1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 05 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti me th e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th e C o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200 U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s HILL v . M C DONOUGH, INTERIM SEC RETARY, FLOR

ID A DE PAR T ME NT O FCO RR EC T I O N S , ET AL
. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVE NTH CIRCUI T No. 05–8 79 4. Ar g u ed Apr i l 26, 200 6—D e c i ded Ju n e 12, 2006 Fac i n gex ec u t i o ninFlor ida, petition erHil lbr ou g h t th is feder al ac tio n

u n d er42 U. S. C. §1983 to e n jointh e th r e e-dr u gleth al in jec t ionpr o cedure t h e S t a t e likely would us e on him. He a lleged t h e procedu r e could ca us e him s e vere pa in a n d t h ereb y viola t e t h e Eight hAmend

ment ’s prohib it ion of cruel a n d unus ua l punis h ment s . The Dis t rict Court found that under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent the §1 9 8 3 cla i m w a s t h e funct iona l eq uiva lent of ahab e as pet i t i on. Be

cause Hill h a dsought federal habe as relief earlier, the court deeme d his petition successive and barred und er 28 U. S. C. §2244. The Elev

ent hCircuita g reed a n d a ffi rmed. Held: Because Hill’s claim i s comparable in its essenti a ls to the §198 3

ac tionth e Cou r tallow e d to pr oc eed in N e lsonv. Campbell, 541 U. S. 637, it does n o t h a v e to be brou g h t in h abeas, bu t maypr oc eed un der §198 3. Pp. 4–10.

(a) Nelsonco n t rols here. Althougha ninma t e ’s ch al l e n g e t o th e l aw fuln e s s o f a se nte nce or con f inemen t is th e provinc e o f h abe as c o rp u s , e.g., Muh a mmad v. Close, 540U. S

. 7 49, 750 , th e NelsonCourtde

c lin ed to deem th e in stan t §1 983 E i g h thAmen d men t“c h a llen g e seek

in gto per m an en tlyen jointh e u s e of leth al in jec t ion. . . a c h a llen g e to t h e fa ctof t h e s e nt ence it s e lf,” 5 4 1 U

. S

. , at6 4 4

. Nels on’s veins were sev e r e lyc o mpr o mised, an d Alab am a plan n e d to apply anin v a siv e s urgica lproce d ure t o enab l e t h e inj e ct ion. Howeve r, t h a tprocedure was not m a ndated by st ate l a w, and Nelso nappeared wi lling to con

cede t h e exis tence of a na ccept ab le alt e rna t i ve procedure. Ab s e nt a fin d in gth at th e pr oc edur e w a s n e c e ssar yto th e leth al in jec t ion , th e Court conclud e d, injunctive relief would not prevent theState fro m implementing the sentence. Id. , at 645– 646. Her e , as in Nelson ,2 HILL v. M C DONOUGH Sy llabu s Hill’s action if successful would not ne ce ssarily prevent the State from execut in g him b ylet h a linj e ction. He does not cha llenge his s e nt ence a s a genera l ma t t er b u ts e eks only t o enj o in res p ondent s from exec ut in g him inama nner t h at alleg e dlyc a u s es a for eseeabl e ris kof gra t u it ous a n d unne ces s a ry pa in. He con c edes t h a tot her le

th al in jec t ionmeth ods th e S tate c o u l d c h o ose w o u l d be con s titu tion a l , a n d res p ondent s do not cont end, a tleas t a t t h is point , t h ata ninj unc tionw o u l d lea v e n o oth e rprac tic able, leg a l meth od of le th allyin jec t

ing Hill. Florida law, moreover, does not re quire the use of the chal

lenged proced ure. Unde r t h es e circums t a nces agra n tof inj unct ive relief could n o tb e s een a s b a rring t h e e x ecut ion of Hi ll’s s e nt ence. The fact that Hill challenges the che mical injection sequence rather th ana pr elim in ar ysu r g ic al pr oc edu r e does n o t c h a n g e th e an a l y s is. In Nelso n , th e Cou r tr e asoned th at “th e g r av amenof petition er ’s en

tir e c l aim ” w a s th a tth e su r g ic al pr oc edu r e w a s “g r atu it ou s,” id. , at 645, w h e r e as Hill a lleg e s th at th e pr oc edu r e h e c h a llen g es pr esen ts a risk of pa in t h e Sta t e can avoid while s t ill being able to enforce his s e nt ence.

The Courtrej e ct s t w o rules propos ed b yres p ondent s a n d t h eir amici to counter the prospe ct of inm ate s filing successive §1983 ac

t i ons cha llenging onea s pectof a nexe cut i o n proced ure a f t e r a n ot her inor derto forestal l ex ec u t ion

. Fir s t, th e Un ited St ates c o n t en ds th at a c a pi tal li tig a n t ’s §19 8 3 ac ti onc a npr oc eed on lyif, a s in Nelson, th e prisoner identifies an alternative, authorized method of execution. Alt h ough Nels on’s doing s o s u pport ed t h e Court ’s conclu s ion t h a this su it n eed n o t pr oc eed as a h abeas ac tion , th at fac tw a s n o t dec i siv e . Nelsondid not c h a n g e the tr adition a l pleadin gr e qu ir emen ts for §198 3 ac t i on s. Spec ific ple a din gr e qu ir emen ts ar e m a n d ated byth e Federa l Rules of Civil Pro c e d ure, a n dnot , a s agenera l rule, t h rou g h federa lcourt s ’ ca s e-b y-ca s e det e rmina t i on s . S e c o n d , relying o nca s e s barring §1983 damages actions that, if succe ssful, would imp l y the invalidation of an existing sent ence or confinement, see, e.g. , Heckv. Humphre y, 512 U. S

. 477 , re s p o n d e n t s a n d t h e amiciS tate s c o n t en d th at an yc h a ll en g e th at w o uld fr u s tr ate a nex ecu t ionas a pr ac tic a l mat t ermu st pr oc eed in h abeas. Th is ar g u men tc a nn ot be squ a r e d wit h Nelson ’s obser v ation , 5 41 U. S., at 6 46– 64 7, th at i t s c r i ter i on— whet h er gra n t i ng relief wo uld neces s a rily b a rt h e in ma t e ’s execu t i on—is cons ist e ntwit ht h ose ca s e s . Becaus e inj unct iverelief would not necessarily foreclose Florida fr om executing Hill by lethal injec

tionu n d erpr esen t law , itc o u l d n o t be s a i dth at th is su it seeks to e s tabl ish“u n l a w fu ln ess [th at] w o u l d r e n d era c o n v ic tionor sen t en c e invalid,” Heck, supra , at 486. Pp. 4–9.

(b) Filing a §198 3 action d o es no t entitl e the complainant to an a u t o mat i c s tay of execut ion. S uch ast a y is a neq uit a b l e remedy not3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Sy llabu s
av aila ble as amat t erof r i g h t, an d equ i t ymu st be se n s itiv e to th e S t at e’s st rongint e res tin enforcin git s crimina l j u dgment s wit h ou t undue int e rfe r ence from fed era lcourt s . Thus , inma t e s s e eking t i me t o cha llenge the ma nner of t h eir execut io n mus t s a tis f y a l l of t h e re qu ir emen ts fo ra stay , in c l u d in gsh ow in g a sig n ific an t possi bili tyof s ucces s on t h e merit s . A c o u rt c o n s i d e r i n g a s t ay mus ta l s o a p ply a s t rong eq uit able pres umption a g a i ns t gra n t i ng relief where t h e cla i m could ha ve b een b r oughta ts uch at i me a s t o a l low cons idera t i on of th e mer i ts w i th ou t r e qu ir inga stay

. Nelson, supra , at650. Af te r Nelsonfeder al c o ur ts h a v e i n v o ked th eir equ i tab le pow e r s to dismis s su its th eysaw as spec u l a t iv e orfile dt o o l a t e . Re peti tive or p i e c emeal litig ationpr esumably w o uld rais e s i milarconc ern s . S t a t e s c a n a n d sh ou ld be pr otec ted fr om dilator yorspec u l ativ e su its, bu t it is n o t neces s a ry t o r ej e ct Nelsonto do so. The equities and merits of Hill’ s u n d er ly ingac t i onar e n o t befor e th is Cou r t

. Pp. 9–10. 437 F. 3d 10 84 , r e v e r s ed an d r e man d ed.

K ENNEDY , J ., d e livered t h e op inion for a una nimous Court

._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rma l rev i si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on s m a y b e mad e b e f o r e th e p r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–8 79 4 CLAR EN C E E. HIL L , PETITION ER v. JAM E S R. M C DO NO UG H , INT E RIM S E C RETARY , FLO RIDA DEPARTM E NT OF C O RR EC T I O N S , ET AL
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Ju n e 12, 2006 ] J USTICE K E NNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Clarence E. Hill challenges the constitution

ality of athree-drug sequenc e th e State of Florida lik e l y would use to execute h i m by letha linjection. Seek ing to enjoin the procedure, he filed thi s action inthe United States Dist rict Courtf o r the Nor t hern Distri ct of Florida, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1983. The District Court and th e Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit c o nstrued the action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered it dismissed for nonco m pliance w i th the req u irements for a second an d successive petition. The question before us is whether Hi ll’s claim must be brought by a naction for a writ of habeas corpus under the s t atute authorizing that writ, 28 U. S. C. §2254 , or whethe r it ma y proceed as an action for relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983. This is not the first time we have found it necessary t o discuss which of the two statu t es governs an action brought by a prisoneralleging a constitutional violation

.2 HILL v. M C DONOUGH Opinion of t h eCourt See, e.g. , Nels o nv. Campbe ll , 54 1 U. S. 63 7 (200 4); Heckv. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 4 77 (1 99 4); Pre i ser v. Ro dr igu ez , 411 U. S. 47 5 (1 973 ). Hil l ’s sui t , we no w de te rmin e, is com p a r a b l e in i t sess e nt ia l s to th e ac ti on t h e C o u r t allo we d topr o cee du n d e r§198 3 in Ne ls on , su p ra . In ac cord w i ththat pr ec edent we now r e v e rse. I In the year 1983, Hi ll was convicted of fi rst-degre e murder and sentenced to death. When his c o nviction and sentence became final some five years later, t h e method of execution then prescribed by Florida law w a s electrocu

tion. Fla. Stat. §922.10 (1987). On January 14, 2000

— four days after the conclusion of Hill’s first, unsuccessful round of federal habeas corpus litigation—Florida amended the controlling statut e to provide: “A death sentence sh all be exec uted by let hal injection, unless t h e person sentenced to death affi rmatively elects to be exe

cuted by electrocution.” §922.105(1) (2003). The now

controlling statute, wh ich has not been changed in an yrelevant respect, does not specify a particular lethalinjection procedure. Implementation is the responsibili ty of the Florida Department of Corrections. See ibid.; Sims v. Sta t e , 75 4 So. 2d 65 7, 670 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam)

. The department has n o t is sued rules establishin ga specific lethal-injection protocol , and its implementing policies and procedures appear exe m pt from Florida’ s Administrative Procedure Act. See §922.105(7). After the statute was amended to provide for lethal injection, the Florida Supreme Court heard a death row inmate’s claim that the exec utio n procedure violated t h e Eighth Am endment’s prohibitionof cruel and unusual punishments. Sims v. State , sup r a . In Si ms , the com plainant, who had acquired detailed information about t h eprocedure from the State, contended the planned threedrug sequence of injec t ions would cause great pain if the3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt drugs we re not adminis t ered properly. 754 So. 2d, at 666 – 668. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argum e nt as too specu l ative. Id. , at 668. On Novem b er 29, 2005, the Governor of Florida signed Hill’s death warrant, which orde red him to b e executed on January 24, 2006. Hill requested information about the lethal injec t ion protocol, but the department provide d none. App. 21, n. 3 (Verified Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief ¶15, n. 3 (herein a fter Complaint)). Hill then challenged, for th e first time, the S t ate’s lethal injec

tion procedure. On December 15 , 2005, he f iled a succes

sive postconviction petit i on instate court, relyi n g upon the Eighth Am endment. The trial court denied Hill’s request for an evidentiary hearing and dismissed his claim as procedurally barred. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed on January 17, 2006. Hill v. St ate , 921 So. 2d 579, cert. denied, 546 U. S. ___ (2006). Three days later—and four days before his scheduled execution—Hill brought this action in District Court pu r suant to 42 U. S. C. §19 83. Assuming the Sta t e would use the procedure discussed at length in the Sims decision, see App. 20–21 , and n. 3 (Complaint ¶15, n. 3), Hill alleged that the first drug injected, sodium pentothal, would not be a sufficient anesthetic to render painless the admini

stration of the second and thirdd r ugs, pan c uronium bro

mide and potassium chloride. There was an ensuing risk, Hill alleged, that he could remain conscious and suffer severe painas the pancuronium paralyzed his lungs and body and the potassium chloride caused muscle cramping and a fatal heart atta ck. Id., at 18–21 (Complaint ¶¶9– 16). The complaint sought an injunction “barring defen

dants from executing Plaintiff in the manner they cu r rently intend.” Id., at 22 (Complaint ¶¶19–20). The District Court found that un der controlling Elev

enth Circuit precedent the §1983 claim was the functional equivalent of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id., at4 HILL v. M C DONOUGH Opinion of t h eCourt 15 (relying on Robinsonv. Cr os by , 358 F. 3d 1281 (2004)). Because Hill had sought federal habeas corpus relief in an earlier action, the District Cour t deemed his petition successive and thus b a rred for f a ilure to obtain leave to file from the Court of Appeals as required by 28 U. S. C. §2244(b). On the day of the scheduled execution the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Hill’s action was a suc

cessive petition and that it would deny any a pplication for leave to file a successive petition because §2244(b)(2) would not allow his claim to proceed. Hill v. Crosby , 437 F. 3d 1084, 1085 (CA11 2006). After issuing a temporary stay of execution, this Court gra n ted Hill’s petition for certiorari a n d continued the sta y p e nding our resolution of the case. 546 U. S. ___ (2006). II “Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on com

plaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U. S. C. §22 54, and a complaint under the Ci vil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Sta t

. §1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1983. C h a l l e n g e s t o th e l a w f u l n e s s o f c o n f i n e m e n t o r t o part icu l ar s af f e ct in g it s du rat i onar e th e pr ovinc eof hab eas co rpus.” Muhamm ad v. Clos e, 54 0 U. S. 74 9, 75 0 ( 2 00 4) (per c u riam) (cit ing Pr eis e r, sup r a , a t500). An inmate’s challenge to the circum s tances of his confine

ment, however, may be brought under §1983. 540 U. S., at 750. In Ne ls onv. Ca mpbe ll , supr a , we addressed whether a challenge to a lethal injectionproce d ure must proceed as a habeas corpus action. The co mplainant had severely compromised peripheral veins, a n d Alabama planned to apply an invasive procedure on hi s arm or le g to enable the injection. He sought to enjoin the procedure, allegin g it would violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court ob

served that the question whether a general challenge to a method of execution must proceed under h abeas was a5 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt difficult one. The claim was not easily described as a challenge t o the fact or duration of a sentence; yet in a State where the legislat ure has established let hal injection as the method of execution, “a constitutional challenge seek ing to permanently enjoin the use of let hal injectio n may amount to a challenge to the fact of the sentence itself.” Id ., at 644. Nelsondidnot decide this question. The lawsuit a t issue, as the Court und erstood the case, did not require an injunction that would challenge the sentence itself. Th e invasive procedure in Nelson was not mandated by la w, and the in mate appeared willing to concede the existen c e of an acceptable alternative procedure. Id. , at 645–64 6. Absent a finding that the challen g ed procedu r e was neces sary to the lethal injection, th e Court concluded, injunctiv e relief would not prevent the St ate from imple m enting the sentence. Consequent ly, the suitas present e d would n o t be deemed a challenge to the fact of the sen t ence itself. See ibid

. The decision in Nelsonalso observed that its holding was congru ent with t h e Court’s precedents addressing civil rights suits for damages that implicate habeas reli ef. Those cases provide that prisoners’ suits for damages can be barred from proceeding under §1983 when a judgment in the prisoner’s favor necessarily implies the invalidity of the prisoner’ s sentence. See, e.g. , Heck , 5 12 U. S., a t48 7; Close, supr a , at 751. The action in Nelson , however, w a s not analogous to a damages suit filed to circumvent th e limits imposed by the habeas statute. The s u it did not challenge an execution proced u r e required by law, so granting re lief would not imply the unlawfulness of th e lethal injection sentenc e . See 541 U. S., at 64 7. In the case before u s we conclude that Hill’s §1983 action is controlled by the holding in Nelson

. Here, as in Nelson , Hill’s action if successful would not necessaril y prevent the State from executin g him by leth al injection.6 HILL v. M C DONOUGH Opinion of t h eCourt The complaint does not challenge the let hal injection sentence as a general matter but seeks instead only to enjoin the respondents “from execu t ing [Hill] in the man

ner they cu rrently inte nd.” App. 2 2 (Complaint ¶20). The specific objection is th at the anticipated protocol al legedly causes “a foreseeabl e risk of .

. . gratuitous and unneces

sary” pain. Id., at 46 (Applicatio n for Sta y of Executio n and for E x pedited Ap peal). Hil lconcedes that “oth er methods of lethal injection the Department co uld choose to use would be constitutional,” Brief for Petitioner 17, and respondents do not contend, at least to this point in the litigation, that grantin g Hill’ s injunction would leave t h e State witho u t any other practi cable, legal method of exe

cuting Hill by lethal inj e ction. Fl orida law, moreover, does not require the Department of Corrections to use the challenged procedure. S ee Fla. Sta t . §§922.105(1), (7) (prescribing lethal injec t ion and lea v ing implementation to the Department of Corrections). Hill’s challenge appears to leave the State free to use an alt e rnative lethal injection procedure. Under the s e circumstances a grant of injunc

tive relief c o uld not be seen a s b a rring the execution of Hill’s sentence. One difference between the present case and Nelson , of course, is t hat Hill challenges th e chemical injection se

quence rather than a surgicalprocedure preliminary to the lethal injection. In Nelson , h o wever, the State a r gu ed that the invasive procedure was not a medi cal operation separable fr om the lethal injection but rather a “necessary prerequisite to, and thus an indispensable part of, an y lethal injec t ion procedure.” 541 U. S., at 645. The Cou r t reasoned that although venous access was necessary for lethal injec t ion, it did not followthat the State’s chosen means of access were necessary; “the gra v a m en of peti

tioner’s entire claim” was that th e procedure was “ g ratu i

tous.” Ibid

. (emphasis deleted). The same is true here. Although the injectio nof lethalchemicals is an obvio u s7 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt necessity for the execution, Hill alleges th at the chal

lenged procedure presents a risk of pain the State can avoid while still being able to enforce the sentence order

ing a lethal injection. One concern is that th e foregoing analysis may be more theoretical than real based on the practica lities of th e case. A procedure that avoids the harms Hill all e ges, f o r instance, may be susceptible to attack for othe r purpor ted risks of its own. Respondents and their supporting ami c i thus contend that th e legal dist inction between habeas corpus and §1983 acti ons must account for the practical reality of capital litigation tactics: Inmates file thes e actions intending to forestall execution, and Nelson ’s emphasis on whether a suit challenges something “nece s sary” to th e execution provid es no endpoint to piecemeal litigation aimed at delaying the execution. Viewed in isolation, n o single component of a given execution proce

dure may b e strictlyn e cessary, th e argumentgoes, and a capital litigant may put off execution by ch allenging one aspect of a procedure after another. The amiciStat es point to Ne ls on ’s afte rmath as a cautionary example , contending that on remand the District C o urt allowed Nelson to amend his complaint and that litiga t ion over th e constitutionality of Al abama’ s adopted alternative—one that Nelson had previously proposed—continues to thi s day. See Brief for the State of Alabama et al. 7 –14. Respondents and their supporting amiciconc lude tha t two differe nt rules s h ould follow from th ese practic a l considerations. The United States as amic us curiaecon tends that a capital litigant’s §1983 action can proceed if, as in Nelson, supra , at 646, the prisoner identifies a n alternative, authorized method of execution. A suit lik e Hill’s that fails to do s o , the United States maintains, is more like a claim challenging the imposition of a n y method of execution—which is to say, the execution it

self—because it sh ows the compl a inant is u nable or u n -8 HILL v. M C DONOUGH Opinion of t h eCourt willing to concede acceptable alternatives “[e]xcept in th e abstract.” Brief for Un ited States 14. Although we agree courts should not tolerate abusive litigation tactics, see Part III, infra , even if the United States’ pro p osed limitation were likely to be effective w e could not a ccept it. Itis true th at the Ne ls onplaintiff’s affirmative identification of anacceptable alternati v e supported o u r conclusion that the s u it need not proceed as a habeas a ction. 541 U. S., at 646 (citing the inmate’s complaint and affidav i ts). Thatfact, howe ver, was n o t decisive. Nelsondid not change the traditi onal pleadi ng requiremen t s for §1983 actions. If the relief sought woul d foreclose execution, rechara cteri zing a complaint as an action for habeas corpus might be proper. Se e id., at 644, 646. Cf. Go nza lez v. Cros by, 5 45 U. S. __ _ (2 005 ). I m p o s i

tion of hei ghtened pleading requirements, however, is quite a different matter. Specific pleading requiremen t s are mandated by the F e deral Ru le s of CivilProcedure, and not, as a general rule, thro ugh case-by-case determina

tions of the federal courts. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8 and 9; Swie rkiewicz v. So rem a N. A

. , 534 U. S. 5 06, 51 2– 51 4 ( 2 00 2)

. Respondents and the States as amiciframe their argu

ment differently. While not asking the Cou rt in explicit terms to overrule Nelson , they contend a ch allenge to a procedure implicating the direct administration of a n execution must proceed as a h abeas action. Brief f o r Respondents 30–31; Brief for the State of Al abama et al. 16–18. They rely on cases barring §1983 damages actions that, if successful, would imply the invalidation of an existing sentence or confinement. See, e. g. , Edwardsv. Ba lis ok, 5 2 0U

. S

. 64 1 ( 1 99 7) ; Heck , 51 2 U. S. 477. T h os e c a s e s , th e y c o n t e n d , d e m o n s t r a t et hat the test of whether an action would undermine a sentence must “be applied functionally.” Brief for the State of Alabama et al. as Amici Curi ae16. By the same logic, it is said, a suit9 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt should be b r ought in habeas if it would frustrate the exe

cution as a practical m a tter. This argum e nt cannot be squared with Ne ls on ’s o b se r vation thatits criterio n—whethera grantof relief to the inmate would necessari ly bar the execution—is consistent with H eck ’s and Balisok ’s approach to dam a ges actions that implicate habeas relief. Nelson, supra, at 646–64 7. In those cases the que stion is whether “the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity” of the confinement o rsentence. Balisok, su pra , at 645

. As discussed above, and at this stage of the litigation, the in juncti on Hill seeks would n o t necessarily foreclose the State from implementing th e lethal injec t ion senten ce under present law, and thus it could not be said that the suit seeks to establish “unlaw

fulness [that] would render a conviction or sentence inva

lid.” Heck, supra , at 4 86. Any in cidental del a y caused b y allowing Hi ll to file suit does not cast on his s e ntence the kind of negative legal implication that would require hi m to proceed in a habeas action. III Filing an action that can proceed under §1983 does not entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution as a matterof course. Both the S t ate and the victims of crime have an import ant interest in the timely enforc e ment of a sentence. Ca lderonv. Thompson, 5 23 U. S. 53 8, 556 (19 9 8)

. Ou r co nclusio n s to day do no t di mini sh th at in te res t , no r do t h e y d e p riv e fe de r a l c o u r ts o f the me ans t o pr ot ectit

. We state again, as we did in Nelson , that a s t ay of exe

cution is an equitable remedy. It is not available as a matter of right, and equity mustbe sens itive to the State’s strong int e rest i nenforc ing its cri m in al judg ment s with out undu eint e rf er enc efrom the f e der a l courts. 541 U. S., at 649–65 0. S ee In re Blodgett, 502 U. S. 2 36, 2 39–240 ( 1 9 9 2 )10 HILL v. M C DONOUGH Opinion of t h eCourt (per curiam); Delov. St okes, 49 5 U

. S. 320 , 3 2 3 (1 990) (pe r curiam) (KENNEDY , J. , conc urring). Thus , li ke o the r s t ay applicant s, i n mat e ss e eking ti me to chal l e nge th e man n er i n which th e State pl ans t oexec ute th em mu st sati sfy all of th e requ ir ement sfor a st ay, incl udi n g a showi n g of a signif icant pos s ib ility o f succe ss onthe meri ts

. See Barefootv. Estelle, 463 U. S. 8 80, 8 9 5–89 6(198 3). S e e al s o Mazurekv. Ar m strong, 5 20 U. S. 9 68, 9 72 (1 997) (per curiam) (preliminary inju ncti on n o t grant ed unl es s th e mova nt, by a cl ear s h ow ing, carries the burden of per s uasion). A court con s id eri n g a s t ay must al so app l y “a strong equi

tabl e pr esu m pti o n agai nst th e grant of a st ay where a clai m cou l d hav e been br ough t at such a time as to all o w con s i d

eratio n of th e meri tswitho u t r e qu iring entry of a st ay .” Nelson, sup ra , at 6 50. See al so Gom ez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 5 0 3 U. S. 653 , 65 4 ( 1 9 92) (per curiam) (n oting that th e “l a s t-minut e n a ture of a n application”or anapp li c ant’s“att empt at ma ni pu lati on” of the j u di cial processmay be ground s for d e ni al of a st ay). After Nelsona number of f e der a l c o urts hav e invoked th eir equ i tabl e p o wers t odi s m is s suit s th ey saw a s spec ulativ e or f i le dto o l a tei nth eday

. S e e, e.g. , Hicksv. Taft , 43 1 F. 3 d 916 (CA6 2 0 05); Whitev. Joh n son , 4 29 F. 3d 572 (CA5 2 005 ); Boyd v. Beck , 404F. Su pp. 2d 8 79 ( E DNC 2005 ). Altho u gh the pa rticul ar de te rmin ation s ma de in tho s e cases a r e no t befo re us , we re co gn i z e th a t the problem they address is si gni f i c a n t. Repeti tiv eor piec emeal litigation pres umab ly would rais e si milar concern s . Th e f e d e ral c o urts c an an d sho u ld pr ot ect State sfr om dilat o ry or sp ecu l ativ e su its , bu t i t i s n o t ne ce ss a ry tore je c t Nels ont od o so. The equ i ti esand the merits of Hill’ sunderlying acti on are als o not b e f o re us . We rever s e th e judgment of the Court of Appeal sand remand th e cas ef o r further pr oc eedingscons is

tent wi th this op inion. It isso ordered.