(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

HILL v. MCDONOUGH, INTERIM SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 05–8794. Argued April 26, 2006—Decided June 12, 2006 

Facing execution in Florida, petitioner Hill brought this federal action

under 42 U. S. C. §1983 to enjoin the three-drug lethal injection procedure the State likely would use on him. He alleged the procedure 

could cause him severe pain and thereby violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. The District 

Court found that under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent the

§1983 claim was the functional equivalent of a habeas petition. Because Hill had sought federal habeas relief earlier, the court deemed

his petition successive and barred under 28 U. S. C. §2244. The Eleventh Circuit agreed and affirmed. 

Held: Because Hill’s claim is comparable in its essentials to the §1983

action the Court allowed to proceed in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 

637, it does not have to be brought in habeas, but may proceed under 

§1983. Pp. 4–10.

(a) Nelson controls here. Although an inmate’s challenge to the lawfulness of a sentence or confinement is the province of habeas corpus, 

e.g., Muhammad v. Close, 540 U. S. 749, 750, the Nelson Court declined to deem the instant §1983 Eighth Amendment “challenge seeking to permanently enjoin the use of lethal injection . . . a challenge to

the fact of the sentence itself,” 541 U. S., at 644. Nelson’s veins were 

severely compromised, and Alabama planned to apply an invasive

surgical procedure to enable the injection. However, that procedure 

was not mandated by state law, and Nelson appeared willing to concede the existence of an acceptable alternative procedure. Absent a 

finding that the procedure was necessary to the lethal injection, the

Court concluded, injunctive relief would not prevent the State from

implementing the sentence. Id., at 645–646. Here, as in Nelson, 
2 HILL v. MCDONOUGH 

Syllabus 

Hill’s action if successful would not necessarily prevent the State

from executing him by lethal injection. He does not challenge his 

sentence as a general matter but seeks only to enjoin respondents

from executing him in a manner that allegedly causes a foreseeable

risk of gratuitous and unnecessary pain. He concedes that other lethal injection methods the State could choose would be constitutional, 

and respondents do not contend, at least at this point, that an injunction would leave no other practicable, legal method of lethally injecting Hill. Florida law, moreover, does not require the use of the challenged procedure. Under these circumstances a grant of injunctive

relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill’s sentence.

The fact that Hill challenges the chemical injection sequence rather 

than a preliminary surgical procedure does not change the analysis.

In Nelson, the Court reasoned that “the gravamen of petitioner’s entire claim” was that the surgical procedure was “gratuitous,” id., at 

645, whereas Hill alleges that the procedure he challenges presents a

risk of pain the State can avoid while still being able to enforce his 

sentence. 

The Court rejects two rules proposed by respondents and their 

amici to counter the prospect of inmates filing successive §1983 actions challenging one aspect of an execution procedure after another 

in order to forestall execution. First, the United States contends that 

a capital litigant’s §1983 action can proceed only if, as in Nelson, the 

prisoner identifies an alternative, authorized method of execution. 

Although Nelson’s doing so supported the Court’s conclusion that his 

suit need not proceed as a habeas action, that fact was not decisive. 

Nelson did not change the traditional pleading requirements for 

§1983 actions. Specific pleading requirements are mandated by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not, as a general rule, through

federal courts’ case-by-case determinations. Second, relying on cases 

barring §1983 damages actions that, if successful, would imply the

invalidation of an existing sentence or confinement, see, e.g., Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, respondents and the amici States contend 

that any challenge that would frustrate an execution as a practical

matter must proceed in habeas. This argument cannot be squared 

with Nelson’s observation, 541 U. S., at 646–647, that its criterion— 

whether granting relief would necessarily bar the inmate’s execution—is consistent with those cases. Because injunctive relief would 

not necessarily foreclose Florida from executing Hill by lethal injection under present law, it could not be said that this suit seeks to establish “unlawfulness [that] would render a conviction or sentence

invalid,” Heck, supra, at 486. Pp. 4–9.

(b) Filing a §1983 action does not entitle the complainant to an 

automatic stay of execution. Such a stay is an equitable remedy not 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Syllabus 

available as a matter of right, and equity must be sensitive to the

State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without 

undue interference from federal courts. Thus, inmates seeking time 

to challenge the manner of their execution must satisfy all of the requirements for a stay, including showing a significant possibility of 

success on the merits. A court considering a stay must also apply a 

strong equitable presumption against granting relief where the claim 

could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of 

the merits without requiring a stay. Nelson, supra, at 650. After 

Nelson federal courts have invoked their equitable powers to dismiss

suits they saw as speculative or filed too late. Repetitive or piecemeal 

litigation presumably would raise similar concerns. States can and 

should be protected from dilatory or speculative suits, but it is not

necessary to reject Nelson to do so. The equities and merits of Hill’s

underlying action are not before this Court. Pp. 9–10. 

437 F. 3d 1084, reversed and remanded. 

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–8794 

CLARENCE E. HILL, PETITIONER v. JAMES R. 

MCDONOUGH, INTERIM SECRETARY, 

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 12, 2006] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Petitioner Clarence E. Hill challenges the constitutionality of a three-drug sequence the State of Florida likely 

would use to execute him by lethal injection. Seeking to

enjoin the procedure, he filed this action in the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, 

pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, 

as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1983. The District Court and the 

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit construed the

action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered 

it dismissed for noncompliance with the requirements for 

a second and successive petition. The question before us is

whether Hill’s claim must be brought by an action for a 

writ of habeas corpus under the statute authorizing that 

writ, 28 U. S. C. §2254, or whether it may proceed as an 

action for relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983. 

This is not the first time we have found it necessary to

discuss which of the two statutes governs an action

brought by a prisoner alleging a constitutional violation. 
2 HILL v. MCDONOUGH 

Opinion of the Court 

See, e.g., Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 637 (2004); Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 

U. S. 475 (1973). Hill’s suit, we now determine, is comparable in its essentials to the action the Court allowed to proceed under §1983 in Nelson, supra. In accord with that 

precedent we now reverse. 

I 

In the year 1983, Hill was convicted of first-degree

murder and sentenced to death. When his conviction and 

sentence became final some five years later, the method of

execution then prescribed by Florida law was electrocution. Fla. Stat. §922.10 (1987). On January 14, 2000—

four days after the conclusion of Hill’s first, unsuccessful 

round of federal habeas corpus litigation—Florida

amended the controlling statute to provide: “A death

sentence shall be executed by lethal injection, unless the

person sentenced to death affirmatively elects to be executed by electrocution.” §922.105(1) (2003). The nowcontrolling statute, which has not been changed in any 

relevant respect, does not specify a particular lethalinjection procedure. Implementation is the responsibility 

of the Florida Department of Corrections. See ibid.; Sims 

v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam). The 

department has not issued rules establishing a specific 

lethal-injection protocol, and its implementing policies and 

procedures appear exempt from Florida’s Administrative

Procedure Act. See §922.105(7).

After the statute was amended to provide for lethal 

injection, the Florida Supreme Court heard a death row 

inmate’s claim that the execution procedure violated the 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishments. Sims v. State, supra. In Sims, the complainant, who had acquired detailed information about the 

procedure from the State, contended the planned threedrug sequence of injections would cause great pain if the 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

drugs were not administered properly. 754 So. 2d, at 666– 

668. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument 

as too speculative. Id., at 668. 

On November 29, 2005, the Governor of Florida signed 

Hill’s death warrant, which ordered him to be executed on 

January 24, 2006. Hill requested information about the

lethal injection protocol, but the department provided 

none. App. 21, n. 3 (Verified Complaint for Declaratory & 

Injunctive Relief ¶15, n. 3 (hereinafter Complaint)). Hill 

then challenged, for the first time, the State’s lethal injection procedure. On December 15, 2005, he filed a successive postconviction petition in state court, relying upon the

Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied Hill’s request

for an evidentiary hearing and dismissed his claim as

procedurally barred. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed

on January 17, 2006. Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, cert. 

denied, 546 U. S. ___ (2006). 

Three days later—and four days before his scheduled 

execution—Hill brought this action in District Court pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §1983. Assuming the State would use 

the procedure discussed at length in the Sims decision, see 

App. 20–21, and n. 3 (Complaint ¶15, n. 3), Hill alleged 

that the first drug injected, sodium pentothal, would not

be a sufficient anesthetic to render painless the administration of the second and third drugs, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. There was an ensuing risk,

Hill alleged, that he could remain conscious and suffer 

severe pain as the pancuronium paralyzed his lungs and

body and the potassium chloride caused muscle cramping

and a fatal heart attack. Id., at 18–21 (Complaint ¶¶9–

16). The complaint sought an injunction “barring defendants from executing Plaintiff in the manner they currently intend.” Id., at 22 (Complaint ¶¶19–20).

The District Court found that under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent the §1983 claim was the functional 

equivalent of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id., at 
4 HILL v. MCDONOUGH 

Opinion of the Court 

15 (relying on Robinson v. Crosby, 358 F. 3d 1281 (2004)). 

Because Hill had sought federal habeas corpus relief in an

earlier action, the District Court deemed his petition

successive and thus barred for failure to obtain leave to 

file from the Court of Appeals as required by 28 U. S. C.

§2244(b). On the day of the scheduled execution the Court 

of Appeals affirmed. It held that Hill’s action was a successive petition and that it would deny any application for 

leave to file a successive petition because §2244(b)(2)

would not allow his claim to proceed. Hill v. Crosby, 437 

F. 3d 1084, 1085 (CA11 2006). After issuing a temporary

stay of execution, this Court granted Hill’s petition for 

certiorari and continued the stay pending our resolution of

the case. 546 U. S. ___ (2006). 

II 

“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas

corpus, 28 U. S. C. §2254, and a complaint under the Civil 

Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, as amended, 42 

U. S. C. §1983. Challenges to the lawfulness of confinement

or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of 

habeas corpus.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U. S. 749, 750 

(2004) (per curiam) (citing Preiser, supra, at 500). An 

inmate’s challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under §1983. 540 U. S., at 

750. 

In Nelson v. Campbell, supra, we addressed whether a 

challenge to a lethal injection procedure must proceed as a 

habeas corpus action. The complainant had severely 

compromised peripheral veins, and Alabama planned to 

apply an invasive procedure on his arm or leg to enable 

the injection. He sought to enjoin the procedure, alleging

it would violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court observed that the question whether a general challenge to a 

method of execution must proceed under habeas was a 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

difficult one. The claim was not easily described as a

challenge to the fact or duration of a sentence; yet in a 

State where the legislature has established lethal injection

as the method of execution, “a constitutional challenge 

seeking to permanently enjoin the use of lethal injection

may amount to a challenge to the fact of the sentence

itself.” Id., at 644. 

Nelson did not decide this question. The lawsuit at 

issue, as the Court understood the case, did not require an

injunction that would challenge the sentence itself. The 

invasive procedure in Nelson was not mandated by law, 

and the inmate appeared willing to concede the existence

of an acceptable alternative procedure. Id., at 645–646. 

Absent a finding that the challenged procedure was necessary to the lethal injection, the Court concluded, injunctive

relief would not prevent the State from implementing the 

sentence. Consequently, the suit as presented would not 

be deemed a challenge to the fact of the sentence itself. 

See ibid. 

The decision in Nelson also observed that its holding

was congruent with the Court’s precedents addressing

civil rights suits for damages that implicate habeas relief. 

Those cases provide that prisoners’ suits for damages can 

be barred from proceeding under §1983 when a judgment

in the prisoner’s favor necessarily implies the invalidity of 

the prisoner’s sentence. See, e.g., Heck, 512 U. S., at 487; 

Close, supra, at 751. The action in Nelson, however, was 

not analogous to a damages suit filed to circumvent the 

limits imposed by the habeas statute. The suit did not 

challenge an execution procedure required by law, so 

granting relief would not imply the unlawfulness of the 

lethal injection sentence. See 541 U. S., at 647. 

In the case before us we conclude that Hill’s §1983 

action is controlled by the holding in Nelson. Here, as in 

Nelson, Hill’s action if successful would not necessarily

prevent the State from executing him by lethal injection. 
6 HILL v. MCDONOUGH 

Opinion of the Court 

The complaint does not challenge the lethal injection

sentence as a general matter but seeks instead only to

enjoin the respondents “from executing [Hill] in the manner they currently intend.” App. 22 (Complaint ¶20). The 

specific objection is that the anticipated protocol allegedly 

causes “a foreseeable risk of . . . gratuitous and unnecessary” pain. Id., at 46 (Application for Stay of Execution 

and for Expedited Appeal). Hill concedes that “other 

methods of lethal injection the Department could choose to 

use would be constitutional,” Brief for Petitioner 17, and 

respondents do not contend, at least to this point in the

litigation, that granting Hill’s injunction would leave the 

State without any other practicable, legal method of executing Hill by lethal injection. Florida law, moreover, does 

not require the Department of Corrections to use the

challenged procedure. See Fla. Stat. §§922.105(1), (7) 

(prescribing lethal injection and leaving implementation to

the Department of Corrections). Hill’s challenge appears

to leave the State free to use an alternative lethal injection

procedure. Under these circumstances a grant of injunctive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of 

Hill’s sentence. 

One difference between the present case and Nelson, of 

course, is that Hill challenges the chemical injection sequence rather than a surgical procedure preliminary to 

the lethal injection. In Nelson, however, the State argued 

that the invasive procedure was not a medical operation 

separable from the lethal injection but rather a “necessary

prerequisite to, and thus an indispensable part of, any 

lethal injection procedure.” 541 U. S., at 645. The Court 

reasoned that although venous access was necessary for 

lethal injection, it did not follow that the State’s chosen

means of access were necessary; “the gravamen of petitioner’s entire claim” was that the procedure was “gratuitous.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). The same is true here. 

Although the injection of lethal chemicals is an obvious 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

necessity for the execution, Hill alleges that the challenged procedure presents a risk of pain the State can 

avoid while still being able to enforce the sentence ordering a lethal injection. 

One concern is that the foregoing analysis may be more 

theoretical than real based on the practicalities of the 

case. A procedure that avoids the harms Hill alleges, for 

instance, may be susceptible to attack for other purported 

risks of its own. Respondents and their supporting amici 

thus contend that the legal distinction between habeas

corpus and §1983 actions must account for the practical 

reality of capital litigation tactics: Inmates file these 

actions intending to forestall execution, and Nelson’s 

emphasis on whether a suit challenges something “necessary” to the execution provides no endpoint to piecemeal 

litigation aimed at delaying the execution. Viewed in 

isolation, no single component of a given execution procedure may be strictly necessary, the argument goes, and a 

capital litigant may put off execution by challenging one 

aspect of a procedure after another. The amici States 

point to Nelson’s aftermath as a cautionary example,

contending that on remand the District Court allowed

Nelson to amend his complaint and that litigation over the 

constitutionality of Alabama’s adopted alternative—one 

that Nelson had previously proposed—continues to this

day. See Brief for the State of Alabama et al. 7–14. 

Respondents and their supporting amici conclude that 

two different rules should follow from these practical 

considerations. The United States as amicus curiae contends that a capital litigant’s §1983 action can proceed if, 

as in Nelson, supra, at 646, the prisoner identifies an

alternative, authorized method of execution. A suit like 

Hill’s that fails to do so, the United States maintains, is 

more like a claim challenging the imposition of any 

method of execution—which is to say, the execution itself—because it shows the complainant is unable or un-
8 HILL v. MCDONOUGH 

Opinion of the Court 

willing to concede acceptable alternatives “[e]xcept in the 

abstract.” Brief for United States 14. 

Although we agree courts should not tolerate abusive

litigation tactics, see Part III, infra, even if the United 

States’ proposed limitation were likely to be effective we

could not accept it. It is true that the Nelson plaintiff’s

affirmative identification of an acceptable alternative

supported our conclusion that the suit need not proceed as

a habeas action. 541 U. S., at 646 (citing the inmate’s 

complaint and affidavits). That fact, however, was not 

decisive. Nelson did not change the traditional pleading 

requirements for §1983 actions. If the relief sought would 

foreclose execution, recharacterizing a complaint as an

action for habeas corpus might be proper. See id., at 644, 

646. Cf. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. ___ (2005). Imposition of heightened pleading requirements, however, is 

quite a different matter. Specific pleading requirements

are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 

not, as a general rule, through case-by-case determinations of the federal courts. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8 and 

9; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 512–514 

(2002).

Respondents and the States as amici frame their argument differently. While not asking the Court in explicit 

terms to overrule Nelson, they contend a challenge to a

procedure implicating the direct administration of an 

execution must proceed as a habeas action. Brief for 

Respondents 30–31; Brief for the State of Alabama et al. 

16–18. They rely on cases barring §1983 damages actions

that, if successful, would imply the invalidation of an

existing sentence or confinement. See, e.g., Edwards v. 

Balisok, 520 U. S. 641 (1997); Heck, 512 U. S. 477. Those 

cases, they contend, demonstrate that the test of whether 

an action would undermine a sentence must “be applied 

functionally.” Brief for the State of Alabama et al. as 

Amici Curiae 16. By the same logic, it is said, a suit 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

should be brought in habeas if it would frustrate the execution as a practical matter.

This argument cannot be squared with Nelson’s observation that its criterion—whether a grant of relief to the 

inmate would necessarily bar the execution—is consistent 

with Heck’s and Balisok’s approach to damages actions

that implicate habeas relief. Nelson, supra, at 646–647. 

In those cases the question is whether “the nature of the

challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to

imply the invalidity” of the confinement or sentence. 

Balisok, supra, at 645. As discussed above, and at this 

stage of the litigation, the injunction Hill seeks would not 

necessarily foreclose the State from implementing the 

lethal injection sentence under present law, and thus it 

could not be said that the suit seeks to establish “unlawfulness [that] would render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Heck, supra, at 486. Any incidental delay caused by

allowing Hill to file suit does not cast on his sentence the 

kind of negative legal implication that would require him

to proceed in a habeas action. 

III 

Filing an action that can proceed under §1983 does not

entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution 

as a matter of course. Both the State and the victims of 

crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 

556 (1998). Our conclusions today do not diminish that

interest, nor do they deprive federal courts of the means to

protect it.

We state again, as we did in Nelson, that a stay of execution is an equitable remedy. It is not available as a 

matter of right, and equity must be sensitive to the State’s 

strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without

undue interference from the federal courts. 541 U. S., at 

649–650. See In re Blodgett, 502 U. S. 236, 239–240 (1992) 
10 HILL v. MCDONOUGH 

Opinion of the Court 

(per curiam); Delo v. Stokes, 495 U. S. 320, 323 (1990) (per 

curiam) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Thus, like other stay 

applicants, inmates seeking time to challenge the manner in

which the State plans to execute them must satisfy all of the 

requirements for a stay, including a showing of a significant

possibility of success on the merits. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 

463 U. S. 880, 895–896 (1983). See also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U. S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (preliminary

injunction not granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion). 

A court considering a stay must also apply “a strong equitable presumption against the grant of a stay where a claim 

could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.” 

Nelson, supra, at 650. See also Gomez v. United States Dist. 

Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S. 653, 654 (1992) 

(per curiam) (noting that the “last-minute nature of an 

application” or an applicant’s “attempt at manipulation” of 

the judicial process may be grounds for denial of a stay). 

After Nelson a number of federal courts have invoked their 

equitable powers to dismiss suits they saw as speculative or 

filed too late in the day. See, e.g., Hicks v. Taft, 431 F. 3d 

916 (CA6 2005); White v. Johnson, 429 F. 3d 572 (CA5 2005); 

Boyd v. Beck, 404 F. Supp. 2d 879 (EDNC 2005). Although

the particular determinations made in those cases are not 

before us, we recognize that the problem they address is 

significant. Repetitive or piecemeal litigation presumably

would raise similar concerns. The federal courts can and 

should protect States from dilatory or speculative suits, but 

it is not necessary to reject Nelson to do so. 

The equities and the merits of Hill’s underlying action are 

also not before us. We reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.