Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Anderson, 2021 IL App (2d) 191001

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

JAQUAN S. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Second District 

No. 2-19-1001

Filed

Rehearing denied

April 21, 2021

May 12, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 17-CF-2484; the 

Hon. Daniel B. Shanes, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Christopher McCoy (Melissa 

Vachon, law student), of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, 

for appellant.

Michael G. Nerheim, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan (Patrick Delfino, 

Edward R. Psenicka, and Leslie Martin, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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Panel JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Zenoff and Brennan concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Jaquan S. Anderson, entered an open guilty plea to armed robbery, a Class X 

felony (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1), (b) (West 2016)). The trial court sentenced him to 18 years in 

prison (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2016)). He appeals, contending that his sentence 

was (1) an abuse of discretion and (2) unreasonably disproportionate to the 14-year sentences 

received by his codefendants. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant, along with codefendants Jamaal S. Anderson (Jamaal)—his twin brother—and 

Jhashi J. Adorno, was charged with armed robbery and other offenses. Jamaal and Adorno 

entered fully negotiated pleas to armed robbery in exchange for 14-year sentences.

¶ 4 Defendant rejected an offer of a 15-year sentence in exchange for his guilty plea and his 

testimony against Adorno. Later, the State made two additional offers. Under one offer, 

defendant would plead guilty to armed robbery and serve 18 years in prison “at 50 percent.” 

Under an alternative offer, defendant would enter an open plea to armed robbery. In either 

case, the State would remove the 15-year firearm enhancement from the charge. Defendant 

accepted the second option.

¶ 5 The factual basis for the plea was that on September 13, 2017, defendant and his

codefendants entered Locksmith Resources. One of the codefendants was wielding as a 

weapon an item that could be used as a bludgeon. The three men took key fobs from employee 

Benjamin Jacobs.

¶ 6 The presentence investigation report (PSI) contained further details, namely that the three 

men entered the business brandishing several firearms. They tied up and duct-taped several 

workers and took several bins of car remotes before leaving in a rental truck. At an intersection, 

the driver attempted to drive between two lanes of stopped traffic, striking vehicles before the 

truck came to a stop. Defendant and his companions fled on foot. None of the occupants of the 

other vehicles were injured.

¶ 7 The PSI further showed that defendant, who was born in 1996 and was 21 years old when 

he committed the offense, had an extensive history of juvenile adjudications and one adult 

criminal conviction.

¶ 8 As for his juvenile history, defendant was charged in April 2010 with burglary and criminal 

damage to state property. He admitted to criminal trespass to state land, was adjudicated 

delinquent, and was sentenced to six months’ juvenile probation, which he satisfactorily 

completed.

¶ 9 In June 2011, defendant was arrested and charged with residential burglary. He admitted 

to theft. Defendant was adjudicated delinquent and sentenced to 18 months’ juvenile probation. 

On March 7, 2012, the State sought to revoke defendant’s probation. On May 17, 2012, 

defendant was arrested for assault and domestic battery (the PSI indicates “12JD244, 
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withdrawn”). On May 25, 2012, defendant admitted to violating probation. The following day, 

he was arrested for theft and criminal trespass. On July 30, 2012, he admitted to criminal 

trespass, was readjudicated delinquent, and had his probation extended for one year. On August 

20, 2012, the State filed a second revocation petition. On September 5, 2012, defendant again 

admitted to violating probation. He was ordered to enter the Gateway residential program, from 

which he was unsuccessfully discharged. On September 19, 2012, he was arrested for 

aggravated battery (the PSI indicates “12 JD 603, withdrawn”). On November 7, 2012, he was 

readjudicated delinquent, and his probation was extended another nine months. On November 

9, 2012, he was arrested for robbery, aggravated battery, and resisting a peace officer. On 

November 13, 2012, a third revocation petition was filed. On December 11, 2012, defendant 

admitted to theft and to violating probation. He was adjudicated delinquent and was committed 

to the Department of Juvenile Justice. On January 16, 2013, a fitness evaluation was ordered. 

On February 11, 2013, defendant was found fit, and his probation was terminated. On February 

15, 2013, defendant was admitted to the Illinois Youth Center in St. Charles. He was paroled 

in September of that year. In October 2013, he was ticketed twice for curfew violations. On 

October 16, 2013, defendant was arrested on two counts of criminal trespass to a vehicle and 

three counts of theft. On November 27, 2013, defendant admitted to one count of criminal 

trespass, and all other counts were withdrawn. On December 18, 2013, he was adjudicated 

delinquent, and the case was closed. His parole was not revoked, and he was discharged on 

September 17, 2015.

¶ 10 The PSI noted that, while on probation, in addition to being arrested multiple times, 

defendant failed to complete his public service requirements. He generally attended school but 

did not finish high school or obtain a GED. He obtained a substance abuse evaluation but failed 

to complete treatment.

¶ 11 As an adult, defendant was arrested in July 2014 for residential burglary. He eventually 

pleaded guilty to attempted residential burglary and was sentenced to two years’ probation. 

After defendant failed to report to the probation department, the State moved to revoke his 

probation. He was found in indirect criminal contempt of court and sentenced to 154 days in 

jail, with credit for 77 days served. Defendant tested positive for cannabis in 2015, and he 

generally failed to comply with his probation obligations. A second petition to revoke 

probation was filed. After defendant was found fit to stand trial, the court revoked his probation 

and sentenced him to three years in prison. He was granted mandatory supervised release 

(MSR) on February 7, 2017. He was still on MSR when he committed the offense in question.

¶ 12 Defendant has three children. The mother of the eldest is Shannon Scales. Defendant and 

Scales were not on speaking terms. He “does not get to see much of their child,” and Scales 

had “taken him to court for child support.”

¶ 13 At the sentencing hearing, defendant read a statement in which he expressed remorse and 

accepted responsibility for his actions. While in jail, he had had time to reflect on his actions 

and had come to realize the fear and terror he had caused.

¶ 14 The prosecutor asserted that defendant, in addition to his juvenile and adult criminal record, 

had gotten in fights at school, had physical contact (a “chest bump”) with a teacher, and had 

been expelled after burglarizing the school. Defendant had also been placed in segregation 

twice while in jail awaiting sentencing.

¶ 15 Defense counsel argued that defendant played a similar role in the offense to that of his 

codefendants. Therefore, he should receive a similar sentence.
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¶ 16 The trial court acknowledged defendant’s statements expressing remorse. The court also 

considered that defendant had a difficult childhood in which his father was absent and he 

frequently witnessed violence in his neighborhood. However, it also detailed his “significant” 

criminal history and noted that in every case the charges had “been reduced in some way.”

¶ 17 The court considered in mitigation that defendant accepted responsibility by pleading 

guilty. By accepting responsibility, defendant was “moving along on that road of *** 

rehabilitation.” The court did not find it significant that defendant waited until the eve of trial 

to plead guilty.

¶ 18 The court acknowledged that both codefendants had pleaded guilty in exchange for 14-

year sentences. The court noted that, because those pleas were fully negotiated, the court did 

not have the benefit of PSIs for the codefendants and, consequently, did not have “as *** robust 

[an] understanding” of the facts of the case when sentencing them.

¶ 19 Finally, the court noted that defendant faced a 21-year minimum sentence for this offense 

until the State removed the firearm enhancement and the court accepted that plea. After 

considering all these factors, the court sentenced defendant to 18 years in prison.

¶ 20 Defendant moved to reconsider the sentence, arguing that it was disproportionate to those 

of his codefendants. The court denied the motion, and defendant timely appealed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 On appeal, defendant first contends that the 18-year sentence was an abuse of discretion.

He argues that the court did not give sufficient weight to his youth, rehabilitative potential, and 

sincere expressions of remorse. He further contends that the court did not consider his status 

as a father and the impact that his lengthy incarceration will have on his family. Defendant 

alternatively contends that his sentence was disproportionate to the 14-year sentences his 

codefendants received.

¶ 23 The trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing 

decision is entitled to great deference. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). This is 

because the trial court is generally in a better position than a reviewing court to decide the 

appropriate sentence. Id. The trial court has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the 

defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, 

habits, and age. People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991). Consequently, we may not substitute 

our judgment for that of the trial court merely because we would have weighed these factors 

differently. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209.

¶ 24 The trial court, in lengthy comments, carefully considered various aggravating and 

mitigating factors in imposing the sentence. As the trial court noted and as defense counsel 

conceded, the instant offense was quite serious. In fashioning a sentence, the trial court need 

not give a defendant’s rehabilitative potential greater weight than the seriousness of the 

offense. People v. Fort, 229 Ill. App. 3d 336, 341-42 (1992). Moreover, the court noted that, 

despite defendant’s relatively young age, he had accumulated a substantial number of contacts 

with the justice system including delinquency adjudications and a criminal conviction. The 

court noted that, in virtually every case in defendant’s juvenile history, the original charges 

had been reduced and defendant was sentenced to probation. However, he performed poorly 

on probation, resulting in multiple revocations. When defendant was charged with residential 

burglary as an adult, he pleaded guilty to attempted residential burglary and received probation. 
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However, his probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to prison. He was still on MSR for 

that crime when he was arrested for this offense. Thus, the court appropriately concluded that, 

despite receiving lenient treatment numerous times, defendant had failed to take advantage of 

those opportunities for rehabilitation. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing a sentence at the exact midpoint of the 6- to 30-year range for a Class X offense. See 

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2016).

¶ 25 Defendant cites Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-72 (2012), in support of an argument 

that the trial court failed to give sufficient consideration to his youth and the “hallmarks of

adolescence,” such as lack of maturity and impulsiveness, which in his view make adolescents 

and young adults more amenable to rehabilitation. However, this court has consistently held 

that Miller’s requirement does not apply to those who, like defendant, were legally adults when 

they committed their crimes. See People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35 (declining 

to apply Miller to a 23-year-old defendant); People v. Hoover, 2019 IL App (2d) 170070, 

¶¶ 37-39 (22-year-old defendant). Moreover, the factual basis does not reveal the rash, 

impetuous act of an adolescent but a carefully planned crime. See Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 

170632, ¶ 36 (defendant’s crime exhibited few if any of the “signature qualities” of youth).

¶ 26 Defendant next contends that his sentence was unreasonably disparate to the 14-year 

sentences his codefendants received under their plea agreements. Fundamental fairness forbids 

arbitrary and unreasonable disparities between the sentences of similarly situated 

codefendants. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 216 (1997). However, a disparity in 

sentences does not, by itself, establish fundamental unfairness. Id. Generally, a sentence 

imposed on a defendant who pleaded guilty per an agreement “does not provide a valid basis 

of comparison” to one imposed on another defendant after a trial. People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 

139, 171 (2001); see also Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 217.

¶ 27 The parties have not cited, and our research has not uncovered, a case discussing whether 

a sentence imposed following an open plea of guilty may be validly compared to a sentence 

imposed under a fully negotiated plea. The trial court stated that it would not penalize 

defendant for waiting until the eve of trial to plead guilty and that it gave defendant credit for 

accepting responsibility by pleading guilty. The court thereby indicated that it did not consider 

defendant’s plea the equivalent of a trial. However, the court also noted that, because no PSIs 

were prepared for Adorno and Jamaal, the court had a more “robust” understanding of 

defendant’s social and criminal histories. Whether this is a valid basis for disparate sentences 

is an issue we need not decide, however, because defendant’s argument suffers from a more 

fundamental defect.

¶ 28 A defendant who contends that his sentence is unfairly disparate to that of a codefendant 

has the burden to produce a record sufficient to support the claim. People v. Horta, 2016 IL 

App (2d) 140714, ¶ 52. Thus, if we have no record of the factors that the trial court relied on 

when sentencing the codefendant, we cannot decide whether any sentencing disparity was 

unfair. Id. Here, like the trial court, we have no record of the codefendants’ criminal and social 

histories. We do not know what information the trial court had available when sentencing the 

codefendants, such as what factual bases were provided for those pleas or whether the court 

heard any evidence from other sources before accepting the pleas. We do not know the 

codefendants’ complete criminal histories, including the ultimate disposition of charges and 

their records of compliance with probation. We do not know what, if any, information the court 

knew about the codefendants’ family, school, and employment histories. A sentence should be 
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based on a wide variety of factors. See Streit, 142 Ill. 2d at 19. Without a complete picture of 

the information available to the trial court when it sentenced the codefendants, we cannot 

meaningfully compare defendant’s sentence to theirs.

¶ 29 Defendant notes that his own PSI states that Jamaal has juvenile adjudications for “Crim 

Trespass to Land, Retail Theft, Theft, Aggravated Battery, Criminal Trespass to Building, 

Curfew, and Assault.” He has convictions for “Theft, Poss Stolen Vehicle, and Armed 

Robbery.” Defendant argues from this that Jamaal’s criminal history is at least as serious as 

his own, if not more so. However, comparing the sentences of multiple defendants is more 

nuanced than simply listing each defendant’s history of offenses. Here, for example, the trial 

court spoke at length about defendant’s history of having charges reduced and receiving 

probation, then failing to comply with the conditions of probation. This resulted in defendant 

being placed in juvenile detention for a time and being sent to prison as an adult after his 

probation was revoked. Defendant was still on MSR from that conviction when he committed 

this offense. Defendant had been placed in segregation while in jail awaiting trial for this 

offense. Whether Jamaal has a similar history of noncompliance with probation, we cannot 

say. And, of course, we have no information at all about Adorno’s criminal or social history.

¶ 30 Defendant cites People v. Sherman, 52 Ill. App. 3d 857 (1977), in support of his argument 

that his sentence was unreasonably disparate to those of his codefendants, but that case is 

distinguishable. There, the trial court acknowledged that the defendant and his codefendant 

were similarly situated in most respects but imposed a significantly longer sentence on the 

defendant for the sole reason that his codefendant had accepted responsibility by admitting his 

guilt to a probation officer. The reviewing court found that the fact that the codefendant 

admitted his guilt after having been found guilty by a jury was not a valid basis for a lesser 

sentence. Id. at 858-59. Here, the trial court acknowledged that defendant, like his 

codefendants, had accepted responsibility by pleading guilty. As detailed above, the court cited 

other factors in sentencing defendant. Moreover, in Sherman, the court was able to review the 

PSIs of both defendants. Id. at 858.

¶ 31 Because we lack sufficiently detailed information about the codefendants, we cannot say 

that defendant’s sentence was disproportionate to theirs even if their fully negotiated pleas 

offer a valid basis of comparison.

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.

¶ 34 Affirmed.