FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 10-10304 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  5:99-cr-20094-

CARLOS QUINTANA SOLORIO, Carlos RMW-1

Quintana Solorio, OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Ronald M. Whyte, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 6, 2011—San Francisco, California

Filed January 19, 2012

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain and Marsha S. Berzon,

Circuit Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Berzon

*The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Washington, sitting by designation. 

399
COUNSEL

Melinda Haag, United States Attorney, Barbara J. Valliere,

Chief, Appellate Division, Assistant United States Attorney,

402 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
Laurie Kloster Gray (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, San Francisco, California, John N. Glang, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, San Jose, California, for plaintiff-appellee United

States of America. 

Amitai Schwartz (argued), Law Offices of Amitai Schwartz,

Emeryville, California, for defendant-appellant Carlos Quintana Solorio.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Carlos Quintana Solorio (“Solorio”) was arrested during a

Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) “buy bust” operation for

arranging to sell methamphetamine to a government informant.1

Following a jury trial, Solorio was convicted of possession

with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of a substance

containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii), and conspiracy to distribute

500 or more grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.

Solorio now appeals his conviction on four grounds, contending that: (1) the trial court committed reversible plain

error by not requiring interpreters to take an oath, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Evidence 604, before translating the government informant’s testimony at trial; (2) allowing two DEA

agents to recount the “present sense impressions” of other

nontestifying agents violated Solorio’s right to confrontation;

(3) there was insufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reason1A “buy bust” operation refers to an undercover narcotics operation

designed to catch suspected drug dealers by feigning a drug purchase. 

UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 403
able doubt, that Solorio actually possessed methamphetamine;

and (4) cumulative error warrants reversal.2

I.

Background

A. Events preceding the “buy bust” operation

On May 5, 1999, Miguel Portillo-Rodriguez (“PortilloRodriguez”) approached Solorio at a casino in San Jose, California and expressed an interest in buying drugs. PortilloRodriguez had worked as a government informant for nineteen years, earning $18,000-$19,000 annually and receiving

immigration benefits for both himself and his family. Solorio,

who was with a companion named Servando Jimenez

(“Jimenez”), replied that he could sell Portillo-Rodriguez

methamphetamine, and gave him a free drug sample.

Later that day, Portillo-Rodriguez went to the San Jose

DEA office and informed Special Agent Hilda Rubino

(“Rubino”) of his meeting with Solorio and Jimenez. PortilloRodriguez gave Rubino the drug sample that Solorio had

given him. The sample tested presumptively positive for

methamphetamine in a non-conclusive field test and was sent

to the Western Regional Laboratory in San Francisco for further testing. Based on the information Portillo-Rodriguez provided, Rubino opened a drug investigation.

Rubino began the investigation by instructing PortilloRodriguez to contact Solorio and arrange to buy five pounds

of methamphetamine. Following that directive, Portillo2On appeal, the government lodged Solorio’s Presentence Report

(“PSR”) with this Court and, in its answering brief, referred to the PSR for

a prejudicial fact not before the jury. Solorio then filed a motion to strike

the PSR and the government’s reference to it. We deny Solorio’s motion

as unnecessary. The PSR and the information derived from it were not

before the jury and are therefore irrelevant to our review. 

404 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
Rodriguez called Solorio on May 12, 1999 and arranged to

meet him for a drug sale that afternoon at a Costco store in

San Jose. Solorio said on the call that he could obtain seven

pounds of methamphetamine, and Portillo-Rodriguez agreed

to buy that amount at $5,000 per pound. That price was consistent with the standard charge for methamphetamine in San

Jose at the time.

DEA agents gave Portillo-Rodriguez a bag containing

$25,000 cash, which Portillo-Rodriguez placed in the trunk of

the car he drove to the arranged meeting spot. All went well

at the outset: Solorio showed up at the Costco as planned,

arriving in a gray van driven by Jimenez. After PortilloRodriguez showed him the money, however, Solorio

responded that he did not have the drugs with him and suggested completing the deal at his work place, presumably that

same day. Portillo-Rodriguez, however, had been instructed

by DEA agents not to complete the deal anywhere else that

day, as the agents had an operational plan set up specifically

for the Costco location; moving the operation at that point

would have raised safety concerns. So, rather than agreeing to

Solorio’s proposal, Portillo-Rodriguez agreed to call Solorio

at a later time. 

B. The “buy bust” operation

Following up, Portillo-Rodriguez called Solorio on June 3,

1999. DEA agents were with Portillo-Rodriguez during the

call and recorded the conversation, during which the men

agreed to meet that afternoon to complete the drug deal. The

meeting place arranged this time was near the body shop

where Solorio worked. When Portillo-Rodriguez asked,

“What’s gonna be the, the number of people,” which, according to the evidence at trial, was code for the number of

pounds Solorio was selling, Solorio replied, “Five.” PortilloRodriguez then asked, “[S]o after all it’s not . . . all 7 weren’t

gonna go?” Solorio responded, “He couldn’t,” but assured

Portillo-Rodriguez that the deal was for “sure.” 

UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 405
As the men had discussed, Portillo-Rodriguez met Solorio

near Solorio’s workplace. At first, Solorio indicated once

again that he did not want to complete the deal, this time

explaining that he was “nervous because there was a van or

vehicle there that he didn’t like the looks of.” Agent Rubino,

who was monitoring the conversation, alerted other agents

that the van, which was indeed a DEA surveillance vehicle,

needed to be moved. Soon, the “suspicious” van left, and

Jimenez joined Portillo-Rodriguez and Solorio. The three men

then walked to a gray van that Portillo-Rodriguez recognized

as the same one Solorio and Jimenez had driven to their previous meeting at Costco.

Solorio proceeded to raise the gray van’s hood, and Jimenez took a black plastic bag out of a microwave oven in the

back seat. According to Portillo-Rodriguez, there were

“pound disks” of “coffee-colored” drugs inside the bag. Solorio explained that the disks were stained with coffee “to

throw the dogs off.” Portillo-Rodriguez told Solorio that he

would get the money from his car and advised him not to

lower the hood of the van. As Portillo-Rodriguez walked

toward his car alone, he repeated the phrase “Lake Tahoe,”

the prearranged arrest signal. The two DEA arrest teams then

descended upon the scene and arrested Solorio and Jimenez.

A total of approximately twenty agents were involved in

the undercover operation, each assigned to one of a variety of

responsibilities. About eight to ten of the agents conducted

surveillance of the meeting. At least two of those agents

broadcast their observations over a radio, one from a van

“parked on a street overlooking the parking lot area,” and one

from an airplane overhead.3 Other agents were assigned to the

3

It is unclear precisely how many agents participated in the broadcasting. Rubino first testifies that, to the best of her recollection, there were

two agents who broadcast their observations. Subsequently, however, she

stated that she “heard radio traffic from different surveillance vehicles

who were observing, in addition to the airplane that was observing.”

406 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
arrest teams and charged with taking the suspects into custody

once the arrest signal was given. Agent Kenneth Mazza, an

arrest team member, was “a few blocks away,” monitoring the

live transmissions that the broadcasting agents sent over the

radio. Agent Rubino monitored the body wire that PortilloRodriguez wore to the meeting and was assigned “to be security for” him. Rubino also listened to the radio traffic from the

different surveillance vehicles and the airplane that were

observing Solorio’s actions. Like Mazza, Rubino was in a van

parked “blocks away,” and did not personally see the interactions among Portillo-Rodriguez, Solorio, and Jimenez. After

Portillo-Rodriguez gave the “Lake Tahoe” arrest signal,

Rubino informed the arrest team that “it was a bust” and that

they should move in and arrest the subjects. 

C. The methamphetamine

1. Testimony of Agent Joseph Muenchow

(“Muenchow”)

As the assigned “finder” during the “buy bust” operation,

Muenchow was responsible for maintaining custody and control of evidence. In that capacity, he was in charge of transporting any drugs back to the DEA office, processing them,

and securing them until they could be sent to a laboratory for

analysis.

After the arrest signal was given, Muenchow followed

Mazza to the gray van where Solorio and Jimenez had taken

Portillo-Rodriguez. Mazza pulled out a black plastic bag from

a microwave on the back seat of the van and handed it to

Muenchow. Muenchow opened the bag and observed “five

disks” of an “off white, kind of powdery, chunky substance

with some black particles sprinkled on them which appeared

to be coffee grounds.” The disks “were each individually

wrapped in . . . a clear cellophane.”

UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 407
Muenchow took the drugs back to the DEA’s San Jose

office. There, he removed a “little bit of sample” from the

suspected drugs and performed a presumptive field test—that

is, a preliminary test that would indicate whether the substance was probably methamphetamine, but which was not

definitive. The suspected drugs tested presumptively positive

for methamphetamine. Muenchow then put the drugs in an

evidence bag, filled out the label on the bag, and heat-sealed

the bag. He then weighed the drugs, their packaging, and the

evidence bag, determining that the gross weight was approximately 2,490 grams.4

 At that point, Muenchow put the evidence “in the temporary drug evidence safe pending transfer

to the DEA West Regional Lab.” He did not alter the evidence

in any way before putting it into the evidence locker. Muenchow never again saw the drugs seized from Solorio.

At trial, the prosecution produced, and Muenchow identified, Government Exhibit 2 as the original evidence bag in

which he had sealed the drugs. Describing the DEA protocol

for transporting drugs from the evidence locker in San Jose to

the Western Regional Laboratory in San Francisco, Muenchow stated, “When you get evidence, drug evidence, you fill

out what’s called a DEA 7, which is a report of seizure.”

Muenchow recounted that he had filled out such a report on

the bag, which included the case number, exhibit number,

weight, name of the person who had acquired and sealed the

evidence (that is, Muenchow), name of a witness to the sealing, and the location and date of seizure. Below this information, Muenchow testified, the report had “a section for

transport and custody,” which contained the name of the agent

who transferred the bag to the DEA lab and the signature of

the lab custodian. Muenchow did not, however, have any personal knowledge of what happened to the bag after he placed

it in the DEA safe in San Jose. Instead, he testified only that

information inscribed on the DEA 7 indicated that the drugs

seized from Solorio had been transported to San Francisco.

4

2,490 grams equals approximately 5.5 pounds. 

408 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
Muenchow also testified that his original heat seal on the bag

had been broken and that the bag had been resealed. Consistent with Muenchow’s testimony, the report on the bag

reflects that it had been opened and resealed twice, once on

September 15, 1999, and once on September 28, 2009, but

does not say who did the reopening and resealing or why.

Muenchow opened the evidence bag during the trial, observing, “Now [the drug’s] no longer in disk form. It’s chunky,

off-white powdery substance which would have been done at

the lab. . . . This looks like part of the original disks. . . . There

is still some shape, part of a disk. It looks like they’re quartered.”

2. Testimony of Brittany Huntington (“Huntington”)

Huntington, a forensic scientist at the DEA laboratory in

San Francisco, testified that she received Government Exhibit

2 on November 19, 2009. She described the exhibit as “three

heat sealed bags that all contain the same powder in various

sizes.” Someone at the laboratory had handed her the bags;

she did not know where they had come from before that. As

soon as Huntington received the bags, she weighed them and

determined the net weight of the drugs, excluding all the

packaging, to be approximately 1,850 grams.5 She then took

about a gram and a half of the substance and performed tests

on it, from which she concluded, with no doubt in her mind,

that “all three of the powders within this packaging . . . contained methamphetamine.” Upon examining the exhibit at

trial, Huntington testified that “[t]he outer packaging is now

cut open, but everything else is exactly the same.”

In addition, Huntington testified that she tested Government Exhibit 1, which the prosecution represented to be the

5

1,850 grams equals approximately 4.1 pounds. The amount Huntington

received was thus nearly one and a half pounds less than the aggregate

weight of the five “pound disks,” their cellophane wrapping, and the black

plastic bag they were originally in.

UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 409
drug sample that Solorio had given to Portillo-Rodriguez on

May 3, 1999. Huntington attested that she came into possession of this substance also on November 19, 2009, and that it

came with “the previous chemists’s report” and “the packaging sealed by that chemist.” Through her analysis, Huntington

identified that drug sample to be methamphetamine as well,

and said that she was absolutely certain of the identification.

D. Trial

Solorio was tried by a jury in January 2010. PortilloRodriguez testified at length against him, in Spanish, with

translation by interpreters Carol Rhine-Medina and Aracely

Callaway. On the first day of trial, the court instructed the

jurors:

There may be Spanish language used during the trial.

The evidence you are to consider is only that provided through the official court interpreter. Although

some of you may know Spanish, it is . . . important

that all jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore,

you must accept the English translation and you

must disregard any different meaning.

On the second day of trial, Rhine-Medina interpreted while

Portillo-Rodriguez was sworn in; she was not herself administered an oath at that time. Solorio raised no objection to

Rhine-Medina’s failure to take an oath just before she translated or to her subsequent translation. The following day, Callaway translated for Portillo-Rodriguez. The court asked

Callaway to remind Portillo-Rodriguez that he was still under

oath, but, again, did not administer an oath at that time to Callaway herself. Once more, Solorio raised no objection to the

translation or to the failure of the interpreter to take an oath

just before beginning her translation.

Mazza, Rubino, Muenchow, and Huntington, also testified

against Solorio. The government did not, however, introduce

410 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
as witnesses the agents who had actually observed Solorio’s

interactions with Portillo-Rodriguez and Jimenez during the

June 3, 1999 “buy bust” operation. Instead, Mazza and

Rubino testified about the surveillance observations of the

nontestifying agents, which had been broadcast over the DEA

radio system. Solorio objected to this testimony on hearsay

grounds,6 but the trial court overruled his objections, holding

the testimony admissible under the present sense impression

exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed R. Evid. 803(1).

Ultimately, the jury convicted Solorio of both possession

with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of a substance

containing methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute 500

or more grams of a substance containing methamphetamine.

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), 846.

II.

Discussion

A. Interpreter oaths

Solorio raises for the first time on appeal his contention that

the district court committed reversible error by failing to

administer oaths to Portillo-Rodriguez’s interpreters before

they translated his testimony at trial. We review for plain

error. See United States v. Matus-Zayas, 655 F.3d 1092, 1098

(9th Cir. 2011). 

[1] Under the version of Federal Rule of Evidence 604 in

effect at the time of Solorio’s trial, “[a]n interpreter is subject

to . . . the administration of an oath or affirmation to make a

6During a pretrial hearing, the prosecution notified the court that it

intended to introduce “contemporaneous surveillance observations of nontestifying agents as present sense impressions under the hearsay rule.” Solorio objected on both hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds. The trial

judge reserved his ruling on the objections at that point, and Solorio did

not renew his Confrontation Clause objections at trial. 

UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 411
true translation.” Fed. R. Evid. 604 (2010).7

 Interpreters who

translate the testimony of witnesses on the stand are covered

by this requirement. See United States v. Taren-Palma, 997

F.2d 525, 532 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by

United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994). Rule 604 does

not, however, indicate whether such an oath must be administered in any particular manner or at any specified time,

including whether the oath must be administered for each

trial. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts

(“AO”), has published guidelines on the administration of

oaths to interpreters, observing that “[p]olicies with regard to

the oath of interpreters vary from district to district and from

judge to judge.” 5 Guide to Judiciary Policy § 350(b) (2010).

Although some courts administer oaths to interpreters each

day, or once for an entire case, others “administer the oath to

staff and contract interpreters once, and keep it on file.” Id. 

[2] We agree with the courts that proceed in the latter fashion that there is no requirement that the oath be administered

during each trial. Most telling in that regard is the absence of

any such requirement—or any indication as to how or when

interpreters are to be qualified and their oaths administered—

in Rule 604. In contrast, Rule 603, applicable to witnesses,

specifies that the oath must be administered “[b]efore testifying,” suggesting a temporal nexus to the actual appearance of

each witness at a particular trial.8 Unlike witnesses, an interpreter’s role is not limited to a specific trial, and there is no

apparent reason the oath need be either. In the absence of any

requirement that the interpreter’s oath be administered during

7Rule 604 was amended in 2011 for purely stylistic reasons and now

reads, “An interpreter . . . must give an oath or affirmation to make a true

translation.” Fed. R. Evid. 604 (2011); see Fed. R. Evid. 604 advisory

committee’s note. 

8Federal Rule of Evidence 603 was also amended in 2011 for purely

stylistic reasons; the changes do not reflect an “intent to change any result

in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” Federal Rule of Evidence 603

advisory committee’s note. 

412 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
each new trial, it could not have been plain error for the trial

judge to have failed to do so.

[3] The record does not, however, indicate that the interpreters took the requisite oath at any time.9

 Nonetheless, if

they did not, and there was therefore error, any error did not

affect Solorio’s substantial rights, as is required for reversal

on plain error review. See Matus-Zayas, 655 F.3d at 1098. We

reject one strand of the government’s argument as to why this

is so: that the interpreters each “translated the oath to testify

truthfully to the confidential informant, which served as a

reminder of their own duty to faithfully translate.” As noted,

the Federal Rules of Evidence contain a separate rule requiring that witnesses be administered an oath prior to testifying.

See Fed. R. Evid. 603 (“Before testifying, every witness shall

be required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully,

by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to

awaken the witness’ conscience and impress the witness’

mind with the duty to do so.”). That Rule 604, which is specifically directed at interpreters, exists in addition to Rule 603

indicates that the two rules impose independent requirements

that must both be met. Thus, the fact that Rhine-Medina and

Callaway helped administer oaths to Portillo-Rodriguez does

not substitute for the Rule 604 requirement that they themselves be administered oaths.

[4] Solorio nonetheless cannot prevail on plain error

grounds, as he has not shown prejudice arising from the trial

court’s possible error. Solorio does not challenge the accuracy

of the translations by identifying potentially material mistakes

or irregularities in the interpretation of Portillo-Rodriguez’s tes9Of course, had the issue been raised at trial, it would undoubtedly have

been clarified whether they did or not, and there is no indication that they

did not. To avoid similar arguments on appeal in the future, it would be

preferable for district courts to place on the record of each trial in which

interpreters appear that proper qualification and oath-taking procedures

have been followed. 

UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 413
timony.10 Nor does he claim that either interpreter engaged in

unlawful conduct. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that “[a]s

to [court interpreters], the fundamental question is normally

one of qualification, not of veracity or fidelity. In the absence

of special circumstances, the latter qualities are assumed.”

United States v. Perez, 651 F.2d 268, 273 (5th Cir. Unit A

July 1981). Because Solorio has not shown that he was prejudiced by any failure to administer Rule 604 oaths to PortilloRodriguez’s interpreters, any error did not affect Solorio’s

“substantial rights” and therefore did not constitute plain error

warranting reversal. See Matus-Zayas, 655 F.3d at 1098.

[5] Nor did any failure to administer oaths to PortilloRodriguez’s interpreters, combined with the trial court’s

instruction that the jury could only consider the English translation presented by the interpreters, result in a Confrontation

Clause violation. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that, “[i]n

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .

to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const.

amend. VI. The interpreters, who only translated PortilloRodriguez’s in-court statements, were not themselves witnesses who testified against Solorio. See Taren-Palma, 997

F.2d at 532 (distinguishing between a “language expert” who

took the stand and testified about his out-of-court translation

of a taped conversation and “interpreters who translate the

testimony of witnesses on the stand”). Because Solorio had

the opportunity to confront Portillo Rodriguez, the actual

adverse witness, whose testimony the interpreters merely

translated, there was no Confrontation Clause violation.

10Solorio identifies only a single discrepancy between Rhine-Medina’s

interpretation of Portillo-Rodriguez’s testimony and the translated transcript of his conversation with Solorio on June 3, 1999. With respect to

the hood of the van, which Solorio had put up, the transcript indicates that

Portillo-Rodriguez said, “Don’t take them down.” In contrast, PortilloRodriguez clarified, through Rhine-Medina’s interpretation, that he really

said, “Don’t put it down.” If anything, however, this discrepancy affirms

the accuracy of Rhine-Medina’s interpretation, which, unlike the out-ofcourt translation, is consistent with the context of Portillo-Rodriguez’s

statement. 

414 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
B. “Present sense impressions” of nontestifying agents11

We next consider whether the admission of Mazza’s and

Rubino’s testimony violated Solorio’s constitutional right to

confrontation because the two agents recounted the present

sense impressions of nontestifying agents. Solorio did not

object on Confrontation Clause grounds to the admission of

these statements at trial, so we review for plain error. See

Matus-Zayas, 655 F.3d at 1098. We hold that the district court

did not plainly err in admitting the statements; the remaining

prongs of the plain error inquiry are therefore not pertinent.

See Wahid, 614 F.3d at 1016 n.2.

[6] The Confrontation Clause covers only “testimonial”

statements. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52

(2004). Although the Supreme Court did not set forth a comprehensive definition of the term “testimonial” in Crawford,

it provided examples of what falls within the “core class” of

“testimonial statements”:

ex parte in-court testimony or its functional

equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial

statements that declarants would reasonably expect

to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements

. . . contained in formalized testimonial materials,

such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or

confessions; [and] statements that were made under

circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would

be available for use at a later trial.

11Solorio concedes that the contemporaneous observations of the nontestifying agents were properly admitted as “present sense impressions”

under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1). See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d

1414, 1422 (9th Cir. 1995). He thus does not appeal the admission of these

statements on hearsay grounds. 

UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 415
541 U.S. at 51-52 (first alteration in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Jensen v. Piller, 439

F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006) (characterizing Crawford’s

formulation of “testimonial” statements as statements “made

to a government officer with an eye toward trial”). 

[7] Post-Crawford cases have clarified somewhat the limits

of the testimonial statement category. First, Davis v. Washington held that statements made during a police interrogation

“are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate

that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary

purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past

events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” 547

U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Next, Michigan v. Bryant reiterated that

when “the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond

to an ‘ongoing emergency,’ its purpose is not to create a

record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause.” 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (quoting

Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). Bryant also explained that there can

be an “ongoing emergency” even after the original threat to

a victim has ceased to exist, so long as there is “a threat

potentially to the police and the public.” Id. at 1164; see also

id. at 1157 (“An ongoing emergency has a[n] . . . effect of

focusing an individual’s attention on responding to the emergency.”). Thus, while “statements made in the absence of any

interrogation are [not] necessarily nontestimonial,” Davis, 547

U.S. at 822 n.1, and the admissibility of a statement under a

hearsay exception is not controlling with respect to Confrontation Clause analysis, see Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 1098,

1108 (9th Cir. 2011); Ponce v. Felker, 606 F.3d 596, 599 (9th

Cir. 2010), statements made out-of-court with a primary purpose other than possible prosecutorial use are nontestimonial.

[8] In this case, the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction

arises with regard to statements by two or more DEA agents

on the scene, made before and during the drug sale for which

Solorio was prosecuted. Those agents broadcast to other

agents their contemporaneous observations of Portillo416 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
Rodriguez’s interactions with Solorio and Jimenez. For reasons not explained in the record, the observing agents did not

testify at trial. Solorio contends that “[t]he observations of the

agents were formally recorded by Mazza and Rubino as present sense impressions in order that they could be used for

prosecution purposes, to create a record for trial, if necessary.” In contrast, the government maintains that the two

agents communicated their observations to the other agents to

ensure the success and safety of the operation, by assuring

that all agents involved knew what was happening and

enabling them to gauge their actions accordingly. 

The record supports the government’s characterization. The

“buy bust” operation was a high-risk situation involving the

exchange of a large amount of money and a substantial quantity of drugs. It took place near Solorio’s work place, a location that he had selected, presumably because it placed him at

a strategic advantage should anything go wrong. That Solorio

was wary of the situation was confirmed by his initial reluctance to complete the deal when he saw the “suspicious” van

—a van that was, in fact, a DEA surveillance vehicle. The

agents also knew that Solorio was accompanied by Jimenez,

but did not know whether the two men were armed. So the

agents did not know exactly what might happen if Solorio discovered that the exchange was a set-up and that PortilloRodriguez was actually a government informant. 

Under these circumstances, an objective observer could

reasonably believe that the undercover operation posed a

safety threat to Portillo-Rodriguez, and to the DEA agents on

the scene were they found out. By reporting their contemporaneous observations over the radio, the nontestifying agents

enabled the testifying agents to monitor the operation, to stay

ready to protect Portillo-Rodriguez and the on-the-scene

agents should it prove necessary, and to be promptly alerted

when it was time for them to play their assigned roles once

the arrest was triggered—in Mazza’s case helping to arrest

UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 417
Jimenez, and in Rubino’s case, securing the informant,

Portillo-Rodriguez.12

[9] The circumstances thus suggest that, like an “ongoing

emergency,” which “has a[n] . . . effect of focusing an individual’s attention on responding to the emergency,” Bryant,

131 S. Ct. at 1157, the undercover operation focused the surveilling agents’ attention on reporting the unfolding events to

others working with them. Accordingly, objectively assessed,

the “primary purpose” of the agents’ statements was assuring

that the arrest effort both succeeded and did not escalate into

a dangerous situation, not “to create a record for trial,” id. at

1155.

Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained in Bryant, “because the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the

primary purpose of resolving [an] emergency is presumably

significantly diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not

require such statements to be subject to the crucible of crossexamination.” Id. at 1157. Similarly, the “prospect of fabrication” in statements made for the principal purpose of ensuring

the safety and success of an undercover operation is “significantly diminished.” Id. Although, “after Crawford the

‘obviou[s] reliab[ility]’ of a testimonial statement does not

dispense with the Confrontation Clause,” Bullcoming v. New

Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011) (alterations in original)

(quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62), that quality is informative

in this case, as it was in Bryant, in determining whether the

statement was or was not testimonial in the first place.

[10] We therefore hold that the district court did not

plainly err in admitting the nontestifying agents’ statements.

12Rubino testified that she was “responsible for the informant,” which

ordinarily meant “secur[ing] him and get[ting] him out of the area.” She

did not, however, specifically recall what she did in this instance once the

arrest was triggered.

418 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
C. Sufficiency of evidence

Next, we address Solorio’s argument that there was such a

major gap in the chain of custody between the substance

seized from him and the drugs produced at trial that there was

insufficient evidence to convict him of possession with intent

to distribute 500 or more grams of a substance containing

methamphetamine. Solorio preserved this claim by making a

Rule 29 motion at the close of evidence. We therefore undertake de novo review of the sufficiency of the evidence. See

United States v. Green, 592 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010).

[11] To sustain Solorio’s conviction under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), there must be sufficient evidence from which a

rational juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, see

United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-65 (9th Cir.

2010) (en banc), that the substance seized from Solorio was,

in fact, methamphetamine, and that the amount of methamphetamine seized was 500 or more grams. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). As to this factual question, the government relied largely, although not exclusively, on testimony

regarding the testing results on a substance contained in a

plastic evidence bag and said to be the methamphetamine

seized during the raid on June 3, 1999. Solorio does not contend that the drug evidence was inadmissible.13 Instead, the

13In this respect, this case diverges from the line of cases in which

defendants have relied on alleged discrepancies in the chain of evidence

to challenge the admissibility rather than weight of evidence. See, e.g.,

United States v. Edwards, 235 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1991).; Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d

914 (9th Cir. 1960). As we have held in those cases, before such evidence

can be admitted, “[t]he prosecution must introduce sufficient proof so that

a reasonable juror could find that the items [that the prosecution seeks to

admit into evidence] are in ‘substantially the same condition’ as when they

were seized.” Harrington, 923 F.2d at 1374 (quoting Gallego, 276 F.2d at

917)). In other words, “[t]he district court may admit the evidence if there

is a ‘reasonable probability the article has not been changed in important

UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 419
parties agree that “[t]he possibility of a break in the chain of

custody goes only to the weight of the evidence.” United

States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1991).

The record supports conflicting inferences regarding

whether the substance seized from Solorio on June 3, 1999,

was the same as that tested by Huntington and produced at

trial. On the one hand, Solorio argues that “the contents of the

bag appeared to be different when they were produced at trial

than when Agent Muenchow first sealed the bag.” Whereas

Muenchow had seized five “pound disks” that “were each

individually wrapped in . . . a clear cellophane,” and held in

a black plastic bag, the substance produced at trial was “no

longer in disk form,” and was contained in “three heat sealed

bags” that held “powder in various sizes.” In addition, the evidence weighed nearly one and a half pounds less than the

weight Muenchow had recorded, albeit this difference

included the weight of the cellophane wrapping and the black

plastic bag. The outer evidence bag had also been unsealed

and resealed twice between when Muenchow had sealed it

and when Huntington received it, by people and for reasons

unidentified in the record. These facts could certainly support

an inference that the contents of the evidence bag, as received

by Huntington, may not have been in the bag when Muenchow originally sealed it, or that the contents had been materially altered before they reached Huntington.

On the other hand, the drugs produced at trial came to Huntington in an outer evidence bag that, according to Muenchow, looked like the one he had sealed and bore his report

from 1999. The DEA 7 report also reflected that the drugs had

respects.’ ” Id. (quoting Gallego, 276 F.2d at 917). Because Solorio did

not challenge the admissibility of the drugs, we do not rule on whether

there was a “reasonable probability” that the drug evidence “ha[d] not

been changed in important respects.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

420 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
been transported from San Jose to San Francisco. In addition,

the substance seized by Muenchow had been an “off white,

kind of powdery, chunky substance,” and the substance produced at trial was likewise a “chunky, off-white powdery substance.” Upon examining the evidence at trial, moreover,

Muenchow observed, “This looks like part of the original

disks. . . . There is still some shape, part of a disk. It looks like

they’re quartered.”

[12] The methamphetamine produced at trial was well over

500 grams, as was required to convict Solorio, so the weight

difference from the drugs seized was not material. See 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), 846. While no reasonable juror

could conclude that the drug evidence remained unchanged,

a reasonable juror could nonetheless infer that the evidence

produced at trial consisted of remnants of the original

methamphetamine disks in fragmented form. Such a juror

could also conclude that although some of the drugs was

missing, the chemical composition of the remaining drugs had

not been altered. 

We need not determine whether or not this permissible

inference would be sufficient in itself for a reasonable juror

to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance

seized during the raid was methamphetamine, in the requisite

amount. It need not be, as long as other evidence, combined

with the inference premised on the contents of the bag, would

permit a reasonable juror to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that the substance seized from Solorio was methamphetamine. Viewing the record as a whole, not just the testimony concerning the evidence bag, there was sufficient

evidence regarding the substance seized during the raid to

sustain the verdict. 

At their first meeting in the casino, Solorio told PortilloRodriguez that he could sell him methamphetamine. Solorio

provided Portillo-Rodriguez with a small drug sample, which

tested positive for methamphetamine based on both a preUNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 421
sumptive field test performed by DEA agents and a subsequent laboratory analysis performed by Huntington. In

addition, Portillo-Rodriguez spoke with Solorio on May 12,

1999 and agreed to buy seven pounds of methamphetamine at

$5,000 per pound, which was consistent with the going rate

for the drug in San Jose at the time. On June 3, 1999, prior

to their afternoon meeting, Portillo-Rodriguez spoke again

with Solorio and inquired how many pounds Solorio would be

selling. When Solorio said five, Portillo-Rodriguez expressed

surprise that it was not seven pounds. A rational juror could

infer from this conversation that the men were discussing a

methamphetamine deal, because Portillo-Rodriguez had previously agreed to buy seven pounds of methamphetamine

from Solorio. Finally, the substance seized from Solorio

tested positive for methamphetamine in the presumptive field

test that Muenchow performed. Although Muenchow

acknowledged that presumptive tests can yield false positives,

a fact finder could still rely on the test as some evidence that

the substance was methamphetamine. 

[13] On the record as a whole, then, there was sufficient

other evidence to fill any gap in the chain of custody for the

bag carrying the drugs. Given that the jury resolved “a record

of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences” in

favor of the prosecution, Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted), and keeping in mind

the “great deference” that a court of appeals must give to a

jury verdict when reviewing for sufficiency of evidence,

United States v. Pelisamen, 641 F.3d 399, 409 n.6 (9th Cir.

2011), we hold that a rational fact-finder could conclude,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the substance Solorio meant

to sell to Portillo-Rodriguez was actually methamphetamine.

See United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 291-92 (9th Cir.

1992) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to support

a defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine despite “a controversy regarding the chain of custody”), abrogated in part on other grounds as recognized in

Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010, 1020 (9th Cir.

422 UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO
2006). There was therefore sufficient evidence to sustain the

verdict. 

D. Cumulative error

[14] There can be no cumulative error when a defendant

fails to identify more than one error. See United States v. Laurienti, 611 F.3d 530, 551 (9th Cir. 2010). As discussed above,

even if the trial court’s failure to administer oaths to PortilloRodriguez’s interpreters was plain error, the error did not

affect Solorio’s substantial rights. See supra Section II.A.

Because Solorio has not identified any other error, there is no

cumulative error warranting reversal. 

***

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Solorio’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES v. SOLORIO 423