[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Harmon v. Cincinnati, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-2889.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-2889

HARMON ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE CITY OF CINCINNATI ET AL., APPELLANTS.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Harmon v. Cincinnati, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-2889.]

Civil service—R.C. 4117.10(A)—R.C. 2506.01(A)—Common pleas court not 

divested of jurisdiction to hear city employees’ administrative appeal 

regarding whether separation from employment under temporary 

emergency-leave program implemented in response to COVID-19 

pandemic constituted a layoff—Judgment affirmed.

(No. 2023-0559—Submitted January 9, 2024—Decided August 6, 2024.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,

No. C-220236, 2023-Ohio-788.

__________________

STEWART, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and 

FISCHER, DONNELLY, and BRUNNER, JJ., joined. DETERS, J., dissented, with an 

opinion joined by DEWINE, J.
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STEWART, J.

{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to determine whether the Hamilton County 

Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction over the administrative appeal of 

appellees, Jeffrey Harmon and David Beasley, from a decision of appellant the 

Cincinnati Civil Service Commission (“the commission”). We hold that Harmon 

and Beasley had a right to appeal the commission’s decision to the common pleas 

court under R.C. 2506.01 and that they were not precluded from doing so by R.C. 

4117.10. Accordingly, the common pleas court had jurisdiction over the 

administrative appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the First District Court 

of Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} Harmon and Beasley were longtime employees of appellant the City

of Cincinnati (“the city”) and members of a city-employees union, Cincinnati 

Organized and Dedicated Employees, Inc. (“CODE”). In April 2020, the city 

implemented a Temporary Emergency Leave (“TEL”) program to, among other 

things, mitigate anticipated financial losses resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic

by placing certain city employees on leave. The city explained at that time that it 

expected a decrease in income-tax revenue (the city’s main source of general 

revenue) due to the state-imposed delay in collection of income taxes and rising 

unemployment rates and that it expected decreases in revenue from sources such as 

parking meters and casino taxes.

{¶ 3} The city also explained that the declining revenue was coupled with 

an anticipated increase in pandemic-related costs like purchasing personal 

protective equipment for its employees. This anticipated financial double-hit had 

required the city to “take quick action to close [the] projected deficit.” As of 

March 30, 2020, the city forecasted that its general fund would experience a 

negative variance of $27.5 million instead of the pre-pandemic anticipated positive 

variance of $24 million. And given the uncertainty during the early days of the 
January Term, 2024

3

COVID-19 pandemic, the city could not confidently predict the loss in revenue and 

increase in expenses that it would incur. Therefore, the TEL program was intended 

to preserve basic services while helping to stabilize the city’s budget until the city 

could get a better handle on its finances. Workers placed on leave under the 

program could either use accrued paid leave to cover the leave period or elect to 

receive no payment from the city and be eligible for unemployment compensation 

from the State of Ohio.

{¶ 4} Harmon and Beasley were placed on leave under the program, and 

each used accrued paid leave for that time. They appealed the city’s decision to 

place them on leave to the commission, asserting that the city had not followed

proper procedure under Cincinnati Civil Service Rule 12 in conducting their layoffs

under the TEL program. CODE filed a grievance on behalf of its members, alleging 

claims similar to those of Harmon and Beasley. The city argued that the TEL 

program was not a layoff and therefore the civil-service rules concerning layoffs 

did not apply.

{¶ 5} The commission agreed with the city that the TEL program was not a 

layoff. However, the commission made that decision following Harmon and 

Beasley’s “appearance” before the commission rather than after a hearing. That is

because the commission had determined that Harmon and Beasley were not entitled 

to a hearing despite their request for one.

{¶ 6} There are key differences between an appearance and a hearing under 

the civil-service rules. At a hearing, the parties may call witnesses, present 

evidence, and subpoena witnesses and documents. See Cincinnati Civil Service 

R. 17. In contrast, an appearance is scheduled when “an individual or group has a 

matter which requires or might require the consideration or decision of the 

Commission,” and the civil-service rules do not require that the individual or group 

attend the appearance for the commission to consider the matter. Cincinnati Civil 

Service R. 2, § 5.
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4

{¶ 7} Harmon and Beasley appealed the commission’s determination that 

they were not entitled to a hearing to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

under R.C. 2506.01. That court reversed the commission’s determination and 

remanded the matter to the commission to conduct a hearing regarding whether the 

TEL program was a layoff. The city appealed that decision to the First District, 

arguing that the common pleas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider 

Harmon and Beasley’s appeal from the commission’s decision because the matter 

was governed by the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement (“the CBA”) and

because the commission’s determination regarding whether the TEL program was 

a layoff was not the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding. 2023-Ohio-788, ¶ 16, 21. 

The First District held that the common pleas court had jurisdiction to consider the 

appeal under the terms of the CBA and was not precluded from doing so by R.C. 

4117.10(A). 2023-Ohio-788 at ¶ 21-26. And the court of appeals held that the 

common pleas court had jurisdiction under R.C. 2506.01 because the commission’s 

decision denying a hearing was an adjudication from a quasi-judicial proceeding. 

2023-Ohio-788 at ¶ 20.

{¶ 8} This court accepted the city and the commission’s appeal to review 

two propositions of law:

1. A court considering whether an individual right of action 

i[s] preempted by R.C. 4117 must consider whether the underlying 

claim arose from or depended upon an interpretation of the 

collective bargaining rights guaranteed by a collective bargaining 

agreement. Where the cause of action requires interpretation of the 

collective bargaining agreement, the binding arbitration procedure 

provided by the contract is the exclusive remedy and the trial court 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
January Term, 2024

5

2. When there is uncertainty as to whether a party is entitled 

to a quasi-judicial hearing before a municipal civil service 

commission, a court must defer to the discretion of the 

administrative agency as to the interpretation of its rules. Where the 

commission finds that a party is not entitled to a quasi-judicial 

hearing pursuant to its rules, a trial court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear an administrative appeal under R.C. 2506.

See 2023-Ohio-2407.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. The common pleas court had jurisdiction to consider the administrative 

appeal under the terms of the CBA and was not precluded from doing so by

R.C. 4117.10(A)

{¶ 9} If a collective-bargaining agreement provides for a final and binding 

arbitration of grievances, the parties are subject solely to that grievance procedure. 

R.C. 4117.10(A). However, if there is no collective-bargaining agreement or the 

agreement does not cover a certain issue, the parties are subject to all applicable 

state or local laws and may bring claims outside the arbitration procedure. See id.

{¶ 10} In this case, there is a collective-bargaining agreement between the 

city and CODE. While many subjects fall exclusively within the arbitration-ofgrievances requirement of the CBA, § 10.1(B) of the CBA, which governs layoffs, 

specifically preserves an employee’s right “to appeal the procedural aspects of 

layoff or displacement to the Civil Service Commission.” Harmon and Beasley

maintain that because they were appealing procedural aspects of the TEL program

to the commission, their claims were not governed by the CBA’s grievance 

procedure.

{¶ 11} The city relies on the management-rights clause of § 5.2 of the CBA, 

which states that the city retains the rights “[t]o determine any and all terms and 
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conditions of employment not specifically set forth in [the CBA]” and “to layoff or 

relieve employees due to lack of work or funds or for other legitimate reasons.”1 

The city’s reliance on this provision fails for multiple reasons.

{¶ 12} Importantly, the city forfeited this argument because it did not raise 

it to the First District. The city admits that it did not raise the argument to the First 

District (and on review, we note that the terms “management” and “5.2” do not 

appear in the city’s merit brief or reply brief filed in the First District). But the city 

submits that it should have the opportunity to advance an argument in this court 

based on the management-rights clause because the First District sua sponte raised 

it and the city did not have a chance to develop the argument below. But, as the 

city also argues, the First District did not make any findings with respect to § 5.2

of the CBA (and like the city failed to do in its briefs filed in the First District, the 

First District did not refer to “management” or “5.2” anywhere in its decision). The 

First District did not sua sponte raise the issue of application of the managementrights clause, and there is no justification for the city’s failure to raise that argument 

below.

{¶ 13} Additionally, the city raised arguments regarding § 10.1 of the CBA 

and other specific language in the CBA in its briefs filed in the First District, so it 

had the opportunity to argue that the CBA supported a management-rights-clause

claim. But it failed to specifically mention § 5.2 of the CBA and thus forfeited any 

argument regarding that provision. See State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 21 

(“forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right or object to an error”).

{¶ 14} Even if the city did not forfeit the management-rights-clause

argument, it still fails to explain how that clause, which is relatively general in 

nature, should be given effect over the more specific layoff provisions in § 10.1 of 

the CBA. Instead, the city claims that § 5.2 proves that this matter is merely a 

1. While the city has maintained that the TEL program was not a layoff, it specifically cites the 

layoff language of § 5.2 of the CBA to support its arguments here.
January Term, 2024

7

contractual dispute, and it offers numerous policy and statutory-interpretation 

reasons for allowing only one avenue of relief for employees such as Harmon and 

Beasley. It is a maxim of contract interpretation that when two clauses of a contract 

appear to be inconsistent, the more specific clause prevails over the more general 

clause. See Gibbons-Grable Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 34 Ohio App.3d 170, 175

(8th Dist. 1986), citing Hoke v. Marcis, 127 N.E.2d 54, 55 (8th Dist. 1955). Here, 

§ 10.1 of the CBA specifically concerns layoff and displacement procedures, and 

that specific provision trumps the more general management-rights clause of § 5.2.

{¶ 15} Additionally, even if the TEL program is not a layoff under § 10.1

of the CBA, § 5.1 allows employees to enforce their individual employee rights 

concerning terms and conditions of employment not specified in the CBA, through 

the “normal Civil Service, regulatory, and/or judicial processes.” Other than § 10.1, 

no other part of the CBA addresses nondisciplinary leave or emergency or 

temporary leave. Therefore, even if the TEL program does not qualify under § 10.1 

as a layoff, an employee may still have an individual right of action under § 5.1,

because participation in the program was a condition of employment.2 The city 

does not dispute that § 5.1 applies and provides an individual right of action, but 

the city claims that the management-rights clause in § 5.2 of the CBA somehow 

overrides § 5.1. However, as discussed above, the city forfeited any arguments 

regarding the management-rights clause.

{¶ 16} Next, the city posits that policy reasons should bar any individual 

right of action outside those available under the CBA, especially in cases like this

2. The dissenting opinion claims that we “endorse[]” the court of appeals’ “either/or approach” in 

that we cite § 5.1 of the CBA as a basis for an action before the commission. However, both this 

majority opinion and the First District’s decision refer to § 5.1 in addressing the city’s argument that 

this action is barred by R.C. 4117.10 and the CBA. This is not a matter of the court’s “hedg[ing] its

bets,” dissenting opinion, ¶ 40, but is instead this court’s considering the propositions of law raised 

by the commission. The dissent may choose to focus its analysis solely on R.C. 2506.01, but this

majority opinion addresses both propositions of law put before us.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

one in which the union is proceeding with a claim identical to that in the 

individual’s action. While presenting identical claims in a single action may be 

good policy, the CBA governs and allows employees to assert their individual rights 

under § 5.1 and § 10.1. If the city wanted to foreclose an individual’s avenues for 

relief, it should have bargained for that result in the CBA. Instead, it now argues 

that (1) the CBA governs and Harmon and Beasley have no rights as individuals to 

challenge a layoff or a condition of their employment under the CBA (despite there 

being express language in the CBA to the contrary) and (2) policy rationale should 

override the CBA. The city cannot have it both ways. If the CBA applies, which 

it does under R.C. 4117.10(A), then the parties must follow the terms of the CBA, 

which include individual rights of appeal under § 10.1 and enforcement of those 

rights under § 5.1.

{¶ 17} The First District correctly concluded that under § 5.1 and § 10.1 of 

the CBA, Harmon and Beasley have a right to contest alleged procedural 

deficiencies in the TEL program. It also correctly concluded that the CBA did not 

terminate the common pleas court’s jurisdiction to hear the administrative appeal. 

Therefore, we reject the city’s first proposition of law.

B. The common pleas court had jurisdiction under R.C. 2506.01(A)

{¶ 18} A party may appeal any “final order, adjudication, or decision of any 

officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other 

division of any political subdivision” to the court of common pleas of the county in 

which the principal office of the political subdivision is located. R.C. 2506.01(A). 

However, the final order, adjudication, or decision appealed from must have been 

rendered in a quasi-judicial proceeding. State ex rel. McArthur v. DeSouza, 65 

Ohio St.3d 25, 27-28 (1992); M.J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio St.2d 150 

(1972), paragraph one of the syllabus. A quasi-judicial proceeding is a proceeding 

that requires notice, a hearing, and the opportunity to introduce evidence. See 

McArthur at 27, citing M.J. Kelley Co. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2024

9

Importantly, whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial is a question of law, not of fact. 

See In re Appeal of Howard, 73 Ohio App.3d 717, 719 (10th Dist. 1991).

“Whether there is an adjudication depends not upon what the 

administrative agency actually did, but rather upon what the 

administrative agency should have done. Where the administrative 

agency should have given notice, conducted a hearing and afforded 

the parties an opportunity to be heard and to introduce evidence, the 

order is the result of an adjudication even if the administrative 

agency fails to afford such notice and hearing.”

(Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Fern v. Cincinnati, 2005-Ohio-3168, ¶ 51 (1st

Dist.), quoting Howard at 719.

{¶ 19} Here, the commission was required to give notice and conduct a 

hearing under the Cincinnati Civil Service Rules. Under Cincinnati Civil Service 

R. 17, § 1, “[a]n employee may appeal . . . layoffs . . . by filing a notice of appeal 

with the Commission.” Harmon and Beasley timely filed their appeals with the 

commission under this rule, arguing that the city had violated the layoff procedures 

set forth in Cincinnati Civil Service R. 12.

{¶ 20} Upon the filing of an appeal under the civil-service rules, the 

commission must take numerous steps to conduct a hearing, including issuing 

notice. Cincinnati Civil Service R. 17, § 1(D). The commission must admit and 

consider evidence, allow the parties to be represented by counsel, and issue a 

decision that must be recorded in the commission’s minutes and sent to the parties. 

Cincinnati Civil Service R. 17, § 1(E)(3) and (5). The commission also has the 

power to issue subpoenas for witness testimony or documents and to administer 

oaths. See Cincinnati Civil Service R. 17, § 1(E)(3).
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10

{¶ 21} The commission did not set Harmon’s and Beasley’s appeals for a 

hearing or take any other steps required by Cincinnati Civil Service R. 17, such as 

issuing the subpoenas Harmon and Beasley had requested, because the commission

found that the TEL program was not a layoff and thus Cincinnati Civil Service

R. 17 did not apply. Instead, the commission held an “appearance” under 

Cincinnati Civil Service R. 2, § 5. An appearance does not require the same 

procedures as Cincinnati Civil Service R. 17, and the parties here agree that an 

appearance is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. At the appearance, the commission 

asked the parties some questions, including whether holding a hearing under 

Cincinnati Civil Service R. 17 would be tantamount to an admission that the TEL 

program was a layoff. Harmon and Beasley argued that the commission could take 

evidence at a hearing to determine whether the program was a layoff. The 

commission, however, did not allow the parties to present such evidence and 

summarily decided that the TEL program was not a layoff.

{¶ 22} Just as it did below, the city’s arguments here rest on the fact that the 

commission determined that a full hearing was unnecessary because, in its view,

the TEL program was not a layoff. We conclude that the commission exercised its 

discretion in deciding that the program was not a layoff, rendering the appearance 

a quasi-judicial proceeding. See M.J. Kelley Co., 32 Ohio St.2d at 153. And while 

the commission did not follow the requirements under Cincinnati Civil Service 

R. 17 for conducting a hearing, it was required to do so.

{¶ 23} There was disagreement among the parties regarding whether the 

TEL program was a layoff (though the city had analogized the program to a “mass 

layoff” in its frequently-asked-questions document concerning the program). 

Because there was some doubt regarding whether the program was a layoff, the

commission should have proceeded with a hearing to allow the parties to argue their 

positions. As the First District noted, “[t]he commission may not abandon its own 

rules and sua sponte decide that the leave under the TEL program was not a layoff 
January Term, 2024

11

prior to holding a hearing on that issue.” 2023-Ohio-788 at ¶ 19. If the commission 

had conducted a hearing, there would have been no doubt that the common pleas 

court had jurisdiction over Harmon and Beasley’s appeal, and a hearing would have 

provided greater insight and detail into the matter for the court to consider in 

making its decision. Regardless, because the commission’s decision was the result 

of a quasi-judicial proceeding, the common pleas court had subject-matter 

jurisdiction to review the decision on administrative appeal and to ultimately 

remand the matter to the commission for a hearing.

{¶ 24} The city contends that the commission has the authority to interpret 

its own rules and that it was within the commission’s discretion to determine 

whether a hearing was required. The city attempts to distinguish this case from the 

First District’s decision in State ex rel. Bower v. Cincinnati, 2023-Ohio-3369 (1st

Dist.). In that case, Bower, a sergeant with the Cincinnati Police Department, had 

challenged the city’s failure to follow a promotional-eligibility-exam grading rule 

requiring examinee anonymity. Bower at ¶ 2-7. The First District determined that 

the commission had been required to hold a hearing on the challenge because 

Cincinnati Civil Service R. 17, § 2, allowed an appeal regarding “‘the grading of 

an examination’ ” (emphasis deleted), Bower at ¶ 17; id. at ¶ 18-21. Here, the city 

states that in contrast, “[Cincinnati Civil Service] R. 12 provides no indication that 

the Commission can review the determination of whether a layoff occurred.” But 

at the same time, the city argues that the commission was authorized to interpret its 

own rules to find that a layoff did not occur—without even holding a hearing. But 

both arguments cannot be correct. Either the commission has the authority to 

determine that a layoff occurred or it does not have the authority to do so. In either 

event, the city’s analysis does not support a claim that the commission is permitted 

to make such determinations without following proper procedure under its own 

rules. Additionally, the city’s argument that there is a distinction between this case 

and Bower is unavailing because Cincinnati Civil Service R. 17, § 1 allows an 
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12

appeal concerning layoffs, just like § 2 of that rule allows an appeal concerning the 

grading of an exam.

{¶ 25} The city also argues that the TEL program is not encompassed by 

Cincinnati Civil Service R. 17, because the civil-service rules do not specifically 

contemplate or otherwise address the TEL program and therefore the commission 

was correct to set the matter for an appearance instead of a hearing. But the 

initiation of the program in April 2020 was a somewhat sudden response to the 

COVID-19 pandemic, so it makes sense that the program was not mentioned in the 

civil-service rules. And there is no requirement that the civil-service rules contain 

the exact name of a program for that program to fall under Cincinnati Civil Service 

R. 17. The commission was indeed required to determine whether the TEL program 

was a layoff, but that decision should have occurred only after it conducted a

hearing under Cincinnati Civil Service R. 17.

{¶ 26} The city argues that affirming the First District’s decision will

endorse a practice that will reward employees for “creative pleading” and using 

“magic words” to garner an otherwise unauthorized appeal. This argument is also 

unavailing. If a party appeals the procedural aspects of a layoff, an initial question 

should always be: Was there, in fact, a layoff such that the procedural civil-service 

rules apply? Whether there was a layoff is the baseline determination that the 

parties must establish or refute at the hearing, and the commission does not have 

the authority to undercut the procedure for making that initial determination. 

Further, this case is specifically about a rare instance of mandatory leave, because

it relates to an emergency measure that was taken in the early days of the COVID19 pandemic. The TEL program did not look typical, because it was created under 

atypical circumstances. The rarity of such circumstances further supports the 

conclusion that the commission should have conducted a hearing to determine 

whether the TEL program was a layoff before it summarily dismissed the appeals.
January Term, 2024

13

{¶ 27} The dissenting opinion ignores what the commission should have 

done in favor of what the commission actually did. But what the commission did 

is not what our caselaw requires, and it is apparent that the dissent knows better, 

because it cites the correct standard—“whether a proceeding is a quasi-judicial one 

. . . depends upon what the law requires the agency to do, not what the agency 

actually does,” State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. 

Cleveland, 2014-Ohio-4364, ¶ 36. See dissenting opinion at ¶ 43. We agree with 

the dissent that the commission needed to determine whether the TEL program was 

a layoff before considering Harmon’s and Beasley’s arguments regarding whether 

the city complied with the rules for a layoff. However, the dissenting opinion 

claims that the commission did not need to hold a hearing and that it could 

determine whether a layoff occurred by holding only an appearance, simply 

because that’s how the commission chose to proceed. That analysis rings hollow,

especially considering the dissenting opinion’s suggestion that we are finding that

Harmon and Beasley were appealing layoffs because that is what Harmon and 

Beasley said they were doing. Yet, the dissenting opinion would find that the 

commission had authority to forego a hearing, simply because the commission says 

it had such authority.3

{¶ 28} There is nothing in the Cincinnati Civil Service Rules that requires

such a determination to be made at an appearance under Cincinnati Civil Service 

R. 2, § 5, and the dissent concedes that Rule 2, § 5 only “plausibly” applies. It 

makes sense that the rules do not dictate that such questions be considered at an 

appearance. If parties are seeking a hearing on a matter, any questions about the 

subject matter of the hearing are best considered in the context of that hearing, not 

at a separate, standalone appearance under the rules. Indeed, allowing the 

commission to proceed with only an appearance based on nothing but its own 

3. As explained above, the city’s analysis does not even support a claim that the commission is 

permitted to make such determinations without following the proper procedure under its own rules.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14

determination of whether a layoff occurred seems to be a convenient way to allow 

the commission to escape appellate scrutiny, because parties who are dissatisfied 

with the results of an appearance do not have a right to appeal the results.

{¶ 29} Additionally, the dissent’s comparison of this case to Mun. Constr. 

Equip. Operators’ Labor Council, 2014-Ohio-4364, is inapt because that case 

applied different rules in a different type of action. In Mun. Constr. Equip. 

Operators’ Labor Council, the Cleveland Civil Service Rules required a 

predisciplinary hearing. Id. at ¶ 5-6. Only if the predisciplinary procedure resulted 

in an initial decision favoring a discharge, demotion, or suspension longer than ten 

days could the matter proceed to a full disciplinary hearing. See id. The employee 

in that case was given notice of a predisciplinary hearing under the Cleveland Civil 

Service Rules. See id. at ¶ 11. However, the City of Cleveland cancelled that 

hearing and immediately terminated the employee because it had found that he had 

not scored highly enough to retain his appointment. See id. at ¶ 12-13.

{¶ 30} The applicable rules and the facts in this case are different from those 

in Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council. This case does not involve a 

disciplinary matter, there was no requirement for a separate prehearing to determine 

whether a full hearing should be held, and there is no test or other rule that would 

definitively place Harmon’s and Beasley’s complaints outside of a hearing. The 

dissent tries to compare an appearance to a predisciplinary hearing, but there is no 

authority for such a comparison. Under the rules applicable in this case, there was 

no basis for the commission to divorce the baseline question of whether a layoff 

occurred from the hearing on the layoff procedures. As the dissent concedes, 

whether the TEL program was a layoff was an open question, and since the 

commission should have resolved it in a quasi-judicial proceeding, the common 

pleas court had jurisdiction to consider Harmon and Beasley’s appeal.

{¶ 31} The commission was required to conduct a hearing on Harmon’s and 

Beasley’s appeals. Since the commission should have conducted a hearing, its 
January Term, 2024

15

failure to do so rendered its decision the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding and 

Harmon and Beasley were thus permitted to appeal the commission’s decision to 

the court of common pleas under R.C. 2506.01(A).

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 32} None of the city’s arguments in this matter provide a basis to divest 

the common pleas court of jurisdiction to hear Harmon and Beasley’s 

administrative appeal. Under R.C. 4117.10(A), the CBA controls aspects of the 

parties’ relationship. But the CBA specifically preserved the rights of an individual 

to appeal to the commission the procedural aspects of his or her layoff, which is 

what Harmon and Beasley have asserted. Therefore, this matter falls outside the 

CBA’s arbitration procedure and the common pleas court had jurisdiction to

adjudicate Harmon and Beasley’s administrative appeal.

{¶ 33} Further, the commission was required to hold a hearing on the 

matter—not merely an appearance. But the commission’s failure to do so did not 

divest the common pleas court of jurisdiction under R.C. 2506.01, and the common 

pleas court was not required to defer to the commission’s incorrect application of 

its own rules. We therefore affirm the judgment of the First District Court of 

Appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

_________________

DETERS, J., joined by DEWINE, J., dissenting.

{¶ 34} The Cincinnati Civil Service Commission’s decision not to hear the 

appeals of Jeffrey Harmon and David Beasley was not the result of a quasi-judicial 

proceeding. For that reason, the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas lacked 

jurisdiction over Harmon and Beasley’s administrative appeal of the commission’s 

decision to that court. Because the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully

dissent.
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Harmon and Beasley appeal to the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission

{¶ 35} Understanding the procedural posture of this appeal is necessary to 

its resolution. In April 2020, Harmon and Beasley were placed on leave under the 

Temporary Emergency Leave program (“TEL”) instituted by the City of 

Cincinnati. Harmon filed an appeal with the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission 

(“the commission”), indicating the basis of his appeal was that “[l]ayoff procedures 

[were] not followed.” Similarly, Beasley appealed “the procedural aspects of [his] 

layoff” to the commission.

{¶ 36} Harmon and Beasley were scheduled for “appearance[s]” before the 

commission. According to an email sent to Harmon by an analyst with the city’s 

human-resources department, Harmon was going to be “given the opportunity to 

speak before the Commission.” After Harmon replied to that email asking for more 

time “to prepare for the hearing on [his] appeal and to submit supporting materials 

so there [would be] a record to support [his] appeal,” the analyst explained to him 

that “a hearing for th[e] matter ha[d] not been scheduled as [it was] not one that is 

covered under [Cincinnati Civil Service] Rule 17.” Similar correspondence 

occurred between the city and Beasley.

{¶ 37} An agenda for the July 2, 2020 commission meeting shows that 

agenda items titled “Jeffery Harmon regarding Temporary Emergency Leave” and 

“David Beasley regarding Temporary Emergency Leave” were placed in the 

category “APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION.” (Capitalization in 

original.) Minutes of the July 2 meeting indicate that the Harmon and Beasley 

matters were “Tabled” until the July 16 commission meeting. At the July 16 

meeting, Harmon and Beasley made their arguments as to why the TEL was a 

layoff. The commission then determined that the TEL was not a layoff, stating, 

“[The] Commission concludes that the [TEL] was not a layoff or separation and 

therefore is not an appealable matter under [Cincinnati] Civil Service Rule 17, 

Section 1.”
January Term, 2024

17

Harmon and Beasley appeal to the common pleas court

{¶ 38} Harmon and Beasley appealed to the common pleas court the 

commission’s decision to not hold hearings on their appeals under Cincinnati Civil 

Service Rule 17 (“Rule 17”). They amended their appeal to add a complaint for a 

writ of mandamus seeking to compel the commission to hold hearings on their 

appeals. The common pleas court determined that the commission erred by not 

holding hearings on whether the TEL was a layoff. The court remanded the matter 

to the commission “so that [Harmon and Beasley could] have the opportunity to 

present sworn testimony, to cross-examine witnesses, and/or to present other 

competent evidence concerning whether the TEL was a layoff.” Harmon v. 

Cincinnati, Hamilton C.P. No. A 2003055 (Apr. 27, 2022).

{¶ 39} The city appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, arguing that 

the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court of appeals 

concluded that the common pleas court had jurisdiction under R.C. 2506.01 

because Harmon and Beasley indicated that they were appealing the procedural 

aspects of their layoffs. 2023-Ohio-788, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.).

{¶ 40} Although the city’s assignment of error was limited to the question 

whether the common pleas court had jurisdiction, see id. at ¶ 14, the court of 

appeals’ decision exceeded the scope of that issue. Recall that the common pleas 

court had remanded the matter to the commission for a hearing limited to 

determining whether the TEL was a layoff. Presumably, if after that hearing the 

commission were to determine again that the TEL was not a layoff, then Harmon 

and Beasley would not be entitled to Rule 17 hearings. The court of appeals, 

however, hedged its bets. It decided that Harmon and Beasley could appeal to the 

commission under Rule 17, either because the TEL was a layoff or because they 

were entitled to enforce their rights under Section 5.1 of the parties’ collectivebargaining agreement. 2023-Ohio-788 at ¶ 25. Notably, the latter justification for 

the ability of Harmon and Beasley to appeal to the commission was created out of 
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whole cloth by the court of appeals; Harmon and Beasley grounded their appeals to 

the commission and their arguments in the common pleas court in their contention 

that the TEL was a layoff.

{¶ 41} The majority opinion concludes that the common pleas court had 

jurisdiction under R.C. 2506.01. It also endorses the court of appeals’ “either/or 

approach,” stating, “Therefore, even if the TEL program does not qualify under 

Section 10.1 [of the collective-bargaining agreement] as a layoff, an employee may 

still have an individual right of action under Section 5.1 [of the collectivebargaining agreement], because participation in the program was a condition of 

employment.” Majority opinion, ¶ 15. This approach is flawed. In my view, 

resolution of this appeal requires no more than an examination of the common pleas 

court’s jurisdiction under R.C. 2506.01(A).

The commission’s decision was not appealable under R.C. 2506.01(A)

{¶ 42} The common pleas court has jurisdiction to review “every final 

order, adjudication, or decision” of the commission, R.C. 2506.01(A). Only 

decisions resulting from quasi-judicial proceedings are appealable to the common 

pleas courts. M.J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio St.2d 150 (1972), paragraph 

one of the syllabus. Quasi-judicial proceedings are proceedings that have 

requirements for notice, a hearing, and the opportunity for introduction of evidence. 

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; see also State ex rel. Tremmel v. Erie Cty. Bd. 

of Elections, 2009-Ohio-5773, ¶ 16 (holding that “a hearing resembling a judicial 

trial” was “a quasi-judicial proceeding”); Rankin-Thoman, Inc. v. Caldwell, 42 

Ohio St.2d 436, 438 (1975) (“Quasi-judicial proceedings require notice, hearing 

and the opportunity for introduction of evidence.”).

{¶ 43} The absence of quasi-judicial hallmarks from an administrative 

proceeding is not dispositive of the question whether a decision in the proceeding 

may be appealed to the common pleas court under R.C. 2506.01, however. Rather, 

the question is whether the commission was required to conduct a proceeding with 
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those hallmarks. See State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council 

v. Cleveland, 2014-Ohio-4364, ¶ 36 (“whether a proceeding is a quasi-judicial one 

. . . depends upon what the law requires the agency to do, not what the agency 

actually does”); M.J. Kelley Co. at paragraph two of the syllabus (“Proceedings . . . 

are not quasi-judicial where there is no requirement for notice, hearing and the 

opportunity for introduction of evidence.”).

{¶ 44} Here, the majority acknowledges that “[a] quasi-judicial proceeding 

is a proceeding that requires notice, a hearing, and the opportunity to introduce 

evidence.” Majority opinion at ¶ 18. It applies this rule to what it says should have 

happened before the commission. But the majority reaches the wrong conclusion 

about what the commission was required to do and thus arrives at the wrong result.

{¶ 45} In the majority’s view, Harmon and Beasley were appealing layoffs 

because that is what Harmon and Beasley said they were doing. And according to 

the majority, because Harmon and Beasley said they were appealing layoffs, the 

commission should have held a hearing under Rule 17. But if simply labeling a 

governmental action a layoff—regardless of whether the action was a layoff under 

the terms of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement—was all that was needed 

to invoke Rule 17, then the stretch of Rule 17 would be boundless. Before Rule 17 

may be invoked, a layoff must have occurred.

{¶ 46} As the majority observes, “there was some doubt regarding whether 

the [TEL] program was a layoff.” Majority opinion at ¶ 23. That doubt needed to 

be resolved by the commission before it could move forward with a Rule 17 

hearing. The pertinent question, then, is whether a rule required the commission to 

make that determination in a quasi-judicial proceeding.

{¶ 47} The answer is no. Only one other Cincinnati Civil Service Rule 

could plausibly apply to that determination: Cincinnati Civil Service Rule 2, 

Section 5 (“Rule 2, Section 5”). That rule provides, in its entirety:
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Appearance before the Commission: Whenever an 

individual or group has a matter which requires or might require the 

consideration or decision of the Commission, such individual or 

group shall first inform the Secretary in writing, who shall make the 

necessary arrangements to bring such matters before the 

Commission in regular session.

Determining whether the TEL was a layoff is certainly “a matter which requires or 

might require the consideration or decision of the Commission,” Rule 2, Section 5.

{¶ 48} Nothing in Rule 2, Section 5 contemplates any of the trappings of a 

hearing. Contrast Rule 2, Section 5 with Rule 17, which provides for notice of a 

hearing, Rule 17, Section 1(D); hearing proceedings, Rule 17, Section 1(E); and the 

opportunity to present evidence, Rule 17, Section (1)(E)(3). And at the conclusion 

of a Rule 17 hearing, the commission shall “render its judgment affirming, 

disaffirming or modifying the action of the appointing authority.” Rule 17, 

Section 1(E)(5). That judgment is what is appealable under R.C. 2506.01. An 

appearance before the commission under Rule 2, Section 5, in contrast, is not 

subject to any requirements similar to those under Rule 17 and does not result in a 

judgment. Because it lacks any indicia of an adjudicative hearing, a Rule 2, 

Section 5 appearance is not a quasi-judicial proceeding resulting in a judgment 

from which an appeal may be taken. And no other Cincinnati Civil Service Rules 

required that the commission hold a quasi-judicial hearing to determine whether the 

TEL was a layoff.

{¶ 49} What the commission actually did confirms this conclusion. The 

commission provided Harmon and Beasley with the opportunity to make 

appearances under Rule 2, Section 5, during which they made their arguments that 

the TEL was a layoff. The commission entertained the arguments of Harmon and 

Beasley—as well as those of the city—during their appearances on July 16. But 
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again, the July 16 appearances lacked the trappings of a quasi-judicial proceeding. 

And as the majority notes, “the parties here agree that an appearance is not a quasijudicial proceeding.” Majority opinion at ¶ 21.

{¶ 50} The opportunities afforded Harmon and Beasley to appear before the 

commission were similar to the meeting that took place in Mun. Constr. Equip. 

Operators’ Labor Council, 2014-Ohio-4364. In that case, we considered whether 

a city employee could have appealed from the civil-service commission’s decision 

to deny his request for a disciplinary hearing. Id. at ¶ 1-2, 17. The commission had 

held a meeting to consider whether the employee was entitled to a disciplinary 

hearing. Id. at ¶ 17. And the commission had voted at the hearing against holding 

a disciplinary hearing. Id. We concluded that the employee could not have 

appealed the commission’s decision. Id. at ¶ 32-37. We acknowledged that 

“whether a proceeding is a quasi-judicial one from which an R.C. 2506.01 appeal 

may be taken depends upon what the law requires the agency to do, not what the 

agency actually does.” Id. at ¶ 36, citing State ex rel. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc. 

v. Cincinnati, 2005-Ohio-6817, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.), and In re Appeal of Howard, 73 

Ohio App.3d 717, 719 (10th Dist. 1991). And we noted that “[w]hen there is no 

requirement for notice, hearing, or an opportunity to present evidence, the 

proceedings are not quasi-judicial.” Id. Likewise, an appearance under Rule 5, 

Section 2 did not require notice, hearing, or an opportunity to present evidence.

Conclusion

{¶ 51} Beasley’s and Harmon’s right to appeal to the commission arose 

only if the TEL was a layoff. Nothing in the Cincinnati Civil Service Rules required 

that the commission hold a hearing to determine whether the TEL was a layoff. 

The commission’s decision that the TEL was not a layoff was not the result of a 

quasi-judicial proceeding, so it was not appealable to the common pleas court. 

Because the majority sees it otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

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Stokar Law, L.L.C., and Robb S. Stokar, for appellees.

Emily Smart Woerner, Cincinnati City Solicitor, and William C. Hicks, 

Assistant City Solicitor, for appellants.

Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., Philip K. Hartmann, Alexander L. Ewing, and 

Thaddeus M. Boggs; and Garry Hunter, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio 

Municipal League.

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