No. 02-295 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

 

2002 MT 267 

DARREN RICE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Department of Labor and Industry, 

Unemployment Insurance Division, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lincoln, 

The Honorable Michael C. Prezeau, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Charles K. Hail, Montana Department of Labor & Industry, Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

( No Respondent’s Brief Filed ) 

Submitted on Briefs: August 8, 2002 

Decided: November 26, 2002 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk
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Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 The Respondent, Darren Rice, appealed the Montana Board of 

Labor and Appeals’ October 11, 2001, decision which denied him 

unemployment benefits to the District Court for the Nineteenth 

Judicial District in Lincoln County. The District Court reversed 

the Board of Labor and Appeals’ decision and awarded Rice 

retroactive unemployment benefits. The State of Montana appeals 

the District Court’s decision. We affirm the Order of the District 

Court. 

¶2 The sole issue on appeal is whether § 39-51-2302, MCA, barred 

Rice’s claim for unemployment benefits as a matter of law. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶3 The facts in this case are undisputed. Rice was diagnosed 

with, and began treatment for, bi-polar disorder on September 21, 

1998. On October 14, 1999, he was hired by Interstate Transfer and 

Storage (Interstate Transfer), as a full time long haul truck 

driver. As a long haul truck driver, Rice was required to travel 

long distances and remain on the road for extended periods of time. 

 When he was hired, his bi-polar condition was being successfully 

treated through medication and he was fully qualified as a 

commercial truck driver pursuant to state and federal regulations. 

¶4 On or around June 8, 2001, Rice suffered from a blackout while 

visiting his home in Libby, Montana. Following the blackout, he 

sought medical advice about his condition at the Libby Prompt Care 

walk-in clinic. After consulting with an emergency room doctor, a 

Licensed Practitioner Nurse (LPN) authorized Rice to take four days 
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off work, advised him to refrain from driving, and advised him to 

seek further assistance from his regular doctor, Dr. Gregory 

Winter. Rice informed Interstate Transfer that he would not be 

returning to work as scheduled and that he would contact them when 

he had more information concerning his condition. He was unable to 

immediately contact Dr. Winter at the Fort Harris VA hospital. 

However, the two VA counselors he talked to concurred with the 

LPN’s opinion that he should not return to work as a trucker. 

¶5 Based on the advice he received from the LPN and the two VA 

counselors, on June 12, 2001, Rice notified Interstate Transport 

that he would not be returning to work. At that same time he filed 

a claim for unemployment benefits retroactive to June 10, 2001. On 

June 22, 2001, Dr. Winter concluded that Rice should not drive a 

motor vehicle and completed the necessary Department of Labor and 

Industry (Department) form to document that opinion. 

¶6 The Department conducted a hearing on August 13, 2001, and 

issued its decision to deny benefits on August 17, 2001. The 

Department held that Rice was not qualified to receive benefits 

because he had not received the advice of a licenced practicing 

physician before resigning from his employment on June 12. Rice 

appealed the Department’s decision to the Board of Labor and 

Appeals (Board) which held an additional hearing on September 7, 

2001. The Board affirmed the Department’s decision to deny 

benefits on September 11, 2001. 

¶7 Rice appealed the Board’s decision in the Nineteenth Judicial 

District Court pursuant to § 39-51-2410, MCA. The District Court’s 
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review was limited to issues of law pursuant to § 39-51-2410(5), 

MCA. It concluded that the Department and the Board misinterpreted 

§ 39-51-2302, MCA, and that Rice qualified for unemployment 

benefits because he demonstrated that he left work for “good 

cause.” The State appeals the District Court’s conclusions of law. 

DISCUSSION 

¶8 Does § 39-51-2302, MCA, bar Rice’s claim for unemployment 

benefits? 

¶9 Interpretation and construction of a statute is a matter of 

law which we review to determine whether the district court’s 

conclusions are correct. State v. Price, 2002 MT 150, ¶ 15, 310 

Mont. 320, ¶ 15, 50 P.3d 530, ¶ 15 (citation omitted). Construction of 

a statute requires this Court “simply to ascertain and declare what is in the terms or substance 

contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted.” 

Section 1-2-101, MCA. 

¶10 The State contends that the District Court’s interpretation of 

§ 39-51-2302, MCA, is incorrect and that Rice is not eligible for 

unemployment because he failed to obtain a licensed and practicing 

physician’s opinion before he resigned from his employment with 

Interstate Transfer. Rice did not file a Respondent’s Brief. 

¶11 Section 39-51-2302, MCA, provides in part: 

(1) An individual must be disqualified for benefits if 

the individual has left work without good cause 

attributable to the individual’s employment. 

(2) The individual may not be disqualified if the 

individual leaves: 

(a) employment because of personal illness or injury 

not associated with misconduct upon the advice of a 

licenced and practicing physician and, after 
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recovering from the illness or injury when recovery 

is certified by a licensed and practicing 

physician, the individual returned to and offered 

service to the individual’s employer and the 

individual’s regular or comparable suitable work 

was not available, as determined by the department, 

provided the individual is otherwise eligible; or . . . . 

¶12 The Board interpreted § 39-51-2302, MCA, to require advice 

from a licenced and practicing physician before an individual can 

resign from his job because of personal illness. The District 

Court found that the Board’s interpretation of the statute was too 

narrow and concluded that the advice of a licensed and practicing 

physician was not the exclusive method of showing “good cause” for 

leaving work. We conclude that the District Court was correct. 

¶13 Section 39-51-2302(1), MCA, disqualifies an employee for 

unemployment benefits if he voluntarily quits his job without good 

cause attributable to his job. Rules 24.11.457(1)(a) and (2)(a), 

ARM, equate “good cause” with “undue risk” arising from the work 

environment. Section 39-51-2302(2)(a), MCA, provides that an 

employee may not be disqualified from receiving benefits when the 

claimant quits his job based upon a doctor’s recommendation and 

similar suitable work is unavailable when he is able to return to 

work. This later section protects a person’s right to receive 

benefits when the medical condition that caused the claimant to 

leave work no longer exists, yet the claimant cannot return to work 

because his or her job no longer exists. The requirements of the 

two provisions are independent. 

¶14 The State argues that because subsection 2(a) requires the 

medical advice that prompts a claimant to leave work to come from a 
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licensed physician prior to resigning, Rice is prohibited from 

receiving benefits because he did not receive advice from a 

“licensed and practicing physician” until after he resigned. The 

District Court concluded that while prior advice from a physician 

is an example of “good cause” specifically provided by statute, 

there is nothing in the language of the statute to suggest that 

there may not be other good causes for leaving employment. We 

agree with the District Court that to interpret the statute so 

narrowly would undermine the humane purpose for which unemployment 

insurance is provided. 

¶15 In this case, after experiencing blackouts, Rice resigned from 

his employment based upon the advice of an LPN who conferred with a 

licensed and practicing doctor. To do otherwise would have been 

detrimental to his employer, the public and himself. Following a 

short delay, Rice’s physician, Dr. Winter, concurred with the 

recommendation of the LPN and VA counselors and completed the 

required medical documentation, which indicated Rice was not to 

operate a motor vehicle. There is no question that Rice’s 

blackouts prevent him from continuing his employment as a long haul 

truck driver. Accordingly, we hold that § 39-51-2302(1), MCA, does 

not require an employee to obtain a physician’s advice prior to 

resigning from employment under these circumstances and Rice 

resigned from his job with “good cause.” 

¶16 For these reasons, we affirm the Order of the District Court. 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

We Concur: 
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/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

/S/ JIM RICE