[Cite as State v. Reddick, 2023-Ohio-765.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- vs -

BREYONA R. REDDICK,

Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO. 2022-P-0039

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas

Trial Court No. 2020 CR 00292

O P I N I O N

Decided: March 13, 2023

Judgment: Affirmed

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant 

Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Mallorie Thomas, Patituce & Associates, LLC, 16855 Foltz Industrial Parkway, 

Strongsville, OH 44149 (For Defendant-Appellant).

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Breyona R. Reddick (“Ms. Reddick”), appeals from the judgment 

of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, which sentenced her to an indefinite term 

of imprisonment of ten to 15 years after accepting her guilty plea to one count of 

involuntary manslaughter. Ms. Reddick’s conviction arose from the death of her newborn 

son, whom she delivered in a bathroom at Hiram College in Portage County. 

{¶2} Ms. Reddick raises one assignment of error on appeal, contending that the 

state committed plain error when it violated the terms of her plea agreement by making 

“comments” at her sentencing hearing, which impacted the outcome of her sentence. 
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{¶3} After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find Ms. Reddick’s 

assignment of error to be without merit. Quite simply, Ms. Reddick has not carried her 

burden of demonstrating that the sole error identified in her appeal occurred and that it 

must be corrected to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. A review of the plea 

agreement and transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings reveals the state abided 

by the terms of the parties’ agreement that both sides would make their sentencing 

arguments but that the state would remain silent as to recommending any term of years. 

It was agreed that the term of years would be left to the discretion of the judge, and the 

judge imposed one year less than the maximum penalty.

{¶4} The judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Substantive and Procedural Facts

{¶5} In March 2020, a Portage County grand jury indicted Ms. Reddick on one 

count of aggravated murder, an unclassified felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.01 and R.C. 

2929.02; three counts of murder, unclassified felonies, in violation of R.C. 2903.02 and 

R.C. 2929.02; felonious assault, a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.11; 

endangering children, a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2919.22; tampering 

with evidence, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2921.12; and gross abuse of a 

corpse, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2927.01(B). 

{¶6} Ms. Reddick filed a “Motion to Suppress” any evidence of a “Lung Float 

Test” or “Hydrostatic Lung Test” (a test used by medical examiners as part of the autopsy 

protocol to determine whether the infant was alive at birth), asserting that the test 

performed on the victim by the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office is 

inadmissible pursuant to Evid.R. 702 and the holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Ms. 
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Reddick asserted the prevailing opinion in the medical and scientific community is that 

the test is not a scientifically reliable test.

{¶7} An evidentiary hearing was held at which Todd M. Barr (“Dr. Barr”), a 

forensic pathologist and deputy medical examiner at the Cuyahoga County Medical 

Examiner’s office, testified for the state of Ohio. Dr. Barr performed the autopsy on the 

victim. John C. Hunsaker, III, a semi-retired professor at the University of Kentucky and 

forensic consultant in the specialty of forensic pathology, testified for Ms. Reddick. While 

Dr. Hunsaker described the controversy surrounding the use of this test, he testified that 

he would “probably” use the test as part of his procedure in such a case and that he was 

not aware of any medical examiner’s office prohibiting the use of this test. The trial court 

overruled the motion, ruling the testimony of Dr. Barr would be admitted.

{¶8} Ms. Reddick ultimately entered into a plea agreement with the state, in 

which she agreed to plead guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter, a first-degree 

felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A) and (C). In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss 

the balance of the indictment. The plea agreement further provided for a “PSI [presentence investigation], with victim impact statement” and that “[p]arties free to argue, 

Judge to decide sentence and disposition”. 

{¶9} At the plea hearing, the following discussion occurred between the state 

and defense counsel before the court. 

{¶10} The prosecutor began by explaining that he was authorized to offer “an 

amendment to count one of the indictment from its current charge of aggravated murder 

to a charge of involuntary manslaughter, a felony of the first degree, in violation of Section 

2903.04(A) and (C) is the penalty section, with the agreement that we would allow a PSI 

to be done, put off the sentencing hearing until both sides were ready for a sentencing 
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hearing and Probation had done a full presentence investigative report, would not object 

to bond continuing the same, allowing Ms. Reddick to remain out to participate in her PSI 

preparation. 

{¶11} “I represented to them that the State would not be picking or asking the 

court for any specific amount of time. We would not come up and say X or Y or Z. We 

would allow the PSI to go forward, all the information to come forward, the background 

information, the defense to make its argument and the State to make its argument and 

the State was going to leave sentencing up to you, Judge Doherty, after you’ve heard 

from all sides.

{¶12} “ * * *

{¶13} “[Defense counsel]: I just want it to be clear, when the written plea of guilty 

states the parties are free to argue, at least it’s my understanding that the State of Ohio, 

I guess for lack of a better term, is not going to argue for any particular sentence.

{¶14} “[The state]: No, we are going to leave it to the court. As I said, we may 

make statements about the gravity of the situation and the loss, both for the child and for 

Breyona. This is a horribly, horribly tragic and sad case, but I will not be asking for a 

prison term. I will not be stating four years, six years, three years, whatever. I don’t do 

that in this court normally unless we have a joint sentencing recommendation and I wasn’t 

authorized to do a joint sentencing recommendation by Mr. Vigluicci. I will really truly be 

leaving it up to the court. I’m not going to remain silent. I have some things I want to say, 

to place into the record, but they will not be an amount of time or anything like that.”

{¶15} After engaging Ms. Reddick in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the court accepted 

Ms. Reddick’s plea of guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter and referred the 

matter for a PSI, setting the sentencing hearing for a later date. 
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{¶16} At the sentencing hearing, the state argued to the court: 

{¶17} “As the court’s aware, [Ms. Reddick] entered a plea of guilty to involuntary 

manslaughter. There is not a mandatory, under the Ohio sentencing guidelines, a 

mandatory prison term. It is a presumption under the statute so that leaves that to the 

discretion of this court. We agreed at the time, as part of our Criminal Rule 11(F) 

negotiations, to allow the victim impact statement to be made, to allow the defense to 

present all of its mitigating circumstances and to leave disposition sentencing to you.”

{¶18} The state further remarked on the sadness of this case, Ms. Reddick’s 

status as an adult, and the seriousness of her crime and asked the court to “fashion a 

disposition that it finds appropriate for the involuntary manslaughter charge that [Ms. 

Reddick] pled to at the Criminal Rule (F) negotiations.”

{¶19} After defense counsel and Ms. Reddick spoke on her behalf, the court 

sentenced Ms. Reddick to an indefinite term of imprisonment of ten years to 15 years.

{¶20} Ms. Reddick raises one assignment of error for our review:

{¶21} “The State committed plain error when it violated the terms of Appellant’s 

plea by making comments as to Appellant’s sentence at her sentencing hearing which 

was an obvious error that impacted the outcome of her sentencing hearing.”

Plea Agreement

{¶22} In her sole assignment of error, Ms. Reddick contends the state violated her 

plea agreement by making comments as to her sentence at the sentencing hearing, which 

was an obvious error that impacted the outcome of her sentencing hearing. More 

specifically, she contends the state asked the trial court on numerous occasions to hold 

Ms. Reddick “accountable” and implied a term of incarceration is appropriate.
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{¶23} A plea agreement constitutes a contract between the state and a criminal

defendant and is subject to the general law of contracts. State v. Watkins, 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-15-1213, 2016-Ohio-5756, ¶ 8. Thus, if one side violates a term of the plea

agreement, the other party has a right to pursue appropriate remedies, including

rescission of the agreement. Id.

{¶24} Notably, Ms. Reddick failed to object at sentencing and concedes she has

waived all but plain error. See id. at ¶ 9; State v. Montgomery, 4th Dist. Adams No.

07CA858, 2008-Ohio-4753, ¶ 15-16; State v. Dudas, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2006-L-267 &

2006-L-268, 2007-Ohio-6739, ¶ 51-54. “‘Plain error does not exist unless, but for the

error, the outcome of the criminal proceedings would clearly have been different.’” 

Watkins at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Ferreira, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-06-1282, 2007-Ohio-4902,

¶ 11. A reviewing court should notice plain error only if the error seriously affects the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio

St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). 

{¶25} Our review of the record reveals the state abided by its agreement at the 

sentencing hearing and argued exactly what it promised at the plea hearing. As the 

prosecutor stated at the plea hearing, “I’m not going to remain silent. I have some things 

I want to say, to place into the record, but they will not be an amount of time or anything 

like that.” The state was clear that both sides would argue and that it would not 

recommend a term of imprisonment. 

{¶26} Quite simply, this is not a case where the state agreed to remain silent or 

where the prosecutor failed to make a recommendation. See, e.g., Watkins at ¶ 16 

(prosecutor breached plea agreement to remain “mute” by providing disparaging 

information at sentencing); State v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23156, 2009-Ohio-
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6585, ¶ 31 (state disregarded prior agreement by failing to make agreed recommendation 

and emphasizing defendant’s criminal history and harm caused to his victim). Rather, the 

state fulfilled the terms of the parties’ agreement that explicitly stated both parties would 

argue, which includes making “comments.” See, e.g., State v. Kocak, 2016-Ohio-8483, 

79 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 35 (7th Dist.) (state did not breach plea agreement by merely stating 

facts and stood silent as per the parties’ agreement that the state would not argue 

concurrent versus consecutive sentencing). 

{¶27} Ms. Reddick has not carried her burden of demonstrating that an error, plain 

or otherwise, has occurred that should be corrected to prevent a manifest miscarriage of 

justice. As the Supreme Court of Ohio explained in Barnes, there must be (1) an error, 

or deviation from a legal rule (2) that is plain (an obvious defect in the trial proceedings) 

(3) that must have affected substantial rights, and (4) that should only be corrected “‘with 

the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest 

miscarriage.’” Id. at 27, quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), 

paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶28} Ms. Reddick’s sole assignment of error is without merit.

{¶29} The judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.