[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-13045

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-tp-20072-JAL-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

REY JOMARRON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(June 9, 2016)

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Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Rey Jomarron appeals his 24-month sentence, imposed above the advisory 

Sentencing Guidelines range and at the statutory maximum, following revocation 

of his supervised release. On appeal, Jomarron argues that his sentence was 

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. After careful consideration, we 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Jomarron pled guilty to possession of counterfeit credit cards with intent to 

defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(3), (2). He was sentenced to two 

years’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. 

Some time after his release, Jomarron was arrested in Pembroke Pines, 

Florida, when police received a call alerting them to a potential fraudulent 

transaction at a local Best Buy store. After receiving a description of the suspect, 

Officer Keith Forseth observed an individual, Jomarron, who matched the 

description walking through the parking lot of the Best Buy and carrying a Best 

Buy shopping bag. Forseth identified himself and directed Jomarron to sit on a 

curb in the parking lot. Shortly after taking a seat, Jomarron dropped his bag and 

attempted to flee. Forseth managed to apprehend Jomarron. He then searched 

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Jomarron and found a laptop in Jomarron’s shopping bag, a receipt for the laptop, 

and two debit cards in Jomarron’s name. 

Another officer, Thomas Moran, determined that the debit cards were 

counterfeit after using a magnetic strip card reader to decipher the information 

encoded on the cards’ magnetic strips. The reader revealed that the cards were 

linked to Bank of America accounts but had the appearance of NetSpend Visa 

credit cards. Jomarron was not an authorized user on either account even though 

his name appeared on both cards. Moran was also able to determine that Jomarron 

had used one of the counterfeit cards to pay for the new laptop in his possession. 

Police arrested Jomarron and subsequently released him after he posted bail. 

After being released, Jomarron never notified his probation officer that he had been 

arrested. Instead, Jomarron fled to Panama. United States Marshalls eventually 

apprehended Jomarron when he attempted to reenter the United States at the Texas 

border. 

The probation department filed a superseding petition alleging that Jomarron 

had violated the terms of his release by committing seven offenses: (1) illegal use 

of a credit card, (2) forgery or alteration of a credit card, (3) grand theft, (4) 

resisting an officer, (5) failing to notify probation within 72 hours of being arrested 

or questioned by police, (6) failing to notify probation of a change in residence, 

and (7) leaving the judicial district without prior permission from probation. The 

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probation department recommended that the district court revoke Jomarron’s 

supervised release and calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of four to 10 

months’ imprisonment. The statutory maximum sentence was 24 months. 

At the revocation hearing, Jomarron admitted to violations five through 

seven of the superseding petition but did not admit to violations one through four. 

After hearing witness testimony and argument from counsel, the district court 

found Jomarron guilty of violations one through four. The court dismissed 

violations five through seven on the government’s motion. 

At sentencing, Jomarron asked for a sentence at the high end of the 

guidelines range. He explained that he had struggled to find work after being 

released. He further described how he had fled to Panama because he was 

concerned about how his mother, who was very ill at the time, would be affected 

by his incarceration. He also claimed that his co-conspirators to the credit card 

scheme had threatened to shoot him if he did not leave the country. 

The district court ultimately revoked Jomarron’s supervised release and 

sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum. The court 

noted that it had “considered the statements of the parties, the testimony . . . and 

the information contained in [Jomarron’s] violation report.” Revocation Hr’g Tr. 

at 31 (Doc. 21).1

 The court further explained that a sentence at the statutory 

 1 “Doc.” refers to the docket entry in the district court record in this case.

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maximum was appropriate because Jomarron had “previously [been] convicted of 

possession of counterfeit access devices” and he had “now [been] found to have 

violated his supervised release by the very same conduct for which he was 

[previously] sentenced.” Id. at 32. Jomarron objected to the procedural and 

substantive reasonableness of the imposed sentence. This is his appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION

“Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), upon finding that [a] defendant violated a 

condition of supervised release, a district court may revoke the term of supervised 

release and impose a term of imprisonment” after considering certain factors set 

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 

1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). These factors include the nature and circumstances 

of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need to afford 

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, the need to protect the public from further 

crimes, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to 

avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to 

victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), 3553(a). When the district court determines that a 

variance from the guidelines range is appropriate, it must then consider the extent 

of the variance and ensure that there is a sufficiently compelling justification for it. 

United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).

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We review a sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release for 

reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 

2006). In doing so, we review for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This standard reflects the due deference we give to district 

courts because they have an “institutional advantage in making sentencing 

determinations.” United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 735 (11th Cir. 

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[w]e may vacate a sentence only 

if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed 

a clear error of judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We conduct a 

de novo review, however, of the sufficiency of a district court’s explanation of a 

defendant’s sentence. United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 

2006).

Reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence is a two-step process. “We look 

first at whether the district court committed any significant procedural error and 

then at whether the sentence is substantively reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances.” Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378. The party challenging the sentence bears 

the burden of showing it is unreasonable in the light of the record and the relevant 

factors. Id. Jomarron contends that his sentence is both procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable. We address these arguments in turn. 

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A. Procedural Reasonableness

“A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the district court 

improperly calculates the Guidelines range, treats the Guidelines as mandatory 

rather than advisory, fails to consider the appropriate statutory factors, selects a 

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain the chosen 

sentence.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Jomarron contends that the district court committed procedural error by failing to 

explain adequately the basis of his sentence. Jomarron notes, in particular, that the 

court never explicitly stated it had considered the relevant policy statements of the 

Sentencing Guidelines. 

Jomarron is correct that a district court must explain its reasons for imposing 

a particular sentence. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(c). This explanation, however, need not be exhaustive. Rather, an 

acknowledgement by the court that it has considered the defendant’s arguments 

and the factors listed in § 3553(a) will satisfy this requirement. United States v. 

Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 2007). Moreover, “[t]he district court need 

not state on the record that it has explicitly considered each factor and need not 

discuss each factor.” Id. We typically conclude that a district court failed to 

adequately explain a sentencing decision only “when the record contain[s] no 

evidence that the district court had considered, or the defendant had even raised, 

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the applicability of any of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Smith, 568 F.3d 

923, 928 (11th Cir. 2009).

We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation of 

Jomarron’s sentence. The court heard and considered Jomarron’s arguments for 

why he should receive a sentence within the guidelines range. Jomarron’s counsel 

explained that Jomarron had difficulty finding work after being released and had 

fled the country after his arrest because he was threatened and because he was 

concerned his imprisonment might adversely affect his ill mother. Jomarron 

expressed remorse and apologized for his conduct. 

Apart from considering Jomarron’s and his counsel’s presentations, the court 

noted that Jomarron had “violated his supervised release by the very same conduct 

for which he was [previously] sentenced.” Revocation Hr’g Tr. at 32 (Doc. 21). 

The court also stated that it had considered Jomarron’s “criminal history” and the 

“statements of the parties, the testimony . . . and the information contained in 

[Jomarron’s] violation report” in deciding the appropriate sentence. Id. at 31-32.

Although the district court never explicitly referenced the § 3553(a) factors, 

the record clearly demonstrates that the court weighed them, both in considering 

Jomarron’s arguments and in deciding that a variance was appropriate. Jomarron’s 

protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the court was under no obligation to 

state on the record that it had considered all of the relevant § 3553(a) factors 

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(including the policy statements of the Sentencing Commission) when imposing its 

sentence. See Dorman, 488 F.3d at 938. The statements of the parties, the 

testimony of Officers Forseth and Moran, and Jomarron’s violation report, all of 

which the court considered, concerned the nature and circumstances of Jomarron’s 

offense. Similarly, the court clearly weighed Jomarron’s history and 

characteristics when it based Jomarron’s sentence on his “criminal history.” Id. at 

32. Finally, the fact that Jomarron had violated his supervised release by engaging 

in the same conduct for which he was previously convicted spoke to Jomarron’s 

propensity for engaging in criminal conduct, and thus whether there was a need to 

deter future criminal conduct and protect the public from him. Therefore, 

although the district court “fail[ed] to articulate specifically the applicability . . . of 

each of the section 3553(a) factors, . . . the record demonstrates that the pertinent 

factors were taken into account.” Smith, 568 F.3d at 927. That is all the law 

requires.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

Having determined that the district court’s sentencing decision was 

procedurally sound, we next consider the substantive reasonableness of Jomarron’s 

sentence. A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a substantively 

unreasonable sentence if it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant [§ 3553(a)] 

factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper 

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or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the 

proper factors.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The weight to be accorded any given 

§ 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court 

. . . .” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In imposing an upward variance, the district court may consider 

any information relevant to a defendant’s background, character, and conduct. See 

Tome, 611 F.3d at 1379. “[I]t is only the rare sentence that will be substantively 

unreasonable.” Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Jomarron contends that his sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment was 

unduly harsh for two reasons. First, he argues that the district court failed to 

consider relevant § 3553(a) factors. Second, he argues that a sentence within the 

guidelines range would have sufficiently accounted for his violation of supervised 

release. We reject both arguments. 

Jomarron argues that the district court failed to properly consider the 

§ 3553(a) factors, but, as we have already discussed, the court’s explanation of 

Jomarron’s sentence demonstrated that it considered and weighed them. Notably, 

a district court “abuses its considerable discretion and imposes a substantively 

unreasonable sentence only when it . . . fails to afford consideration to 

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relevant factors that were due significant weight.” Id. (emphasis added). Even if 

Jomarron had adequately demonstrated that the district court failed to consider all 

of the § 3553(a) factors—and he has not—he failed to show that any factors 

disregarded by the court were relevant and due significant weight. Jomarron’s

argument therefore fails to demonstrate that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. 

Jomarron’s second argument, that a sentence within the guidelines range 

would have been sufficient, fares no better than his first argument. In order to 

prevail on his appeal, Jomarron has “the burden of showing that [his] sentence is 

unreasonable in light of the entire record.” Id. In other words, he must show that 

the sentence he received is unreasonable, not simply that a different sentence 

would have served as an adequate punishment. Although the sentencing court 

must ensure that there is a sufficiently compelling justification for any variance 

from the guidelines range, Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378, a reviewing court may not 

presume a sentence is unreasonable simply because it is outside the guidelines 

range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Indeed, the Supreme Court has “forbidden us from 

requiring extraordinary circumstances to justify” a sentence outside the guidelines 

range. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Ultimately, despite the fact that Jomarron’s sentence represented a 

significant variance from the guidelines range, we cannot conclude that the district 

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court committed a clear error of judgment in imposing it. Jomarron originally pled 

guilty to possession of counterfeit credit cards with intent to defraud. After serving 

his prison sentence, he was released only to be arrested again for the same conduct. 

And instead of taking accountability for his conduct, he fled police not once, but

twice: he attempted to flee after he was initially identified by a police officer in 

the Best Buy parking lot and he fled the country after he was released on bail. The 

district court acted within the bounds of its discretion in deciding that this conduct 

warranted a significant upward variance. “[T]he sentence was within the outer 

bounds of the district court’s substantial sentencing discretion—in the ballpark of 

permissible outcomes.” Id. at 1257 (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that Jomarron has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is 

procedurally or substantively unreasonable. We therefore affirm the sentence the 

district court imposed.

AFFIRMED.

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