IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

November 13, 2003 Session

ROBERT TERRY MOORE v. THE TOWN OF COLLIERVILLE, ET AL.

 An Appeal from the Supreme Court Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel

Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT-001919-01 John R. McCarroll, Jr., Judge

No. W2002-02647-SC-R3-CV - Filed January 20, 2004

In this workers’ compensation appeal, we must determine whether an employer is liable to a health

insurer who paid necessary and reasonable medical expenses incurred by an employee but did not

intervene in the workers’ compensation claim to protect its interest. Although the trial court found

that the treatment was necessary and reasonable, it further found that the employer was not liable for

the medical expenses paid by the employee’s health insurer because the insurer failed to intervene

and prove its interest. The employee appealed to the Special Workers’ CompensationAppealsPanel,

which transferred the case for full Court review without a recommendation. After reviewing the

record and applicable authority, we have determined that the employer is liable to the employee’s

health insurer for all reasonable and necessary medical expenses and that the health insurer is not

required to intervene in the workers’ compensation suit. Because the record does not fully develop

the nature and extent of the expenses paid by the health insurer, we remand to the trial court for that

purpose and further action consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Reversed; Case Remanded to the Circuit Court

E. RILEY ANDERSON,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J.,

and ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JANICE M. HOLDER, and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.

Steve Taylor, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Robert Terry Moore.

W. Timothy Hayes, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellees, The Town of Collierville and

Tennessee Municipal League, Inc.
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OPINION

BACKGROUND

At all times pertinent to this appeal, the employee, Robert Terry Moore, age 52, worked as

an electrical inspector for the Town of Collierville in Shelby County, Tennessee. On October 21,

1999, August 10, 2000, and November 20, 2000, Moore sustained injuries to his neck and back in

the course and scope of his employment. The first injury resulted from a fall from a ladder, the

second occurred while inspecting a swimming pool electrical box, and the third, a neck injury,

resulted from a fall off a porch while inspecting a home. 

The employer, the Town of Collierville, treated these injuries as compensable and authorized

medical treatment for Moore by Dr. Edward Pratt, an orthopaedic surgeon, and Dr. Fereidoon

Parsioon, a neurosurgeon, both of whom treated him conservatively. Dissatisfied with his treatment,

Moore, without the authorization of his employer, saw his family physician, Dr. Aram Hannissian,

who referred him to Dr. David McCord, an orthopaedic surgeon, who performed fusion surgery on

his neck. The employer refused to pay the unauthorized medical expenses. Moore then filed suit

against the employer for the unauthorized medical expenses and permanent disability. 

The following is a summary of the relevant proof at trial:

On June 29, 2000, Moore saw Dr. Edward Pratt, an orthopaedic surgeon authorized by the

employer after the first work-related injury but before the second and third injuries. Dr. Pratt

diagnosed a small disc bulge at C5-6 and facet irritability at C4-5 and C5-6. He did not think Moore

was a surgical candidate and started him on a conservative course of treatment, including medication

and physical therapy. Moore showed no improvement over the approximately two months of

treatment. Dr. Pratt testified that Moore’s symptoms were mechanically inconsistent with the

bulging disc at C5 and 6, and that there was a psychological component to his injury. Dr. Pratt found

no permanent disability, recommended no work restrictions, and discharged Moore from his care on

August 22, 2000. He conceded that if Moore suffered a separate and new injury in November of

2000, “all bets were off” and that Dr. McCord “could have been correct in performing cervical fusion

surgery.”

During the course of Dr. Pratt’s conservative treatment, Moore requested a second opinion.

The employer then referred him to Dr. Fereidoon Parsioon, a neurosurgeon, whom Moore saw on

a single occasion on August 11, 2000, i.e., after the swimming pool injury but before the November

2000 porch fall injury. Moore reported intense cervical pain. Dr. Parsioon ordered a new MRI,

which showed a central disc bulge at C4 and a disc protrusion at C5 and C6 of the cervical spine

which, in his opinion, were not large enough to put pressure on the spinal cord or nerve root. Dr.

Parsioon concurred with Dr. Pratt that the employee was not a candidate for surgery. He also

testified that Moore seemed depressed and that this depression could be related to the employee’s

complaints of pain. Dr. Parsioon determined that there was no new injury and he found no disability.
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Following the accident on November 20, 2000, Moore consulted his family physician, Dr.

Aram Hannissian, without the authorization of his employer. Dr. Hannissian referred Moore to Dr.

McCord, an orthopaedic surgeon. Dr. McCord first saw Moore on December 5, 2000. Moore

described his work-place injuries, and Dr. McCord found decreased neck motion and pain. Moore’s

x-rays showed a previous fusion surgery at C6 and 7 for a work-related injury he sustained in 1996

and a disc protrusion or herniation at C4-5 and C5-6. Dr. McCord then performed a discogram,

which demonstrated disc herniation which was painful and symptomatic at C4-5 and C5-6. After

Dr. McCord discussed surgical and non-surgical options, Moore elected surgery. 

On January 30, 2001, Dr. McCord performed surgery. The fusion surgery consisted of

removal of the cervical discs which were replaced with bone taken from Moore’s hip secured by

plates and screws. According to Dr. McCord: “On his first postoperative visit on March 8th, 2001[,]

. . . [Moore] stated he was doing exceptionally well, that he . . . [had] stopped taking [pain]

medication. . . . He was very happy. His neck motion was improved . . . . His strength . . . had

returned.” Dr. McCord opined that Moore’s work-related injuries caused his condition and that his

permanent disability was twenty percent (20%) to the body as a whole. He was placed on work

restrictions. 

Although Moore suffered an automobile accident in March of 2001 which aggravated his

symptoms, Dr. McCord testified that his assessment of Moore’s condition and permanent disability

did not take into consideration how that accident affected Moore’s condition.

Because the employer refused to pay the unauthorized medical expenses, Blue Cross,

Moore’s personal health insurer, paid the vast majority of the medical expenses associated with the

medical treatment provided by Dr. McCord. Moore was, however, billed for small co-payments.

Dr. Joseph Boals, an orthopaedic surgeon, evaluated Moore on March 11, 2002. Dr. Boals

testified that his examination revealed loss of neck motion. Dr. Boals opined that Moore’s neck

condition was caused by work-related injuries and that his permanent disability to the body as a

whole was thirty-four percent (34%) based upon the anatomic change resulting from the fusion

surgeries and the disc excision. Dr. Boals also testified that the medical treatment provided by Dr.

McCord and the associated medical expenses were reasonable, necessary and related to the

employee’s work injuries. 

After his employer refused to pay for the unauthorized medical expenses, Moore filed suit

against the employer alleging that his work-related injury caused him to incur medical expenses and

to suffer permanent partial disability.

After considering the evidence outlined above, the trial court determined that as a result of

his work-related injuries, Moore sustained a permanent medical impairment of thirty-five percent

(35%) to the body as a whole and ordered the workers’ compensation disability award to be paid in

a lump sum. Despite finding that Moore’s unauthorized medical treatment was reasonable and
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necessary, the trial court held in abeyance the issue of whether Blue Cross was entitled to

reimbursement from the employer for the unauthorized medical expenses. 

Moore filed a motion to compel the employer to pay the unauthorized medical expenses to

Blue Cross and attorney fees. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the health insurer was

required to intervene in the worker’ compensation suit before the employer would be required to

reimburse it for the medical expenses. Moore appealed to the Special Workers’ Compensation

Appeals Panel, which transferred the appeal to this Court for review without a recommendation. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard of review of factual issues in a workers’ compensation case is de novo upon

the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the trial court’s factual

findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2)

(Supp. 2003); see also Houser v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 68, 70-71 (Tenn. 2001). When the trial

court has seen the witnesses and heard the testimony, especially where issues of credibility and the

weight of testimony are involved, the appellate court must extend considerable deference to the trial

court’s factual findings. Houser, 36 S.W.3d at 71. 

Our standard of review of legal issues, such as statutory interpretation, is de novo. Tucker

v. Foamex, LP, 31 S.W.3d 241, 242 (Tenn. 2000). Moreover, we must interpret workers’

compensation statutes “to promote and adhere to [their] purposes of securing benefits to those

workers who fall within its coverage.” Allen v. City of Gatlinburg, 36 S.W.3d 73, 75 (Tenn. 2001)

(quotingLindsey v. Smith & Johnson, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tenn. 1980)); see also Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-116 (1999).

ANALYSIS

The question of first impression presented by this appeal is whether an employer is liable to

a health insurer who paid necessary and reasonable medical expenses incurred by an employee as

the result of a work-related injury but did not intervene in the workers’ compensation suit to seek

reimbursement. 

The employee contends that the employer is liable for unauthorized medical expenses

deemed to be reasonable and necessary, that an award of such expenses should result in the

employee’s attorney collecting the statutory attorney fee, and that a third-party insurer that has paid

the medical expenses need not intervene in a workers’ compensation claim for a court to order

reimbursement.

Conversely, the employer contends first that it is not liable for the unauthorized medical

expenses at all and that the employee’s attorney is not entitled to a statutory attorney fee based on

the recovery of the medical expenses. Next, the employer contends that even if it is responsible for
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the unauthorized medical expenses, the third-party health insurer must intervene in the claim to

secure reimbursement from the employer. 

We begin our analysis by reviewing the provisions of the workers’ compensation statute that

state an “employer . . . shall furnish free of charge to the employee such medical and surgical

treatment, medicine, medical and surgical supplies . . . as ordered by the attending physician and

hospitalization, . . . made reasonably necessary by accident as herein defined,” namely a work-related

injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). We have previously held that when an

employee receives medical care for a work-related injury that has not been authorized by the

employer, the employee must establish the necessity and reasonableness of the charges before the

employer is responsible. See Baggett v. Jay Garment Co., 826 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tenn. 1992). 

Where an employer is liable for such medical expenses, the employer must pay the medical

providers directly for the costs of such care, rather than the employee personally. See Staggs v. Nat’l

Health Corp., 924 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tenn. 1996) (construing Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(1)).

Where the employee has personally paid for the disputed medical treatment, however, the employer

shall reimburse the employee personally. See id.; see also State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 31

S.W.3d 562, 565 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel 2000). Additionally, where medical expenses are

contested and the employee prevails, the amount awarded in compensation for those expenses

become part of the benefits upon which attorney’s fees are calculated. Wilkes v. Res. Auth. of

Sumner County, 932 S.W.2d 458, 463 (Tenn. 1996); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-226 (Supp.

2003) (providing for the payment of attorney’s fees in workers’ compensation cases).

As previously stated, it is well-settled that an employer may be liable for an injured

employee’s unauthorized medical expenses when the employee proves that the treatment was

reasonable and medically necessary. See Baggett, 826 S.W.2d at 439. Accordingly, the first issue

raised by the employer is easily resolved. It is clear that the employee here proved the disputed

treatment was reasonable and medically necessary; therefore, the trial court correctly found that the

employer was liable for the unauthorized medical expenses and attorney’s fees. 

The more difficult issue of first impression is whether the employer is liable for unauthorized

medical expenses established as reasonable and necessary when the expenses were paid by a thirdparty health insurer that did not intervene in the workers’ compensation claim to seek

reimbursement. It is undisputed that the medical providers of this treatment were compensated by

the employee’s health insurer, rather than by the employer or any direct payment by the employee,

except perhaps, for small co-payments. It is also undisputed that the health insurer did not intervene

in the workers’ compensation claim to seek reimbursement. 

Although this Court has not addressed this specific issue, two Workers’ Compensation

Appeals Panels have done so and reached opposite results. In Brackins v. Sevier County, No.

038S01-9607-CV-00083, 1997 WL 198783 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel April 22, 1997) (no

motion for full court review filed), the Panel stated that “[w]e are not persuaded by the [employer’s]

argument that the group hospitalization insurer’s failure to request reimbursement in this case affects
1

 Presumably, in a case where neither the employee’s personal health insurer nor the employer would pay for

medical expenses, the employee could bring a claim against the employer and interplead the health insurance carrier.

See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 22. This, however, may likewise create a barrier that is inconsistent with the policy of providing

complete and early access to reasonable and necessary medical treatment, as well as the payment of medical expenses

to health care providers. 

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the [employer’s] liability under Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law.” Id. at *3. In Prosser v.

Bedford County Bd. of Educ., No. M2000-02424-WC-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1006078 (Tenn. Workers’

Comp Panel September 4, 2001) (motion for full court review denied), however, the Panel held that

an employer shall not be held liable to reimburse health insurance carriers who have paid workinjury related medical expenses in cases where the carriers have not become parties to the claim and

where the total extent of the reasonable and necessary medical expenses has not been proved. Id.

at *5.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1), part of the workers’ compensation

statutory scheme, makes it crystal clear that the employer is obligated to the employee to pay

reasonable and necessary medical expenses for work-related injuries. The workers’ compensation

statutes, however, do not provide for or prohibit employer reimbursement of medical expenses to

a third-party health insurer for treatment which was reasonable and necessary, and they do not

address the question of intervention.

The legislature has decided that it is the employer’s statutory responsibility to pay reasonable

and necessary medical expenses for work-related injuries and that workers’ compensation provisions

should be construed to achieve their remedial purpose. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (1999) &

§ 50-6-204 (Supp. 2003). Accordingly, where an employer does not authorize or pay for medical

expenses and instead forces an employee who seeks early treatment to use personal health insurance

benefits to pay for expenses that are later determined to be necessary and reasonable, a health insurer

should not be required to intervene to be reimbursed for the medical expenses it paid, and the

employee should not be required to force such intervention. Indeed, allowing health insurers to

receive reimbursement without formally intervening in workers’ compensation claims is consistent

with the remedial nature of the workers’ compensation statutes because it may result in employees

having earlier access to medical treatment and the full range of workers’ compensation benefits.

Conversely, requiring health insurers to intervene in workers’ compensation claims to protect their

potential reimbursement interests may have a chilling effect on health insurers’ willingness to pay

claims that could ultimately be deemed “work-related” and thus outside their contractual obligations.

Our holding supports the remedial policy goals of the workers’ compensation statutes on a

practical level as well. As noted, once a finding has been made that the employee’s injury is workrelated, the health insurer can seek reimbursement from the employer for expenses paid on the

employee’s behalf because health insurance contracts do not cover work-related injuries. Before

such a finding is made, however, employees may have difficulty recovering expenses from either the

employer or a health insurer and could ultimately be forced to either pay for their own medical

expenses1

 or delay treatment altogether. Clearly, this is not a result envisioned under the workers’

compensation statutes.
2

 Since the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204 does not address this problem, we have

crafted this solution. The legislature may likewise wish to address these issues to establish a statutory procedure.

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Accordingly, the language and the remedial policy of the workers’ compensation statutes do

not require that a third-party health insurer intervene to obtain reimbursement for medical expenses

from the employer.2 We therefore hold that the employer is liable to the health insurer for

unauthorized but reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred in the course of treatment of

the employee’s work-related injuries and paid for by the health insurer. Because the record does not

fully reflect the medical expenses paid by the health insurer or the employee, if any, this case must

be remanded to the trial court.

Upon remand, the trial court should determine whether and to what extent a third-party health

insurer paid medical expenses on behalf of the employee which were reasonable, necessary and on

account of the work-related injuries in this claim. The trial court shall then order the employer to

pay the third-party health insurer that amount as reimbursement and to pay the employee for medical

expenses incurred for co-payments, if any. The employee’s attorney shall be entitled to the statutory

attorney’s fee based on these additional recovered medical expenses.

CONCLUSION

After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the employer is liable

for all medical expenses deemed reasonable and necessary as the result of the work-place injury and

shall be required to reimburse the employee’s health insurer who has paid those expenses without

the necessity of the insurer intervening in the workers’ compensation claim. We therefore modify

the trial court’s judgment and remand to the Circuit Court for further action consistent with this

opinion. Costs on appeal are taxed to the defendant, the Town of Collierville.

___________________________________ 

E. RILEY ANDERSON, JUSTICE