### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT N ovembe r 10 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1223 0

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 00-02231 -CV -O DE -1 CORNELIUS COOPER, MIC HAEL E DWARDS, etal., Pl ai nti ff s- Appe llants , ve rs us SOUTHERN COMPANY, GEORGIA POW ER COMPANY, etal., D ef en dants -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (N ove m be r 10, 200 4) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , CA RN E S an d M A RC U S, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. MAR CUS , C ircuit Judg e: Co rn el i u s Co o p eran ds i x o t h erp l ai n t i ff s ap p ea l fr o m

th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s or de rs de ny ing c la ss c er

tif ic at ionin the ir

e m plo ym en t di sc ri m inatio n su it an d entering final summ ary

j udgm ent in favor of the defe ndants, the SouthernThe plaintiffs/appe llants are Corne lius Cooper, Michael Edw ards, Char cella Gree n, 1 Patricia Ha

rris, Sara h J ean H arr is, Irene McCullers, and Car oly n Wil son. 2 Co m pany , G eo rg iaP ow er

Co m pany , S outhe rnCo m

pany S er vic es , I nc . , and So uth er n C om pany E ne rg y S olu tio ns, I nc . S ev enc ur re nt o r fo rm er

e m plo y ee s of

1 the vari ous de fe ndants br ough t this put at ive c la ss a ct ion , a lle gin g vi olatio ns o f Tit le VII of

th e Ci vi l Ri gh ts Act o f 19 64 (“ Tit le VII”), 4 2 U.S.C. § § 2 00 0e , et s eq ., an d 42 U . S. C. § 19 81 ( “ Se ct ion198 1” ). T he pla int if fs c la im ed

dis cr im inatio n in prom otion s and com

pensation , and sou ght declaratory and injunctive relief

, bac k pay , and c om

pe nsator y and p uni tiv e da m ag es . A ft er de ny ing c la ss c er

tif ic at ion , the dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d se ve n se parate or de rs of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of th e d efen da nt s. A ft er pa ins takin g r ev ie wof

the r ec or d, a s w el l a s c ar ef ul c onsi de ratio n of the br ie fs and o ra l arg um en t, w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s discretion in d eny ing class certification, bec ause the plaintiffs dem onstrated ne ith er that the y ha d satis fi ed

the c om m ona lity and ty pic al ity r equir em en ts o f Fe de ra l R ule of Ci vil P ro ce dur e 23( a) , nor that dam ag es w er e inc ide nta l t o equitable and declaratory relief or that com

m on qu estions of lawor fac t pr ed om inate d, a s r equir ed und er F ed er al Ru le of

C ivi l P ro ce dur e 23( b) (2 ) or (b )( 3) . I n a ddi tio n, w e ar e pe rs ua de d by non e of the pla int if

fs ’ arg um en tsThe plaintiffs subseque ntly amende d their Complaint in August, 2000. Afte r the 2 defe ndants answe red the Amended Complaint, and the district c ourt g rante d permission to amend and supplement the Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs filed a Third Amende d Complaint on Dec ember

11, 2000. Unless otherw ise noted, throughout this opi nion refe renc es to the “ Com pla int ” are to t

he pla int if

fs ’ T hir d A me nd e d Co mpl a int .

3 re gard ing the ind ivi dua l sum m ar y j udgm en t or de rs and, a cc or din gly , a ff irm in al l re spe ct s th e j udgm en ts o f the dis tr ic t c ourt. I. The co m pl ex fact s an d p ro cedur al hi st ory un de rlyin g t hi s ap pe al are t he se . Seven A frican-Am erican past or present em ploy ees of the defe ndant com panies fi le d su it on July

27, 200 0, a lle gin g th at

the S outhe rnCo m

pany and s ev er al of

it s subs idi ar ie s - - G eo rg ia

P ow er Co m pany , S outhe rnCo m

pany S er vic es , I nc . and So uth er n C om pany E ne rg y S olu tio ns, I nc . - - unl aw fu lly dis cr im inate d a ga ins t the ir e m plo y ee s ona cc ount

of r ac e. T he pla int if

fs a lle ge d th at

the de fe ndants 2 dis cr im inate d a ga ins t the m in co nne ct ionw ithpr om oti on o ppor tun iti es and pe rf orm an ce e va luatio ns, a s w el l a s inte rm s of c om pe nsatio n, and c la im ed

that the de fe ndants tol er at ed

ar ac ia lly hos til e w orkin g e nvi ro nm en t. N ota bly , the pla int if fs sou ght to re pr es en t a

Ru le 23 c la ss tha t the y

de sc ri be d inthe f

oll ow ing te rm s: Al l Af

ri ca n -A m er i ca n p er s o n s empl o yedb y So u t h ern Co m p an y’ s Co rp or at e O ff

ic e, G eo rg iaP ow er

Co m pany , S outhe rnCo m

pany Se rv ic es , I nc . or

S outhe rnCo m

pany E ne rg y S olu tio ns, I nc . , in the United States at any

tim e fr om

July , 1998 to the present, w ho areNon-e x empt employ ees a re c overe d by

the re quirements of the Fa ir L abor Standa rds Act 3 (“F L SA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., including , for e x ample, its overtime provisions. Exempt employ ees a

re not c overe d by

the FL SA. 4 subject to the D efendants’ em ploym ent, per sonn el and hum an re sour ce s po lic ie s and p ra ct ic es and who h av e be en , c ont inu e to b e, or m ay in the f uture be a dve rs el y

a ff ec te d by the D ef en dants ’ r ac ia lly discrim inatory

em ploym ent policies and p ractice s (“ the Class”). Co ope r v. S outhe rnCo . , 205 F . R. D . 596 , 598 -9 9 (N . D . G a. 200 1) . A t the ti m e sui t w as f ile d, the pr opos ed

c la ss i nc lud ed

appr oxi m at el y

2, 400 ind ivi dua ls r es idi ng i n Ge orgia, A labam a, Florida, and Missis sippi , and working at location s disp ersed through out th e four states. T he proposed class con sisted of entry -level m anual la bor er s and s kil le d pr of

es sio na ls, a m ong oth er s, and e nc om pa sse d e xe m

pt, non ex em pt, uni oni ze d and n on- uni oni ze d w orke rs . 3 In essence, the plaintiffs m aintain that the various defendant com panies share ac om

m on s y ste m

f or pe rs onne l de ci sio n- m ak ing , w hic h c onst itu te s a

“ co m m on p oli cy

or pr ac tic e” that i s a

ppr opr ia te ly

c ha lle nge d onac la ss- w ide ba sis . S pe ci fi ca lly , pla int if fs say that the re are “ co m

m on p ro m oti on and co m pe nsatio n po lic ie s and p ra ct ic es , w hic h gi ve m an ag er s un fe tte re d di sc re tio n to m ak e subj ec tiv e, non -j ob- re la te d de ci sio ns. ” Appe llants ’ Br ie f at 2. A cc or din g to pla int if fs , the se “ co m

m on p oli ci es and p ra ct ic es . . . f ost er apa tte rnor

pr ac tic e of5

ra ce dis cr im inatio n or

have adis parate im

pa ct on b la ck e m plo y ee s, ” id. , and pla int if fs sou ght to re dr es s th e cl ai m ed

w ro ngdo ing in the f

orm of ac la ss a ct ion . A. Th e d e f e n d a n t s i n c l u d e f

o u r c o mp a n i e s th a tp r o v i d e awi d e r a n g e o f e n e r g yre la te d pr oduc ts and s er

vic es thr ough out

the sou the as te rnU nit ed

S ta te s. T he So uth er n C om pany ( “ T SC ”) is a hol din g c om pany that i tse lf

ha s no e m

plo y ee s, but w hic h owns s toc k inthe oth er de fe ndant c om

panie s, a ll So uth er

n C om pany subs idi ar ie s. T SC is a D el aw ar e co rp or at ionthat i s do m es tic at ed und er the law s of G eo rg iaand m ai nta ins it s c or por at e he ad quart er s inA tlanta , G eo rg ia . I n a ddi tio n, T SC is the c or

por at e pare nt o f vari ous oth er uti lity c om panie s no t di re ct ly inv olv ed in the law sui t. G eo rg iaP ow er

Co m pany ( “ G PC ”) is the S outhe rnCo m pany ’ s larg es t subs idi ar y , and p ro vid es e le ctri ci ty to ap pr oxi m at el y

1. 9 m ill ionc ust om er s in153 of G eo rg ia ’ s 15 9 c ount ie s. G PC e m plo y s a ppr oxi m at el y

9, 000 em plo y ee s inthe state of G eo rg ia , som e 44% of

w hom are c ove re d by

ac oll ec tiv e barg ai nin g agreem ent (“ CBA ”) w ith the International Brotherhoodof E lectrica l W orkers (“ IB E W ”) , L oc al N o. 84. G PC ’ s op er at ion s are e xtr em el y div er sif ie d, and i ts fa ci lit ie s, w orkf

or ce , and m an ag em en t are dis pe rs ed a cr oss the e nti re state of G eo rg ia . C er

ta in f unc tio ns w ith in G PC are div ide d am ong dif fe re nt r eg ion s inthe6

state , and w ide ly

div er ge nt o pe ratin g and m an ag em en t stru ct ur es e xis t w ith in dif fe re nt r eg ion s. T hus, f

or e xa m ple , G PC ’ s C ust om er

O pe ratio ns f

unc tio n a cr oss 16 r eg ion s th at

have ve ry

dif fe re nt w orkf

or ce s. T he e xpansi ve and r ur al S outhe as t Region has very

differ ent charac teristics with re spect to technolo gy , c ustom er se rv ic e, an d d is tri bu ti on cap aci ty tha n d oe s t he m et ro po li ta n At la nt a reg io n, a de nse and h igh ly -p opul at ed are a that i nc lud es num er ous co m m er ci al c lie nts . So uth er n C om pany E ne rg y S olu tio ns ( “ SC E S” ), in tur n, is a non- re gul at ed , non- uti lity

sub sid iary

of the S outhe rnCo m

pany that de ve lop s f

or sa le vari ous en er gy -r el at ed

pr oduc ts and s er

vic es . S CE S co nsul ts w ithc om m er ci al and ind ustri al c lie nts on e ne rg y

e ff ic ie nc y , pr ovi de s e ne rg y

e ff ic ie nc y and en vir onm en ta l pr ogr am s and s er vic es , and o ff

er s othe r se rv ic es to co m

m er ci al and res id en ti al cu st om ers . Mos t o f th e fewerth an 30 0 e m pl oyees e m

pl oyed b y SCES ar e ex em pt e m plo y ee s w hose c om

pe nsatio n is de te rm ine d by sa le s c om

m iss ion s; none of S CE S’ s e m

plo y ee s is am em

be r of auni on. Fi na lly , S outhe rnCo m

pany S er vic es ( “ SC S” ) pr ovi de s th e oth er de fe ndants w ithhum anr es our ce s se rv ic es and a dm ini ste rs c om m on c om pe nsatio n and prom otion policies. SC S also provides various publi c re lations andem ploy ee re la tio ns s er

vic es to the oth er

de fe ndant c om

panie s. S CS e m

plo y s a ppr oxi m at el y 3,500 non -unioni zed em

ploy ees w ho work prim arily in Georgia and Alabam a,In 1998, for e x ample, grade E5 rang ed fr om $42,396 to $67,837, and g rade E3 rang ed 4 from $34,020 to $54,432. Thus, an e mploy ee w ith a salary at the upper

rang e of one g rade might rec eive a highe r salar

y than an e mploy ee w ith a salary in the lower r ang e of the next hi g her 7 al tho ugh the y

a lso c oor din at e se rv ic es in Mi ssi ssi ppi , F lor ida , N ewY ork, and W ashingt on, D .C. T he dif fe re nc es in m an ag em en t stru ct ur es , w orkin g e nvi ro nm en ts, and cr ite ri a fo r em

plo ym en t de ci sio ns v ar

y sub stanti al ly

a m ong the de fe ndant com panies. T he prom otion and com pensation decisions affecting laborers inv olv ed in el ec tr ic al pow er

tr an sm iss ionand d istri but ion , f or e xa m ple , take int o ac co unt ve ry dif fe re nt c ri te ri a than do de ci sio ns i nvol vin g th e pr of es sio na l and m an ag er ia l r an ks o f the c om panie s. S im ilarl y , the m or e than 20 0 lo catio ns i n w hic h e m plo y ee s of

the dif fe re nt d ef en dants w ork are spr ea d th ro ugho ut a w ide ly dis pe rs ed ge ogr ap hic al are a an d e nc om pa ss an e xtr em el y

div er se r an ge of

w orkin g en vi ro nm en ts . While the operations andworkfor ces of the defe ndant com panies are subs tanti al ly

dif fe re nt, the y

are li nke d inse ve ra l w ay s. A ll the de fe ndants m aintain a com

m on job, salary , and pay -grade sy stem that dictates salary

ranges for both exem

pt and no n-exem

pt em ploy ees. N on-exem

pt em ploy ees ar e classified from

grade N E1 through NE 9; exem pt em ploy ees ar e classified at gr ad es E 1 th ro ugh E 15. S al ar y r an ge s f or e ac h gr ad e vary

sig nif ic an tly . Whil e

4g rade . This could result in a white e mploy ee in a lower sa lary

grade rec eivinga hig her sa lary than a blac k employ ee in a highe r salar

y g rade . The plaintiffs sa

y that the def

endants e x ploited this possi bility

to mask rac ial discrimination. 8 the sam e pay -grade sy stem is used within all of TSC ’ s subs idiaries, the w orkforces w ith in the dif

fe re nt c om

panie s are str iki ngl y

dif fe re nt. N ot e ve ry

pos iti on e xis ts in every com pany , and in so m e subsid iaries the j ob respons ibiliti es for a given posit ion di ffer

greatly from the responsib ilities for the sam e positio n in anoth er subs idiary . Job po sition s m ay also correspond to di ffer ent pay -grade r anges w ith in d if fe re nt s ubsi diari es . T he te rm s of

c om pe nsatio n f

or uni oni ze d w orke rs are str ic tly gov er ne d by the te rm s of

the CB A , giv ing m an ag er s pr ec iou s li ttl e dis cr et ionove r sa lary and sim ilar issues. F or non-uni onized workers, hiring and prom otion decisions are m ade by m anagers of var ious rank based in geographically dispersed facilities w ith in e ac h of

the de fe ndant c om

panie s. D if

fe re nt m an ag er s a ssi gn v ar iou s w ei ght s to dif

fe re nt qua lif

ic at ion s inm ak ing the ir

e m plo ym en t de ci sio ns, and m anagers have the discretion to utili ze a wide r ange of processes and procedures whe n m ak in g c om

pe ns at io n a ndpro m ot io n d eci si on s. Severa l differe nt ty

pes of prom otion s are available to non -unioni zed em ploy ees. Most com

petitive job opening s -- j obs op en to any qualified em

ploy ee

-- are pos te d onac om

put er intrane t sy ste m

kno w n a s “ JobN et , ” w hic h is9

ac ce ssi ble to em

plo y ee s w ith in e ac h T SC sub sid iary . S CS r ec om m en ds standard iz ed

pr oc es se s f

or f ill ing Job N et

pos iti ons, but

m an ag er s w ith in the va rio us su bs id ia rie s re ta in di sc ret io n i n c ho os in g wh et he r to po stjob va can ci es . O the r pr om oti ons oc cur out sid e the c ont ex t of the c om pe tit ive pr om oti ons av ai la ble on J obN et . F or

e xa m ple , e m plo y ee s c ana dvanc e w ith in the ir ow n “ j ob fam ily .” T hese “progressive prom otion s” occur when em ploy ees m eet predeterm ined perform ance goals or dem onstrate satisfactory work over a

given period. U nder these circum stances, an em ploy ee m ay

be prom oted, for e xam

ple, fr om an O pe rator

I I posi tio n to an O pe rator I pos iti on. T he se pr om oti ons ar e not co m pe tit ive sin ce the y

do n ot i nvol ve unf

ill ed pos iti ons, but

r athe r ar e av ai la

ble on ly to em

pl oyees p ro gr es si ng in di vi du al ly w it hi n t he ir o wn jo b fa m il y . SC S al so p ro vid es num er ous pr ogr am s and p ro ce dur es de sig ne d to a ssi st m an ag er s w ith in the oth er de fe ndant c om

panie s ine va luatin g e m

plo y ee s and m ak ing c om

pe nsatio n and p ro m oti on d ec isi ons. T he se pr oc ed ur es are de sig ne d to en sur e that e m

plo y ee s are e va luate d, c om pe nsate d, and p ro m ote d ba se d onj obre la te d f ac tor s, in ac co rd an ce w iththe c om panie s’ str ic t pr ohi bit ion s on dis cr im inatio n ona cc ount of r ac e. T hus, f

or ins tanc e, S CS pr ovi de s th e de fe ndant co m panie s w ithr es our ce s to a ssi st m an ag er s inpr om oti on d ec isi ons, inc lud ing str uc tur ed int er vie wgui de lin es de sig ne d to e va luate j ob- re la te d sk ill s. S CS a lso10

re co m m en ds tha t e m

plo y ee s r ec ei ve r eg ular w ri tte n and o ra l e va luatio ns, and de ve lo ps sp eci fic ev al ua ti on for m s fo r th is pu rp os e. SC S an d th e oth er

de fe ndants have a ll de ve lop ed a ff irm at ive a ct ionplans t o ad dr es s w orkf

or ce div er sity , and the y

a lso pr ovi de pr of

es sio na l de ve lop m en t and pr of es si on al m en to rin g p ro gr am s t o fa ci li ta te em pl oyees’ pro fes si on al gro wth . SCS’ s Equal E m

ploym ent Opportunity(“ EE O” ) D epartm ent has prim ary responsib ility

for ensuring com

pliance with anti-discrim ination and equal oppo rt uni ty law s. T he E E O D ep ar

tm en t’ s po lic y

is to i nve sti ga te dis cr im inatio n com plaints, and if any

discrim ination or harassm ent is revealed, to take rem edial ac tio n to e lim inate the dis cr im inatio n or hara ssm en t. S CS ’ s E E O D ep ar tm en t a lso ac ts i n c onj unc tio n w ithCo m pli an ce O ff

ic er s w ith in e ac h de fe ndant c om pany to co nduc t annua l c om

pli an ce sur

ve y s. E ve ry

ind ivi dua l e m

plo y ee w ith in the de fe ndant c om

panie s r ec ei ve s an annua l c om pli an ce que sti onna ir e, w hic h a sks w he the r the e m

plo y ee is aw ar e of

any inc ide nts of

dis cr im inatio n or

hara ssm en t. T he E E O D ep ar

tm en t a lso c ondu ct s qu ar te rl y E qua l E m

plo y m en t O ppor tun ity r ev ie w s de sig ne d to e nsur e that a ll the de fe ndant c om panie s c om

ply no t o nl y wit h t he ap pl ic ab le ant i-d is cri m in at io n l aws , bu t al so wit h t he ir o wn int er na l po lic ie s. I n th es e re vie w s, the E E O D ep ar tm en t e va luate s th e hir ing , pr om oti on, and c om

pe nsatio n pr ac tic es of

r an dom ly

se le ct ed de partm en ts w ith in11

the various defendant com panies, w ith the go al of re m edy ing any inconsis tencies that m ay e xis t be tw ee n ade partm en t’ s pr ac tic e an d th e de fe ndant’ s E E O pol ic ie s. T h e d e f e n d a n tc o mp a n i e s h a v e a l s o i mp l e me n t e d v a r i o u s tr a i n i n g p r o g r a ms to p ro m ote c om

pli an ce w itha ll E E O pol ic ie s and anti -d isc ri m inatio n law s. Many of the defendants’ m anagers ar e re quired to attend “ FE DL AW ,” a one-day sem inar that pr ovi de s an ov er

vie wof the f ed er al anti -d isc ri m inatio n law s a ppl ic ab le to the de fe ndants ’ w orkpl ac es . T he de fe ndants a lso e nc our ag e the ir e m plo y ee s and m an ag er s to a tte nd anothe r one -d ay tr ai nin g se ssi on, the “ Ci vil T re atm en t” se m inar. I n th e “ Ci vil T re atm en t” tr ai nin g, e m plo y ee s are r em ind ed

of the de fe ndants ’ anti -d isc ri m inatio n po lic ie s and e nc our ag ed to re port any

vio la tio ns. Fi na lly , a ll em

plo y ee s of

S CS and S CE S ar e en tit le d to r ai se E E O c onc er ns with SCS ’ s Em

ploy ee Concer

ns departm ent, and un ionized em ploy ees at G PC m ay r ai se dis cr im inatio n c om pla int s w iththe ir

uni on s te w ar ds, pur suant t o successive agreem ents between G PC and L ocal 84 of the IBE W . GP C em ploy ees m ay a lso br ing c om

pla int s to the Co rp or at e Co nc er ns D ep ar tm en t or the Co rp or at e Se curi ty D ep ar tm en t. B. T he se ve n nam ed

pla int if fs are A fr ic anA m er ic an s w ho w ork ( or f orm er ly worked) in a wide assortm ent of union and non-un ion po sition s within GPC , S CS12

an d S CE S, and who h av e be ensub j ec te d to c om

pe nsatio n and p ro m oti on d ec isi ons m ad e by dif fe re nt m an ag er s ut ili zi ng d if fe re nt p ro ce dur es . W e an al y ze in de ta il the ind ivi dua l c la im s of

e ac h pl ai nti ff

in Se ct ionI II , inf

ra , w hic h a ddr es se s e ac h of t h e s u m m ary ju d g m en to rd er s , b u to ff erh er e ab ri ef

s u m m ary o f e ac h p l ai n t i ff

’s work history

in order to m easure his or her c laim s against the stand ards em bodi ed in Rule 23 of the Federal R ules of Civil Procedure. Cornelius Coop er ( “ Cooper”) w orks as a L inem an for G PC in A tlanta, G eo rg ia , w he re he ha s be ene m plo y ed sin ce 197 3. A t the ti m e the sui t w as f ile d, Co ope r ha d be ene m

plo y ed by G PC f or som e 28 y ears . H e ha s be enauni on m em be r dur ing his e m

plo ym en t at G PC , and thus, his c om pe nsatio n and pr om oti ons w ith in the barg ai nin g un it ha ve be engov er ne d by the te rm s of

the CBA . Cooper rec eived his current Linem an positi on in 1 981 andhas not been prom oted since, in spite of posit ive work evaluations; he claim s that less qualified w hit e em plo y ee s have be enpr om ote d w hil e he c oul d no t a dvanc e fo r ne ar ly 20 y ears . Cooper has not taken th e First L ine Supervisor test, nor has he applied for a Forem an positi on sin ce at le ast 1990 , bec ause no Forem an positi ons have been open in th at tim e. H e has not applied to be a cr ewleader. H owever , C ooper m ai nta ins that he suf

fe re d di sc ri m inatio n w he n he w as de nie d tw o pr om oti ons in13

1998 . The f

irst posit ion th at Cooper w as denied was a s a L ighti ng Coordin ator, an openin g that was posted on Jo bNet in July 1998 . Later that y ear, Cooper applied for and w as denied a non-unio n Methods & T raining Specialist (“ Tr ainer”) posit ion at the Klondik e T raining Center. O f severa l Tr ainer j obs op en at the tim e, atlea ston e was award edto an Afric an -Am eri can em pl oyee, Ch arl ie Jo hn so n. Mi ch ae l E dw ar ds ( “ E dw ar ds” ) ha d w orke d a t G PC f or 13 y ears w he n th is sui t w as c om

m en ce d. L ike Co ope r, E dw ar ds h as he ld a vari ety of uni on p osi tio ns in whi ch hi s co m

pe ns at io n a ndpro m ot io ns were s ub ject t o t he ter m s o f th e CBA. Over the course of his em

ploym ent with G PC, Edw ards wor ked in several dif fe re nt d ep ar

tm en ts o f the c om

pany , ba se d in

dif fe re nt c iti es thr ough out G eo rg ia . H e m ai nta ins that he ha s be ende nie d vari ous pr om oti ons to unio n posi tio ns, e spe ci al ly

in the tw o y ears im

m ed ia te ly be fo re the sui t w as f

ile d, and was freq ue nt ly den ie d e ve n a n o pp or tu ni ty to i nt erv ie w forth es e p os it io ns . In April 2000, E dwar ds didinterview f or a Ca ble Locator posit ion, but was de nie d th e j ob. E dw ar ds s ay s th at he w as f ull y qua lif ie d f or the pos iti on, havin g w orke d f or 5 m onths a s aCa

ble L oc at or

in a te m por ar y c ap ac ity , and h av ing worked as a

Linem an, which inv olved m ore extensive and difficult responsib ilities than aCa ble L oc at or . I n sp ite of

his qua lif

ic at ion s, E dw ar ds d id n ot r ec ei ve the j ob, w hic h w as ins te ad

giv ento a w hit e co -w orke r w hom E dw ar ds arg ue s w as le ss14

qualified. E dwar ds was denied the Cable L ocator positio n after his int erview ers fo un d h is de m ean or“ to o re la xe d.” D ur ing his te nur e at

G PC , E dw ar ds s uf

fe re d in j ur ie s to his ba ck , and a s a result he has had several extended absences and light duty assignm ents. Be twee n May and N ove m

be r, 199 8, E dw ar ds t ook a m ed ic al le av e fr om G PC , r et ur nin g to take a tem

porary positi on which he held unti l its elim ination in April 2000. Since th atti m e h e h as be en ou t o f work o n d is ab il it y lea ve . E dw ar ds f

ile d ac om

pla int w iththe E E O C i n 19 99, a lle gin g avio la tio n of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act ( “ AD A” ), but he didnot allege any rac e-based dis cr im inatio n a t tha t t im e. L es s th anaw ee k pr ior to the f ili ng o f thi s su it, how ev er , he lod ge d ac om pla int w iththe E E O C tha t a lle ge d in div idu al and c la ssw ide r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n. O n a ppe al , E dw ar ds r ai se s th re e oth er pr om oti on cl ai m s th at

w er e not inc lud ed in the Co m

pla int . Charce lla Gr een (“ Gr een”) had been em ploy ed at G PC f

or 17 y ears when thi s su it w as f

ile d. F or the la st 1 1 of

tho se y ears she w orke d a s an E duc at ion Service s Coordinator, afte r having been em ploy ed in various capacities since initiallyj oinin g GPC as a tem porary intern in 198 3. While Gre en advanced th ro ug h v ari ou s p os it io ns at GPC , sh e acq ui redsev eral educ at io na l cr ed en ti al s. Prior to j oinin g GPC , G reen r eceived a B .S . degre e in Hum an Ser vices15

A dm ini str at ionf

ro m Me rc er U niv er sity , and i n 19 83 s he w as aw ar de d aMa ste r of So ci al W ork de gr ee . Whil e w orkin g a t G PC , she c ont inu ed he r ed uc at ion , e v e n tu a l l y re c e i v i n g aP h . D . f r o m Cl a rkAt l a n t aUn i v e r s i t y. From 1996 until h er departm ent was e lim inated in 20 02, G reen w orked at GP C’ s headquarters in Atlanta in a r ange of exem pt pos ition s in the Educational Service s departm ent. S he com plains th at she wa s wr ongfull y denied an E duc at ion al S er

vic es Mana ge r posi tio n in199 6 and a Co m m uni ty A dvi sor posi tio n in199 7. O n Ju ly 11, 199 8, G re enw as a ga in d en ie d aMana ge r of E duc at ion al S er

vic es pos iti on tha t w as aw ar de d to aw hit e em plo y ee . G re ena lso sa y s t ha t s he ha s b een co m pe ns at edat ales s fa vo rab le rat e th an whi te em pl oyees. Patr ic iaH ar

ri s ( “ P. H ar

ri s” ) vol unt ar ily

r es ign ed f ro m S CS in A ugus t 19 99, pr ior to the c om

m en ce m en t of

thi s c as e. P . H ar

ri s be gan w orkin g a t G PC in 1990 , and becam e an em

ploy ee of S CS in 1997, when she began w orking as a Market Re se ar chA na ly st i n A tlanta . P . H ar ri s di d no t a

ppl y f or any pr om oti ons dur ing the r el ev an t pe ri od and d id n ot f ile any c om pla int s w iththe E E O C. H ow ev er , she m aintains that sh e w as only granted her Mar

ket Resear ch Analy st pos ition after re pe at ed ly

c om pla ini ng - - inc lud ing to a G PC V ic e Pr es ide nt - - ab out the dif fi cu lty of advancing. P. Harris contends that her white counterparts w ere prom oted m uch16

m or e ea sil y , and s ay s th at onc e she be gan w orkin g a s aMark et Re se ar chA na ly st, she w as pr ovi de d w ithle ss tra ini ng and s uppo rt than he r w hit e co lle ag ue s. P. H ar ri s a lso c la im s th at

she suf fe re d di sc ri m inatio n inc om pe nsatio n on account of rac e, observing that she was paid at the lowend of her salar y grade, w hil e w hit e co lle ag ue s w er e m or e ge ne ro usl y c om pe nsate d, notw ith standi ng the ir be ing le ss qua lif

ie d. I nde ed , P . H ar

ri s po int s ou t tha t sh e earn ed aMa ste r of Bu si ne ss Adm in st rat io n d eg ree, wh il e h er wh it e co -wo rk ers lac ke d t ha t cr ed en ti al . Sarah Je anH ar

ri s ( “ S. J. H ar

ri s” ) w as e m

plo y ed by G PC f ro m 197 9 un til 2000 , w orkin g invari ous non- ex em pt, non -unio n c ust om er

se rv ic es pos iti ons in L awre nc ev ill e, D ulu th, and G w inn et , G eo rg ia . H ir ed in 1979 a s aG en er al Cl er k, she had been prom oted to Operating Assistant by 1989 . In 1994, S.J. Harris w as as sig ne d to w or

k inD ulu th a s aS ec re tary ; he r j ob t itl e w as c hange d to Re gio n Support Representative in 199 7. W orking as a Region Supp ort Representative, S.J. Harris was t he on ly A fri can -Am eri can em pl oyee in an 18 -p ers on de pa rtment. Sh e al le ge s th at

she w as dis cr im inate d a ga ins t i n he r em plo y ee e va luatio ns, cl ai m ing that sh e re ce ive d lo w er e va luatio n sc or es than sh e de se rv ed , w hil e w hit e em ploy ees re ceived inappropriately positi ve evaluations. She also observes that she rece ived onl y

“ m inuscul e” salar

y increases during her tenure, and has the re fo re r ec ei ve d lo w er

c om pe nsatio n th anw hit e em

plo y ee s.17

S. J. H ar ri s di d no t a

ppl y f or any pr om oti ons dur ing the r el ev an t pe ri od and has brough t no prom otion claim s. H owever , in addition to raising her co m pe nsatio n di sc ri m inatio n c la im s, S . J. H ar ri s c ont en ds tha t sh e w as w ro ngf ull y fired in re taliation for her involv em ent in this law suit. GP C denies any retaliatory m oti ve and c ont en ds tha t sh e w as f ir ed f or dis ci pli nary

r ea sons , a ft er

havin g rece ived several negative evaluations andhaving b een placed in a disciplinary pr ogr am . Whil e on “ la st- ch an ce ” pr obatio n, S . J. H ar ri s w as a ga in d isc ipl ine d, and th en was t erm in at ed . Ir en e Mc Cu lle rs ( “ Mc Cu lle rs ”) w as hir ed by G PC in 1978 , and w orke d in several cle rical position s until 1997 , when she was transferre d to SCS. Since 1997 , Mc Cu lle rs ha s w orke d a t S CS a s anon -e xe m pt P ro ce ssi ng O pe rator

I in the In fo rm at ionMana ge m en t S er vic es D ep ar

tm en t. A lto ge the r, Mc Cu lle rs ha d sp en t 23 y ears work in g fo r th e d efen da nt co m pa ni es at t he ti m e su itwas fi le d. McCullers alleges that she w as discrim inated against in term s of her co m pe nsatio n, pr om oti ons, and p er fo rm an ce e va luatio ns. Sp ec if ic al ly , Mc Cu lle rs c ont en ds tha t w ith in h er de partm en t the re are six em plo y ee s w orkin g a s P ro ce ssi ng O pe rator s: tw o A fr ic an -A m er ic anand tw o w hit e em plo y ee s ho ld P ro ce ssi ng O pe rator I ti tle s, and tw o w hit e em plo y ee s ho ld Pr oc es sin g O pe rator

S en ior pos iti ons. Mc Cu lle rs a lle ge s th at she and h er

A fr ic an -18

A m er ic anc oll ea gue are vic tim s of r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n inthat the y are the low es t paid em ploy ees. McCullers a dds th at she is paid approxi m ately 10% less than her w hit e co lle ag ue s, e ve n th oughshe ha s an a sso ci at es de gr ee in busi ne ss adm ini str at ion , w hil e the w hit e em plo y ee s have no m or e than ahig h sc hool ed uc at ion . Mc Cu lle rs a lso m ai nta ins that sh e ha s be endis cr im inate d a ga ins t i n pr om oti ons. S he a ve rs that at the ti m e he r de partm en t w as r eo rg an iz ed in 1997 , she w as dis cr im inator ily

de nie d apr ogr es siv e pr om oti on f ro m P ro ce ssi ng O pe rator I to Proce ssing Oper ator Senior, while at least one white counterpart w as pr om ote d to the se nio r posi tio n. I n th e tw o y ears be fo re thi s li tig at ion co m m en ce d, Mc Cu lle rs w as a ga in d en ie d apr om oti on t o P ro ce ssi ng O pe rator Sen io r, whi le an ot he r whi te co ll eag ue was p ro m ot ed . Fi na lly , Caro ly

n W ils on ( “ W ils on” ), the se ve nthof the nam ed

pla int if fs , began working for the defendants in 198 5, when she was hired by GP C as an em ploy ee in its Custom er S ervice O perations. In 1997, she w as hired as a P roj ect Analy st in the Finance Center at SCE S. W ilson m aintains that sh e experience d ra ci al dis cr im inatio n inpr om oti on and c om pe nsatio n de ci sio ns, a s w el l a s w ith respect to her per form ance evaluations. W ilson say s that she uni form ly perform ed her j ob well and rec eived posit ive perform ance evaluations, and y et w as denied19

num er ous pr om oti ons fo r w hic h sh e w as qua lif ie d. S he a dds that whil e she applied for approxim ately 15 prom otion s within the defendant com panies, she w as gr an te d o nl y

3 i nt erv ie ws, an d was de ni edsev eral pro m ot io ns be cau se of h er ra ce. InN ove m

be r 1997 , W ils on a

ppl ie d f or and w as gr an te d aP ro

j ec t A na ly st S en ior posit ion at SCE S, which she lear ned of through the JobNet sy stem , but her posi tio n w as r e- cl as sif

ie d a s aP ro

j ec t A na ly st I II , alow er - le ve l po sit ionthan sh e had soug ht. T he following y ear, W ilson applied for and wa s offere d a Custom er Serv ic e Rep res en ta ti ve po si ti on , bu t turne d i t d own . A t a ppr oxi m at el y

the sam e tim e thi s law sui t w as c om m en ce d, W ils on f

ile d a ch ar ge w iththe E E O C, but she did not ide nti fy the spe ci fi c ev en t or

e ve nts that constitu ted the discrim ination she face d, instead alleging dis crim ination m ore ge ne ra lly . S he m ai nta ins that sh e is c om pe nsate d le ss f

av or ab ly than a t l ea st f

our white colleagues w ho perform the sam e j ob as she does, even thoug h they are cl as si fie d a t t he same, or lo wer, sa la ry gra de s. T o sum m ar iz e, of

the se ve n nam ed

pla int if fs , thr ee no l onge r w orke d f or any of the de fe ndants a t the ti m e thi s c as e w as c om m en ce d ( E dw ar ds, P . H ar ri s, and S.J. Harris). O f the four r em aining em ploy ees, one held a posit ion which was co ve re d by

the CB A( Co ope r) , tw o he ld e xe m pt p osi tio ns o uts ide se nio r20

m an ag em en t ( G re enand W ils on) , and o ne he ld a non -e xe m

pt p osi tio n (Mc Cu ll ers ). A lth ougha t vari ous tim es dur ing the ir e m plo ym en t w iththe de fe ndants , som e of the plaintiffs w orked in Georgia locations outs ide m etropolitan Atlanta, m ost of the m w er e em plo y ed in A tlanta

f or m ost or a ll of the ir te nur es . S ev er al of the nam ed plaintiffs worked in office environm ents characte ristic of the centra l adm ini str at ive ope ratio ns tha t t ook pla ce in A tlanta , and e ve n E dw ar ds and Cooper -- who labored in con nection with the direct delivery of elec tricity

-- worked in m ore developed urban areas of G eorgia. None of the nam ed plaintiffs w orke d inthe le ss d en se ly pop ulate d, r

ur al are as of

the state , and a lth oughthe pla int if fs sou ght to re pr es en t a

br oa d c la ss i nc lud ing e m plo y ee s ba se d th ro ugho ut Fl or id a, Mi ss is si pp i, an d Al ab am a, no ne of t he m work edwit hi n t he se st at es . A ll of the pla int if

fs c om pla ine d of

dis cr im inatio n ine ith er

c om pe nsatio n or pr om oti on, and whil e none of the pla int if

fs pr oduc ed

dir ec t e vid en ce that the personnel decisio ns in th eir individu al cases w ere m otivated byrac e, each plaintiff al le ge d th at

he or she w as vic tim iz ed

by ac om m on p oli cy

of sub j ec tiv e de ci sio nm ak in g t ha t al lo weddi sc riminat io n t o p ers is t i n t he de fen da nt co m pa ni es . Sp ec if ic al ly , the pla int if

fs ’ Co m pla int a sse rt ed that the re w as ac la ss- w ide

“ co nti nui ng p atte rnand p ra ct ic e of r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n, ” that the y and theAs a pre liminary matter, the de fenda

nts sugg est that if we a ffirm the district c ourt’s 5 summary judgme nt orders a s to eac h of the named plaintiffs, the c lass cer tification issue is moot. This positi on has intuitive appea l, since it might see m improbable that plaintiffs whose own c la ims c ann ot s ur

viv e summa

ry jud g me nt c ou ld r e pr e se nt a larg e r c la ss o f p la int if

fs . T hat is , if we a ffirm the f

inal order s of summary

judgme nt on the named plaintiffs’ claims, it would appea r unnece ssary

to rea ch the c lass cer

tification issue, bec ause e ven if other class member s retaine d valid claims, they

would have no r epre sentative plaintiffs to prose cute their claims. See Satterwhite v. City

of Gre enville, 634 F.2d 231, 234 ( 5th Cir. 1981) (en ba nc) ( Gee , C.J ., dis se nti ng ) ( arguin gthat r e qu ir ingan a pp e llate c ourt

to r e vis it the c la ss c e rt if

ic atio n is su e e ve n if the named pla intiffs’ claims fa il could lead to the “e x treme” result “that a class nee d have no persona l repre sentative at all: only a putative c ause a

nd a counse l”). The plaintiffs, on the othe r hand, ha ve dire cted our

attention to Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion International Corp., 340 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2003), in which a panel of this Court held that “e ven af

ter findingag ainst plaintiffs on the merits, the [district] court should have de te rm ine d whe the r t

he c la ss a c tio n c ou ld b e ma int a ine d, and wh e the r t he pla int if

fs c ou ld repr esent that c lass.” I d. at 1215. Martinez-Mendoza r efle cts established Circuit pre cede nt that 21 put at ive c la ss m em

be rs w er e subj ec te d to dis cr im inator y tr eatm en t, and tha t the de fen da nt s’ po li ci es an d p ract ic es “ ha d a n o ng oi ng di sp arat e im pa ct .” T w o m aj or

iss ue s are pr es en te d inthi s a ppe al . F ir st, pla int if

fs arg ue that the dis tr ic t c ourt a

buse d it s di sc re tio n w he n it de nie d th ei r m oti on f

or c la ss certific ation un der Rule 23 of the Fe deral Rules of C ivil Procedure. Sec ond, they say that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed w he n it gr an te d sum

m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of the de fe ndants on e ac h of

the se ve n nam ed

pla int if fs ’ ind ivi dua l c la im s. W e ad dr es s ea chof the se iss ue s intur

n. II. W e begin with the plaintiffs’ basic argum ent that the district court abused its discretion when it denied th eir m otion for cla ss certification. In deny ing th e 5require s us to revisit the class ce rtification issue eve n if we a ffirm summary judgme nt for the defe ndants. In Whit e v. I .T.T., 718 F.2d 994 ( 11th Cir. 1983), a pane l of this Court ex plained that wher e a plaintiff br ings both a n individual and class ac tion; the class action is dismissed pr e tr ia l; h e los e s h is i nd ivi du a l c la im at tr ia l and the n a pp e a ls t he dis mis sa l of

his class ac tion . . . we have rema nded the c ase to the district c ourt to determine ( 1) the pr e se nc e of

a liv e c ontr ov e rs y

inv olv ingthe pr op os e d c la ss, and if on e is pr e se nt, (2 ) whe the r, purs ua nt t o Ru le 23 , th e a c tio n is a pp ro pr iate fo r c la ss cer tification and the a

ppellant is a prope r re prese ntative of the pr oposed cla ss (or if not, whether

there exis ts an appropr iate cla ss repre sentative who c an be substitut ed for

the appe llant). I d. at 997-98. It is “[t ]he law of this circuit . . . [that] a plaintiff’ s capa city to act as r epre sentative o f th e c la s s is n o t i p s o f

a c to te r mi n ate d w h e nh e lo s e s h is c a s e o nth e me r it s . ” M arti n e zMendoza, 340 F.3d at 1215; see also Satterwhite, 634 F.2d at 231-32; Armour v. City of Anniston, 654 F.2d 382, 383 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug .1981) (pe r cur iam). (In Bonne r v. City of Prichard, 661 F .2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (e n banc) , this Court adopted as binding prec edent a ll decisions of the for mer F ifth Circuit handed down pr ior to October 1, 1981.). Under the law of

this Ci rcuit, a live c ontroversy involving a putative class may continue even when the c laim of a spec ific plaintiff fa ils. Thus, even if we aff irm eac h summary

judgme nt order enter ed ag ainst the individual plaintiffs, the class ce rtification issue may not be moot, and we a re still require d to addre ss the district court’s de nial of cla ss cer tification. Rul e 23 (a ) p ro vid e s th at: 6 One or

more membe rs of a

class may

sue or be sued as re pr e se ntativ e pa

rt ie s o n b e ha lf

of a ll o nly if (1 ) t he c la ss i s so numerous that joinder of

all members is imprac ticable, ( 2) there are questions of law or f

act c ommon to the class, (3) the c laims or defe nses of the r epre sentative pa rties ar e ty

pical of the claims or de fe ns e s o f t

he c la ss, and

(4 ) t he re pr e se ntativ e pa

rt ie s w ill fa ir ly and a de qu ate ly

pr ote c t th e int e re sts of

the c la ss. 22 pla int if fs ’ m oti on, the dis tr ic t c ourt f ir st c onsi de re d th e pla int if fs ’ ane cd ota l and statis tic al e vid en ce , be fo re c onc lud ing that the pla int if fs c oul d no t satis fy

the ba sic requirem ents of Rule 23(a) of the F ederal R ules of Civil Procedure. 6F e d

R . C i v . P . 2 3 ( a ) . W e r e f e r t o th e s e f o ur r e qu i r e m e n t s a s th e num e r o s i ty, c o m m o n a l i ty, ty picality , and ade quacy

criter ia. See Pra do-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F .3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2000). Rul e 23 (b ) p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art , th at:

7 [a] n action may

be maintained a s a cla ss action if the pre requisites of subdivision (a) a

re satisfied, and in addition:

. . . . (2) the pa rty opposing the class has a cted or ref used to ac t on g rounds g ener ally

applicable to the class, ther eby making appropr iate fina l injunctive relief or corr espondingdecla

ratory relief with respec t to the class as a whole; or (3) the c ourt finds that the questions of law or fac t common to the members of

the class pr edominate ove r any questions affe cting only individual members, and that a class ac tion is superior to other available methods for the f air a nd eff icient adjudication of the controve rsy . The matter s pertinent to the finding s include: (A) the interest of me mbers of the class in individually controllingthe prosec ution or defe nse of se parate ac tions; (B) the e x tent and nature of any

litigation conc erningthe controve rsy alre ady c omm e nc e d b y

or a g a ins t me mbe rs of

the c la ss; (C ) t

he de sir a bil ity or undesira

bility of conc entrating the litig ation of the c laims in the particula r for um; (D) the diff

iculties likely

to be enc ountere d in the manag ement of a

class ac tion. Fe d R. Civ. P . 23(b). 23 Alter natively , the district court held that indivi dual questi ons of law and fa ct pla inl y outw ei ghe d any

c om m on que sti ons, and the re fo re that this sui t w as not ap pr opr ia te f

or c er tif ic at ionund er

e ith er sub se ct ion( 2) or

( 3) of Ru le 23( b) of

the Fe d er al Ru l es o f C i v i l Pr o ce du re . Th e p l ai n t i ff s m ai n t ai n th at th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 7 de nia l of c la ss c er tif ic at ionr es ult s f

ro m “ fundam en ta l e rr or s of

lawand a24

fundam en ta l m isc onc ep tio n of the r ole of

the c ourt i n r

uli ng o n am oti on f

or c la ss ce rt if ic at ion . ” Appe llants ’ Br ie f at 8. W e re m ai n unpe rs ua de d. A. Q ue sti ons co nc er

nin g c la ss c er

tif ic at ionare le ft

to the sound d isc re tio n of the dis tr ic t c ourt. A rm str ong v. Mart in M ar ie tta Co rp . , 138 F . 3d 1 374, 138 6 ( 11th Ci r. 199 8) ( enbanc ); F re em anv. Mo tor Co nvoy , I nc . , 700 F . 2d 1 339, 134 7 ( 11th Ci r. 198 3) . “ Adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n w he the r or not to ce rt if y ac la ss unde r Ru le 2 3 o f t h e F RC P i s re v i ew edfo r ab u s e o f d i s cr et i o n . As l o n g as th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s re as oni ng s tay s w ith in the param et er s of Ru le 23’ s r equir em en ts f or the ce rt if ic at ionof ac la ss, the dis tr ic t c ourt de ci sio n w ill not be dis tur be d. ” H ine s v. W id na ll , 33 4 F .3d12 53 , 12 55 (11 th Cir . 20 03 ) (ci ta ti on s o m it te d) . Even if we would have certif ied a class, that does not m ean the district court abused its d iscretion in declinin g to do so. I d.; see a lso Shroder v. Suburban Co as ta l C or

p. , 729 F . 2d 1 371, 137 4 ( 11th C ir . 198 4) . I nde ed , the dis tin gui shi ng hallm ark of abuse-of- discretion review is that it “presuppo ses a zone of choice w ith in whic h th e tr ia l c our ts m ay go e ith er w ay . ” K er

n v. T X O P ro d. Co rp . , 738 F. 2d 96 8, 971 (8th Cir. 1984). By definition . . . under the abuse of discretion stand ard of r eview there w ill be occasions in which w e af firm the district court even thou gh we w ouldhave gone the other way had it been our call. That25

is h owan a

buse of dis cr et ionstandard

dif fe rs f ro m ade nov o standard of r ev ie w . A s w e ha ve state d pr ev iou sly , the abuse of dis cr et ionstandard

a llo w s “ a range of

c hoi ce f or the dis tr ic t c ourt, so lo ng as t ha t ch oi ce d oe s n ot co ns ti tu te a cl ear e rro r of jud gm en t.” Ra sbur y v. I . R. S. , 24 F . 3d 1 59, 168 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) ( quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. Kell y , 88 8 F .2d73 2, 7 45 (11 th Cir . 19 89 ) (ci ta ti on om it te d) ). Fi rs t, the pla int if

fs arg ue that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by “ re ac hin g th e m er its ” of

the pla int if

fs ’ c la im a t the pr el im inary

sta ge of c la ss c er tif ic at ion . T hus, w e ar e re qui re d to de te rm ine w he the r the tr ia l c ourt pr ope rl y a sse sse d th e pla int if fs ’ e vid en ce onl y

to the e xte nt n ec es sary

to de ci de the iss ue of

c la ss certific ation, or w hether the trial j udge im perm issib ly

usurped the role of the j ury by ruling on the m erits of the plaintiffs’ statistical and expert evidence. Af ter tho ro ugh re vie wof

thi s r ec or d, w e ar e sa tis fi ed that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t im pr ope rl y inv ad e the j ur

y ’ s pr ovi nc e whe n it

c ondu ct ed

( as it w as r equir ed

to do in this c as e) ar igo ro us ana ly sis of the e vid en ce pr of

fe re d by the part ie s a t the c la ss certific ation stage. The plaintiffs r ely

on the Suprem e Court’ s often-cited adm oniti on in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S . 156, 94 S. Ct. 2140 , 40 L . E d. 2d 732 (197 4), that “ nothin g ine ith er

the langua ge or

his tor y of Ru le 23 . . . giv es ac ourt any au tho ri ty to co nduc t a

pr el im inary

inquir y int o th e m er its of

asui t i n or de r to26

determ ine whether it m ay be m aintained as a class action.” Id. at 177, 94 S. Ct. at 2152 . H ow ev er , w e ha ve not ed that “ [w ] hil e it is tru e that a tr ia l c ourt m ay

not pr ope rl y r ea chthe m er its of

ac la im w he n de te rm ini ng whe the r cl as s c er tif ic at ion is w ar rante d, thi s pr inc ipl e shou ld n ot b e ta lis m an ic al ly inv oke d to art if

ic ia lly lim it a trial court’ s exam ination of the fac tors necessary to a rea soned de te rm inatio n of

w he the r a pla int if

f ha s m et he r bur de n of

e sta bli shi ng e ac h of

the Ru le 23 c la ss a ct ionr equir em en ts. ” L ove v. T ur lin gto n, 733 F . 2d 1 562, 156 4 (1 1t h C ir. 1 98 4) (ci ta ti on om it te d) . Indeed, both the Suprem e Court and this Court have not ed since Eisen that evidence pertaining to th e re quirem ents em bodi ed in Rule 23 is often int ertw ined w iththe m er its , m ak ing it im poss ibl e to m eanin gf

ull y a ddr es s th e Ru le 23 c ri te ri a w ith out a t l ea st t ouc hin g onthe “ m er its ” of the li tig at ion . S ee Co ope rs & L y br an d v. L ive say , 437 U . S. 463 , 469 n. 12, 98 S . Ct . 245 4, 245 8 n. 12, 57 L . E d. 2d 3 51 (1 978) ( “ E va luatio n of

m an y of the que sti ons en te ri ng i nto de te rm inatio n of c la ss ac tio n qu es tio ns i s in tim at el y inv olv ed w iththe m er its of

the c la im s. ” (c itatio n om itt ed )) ; N el son v. U . S. S te el Co rp . , 709 F . 2d 6 75, 679 ( 11th C ir . 198 3) (ex pl ai ni ng th atRu le 23 (a) e vi de nc e “ is oft en in te rtwi ne d wi th th e m eri ts ”). As the Supre m e Court has noted, the bare allegation that racial dis cr im inatio n ha s oc curr ed “ ne ith er de te rm ine s w he the r a cl as s a ct ionm ay be27

m ai nta ine d . . . nor

de fi ne s th e cl as s th at

m ay be c er tif ie d. ” G en . T el . Co . of

the So uth w es t v. F al co n, 457 U . S. 147 , 157 , 102 S . Ct . 236 4, 237 0, 72 L . E d. 2d 7 40 (1 982) . R athe r, be fo re adis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine s th e ef fi ca cy of c la ss ce rt if ic at ion , it m ay be r equir ed

to m ak e aninf

orm ed a sse ssm en t of

the part ie s’ ev ide nc e. T ha t a

tr ia l c ourt do es so d oe s no t m ean th at it ha s e rr one ousl y

“ re ac he d th e m er its ” of

the li tig at ion . S ee K irkpatr ic k v. J. C. Br ad fo rd & Co . , 827 F.2 d 7 18 , 72 2 (1 1t h C ir. 1 98 7) . In this case, the district court was obliged to m ake som e prelim inary as se ssm en t of

the pla int if

fs ’ e vid en ce to de te rm ine , a t the ve ry le as t, w he the r the nam ed pla int if fs w er e cl ai m ing dis cr im inatio n th at w as c om m on t o th e m em

be rs of the put at ive c la ss. I nde ed , the dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d have e rr ed if it ha d c er tif ie d a cl as s w ith out

f ir st d et er m ini ng tha t the nam ed

pla int if fs ha d c la im s c om

m on t o th os e o f th e u nn am edcla ss m em be rs . B. W e tur n, the n, to w he the r the c ourt’ s su bst an tiv e de te rm inatio ns at the c la ss ce rt if ic at ionsta ge a m ount ed

to anabuse of

dis cr et ion . T he pla int if

fs say that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by c onc lud ing that the y

ha d f ai le d to e sta

bli sh theTh e dis tr ic t c ourt c on c lud e d th at be c a

us e the y fa ile d th e c omm on a lity

and ty pic a lity 8 require ments under Rule 23(a ), the named plaintiffs could not ade quately repr esent the othe r putative class membe rs. See Cooper , 205 F.R.D. at 627. The district court did, howe ver, deter mine that the plaintiffs’ c ounsel wer e “c apable and experienc ed lawyers who w ould more th anad equ at el y

re p re s en tth e c l as s , we re a c l as s ce rt i fi ed . ” Id. T h e d ef en d an t s d o n o tch al l en ge this conclusion conce rningthe ade quacy of plaintiffs’ r epre sentation. 28 co m m ona lity , ty

pic al ity , and a de qua cy r equir em en ts o f Ru le 23( a) . T he y c la im 8 that the re w er e que sti ons of lawand f

ac t c om m on t o th e en tir e cl as s and tha t the cl ai m s o f th e n am edpl ai nt iff s wer e in facttypic al of a ll th e cl as s m em be rs . T he f our ba sic r equir em en ts o f Ru le 23( a) are “ de sig ne d to e ff ec tiv el y li m it class claim s to tho se ‘ fairly encom passed’ by

the nam ed plaintiffs’ indiv idual cl ai m s. ” P ra do- St ei m an , 221 F . 3d at 12 78 ( quot ing F al co n, 457 U . S. a t 15 6, 102 S. Ct . a t 23 70) ( int er

na l qu otatio n m ar

ks o m itt ed ). A s th e dis tr ic t c ourt pu t i t, Ru le 23( a) is de sig ne d to e nsur e that “ the c om m on b ond be tw ee n th e cl as s re pr es en ta tiv es ’ c la im s and those of the c la ss i s stro ng e noug h so that i t i s f ai r fo r the f ortun es of

the c la ss m em

be rs to ri se or

f al l w iththe f

ortun es of

the c la ss rep res en ta ti ve s.” C oo pe r, 20 5 F .R.D. at 6 08 -0 9. The ty picality and com m onalityrequirem ents are distinct but in terre lated, a s the Suprem e Court has m ade clear: T he c om m ona lity and ty pic al ity r equir em en ts o f Ru le 23( a) te nd t o m er ge . B othse rv e as gui de post s f or de te rm ini ng whe the r unde r the particular cir cum stances m aintenance of a c lass action is econom ical an d w he the r the nam ed

pla int if f’ s c la im and the c la ss c la im s are so29

int er re la te d th at

the int er es ts o f the c la ss m em be rs w ill be f

ai rl y and ad equa te ly pro te ct edin th ei r ab se nc e. Fa lc on, 457 U . S. a t 15 7 n. 13, 102 S . Ct . a t 23 70 n . 13. W e ha ve sim ilarl y explained that “ the com

m onalityand ty

picality requirem ents of Rule 23(a) ove rl ap . B othr equir em en ts f oc us o n w he the r a suf

fi ci en t ne xus ex ist s be tw ee n th e le ga l c la im s of

the nam ed

c la ss r ep re se ntativ es and those of ind ivi dua l c la ss m em be rs to warran t cl as s ce rti fic at io n.” Prad o- St ei m an , 22 1 F .3dat 1 27 8. “Ac l a s s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e mu s tp o s s e s s th e s a me i n t e r e s tan ds u f f e r th e s a me inj ur y a s th e cl as s m em

be rs in or de r to b e ty

pic al und er

Ru le 23( a) (3 ). ” Murr ay

v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 811 (11t h Cir. 2001 ). “ [T ] y picality m easures whether a suf fi ci en t ne xus ex ist s be tw ee n th e cl ai m s of the nam ed

r ep re se ntativ es and those of th e cl as s at lar ge .” Prad o- St ei m an , 22 1 F .3dat 1 27 9. Whi l e n o ten t i re l y d i s s i m i l art o th e t ypi ca l i t y re qu i re m en t , R u l e 2 3 (a )’s co m m ona lity r equir em en t m ea sur es the e xte nt t o w hic h a ll m em be rs of aput at ive cl as s have sim ilar cl ai m s. “ T ra dit ion al ly , c om m ona lity r ef er s to the gr oup charac teristics of the class as a whole [while] ty picality ref ers to the indivi dual ch ar ac te ri sti cs of

the nam ed

pla int if f in r el at ionto the c la ss. ” I d. U nde r the co m m ona lity r equir em en t, “ a cl as s a ct ionm ust inv olv e iss ue s th at

are sus ce pti ble to cla ss -wid e p ro of

.” Mu rray, 244 F.3dat 8 11 .30

N ei the r the ty

pic al ity nor the c om m ona lity r equir em en t “ m an da te s th at a ll put at ive c la ss m em

be rs share ide nti ca l c la im s, and . . . f ac tua l di ff

er en ce s am ong the c la im s of

the put at ive c la ss m em

be rs do n ot d ef

eat c er tif ic at ion . ” Ba

by N ea l v. Ca se y , 43 F . 3d 4 8, 56 ( 3d C ir . 199 4) ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ); se e al so P ra do- St ei m an , 22 1 F .3dat 1 27 9 n .14 ; Ap pl ey ardv. Wall ace, 7 54 F.2d95 5, 9 58 (11 th Cir . 19 85 ). Ne vertheless, the nam ed plaintiffs’ claim s m ust stil l share “ the sam e essential ch ar ac te ri sti cs a s th e cl ai m s of the c la ss at l ar ge . ” Appl ey ar d, 754 F . 2d at 95 8 (citation and internal quo tation m arks om itted). A s f or the ty pic al ity r equir em en t, the dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that whil e som e of the nam ed

pla int if fs ha d c la im s th at

c oul d be ty

pic al of sub gr oups w ith in the larg er c la ss, c oll ec tiv el y

the nam ed

pla int if fs did not have c la im s ty

pic al of the en tir e cl as s. T hus, f

or e xa m ple , pla int if

f E dw ar ds’ s c la im s w er e uni que ly ti ed to issues relating to his dis ability ; plaintiff S. J. H arris’ s claim s could no t be divorced f r o m th e d i s c i p l i n a ry i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o h e r c a s e ; an da l t h o u g h C o o p e r ’s c l a i ms w er e ty pic al of uni on m em

be rs de nie d pr om oti on t o no n- uni on j obs, the y w er e not ty pical of those unio n m em bers who m ight h ave com plaints relating to the denial of un io n p os it io ns . Si m ilarl y , non e of

the nam ed

pla int if fs ha d c la im s ty

pic al of m em be rs of the put at ive c la ss who w er e de nie d se nio r m an ag em en t po sit ion s, nor did any of the31

nam ed pla int if fs have c om

pe nsatio n c la im s ty

pic al of upp er -m an ag em en t e mp l o ye e s . A n dw h i l e th e p l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i ms may h a v e b e e n typ i c a l o f s o me subc la sse s of

the de fe ndants ’ w orkf

or ce , it is not c er ta in tha t the ir

c la im s w oul d be ty pic al of oth er sub cl as se s. T hus, f

or e xa m ple , the spe ci fi c j ob- re la te d c ri te ri a GP C uses to m ake em

ploym ent decisions aff

ecting its rural power- delivery ope ratio ns m ay

be ve ry dif fe re nt f ro m the c ri te ri a unde rl y ing de ci sio ns a bout em plo y ee s inthe ir

a dm ini str at ive of

fi ce s. A s ar es ult , the nam ed pla int if fs did not pr es en t cl ai m s t y

pi cal of t he ful l ra ng e o f em pl oyees i n t he ir p ut at iv e cl as s. T he pla int if

fs arg ue , ne ve rthe le ss, that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by f oc usi ng o n the idi osy nc ratic f eatur es of the dif fe re nt n am ed

pla int if fs ’ c la im s in ste ad

of ac know le dgi ng tha t the c la im s of the pla int if

fs and the m em

be rs of the larg er

c la ss w er e ba se d onthe sam e le ga l the or ie s. T ha t i s, the pla int if fs say that the ir ind ivi dua l i nj ur ie s “ ar ise out of the sam e pa tte rnand p ra ct ic e [o f dis cr im inatio n] an d sam e [d isc ri m inator

y ] pol ic ie s th at

giv e ri se to the inj ur ie s of the c la ss m em be rs .” App el la nt s’ Bri ef at18 . W e re iterate that our r eview is only for abuse of discre tion, and that whether w e w oul d have c er

tif ie d th e cl as s inthe f

ir st i nst an ce - - or

e ve n so m e gr oupi ng o f subc la sse s - - is n ot d isp osi tiv e. H ine s, 334 F . 3d at 12 57; se e al so S hr ode r, 729 F. 2d at 13 74. H er e, the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s ana ly sis a s to ty pic al ity f el l w ith in the32

range of c hoi ce pe rm iss ibl e on a

buse -o f- dis cr et ionr ev ie wand d id n ot r ep re se nt a cl ear e rro r in jud gm en t. See Kell y , 88 8 F .2dat 7 45 . Fi rs t, the c om

pe nsatio n and p ro m oti on d ec isi ons af fe ct ing e ac h of

the nam ed plaintiffs wer e m ade by indiv idual m anagers in disparate locations, based on the ind ividu al plaintiffs’ chara cteristics, includi ng their educational ba ck gr ound s, e xpe ri en ce s, w ork a ch ie ve m en ts, and p er fo rm an ce in int er vie w s, am ong oth er

f ac tor s. I n L ove v. T ur lin gto n, w e he ld tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d no t abused its d iscretion in deny ing class certification based on the plaint iffs’ failure to m ee t the ty

pic al ity and c om m ona lity r equir em en ts. 733 F . 2d at 15 64. T ha t c as e inv olv ed ac ha lle nge to Fl or ida ’ s S SA T -I , ate st d es ign ed to ide nti fy

hig h sc hool student s who had failed to m aster one of the state’ s academ ic perfor m ance standard s. S tud en ts f

ai lin g th e te st w er e ide nti fi ed f or r em ed ia l a ssi stanc e, but

a fai lu re d idno t au to m at ic al ly rend er a s tu de nt in el ig ib le fora hi gh sch oo l d ip lo m a. Rathe r, de ci sio ns o n e ac h in div idu al stu de nt’ s e lig ibi lity f or adip lom a w er e “ m ad e by ind iv idua l t each ers on th e b as is of [ th e st ud en t’s] in di vi du al ach ie ve m en ts . E ac h st ude nt’ s si tuatio n di ff

er s, and the dip lom a is d en ie d e ac h st ude nt f or r ea sons w hic h are uni que to his sit ua tio n, and whic h do not ne ce ssari ly

c or re spon d to his pe rf orm an ce on the S SA T -I . ” I d. S im ila rl y , in the ins tant c as e the c om pe nsatio n33

an d pr om oti on d ec isi ons af fe ct ing e ac h of

the nam ed

pla int if fs w er e ba se d on fact or s t ha t, b y

an d l arg e, ap pe ar u ni qu e to each of t he pl ai nt iff s i n q ue st io n. In addition , the plaintiffs sought to repre sent a very broad class that pur porte d to r ep re se nt a ll A fr ic an -A m er ic ane m plo y ee s of

the de fe ndants , a t a ll le ve ls o f the c or

por at e hie rarc hy

of a ll the de fe ndant c om

panie s. B ec au se the pla int if fs a sse rt ed

br oa d c la im s onbe ha lf

of abr oa d c la ss, the y

w er e re qui re d to ide nti fy r ep re se ntativ e pla int if

fs w ho s hare d th ose br oa d c la im s. H ow ev er , w hil e t h e d i f f e r e n tn a me dp l a i n t i f

f s may h a v e h a dc l a i ms th a tw e r e typ i c a l o f s o me co nc ei vable sub gr oups of the ove ra ll cl as s, the se ve n nam ed pla int if fs , co ll ect iv el y , di d n ot ha ve cla im s t ha t wo ul d h av e b een typic al of t he en ti re cl as s. Se e Fa lc on, 457 U . S. a t 15 6, 102 S . Ct . a t 23 70; H ine s, 334 F . 3d at 12 57- 58. A s a re sul t, w e ar e co nstra ine d to c onc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ion s regarding ty

picality did no t constitu te a cle ar e rror of j udgm ent, nor w ere they ot he rwis e o ut si de th e ran ge of c ho ic es th e d is tri ctco ur t was all owe d t o m ak e. As f or the com

m onalityrequirem ent, the district court concluded that it was im poss ibl e to s ay

that the e m

plo ym en t hi sto ri es of

the nam ed

pla int if fs and the w ay s inw hic h th ey

c la im ed to have e xpe ri en ce d di sc ri m inatio n c oul d be “ fa ir ly co m pare d w iththe his tor

y or ind ivi dua l e xpe ri en ce s of abse nt c la ss m em

be rs , ” or that the c la im s of

c la ss m em

be rs share d su chc om

m on f eatur es that r

uli ngs co uld34

be fashioned to fairly

adj udicate the claim s as a group. C ooper, 205 F.R .D . at 610- 611. Whe re , a s he re , c la ss c er tif ic at ionw as sou ght

by e m plo y ee s w orkin g in w ide ly div er se j ob ty

pe s, spr ea d th ro ugho ut d if fe re nt f ac ili tie s and g eo gr ap hic loc at ion s, c ourts h av e fr eque ntl y de cl ine d to c er

tif y c la sse s. S ee , e . g. , Z ac he ry v. T ex ac o E xpl or at ion& Pr od. , I nc . , 185 F . R. D . 230 , 239 ( W . D . T ex . 199 9) ( de ny ing certific ation where propos ed class spread ac ross fifteen states and involv ed se ve nt een bu si ne ss un it s) ; Tro up e v . Ran da ll ’s Foo d & Drug , Inc ., No. CIV.A. 3:9 8- CV -2 462, 199 9 W L 552 727, a t *5 ( N . D . T ex . Jul y 28, 199 9) ( de cl ini ng t o cert ify pro po se d c la ss th atco ve redat l eas t “ fif ty sep arat e st or es sp readov er t wo larg e ci tie s and the ir

out ly ing sub ur

bs” w ith“ m an ag em en t pr ac tic es vary [i ng] widely accor ding to stores across the divis ion”). Si nc e the hir ing , c om

pe nsatio n, and p ro m oti on d ec isi ons at iss ue w er e m ad e by dif fe re nt m an ag er s indif

fe re nt c om

panie s im ple m en tin g di ff

er en t po lic ie s, ev enif the nam ed

pla int if fs e sta bli she d th at

the y w er e, ind ivi dua lly , sub

j ec te d to intentio nal discrim ination , they would not necessarily

have established that ot her c l a s s me mb e r s s u f

f e r e df r o m th e s a me d i s c r i mi n a t i o n . C o mmo n a l i t y i n th e c l a i ms of the br oa d c la ss the pla int if fs sou ght to ce rt if y w oul d have to be e sta

bli she d by showing th at the discrim ination sustained was either part of an overarc hing pattern an d pr ac tic e of

int en tio na l di sc ri m inatio n onthe part of the de fe ndants or

theTo pr ov e dis pa rate tr e atme nt, a

pla int if f ( a s d o p la int if

fs he re ) u su a lly

se e ks to e sta

bli sh 9 that he or sh e is a me mbe r o f a

pr ote c te d gro up ; th at he or sh e wa s su

bje c te d to an a dv e rs e employ ment decision; that the employer tre ated similarly situated employ ees outside the protec ted g roup more f

avora bly ; and that he or

she wa s qualified for

the job. J oe’s Stone Crab, 220 F.3d at 1274-75. 35 re sul t of the dis cr im inator

y dis parate im

pa ct of af ac ia lly ne utr al e m

plo ym en t p o l i c y. W e expla in the e le m en ts r equir ed to sus ta in a

suc ce ssf ul p atte rnand practice or disparate im

pact claim

m ore fully

in Section III .B. , infr a, but a brief ove rv ie wsuf

fi ce s f or our pur pose s he re . T o e sta

bli sh a “pa tte rnor

pr ac tic e” of disparate treatm ent, the plaintiff m ust sh ow that intention al discrim ination wa s 9 the em ploy er’ s “ standard operating procedure.” Joe’ s Stone Crab, 220 F.3d at 1274 (explaining d iffer ent ty pes of discrim ination claim s in context o f gender discrim ination ). T he plaintiff can prove that discrim ination wa s the standard op erat in g p ro cedur e “ th ro ug h aco m bi na ti on of s ta ti st ic s an d a ne cd ot es .” Id . To pr ove dis parate im

pa ct , apla int if

f m ust e sta bli sh the e xis te nc e of

astatis tic al ly sig nif ic an t di spari ty

a m ong m em

be rs of dif fe re nt g ro ups af

fe ct ed by aty pe of em plo ym en t de ci sio n; a

spe ci fi c, f

ac ia lly ne utr al e m

plo ym en t pr ac tic e inv olv ed in the decision; anda ca

usal nexus betwee n the facially neutral em

ploym ent practice an d th e statis tic al ly

sig nif ic an t di spari ty . I d.The plaintiffs a lso submit ted an e x pert re port prepa red by Dr. Ke vin R. Murphy , a 10 psy cholog ist, who ex amined var ious affidavits and deposition testim ony provided by

the plaintiffs and c oncluded that while the defe ndants ac tually had policies in pra ctice to pr event dis c ri min atio n, the y

un de rm ine d th e se po lic ie s “ by a ff or din gmana g e rs dis c re tio n to ig no re tho se policies and use c riteria that are not job related” in making c ompensation and promotion decisions. R119-56 at 2. In essenc e, Murphy ’s re port rec apitulated the ba sic alleg ations of the plaintiffs in the guise of an e x pert re port. The de fenda nts submit ted an e x pert re port prepa red by Dr. Ronald R. Sims, which concluded that Murphy ’s re port was “ neither a ccur ate nor reliable ,” R136-2 at 4, and that in fa ct the def endants ha d in place policie s that preve nted manag ers f rom exercisingunfetter ed discre tion to make decisions on non-job-r elated ba ses. We agree with the 36 Thus, it w as plainly

necessary

for the district court to evaluate the statistical ev ide nc e the pla int if

fs sub m itt ed

in or de r to d et er

m ine w he the r it es ta

bli she d th e dis cr im inatio n of

w hic h pl ai nti ff

s c om pla ine d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed the statis tic al “ an al y sis ha [d ] som e lim itatio ns whic h un de rm ine [d ] it s us ef uln es s in m easuring whether D efendants’ em ploym ent practices [ we ] re r acially neutral.” Co ope r, 205 F . R. D . a t 61 3. B ec au se of sub stanti al ana lytic al f

law s inthe statistical evidence, the plaintiffs had m ade an “ inadequate sho wing . . . to raise a pr es um pti on o f dis cr im inatio n ari sin g f ro m appl ic at ionof

the c oll ec tiv e w hol e of De fendants’ com

pensation and prom otion policies. T hus, disparate im pact an al y si s p ro du ce[d ] no ev id en ce co m m on to th e cl ai m s o f al l cl as s m em be rs . A lso , the [ statis tic al e vid en ce ] f ai l[ ed ] to es ta

bli sh e vid en ce of

apa tte rnand practice of discrim ination .” Id. at 615 (em phasis add ed). The plaintiffs’ prim ary

statistical evidence wa s found in reports by Dr . Janice Madden, who analy zed em ploym ent data provided by the defendants. D r. 10district court that the re ports of Murphy and Sims, which rea ch swe epingconclusions about what may or may not occur within the defe ndant companie s, are of extremely limit ed use, la cking statistical evidence to substantiate broad c laims that, in essence , simply rec harg e the a lleg ations of the pa rties to this li tigation. See Cooper, 205 F .R.D. at 611 & n.24. 37 Ma dde n’ s r ep orts co nc lud ed that A fr ic anA m er ic an s r ec ei ve d f ew er pr om oti ons than would be expected given th eir num bers in the workforc e. H owever , a fter analy zing Madden’s m ethodo logyand conclusio ns, the district court identified se ve ra l ba sic inf

irm iti es that un de rm ine d th e re ports’ sub stanti ve va lue . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e xc lud e D r. Ma dde n’ s r ep orts b ec au se she w as unqua lif ie d or be ca use the r ep orts w er e ba se d onaw hol ly unr el ia ble m ethodo log y ; r athe r, the co urt a cc ep te d th e re ports’ c onc lus ion s bu t de te rm ine d th at the y sti ll fa ile d to establish th at the nam ed plaintiffs had claim s in comm on with other class m em bers un de r ei th er a p at te rn an d p ract ic e o r di sp arat e im pa ctth eo ry . Inthe f ir st p la ce , the dis tr ic t c ourt no te d th at Ma dde n’ s r ep orts d id n ot incorporate variables that w ouldallow f or the com

parison of ind ividu als who w ere sim ilarl y sit ua te d w ithr es pe ct

to m an ag er ia l de ci sio n m ak er s, j ob ty pe s, loc at ion s, departm ents, and the specific c riteria r elevant for the j obs in question . Madden did no t tailor her analy sis to th e specific positions , j ob location s, or depar tm ental an d or ganiz at ion al str

uc tur es in que sti on; how ev er , the w ide -r an gin g and h igh ly diversified nature of the defendants’ operations requires that em ploy ee38

com parisons take these dis tinction s into account in order to ensure that the black an d w hit e em

plo y ee s be ing c om

pare d are sim ilarl y

sit ua te d. S ee W ar ds C ove Pack in g C o. v . Ato ni o, 4 90 U.S. 64 2, 6 56 -5 7, 1 09 S. Ct. 2 11 5, 2 12 4- 25 , 10 4 L. E d. 2d 7 33 ( 1989 ) (“ [A ] T itl e V II pla int if f doe s no t m ak e a ca se of dis parate im pa ct sim ply by sho w ing that, ‘ at

the bottom

li ne , ’ the re is ra ci al im

ba lanc e in the w ork f or ce . ”) ; se e al so B ro w n v. A m . H onda Mo tor Co . , 939 F . 2d 9 46, 952 ( 11th Ci r. 199 1) ( “ St at ist ic s . . . w ith out a [ pr ope r] ana lytic f

ound at ion [] are vir

tua lly m eanin gle ss. ”) ; B al de rs tonv. F ai rb an ks M or se E ngi ne D iv. of Co lte c In dus. , 328 F. 3d 3 09, 319 ( 7thCi r. 200 3) ( “ T he S upr em e Co urt ha s e m pha siz ed the im portance of looking to the proper base ‘ group’ when m aking statis tical com parisons andexam ining all of the surrounding fac ts and circum stances which create the statistics them selves.”) . A s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ob se rv ed , Ma dde n’ s r ep orts d id n ot t ak e int o a cc ount the ty pe or le ve l of a cquir ed ski lls of j ob a ppl ic an ts. Ma dde n’ s “ ed uc at ion ” co m pone nt f ai le d to take int o a cc ount the f ie ld o f stu dy , the r el ev an ce of that f ie ld to any pos iti on i n qu es tio n, or

the qua lity

of the e duc at ion al ins tit

uti ons inv olv ed , fact or s wh ic h m ay

be im po rta nt in so m e m an ag ers ’ em pl oym en t d eci si on s. Mor eo ve r, Ma dde n c al cu la te d “ expe ri en ce ” onl y by ta bul at ing the a m ount of ti m e that ha d pa sse d si nc e anind ivi dua l f ini she d hi s or

he r fo rm al e duc at ion39

and the am ount of tim e that indivi dual had sp ent on the defendants’ pay roll. T hat two em ploy ees com

pleted their education in th e sam e y ear does not ensure that they have sim ilar levels of j ob-related experience , since what those em ploy ees have don e in the int er

ve nin g y ears m ay

be e xtr ao rd inari ly

dif fe re nt. Whil e Ma dde n’ s “ expe ri en ce ” vari ab le m ay have m ea sur ed

the pa ssa ge of

ti m e, it did not in an y way fact orin th e qua li ty, type, o r rel ev an ce o f an em pl oyee’s ex pe rie nc e. Andth e rep or ts di d n ot fact orin an y em pl oyee’s actua l jo b p erfo rm an ce, a co nsi de ratio n th at

is unde nia

bly im portant i n de ci sio ns r el at ing to co m pe nsatio n an d pr om oti on. I nde ed , w ith out takin g in to a cc ount

j ob p er fo rm an ce a t a ll, the f a c tth a ttw o e mp l o ye e s b e g a n th e i r e mp l o yme n tw i t h th e d e f e n d a n t s a tth e s a me tim e and have not been prom oted at the sam e rate does not establi sh that di sc riminat io n i s at work . In essence, the district court concluded th at these m ethodo logical de fi ci en ci es r en de re d it

“ im poss ibl e to d et er

m ine w ha t the [ sa lary

and p ro m oti ons] gaps [we] re, whether

they [w e] re statistically

significant, or w hether fac tors other than race [w e] re involved.” Cooper, 205 F.R. D. at 615. T hus, the district court observed that “ there ha[d] been an inadequate showing byPlaintiffs to raise a pr es um pti on o f dis cr im inatio n ari sin g f ro m appl ic at ionof

the c oll ec tiv e w hol e of D ef en dants ’ c om

pe nsatio n and p ro m oti on p oli ci es . ” I d. ; s ee a lso Ma ddox v.40

Cl ay tor , 764 F . 2d 1 539, 155 2 ( 11th C ir . 198 5) ( “ [M ult ipl e re gr es sio n ana ly sis ] m ea sur es the pr oba

bil ity that the c al cu la te d di spari ty c oul d oc cur random ly

- - but the analy sis in n o way

validates the calculation of the disp arity itself. If the tested dis pari ty is ba se d one rr one ous as sum pti ons or suf fe rs f ro m f law s inthe unde rl y ing da ta , the n st an dard de viatio n ana ly sis is fo re doom ed to y ie ld an e qua lly faulty result.” ); E astland v. T enn. V alley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 621-24 (11th Cir. 1983 ). The district court also observed that Madden’ s analy sis of prom otion rates wa s, sim ilarly , grounded in ins ufficiently tailored data. Significantly , Ma dden fa ile d to dis tin gui sh b etw ee n c om pe tit ive pr om oti ons -- tho se ope n to any qua lif ie d c an did at e -- and p ro gr es siv e pr om oti ons -- tho se a va ila ble onl y to indiv idual em

ploy ees progressing in a “ j ob fam ily ” -- a distinction that is crucial w he n ana ly zi ng p ro m oti ons. S ee F or eh an d v. F la . S ta te H osp. , 89 F . 3d 1 562, 1572 -73 (11th Cir. 1996). As f or progressive prom otion s, beca use Madden recognized prom otion s onlywhen an e m ploy ee r eceived an incre ase in salary gr ad e, m ove d f

ro m anon -e xe m

pt t o an e xe m

pt p osi tio n, or

m ove d f ro m auni on j ob int o a higher-pay ing no n-union j ob, Madden’ s calculations didnot capture tho se that oc curr ed

w ith in the sam e sa lary

gr ad e. A s f

or c om pe tit ive pr om oti ons, Ma dde n di d no t t ak e int o a cc ount howm an y

and whic h e m

plo y ee s a ct

ua lly41

ap pli ed f or the m , a lso asig nif

ic an t f ac tor in m ak ing any

m eanin gf

ul ge ne ra liz at ion s a

bout a lle ge dly dis cr im inator

y pr om oti on p ra ct ic es . A s part of he r an al y sis , Ma dde n di vid ed the e m plo y ee s in to d if

fe re nt

“pool s,” or

subsets, of em

ploy ees, and her analy sis revealed statistical deficiencies in o nly som e of the poo ls. O f the 148 poo ls o f em plo y ee s ana ly ze d in199 8- 1999 , Madden’ s analy sis revealed a r epresentational deficiency of A frican-Am erican em plo y ee s inonl y

thr ee poo ls: tw o un ionsa lary -g ra de poo ls and o ne poo l f or non ex em pt s al ar y -g ra de -5 e m

plo y ee s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that this a ct

ua lly could be evidence that the prom otion al deficiencies f or Af rican A m ericans m ay have e xis te d on ly

in som e se gm en ts o f the w orkf or ce , and the re fo re not thr ough out

the e nti re c la ss. Fi na lly , the dis tr ic t c ourt ob se rv ed that M ad de n’ s r ep orts d id n ot e sta bli sh the existence of any

specific prom otion or com pensation policy

or practice , le t al one tr ac e the a lle ge d r ac ia l di spari tie s to suc h apol ic y or pr ac tic e. I n a ddi tio n, the Madden reports did no t m ake any ref erence to any

of the specific nam ed plaintiffs or their specific sim ilarly -situated com parators, m aking it alto getherSevera l of the flaw s in plaintiffs’ statistical evidenc e that the district cour t highlig hted 11 wer e initially

pointed out in the report of defe nse expert Dr. Joan G. Haw orth, an e conomist, who inc lud e d s tatis tic a l ana ly se s th at c ontr a dic t Ma dd e n’ s r e po rt s a nd su pp or t th e de fe nd ants ’ c la im of no discrimination. In response to these cr iticisms of Dr. Madden’ s statisti cal r eports, the plaintiffs cite B azemore v. F riday , 478 U.S. 385, 106 S. C t. 3000, 92 L . Ed. 2d 315 (1986), which he ld t hat th e fa ilure of

the pla int if

fs ’ m ult ipl e re g re ssi on

ana ly se s to inc or

po ra te a ll c on c e iva

ble varia bles aff ecte d the weight of the ana ly ses but not their admissibili ty . Plaintiffs argue that the district court her e ig nored B azemore by inappropriately

evaluating the pr obative value of the statistical evidence , rathe r than lea ving that task to the jury . Pla int if fs ’ r e lia nc e on B a zem or e is unava ili ngin t his c a se . F ir st, B a zem or e he ld t hat a statis tic a l ana ly sis sh ou ld n ot b e re je c te d me re ly

be c a us e it f a ils to i nc or

po rate e ve ry

po ssi ble varia ble; it did not hol d that any statistical report, no matter how many

critica l variable s were missing, should automatically prese nt a jury

question, indicatingthat there are “some re g ressions so incomplete as to be ina dmissibl e as irr eleva nt.” I d. at 400 n.10, 106 S. Ct. at 3009 n.10. Moreove r, in Bazemore, the plaintiffs submitted independe ntly conducte d statistical analy ses that confirme d the validity

of their r egressions, and most importantly , the def endants’ statisti cal ana ly sis re a c he d s ub sta

nti a lly the same re su lts a s d id t

ho se of the pla int if

fs . I d. at 40 1, 10 6 S. Ct. at 30 09 . T hat w a s n ot t

he c a se he re , whe re the de fe nd ants ’ a na ly se s e xpre ssl y

c ontr a dic te d th os e of the plaintiffs. 42 unclear how the r eports could establ ish comm onalityam ong th ese nam ed pla int if fs ’ c la im s and the ove ra ll cl ai m s of the a ff ec te d c la ss. 11 Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt co n cl u d edth at b ec au s e o f t h es e f l aw s i n Ma d d en ’s m ode ls, it w as im poss ibl e to d et er

m ine how w ide ar ea l ga

p, if any , e xis te d in sa lari es and p ro m oti on r at es a m ong w hit e an d bl ac k e m plo y ee s, or

w he the r any suc h ga p w as a ttr ibu ta

ble to fa ct or s othe r than r ac e. W e ar e pe rs ua de d th at the district court’ s basic conclusio n -- that plaintiffs’ statistical evidence wa s ins uf fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh a pr es um pti on o f dis cr im inatio n c om m on t o th e cl ai m s of al l m em be rs of the put at ive c la ss - - did

not c onst itu te ac le ar

e rr or of j udgm en t, no r was th e co nc lu si on ot he rwis e o ut si de th e acc ep tabl e ran ge of c ho ic es .43

T he pla int if

fs a lso pr of

fe re d, in ad dit ionto the statis tic al e vid en ce , ar an ge of ane cd ota l e vid en ce that, the y c la im ed , she d a ddi tio na l l igh t onthe de fe ndants ’ allegedly discrim inatory

policies and practices. Am ong th e evidence prese nted w e r e r e p o rt s o f

s e v e r a l u g l y i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g n o o s e s d i s p l aye da ts o me loc at ion s w ith in s om e of

the de fe ndants ’ f

ac ili tie s, r ep orts o f ra ci al j oke s and slurs , and the be lie f expr es se d by vari ous em

plo y ee s th at

the re w as a“ gla ss ce ili ng” f or A fr ic an -A m er ic ane m

plo y ee s. F ina lly , pla int if fs f ile d ase ri es of affidavits of prospective class m em bers who offe red anecdotal evidence that repeate d m any

of the claim s plaintiffs had m ade in their pleadings. T he district co ur t d et erm in edth atth e an ecd ot al ev id en ce was “ in ad equa te to est ab li sh . . . a pa tt ern an d p ract ic e o f di sc riminat io n.” Coo pe r, 20 5 F .R.D. at 6 19 . Agai n, we co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt a ct ed w ith in i ts d isc re tio n inde te rm ini ng tha t, giv enthe she er

siz e an d ge ogr ap hic al ly

dis pe rs ed

na tur e of the de fe ndants ’ workforc e, the anecdotal evidence -- disturbi ng as som e of it m ay have been -- wa s in ad equa te to est ab li sh di sc riminat io n c la ss -wid e. Af ter thorough review of the e ntire rec ord, w e conclude that the district court did no t abuse its dis cretion in determ ining that the statistical and anecdotal evidence subm itted by

the plaintiffs did no t establish p attern and practice dis cr im inatio n c om

m on t o th e cl as s or

ac om m on d isp ar at e im

pa ct a ff ec tin g th e44

defendants’ Af

rican-A m erican em

ploy ees class-w ide. T he powerf ul difference s betwee n the nam ed plaintiffs’ claim s and the claim s of the overall class m em bers m eant tha t pr oc ed

ur al f ai rn es s f or a ll m em be rs of the put at ive c la ss w oul d no t be ensured if the claim s of the entire cla ss wer e allowe d to rise or fall on the fortunes of the nam ed

pla int if fs ’ c la im s. C. E ve n if w e co nc lud ed , how ev er , that the dis tr ic t c ourt a buse d it s di sc re tio n in d et er m ini ng tha t the pla int if

fs did not m ee t tw o of

the r equir em en ts o f Ru le 23( a) , c er tif ic at ionw oul d st ill be ina

ppr opr ia te unl es s th e pla int if fs a lso c oul d sa tis fy a t l ea st o ne of

the r equir em en ts o f Ru le 23( b) . S ee Ja ck son v. Mo te l 6 Mul tip ur pose , I nc . , 130 F . 3d 9 99, 100 5 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) . A s anothe r gr ound f or its decision , the district court concluded that certification was inappropriate under either Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3). O n appeal the plaintiffs say that the district court err ed in refusing to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) for inj unctive relief and back pay

or to certif

y a hy brid class und er R

ule 23(b)(2) for inj unctive relief, w hil e se ve ri ng the dam ag es pha se of the pr oc ee din gs b y

a llo w ing opt -o uts f

or dam ag es . T he y

a lso arg ue that the c ourt sh oul d have c er tif ie d ac la ss unde r Ru le 23(b)(3) for inj unctive relief, back pay , and dam ages. W e re m ain unconv inced45

an d, a cc or din gly , hol d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n in concludin g that the requirem ents of Rule 23(b) we re not satisfied either. U nde r Ru le 23( b) (2 ), c la ss c er tif ic at ionis ap pr opr ia te w he n th e requirem ents of Rule 23(a) are m et and the defendant “ has acted or re fused to act on groun ds generally

applicable to the class, there by m aking approp riate f

inal inj unc tiv e re lie f or

c or re spon din g de cl ar at or

y r el ie f w ithr es pe ct

to the c la ss a s a whole. ” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 23(b)( 2). Back pay is consid ered e quitabl e re lief and can the re fo re be aw ar de d inac as e ce rt if ie d un de r Ru le 23( b) (2 ). P ettw ay v. A m . Ca st Iro n P ip e Co ., 49 4 F .2d21 1, 2 57 (5t h C ir. 1 97 4) . H er e, how ev er , the pla int if fs a lso sou ght

c om pe nsator y and p uni tiv e dam ag es , le ga l r el ie f that c anonl y be aw ar de d inaRu le 23( b) (2 ) cl as s a ct ion w he n th e da m ag es sou ght are “ inc ide nta l” to the c la im s f or e qui ta ble and de cl ar at or

y r el ie f. Murr ay , 244 F . 3d at 81 2. D am ag e cl ai m s inaRu le 23( b) (2 ) cl as s a ct ionm

ust be inc ide nta l t o th e equit ab le and d ec larator y r el ie f be ca

use the basic prem ise of such a class action -- that class m em bers suffer

a com m on injury properly addressed by

class-w ide equitable relief - - “begins to break down when the class seeks to recover . . . m onetary relief to be allocated based on ind ividu al inj ur ie s. ” A lli son v. Ci tgo P etro le um Co rp . , 151 F . 3d 4 02, 413 ( 5thCi r. 199 8)Th e pla int if fs say that “ the qu e sti on

of wh e the r c la ims fo r d ama g e s a re ‘i nc ide nta l’ to 12 claims for injunctive r elief is improper ,” Appe llants’ Br ief at 22, and urg e this Court to adopt the position t aken by

the Second Circuit, which ha s rejec ted the incidenta l damag es standar d. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2001). How ever , Murra y unambiguously

explained that the Allison incidental damag es standar d is the proper leg al sta nd ard to a na ly ze c e rt if ic atio n und e r R

ule 23 (b )( 2) in t

he El e ve nth

Cir c uit . We are bo un d to apply the standar d outlined in Murray , since one panel of this Court cannot overr

ule another . That powe r is rese rved only to the full Eleventh Circuit sitting en ba nc or to the United States Supreme Court. Jul ius v. J ohnson, 755 F.2d 1403, 1404 (11th Cir. 1985). 46 (quotin g Eubanks v. Billingto n, 110 F.3d 87, 95 (D .C. Cir. 1997 )) ( internal quot ation m arks om itted). W e explained in Murray

those criteria used to evaluate whether m oney da m ag es sh ou ldbe co ns id ered“ in ci de nt al ” to equi tabl e cl ai m s i n a23 (b )(2 ) cas e. InMurr ay , w e ad opt ed

the pos iti on o f the F if

th C ir cu it in A lli son v. Ci tgo Pet ro le um

Co rp .: By inc ide nta l, w e m ean dam ag es that f lowdir ec tly

f ro m li ab ili ty to the c la ss a s aw hol e on the c la im s f orm ing the ba sis of

the inj unc tiv e or de cl ar at or

y r el ie f. . . . L ia

bil ity f or inc ide nta l dam ag es sho uld not .

. . entail com

plex ind ividu alized determ ination s. T hus, incidental d a mag e s wi l l , b y d e f

i n i t i o n , b e mo r e i n th e n a tu r e o f ag r o up r e med y, co nsi ste nt w iththe f

orm s of r el ie f int en de d f

or ( b) (2 ) cl as s a ct ion s. Mur ray , 244 F . 3d at 81 2 ( quot ing A lli son, 151 F . 3d at 41 5) . I n ke ep ing w iththe 12 re qui re m en t tha t m one tary dam ag es be inc ide nta l t o e qui ta ble r el ie f in R

ule 23(b)(2) class ac tions , the a dviso ry com m ittee’ s note to Rule 23 explains that ce rt if ic at ionund er

se ct ion( b) (2 ) is n ot p ro pe r in “ ca se s inw hic h th e ap pr opr ia teThe injunctive re lief spec ified in the plaintiffs’ Complaint consists of a re quest for 13 “ pr e lim ina

ry and pe rm ane nt i nju

nc tiv e re lie f t o e nd

De fe nd ants ’ d isc ri min ator y pr a c tic e s a

nd to preve nt curre nt and future harm to the Na med Plaintiffs and the Class.” Complaint at 59. Simi larl y , th e Com

pla int se e ks de c larator

y re lie f i n th e fo rm

of a “ jud g me nt t

hat D e fe nd ants ’ a c ts and pra ctices a s set forth her ein ar e in violation of the laws of the United States.” I d. Thus, the decla ratory and injunctive re lief plaintiffs see k amounts, in essence , to an orde r statingthat the defe ndants discriminated a g ainst Afric an-America n employ ees, a

nd enjoining the m from discriminating in the f

uture. 47 fi na l r el ie f re la te s e xc lus ive ly or pr ed om inantl y

to m one y dam ag es . ” F ed . R. Ci v. P. 23 , adv is ory

co m m it te e’s no te (em

ph as is ad de d) . The plaintiffs ar gue, nevertheless, that the district court couldhave certified a cl as s un de r Ru le 23( b) (2 ) onl y a s to the inj unc tiv e an d de cl ar at or y pr ay er f or rel ie f, th ereb y

ex cl ud in g a lt og et he r th e d am ag es is su es fro m cla ss cert ifi cat io n. H ow ev er , to the e xte nt the nam ed pla int if fs w er e w ill ing to fo re go c la ss certific ation on dam ages in order to pursue injunctive relief that consis ted of an adm oni tio n to f

oll owge ne ra l pr inc ipl es of se ttl ed law , it is far fr om

c le ar that the 13 nam ed pla int if fs w oul d a de quate ly

r ep re se nt the int er es ts o f the oth er put at ive cl as s m em

be rs . I nde ed , to m an y

of the c la ss m em

be rs ( an d e spe ci al ly

to tho se w ho n o lo nge r w ork f

or the de fe ndants ), the m one tary dam ag es r eque ste d m igh t be of f ar gr eate r sig nif

ic an ce than in

j unc tiv e re lie f, state d a t a hig h or de r of abstraction, that sim

ply directs the defendants not to d iscrim inate. Moreover, de te rm ini ng the le ve l of

dam ag es to w hic h e ac h c la ss m em be r w as e nti tle d pl ai nly would require detailed, case- by -case fact f indin g, carefully

calibrated f

or eac hMoreove r, the c ases plaintiffs c ite in support of their cla im that the district court abused 14 its discretion by

ref using to c ertify

an injunctive cla ss under Rule 23(b) (2) while a llowing f or opt-outs on compensatory damag es ar e inapposite. Ne ither Pettway , 494 F.2d at 256-60, nor P e n s o nv . T e r

m i n a l T r an s p o rt at i o nC o . , 6 3 4 F . 2 d 9 8 9 ( 5 thC i r . U n i tB J an . 1 9 8 1 ) , n o r , f i n a l l y, Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983), involved a hy brid trial in which me mbe rs of

an in jun c tiv e c la ss c ou ld o pt o ut f or c omp e ns ator

y and punit ive dama g e s, sin c e the se reme dies wer e not at stake in those case s. Indeed, a ll of these ca ses pre date the Civil Rights Act of 19 91 , whic h c ha

ng e d th e land sc a

pe of e mpl oy me nt d isc ri min atio n la

w b y makin gava ila

ble c o mp e n s ato r

y an d p un it iv e d ama g e s ( a s w e ll a s th e r igh t t o tr ia l b y ju r y ) in T it le V I Ic a s e s . We explained in Cox v. Americ an Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1554 (11th Cir. 1986) that “ [a] hy brid Rule 23(b)( 2) cla ss action is one in which c lass members se ek individual monetary relief , ty pically back pa y , in addition to class-wide injunctive or de clar atory relief .” (c iting Penson, 634 F.2d at 994) (empha sis added). The case s relied on by the plaintiffs stand for

the proposition that it may be appr opriate to use a

bifurca ted or hy brid trial proc ess in Rule 23(b)(2) case s when class-w ide injunctive re lief is appropr iate, followe d by individualiz ed aw ards of back pa y . Significa ntly , these c ases do not hold that such a proce ss is appropriate (much less re quired, a s plaintiffs would have it) when hig hly individualiz ed aw ards of compensatory

and punitive damag es ar e at stake . 48 ind ivi dua l e m

plo y ee . T he “ co m

ple x, ind ivi dua liz ed

de te rm inatio ns” ne ce ssary to fi x th e ap pr opr ia te le ve l of ind ivi dua l dam ag e aw ar ds i n th is c as e ar e ex ac tly the ty pe that M ur

ray and A lli son m ak e cl ear shou ld n ot b e co nsi de re d “ inc ide nta l” to the claim s for inj unctive and declaratory relief . 14 Finally , a s the district court not ed, since the plaintiffs dem anded a j ury trial in this c as e, the part ie s w er e en tit le d un de r the S ev en th A m en dm en t t o have a ll m atte rs a t l awde te rm ine d by asin gle j ur

y be fo re havin g de ci sio ns c onc er nin g equit ab le r el ie f m ad e by

the tr ia l c ourt. S ee Co ope r, 205 F . R. D . a t 62 9 ( ci tin g Ro ss v . Be rnhard , 396 U . S. 531 , 538 -3 9, 90 S . Ct . 733 , 738 , 24 L . E d. 2d 7 29 (1970)). Under the circum stances of this case, even assum ing th at the district49

co urt c oul d c ondu ct

an in iti al be nc h tr ia l onthe m er its of the e qui ta

ble c la im s, and that the court actually

found in favor of the plaintiffs, it w ouldstill be necessary fo r a sin gle j ur

y to he ar and r ule on m or e than 2, 000 ind ivi dua l c la im s f or co m pe nsator y dam ag es . A ga in, on this r ec or d w e can di sc er n no abuse of discretion in th e district court’ s refusal to proceed under the cla ss action um brella. T he pla int if

fs a lso say

that e ve n if

c er tif ic at ionund er

Ru le 23( b) (2 ) w as not ap pr opr ia te , the dis tr ic t c ourt st ill sho uld have c er tif ie d th e cl as s f

or e qui ta ble re lie f, ba ck

pay , and d am ag es und er

Ru le 23( b) (3 ). B ut, f

or c la ss c er tif ic at ion unde r Ru le 23( b) (3 ) to b e ap pr opr ia te , c om m on que sti ons sti ll m

ust “pr ed om inate ove r any que sti ons af

fe ct ing onl y

ind ivi dua l m em

be rs ” an d th e cl as s a ct ion m ec hanis m

m ust be “ supe ri or

. . . f or the f ai r an d e ff

ic ie nt a dj udi catio n of

the co nt ro ve rs y .” Fed . R. Civ . P. 23 (b )(3 ). W e ha ve e xpl ai ne d th at

in ad dit ionto the r equir em en ts e m bodi ed in Ru le 23(a), Rule 23(b)(3) “ im

poses two additio nal requirem ents, and increa sed ef fi ci en cy is onl y one of the m . P re dom inanc e is the oth er . . . . ” Ja ck son, 130 F. 3d at 10 06. T he re fo re , “ the iss ue s inthe c la ss a ct ionthat are sub j ec t t o ge ne ra liz ed

pr oof and thus ap pli ca

ble to the c la ss a s aw hol e, m ust pr ed om inate o v erth o s e i s s u es th at ar e s ub je ct o n l y t o i n d i v i du al i ze dp ro o f. ” K err v . C i t y o f W. Pa lm Be ac h, 875 F . 2d 1 546, 155 8 ( 11th C ir . 198 9) ( ci ta tio n and i nte rn al quo ta tio n50

m arks om itted). C omm on iss ues will not predom inate over indivi dual questi ons if,

“ as apr ac tic al m atte r, the r es olu tio n of . . . [ an ] ove rarc hin g c om m on i ssu e br eaks down into an un m anageable variety of individ ual legal and factual issues.” A ndr ew s v. A m . T el . & T el . Co . , 95 F . 3d 1 014, 102 3 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) . O ur c as e lawpla inl y

e sta bli she s th at

ac la ss a ct ionsho uld

not pr oc ee d un de r Ru le 23( b) (3 ) w he n it appe ar s th at

“ m ost , if not a ll, of the pla int if

fs ’ c la im s w ill stand o r fa ll, not on the qu estion whether [the def endant] has a prac tice or policy of [r ace] discrim ination , but on the resolutio n of . . . high ly case- specific fa ctual issues.” Ru tst ei n, 211 F . 3d at 12 35 ( quot ing Ja ck son, 130 F . 3d at 10 06) ( int er na l qu otatio n m arks om itted). I ndeed, the predom inance requirem ent under Rule 23(b)(3) is “ far m or e de m an din g” than R ule 23( a) ’ s c om

m ona lity r equir em ent. Ja ck son, 130 F . 3d at 1005 (citation and internal quot ation m arks om itted). H er e, the pla int if

fs a tte m pte d to use statis tic al pr oof to es ta bli sh the ex ist en ce of

age ne ra liz ed

pol ic y of dis cr im inatio n th at

pr ovi de d th e co m

m on th readli nk in g t og et he r pl ai nt iff s’ ot he rwis e d is pa rat e an d i nd iv idua li zedcla im s. H ow ev er , w e ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t su bst an tia l l im itatio ns i n th e pla int if fs ’ statis tic al e vid en ce r en de re d th e fo rm of pr oof w hol ly ins uf fi ci en t t o showthat any

pa tte rnor

pr ac tic e of

dis cr im inatio n di sparate ly a ff ec te d th e pla int if fs ’ c la ss, or , f

or that m atte r, that the de fe ndants ha d age ne ra l po lic y of51

discrim ination . See Cooper, 205 F. R.D . at 630. Moreover, the indiv idual de te rm inatio ns o n li ab ili ty and d am ag es ne ce ssary

f or the ind ivi dua l pl ai nti ff

s to su ccee d wo ul d re qu ire hi gh ly fact-s pe ci fic in qu iri es co nc ern in g e ach pl ai nt iff . T hus, w e can di sc er

n no abuse of

dis cr et ionin the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n that the iss ue s su

bj ec t t o in div idu al iz ed

pr oof pr ed om inate d ov er

tho se that c oul d be e sta bli she d w ithc la ss- w ide pr oof , and the re fo re that the Ru le 23( b) (3 ) cl as s ac tio n pr oc ed

ur e w oul d no t be sup er ior f or the f ai r an d e ff

ic ie nt a dj udi catio n of th e co nt ro ve rs y . III . A. Fi na lly , w e tur

n to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de rs gr an tin g sum m ar y j udgm en t i n fav orof t he de fen da nt s o n t he cla im s o f eac h o f th e se ve n i nd iv idua l p la in ti ffs . W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de rs gr an tin g sum m ar y j udgm en t de nov o, ap ply ing the sam e le ga l st an dard s a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt di d and v ie w ing a ll of the fa ct s i n th e lig ht m ost

f av or ab le to the non -m ovi ng p ar ty . S ee , e . g. , Joh nsonv. Bo ok er. T. W as hi ng to n B ro ad . Serv ., Inc ., 23 4 F .3d50 1, 5 07 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ). Sum m ar y j udgm en t i s a

ppr opr ia te w he n “ the ple ad ing s, de posi tio ns, answ er s to int er ro ga tor ie s, and a dm iss ion s onf ile , tog ethe r w iththe a ff

idavit s, if any , sho w that the re is no g enuin e iss ue a s to any m at er ia l f

ac t and tha t the m ovi ng p ar ty is52

en tit le d to aj udgm en t a s am atte r of law . ” F ed . R. Ci v. P . 56 ( c) . “ Whe re the re co rd take n a s aw hol e co uld

not le ad ar at ion al tr ie r of

f ac t t o f ind f or the non m ovi ng p ar

ty , the re is no ‘ ge nui ne iss ue f or tr ia l. ’ ” Matsu shi taE le c. I ndus . Co . v. Z en ithRa dio Co rp . , 475 U . S. 574 , 587 , 106 S . Ct . 134 8, 135 6, 89 L . E d. 2d 5 38 (1 986) ( quot ing F ir st N at ’ l B an k of A ri z. v. Ci tie s S er

v. Co . , 391 U . S. 253 , 289 , 88 S . Ct . 157 5, 159 2, 20 L . E d. 2d 5 69 ( 1968 )) . “ [A ] ll re as ona ble doubts about the f ac ts s houl d be r es olv ed

in favor of the non -m ovant. ” Burt on v . Ci ty of Be lle G la de , 178 F . 3d 1 175, 118 7 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( quot ing Cl em ons v. D ough er ty County , 684 F. 2d 13 65, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1982)). B. As w e have observed, the plaintiffs cla im ed rac ial discrim ination under thr ee dis tin ct

T itl e V II the or ie s: p atte rnand p ra ct ic e dis cr im inatio n, dis parate tr eatm en t di sc ri m inatio n, and d isp ar at e im pa ct dis cr im inatio n. S ee Joe ’ s S ton e Cr ab , 220 F . 3d at 12 73. T he f ir st tw o th eo ri es r equir e the pla int if fs to pr ove d i s c r i mi n a t o ry i n t e n t ; th e th i r dd o e s n o t . I d . T h e p l a i n t i f f s a l s o a s s e rtc l a i ms unde r Se ct ion198 1, w hic h, unl ike T itl e V II , onl y pr ovi de s ac au se of

a ct ionf or cl ai m s in vol vin g in te nti ona l di sc ri m inatio n. G en . Bl dg. Co ntr ac tor s A ss’ n v. Pennsy lvania, 458 U. S. 375, 391, 102 S. Ct. 3141 , 3150, 73 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1982); Bro wn, 9 39 F.2dat 9 49 .Direc t evidence is evidence which itself prove s the exist ence of discrimination and doe s 15 not require infere nce or

interpre tation, as for e x ample a f rank a dmission from a manag er that he ref used to hire a

n applicant be cause he wa s black or be cause she wa s female . As would be e xpe c te d, su c h d ir e c t e vid e nc e is e nc ounte re d o nly inf re qu e ntl y , s inc e dir e c t e vid e nc e “ is c omp os e d o f o nly

the mos t bl atant r e mark s, wh os e int e nt c ou ld b e no thi ngoth e r t ha n to discriminate on the ba sis of some impermissible factor .” Schoenf eld v. B abbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999) (c itation and internal quotation marks omitted). Th e Mc Do nn e ll D ou g la s f ra me wo rk fo r e sta bli sh inga pr ima fa c ie c a se is u se d in 16 intentional discrimination cases br oug ht under e ither Title VI Ior Section 1981. Sledg e v. Go od y e ar D un lop Ti re s N .A ., L td. , 2 75 F .3 d 1 01 4, 10 15 n. 1 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 1) . Und e r M c Do nn e ll Doug las, a plaintiff ma

y establish a prima f

acie case of discrimination in promotion by establishing that (1) he be longs to a rac ial minority ; (2) he w as qualified f or and a pplied for a position t he employer w as trying to f ill; (3) he was de nied the position; and (4) other s who wer e no t me mbe rs of

the pr ote c te d c la ss w e re hir e d, or the e mpl oye r c ontin

ue d to se e k a

pp lic ants wi th the plaintiff' s qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824. 53 T he ba sic le ga l f

ram ew ork go ve rn ing the se the or ie s is by noww el les ta bli she d. I n adis parate tr eatm en t c as e, the pla int if f be ar s th e bur de n of

pr ovi ng that the em

ploy er intentionallydiscrim inated against hi m because of his rac e. See Holifield v. R eno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff can es ta bli sh d isc ri m inator

y int en t thr oughe ith er

dir ec t or

ind ir ec t e vid en ce ; t o 15 establish a prim a fa cie ca se of intention al discrim ination using circum stantial evidence, plaintiffs m ay

use the fram ew ork establishedin McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Gr een, 411 U.S . 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 , 36 L . E d. 2d 668 (197 3). 16 Again, in a “pattern and practice” disparate treatm ent case, “ the plaintiff m ust prov e, norm ally

through a com

binatio n of statistics and anecdotes, that dis cr im inatio n is the c om pany ’ s ‘ standard

ope ratin g pr oc ed

ur e. ’ ” Joe ’ s S ton e54

Crab , 22 0 F .3dat 1 27 4 (c it at io n o m it te d) . “ To m eetth is bu rd en of p ro of , a pla int if f m ust ‘ pr ove m or e than th e m er e oc curr en ce of iso la te d or

a cc ide nta l or spor ad ic dis cr im inator

y a ct s. I t ha [s ] to es ta

bli sh b y apr ep onde ranc e of

the evidence that . . . discrim ination [is] . . . the regular r ather than unusu al practice .’ ” Id. at 1286 -87 (quotin g Team sters, 431 U. S. at 336, 97 S. Ct. at 1843). To state a claim under a disparate im

pact theory , in contrast, a plaintiff need not establis h that he suffered intentional dis crim ination . Rather, “ disparate im pact the or y pr ohi bit s ne utr al e m

plo ym en t pr ac tic es w hic h, w hil e non- dis cr im inator y on their fac e, visit an adverse, disproportion ate im pact on a statutorily -protected g r o up . ” I d . a t1 2 7 4 . We h a v e n o t e dth a tth e d i s p a r a t e i mp a c tth e o ry i s “a doc tr ina l surr ogate f

or e lim inatin g unpr ova

ble a ct s of

int en tio na l di sc ri m inatio n hi dd en in no cu ou sl y

be hi ndfaci al ly-neu tra l p ol ic ie s o r pr act ic es .” Id . Thu s, t o s ta te a pr im a fac ie cas e o f di sp arat e im pa ctdi sc riminat io n, a pla int if f m ust e sta bli sh tha t ( 1) the re is a sig nif ic an t st at ist ic al dis pari ty

a m ong m em bers of diffe rent rac ial groups; (2) there is a specific, fac ially -neutral em plo ym en t po lic y

or pr ac tic e; and ( 3) the re is a ca usa l ne xus be tw ee n th e spe ci fi c policy or practice and the statistical disp arity . Id. Moreover, in order to satisfy the thi rd , c ri tic al r equir em en t, apla int if f “ m ust of fe r statis tic al e vid en ce of akin d an d de gr ee suf

fi ci en t t o sh owthat the pr ac tic e in que sti on h as c au se d th e55

ex cl usi on o f ap pli cants f

or j obs or pr om oti ons be ca

use of the ir m em be rs hip in a protected group.” Id. at 1274-75 (citation and internal quot ation m arks om itted). In general ter

m s, disparate im

pact cases are m ore am enable than other ty pes of discrim ination claim s to class treatm ent, since they arise out of specific policies orpra ct ic es th atha ve a di sp ro po rti on at e im pa cton an en ti re cl as s o f em pl oyees. Inc ontra st, w he n di sparate tr eatm en t i s th e ba sis of ac la ss a ct ion , it

is ge ne ra lly m or e lik el y

that i ndi vid

ua l i ssu es w ill pr ed om inate and m ak e pr oc ee din g inac la ss ac tio n f orm at ina ppr opr ia te . S ee , e . g. , Re y es v. W al t D isn ey W or ld C o. , 176 F. R.D . 654, 658 (M. D. Fla. 1998 ) (e xplaini ng that di sparate tre atm ent claim s are inh er en tly

“ hig hly ind ivi dua liz ed ” an d w he re e m plo y ee s w orke d indif

fe re nt divis ions with different structures and decision m akers, each plaintiff w as subject to h is “ ow n se t of

uni que c ir cum stanc es sur ro undi ng the a dve rs e em

plo ym en t action about which they

now attem

pt to collectivelycom

plain”). In a di sc riminat io n a ct io n b ro ug ht un de r ei th er Tit le VII orSect io n 1 98 1, a pla int if f m ust f ir st e sta bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

dis cr im inatio n, w hic h th e de fe ndant c anr eb ut b y

of fe ri ng a le git im at e, non -d isc ri m inator y r ea son fo r the al le ge dly dis cr im inator

y a ct . S ee Re ev es v. S an de rs on P lum bin g P ro ds. , I nc . , 530 U . S. 133 , 142 , 120 S . Ct . 209 7, 210 6, 147 L . E d. 2d 1 05 ( 2000 ). “ Inoth er w or ds, the de fe ndant m

ust pr oduc [e ] e vid en ce that the pla int if f w as r ej ec te d, or

som eo neTh e pla int if fs argue , h ow e ve r, that th e Mc Do nn e ll D ou g la s b ur de n- sh if tin gana ly sis 17 a pp lie d to c la ims of

e mpl oy me nt d isc ri min atio n w a s r a dic a lly re vis e d b y

the Sup re me Court

in Dese rt Palace , Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct . 2148, 156 L . Ed. 2d 84 (2003). A ccor ding to the plaintiffs, Dese rt Palace overr uled McDonne ll Dougla s and its prog eny , so that “once a pla int if f e sta bli sh e s a pr ima fa c ie c a se of

dis c ri min atio n, a

de fe nd ant m ay

no lon g e r s imp ly articulate a leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for the a dverse employ ment action, but rather must prove that it would have take n the same a ction absent the a lleg ed discrimination.” Appellants’ January

9, 2004 Notice of

Supplemental Authority

at 1. The plaintiffs r ead D eser

t Palace too br oadly . Whil e it is true that some cour ts have sug g ested that De sert Palac e may spell the end of the McDonne ll Dougla s burden- shifting analy sis, see, e.g ., Dar e v. Wal-Mar t Stores, Inc., 267 F . Supp. 2d 987, 990-91 (D. Minn. 2003), the Dese rt Palace holding wa s expressly limit ed to the conte x t of mix ed-motive discr imination case s under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2( m). Indeed, the Court expl ained that it did not decide whether its analy sis applied in other conte x ts. Deser t Palace, 539 U .S. at 94 n.1, 123 S. C t. at 2151 n.1. Moreove r, the fa ct that the Court did not even mention McD onnell Doug las in Deser t Palace makes us eve n more re luctant to believe that Deser t Palace should be understood to over rule that se min a l pr e c e de nt. F ina lly , a ft e r D e se rt Pa la c e wa s d e c ide d, thi s Co ur t ha s c ontin

ue d to a pp ly the McDonne ll Dougla s analy sis in non-mix ed-motive c ases. See , e.g ., May nard v. B d. of Reg ents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289- 90 (11th Cir. 2003). 56 el se w as pr ef

er re d, f or ale git im at e, non dis cr im inator y r ea son. ” U . S. P ost al S er v. Bd . of G ove rn or s v. A ike ns, 460 U . S. 711 , 714 , 103 S . Ct . 147 8, 148 1, 75 L . E d. 2d 4 03 ( 1983 ) (c itatio n and i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks o m itt ed ). “ It

is im portant t o be ar i n m in d . . . th atth e d efen da nt 's b ur de n o f reb ut ta l i s ex ceed in gl y li gh t . . . . A t this sta ge of

the inquir

y , the de fe ndant n ee d no t pe rs ua de the c ourt tha t i ts pr of fe re d r ea sons are le git im at e; the de fe ndant' s burd enis m er el y one of pr oduc tio n, not

pr oof . ” P er ry m anv. Joh nsonP ro ds. Co . , 698 F . 2d 1 138, 114 2 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation and internal quot ation m arks om itted). 17 If the de fe ndant s uc ce ssf

ull y r eb uts the pla int if

f’ s pr im a fa ci e ca se , “ the pr es um pti on o f dis cr im inatio n is e lim inate d. ” Ch ap m anv. A I T ransp. , 229 F . 3d57

1012 , 102 4 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ( enbanc ). T o surv ive sum m ar y j udgm en t, the pla int if f m ust the n “ co m e fo rw ar d w ithe vid en ce , inc lud ing the pr ev iou sly pr oduc ed e vid en ce e sta

bli shi ng the pr im a fa ci e ca se , suf fi ci en t t o pe rm it a re as ona ble f ac tf ind er to co nc lud e that the r ea sons giv enby the e m plo y er w er e not the r ea l r ea sons f

or the a dve rs e em

plo ym en t de ci sio n. ” I d. ( quot ing Co m bs v . Pl an ta tio n P atte rn s, 106 F . 3d 1 519, 152 8 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ) ; se e al so R ee ve s, 530 U . S. a t 14 3, 120 S . Ct . a t 21 06; P er ry m an , 698 F . 2d at 11 42. T o sh owthat the em ploy er’ s reasons wer e pretextual, the plaintiff m ust dem onstrate “ such w eakne sse s, im

pla usi bil iti es , inc onsi ste nc ie s, inc ohe re nc ie s, or c ontra dic tio ns i n the e m plo y er ’ s pr of

fe re d le git im at e re as ons fo r its a ct ionthat a r ea sona ble factf inder could find th em

unworthy

of cre dence.” Com

bs, 106 F.3d at 1538. “ If the pla int if

f doe s no t pr of

fe r suf fi ci en t e vid en ce to cr eate age nui ne iss ue of m aterial f act re garding whether ea ch of the defendant em ploy er’ s articulated re as ons is p re te xtu al , the e m plo y er is en tit le d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t onthe plaintiff’ s claim .” Chapm an, 229 F. 3d at 102 4-25; see also Com bs, 106 F.3d at 1529 ( expla ini ng tha t the pla int if f m ust pr es en t “ suf

fi ci en t e vid en ce to de m onstrate the e xis te nc e of age nui ne iss ue of

f ac t a s to the tr

uthof e ac h of the em ploy er’ s proffer ed rea sons for its challenged action”).58

The plaintiffs ar gue that they have presented sufficient statistical evidence in s uppo rt

of the ir pa tte rnand p ra ct ic e an d di sparate im pa ct c la im s to r ai se ge nui ne iss ue s of

m at er ia l f

ac t, and thus to d ef

eat sum m ar y j udgm en t. I n c ontra st to the ind ividu al claim s of disparate treatm ent, which we a ddress infra, the pattern and practice and dis parate im pact claim s depend on the sam e body of statistical ev id en ce. Acco rd in gl y , th es e cl ai m s s ta ndor f al l i n c on cert . A s w e ha ve obs er

ve d a t so m e le ngth, the statis tic al e vid en ce c onsi sts prim arily of two e xpert reports authored by Dr . Janice Madden. H owever , D r. Madden’ s reports we re not sufficiently tailored to com

pare sim ilarly

situated em plo y ee s. T he y

f ai le d to e ff

ec tiv el y m ea sur e j ob- re la te d sk ill s, e duc at ion , experience, and j ob perform ance, using only broad, im

precise m easurem ents as pr oxi es f or w ork e xpe ri en ce . N or

did the r ep orts s uf

fi ci en tly narr owthe c la sse s of em plo y ee s w ho w er e co m

pare d, ins te ad

usi ng c om

pany -w ide da tathat di d no t rel iabl y id en ti fy di sc riminat io n wi th in de si gn at edseg m en ts of t he work fo rce. A nd, a s w e ha ve obs er

ve d, the r ep orts d id n ot d ist ing uis h be tw ee n c om pe tit ive and non- co m pe tit ive pr om oti ons, did

not c ap tur e in- gr ad e pr ogr es siv e pr om oti ons an d did no t m easure outcom es for e m ploy ees w ho actually

applied for prom otion s as oppo se d to tho se w ho d id n ot.59

Af ter re viewing this bo dy

of statistical evidence, we agree with the district co urt tha t ba sic ana lytic al de fi ci en ci es in the r ep orts r en de r the m ins uf fi ci en t t o supp ort a conclusion th at intention al discrim ination wa s the defendants’ standard o p er at i n g p ro ce du re . Ev en i f w e a cc ep tal l th e c al cu l at i o n s u n d er l yin g Ma d d en ’s re ports a s c or

re ct , the r ep orts’ c onc lus ion s are of ve ry li m ite d va lue be ca

use the data on which those calculations were based was not m eaningfullytailored. That is, e ve n c re dit ing a s tr

ue the c onc lus ion s, w e do n ot b el ie ve that a j ur y r ea sona bly co uld inf er , ba se d onthe e vid en ce , that the pla int if fs e sta bli she d apa tte rnand pr ac tic e cl ai m . S um

m ar y j udgm en t w as the re fo re pr ope rl y e nte re d f or the de fen da nt s as to th e p la in ti ffs ’ di sc riminat ory pa tt ern an d p ract ic e cl ai m s. Mor eo ve r, the dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rl y e nte re d sum

m ar y j udgm en t f

or the de fe ndants on the dis parate im pa ct c la im s. T he pla int if

fs say the y ide nti fi ed

a statis tic al dis pari ty

be tw ee n w hit e an d bl ac k e m plo y ee s, a lon g w ithaf

ac ia lly ne utr al e m

plo ym en t pr ac tic e -- the use of sub j ec tiv e hir ing c ri te ri a by

the de fe ndants - - that ha s c au se d th is d isp ar ity . F ir st, how ev er , asub stanti al que sti on ex ist s a s to w he the r the pla int if fs ’ statis tic al e vid en ce is suf fi ci en tly ta ilo re d to es ta bli sh s ta tis tic al dis pari tie s w ith in the spe ci fi c se gm en ts o f the de fe ndants ’ w orkf or ce in w hic h th e ind ivi dua l pl ai nti ff s w orke d. S ee , e . g. , Ma ddox , 764 F . 2d at 1549-50 . But even assum ing th at the plaintiffs had m et this requirem ent, theyThe district cour t gr anted summary

judgme nt in favor of

defe ndant SCES on t he ground 18 that Co op e r h a d a

ba nd on e d a ny c la ims a g a ins t SCE S, a

nd in f avo r o f T SC and

SCS b e c a

us e Coo pe r w a s n e ve r a

n e mpl oye e of

the se de fe nd ants . R3 01 at 1- 2; s e e L lampa lla s v . M ini Circuits, L ab, Inc., 163 F .3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 1998) (e x plaining that a plaintiff must be an employ ee to br ing a

n employ ment discrimination lawsuit). As for G PC, t he district cour t found that althoug h Cooper had be en an e mploy ee of that defe ndant, his claims failed f or other r easons. Whil e Cooper’ s arguments on appea l are phrase d in terms of “the defe ndants” a nd “Southern” g ener ally , in substance they are direc ted to the district court’s a naly sis of his claims ag ainst GPC. To the extent that Cooper argues that TSC and/or SCS wer e “joint employ ers,” we a re unpersua ded and c onclude that Cooper was a n employ ee of

GPC only . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the district court’s e ntry

of summary

judgme nt ag ainst Cooper and in fa vor of TSC, SCES , and SCS. 60 have f ai le d to de m onstrate ac au sa l ne xus be tw ee n any statis tic al dis pari tie s inthe de fe ndants ’ w orkf

or ce and the pr ac tic e of

usi ng p ar tia lly sub j ec tiv e hir ing c ri te ri a by som e m an ag er s insom e of the de fe ndants ’ f

ac ili tie s. S ee , e . g. , W ar ds C ove Packing, 490 U. S. at 651-55, 109 S. Ct. at 2121-24 . Ac cordingly , the district court did not e rr in ente ri ng s um

m ar y j udgm en t f

or the de fe ndants on the pla int if fs ’ dis parate im

pa ct c la im s. W e tur n, the n, to the arg um en ts m ount ed by e ac h pl ai nti ff

c onc er nin g hi s or he r dis parate tr eatm en t c la im s. C. Cornelius Cooper Cooper asserts that the district court erre d by entering final summ ary j udgm en t i n f

av or of the de fe ndants on h is i ndi vid ua l di sparate tr eatm en t c la im s. 18 Specifica lly , C ooper argues that the district court erred in entering sum m ary j udgm en t a ga ins t hi m

a s to the de nia l of

tw o pr om oti ons in 1 998, one to a L igh tin gIn a no tic e of su pp le me nta l a

uth or ity , th e pla int if

fs c la im that un de r Jon e s v . R. R. 19 Do nn e lle y

& Son s Co ., __

_ U .S. __ __ , 1 24 S. Ct . 1 83 6 ( 20 04 ), the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr on e ou sly applied a two- y ear

statute of limitations t o the plaintiffs’ Sec tion 1981 claims, thus barring claims based on e vents that occ urre d more than two year s befor e this lawsuit was filed ( for example, claims based on Cooper ’s beingdenied pr omotions m ore tha n two y ear s befor e suit was filed). While it is t rue that the Supreme Court held in Jones that claims made possible by the amendment to Section 1981 in the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1991 we re g overne d by the four- y ear fe de ra l “ c atc h- a ll” statut e of lim itatio ns , th e pla int if

fs are ba rr e d f ro m arguin gthat th e ir

c la ims are g overne d by

a four -year

limit ations period bec ause the y have w aived the issue. T he plaintiffs did not argue in the district cour t, or, indeed, in their br iefs submitted to this court that a foury ear limit ations period applied to their claims, and “ parties c annot prope rly raise ne w issues at supplemental brief

ing, e ven if the issues a

rise base d on the interve ning de cisions or new developments c ited in the supplemental authority .” United States v. Ne aly , 232 F.3d 825, 830 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 0) . A s o ur

c a se law m ake s c le ar, pa rt ie s “ mus t su

bmi t a ll i ssu e s o n a

pp e a l in the ir ini tia l br ie fs . Wh e n n e w a uth or ity ari se s a ft e r a

br ie f i s f ile d, thi s c ir c uit

pe rm its pa

rt ie s to submit suppl emental a

uthority on interveningdecisions or ne w deve lopments reg ardingissues alre ady proper ly raised in the inital brie fs.” I d. (citations and inter nal quotation marks omitted) (final e mphasis added) ; see a lso United States v. Padilla-Rey es, 247 F .3d 1158, 1164 (11th Cir. 20 01 ) ( “ B e c a

us e thi s is su e is r a ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me in s up ple me nta l br ie fi ng , w e de e m it waived.” ). 61 Coordinator pos ition and the other to a Tr ainer position . Cooper also argues that 19 the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in ex cl udi ng an e xpe rt

r ep ort whic h, he c la im s, w oul d have es ta bli she d th at

it w as hig hly

unl ike ly that the se le ct ionpr oc es s us ed to de ny him hi s p os it io n was “ race bl in d.” Co ope r fi rs t say s th at

he e sta bli she d pr et ex t a s to the de nia l of aL igh tin g Co or di na to r job wit hi n GPC ’s Lig ht in g S erv ic es Bu si ne ss Uni t (“ LSBU”). L igh tin g C oor din at or s a t G PC are inv olv ed in se lli ng o utd oor

li ght ing sy ste m s and ove rs ee ing the ins ta llatio n and m ai nte nanc e of the se sy ste m s by

out sid e co ntr ac tor s. C oope r w as one of m or e than f

if ty appl ic an ts f

or tw o L igh tin g Coordinator pos ition s post ed on the defendants’ JobNe t sy stem in 199 8, but wa s62

de nie d an in te rv ie wf

or the pos iti on. H e es ta

bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se that the denial of the prom otion wa s discrim inatory , but the district court concluded he had fa ile d to sho wthat the le git im at e, non -d isc ri m inator y r ea sons f or G PC ’ s de ny ing him the pr om oti on w er e pr et ex tua l. W e dis pe nse f

ir st w ithCo ope r’ s su gge sti on tha t st at ist ic al e vid en ce f ound in the declaration of expert John Del R occili raised a genuine issue of m aterial f act co nc ern in g wh et he r th e in te rv ie w sel ect io n p ro ces s u se d b y GPC was race bl in d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt e xc lud ed D el Ro cc ili ’ s de cl ar at iona ft er f ind ing that the pla int if fs ha d no t pr ope rl y

ide nti fi ed

D el Ro cc ili a s an e xpe rt

or pr ovi de d a state m en t of

his int en de d te sti m ony , a s r equir ed by Ru le 26 o f the F ed er al Ru le s of Civil Procedure. T he district court also held th at, to the extent the plain tiffs soug ht t o us e D el Ro cc ili a s af ac t w itn es s, his de cl ar at ionw as ina dm iss ibl e be ca use he la ck ed

pe rs ona l kn ow le dge of

the da taabout

w hic h he opi ne d. W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to e xc lud e D el Ro cc ili ’ s de cl ar at ion for abuse of discretion, see Benson v. T occo, I nc., 113 F.3d 1203 , 1208 (11th Cir. 19 97 ), an d c on cl ud e th atth e d is tri ctco ur t cl earl y act edwit hi n i ts di sc ret io n h ere. U nde r Fe de ra l R

ule of Ci vil P ro ce dur e 26, a ll part ie s m ust dis cl ose e xpe rt

opi nio n re ports whe n di re ct ed

by the c ourt, or

a t l ea st 9 0 day s be fo re tr ia l. T he se r ep orts m ust c ont ai n “ a co m

ple te state m en t of

a ll opi nio ns t o be e xpr es se d and the ba sis63

an d r ea sons the re fo r. ” F ed . R. Ci v. P . 26( a) (2 )( B) . U nde r Ru le 37( c) (1 ) of the Fe de ra l R ule s of Ci vil P ro ce dur e, aparty

“ that w ith out

sub stanti al j ust if

ic at ion fa ils to dis cl ose inf

orm at ionr equir ed

by Ru le 26( a) or

26( e) (1 ) . . . is not , unl es s suc h f ai lur e is h ar

m le ss, pe rm itt ed

to use a s e vid en ce a t a

tr ia l . . . any

w itn es s or inform ation no t so dis closed.” F ed. R . C iv. P. 37(c)(1). In this case, plaintiffs originallyrepre sented that Del Rocc ili was a fact w itn es s, but

late r ide nti fi ed

him a s an e xpe rt

w itn es s inr es pons e to d ef en dants ’ discovery requests. H owever , the plaintiffs never provideddefendants with an expe rt r ep ort c ont ai nin g D el Ro cc ili ’ s op ini ons or , f or that m atte r, the ba se s f

or his opin ions, as required under Rule 26. Beca use the expert witness discovery rules ar e de sig ne d to a llo wboth si de s inac as e to p re pare the ir c as es a de quate ly

and t o prevent surprise, see Sherr od v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2000 ), co m pl ia nc e wit h t he req ui rem en ts of Rul e 2 6 i s n ot m erel y asp ira ti on al . Pl ai nti ff s have ide nti fi ed

D el Ro cc ili a s “ ane xpe rt in ex tr ac tin g and an al y zi ng d at a fr om

hum anr es our ce s data

ba se s, ” R2 82 at 2, and i n hi s de cl ar at ion , De l Roccili extracte d subs tantial data from the defendants’ databases, per form ed statistical probabil ity

calculations, and expressed opinio ns about the significance o f t h es e c al cu l at i o n s . Wh i l e w e d o n o tev al u at e t h e r el i ab i l i t y o f D el Ro cc i l i ’s opi nio ns, the te ch nique s ut ili ze d and o pin ion s pr es en te d pl ai nly r equir e the kin d of64

technical or specialized knowledge that is the hallm ark of expert e vidence. S ee Fed. R. Evid. 702. W e theref ore conclude that Del R occili’ s declaration wa s pr ope rl y c onstru ed

a s an e xpe rt

r ep ort and, thu s, be ca

use the pla int if

fs f ai le d to co m ply w iththe e xpl ic it re qui re m en ts o f Ru le 26, it w as w ith in the sound dis cr et ionof

the tr ia l j udge to sanc tio n pl ai nti ff s f or the ir f ai lur e to d isc los e by enforcing the unam

bigu ous term s of Rule 37(c). See Firef ighters’ Inst. f

or Racia l Equ al it y ex rel . And ers on v. Ci ty of St . Lou is , 22 0 F .3d89 8, 9 02 (8t h C ir. 2 00 0) . Co ope r cl ai m s, how ev er , that he ha s de m onstrate d pr et ex t e ve n inthe absence of D el Roccili’ s declaration. W e re m ain unpersuaded. It is undisp uted th atLSBU Sal es Man ag er Mi ke Cla y was re sp on si bl e fo r ch oo si ng forin te rv ie ws applicants who had appli ed for the L ighti ng Coordin ator positio ns. A fter rece iving m ore than 50 application s for the openings , C lay review ed a com

puterg en er at edl i s to f ap p l i ca n t s , i n cl u d i n g a c an d i d at e p ro fi l e l i s t i n g ea ch ap p l i ca n t ’s w ork hi sto ry . C lay

r ev ie w ed the appl ic an t pr of

ile s and s el ec te d c an did at es to interview based on the following specific j ob-related cr iteria: applicants needed at le as t tw o y ears of

e xpe ri en ce in pow er

de liv er y ; de m onstrate d c om

m uni catio n, le ad er shi p and t eam

w ork sk ill s; e xpe ri en ce in co ntr ac t a dm ini str at ionand contractor supervision ; and experience as a forem an. Clay

also consid ered applicants whom

he knew per sonally , f

or whom he had rece ived65

re co m m en da tio ns, and who h ad take n in iti at ive by

e xpr es sin g sp ec if

ic int er es t i n le ar nin g m or e ab out

the L igh tin g C oor din at or pos iti ons. C lay

state d th at

he did not se le ct Co ope r fo r anint er

vie wbe ca

use ( 1) Co ope r la ck ed

any e xpe ri en ce a s a forem an; (2) Cooper w as not kno wn personally to Clay ; (3) Cooper had not been re co m m en de d; and ( 4) Co ope r ha d no t c ont ac te d C lay or oth er m em be rs of the L SB Ur eg ar din g th e posi tio ns. Cooper contends th at Clay ’ s stated reliance on re com m endations wa s pr et ex tua l. B ec au se the Job N et pos tin g di d no t r equir e ap pli cants to subm it a re co m m en da tio n, Co ope r say s th at Cl ay ’ s us e of

thi s no n- post ed

r equir em en t cr eate d an “ inf

orm al , se cr et ive and s ubj ec tiv e . . . pr om oti on d ec isi on p ro ce ss[ w hic h] te nd[ ed ] to fa ci lit at e the c onsi de ratio n of im pe rm iss ibl e cr ite ri a. ” Ro be rt s v. G adsden Mem ’ l Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 798 (11t h Cir. 1988 ). W e ar e unpe rs ua de d th at

Cl ay ’ s us e of

appl ic an t r ec om

m en da tio ns a s on e fa ct or - - am ong oth er , c le ar ly

j ob- re la te d f

ac tor s - - in d et er

m ini ng who w oul d be int er vie w ed w as a pretext for a

secre tive, subje ctive, and dis crim inatory process. Moreover, GP C has offer ed evidence that one prefer red qualification was that an a pplicant had pr ev iou sly

se rv ed a s f or em an- - a le git im at e, j ob- re la te d r equir em en t - - an d Co o p erh adn o ts er v edas a f o re m an . In s h o rt , C o o p erh as n o ts h o wn th at GP C’s pr of fe re d, le git im at e re as ons fo r de ny ing him an in te rv ie ww er e “ unw orthy of66

cr ed en ce . ” T ex . D ep ’ t of Cm ty . A ff ai rs v. Burd ine , 450 U . S. 248 , 256 , 101 S . Ct . 10 89 , 10 95 , 67 L. Ed. 2d20 7 (1 98 1) . Cooper also claim s that he was discrim inated against on account of rac e w he n he w as de nie d anon -unio n j ob a s aT ra ine r, and tha t he ha s r ai se d age nui ne que sti on tha t the le git im at e re as ons pr ovi de d f or the de nia l of

thi s j ob w er e al so pr et ex tua l. T ra ine rs w ork w ithli ne c re we m plo y ee s, ins tr

uc tin g th em

on s af ety te ch nique s and j ob- re la te d sk ill s th ro ugh hands- on tra ini ng. T he de fe ndants m ai nta in tha t, in ad dit ionto re qui ri ng t ec hni ca l kn ow le dge , the T ra ine r posi tio n requires significant com

m unication skills, since Tr ainers m ust be able to teach their charges ef

ficiently . The hiring m anager in char ge of filling the Tra iner va canc ie s, F ranc is H ow ar d, state d th at he did not se le ct Co ope r be ca

use he believed Cooper did no t poss ess superior com m unication skills, job knowledge, expe ri en ce , te am

w ork sk ill s, and p ee r cr ed ibi lity . H ow ar d a lso sa id tha t he learned fr om

other m em

bers of the Sc reening Com m ittee that Cooper had experienced difficulty

articulating training in structions to stud ent em ploy ees w hen he se rv ed a s ague st i nstru ct or

a t the T ra ini ng C en te r. S ee R- 204- 2 a t 10 . Cooper responds th at he did have the necessary com m unication and other ski lls . H ow ev er , the c ru ci al que sti on h er e is n ot whe the r Co ope r fu lf ill ed the re qui re m en ts, but

w he the r H ow ar d ho ne stl y be lie ve d th at

Co ope r did

not m ee t the67

criteria . See Elr od v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466 , 1470 (11th Cir. 1991 ). C oope r doe s no t di sput e that so m e se le ct ionc om m itt ee m em

be rs tol d H ow ar d th at

Co ope r ha d tr oubl e ar

tic ulatin g in str

uc tio ns t o tr ai ne es w he n he served as guest trainer. N or has Cooper presented any evidence suggestin g that H ow ar d di d no t ge nui ne ly be lie ve that C oope r did

not pos se s th e re qui sit e j ob sk il ls . Mor eo ve r, H ow ar d te sti fi ed that he hon es tly

be lie ve d C oope r did

not have up -to -d at e job kn owl ed ge of o ve rh eadli ne s at th e ti m e tr ai ne rs were h ire d. H ow ar d dr ewthi s c onc lus ionbe ca use Co ope r onl y

ha d e xpe ri en ce in unde rg ro und c ab l e r e p a i r

du r i n g th e tw o ye a r s p r e c e d i n g h i s Tr a i n e r ap p l i c a t i o n . C o o p e r

s a ys that be ca use G PC w as f

ill ing both ov er

he ad and unde rg ro und T ra ine r posi tio ns, this reason is also p retextual. Again, however, Cooper has presented no evidence sugg es tin g th at

H ow ar d di d no t ho ne stl y be lie ve atr ai ne r re qui re d up -t o- da te know le dge of

a ll lin e cr eww ork, inc lud ing ove rh ea d and unde rg ro und ca ble repair. Finally , C ooper challenges Howard’ s explanation that Cooper lacked peer cr ed ibi lity

and t eam w ork sk ill s. B ut h er e, a ga in, Co ope r’ s arg um en t tha t he ind ee d po sse sse d th es e attr ibu te s is w ide of the m ar k: Co ope r ha s of

fe re d no evidence that How ard did not ho nestly believe this. Short of som e evidence that68

Howar d d idno t g en ui ne ly bel ie ve th e le gi ti m at e rea so ns , on th is ba re re co rdwe wil l n ot sec on d- gu es s Ho ward ’s ho ne stass es sm en t o f Co op er’s qua li fic at io ns . See id. (“ Federa l courts do no t sit as a super-personnel departm ent that reexam ines ane nti ty ’ s bu sin es s de ci sio ns. . . . Rathe r, our inquir y is lim ite d to w he the r the em ploy er gave an hon est explanation of its behavior.” ( citation and in ternal quot at ionm ar

ks o m itt ed )) . “ W e do n ot a sk whe the r the e m plo y er se le ct ed the

‘ m ost’ qualified candidate, but onlywhether it selected the candid ate based on an unlawful m otive.” D enney v. City of A lbany , 247 F. 3d 11 72, 1188 (11t h Cir. 2001 ) (c itatio n om itt ed ). A nd e ve n if Co ope r co uld

dis cr ed it one of

the r ea sons H ow ar d of

fe re d f or not hir ing him , it

w oul d st ill not

e sta bli sh p re te xt, be ca

use to do so, Cooper would have to establish that each of H owar d’ s reasons was pretextual. S ee Chapm an, 229 F. 3d at 102 4-25 (“ If the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of m aterial f act re garding whether ea chof the de fe ndant e m

plo y er ’ s art ic ulate d r ea sons is pr et ex tua l, the e m plo y er is en tit le d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t onthe pla int if f’ s c la im . ” (e m

pha sis a dde d) ). T his he ha s f ai le d to do. Insho rt , be ca

use Co ope r ha s no t r ai se d age nui ne iss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t a s to ea chof the le git im at e re as ons pr of fe re d f or w hy he w as not

of fe re d th e L igh tin gE dw ar d s ar gu e s r e p e at e d l y th at“ S o u th e r n ” d e n i e d h i mv ar i o u s p r o m o t i o n s ; i na c tu a l i ty, 20 mana g e rs at G PC de c lin e d to pr omo te him . B e c a us e Ed wa rd s w a s n e ve r a

n e mpl oye e of

TSC , SCE S, o r S CS, w e a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f t he se de fe nd ants . Se e L lampa lla s, 16 3 F .3 d at 12 42 ; su pr a no te 18 . T he re ma ind e r o f o ur ana ly sis e va luate s whe the r s umm ary jud g me nt w a s p ro pe rl y

g ra nte d a s to de fe nd ant G PC. B e c a us e Ed wa rd s o nly of fe rs argume nts re late d to the de nia l of the se fo ur

sp e c if ic 21 pr omo tio ns , h e is d e e me d to have a ba nd on e d a ny c la ims c on c e rn ingany

oth e r a lle g e dly discriminatory

denials of pr omotion. S ee, e .g ., Acc ess Now v. Southwest Airlines, Inc., __ F .3d ____, 2004 WL2113022, at *6 (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2004); United States v. J ernig an, 341 F .3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003). 69 Co or din at or

or T ra ine r posi tio n in199 8, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in aw ar din g G PC f ina l sum m ar y j udgm en t. D . Mi ch ae l E dw ar ds T he pla int if

f E dw ar ds c om

pla ine d th at

he suf fe re d di sc ri m inatio n w he n hi s m an ag er s a t G PC de nie d hi m num er ous pr om oti ons. O n a ppe al , he a lle ge s th e district court erre d in its review of the denial of f our specific prom otion s for w hich he applied. E dwar ds m aintains that it was on account of race that GPC declined

20 to o ff er him apr om oti on t o aCa

ble L oc at or

pos iti on i n Apr il 2000 ; t o an O pe rator I j ob i n M ar ch200 0; t o an O pe ratin g S er vic e Re pr es en ta tiv e posi tio n inJun e 1999 ; and to a Powe r D elivery Supervisor posit ion, also in 199 9. T he district 21 co urt c onc lud ed

that E dw ar ds f

ai le d to sho wthat the le git im at e, non di sc riminat ory

ex pl an at io ns off

eredforhi rin g o th er ca nd id at es were p ret ex tu al . W e agre e.70

D ur ing his 13 y ears a t G PC , E dw ar ds w orke d inar an ge of dif fe re nt unio n posi tio ns, a t a

r an ge of loc at ion s. B etw ee n 19 87 and D ec em be r 1990 , E dw ar ds se rv ed a s L ab or er

in the N uc le ar

O pe ratio ns are a of

aplant i n W ay

ne sbor o, Ge orgia. A fter le aving th at positio n, he ser ved unti l July

1993 as a L ine Crew H el pe r in Augus ta , G eo rg ia , be fo re w orkin g a s an Appr en tic e L ine m anin H ine svi lle , G eo rg iaunt il Apr il 1996 . B eg inn ing a t tha t t im e, E dw ar ds w orke d a s a L ine m anba se d inT uc ke r, G eo rg ia . Whil e E dw ar ds p ro gr es se d th ro ugh the se vari ous posi tio ns d

ur ing his te nur e at

G PC , he c om

pla ins that se ve ra l pr om oti ons he sough t in 199 9 and 200 0 wer e denied him on account of race . W e be ginw ithG PC ’ s de ci sio n no t t o of fe r him aCa ble L oc at or

pos iti on i n Apr il 2000 . A ft er

suf fe ri ng v ar iou s in

j ur ie s th at

int er fe re d w ithhis w orkin g a s a Linem an -- including a severe thum b injury and dam age to his back -- and af ter taking v arious m edical leaves and light-dutyassignm ents, E dwar ds received an a s s i g n men ta s at e mp o r a ry c ab l e l o c a t o r i n No v e mb e r

1 9 9 9 . I n th a tc ap a c i t y, Edw ards reported to Jam es W eldon, GP C’ s Cable L ocating Manager, and was re spon sib le f

or loc at ing und er gr ound

e le ctri ca l c ab le whil e fa ci lit at ing en gin ee ri ng, c onstru ct ion , and o the r pr oj ec ts. A ft er w orkin g a s ate m

por ar y Ca ble L oc at or f or f our or f ive m onths, E dw ar ds a

ppl ie d f or af ull -t im e Ca

ble L oc at or po si ti on in earl y

Apri l 2 00 0.71

W el don w as the hir ing m an ag er f or the pe rm an en t C ab le L oc at or pos iti on, an d he c hose se ve n in div idu al s, inc lud ing E dw ar ds, f or int er vie w s. A lon g w itha Hum an Resources Re presentative who w orked as a fa cilitator, W eldon assem bled an in te rv ie win g p an el th atin cl ud ed , in ad di ti on to W el do n, a wh it e wom an , a white m an, and a black m an. The interviewpanel spok e w ith each of the seven applicants ind ividu ally , r ating their responses to six structured, j ob-related que sti ons on a

sc al e of 0 t o 3. A ft er

a ll of the int er vie w s w er e co m

ple te d, the f

our interviewer s ranked the applicants based on their “ gut feel,” and Edw ards scored ve ry hig hly . S ubse que ntl y , the sc or es a ssi gne d to e ac h c an did at e, ba se d onthe ir an sw er s to the six que sti ons, w er e ta lli ed . T he top thr ee c an did at es , ba se d on these aggregate scores, we re Jim Brow n (69 poin ts), C arey Rutledge (62.5 points ), and the plainti ff E dwar ds (61 po ints). T he com m ittee then discuss ed the three

“ fi na lis ts. ” O ne of

the int er vie w er s e xpl ai ne d th at

she ha d r es er

va tio ns a bout E dw ar ds’ s j ob p er fo rm an ce in his c ap ac ity a s ate m por ar y Ca ble L oc at or . S he sa id she ha d f re que ntl y se enE dw ar ds i n th e of

fi ce soc ia liz ing and s pe ak ing on the phon e, w hil e oth er

e m plo y ee s w er e in the f

ie ld. Mo re ove r, she f

el t tha t E dw ar ds ha d n ot pe rfo rm edwell in hi s i nt erv ie w. The c omm ittee rec omm ended not o ffer ing th e j ob to th e m ost hig hly ranked ap pli cant ( Br ow n) be ca

use he ha d e xpr es se d do ubt that he w oul d a cc ep t the j ob72

ev enif it w er e of fe re d to him . T he m em

be rs of the c om m itt ee the n a gr ee d to recom m end that the pos ition be offer ed to Rutledge, w hose aggregate interview score w as slight ly

higher than that of Edwards. R utledge had previo us work experience r elated to the Cable L ocator positio n, interview ed eff ectively , and was fam iliar w ith the equip m ent used in th e positio n. Rutledge ac cepted the offer . E dw ar ds c la im s th at

the r ea sons G PC a dvanc es f or of fe ri ng the j ob t o Rutledge m

ust be pretextual because the hiring m anager, W eldon, testified that Edw ards wa s well qualified, because G PC only revea led the j ob-perform ance concerns of the com

m ittee m em

ber in its summ ary

j udgm ent m otion , r ather than at the e ar lie st s ta ge s of

dis co ve ry , and b ec au se E dw ar ds w as be tte r qua lif ie d f or the po si ti on th an Ru tl ed ge . T he r el ev an t i ssu e he re , how ev er , is not w hom w e w oul d de te rm ine to be be tte r qua lif

ie d f or the j ob. S ee E lr od, 939 F . 2d at 14 70. A ga in, w e do n ot s it in jud gm en t o f th e wis do m

of a n e m pl oyer’s sel ect io n. Ed ward s “ can no t . . . es tabl is h p ret ex t s im

pl y by sho win g t ha t [h e] is m or e qua li fie d t ha n [Rut le dg e]. Rathe r, [ E dw ar ds] m

ust a dduc e ev ide nc e that the dis pari ty in qua lif ic at ion s is ‘ so ap pare nt a s vi rt

ua lly to j um p of f the pa ge and s la

p y ou i n th e fa ce . ’ ” Co fi el d v. G oldkis t, I nc . , 267 F . 3d 1 264, 126 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( quot ing D en ne y , 247 F . 3d at 1187); see also Lee v. G TE Fla. , I nc., 226 F.3d 1249 , 1253-54 (11th Cir.73

2000 ). T his pr inc ipl e “ shou ld b e unde rs too d to m ean th at dis pari tie s in qua lif ic at ion s m

ust be of suc h w ei ght

and s ign if

ic an ce that no r ea sona

ble pe rs on, in the exercise of im

partial j udgm ent, c ouldhave chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the j ob in q uestion .” L ee, 226 F.3d at 1254 (quo ting Deines v. T exas De p’ t of Protec tive & Regulatory Ser vs., 164 F.3d 277 , 280-81 (5th Cir. 1999 )) ( internal quotatio n m arks om itted). On this record, the evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact a s to whether G PC’ s stated reasons for prom oting Rutledge instead of Edwards are pr et ex tua l. E dw ar ds h as not of fe re d e vid en ce sho w ing that he w as “ so c le ar ly m ore qualified for the position than [Rutledge] that a re asonable juror could in fer dis cr im inator

y int en t f ro m the c om pari son. ” I d. a t 12 55. I ndi sput ab ly , R utl ed ge rece ived a higher aggregate score than E dwar ds on h is interview, Rutledge had relevant j ob experience and fam iliarity with the w ork required of a C able L ocator, and at least one com

m ittee m em

ber believed that Edw ards had adopted an in ap pr op ria te de m ean ordu rin g h is in te rv ie w andha d q ue st io nabl e wor k h ab it s. Th e e v i d en ce wa s n o ts u ff i ci en tt o s h o w ad i s p ar i t y b et we en Ed wa rd s ’s qua lif ic at ion s and R

utl ed ge ’ s so gr eat tha t a

j ur y c oul d in fe r the c om

m itt ee did

not hone stl y be lie ve Ru tle dge w as m or e qua lif ie d. S ee id.F ur the rm or e , s e ve ra l of

the c la ims no t in c lud e d in the Com pla int , b ut a sse rt e d in 22 dis c ov e ry , o c c ur

re d mo re tha

n 1 80 da y s b e fo re Ed

wa rd s f ile d a c omp la int

wi th t he EE OC . T ho se claims wer e, ther efor e, bar red by Title VI I ’s statute of limitations. S ee 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5( e)( 1); Stewart v. B ooker T. Washing ton Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000). 74 Mor eo ve r, be ca

use the pla int if

fs ’ Co m pla int li ste d on ly

the Ca ble L oc at or posit ion, the district court observed that Edwar ds was lim ited to pu rsuing o nly that claim . Out of “ an abundance of caution,” howe ver, the district court addressed se ve ra l othe r cl ai m s r ai se d by E dw ar ds. I t ne ed

not have don e so. A ny

c la im s no t asserted in the plaintiff’ s Com plaint are properly

dism issed. Se e Coon v. G a. Pac . Corp., 829 F.2d 1563 , 1568-71 (11th Cir. 1987 ). Y et even if E dwar ds had 22 included th e re m aining th ree prom otion denials in the Com plaint, summ ary j udgm en t st ill w oul d have be enpr ope rl y gr an te d inf

av or of G PC , be ca

use E dw ar ds d id n ot e sta

bli sh p re te xt a s to any

of tho se e m plo ym en t de ci sio ns. Fi rs t, E dw ar ds s ay s th at

he w as m or e qua lif

ie d th anthe tw o w hit e candidates who we re off

ered O perator I positi ons in Marc h 200 0, but he has failed to d em onstrate adis pari ty be tw ee n hi m

and the m so gr eat tha t a

f ac tf ind er c oul d inf er dis cr im inatio n f

ro m the de ci sio n no t t o pr om ote . Mo re ove r, som e of the evidence E dwar ds relied upon is taken from perform ance evaluations com pleted after the successful applicants had already begun working in the Oper ator I posit ions. Isolated negative com m ents in these evaluation s cannot sup port an75

i n fe re n ce th at th o s e c h ar g edwi t h fi l l i n g th e o p en i n g s d ec l i n edEd wa rd s ’s application b ecause of r ace. As f or the Oper ating Service R epresentative prom otion Edw ards wa s denied in June 199 9, E dw ar ds c la im s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by ba sin g it s de ci sio n on

“ ina dm iss ibl e he ar say . ” Appe llants ’ Br ie f at 69. T he a lle ge d he ar say w as a state m en t by

am em be r of the se le ct ionc om

m itt ee , D av id K ee num , that, to his know le dge , the hir ing m an ag er , Bo b D av ids on, c hose the w hit e candi da te be ca use he be li ev edth e whi te can di da te was t he be st -qua li fie d c an di da te forth e p os it io n. Re gard le ss o f w he the r thi s st at em en t i s f ai rl y c hara ct er iz ed

a s he ar say , E dw ar ds fa ile d to pr es en t any

e vid en ce to ch al le nge G PC ’ s e vid en ce that the suc ce ssf ul candidate wa s hired based on hi s interview per form ance and extensive experience related to the positio n. T he successful candidate, G ary E. Miller, wa s a long-term em pl oyee of GPC who ha d e xt en si ve ex pe rie nc e in m et eri ng an d p owe r de li ve ry . He wa s recom

m ended by

the interview c omm ittee as one of the m ost qu alified can di da te s fo r th e Ope rat orServ ic e Rep res en ta ti ve po si ti on Edward s h adso ug ht . Moreover, Edw ards has not un derm ined GPC’ s evidence that his race w as unkn ow n duri ng the se le ct ionpr oc es s, r en de ri ng unte nable the sug ge sti on tha t he was de ni edth e p os it io n b ecau se of h is race .76

Finally , E dwar ds has no t established p retext concer ning his failed application for the Power De livery Supervisor posit ion in Februar y 1999 . GP C m ai nta ins that E dw ar ds w as not se le ct ed f or an in te rv ie wbe ca

use his appl ic at ion did no t refle ct fam iliarity with the re pair shop op erations or any m echanical ba ck gr ound . I n c ontra st, the suc ce ssf ul c an did at e, A l R . K

uz av a, w as the co nse nsus r ec om

m en da tio n of

the int er vie wc om m itt ee , havin g be ende em ed the m ost qu alified for the position b ased on his extens ive repair shop and m echanical experience, his sub stantial experience as a j ourneym an, and his dem onstrated leadership skills , a ll job-r elated skills id entified by the hiring m anager, Mark E dw a r dC a w t h o n , a s p r e r e qu i s i t e s f o r th e j o b . O u r

r e v i e wo f

th e r e c o r dc o n f

i rms that the successful candidate had extensiv e m echanical and re pair shop experience, an d th at E dw ar ds’ s a

ppl ic at ionla ck ed

any ind ic at ionthat he ha d f

am ili ar ity w ith re pa ir sho p op er at ion s. A cc or din gly , E dw ar ds h as f ai le d to c as t do ubt

on the legitim ate re asons proffered by GP C for deny ing hi m

the Powe r D elivery Su pe rv iso r posi tio n. In short, w e find no reversible err or in the decision to grant summ ary j udgm ent in favor of G PC. E. Charc ella G reenGre en’s a rguments on appea l are direc ted to “Southern” and “the defe ndants,” but 23 Gr e e n w a s sp e c if

ic a lly e mpl oye d b y

GPC . B e c a

us e Gr e e n w a s n e ve r a

n e mpl oye e of

TSC , SCE S, o r S CS, w e a g a in a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f t he se de fe nd ants . Se e L lampa lla s, 16 3 F .3 d at 12 42 ; su pr a no te 18 . T he re ma ind e r o f o ur ana ly sis is dir e c te d to wh e the r s umm ary jud g me nt w a s p ro pe rl y

g ra nte d to de fe nd ant G PC. Gre en off ers no a rguments as to the entry

of summary

judgme nt ag ainst her on he r 24 claims relating to bonuses or promotions other than the Mana g er of Education Services position. Acc ording ly , she is deeme d to have a bandoned a

ny claims other than those based on compensation and the denial of the educ ation manag er position. See, e.g ., Acc ess Now, ___ F .3d at ____, 2004 WL2113022, at *6; J ernig an, 341 F .3d at 1283 n.8. 77 Pl ai nti ff G re enc ont en ds tha t sh e w as dis cr im inate d a ga ins t a s to both pr om oti on and c om

pe nsatio n, and s he c ha lle nge s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e ntr y of s u m m ary ju d g m en tag ai n s th ero n b o t h cl ai m s . We tu rn , f i rs t , t o Gr ee n ’s 23 ar gum en ts c onc er

nin g he r pr om oti on d isc ri m inatio n c la im , ste m m ing f ro m the de nia l of aMana ge r of

E duc at ionS er

vic es pos iti on i n 19 98. 24 T he dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine d th at sum m ar y j udgm en t w as appr opr ia te on G re en ’ s pr om oti on c la im be ca use , havin g a cc ru ed

m or e than tw o y ears be fo re thi s law sui t w as f

ile d, the c la im

w as ti m e- barr ed . G re enm ai nta ins , how ev er , that the district court erre d in calculating when her prom otion claim accr ued. T he district court also foundthat the claim failed on the m erits. Beca use we agree that Gr een’ s prom otion claim wa s tim e-barr ed, w e need not reac h the m erits of her c l a i m. Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ap p l i eda t wo -yea r s t at u t e o f l i m i t at i o n s t o Gr ee n ’s Section 1981 prom otion claim , dete rm ining that, to be tim ely , G reen’ s claim had78

to a cc ru e af

te r Jul y 28, 199 8. S ee R- 303 at

8 ( ci tin g H ill v. Me tr o. A tlanta Ra pid T ransi t Auth . , 841 F . 2d 1 533, 154 6 ( 11th C ir . 198 8) ). G re endid not c ont es t the ap pli ca bil ity of thi s tw o- y ear statut e of

li m itatio ns b ef

or e the dis tr ic t c ourt or

in the br ie fs sub m itt ed

to thi s C ourt, and the re fo re ha s w ai ve d any c ha lle nge to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s us e of

atw o- y ear lim itatio ns p er iod . S ee sup ra not e 19. T he lim itations period begins to run when the fac ts that will suppo rt a c laim are ap pare nt, or

sho uld be appare nt t o ape rs on w ithar ea sona bly pr ude nt r eg ar d f

or her rights. S ee E verett v. Cobb Coun ty Sch. Dist. , 138 F. 3d 14 07, 1410 (11t h Cir. 1998 ). T herefor e, if G reen knewor shouldhave known before July 28, 1998 th at she had been denied the Manager of E ducation Services positi on because of rac e, he r pr om oti on c la im

w as ti m e- barr ed . A s th e dis tr ic t c ourt no te d, G re en ’ s de posi tio n te sti m ony r ev ea ls tha t sh e learned in ear ly

July 1998 that the educational m anager position she had applied for had been given to Pam ela T hom as, a white e m ploy ee. When depos ed, G reen state d th at

the pos iti on h ad

be enf ill ed “ ei the r tow ar d th e en d of Jun e or the f ir st part of Jul y [ 1998 ] . ” R1 37- R at 25 4. G re ente sti fi ed that sh e re ce ive d avoi ce m ai l stating th at Ms. Thom as had been hired “ about two day s” before a perf orm ance reviewthat wa s held on J uly 15, 1998. Id. at 180-82. G reen a lso testified that shortlyafter

finding o ut Ms. T hom as had been hired, she e xpressed her concern79

ab out not be ing giv enthe pos iti on t o a dm ini str at or s a t G PC , inc lud ing the ad m in is tra to rs co nd uc ti ng he r pe rfo rm an ce re vi ew on Ju ly 15, 1 99 8. Id . Moreover, Gr een stated that when she applied for the opening sh e knew she w as the m ost qua lif ie d pe rs on f

or the j ob, ind ic at ing he r be lie f that the suc ce ssf ul candi da te w as , in fa ct , le ss qua lif ie d. I n he r de posi tio n, G re ena lso state d th at she be gan to sus pe ct

she w as avic tim

of r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n a s e ar ly a s 19 96. T he tw o- y ear lim itatio ns p er iod e nde d a t the late st i n m id- Jul y 200 0, som e tw o w ee ks be fo re thi s su it w as c om

m en ce d. T hus, the tr ia l c ourt pr ope rl y de te rm ine d th at

the pr om oti on c la im

w as ti m e- barr ed . G re ena lso arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by e nte ri ng a

f ina l or de r of summ ary j udgm ent against her on the com pensation claim s. G reen say s she was dis cr im inate d a ga ins t ona cc ount of r ac e in tha t sh e w as pa id l es s th anw hit e co worker s who perform ed sim ilar j obs. T o state a prim a fa cie ca se of intention al dis cr im inatio n inc om

pe nsatio n, apla int if

f m ust e sta bli sh tha t ( 1) she be lon gs t o a racia l m inority ; (2) she re ceived low w ages; (3) sim ilarly situated com

parators outsi de the protected class re ceived higher com pensation ; and (4) she w as qualified to receive the higher w age. See Miranda v. B&B C ash Groce ry Store, In c. , 975 F . 2d 1 518, 152 8 ( 11th C ir . 199 2) ( co m pe nsatio n di sc ri m inatio n by ge nde r) ; M ac Ph er son v. U niv . of Mo nte va llo , 922 F . 2d 7 66, 774 ( 11th C ir . 199 1)80

(com pensation discrim ination by age). T he com

parators m

ust perform

j obs si m ilar to the pla int if

f’ s; thus, the pla int if

f m ust sho wthat, in he r j ob, she “ share d th e sam e ty pe of ta sks ” as the c om

parator s. B &B Ca sh G ro ce ry , 975 F . 2d at 15 29. It is undi sput ed

that G re enbe gan w orkin g f or G PC a s an in te rnin 1983 , later bec om ing a full-tim e, regular e m ploy ee and continuin g at GP C for se veral y ears. In O ctober 1996, while G reen w as working at G PC’ s Shenandoah Center, an environm ental education center, GP C underwe nt a corporate r estructuring that cl ose d th e Sh en an doah C en te r. G re enw as the n tr an sf er re d to G PC ’ s C om

m uni ty and Econom ic D evelopm ent Depar tm ent (“ CE DD ”), wher e she claim s she began suf fe ri ng d isc ri m inatio n inc om pe nsatio n. Af ter the 1996 corporate restructuring, G reen a ccepted a position as an E duc at ionA dvi sor

w ith in the CE D D . S he c la im s sh e w as c om pe nsate d onle ss favor ab le te rm s th anw hit e co lle ag ue s w ho s er ve d a s U rb anA dvi sor s or Co m m uni ty A dvi sor s, pos iti ons that G re enc la im s are e qui va le nt t o E duc at ion Advisor. I ndeed, Urban, C omm unity , and Education Advisors are all classified w ith in the de fe ndants ’ e m plo ym en t data

ba se a s “ A D O A dvi sor s, ” but G PC a sse rt s that U rb anand C om

m uni ty A dvi sor s are not

appr opr ia te c om

parator s be ca

use the j obs th ey perform are notablydiffer ent from those of Education Advisors. G PCGre en introduce d evidenc e of a 1996 marke t survey , the “Ha y survey ,” which she 25 a lle g e s is the surv e y

GPC re lie d u

po n in a ssi g nin gsa lary

g ra de s to the va

ri ou s p os iti on s w ith in the CEDD. B eca

use this survey

does not mention any

ADO Advisor positions, Gre en maintains that GPC’s alleg ed re liance on a marke t survey

is not credible, a

nd thus that the proffe red justification is pretextual. However , the Hay survey was c onducted a fter Gree n’s salar y was fix ed, and c ould not have bee n the survey upon which GPC relied. Indeed, B lalock testified that this was not the survey

used in setting the salary g rade s for Gr een a

nd her c olleagues in the CEDD. 81 relies on this dis tinction because it is undis puted th at w hite Com m unityand Ur

ban A dvi sor s are c om

pe nsate d m or e ge ne ro usl y than is G re en . GP C V ice Pr esident Rebecca Blalock and CED D a dm inistrator Lam ar Norton testified that, during GP C’ s corporate re structuring, pay grade ranges were se t by pe rf orm ing am ar

ke t r ev ie wto co m

pare ne wpos iti ons to s im ilar posi tio ns i n the r eg ion . A cc or din g to Bl al oc k, thi s surv ey r ev ea le d th at

the m ar ke t va lue of E duc at ionA dvi sor s w as le ss than th at of Co m m uni ty and Urb anA dvi sor s w ith in the CE D D , le ad ing G PC to cl as sif y E duc at ionA dvi sor s a t pay gr ad es E 3 to E 5, but Co m m uni ty and Urb anA dvi sor s a t gr ad es E 5 to E 7. G PC m ai nta ins that this distin ction justifies the lesser salar ies for G reen and oth er E ducation Services em plo y ee s, a s c om

pare d to the Co m

m uni ty and Urb anA dvi sor s. 25 T he re is a subs tanti al que sti on whe the r G re enha s e sta bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se of c om pe nsatio n di sc ri m inatio n, be ca use it is not c le ar that the Co m

m uni ty an d U rb anA dvi sor s G re enuse s a s c om parator s are sim ilarl y

sit ua te d ina ll re le vant r es pe ct s. S ee Ma cP he rs on, 922 F . 2d at 77 4 n. 16 ( “ Inac om paratorIn fac t, Gree n was c lassified at grade E5, the hig hest possible g rade for the E ducation 26 Advisor position. W hen Gr een tr ansfe rre d to the CEDD as a n Education Advisor, she reta ined the E5 g rade from her

previous position. In contra st, her for mer super visor, J ohn Thrashe r (a white employ ee) , who also bec ame a n Education Advisor after the re structuring , acc epted a demotion and salar

y g rade reduc tion by

two levels to reta in his employ ment at GPC. In 1997, Thrashe r wa s transfe rre d from the Educ ation Advisor position to a Comm unity Advisor position. 82 analy sis, the plaintiff is m atched with a per son or persons who have very sim ilar j ob- re la te d c hara ct er ist ic s and who are in a sim ilar sit ua tio n to de te rm ine if

the pl ai nt iff ha s b een tre at eddi ffer en tl y th an ot he rs who are s im il ar t o h im .” (em phasis add ed)). E ven assum ing, however, that the differe nt Advisors are pr ope r co m

parator s, se e B& B C as h G ro ce ry , 975 F . 2d at 15 29, G re enha s no t es ta bli she d th at

the le git im at e re as on a dvanc ed by G PC f or the pay dis pari ty is re al l y a p re t ex tfo r r ac e d i s cr i m i n at i o n . Gr ee n h as n o td emo n s t ra t edth at GP C’s state d r el ianc e on a

m ar ke t surv ey

to cl as sif y E duc at ionA dvi sor s’ sa lary le ve ls wa s false or otherw ise shown that race discrim ination m otivated th e salary structure. Indeed, when G PC cla ssified Education Advisors in th e E 3 to E5 pay grade range, all E ducation Adviso rs w ere so classified -- including Green and at le as t tw o w hit e co lle ag ue s. T he f ac t that G re en ’ s tw o w hit e co lle ag ue s w er e pa id 26 acco rd in g t o t he same scal e u nd erm in es Green ’s pre te xt arg um en t. In short, as to her c om

pensation claim , G reen has f ailed to introdu ce su ffi ci en t ev id en ce t o ra is e a m at eri al qu es ti on on th e is su e o f pr et ex t. F. P atri ci a H ar

ri sP. Harris off ers no a rguments relatingto the district court’s e ntry of summary

judgme nt 27 ag ainst her on he r promotion and tra ining a nd support claims. As a r esult, she is deeme d to have abandone d all claims other than he r Section 1981 compe nsation claim. See, e .g ., Acc ess Now, ___ F.3d at ____, 2004 WL2113022, at *6; J ernig an, 341 F .3d at 1283 n.8. 83 P. Harris ar gues that the dis trict court er roneouslyentered sum

m ary j udgm en t a ga ins t he r on h er S ec tio n 19 81 c la im

of dis cr im inatio n in com pensation . T he district court concluded th at, while P. Ha rris had established 27 a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

c om pe nsatio n di sc ri m inatio n, she f ai le d to r ai se an is sue of fa ct c onc er nin g th e le git im at e re as ons the de fe ndants of fe re d to e xpl ai n th e differe nces in her salary

and those of her white colleagues. W e agre e. P. H ar ri s be gan w orkin g f

or G PC in June 199 0, w he n sh e w as of fe re d a Secr etary III positi on on a contrac t basis. She bec am e a f ull-tim e, regular G PC em pl oyee on Ju ly 1, 19 91 , when sh e acc ep te d aSen io r Sec ret ary po si ti on . Be tw ee n 19 93 and 1 997, P . H ar ri s w orke d f

or G PC a s aRe se ar chA na ly st i n th e Co m pe titve I nte lli ge nc e D ep ar tm en t, be fo re takin g aj ob a s an E co nom ic Dev el op m en t An al y stin th e Eco no m ic Res earc h Dep art m en t. In the summ er of 1997, P . H arris a pplied for a positio n as Market Re search an d S uppo rt

A na ly st i n th e A tlanta , G eo rg iaof fi ce s of S CS . S he c ont en ds tha t sh e wa s discrim inated against when, on acc ount of rac e, her m anager at SCS set herBe cause P. Harris wa s never an employee of

TSC or SC ES, and was no long er a n 28 employ ee of

GPC during the timef

rame rele vant to this appeal, we aff irm the district court’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt in favor of

these de fenda

nts. See L lampallas, 163 F .3d at 1242; supra no te 18 . T he re ma ind e r o f o ur ana ly sis e va luate s whe the r s umm ary jud g me nt w a s p ro pe rl y g ra nte d w ithre sp e c t to de fe nd ant S CS. 84 salary at an ar tificially low level as c om

pared w ith salaries of w hite colleagues pe rf orm ing sim ilar w ork. 28 When P. Harris interview ed for the A naly st pos ition at SC S, she m et w ith an int er vie wc om m itt ee and a lso ha d an in div idu al m ee tin g w iththe Mark et ing Resear ch De partm ent’ s m anager, Charles P lunk ett. Beca use P. Harris lacked education or experience in m arketing, the interviewcom m ittee rec omm ended ag ai nst hir ing he r; P lun ke tt, how ev er , ove rr ode the c om m itt ee ’ s r ec om

m en da tio n an d c hose to of

fe r P. H ar ri s th e A na ly st p osi tio n. P lun ke tt te sti fi ed that, ow ing to P H ar ri s’ s la ck of e xpe ri en ce and m ar

ke tin g e duc at ion , he w oul d or din ar ily have of fere d h er an en try lev el po si ti on as a Mark etRes earc h a ndSupp or t An al y stII. How ever, based on P. H arris’ salary grade at G PC, hiring her as an A naly st II w oul d have pr ec lud ed

giv ing he r a ra ise , pr es um ab ly one r ea son she ha d de sir ed to transfer to SCS. A s a result, Plunkett chos e to select P. Harris as an Analy st I, pla ci ng h er

in a hig he r sa lary

gr ad e than he r posi tio n a t G PC . I n do ing so, Pl unke tt aw ar de d P . H ar

ri s an 8% r ai se in thi s ne wpos iti on, w hic h w as his unde rs tandi ng o f the m ax im um pay inc re as e that an e m

plo y ee tr an sf

er ri ng f ro mThe 8% r aise P. Har ris rec eived br oug ht her sala ry from $39,432 annua lly

to $42,587 29 annually . Notably , P. Harris ne ver que stioned this figure , asked f or a higher sa lary , or g ave Plunkett any

rea sons why

her c ompensation should be more f avora ble. F or e xamp le , le ss t

ha n a y e ar a ft e r h e r p ro mot ion

to t he An a ly st I

po sit ion at SCS, P. 30 H ar r i s r e c e i v e d

a 4 . 2 % m e r i tr a i s e . Ay e ar

l at e r , i nM ar c h1 9 9 9 , s h e r e c e i v e d a 4 . 9 % r a i s e . In addition, P. Harris re ceive d the hig hest perc entag e ince ntive bonus in her depa rtment, 15%. 85 GP C could receive. P. Harris continued to rec eive substant ial salary raises 29 during h er tenure at SCS . 30 In spite of the raises she re ceived, P . H arris m aintains that sh e suffer ed dis cr im inatio n inc om

pe nsatio n inthat he r sa lary sti ll w as low er

than th ose pa id t o white co-w orkers perfor

m ing th e sam e tasks. T he district court concluded th at thr ee w hit e em

plo y ee s w er e va lid

c om parator s: J ohn Pa ge , D ar in K le in, and Re be kah G old en . A ll thr ee e m plo y ee s w er e pa id h igh er sa lari es than P . H ar

ri s, a n dw e a g r e e w i t h th e d i s t r i c tc o u rtth a tP . H a rr i s s u c c e s s f u l l y e s t ab l i s h e dap r i ma fa ci e ca se of

c om pe nsatio n di sc ri m inatio n. H ow ev er , S CS of fe re d le git im at e, non dis cr im inator

y e xpl an at ion s f

or the pay dis pari tie s - - that P . H ar

ri s di d no t have ei the r the pr of

es sio na l e xpe ri en ce or

f orm al e duc at ionof

P ag e, K le in, and G old en , co uld not the re fo re pe rf

orm he r j ob a s e ff

ic ie ntl y or ind ep en de ntl y , and w as thu s less valuable to th e departm ent. T he district court concluded th at P. Harris had fa ile d to r eb ut the se r ea sons and h ad not e sta bli she d th at

the pr of fe re d r ea sons w er e pr et ex t.Appar ently conce ding that the superior qua lifications of Klein provide d a leg itimate, 31 non-discriminatory

rea son for Kle in’s highe r salar y , P. Harris off

ers no a rgument on appea l using Klein as a compar ator. Indeed, K lein possesses master ’s and doc torate de g ree s from the University

of Pennsylvania, spec ializes in communi cations and r esea rch, a nd had prof

essional experience in market re sear ch. 86 O n a ppe al , P . H ar

ri s c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed be ca use she ha d, in fact , est ab li sh edpre te xt as t o P ag e an d Go ld en . Howev er, o n t hi s re co rdwe 31 cannot f ind “ suc h w eakne sse s, im

pla usi bil iti es , inc onsi ste nc ie s, inc ohe re nc ie s, or co ntr ad ic tio ns i n [ SC S’ s] pr of er re d le git im at e re as ons . . . that a r ea sona ble fa ct fi nde r co uld

f ind the m unw orthy

of c re de nc e. ” Co m

bs, 106 F . 3d at 15 38 (citation and internal quo tation m arks om itted). P . H arris’ s own contention that she w as e qua lly

qua lif ie d and e xpe ri en ce d do es not c re at e aniss ue of

f ac t. P. Harris holds a m aster of business adm inistration degree f rom the De Vr y In sti tut e an d ha d w orke d f or G PC f or six y ears pr ior

to takin g th e A na ly st I posit ion at SCS; she m aintains that sh e gained relevant m arketing experience at GP C. Golden possessed a bachelor’ s degree and had six y ears of m arket re search expe ri en ce be fo re j oin ing S CS , in w hic h sh e he ld m ar ke tin g po sit ion s in cl udi ng Pr oj ec t D ir ec tor

of Mark et ing , S upe rv iso r of Mark et ing Re se ar ch , and M ar ke tin g Resear ch Coordinator for Cox Com m unication s. P age had lim ited work expe ri en ce , havin g w orke d a s aMark et Re se ar chMana ge m en t i nte rnw ith Be llS outh C om

m uni catio ns f

or six m onths, but

he ld a ba ch el or ’ s de gr ee in87

busi ne ss and m ar

ke tin g a s w el l a s am as te r’ s de gr ee in m ar ke tin g r es earc h f

ro m the University

of G eorgia, one of onlya fe w universities to offer an advanced de gr ee in m ar

ke t r es earc h. Both Golden and Page w ere external hires, unlik e P. Harris, who w as an int er na l transf er f ro m G PC . P lun ke tt te sti fi ed

that he c onsi de re d di ff

er en t c ri te ri a in hiring Golden and Page, who w ere hired in tigh t labor m arkets in which new em plo y ee s c oul d c om

m an d m or e co m

pe tit ive c om

pe nsatio n pa ck ag es . A cc or din g to Plunkett, when G olden was hired, her extensive m arketing experience allow ed he r to p er fo rm

m or e ef fi ci en tly than P . H ar

ri s; G old enw as able to w ork w ith m in im al supe rv is io n a ndwas g iv en m or e res po ns ib il it y th an P. Harri s. Si m ilarl y , w hil e Pa ge la ck ed G old en ’ s e xte nsi ve e xpe ri en ce , P lun ke tt testified that Page’ s training at the University of G eorgia m ade him

we ll-prepare d to t ak e on e xte nsi ve m ar

ke t r es earc h ta sks . P lun ke tt al so s ta te d th at he be lie ve d a candi da te w ithP ag e’ s e duc at ionc oul d de ve lop m or e ra pid ly than an e m

plo y ee li ke P. Harris, who lacked the tra ining , and couldalso help SCS attr act additional gr adua te s fr om

th e Uni ve rs it y

of Ge or gi a’s gr adua te pro gr am in Mark etRes earc h. A cc or din g to P lun ke tt, P ag e’ s va lua ble e duc at ion al e xpe ri en ce a llo w ed him to w ork in de pe nde ntl y

and t ak e on s ign if

ic an t r es pons ibi lit ie s.S.J. H arr is o ff e rs no argume nt o n a

pp e a l r e latin gto h e r p ro mot ion dis c ri min atio n c la im, 32 and is there fore deeme d to have a bandoned a

ny promotion claims. See, e.g ., Acc ess Now, ___ F.3d at ____, 2004 WL2113022, at *6; J ernig an, 341 F .3d at 1283 n.8. 88 T he pla int if

f co nte nds that he r m as te r’ s de gr ee f ro m the D eV ry

I nst itu te and six y ears of

m ar ke tin g e xpe ri en ce a t S CS , m uc h of w hic h w as spe nt e ff

ec tiv el y in on -th e-jo b t rai ni ng , were eq ui va le nt to th e qua li fic at io ns of P ag e an d Go ld en . H ow ev er , P lun ke tt of

fe re d le git im at e explanatio ns f or w hy the e duc at ion al and work e xp eri en ces of P ag e an d Go ld en were m or e v al uabl e to hi m as t he ir m an ag er. P. H ar ri s’ s a sse rt ionthat sh e de se rv ed to earnthe sam e sa lary

a s th es e em plo y ee s do es not

r en de r Pl unke tt’ s st at ed

e xpl an at ion s un w orthy

of c re de nc e or otherwise r aise any

genuine iss ue of fac t. A s we have observed, w e do not “ sit as a super-personnel departm ent that reexam ines an entity ’ s busi ness decision s.” E lr od, 939 F . 2d at 14 70 ( ci ta tio n and i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks o m itt ed ). I n th e absence of any

other evidence that Plunkett’ s com pensation decisions were m oti va te d by

r ac e, w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in gr an tin g summ ary j udgm ent in favor of SC S.

G . S ar ahJe anH ar

ri s S. J. H arris a lso claim s that the dist rict court er red by granting su m

m ary j udgm en t f

or the de fe ndants on h er

c la im s of dis cr im inatio n inc om

pe nsatio n and u n l aw fu l re t al i at i o n . Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt co n cl u d edth at b ec au s e o f S .J . Ha rr i s ’s 32S.J. H arr is w a s n e ve r e mpl oye d b y , n or did sh e e ve r a

pp ly fo r a po sit ion wi th 33 defe ndants TSC, S CES, or SC S. Accor dingly , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt in favor of

these de fenda

nts. See L lampallas, 163 F .3d at 1242; supra note 18. T he re ma ind e r o f o ur

ana ly sis is d ir e c te d to wh e the r s umm ary jud g me nt w a s p ro pe rl y

g ra nte d to de fe nd ant G PC. 89 uni que dis ci pli nary

his tor y , the c om

parator s sh e use d to e sta

bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of c om pe nsatio n di sc ri m inatio n w er e not sim ilarl y sit ua te d, and tha t e ve n if S. J. H ar ri s ha d be enable to es ta

bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se , she f

ai le d to sho wthat the proffer ed legitim ate re asons for her com pensation we re pre textual. T he district co urt a lso de te rm ine d th at S . J. H ar ri s f ai le d to sho wpr et ex t a s to the le git im at e re as on o ff

er ed to expla in h er

te rm inatio n: tha t sh e w as f ir ed be ca use , w hil e on dis ci pli nary

pr obatio n, he r j ob p er fo rm an ce de te ri or at ed and s he f al sif ie d a co m pany doc um en t. B ut H ar

ri s c ont en ds tha t a

m at er ia l i ssu e of

f ac t st ill r em ai ns as to w he the r the pr of

fe re d r ea sons w er e a pr et ex t f or r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n. GP C hired S. J. H arris a s a G eneral C lerk in 1979 , and her em ploym ent was te rm inate d onAugus t 24 , 200 0, appr oxi m at el y am onth a ft er

thi s c as e w as f

ile d. 33 Fr om 199 7 un til he r fi ri ng, S . J. H ar ri s w orke d inD ulu th, G eo rg iaa s aRe gio n Support Representative, a custom er ser

vice positio n in GPC’ s Gw innett Region . It is undi sput ed

that, w hil e she he ld this pos iti on, S . J. H ar ri s r ec ei ve d po or perform ance evaluations and was eventually subjecte d to form al disciplin e. In evaluating S.J. Harris’ s job perf orm ance in 1997, her supervisor, H ugh W alters90

(“ W alters”) , noted concerns re lating to S. J. H arris’ s personal use of the telephon e, as w el l a s he r punc tua lity , c oope ratio n, te am w ork, and c om

m uni catio ns w ithc ow orke rs . S im ila

r co nc er ns w er e al so e xpr es se d inS . J. H ar ri s’ s e va luatio n f

or 1998 , and S . J. H ar

ri s r ec ei ve d r at ing s of

“ U nsatis fa ct or

y ” or “N ee ds Im pr ov em en t” in all cat eg or ie s o n h er m id -y ear 1 99 9 e va lu at io n. Be ca use of c onc er ns a bout he r j ob p er fo rm an ce , S . J. H ar ri s w as pla ce d in GP C’ s Positive Discipline prog ram in m id-1999 . GP C’ s discipl inary program prescribed form al processes designed to im prove em ploy ee per form ance: at level one, S. J. H arris r eceived the “ Or al Rem inder” about her work goals, and at level two she rec eived the “ Written Rem inder” lay ing ou t the im provem ents she needed to m ak e. Whe n he r j ob p er fo rm an ce did not sho wsuf fi ci en t i m pr ove m en t, S . J. Harris w as placed in the final level of discipline, the “ De cision-Making Le ave” (“ DML ”). S. J. H arris’ s placem ent on DML occurre d on October 7, 1999 , at which tim e she w as giv enaday of f to d ec ide w he the r she w ish ed to le av e G PC , or

to return and redouble her ef forts to im

prove her j ob perform ance. G PC em ploy ees pla ce d onD ML status are inf orm ed that i f an y

dis ci pli nary

a ct ionoc curs w ith in 1 8 m onths a ft er

pla ce m en t onD ML , the n th e em plo y ee w ill li ke ly

be f ir ed . Af ter re turning to work, S. J. H arris showed som e im provem ent in her perform ance during the later part of 1999 and the first m onth s of 2000 . How ever,91

GP C has offer ed uncontrov erted evidence that in July and August 200 0, W alters re ce ive d c om

pla int s a bout S . J. H ar ri s bo th f ro m c ust om er s and c o- w orke rs , inc lud ing c om

pla int s th at

he r pe rs ona l t el ep hone usa ge ha d a ga in i nc re as ed , and that she was not com

pleting assignm ents in a tim ely fashion. In a dditi on, W alters re ce ive d se ve ra l c om

pla int s a bout de lay s f or se rv ic e or de rs that S . J. H ar ri s ove rs aw . T he pla int if

f ha s no t of

fe re d any e vid en ce c ha lle ngi ng G PC ’ s a sse rt ion th atm uc h o f he r work i n t hi s t im e p eri odsu ffer edfro m va rio us erro rs . S. J. H ar ri s arg ue s, how ev er , that this e vid en ce m ust be pr et ex tua l, be ca

use ane va luatio n sh e re ce ive d j ust be fo re he r te rm inatio n inAugus t 20 00 f ai le d to re fe r t o th es e p er fo rman ce i s s u es . In d ee d , GP C a ck n o wl ed g es th at S. J . Ha rr i s ’s pe rfo rm an ce i m

pr ov edso m ewh atin lat e 1 99 9 a nddu rin g t he fir stpa rt o f 20 00 . Bu t the pr obl em s th at

G PC m ai nta ins le d to H ar ri s’ s f ir ing oc curr ed

in Jul y and A ugus t 20 00, w hil e the pe rf orm an ce e va luatio n c ove re d on ly the pe ri od f

ro m January to June 200 0, thu s e xpl ai nin g w hy the dis ci pli nary

iss ue s of Jul y and A ugus t w er e ab se nt f

ro m the e va luatio n. A cc or din g to G PC , the e ve nt tha t a ct ua lly pr ec ipi ta te d th e fi ri ng o cc ur ed in la te Augus t 20 00. O n Augus t 22 , 200 0, W al te rs le ar ne d th at an e ngi ne er , K ei th Thom as (“ Thom as”), rec eived a w ork order fr om S. J. H arris that day , which Tho m as be li ev edha d o rig in al ly been fil edwit h S .J. Harr is on Aug us t 1 6, 2 00 0.92

A ft er spe ak ing w ithT hom as and h is s upe rv iso r, W al te rs c onc lud ed that S . J. H ar

ri s ha d f al sif ie d ac om put er e ntr y to m ak e it ap pe ar

a s if she ha d gi ve n T hom as a w ork or de r on Augus t 16 th, w he n inf ac t sh e ha d f

ai le d to do s o un til Augus t 22nd . W al te rs c onf

er re d w ithoth er

a dm ini str at or s and c onc lud ed that be ca use of S. J. H ar ri s’ s D ML status , the de cl ine in he r pe rf orm an ce in the sum

m er of 200 0, an d h er fa ls ifi cat io n o f th e co m pu te r en try, her em

pl oym en t s ho ul d b e te rm in at ed . S. J. H ar ri s w as f ir ed on Augus t 24 , 200 0. W e tur n, f ir st, to S. J. H ar

ri s’ s arg um en t tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by en te ri ng s um

m ar y j udgm en t f

or G PC on h er

r et al ia tio n c la im . T o e sta bli sh a prim a fa cie showing of retaliation under Title V II, “ the plaintiff m ust sh ow (1) that she e nga ge d instatut or ily pr ote ct ed

e xpr es sio n; ( 2) that sh e suf fe re d an a dve rs e em pl oym en t ac ti on ; an d (3 ) th atth ere i s s om e cau sa l re la ti on be twee n t he two ev en ts .” Mee ks v. Co m

pu te r Ass oc s. In t’l, 1 5 F .3d10 13 , 10 21 (11 th Cir . 19 94 ). H er e, the f

ir st tw o e le m en ts are not

in dis put e, and S . J. H ar

ri s e sta bli she d a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

r et al ia tio n be ca

use the de lay

be tw ee n th e fi lin g of

the law sui t an d he r fi ri ng w as so b ri ef . S ee G upt a v. F la . Bd . of Re ge nts , 212 F . 3d 5 71, 590 (1 1thCi r. 200 0) ( expla ini ng tha t “ cl ose te m por al pr oxi m ity ” m ay

be suf fi ci en t t o e s t ab l i s h c au s a l r e l a t i o n i n r e t a l i a t i o n c a s e s ) . H o w e v e r , G P C may r e b u tth e p r i ma fa ci e c as e b y o ff

er i n g a l eg i t i m at e, n o n -d i s cr i m i n at o ry re as o n fo r S .J . Ha rr i s ’s93

te rm inatio n. G PC ha s do ne so b y m ai nta ini ng tha t S . J. H ar ri s w as f ir ed be ca use of the speedy

and subs tantial decline in her j ob perform ance during the late sum m er of 200 0, and b ec au se of

he r m an ag er ’ s go od- fa ithbe lie f that sh e ha d f al sif ie d a c o mp u t e r e n t ry. A ft er r ev ie wof

the r ec or d, w e ar e sa tis fi ed that the dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rl y co nc lud ed

that W al te rs hon es tly

be lie ve d H ar

ri s ha d f al sif ie d th e re co rd . T he relevant issue here is not whether Harris ac tually falsified the entry , but rather w he the r W al te rs hon es tly be lie ve d H ar

ri s f al sif ie d th e en tr

y . S ee E lr od, 939 F . 2d at14 70 ; E.E.O.C. v. Tot al Sy s. Se rv s., In c., 22 1 F .3d11 71 , 11 76 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ). T he r ec or d r ef

le ct s th at on Augus t 22 , 200 0, S . J. H ar ri s pr int ed

ase rv ic e or de r an d providedit to Thom as. On the sam e day , she m ade a c om puter entry

stating th at she had giv en the order to T hom as on August 16 , 2000. G PC introduced evidence that W al te rs c onf

er re d w ithT hom as and h is s upe rv iso r ab out the inc ide nt, exam ined the docum ent in questi on, and honestlybelieved S. J. H arris had fa lsified the doc um en t. B ec au se she w as in the f ina l st ag e of

dis ci pli nary

pr obatio n and ha d be enthe sub

j ec t of num er ous co m

pla int s, S . J. H ar

ri s w as te rm inate d f

or thi s incident. She has introduced noth ing to rebut this evidence, and theref ore, she has not r ai se d age nui ne iss ue a s to pr et ex t. A cc or din gly , w e dis ce rnno e rr or in the d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’s g r a n to f

s u mmary j u d g me n t

o n th e r e t a l i a t i o nc l a i m.94

N ex t, S . J. H ar

ri s c la im s th at

she w as dis cr im inate d a ga ins t i n c om pe nsatio n in tha t sh e w as pa id l es s th anw hit e em plo y ee s insim ilar posi tio ns. N ota bly , S . J. H ar ri s do es not

dis put e that he r dis ci pli nary r ec or d w as dis tin gui sha

ble f ro m tho se of the a lle ge d c om

parator s sh e ide nti fi es . I nde ed , f ro m 199 7 to 199 9, and a ga in i n Jul y and Augus t 20 00, S . J. H ar ri s ha d ade m onstra

bly poo r j ob p er fo rm an ce . S . J. H ar ri s do es not

dis put e that he r pe rf

orm an ce e va luatio ns w er e ne ga tiv e, or that sh e w as dis ci pli ne d in199 7 and 1 998 fo r m ak ing e xc es siv e pe rs ona l ph one c al ls and habitual tardiness . Moreover, in 199 8, tw o of S. J. H arris’ s job re spon sibili ties w er e w ith dr awn be ca

use of pe rf orm an ce iss ue s, and i n he r 1999 e va luatio n, S . J. H a rr i s ’s s up e rv i s o r

n o t e dth a ts h e r e ma i n e du n ab l e t o r e tu rn f r o m l u n c h o n t i me an d c on ti nu edm ak in g t oo m an y pe rs on al cal ls . In spite of her disciplinary history , S .J. Harris alleges discrim ination in that she was paid less than co-w orkers Bar ron and Collett. But these com parators had no r ec or d of

dis ci pli nary

pr obl em s. N ei the r w as pla ce d inG PC ’ s P osi tiv e D isc ipl ine pr ogr am , le t a lon e on D ML status . I n f ac t, S . J. H ar

ri s w as the onl y Cu st om er Se rv ic e em

pl oyee in th e Gwin ne ttReg io n t o b e p la cedon DML st atus . G PC ’ s annua l m er it pay

inc re as es and b onus es are r el at ed to pe rf orm an ce , and the dif fe re nc e in p er fo rm an ce e va luatio ns b etw ee n H ar ri s and B ar

ro n and C oll ett renders the latter

two inappropriate com

parators. See MacP herson, 922 F.2d at95

774 n .16. Finally , C ollett worked as an O perating Assistant, a j ob on e level higher than S . J. H ar

ri s’ s, f urthe r dim ini shi ng h er

va lue a s ac om

parator . A ga in, the district court did n ot err in enter ing su m m ary j udgm ent against S.J. Harris on her co m pe nsatio n c la im . S ee Jon es v. Be sse m er Carr aw ay

Me d. Ctr. , 137 F . 3d 1 306, 1313 (individuals lacking d isciplin ary and perform ance issues of plaintiff we re inapprop riate c om

parators), superseded in oth er part by 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998 ). H. Ir ene McCuller s Mc Cu lle rs c ont en ds o n a ppe al that the e ntr

y of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of th e d efen da nt s o n h er p ro m ot io n a ndco m pe ns at io n c la im s was erro r. Mc Cu lle rs m ai nta ins that sh e es ta bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se of dis cr im inatio n in pr om oti ons an d c om

pe nsatio n and r ai se d age nui ne iss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t a s to w h e t h e r th e d e f e n d a n t s ’ s t a t e dju s t i f

i c a t i o n s we r e p r e t e x tu a l . S p e c i f i c a l l y, Mc Cu lle rs c la im s th at

she w as dis cr im inate d a ga ins t by be ing de nie d apr ogr es siv e pr om oti on f

ro m P ro ce ssi ng O pe rator

I to Pr oc es sin g O pe rator S en ior , and tha t sh e w as pa id l es s th ansim ilarl y sit ua te d w hit e co -w orke rs .Mc Cul le rs wa s n e ve r e mpl oye d b y , n or did sh e e ve r a

pp ly fo r a po sit ion wi th 34 defe ndants TSC or SC ES. Accor dingly , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt in favor of

these de fenda

nts. See L lampallas, 163 F .3d at 1242; supra note 18. In addition, while McCullers did work for GPC between 1978 a

nd J anuar y 1997, her employ ment at GPC occurr ed more than two y ear s prior to the filingof this lawsuit. As we have explained, see supra

note 19, the district cour t applied a two- y ear

statute of limitations t o the plaintiffs’ cla ims, and beca use McCullers did not raise any objection to the two-year limit ations period a pplied by the district court be low or in her initial brief s, she is deeme d to have wa ived any argument that a long er limitations period applies. See Padilla- Rey es, 247 F .3d at 1164 (“B eca use this issue is raised for the first time in supplemental brief ing, w e dee m it waived.”) . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt in favor of

defe ndant GPC. The rema inder of our analy sis relatingto McCullers’s claims, there fore , is devoted to the fi na l summa

ry jud g me nt e nte re d in

fa vo r o f d e fe nd ant S CS.

96 Mc Cu lle rs be gan w orkin g a s af ile c le rk f or G PC in 1978 , and transf er re d to SC S in J anuary

199 7. Whe n M cC ull er s f ir st transf er re d to S CS , she r ec ei ve d th e 34 j ob t itl e of

Co m put er O pe rator I . A t S CS , Mc Cu lle rs w orke d w ith , a m ong oth er s, thr ee w hit e co lle ag ue s, Mi ldr ed Br une ( “ Br une ”) , S hir le y

K ee n ( “ K ee n” ), and Fay e Star bird (“ Starbird”) . Brune, Ke en and Starbird all had at lea st six m ore y ears of e xp eri en ce i ns id e th e d efen da nt co m pa ni es th an di d M cCu ll ers . When the departm ent in which McCullers and her white colleagues w orked w as r eo rg an iz ed

in 1999 , Mc Cu lle rs ’ s j ob t itl e w as c hange d to P ro ce ssi ng Oper ator I. Brune and K een w ere also reclassified as P rocessing Operators I , w hil e St ar

bir d’ s j ob t itl e w as c hange d to P ro ce ssi ng O pe rator I I. I n M ay

199 9, Starbird w as prom oted to Processing Operator I , and in March 2000 , B rune wa s97

pr om ote d to P ro ce ssi ng O pe rator S en ior . Mc Cu lle rs w as ne ve r pr om ote d f ro m Processing Operator I to Proce ssing Oper ator Senior. McCullers alleges that she w as discrim inated against in prom otion s when SCS re fu se d t o p ro m ot e h er t o P ro ces si ng Oper at orSen io r, as itdi d wi th Bru ne . SCS re sp on ds th atMcC ul le rs was l es s q ua li fie d fo r th e p ro m ot io n t ha n was Bru ne . SC S m ai nta ins that B rune ’ s w ork pe rf orm an ce c onsi ste ntl y

e xc ee de d e xpe ct at ion s, while McC ullers’ s did no t, in large part because of pr oblem s with wor k attendance an d tard ine ss. Mc Cu lle rs a lso c ont en ds tha t sh e w as dis cr im inate d a ga ins t i n com pensation in that she was paid less than Brune, K een, and Starbird. SCS ar gue s, in tur

n, that M cC ull er s w as pa id l es s th anthe se c o- w orke rs be ca use Mc Cu lle rs la ck ed

the se nio ri ty

of he r co lle ag ue s. W e turn first to McCullers’ s claim of prom otion discrim ination . The district co urt c onc lud ed

that M cC ull er s ha d f

ai le d to e sta

bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of pr om oti on d isc ri m inatio n be ca use she ha d no t e sta

bli she d e le m en ts tw o or

f our of the appropriate test, which required McCullers to prove that (1) she w as a m em ber of apr ote ct ed

c la ss; ( 2) she appl ie d f

or and w as qua lif

ie d f or a pr om oti on; ( 3) she wa s denied the prom otion ; and (4) a sim ilarly situated white em

ploy ee instead rece ived the prom otion . See, e. g., De nney , 247 F. 3d at 118 3; Lee , 226 F. 3d at 12 53 ; Taylorv. Ru nyon , 17 5 F .3d86 1, 8 66 (11 th Cir . 19 99 ).98

Mc Cu lle rs arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by m isc onstru ing the f

ourth el em en t of

the D en ne y

te st f or dis cr im inatio n inpr om oti on. Mc Cu lle rs c ont en ds that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr one ousl y r equir ed Mc Cu lle rs to showthat a sim ilarl y sit ua te d w hit e em

plo y ee w as pr om ote d ov er Mc Cu lle rs spe ci fi ca lly , and tha t this ru lin g w as w ro ng “be ca

use no ‘ pr om oti on o ve r the pla int if f’ r equir em en t e xis ts” unde r D en ne y . Appe llants ’ Br ie f at 51. F ir st, D en ne y

did not inv olv e a nonco m pe tit ive ( pr ogr es siv e) pr om oti on l ike the one that M cC ull er s w as de nie d, and the dis tr ic t c ourt a lso c ite d H ar ri s v. S ec re tary , U . S. D ep ar tm en t of the A rm y , 119 F. 3d 1 313, 132 1 ( 8thCi r. 199 7) , ac as e that di d in vol ve apr ogr es siv e pr om oti on lik e the one a t i ssu e fo r Mc Cu lle rs . B ut w e ne ed not de te rm ine w he the r the di st ric t co ur t’s g lo ss on th e fo ur th ele m en t u nd er Den ne y was i na ccu rat e, si nc e we ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t M cC ull er s f ai le d to e sta

bli sh the se co nd e le m en t - - th atsh e was qu al ifi edfor th e p ro m ot io n i n q ue st io n. T he r ec or d de m onstrate s th at pr om oti on f

ro m P ro ce ssi ng O pe rator

I to Pr oc es sin g O pe rator

S en ior r equir ed an e m plo y ee ’ s pe rf

orm an ce to co nsi ste ntl y m ee t and e xc ee d e xpe ct at ion s. Mc Cu lle rs c ont en ds tha t duri ng the r el ev an t pe ri od, S CS c onsi ste ntl y

r an ke d he r j ob p er fo rm an ce a s af our , on a f ive -p oin t sc al e, an d t ha t t hi s ra nk in g i nd ic at es th atsh e m etan d e xc eed edex pe ct at io ns . H ow ev er , Mc Cu lle rs ’ s pe rs ona l op ini on tha t be ing r an ke d a s af our m eant s heMoreove r, eve n the document that Mc Cullers relies on to establish that a f our ra nking 35 demonstrates he r qualification undercuts her case : this document states that employ ees in the fo ur th c ate g or y “ c on sis te ntl y

me e t and fr e qu e ntl y

e xce e d[] . . . e xpe c tatio ns ,” wh ile it i s o nly employ ees in the f

ifth cate g ory

who “c onsistently

exceed[] performanc e objec tives.” R262-18. As the district court obse rved, Mc Cullers “has ne ver me t Defe ndants’ job assessment c riterion of ‘mee ts and exceeds e x pectations’ although she has alwa y s been f ound to ‘meet e x pectations.’ Under Def endant’ s policy , this is notenough for a prog ressive pr omotion.” R300 at 14. Indeed, the defe ndants have submitt ed multiple exhi bits -- includingperf ormanc e 36 assessments, employee de velopment mater ials, and skills assessments -- which ide ntify various are as in which McCullers’ s manag ers f elt she nee ded improveme nt. Her ma nag ers e x presse d conce rns re g ardingMcCullers’s wor k habits, including longlunches, a rrivingto work late, a

nd takingexcessive sick time, and g ener ally rate d her skills in the middle, rather than the upper , rang e of the assessment sca le. See, e .g ., R137-96; R137-100; R137-105; R 137-112; R137-118. 99 ex ce ed ed e xpe ct at ion s is ins uf

fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh h er qua lif ic at ion . S ee H oli fi el d, 115 F. 3d at 15 64 ( expla ini ng tha t a pla int if f’ s “ opi nio n, w ith out

m or e, is not enough to establish a prim a fa cie ca se”). 35 In de ed , in co ntr as t t o M cC ull er s’ s own se lf -a sse ssm en t, he r m an ag er s have m ai nta ine d th at

he r pe rf orm an ce “ w as vie w ed

a s ave ra ge - - she w as not a consist ently

strong perform er - - she did not con sistentl y perform at a level that m et an d e xc ee de d th e expe ct at ion s of he r j ob. ” R2 00 at 11 ; se e al so i d. a t 21 . T he 36 on ly evi de nc e Mc Cu ll ers ha s p ro ffer edto supp or t h er q ua li fic at io n i s h er o wn opin ion, while a ll the other record evidence supports SCS’ s posi tion th at McC ul le rs was n ot qu al ifi edforth e p ro m ot io n t o P ro ces si ng Oper at orSen io r. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in co nc lud ing that M cC ull er s ha d f ai le d to e sta

bli sh a pr im a fac ie cas e o f pr om ot io n d is cri m in at io n.100

As f or McCullers’ s com

pensation claim , the district court deter m ined that Mc Cu lle rs f

ai le d to e sta

bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

dis cr im inatio n be ca

use she did not ide nti fy apr ope r co m

parator . T he thr ee e m

plo y ee s M cC ull er s arg ue s are va lid co m parator s - - St ar

bir d, Br une and K ee n - - al l ha d m or e than si x y ears of se nio ri ty over McCullers. Seniority m ay constitu te a legitim ate, non-dis crim inatory j ust if ic at ionf or dif fe re nc es in co m

pe nsatio n. S ee , e . g. , I rb y v. Bi tti ck , 44 F . 3d 949, 956 & n. 10 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) ; M ulh al l v. A dvanc e Se c. , I nc . , 19 F . 3d 5 86, 599 (1 1thCi r. 199 4) . B ec au se Mc Cu lle rs f ai le d to ide nti fy

any c om parator s w ith sim ilar le ve ls o f se nio ri ty , she ha s f ai le d to e sta

bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of discrim ination in com

pensation . The district court did not err in entering sum m ary j udgm en t a ga ins t M cC ull er s. I. C ar oly n W ils on Fi na lly , the pla int if

f W ils on arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in gr an tin g su m m ary jud gm en t fo r th e d efen da nt s o n h er p ro m ot io n a nddi sc riminat io n c la im s. W ils on m ai nta ins that the c ourt e rr ed by de te rm ini ng tha t sh e ha d f ai le d to sho w that the pr of

fe re d le git im at e, non -d isc ri m inator y r ea sons f or de ny ing W ils on a p ro m o t i o n we re p re t ex tu al . Wil s o n al s o fi n d s erro r i n th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s co nc lus ionthat sh e fa ile d to m ak e a pr im a fa ci e ca se of c om pe nsatio n dis cr im inatio n be ca

use she did

not ide nti fy any pr ope r co m

parator s.Wils on wa s n e ve r e mpl oye d b y , n or did sh e e ve r a

pp ly fo r a po sit ion wi th d e fe nd ants 37 TSC or SC S. Accor dingly , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt in favor of the se de fe nd ants . Se e L la mpa lla s, 16 3 F .3 d at 12 42 ; su pr a no te 18 . M or e ov e r, wh ile Wils on did work for GPC for a dozen year s, her e mploy ment at GPC ended be fore the statutory period rele vant to this lawsuit. According ly , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt in favor of

defe ndant GPC. The re mainder of our ana ly sis is devoted to the summary judgme nt e nte re d in fa vo r o f d e fe nd ant S CES . 101 W ils on b eg anw orkin g f

or G PC in 1985 , but

in la te 199 7, she appl ie d f or an d r ec ei ve d apos iti on w ith in the F inanc e Ce nte r of S CE S in A tlanta . W ils on 37 be gan w orkin g inthi s po sit ionin Fe br uary 199 8. T he hir ing m an ag er f or the ope nin g a t S CE S, K ar laF ull er ( “ Fu lle r” ), li ste d ade sc ri pti ve j ob t itl e of the posit ion as “ Finance Ce nter Supervisor,” althoug h the offer letter W ilson rec eived refe rredto th e job as “ Pro ject An al y stSen io r,” an ex em pt lev el two po si ti on . W ils on’ s j ob p er fo rm an ce in the F inanc e Ce nte r Su pe rv iso r m er ite d se ve ra l r ai se s: she r ec ei ve d pe rc en ta ge inc re as es in sa lary in N ove m

be r 1998 , Marc h 19 99, and March 2000, and also repeate dly rec eived incentive awar ds and bo nuses of as mu c h a s 2 0 % o f

h e r s a l a ry. In Novem

ber 1999, W ilson applied for a position as Business Analy st II w ithS CE S. F ull er

w as the hir ing m an ag er

f or thi s po sit ion , too , and the successful candidate would be supervised b y Fuller as w ell. The pre ferr ed qua lif ic at ion s f or the Bu sin es s A na ly st I I posi tio n in cl ude d th e ab ili ty to start the j ob with m inim al training and sup ervision; a bachelor’ s degree in finance,102

m an ag em en t, or

a cc ount ing ; e xpe ri en ce in the c onstru ct ionind ustry ; go od o ra l and writ te n c omm

un ic at io ns ab il it y ; an d fa m il ia rit y wit h t he Exce l s of

twar e p ro gr am . A lth oughW ils on d id n ot h av e expe ri en ce in co nstru ct ionor the pr ef er re d ty pe of ba ch el or ’s deg ree, Fu ll er n ev ert he le ss sel ect edW il so n fo r an in te rv ie w. A lth oughF ull er

int er vie w ed W ils on f or the Bu sin es s A na ly st I I posi tio n, the j ob was ultim ately

offer ed to a white w om an, S arah Mc Fall. Fuller suggested that bo th W ils on and M cF al l w er e qua lif ie d f or the Bu sin es s A na ly st I I j ob, but McFall had a bachelor’ s degree in acc ount ing, unlik e W ilson , and had lim ited work e xp eri en ce i n t he co ns tru ct io n i nd us try, agai n u nl ik e Wils on . SCES m aintains that Fuller -- as the hiring m anager and supervisor for the positio n -- hone stl y be lie ve d th at

Mc Fa ll w as be tte r qua lif ie d f or the j ob than W ils on and w oul d be able to pe rf

orm w ithli ttl e tr ai nin g or

sup er vis ion . A s th e d i s t r i c tc o u rtc o n c l u d e d , Wi l s o n s u c c e s s f u l l y e s t ab l i s h e dap r i ma fa ci e ca se of

pr om oti on d isc ri m inatio n by pr ovi ng tha t sh e w as qua lif ie d f or the pr om ot io n a ndth atth e p os it io n was off eredto McFa ll , a whi te wom an . See, e.g ., D enne y , 247 F . 3d at 11 83; L ee , 226 F . 3d at 12 53. H ow ev er , the dis tr ic t c ourt a lso co nc lud ed

that W ils on h ad

not e sta bli she d pr et ex t a s to the le git im at e re as on pr of fe re d to e xpl ai n de ny ing W ils on the pr om oti on - - that F ull er , the hir ing m an ag er, s in cere ly bel ie ve d t ha t M cFal l was be tt er q ua li fie d.103

W ilson ’ s essential argum ent as to Fuller’ s conclusio n that McFall had supe ri or qua lif ic at ion s is that the a sse rt ed be lie f m ust be pr et ex tua l, be ca

use W ilson herself believes she w as better qualified. But w hether w e could conclude W ils on w as be tte r qua lif

ie d th anMc Fa ll is n ot the iss ue he re . S ee E lr od, 939 F . 2d at 147 0. A s w e ha ve a lr ea dy e xpl ai ne d, apla int if

f cannot e sta bli sh p re te xt s im

ply by sho w ing that sh e is m or e qua lif ie d th anthe suc ce ssf

ul a ppl ic an t. R athe r, f

or W ils on t o e sta

bli sh p re te xt, she w oul d have to “ ad duc e ev ide nc e that the dis pari ty in qua lif ic at ion s is ‘ so a

ppare nt a s vi rt

ua lly to j um p of f the pa ge and s la

p y ou i n the f ac e. ’ ” Co fi el d, 267 F . 3d at 12 68 ( quot ing D en ne y , 247 F . 3d at 11 87) . I t i s undi sput ed

that W ils on l ac ke d th e ed uc at ion al c re de nti al s th at Mc Fa ll poss es se d, and that, unlike W ilson , Mc Fall had at least m inim al construction in dustry ex pe rie nc e. As the supervisor and hiring m anager f or the vacant Business Analy st II posit ion, Karla Fuller

wa s in a uniqu e positio n to determ ine that McFall w as better qualified, since Fuller knew the specific j ob requirem ents of the posit ion, had supe rv ise d W ils on, and w as int im at el y f am ili ar w ithW ils on’ s sk ill s and qua lif ic at ion s. O n th is r ec or d, w e cannot say that any dis pari ty in qua lif ic at ion s ris es to th e n eces sa ry

lev el of o bv io us ne ss .104

As f or W ilson ’ s com

pensation claim , the district court concluded that s u mmary j u d g me n tw a s ap p r o p r i a t e b e c au s e Wi l s o n f a i l e dt o e s t ab l i s h ap r i ma faci e cas e. Spe ci fic al ly, W il so n fa il edto id en ti fy a si m il arl y

si tu at edco m

pa rat or . On appeal, W ilson asserts not onlythat she was paid less than sim ilarly situated white em ploy ees, but also th at w hite em ploy ees occupy ing “ lower” positi ons were paid m ore generously . How ever, W ilson has not establis hed that the propo sed com parators had sim ilar levels of experie nce or education, nor has she established the com parators’ j ob respons iblities with any particularity . W ilson ’ s assertion that these indiv iduals were “ lower” em ploy ees is offer ed in a wholly conclusory m an ne r, ba se d o n h er o wn s ub jecti ve be li ef. As a r es ul t, Wils on ’s arg um en t fa il s. Se e Cart er

v. Ci ty of Mi am i, 870 F . 2d 5 78, 585 ( 11th C ir . 198 9) ; se e al so E ar le y v. Ch am pi on Int ’l Cor

p., 9 07 F.2d10 77 , 10 81 (11 th Cir .19 90 ) (co ll ect in g c as es ). T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e ntr

y of sum m ar y j udgm en t w as appr opr ia te he re , too . IV. Insum , w e ar e pe rs ua de d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in an y of it s de te rm inatio ns, and, a cc or din gly , a ff irm it s j udgm en ts i n a ll re spe ct s. AF FIRMED .