J-S04036-19

2019 PA Super 80

____________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES EDWARD WALLS 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1385 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 16, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal 

Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0001584-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 19, 2019

Appellant, James Edward Walls, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of six months’ intermediate punishment, including 30 days of house arrest 

with electronic monitoring, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Northumberland County after he entered a plea of no contest to one count of 

driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance (“DUI”).1 

Herein, Appellant contends the suppression court erroneously denied his 

motion to suppress evidence stemming from what he argues was an unlawful 

traffic stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion of DUI. We affirm.

We apply the following standard when reviewing the denial of a 

suppression motion:

[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are 

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
J-S04036-19

- 2 -

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth 

prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the 

evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for 

the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context 

of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court is] 

bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the 

suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the 

conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to [ ] plenary 

review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). Moreover, the scope of review for a suppression issue is limited to 

the record available to the suppression court. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 

2013).

At the hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress, Pennsylvania State 

Trooper Joshua Lee Herman, who possessed eight years’ experience at the 

time in question, testified that Trooper Justin Rosboschil was driving in front 

of him on Pennsylvania State Route 405 South when Rosboschil advised by 

radio that “there was a vehicle coming towards me [Herman]. . . . [T]here 

was a truck headed my way, and it appeared that it was straddling the right 

fog line” of the northbound lane. N.T. 3/27/17 at 4-5.

2

 Trooper Herman 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant raised a hearsay objection to Trooper Herman’s recitation of

Trooper Rosboschil’s radio advisement. N.T. at 5. The Commonwealth 

responded that it offered the statement not as substantive evidence 

supporting the stop but only as background information explaining why 

Trooper Herman had prepared himself to observe keenly the truck’s manner 
J-S04036-19

- 3 -

testified he slowed down in anticipation of the truck, and when he saw it he 

immediately noticed its right tires were across the right fog line. N.T. at 5, 

10-11.

Unlike his fellow trooper, Trooper Herman was at a place along the 

highway where he was able to turn onto the northbound lane and follow the 

truck. N.T. at 5, 10, 11. Herman testified, “While following the vehicle, [I 

noticed] the vehicle was weaving within its lane of travel by going left to right, 

back and forth. And I also observed it to cross over again the right fog line in 

front of the Milton Transportation Company.” N.T. at 5-6. He explained that 

he made these observations over the course of approximately 300 yards 

before executing the traffic stop. N.T. at 7.

On cross-examination, counsel for Appellant played the video recording 

taken by the dashboard-mounted video camera inside Trooper Herman’s 

patrol car. Counsel emphasized the obscuring effect the headlight’s glare had 

on the video, but Trooper Herman insisted that such an effect was limited to 

the video, as he maintained a clear view of the truck’s position on the highway 

throughout the relevant time. N.T. at 10. 

By Order of June 30, 2017, the suppression court denied Appellant’s 

motion to suppress based on its acceptance of Trooper Herman’s testimony

____________________________________________

of driving. Id. As we explain below, however, we conclude that Trooper 

Rosboschil’s advisement was admissible as substantive evidence of Trooper 

Herman’s formation of reasonable suspicion of DUI. Therefore, we consider 

such evidence in conducting our inquiry into whether reasonable suspicion 

supported the traffic stop in question. 
J-S04036-19

- 4 -

that Appellant’s truck, within a 300-yard distance, crossed the right fog line 

twice and weaved within its lane of travel. The court also relied on its review 

of the video, which, it said, depicted Appellant’s truck “drifting within his lane 

of travel[,] touch[ing] the fog line and then mov[ing] towards the center 

line[.] If contact with the centerline occurred, it was brief and did not appear 

to result in any part of the vehicle actually crossing into the opposite lane of 

travel.” Order, 6/30/17, at 2.

On January 18, 2018, Appellant entered his no contest plea. The court 

imposed Appellant’s sentence, described above, on July 16, 2018, and this 

timely appeal followed. 

Here, Appellant argues that the suppression court should have 

suppressed all evidence admitted against him because it stemmed from an 

unlawful stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion of DUI. We disagree. 

The Motor Vehicle Code sets forth a law enforcement officer's authority 

to stop a vehicle for an alleged violation as follows:

Whenever a police officer ... has reasonable suspicion that a 

violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a 

vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the 

vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle 

identification number or engine number or the driver's license, or 

to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably 

believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).

Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal 

activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the 

authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory 

purpose. In effect, the language of Section 6308(b)—to secure 
J-S04036-19

- 5 -

such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be 

necessary to enforce the provisions of this title—is conceptually 

equivalent with the underlying purpose of a Terry [3] stop.

Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the 

driver's detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant 

to the suspected violation. In such an instance, it is encumbent 

[sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, 

at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable 

cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of 

some provision of the Code.

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) 

(citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted, footnote added). 

Thus, there is a “distinction between the investigative potential of a 

vehicle stop based on a reasonable suspicion of DUI as compared to other 

suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Busser, 

56 A.3d 419, 423 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted); 

see also Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008)(noting 

“[e]xtensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle stop for DUI 

may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop investigation is normally 

feasible.”); Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 270 (Pa.Super. 2005) 

(stating that “a suspected violation for DUI is in fact a scenario where further 

investigation almost invariably leads to the most incriminating type of 

evidence.”).

In determining whether Trooper Herman possessed reasonable 

suspicion, “we must accord due weight to the specific reasonable inferences 

that [he] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Sands,

____________________________________________

3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
J-S04036-19

- 6 -

887 A.2d at 272. Reasonable suspicion requires an evaluation of the totality 

of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa.

2011).

Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than [the] 

probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and 

depends on the information possessed by police and its degree of 

reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify 

the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to specific and 

articulable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. 

In assessing the totality of the circumstances, courts must also 

afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn 

from the facts in light of the officer's experience[,] and 

acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered collectively, 

may permit the investigative detention.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. 2010) (citations 

omitted).

Here, in explaining its ruling that reasonable suspicion of DUI supported 

the stop, the suppression court pointed to testimonial and video evidence 

showing Appellant’s truck drifted back and forth within its lane for 

approximately 300 yards, during which time it went from the right fog line, to 

the double yellow center line, and back atop the right fog line again. The court 

also discussed how Trooper Herman relied on his eight years’ experience to 

infer that the movements he observed created reasonable suspicion of DUI 

justifying a traffic stop to permit further investigation necessary to 

substantiate such suspicion. The court, therefore, denied Appellant’s 

suppression motion.
J-S04036-19

- 7 -

Applying the applicable standard of review and considering comparable

decisional law, we conclude that the record supports the court’s factual 

findings and legal conclusion that reasonable suspicion of DUI supported 

Trooper Herman’s traffic stop of Appellant. 

We note, however, that the totality of information leading Trooper 

Herman to perform the traffic stop in question comprised not only his own 

observations of Appellant’s driving but also his receipt of Trooper Justin 

Rosboschil’s observations made proximate in time and location to his own. 

Specifically, Trooper Rosboschil advised that he had witnessed Appellant’s 

truck “straddling the fog line” just moments before Trooper Herman then 

confirmed this advisement with his own observations.

Relevant precedent confirms that a law enforcement officer may conduct 

an investigative detention of a suspect based on reasonable suspicion formed 

in whole or in part upon facts observed by a reliable source, such as another 

officer or an identified citizen tipster.

“To have reasonable suspicion, police officers need not personally 

observe the illegal or suspicious conduct, but may rely upon the 

information of third parties, including tips from citizens.” 

Commonwealth v. Swartz, 787 A.2d 1021, 1024 (Pa.Super. 

2001) (en banc) (citation omitted). “Indeed, identified citizens 

who report their observations of criminal activity to police are 

assumed to be trustworthy, in the absence of special 

circumstances, since a known informant places himself at risk of 

prosecution for filing a false claim if the tip is untrue, whereas an 

unknown informant faces no such risk.” Commonwealth v. 

Barber, 889 A.2d 587, 593 (Pa.Super. 2005). Similarly, 

“Pennsylvania law ... permits a vehicle stop based upon a radio 

bulletin if evidence is offered at the suppression hearing to 

establish reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 594.
J-S04036-19

- 8 -

[F]or a stop to be valid, someone in the police 

department must possess sufficient information to 

give rise to reasonable suspicion. The officer with the 

reasonable suspicion, usually the dispatcher, need not 

convey all of this background information to the officer 

who actually effectuates the stop. Thus, the police 

may justify the search by presenting sufficient 

evidence at the suppression hearing that someone in 

the chain of command had reasonable suspicion 

before the stop, even if the arresting officer did not.

Id. (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Anthony, 977 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Pa.Super. 2009) 

(holding Commonwealth established existence of reasonable suspicion of DUI 

solely through testimony of arresting officer who executed traffic stop 

exclusively upon highly detailed information supplied in dispatch relaying 

observations of a named-citizen informant maintaining contact with erratic 

driver).

Therefore, we examine whether Trooper Herman’s possession of 

Trooper Rosboschil’s advisement coupled with his own observations supplied 

reasonable suspicion of DUI permitting the investigative detention that 

followed. As discussed, Trooper Herman testified that his fellow trooper 

warned him of an oncoming truck straddling the right fog line. Trooper 

Herman slowed to position himself to make a U-turn, which he completed after 

witnessing Appellant’s truck riding along the right fog line. After turning to 

follow the truck, Trooper Herman witnessed it drift within its lane, from fog 

line to the double yellow center line, and back to the fog line, all within 300 

yards before the trooper activated his overhead lights to conduct a traffic stop.
J-S04036-19

- 9 -

In Sands, this Court held that reasonable suspicion of DUI was formed 

when a qualified officer observed a vehicle’s “unsteady weaving progress” as 

it drifted across the fog line three times on a portion of road free from 

obstructions. Id. at 272. Sands, therefore, supports the conclusion that 

information available to Trooper Herman at the critical time was, likewise,

sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of DUI. Consequently, Trooper 

Herman’s traffic stop was not improper, and we affirm the judgment of 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/19/2019