1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

State of West Virginia,

Plaintiff Below, Respondent

vs.) No. 18-0923 (Summers County CC-45-2018-F-5)

Leland P.,

Defendant Below, Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Leland P., by counsel Scott A. Ash, appeals the Circuit Court of Summers 

County’s October 10, 2018, order sentencing him to an effective 25-to-100-year term of 

incarceration for his conviction of multiple sex crimes.

1 The State of West Virginia, by counsel

Jane Charnock, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. Petitioner filed a reply. On 

appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in admitting his inculpatory statement to law 

enforcement and in admitting highly prejudicial hearsay evidence.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by 

oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, 

the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a 

memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules 

of Appellate Procedure.

In March of 2018, petitioner was indicted on two counts of first-degree sexual assault; three 

counts of second-degree sexual assault; five counts of sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, or 

custodian; and five counts of incest. The victim was petitioner’s step-daughter.

Prior to petitioner’s trial on these charges, the State filed a motion to determine the 

admissibility of petitioner’s recorded inculpatory statement to law enforcement. The circuit court 

held an evidentiary hearing on the State’s motion in June of 2018. During the hearing, the State 

 

1Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. 

Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990).

FILED

March 13, 2020

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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called West Virginia State Trooper Sergeant Wood (“Sgt. Wood”), who testified that petitioner 

willingly participated in an interview at his request. Sgt. Wood testified that, although petitioner 

was not under arrest at the time of the interview, he informed petitioner of his Miranda2rights, 

which petitioner waived. Sgt. Wood testified that, during the approximately one-hour-and-nineminute interview, petitioner admitted that he had sexually assaulted the victim on five separate 

occasions. On cross-examination, Sgt. Wood testified that his interview technique was not based 

on any specific training he received as a State Trooper; rather, his technique was based on his eleven 

years of career experience. Sgt. Wood explained that his interviewing style involved establishing a 

rapport with the interviewee prior to initiating investigative questioning. Sgt. Wood further testified 

that he was aware of the specifics of the victim’s allegations prior to the interview with petitioner 

and noted that petitioner’s admissions were consistent with the allegations. Ultimately, the circuit 

court determined that petitioner’s statement to Sgt. Wood was voluntarily given and was, therefore,

admissible at trial.

During this recorded statement, which was published to the jury during petitioner’s trial, 

Sgt. Wood told petitioner that he believes “there’s two kinds of people” that he had interacted with 

during his career: criminals and good people that have made mistakes. Sgt. Wood stated that he 

believed petitioner was “a good person” and that petitioner would benefit from telling the truth 

because he “needed [Sgt. Wood] to go to the jury . . . and say . . . yes, mistakes were made, but 

[petitioner] is not a bad person and he doesn’t want to be remembered for a few tiny little mistakes.” 

Although petitioner initially denied the allegations against him, he confessed to a single incident of 

sexual assault twenty-two minutes into the interview. Petitioner provided details, such as the 

victim’s activities prior to the assault, what she was wearing, and the duration of the assault, without 

leading questioning from Sgt. Wood. Upon further questioning, petitioner admitted to four other

incidents of sexual abuse, the first of which occurred when the victim was eleven years old. The 

details provided by petitioner matched that of the victim’s previous disclosure during a forensic 

interview.

In addition to Sgt. Wood’s testimony and petitioner’s recorded statement, the State 

presented the testimony of the victim, which corroborated the details of petitioner’s confession. 

Petitioner testified and presented the testimony of four additional witnesses. One of these witnesses 

was the victim’s younger brother, who testified that he saw petitioner “come out of [the victim’s 

room] putting his shorts back on.” The younger brother also testified that “[petitioner] and [the 

victim] would go back to [the victim’s] room sometime[s] and [petitioner] would have me and 

[another sibling] stay in the living room.” Based upon all of this evidence, the jury convicted 

petitioner on all counts.

Following his conviction, petitioner moved for a new trial, and the circuit court denied the 

motion. Ultimately, the circuit court sentenced petitioner to an effective 25-to-100-year term of 

incarceration. Additionally, the circuit court ordered that petitioner serve a fifty-year period of 

extended supervision following his incarceration. The circuit court’s decision was memorialized by 

its October 10, 2018, sentencing order. Petitioner now appeals this order.

 

2Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in admitting his inculpatory 

statement to Sgt. Wood because it was obtained through “the inducement of fear and fomenting of 

hope.”3 This Court has held as follows:

“When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court should 

construe all facts in the light most favorable to the State, as it was the prevailing 

party below. Because of the highly fact-specific nature of a motion to suppress, 

particular deference is given to the findings of the circuit court because it had the 

opportunity to observe the witnesses and to hear testimony on the issues. Therefore, 

the circuit court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” Syllabus point 1, 

State v. Lacy, 196 W.Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996).

Syl. Pt. 13, State v. White, 228 W. Va. 530, 722 S.E.2d 566 (2011). Moreover, 

[b]y employing a two-tier standard, we first review a circuit court’s findings of fact 

when ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under the clearly erroneous standard. 

Second, we review de novo questions of law and the circuit court’s ultimate 

conclusion as to the constitutionality of the law enforcement action. Under the 

clearly erroneous standard, a circuit court’s decision ordinarily will be affirmed 

unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence; based on an erroneous 

interpretation of applicable law; or, in light of the entire record, this Court is left 

with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. See State v. Stuart, 

192 W.Va. 428, 452 S.E.2d 886, 891 (1994). When we review the denial of a motion 

to suppress, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

State v. Lilly, 194 W. Va. 595, 600, 461 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1995). The crux of petitioner’s argument 

is that “[w]hen the representations of one in authority are calculated to foment hope or despair in 

the mind of the accused to any material degree, and a confession ensues, it cannot be deemed 

voluntary.” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Justice v. Allen, 189 W. Va. 437, 432 S.E.2d 199 (1993) (quoting

State v. Parsons, 108 W. Va. 705, 152 S.E.2d 745 (1930)). However, in State v. Farley, 192 W. Va. 

247, 452 S.E.2d 50 (1994), this Court rejected the proposition that representations or promises 

necessarily invalidate a subsequent confession and overruled Parsons and, by extension, Allen—

the cases on which petitioner now relies. As we have held, “[i]n determining the voluntariness of a 

confession, the trial court must assess the totality of all the surrounding circumstances. No one 

factor is determinative.” Id. at 258, 452 S.E.2d at 61. “Whether an extrajudicial inculpatory 

statement is voluntary or the result of coercive police activity is a legal question to be determined 

 

3Although petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in “failing to suppress” his 

confession, the record reflects that petitioner did not move to suppress the statement in question 

and offered no argument against the admission of the statement. Nevertheless, this Court has held 

that “[i]t is the mandatory duty of a trial court, whether requested or not, to hear the evidence and 

determine in the first instance, out of the presence of the jury, the voluntariness of an oral or written 

confession by an accused person prior to admitting the same into evidence.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. 

Black, 227 W. Va. 297, 708 S.E.2d 491 (2010) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, despite the 

apparent failure to preserve this issue below, we find it necessary to review the voluntariness of 

petitioner’s confession.
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from a review of the totality of the circumstances.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Jones, 220 W. Va. 214, 640 

S.E.2d 564 (2006) (citations omitted). Finally,

[i]n examining the totality of the circumstances, a court must consider a myriad of 

factors, including the defendant’s age, intelligence, background and experience with 

the criminal justice system, the purpose and flagrancy of any police misconduct, and 

the length of the interview. State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995). 

State v. Bradshaw, 193 W. Va. 519, 527, 457 S.E.2d 456, 464 (1995). 

When considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, we find that petitioner’s 

confession was voluntarily given. While recognizing that petitioner was of limited intelligence4and 

had little experience with the criminal justice system, it is clear that Sgt. Wood’s conduct and 

questioning were not unduly coercive. Sgt. Wood properly informed petitioner of his Miranda

rights, clarified that petitioner could leave at any time, and told petitioner that he did not need to 

answer any questions. Subsequently, Sgt. Wood developed a rapport with petitioner and slowly 

introduced the fact that the victim had levied allegations against him. Sgt. Wood provided petitioner

an opportunity to admit his mistakes so that he could be remembered “for all the good things” that 

he did. Sgt. Wood did not threaten or promise petitioner any particular outcome as a result of 

confessing. Further, the interview lasted only one hour and nine minutes, and petitioner began to 

admit to the crimes after only twenty-two minutes of questioning. Petitioner was not subjected to 

an extensive or long interrogation before confessing. Critically, as petitioner confessed to sexually 

abusing the victim, he provided details that matched the allegations of the victim, without 

knowledge of the details of her allegations or leading questions. Accordingly, we find no error in 

the circuit court’s determination that petitioner’s confession was voluntary based upon the totality 

of the circumstances during which it was given.

Petitioner also argues that the circuit court erred in admitting prejudicial hearsay testimony

in two instances at his trial. However, it is clear that petitioner failed to object to the testimony on 

hearsay grounds in both instances.5 We have previously held that “[t]o preserve an issue for 

appellate review, a party must articulate it with such sufficient distinctiveness to alert a circuit court 

to the nature of the claimed defect.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Sites, 241 W. Va. 430, 825 S.E.2d 758 (2019) 

(internal citations omitted). “This principle is designed to prevent ‘a party from making a tactical 

decision to refrain from objecting and, subsequently, should the case turn sour, assigning error (or 

even worse, planting an error and nurturing the seed as a guarantee against a bad result).’” Id. at 

438, 825 S.E.2d at 776 (quoting State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 316, 470 S.E.2d 613, 635 (1996)). 

Petitioner’s failure to raise hearsay objections at trial precludes this Court from addressing this 

matter on appeal.

 

4Petitioner participated in a competency evaluation during these proceedings, and the 

evaluator determined that his “IQ” score was 68, which is below average intelligence. Nonetheless, 

the evaluator ultimately concluded that petitioner was competent to stand trial. 

5

In one instance, petitioner objected to the question that led to the hearsay testimony on the 

ground that it was “asked and answered.” In the other instance that petitioner cites on appeal, he 

failed to object in any respect.
5

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s October 10, 2018, sentencing order is hereby 

affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: March 13, 2020

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead 

Justice Margaret L. Workman

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison