Filed 3/2/21 P. v. Velasco CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALEJANDRO JARDER VELASCO,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B305629

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TA148620)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Tammy Chung Ryu, Judge. Affirmed. 

________________________________

Victoria H. Stafford, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, and Alejandro Jarder Velasco, in pro. per, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________________
2

A jury convicted defendant Alejandro Jarder Velasco of 

three counts of committing a lewd act on a child under 14 years 

of age (counts 1, 2, & 4; Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a)), one count 

of continuous sexual abuse (count 3; § 288.5, subd. (a)), eight 

counts of committing a lewd act on a child 14 or 15 years of age 

(counts 5–12; § 288, subd. (c)(1)), two counts of oral copulation with 

a minor (counts 14, 15; § 287, subd. (b)(1), and one count of sexual 

penetration with a minor (count 16; § 289, subd. (h)). The victim of 

defendant’s crimes is his wife’s niece, M.R.

In connection with counts 2 and 4, the jury also found true 

allegations that defendant had “substantial sexual conduct with 

[M.R.]” within the meaning of section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8).2

The jury acquitted defendant of one count of unlawful sexual 

intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (c)).

The court sentenced defendant to prison for 20 years, 

comprised of the following terms: 12 years on count 3; consecutive

two-year terms on each of counts 1, 2, and 4; a consecutive 

eight-month term on count 5; one-year concurrent terms on each

of counts 6 through 12; a consecutive eight-month term on count 14; 

a concurrent 16-month term on count 15; and an eight-month 

consecutive term on count 16. The court also imposed a restitution 

fine in the amount of $300 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), imposed and 

stayed a parole revocation restitution fine in the amount of $300 

(§ 1202.45, subd. (a)), imposed a $600 court operations fee (§ 1465.8, 

subd. (a)(1), and a $450 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, 

§ 70373, subd. (a)(1)).

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory references 

are to the Penal Code.

2 This finding precluded the court from granting probation to 

defendant or suspending the execution or imposition of the sentence 

on counts 2 and 4. (§ 1203.066, subd. (a).) 
3

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

We appointed counsel for defendant, who filed a brief 

pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising 

no issues on appeal and requesting that we independently review 

the record to determine if the lower court committed any error. 

On November 25, 2020, counsel sent a copy of the brief and 

the record to defendant and informed him that he may file a 

supplemental brief. On November 30, 2020, this court informed 

defendant that he may submit a supplemental brief or letter of

any grounds of appeal, contentions, or argument he wishes the 

court to consider. On January 26, 2021, defendant submitted a late 

supplemental brief, which we permitted him to file. We address his 

arguments below.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

M.R. was born in 2002 and was 17 years old at the time 

of trial. According to M.R., on a day in June 2010, when she was 

eight years old, she was visiting in the home of defendant and 

defendant’s wife, Myrabella. While she was resting on a bed, 

defendant entered the room, lifted M.R.’s shirt, and put his mouth 

on M.R.’s breasts for 20 to 30 seconds, then walked away.

Three years later, M.R. began residing permanently in the 

defendant and Myrabella’s home. During the next six years, 

defendant committed lewd and sexually abusive acts against M.R. 

almost daily. The abuse included, among other acts, defendant 

orally copulating M.R., defendant penetrating M.R.’s vagina with 

his finger, defendant sucking M.R.’s breasts, touching M.R.’s 

genitalia with his penis, and having M.R. orally copulate him.

Myrabella first suspected sexual activity between defendant 

and M.R. on February 16, 2019, when she saw a text message on 

M.R.’s phone stating: “Do you want me to kiss your thing? You 

want me to give sweet kisses? Do you want me to kiss it?” The 
4

message further stated, “[M.R.] I love you. Come suck me more.” 

Myrabella determined that the text was sent from defendant’s cell 

phone.

Myrabella became distraught by the message and, on 

February 19, 2019, told defendant she did not trust him and asked 

him to leave their home. When defendant asked her why, she 

told him, “[D]on’t tell me that you do not know.” Defendant then 

called M.R. and said, “I think she found out about us,” and told 

M.R. that if Myrabella asks, to “deny it.” Defendant also sent M.R. 

numerous text messages telling her to “deny it,” and directing her 

to delete their messages.

When Myrabella confronted M.R., M.R. told her that 

defendant had been molesting her “from the summer before third 

grade up until” the present.

Myrabella and M.R. informed law enforcement about the 

abuse on April 5, 2019.

DISCUSSION

Defendant’s 25-page supplemental brief, which lacks 

headings or distinct parts, appears to raise the following 

arguments: (1) The evidence was insufficient to support the 

verdicts; (2) defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial 

because of juror bias, judicial bias, and juror misconduct; (3) the 

court erred by denying his request for new counsel pursuant 

to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden); and (4) he 

was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his convictions. In assessing this argument, our task

is to “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the

judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial 

evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and 
5

of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson

(1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) In making this determination, we “view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must 

presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the 

trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Jones

(1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) We do not reweigh the evidence, resolve 

conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. 

(People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403; People v. Little (2004) 

115 Cal.App.4th 766, 771.) 

Defendant contends that because a forensic examination 

of his cell phone and a flash drive revealed no incriminating 

evidence of text messages or videos, there is no evidence that 

he sent the text message Myrabella found on M.R.’s phone. Even 

in the absence of such evidence, however, the testimony of M.R., 

as to defendant’s conduct over the course of nine years provides 

substantial evidence to support the convictions. Although the 

evidence regarding the text message was relevant to show how 

Myrabella learned of defendant’s relationship with M.R., it was, 

in light of other evidence, unnecessary to establish the elements 

of his crimes.

Defendant devotes much of his brief to arguments that M.R. 

and Myrabella testified falsely or created the alleged misimpression 

that M.R. is “naïve and [he is] a cold blooded monster.” He 

dismisses the evidence of his sexual abuse of M.R. as “assumed, 

coerced, . . . pure allegations” and “lies.” M.R.’s testimony that the 

sexual abuse occurred five to seven times each week for nine years 

is, he contends, “[a]n absurd exaggeration.” He asserts that M.R.

is not only “a pathological liar,” but “a very ungrateful one,” and 

Myrabella is “a liar [and] a half.” These contentions are not within 

our purview. As stated above, issues concerning the credibility of 

witnesses and the determination of the truth or falsity of testimony 
6

are within “the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury.” (People 

v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403.) We will not disturb them.

Based on our independent review of the record, there is no 

arguable issue concerning the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the convictions.

B. Fair Trial Issues

Defendant asserts various arguments that implicate his right 

to a fair trial. He contends that during jury selection, a prospective 

juror stated that she “already hates” defendant because she was 

a rape victim. Nevertheless, the juror was ultimately selected 

for the jury and became the jury forewoman. Defendant does not, 

however, refer us to the record for this argument and our record 

does not include a transcription of juror voir dire. We cannot, 

therefore, review the claim.

Defendant contends that his counsel, the prosecutor, the 

judge, the juror who hated him, and his accusers were biased 

against him because they are female. The argument is based on 

conjecture and made without reference to evidence of bias; in short, 

it is meritless.

Defendant further contends that his sisters were in the 

courtroom while the jury deliberated and heard the jurors laughing. 

The argument is without support in the record.

C. Marsden Hearing

Prior to the start of trial, defendant requested and was

granted a Marsden hearing. Under Marsden, “ ‘ “ ‘[w]hen a

defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute

another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the 

trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of 

his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s 

inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to 

relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney 
7

is not providing adequate representation [citation] or 

that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such 

an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely 

to result.’ ” [Citation.] The decision whether to grant a requested 

substitution is within the discretion of the trial court; appellate 

courts will not find an abuse of that discretion unless the failure to 

remove appointed counsel and appoint replacement counsel would 

“substantially impair” the defendant’s right to effective assistance 

of counsel.’ ” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 487–488.)

Defendant contends the court’s failure to appoint new 

counsel was error. We have reviewed the transcript of the Marsden

hearing. The court allowed defendant to express his concerns 

about counsel and her representation of him and gave him the

opportunity to relate specific instances of her inadequate 

performance. The court permitted counsel to respond to defendant’s 

assertions and determined there had not been a breakdown in the 

relationship between them such that it would make it impossible for 

counsel to properly represent defendant. Based on our review, the 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Marsden

motion.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant asserts that he was deprived of his right to the 

effective assistance of counsel in numerous ways, including failing 

to file unspecified motions on his behalf, having “a preconceive[d] 

notion that the trial will result in conviction,” failing to “present 

character witnesses” he had offered, advising him not to testify at 

trial, and failing to challenge the allegedly false evidence presented 

by M.R. and Myrabella.

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant 

“must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that 

the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” (Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 
8

539 U.S. 510, 521, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 

668, 687.) Defendant has failed to establish, and our review of 

the record does not reveal, an arguable issue as to either of these 

elements. 

E. Conclusion

Pursuant to Wende, we have reviewed the record to 

determine whether there is any arguable issue. Based on our 

review of the record, defendant’s contentions, and the applicable 

law, we are satisfied that defendant’s counsel has fully complied 

with her responsibilities and that no arguable appellate issues

exist. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441; People v. Kelly (2006)

40 Cal.4th 106, 110.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, J.