case

and reducing the need for further curative measures. So it was reasonable at that time to postpone consideration of sanctions more

drastic than an award of attorney’s fees until it became clear 

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whether the Estate would receive a list of Wright’s bitcoin holdings. Then, shortly after the court’s order, Wright in fact produced 

a list of bitcoin holdings. While the Estate disputes the origin and 

authenticity of this list, with supporting evidence, those issues were 

raised in the Estate’s omnibus sanctions motion, filed several 

months later. And the Estate has not appealed the denial of that 

subsequent decision, as we explained above, so we will not consider those matters here. 

III. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

We review a ruling on a motion for a new trial for an abuse 

of discretion. McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 817 F.3d 

1241, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016). “Deference to the district court is particularly appropriate where a new trial is denied and the jury’s verdict is left undisturbed.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

A party is entitled to a new trial where opposing counsel’s 

misconduct “impaired a substantial right of the objecting party.” 

Ruiz v. Wing, 991 F.3d 1130, 1141 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks 

omitted). “Inappropriate statements made by counsel will not justify a new trial unless the remarks were such as to impair gravely 

the calm and dispassionate consideration of the case by the jury.” 

Id. (quotation marks omitted). “We consider the entire argument, 

the context of the remarks, the objection raised, and the curative 

instruction.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

Before trial, the district court granted the Estate’s motion in 

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ship with [David] Kleiman.” The one exception was an alleged dinner conversation on Thanksgiving in 2009 in which, according to 

Ira, David made comments suggesting that he was developing 

Bitcoin with another person. But, in the court’s view, whether Ira 

“visited his brother at the hospital, spoke to him infrequently, or 

whether Mr. Kleiman mentioned Ira Kleiman to others has limited 

probative value but substantial capacity to cause undue prejudice.” 

In particular, the court stated, it raised “significant concerns” that 

jurors would decide the case based “on how ‘good’ of a brother Ira

[Kleiman] was or whether [he] ‘deserves’ Dave [Kleiman’s] fortune.”

The Estate maintains that opposing counsel knowingly and 

repeatedly violated the in limine order by putting improper information before the jury. On cross-examination, Wright’s counsel 

questioned Ira about issues bearing on the sibling relationship, including whether Thanksgiving 2009 was the “last day you saw your 

brother in person,” whether he ever “saw [David] in the hospital,” 

whether he didn’t “learn of Dave’s death until a few days after his 

body was found,” and how frequently he spoke with his brother in 

the “last 13 months of your brother’s life.” Wright’s counsel also 

briefly showed the jury an exhibit with unredacted statements that 

Ira had “limited contact and personal knowledge as to David’s financial affairs throughout David’s life.” And the jury may have 

seen another unredacted exhibit stating that “Ira never saw [David] 

at the hospital.” Wright’s counsel also asked another witness, a 

close friend of David’s, how often he heard of Ira from David. The 

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Estate objected to some, but not all, this alleged misconduct, and 

the district court sustained some, but not all, the objections. 

Following the adverse jury verdict, the Estate moved for a 

new trial, arguing that opposing counsel’s violations of the order in 

limine so prejudiced the jury that a new trial was warranted. The 

district court disagreed and denied the motion. The court first 

found that the Estate had effectively waived its challenge by failing 

to object to some questions or to seek a remedy at trial, such as a 

curative instruction. The court further reasoned that, even assuming the claim of error was preserved, it was “not persuaded that 

[defense counsel’s] purported misconduct was so prejudicial as to 

warrant a new trial.”

We assume without deciding that the Estate properly preserved its objections to any alleged breaches of the in limine order. 

And we agree that some of the questions and comments—including whether Ira visited David at the hospital and how frequently he 

spoke with him—were improper and violated the in limine order.

That said, the district court, having overseen the 21-day trial, 

was in the best position to assess whether the misconduct gravely 

impaired the jury’s dispassionate consideration of the case. Only 

the court “had the opportunity to hear the offensive remarks 

within the context of the arguments and to view their effects on 

the jury.” Vinson, 12 F.4th at 1277 (quotation marks omitted). 

The Estate has failed to show that deference to the district 

court’s decision is not appropriate here. See McGinnis, 817 F.3d at 

1255. For starters, the Estate has not addressed the court’s finding 

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18 Opinion of the Court 22-11150

that some of the alleged misconduct concerned other “proper purposes,” including “establishing the implausibility of the Thanksgiving Day 2009 conversation, relevant dates, and Ira Kleiman’s personal knowledge of David Kleiman’s finances.” And as the court 

observed, opposing counsel “never urged the jury at any point during trial . . . to decide the Estate’s claims on an improper basis,” and 

the court repeatedly instructed jurors that their decision must be 

based on the evidence presented, and that they must not be influenced by any sympathy for or prejudice against any party. A jury 

is presumed to follow its instructions, and we see nothing to indicate that the jury in this case did otherwise. See United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1192 (11th Cir. 2021) (“We always presume that 

a jury follows its instructions.”).

The Estate largely rests its claim of prejudice on a juror’s 

comments in a Law360 article after the trial.4 In the article published on December 23, 2021, an anonymous juror was quoted as 

stating, in regard to Ira, “In three years he didn’t go to the hospital? 

That clouded my view as far as what the actual record stated.” But 

that same juror also recalled how two holdouts for the Estate had 

pored through all the evidence and “finally realized there was no 

positive connection with bitcoin,” and that the Estate had failed to 

4 Carolina Bolado, No Proof Bitcoin ‘Inventor’ Owed Friend, Juror Tells Law360, 

Law360 (December 23, 2021), available at https://www.law360.com/articles/1451020/no-proof-bitcoin-inventor-owed-friend-juror-tells-law360

[https://perma.cc/4QVD-CQ4A]. 

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22-11150 Opinion of the Court 19

convince the jury that David was involved in developing the 

Bitcoin technology or mining bitcoins. 

The Law360 article does not present grounds to grant a new 

trial. First, the juror’s comments were equivocal, at best, about the 

effect of the alleged misconduct, and they suggest that the jury 

would have found against the Estate regardless of whether any misconduct occurred. And second, these kinds of posttrial comments 

by jurors—relating to the jury’s deliberations and a juror’s mental 

processes—are not competent evidence to impeach a verdict. See 

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1) (“During an inquiry into the validity of a 

verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement 

made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the 

effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any 

juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.”); 

see also Al-Amin v. Warden Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 932 F.3d 1291, 1297 

(11th Cir. 2019) (noting that federal law “permit[s] the introduction 

of jury testimony to impeach a verdict only in rare circumstances”). 

For these reasons, the Estate has failed to show that the district court abused its broad discretion by denying a new trial. See 

McGinnis, 817 F.3d at 1255. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

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