NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

LILLIAN C. THOMPSON, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

BRIAN DAVID VAUGHN, Respondent/Appellee.

No. CV 15-0072 FC 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. FC2010-005937 

The Honorable William L. Brotherton, Jr., Judge 

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS 

COUNSEL 

Law Offices of David D. White, P.C., Phoenix 

By David D. White, Sundown L. White 

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant 

Law Office of Robert E. Siesco, Phoenix 

By Robert E. Siesco 

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined. 

W I N T H R O P, Judge: 

¶1 Lillian C. Thompson (“Mother”) appeals the family court’s 

orders denying and dismissing her petition to modify legal decisionmaking and awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Brian David Vaughn 

(“Father”). For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the family court’s 

orders and remand for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the 

petition pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 25-411(L) 

(Supp. 2015). 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Mother and Father were married in 2001. The couple have 

two minor children in common, D.V. (born in 2004) and T.V. (born in 2006). 

¶3 In September 2010, Mother filed a petition for dissolution of 

the parties’ marriage. Both before and after finalization of the decree of 

dissolution, the parties had a strained relationship and regularly engaged 

in disagreements regarding parenting. In November 2011, the family court 

(Judge Christopher Whitten) appointed a parenting coordinator, Annette 

Burns, to assist in the case. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 74. 

¶4 On March 22, 2012, the family court entered a decree of 

dissolution of marriage via settlement. Under the decree, the parties were 

granted joint legal custody (decision-making) and equal parenting time 

with the children. Also, the parties were required to participate in 

mediation to resolve disputes involving the children before seeking relief 

from the court. 

¶5 The family court continued to utilize the parenting 

coordinator’s services after the decree, regularly approving and adopting 

her recommendations as temporary orders of the court, although 

sometimes with slight modification. The majority of the parenting 

coordinator’s involvement consisted of attempting to resolve Father’s 

inappropriate communications with Mother, as well as resolving 
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

3

disagreements between Mother and Father regarding the need for 

counseling for D.V. and a medical (eye) decision affecting T.V.1

¶6 After an October 2, 2013 email from Father indicating he 

would purposely draft emails in such a way as to frustrate communications, 

the parenting coordinator reported, “The content of Father’s emails to 

Mother make co-parenting communication virtually impossible.”2 On 

October 24, 2013, the family court adopted the parenting coordinator’s 

recommendation that Father’s communications be monitored by a 

forensically informed mental health professional for a duration of at least 

thirty days. 

¶7 Also in October 2013, Mother moved to extend the parenting 

coordinator’s appointment, which was set to expire in November. Father 

objected to the parenting coordinator’s report and recommendations, and 

moved for appointment of a new parenting coordinator. 

¶8 At the conclusion of a January 7, 2014 evidentiary hearing 

regarding Father’s objection and the parties’ motions, the family court 

reappointed Ms. Burns as parenting coordinator and affirmed her findings 

and recommendations, explaining in part: 

 Father and Mother have historically communicated 

poorly. Evidence of this problem is plentiful in reviewing 

their email messages to one another. Father’s emails to 

Mother, many of which are trial exhibits, are sarcastic, 

condescending and go far beyond any issues related to 

parenting of the children. They are unnecessarily lengthy and 

 

1 Based on the parenting coordinator’s recommendations, Father was 

sanctioned by the court for “inappropriate” email communications, which 

included numerous, duplicative, and lengthy emails, and emails accusing 

Mother of lying and containing insults, sarcasm, and derogatory comments 

about Mother, and consistently referencing past events, including those 

that occurred during the divorce proceedings. Mother occasionally 

engaged in some of the same conduct as Father, but as the parenting 

coordinator noted, “not nearly to the same extent as Father.”

2 After being advised by the parenting coordinator that some of his 

emails were not understandable, Father responded, “Since I am meeting 

your requirement of less than 70 words I started using code which [Mother] 

will understand but you will not. You will understand less and less of some 

[e]mails as I will be doing it more in the future.”
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

4

repetitive. They repeatedly attack in an unnecessarily harsh 

manner and cover subjects which the Parenting Coordinator 

told him should not be discussed in emails. The Court 

adopted more restrictive email rules, based upon the 

recommendations of the Parenting Coordinator, without 

objection by Father, on August 22, 2013. After these more 

restrictive rules were put in place, Father largely continued 

his bad behavior. Even when Father has a valid point to 

make, he communicates that point in such an inflammatory 

manner, that his point is forever drowned in the vitriolic 

manner in which it is sent. 

 Father admits only that he has not followed the email 

rules “to the letter.” He continues to argue that he is doing 

only what is in the best interest of the children. He does not 

seem to perceive himself as having created stumbling blocks 

in the way he communicates. 

 The Parenting Coordinator has made efforts to address 

this problem on multiple occasions. Father seems to perceive 

these efforts as adversarial. He apparently perceives the 

relationship between the Parenting Coordinator and himself 

as so antagonistic that she should be removed. He is wrong 

on both counts. The Parenting Coordinator’s reprimands 

have been largely one sided only because the violations of the 

email rules have been largely one sided. She has not been 

unfairly harsh to Father. 

 Although the Court is cognizant of the need to replace 

Parenting Coordinators to avoid the danger of them 

becoming stale, usually after two years, Father has frustrated 

the purpose and work of the Parenting Coordinator in this 

case so much that it would be unfair to now rotate Annette 

Burns, rewarding Father for his long standing bad conduct by 

replacing her for trying to call him on that conduct. 

The Parenting Coordinator’s recommendation that 

Father participate in counseling with a forensically informed 

mental health professional, one who is willing to review email 

drafts with Father prior to him sending them for a period of 

90 days, to assist him with tools to develop more effective 

communication is adopted as an order of the Court. The 

Parenting Coordinator shall choose the professional from 
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

5

those which might be covered by Father’s health insurance 

plan. That professional shall review the potential that Father 

has an anger control problem and, if he is found to have one, 

shall make a recommendation for addressing the issue. That 

professional shall report to the Parenting Coordinator in 

writing on a monthly basis. 

¶9 On January 29, 2014, Mother filed a request for mediation, 

arguing a modification of legal decision-making was necessary. On March 

4, 2014, the parties participated in mediation through Conciliation Services 

regarding Mother’s desire to have sole legal decision-making, but were 

unable to reach any agreement regarding a modification of the legal 

decision-making arrangement. 

¶10 Meanwhile, the treatment of T.V.’s eye misalignment disorder 

(intermittent exotropia) became a focus of contention between the parties. 

Based on the recommendation of an ophthalmologist, Dr. Mark Salevitz, 

Mother believed surgery was immediately necessary. Father insisted upon 

a second opinion, however, and Dr. Brendan Cassidy recommended a more 

conservative approach, which Father favored. The parties consulted a third 

ophthalmologist, Dr. Thomas Tredici, who indicated the reports and 

opinions of both of the other doctors were acceptable, but ultimately 

appeared amenable to adopting the conservative approach. The parties 

were unable to reach a decision between themselves as to whether surgery 

should take place to treat the condition, or the parameters for making such 

a decision, and sought the assistance of the parenting coordinator, who 

recommended a conservative approach with further evaluation in her 

March 17, 2014 report and recommendations. 

¶11 Mother filed a partial objection to the parenting coordinator’s 

report and recommendations. Later, after Father’s response and Mother’s 

reply, Mother filed a supplement to her reply, in which she accused Father 

of recording the doctors without their knowledge and consent, and 

subsequently manipulating or attempting to manipulate their 

recommendations, especially those of Dr. Tredici and Dr. Salevitz, through 

ex parte communications.3 Mother also requested final decision-making 

 

3 Dr. Salevitz withdrew from further professional care of the parties’ 

children on April 30, 2014, after becoming aware Father was surreptitiously 

recording conversations with the physicians and had accused Dr. Salevitz 

of failing to follow the American Association for Pediatric Ophthalmology 

and Strabismus (AAPOS) guidelines. According to Mother, Dr. Salevitz 
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

6

authority for T.V.’s eye condition only. Father responded in part that 

neither parent should be awarded final decision-making authority, but if 

the court determined the need to specify one parent, Father should be 

awarded final decision-making authority. 

¶12 On May 27, 2014, the family court held an evidentiary hearing 

regarding whether surgery should take place, and the court adopted the 

recommendation of the parenting coordinator for conservative, nonsurgical care in a signed minute entry order dated May 28 and filed June 4, 

2014. The court also ordered the parties to continue to monitor T.V.’s vision 

and present future disputes to the parenting coordinator. Additionally, 

after noting the parties had “advocated with these doctors in a manner that, 

at least in part, is responsible for some of the doctors withdrawing from 

[T.V.]’s care,” the court ordered that neither party (1) communicate with the 

children’s medical providers in writing without sending copies of 

communications to the other parent, or (2) record the children’s medical 

care providers without the knowledge and consent of all persons being 

recorded. The court also denied both parties’ requests for attorneys’ fees, 

but did not explicitly address in its minute entry the parties’ arguments 

regarding sole legal decision-making for T.V.’s eye.

¶13 Later, on June 13, 2014, the parenting coordinator issued 

another report and recommendations, finding that Father continued to 

have difficulties with communications by sending numerous emails to 

Mother accusing her of misrepresentations until instructed by the parenting 

coordinator to stop.4 On July 1, 2014, the family court approved the 

parenting coordinator’s recommendations that the forensically informed 

mental health professional, Dr. Marlene Joy, continue monitoring Father’s 

communications and provide an update report regarding his ongoing 

therapy, and that the parties be limited in their communications with and 

 

explained in part, “I cannot be accused of these type of things,” and “I can’t 

take threats.” Father asserted he had recorded the appointments to ensure 

Mother did not misrepresent statements made by the doctors and to hold 

the doctors “accountable,” and that Dr. Salevitz withdrew because the 

parties were not following his recommended treatment plan. In a letter 

dated May 21, 2014, Dr. Cassidy also withdrew his services as T.V.’s 

ophthalmologist. 

4 The parenting coordinator also noted Mother had on occasion sent 

emails of excessive length; however, when advised she had done so, Mother 

revised her emails to comply. 
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

7

documentation provided to health care providers. After Father filed an 

objection, the court held oral argument in September 2014 and affirmed the 

recommendations, with minor amendments. 

¶14 In the meantime, on July 17, 2014, Mother filed her petition 

for modification of legal decision-making, alleging in part that a substantial 

change of circumstances affecting the best interest of the children had 

occurred since the decree because “Father’s inappropriate behavior and 

inability to communicate has made co-parenting utterly impossible,” and 

that although the parenting coordinator had been “helpful,” Father had 

continued his inappropriate communications “despite numerous sanctions, 

reports and recommendations to the Court.” Mother further alleged the 

parties were in disagreement as to the selection of a new treating physician 

for T.V., and Father had indicated he would be unwilling to consent to 

surgery until T.V. was eighteen years of age. 

¶15 On August 4, 2014, Father filed both a response to Mother’s 

petition for modification of legal decision-making and a motion to dismiss 

the petition. Father sought to have the petition dismissed for failure to 

comply with Rule 91, Ariz. R. Fam. Law P., and A.R.S. § 25-411, maintaining 

no substantial change of circumstances had occurred, Mother had failed to 

set forth specific facts and allegations supporting adequate cause for a 

hearing, and Mother had not provided a factual basis for concluding 

modification would be in the best interest of the children. Father further 

maintained that “Mother’s agenda is to obtain sole legal decision-making 

so that she can authorize the minor child, [T.V.]’s, ex[o]tropia eye surgery 

without Father’s consent and over Father’s objection.”

¶16 Mother moved to strike Father’s motion to dismiss, and filed 

a response, requesting the court deny his motion and arguing that detailed 

facts were set forth in the petition for modification establishing adequate 

cause for a hearing and why modification would be in the children’s best 

interest. Father responded to the motion to strike, arguing his motion to 

dismiss was not frivolous because it was based on Mother’s failure to state 

a claim. 

¶17 On September 10, 2014, the family court heard oral argument 

regarding Father’s objection to the parenting coordinator’s June 13, 2014 

report and recommendations and subsequent related pleadings. The court 

did not hear oral argument or receive any evidence regarding Mother’s 

petition for modification of legal decision-making or the parties’ 

subsequent motions related to that petition. 
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

8

¶18 Later, however, in a signed minute entry order filed October 

1, 2014, the family court denied Mother’s petition for modification of legal 

decision-making, granted Father’s motion to dismiss Mother’s petition, and 

denied Mother’s motion to strike Father’s motion to dismiss. The court 

found the petition failed to state “adequate cause” under A.R.S. § 25-411 to 

support holding a hearing on the petition. The court also awarded Father 

his reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs after finding the cause was so 

inadequate as to render the filing an unreasonable position under A.R.S. 

§ 25-324:

 The Court notes that Judge Whitten[5] did agree with 

the medical approach for the minor child, [T.V.], which was 

supported by Respondent/Father and the Parenting 

Coordinator. Subsequent to Judge Whitten’s ruling, 

Petitioner/Mother filed a Petition for Modification of Legal 

Decision Making on July 17, 2014. In said Petition, 

Petitioner/Mother’s main request is to be given sole legal 

decision making for the minor children or, in the alternative, 

“at the very least” she receive “final say regarding major 

mental and medical related decisions.”

 The Court finds the timing of the filing of this Petition 

suspect considering the fact that it occurred a few weeks after 

Judge Whitten ruled against Petitioner/Mother’s preferred 

treatment option for her son. Respondent/Father’s pleadings 

are well-taken especially where they infer [sic] that a granting 

of Petitioner/Mother’s Petition would result in an “end run” 

around Judge Whitten’s May 28, 2014 Order.

 The Court finds that Petitioner/Mother’s Petition for 

Modification of Legal Decision Making fails to state 

“adequate cause” under ARS § 25-411 to support holding a 

hearing on the Petition. Therefore, consistent with the statute, 

Petitioner/Mother’s Petition for Modification of Legal 

Decision Making is denied, Respondent/Father’s Motion to 

Dismiss Petitioner/Mother’s Petition for Modification of 

Legal Decision Making is granted, and Petitioner/Mother’s 

Motion to Strike Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is denied. 

Additionally, the Court finds the cause so inadequate for 

 

5 The case was reassigned to Judge William L. Brotherton, Jr., on July 

28, 2014.
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

9

Petitioner/Mother’s Petition for Modification of Legal 

Decision Making, as to render its filing as an unreasonable 

position by Petitioner/Mother pursuant to ARS § 25-324. 

Therefore the Court awards reasonable attorney fees and 

costs to Respondent/Father. Respondent/Father is ordered 

to file a China Doll Affidavit[6] by October 8, 2014. 

In a signed minute entry order filed December 10, 2014, the court awarded 

costs and attorneys’ fees to Father in the amount of $3,408.

¶19 We have jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal from the 

court’s minute entry orders filed October 1 and December 10, 2014. See

A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2) (Supp. 2015). 

ANALYSIS

¶20 As an initial matter, Father argues this court should not 

consider the merits of the family court’s May 28, 2014 order addressing 

T.V.’s medical (eye) issue. Mother agrees, and so do we. 

¶21 Mother did not appeal the family court’s May 28 order; 

accordingly, that order, absent intervening facts, is final and is not at issue 

in this appeal. See generally Wendling v. Sw. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 143 Ariz. 

599, 601, 694 P.2d 1213, 1215 (App. 1984) (stating that this court lacks 

jurisdiction to review matters not contained in the notice of appeal 

(citations omitted)). Moreover, we agree with Father and the family court 

that, to the extent Mother’s July 17 petition for modification of legal 

decision-making could be construed as challenging the family court’s May 

28 order, her petition would constitute an untimely and improper collateral 

attack on, or “end run” around, that order. See generally Chaney Bldg. Co. v. 

City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 573, 716 P.2d 28, 30 (1986). Further, although 

Mother is correct that the family court did not directly address her prior 

request for sole legal decision-making regarding T.V.’s eye in its May 28 

order, the parties had placed the issue before the court, and the court 

implicitly ruled on that issue when it ordered that “the parties shall 

continue to monitor [T.V.]’s vision and shall present any dispute about his 

future care to the Parenting Coordinator.” The only reasonable 

interpretation of the court’s May 28 order is that Mother’s limited request 

for modification of legal decision-making as to T.V.’s eye was denied.

 

6 See Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 189, 673 P.2d 927, 

933 (App. 1983).
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

10

¶22 Mother argues, however, that she based her July 2014 petition 

for modification of legal decision-making on what she perceived to be longstanding and systemic issues in communicating with Father-issues that 

allegedly affected the parties’ ability to parent the children and that began 

long before and continued even after the family court issued its May 28 

order–and not simply on her lack of success in convincing the court to order 

surgery for T.V. or provide her with sole legal decision-making as to that 

issue. See generally Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 177, 180, 655 P.2d 1, 

4 (1982) (recognizing that the significance of subsequent changes in 

circumstances “need not be determined in a vacuum” (citation omitted)). 

We agree with Mother that the May 28 order did not constitute a final 

appealable order on a global legal decision-making arrangement. That 

issue was not before the family court at the May 27 hearing, and the court’s 

order did not address that issue. Further, Mother’s July 17 petition for 

modification of legal decision-making alleged the parties had subsequently 

encountered disagreements regarding selection of a new treating physician 

for T.V., that Father had continued to act inappropriately and unreasonably 

in his communications since the May 28 order, and that Father’s

intransigent behavior continued to prevent a collaborative decision-making 

process – all issues that allegedly arose or had become exacerbated since the 

family court’s May 28 minute entry order.7

¶23 Mother argues the family court abused its discretion in 

finding her petition for modification of legal decision-making failed to state 

adequate cause under A.R.S. § 25-411(L) to support holding a hearing on 

the petition. We review the family court’s order granting Father’s motion 

to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. Dressler v. Morrison, 212 Ariz. 279, 281, 

¶ 11, 130 P.3d 978, 980 (2006). 

¶24 Pursuant to Rule 91(D), Ariz. R. Fam. Law P., “[n]o hearing 

for modification of a child custody order or decree shall be set unless there 

is compliance with A.R.S. § 25-411.” Subsection (L) of A.R.S. § 25-411 

requires a person seeking to modify any type of legal decision-making or 

parenting time order to submit an affidavit or verified petition setting forth 

detailed facts supporting the requested modification, and further provides 

that the family court “shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate 

cause for hearing the motion is established by the pleadings, in which case 

 

7 Moreover, although Mother’s July 17 petition appeared to seek 

broad relief that, if granted in full, might have tended to undercut the 

family court’s previous May 28 order, nothing would have prevented the 

court from imposing appropriate limitations on any relief granted. 
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

11

it shall set a date for hearing on why the requested modification should not 

be granted.”

¶25 In general, the family court has wide discretion in assessing 

whether adequate cause for hearing the motion has been established by the 

pleadings. Siegert v. Siegert, 133 Ariz. 31, 33, 648 P.2d 146, 148 (App. 1982). 

We will reverse the court’s decision, however, if “no reasonable judge 

would have denied the petition without a hearing.” Id.

¶26 In this case, Mother’s petition for modification of legal 

decision-making set forth detailed facts supporting the requested 

modification, see A.R.S. § 25-411(L), including facts supporting Mother’s 

allegation that a substantial change of circumstances affecting the best 

interest of the children had occurred since the decree because Father’s 

persistent, inappropriate behavior and inability or refusal to properly 

communicate had rendered collaborative decision-making “impossible,”

and that Father had continued his inappropriate communications despite 

the consistent and ongoing assistance of a parenting coordinator and a 

forensically informed mental health professional, and sanctions and 

modifications to email policies imposed by the court. See A.R.S. § 25-

403.01(B)(2)-(3) (Supp. 2015).8 The petition further stated the parties had 

reached a new disagreement regarding the selection of a new treating 

physician for T.V., Father had engaged in various instances of 

inappropriate conduct with medical providers, and Father had indicated he 

would be unwilling to consent to surgery—presumably even if medically 

 

8 Subsection (B) of A.R.S. § 25-403.01 provides as follows: 

B. In determining the level of decision-making that is in the 

child’s best interests, the court shall consider the factors 

prescribed in § 25-403, subsection A and all of the following: 

1. The agreement or lack of an agreement by the parents 

regarding joint legal decision-making. 

2. Whether a parent’s lack of an agreement is unreasonable or is 

influenced by an issue not related to the child’s best interests.

3. The past, present and future abilities of the parents to cooperate 

in decision-making about the child to the extent required by the 

order of joint legal decision-making.

4. Whether the joint legal decision-making arrangement is 

logistically possible. 

(Emphasis added.) 
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

12

necessary—until T.V. was eighteen years of age, and that Mother lacked the 

financial resources to engage in continual litigation with Father while he 

continued to act unreasonably and inappropriately with regard to the 

children’s best interest. In response, Father disputed Mother’s allegations 

and the factual basis for them—including Mother’s basis for asserting that 

modification would be in the best interest of the children—and maintained 

Mother’s agenda was to obtain sole legal decision-making over treatment 

of T.V.’s eye disorder. 

¶27 In denying and dismissing Mother’s petition, while finding 

the timing of the petition “suspect,” that it was designed as an “end run” 

around Judge Whitten’s May 28 order, and that it was so lacking in 

adequate cause as to constitute an unreasonable position, the family court 

necessarily adopted the facts as stated by Father, and implicitly found 

Father more credible than Mother. By weighing the credibility of the 

parties’ opposing statements without an evidentiary hearing, however, the 

family court engaged in an impermissible “trial by affidavit.” See Pridgeon, 

134 Ariz. at 181, 655 P.2d at 5. “In such a case, the court must hold a 

hearing.” Id.; accord Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 464, ¶ 1, 333 P.3d 789, 791 

(App. 2014) (holding that “when the resolution of an issue before the court 

requires an assessment of credibility, the court must afford the parties an 

opportunity to present sworn oral testimony”). We recognize that, having 

recently inherited this long-standing, contentious matter, Judge Brotherton 

was at a significant disadvantage in understanding the background and 

context of the new and recurring disputes, but, on this record, it was 

inappropriate for the court to summarily deny and dismiss Mother’s 

petition for modification of legal decision-making—and further order that 

Mother pay Father’s costs and attorneys’ fees for taking an unreasonable 

position—without affording Mother the opportunity to present sworn oral 

testimony. In this situation, the family court must hold an evidentiary 

hearing before assessing and determining the credibility of the parties. 

¶28 Father requests attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 25-324 (Supp. 2015). Father provides no current information as to the 

parties’ relative financial information, however, and to the extent the record 

reflects financial disparity as between the parties, it would appear that 

Father has more financial resources. Further, neither party’s arguments on 

appeal were unreasonable. We therefore decline to award fees. See Leathers 

v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 379, ¶ 22, 166 P.3d 929, 934 (App. 2007) 

(recognizing this court must examine the parties’ financial resources and 

the reasonableness of their positions before awarding fees under § 25-324); 

Magee v. Magee, 206 Ariz. 589, 593, ¶ 18, 81 P.3d 1048, 1052 (App. 2004) 

(“[R]elative financial disparity between the parties is the benchmark for 
THOMPSON v. VAUGHN 

Decision of the Court 

13

eligibility.”). We grant Mother her taxable costs on appeal upon her 

compliance with Rule 21, ARCAP. 

CONCLUSION 

¶29 We vacate the family court’s October 1 and December 10, 2014 

minute entry orders, and remand for the court to hold a hearing on 

Mother’s petition for modification of legal decision-making. We make no 

comment on the merits of the hearing on remand, but emphasize that, in 

making any legal decision-making determination, the family court must 

consider all factors relevant to the children’s best interest, including the 

factors enumerated in A.R.S. § 25–403(A) (Supp. 2015). Further, “the court 

shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the 

reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child[ren].” 

A.R.S. § 25–403(B).