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### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT JAC KSON

OLIVE R J. HIGGINS v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forHardin Cou nty No. 6205 Charles C. M cGinley, Jud ge

No. W2008-02694-C CA-R 3-PC - Filed April 20, 2009

Th e Pe tit ion e r, Ol ive r J. H ig g ins , a pp e a ls the tr ia l c ourt ’s de nia l of hi s pet iti on fo r p os tconviction re lief. Th e State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial c ourt’s denial of r elief pur suant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appea ls. W e conc lude that the State’s motion is m eritorious. Ac cording ly , we g rant the State’ s motion and a ffirm the judg ment of the low e r c ourt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of th e Tr ial Co ur t A ff

ir me d Pur sua nt

to Rul e 20 , Rule s o f t he Co ur t o f C r im ina l A ppe als

C AM I LLE R. M C M ULLEN , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VERET T W I L L I AMS and A LA N E. G LE NN , JJ., joined.

Oliver J. Higgins, pro se.

Rob e rt E. C o o p e r , J r. , A tto rn e y G e ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Mo or e , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; Ra c he l W e st Har mon, Assistant Attorney Gene ral , for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION

I n 1 98 4, the Pe tit ion e r, Ol ive r J. H ig g ins , w a s c on vic te d o f s e ve n o ff e ns e s in vo lvi ng the sa le of marijuana . He a sserts t h at h e re ceived a sente nce of eleve n months, twenty -nine da y s on eac h count; all to b e s er ved conc urre ntly . No appe al was taken see king r eview of his convictions or
sentenc es. On De cembe r 27, 2007, the P et i t i o n er rec eived a sentenc e of life imprisonment in the fede ral sy stem. His curre nt fede ral sente nce w as base d in p ar t u p o n the Petitioner’s 1984 drug

c on vic tio ns

.2

On October 16, 2008, the Petitioner filed, pr o s e , a petition for post-c onviction relief in the Har din County

Circuit Court collatera lly challeng ing his 1984 c onvictions. As g rounds for relief, the Pe ti ti o n e r a ll e g e d th a t c o u n s e l w a s in e f f e c ti v e , th a t h is c o n v ic ti o n w a s b a s e d o n th e use of

e vidence obtained pursua

nt to an unconstitutional searc h, that the State fa iled to disclose exculpatory evidenc e, that he w as ac tually innocent o f t h e offe nses, and that ne wly discovere d evidenc e established his innocenc e. The Petitioner further asser ted that th e s tatute of limitations shoul d be tolled due to the extraordinar y ci rc umstances a nd beca use of the U nited States Supreme Court’s decision in J ohnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 1 2 5 S

. C t

. 1 571 (2003). B y order enter ed November 13, 2008, the trial court summarily dismiss ed the petition, f inding that that the petition was time-ba

rre d by the statute of limitations. A notice of appea l doc ument was filed on November 26, 2008.

The State ha s filed a motion reque sting that this Court aff irm the lower

court' s denial of r elief
pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tenne ssee Court of Crimi nal Appeals. As basis for its motion, the State asser

ts that the statute of limit ations for filing a petition for post-c onviction relief ha s expi red and ar gu es that due pr ocess c onsiderations do not requir e tolling of the limitations period. The Pe tit ion e r h a s f

ile d a res po ns e to the St a te ’s mot ion in w hic h h e c on te nd s th a t hi s c a se pr e se nts extraordinary

circ umstances justifying e quitable tolling.

B e tw e e n th e date of th e P etition e r’ s c on vic tio ns a nd the fi lin g of

the pe tit ion

fo r p os tconviction re lief, seve ral statutes g overning post-conviction relief have been enac ted and amended. At the time his c onvictions be came final, there was no applicable statute of limitations for seeking post-conviction re lief. Acc ording ly
, a petition c ould be filed “at any time after [a petitioner] ha[ d] exhausted his appellate r emedies and befor e the sentenc e ha[d] expired or had been f ully satisfied.” T.C.A. § 40-30-102 ( 1982) ( repeale d 1986). In 1986, the Post-Conviction Act established a thre ey ear statute of limitations. T.C .A. § 40-30-102 ( 1990) ( repeale d 1995). Those whose convictions

we re fi na l be fo re the e ff e c tiv e date of the a c t ha d thr e e y e a rs fr om July 1, 19 86
, to fi le a postconviction claim. See A

bston v. St ate, 749 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appea l denied, ( Tenn. 1988). I

n 1995, our leg islature amende d the Post- Conviction P roce dure A ct such that

un de r o ur c ur re nt l a w, a

pe tit ion e r mus t se e k po st- c on vic tio n re lie f “ wi thi n on e (1 ) y e a r of the date of the fi na l a c tio n of the hig he st sta te a pp e llate c ourt to wh ic h an a pp e a l is take n o r, if

no a pp e a l is taken, within one ( 1) y ear of the date on which the judg ment beca me final.” T.C.A. § 40-30-102( a) (2 00 3)

. Th e statut e e mph a size s that “ [t]ime is of the e sse nc e of the ri g ht t o f

ile a pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief or motion to reope n established by this chapter, a

nd the one- y ear

limit ations period is an eleme nt of the rig ht to file such an action and is a condition upon its ex erc ise.” T.C.A.§ 40-30- 102(a)

.

Whil e due proce ss dictates that the s tatute of limit ations not be so st rictly applied as to de ny a per son the opportunity

to have his cla im heard a nd deter mined at a mea

ningf ul t i m e an d in a meaning ful manner , State v. McKnig ht, 51 S.W .3d 559 (Tenn. 2001) ; Seals v. State, 23 S.W .3d 272 (Tenn. 2000) ; Burf

ord v. State, 845 S

. W

. 2d 204 (Tenn. 1992) , the exceptions to the statute of limit ations are expli citly limit ed, i.e ., (1) c laims b ased upon a new r ule of c onstitut ional law3

applicable to a petitioner' s case , (2) claims based upon ne w scientific e vidence showing innocenc e, and (3) claims based upon e nhance d sen t ences that wer e enha nced be cause of convic tions subsequently

found to be illeg al. See T.C.A. § 40- 30-102(b) (1)- (3). The p o s t -c o n viction court
must a lso c onsider an otherwise untimely petition if the application of the statu t e o f l i m i t ations

wo uld be a de nia l of du e pr oc e ss. Se e Se a ls, 23 S.W. 3d a t 27 8- 79

. Th e pr inc ipl e s of du e pr oc e ss

a re fl e xible , r e qu ir inga

ba lanc ingof

the Pe tit ion e r’ s li be rt

y interest a g a ins t th e State ’s fi na lity interests. Sample v. State, 82 S.W.3d at 274.

I n d e te r mi n in g w h e th e r

d u e p r o c e s s s h o u ld

to ll th e s tatute o f

li mi tati o n s , c o u rts s h o u ld u ti li ze

a thr e e -s te p p ro c e ss:
(1) deter mine when the limitations period would have norma lly have be g un to run;

(2) de termine whe ther the g rounds for relief actua lly arose afte r the limitations period would normally

have c ommenced; a

nd

(3) if the g rounds are “later -ar ising,” deter mine if, under the fac ts of the ca se, a stric t application of the limit ations period would ef fec tively deny t he petitioner a

re a so na ble op po rt

un ity to p re se nt t

he c la im.

Sand s v . St a te , 9 03 S.W. 2d 29 7, 30 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) . In ma kin g thi s f

ina l de te rm inati on , c ourt s should care fully

weig h the Petitioner’s liberty i n t er est in “collater ally

attackingconstitutional violations occurr ing dur ing the conviction proce ss,” Bur ford, 845 S.W .2d at 207, ag ainst the State’s inter e s t in p r e v e n ti n g th e li ti g a ti o n o f “ s ta le a n d f r a u d u le n t c la im s

. ” Sa

n d s , 9 0 3 S. W. 2d at 301. Ag a in, the Pe tit ion e r c la ims that th e statut e of lim itatio ns is t oll e d b y

(1 ) t he Un ite d State s Su

pr e me Court ’s de c isi on

in Joh ns on

v. Un ite d St a te s, 54 4 U .S. 29 5, 12 5 S. Ct. 15 71 (2 00 3) ; ( 2) ne wl y discovere d evidenc e of la w enf orce ment corr

uption t hat af

fec ted the Petitioner’s c ase; a nd (3) the Petitioner’s ac tual innocenc e of the char g es in this case.

I n J ohnson v. United States, the Supr em e C o u rt , interpre ting a one-y ear fede ral statute of limit ations, held that the vacatur of a prior state conviction used to e nhance a fe d er al sentenc e constituted a new“fa ct,” whic h commence d the s tatute of limit ations for collatera lly attackingthe fede ral sente nce. Johnson did not create a new co n s t i t u t i o n al rule of la w applica

ble to the Petitioner’s ca se. See 40- 30-102(b) (1). The Petitioner’s relianc e upon Johnson i s misplaced. John son atta c ke d h is f

e de ra l se nte nc e purs ua

nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 55 on the g ro un d th a t a

state conviction used to enha

nce the fede ral sente nce. The S upreme Court decided the “distinct issue of how soon a prisone r, succ essful i n his state proceeding
, must challeng e the fede ral sente nce unde r § 2255.” I d., at 304. The holdi ng in J ohnson was li mited to challeng ing fede ral sentences a nd the interpre tation of section 2255. The holding i n J o h n s o n did not create a tolling pr ovision for challeng ing state convictions.

Th e Pe tit ion e r fu

rt he r a lle g e s that he is a c tua lly inn oc e nt of the of fe ns e a nd that ne wl y discovere d evidenc e of la

w enf orce ment corr

uption entitles him to relief

. I n support of his argument4

that newly

discovere d evidenc e exists, t he P etitioner maintains that he “ has g ood rea son to believe that o n e o r m o r e o f t h e H a r d i n C o u n t y S h e r i f f s D e p t

. A g e n t s i n v o l v e d i n t h e 1 9 8 4 n a rc oti c s c a se have be en re moved from of fice due to cor

rupt and illeg al conduc t while performing their law enfor ceme nt duties.” First, thi s information fails to qualify as new scientific evidence

. See T.C.A. § 4 0 -30-102( b)(2) . Additionally , the Petitioner’s alleg ation in this reg ard r emains just that an

a lle g a tio n. He c on c e de s th a t he “ do e s n ot h a ve any sp e c if ic do cum ente d e vid e nc e to s ub sta nti a te these c laims.”

Finally , the Petitioner alleg es that his a ctual innocenc e of the crimes f or which he has bee n convicted. T h e Pe ti tioner’s c laim of ac tual innocenc e der ives from his asser tion that his i nvolvement in the s even counts of t he sale of m arijuana was “ essentially a sale of ac commodation [for a fr iend] and not any

distribution for profit.” This ar g ument fails to convinc e this Court t hat the Petitioner is a c tua lly

inn oc e nt o f t

he of fe ns e s.

I n the pre sent case , due proce ss is not implicate d. Due proce ss r equire s that a petitioner be
pr ov ide d th e op po rt

un ity to p ur su e a

c la im; it d oe s n ot r e qu ir e th at th e co ur ts o f t his state pe rm it
pe tit ion e rs to u se the c la im o f “ du e pr oc e ss” to e xcu se purp os e fu l de lay in t he pr e se ntatio n of

c la ims

nor does it pe rmit petitioners to wrap themse lves in a cloak of “due proce ss”comprised of frivolous
g uises to evade the ex pired statute of limit ations. The Petitioner’s post-c onviction petition filed

near ly nineteen y ear s after

the limitations expired is tim e-ba rre d.

When an opinion would have no pr ec ed enti al value, the Court of Criminal Appeals may

a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o r a c tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt

by me mor a nd

um o pin ion whe n th e jud g me nt i s

re nd e re d o r t

he a c tio n ta

ke n in a pr oc e e din g wi tho ut a

jur y a nd su c h ju dg men t or a c tio n is no t a deter mination of g uilt, and the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the finding of the trial judg e. See Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App. 20. W e conc lude that this case satisf i es t h e cr i t er i a of Rule 20. Ac c o r d i n g l y , i t i s o r d e r e d t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s m o t i o n i s g r a n t e d

. T h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l c o u rtis

a ff ir me d in a c c or da nc e wi th Rul e 20 , Ru le s o f t he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls.

___________________________________ 

### CA MILLE R. MC MU LLEN , JU DGE