27196 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices

Issued in Washington, DC, on May 9, 2001.

Janice L. Peters,

FAA Special Assistant, RTCA Advisory

Committee.

[FR Doc. 01–12236 Filed 5–15–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

[Policy Statement Number ANM–01–03]

Factors To Consider When Reviewing

an Applicant’s Proposed Human

Factors Methods of Compliance for

Flight Deck Certification

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of policy statement;

request for comments.

SUMMARY: This notice announces a

proposed FAA general statement of

policy that is applicable to the type

certification process of transport

category airplanes. This policy

statement provides guidance to FAA

Certification Teams that will enable

them to conduct an effective review of

an applicant’s proposed methods of

compliance identified in a Human

Factors Certification Plan, or the human

factors components of a general

Certification Plan, if one is submitted as

part of a type certification certificate

(TC), supplemental type certification

certificate (STC), or amended type

certificate (ATC) application. This

policy also is applicable in cases where

an applicant chooses to identify

methods of compliance in other types of

documents, such as a letter containing

the description of changes to production

configurations. This guidance describes

a process to promote early discussion

and agreement between the FAA and

the applicant regarding the methods by

which the applicant may demonstrate

compliance with human factors-related

regulations during certification projects.

This notice is to advise the public of

FAA policy and give all interested

persons an opportunity to review and

comment on the policy statement.

DATES: Send your comments by June 15,

2001.

ADDRESSES: Address your comments to

the individual identified under FOR

FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Steve Boyd, Federal Aviation

Administration, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Transport Standards Staff,

Airplane & Flightcrew Interface Branch,

ANM–111, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,

Renton, WA 98055–4056; telephone

(425) 227–1138; fax (425) 227–1320; email: 9-ANM-111-

humanfactors@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

The FAA invites your comments on

this proposed general statement of

policy. We will accept your comments,

data, views, or arguments by letter, fax,

or e-mail. Send your comments to the

person indicated in FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT. Mark your

comments, ‘‘Comments to Policy

Statement ANM–01–03.’’

Use the following format when

preparing your comments:

• Organize your comments issue-byissue.

• For each issue, state what specific

change you are requesting to the

proposed general statement of policy.

• Include justification, reasons, or

data for each change you are requesting.

We also welcome comments in

support of the proposed policy.

We will consider all communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments. We may change the

proposals contained in this notice

because of the comments received.

Effect of General Statement of Policy

The FAA is presenting this

information as a set of guidelines

suitable for use by certain applicants for

a type certificate (TC), supplemental

type certificate (STC), or amended type

certificate (ATC). However, the general

policy stated in this document is not

intended to establish a binding norm; it

does not constitute a new regulation,

and the FAA would neither apply nor

rely on it as a regulation. The FAA

Aircraft Certification Offices (ACO) that

certify transport category airplanes and/

or the flight deck systems installed on

them should attempt to follow this

policy, when appropriate. However, in

determining compliance with

certification standards, each FAA office

has the discretion not to apply these

guidelines where it determines that they

are inappropriate. Applicants should

expect that the certificating officials will

consider this information when making

findings of compliance relevant to new

certificate actions.

As with all advisory material, this

general statement of policy identifies

one means, but not the only means, of

compliance.

Background

Recent aviation safety reports

underscore the importance of

addressing issues related to human

performance and flightcrew error in

system design and certification.

Applicants have demonstrated the

effectiveness of using a ‘‘Human Factors

Certification Plan,’’ or any other

certification plan which identifies

human factors issues and

considerations, to communicate to the

FAA their proposed approach to

identifying and resolving human

performance issues. The FAA

previously issued Policy Statement No.

ANM–99–2, entitled ‘‘Guidance for

Reviewing Certification Plans to

Address Human Factors for Certification

of Transport Airplane Flight Decks’’ (64

FR 54399, October 6, 1999; and 65 FR

19958, April 13, 2000). That policy

statement provides guidance on the

recommended content of a Human

Factors Certification Plan. A Human

Factors Certification Plan is not a

required document, but may be

included as part of a certification project

if an applicant so chooses. Policy

Statement No. ANM–99–2

recommended that the plan include a

list of the ‘‘Methods of Compliance

(MOC)’’ that the applicant proposes to

use to show compliance with each

applicable regulation.

The guidance contained in this new

policy statement provides further

recommendations regarding the review

of the applicant’s proposed MOCs.

These recommendations can be used as

a means by which the applicant and the

FAA can establish an early and formal

written agreement on the methods of

compliance for regulations that relate to

human factors and that are applicable to

the certification project. This will help

FAA Certification Teams address the

MOCs as early in the certification

process as possible, thus decreasing the

applicant’s certification cost and

schedule risk.

This new policy statement is one

portion of an overall FAA strategy for

developing policies related to human

factors in the certification of flight decks

on transport category airplanes. Policy

development will cover the following

areas related to showing compliance

with regulatory requirements associated

with human factors:

1. Information on the recommended

content of certification plans. (The FAA

previously published this information

as Policy Statement No. ANM–99–2).

This policy is intended to improve the

timeliness and effectiveness of

communication between the applicant

and the FAA concerning the

requirements related to human factors.

2. Information on how to determine

the adequacy of an applicant’s

proposed methods of compliance. (This

is the information provided in this

policy statement.) This policy provides

further information on the methods of

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices 27197

compliance that may be proposed in

certification plans or other documents

provided by the applicant.

3. Information on how to determine

the adequacy of an applicant’s

proposed human factors test plans

intended to support certification. (The

FAA has not yet developed or published

this information.) This policy will

support the ACO when it determines

that test plans related to compliance

with requirements related to human

factors require FAA review and

concurrencethe ACO determines that it

is appropriate for the FAA to review and

concur with the applicant’s test plans

relative to human factors requirements.

4. Information on how to reach

agreement on design acceptability for

human factors analyses and tests

performed to support certification. (The

FAA has not yet developed or published

this information.) This policy will

improve the process by which the

applicant and the FAA jointly agree on

how to determine whether the design

meets the regulatory requirements. This

is especially important for those

requirements that rely on subjective

evaluations to determine acceptability.

5. Information on the recommended

roles and responsibilities of test pilots,

human factors specialists, and other

technical specialists in certification

programs, with respect to regulations

related to human factors. (The FAA has

not yet developed or published this

information.) This policy will clarify

how these individuals should work

together to review and approve the

various aspects of the certification

project that concern human factors.

Objectives of This Policy Statement

The policy statement is for use by

members of FAA Certification Teams,

which may include the following

individuals:

• Aircraft evaluation group

inspectors,

• Avionics engineers,

• Certification Team project

managers,

• Flight test pilots,

• Flight test engineers,

• Human factors specialists,

• Propulsion engineers, and

• Systems engineers.

While this policy is focused on

providing guidance to these FAA

Certification Team members, it may be

of use to applicants, as well.

This policy statement addresses the

methods by which applicants may show

compliance with regulations related to

flight deck human factors during a type

certificateion (TC), a supplemental type

certificateion (STC), or an amended type

certificate (ATC) project for transport

category airplanes. The objective of this

policy is to provide information for the

FAA Certification Team to refer to’s

reference when reviewing the

applicant’s proposed MOCs. For

projects in which a certification plan is

not submitted, this policy can stillmay

be used useful in discussions between

the applicant and the FAA about how

applicants may demonstrate compliance

with applicable regulations. Although

the policy provides information to all

members of the FAA Certification Team,

test pilots and human factors specialists

will normally determine the

interpretation of the acceptability of a

proposed MOC.

The goal of this policy is to improve

the consistency of FAA evaluations of

applicants’ proposed MOCs. Its purpose

is not to standardize the MOC for any

given requirement; rather, it provides

information about the issues and factors

that should be considered when

evaluating an applicant’s proposed

MOCs. The specifics of each

certification project will determine the

outcome of those evaluations and the

acceptability of an applicant’s proposed

MOCs.

The FAA recognizes that decisions

concerning MOCs for human factors

issues are complex and contextdependent. Usually, selecting the

appropriate MOC for a regulation in a

specific project will be based on an

understanding of the human factors

issues and the capabilities and

limitations of the various MOCs with

regard to the issues and the regulations.

However, it may be appropriate to

consider other factors to ensure that the

desired MOCs are reasonable for the

specific project. These other factors

include:

• The complexity of the project.

• The safety implications of the

human factors issues.

• The availability and need for test

environments (simulators, for example).

• The experience base of the

applicant.

• The cost and schedule implications

of each MOC.

These factors should be considered as

a whole when determining the adequacy

of the applicant’s proposed MOCs, as

well as when determining the need for

alternative MOCs.

The Certification Team should strive

to agree on MOCs that effectively show

compliance with the regulation in a

manner that is commensurate with:

• The significance of the human

factors safety risks, and

• The complexity of the issues

underlying a finding of compliance.

For example, the FAA should not

insist on an extensive and costly

evaluation of a simple design change

that has no significant safety

implications. Conversely, the applicant

should not request a quick FAA sign-off

for a novel, complex design that may

have the potential for significant safetyrelated pilot errors.

This policy statement does not

supersede any current or future FAA

Advisory Circulars that deal with

human factors MOCs. Wherever

possible, this policy statement attempts

to provide references to relevant

existing advisory material. If there are

any cases in which there is a conflict

between existing Advisory Circulars and

this policy statement, the Advisory

Circulars take precedence.

The FAA recognizes the current effort

of several Harmonization Working

Groups, chartered under the Aviation

Rulemaking Advisory Committee

(ARAC) process, that may develop

regulatory or advisory material affecting

human factors requirements or MOCs. If

these Working Groups develop or

modify regulatory or advisory material

relevant to human factors issues, the

FAA will review this policy statement

and update it as necessary to maintain

consistency.

Application of the General Statement of

Policy

Because this general statement of

policy only announces what the FAA

seeks to establish as policy, the FAA

considers it an issue for which public

comment is appropriate. Therefore, as

stated previously, we request comments

on the following proposed general

statement of policy. Resolution of any

public comments received will

determine how the policy is applied in

the long term for future projects.

General Statement of Policy

Guidance for Reviewing Human

Factors Methods of Compliance for

Flight Deck Certification

The guidance provided in the

following sections is intended to help

the FAA Certification Team members

review the human factors MOCs

proposed by an applicant during a

certification project. Those MOCs may

be identified in a Certification Plan or

other document submitted by an

applicant. The applicant may wish to

provide this information by any number

of means, such as:

• Part of a Human Factors

Certification Plan or overall Project

Certification plan, if submitted;

• A separate, unique document; or

• A briefing or series of briefings and

discussions.

Regardless of the medium used for

providing information, it should be

27198 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices

organized in a way that shows the

relationship between the specific

human factors requirements and the

MOCs used for each. The applicant is

under no obligation to provide the

information described in this policy

statement, except as necessary to

demonstrate compliance when

certification is requested. However, the

FAA considers that early discussions of

the proposed MOCs for human factors

requirements is beneficial to both the

FAA and the applicant, and may

significantly reduce certification risk.

This policy does not imply that

applicants should be required to

provide extensive, written justifications

of their proposed MOCs. Rather, the

information in this policy statement

should be used by the FAA Certification

Team to evaluate the proposed MOCs,

and to provide common reference points

for discussions between the applicant

and the FAA.

Organization of This Policy Statement

The information provided in this

policy statement covers three topics:

1. General information on methods of

compliance for regulations related to

human factors.

2. Identification of design-specific

human factors issues.

3. Identification of regulation-specific

human factors issues.

In addition, a list of selected

regulations is included in Appendix A.

This list contains the same regulations

as those cited in Policy Statement No.

ANM–99–2 (referred to previously).

However, Appendix A of this new

policy statement provides a more

detailed discussion of MOCs for each of

the cited regulations. The FAA also

plans to provide the information in

Appendix A of this policy statement on

an internet web site, where it can

become a ‘‘living document’’ and can be

updated as new regulatory material,

information, processes, and technology

become available.

1. Methods of Compliance

In the Human Factors Certification

Plan, overall Certification Plan, or other

certification project documents, the

applicant may propose or describe the

methods that will be or have been used

to demonstrate compliance with the

relevant human factors regulations. The

review and discussion of the methods of

compliance is an opportunity for the

FAA and the applicant to work together,

early in the certification program, to

identify potential certification issues

related to human factors. Policy

Statement No. ANM–99–2 provided a

brief discussion of the MOCs; the

section below expands on that

information by providing more detailed

discussions.

The methods of compliance are not

mutually exclusive. The applicant may

choose to include any one or a

combination of these methods of

compliance. The applicant should

describe all methods of compliance to

be used in a certification project in

enough detail to give the FAA

Certification Team confidence that the

results of the chosen methods will

provide the information necessary for

finding compliance. Following is a list

of MOCs relevant to compliance with

human factors regulations:

1.a. Drawings: These are layout

drawings and/or engineering drawings

that show the geometric arrangement of

hardware or display graphics. Drawings

typically are used when demonstration

of compliance can easily be reduced to

simple geometry, arrangement, or the

presence of a given feature, on a

technical drawing.

1.b. Configuration description: This is

a description of the layout, general

arrangement, direction of movement,

etc., of the regulated item, or a reference

to similar documentation. For example,

such a description could be used to

show the relative locations of flight

instruments, groupings of control

functions, allocation of color codes to

displays and alerts, etc. Configuration

descriptions are generally less

formalized than engineering drawings,

and are developed in order to point out

the features of the design that are

supportive of a finding of compliance.

Configuration descriptions may

illustrate how a design philosophy or

concept is implemented in a consistent,

easy-to-understand manner. In some

cases, such configuration descriptions

may provide sufficient information for a

finding of compliance with a specific

requirement; however, more often,

configuration descriptions provide

important background information

requiring demonstrations, tests, or other

means to confirm compliance. The

background information provided by

configuration descriptions, however,

may significantly reduce the complexity

and/or risk associated with the

demonstrations or tests.

1.c. Statement of similarity: This is a

description of the system to be approved

and a description of a previouslyapproved system. The description

details the physical, logical, and

operational similarities of the two

systems in complying with the

regulations. Past certification precedents

are important; however, this method of

compliance must be used with care

because the flight deck should be

evaluated as a whole, rather than merely

as a set of individual functions or

systems. For example, two functions

that have been previously approved on

two different programs may be

incompatible when combined on a

single flight deck. Also, changing one

feature in a flight deck may necessitate

corresponding changes in other features,

in order to maintain consistency and

prevent confusion.

1.d. Evaluations, assessments, and

analyses: These are conducted by the

applicant or others (not the FAA or a

designee), who then provide a report of

their results to the FAA. Traditionally,

these types of activities have been used

as part of the design process without

formal certification credit. However,

when properly performed, these

activities can result in better designs

that are more likely to be compliant

with applicable regulations. In cases

where human subjects (pilots, for

example) are used to gather data

(subjective or objective), the applicant

should fully document the selection of

participants, what data will be

collected, and how it will be collected.

This will allow the FAA Certification

Team to determine the extent to which

the evaluations, assessments, and

analyses provide valid and relevant

information with respect to finding

compliance with the regulations. For a

more detailed discussion of how these

evaluations, assessments, and analyses

can be used and formalized, see

Appendix D of this policy statement.

1.d.(1) Engineering evaluations or

analyses—These assessments can

involve a number of techniques,

including:

• Procedure evaluations (complexity,

number of steps, nomenclature, etc.);

• Reach or strength analysis via

computer modeling;

• Time-line analysis for assessing task

demands and workload; or

• Other methods, depending on the

issue being considered.

Certification Teams should carefully

consider the validity of assessment

techniques for analyses that are not

based on advisory material or accepted

industry standard methods, and request

that applicants validate any

computation tools used in such

analyses. If analysis involves comparing

measured characteristics to

recommendations derived from preexisting research (internal or public

domain), the applicant may be asked to

validate the use of the data derived from

the research.

1.d.(2) Mock-up evaluations—These

are evaluations using mock-ups of the

flight deck and/or components. Mockups are typically used for assessment of

reach and clearance and, therefore, they

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices 27199

demand a high degree of geometric

accuracy. Mock-ups have traditionally

been physical representations of the

design, which have allowed evaluators

to physically interact with the design. In

some cases, drawings of controls and

indicators, placed on accurately

positioned representations of

instrument panels, can be beneficial in

conducting reach assessments. Using

data extracted from computer-aided

design (CAD) systems, control panels

can now be mocked-up physically in

three-dimensional form (a process

generally referred to as ‘‘stereo

lithography’’). These mock-ups can

allow more precise evaluations of finger

clearances, visibility of labels, etc.

Three-dimensional representations of

the design in a CAD system, in

conjunction with three-dimensional

models of the flight deck occupants,

also have been used as ‘‘virtual’’ mockups for certain limited types of

evaluations. For example, reach

assessments using this technique can

use either:

• Statistical samples of relevant body

characteristics (for example, limb sizes,

joint limits, etc.) or

• Carefully chosen sets of specific

combinations of body characteristics.

In the latter case, attention should be

given to selecting reasonable worst-case

combinations of characteristics (for

example, a worst-case might be a 5′2′′

pilot with more than proportionally

short legs). Care must be taken to

determine if the model of the human

reasonably represents actual human

movement capabilities, especially at

extreme body positions or near joint

rotation limits. It is important to note

that this type of virtual mock-up and, in

fact, many types of mock-ups may be of

even greater use during the design phase

as part of engineering evaluations. They

should only be used judiciously as an

MOC because they typically represent

only certain features of the physical

arrangement. For example, a control

may be reachable in a given location,

but, due to the means of actuation or

forces required, it may be too difficult

to use when placed there. For many of

the compliance issues typically

evaluated in mock-ups, final

compliance findings often can be found

only in the actual airplane or a

simulator.

1.d.(3) Part-task evaluations—These

are evaluations using devices that

emulate the crew interfaces for a single

system or a related group of systems,

using flight hardware, simulated

systems, or combinations of these.

Typically, these evaluations are limited

by the extent to which acceptability may

be affected by other flight deck tasks.

This MOC is most easily used for standalone systems. As flight deck systems

become more integrated, part-task

evaluations may become less useful as

an MOC, even although their utility as

engineering tools may increase. A

typical example of a part-task

demonstrator for an integrated system

would be an avionics suite installed in

a mock-up of a flight deck, with the

main displays and autopilot controllers

included. Such a tool may be valuable

during development and for providing

system familiarization to the authorities.

However, in a highly integrated

architecture, it may be difficult or

impossible to assess how well the

avionics system will fit into the overall

flight deck without more complete

simulation or use of the actual airplane.

1.d.(4) Simulator evaluations—These

are evaluations using devices that

present an integrated emulation (using

flight hardware, simulated systems, or

combinations of these) of the flight deck

and the operational environment. They

can also be ‘‘flown’’ with response

characteristics that replicate, to some

extent, the responses of the airplane.

Typically, these evaluations are limited

by the extent to which the simulation is

a realistic, high fidelity representation

of the airplane, the flight deck, the

external environment, and crew

operations. It should be noted that not

all aspects of the simulation must have

a high level of fidelity for any given

compliance issue. Rather, fidelity

requirements should be evaluated in

view of the issue being evaluated. For

additional information, see section

4.b.(1) of FAA Advisory Circular (AC)

25–11, ‘‘Transport Category Airplane

Electronic Display Systems,’’ dated July

16, 1987.

1.d.(5) In-flight evaluations—These

are evaluations using the actual

airplane. light test generally offer the

most realistic and comprehensive

environment for evaluating the flight

crew interface design in realistic

scenarios. Assuming that the airplane is

fully configured, the integration of the

flight crew interface features can be

evaluated in a flight environment,

including communication tasks and

interaction with the ATC environment.

However, Ttypically, these evaluations

are may be limited by the extent to

which the critical flight conditions (for

example, weather, failures, or unusual

attitudes) can be located or generated,

and then safely evaluated in flight.

While evaluations using the actual

airplane are the closest to real

operations, in some cases not all of the

scenarios of interest can be

demonstrated. The applicant may not be

able to show certain failures or

combinations of failures for a variety of

technical or safety reasons. In such

cases, applicants may find it necessary

to combine flight testing with other

MOCs in order to gain a complete

evaluation. For additional information,

see FAA AC 25–11, section 4.b.(1).

1.e. Demonstrations: These are similar

to evaluations (as described above), but

conducted by the applicant with

participation by the FAA or its designee.

The applicant may provide a report or

summary, requesting FAA concurrence

on the findings. In each case, the

applicant should note the limitations of

the demonstration and how those

limitations relate to the compliance

issues being considered. The FAA

should carefully consider which of its

specialists will participate (for example,

pilots, human factors specialists, or

systems engineers), what data will be

collected (objective and/or subjective),

and how the data will be collected. This

is to ensure that the demonstration

adequately addresses the compliance

issues and that there is participation by

the appropriate FAA evaluators.

Examples of demonstrations include:

• Mock-up demonstrations.

• Part-task demonstration.

• Simulator demonstration.

1.f. Inspection: This is a review of a

regulated item by the FAA or its

designee, who will be making the

compliance finding. This MOC is

generally limited to those items for

which compliance can be found simply

by looking at (or listening to) the feature

being considered (for example, the

presence or absence of a placard, the

direction of control movement, etc.).

1.g. Tests: These are tests conducted

by the FAA or a designee. Types of tests

include:

1.g.(1) Bench tests—These are tests of

components in a laboratory

environment. This type of testing is

usually confined to showing that the

components perform as designed.

Typical bench testing may include

measuring physical characteristics

(forces, luminance, or format, for

example) or logical/dynamic responses

to inputs, either from the user or from

other systems (real or simulated). For

most human factors evaluations, bench

tests are insufficient to show

compliance, but can provide useful

supporting data in combination with

other methods. For example, visibility

of a display under the brightest of the

expected lighting conditions might be

shown with a bench test, provided there

is supporting analysis to define the

expected lighting conditions. This might

include a geometric analysis to show the

potential directions from which the sun

could shine on the display, along with

27200 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices

calculations of expected viewing angles.

These conditions might then be

replicated in the laboratory.

1.g.(2) Ground tests—These are tests

conducted in the actual airplane, while

the airplane is on the ground and

stationary. In some cases, specialized

test equipment may be used to allow the

airplane systems to behave as if the

airplane were airborne. Certain failures

that would be unsafe to test in flight

might be evaluated using ground tests,

provided that the test capability can

adequately simulate the in-flight failure

condition. Another example of a typical

ground test is an evaluation of potential

reflections in displays. Such a test

usually involves covering the flight deck

windows to simulate darkness and

setting the flight deck lighting to desired

levels. This particular test may not be

possible in a simulator, due to

differences in the light sources, display

hardware, and/or window construction.

1.g.(3) Simulator tests—[See

Simulator evaluations, paragraph

1.d.(4), above.]

1.g.(4) Flight tests—These are tests

conducted in the actual airplane during

flight. [See In-flight evaluations,

paragraph 1.d.(5), above.] In some cases,

applicants and the FAA may place too

much emphasis on flight testing, to the

exclusion of other MOCs. This may be

based on the belief that flight testing is

the best available method for evaluating

the flight deck. While it is true that

flight testing can be very powerful, it

also has limitations. As described in the

section on in-flight evaluations, above,

it may not be possible to test all of the

important scenarios or conditions.

Flight testing provides the least control

over conditions of any of the MOCs. In

addition, flight testing is extremely

expensive and may not allow a

thorough, comprehensive evaluation

with sufficient numbers of FAA

evaluators. While many simple

evaluations can and should be handled

by a single FAA evaluator, in other

cases, the issues are too complex and

subjective to be decided by a single

person on a few flights, especially for

novel designs. For such issues, it is

often best to use flight testing as a final

confirmation of data collected using

other MOCs, including analyses and

evaluations. The FAA and the applicant

should discuss thoroughly how and

when flight tests will be used to show

compliance, as well as how flight test

results will be supported by other

MOCs.

1.h. Compliance vs. design

optimization: The FAA personnel who

are evaluating proposed methods of

compliance for rules related to human

factors should keep in mind there may

be a number of crew interface design

features that are compliant with the

applicable rules, but could be improved.

However, applicants are under no legal

obligation to conduct assessments to

show that a compliant design is the best

that they could implement among

feasible alternatives (i.e., is

‘‘optimized’’).

2. Identification of Design-Specific

Human Factors Issues

The MOCs identified above cover a

wide spectrum, from documents that

simply describe the product, to partial

approximations of the system(s), to

methods that replicate the actual

airplane and its operation with great

accuracy. Features of the product being

certified and the types of human factors

issues to be evaluated are key

considerations when selecting which

method is to be used. The

characteristics described below can be

used to help in coming to agreement on

what constitutes the minimum

acceptable method(s) of compliance for

any individual requirement. When a

product may need to meet multiple

requirements, some requirements may

demand more complex testing, while

others can be handled using simple

descriptive measures. It is important to

note that the following characteristics

are only general principles. They are

intended to form the basis for

discussions regarding acceptable

methods of compliance for a specific

product with regard to a requirement.

2.a. Degree of integration/

independence: If the product to be

evaluated for compliance is a standalone piece of equipment that does not

interact with other aspects of the crew

interface, less integrated methods of

compliance may be acceptable.

However, if the product is a complete

flight deck (as in a TC program) or is a

single system that is tightly tied to other

systems in the flight deck, either

directly or by the ways that flightcrews

use them, it may be necessary to use

methods that allow the testing of those

interactions.

2.b. Novelty/past experience: If the

technology is mature and wellunderstood, less rigorous methods may

be appropriate. More rigorous methods

may be called for if the technology is:

• New,

• Used in some new application,

• New for the particular applicant, or

• Unfamiliar to the certification

personnel.

2.c. Complexity/Level of automation:

More complex and automated systems

typically require test methods that will

reveal how that complexity will

manifest itself to the pilot, in normal

and backup or reversionary modes of

operation.

2.d. Criticality: Highly critical systems

may require testing in the most realistic

environments (high quality simulation

or flight test), because any problems are

more likely to have serious

consequences.

2.e. Dynamics: If the control and

display features of the product are

highly dynamic, the compliance

methods should be capable of

replicating those dynamic conditions.

2.g. Subjectivity of acceptance

criteria: If a requirement has specific,

objectively measurable criteria, the

applicant can often use simpler methods

to demonstrate compliance. As the

acceptance criteria become more

subjective, the applicant will need to

use more integrated test methods, so

that the evaluations take into account

the aspects of the integrated flight deck

that may affect those evaluations.

The central point is to carefully match

the method to the product and the

underlying human factors issues. It is

also important for the FAA Certification

Team to recognize that several

alternative methods may be acceptable.

3. Identification of Regulation-Specific

Human Factors Issues

The following steps outline a strategy

for identifying the human factors issues

associated with each regulation. Two

examples are carried through each issue

for purposes of illustration. Further

detail on a selected set of regulations

related to human factors can be found

in Appendix A of this policy statement.

3.a. Identify key human factors issues

related to the rule. While rules may

focus on a single concept, there may be

several underlying components that

must be considered in order to evaluate

that issue.

• Example 1: Section 25.777 (in part)

states that the flight deck must

accommodate pilots from 5′2′′ to 6′3′′ in

height. This means that pilots within

this range should be able to reach all

required controls, see all of the displays,

and have sufficient clearance with the

structure, panels, etc. Height is not the

only variable of interest, because people

of the same height may have different

lengths of arms, legs, etc. So,

consideration must be given to various

representative body proportions that fall

within the height range identified in the

regulation.

• Example 2: Section 25.773(a)(2)

states that there should be no

objectionable reflections in the flight

deck. Underlying variables may include

the size, brightness, color, dynamics,

and location of the reflections.

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices 27201

3.b. Identify systems, components,

and features that are potentially

affected by the rule.

• Example 1: Components that are

near the expected reach boundaries, as

well as those that may be blocked by

intervening objects (such as a control

that is installed in front of the throttles),

should be evaluated for reach. Potential

knee contact with the lower edge of the

main instrument panel may need to be

evaluated for clearance, especially for

tall pilots with long legs.

• Example 2: Windows, displays, and

light sources (all in the correct

geometry) may be affected.

3.c. Look for aspects of those systems,

components, and features that need to

be evaluated in order to show

compliance with the rule (for example,

forces required, readability of labels,

and number of discrete actions

required). These aspects are likely to

vary by system, component, and feature,

and by rule.

• Example 1: Seat and rudder pedal

adjustment ranges should be factored

into evaluations of reach and clearance.

• Example 2: Light source luminance

levels, reflectance of display surfaces,

and readability of the display in the

presence of the reflections should all be

considered.

3.d. For modifications to existing

flight decks or new type designs that are

based on or derived from an existing

flight deck design, look for ways in

which new aspects of the design may

compromise compliance with previously

certified designs.

• Example 1: Reaching for a new

control may result in the inadvertent

activation of a previously installed and

certificated control. Another example

might be the possibility of striking one’s

head on a newly installed head-up

display when reaching for an existing

control on the main instrument panel.

• Example 2: Placing a new display

device in the flight deck may produce

new reflections in the windows. In

another situation, a new electronic

display [for example, a liquid crystal

display (LCD)] may be more susceptible

to reflections than the electromechanical display it replaces.

3.e. Review past precedents. In this

context, precedents should be reviewed

to assess novelty of the design, because

novelty of the design will often affect

the selection of an appropriate MOC.

Similarity to a previously certificated

design does not necessarily mean that

the new product will be certificated.

Rather, that similarity may result in

fewer unknowns and a commensurate

reduction in the rigor of the evaluations.

It is important to assess whether or not

there are new issues or interactions that

were not present in previously

certificated installations. Because it is

the installation (in the flight deck) that

is certificated, not the equipment itself,

it is important to look for installationunique issues when evaluating the

relevance of past precedents.

• Example 1: Two questions to ask

are: If a new control is being added,

have other similar controls been

installed in the same location on other

versions of this flight deck? Are there

any other differences that might cause

new reach or clearance issues to

emerge?

• Example 2: Determine whether the

actual LCD ‘‘glass’’ in the new device is

already certificated in similar

installations. If so, there may be less

concern about unacceptable reflectance

characteristics. However, any unique

characteristics of the lighting

environment in the new installation

may increase uncertainty.

3.f. Assess design novelty. In addition

to the need to fully determine their

compliance with existing rules, novel

designs may require more rigorous

evaluations to ensure that their novel

features (not covered by current

regulations) do not result in any new

safety problems. Note: Any evaluations

intended to identify such new safety

problems, which might require the

development of Special Conditions,

should be accomplished as early in the

project as possible. This will allow the

FAA and the applicant to reach a

common understanding of the issues,

and to allow the applicant sufficient

time to show compliance with any

resultant Special Conditions.

3.g. Review the proposed MOCs for

each human factors rule and determine

if, taken together, they adequately

address the compliance issues that have

been identified for the relevant systems.

There is no formula for this

determination; it is based on the

judgment of the FAA Certification

Team. It is important to note that this

step is not intended to determine if all

potential human factors issues have

been fully addressed. Instead, it is

concerned only with determining if the

proposed MOCs address the regulatory

compliance issues, including those

associated with Special Conditions.

3.h. If the proposed MOCs do not fully

address the human factors issues

associated with compliance, determine

if the level of effort needed for the MOC

preferred by the FAA Certification Team

is commensurate with the level of safety

risk and the compliance uncertainty.

This step is also based on the judgment

of the FAA Certification Team. The

Team should carefully consider the

regulation-specific issues and the

design-specific issues to ensure that

onerous MOCs are not demanded for

simple, low-risk designs. The MOCs

should focus on the compliance and

safety issues, rather than on design

optimization. However, applicants

should be allowed to select (and justify)

efficient and low cost MOCs, when

appropriate. The applicant and the FAA

Certification Team should strive for

consensus on the MOCs. An open dialog

is an important part of reaching that

consensus.

Certification Documentation

This policy statement describes a

number of issues that the FAA should

consider when evaluating the

applicant’s proposed Human Factors

MOCs. In most cases, it will be

beneficial for the applicant to review

this policy and use it to structure the

explanation or justification for the

selection of Human Factors MOCs for

the certification project. The applicant

may provide to the FAA the information

supporting the proposed Human Factors

MOCs in any format or media that is

mutually agreeable to the applicant and

the FAA Certification Team. In general,

a formal document is not required,

although the applicant may choose to

record the information in the relevant

Certification Plan(s) or in a separate

document. Often, the most effective and

efficient means to convey the rationale

for the selected MOCs is to hold

discussions between the applicant and

the FAA. If this latter option is used, it

is recommended that the discussion be

documented and that the conclusions be

jointly approved.

Additional guidance on this policy

statement is provided in the following

appendices:

• Appendix A: Partial List of 14 CFR

part 25 Regulations Related to Human

Factors Issues. (This same list was

published in Policy Statement No.

ANM–99–2. It contains detailed

description of the regulation-specific

issues, and cites relevant Advisory

Circulars.)

• Appendix B: Related

Documentation.

• Appendix C: Sample Human

Factors Methods of Compliance

Briefing.

• Appendix D: The Use of Design

Evaluations to Support the Certification

Process.

Appendix A—Partial List of 14 CFR

Part 25 Regulations Related to Human

Factors Issues

This appendix provides a list of current

regulations that are related to human factors

issues. The list is divided into the following

three categories:

27202 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices

1. General Human Factors Requirements:

Rules that deal with the acceptability of the

flight deck and flightcrew interfaces across a

variety of systems/features.

2. Specific Human Factors Requirements:

Rules that deal with the acceptability of a

specific feature or function in the flight deck.

3. Specific Crew Interface Requirements:

Rules that mandate a specific system feature

that must be implemented in an acceptable

manner.

This list does not include all regulations

associated with flightcrew interfaces.

However, those listed represent some of the

requirements for which demonstrating

compliance can be problematic. In some

cases, where only subparagraphs are noted,

they have been paraphrased for clarity.

However, the FAA Certification Team should

ensure that the applicant refers to the exact

wording of the regulation in all plans and

compliance documents.

Where there is associated advisory

material, it is cited. In many other cases,

there may be no explicit guidance on

methods of compliance (MOC). Therefore, it

is important for the FAA Certification Team

to carefully consider the applicant’s

proposed MOCs and attempt to come to

agreement with the applicant. Rather than

specifying an acceptable MOC for any given

project, which is the function of advisory

material, the information that is provided

below for each rule is intended to identify

issues that should be considered when

reviewing the applicant’s proposed MOC.

Following each regulatory requirement are

the following subsections, where appropriate:

1. General discussion of the regulation and

issue.

2. Key questions to be asked or considered

by the FAA Certification Team in order to

help identify the MOC issues associated with

the requirement. These regulation-specific

questions assist the Certification Team to

ensure that the applicant has tailored the

MOCs to the potential human factors issues

for the design being considered. The

questions help provide focus on some of the

features of designs and the way the

flightcrew will use them that typically result

in concerns about how to show compliance

with the requirement. These lists are not allencompassing. Rather, they are intended to

stimulate the review process and lead to

additional questions that are unique to the

features of the specific designs. As new

technologies emerge, the issues may change

and new questions will need to be asked in

order to identify the human factors issues

related to the requirement.

3. Design-related factors, such as those

listed below, are included when appropriate

to point out other more generic issues

relevant to the MOC for the requirement:

• Novelty and past experience;

• Degree of integration and independence;

• Complexity or Level of automation;

• Criticality;

• Dynamics;

• Level of training required; and

• Subjectivity of acceptance criteria.

It is important to remember that, for the

purposes of this policy statement, the

information is directed at reviews of the

proposed MOCs, not the acceptability of the

design itself. More specifically, the focus is

on the general types of MOCs that the

applicant has proposed. Details of how the

compliance assessments are to be conducted

(for example, the test designs, and the types

of subjects) or the criteria for compliance

(i.e., acceptance criteria) are not included.

These topics will be the subjects of future

policy statements. For example, this

appendix discusses whether or not

simulation would be appropriate for showing

compliance with a given requirement; it does

not discuss how the simulator should be

used, what data should be collected, or how

to determine whether or not the design is

acceptable based on the data.

Note that none of the regulations listed

below are associated with airplane handling

qualities. While such rules obviously have

human factors implications, they have

traditionally been the responsibility of

aeronautical engineers, control system

designers, and test pilots. The applicant may,

if it so chooses, include such regulations in

the Human Factors Certification Plan.

However, the methods of compliance are

discussed in flight test advisory material and

FAA orders, and are outside the purview of

this policy statement.

1. General Human Factors Requirements

Section 25.771(a) [at amdt. 25–4]: ‘‘Each

pilot compartment and its equipment must

allow the minimum flightcrew to perform

their duties without unreasonable

concentration or fatigue.’’

Discussion: The FAA Certification Team

should carefully consider the aspects of the

flightcrew interface that might require

significant or sustained mental or physical

effort, or might otherwise result in fatigue.

Other factors affecting fatigue, such as noise

and seat comfort, may also need to be

evaluated. When reviewing the applicant’s

proposed MOC, the FAA Certification Team

should consider the expected sources of

fatigue, as well as how and when that fatigue

is likely to manifest itself. Applicants have

often successfully used comparisons to

previously certificated designs, although

testing may be warranted for new flightcrew

interface designs or functions.

Questions that the FAA Certification Team

should ask the applicant when identifying

the human factors-related MOC issues are

discussed in Table A–1.

TABLE A–1.—§ 25.771(a): QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES

Question Discussion

Are there any controls that will require significant peak or sustained muscular exertion.If the applicant chooses to perform analyses as a way to provide data in support of compliance, the

FAA Certification Team should review any strength data and analysis methods to ensure that

they can be generalized to the flight deck controls in question.

Are there any displays that will require sustained attention ......... The FAA Certification Team may determine that the ability to time-share attention to the displays

may require testing in a full simulation or in flight, in order to replicate the other tasks. In some

cases, it may be possible to measure task performance, but subjective assessments are more

frequently used and are likely to be more practical.

Are there any pilot actions that will require sustained mental

concentration, especially during high workload flight phases,

other than that required as part of normal flying skills.

Simulation and/or flight testing, using subjective measures, are typically proposed for such issues,

due to the complex interactions between the various flightcrew tasks.

Is this aircraft intended primarily for low cycle rate, long haul operations, or for high cycle rate, short haul operations.The effects of multiple cycles per crew per day or long duration flights may need to be factored into

MOCs.

Is this a new or modified seat design ........................................... It may be appropriate to determine that a new seat design should be tested for long-term comfort,

to the extent that discomfort is expected to add to fatigue.

Are there functions of time-shared displays or controls that increase pilot workload.In some cases, the FAA Certification Team may accept analysis intended to show that there is sufficient time available to use the display for multiple purposes (for example, maintenance display

functions time-shared with navigation). However, in many other cases, that information is likely to

be usable only as supporting data that must be verified in simulation or flight test, depending on

the functions being time-shared and the critical scenarios.

Other factors to consider when reviewing the MOC are discussed in Table A–2.

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices 27203

TABLE A–2.—§ 25.771(a): FACTORS TO CONSIDER

Issue Discussion

Complexity/Level of automation ................................................... Navigating though complex menu trees and deciphering or predicting operating modes for complex

automation can lead to high concentration and memory demands. These demands can be especially significant if they occur during high stress or workload portions of the flight (for example,

during non-normal conditions, severe weather, etc.). System description information, and an

analysis of menu complexity and function accessibility, if provided by the applicant, can yield

useful supporting data. However, as complexity and level of automation increases, the need for

demonstrations and tests increases.

Criticality ....................................................................................... A high demand for concentration, especially on a single issue during a critical flight situation, has

been shown to result in ‘‘attention tunneling’’ or ‘‘channelized attention’’ (focusing of attention on

one task to the extent that other important tasks receive little or no attention). This phenomenon

has been implicated in numerous accidents. The FAA Certification Team should ensure that the

proposed MOCs cover such critical situations, if they exist.

Subjectivity of acceptance criteria ................................................ Currently available and accepted methods for assessing concentration and mental fatigue usually

involve subjective assessment, although certain applicants have employed physiological methods

as methods to collect supporting data. It is often useful to compare the proposed design with

previously certificated designs that have been shown in service to result in acceptable levels of

concentration and fatigue.

Section 25.771(e) [at amdt. 25–4]:

‘‘Vibration and noise characteristics cockpit

equipment may not interfere with safe

operation of the airplane.’’

Discussion: When reviewing the proposed

MOC, the FAA Certification Team should

ensure that the applicant has carefully

considered the types and magnitudes of

vibration and noise that may be present

under both normal and abnormal conditions.

Then, the tasks that may be affected by

vibration (for example, display legibility and

the operation of controls) and noise (for

example, communication and identification

of aural alerts) should be identified.

Additionally, the methods that could be used

to determine whether the vibration or noise

will unacceptably interfere with safe

operation of the airplane should be

identified.

Unfortunately, there are no widely used

and accepted vibration standards or testing

methods which directly address whether or

not pilots will be able to safely operate the

airplane under the expected vibration

conditions. Existing standards for workplace

vibration primarily focus on injury to the

worker after long periods of exposure (days,

weeks, months), rather than on the ability to

perform the required tasks (i.e., continued

safe flight and landing).

Actual testing of pilots in representative

vibration environment with actual flight deck

equipment (seats, controls, displays) can be

extremely involved and expensive, especially

if an applicant were to be required to develop

a test facility with which the pilots could

interact as with the actual airplane. The

duration of the tests may also present a

problem—it may be difficult to find a group

of pilots willing to sit on a shaker table for

the maximum duration of an extended twinengine operation (ETOPS) diversion. As a

result, showing compliance with this rule

can be especially problematic.

Questions to ask when identifying the

human factors-related compliance issues are

discussed in Table A–3.

TABLE A–2.—§ 25.771(e): QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES

Question Discussion

Are there any controls requiring precise dexterity to operate (for

example, cursor control devices, touch screens, etc.).

In some cases, the devices may already be in service for non-essential functions. More thorough

testing may be warranted if the devices are to be used for essential or critical functions.

Are there fine details of displays that must be interpreted during

turbulence or vibration conditions.

(Self-explanatory.)

What are the characteristics (frequency, acceleration, amplitude) of the expected engine fan blade-loss vibrations or

other expected vibratory modes.

Are the vibration frequencies the same as any relevant body resonant frequencies (hand, arm, eye,

head, abdomen, etc.)? If the pilots are not likely to be exposed to frequencies at body

resonances, then testing may not be needed.

To what extent will the seat design dampen or amplify the vibrations that are transmitted from the seat structure, through the

seat cushion, to the pilot.

Relatively minor changes to seat cushion design can significantly affect the transmission of vibrations to the pilot. Such changes may warrant testing, especially if frequencies at known body

resonances are expected to be present at the seat pan.

Other factors to consider when reviewing the MOC are discussed in Table A–4.

TABLE A–4.—§ 25.771(e): FACTORS TO CONSIDER

Issue Discussion

Novelty/past experience ............................................................... Conventional controls, such as pushbuttons and rotary knobs can generally be shown to be compliant via similarity, providing that they have conventional characteristics (size, force/friction, tactile

feedback) and the vibration environment is not expected to be severe (see discussion above).

Criticality ....................................................................................... Are the tasks that require a high degree of visual resolution or manual dexterity likely to be critical

to continued safe flight and landing in situations that result in flight deck vibration? Such a condition may warrant testing, if the controls/displays are non-conventional or if the vibration is expected to be unusual.

Subjectivity of acceptance criteria ................................................ Analysis and testing of components could be used to show that no significant vibration problems

are present. However, in cases that cannot be clearly disposed of through similarity or analysis,

the FAA Certification Team may wish to request testing with human subjects. There is no standardized and accepted subjective measurement method for this requirement. As of the time of

publishing this policy statement, the only certification evaluations in an actual vibratory environment have involved a subjective assessment of the acceptability of the vibration, after a short duration exposure.

Other factors relative to finding

compliance with § 25.771(e) are:

1. Improved MOCs and standards for this

requirement are being considered for

development. As the FAA and applicants

become more experienced in dealing with

27204 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices

this issue, the FAA will provide more

information on MOCs.

2. The FAA Aircraft Certification Offices

(ACO) should use care when assessing the

proposed MOCs, due to the difficulty and

cost of doing full-scale testing. The ACOs

should work closely with the applicant to

develop sufficient evidence to make a

supportable determination regarding the

need for such testing.

Section 25.773(a)(1) [at amdt. 25–72]:

‘‘Each pilot compartment must be arranged to

give the pilots sufficiently extensive, clear,

and undistorted view, to enable them to

safely perform any maneuvers within the

operating limitations of the airplane,

including takeoff, approach, and landing.’’

Discussion: The applicant should carefully

consider the methods of compliance

described in Advisory Circular (AC) 25.773–

1, ‘‘Pilot compartment View for Transport

Category Airplanes,’’ dated January 8, 1993.

Section 25.773(a)(2) [at amdt. 25–72]:

‘‘Each pilot compartment must be free of

glare and reflections that could interfere with

the normal duties of the minimum

flightcrew.’’

Discussion: The applicant may be able to

develop analytical techniques that identify

potential sources of glare and reflections, as

a means for reducing the risk of problems

identified after the major structural features

have been committed. Mock-ups also may be

a useful means for early assessments.

However, analysis results typically should be

verified in an environment with a high

degree of geometric and optical fidelity. Both

internal sources of reflections (for example,

area and instrument lighting) and external

sources of reflection (for example, shafting

sunlight) so should be considered.

Compliance can be greatly affected by the

relative geometry of the reflective surfaces

(windows, glass instrument faces, etc) and

the direct/indirect light sources

(instrumentation, area lighting, white shirts,

etc). In addition, the reflective characteristics

of the surfaces (windows, instruments) can

vary greatly with material and manufacturing

processes. Therefore, it is important that

those surfaces are representative of those that

will be present in the airplane.

Factors to consider when reviewing the

MOC are listed in Table A–5.

TABLE A–5.—§ 25.773 (a)(2): FACTORS TO CONSIDER

Issue Discussion

Degree of integration/independence ............................................ This means that testing or evaluations usually must be conducted using an environment with accurate geometry.

Criticality ....................................................................................... If reflections are likely to be present in the forward windshield, they must be carefully evaluated for

the possibility of interference with external visual scanning during critical phases of flight (especially takeoff and landing). Similarly, potential reflections on primary flight displays or other important display surfaces should get special attention.

Subjectivity of acceptance criteria ................................................ Even though objective standards for reflectivity do not exist, the FAA Certification Team should encourage applicants to measure the intensity of reflections as an objective means for comparison

with existing designs.

Section 25.777(a) [at amdt. 25–46]: ‘‘Each

cockpit control must be located to provide

convenient operation and to prevent

confusion and inadvertent operation.’’

Discussion: While applicants sometimes

use physical mock-ups for preliminary

evaluations, such devices often have

insufficient fidelity to allow findings of

compliance. Simulators, if available, provide

a more powerful evaluation environment,

because they allow the evaluation to take

place in a flight scenario that may influence

convenience and inadvertent operation.

Simulator evaluations also may reduce the

need for flight testing.

Questions to ask when identifying the

human factors-related compliance issues are

discussed in Table A–6.

TABLE A–6.—§ 25.777(a): QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES

Question Discussion

Are there situations in which a pilot will be required to reach

across the centerline of the flight deck to operate controls on

the other side (for example, the landing gear handle).

Are there other circumstances where the pilot will need to reach past prominent controls in order to

accomplish flight deck tasks, whether or not those tasks are ‘‘required’’ for operation of the airplane (for example, reaching for something stowed behind a seat, or reaching for food from the

flight attendant)? Such cases may provide justification for the FAA Certification Team to request

specific evaluations using computer modeling, mock-ups, the flight simulators, and/or the airplane.

Are there safety consequences if the pilot inadvertently activates a similar control that is in proximity to the control in

question.

If safety is not a significant issue, and if the error will be obvious and easy to correct, then the

MOCs necessary to fully evaluate the possibility of confusion may be reduced.

Factors to consider when reviewing the MOC are discussed in Table A–7.

TABLE A–7.—§ 25.777(a): FACTORS TO CONSIDER

Issue Discussion

Complexity/Level of automation ................................................... The proposed MOC should address the ease of use and inadvertent operation of control functions

that are accessed through menu logic.

Criticality ....................................................................................... Determine if the controls for which inadvertent operation has significant safety implications have

appropriate guards or other means of protection. Such safeguards typically reduce both inadvertent operation and convenience, so the proposed evaluations should include both aspects.

Section 25.777(c) [at amdt. 25–46]: ‘‘The

controls must be located and arranged, with

respect to the pilot’s seats, so that there is full

and unrestricted movement of each control

without interference from the cockpit

structure or the clothing of the minimum

flightcrew when any member of this

flightcrew, from 5′2′′ to 6′3′′ in height, is

seated with the seat belt and shoulder

harness fastened.’’

Discussion: While this rule directly

addresses body height, other body

dimensions, such as sitting height, sitting

shoulder height, arm length, hand size, etc,

can have significant effects on the geometric

acceptability of the flight deck for pilots

within the specified height range. These

other dimensions do not necessarily correlate

well with height or with each other. The

MOC should reasonably account for these

variables. The applicant may choose to use

analytical methods, such as computer

modeling of the flight deck and the pilots, for

early risk reduction and to supplement

certification evaluations using human

subjects. Computer modeling allows for more

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices 27205

control over the dimensions of the pilot

model, and thus, may allow the assessment

of otherwise unavailable combinations of

body dimensions.

The FAA Certification Team should

carefully consider the advantages and

limitations of each of these methods when

assessing the applicant’s proposal to use such

data in support of findings of compliance. In

addition, the FAA Certification Team should

usually require final verification in the

airplane, because even simulators rarely

reproduce all of the aspects of the flight

geometry that may be relevant to this

requirement.

Section 25.1301(a) [original amdt.]: ‘‘Each

item of installed equipment must be of a kind

and design appropriate to its intended

function.’’

Discussion: The applicant might propose a

number of methods for showing compliance

with this requirement, with respect to human

factors. For example, service experience may

be an effective means for assessing systems

with well-understood, successful crew

interfaces, assuming that other factors, such

as changes in the operational environment,

do not affect the relevance of that experience.

System descriptions can be used to define the

intended functions of the systems, along with

those of the components or other elements of

the system (for example, the intended

function of each piece of data on a display).

Various requirements analysis techniques

can be used to show that the information that

the pilot needs to perform key tasks is

available, usable, and timely. Simulation may

be used to verify that properly trained pilots

can adequately perform all required tasks,

using the controls and displays provided by

the design, in realistic scenarios and

timelines. Finally, flight tests can be used to

investigate specific normal and abnormal

operational scenarios to show that the system

adequately supports the pilots’ tasks, in

accordance with the stated intended

functions. For additional guidance on

electronic display systems, see FAA AC 25–

11, Transport Category Airplane Electronic

Display Systems,’’ dated July 16, 1987,’’

sections 6 and 7, as appropriate.

Section 25.1309(b)(3) [at amdt. 25–41]: ‘‘*

* * Systems, controls, and associated

monitoring and warning means must be

designed to minimize crew errors that could

create additional hazards.’’

Discussion: The applicant may propose

analyses of crew procedures in response to

system faults. This can be especially useful

in cases where the applicant wishes to take

certification credit (for example, in a fault

tree analysis) for correct pilot response to a

system failure. A crew procedure analysis

could be supported by qualitative evaluations

that compare actual procedures to procedure

design philosophies by developing measures

of procedure complexity, or by other

techniques that focus on procedure

characteristics that impact the likelihood of

crew errors. Simulation testing can be helpful

in demonstrating that the design is not prone

to crew errors.

Section 25.1321(a) [at amdt. 25–41]: ‘‘Each

flight, navigation, and powerplant instrument

for use by any pilot must be plainly visible

to him from his station with the minimum

practicable deviation from his normal

position and line of vision when he is

looking forward along the flight path.’’

Discussion: The applicant may wish to

perform analyses of the visual angles to each

of the identified instruments. Final

assessments of the acceptability of the

visibility of the instruments may require a

simulator with a high degree of geometric

fidelity and/or the airplane. For more

information on electronic display systems,

see FAA AC 25–11, section 7, as appropriate.

Section 25.1321(e) [at amdt. 25–41]: ‘‘If a

visual indicator is provided to indicate

malfunction of an instrument, it must be

effective under all probable cockpit lighting

conditions.’’

Discussion: Demonstrations and tests

intended to show that these indications of

instrument malfunctions, along with other

indications and alerts, are visible under the

expected lighting conditions will typically

use production quality hardware and careful

control of lighting conditions (for example,

dark, bright forward field, shafting sunlight).

Simulators and aircraft are often used,

although supporting data from laboratory

testing also may be useful.

Section 25.1523 [at amdt. 25–3]: ‘‘The

minimum flightcrew must be established so

that it is sufficient for safe operation,

considering:

(a) The workload on individual

crewmembers;

(b) The accessibility and ease of operation

of necessary controls by the appropriate

crewmember; and

(c) The kind of operation authorized under

§ 25.1525.’’

Discussion: The criteria used in making the

determinations required by this section are

set forth in Appendix D of 14 CFR part 25.

For additional information, see:

• AC 25.1523–1, ‘‘Minimum Flightcrew,’’

dated February 2, 1993; and

• AC 25–11, section 5.b.

Section 25.1543(b) [at amdt. 25–72]: ‘‘Each

instrument marking must be clearly visible to

the appropriate crewmember.’’

Discussion: The applicant may choose to

use computer modeling to provide

preliminary analysis showing that there are

no visual obstructions between the pilot and

the instrument markings. Where head

movement is necessary, such analyses also

can be used to measure its magnitude. Other

analysis techniques can be used to establish

appropriate font sizes, based on researchbased requirements. Mock-ups also can be

helpful in some cases. The data collected in

these analysis and assessments are typically

used to support final verification in the flight

deck, using subjects with vision that is

representative of the pilot population, in

representative lighting conditions. For more

information on electronic display systems,

see AC 25–11, sections 6 and 7, as

appropriate. For more information on

marking of power plant instruments, see AC

20–88A, ‘‘Guidelines on the Marking of

Aircraft Powerplant Instruments (Displays),’’

dated 9/30/85.

2. Specific Human Factors Requirements

Section 25.785(g) [at amdt. 25–88]: ‘‘Each

seat at a flight deck station must have a

restraint system * * * that permits the flight

deck occupant, when seated with the

restraint system fastened, to perform all of

the occupant’s necessary flight deck

functions.’’

Discussion: The applicant may choose to

develop a list of what it considers to be

necessary flight deck functions, under

normal and abnormal conditions. Methods

similar to those used to show compliance

with § 25.777 also may be appropriate for this

paragraph, with the additional consideration

of movement constraints imposed by the full

restraint system.

Factors to consider when reviewing the

MOC are discussed in Table A–8:

TABLE A–8.—§ 25.785(g): FACTORS

TO CONSIDER

Issue Discussion

Dynamics ......... If the restraint system could lockup during turbulence or vibration, and thus restrict reach, the

MOC may need to include evaluations under these conditions.

Section 25.785(l) [at amdt. 25–88]: ‘‘The

forward observer’s seat must be shown to be

suitable for use in conducting the necessary

enroute inspections.’’

Discussion: The applicant may choose to

develop a set of requirements (for example,

what must be seen and reached) based on the

expected tasks to be performed by an

inspector. The FAA Certification Team

personnel may wish to consult with FAA

Flight Standards personnel to validate these

requirements. Computer-based analysis and/

or mock-ups can be used to develop

supporting data (for example, visibility of

displays); evaluation of enroute inspection

scenarios can be used to verify that all

required tasks can be performed. Since the

geometric relationship between the

observer’s seat and the rest of the flight deck

(including the pilots) is important, the

evaluations often must occur in the actual

airplane.

Section 25.1141(a) [at amdt. 25–72]: ‘‘Each

powerplant control must be located so that it

cannot be inadvertently operated by persons

entering, leaving, or moving normally in the

cockpit.’’

Discussion: This type of assessment

typically requires at least a physical mockup, due to limitations in the ability to

adequately model ‘‘normal’’ movement in the

cockpit. Evaluations should be designed:

• To include cases in which the pilots

must reach across the area surrounding the

powerplant controls; and

• To look for places where pilots will

naturally place their hands and feet during

ingress and egress, and during cruise.

Subjective assessments by the FAA

Designated Engineering Representative (DER)

or FAA pilots would be the most typical

method for assessing the likelihood and

seriousness of any inadvertent operation of

the powerplant controls.

Section 25.1357(d) [original amdt.]: ‘‘If the

ability to reset a circuit breaker or replace a

fuse is essential to safety during flight, that

circuit breaker or fuse must be located and

27206 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices

identified so that it can be readily reset or

replaced in flight.’’

Discussion: The applicant may choose to

use methods similar to those employed for

§ 25.777 to demonstrate the ability of the

pilot to reach the specific circuit protective

device(s). The applicant also should consider

how to evaluate the ability of the pilot to

readily identify the device(s), whether they

are installed on a circuit breaker panel or

controlled using an electronic device (i.e.,

display screen on which the circuit breaker

status can be displayed and controlled).

A necessary question to ask when

identifying the human factors-related

compliance issues is discussed in Table

A–9.

TABLE A–9.—§ 25.1357(d): QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES

Question Discussion

Are there any crew procedures which require the flightcrew to

reset a circuit breaker or replace a fuse.

If not, it may be reasonable for an applicant to state this and to provide verification via published

flightcrew specific procedures.

Section 25.1381(a)(2) [at amdt. 25–72]:

‘‘The instrument lights must be installed so

that * * * (ii) no objectionable reflections are

visible to the pilot.’’

Discussion: See the discussion of

§ 25.773(a), above.

3. Specific Crew Interface Requirements

Section 25.773(b)(2)(i) [at amdt. 25–72]:

‘‘The first pilot must have a window that is

openable * * * and gives sufficient protection

from the elements against impairment of the

pilot’s vision.’’

Discussion: While the applicant may

perform analyses to show the visual field

through the openable window, due to the

nature of the task (landing the airplane by

looking out the opened window), it is likely

that a flight test would be the most

appropriate method of compliance.

Assessment of the forces required to open the

window under flight conditions also may be

needed.

Section 25.1322 [at amdt. 25–38]: ‘‘If

warning, caution, or advisory lights are

installed in the cockpit, they must, unless

otherwise approved by the Administrator,

be—

(a) Red, for warning lights (lights

indicating a hazard which may require

immediate corrective action);

(b) Amber, for caution lights (lights

indicating the possible need for future

corrective action);

(c) Green for safe operation lights; and

(d) Any other color, including white, for

lights not described in paragraphs (a) through

(c) of this section, provided the color differs

sufficiently from the colors prescribed in

paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section to

avoid possible confusion.’’

Discussion: Compliance with this

requirement is typically shown by a

description of each of the warning, caution,

and advisory lights (or their electronic

equivalents). Evaluations may also be useful

to verify the chromaticity (for example, red

looks red, amber looks amber) and

discriminability (i.e., colors can be

distinguished reliably from each other) of the

colors being used, under the expected

lighting levels. These evaluations can be

affected by the specific display technology

being used, so final evaluation with flight

quality hardware is sometimes needed. A

description of a well-defined color coding

philosophy which is consistently applied

across flight deck systems can be used to

show how the design avoids ‘‘possible

confusion’’. For additional information, see

AC 25–11, section 5.a.

Appendix B—Related Documents

1. Advisory Circulars (AC): The specified

sections of the ACs listed below concern

selecting a method of compliance (test,

inspection, simulation, etc.), rather than

identifying specific design features that will

generally be accepted as compliant.

a. AC 25.1309–1B, ‘‘System Design and

Analysis’’ [draft]: This AC identifies certain

human factors assessments that should be

done as part of the overall safety assessments

intended to show compliance with § 25.1309.

Section 9 (subparagraphs on ‘‘Crew and

Maintenance Actions’’) provides some

information on determining if failure

indications are considered to be recognizable,

and if the required actions cause an excessive

workload.

b. AC 25–11, ‘‘Transport Category Airplane

Electronic Display Systems,’’ dated July 16,

1987: This AC applies to systems using

cathode ray tube (CRT)-based technology, but

the FAA plans to update it to cover other

display technologies [for example, liquid

crystal displays (LCD)]. The AC is used to

support compliance with a number of

regulations, including the following, also

cited in this policy statement, that are related

to human factors aspects of the flightcrew

interfaces:

• § 25.771, Pilot compartment.

• § 25.777, Cockpit controls.

• § 25.1141, Powerplant controls: general.

• § 25.1301, Equipment: Function and

installation.

• § 25.1309, Equipment, systems, and

installations.

• § 25.1322, Warning, caution, and

advisory lights.

• § 25.1381, Instrument lights.

• § 25.1523, Minimum flightcrew.

• § 25.1543, Instrument markings: general.

Several sections of AC 25–11 identify

display system characteristics that can be

verified by inspection. The information

provided in the following sections of the AC

may be useful in assessing the applicant’s

other proposed evaluation methods:

• Section 4.b.(1): General Certification

Considerations, Compliance Considerations,

Human Factors. This section includes a

discussion of the use of simulation and inflight evaluations.

• Section 6.: Display Visual

Characteristics. Various subsections of this

section contain guidance on evaluation and

test conditions and methods.

c. AC 20–88A, ‘‘Guidelines on the

Markings of Aircraft Powerplant Instruments

(Displays),’’ dated September 30, 1985: This

AC provides information related to marking

of aircraft powerplant instruments and

electronic displays (cathode ray tubes, etc.).

The AC is used to support compliance with

a number of regulations, including the

following, that are related to human factors

aspects of the flightcrew interfaces:

• § 25.1541, Placards and markings:

General.

• § 25.1543, Instrument markings: General.

• § 25.1549, Powerplant and auxiliary

power unit instruments.

d. AC 25.1523–1, ‘‘Minimum Flightcrew,’’

dated February 2, 1993: This AC provides

information related to compliance with

§ 25.1523 and Appendix D of 14 CFR part 25,

which contain the certification requirements

for the minimum number of flightcrew

personnel on transport category airplanes.

e. AC 25.773–1, ‘‘Pilot Compartment View

Design Considerations,’’ dated January 8,

1993: This AC defines a method for

determining the clear view area of the flight

deck windows. In practice, this approach can

be carried out using direct measurements of

an actual flight deck (or high fidelity physical

flight deck), or using computer analysis of a

3-D computer aided design (CAD) model of

the flight deck. Referenced in this AC is

Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)

Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP)

4101/2 (which replaced AS 580B), ‘‘Pilot

Visibility from the Flight Deck,’’ dated

February 1989.

2. Other References

a. Technical Report DPT/FAA/RD–93/5,

‘‘Human Factors for Flight Deck Certification

Personnel,’’ dated July 1993, which can be

ordered through the National Technical

Information Service (http://www.ntis.gov/):

Key chapters of this document include:

• Chapter 8: Timesharing, Workload, and

Human Error.

• Chapter 11: Workload Assessment.

• Chapter 12: Human Factors Testing and

Evaluation.

Appendix C—Sample Human Factors

Methods of Compliance Briefing

This sample briefing is intended to provide

examples of the types of information that

could be included in such a briefing. Keep

the following in mind while reviewing it:

• It is based on a totally hypothetical

certification program, and no connection to

any real system or certification program is

intended or implied. For more information

on this hypothetical program, see the FAA

policy on human factors certification plans,

contained Appendix C of Policy Statement

No. ANM–99–2. The extracts from the human

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices 27207

factors certification compliance matrix

contained in this policy statement are drawn

from that appendix.

• This sample briefing should not be

considered comprehensive. The examples are

intended to be illustrative, but do not

necessarily include all of the issues, even for

the hypothetical program.

• The methods of compliance are intended

to show the methods that a hypothetical

applicant might have proposed for the

project. It should not be construed as

describing an acceptable list of methods for

any real program. Such methods would have

to be discussed and agreed upon within the

context of a specific program.

• The ‘‘Deliverable Products’’ column in

the compliance matrix identifies what the

hypothetical applicant will produce to

substantiate compliance. The titles of reports

represent examples of how an applicant

might choose to package the information.

• Finally, the sample briefing is not

intended to specify the format of how this

information is provided to the FAA; rather,

it is meant to provide guidance only on an

acceptable structure and recommended

content. Alternative methods for providing

this information are acceptable, such as

adding it to the Certification Plan or

providing it in a separate document. For

large, complex projects, it could be a part of

the overall project, without being a separate

piece. The primary intent is to illustrate how

an applicant could provide information to

the FAA, explaining why and how the

proposed methods of compliance are

sufficient.

[Hypothetical]

Human Factors Certification Methods of

Compliance for the Electronic Approach

Chart System (EACS)

1. Introduction

a. Project: This project seeks a

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for the

installation of an Electronic Approach Chart

System (EACS) in Guerin Model 522

airplanes. The intent of the EACS is to

provide an alternative to the use of paper

approach charts.

b. Installation: The ECAS will be installed

so that it is physically and functionally

integrated into the flight deck.

c. Data loading: System data will use

existing on-board data loading capabilities.

d. System type: The EACS will be certified

as a non-essential system.

2. System Description

a. Intended Function: The EACS uses a

panel-mounted Active Matrix Liquid Crystal

Display (AMLCD) to display approach charts

for the pilots to use on the ground and in

flight. The key functions include the

following:

(1) During the preflight preparation: 

(a) The pilot will use the system to call up

and review the approach charts for the

destination airport and selected alternates.

(b) The pilot will be able to ‘‘mark’’ the

appropriate charts for quick retrieval later in

the flight.

(c) If initiated by the pilot, the system will

be able to query the Flight Management

System (FMS) to pre-identify the appropriate

charts, based on the flight plan.

(2) During flight (normal operations): 

(a) The pilot will quickly access the preselected approach charts. Charts that were

not pre-selected also will be accessible.

(b) The pilot will be able to manipulate the

display of the chart to show only the

information relative to the planned route of

flight.

(c) The pilot will be able to select the

appropriate approach parameters (transition,

approach navigation aids, minimums, etc.)

using the EACS. Upon pilot initiation, the

EACS will load these selections into the

other systems on the airplane [for example,

the approach navaids will be sent to the FMS

for autotuning, and decision height (DH) will

be sent to the altitude alerting system and

display system]. For a complete list of EACS

functions, see the EACS System Description

Document.

(3) During flight (non-normal operations,

i.e., requiring an emergency diversion): In

addition to those functions available for

normal operations, the EACS provides the

following functionality to support emergency

diversions:

(a) When the pilot selects the ALTERNATE

AIRPORT function on the FMS, the FMS

automatically identifies the five nearest

airports that meet the landing requirements

for the airplane. These airports will be

automatically transmitted to the EACS,

which will preselect them (mark them for

quick retrieval).

(b) At the pilot’s request, the EACS will

display a listing of the diversion airports and

allow the pilot to quickly review the

approach charts and select the desired

approach. As in normal operations, this

selection will be automatically transmitted to

the FMS and other using systems.

Note: For more detail on the EACS, see the

Human Factors Certification Plan and System

Description Document.

3. Proposed Methods of Compliance

a. The following slides provide a

discussion of the proposed Method of

Compliance for each of the human factors

rules identified in the EACS Human Factors

Certification Plan.

b. The rules are organized into the

following categories for discussion:

(1) Flightcrew workload.

(2) Noise and vibration.

(3) Internal/external vision.

(4) Flight deck lighting.

(5) Flight deck arrangement.

(6) System failures and alerting.

(7) Miscellaneous.

4. Simulator

a. A rudimentary PC-based simulator will

be used for some evaluations.

b. The simulator has representative

(generic) flight controls, autopilot, and

performance models. (The EACS has no

interaction with aircraft performance, so high

fidelity is not needed.)

c. The simulator includes the same flight

management computer (FMC) and main

displays as the STC configuration. The EACS

will be installed only on the captain’s side

in the simulator. Any evaluations requiring

participation by both crew members will be

conducted on the test airplane.

d. Installation geometry of the simulator is

approximately equivalent to the actual

installation. Any evaluations requiring

accurate installation geometry will be

conducted on the test airplane.

e. Because EACS does not interact with

other airplane systems (pressurization,

hydraulics, etc), those systems are not

replicated in the simulator. It will be possible

to fail the EACS, simulating an electrical bus

failure.

f. The simulator will be used primarily to

assess EACS/FMS interaction and to perform

comparisons between use of paper charts and

EACS.

5. Flightcrew Workload

Section [amdt.level] Human factors requirements Method(s) of

compliance Deliverable product

25.771(a) [at amdt. 25–

4].

Each pilot compartment and its equipment must allow the minimum

flightcrew to perform their duties without unreasonable concentration or fatigue.

• Analysis

• Simulator evaluations

• Flight test

Workload Certification

Report.

25.1523 [at amdt. 25–

3].

The minimum flightcrew must be established so that it is sufficient

for safe operation, considering:

• Simulator demonstration

• Flight test

• Demonstration Report.

• Flight Test Report.

(a) The workload on individual crewmembers;

(b) The accessibility and ease of operation of necessary controls by

the appropriate crewmember; and

27208 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices

Section [amdt.level] Human factors requirements Method(s) of

compliance Deliverable product

(c) the kind of operation authorized under § 25.1525.

The criteria used in making the determinations required by this section are set forth in Appendix D of 14 CFR part 25.

a. The EACS functions are centered around

the selection and review of approach charts.

Although we do not anticipate any

certification issues with respect to showing

compliance with the above rules (workload

reduction is a central goal for this system),

we will perform a workload evaluation in

order to show the benefits of the system.

b. Analysis will be used to identify all of

the pilot activities associated with

identification, retrieval, review, and use of

the charts, along with any other tasks

necessary for operation of the EACS.

c. Simulator evaluations or demonstrations

will be used to measure task times and error

rates for conventional charts and the EACS.

Subjective measures of task difficulty and

workload will be taken. Normal and nonnormal scenarios will be included. Subjects

will include DER and customer pilots.

d. Limited flight tests with FAA pilots will

be used to confirm the analyses and

simulator tests.

6. Vibration and Noise

Section [amdt.level] Human factors requirements Method(s) of

compliance Deliverable product

25.771(e) [at amdt. 25–

4].

Vibration and noise characteristics of cockpit equipment may not

interfere with safe operation of the airplane.

Flight test Flight Test Report.

a. Controls are conventional in design and

similar to other certificated systems:

(1) Function keys [similar to keys on

current Master Control Display Unit

(MCDU)].

(2) Touch screen [similar to certain Aircraft

Communications Addressing and Reporting

System (ACARS) units].

(3) Brightness control (conventional rotary

knob).

b. The EACS is a supplemental system, so

we suggest that full testing of usability in

high vibration and turbulence is not required

(pilot can revert to paper charts).

c. During flight test program, turbulence

will be sought out for pilot subjective

evaluations of EACS usability. However,

certification will not be contingent upon

testing in turbulence.

7. Internal/External Vision and Flight Deck

Lighting

Section [amdt.level] Human factors requirements Method(s) of

compliance Deliverable product

25.773(a)(1) [at amdt.

25–72].

Each pilot compartment must be arranged to give the pilots sufficiently extensive, clear, and undistorted view, to enable them to

safely perform any maneuvers within the operating limitations of

the airplane, including takeoff, approach, and landing.

Similarity Vision Certification Report.

25.1321(a) [at amdt.

25–41].

* * * Each flight, navigation, and powerplant instrument for use by

any pilot must be plainly visible to him from his station with the

minimum practicable deviation from his normal position and line of

vision when he is looking forward along the flight path.

• System description

• Analysis

• Flight test

• Installation Drawings

• Vision Certification

Report

• Flight Test Report.

25.1543(b) [at amdt.

25–72].

Each instrument marking must be clearly visible to the appropriate

crewmember.

Ground test • Vision Certification

Report

• Ground Test Report.

a. Because this system will be fully

integrated into the existing instrument

panels, external vision will be unaffected by

the installation.

b. Because all pilots are intended to

position themselves at the Design Eye

Reference Point (DERP), there will be little

pilot-to-pilot variability with respect to the

visibility of the display. Thus, visibility will

be easily confirmed during flight test. Risk

for this installation is expected to be very

low.

c. The visual angles from the DERP to the

EACS will be determined and compared to

other display systems, as well as the

clipboard where pilots currently place their

paper charts.

d. Readability will be assessed (using a

questionnaire) in the airplane during ground

testing, concurrently with the lighting tests.

This will allow evaluation of readability

under all expected lighting conditions.

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices 27209

8. Flight Deck Lighting

Section [amdt.level] Human factors requirements Method(s) of

compliance Deliverable product

25.773(a)(2) [at amdt.

25. 72].

Each pilot compartment must be free of glare and reflections that

could interfere with the normal duties of the minimum flightcrew.

Ground test Lighting Certification

Report.

25.1321(e) [at amdt.

25–41].

If a visual indicator is provided to indicate malfunction of an instrument, it must be effective under all probable cockpit lighting conditions.• Similarity

• Flight test

• Ground test

• System Description

and Statement of

Similarity.

• Flight Test Report.

25.1381(a)(2) [at amdt.

25–72].

The instrument lights must be installed so that (ii) no objectionable

reflections are visible to the pilot.

Ground test Flight Test Report.

a. This system uses a conventional

normally white Active Matrix Liquid Crystal

Display (AMLCD) display.

b. The AMLCD is provided by a vendor

who has produced similar display glass for

other previously certificated flight deck

systems.

c. In general, visibility/lighting risk should

be low for this display.

d. Ground tests will cover the following

lighting cases:

(1) Night (windows will be covered), and

(2) Shafting sunlight (using a hand held

spotlight).

e. Flight tests will cover the following

lighting cases:

(1) Bright forward field (flying into brightly

lit clouds), and

(2) Bright forward point light source (flying

toward the sun).

f. Reflections that might be caused by the

EACS, or that might be present on the EACS

display, will be assessed subjectively during

the ground test.

9. Flight Deck Arrangement

Section [amdt.level] Human factors requirements Method(s) of

compliance Deliverable product

25.777(a) [at amdt. 25–

46].

Each cockpit control must be located to provide convenient operation and to prevent confusion and inadvertent operation.• Ground test

• Flight test

Flight Deck Anthropometry Certification

Report.

25.777(c) [at amdt. 25–

46].

The controls must be located and arranged, with respect to the pilot’s seats, so that there is full and unrestricted movement of each

control without interference from the cockpit structure or the clothing of the minimum flightcrew when any member of this flightcrew,

from 5′2′′ to 6′3′′ in height, is seated with the seat belt and shoulder harness fastened.

Ground test Flight Deck Anthropometry Certification

Report.

a. Reach to the EACS will be shown by

using a representative sample of people

within the required height range.

b. Ground tests will show that the EACS

does not interfere with use of the nose wheel

steering tiller and oxygen masks (the only

controls in the vicinity of the EACS).

10. Miscellaneous:

Section [amdt.level] Human factors requirements Method(s) of

compliance Deliverable product

§ 25.1309(b)(3) [at

amdt. 25–41].

. . . Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and warning

means must be designed to minimize crew errors that could create additional hazards.

÷ Hazard assessment

• Simulator demonstration

• Fault Tree Analyses.

• Demonstration Report.

§ 25.1322 [at amdt. 25–

38].

If warning, caution, or advisory lights are installed in the cockpit,

they must, unless ortherwise approved by the Administrator, be—

Configuration descriptionSystem Description

Document.

(a) Red, for warning lights (lights indicating a hazard which may require immediate corrective action);

(b) Amber, for caution lights (lights indicating the possible need for

future corrective action);

(c) Green for safe operation lights; and

(d) Any other color, including white, for lights not described in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section, provided the color differs

sufficiently from the colors prescribed in paragraphs (a) through

(c) of this section to avoid possible confusion.

27210 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices

Section [amdt.level] Human factors requirements Method(s) of

compliance Deliverable product

§ 25.773(b)(2)(i)[at

amdt. 25–72].

The first pilot must have a window that is openable * * * and gives

sufficient protection from the elements against impairment of the

pilot’s vision.

Ground test (to verify

no interference with

window opening)

Flight Test Report.

§ 25.1301(a) [original

amdt.].

Each item of installed equipment must be of a kind and design appropriate to its Document intended function.• System description

• Simulator demonstration

Flight test

• System Description

Document.

• Demonstration Report.

• Flight Test Report.

a. Regarding § 25.1309(b)(3):

(1) The EACS failure annunciations, along

with their associated crew procedures, will

be demonstrated in the simulator.

(2) The annunciation, data transfer

inhibits, and crew procedures are very

simple and straight-forward. We believe this

to be a very low risk issue.

b. Regarding § 25.1301(a):

(1) A checklist of all functions (listed in the

System Description Document) involving

flightcrew interfaces will be developed.

(2) The DER and FAA pilots will use this

checklist throughout the demonstration and

test program to verify that all intended

functions are satisfactorily implemented.

Appendix D—Information on the Use of

Applicant-Conducted Human Factors

Evaluations, Assessments, and

Analyses in Support of Certification

1. What Are the Benefits of Evaluations?

The FAA recognizes the benefits of early

and continuing human factors evaluations,

assessments, and analyses (from here on

referred to as ‘‘evaluations’’) during the

applicant’s design process. Such evaluations

have several potential benefits:

a. Human factors or flight crew interface

problems can be identified in a timely

manner, so changes can be made with

acceptable technical, schedule, and economic

impacts. This can help foster better designs

with fewer certification risks and fewer last

minute design changes. Design changes that

are incorporated early also are more likely to

be well-integrated into the design, rather than

quick ‘‘patches’’ needed to ‘‘plug holes.’’

b. Good aspects of the design can be

confirmed early, which can increase

applicant and FAA confidence. Such

confidence, especially with respect to human

factors issues, can reduce the amount of more

costly testing (especially flight testing).

c. Cooperation between the FAA and the

applicant on these evaluations can give the

FAA more overall confidence in the

applicant’s methods and processes with

respect to human factors issues.

d. The applicant may choose to conduct

evaluations using a variety of pilots, with

different backgrounds and levels of

experience. Such tests and evaluations can

provide valuable insights into how the well

the airplane or system will function with line

pilots.

2. Are Evaluations Required?

While such human factors evaluations are

not required by current FAA regulations or

advisory material, many applicants routinely

perform them as part of their normal design

development processes. The FAA should

encourage all applicants to conduct such

evaluations, when warranted by the nature of

the design being developed. This policy does

not establish any new requirements for such

evaluations. Instead, the FAA wishes to

provide incentives by establishing an explicit

process by which applicants can use these

evaluations to reduce certification risk if they

choose to do so.

3. Are Evaluations Necessary To Show

Compliance?

These evaluations, in and of themselves,

should never be considered to be necessary

or sufficient to show compliance with the

regulations. However, in situations where

compliance or non-compliance is not obvious

and clear-cut, applicants may wish to use

such data to support compliance decisions.

The FAA personnel should take note of the

results of evaluations presented for

consideration by applicants, providing that

the FAA agrees the results are relevant to the

compliance findings.

4. How Should the Evaluations Be

Conducted?

Because these evaluations can take a

variety of forms, the FAA and the applicant

should discuss them fully to understand the

capabilities and limitations of the evaluations

and the conclusions that can be drawn from

them.

This policy will not establish a specific set

of recommendations for these evaluations.

The requirements for any specific evaluation

that an applicant might propose would be

influenced by several factors, including those

listed as follows. The FAA and applicant

should discuss these factors.

• The level of similarity between the tested

flightcrew interface (including displays,

controls, procedures, system performance)

and the expected characteristics of the

system (hardware and software) that will be

certified.

• The areas of certification risk related to

human factors. The design characteristics

and the related regulations should both be

considered.

• The pilots (or others) that will be used

in the evaluations.

• The types of data that will be collected

(objective vs. subjective, performance vs.

opinion).

• The types of conclusions that the

applicant hopes to derive, based on the

evaluations.

5. When Should the Evaluation Be Planned

and Coordinated With the FAA?

It would be desirable for the applicant to

identify the types of evaluations that will be

conducted when certification planning is in

progress, if the applicant wishes to use such

evaluations as part of their overall data

collection effort in support of certification.

Applicants should be encouraged to discuss

in some detail with the FAA the evaluations

they are developing. In most cases, it is

appropriate for FAA personnel to ask for an

opportunity to review the tested

configuration and the test scenarios. This

will allow the FAA personnel to determine

whether the evaluations are appropriate and

relevant for the compliance issues under

consideration.

However, the FAA recognizes that such

evaluations may be conceived and planned

later during the development cycle. In such

cases, it is acceptable for the applicant to

communicate such plans to the FAA as they

develop, so that agreement can be reached on

the appropriateness of the evaluations with

respect to certification. If the applicant has

already developed a certification plan, it may

be useful to update the certification plan as

a way to document the intent to use such

evaluations.

Finally, the FAA recognizes that the

applicant may collect data during evaluations

without intending to use the evaluations to

support certification, but may achieve results

that are subsequently believed to be relevant

to certification. Under these circumstances, it

is acceptable for the applicant to describe the

evaluations to the FAA and request

consideration of the results, even though the

evaluations were not part of the certification

plans.

6. How Should Evaluation Results Be

Interpreted?

In order for applicants to consider such

evaluations to be a way to reduce rather than

increase certification risk, some latitude in

interpreting evaluation results must be

permitted, especially in view of the issues

described above.

For example, the applicant should feel

confident collecting and then presenting

evaluations that include data from subjects

who experienced difficulties or who

provided negative comments on the design.

Such data should be considered a normal

part of such development testing, and in

some cases, point out the strength and value

of such testing. In such situations, applicants

should be given the opportunity to explain

causes of the reported problems and how the

features of the design have been modified to

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 16, 2001 / Notices 27211

account for the problems. Unlike

conventional certification testing for systems,

the applicant should not be expected to

repeat the evaluations in order to ‘‘prove’’

that the problems have been mitigated.

Rather, the nature of the problems, the

explanations, and the design modifications

can all be used to form the basis for the

FAA’s overall assessment of the results and

the relevance of those results to certification.

7. Summary

In summary, this policy is intended to

provide an incentive to applicants, so that

they will conduct effective human factors

evaluations during the design phase of a

program. Involvement of the FAA during the

design phase is also a desired, but not a

required, outcome.

This policy should not be used by FAA

personnel to force such evaluations as part of

the certification process. In other words,

there should be no penalties, either formal or

informal, for an applicant who chooses not

to use such evaluations as part of their

certification effort.

However, if the applicant chooses to

submit the results of such evaluations, and

the FAA agrees that the evaluations were

appropriate, then the FAA should consider

the results of the evaluations as part of their

overall determination of the amount of

additional testing (or other methods of

compliance) required to show compliance

with the regulations.

Applicants should be encouraged to keep

the FAA involved. This will improve the

quality and value of the evaluations (with

respect to certification), foster FAA

confidence in the applicant’s evaluation

methods and processes, and maximize the

benefit of the evaluations.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 8,

2001.

D.L. Riggin,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 01–12275 Filed 5–17–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Highway Administration

Final Environmental Impact Statement;

Douglas County, CO

AGENCY: Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of availability.

SUMMARY: In compliance with the

National Environmental Policy Act of

1969, the FHWA, in cooperation with

the Colorado Department of

Transportation (CDOT), have prepared a

Final Environmental Impact Statement

(EIS) for proposed transportation

improvements in the South I–25

Corridor and US 85 Corridor of the

Denver, Colorado metropolitan area.

The project is within Douglas County.

The Final EIS identifies the Preferred

Alternative and the Other Alternative

and their associated environmental

impacts. Interested citizens are invited

to review the Final EIS and submit

comments. Copies of the Final EIS may

be obtained by telephoning or writing

the contact person list below under

Addresses. Public reading copies of the

Final EIS are available at the locations

listed under Supplementary

Information.

DATES: A 30-day public review period

will begin on May 11, 2001 and

conclude on June 11, 2001. Written

comments on the alternatives and

impacts to be considered must be

received by CDOT by June 11, 2001.

Two public hearings to receive oral

comments on the Final EIS will be held

in Castle Rock and Sedalia.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on the

Final EIS should be addressed to Wes

Goff, Project Manager, Colorado

Department of Transportation, South I–

25 Corridor and US 85 Corridor, 18500

East Colfax Avenue, Aurora, CO 80011.

Requests for a copy of the Final EIS may

be addressed to Ms. Wes Goff at the

address above. Please see

Supplementary Information section for a

listing of the available documents and

formats in which they may be obtained.

Copies of the Final EIS are also available

for public inspection and review. See

Supplementary Information section for

locations.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: To

request copies of the Final EIS or for

additional information, contact: Mr.

Scott Sands, FHWA, Colorado Division,

555 Zang Street, Room 250, Lakewood,

CO, 80228, Telephone: (303) 969–6730

extension 362; or Mr. Wes Goff,

Colorado Department of Transportation,

Region 1, 18500 East Colfax Avenue,

Aurora, CO 80011, Telephone: (303)

757–9647.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Hearing Dates and Locations:

Tuesday, June 5, 2001: Louviers

Village Club House (5 p.m.–7:30

p.m.)

Thursday, June 7, 2001: Douglas

County Building (5 p.m.–7:30 p.m.)

Copies of the Final EIS are available in

hard copy format for public

inspection at:

• City of Lone Tree, 6399 S. Fiddlers

Green Cr., Ste. 102, Greenwood

Village, CO 80111, 303–779–4525

• CDOT Arapahoe Residency, 359

Inverness Drive South, Suite K,

Englewood, CO 80112, 303–790–

1020

• CDOT Office of Environmental

Services, 1325 South Colorado

Boulevard, Suite B400, Denver, CO

80222, 303–757–9259

• CDOT Region 1, 18500 E Colfax

Avenue, Aurora, CO 80010, 303–

757–9371

• Douglas County Planning

Department, 100 Third Street,

Castle Rock, CO 80104, 303–660–

7490

• Federal Highway Administration,

555 Zang Street, Room 250,

Lakewood, Co 80228, 303–969–

6730

• Highlands Ranch Library, 48 West

Springer Drive, Littleton, CO

80129–2314, 303–791–7703

• Lone Tree Library, 8827 Lone Tree

Parkway, Lone Tree, CO 80124–

8961, 303–799–4446

• Louviers Library, 7885 Louviers

Boulevard, Louviers, CO 80131–

9900, 303–791–7323

• Parker Library, 10851 South

Crossroads Drive, Parker, CO

80134–9081, 303–841–3503

• PBS&J, 5500 Greenwood Plaza

Blvd., Suite 150, Englewood, CO

80111, 303–221–7275

• Philip S. Miller Library, 961 S Plum

Creek Road, Castle Rock, CO 80104,

303–688–5157

• Town of Castle Rock, 100 Wilcox

Street, Castle Rock, CO 80104

• The document is also available on

the project Website:

www.southi25.com

Background

This Final EIS provides a detailed

evaluation of the South I–25 Corridor

and US 85 Corridor improvement

project. The project corridors both lie

within Douglas County, Colorado. The

I–25 Corridor extends from C–470 at

approximate milepost 195 to the

southern limit of Castle Rock at

approximate milepost 178 and the US

85 Corridor extends from C–470 at

approximate milepost 200 to Castle

Rock at approximate milepost 184. This

Final EIS includes an examination of

the purpose and need, alternatives

under consideration, travel demand,

affected environment, environmental

consequences, and mitigation measures

as a result of the improvements under

consideration. Three alternatives,

including the No-Action Alternatives,

are considered for improvements.

The FHWA, the CDOT, and other

local agencies invite interested

individuals, organizations, and Federal,

State, and local agencies to comment on

the evaluated alternatives and

associated social, economic, or