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*********************************************** 
APPENDIX

IN RE EMILY S.*

Superior Court, Judicial District of

New Britain, Juvenile Matters

File No. CP-18-012507-A

Memorandum filed April 22, 2021

Proceedings

Memorandum of decision on petition by Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate respondent’s parental rights with respect to his minor child and

on motion for review of permanency plan. Judgment

terminating respondent’s parental rights and approving permanency plan.

Jeanette Johnson, assistant attorney general, for the

petitioner.

Chris Oakley, for the respondent.

Patricia Lyga, for the minor child.
Opinion

HUDDLESTON, J.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Emily S. is a young child, born on August 5, 2018. Now

pending before the court are an amended coterminous

petition for the termination of parental rights as to the

child’s father, Damon F., and a contested motion for

review of a permanency plan. The child was previously

adjudicated neglected, and the parental rights of the

child’s mother were terminated by consent, on July 23,

2019. The child’s mother died on November 4, 2019.

A consolidated trial as to all issues relating to Mr. F.

was held on February 8, 2021. Mr. F. appeared and was

represented by counsel. The child was also represented

by counsel.

The court finds that it has jurisdiction over the matter.

Proper notice of the proceeding was provided. No

action is pending in any other court concerning the

custody of this child. No Native American tribal affiliation was claimed, and the Indian Child Welfare Act does

not apply.

For all the reasons that will be discussed in this

decision, the court finds that the department has

proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that a statutory ground for termination exists and that termination

is in the child’s best interest. The petition is granted

and the Commissioner [of Children and Families] is

appointed the child’s statutory parent. Mr. F.’s objection

to the permanency plan is overruled, and the permanency plan is approved as in the best interest of the

child.

I

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Emily was born on August 5, 2018. At her birth, both

the child and her mother, Florence M., tested positive

for opiates and cocaine. Ms. M. left the hospital against

medical advice on the day of the child’s birth and did

not provide any information concerning the child’s

father. On August 15, 2018, the Commissioner of the

Department of Children and Families (department or

DCF) initiated a ninety-six hour hold. On August 16,

2018, the department filed an ex parte motion for order

of temporary custody and coterminous neglect and termination of parental rights petitions. The pleadings

named Ms. M. as the respondent mother and John Doe

as the respondent father. Ms. M. was served by abode

service. Publication was ordered as to John Doe.

The ex parte motion for order of temporary custody

was granted on August 16, 2018, and sustained by

default on August 24, 2018, at the preliminary hearing

on the order of temporary custody. At that hearing, the

department’s counsel orally moved to cite in John S.
as the child’s putative father, based on information

recently provided to the department by Ms. M. That

motion was granted. On the plea date of September 12,

2018, Mr. S. appeared, was advised of his rights, and

entered pro forma denials. Putative father John Doe

was defaulted for failure to appear. The department

sought and obtained an order for paternity testing as

to Mr. S. On November 13, 2018, the department filed

a DNA report which indicated that Mr. S. was excluded

as the child’s father. The department moved for a judgment of nonpaternity as to Mr. S., which was granted,

and Mr. S. was removed from the case.

Also on November 13, 2018, the mother appeared,

was appointed counsel, and the previous default was

vacated. She was questioned under oath as to possible

fathers and was reminded that she had mentioned Mr.

F. as a possible father. She responded that he was not

the father and she did not know who the father might

be. She said it could have been a man in Bristol. The

court ordered service of notice by publication in Bristol

for John Doe, which was effected. Doe was defaulted

when he did not appear on the plea date of December

6, 2018.

While the case was pending, the department

requested and obtained a study under the Interstate

Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), General

Statutes § 17a-175, regarding the possible placement of

the child with a maternal uncle and his family in Missouri. The ICPC study was completed and the maternal

uncle was initially approved for placement. When the

child was classified as a medically complex child, however, additional approval was needed from Missouri.

After coming to Connecticut on two occasions to meet

the child, her foster mother, the social worker, and the

child’s medical providers, the maternal uncle ultimately

withdrew from ICPC consideration because he did not

want to disrupt the child’s current placement. He has

maintained regular contact with the foster mother up

to the present time.

On July 23, 2019, Ms. M. appeared for a coterminous

trial on the neglect and termination petitions. She

entered a nolo contendere plea to the neglect petition

and tendered her consent to the termination petition.

John Doe had previously been defaulted for failure to

appear at the initial plea hearing and was not present

for the trial. After DCF presented its evidence, the court,

Lobo, J., adjudicated the child neglected on the ground

that she had been denied proper care and attention.

The court then terminated the parental rights of Ms. M.

and of John Doe. At the request of the assistant attorney

general representing the department, the court postponed the disposition on the termination petition to

allow the department additional time to speak with

an additional putative father, Mr. F. The department’s

counsel explained that an anonymous caller had con-
tacted the department’s Care Line on July 7, 2019, and

provided information about a possible father of the

child. The social worker had been able to locate the

putative father out of state but had not yet succeeded

in making contact with him. Although Ms. M. again

denied that Mr. F. could be the father, the court postponed the disposition on the termination petition. The

court entered a disposition on the neglect petition, committing the child to the custody of the department.

At an in court review on August 21, 2019, the department’s social worker reported that she had communicated with Mr. F. on July 26, 2019. At that time, Mr. F.

was incarcerated in Strafford County Corrections in

Dover, New Hampshire. Mr. F. told the social worker

that he did not believe he was the child’s father and he

did not wish to have a paternity test. The court, Lobo,

J., ordered the department to amend the petition to

include Mr. F. as a putative father and to effectuate

service. The social worker spoke with Mr. F. again in

August, 2019, approximately a month after her first

conversation with him, and in that conversation he told

her that he might be the child’s father and would be

willing to participate in a paternity test.

On September 12, 2019, the department filed

amended coterminous petitions for neglect and termination of parental rights, naming Mr. F. as the respondent father. On the plea date, October 9, 2019, Mr. F.

appeared by telephone, was advised of his rights, and

confirmed that he had received the petitions. He

declined to apply for appointment of counsel at that

time. The department orally moved for paternity testing,

which the court ordered. The paternity test subsequently indicated a 99.99 percent probability that Mr.

F. is the child’s father. A finding of paternity was made

on October 28, 2019. Mr. F. applied for counsel, and

counsel was appointed.

Although the neglect petition was amended to name

Mr. F. as the sole respondent, neither the neglect adjudication nor the disposition of commitment was opened

or modified as a result of the amendment.1 The amended

petition for termination of parental rights, naming Mr.

F. as the sole respondent, alleged abandonment and

the absence of an ongoing parent-child relationship as

the statutory grounds for termination. At a hearing on

March 5, 2020, the court ordered specific steps for Mr.

F. and reviewed those steps with him. Trial on the

termination of parental rights petition was scheduled

for March 23, 2020, but was subsequently postponed as

a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. On April 6, 2020, the

department filed a motion for review of the permanency

plan, which proposed a plan of termination of parental

rights and adoption. Mr. F., through counsel, filed an

objection to the proposed plan, and the contested hearing on the permanency plan was consolidated with the

trial on the termination petition.
The consolidated trial on the termination petition and

the permanency plan took place on February 8, 2021,

as a virtual trial on the Microsoft Teams platform. Mr.

F., who remains incarcerated in New Hampshire,

appeared by video and was represented by counsel.

The court advised Mr. F. of his rights and of the nature

of the termination proceeding as required by In re

Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 794, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

The department had previously filed two motions for

judicial notice: one for judicial notice of the court

record, and a second for judicial notice of copies of ten

judicial records, nine of which related to a prosecution

pending against Mr. F. in the United States District

Court for the District of Maine, and one of which was

a copy of a Connecticut Supreme Court decision

affirming a prior Connecticut conviction of Mr. F. The

motions for judicial notice were granted without objection or limitation.

The department presented the testimony of Courtney

E., the foster mother in whose care the child has been

placed since her discharge from the hospital after birth,

and Margaret DeSena, the department social worker

who was assigned to the case.

The department proffered twelve exhibits, some of

which were redacted by agreement. The exhibits were

admitted in full without objection. The department’s

exhibits included the following:

• State’s Exhibit 1: Social Study in Support of Neglect

and Termination of Parental Rights Petition dated September 12, 2018, as redacted

• State’s Exhibit 2: Status Report dated May 1, 2019

• State’s Exhibit 3: Addendum to the Social Study

dated October 8, 2019

• State’s Exhibit 4: Status Report dated January 23,

2020, as redacted

• State’s Exhibit 5: Motion to Review Permanency

Plan and Study in Support Thereof dated March 9, 2020

• State’s Exhibit 6: Addendum to the Coterminous

Social Study dated February 1, 2021

• State’s Exhibit 7: Criminal Conviction Certification

record dated February 6, 2020

• State’s Exhibit 8: Department of Correction Records

dated February 3, 2020

• State’s Exhibit 9: Yale-New Haven Health L & M

Rehabilitation Services Physical Therapy Summary

dated January 3, 2020, as redacted

• State’s Exhibit 10: Letter by Amanda Vellali, M.S.,

CCC-SLP, Pediatric Speech Pathologist dated February

11, 2020, as redacted

• State’s Exhibit 11: ProHealth Physician’s Letter by
Allyson Salek, M.D., dated February 17, 2020, as

redacted

• State’s Exhibit 12: LEARN Birth-to-Three Letter by

Allison Frost, M.S., Special Ed/Early Intervention Specialist, as redacted

After the department rested, Mr. F.’s counsel moved

for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the department had failed to meet its burden of proof with respect

to the ground of abandonment. The court reserved decision on that motion.

Mr. F. then testified after being canvassed by his

counsel about his decision to testify. In addition, Mr.

F. introduced one exhibit, Respondent’s Exhibit B,

Father’s Specific Steps as ordered on March 5, 2020.

That exhibit was admitted in full without objection.

The court heard arguments of counsel at the close

of the evidence. Among other arguments, counsel for

the department and counsel for the minor child argued

that Mr. F. has no relationship with the child, no understanding of the degree and intensity of care the child

needs, and that it would be highly detrimental to the

child to disrupt her secure placement. Counsel for Mr.

F. argued against termination. He emphasized the fundamental constitutional interests at stake for the father

and Mr. F.’s desire to parent his child or to have her

placed with his family. He argued that the fact of incarceration can never constitute abandonment, and further

argued in favor of allowing Mr. F. additional time to

establish a parent-child relationship.

The court has carefully considered all the testimonial

and documentary evidence in light of the applicable

statutes and principles of law. It has considered the

demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. It has taken

judicial notice of court records as permitted by law. It

has considered the arguments of counsel.

II

PRELIMINARY FACTS

A

The Child

Emily was born on August 5, 2018, at the Hospital of

Central Connecticut in New Britain. She was premature,

weighing approximately four pounds, but her true gestational age was unknown because her mother, Ms. M.,

received no prenatal care during her pregnancy. Ms.

M. had a significant history of substance abuse. Her

substance abuse had led to the termination of her parental rights as to her older child, Jadalynn, who was born

in 2008. Ms. M. provided no information about Emily’s

father to hospital staff. She left the hospital against

medical advice on the day of Emily’s birth and did not

return to visit her.

Emily tested positive for cocaine and opiates at birth
and was kept in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU)

for ten days. She experienced withdrawal symptoms,

which required her to be given morphine. While Emily

was in the hospital, the department identified a legal

risk licensed preadoptive home. The identified foster

mother visited Emily daily while she was in the NICU

and learned about the care she would need upon discharge. On August 15, 2018, the department initiated a

ninety-six hour hold, and, on the next day, sought and

obtained an ex parte order of temporary custody. Emily

was discharged from the hospital and placed in the

preadoptive home, where she has remained through the

date of the trial.

Emily has had substantial medical and developmental

issues. She has been diagnosed with neonatal abstinence syndrome. In the first months after her discharge

from the hospital, she had severe tremors, cried constantly, and seldom slept. She had severe gastrointestinal issues, including reflux throughout her first year of

life. She had difficulty having bowel movements. She

lost weight at first, and her weight had to be checked

twice weekly at the pediatrician’s office or by a visiting

nurse. She was on a prescription formula for her first

two years.

In her first months of life, Emily lacked the ability

to suck and had to be wakened every two hours for

feeding. She was referred to a feeding team for therapy

to help strengthen the muscles in her mouth and tongue.

Although she had made substantial progress with feeding by the age of two and one-half, and, although she

is now able to speak, she will continue to need speech

therapy to address a lisp and a stutter.

Emily also developed significant respiratory issues

that led to multiple visits to the emergency room. When

she was four months old, she was referred to a pulmonologist. She had to be given breathing treatments, each

taking about forty-five minutes, three or four times

daily. On November 25, 2018, she was diagnosed with

pneumonia in an emergency room visit and was given

a stronger breathing treatment. Her respiratory issues

have continued. She has been diagnosed with severe

persistent asthma, which is managed through administration of an inhaled steroid once or twice a day. A dual

treatment plan is in place when she develops congestion, because she gets sick very quickly. She is seen by

a pulmonologist every four months. Her physician has

stated that she is likely to have pulmonary issues

throughout her life. As a result of her respiratory issues,

she has been classified as a child with complex medical

needs, Level 3.2

At the age of eighteen months, Emily was tested for

Hepatitis C and was found to be positive. She will need

to have blood tests every eight months to monitor the

effects of the Hepatitis C infection on her liver. She is

monitored by the gastroenterology department at the
Connecticut Children’s Medical Center for this condition. Her medical providers hope to delay treatment for

the condition until she is at least five years old because

the treatments are harsh for children. Because of the

Hepatitis C infection, she cannot take certain medications that can harm the liver, and care must be taken

to ensure that all of her medical providers are aware

of the condition.

Emily was developmentally delayed in both gross and

fine motor skills. She has required physical therapy and

occupational therapy to address those delays. She had

tightness on her left side, and there was a question as

to whether she might have cerebral palsy. She has had

vestibular issues which are very frustrating for her. She

received Birth to Three services from October, 2018,

through November, 2020, when she was successfully

discharged.

Emily is currently in day care full time, although her

foster mother has sometimes kept her home during the

pandemic. Emily is in a therapeutic room in her day

care setting. Her teacher is a certified therapeutic

teacher. The therapeutic room in the day care provides

a smaller class with more direct one-on-one attention.

The staff is trained to administer Emily’s breathing

treatment during the day.

Emily has a hard time adapting to strangers and looks

to her foster mother as her source of security. Emily

received Birth to Three services at the day care because

her providers thought it was beneficial to see her interact with other children. Emily’s foster mother communicated with the Birth to Three providers regularly to get

reports on what they had done and to share what she

was noticing about Emily’s development.

Although Emily was successfully discharged from

Birth to Three services, she continues to need physical

and occupational therapy for various issues. She is

delayed in developing fine motor skills and still cannot

use a fork or spoon. The delay in fine motor skills

affects her eating and causes her frustration in playing

with toys such as Megablox.

Emily’s providers attribute much of Emily’s medical

and physical progress to the consistent care and attention of her foster mother, who has attended every medical appointment with her and has carefully attended to

the various breathing and other medical treatments and

physical therapy exercises that have been prescribed

for Emily at home. The foster mother’s six year old

son has also participated in Emily’s physical therapy,

motivating her to copy his actions.

Emily’s pediatrician has indicated that, as a result of

her prenatal exposure to drugs, Emily is expected to

have learning disabilities and will have an ‘‘uphill battle’’

when she starts school. She will likely require special

education services.
B

The Father

Mr. F. was born in February, 1975, in Hartford, Connecticut, in a household with his mother, his sister, and

his grandmother. He also has two paternal half-siblings.

He told the department that he continues to have a

relationship with his mother and all his siblings, who

provide financial and emotional support for him. He

denied any traumas during his childhood and reported

that he did well in school, although he admitted to

behavioral issues in school, where he was often in trouble. When he was seventeen, in 1992, he was arrested,

and subsequently convicted, on charges of robbery in

the first degree, for which he received a five year sentence. He obtained his GED while incarcerated.

Mr. F. has never been married, but he has one older

child, Daijah, who is now an adult. The department’s

records indicate that Mr. F. was substantiated for physical neglect with regard to Daijah in 2003. The social

worker testified that Mr. F. had a history of domestic

violence and harassment with Daijah’s mother and was

convicted of violating a protective order for which Daijah’s mother was the protected person. That testimony

was corroborated by a copy of a 2006 decision by the

Connecticut Supreme Court, which affirmed Mr. F.’s

conviction arising from a 2003 incident relating to his

child’s mother.

Mr. F. has been incarcerated for most of his adult

life, with relatively brief periods of liberty followed

by new arrests, convictions, and further incarceration.

More specifically: Mr. F.’s Connecticut criminal conviction history indicates that, between 1992 and 2012, he

was convicted on the following dates on the stated

Connecticut charges: (1) December 12, 1992, larceny

in the sixth degree; (2) April 23, 1993, robbery in the

first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the

first degree; (3) November 12, 1997, sale of narcotics;

(4) May 12, 1999, carrying a pistol without a permit and

possession of narcotics; (5) February 14, 2003, disorderly conduct; (6) August 5, 2004, running from police;

(7) August 5, 2004, violation of a protective order; and

(8) October 18, 2012, violation of a protective order.

During those years, he was also convicted of violations

of probation in 1999, 2004, and 2012. He spent approximately nineteen of the twenty-three years between 1992

and 2015 in correctional facilities. During some of his

periods in the community, he was on probation, parole,

or special parole. His criminal history in Connecticut,

so far as the record discloses, ended when he was

discharged from a period of special parole in April, 2016.

When he was not incarcerated, Mr. F. worked at various jobs. He was most recently employed in 2017, at

Boost Mobile, where he worked for eighteen months.

Before that, he worked at Hartford Hospital in environ-
mental services for seven months. He has also worked

as a truck driver in the past.

Mr. F.’s Connecticut criminal history and incarceration records end in 2016, but his criminal activity did not

end then. Although the department did not introduce

a copy of Mr. F.’s criminal conviction history from other

states, both the social worker and Mr. F. testified that,

when the social worker first spoke with Mr. F. on July

26, 2019, he was incarcerated at Strafford County Correctional facility in Dover, New Hampshire, where he

was serving a sentence on state criminal charges from

the state of Maine and was also under an order of

detention for a pending federal criminal charge. The

social worker testified that she believed that Mr. F.’s

incarceration began on or about February 19, 2019, and

Mr. F. did not offer contradictory testimony.

Evidence as to Mr. F.’s incarceration status as of the

date of trial is found in the testimony of both the social

worker and Mr. F. and in nine documents related to

the criminal charge pending against Mr. F. in federal

District Court in Maine. These documents were

attached to a motion for judicial notice filed on February 7, 2021, which was granted without objection and

without limitation. The documents include an arrest

warrant issued on January 20, 2019; the criminal complaint dated January 30, 2019; an indictment synopsis

dated June 20, 2019; an order of detention pending trial

issued on May 30, 2019; an excerpt from a transcript

of a hearing held on February 6 and February 11, 2020,

on Mr. F.’s motion to suppress certain evidence in the

District Court action; a speedy trial order dated April

30, 2020; a decision on [Mr. F.’s] renewed motion for

an expedited and combined plea and sentencing hearing

by telephone or videoconference, dated June 2, 2020;

a decision on [Mr. F.’s] second renewed motion for an

expedited and combined plea and sentencing hearing

by videoconference, dated August 24, 2020; and a

speedy trial order dated December 11, 2020.

The information that can be gleaned from the federal

District Court documents is as follows: The government

alleges that, on January 6, 2019, Mr. F. knowingly and

intentionally possessed heroin with intent to distribute

it in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1) (2018). His arrest

resulted from a traffic stop in Maine on that date. On

the date of the traffic stop, he was out on bond on

various Maine state charges. His motion to suppress

certain evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop

was denied. He subsequently moved for an expedited

and combined plea and sentencing hearing by telephone

or videoconference so that he could enter a conditional

guilty plea, be sentenced, and then appeal the denial

of his motion to suppress. The District Court denied

the motion on June 2, 2020, but on August 24, 2020, the

District Court granted Mr. F.’s second renewed motion

for such a remote hearing. As of the date of trial in this
case, the federal plea and sentencing hearing had not yet

been scheduled. On at least two occasions, the District

Court had issued, on its motion, ‘‘speedy trial orders,’’

in which the court excluded certain dates from the

calculations under the Speedy Trial Act, attributing the

exclusion to the public health crisis caused by the

Covid-19 pandemic. The more recent of those orders,

dated December 11, 2020, excluded the time between

February 1, 2021, and April 5, 2021, from calculations

under the Speedy Trial Act.

Mr. F. testified at trial that he hopes to have his

federal court sentencing hearing in April, 2021, and he

hopes to receive a sentence of time served. He testified

that his sentencing range under the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines is ‘‘thirty or thirty-one months’’ and he has

served ‘‘about twenty-one’’ months. His testimony is not

entirely consistent with the federal court documents.

In a ruling dated June 2, 2020, the federal district judge

observed that, according to a preplea presentence

report authorized by the court, Mr. F.’s Guideline range

is thirty to thirty-seven months, but the judge noted

that Mr. F.’s own motion stated that the Guideline range

might be increased to thirty-three to forty-one months

when additional information about his criminal history

was considered. The District Court further commented

that Mr. F. would not begin to be detained on the federal

charge until he completed his sentence on the state

charge, an event which was imminent at the time of

the District Court’s ruling on June 2, 2020. If the District

Court’s summary is accurate, Mr. F. had served approximately eight months in federal detention by February

8, 2021, the date of the trial in this court, and he may

face a Guideline sentence range of as much as fortyone months. If Mr. F.’s testimony was accurate, he was

hoping for time served but was exposed to the possibility of eight more months of incarceration. At the time

of the trial in this court, it was unknown when his

plea and sentencing would be scheduled and what his

sentence would be.

There is no evidence in the record as to the exact

date when Mr. F. moved from Connecticut to Maine,

but it can be inferred to have been at some time between

2016, when he was discharged from special parole in

Connecticut, and 2018, when he had a relationship with

Florence M., the mother of the child at issue in this case.

The social worker initially spoke with Mr. F. on July

26, 2019. He told the social worker that Ms. M. was

with him for ‘‘a time’’ in Maine and that he loved her

but could not stay in a relationship with her because

she was using heroin and cocaine. (Ex. 3, p. 3.) He

made inconsistent statements about whether he knew

about Ms. M.’s pregnancy and his potential paternity.

In his first conversation with the social worker, he

stated that he was aware that Ms. M. had a baby but

he did not believe the child was his. At other times he
stated that he was unaware that Ms. M. was pregnant

or had his child. He admitted that he had not taken

phone calls from Ms. M. after their breakup because

he was upset with her, but he also said that he had

spoken with her in July, 2018, and she did not tell him

she was pregnant. He initially did not want to participate

in a paternity test. When the social worker contacted

him again a month after their first conversation, however, he said that he might be the father and agreed to

a paternity test. He did not want to provide any

resources for the child until the paternity test was completed. A DNA test was ordered, and the results received

in October, 2019, confirmed Mr. F.’s paternity.

In November, 2019, after his paternity was determined, Mr. F. offered Tabitha Hand as a placement

resource. Ms. Hand lived in Madawaska, Maine. On

December 12, 2019, Mr. F.’s counsel filed a motion for

an order for an expedited ICPC study of Ms. Hand as

fictive kin. In the motion, he represented that Ms. Hand

lived in the town where Mr. F. planned to live when

his prison sentence was concluded and that she was a

licensed foster parent in Maine. The social worker

spoke with Ms. Hand and began the process of collecting information to assess her suitability. In speaking

with Ms. Hand, the social worker learned that Ms. Hand

was the mother of a friend of Mr. F. and had only met

Mr. F. on a few occasions. The department concluded

that Ms. Hand did not qualify as fictive kin because she

had never met the child. It also determined that an

expedited ICPC study could not be requested because

Ms. Hand did not have a biological relationship with

the child. Mr. F. did not agree with the department’s

decision not to consider Ms. Hand and stated that he

did not think it would be harmful to the child to change

her placement since she was so young. When the social

worker attempted to explain the impact of removals at

any age, Mr. F. became upset and ended the telephone

call. He nevertheless subsequently withdrew his motion

for an ICPC study for Ms. Hand.

Mr. F. also proposed his first cousin, Joshua [H.],

as a placement resource. Mr. [H.] is employed as a

firefighter in Hartford and also runs an electric business. The department assessed Mr. [H.] as a possible

placement resource for Emily. The social worker spoke

with him and then met with him with the foster mother,

who described the child and provided a summary of her

medical conditions and needs. Mr. [H.] and his mother

subsequently met with the foster mother and the child

for a two hour visit at the foster mother’s home, where

the foster mother took photographs of the child with

Mr. [H.] and his mother. After meeting with the child

and the foster mother, Mr. [H.] did not wish to remove

the child from her foster home and no longer wished

to be considered a placement option. The foster mother,

with the department’s approval, offered to meet Mr.

[H.] in Hartford to take the child to meet Mr. F.’s mother,
but Mr. [H.] never responded to that offer.

Mr. F. has not proposed other family members as

possible resources for the child. His mother is elderly

and unable to care for the child.

Mr. F. was provided with specific steps which

required, among other things, that he engage in substance abuse treatment and a mental health assessment

and treatment at the correctional facility. He did not

do so even when such services were available; he told

the social worker he did not think he needed the services. Since the onset of the pandemic, such services

by outside providers have been suspended and have

not been available to him. The social worker has called

Mr. F. on a monthly basis to discuss the child with him.

The social worker has not always been able to reach

him, in part because he has a job in the correctional

facility’s laundry and telephone calls have to be scheduled around his work hours. He has participated in

telephone calls when the social worker was able to

reach him, and more recently the corrections officer

who is his supervisor in the laundry provided an e-mail

address the social worker could use to send photographs of the child for him.

Mr. F. has expressed concern for the child and a

desire to be able to parent her or to have her placed

with his family. Although he has regularly asked about

her, he has never sent her a letter or card. The social

worker told him that the foster mother was making a

memory book for the child about her biological family,

including photos of the child’s maternal uncle and his

family and photos of Mr. [H.’s] visit with the child, but

Mr. F. never provided anything to the social worker to

be included. He told the social worker that it would be

difficult for him to write to the child because he would

not know what to say. Mr. F. has never met the child.

Although he inquired about visits with her, the department did not provide visits.

Mr. F. acknowledged that the foster mother has taken

good care of the child. He admitted that the date of his

release from prison is unknown, although he hopes that

it will be soon. He further admitted that when he is

released from prison, he will need to find housing and

employment and will have to engage in services recommended by the department. He nevertheless asks the

court to deny the petition to allow him time to be able

to care for the child himself or to have her placed with

his family.

III

THE PETITION FOR TERMINATION OF

PARENTAL RIGHTS

The court is mindful of what is at stake in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. ‘‘[T]he termination of

parental rights is defined . . . as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all
its rights and responsibilities, between the child and

his parent . . . . It is, accordingly, a most serious and

sensitive judicial action. . . . Although the severance

of the parent-child relationship may be required under

some circumstances, the United States Supreme Court

has repeatedly held that the interest of parents in their

children is a fundamental constitutional right that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Tresin J., 334 Conn. 314, 324–25,

222 A.3d 83 (2019). With due consideration for the serious nature of this action, the court has carefully considered the petition, all of the evidence presented, the

information in the court files judicially noticed in accordance with the standards required by law, and the arguments of the parties.

‘‘A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights

consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition.

. . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights [under General Statutes § 17a112 (j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the

trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.

. . . In the dispositional phase, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best

interest of the child.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Gianni C., 129 Conn. App.

227, 230, 19 A.3d 233 (2011). ‘‘The best interest determination also must be supported by clear and convincing

evidence.’’ Id., 230–31. Pursuant to Practice Book § 35a7 (a), ‘‘[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority

is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of

the petition or the latest amendment, except where the

judicial authority must consider subsequent events as

part of its determination as to the existence of a ground

for termination of parental rights.’’

In this case, the petition alleges two adjudicatory

grounds for termination of Mr. F.’s parental rights: abandonment and the absence of an ongoing parent-child

relationship. The elements of these adjudicatory

grounds are set out in § 17a-112 (j), which provides in

relevant part as follows: ‘‘The Superior Court, upon

notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and

45a-717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that

(1) the Department of Children and Families has made

reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify

the child with the parent in accordance with subsection

(a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this

proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to

benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a

hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or determines at

trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required,

(2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and
(3) (A) the child has been abandoned by the parent

in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a

reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility

as to the welfare of the child . . . [or] (D) there is

no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the

relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a

parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical,

emotional, moral and educational needs of the child

and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be

detrimental to the best interest of the child . . . .’’ That

is, in this case, to prove an adjudicatory ground, the

department must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to locate Mr. F.;

that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Mr. F. with

the child or that Mr. F. was unable or unwilling to

benefit from reunification efforts; and either that Mr.

F. abandoned the child, or that there is no ongoing

parent-child relationship, as those grounds are defined

in the statute and further explained by judicial decisions. If one or both of those adjudicatory grounds are

proved by clear and convincing evidence, the department must also prove, by clear and convincing evidence,

that termination is in the best interest of the child.

A

ADJUDICATORY FINDINGS

i

Reasonable Efforts

As stated [previously], in a proceeding on a petition

for termination of parental rights under § 17a-112 (j),

the court must first determine whether there is clear

and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the

parent and child, unless the court finds that the parent

was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification

efforts. ‘‘The word reasonable is the linchpin on which

the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor

the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature

or by the federal act from which the requirement was

drawn. . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 129 Conn.

App. 746, 767–68, 23 A.3d 18 (2011), aff’d, 306 Conn.

438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012). ‘‘[I]n determining whether the

department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a

parent and a child or whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit

from reunification efforts, the court is required in the

adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis

of events preceding the date on which the termination

petition was filed.’’ In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn. App. 42,

48, 887 A.2d 415 (2006). Because the amended petition
naming Mr. F. as the respondent father was filed on

September 12, 2019, the court must assess the department’s efforts on the basis of events before that date.

Clear and convincing evidence establishes that the

department made reasonable efforts to locate the

child’s father under the circumstances that existed

before the adjudicatory date. The mother left the hospital on the day of the child’s birth without providing any

information about the child’s paternity. The department

had difficulty locating the mother for a time. When the

mother did speak with department social workers, she

gave inconsistent information about the child’s possible

paternity, naming, at various times, Mr. S., Mr. F., and

a man whose name she did not know who lived in

Bristol. Mr. S. believed that he might be the father and

agreed to a paternity test, which subsequently excluded

him. The mother had not received prenatal care and

did not know the child’s true gestational age.

The social worker testified credibly that, when Ms.

M. first mentioned Mr. F. in October, 2018, Ms. M. mentioned his approximate age and said that he might be

in jail in Maine. The social worker conducted online

searches for him at that time, but without more information, she was unable to locate him. On July 7, 2019, an

anonymous caller informed the department’s Care Line

that her boyfriend, Mr. F., might be the father of Ms.

M.’s child. The caller provided sufficient information

about Mr. F.’s date of birth and possible location to

allow the social worker, with some ‘‘digging,’’ to locate

him in New Hampshire after speaking with jails in Maine

and in New Hampshire. The social worker spoke to Mr.

F. for the first time on July 26, 2019.

In light of the mother’s inconsistent statements about

the child’s possible paternity, her inability to provide

accurate information about Mr. F.’s date of birth or his

location, the existence of at least one other man who

could have been the father, and the uncertainty as to

when the child was conceived, the department’s efforts

to locate Mr. F. were reasonable under the circumstances. The social worker conducted online searches

for Mr. F. in October, 2018, but was unable to locate him

then. When the mother then identified other putative

fathers, the department followed up on those leads.

When the department received information that allowed

it to conduct a more focused search for Mr. F., the

social worker did so promptly, and she soon located

him in New Hampshire. She spoke with Mr. F. within

three weeks of receiving the information that allowed

her to find him.

As to reunification efforts, the termination petition

alleges both that the department made reasonable

efforts to reunify the father and the child, and in the

alternative, that the father was unable or unwilling to

benefit from reunification efforts. Either or both of

these allegations must be proved by clear and convinc-
ing evidence based on events prior to the adjudicatory

date of September 12, 2019.

As of the adjudicatory date, the department had made

no efforts to reunify Mr. F. with the child. It had only

recently located him and his paternity had not yet been

determined. See In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.

App. 49–50 (where coterminous petition was filed

before paternity was established, department failed to

make reasonable efforts to reunify parent and child by

adjudicatory date).

The court finds, however, that clear and convincing

evidence establishes that Mr. F. was unable or unwilling

to benefit from reunification efforts as of September

12, 2019. As of that date, Mr. F. was incarcerated in

New Hampshire on Maine state criminal charges, for

which he still had approximately nine months to serve.

He had been ordered detained on pending federal

charges when he completed his state sentence, and the

outcome of his federal charges was unknown as of the

adjudicatory date. The department could not refer him

for rehabilitative services in the community, such as

drug screening and treatment, mental health issues, and

parenting services. Although substance abuse and parenting services might have been available to him

through the correctional facility while he was incarcerated, at least initially he did not feel he needed any

services. At trial, he acknowledged that he would need

to participate in such services when he is released

from jail.

‘‘[T]he fact of incarceration, in and of itself, cannot

be the basis for a termination of parental rights. . . .

At the same time, a court properly may take into consideration the inevitable effects of incarceration on an

individual’s ability to assume his or her role as a parent.

. . . Extended incarceration severely hinders the

department’s ability to offer services and the parent’s

ability to make and demonstrate the changes that would

enable reunification of the family.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Tresin J., supra, 334 Conn. 325.

While imprisonment alone can never constitute abandonment, ‘‘[o]n the other hand, the inevitable restraints

imposed by incarceration do not in themselves excuse

a failure to make use of available though limited

resources for contact with a distant child.’’ In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155), 187 Conn. 431, 443,

446 A.2d 808 (1982).

Mr. F.’s incarceration in New Hampshire also hindered the department’s ability to offer visitation, especially in light of the fact that, as of the date the petition

was filed, Emily was a medically complex thirteen

month old child with severe respiratory issues that

required multiple treatments a day. Nor was telephonic

visitation feasible because Emily was not yet verbal.

Our courts have recognized that ‘‘[t]he logistics of

prison visits with young children, particularly to out-
of-state facilities, limit their feasibility.’’ In re Elvin G.,

310 Conn. 485, 515, 78 A.3d 797 (2013); see also In re

Luciano B., 129 Conn. App. 449, 461, 21 A.3d 858 (2011).

In sum, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department made reasonable efforts to

locate the father in light of all the circumstances. The

court also finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that

the father was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts as of the adjudicatory date and for the

foreseeable future.

The court now turns to the adjudicatory grounds

alleged in the petition.

ii

Abandonment

The first alleged adjudicatory ground is abandonment. As our courts have often stated, abandonment

‘‘occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not

display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child’s welfare. . . . Section 17a-112 [(j)

(3) (A)] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of

the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the

welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable

degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.

Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of

concern.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn. App. 819, 839–40, 863 A.2d 720, cert.

denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005).

There is clear and convincing evidence that as of the

adjudicatory date, September 12, 2019, Mr. F. had never

seen the child, provided financial support, attempted

to communicate with the child, shown an interest in

the child’s welfare, or requested visitation. There is not,

however, clear and convincing evidence that Mr. F.

knew he was the child’s father before that date. Ms. M.

had moved from Maine to Connecticut before the child’s

birth. Ms. M. expressed considerable uncertainty about

the child’s paternity. She told the department on one

occasion that Mr. F. might be the father, but on subsequent occasions she denied that he could be the father.

At least one other man—Mr. S.—believed that he (Mr.

S.) might be the father. Mr. F. himself made contradictory statements to the social worker as to whether he

knew that Ms. M. was pregnant or had given birth.

Sometimes he said that he had not spoken with her

since their relationship ended; sometimes he said he

had spoken with her in July, 2018, a few weeks before

the child’s birth, and she had not told him she was

pregnant; sometimes he said that he knew she had a

child but did not believe he was the child’s father. He

admitted she had tried to contact him after they broke

up but he had not returned her calls. The fact that a

girlfriend of his knew of the child’s birth and of his

prior relationship with Ms. M. suggests that he may
have known more than he admitted, but the evidence

is not clear and convincing. Because his paternity was

not established until after the adjudicatory date, the

court is not persuaded that his conduct before the adjudicatory date can fairly be held to constitute abandonment.

iii

Absence of An Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship

The department also alleged, as an adjudicatory

ground, that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Mr. F. and Emily. Pursuant to § 17a-112

(j) (3) (D), a court may terminate a parent’s parental

rights if ‘‘there is no ongoing parent-child relationship,

which means the relationship that ordinarily develops

as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis

the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs

of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the

child . . . .’’

In In re Tresin J., supra, 334 Conn. 323–33, our

Supreme Court provided a comprehensive summary of

its prior decisions concerning the adjudicatory ground

of no ongoing parent-child relationship and further

addressed the application of this ground to an incarcerated parent. It emphasized that this ground must not

be used to place ‘‘ ‘insurmountable burden[s]’ ’’ on noncustodial parents. Id., 326. It has explicitly rejected a

literal interpretation of the statute, holding that day-today absence alone is insufficient to support a finding

of no ongoing parent-child relationship. Id.

‘‘The lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship is a

no fault statutory ground for the termination of parental

rights.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 325. In

In re Tresin J., the Supreme Court reiterated that ‘‘the

ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship for the

termination of parental rights contemplates a situation

in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never

known his or her parents, so that no relationship has

ever developed between them, or has definitively lost

that relationship, so that despite its former existence it

has now been completely displaced. . . . The ultimate

question is whether the child has some present memories or feelings for the natural parent that are positive

in nature.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id.

To determine whether there is ‘‘ ‘no ongoing parentchild relationship,’ ’’ the court must engage in a two

step process. Id. ‘‘In the first step, a petitioner must

prove the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship

by clear and convincing evidence. In other words, the

petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence

that the child has no present memories or feelings for

the natural parent that are positive in nature. If the
petitioner is unable to prove a lack of an ongoing parentchild relationship by clear and convincing evidence, the

petition must be denied, and there is no need to proceed

to the second step of the inquiry. If, and only if, the

petitioner has proven a lack of an ongoing parent-child

relationship does the inquiry proceed to the second

step, whereby the petitioner must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that to allow further time for the

establishment or reestablishment of the relationship

would be contrary to the best interests of the child.

Only then may the court proceed to the disposition

phase.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 326–27.

‘‘There are two exceptions to the general rule that

the existence of an ongoing parent-child relationship

is determined by looking to the present feelings and

memories of the child toward the respondent parent.

The first exception . . . applies when the child is an

infant, and that exception changes the focus of the first

step of the inquiry. . . . [W]hen a child is virtually a

newborn infant whose present feelings can hardly be

discerned with any reasonable degree of confidence, it

makes no sense to inquire as to the infant’s feelings,

and the proper inquiry focuses on whether the parent

has positive feelings toward the child. . . . Under

those circumstances, it is appropriate to consider the

conduct of a respondent parent.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 327.

‘‘The second exception . . . applies when the petitioner has engaged in conduct that inevitably has led

to the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship

between the respondent parent and the child. This

exception precludes the petitioner from relying on the

lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship as a basis

for termination. Under these circumstances, even if neither the respondent parent nor the child has present

positive feelings for the other, and, even if the child

lacks any present memories of the respondent parent,

the petitioner is precluded from relying on [the lack

of an ongoing parent-child relationship] as a basis for

termination. . . . The interference inquiry properly

focuses not on the petitioner’s intent in engaging in

the conduct at issue, but on the consequences of that

conduct. In other words, the question is whether the

petitioner engaged in conduct that inevitably led to a

noncustodial parent’s lack of an ongoing parent-child

relationship. If the answer to that question is yes, the

petitioner will be precluded from relying on the ground

of no ongoing parent-child relationship as a basis for

termination regardless of the petitioner’s intent—or

not—to interfere.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 327–28.

Applying these principles to the case at hand, the

court finds that the department has proved, by clear

and convincing evidence, that the child has no positive

feelings for or memories of the respondent father.
Indeed, that fact is undisputed. She has never been in

his care. She has never met him or even seen him. She

would not recognize him if she were to see him now.

Although the father did not expressly raise the issue,

the court has considered whether the virtual infancy

exception applies in this case. The court concludes that

it does not. As stated [previously], the virtual infancy

exception applies when the child is ‘‘virtually a newborn

infant whose present feelings can hardly be discerned

with any reasonable degree of confidence . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 327. The child’s

age and ability to express her feelings is assessed as

of the time of the termination trial. See id., 329. ‘‘To

determine whether a petitioner has established the lack

of an ongoing parent-child relationship, the trial court

must be able to discern a child’s present feelings toward

or memories of a respondent parent. The virtual infancy

exception takes account of the particular problem that

is presented when a child is too young to be able to

articulate those present feelings and memories. . . .

The inability of the court to discern or to be presented

with evidence regarding a virtual infant’s present feelings drives the exception. That finding must be made

at the time of the termination hearing.’’ (Emphasis in

original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In this case, at the time of the termination hearing,

there was clear and convincing evidence the child was

not ‘‘virtually a newborn infant.’’ She was two and onehalf years old. There was clear and convincing evidence

that she is capable of expressing her feelings for the

people she regards as family. She refers to her foster

mother as ‘‘mommy,’’ her foster mother’s son as her

brother, and her foster mother’s parents as her ‘‘nana’’

and ‘‘papa.’’ She demonstrates affection and positive

feelings for her foster family. Letters from her speech

therapist, her physical therapist, her pediatrician, and

her Birth to Three developmental therapist all described

her trusting relationship with and attachment to her

foster mother, as did the testimony of the social worker.

Because it is undisputed that the child has no present

positive feelings for or memories of Mr. F., whom she

has never seen, and because there is clear and convincing evidence that the child’s present feelings about

parental figures can be discerned, the ‘‘virtual infancy’’

exception does not apply.

The court has also considered whether the ‘‘interference’’ exception applies either because the department

was unable to locate Mr. F. when he was first mentioned

as a possible father in October, 2018, or because the

child’s mother thereafter repeatedly said that Mr. F.

was not the father. The court has previously found that

the department’s efforts to locate Mr. F. were reasonable under the circumstances, and it now concludes

that the department’s inability to locate Mr. F. sooner

does not constitute ‘‘interference.’’ Nor can the mother’s
statements directing the department away from the

search for Mr. F. be considered as ‘‘interference’’ under

In re Tresin J. and the cases discussed therein. ‘‘Our

case law makes clear that the interference exception

is akin to the equitable doctrine of ‘clean hands’ and is

triggered only by the conduct of the petitioner rather

than that of a third party or some other external factor

that occasioned the separation.’’ In re Tresin J., supra,

334 Conn. 332. The clear and convincing evidence establishes that Mr. F.’s separation from the child is a result of

his own conduct, from refusing the mother’s telephone

calls after they broke up to engaging in criminal conduct

that resulted in his incarceration in New Hampshire.

The petitioner here—the department—did not cause

the separation that resulted in the lack of an ongoing

parent-child relationship, and the interference exception therefore does not apply.

The court is mindful that incarceration, in and of

itself, cannot be the basis for a termination of parental

rights, but the court may properly consider the effects

of incarceration on a parent’s ability to assume a parental role. See id., 325. As the Supreme Court recognized

in In re Tresin J. and earlier cases, ‘‘[e]xtended incarceration severely hinders the department’s ability to

offer services and the parent’s ability to make and demonstrate the changes that would enable reunification

of the family. . . . This is particularly the case when

a parent has been incarcerated for much or all of his

or her child’s life and, as a result, the normal parentchild bond that develops from regular contact instead

is weak or absent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id. The usual challenges to creating a parent-child relationship that result from incarceration were exacerbated in this case by the fact that Mr. F. was incarcerated out of state when the department located him and

has continued to be incarcerated out of state throughout

the entire time he has been a party to this case.

It is noteworthy, moreover, that the social worker

encouraged Mr. F. to begin to establish a relationship

with Emily by writing to her. He told the social worker

it was hard because he would not know what to say.

He chose not to provide Emily, through the social

worker, with even a note or a letter that might tell her

something about himself and how he felt about her. He

did not ask for the social worker’s help in getting mail

to Emily or in thinking about what he might say to her.

In sum, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists

between Mr. F. and Emily, and no exception to this

statutory ground applies.

The court now must determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether ‘‘to allow further time for the

establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child

relationship would be detrimental to the best interest

of the child.’’ General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (D). The
Supreme Court has construed this language to mean

the time needed ‘‘for the [respondent] to meet ‘on a

day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and

educational needs’ ’’ of the child. In re Juvenile Appeal

(Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 646, 436 A.2d 290 (1980).

Among the factors to be considered in deciding whether

it would be detrimental to Emily’s best interest to allow

further time to develop a parent-child relationship with

her father are the length of stay in her foster home, the

nature of her relationship with her foster parent, the

degree of contact maintained with the natural parent,

and the nature of her relationship to her natural parent.

See In re Savanna M., 55 Conn. App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d

484 (1999).

Our Supreme Court and our Appellate Court have

‘‘noted consistently the importance of permanency in

children’s lives. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous),

[supra, 181 Conn. 646] (removing child from foster

home or further delaying permanency would be inconsistent with his best interest); In re Victoria B., 79

Conn. App. 245, 263, 829 A.2d 855 (2003) (trial court’s

findings were not clearly erroneous where much of

child’s short life had been spent in custody [of commissioner] and child needed stability and permanency in

her life); In re Teshea D., [9 Conn. App. 490, 493–94,

519 A.2d 1232 (1987)] (child’s need for permanency in

her life lends added support to the court’s finding that

her best interest warranted termination of the respondent’s parental rights). Virtually all experts, from many

different professional disciplines, agree that children

need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 494, 940 A.2d 733 (2008).

There is clear and convincing evidence that to allow

further time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship with Mr. F. would be highly detrimental to the

best interest of the child. Emily is now two years and

eight months old, and she has been in the department’s

care since she was ten days old. She has been in the

same foster home for her entire life; it is the only home

she has ever known. Emily is medically complex and

developmentally delayed, and her pediatrician has

advised the department and her foster mother that she

is likely to experience significant challenges when she

is school aged. She is shy and sometimes fearful of

strangers, and Mr. F. is a stranger to her. Her physical

therapist and her speech therapist have stated that her

sense of safety and security with a trusted caregiver

has been instrumental in the progress she has made in

overcoming feeding difficulties, motor weakness, and

speech delays, and that continuity in her care is essential. The developmental therapist who worked with her

in the Birth to Three program stated that her mental

health would be ‘‘negatively compromised and potentially irreparable’’ if she were to be removed from the

consistent and positive environment in which she is
placed.

Whether Mr. F. is released from incarceration in April,

2021, as he hopes, or at some unknown time between

April, 2021, and 2023, as is possible based on his Guideline range, he will not be ready to assume a parental

role in Emily’s life for a substantial period of time after

his release. As he admitted at trial, when he is released,

he will need to obtain housing and a legal income and

engage in services to which DCF can refer him. That

is only the beginning. Given his criminal history, consisting of numerous convictions and lengthy periods of

incarceration since 1992, he would need to demonstrate

that he can avoid further criminal activity and incarceration. It is by no means assured that he will succeed.

He would also need considerable education concerning

child development generally and Emily’s many special

needs in particular. To allow such further time for the

establishment of a parent-child relationship would

indefinitely delay the permanency that is critical to Emily’s continued development and well-being. The department has proved, by clear and convincing evidence,

that it would be detrimental to Emily’s best interest to

allow further time for the establishment of a parentchild relationship with Mr. F.

B

DISPOSITIONAL FINDINGS

The court has found, by clear and convincing evidence, that an adjudicatory ground for termination

exists because there was no ongoing parent-child relationship as defined by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (D) and to allow

further time for the development of such a relationship

would be detrimental to the child’s best interest. The

court must now determine whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that it is in the child’s best

interest to terminate Mr. F.’s parental rights.

‘‘The best interests of the child include the child’s

interests in sustained growth, development, well-being,

and continuity and stability of its environment. . . . In

the dispositional phase of a termination of parental

rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether

it is established by clear and convincing evidence that

the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is

not in the best interest of the child.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Anthony H., 104 Conn. App. 744,

764, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920,

943 A.2d 1100 (2008).

In deciding whether continuation of the parental

rights of Mr. F. is in the child’s best interest, the court

has considered the importance and value of the child’s

genetic bond with her biological father. See In re

Savanna M., supra, 55 Conn. App. 816 (‘‘the genetic

bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child,

although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). The court has also considered the child’s need for sustained stability and

continuity in her environment. ‘‘Our appellate courts

have recognized that long-term stability is critical to a

child’s future health and development . . . . Because

of the psychological effects of prolonged termination

proceedings on young children, time is of the essence

in custody cases.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Anthony H., supra, 104 Conn.

App. 767.

Pursuant to § 17a-112 (k), except where termination

is based upon consent, the court is required to make

findings as to seven factors. The seven factors set forth

in § 17a-112 (k) ‘‘serve simply as guidelines to the court

and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be

proven before termination can be ordered.’’In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn. App. 96, 104, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied,

255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000). As to Mr. F., the

court makes the following findings as required by § 17a112 (k).

§ 17a-112 (k) (1)

The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered,

provided, and made available to the parent and the

child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child

with the parent

Mr. F. has been incarcerated in New Hampshire since

the department located him in July, 2019. The department was therefore unable to refer him to services

in the community. The department discussed services

available to him in the correctional facility, including

substance abuse, mental health, and parenting programs, and recommended that he engage in those programs. Those programs, however, were suspended during the pandemic.

§ 17a-112 (k) (2)

[W]hether the Department of Children and Families

has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act

of 1997, as amended from time to time

After Mr. F.’s paternity was established, the department made reasonable efforts under the circumstances

presented to reunite the family pursuant to the federal

Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. The social

worker contacted him on a monthly basis to provide

information about the child, provided photographs of

the child to him, assessed his cousin as a placement

resource for the child, advised the father to participate

in programs to the extent they were available in the

correctional facility, and encouraged him to send letters

about himself to be shared with the child. His incarceration in New Hampshire made it impossible to refer him

for services in the community. His out-of-state incarceration, Emily’s young age and fragile health, and the

subsequent emergence of a pandemic precluded the
provision of visits.

§ 17a-112 (k) (3)

[T]he terms of any applicable court order entered

into and agreed upon by any individual or agency

and the parent, and the extent to which all parties

have fulfilled their obligations under such order

The court ordered specific steps for the department

and Mr. F. to facilitate reunification. The department

complied with its obligations to the extent that it was

possible to do so. Mr. F.’s specific steps, and his compliance or lack of compliance with them, were as follows:

• Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)’s attorney and/

or guardian ad litem.

Mr. F. has been incarcerated in New Hampshire

throughout the entire time he has been known to the

department. He has cooperated with telephone calls

from the department.

• Let DCF, your attorney, and the attorney for the

child(ren) know where you and the child are at all

time.

Mr. F. has been incarcerated in New Hampshire since

the steps were ordered.

• Take part in counseling and make progress toward

the identified treatment goals: Parenting, Individual,

Family. The identified goals are: (1) Create and maintain safe, stable and nurturing home environment free

from domestic violence/substance abuse/criminal

activity. (2) Learn triggers for substance abuse and

alternate coping mechanisms. (3) Understand impact

of substance abuse on children. (4) Learn and demonstrate age appropriate parenting skills in the areas of

supervision, discipline and developmental expectations. (5) Understand danger that criminal activity

presents to children. (6) Develop and implement

appropriate coping mechanisms to safely address

stressors of parenting. (7) Create and maintain nurturing relationship with Emily. (8) Address mental

health needs in individual counseling in order to

maintain emotion stability and be a stable resource

for Emily.

Mr. F. has not complied with this step. He remains

incarcerated and, before the onset of the pandemic,

had not engaged in any services that were available to

him at Strafford County Corrections in the areas of

substance abuse, mental health, or parenting. The availability of such programs was curtailed after the pandemic began.

• Submit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow

the recommendations about treatment, including

inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse
prevention.

Mr. F. has not engaged in substance abuse programming.

• Submit to random drug testing; the time and

method of the testing will be up to DCF to decide.

Mr. F. has not been referred for drug testing because

he is incarcerated.

• Not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine.

Mr. F. denies use of illegal drugs, alcohol, or medicine

as he is currently incarcerated.

• Cooperate with service providers recommended

for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home

support services and/or substance abuse assessment/

treatment: Substance abuse treatment at correctional

facility; Mental health assessment and treatment at

correctional facility.

Mr. F. has not engaged in substance abuse or mental

health services, which the correctional facility suspended as a result of the pandemic.

• Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing.

No evaluations or testing have been ordered by the

court since the steps were ordered.

• Sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with

service providers to check on your attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use

in future proceedings with this court. Sign the release

within 30 days.

Mr. F. has not been asked to sign any releases of

information.

• Sign releases allowing your child’s attorney and

guardian to review your child’s medical, psychological, psychiatric and/or educational records.

No releases were needed because Emily is committed

to the department’s care.

• Get or maintain adequate housing and a legal

income.

Mr. F. is incarcerated and has a job in the correctional

facility. He does not have adequate housing or a legal

income outside the correctional facility.

• Immediately let DCF know about any changes in the

make-up of the household to make sure that the change

does not hurt the health and safety of the child(ren).

This step did not apply to Mr. F. because he was

incarcerated throughout the proceeding.

• Not get involved with the criminal justice system.

Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole

officer and follow your conditions of probation or
parole.

Mr. F. was incarcerated throughout this proceeding.

His federal criminal charges remain pending. There was

no evidence of new involvement in criminal activity

since the steps were ordered.

• Visit the child(ren) as often as DCF permits.

The department did not provide visits for Mr. F., who

was incarcerated in New Hampshire throughout his

involvement in this proceeding.

• Within thirty (30) days of this order, and at any

time after that, tell DCF in writing the name, address,

family relationship and birth date of any person(s)

who you would like the department to investigate and

consider as a placement resource for the child(ren).

Mr. F. complied with this step. He first proposed

an acquaintance in Maine, then proposed a cousin in

Hartford as a placement resource.

Having considered the parties’ compliance with the

specific steps, the court now addresses the remaining

factors under § 17a-112 (k).

§ 17a-112 (k) (4)

[T]he feelings and emotional ties of the child with

respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such

child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least

one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties

Emily has never met Mr. F. and has no emotional

ties with him. He has never provided any physical care

for her. Despite encouragement from the social worker,

Mr. F. did not attempt to communicate with Emily by

writing letters or cards or having family members provide her with information about him.

Emily has been in the same foster home for two and

one-half years, since her discharge from the hospital

after her birth. She has been observed by social workers, speech and physical therapists, developmental therapists and her pediatrician to be deeply attached to her

foster mother. She calls her foster mother ‘‘mommy’’

and goes to her for comfort when she is upset. The

foster mother is willing to adopt Emily if she becomes

available for adoption.

§ 17a-112 (k) (5)

[T]he age of the child

Emily was born on August 5, 2018. She was two and

one-half years old as of the date of the termination trial.

She is now two years and eight months old.

§ 17a-112 (k) (6)

[T]he efforts the parent has made to adjust such

parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the best interest of the child to return such

child home in the foreseeable future, including, but

not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has

maintained contact with the child as part of an effort

to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court

may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of

regular contact or communication with the guardian

or other custodian of the child.

Since his paternity was adjudicated, Mr. F. has spoken monthly with the social worker. He has proposed

placement resources and has asked about Emily’s wellbeing. He has not written to Emily or tried to communicate with her foster parent through the department.

Although he inquired about the possibility of visits, he

did not move to have visits ordered.

§ 17a-112 (k) (7)

[T]he extent to which a parent has been prevented

from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the

child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other

parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other

person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

Mr. F. has not been prevented from maintaining a

meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or

the unreasonable act of any other person or by his

economic circumstances of the parent. He refused telephone contact with Ms. M. after their relationship

ended. It was his own criminal activity that led to his

incarceration and made him unavailable to develop and

maintain a relationship with Emily.

The court has carefully considered the seven factors

required by § 17a-112 (k) as well as all evidence concerning Emily’s best interests in relation to the continuation of Mr. F.’s parental rights. Mr. F. has testified as

to his love and concern for his daughter. Our courts

have recognized, however, that love and a biological

bond is not enough. See In re Ashley S., 61 Conn. App.

658, 667, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769

A.2d 61 (2001). A parent must also be able to provide

a safe, stable environment. As a result of his criminal

conduct, Mr. F. has never been available to provide a

home of any kind for Emily, and it is highly unlikely

that he will be able to provide a safe, stable environment

within any time that is reasonable in light of Emily’s

needs.

A parent must also be able to recognize and meet

his child’s developmental needs. It was clear from the

evidence that Mr. F. has a limited understanding of

the needs of young children generally and of Emily’s

specific physical, medical, and emotional needs. At the

outset of his involvement in the case, he did not think

it would cause any problems to move Emily to the home

of a stranger in Maine because she was so young. He
became upset with and hung up on the social worker

when she attempted to explain the trauma experienced

by children with changes in placement. Even at the time

of trial, he continued to believe that Emily should be

placed with his family rather than with the foster

mother, who he acknowledged had provided excellent

care. He persisted in this belief even though he had not

identified any family member who was willing and able

to care for her.

Emily needs a caregiver who is capable of nurturing

her, monitoring and attending to her many medical conditions, assisting her in addressing the developmental

challenges she currently faces and those she will face

as she enters school, and ensuring that she receives

the services she will need to continue to develop and

grow. Mr. F. is not currently capable of providing such

nurture, and it is not foreseeable that he will be able

to do so within a reasonable time.

The court has also considered Emily’s need for permanence and stability. Mr. F. will have many challenges

upon his release from prison, including but not limited

to finding legal employment and avoiding further criminal activity. It is not in Emily’s best interest to wait for

an indefinite but undoubtedly protracted period of time

to see if Mr. F. can overcome those challenges.

Considering all the evidence presented, the court

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that continuation of Mr. F.’s parental rights is not in Emily’s best

interest, and that termination of Mr. F.’s parental rights

is in Emily’s best interest.

IV

CONCLUSION AND ORDERS AS TO THE

TERMINATION PETITION

In sum, for all the reasons stated [previously], the

court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, a statutory ground exists for the termination of Mr. F.’s parental rights. More specifically, the court finds, by clear

and convincing evidence, that the department made

reasonable efforts to locate Mr. F., that Mr. F. was

unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts,

that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship as

defined by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (D), and that to allow further

time for the establishment of such a relationship would

be detrimental to the best interest of the child. The

court also finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that

termination of Mr. F.’s parental rights is in Emily’s best

interest. Accordingly, the petition for termination of

parental rights is granted. Judgment is entered terminating the parental rights of Mr. F. as to Emily, and the

Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed as Emily’s statutory parent. The department shall file, within thirty days, a report as to the

status of the child and shall also timely file any additional reports that are required by law.
V

PERMANENCY PLAN

On April 6, 2020, after the petition for termination of

parental rights had been filed, the petitioner moved for

review of a permanency plan for Emily. By objection

dated April 15, 2020, Mr. F. opposed the proposed plan.3

The contested motion was consolidated for trial with

the termination of parental rights petition.

The proposed permanency plan is termination of the

father’s parental rights and adoption. The motion for

review is governed by General Statutes § 46b-129 (k)

and Practice Book § 35a-14. Under each provision, the

commissioner has the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the proposed permanency plan is in the child’s best interests. Under the

statute, at a permanency plan hearing, ‘‘the court shall

approve a permanency plan that is in the best interests

of the child or youth and takes into consideration the

child’s or youth’s need for permanency. The child’s or

youth’s health and safety shall be of paramount concern

in formulating such plan.’’ General Statutes § 46b-129

(k) (2). Practice Book § 35a-14 (d) makes clear that

review of a permanency plan is a dispositional question,

based on the prior adjudication of neglect. The court

must also find that the department has made reasonable

efforts to achieve the existing permanency plan. See

General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (4) (F); see also Practice

Book § 35a-14 (d). The prior plan, filed May 16, 2019,

and approved by the court, Lobo, J., on June 26, 2019,

was for termination of parental rights and adoption.

For the reasons discussed [previously] in consideration of the petition for termination of the parental

rights of Mr. F., the court finds that the proposed permanency plan of termination of the parental rights of Mr.

F. and adoption is in Emily’s best interest. The court

further finds that the department has made reasonable

efforts to achieve the most recent permanency plan.

Mr. F.’s objection to the proposed permanency plan is

overruled. The motion for review of the permanency

plan is granted, and the permanency plan is approved.

The clerk shall establish dates for the department to

file the next permanency plan and for hearing on the

plan and notify the parties thereof.

So ordered.

* Affirmed. In re Emily S., 210 Conn. App. , A.3d (2022).

In accordance with General Statutes § 46b-124 (b) and Practice Book

§ 32a-7, the names of the parties to this case are not to be disclosed. The

records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons

having a proper interest therein and only upon order of the Superior Court.

1 Where a child’s paternity is not known at the time of an adjudication of

neglect, the subsequent entry of the father into the proceeding does not

invalidate the previous adjudication of neglect. See In re Zoey H., 183 Conn.

App. 327, 352–53, 192 A.3d 522 (respondent’s later appearance in case did

not change historical fact that child was neglected at time of adjudication),

cert. denied, 330 Conn. 906, 192 A.3d 426 (2018). Mr. F.’s entry into the

ongoing neglect case allowed him to be provided with specific steps and
to participate in any dispositional issues that arose. ‘‘[A]n adjudication of

neglect relates to the status of the child and is not necessarily premised on

parental fault. A finding that the child is neglected is different from finding

who is responsible for the child’s condition of neglect. Although [General

Statutes] § 46b-129 requires both parents to be named in the petition, the

adjudication of neglect is not a judgment that runs against a person or

persons so named in the petition; [i]t is not directed at them as parents,

but rather is a finding that the children are neglected . . . .’’ (Emphasis in

original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re T.K., 105 Conn. App. 502,

505–506, 939 A.2d 9, cert. denied, 286 Conn. 914, 945 A.2d 976 (2008). At

the trial in this matter, no party raised any issue with respect to the neglect

adjudication, and the court therefore does not need to address it in this decision.

2 A Level 3 classification of a child with complex medical needs is defined

by the department’s practice guide, in relevant part, to mean ‘‘a child with

a chronic condition that is not well-controlled or which requires daily or

regular intensive medical follow-up or treatment, including severe forms of

chronic disease such as . . . severe persistent asthma which requires intensive and ongoing medical follow-up or has required an acute hospitalization

or [pediatric intensive care unit] admission in the past six months.’’ Department of Children and Families, ‘‘Health Care Standards and Practice for

Children and Youth in Care,’’ Children with Complex Medical Needs, p. 86,

available on the department’s website at https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/DCF/

Policy/BPGuides/21-5PG-HEALTH-CARE-STANDARDS-AND-PRACTICEFOR-YOUTH-IN-CARE-PRACTICE-GUIDE.pdf (last visited on April 21,

2021).

3 Because of the temporary closure of the New Britain juvenile clerk’s

office at the outset of the pandemic, the objection was not stamped as

received until June 1, 2020. Under the circumstances, the objection was

timely.