SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

205 

CA 16-00363 

PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

 

BN PARTNERS ASSOCIATES, LLC, LECHASE 

CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC, AND THE 

GOLUB CORPORATION, 

PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS, 

 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SELECTIVE WAY INSURANCE CO., 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT-RESPONDENT, 

AND JAG I, LLC, DEFENDANT. 

 

HURWITZ & FINE, P.C., BUFFALO (DAN D. KOHANE OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT-RESPONDENT. 

WOODS OVIATT GILMAN LLP, ROCHESTER (JENNIFER SCHAUERMAN OF COUNSEL),

FOR PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS. 

 

Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Supreme Court,

Monroe County (J. Scott Odorisi, J.), entered March 31, 2015. The

order, among other things, denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment and granted in part the cross motion of defendant Selective

Way Insurance Co. for summary judgment. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously modified on the law by granting the cross motion of

defendant Selective Way Insurance Co. in its entirety and granting

judgment in favor of that defendant as follows: 

It is ADJUDGED and DECLARED that defendant Selective

Way Insurance Co. is not obligated to defend and indemnify

plaintiffs in the underlying action, 

and as modified the order is affirmed without costs. 

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a

declaration that defendant Selective Way Insurance Co. (Selective) is

obligated to defend and indemnify plaintiffs in the underlying

personal injury action pursuant to a commercial general liability

insurance policy issued to defendant JAG I, LLC (JAG). The underlying

action arose when an employee of JAG was injured while working on

property owned by plaintiff BN Partners Associates, LLC (BN) and

leased to plaintiff The Golub Corporation (Golub) pursuant to a

subcontract between JAG and plaintiff LeChase Construction Services,

LLC (LeChase), the general contractor. 
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CA 16-00363 

The employee commenced the underlying action against BN and

LeChase on June 16, 2011, and commenced a related action against Golub

on October 5, 2011. Thereafter, plaintiffs commenced the instant

action on November 30, 2012. Selective answered, asserting several

affirmative defenses including that plaintiffs did not timely notify

Selective of the claim or the underlying lawsuit, and that plaintiffs

failed to immediately forward copies of legal papers received in

connection with the lawsuit. Selective therefore asserted that it had

no obligation to defend or indemnify plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs moved for, inter alia, summary judgment on their

declaratory judgment cause of action on the ground that they provided

timely notice to Selective in the form of (1) a letter that LeChase’s

insurance carrier sent to JAG, dated September 27, 2011, informing it

of the lawsuit and advising JAG to turn the matter over to its general

liability carrier, and (2) a voicemail message with JAG’s insurance

agent following up on that letter. Selective cross-moved for summary

judgment, seeking a declaration that it has no obligation to defend or

indemnify plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit because, inter alia, it

did not receive notice of the claim or lawsuit until December 5, 2012,

when it was served in the instant matter, and that a delay of nearly

17 months after plaintiffs learned of the lawsuit is untimely as a

matter of law. Selective further argued that notice to JAG’s

insurance agent did not suffice insofar as it was not written notice

as required by the policy and was not notice to Selective’s agent. 

Supreme Court determined, inter alia, that BN and Golub did not

provide Selective with any notice of the underlying occurrence or

claim, but that there is a question of fact whether LeChase had done

so. That was error. We conclude that plaintiffs did not provide

Selective with notice of the claim or lawsuit as required under the

policy and, thus, the court should have granted that part of

Selective’s cross motion seeking a declaration that Selective had no

duty to defend or indemnify plaintiffs in the underlying action. 

Furthermore, we note that the court failed to declare the rights of

the parties in connection with the duty to defend and indemnify (see

Kemper Independence Ins. Co. v Ellis, 128 AD3d 1529, 1530). We

therefore modify the order accordingly.

It is well settled that, “[i]n determining a dispute over

insurance coverage, we first look to the language of the policy”

(Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v Allstate Ins. Co., 98 NY2d 208,

221). “As with any contract, unambiguous provisions of an insurance

contract must be given their plain and ordinary meaning . . . , and

the interpretation of such provisions is a question of law for the

court” (White v Continental Cas. Co., 9 NY3d 264, 267). “If the terms

of a policy are ambiguous, however, any ambiguity must be construed in

favor of the insured and against the insurer” (id.; see

Christodoulides v First Unum Life Ins. Co., 96 AD3d 1603, 1604-1605). 

Further, “[n]otice requirements are to be liberally construed in favor

of the insured, with substantial, rather than strict, compliance being

adequate” (Greenburgh Eleven Union Free Sch. Dist. v National Union

Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 304 AD2d 334, 335-336).
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CA 16-00363 

Here, we conclude that the policy unambiguously requires an

insured to provide Selective with written notice of a claim or lawsuit

brought against an insured and to send Selective copies of any legal

papers received in connection with the claim or lawsuit. We further

conclude that Selective met its initial burden of establishing that

plaintiffs failed to provide notice of the claim or lawsuit as a

matter of law inasmuch as Selective’s employee averred that Selective

did not receive notice of the underlying lawsuit until nearly 17

months after the undisputed latest date when plaintiffs learned of the

underlying lawsuit and where plaintiffs offered no excuse for the

delay (see Anglero v George Units, LLC, 61 AD3d 564, 565; Gershow

Recycling Corp. v Transcontinental Ins. Co., 22 AD3d 460, 461-462;

Zugnoni v Travelers Ins. Cos., 179 AD2d 1033, 1033). 

Plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition

(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). We

reject plaintiffs’ contention that they provided Selective with

adequate notice via the voicemail message left with JAG’s insurance

agent and the letter sent to JAG informing each of the underlying

lawsuit. The inadmissible double hearsay submitted by plaintiffs with

respect to the letter is, standing alone, insufficient to defeat

Selective’s cross motion (see Raux v City of Utica, 59 AD3d 984, 985). 

Inasmuch as the plain language of the policy requires that plaintiffs

“see to it that [Selective] receive[s] written notice of the claim or

‘suit’ as soon as practicable” ([emphasis added]; see Bretton v Mutual

of Omaha Ins. Co., 110 AD2d 46, 49-50, affd 66 NY2d 1020), we conclude

that a telephonic voicemail message does not constitute the requisite

notice in writing (see First City Acceptance Corp. v Gulf Ins. Co.,

245 AD2d 649, 651). We reject plaintiffs’ further contention that

JAG’s insurance agent was an agent of Selective (cf. U.S. Underwriters

Ins. Co. v Manhattan Demolition Co., 250 AD2d 600, 600-601).

Finally, we reject plaintiffs’ contention that Selective’s

decision to afford JAG a courtesy defense raised an issue of fact with

respect to the timeliness of plaintiffs’ notice to Selective. We

conclude that Selective used the same standard in determining whether

to afford plaintiffs a defense as it did with respect to JAG (see BP

A.C. Corp. v One Beacon Ins. Group, 8 NY3d 708, 715), and that

questions concerning the reasonableness of JAG’s failure to provide

timely notice warranted the provision of a courtesy defense rather

than an outright disclaimer of the duty to defend and indemnify (see

generally Lang v Hanover Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 350, 356). 

In light of the foregoing determinations, we need not address

plaintiffs’ remaining contentions.

Entered: March 24, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court