11-1035-cr(L) 

United States v. Anderson (Grimes)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order 

filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

 At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, at 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on 

the 28th day of April, two thousand seventeen. 

 

Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

 Chief Judge, 

 DENNIS JACOBS, 

 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

 Circuit Judges. 

________________________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellee, 

 v. No. 11-1035-cr(L) 

 No. 13-3224-cr(con) 

DAVID ANDERSON, a/k/a Day Day, JEFFREY 

ANDERSON, JULIET ANDERSON, KEVIN LOUIS 

ANDERSON, a/k/a Glasses, MARLON ANDERSON, a/k/a 

Cash, KEITH BENJAMIN, a/k/a KB, DANIEL BRIGGS, 

a/k/a Tre Pound, SHANDRELL DAWSON, DEREK 

GREEN, a/k/a “D”, MADELINE SANCHEZ, HOWARD 

TAYLOR, a/k/a Jay, 

 Defendants, 

WILLIE GRIMES, a/k/a Chill, KEVIN 

LAMONT ANDERSON, a/k/a Cuda, 

 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

_____________________________________________ 
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For Defendant-Appellant MATTHEW D. NAFUS, Law Office of Matthew D. Nafus, Esq., 

Willie Grimes: Scottsville, NY. 

For Defendant-Appellant LAWRENCE D. GERZOG, Law Offices of Lawrence D. Gerzog, 

Kevin Lamont Anderson: New York, NY. 

For Appellee: FRANK T. PIMENTEL, Assistant United States Attorney, for 

James P. Kennedy, Jr., Acting United States Attorney for the 

Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY. 

 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York 

(Siragusa, J.). 

 ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

and DECREED that the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED. 

Defendants Willie Grimes and Kevin Lamont Anderson appeal from judgments of 

conviction and sentence entered against them by the United States District Court for the Western 

District of New York (Siragusa, J.). On October 26, 2009, a jury convicted Grimes of conspiracy 

to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of cocaine base and 

between 500 grams and less than 5 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The 

jury convicted Anderson of conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, 50 

grams or more of cocaine base and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846. It also convicted Anderson of renting, using, and maintaining premises for the purpose of 

manufacturing and distributing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a), and of money 

laundering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Finally, the jury found by special 

verdict that Anderson’s assets were subject to forfeiture in the amount of $1 million. Grimes was 

sentenced principally to 168 months’ imprisonment and Anderson was sentenced principally to 
3 

life imprisonment.1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 

history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

Both defendants contend on appeal that the district court erred in denying their motion for 

a new trial alleging juror misconduct without holding an evidentiary hearing. We review a 

district court’s denial of a motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 for 

abuse of discretion, United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458, 475 (2d Cir. 2009), as we do “a 

trial judge’s handling of juror misconduct,” United States v. Abrams, 137 F.3d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 

1998) (per curiam). The defendants’ argument is based on a juror’s post-verdict assertions that 

two other jurors were using the internet during trial and deliberations to learn information that 

was not properly before the jury. In particular, the juror avers that one juror learned that 

Anderson’s grandmother (Juliet Anderson, a co-defendant) was going to testify on Anderson’s 

behalf and that another juror somehow knew Juliet Anderson’s income. As the district court 

observed, the first allegation lacked credibility because no public report could be located 

suggesting that the defense was going to call Juliet Anderson, and the second allegation was 

based on the mistaken premise that no information regarding Juliet Anderson’s income was in 

evidence. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion. 

Grimes makes two arguments specific to his appeal: first, that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he willfully participated in the charged conspiracy, 

and second, that the district court erred in assigning criminal history points for a 2001 

misdemeanor conviction. Beginning with the first argument, “[w]e review a claim of insufficient 

evidence de novo, but must uphold the jury verdict if drawing all inferences in favor of the 

prosecution and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 

 

1

 The district court subsequently granted Grimes’s motion for a sentence reduction based on a 

retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. Grimes is now serving a 135-month term. 
4 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 

United States v. Cuti, 720 F.3d 453, 461 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). That standard is easily met here, as various witnesses testified to Grimes’s involvement 

with Anderson and his crack cocaine distribution activities. For example, one government 

witness testified that Grimes “work[ed]” for Kevin Lamont Anderson, the orchestrator of the 

conspiracy, “[p]ick[ing] up money and drop[ping] off drugs.” Joint App. 377–78. 

Grimes’s argument regarding his criminal history score turns on whether the district court 

clearly erred in determining that the conduct underlying his 2001 misdemeanor conviction for 

attempted criminal possession of marijuana in the fourth degree was not “relevant conduct” to 

the instant offense within the meaning of § 1B1.3 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 

See United States v. LaBarbara, 129 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Appellate review of a district 

court’s determination of whether particular acts are relevant conduct for purposes of Section 

1B1.3 employs clear-error analysis.”); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.1. The district court reasoned 

that the 2001 offense was not “relevant conduct” to the instant offense because it involved 

marijuana rather than cocaine and involved possession rather than distribution. Though Grimes 

asserts that his 2001 offense was relevant conduct to his instant conviction because it involved 

the distribution of illegal drugs, we are not persuaded. We find no clear error in the district 

court’s determination. 

Turning to Anderson’s arguments, Anderson first submits that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying a series of Rule 33 motions he filed contending that his trial was tainted by 

perjury on the part of cooperating witnesses. In exercising the “broad discretion” conferred by 

Rule 33, a district court may “weigh the evidence and in so doing evaluate for itself the 

credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir. 1992) 
5 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court carefully analyzed the specific 

instances of alleged perjury identified in Anderson’s Rule 33 motion and concluded that the 

defendant had failed to establish perjury in each instance. Finding no error in these 

determinations, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the Rule 33 

motion. See United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) (providing for clear error 

review of district court findings of fact in the context of Rule 33 motions). 

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that some of the possible inconsistencies Anderson 

now highlights for the first time on appeal amount to perjury, and assuming that these are 

properly before us, Anderson’s challenge fails because he makes no persuasive showing “that the 

jury probably would have acquitted in the absence of the false testimony.” Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 

1414. That stray pieces of testimony over the course of a six-week trial may have been false does 

not show how Anderson would likely have been acquitted in the absence of such testimony. Nor 

has Anderson made any nonconclusory showing that the government should have known that its 

witnesses were committing perjury, such that Anderson would need only to demonstrate that the 

jury might have acquitted in order to be entitled to a new trial. See id. (“It is only in the rare 

instance where it can be shown that the prosecution knowingly used false testimony that we 

would apply a less stringent test and permit the granting of [a] new trial where the jury ‘might’ 

have acquitted absent the perjury.”). 

Anderson also contends that, because of the supposed pervasive unreliability of the 

testimony, the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction and that the conviction 

was entered in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. As for the challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, “resolv[ing] all inferences from the evidence and issues of credibility 

in favor of the verdict,” we conclude that “a rational trier of fact could . . . have found the 
6 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Howard, 214 F.3d 

361, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Triumph 

Capital Grp., 544 F.3d 149, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In order to avoid usurping the role of the 

jury, courts must defer to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and the jury’s resolution of 

conflicting testimony when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted)). Anderson’s vaguely sketched constitutional argument fails for 

substantially the same reasons that Anderson’s challenge to the denial of his Rule 33 motions 

fails. 

Anderson next argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district 

court erred in applying the “murder cross-reference” found in § 2D1.1(d)(1) of the Sentencing 

Guidelines. The application of the cross-reference was based on the district court’s finding that 

Anderson preemptively murdered two individuals that he believed intended to rob him in order 

to protect his drug trafficking activity. “This Court reviews a district court’s application of the 

Guidelines de novo, while factual determinations underlying a district court’s Guidelines 

calculation are reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Cramer, 777 F.3d 597, 601 (2d Cir. 

2015). “A district court commits procedural error where it . . . makes a mistake in its Guidelines 

calculation . . . .” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). Section 

2D1.1 of the Guidelines, which covers drug trafficking offenses, provides that if a victim was 

murdered, the sentencing court should apply the applicable murder Guideline in calculating the 

defendant’s Guidelines range (assuming the resulting offense level is greater). U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(d)(1). The murder cross-reference applies only if the “murder is relevant to [the 

defendant’s] offense of conviction under guideline § 1B1.3.” United States v. Taylor, 813 F.3d 

1139, 1150 (8th Cir. 2016). Here, it is undisputed that the district court invoked the wrong 
7 

paragraph of § 1B1.3 in finding the cross-reference applicable. In particular, the district court 

stated prior to announcing its finding that “[w]hat must be shown is that the murders were part of 

a common plan or scheme as the offense charged in the indictment,” paraphrasing the language 

of § 1B1.3(a)(2). Gov’t App. 249. That provision, by its terms, only applies where the relevant 

conduct constitutes an offense that the Guidelines would require to be grouped—a circumstance 

that does not obtain here. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). 

Contrary to Anderson’s contention, however, a different standard for relevant conduct 

could apply. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (classifying as relevant conduct “all acts and 

omissions committed . . . by the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the 

offense of conviction [or] in preparation for that offense”). Though facially expansive, this Court 

has explained that “[t]o qualify as ‘relevant conduct’ [under § 1B1.3(a)(1)], the conduct must 

occur in the course of commission of the offense of conviction.” United States v. Wernick, 691 

F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). We need not determine whether 

§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) would apply here, however, because even assuming arguendo that it did not, 

the error would be harmless because Anderson’s offense level and Guidelines range would 

remain unchanged. Cramer, 777 F.3d at 603 (“An error in Guidelines calculation is harmless if 

correcting the error would result in no change to the Guidelines offense level and sentencing 

range.”). Anderson’s total offense level with the application of the murder cross-reference 

exceeded 43, but was treated as 43 pursuant to the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, cmt. 

n.2 (“An offense level of more than 43 is to be treated as an offense level of 43.”). In the absence 

of the cross-reference, Anderson’s base offense level would have been 38 in light of the quantity 

of cocaine base involved in the offense. His total offense level would have been 46, however, in 

light of a four-level enhancement for leadership role, a two-level enhancement for possession of 
8 

a firearm, and a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice—all of which the district court 

found applicable. Thus, even without the murder cross-reference, Anderson’s offense level 

would still be treated as 43, and his Guidelines range would remain life imprisonment. 

Anderson argues that a retroactive amendment to U.S.S.G § 2D1.1 has increased the 

threshold drug quantity needed to support a base offense level of 38 from 8.4 kilograms of 

cocaine base to 25.2 kilograms, such that we should remand for the district court to reconsider 

the Guidelines calculation in light of the amendment. This is unnecessary for two reasons. First, 

in finding that Anderson’s offense involved “well beyond” 8.4 kilograms of cocaine base, the 

district court credited a witness’s testimony that Anderson and his accomplices were distributing 

about 2 kilograms of cocaine base per week in the late 1990s. Gov’t App. 312–13. The district 

court thus effectively found that the offense involved far more than 25.2 kilograms of cocaine 

base. Second, even assuming a lower base offense level of 36 (the base offense level now 

associated with at least 8.4 but less than 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(c)(2)), Anderson’s offense level would still exceed 43 with the aforementioned 

enhancements. Accordingly, any error in applying the murder cross-reference remains harmless. 

We likewise reject Anderson’s argument that the alleged perjury at trial and during the 

sentencing proceedings renders his sentence procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The 

district court explicitly found at sentencing that Keith Benjamin, whose testimony supported the 

district court’s Guidelines calculation, was credible. That finding was not clearly erroneous. 

Anderson also suggests that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district 

court credited testimonial evidence during the sentencing proceedings without giving Anderson 

an opportunity to confront relevant witnesses. However, to the extent Anderson is arguing that 

his rights were violated in this manner, “[b]oth the Supreme Court and this Court . . . have 
9 

consistently held that the right of confrontation does not apply to the sentencing context.” United 

States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2005). 

Finally, Anderson argues that the jury’s forfeiture verdict should be vacated. We review a 

district court’s legal conclusions regarding forfeiture de novo and its factual conclusions for clear 

error. United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 261 (2d Cir. 2010). Anderson argues that the 

special verdict form submitted to the jury was invalid in two respects. First, he argues that the 

form did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(5)(B) because it did not 

“ask[] the jury to determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between 

the property and the offense committed by the defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(b)(5)(B). 

Second, he contends that it was error for the jury to determine the amount of money subject to 

forfeiture because Rule 32.2 vests that responsibility with the court. 

As a threshold matter, the government’s position that these arguments are waived is 

wrong. While Anderson’s counsel did not object to the composition of the special verdict form or 

the submission of the quantum issue to the jury, his silence does not amount to the “intentional 

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 

(1993). Rather, where a party does not contemporaneously object to a claimed error, we examine 

it on appeal for plain error. See Marcic v. Reinauer Transp. Cos., 397 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 

2005). “To establish plain error, the defendant must establish (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) 

affects substantial rights.” United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2007). “If the 

error meets these initial requirements, we then must consider whether to exercise our discretion 

to correct it, which is appropriate only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10 

Neither of Anderson’s arguments regarding the special verdict satisfies the plain error 

standard. With respect to Anderson’s first argument regarding the omitted verbiage, the district 

court instructed the jury on what was required to find forfeiture, and Anderson does not contend 

the court’s instructions were deficient in any respect. As such, Anderson cannot show that the 

claimed error affected substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (noting that to “affect 

substantial rights,” the claimed error generally “must have affected the outcome of the district 

court proceedings” (alteration omitted)). With respect to Anderson’s second argument regarding 

the jury’s finding as to the amount of forfeiture, nothing in Rule 32.2 precludes the court from 

putting the question to the jury. Thus, the claimed error cannot be deemed “clear or obvious” 

(such that it was plain), and Anderson has again made no showing that the claimed error affected 

substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 

Anderson also contends that the district court erred in permitting the government’s efforts 

to attach assets of which he was the beneficial owner, specifically, his mother’s life insurance 

policy and retirement plan account. But we have clearly held that a money judgment entered 

under the criminal forfeiture statute at the time of sentencing “is effectively an in personam

judgment in the amount of the forfeiture order.” United States v. Awad, 598 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 

2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation mark omitted). There was therefore no error in the district 

court’s decision to permit the government to pursue these assets. 

We have considered all of the defendants’ arguments on this appeal and find in them no 

basis for reversal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments of the district court.

 FOR THE COURT: 

 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK