[Cite as State v. Bolton, 2013-Ohio-2467.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

No. 99137

STATE OF OHIO 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

TREVOR BOLTON 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED 

IN PART, AND REMANDED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-537424 

BEFORE: Stewart, A.J., Celebrezze, J., and Jones, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 13, 2013 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Paul Mancino, Jr. 

75 Public Square, Suite 1016 

Cleveland, OH 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Daniel T. Van 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor 

Cleveland, OH 44113 
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J.: 

{¶1} In 2010, a jury found defendant-appellant Trevor Bolton guilty of kidnapping, 

rape, gross sexual imposition, and having a weapon while under disability. On direct 

appeal, we found that two of the counts for which Bolton was convicted were allied 

offenses of similar import that should have merged for sentencing. We also found that 

Bolton had been improperly classified under the Adam Walsh Act rather than being 

classified under the former Megan’s Law. On remand, the court resentenced Bolton to 

the same prison term that it had previously imposed. In this appeal, Bolton complains 

that the court erred by refusing to conduct a de novo resentencing on all counts; that the 

court was legally barred from imposing consecutive sentences and in any event failed to 

make the requisite findings for doing so; that the court should have applied statutory 

changes to reduce Bolton’s sentence for having a weapon under disability; and that the 

court failed to consider Bolton’s present circumstances when it resentenced him. 

 I 

{¶2} The court originally sentenced Bolton to ten years on the kidnapping charge 

and ten years on the rape charge, to run concurrently to each other. The court also 

sentenced Bolton to 18 months on the gross sexual imposition charge and five years on 

the charge of having a weapon while under disability, to run consecutively to each other 

and consecutively to the rape and kidnapping charges, for a total of 16 and one-half years 

in prison. We affirmed the convictions on direct appeal, State v. Bolton, 8th Dist. No. 
96385, 2012-Ohio-169, but as relevant to the present appeal concluded that the gross 

sexual imposition and kidnapping counts were allied offenses that should have merged 

for sentencing. Id. at ¶ 97. We also found that Bolton was improperly ordered to 

comply with the sex offender registration provisions of the Adam Walsh Act because he 

committed his crimes before the effective date of that act. We held that Bolton should 

have been classified under the provisions of the former Megan’s Law. Id. at ¶ 103. 

{¶3} On remand, Bolton asked the court to conduct a de novo resentencing on all 

counts. He also argued that he could no longer be sentenced under the former Megan’s 

Law because that statute had been repealed and replaced with the Adam Walsh Act. 

Finally, and as part of his claimed right to a de novo resentencing, he asked the court to 

apply new statutory reductions to the weapons disability count. 

{¶4} The state opposed a de novo resentencing on grounds that it would exceed the 

scope of this court’s remand. On the allied offenses issue, it elected to have Bolton 

sentenced on the gross sexual imposition count. 

{¶5} The court refused to conduct a de novo resentencing on all counts and limited 

the proceedings to the allied offenses issue and the sexual offender classification under 

Megan’s Law. The court then reimposed the same sentences it had previously ordered: 

10 years on the rape count, 18 months on the gross sexual imposition count, and 5 years 

on the weapons disability count, all to be served consecutively for a total term of 16 and 

one-half years. The court also classified Bolton as a sexually-oriented offender with a 

ten-year, annual registration requirement under Megan’s Law. 
 II 

{¶6} We begin at the outset by rejecting Bolton’s claim that the court erred by 

refusing to conduct a de novo resentencing on all counts. In State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio 

St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, the Supreme Court stated: 

In a remand based only on an allied-offenses sentencing error, the guilty 

verdicts underlying a defendant’s sentences remain the law of the case and 

are not subject to review. [State v.] Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 

2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, at ¶ 26-27. Further, only the sentences for 

the offenses that were affected by the appealed error are reviewed de novo; 

the sentences for any offenses that were not affected by the appealed error 

are not vacated and are not subject to review. [State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824], at paragraph three of the 

syllabus. Id. at ¶ 15. 

Under Wilson, the court could only resentence Bolton on the gross sexual imposition 

count because that was the only sentence affected by the remand necessitated by the allied 

offenses error. Our conclusion that the court could not conduct a de novo resentencing 

on all counts necessarily dispenses with Bolton’s argument that the court erred by failing 

to consider his present status before resentencing. 

{¶7} Additionally, the court had no authority to consider whether to resentence 

Bolton on the weapons disability count based on certain statutory changes to prison terms 

for third degree felonies under R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). Wilson makes it plain that only 
those offenses that were the subject of the reversal are subject to resentencing. The 

weapons disability count was not the subject of our allied offenses reversal, so the court 

lacked authority to resentence on that count. 

 III 

{¶8} The court originally classified Bolton under the Adam Walsh Act. On direct 

appeal, we found this error because Bolton committed his crimes before the effective date 

of the Adam Walsh Act. We thus held that Bolton should have been classified under 

Megan’s Law. Bolton, supra, at ¶ 103. Bolton now argues that the court had no 

authority on remand to classify him as a sexually-oriented offender under the former 

Megan’s Law because that law had been repealed after the enactment of the Adam Walsh 

Act. We reject this assertion on authority of State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 

2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, which held that a defendant who, like Bolton, 

committed his sexually oriented offenses prior to the effective date of the Adam Walsh 

Act, but after the effective date of Megan’s Law, would be remanded “for resentencing 

under the law in effect at the time [he] committed the offense.” Id. at ¶ 22. 

 IV 

{¶9} Bolton’s final arguments relate to consecutive sentences. 

 A 

{¶10} Bolton first argues that the court had no authority to order that he serve the 

weapons disability count consecutive to the other counts. He maintains that former R.C. 

2929.41(A) in effect at the time he was sentenced expressly provides that prison terms 
must be imposed concurrently unless an express exception applies. Relying on what the 

courts have construed as a “typographical” error in R.C. 2929.41(A) that did not reflect 

the H.B. 86 revisions that renumbered former R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),1

Bolton claims that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) was not listed as an exception under R.C. 

2929.41(A) so there was no applicable exception to ordering his sentences to be served 

concurrently. 

{¶11} We have repeatedly rejected the argument made by Bolton, finding that “the 

[former R.C. 2929.41(A)’s] reference to R.C. 2929.14(E) is a typographical error and that 

the legislature meant to state R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), which concerns making findings prior 

to imposing a consecutive sentence.” State v. Simonoski, 8th Dist. No. 98496, 

2013-Ohio-1031, ¶ 6; State v. Walker, 8th Dist. No. 97648, 2012-Ohio-4274, at fn. 2; 

State v. Ryan, ___ Ohio App.3d ___, 2012-Ohio-5070, 980 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). 

So despite the obvious typographical error contained in former R.C. 2929.41(A), the court 

had the authority to order Bolton’s sentences to be served consecutively. 

 B 

{¶12} Even though the court had the authority to impose consecutive sentences, we 

still must consider whether the court validly imposed consecutive sentences. 

 1

R.C. 2929.41(A) was amended, effective September 28, 2012, to correct a typographical error 

and list “division (C) of section 2929.14,” the current consecutive sentencing statute, as one of the 

exceptions to the rule in favor of consecutive sentences. The court sentenced Bolton on September 

27, 2012, so the current version of R.C. 2929.41(A) did not apply at that time. 
{¶13} In State v. Huber, 8th Dist. No. 98206, 2012-Ohio-6139, we held that when 

a court conducts a de novo resentencing on allied offenses, the de novo aspect of 

resentencing obligates the court to comply with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the consecutive 

sentencing statute, for those counts that are the subject of the remand. Id. at ¶ 24. And 

even though the court was under no obligation to make any findings before ordering 

consecutive sentences at the time it originally sentenced Bolton, it resentenced Bolton 

after the effective date of revised R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), so that statute applied. Id. at ¶ 25; 

State v. Jones, 8th Dist. No. 98371, 2013-Ohio-489, ¶ 18. 

{¶14} The court did not make any of the findings required under R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) before ordering consecutive sentences. The state concedes this error. 

We therefore sustain the fourth assignment of error. 

{¶15} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga 

County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified 

copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. 

 

 
MELODY J. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR