### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ugus t 5, 200 8 S es sio n



### STAT E O F T EN NE SSEE v. JUNIO R A LD RIDG E

Appeal from t he Criminal Court for Shelb y County No. 05-08430 Chris Cr aft, Judge

No. W2007-01722-C CA-R 3-CD - Filed Jun e 5, 2009

A Shelby County jury found the defe ndant, Junior Aldridge, guilty of one count e ach of first degre e murder, se cond degr ee mur der, a nd espec ially aggra vated r obbery. The trial court mer ged the two murder c ounts and imposed concur rent sente nces of

life in priso n for the first degre e murde r convictio n a n d f

o r ty y e ar s a s a

Ra n g e I I
, mu lt ip le o f

f e n d e r f o r th e e s p e c ia ll y a g g r a v a te d r o b b ery conviction. On appe al, the def endant a rgues that the trial court’s e xclusion of testimony regar ding statements made by the victim denied the def endant his right to pre sent a de fense . After revie wing the re c or d, we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y e xc lud e d the te sti mon y a nda ff ir m th e jud gme nts of the tr ia l c ou rt

.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Cr iminal Cou rt A ffirm ed

D. K EL LY T HOMAS , J R ., J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W OOD ALL and N OR MA M C G EE O GLE , JJ., joined.

James E. Thomas (at trial and on appea l) and Juni Ganguli (at trial), Me mphis, Tennessee , for the appellant, Junior Aldr idge.

Rob e rt E. Co op er, J r., At to rney Gen eral and Re po rt er; Dav id H. F in dl ey, As si st ant Attor ne y G e ne ra

l; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney Ge nera l; and Michelle Parks a nd James R

. C ar t er, Jr
., Assistant District Attorneys Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Although the defe ndan t is not challenging the suffic iency of the convicting evide nce on appea l, we will provide the f ollowing f

actua l summary to e stablish c ontext for the def endant’ s issue

on app e a l. A t tr ia l, J e re my H ull te sti fi e d that on Ma rc h 1 0, 20 05 , h e dr ov e his un c le , T ra vis Cla ri e tt, the v i ctim in this case , from Clariett’s mother ’s home in Burton, Mississ ippi, to Memphis i n an attempt to retrie ve the victim’s car . Hull said that once he arrived at the Mississippi residence , the2

vic tim ’s gi rl fri e nd , Re na

rd a Ir vin g, arrive d in he r c ar, a ndHu ll a ndthe vic tim fo llo we d I rv ing to Memphis. Hull lost sight of Irving but the victim led Hull to Irv i n g ’s h o u s e. The two men le ft Irving’s house , went to a f ast food re staurant down the street, then returne d to the house. Soon after the tw o me n re turne d to Ir vin g’ s ho us e , Ir vin g arrive d. Hu ll sa id that sh e a sk e d th e vic tim to c ome into the house, but the victim refuse d.

Fiv e to ten min ute s late r, a n “ old e r g uy ,” wh om H ull ide nti fi e d a s th e de fe nd a nt at tr ia l, pulled up in the victim’s c ar, parking the car behind Hull’s car . Hull said that the defe ndant went into the house two or thre e times; Irving initially stood on t he fr ont porch, but eventua lly she and the victim got int o the victim’s car , with the vi ctim sitti ng in the driver’ s seat and I rving sitting i n the front passe nger se at. Hull said that the sec ond or third time the def endant e xited the house, he

c arrie d a pla sti c ba g in his ha nd

. Hu ll sa id tha t in his re arv ie w mir ro r he sa w the de fe nd a nt w a lk t o the re ar p a sse ng e r s ide wi nd ow , tak e a gu n out of the ba g, sh oo t the vic tim , a ndru n a wa y. Hu ll s a id that afte r he saw defe ndant shoot the victim, he drove of f bec ause he “didn’t know whe re the next shot was going.” Hull later identified the de fenda nt’s photograph in an a rra y prepa

red by the Memphis Poli ce D epartment.

On c ro ss- e xa min a tio n, Hu ll sa id tha t Ir vin g wa s th e vic tim ’s gir lf ri e nd , n ot h is w if

e . H ull

sa id he kn ew the vic tim

fa ir ly w e ll a ndkn e w tha t th e vic tim a ndIr vin g h a d b e e n d a tin g f or so me time, but he never

spoke with the victim about the re lationship a nd had never met Irving bef ore the day of the shooting. He testified that whe n Irving ar rived a t the residenc e in Mississi ppi, s he put

so me of the vic tim ’s c lothe s in the ba c k s e a t of Hu ll’ s c ar b e fo re dr ivi ng a wa y. Ac c or din g to Hu ll, Irving said nothing to the victim at this t i m e. Hull said that he w as unaw are why Irving ha d the vic tim ’s c ar at th e tim e , b ut h e didno t be lie ve that I rv ing ha d ta ke n th e c ar f

ro m hi m.

Hull testified that once the y arrived at Ir ving’s home and discove red tha t she was not there, they went to a f

ast food restaurant, where they spent twenty-f ive to thirty minut es bef

ore r eturning to Irving’s re sidence , wher e she w as wa iting. Hull s aid that t he victim did not appear nervous be fore be ing sh ot. He sa id tha t I rv ing “ ho lle r[ e d] ” a t the vic tim tw o or thr e e tim e s in a n a tte mpt to g e t hi m to go inside her house, but he ref used. Hull said that while Ir ving was not ca lm, the extent of he r and the victim’s argume nt involved the victim saying “no” to Ir ving’s entre aties.

Hull admitted that on the day of the shooting he told police that while he wa s awa re tha t the shot came f

rom the passenger side of t he victim ’s car, he did not know whether the shot came from the front or

rea r window. He also admitted that he told police that he put his c ar in drive bef ore the victim was shot. Howeve r, he insisted that despite this stateme nt to police , the def endant shot the victim from the re ar pa ssenger window and that he (Hull) drove awa y afte r the victim was shot.

On re direc t examination, Hull said that the vi ctim had ar ound $2500 in his possession before the s h o o ti n g

. H e s a id th a t h e s a w I r v in g a f te r th e d e f

e n d a n t s h o t th e v ic ti m, a n d th a t I r v in g was “hollering a nd crying” afte r the incide nt. Hull said that he did not see I rving with a we apon during the inc ide nt.

Ir vin g te sti fi e d th a t on Ma rch 1 0, 20 05 , she me t w ith the vic tim to r e turn h is c ar t o h im. Irving, who sa id that she had keys t o the vi ctim’s car , testified t hat s he and the vi ctim also planned3

for the vic tim to gi ve her “tax money” that day. Ir ving explained that t h e v i ct i m claimed her daughter as a depende nt on his income tax returns even though she and the vi ctim were not married and he w as not the girl’s fathe r. Irving said that the victim would rec eive a large r income ta x ref und under this ar

range ment than s he would rec eive we re she to claim her daughter; the victim and Ir ving agre ed that he w ould give this money, totaling $2500, t o her.

Irving said that she w ent to the victim’s mother’s house in Mississ ippi and led the vi ctim and his ne ph e w, Hu ll, to h e r h ou se , w hic h s he sh are d w ith ano th e r w oma n, Li sa Ma ys . U nli ke Hu ll, Ir vin g te sti fi e d th a t sh e a ndHu ll a rrive d a t th e ho us e a t th e sa me tim e . I rv ing sa id tha t th e de fe nd a nt, wh om s he c a me to k no w a ft e r the de fe nd a nt wo rk e d on he r ca r, wa s pre se nt wh e n she , the vic tim

, and Hull arr iv e d a t th e h o u s e

. Sh e a n d th e d e f e n d a n t w e n t to r e trie v e th e v ic ti m’ s c ar ; o n ce the y

arrive d a t th e ho us e whe re the c ar w a s lo c a te d, Ir vin g a ndthede fe nd a nt r e turne d to he r h ou se

se pa rate ly, wi th Ir vin g dr ivi ng he r c ar a nd the de fe nd a nt arrivi ng in the vic tim ’s c ar f if te e n to tw e nty minutes later. Irving said that the defendant parked the car in front of the hous e, behind Hull’s car.

Irving said that onc e the de fenda nt arrive d in the victim’s car , the def enda n t left the c ar, le a vin g th e ke ys in the ign iti on

. Th e vic tim a nd Ir vin g the n got int o the vic tim ’s c ar, wi th the vic tim sit tin g in the dr ive r’ s se a t a ndIr vin g s itt ing in the fr on t pa sse ng e r s e a t. A t th a t ti me, the v ic tim

remove d money from his pocke t and bega n counting it. The victim counted $500 and gave it to her

. Ir vin g s a id tha t w hil e the vic tim wa s c ou nti ng mon e y, the de fe nd a nt c a me to the c ar. Th e vic tim tol d the de fe nd a nt t o g o to the ho us e a ndge t hi s sh oe s. Th e de fe nd a nt exite d th e ho us e the fi rs t ti me wi t h o u t t h e s h o e s , a t w h i c h t i m e t h e v i c t i m t o l d t h e d e f e n d a n t t o r e t u r n t o t h e h o us e a nd a skLi sa Mays, Irving’ s roommate, whe re the shoes wer e. The defe ndant re turned to t he house and emer ged

a sec ond time, car

ryi ng a plastic ba g. The de fenda nt asked the vic tim to l ower the re ar pa ssenger side window, which the victim did. At that point, the defendant hit Irving in the hea d with a gun and demande d that she and the victim give him t heir money. I rving then gave the def endant some mone y befor e hea

ring a s h o t. She then saw the vic tim fall halfway out of the ca r and the defe ndant run

a wa y. Hu ll d ro ve a wa y a ft e r the sh ot w a s f ir e d, bu t he la te r re turne d. Ir vin g tes tif ie d tha t at th e tim e the victim was shot, he was fac ing her, with his back to the driver’s side window. She said that f rom this posit ion, the victim could see the de fenda nt.

On cross-e xamination, Irving said that while she ref err ed to the victim as her husba nd, she and the victim wer e not legally marr ied. Irving sa id that at one point she and the victim participated in what she be lieved wa s a we dding cer emony; she said that only she, the victim, a man w ho was working at the house that day, and Melvin Smit h, the man whom Irving believe d presided ove r the

cer emony, attende d. Irving believe d she wa s marrie d to the victim after the cer emony; howeve r, she later le arne d that the wedding c ere mony was not valid.

Irving said she w as unaw are that the vi ctim’s claiming her daughter on his income tax r eturn constituted fraud. Regarding the vic tim’s car, I rving denied taking the car without his permission and using it as “collate ral” or “leve rage ” which would forc e the victim to pay the money he owe d her f rom his ta x return. She also denied hiding the car from the victim. Rather, she said that a fe w days bef ore the shooting, the victim t old her to take the ca r fr om the victim’s workplac e and bring it to a friend’ s house to be re paire d. Irving said that she w as unaw are that the victim had the tax ref und money until he called he r the morning of the shooting.4

Irving said that by the da y of the shooting, the victim had m oved out of t he house w hich they

a nd Ma ys ha d s h ar e d

. H o w e v e r , s h e i n s i s t e d t h a tt h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s a

“ g o o d ” o n e a n d w o u ld ha ve c on tin ue d h a d th e vic tim no t be e n k ill e d. Ir vin g d e nie d hit tin g the vic tim or c a lli ng him

na me s. Irving also de nied yelling at the victim or trying to convince him to c ome inside the house be fore the shooting. I rving said that during the fiftee n minutes be tween her arrival at her house the sec ond time and the def

endant’ s arr ival with the victim’s car , she and the victim had a ca lm conversa tion, with her standing outside Hull’s ca r and the victim seated inside Hull’s car. Ir ving claimed that the victim did not appear to be scar ed of he r during this conver sation.

Irving said that she had not expec ted to see the defe ndant the day of the shooting, but she was
not scare d when she first saw him or whe n she aske d him to help her re trieve the victim’s car . Irving

sa id s he did no t te ll t

he de fe nd a nt a

bo ut the mon e y th e vic tim wa s p la nn ing to g ive he r. She sa id that she did not see whe re the victim was shot.

An tho ny Fr a nk lin te sti fi e d th a t on the a ft e rn oo n of Ma rc h 1 0, 20 05 , h e wa s r e turnin g h ome from his job as a se curity guar d. While at a stop sign near the inter section of C arnes Avenue and Gr e e r S tr e e t, h e sa w “ a

ma le bla c k a

pp ro a c h[ ] [ a ] v e hic le fr om the pa sse ng e r s ide a ndfi re [] sh ots into the vehicle.” Franklin then s aw the shooter run a way. Fra nklin further de scribed the shooter as being “ [a] bout six feet in height, slim buil d, wea ring dark c lothing and a black le ather jacke t.” He sa id tha t th e de fe nd a nt loo ke d like the sh oo te r but that he wa s u ns ur e that th e de fe nd a nt a c tua lly committed the offe nse. Franklin adde d that the shooter, who was car rying an object in a plastic bag,

“ app ro a c he d th e ve hic le fr om the re ar” be fo re fi ri ng int o th e re ar p a sse ng e r s ide wi nd ow . Fr a nk lin said that the house in fr ont of which the inc ident occur red w as t wo hous es from the intersec tion at which he stoppe d; while Franklin initi ally s aw t h e s h ooter a pproac h the ca

r while he was a t the intersec tion, he drove pa st the victim’s car w hen the shooting oc curr ed. Franklin said that he did not kn ow wh e the r a ny on e wa s si tti ng in the fr on t pa sse ng e r se a t wh e n the sh oo tin g oc c ur re d, a ndhe did not hear any scr eaming coming fr om the car befor e the s h o t s were fire d. On cr oss-exa mination, Fr a nk lin a dmi tte d th a t he didno t se e the sh oo te r ac tua lly fi re int o the c ar, bu t th a t he ins te a d o nly hear d gunshots.

Of fi c e r L a ve rn Jo ne s w ith the Me mph is Po lic e Depart me nt t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s th e c ri me

sc e ne invest ig ato r a ssi gn e d to thi s c a se . O ff ic e r J on e s te sti fi e d th a t he fo un d a pu rs e a ndso me money on the fr ont passenger side floorboa

rd of t he victim’s ca

r. He said that he found approximate ly $750 inside the car , some of which w as in the purse and some of which w as on the floorboar d

. T h e off

icer also rec overe d a .40 ca liber shell ca sing from atop a ja cket on the f ront pa sse ng e r s e a t. H e sa id tha t hi s se rv ic e we apo n w a s a .4 0 c a lib e r se mi- a uto ma tic pis tol , a ndin h is
experience the gun ejec ted its spent shell casings to the right. On cross- examination, Of fice r Jones said that he did not see a ny bullet strikes inside the car , nor did he see any money outside the c ar.

Dr. Ke nneth Snell, w ho at the time of the shooting was the chie f medica l examiner for Shelby County, testified that he perf ormed the autopsy in thi s case . Dr. Snell testified tha t the victim died of a single gunshot wound to the chest. The bullet, w hich Dr. Snell de scribed a s a “la rge c aliber” projec tile, entere d the victim’s right upper chest and trave led “fr om the dece dent’s right to left, fr ont to back . . . [ with] a downw ard move ment as we ll.” Although D r. Snell c hara cter ized the bullet’s path as a “downwa

rd movement,” on cross-e xamination he ad m i t t ed that the bullet exited the5

victim’s body on a level only a ha lf inch below the level on which the bullet entere d the body. Dr. Snell said that the victim’s injuries could have be en ca used by som eone shooting from the ve hicle’s

re ar p a sse ng er wi nd ow if th e vic tim ha d b e e n tu rn e d f

a c ing the wi nd ow , a lth ou gh on c ro ssexamination Dr . Snell testified that the shot could also have be en fired b y s o meone sitting in the front passe nger se at. Dr. Snell sa id tha t w eapons fired at close range usually resulted in soot being left on the body, but no soot was found on the victim’s body or clothes. How ever , Dr. Snell said that he did not use a microscope to se arc h for stipling on the victim’s clothes or body. Dr. Snell said that semi-automatic we apons generally eje ct their spent she lls to t he right, but he noted tha t he was not a ballistics expert and could not say with ce rtainty from whe re the fata l shot was fired.

Revere nd Melvin C. Sm ith, testifying for the defendant, said that he did not perfor m wedding

cer emonies outside his churc h. He said that he did not know t he victim or Ir ving and did not preside

over a ny cer emony involving them. Dr. O.C. Smit h, the former chief medical examiner for Shelby County, testified that because “in the w hole width of the body the bullet de scende d only half an inc h, ” on e wo uldbe un able to de te rm ine the a ng le a t whic h the fata l shot wa s fir e d. Dr . Sm ith sa id that w hil e so me on e sit tin g in the fr on t pas se ng e r se a t cou ld h a ve fi re d th e fata l sh ot, the sh ot c ou ld also have come f

rom the re ar pa ssenger

window.

Jacoby Burks testified tha t he knew the victim for about five year s befor e his dea th. Brooks said that he saw at least one , but fewe r than five

, argume nts be tween the victim and Irving, whom he kn e w w e re da tin g, a ndthat Ir vin g p un c he d th e vic tim du ri ng so me of

the se arg ume nts . O n c ro sse xa min a tio n, Bur

ks sa id tha t on ly on e of

the arg ume nts be tw e e n th e vic tim a ndIrvin g d e vo lve d in to a physica l confronta tion an d that this confrontation ende d rathe r quickly. Burks admitted that “[m]ost of the time” when he saw the vic tim and Irving, they we re not fighting.

The jury f ound the def

endant guilty of one count of fir st degree felony murde r and one count of espe cia l l y aggra vated r obbery a s char ged in the indictment. The indictment a lso charge d the defe ndant with one count of preme ditated first degre e murder. The jury a cquitted the def endant on this count but found hi m guilty of t he lesser included offense of second de gree murder, w hich the
tr ia l c ou rt me rg e d wi th the de fe nd a nt’ s fi rs t de gr e e mur de r c on vic tio n. Th e de fe nd a nt s ub se qu e ntl y filed a timely notice of

appea l.

ANALY SIS

The de fenda

nt’s sole issue on appe al is that the trial co u rt ’s ex clusion of ce rtain evide nce denied him the rig ht to present a de fense . After revie wing the re cord, w e conc lude that the trial c ourt proper ly excluded the evidenc e at issue

.

Preliminary He aring

On the day the trial bega n, the State made a n oral motion to exclude a ll refe re n ce s to the marital status of the victim and to exc lude statements mad e b y t h e victim to a Collierville police office r two days be fore the victim was killed. Regar ding the victim’s marital status, in a jury-out hearing the defe ndant ar gued that Ir ving’s telling “multipl e individuals that she an d [the victim] we reT hi s d o cum ent was not m ad e an exhi b i t f o r i d ent i f

i cat i o n purp o ses at t ri al
, nor d o es i t ap p ear i n t he reco rd 1

o n a p p e a l.

6 marrie d” when in fac t they were never married impacted “her honesty, her ability to tell the truth.” The trial c ourt agre ed w i t h t h e d ef en d ant, ruli ng that the jury “ought to be a llowed to go into her statements about their r elationship, espec ially if the[] defe nse is going to be tha t she’s the one [who] did the killing.” On cross-e xamination, defe nse counsel asked I rving numerous que stions about her rela tionship wit h the victim. After I rving testified that she and the victim ha d participa ted in what she believe d to be a mar riage ce re m o n y , defe nse counse l attempted to show Irving a purported marria ge license

. The State objec ted, and dur ing a benc h conferenc e the tria l court instructed 1 defe nse counse l tha t he could only introduc e the document if Irving denied telling pe ople that she and the victim were married. Def ense counsel t hen asked Irving if she t old people that she and the vi cti m were ma

rrie d. Ir vin g a dmi tte d th a t sh e did , a ndthat su c h a state me nt w a s a

lie . D e fe ns e counsel c ontinued to ask Irving que stions about her r elationship with the victim, but t he def endant did not attempt to int roduce the purporte d license a fter his initial attempt.

Regarding the vic tim’s statements to police, at the jury-out hearing the defe ndant noted that two days bef

ore the victim died, the victim filed a stolen ca r report with the Collierville Pol ice Depa rtment. The de fenda nt further noted that “in the state ment [the victim ] i n dicate[ d] to the Col lie rv ill e Pol ic e Of

fi c e r tha t he was in fea

r o f h is g ir lf

ri e nda t th a t ti me . W e thi nk that it is rele vant to show that there ’s an e xisting m ental state. That he w as af raid of [ Irving].” The de fenda nt

a lso a nn ou nc e d h is i nte nti on to i ntr od uc e a writt e n s ta te me nt the vic tim gav e to th e po lic e in

connec tion with the report. The trial court r ead this statement into the re cord:

At app ro xim a te ly 8 :30 p. m., I w a lke d o uts ide fo r b re a k, that’ s w he n I sa w m y w hit e Ca dil la c Se da n D e vil le

, mis sin g. I ha ve re a so n to be lie ve that Re na rd a Ir vin g s tol e my car , beca

use she ha d been thr eate ning me and she had opportunity, Monday. She

came to my job and threate n[ed] to do something bad to me.

Th e State argue d th a t th e vic tim ’s wr itt e n a nd or a l st ate men ts to po lic e we re ina dmi ssi ble hear say , while the def

endant a rg u ed that the state ment was “ rele vant to show that someone other tha n [th e de fe nd ant] k ill e d [th e vic tim ].” At the c los e of

the he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt sa id t hat it wo uld withhold its ruling on the admissibilit y of the victim’s statements until after I rvi ng testified; specific ally , the trial cour t noted that “I

would all o w h er t o b e cross-e x amined by the def ense on whether there wer e any

t h re at s an d i f she denies the threa ts, then Ithink . . . we nee d to let the defe nse put that statement in, throug h a police of fice r.” H oweve r, af

ter a rec ess, the trial c ourt ruled that the statements would be inadmissible. The trial court state d that the statements would not be admissible under the “state of mind” hear say exception be cause “only the dec lara nt’s conduct, the victim’s conduct, not some third par ty ’s conduc t, is probable by this hear say exception.” Reg arding the de fe nd ant’ s argume nt t hat th e state me nts we re a dmi ssi ble purs ua nt t o h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o prese nt a def

ense, the trial court noted:

[Th e de fe nd ant’ s st a te me nt] i s r e lia ble on ly in t he se ns e that app are ntl y

the de fe ns e

c ou ld e sta bli sh that it wa s g ive n to a po lic e of fi c e r, bu t th e re ’s no re lia

bil ity a bo ut,7

from the victim’s motive, of why he m ight have made that statement. . . . I ’m meaningno disrespec t to the victim, or the defe ndant, or any of the witnesses, but we have pe op le fi lin g fa lse sto le n c ar r e po rt s in Memp hi s all o f t

he tim e and

pe op le
pawn c ars for crack, or they loan people car s and they don’t bring them back a nd they call the police in a peak of ang er. Appar ently

. . . the wit ness and the vic tim shared some relationship - - Iam not sure what that relationship is. . . .

But, we don’t re al ly

know why

he g ave that statement to the police, a bout why she may have ta ken his ca r, or . . . what she threatened to do.

So fo r that re a so n I fi nd that it ’s no t so c ru c ia l to the de fe ns e and so re lia ble that it would o v er co m e t he stronginterest that we have in our justice sy stem of excluding such spe culative he arsa y evidenc e.
Offer of Proof

During a jury- out offer

of proof, Offic er Neil Young wit h the Collierville Poli ce D epartment test if ie d th a t o n M ar c h 8
, 2 0 0 5

, h e r e s p o n d e d to a n a u to mo b il e b u r g la r y c a ll a t th e Ca

rr ie r p la nt wher e the victim was employed. The victim, whom Off icer Young desc ribed a s “ra ther upset” but who appe are d “to be a cting in good faith,” told the off icer th at Irving ha d stolen his car f rom the Carrie r par

king lot. Officer Young s aid t hat t he victim “appe are d more upset, [ rathe r] than sc are d” of Ir vin g, bu t in a

writt e n s ta te me nt, pr e se nte d a bo ve , th e vic tim

sa id tha t I rv ing ha d th re a te ne d h im. Afte r th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s o f

f e r o f p r o o f

, th e tria l c o u r t r e a f f irme d it s o r d e r e x c lu d in g th e victim’s
statements t o police, with the trial c ourt’s re asoning mirroring that outlined in the court’s pretria l decision.

Du e Pr oc ess a nd theRi gh t to Pr ese nt a De

fe ns e

“ Th e Sixth Ame ndme nt an d the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla us e of the F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt c le a rl y g uara ntee a criminal def

endant the rig ht to present a de fense which includes the rig ht to present witnesses fa

vorable to the defense.” State v. Br own, 29 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tenn. 2000); see T aylor v. I llinois , 484 U.S. 400, 408, 108 S. C t. 646, 652 (1988); Washington v. Tex as, 388 U.S. 14, 23, 87 S. Ct . 1920, 1925 (1976). Howeve r, this rig ht is not a bsolute: “ I n the exercise of this right, the

acc used, as is r equire d of the State, must c omply with e stablished rules of pr ocedur e and e vidence

.

. . .” Chambers v. Mississ ippi, 410 U.S.284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1973). “Such rules do not

a br idg e an a c c us e d’ s rig ht to pr e se nt a de fe ns e so lon ga s th e y

are no t ‘ arb itr ary ’ o r ‘ dis pr op or tio nate t o t h e p ur

p o s e s t h e y

ar e d e s i g n e d

t o s e r v e

. ’ ” B r o w n , 2 9 S

. W

. 3 d

a t 4 3 2 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. In d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r

a t r i a l c o u rt ’ s e v i d e n t i ar

y r u l i n g v i o l a t e s t h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l yprotec ted rig ht to present a de fense , an appe llate cour t must consider whethe r: (1) the excluded evidenc e is critica l to the defe nse; (2) the evidenc e bea rs s ufficie nt indicia of reliability ; and (3) the interest supporting the exclusion of the evidenc e is substantially important. I d. at 433-34.

I n this c ase, the purported marria g e cer tificate the defe ndant soug ht to introduce dur ing I rving ’s cross-examination was not critica l to his defe nse. Our supreme court has sug g ested that for8

evidenc e to be c onsidered c ritical to the defe nse, the e vidence must have some probative value a nd “exclusion of the evidenc e would undermine an element of a par ticular de fense .” See State v. F lood, 219 S.W .3d 307, 316-17 (Te nn. 2007). The defe ndant s oug ht to attack the c redibility of Irving , the S t at e’s ke y

witness to the defe ndant’s killing, a nd it did so by

cross-e x amining he r. Duringher

cross-e x amination, I rving admitted that she and the defe ndant wer e not marr ied and that he r telling others that they

wer e mar ried c onstitut ed lying on her part. The defenda nt was able to further

attack I rving ’s cr edibility

throug h the testimony o f P as t o r S mith, the purported off iciant at the a lleg ed

we d d i n g ce re m o n y , wh o s ai d t h at h e ne v er

o ff i ci at ed at an y ce re m o n y

b et we en t h e v i ct i m an d

I rv i n g. F ur the rm or e , a s th e purp or

te d mar ri a g e lic e ns e is not in the re c or d on ap pe a l, w e c ann ot a sc e rt a in whether the document bear s any

indicia of re liability . There fore , we c onclude that the tr ial court’s exclusion of the purported mar riag e license did not deny

the def endant his right to pre sent a de fense

.
Reg ardingthe evidenc e conc erningthe victi m’ s s ta tements to police, on appe al the def endant
argues that the e x cl u d ed ev idence helped e stablish that I rving , and not the def endant, killed the victim, and that I rving had thre atene d the victim shortly befor e his de ath. Howe ver, the defe ndant

wa s a ble to i ntr od

uc e oth e r e vid e nc e to a dv anc e the se the ori es. Th e de fe nd ant e xten siv e ly c ro ssexamined I rving about her relationship wit h the vi ctim and her motive for being with the victim the da y of the sh oo tin g , and the de fe nd ant pr e se nte d te sti mony fr om a wi tne ss, Jac ob y B ur ks , w ho sa id that Irv ingha d f

ou g ht w iththe vic timon

oc c a sio n. Th e de fe nd ant a lso e lic ite d te sti mony fr om h is expert witness, Dr. Smit h, and the State’s expert witness, Dr. Snell, that someone seated in the front
passeng er seat—whe re I rving insisted she was sitting at the time of the shooting—c ould have f ired the fatal shot. There fore , while the victim’s purported statement, but for the reliability issues explained below, was pr obative of the defe ndant’s ar g ument that I rvin g s h o t t he victim, the cumulative natur e of the evidenc e wa s such t hat i ts ex clusion did not undermine an e lement of that de fe ns e . B e c a

us e the de fe nd ant w a s a

ble to a rgue thi s d e fe ns e thr ou g h o the r me ans , we a g re e wi th the trial cour

t that evidence reg ardingthe victim’s statements to police w as not critical to the defe nse.

Simi larly , we a g ree with the trial court that the othe r two fa ctors outlined in Br own ar e not met. The victim’s statements to police do not be ar suf ficient indicia of

reliability , as the victim was unavailable to testify

reg arding h i s m o t ive for making the statements and ther e is nothing e vident from the c ircumstance s surrounding the statement to suppor t t h e stateme nt’s reliability . On the

c on tr ary , the re la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e vic timand I rv ingun de rm ine s th e re lia bil ity of the state me nt. Fur thermore , Offic er Y oung testified that the victim did not appear to be in fea

r of the de fenda

nt at the time he made his statement. That I rving had key s to the victim’s car a nd that the victim ag ree d to meet with I rving the day of h i s death—e ven sitting a lone with her in his ca r bef ore he was

s h o t

— fu rt h er t en d s t o u n d er m i n e t h e r el i ab i l i t y o f h i s s t at em en tt h at h e w as af ra i d o f Irv i n g. Reg ardingthe third fac tor, this co u rt has noted that “ [t ]he interest in excluding unr eliable a nd inacc urate hear say t es t i m o n y ” pursuant to the Rules of Evidence “is an important one.” State v. M ic h e ll e Sh o e ma

k e r , N o

. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 2 6 5 2

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2006 WL 3095446, at *11 (Te nn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2006) (c iting Ne il P. Cohen et al, Tenne ssee L aw of Evidence § 8.01[3] [a] (5th ed. 2005))

. As stated above
, the defendant presented evidence supporting his theories that Irving threatened the victim before killing him and that the victim wa s afr aid of I rving . We theref ore c onclude that the trial court’ s exclusion of t he victim ’s s tatements t o the police did not infring e upon the de fenda nt’s9

due proc ess rig ht to present a de fense

.

CONCLUSION

In consider ation of the for egoing and the record as a whole, the j udgments of the trial c ourt

are aff irmed.

_______________________________ D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE