NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0041n.06 No. 08-5155 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
United States of Am eric a, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. Br ian Se an M c Cl e ndon, Defendan t-Appellant, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE WE S TERN D ISTR

IC T OF K

EN TU CKY

BEFORE: MERRITT, MOORE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
M ERR I TT , C ir c ui t J udge. Brian M c Cle nd on ha d p re vio us ly

wo rk e d at a

Wal -M a rt

in L ouisvill e, Ke ntucky . McClendon was c onvicted for offe nses related t o his role in the robbe ry of

an a rm or e d c a r gua

rd a t th e Wal -M a rt sto re a nd a su bs e qu e nt dr

ugc on sp ir a c y

fu nd e d b y the fr uit s of that robbe ry . He a

ppeals his conviction and sentenc e on g rounds of insufficient evidenc e and the
un re a so na

ble ne ss o f h is s e nte nc e in a dd iti on to c e rt a in t

ri a l e rro rs. We f

ind a ll o f h is a

rgume nts without merit and AF FI RM his conviction and sentence

. I. F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND On Marc h 2 0, 20 06 , an a rm e d g ua rd e mpl oy e d by AT Sy ste ms wa s le a vin g a Wal -M a rt

in L ou isv ill e , K e ntu c ky , w he n h e wa s r ob be d at g un po int by tw o me n. Pol ic e arr e ste d th re e me n in
connec tion with the robbery : Bria n McClendon, Marc us Capers a nd Marc Hill. Both Hill and Caper sNo. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-2- cooper ated with police a

nd claimed that Mc Clendon was the mastermind behind the robber y . The te sti mony of Hi ll a nd Ca pe rs – in c on ne c tio n w it h su rveill a nc e fo ota g e and ph on e re c or ds – constituted the majority of proof offe red ag ainst McClendon. At trial, Caper s and Hill testified as to their roles in the robbe ry . They pro v i d ed m u ch of the infor mation about the planning and execution of the robbe ry

and drugconspirac y . Their testimony taken togethe r allege s the following events. Mc Cle nd on wa s the fi rs t to su g g e st ro bb ing the Wal -M a rt , an d McC le nd on de te rm ine d a ll of the de tails of t h e robber y including the best date a nd time. Capers a

nd McClendon alone w ent to the Wal-Mart on March 13, 2006, alleg edly for the pur

pose of r obbing it on that date . Howeve r, McClendon ca lled off the r obbery afte r wa iting for

the ar mored g uard to a

rrive. H e cla imed that he did not feel rig ht about it and that they would return at another time. McClendon believe d that they neede d a third party to he lp. Consequently , when Mc Clendon saw Hill at the Wal-Mar t day s befor e the ro bb e ry , h e a tte mpt e d to c on vin c e Hi ll “ to d o s ome thi ngfo r h im, ” bu t di d n ot at th a t ti me e xpla in that he wa s rec ruiting H ill to help rob the Wal-Mart. The plan was for Mc Clendon to enter the store first to serve as a look-out a nd inform Caper s and Hill – who wer e to wait outside the store – whe n to enter. The men wer e to communicate via ce ll phone. On Marc h 20, 2006, Capers a nd McClendon, ar

riving in s ep ar at e ca rs , m et Hil l at a g as statio n n e ar t

he Wal -M a rt . Ca

pe rs wa s d

ri vin g his g ir lf

ri e nd ’s c a r, a nd

he sw itc he d th e c a r’ s li c e ns e plate wi th a

sto le n li c e ns e pla

te . A t th is t ime , Ca

pe rs info rm ed Hill of

the ro bb e ry

pla n. Hi ll testified that he initially

expressed re l u ct an ce t o participate but later a g ree d afte r urg ing f rom McClendon. Capers and Hill then drove Capers’ g irlfriend’ s car to the W al-Mar t and waited at theNo. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-3- side of the store , while McClendon drove separ ately to the Wal-Mart. The me n all waited f or two to t hr e e ho ur s f

or the a rm or e d car t o a

rr ive . Ca pe rs te sti fi e d th a t he ha d tw o c e ll p ho ne s w ithhim that day and that he a

nd Hill com m u n i ca t ed b y phone with McClendon throug hout this waiting period. Up on

se e ingthe a rm or e d c a r p ull int o th e re sta ur a nt p a rk ing lot a dja c e nt to t he Wal -M a rt , Mc Cle nd on

c a lle d Cap e rs a nd

Hi ll t o in fo rm

the m th a t th e arm or e d c a r w a s a bo ut t o a rr ive a t Wa lMart
. On c e the a rm or e d c a r a rr ive d, Mc Cle nd on e nte re d the Wal -M a rt sto re a nd c on tin ue d to ta lk to C a pe rs on the ph on e . H e inf or me d th e m th a t th e y

sh ou ld g e t out of

the c a r a nd wa it at th e Wal

Mart sh op pin g c a rt

c hu te
. Wal -M a rt e mpl oy e e Ki rb y B re we r te sti fi e d to no tic ingCa pe rs a nd Hi ll befor e the r obbery

standing outside the ca

rt chute. Br ewe r also noti ced that Capers wa s talking on the phone dur ing this time. Duri ngthi s per iod , Edw a rd B e ll, the a rm or e d car g ua rd , en te re d the Wal -M a rt a nd we nt i nto the c a shof

fi c e of the sto re . H e ma de his de liv e ry and pic ke d u

p s e ve ra l ba g s o f c a shand c he c ks

. Stil l on the ph on e wi th C a

pe rs , M c Cle nd on inf

or me d him that the g ua

rd wa s c omi ng ou t of the c a sh office . There afte r, Caper s and Hill entere d the s tore by running throug h the store’ s car t chute and
ro bb e d B e ll at g un

po int . Ca pe rs te sti fi e d th a t pr ior

to t he ro bb e ry

he p lac ed hi s cell p ho ne in h is pocket, but did not hang up on McClendon. Caper s stated that McClendon wa s still on the phone line during the en t i re ro b b er y . After flee ing the store, Cape rs informed Mc Clendon that they had made it ac ross the stree t and wer e en r oute to the F o rd p l an t , the g roup’s pre arr ang ed mee ting l o c a t i o nf o r a f t e r t h e r o b b e r

y. M c C l e n d o n r e m a i n e d i n t h e s t o r e f

o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h e r o b b e r

y. Following the completion of the r obbery , he purc hased some shirts a nd pants and lef

t the store.No. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-4- Capers a nd Hill drove to the F ord plant to meet McClendon. The pair discarde d the clothes they wore during the robbe ry , moved the cash into a new bag , discarde d all of the c hecks, a nd took the stolen license plate off the car . McClendon ar rived shortly

there afte r, and the three men drove i nM c C l e n d o n ’ s c a r

t o a l o c a l m a l l w h e r e M c C l e n d o n g a v e t h e o t h e r t w o m e n m o n e y t o b u y a chang e of clothes. After leaving the m all, the t hree went back t o McClendon’s house and counted the c a sh . Ca

pe rs re c a lle d th e c ount b e ing$4 2, 00 0, wh ile Hi ll te sti fi e d that the y c ounte d $4 0, 00 0 in cash. Capers te stified that afte r the robbe ry , he and Mc Clendon and McClendon’s g irlfriend Stac y drove to Toledo, O hio, and Detroit, Michig an, whe re the y purcha sed one kilog ram of c ocaine and twenty pounds of marijuan a with t he money from the r obbery . He a sserted that this had been McClendon’s intention all along , so that they might incr ea s e t h eir ga in from the robbe ry . After

arr iv in g in to D e tr o it , M c Cl e n d o n d ir e c te d Ca p e r s to dr iv e to a

s p e c if ic h o u s e , a n d

M c Cle ndon
e nte re d th e ho us e . Ca

pe rs te sti fi e d th a t Mc Cle nd on c a me ou t of the ho us e wi th co c a ine wr a pp e d in

a lum inum f

oil . Ca pe rs a lso state d th a t w hen th ey ret ur ne d to L ou isv ill e , h e no tic e d a bo ut t hir ty pounds of marijuana

in the car

. Capers believed that McClendon must have place d the marijuana in the car while Caper s was asle ep at their motel. There afte r, police c onducted a n investigation, which eventua lly led to the ar

rest of Cape rs
and Hi ll o n M a rc h 2 3, 20 06
. Ca pe rs a nd Hi ll c ho se to c oo pe rate wi th p oli c e a nd pr ov ide d d e ta ils of the robbe ry . Police corr oborate d Capers a nd Hill’s information with Wal-Mart video surve illance footag e and phone rec ords. For instance , p o l i ce believed that a per son inside the store must have

a le rt e d Cap e rs a nd Hi ll as to the mos t oppo rt un e mom e nt to en te r an d rob the g ua rd . O nly c e rt a inNo. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-5- place s in th e s to r e p r o v id e d th e v a n ta g e p o in t n e c e s s a r y to s e e th e g u a r d

. I ma g e s from the surveillance tape r evea led that McClendon wa s in the store with a va ntag e point wher e he could se e the g uard. Additionally , ever

y surveillance imag e of Mc Clendon showed him talking on a ce ll phone. Police took these imag es in conjunction with Capers’ cell phone rec ords, which showed that sixt een phone ca lls were ma de betwe en Cape rs’ 619-0720 number a nd a 767-0496 numbe r. The r ecor ds for these phone s showed that ther e we re c alls made be tween the phones immediately befor e, duringand afte r the robbe ry . Capers te stified that 767-0496 wa s the phone number that McClendon was using on the date of

the robbe ry . The 767-0496 number was listed in the name of Ange lia Musulin, but she told police that she ha d never purcha sed a phone with this num ber. Musulin stated that she kne w M cC lendon, had wor

ked with him, and had be en a ba by sitter for his childre n a fe w times. Poli ce also relied on le tters s ent from McClendon t o Ang elia Musulin to tie McClendon t o this phone. The letters urg ed Musulin to claim that she owned the cell phone numbe r 767-0496. De te c tiv e L a rr

y Dunc a n a

rr e ste d M c Cle nd on

on Au g us t 22 , 20 06 , p ur su a nt t o a n a rr e st
war rant. De tective Dunc an re ad McClendon his rig hts and then t ra n s p o rt ed him to poli ce headqua rters. Mc Clendon waived his rig hts and was interrog ated by Dunca n and F BI Special Ag ent Gr e g Ah le rs . Af

te r be ing c on fr on te d with the surv e ill a nc e ima g e s, he a dmi tte d to bei ng in t he Wal

Mart that day , but he denied be ing invo l v ed i n t h e robbery . He c laimed all phone c alls betwee n himself and Cape rs conc erne d a trip to Detroit that the pa ir planned on taking. McClendon admitted to d ri vin g wi th C a

pe rs to D e tr oit , a

nd on c e the re , p ur c ha sin g on e ki lo gram of c oc a ine and

tw e nty pounds of marijuana

.No. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-6- A fe de ra l gr a nd jur

y c ha rg e d McC le nd on

wi th t he fo llo wi ngfi ve of

fe ns e s: i nte rf

e re nc e wi th interstate c ommerce by

threats or violence relate d to an attempted r obbery of Wal-Mart on Ma

rch 13, 2006, in violation of the Hobbs Act codified in 18 U.S.C. § 951(a) ( “attempted r obbery char g e”) ; using a nd car rying a firea rm during the attempted r obbery char g e, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (1)( A); interf

ere nce w i t h i n t er s t ate c ommerce by threats or violence r elated to the c ompleted robber y of Wal-Mart on Ma

rch 20, 2006, in violation o f t h e Hobbs Act codif ied in 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (“c ompleted robbe ry char g e”) ; aiding a

nd abetting the us ing, car rying, or brandishing of

a fi re arm duri ngc omp le te d r ob be ry c ha rg e , in vio la tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 4 (c )( 1) (A ); c on sp ir ingto possess with intent to dis tribute 500 or m ore gr ams of coc aine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 84 1( b) (1 )( B ) ( i i ) ( “ dr

ugc on sp ir a c y

c ha rg e ” ); and tw o f or fe iture c ounts . A ft e r a

tr ia l on the se c ha rg e s, a jury convicted McClendon of t he completed robber y char g e and the drug c onspiracy char g e and acquitted him of a ll other cha rg es. The D i s t ri ct C o urt sentenc ed McClendon to 240 months of imprisonment on the completed robbe ry char g e and 360 months of i m p ri sonment for the dr ug
c on sp ir a c y

c ha rg e , w iththe te rm s o f i mpr isonm ent to r un c on c ur re ntl y . T he Di str ic t Co ur t a lso enter ed a r estitution order ag ainst McClendon, jointly and seve rally

with Capers a

nd Hi l l , i n the amount of $76,068.65. McClendon timely appea led. After the initial appellate br iefing in this case, McClendon obtaine d new counsel who moved to strike his origina l brief. This req uest was de nied, but this Court provided McClendon’s new
counse l the opportunity

to supplement McClendon’s orig inal brief. B oth McClendon and the Gover nment have sinc e filed suppleme ntal briefs f or this Court’s consi deration. This opini on addre sses all claims made f rom both the orig inal and supplementa l briefs.No. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-7- II. AN AL YSI S 1. Sufficiency of

the Evidence McClendon claims that his conviction s we re based on insuffic ient evidenc e. This Court revie ws the suffic iency of t he evidence to support a conviction by viewing the evidence in the light most favora

ble to the prosec ution and deter mining whe ther “ anyrational trie r o f fa ct could have found t he essential elements of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 44 3 U .S. 307, 319 (1979). Whil e “more than just a scintilla” of evide nce is re quired to sustain a c onviction, circ umstanti al ev i dence alone is suffic ient. See Un ite d S tat es v . S he rli n , 6 7 F .3 d 1 20 8, 12 14 (6 th Cir . 1 99 5) ; se e als o United States v. Vince nt , 20 F.3d 229, 233 ( 6th Cir. 1994). McClendon’s burden “ is very

heavy beca use the re viewing court doe s not judge the cr edibility of witnesses or weig h evidenc e, and it dra ws all rea sonable inferenc es i n the gover nments’s favor .” United States

v. Os trander , 411 F.3d 684, 691 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Furthe r, “ th e u n c o r r o b o r a te d te s ti mo ny

of an
acc omplice m ay support a convic tion under fe dera l law.” Sh e rli n , 6 7 F. 3 d at 1 2 1 4 (q u o t i n g United Sta te s v . G all o , 763 F.2d 1504, 1518 ( 6th Cir. 1985), cert. de nied , 475 U.S. 1017 (1986)). The Robb ery C harge The ju ry convicted McClendon of a violation of the H obbs Act for his participation in the robber y . The Gove rnment must prove two e lements to preva il on a Hobbs Act c harg e: “( 1) interfe renc e with interstate c ommerce (2) in the course of a substantive criminal ac t.” Ostrander , 411 F.3d at 691. First, robbinga business satisfies the f irst element of the Hobbs cha rg e, so long as there is an eff

ect on inter state commer ce. Id

. A national cor poration such a s Wal-Mart has a n eff ect on interstate c ommerce . Second, the statute na mes ro b b ery

as a substantive c riminal act, thusNo. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-8- satisfying the second element of the Hobbs cha rg e. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)

. Statements made by Ca pe rs and Hi ll imp lic a tin g Mc Cle nd on in t he ro bb e ry

wo uld a lon e be su ff

ic ie nt t o s up po rt

his conviction. B ut their testimony is further c orrobor ated by circ umstantial evidence such as the phone
re c or ds , th e Wal -M a rt

surv e ill a nc e vid e o, and

the le tte rs Mc Cle nd on sen t to An g e lia Mu su lin
encour ag ing he r to lie for him. McClendon takes issue w ith the cre dibilit y of Caper s and Hil l, but we must ordinarily defe r to the cre dibilit y deter

minations made by the jury wher e there is conflicting testimony

. See U nited States v. Je

fferson , 14 9 F .3 d 44 4, 44 5 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 8) . T he same is t ru e c on c e rn ingthe c re dib ili ty of Da nielle Smith, C aper s’ gi rl fr i end, who testified at trial to incriminating statements made by McClendon conc erningthe robbe ry . F ina lly , M c Cle nd on

c on te nd s th a t th e p ro se c uti on pr e se nte d n o e vid e nc e tyinghim to t he c e ll phone re cords in question. B oth Capers a nd Hill testified at trial that this was the phone numbe r that they used to communicate with McClendon both prior to a nd during the robbe ry . Fur ther, this was the number that McClendon asked A ng elia Musulin to claim as her ow n. McClendon had no r eason to r equest this of Musulin if he had no conne ction to that phone number. I n sum, there wa s sufficient evidenc e for

a rational jury

to convict McClendon of the robber y . The Drug Conspi racy C harge Th e jur y c on vic te d Mc Cle nd on

fo r c on sp ir ingto p os se ss w ithint e nt t o d istri bu te 50 0 g ra ms
or mor e of c oc a ine . M c Cle nd on ’s pr ima ry a rgume nt r e g a rd inghis dr ug c on vic tio n is th a t Ca

pe rs ’ testimony alone is not sufficie nt evidence to uphold his conviction. As noted above, the
uncorr oborate d testimony of C apers is enoug h to support McClendon’s conviction. In addition,No. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-9- Mc Cle nd on

him se lf a dmi tte d in his po st- a rr e st i nte rv ie w t o tr a ve lin g to D e tr oit to p ur c ha se dr

ug s. Given the e vidence prese nted ag ainst McClendon, a rational jur o r could have found the e ssential elements of the drug conspirac y char g e beyond a re asonable doubt. 2. Reasonableness of the Sent ence McClendon next arg ues that his sentenc e was unrea sonable pointing both to the amount of
re sti tut ion

a nd the te rm of imp ri so nme nt i mpo se d. Th is C ourt re vie ws a

se nte nc e fo r b oth substantive and proc edura l rea sonablene ss under a n abuse- of-discr eti on standard. Gall v. United States , 5 52 U. S. 3 8, 51 (2 00 7) . L ike wi se , th e a mou nt o f r e sti tut ion

is e va luate d und e r t

his same standard. United States v. J ohnson , 440 F.3d 832, 849 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Cr im ina l Hi st or y W e igh e d Too He av ily First, McClendon a

rg ues that his sentenc e wa s substantively unrea sonable be cause the imposit ion of a 360 month sentenc e for the d ru g conspirac y

char g e conf

licts with the sentencing mandate of

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

. A s entenc e is substantively unrea sonable “ when the district c ourt selec ts a sentenc e ar

bitrarily , bases the se ntence on impermissible factor s, fails to consider r eleva nt sentenc ing f

actor s, or g ives an unre asonable amount of we ight to any pertinent fa ctor.” United States v. Conatser , 514 F.3d 508, 519- 20 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. de nied – U.S
. – , 1 2 9 S
. C t
. 4 50 (2008). There is a presumption of rea sonablene ss w hen a se ntence falls within the g uidelines rang e. United States v. W

illiams , 436 F.3d 7 0 6 , 7 08 (6th Cir. 2006). McClendon contends that his sentence violates the purpose s of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) be cause the District Court alleg edly g ave g reater we ight to his prior criminal history t h an any other fa ctor unde r the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (ar ticulating f

actor s that District Court should weig h when sentenc ing a defe ndant). He asser ts thatNo. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-10- the District Court considere d his criminal history four times whe n calc ulating his Guide lines rang e: “first wi t h the incre ased statutory rang e, sec ond with the car eer offe nder f

inding, third with the increased car eer offe nder offe nse level of 37 beca use the maxi mum se ntence for th e i n cre ased statutory rang e wa s life, and f

ourth with the incre ase of t h e criminal history

cate g ory to VI .” (Supplemental B r. of Appe llant at 29.)(e mphasis in origina l). B ut, Mc Cle nd on a lso a dmi ts that hi s 360-month sentence is permissible under the G uidelines. Fu rt h er , each of the e nhance ments that McClendon complains about a re pe rmissible under the Guide lines. Having revie wed the pr esent e n c e r e p o r t on w hich the District Court re lied and the se ntencing he ari ngtr ans cri pt, w e fi nd tha t th e se nte nc e re nd e re d a g a ins t Mc Cle nd on wa s su bs tanti ve ly
rea sonable. Th e Di str ic t Co ur t e mph a size d M c Cle nd on ’s c ri min a l hi sto ry , bu t a lso re lie d h e a vil y on the seriousne ss of the cr ime and the “ need to pr otect the public and promote respe ct for the la w.” (Tra nscript of Sentenc ing Hea ring at 28.) The District Court e valuated and weig hted the § 3553(a ) fa c tor s a pp ro pr ia te ly

wh e n s e nte nc ingMc Cle nd on, and thu s, his se nte nc e is n ot s ub sta nti ve ly
unrea sonable. Am ount of Restit ution McClendon next contends that his sentence was unre asonable beca use the D i strict Court improperly

calc ulated the r estitution order imposed ag ainst him. Whil e thi s Court normally revie ws
a re stitut ion order under an abuse of discretion standa rd, McClendon did not object to the amount of re stitut ion at sentenc ing. T here fore , we r eview the District Court’s order for pl ain er

ror. McClendon seizes upon the fa ct that more tha n twenty -three thousand of the restitution amount was derive d from che cks.No. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

Th e re c or d is un c le a r a s to the $. 50 dis pa ri ty be tw e e n the su m of

the c a sha nd

c he c k amou

nts 1 and the r estitution assessed. -11- Wal -M a rt re pr e se ntativ e Rob e rt Mang old te sti fi e d th a t Wa l- Ma

rt ’s los s w a s $ 52 ,1 49 .1 3 in
c a shand $2 3, 91 9. 02 in c he c ks fo r a tota l of $76 ,0 85 .6 5. Mc Cle nd on a rgue s th a t it

wa s p ro c e dura lly 1

un re a so na

ble fo r t he Di str ic t Court to c a lc ulate re sti tut ion ba se d on the a mou nt of the c he c ks be c a

us e the g ov e rnme nt p re se nte d n o e vid e nc e a s to wh e the r t he c he c ks we re e nd or se d to or by Wal -M a rt , whether the che cks we re use d by McClendon or a

nother p ar t y , o r whether any of the money
ass o c iate d w it

h th e c h e c k s w a s r e c o v e r e d b y Wa l- M a rt. H e a ls o n o te s th a t Ca p e r s a n d Hill each te sti fi e d that th e bo un ty

re c e ive d f

ro m th e ro bb e ry

wa s a pp ro xima te ly

$4 0, 00 0. F or

su pp or t, McClendon di rec ts us to United States v. Dunn , 300 F. App' x 336 (6th Cir. 2008), wher e this court str uc k do wn a se nte nc e wh ic h imp e rm iss ibl y inc lud e d int e re st wh e n c a lc ulatin g los s to the vic tim fo r s e nte nc ingg uid e lin e s p ur po se s. Th is iss ue is dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om Dunn beca

use it involves a fa ctual dispute over the amount of loss to the victim, not a procedur al deter mi n at ion of loss calculation as in Dunn . Ba sed on Wal-Mart’s re cords a

nd Mang old’s testimony that the “p i ckup deposit re port” indicated that $23,919.02 in chec ks had bee n stolen from the g uard, the District Court did not plainly err in finding that am o u n t h ad bee n lost by Wal-Mart in addition to the cash. The $40,000 bounty alleg ed by Capers a nd Hill wa s signific antly less than the ca sh amount alone a nd was thus prope rly

ignor ed by the Court in calculating the f ull amount for re stitut ion. 3. Motion to Su

ppress McClendon’s St

atem ent to PoliceNo. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-12- McClendon c la im s th a

t h is p o s t- a

r r e s t s ta te me n ts w e r e in

v o lu n ta r y b e cause Detec tive Dunca n
c oe rc e d h im i nto ma

kin g the m. H e a rgue s th a t th e Di str ic t Cour t er re d by re fu sin g to s up pr e ss t

he se statements. McClendon argues that the total time of the questioning in conjunction with promises of leniency rende r the statements involuntary

. Promises of leniency may be coe rcive when c oupled with threats of imprisonment or prose cution. See W illiams v. W

ithrow , 944 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 19 91 ); see also United States v . Johnson , 351 F.3d 254, 261-62 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that “promise s o f leniency

may be coe rcive if they

are broken or

illusory .”) McClendon was in police
cu s to dy f o r s ix h o u r s a n d qu e s ti o n e d f o r tw o o f th o s e h o u r s . H e d id n o t c o n s u me f o o d or drink during that time, but the r ec o rd re fl ec t s that he neve r re quested a ny . Detec tive Dunca

n informed Mc Cle nd on

of his Miranda rig hts at the time of arr est. L ater , McClendon sig ned a wa ive r o f r ig hts fo rm a ft e r r e a din g the ri g hts ou t lo ud . M c Cle nd on ma de the fo llo wi ngstate me nt at the e nd of his int e rr og a tio n: Um, Iwould like to add the fa ct that, uh, Mr. Duncan has been truthful to me fr om the beg inning

... Um , a lso Iwa nt t o a dd the fa c t th a t th is i nv e stigatio n w a s to my satisfac tion. I t-I t ...it’s not, I was not for ced to tell any thing. I was not f

orce d to say any thing. I was not coe rce d to nothing; neve r did I take a brea k – a 15-minut e bre ak to o v e r - th ink

th in g s . We ’ v e ta lk e d

s tr a ig h t t

h r o u g h th is

. U m, I ’ m n o t g o n na maintain a innocence or a guilt rig ht now because that would just be stupid. But at the same tim e I just want to thank....on t he record, I just want to thank Mr. Dunc an and his partne r uh, for

the re spect that they ’ve shown me . Thank y ou. (Gove rnment’s Response to De f.’s Moti o n t o Suppress Statement at 5-6.) Moreove r, the re cord evidenc e does not support a conclusion that the District Court cle arly err ed in finding that “ther e wa s no promise of lenie ncy .” Supplemental Hr ’g T r. Vo l

. 2 at 173. Reviewingthe totality of theNo. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-13- circ umstances, we conclude that McClendon’s stateme nts were voluntarily g iven, and the District Court did not err whe n ref using to suppre ss them. 4. Exclusion of Private Inve stigator from the Cou rtroom Mc Cle nd on ne xt a rgue s tha t the Di str ic t Cour t abu se d its disc re tio n by e xclu din g his pr ivate inv e sti g a tor

fr om t he c ourt ro om d ur ingthe tr ia l. F e de ra l Ru le of Ev ide nc e 61 5 a llo ws a

c ourt to exclude witnesses from the courtroom “so t hat t hey cannot hear the testimony of other w itnesses.” Fe d. R. E v i d

. 6 1 5
. I n addition to ex empting a party from beingsequester ed, this rule does not authorize exclusion of “a pe rson whose pr ese n ce i s s h o wn by a par ty to be essential to the prese ntation of the par

ty ’s ca use.” F ed. Rule Evid. 615(3). Af te r t he Di str ic t Co ur

t in stitut e d “ the ru le ” a nd se qu e ste re d a ll w itn e sse s f or the tr ia l, Mc Cle nd on

a sk e d the Court fo r le a ve to a llo w h is i nv e sti g a tor to b e e xemp te d a

nd a llo we d to re ma in in t he c ourt ro om. Mc Cle nd on ’s c ouns e l in fo rm e d th e Court that th e inv e sti g a tor wa s n ot a n e xpe rt , but instead was pr oviding impeachment and backg round i nformation. Following ref lection on the iss ue , th e Di str ic t Co ur

t de nie d this re qu e st, ins te a d c ho os ingto p ro vid e Mc Cle nd on ’s c ouns e l w ith fr e qu e nt b re a ks to d isc us s th e c a se wi th t he invest ig a tor

a nd a llo w the inv e sti g a tor

to o bta in transcr ipts from the other witnesses. McClendon claims that these modifications were insuff icient be c a us e the in ves ti g a tor

int e rv ie we d s e ve ra l g ov e rn me nt w itn e sse s and c ou ld p ro vid e imm e diate insight to their cr oss-examinations if allowed to rema in in the courtroom. We find that the District Court ’s mod if

ic a tio ns a llo we d M c Cle nd on ’s inv e sti g a tor to part ic ipate sig nif ic a ntl y in h is d e fe ns e and that the investig ator’s pr esence wa s n ot “essential.” Th e se fr e qu e nt b re a ks pr ov ide d ampl e opportunity

for the pr ivate investig ator to assist McClendon’s counsel. Additionally , the Court g aveNo. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-14- the inv e sti g a tor ma te ri a ls, su c h a s a c c e ss to t he tr a ns c ri pts of

wi tne ss t e sti mony , th a t a llo we d h im to aid defe nse counse l in the i mpeac hment of witnesses a nd strateg ic def

ense pla nning. T he District Court acted a

ppropriate ly within its discretion. The de cision to ex clude the pr ivate investig ator, a nd ins te a d p ro vid e oth e r m od if ic a tio ns , d id n ot p re

jud ic e Mc Cle nd on ’s ri g ht t o a fa ir tr ia l. 5. Court ’s Response to Jury Question Finally , McClendon claims that the District Court er red by failing to properly

respond to a jury question. During deliberations, the jury submitt ed a question as to who had been identified as having the telephone number ending in 7086. McClendon claims that the District Court re sponded by making a “g ener al re fer ence to the previous instruction that the jury rely upon its recollec tion of the te sti mony .” (A

pp e lla nt’ s Sup ple me nta l B r. a t 25 .) Ac c or din g to Mc Cle nd on , thi s re sp on se did not satisfy

the Court’s obligation to resolve jury questions “with concr ete a ccur acy .” Bollenbach v

. United States , 326 U. S. 6 07 , 6 12 -1 3 ( 19 46 ); United States v. Nunez , 889 F.2d 1564, 1568 ( 6th Cir. 1989). Howeve r, the c ited “ c o n c r e te acc urac y ” languag e conc erns que stions of law, Nunez , 889 F.2d at 1569, wher eas this ca se involves a q u es t i o n of fa ct. When the jury submits a factua l question, in str uc tin g the jur

y to r e ly on its ow n r e c oll e c tio n o f t he te sti mony

is p ro pe r a

nd “ c a re fu lly prese rve[s] t he provinc e of the jury while minimiz ing a

ny prejudice t o the def

ense or the p ro s ecution.” United States v. Blanks , No. 91-6084, 1992 WL120205, at *2 (6th Cir. J une 2, 19 92 )( pe r c ur iam) ; Se e als o R am on e z v . B e rg hu is , 490 F.3d 482, 489 n. 7 (6th Cir. 2007). Moreover , McClen d o n notes that Dete ctive Dunc an “ha d testified at trial that he did not know whose phone number e nded in 7086.” ( App el lant’s Supplemental B r. at 25.) T hus, the answe r to the jury ’sNo. 08-5155

U.S. v. M cClendon

-15- qu e s t i o nw a s a

p p a r e n t l y n o tc o n t a i n e d

i n t h e r e c o r d , m a k i n g i tu n c l e a r w h a te l s e t h e C o u rtc o u ld h a v e t o l d t h e j u r y. V. CO NC LU SION The judg ment of the District Court is aff irmed.