NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 11a0039n.06 No. 09-6483 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
I n r e : D AN

NY CH AM B ERS , Movant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) O P I N I O N

Be for e : S ILER , M OORE, a nd G RI F F IN , C ir c uitJudg e s. KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge. Danny Cham b e rs (“ Chambers” ), a K entucky pr iso ne r c on vic te d of mur de r and se nte nc e d to lif e imp ri so nme nt, se e ks a

uth or iza tio n from t his court, pursua

nt to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), to f ile a second or succ essive habe as petition with the district
c ourt . Ch a mbe rs a lso mov e s to e xpand the re c or d. B e c a

us e Cha mbe rs ha s n ot m e t th e a

pp lic a ble statutory require ments, we DENY Chambers’s motion for a uthorization t o file a se cond or
succe ssive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. Accor dingly , we a lso DENY a s moo t Cha mbe rs ’s mot ion

to expand the rec ord. I. BACKG ROUND On Novem b er 2 3 , 1992, Chambers wa s indicted by a g rand jury

in L ee County , Kentucky
on o n e co u nt of murder . The indictment cha rg ed that, on or a

bout October

4, 1992, Chambers intentionally

cause d the death of L arr

y Allen by shooting him with a pi stol in violation of Kentucky R e v i s e d S t a tu t e § 5 0 7
. 0 2 0
. C h a mb e r s p l e a d e d n o t g u i l t y t o t h e m u r d e r c h ar g e an d

w a s t r i e d b y a jury in Ma

y 1 9 9 4
. T h e ju

r y c o n v ic te d

Ch a mb e r s o f

mu r d e r , b u t w a s u n a

b le to a g r e e o nan appropr iate pena lty . After the jury d eadloc ked, the tria l court sentenc ed Chamber s to lifeNo. 09-6483

In re : D an ny

Cha mb e rs

2 imprisonment. Final j udg ment was e ntere d on J uly 13, 1994. On Novembe r 22, 1995, the Ke ntucky Sup re me Court

a ff ir me d Chambe rs ’s c on vic tio n. Cha mbe rs the n uns uc c e ssf

ull y purs ue d s ta te po stconviction re lief. On Novembe r 25, 1998, Chamber s filed a ha beas pe t i t i o n i n federal c ourt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising va rious claims. The dist rict court denied r elief, but this court re verse d and
rema nded for considera

tion of Chambers’s c laims of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. Cha mb e rs v. Million , 1 6 F
. Ap p’ x 3 70 , 37 4- 75 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) . A ft e r a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ngbe fo re a

ma g istrate judge , the district court de nied habe as re lief, adopting the finding s o f t h e m agis trate judg e that Chambers’s tria l counsel wa s not ineffe ctive. We af firmed. Chambers now move s for a n order authorizing the district c ourt to consider a second or
succe ssive petition for a writ of habe as cor pus. I n his moti on to file a sec ond or succ essive habe as petition, Chambers claims that: 1) his tria l w as fundame ntally unfair be cause two jurors discussed the ca se with non-jurors prior to the verdict, 2) the g rand jury was not fa ir and impartial be cause the g rand- jury fore person, Elizabeth Hollon, was the w ife of the prosec utor, Tom Hollon; and 3) the trial
c ourt vio la te d h is d

ue -p ro c e ss ri g hts and his ri g ht t o a tr ia l by jur y un de r t he F ourt e e nth

and Sixth Amendments whe n the trial cour t sentence d him to life imprisonment after the jury deadloc ked during the pena lty

phase of his tria l. Chambers also moves to e x pand the rec ord to inc lude a CDRO M o f a

re c or de d te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio n r e g ard ingthe a lle g e d ju ro r m isc on du c t. Chambers ha s pursued these claims in state-c ourt proce eding s. On Novembe r 5, 2005, following the denial of

his first habea s petition, Chambe rs filed a motion in t he L ee Circ uit CourtNo. 09-6483

In re : D an ny

Cha mb e rs

3 to corre ct, vac ate, or

set aside the judg ment pursuant to K entucky Rule of Civil P roce dure ( “CR”) 60.02 , ar gu i n g t h at the trial c ourt err ed in sentenc ing him to life imprisonment afte r the jury was unable to ag ree on a re commended se ntence . The c ircuit court de nied Chambers’ s CR 60.02 m otion. The Ke ntucky

Court of Appea ls affirme d on the g rounds that t he sentencing err or should have be en
ra ise d in Cha mbe rs ’s dir e c t app e a l. I n th e a lte rn a tiv e , th e c ourt he ld t hat, e ve n if

Cha mbe rs ’s c la im ha d be e n pr op e rl y br ou g ht via CR 60 .0 2, Cha mbe rs of fe re d no le g a l a

uth or ity in su

pp or t of his c la im that the trial judg e could not have sentenc ed him to the m axim um available sentenc e without a jury
re c omm e nd ingthat se nte nc e , a nd , f ur the rm or e , th a t he ha d n ot r a ise d h is c la im w ith in a “ re a so na ble time.” Cha mb e rs v . Co mm on we alt h , No. 20 06 -C A- 00 06 07 -M R, 200 6 WL 31 12 91 4, a t *2 (K y . Ct
. App. Nov. 3, 2006). O n J anuar y 18, 2007, the Kentuc ky

Supreme Court denie d revie w. On June 4, 20 07 , Ch a mbe rs fi le d in state c ourt

a mot ion fo r a ne w tri al pu rs ua

nt t o CR 60 .0 2( e ) o r ( f) , c la imi ngjur or bia s and mis c on du c t du

ri ng his tr ia l, and

arguin g that he wa s und

uly prejudice d beca

use th e g rand-

jury fore person wa s the wife of the prosec utor. The c ircuit court denied the CR 60.02 motion. The Kentucky Court of Appea ls a ffirme d, holding that the c ircuit court did not abuse its disc retion when it de termined that the c laim of juror bias a nd misconduct was not broug ht within a reasonable time, and that, with respe ct to the g rand- jury bias claim, Chamber s had not shown that the indictment signe d by the wife of a pr osecutor impac ted “t h e validity of the proce eding .” Cha mb e rs v . Co mm on we alt h , No. 2007-CA-001484- MR, 200 8 WL 1116905, at *2 (Ky
. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2008) . The c ourt held fur ther that the g rand-

jury bias claim “c ould have be enNo. 09-6483

In re : D an ny

Cha mb e rs

4 rea sonably

investigated at a muc h ear lier date .” Id. I t is unclear f rom the rec ord whe ther Chamber s
a pp e a le d th is d e c isi on

to t he Ke ntu c ky

Sup re me Court
. Chambers asser

ts the juror misconduct, g rand- jury bias, and sente ncing claims in his present motion. As to t he alleg ations of juror misconduct, Chamber s claims that, in a telephone conver sation with a Mr. Donnie T utt, Chambe rs’s half -brother , which wa s rec orded on A pril 28, 2007 and is the
su bje c t of his mot ion

to e xpand the re c or d, Cha mbe rs le arn e d f

or the fi rs t ti me that, d

ur inghis tr ia l, two jurors discussed the c ase w ith non-jurors. Chambers submits an af fidavit from Tutt in which Tutt states that he “pe rsonally hear d CL AY DOO L EY, the Jury For eman, sa

y that Danny

Chambers was nothing but trouble when D anny worke d wher e Clay

Dooley was the Super

visor for the dr op-out prog ram.” Second § 2254 App. at 2 (Tutt Af f.). Chambe rs also cla ims that Tutt overhear d a juror
and a no n- jur or dis c us sin g Cha

mbe rs and

the tr ia l be fo re the ve rd ic t w a s re nd e re d. Tu tt s ta te s in his aff idavit that, “L inda Tipton told Carol Mattingly that she (L inda) didn’t know what to do about the murder tr ial. Carol t h en t o ld L inda that she (L inda) ne eded to g ive Danny some time beca

use of wh a t Da nn y ha d do ne and be c a

us e Da nn y we nt aro un d thr e a te nin g pe op le wi th gun s” and “ be c a us e all Danny did was lay around drinking and stuff.” Id. at 2-3. The otherwise- ty ped af fidavit includes a handw ritten notation, initialed “DT,” which states, “Not sure of all this[ .] Ihear d some of this[.] I t has bee n y ear s since all of this[.] ” Id. at 2. Althoug h not inc luded in Tutt’s affidavit, Chambers
asser ts that Tutt was also prese nt when, bef ore the trial, Mattingly

told Tip t o n t h at Chambers ha d rape d Mattingly

in the past, and that, in lig ht of this conversation, Tipton should not ha ve been on t h e j u r y.No. 09-6483

In re : D an ny

Cha mb e rs

5 As to Chambers’s a lleg ations of g rand- jury bias, Chambers asserts that, when Chambe rs was indicted, the g rand-

jury fore person, Elizabeth Hollon , was married to Tom Hollon, one of the prosec utors in his c ase. In support of this claim, Chambers submits the g rand- jury indictment, dated November

23, 1992, which includes the s ignature of Eliz abeth Hollon as gra nd-jury fore person, a

nd pag es f r o m th e L e e Ci r c u it Co u rt d o c k e t li s ti n g th e inv o lv e me n t o f T o m H o ll o n a s a specia l prosec utor in pre- trial matters in Marc h, April, and May of 1993. Chamber s claims that he did not le ar n o f th e r e lati o n s h ip u n ti l 2 0 0 7 w h e n h e w a s s h o w n a n e w s p a p e r p h o to g r a

p h o f T o m a nd Eliz abeth Hollon. Chambers also submits the undated newspape r photog raph a nd an af fidavit from Phill ip L anham stating that he is Tom Hollon’s sec o n d cousi n and that the individuals in the photogr aph ar e Tom Hollon and his wife , Eliz abeth. L astly , Chambers claims that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to sentenc e Chamber s
a ft e r the jur

y de a dlo c ke d a t the pe na lty ph a se , and that the tr ia l c ourt “ re lie d on the wro ng stat e statute” to sentenc e him. Second § 2254 Pet. at 25. Chamber s asserts that, a fter the first jury was unable to ag ree on a pena lty , the trial cour t “was r equire d by law to e mpanel another jury to conduct another penalty phase tria l for the pur

pose of se ntencingthe Petitioner.” Id. a t 26 . A c c or din g to Chambers, in a capital case , a trial court in K entucky cannot se ntence a def endant unless a

jury has
se nte nc e d th e de fe nd ant.

II. SEC ON D O R SU CC ESSIV E HA BEA S AP P LIC AT ION We c ann ot a

uth or ize the fi lin g of a seco nd or su c c e ssi ve ha

be a s c or pu s a pp lic a tio n unle ss
we de te rm ine that Ch a mbe rs ha s ma de a pr ima fa c ie sh ow ing that his c la ims me e t the re qu ir e me ntsNo. 09-6483

In re : D an ny

Cha mb e rs

6 of 28 U.S .C. § 2244(b). Chambers did not raise the c laims in the instant mot ion in his first § 2254 pe tit ion . Ac la im n ot p re se nte d in a pr ior a pp lic a tio n mu st b e dis mis se d unle ss: (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of c onstitut ional law, made r etroa ctive to cases on collater al review by the Supreme Court, that wa s previously

unavailable ; or (B) (i) the fa ctual pre dicate f or the c laim coul d n o t have be en discove red previously

throug h the exercise of

due dilige nce; a

nd (ii) the fa cts underly

ing the claim, if proven and viewe d in light of the evidenc e as a

whole, would be suf

ficient to e s t ab l ish by

clea r and c on vin c inge vid e nc e that, b ut f or c on sti tut ion a l erro r, no re a so na ble fac tfinder would h av e found the a pplicant g uilty

of the unde rlying offe nse. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). A lthough Chambe rs’s alleg ations of j uror mis conduct and g rand- jury bias
are troubling, w e must deny Chambers’s § 2244 motion bec ause his cla ims do not meet the string ent § 2244(b)( 2) re quirements. First, none of C hamber s’s claims “re l[ y ] on a new rule of constitutional law, ma de re tr oa c tiv e to c a se s on c oll a te ra l re vie w by the Sup re me Court .” 28 U.S.C. § 2 24 4( b) (2 )( A) . Se c ond, Ch amb ers do e s n ot a lle g e fa c ts that w e re no t pr e vio us ly dis c ov e ra

ble throug h due dilige nce, a nd that “esta

blish by clea r and c onvincing evi d ence that, but for
c on sti tut ion a l e rr or , n o reaso na ble fa c tf ind e r w ou ld h a ve fo un d [Ch a mbe rs ] g uil ty .” 28 U. S.C. § 2244(b)( 2)(B ). Withre sp e c t to his c la ims of jur or mis c on du c t and

g ra nd -j ur y bia s, Cha mbe rs do e s n ot r e ly
on any ne wl y a pp lic a ble ru le of

c on sti tut ion a l la

w, and he fa ils to me e t th e § 2 24 4( b) (2 )( B ) c ri te ri a for ne w evidenc e. Althoug h Chambers a sserts t h at h e d i d not have pe rsonal knowledg e of theNo. 09-6483

In re : D an ny

Cha mb e rs

W e a l s o n o t e t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t r i a l

- c o u rt d o c k e t , T o m H o l l o n w a s a p p o i n te d a s a 1 specia l prosecutor

on or ar ound Marc h 26, 1993 for a pre- trial hea

ring held in May

1993. These a

re the on ly lis tin g s o n th e do c ke t sh e e t su bmi tte d b y

Cha mb ers no tin g Ho llo n’ s in vo lve me nt i n Chambers’s c ase. Cha mbe rs c la ims that th e Ke ntu c ky S up rem e Court

he ld u nc on sti tut ion a l K

y . Re v. Stat. 2 § 532.055, the provision under which the trial cour t had authority

to impose sentence in the event 7 alleg ed juror misconduc t, Chambers does not explain why he could not have dis co v er ed the
m i s co n d u ct ea rl i er t h ro u gh d u e d i l i gen ce . M o re o v er , ev en i f C h am b er s co u l d m ak e s u ch a s h o wi n g, he fa ils to de mon str a te that, bu t fo r the mis c on du c t, no re a so na ble fa c tf ind e r wo uld have fo un d h im g uilty o f m u rd er . I n spite of their improprie ty , the alleg ed juror c onversations do not bear upon Chambers’s guilt or innocence
. Cha mbe rs ’s a lle g a tio ns of g ra nd -j ur y bia s su ff

e r fr om the same de fe c ts. I n li g ht o f E liza be th Hollon’s signat u re on the indictment, it is unclear why Chambers c ould not have discove red previously

the names a

nd relationship of t h e gra n d -j ury fore person a

nd the prosec utor. Nor doe s Chambers show how the involvement of Elizabeth Hollon in the g rand- jury proce eding s casts doubt on his guilt as prove n at trial. A mar ital relationship betwee n a member of the g rand jury an d a pr os e c uto r d oe s r a ise c on c e rn s a bo ut the fa ir

ne ss of the g ra nd -j ur y pr oc e e din g s a g a ins t Ch a mbe rs . Howeve r, in the instant motion, Chamber s does not pr esent evidenc e that would preve nt any rational fac tfinder f

rom finding him guilty , as re quired by § 2244(b)( 2)(B )(ii). 1 Wit h respe ct to his claim of sentenc ing err or, Chambers does not pr esent a ny new e vidence
. No r d oe s h e re ly

on a pr e vio us ly

un a va ila ble ru le of c on sti tut ion a l law , mad e re tr oa c tiv e ly a pp lic a ble to case s on collater al review by the Unit ed S tates S upreme Court. Under Kentucky

law, if a jury 2No. 09-6483

In re : D an ny

Cha mb e rs

of jur y de a dloc k. Ho we ve r, on ly on e pr ov isi on , K

y . Re v. Stat. § 53 2. 05 5( 2) (a )( 6) , w hic h p e rm its imp e a c hme nt b y

u s e of a juv e nil e a dju dic a tio n, wa s h e ld u nc on sti tut ion a l, a

nd , mo re ov e r, it w a s h e ld by the Kentuc ky

Supreme Court to violate the Constituti on of the Commonwealth of K entucky , not by the United States Supreme Court to violate the U nited States Consti tution. Manns v. Com mo nwe alt

h , 80 S.W .3d 439, 445-46 (Ky . 2002). I n the death-pena lty context, the S upreme Court applied Apprendi to h old tha t a jur y mus t 3 find the agg ravating factors nece ssary for the imposition of the death penalty
. Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). But Chambers did not rece ive a c apital sentenc e, and Ring “ do e s n ot a pp ly re t ro ac t i v ely

to case s alrea dy

final on direc t review .” Sc hr iro v . S um me rli n , 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004). 8 in a fe lony

case is unable to ag ree on a sente nce, “ the judg e shall impose the sente n ce within the rang e provided elsewhe re by law.” Ky
. Rev. Stat. § 532.055(4) (1990) . Five y ear s after Chambers’s conviction bec ame f

inal, and two y ear s after

Chambers filed his fir st habea s petition, the United States Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fa ct of a p ri o r convic tion, any fac t that increa ses the pena lty

for a crime be y ond the pre scribed statutory maxi mum must be submitted to a jury , and proved bey ond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 5 30 U. S. 4 66 , 4 90 (2 00 0) . We fi rs t
no te that th e Sup re me Court ha s n ot h e ld t

hat Ap pr e nd i applies re troac tively

to case s on collatera l revie w. See I

n re Nailor , 487 F .3 d 101 8, 10 23 (6 th Cir . 200 7)
. B ut, in any e ve nt, Cha mbe rs ob je c ts 3 to the imposit ion of l ife im prisonment, which did not require additional fac tfinding to be imposed by the trial cour

t. Kentucky

Revised Statute § 532.025(3) pr ovides that “t h e d ea t h p enalty , or imprisonment f

or l i fe without

benefit of probation or parol e until the defendant has serv ed a minimum of twenty-five ( 25) years of his sentenc e ” may not be imposed unl es s a “statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance [] . . . is so found.” Ky . Rev. Stat. § 532.025(3) (1990) (empha sis added). Chambers objec ts to his s entenc e of life imprisonment, which was not for life without benef

it ofNo. 09-6483

In re : D an ny

Cha mb e rs

9 p ro b ation or par ole for twe nty -five y ear s, and which, a ccor dingly , require s no finding of an additional ag g ravating c ircumstance . Thus, Chambers’s se ntence was withi n the power of the trial
c o u rtt o i mp o s e w i t h o u ta j u r y. III . C ON CL USI ON Be ca u s e C hamber s has not met the re quirements of 28 U .S.C. § 2244(b), we DENY Chambers’s motion for a

uthorization t o file a second or succe ssive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petiti on in the district court. Ac cording ly , we a lso DENY as moot Chambers’s motion to expand the rec ord.