1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r:

____

____ ____ ___ 3 Fi lin g D at e: January

10, 201 7 4 N O. 33, 852 5 KEN NET H M. RO BEY 6 Plaintif

f-A ppellee /Cross-A ppellant , 7 v. 8 LLOY D G . P AR

NEL L, 9 De fend ant-A ppellant/Cross-A ppellee . 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF BER NA LILLO C OUN TY 11 D en ise Ba re la S he ph er d, D ist ri ctJu dg e 12 Ynt em a Law Fi rm

P.A. 13 He ssel E. Yntem a, III 14 Albuquerque, N M 15 fo r Appe lle e/ Cr oss Appe llant 16 Lakins LawFirm , P .C. 17 Ch ar le s N

. L ak ins 18 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 19 for Appellant/Cross Appellee18 T he te rm “ bio fo uli ng” is def

ine d as “ the gr ad

ua l ac cu m

ula tio n of w at er bor ne 1 19 or ganis m s ( as ba ct er iaa nd p ro toz oa ) on th e sur fa ce s of e ngi ne er ing str

uc tur es in 20 wa ter that contributes to corrosion of the structures and to a decre ase in the eff iciency 1 OPIN ION 2 HAN ISEE, Judge. 3 { 1} Th e d i s t r i c t c o u rte n t e r e daju d g men ti n f a v o r o f P l a i n t i f f , Ke n n e t h M

. R o b e y, 4 in his action for breach of contract against Defe ndant, Lloy d G. Par nell, af ter a bench 5 t ri al . De fe n d an tap p ea l s , r ai s i n g s i x i s s u es . Pl ai n t i ff cr o s s -ap p ea l s t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 6 dis m iss al of

his cl ai m s fo r unf

ai r an d unc onsc ion ab le tr ad e pr ac tic es . W e re j ec t the 7 argum ents of both part ies, e xcept as to the district court’ s award of consequential 8 da m ag es to Pl ai nti ff

in the a m ount

of $2, 500. W e re ve rs e as to tha t am ount of 9 da m ag es on ly andaffi rm th e jud gm en t i n a ll ot he r res pe ct s. 10 BACKGRO UND 11 { 2} Plaintiff ow ns a far m in Lem itar, Ne w Mexico. After nearly fifty y ears of use, 12 the irrigation well on Plaintiff’ s property stopp ed producin g water and he contacted 13 De fendant about desig ning and constructing a re placem ent well. De fendant provided 14 Pl ai nt iff

wit h two es ti m at es : an in it ia l writ te n e st im at e an d, af te r so m e d is cu ss io n, a 15 fi na l w ri tte n e sti m at e. T he la tte r es tim at e ind ic at ed the w el l wo uld be 120 fe et de ep , 16 an d w oul d inc lud e, am ong oth er thi ngs, an an nul ar se al ins ta lle d to pr ote ct

the w el l 1 7 f r o m b i o f o u l i n g a n d o t h e r c o n t a m i n a n t s . T h e r e p l a c e m e n t w e l l w a s a n t i c i p a t e d to

117 of

m ovi ng p ar

ts. ” Me rr ia m

–W eb ste r D ic tio nary , htt

p:/ /w w w . m er

ri am -w eb ste r. co m 18 /d ic ti on ary/bi of

ou li ng (la st vi si te d o n No v. 1 1, 2 01 6)

. 2 1 cost $37 ,876.64. P rior to co n s t ru ction, Plaintiff a sked Defe ndant for a w ritten 2 contract, but Defe ndant to ld Plaintiff that “ he didn’t do business that way ,” and they 3 co ul d pr oc e e d ba se d ont he e st i m a t e , the i r v e r ba l a gr e e m e nt , a nd

ah a nd sh ake. 4 Pl ai nti ff

a gr ee d. P la int if

f’ s un de rs tandi ng o f the a gr ee m en t, a s to ld t o hi m by 5 D ef en dant, w as that D ef

en dant w oul d c onstru ct

aw el l tha t w oul d be f

ull y a de qua te 6 fo r P l a i n t i f

f ’ s i rr i g a t i o n p u r

p o s e s , t h a t i t w o u l d b e c ap ab l e o f p r o du c i n g 2, 500 to 7 3 ,0 0 0 g al l o n s o f w at erp erm i n u t e, an dt h at i two u l dl as tat l ea s tas l o n g as Pl ai n t i ff ’s 8 pr ior w el l, appr oxi m at el y

f if ty y ears . 9 { 3} In Septem

ber 2007 De fendant com

pleted work on the we ll. The final invoice 10 D ef en dant subm itt ed to Pl ai nti ff tot al ed $37 , 334. 04. T he inv oic e ind ic at ed the w el l 11 w as not

120 but 115 fe et de ep , an d in cl ude d an a dde d it em —ac onc re te pa d— but

did 12 not inc lud e ana nnul ar

se al

. D ef en dant tol d Pl ai nti ff tha t the sha llo w er de pthw oul d 13 “ not m ak e an y

dif fe re nc e[ , ] ” an d th at

the c onc re te pa d w as r equir ed by the sta te a nd 14 w oul d se rv e the f

unc tio n of

a n annul ar se al , w hic h w as unn ec es sary . T he abse nc e of 15 ana nnul ar se al w as co ntr ar y to D ef en dant’ s ve rb al r ep re se nta tio n r eg ar din g th e w el l 16 Pl ai nti ff

und er sto od w oul d be c onstru ct ed

.3

1 { 4} Plaintiff w as initially satisfied with the w ell, but b y March 2011, three- and-a2 ha lf y ears a ft er

it s c om ple tio n, the w el l f

ai le d to pr oduc e anythi ng b ut a sur ge of 3 se dim en t- fi lle d w at er be fo re it be gan suck ing a ir

. P la int if f co nta ct ed

D ef en dant a bout 4 the well’ s failure and Defe ndant recom m ended the well be c leaned out. But in order 5 fo r the w el l t o be c le an ed out , the c onc re te pa d f

ir st h ad to be r em ove d. Pl ai nti ff

a ga in 6 discuss ed the annular seal w ith Defe ndant, who told Plaintiff t hat an annular seal w as 7 not required when Plaintiff’ s well w as constructed but th at he could add one, 8 althoug h it really

wa s not necessary . F ollowing th e w ell’ s clean-out, its perf orm ance 9 did no t im

prove. 10 { 5} Af

ter som e further

unprodu ctive co mm

u n ications with Def

endant, Plaintiff 11 fi le d su it in Augus t 20 11. A t the be nc h tr ia l, P la int if f te sti fi ed tha t i nst ea d of

be ing 12 120 fe et

de ep a s de sc ri be d inthe e sti m at e, or 115 f ee t de ep as de sc ri be d inthe 13 inv oic e, the w el l w as le ss than 105 fe et de ep . A ddi tio na lly , P la int if f te sti fi ed that he 14 dis co ve re d th at

the c onc re te pa d was no t r equir ed by the state , a nd tha t i t w as his 15 be lie f tha t the pa d w as ac tua lly use d to co nc ea l the fa ct tha t an annul ar se al ha d no t 16 be enins tall ed as pr om ise d. P la int if f’ s e xpe rt te sti fi ed to num er ous iss ue s w iththe 17 w el l, inc lud ing D ef

en dant’ s f

ai lur e to i nst al l the a nnul ar se al de sc ri bed inthe 18 es tim at e, ac om

pone nt Pl ai nti ff

’ s expe rt ex pla ine d w as r equir ed by state r eg ula tio n. 19 Pl ai nti ff

’ s e xpe rt f urthe r te sti fi ed tha t the w el l w as not c onstru ct ed

to a w orkm an lik e4

1 s t a n d a r d , a n du l t i mat e l y c o n c l u d e dt h a tt h e f a i l u r e o f t h e we l l wa s c au s e db y a 2 num be r of f ac tor s, inc lud ing D ef

en dant’ s ne gli ge nt d es igna nd c onstru ct iona nd 3 bio fo uli ng a ttr ibu ta

ble to D ef en dant’ s f ai lur e to i nst al l the a nnul ar se al or sanit iz e his 4 too ls and m at er ia ls. D ef en dant’ s e xpe rt

dis put ed the c au se of

the bio fo uli ng an d th e 5 failure of the well. In D efendant ’s ex pert’ s view, the biofouli ng of the well w as 6 ca use d by na tur al ly oc curr ing ba ct er ia , a nd c oul d ha ve beenpr ev en te d th ro ugh 7 routine m aintenance, which w as the responsibi lity of the w ell owner. 8 { 6} A ft er a thr ee -d ay be nc h tr ia l, the dis tr ic t co urt en te re d it s f ind ing s of

f ac t and 9 conclusio ns of law. Cre ditin g Pl ai n tiff’ s testim ony , the district court found that 10 D ef en dant told Pl ai nti ff the ne w w el l wo uld la st at le as t as long as the old one , or f or 11 ab out f if ty y ears , a nd c onc lud ed

that, as a m atte r of law , thi s st at em en t am ount ed to 1 2 an ex p re s s wa rr an t y. Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt fu rt h erco n cl u d ed , b as ed o n t h e P l ai n t i ff ’s 1 3 ex pe rt ’ s t e s t i m o n y , t h a t D e f e n d a n t f a i l e d t o d e s i g n an d c o n s t r u c t t h e w e l l in a 1 4 w or km a n l i k e m a n n e r w i t h t h e o r d i n a ry

s k i l l o f t h o s e w h o u n d e rt a k e s u c h w o rk

. 15 A ddi tio na lly , ba se d onthe es tim at e pr ovi de d by D ef en dant, Pl ai nti ff

’ s te sti m ony , a nd 16 Plaint i f

f ’ s e xp e r t ’ s t e st i m ony , the d i st

rict court concluded Def

endant failed to perform 17 all contracted-for oblig ations and breached his contract w ith the Plaintiff. T he district 18 co urt a lso f

ound that D ef en da nt ne gli ge ntl y

m ad e num er ous fa lse or m isl ea din g 19 m at er ia l r ep re se nta tio ns t o P la int if f re gard ing the w el l’ s sp ec if ic atio ns and5

1 ca pabil iti es an d the sta te ’ s re qui re m en ts fo r the w el l, an d dete rm ine d th at D ef en dant 2 ne gli ge ntl y

r ep re se nte d, by om iss ion , “ re duc tio ns in quanti ty a nd c hange s inqua lity 3 of the m at er ia ls p ro vid ed ,” as co m pare d to w ha t w as or igi na lly spe ci fi ed

in the 4 estim ate. 5 { 7} T he d i s t r i c tc o u rte n t e r e dj u d g m e n tf o r D e f e n d a n to n P l a i n t i f

f ’ s c l a i m s f

or 6 unf ai r an d unco nsc ion ab le tr ad e pr ac tic es , fi ndi ng tha t Pla int if f fa ile d to de m onstrate 7 t h at De fe n d an tkn o wi n g l y m ad e f al s e o r mis l ea d i n g s t at emen t s an dt h at De fe n d an t ’s 8 ac ts and pr ac tic es c onst itu te d an un co nsc ion ab le tr ad e pr ac tic e. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso 9 de nie d D ef

en dant’ s r eque st f

or a tto rn ey f ee s, de te rm ini ng tha t Pla int if f’ s unfa ir tr ad e 10 practices c l ai m

wa s not grou ndless. The district court concluded that Plaintiff w as 11 en tit le d to c om

pe nsa tor y da m ag es in the a m ount

of $37 , 334. 04, the tot al a m ount 12 Plaintiff paid to De fendant for desi gn and cons truction of the well, and consequent ial 13 da m ag es in the a m ount of $14 , 997. 74. 14 { 8} D ef

en dant a ppe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en t, r ai sin g th e fo llo w ing iss ue s: 15 (1 ) T he dis tr ic t cour

t er re d in fi ndi ng tha t an e xpr es s w ar ranty w as c re at ed , ( 2) T he 16 district court erre d in findin g Def endant bre ached the contract based upo n differe nces 17 in the es tim at e an d the w el l as bui lt, (3 ) T he dis tr ic t co urt er re d in fi ndi ng D ef

en dant 18 to b e in b re ac h of

c ontra ct fo r failur e to d es igna nd c onstru ct the w el l i n a 19 w orkm an lik e m an ne r w iththe or din ar y ski ll of tho se w ho unde rt ak e suc h w ork, ( 4)6

1 The district court er

red in determ ining Plaintiff w a s e nt i t l ed to consequ ential dam ages 2 ba se d on ne gli ge nt m isr ep re se nta tio n, ( 5) T he dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in aw ar din g 3 c o n s e qu en t i al d amag es , a n d(6 ) T h e d i s t ri ct co u rt erre di n fi n d i n g t h at Pl ai n t i ff ’s 4 unf ai r tr ad e pr ac tic es c la im

w as not gr ound le ss. 5 { 9} Plaintiff cr oss-appeals, ra ising the following claim s of err or: (1 ) Th e district 6 court erre d in deny ing Plaintiff’ s claim for un fair trade p ractice s; and (2) T he district 7 co urt e rr ed

in de ny ing P la int if

f’ s c la im f or unc onsc ion ab le tr ad e pr ac tic es . 8 DISCUSS IO N 9 Stand ard of R eview 10 { 10} Pl ai n t i f

f a n d D e f e n d a n t d i s a g r e e a s t o t h e ap p r o p r i a t e s t an d a r d o f r e v ie w f or 11 the district court’ s finding s of fac t. Y et, this Court has definitivelystated the standard 12 tha t “ the j udgm en t of the tr ia l co urt w ill not be dis tur be d on ap pe al if the f

ind ing s of 13 fa ct e nte re d by

the c ourt are sup porte d by sub stanti al e vid en ce , a re not c le ar ly 14 erro ne ou s, and are su ffi ci en t to su pp or t t he jud gm en t.” B ank of Ne w Yo rk v . R om er o , 15 20 11 -NMCA- 11 0, ¶ 7, 15 0 N.M. 7 69 , 26 6 P .3d 63 8, re v’ d on oth er gro unds , 201 4- 16 N MS C- 007, 320 P

. 3d 1. “ Su bst an tia l e vid en ce is suc h r el ev an t e vid en ce that a 17 re as onable m ind would find adequate to supp ort a conclusion.” L an da v azo v. 18 Sanchez , 199 0- N MS C- 114, ¶ 7, 111 N

. M. 137, 802 P. 2d 1 283. I n r ev ie w ing ac la im 19 of ins uf fi ci ent ev id en ce, w e re sol ve “ al l di sput es of f ac ts i n f av or of the suc ce ssf

ul7

1 pa rty andin du lg e[] all reas on ab le in fere nc es in su pp or t o f th e p rev ai li ng pa rty.” L as 2 Cruces Prof’l Fire Fi

g h t er s & Int’l A ss’n of Fire F ighters v. City of Las Cruces , 3 1997 -N MC A -0 44, ¶

12, 123 N

. M. 329 , 940 P

. 2d 177. “ Fi ndi ngs of f ac t m ay pr ope rl y 4 be gi ve n a li be ral in te rp ret at io n i f th e in te rp ret at io n i s s up po rte d b y th e ev id en ce.” 5 He rrera v. R oman Catholi c Church , 199 1- N MC A -0 89, ¶ 14, 112 N

. M. 717 , 819 P

. 2d 6 264. L as tly , thi s c ourt “ w ill not r ew ei gh the ev ide nc e nor subs tit ute our j udgm en t f

or 7 that of the fact[ -] finder.” La s C ruc es P rof’l

F ire F igh te rs , 199 7- N MC A -0 44, ¶ 12. 8 { 11} Reg ard in g t he pa rti es ’ ch al le ng es to th e di st ric t co ur t’s co nc lu si on s o f la w, we 9 ap pl y de no vo rev ie w. Se e G al l e go s v . St at e B d. o

f E duc. , 199 7- N MC A -0 40, ¶ 11, 10 123 N

. M. 362 , 940 P

. 2d 4 68. 11 D ef en da nt ’s C lai m s of

Er ro r 12 1. The D istrict C ourt D id N ot Err in F inding an Exp ress Warranty 13 { 12} De fe n d an tfi rs tch al l e n g es t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s co n cl u s i o n t h at De fe n d an t ’s 14 sta te m en ts to Pl ai nti ff cr eate d an ex pr es s w ar ranty an d tha t D ef

en dant b re ac he d hi s 1 5 c o n tr a c twi t h P l a i n t i f f wh e n t h e we l l f

a i l e dt o mee tt h a twa rr a n t y. S p e c i f i c a l l y, 16 De fendants t a t e s t he d i str i c tc ourt ’ s c on c l us i ont hata n e xp r e ss w a rr a nty w a s gi ven 17 is “ contrary

to we ll[-] established Ne w Mexico law” and “ unsu pported bysubst antial 18 ev id en ce.” We di sa gr ee.8

1 { 13} O ur

U nif orm Co m m er ci al Co de sta te s that “ an y af fi rm at ion of fa ct

or pr om ise 2 m a d e b y

t h e s e l l e r t o t h e b u y e r

w h i c h r e l a t e s t o t h e g o o d s a n db e c o m e s p a rto f the 3 ba sis of

the barg ai n c re at es a n e xpr es s w ar ranty that the goo ds s ha ll co nf orm to the 4 af fi rm at ionor

pr om ise [. ] ” N MS A 197 8, § 55 -2 -3 13( 1) (a ) (1 961)

. Furthe r, “ [i ] t i s no t 5 necessary

to the crea tion o f an express warranty that the seller use form al w ords such 6 as ‘warra n t ’ or‘gu ar an t ee ’ ort h at h e h av e as p ec i fi c i n t en t i o nt o m ak e a wa rr an t y[.]” 7 Section 55-2-313(2). Finally , “ [a] ll of the circum stances of a sale are to be considered 8 w he n de te rm ining w he the r the re w as a n e xpr es s w ar ranty or am er e ex pr es sio n of 9 opin ion.” Lovington Cattle Fe eders, I nc. v . A bbot t Labora tories , 198 2- N MS C- 027, 10 ¶ 11, 97 N

. M. 564 , 642 P

. 2d 1 67. 11 { 14} A s gr ound s f

or his c la im that no e xpr es s w ar

ranty ex ist ed , D ef

en dant p re se nts 12 thr ee a rg um en ts. F ir st, D ef en dant s ta te s tha t “ in a co ntr ac t f or dr ill ing aw at er

w el l, 13 there is no im

plied un dertaking that wa ter will be obtained or t hat the we ll will b e a 1 4 s u cc es s as t o t h e q u an t i t y o r q u al i t y o f t h e w at ero b t ai n ed [. ]” Davis v. Merrick, 15 1959 -N MSC- 084, ¶ 6, 66 N. M. 226, 345 P. 2d 10 42. While it is true that NewMexico 16 la w im

po se s n o im

pl ie d warra nt y in a co nt ract fo r th e dr il li ng of a p ro du ci ng well , see 17 id. , that does not m ean that De fendant’ s statem en t to Plaintiff did not con stitut e an 18 ex pr es s warran ty und er o urlaw. Se e Per fe tti v . M cG han M ed

. , 198 3- N MC A -0 32, 19 ¶ 24, 99 N .M. 645, 662 P.2d 646 (settin g forth the elem ents of an express warranty ).9

1 T he re is subs tanti al e vid en ce in the r ec or d to supp ort the fi ndi ng tha t D ef en dant t old 2 Pl ai n t i ff that the w ell would last fifty y ears, and thus s uppo rts the district cou rt ’s 3 de te rm ina tio n th at

D ef en dant m ad e the sor

t of a ff irm at ionthat , inthe se 4 c i r c u ms t a n c e s , a mo u n t s t o an e x p r e s s wa rr a n t y. 5 { 15} T o su

ppor t hi s sec ond pr opos iti on tha t it is not c ust om ar y bus ine ss p ra ct ic e fo r 6 we ll drillers to p ro v i d e e x p re s s wa rr an t i es , De fe n d an tci t es UJ I 1 3 -8 2 6 NM RA, which 7 sta te s th at

“ [a ] c ust om

in the tr ad e is any

m an ne r of de aling that i s c om m onl y 8 fo llo w ed

in a pla ce or

tr ad e so a s to c re at e a rea sona ble e xpe ct at ionthat i t w ill be 9 followed w ith respect to the transaction between the parties.” Id

. How ever, that 10 ins tr uc tio n e xpl ic itl y

state s th at

it sho uld be use d inc onj unc tio n w ithU JI 13- 825 11 NMRA, wh ic h d eal s wi th am bi gu it y of t he ter m s o f th e co nt ract

. See U JI 13- 826. U se 12 N ote

. T he re is no cla im of a m big uity he re . I t a ppe ar s D ef

en dant i s a tte m

pti ng t o arg ue 13 that because the custom in well drilling is not to m ake exp ress warranties, n one wer e 14 m ade here. But again, subs tantial evidence supp orts the district court’ s finding that 15 De fendant did indeed tell Plaintiff that the we ll would last fifty y ears, which in turn 16 supp orts the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ion s of ex pr es s w ar ranty a nd b re ac h. “ A c ust om 17 or usa ge w hic h is rep ug na nt to the te rm s of a n e xpr es s c ontra ct

is not pe rm itt ed

to 18 ope rate a ga ins t i t, a nd ev ide nc e of it is ina dm iss ibl e; f

or w hil e usa ge m ay

be 19 adm iss ibl e to e xpl ai n w ha t i s do ubt fu l, it is ne ve r adm iss ibl e to c ontra dic t wha t i s10

1 pl ai n.” G ooc h v

. Co le m an , 1916-NMS C-057, ¶ 12, 22 N. M. 45, 159 P. 945 (internal 2 quot at ionm ar

ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). H er e, D ef en dant at te m

pts to u se e vid en ce of 3 custom to negate any

warranty ; however, De fendant’ s representation to Plaintiff 4 cr eate d ac le ar ly

state d e xpr es s w ar

ranty , w hic h e vid en ce of

c ust om c an not de fe at

. 5 { 16} T hir d, Defe ndant c ont en ds tha t the statut e of f ra uds ap pli es to thi s c as e an d 6 thu s any

w ar ranty m ust ha ve be en in w ri tin g to be en fo rc ea ble

. Bu t this ar gum en t i s 7 m ad e fo r the f

ir st t im e on ap pe al an d w as not pr es en te d to the dis tr ic t c ourt f or the 8 propos ition now asserte d. While Def endant didraise the a

bsence of a w ritten 9 w ar ranty be low , he did so to point out Pl ai nti ff ’ s lac k of docu m en tary

e vid en ce f

or 10 the w ar

ranty a nd d id n ot arg ue suc h e vid en ce w as r equi red

. N owon a ppe al , 11 D ef en dant arg ue s th at an y w ar ranty m ust ha ve be en in w ri tin g in or de r to s at isf y the 12 st atut e o f frau ds

. See NMS A 1978, § 55-2A-201 (1992). In order “ [t ]o p re serve an 13 iss ue fo r re vie w on ap pe al , it m ust ap pe ar tha t an ap pe llant fa ir ly inv oke d ar uli ng o f 14 the trial court on the sam e ground s argu ed in the appellate court.” W oolwine v. 15 Furr’s, Inc. , 198 7- N MC A -1 33, ¶ 20, 106 N

. M. 492 , 745 P. 2d 7 17. W e fi nd n oth ing 16 in the record to show, and Def endant poi nts to n o place in the record to dem onstrate, 17 tha t D ef

en dant soug ht a ru lin g fr om dis tr ic t co urt on the ba sis tha t the exp res s 18 w ar ranty iss ue f ai le d onstatut e of

f ra uds gr ound s, an d thu s hol d th at thi s arg um en t 19 was no t p r o p e r l y pre se rv ed

. Se e Cr utc hfi el d v

. D ep ’t

of Ta xa tio n & R ev en ue ,11

1 2005 -N MC A -0 22, ¶

14, 137 N

. M. 26, 106 P

. 3d 1 273 (h old ing that “ on ap pe al, the 2 p ar t y m

u s t s p ec i fi ca l l y p o i n t o u t wh er e, i n t h e r ec o rd , t h e p ar t y i n v o k ed t h e c o u rt ’s 3 ru li ng on th e is su e. Abs en t th at ci ta ti on to th e rec or d o r an y ob vi ou s p res erv at io n, we 4 wil l n ot co ns id er t he is su e.”). 5 { 17} E ve n so , D ef

en dant’ s arg um en t f

ai ls on the m er its

. O ur

S upr em e Co urt, in 6 Sala zar v. D .W

.B .H ., Inc. , 200 8- N MS C- 054, ¶ 8, 14 4 N. M. 828 , 192 P

. 3d 1 205, 7 stated, “ [c] omm on t o al l . .

. ty pes of express warranty

is the requirem ent that an 8 ex pr ess warra nt y m

ust be m ad e as part

of the ba sis of

the barg ai n. T his doe s no t 9 m ean, however, that an express warranty m ust be specifically bargained for or even 10 inc lud ed

a s part of a w ri tte n co ntr ac t. ” It is cl ear tha t our ca se law an d the gov er nin g 11 statute, Se ction 55 -2-313, do not require express warranties to be in wr iting , how ever, 12 the re is subs tanti al e vid en ce to showthat the r ep re se nta tions m ad e to P la int if f by 1 3 D e f e n d a n td o mee tt h e r e qu i r e men t s o f a n e x p r e s s wa rr a n t y. 14 { 18} “ It

is fundam en ta l tha t a

j udgm en t c an not

be sus ta ine d onappe al un le ss the 15 co nc lu si on up on whi ch it res ts fin ds su pp or t i n o ne or m or e f i nd in gs of f

act .” 16 Th om pson v . H.B

. Z

ac hryCo

. , 196 6- N MS C- 017, ¶ 3, 75 N

. M. 715 , 410 P

. 2d 7 40. 17 H er e, the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus iondoe s f ind su ppor

t i n it s f ind ing that D ef

en dant 18 tol d P la int if

f the w el l w oul d la st fi fty y ears , a fi ndi ng w hic h is in t ur n su ppor te d by 19 su bs ta ntial e vid en ce . T he re fo re , be ca use the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ionis fa ct ua lly12

1 supp orte d, a nd b ec au se e vid en ce of cu sto m doe s no t a ppl y w he n th e m eanin g of

the 2 ag re em en t i s pl ai n, a nd b ec au se our lawdoe s no t r equir e ex pr es s w ar ranti es to be in 3 wr iting , w e find no error in the district court’ s conclusio ns that De fendant created an 4 express warranty

by his representations to Plaintiff, and breached that w arranty when 5 th e wel l fa il edto las t as ex pe ct ed

. 6 2. Th e D ist ri ctC ou rtD id N ot Er r Wh en itF ou nd D ef endan t to Ha ve 7 Breach ed the Contract Based Upon Differ ence s Between the Estim ate and 8 the Well De fend ant C onstruc ted 9 { 19} De fendant contend s t h at his failure to install all the features of the w ell as 10 de sc rib edin th e es ti m at e d oe s n ot am ou nt to a br each of c on tra ct . W e d is ag ree. 11 { 20} As g ro u n d s fo r h i s ap p ea l , De fe n d an td i s p u t es a n u m b ero f t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 12 fi ndi ngs. O n r ev ie wof the r ec or d, w e co nc lud e tha t the se fi ndi ngs ar e supp orte d by 1 3 s ub s t an t i al ev i d en ce . E x p e rt t es t i m o n y, Def en d an t ’s o wn t es t i m o n y, Def en d an t ’s 14 se co nd es ti m at e, a nd D ef en dant’ s in voi ce a ll supp ort the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ind ing s. 15 Specifica lly , the e vidence dem onstrated that the well was shallower than wa s agreed 16 to, c onstru ct ed

dif fe re ntl y than wa s a gr ee d to , a nd tha t i t f ai le d a ft er

appr oxi m at el y 17 thr ee -and- a- ha lf

y ears , c onsi de ra

bly soo ne r than D e f

e n d an t a s s ur e d P l a i nti ff it w oul d. 1 8 In re g ar dt o t h es e f

i n d i n g s , “[i ]t i s n o terro r f o r a t ri al co u rtt o cr ed i to n e e x p er t ’s 19 testim ony

over another’ s.” Sunn

yl a n d Farms, Inc. v. Cent. N.M . E lec. Coop., Inc. , 20 2013 -N MSC- 017, ¶ 39, 301 P. 3d 38 7. “ When the trial court’ s findi n g s o f fa ct are13

1 su pp or te d b y su bs ta nt ia l evi de nc e . . . refu sa l to m ak e co nt rary fin di ng s i s n ot erro r.” 2 Griffin v. G uada lupe Med. Ctr., Inc. , 199 7- N MC A -0 12, ¶ 22, 123 N

. M. 60, 933 P

. 2d 3 85 9. 4 { 21} De fendant also disputes the dist rict court’ s conclusio n that “ De fendant failed 5 to p er fo rm al l contra ct ed -f or obl iga tio ns t o th e ex pe ct ed w orkm an lik e standard

a nd 6 w iththe or din ar

y ski ll of tho se w ho unde rt ak e suc h wor k. ” D ef en dant ar gue s th at

the 7 es tim at e, the ba sis f

or de te rm ini ng the “ co ntr ac te d-fo r obliga tio ns, ” doe s no t 8 constitu te an a g re em ent betwee n the parties that the well w ould be constructed 9 ac co rd ing to tho se e xa ct spe ci fi catio ns. D ef

en dant s ta te s th at

he w as “ not

bound t o 10 bui ld the w el l to th e ex ac t sp ec if ic at ion s se t f

orth i n th e [e ] sti m at e. ” Fo r thr ee r ea sons , 11 w e re j ec t D ef en dant’ s arg um en t. 12 { 22} First, De fendant does not challenge the district court’ s finding that the parties 1 3 “ en t er ed i n t o a c o n t ra ct b as ed o n De fe n d an t ’s s ec o n des t i m at e an d o ra l s t at emen t s [, ]” 14 nor doe s D ef en dant c ha lle nge the f

ind ing that bo th p ar

tie s a gr ee d to pr oc ee d w ith out 15 further w ritten agreem ent based on th e estim ate. “ An unchallenged findin g of the trial 16 c ourti s bi nd i ng o n appeal.” Se ipe rt v

. J ohns on , 2003-NMC A- 119, ¶ 26, 134 N. M. 17 394, 77 P

. 3d 2 98. 18 { 23} Se co nd, D ef

en dant ar gue s tha t Pl ai nti ff w as “ fu lly co gni zant of w ha t t he 19 differe nces betwe en an ‘[e ] stim ate, ’ an ‘ [i] nvoi ce’ and a ‘ [c] ontract’ are in the norm al14

1 co ur se of

bus ine ss p ra ct ic es , ” but poi nts to nothin g in the r ec or d to sup port this 2 as se rt ion

. A s w e ha ve state d pr ev iou sly , “ [t ] his c ourt w ill not se ar ch the r ec or d to f ind 3 e v i d e n c e t o s up p o rt ” ap a rt y’ s c l a i m. In r e Estate of Heeter , 199 2- N MC A -0 32, ¶ 15, 4 113 N.M. 691, 831 P. 2d 990. It app ears that by stating Plaintiff knewthe differ ences 5 b et we en an estim ate and a c ontract, D efendant attem pts to argue that Plaintiff had 6 reason to know that the well’ s final specifications would differ f rom the es t i m at e. 7 How ever, the evide nc e s ho w s tha t P l a i nt iff’ s understand ing of the agreem ent betwee n 8 the part ie s w as tha t D ef en dant w oul d c onstru ct

the w el l ba se d onthe spe ci fi catio ns 9 in the estim ate, since De fendant refused to provide Plaintiff with a wr itten contract 10 when asked to do so, leading to th e parties’ agree m ent to proceed based on the written 11 estim ate. 12 { 24} Third, De fendant s t at es that he review ed the estim ate w ith Plaintiff, and that 13 Plaintiff understoo d there we re item s in it that m ight o r m ight n ot appear on the final 14 invo ice. How ever, exam ination of the testim ony dem on st r at e s tha t thi s di sc us si on

wa s 15 lim ite d to the f

ac t tha t the a m ount s bi lle d on the f ina l i nvoi ce m igh t de via te f ro m the 16 es tim at e, not

that the spe ci fi catio ns o f the w el l w oul d be dif fe re nt. 17 { 25} “ Whe n aparty

is ch al le ngi ng a

le ga l c onc lus ion , the standard fo r revie wis 18 w he the r the lawc or

re ct ly w as ap pl ie d to the f

ac ts, vie w ing the m

in a m an ne r m ost 19 favorable to the prevailing party [. ] ” G old en Co ne Co nc ep ts, In c. v. V illa Li nda M

all ,15

1 Lt d. , 1991-NMS C-097, ¶ 8, 113 N. M. 9, 820 P.2d 1323 . B ecause the ora l contract 2 be twee n t he pa rti es was b as edo n t he sp eci fic at io ns fou nd in th e es ti m at e, we 3 co nc lud e tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt cor re ct ly ap pli ed the law to the fa ct s of thi s c as e in i ts 4 co nc lus ionthat D ef

en dant b re ac he d hi s c ontra ct w ith Pl ai nti ff w he n he f

ai le d to bui ld 5 th e wel l t o t he sp eci fic at io ns de sc rib edby the est im at e. 6 3. Th e D ist ri ctC ou rtD id N ot Er r Wh en itF ou nd D ef endan t to Ha ve 7 Breach ed t he C ontract By Failing to De sign and Construc t the Well in a 8 W o r kma n l i ke M a n n e r W i t h t h e O r d i n a r y S ki l l o f T h o s e W h o U n d e r t a ke 9 Such Work 10 { 26} D ef

en dant n ex t co nte nds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in de te rm ini ng tha t he 1 1 f a i l e dt o c o n s t r

u c tt h e w e l l i n aw o rk ma n l i k e man n e r . A s g r o u n d s f o r h i s c l a i m, 12 D ef en dant ch al le nge s m an y of the sa m e fi ndi ngs of f ac t he c ha lle nge d f

or his c la im 13 tha t the di st ric t c ourt e rr ed w he n it f ound him in br ea chof

c ontra ct

. W e do n ot 14 re co nsi de r fa ct

ua l f in di ngs w e ha ve pr ev iou sly de te rm ine d are sup porte d by 15 subs tantial evidence, but do exam ine the additio nal dispu ted finding s and the district 16 court’ s conclusio n of law regard i n g t h e m anner and skill with which the we ll was 17 co ns tru ct edby D efen da nt

. 18 { 27} De fendant challenges the find i ng tha t the w e l l “ su

bs t ant i a l l y

failed [in] Marc h[] 19 2011 .” How ever, there is substantial evid ence in the record to support the finding that 20 the w el l had inde ed fa ile d by Marc h 2011. Pl ai nti ff te sti fi ed tha t as o f tha t date , the 21 w el l c ea se d to pr oduc e an ythi ng m or e than a sandy sur ge of w at er . “ [W ] e re vie wthe16

1 ev ide nc e in the lig ht m ost favor ab le to s uppo rt the tr ia l c ourt’ s f

ind ing s, r es olv ing a ll 2 co nf li ct s an d i nd ul gi ng all pe rm is si bl e in fere nc es in fav or of t he de ci si on be lo w.” 3 Jo nes v . Sc hoe llk

opf , 2005-NMC A- 124, ¶ 8, 138 N.M. 477, 122 P. 3d 84 4. In 4 review ing the evidence according to this standard, we con clude that the district court 5 h ad a s u ff

i ci en tb as i s fo r i t s fi n d i n g t h at t h e w el l h ad s ub s t an t i al l y fa i l ed . P l ai n t i ff ’s 6 te sti m ony , c re dit ed

by the dis tr ic t cour

t, al one is suf

fi ci en t to esta

bli sh a bas is fo r the 7 dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ionthat the w el l f ai le d inMarc h 20 11. 8 { 28} De fendant next dispu tes the trial court’ s finding that the well’ s ultim ate fa ilure 9 was cau se d b y

“ Defen da nt ’s in ad eq ua te de si gn an d c on st ru c ti on of t he well .” To 10 supp ort hi s arg um en t, D efend an t sta te s th at the c au se s of

f ai lur e as sig ne d by

the 11 dis tr ic t c ourt are “ co nt rar y to the f ac t tha t the w el l w as pr oduc ing a cc or din g to it s 12 de sig n f

or ne ar ly f our y ears ” and ar e “ ba se d upon spec ula tio n and con j ec tur e . . . not 1 3 supp or te db y

s ub s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . ” W e d i s a g r e e . T h e f i n d i n g w a s n o tb a s e dupo n 14 spe cu la tio n or co nj ec tur e, but rathe r on evi de nc e tha t i nc lud ed e xpe rt te sti m ony . T he 15 record is r eplete with testim ony that, in sever al respects, De fendant fai l ed t o m eet 16 w orkm an lik e stan da rds and c ust om ar y pr ac tic es . F or

e xa m ple , D ef en dant, a m ong 17 oth er thi ngs, fa ile d to ins ta ll an en d ca p as cu sto m ar ily use d in w el l dr ill ing , f ai le d to 18 use the proper size of gravel, failed to adhere to state engineer standards, and failed 19 to c onstru ct

the w el l i n su chaw ay

a s to ke ep c er

ta in b iof oul ing m at er ia ls o ut. T his17

1 ev ide nc e w as sub stanti al in de m onstratin g that the f ai lur e of the w el l w as c au se d by 2 D ef en dant’ s f ai lur e to c onstru ct

the w el l to a w orkm an lik e standard , a nd w as c ite d by 3 the dis tr ic t c ourt t o supp ort i ts f ind ing that D ef

en dant d id n ot d es igna nd c onstru ct the 4 w el l t o aw orkm an lik e standard

. W e w ill “ no t di sturb suc h f ind ing s, w ei gh the 5 evidence, r esolve conflicts or pass on the cre dibil ity of w itnesses where the e vidence 6 subs tantially

supp o rt s t h e find ings m ade by the trial court. ” Bake r v. Be nedict , 7 19 78 -NMSC -0 87 , ¶ 17 , 92 N.M. 28 3, 5 87 P.2d 43 0. 8 { 29} D ef

e n d a n t a l s o c h a l l e n g e s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ’ s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t h e f a i l edto 9 de sig n and c onstru ct

the w el l i n aw orkm an lik e standard w iththe or din ar

y ski ll of 10 those who und ertake such work. “ Unlike express w arranties, im plied warr anties are 11 not bargained for; they are im posed bylaw .” Salazar , 2008- N MS C- 054, ¶ 14. T he 12 im pli ed w ar ranty in a co ntr ac t f

or dr ill ing aw at er

w el l i s th at

“ the w ork sha ll be don e 13 in a wor km an li ke m an ne r wit h t he or di na ry sk il l of t ho se who un de rta ke su ch work .” 14 D av is , 195 9- N MS C- 084, ¶ 6. D ef en dant a sse rt s th at

he co ns tr

uc te d th e w el l 15 according to his exp erience and com m o n p ra ct ices and that “ [n] one of [the] 16 dif fe re nc es be tw ee n th e [e ] sti m at e an d th e [i ] nvoi ce de m onstrates th e we ll w as not 17 co nstru ct ed

in a w orkm an lik e m an ne r w ith the or din ar y ski ll of tho se w ho unde rt ak e 18 such work.” How ever, as discus s ed above, the r ecord is replete w ith evidence 19 de m onstratin g th at

D ef en dant’ s c onstru ct iona nd d es ignof the w el l w as not18

1 co m ple te d inaw orkm an lik e m an ne r. E xpe rt te sti m ony

c onc lud ed

the w el l w as not 2 de sig ne d or

c onst ru ct ed to thi s st an dard

. N or

w as the w el l c onstructe d w iththe 3 or din ar y ski ll of tho se w ho unde rt ak e suc h wor k, giv en , fo r ex am

ple , tha t D ef

en dant 4 varied his wo rk from applicable state regulations and us ed m aterials that w ere 5 inc om pa tib le w ithw orkm an lik e co nstru ct ion

. 6 { 30} “ [I ] t i s no t the f

unc tio n of

a n a ppe llate c ourt onr ev ie wto w ei gh the te sti m ony 7 and evidence presented below, but rather to ascer tain whe t h er there is substantial 8 ev i d en ce t o s up po rt t he tri al co ur t’s fi nd in gs of f act an d c on cl us io ns .” Newc um v. 9 La ws on , 198 4- N MC A -0 57, ¶ 30, 1 01 N

. M. 448 , 684 P

. 2d 5 34. H er e, the re is 10 subs tantial evidence to sup port the challenged finding s of fact which in turn supp ort 1 1 t h e c h al l en g ed co n cl u s i o n s o f l aw . Th er ef o re , we fi n dn o erro r i n t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 12 co nc lus ionthat D ef

en dant f ai le d to de sig n an d co nstru ct the w el l i n aw orkm an lik e 13 st an da rdwit h t he ord in ary sk il l o f th os e who un de rta ke su ch work

. 14 4. A ny Er ro r by th e D ist ri ct C ou rtin U sin g N eg lig en t M isr ep re se nt at ion as 15 a B asi s F or It s A w ar d of C on se qu en ti al D am age s W as H ar m le ss 16 { 31} D ef

en dant n ex t arg ue s th at the dis tr ic t co urt di d no t have asuf fi ci en t ba sis to 17 aw ard da m ag es ba se d up on n eg lig en t m isr ep re se nta tio n. S pe ci fi ca lly , D ef en dant 18 as se rt s th at

“ the [d istri ct c] ourt ex pr es sly fo und [P la int if f] fa ile d to es ta

bli sh tw o of 19 the four requisite elem ents of a negligent m isrepresentation c laim ” and thus there w as 20 no basis to award dam ages for negligent m isrepresentation. T o recover und er a theory19

1 of negligent m isrepresentation, a plaintiff m ust show that: (1) the defendant m ade a 2 m at er ia l r ep re se nta tio n to pla int if f, ( 2) the pla int if

f re lie d up on the re pr es en ta tio n, ( 3) 3 the de fe ndant k

ne wthe r epresent at ionw as f al se or m ad e it re ck le ssl y , a nd ( 4) the 4 defendant inte nded to in duce reliance by the plaintiff. Saylor v. V alles , 5 2003 -N MC A -0 37, ¶ 17, 133 N

. M. 432, 63 P. 3d 1152. H er e, the dis tr ic t c ourt f ound 6 tha t P la int if

f fa il ed to es ta

bli sh tha t D ef

en dant’ s m isr ep re se nta tio ns w er e m ad e 7 re ck le ssl y

or w ithkno w le dge the y

w er e fa lse , a nd tha t the y

w er e m ad e w iththe int en t 8 to d ec ei ve P la int if

f. D ef en dant ar gue s tha t be ca

use the dis tr ic t co urt ex pli ci tly f ound 9 ag ai nst P la int if f on tw o ne ce ssary el em en ts of ne gli ge nt m isr ep re se nta tio n, ne gli ge nt 10 m is rep res en ta ti on sh ou ld n o t ha ve be en a ba si s fo r Pl ai nt iff’s reco ve ry . Whi le we 11 ag re e w ithD ef

en dant tha t P la int if

f’ s c la im f or ne gli ge nt m isr ep re se nta tio n f ai ls f or 12 la ck of ne ce ssary el em en ts, on a ppe al the a ggr ie ve d party “ [h as ] the bur de n of 13 dem onstrating that [it wa s] prej udiced by t h e claim ed err or.” Scott v. B rown , 14 1966 -N MSC- 135, ¶ 2 0, 76 N. M. 501 , 416 P. 2d 51 6. D efendant m akes no claim that 15 he was pr ej udi ce d by the inc lus ionof

ne gli ge nt m isr ep re se nta tio n a s aba sis f or 16 reco ve ry

an d t hu s h as no t m ethi s b ur de n. 17 { 32} E ve n a llo w ing that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr one ousl y inc lud ed

ne glige nt 18 m isrepresentation as a basis for Plaintiff’ s recovery , w e find no prej udice in the error. 19 Under w ell-established law, “ [a] n appellate court does not corre ct harm less error. ” Id

.20

1 Whil e it is w el l- ac ce pte d th at “ [d ] upl ic at ionof da m ag es or

double r ec ove ry

f or 2 injuries r eceived is not perm issib le,” H ood v. F ulk er son , 1985 -N MS C- 048, ¶

12, 102 3 N. M. 677, 699 P. 2d 60 8, there is no claim of dup l i ca t i ve dam ages in this case. 4 Ne gligent m isrepresentatio n wa s sim ply one of two alter

native theories the dist rict 5 co urt de te rm ine d j ust if ie d aw ar di ng Pl ainti ff

c onse que nti al da m ag es in the a m ount 6 of $14, 997. 74. “ Whe re the re ar e dif fe re nt the or ie s of

r ec ove ry a nd l ia bil ity is fo und 7 on e ac h, but

the r el ie f re que ste d [ is] the sa m e, na m el y c om pe nsa tor y da m ag es , the 8 injured party

is entitled to o nly

one com pensatory dam age aw ard. ” Id

. H er e, the re is 9 no arg um en t, nor

e vid en ce in the r ec or d, that P la int iff rece iv ed m or e than on e 10 com pensatory dam age aw ard, and Def

endant does n ot argue that the district court was 11 unj ust if

ie d ina w ar din g c onse que nti al da m ag es ba se d on the br ea ch of co ntr ac t a sid e 12 from the argum ents we have alrea dy rej ected abov e. Ac cordingly , we c onclud e that 13 the district court appropriately aw arded consequential dam ag es , and given th e lack 14 of pr ejud ice to D ef

en dant, c onc lud e al so tha t i ts e rr or r eg ar din g th e inc lus ionof 15 ne gl ig en t m is rep res en ta ti on as a ba si s fo r rec ov ery was ha rm le ss . 16 5. The D istrict C ourt E rred in A w arding $2,500 in Conseq uent ial Dam ages 17 for an Est im ated Fut ure Expense, but Did Not E rr in Othe r A spect s of Its 18 A w ar d of

C on se qu en ti al D am age s 19 { 33} D ef

en dant ne xt ch al le nge s the dis tr ic t co urt’ s fi ndi ng “ co nc er nin g 20 com pensatory dam ages” and asks this Court to overturn the awar d of “ com pensatory21

1 da m ag es . ” H ow ev er , it appe ar s f ro m the r em ai nde r of D ef

en dant’ s ar gum en t tha t hi s 2 intent is to challenge the district c ourt’ s aw ard of consequent ial dam ages to Plaintiff 3 in th e am ount

of $14 , 997. 74. S pe ci fi ca lly , D ef en dant c ont en ds tha t ( 1) the re is not 4 subs tantia l evidence to supp ort the district court’ s awarding of consequ ential 5 da m ag es , ( 2) abse nt a show ing of “ spe ci al ci rc um stanc es ” the re can be no a w ar d of 6 co nse que nti al da m ag es , a nd ( 3) the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ai lur e to m ak e ane xpl ic it fi ndi ng 7 tha t the da m ag es w er e obj ec tiv el y f or es ee ab le is gr ound s f

or r ev er sa l. W e ad dr es s 8 each arg um en t i n t urn. 9 { 34} Fi rs t, D ef

en dant arg ue s th at

the c onse que nti al da m ag es a re not sup porte d by 10 subs tanti al e vid en ce . I n part ic ular, D ef en dant co nte nds tha t the $2, 500 es tim at ed c ost 1 1 o f p l u g g i n g t h e w el l wa s n o ts up p o r t e d b y a n y ev i d en ce o t h ert h an Pl ai n t i ff ’s 12 testim ony

and is “ wholly

speculative.” As we explain below, our re view of the r ecord 13 ind ic at es that D ef

en dant i s c or

re ct in thi s r eg ar d. 14 { 35} “ [W ] he n it is poss ibl e to pr es en t a cc ur at e ev ide nc e on the a m ount of da m ag es , 15 th e p art y

up on who m th e bu rd en res ts to pro ve da m ag es m us t p res en t s uc h e vi de nc e.” 16 First Nat’l B ank in Albuquerq ue v. Sanchez , 199 1- N MS C- 065, ¶ 18, 112 N

. M. 317 , 17 815 P. 2d 6 13. W e ha ve not a llo w ed da m ag es to stand w he n th ey a re sp ecul at ive or 18 based on “ no m ore than m ere estim ates.” Id

. I n th is c as e, Pl ai nt iff’ s f uture c ost of 19 h aving to plug Defendant’ s well w as based only on an estim ate that Plaintiff22

1 de ve lop ed

him se lf a nd h ad not y et pa id. T he re fo re , w e ag re e w ithD ef en dant tha t the 2 district court’ s award of $2,500 for the estim ated future cost of plug ging the well w as 3 un su pp or te d by

sub stanti al e vid en ce a nd thus it w as e rr or f or the dis tr ic t c ourt t o 4 aw ar d th es e da m ag es . 5 { 36} A s t o t h e a d d i t i o n a l c o n s e qu e n t i a l d a m a g e s , D e f e n d a n tc h a l l e n g e s t h a tt h e se 6 too a re uns uppo rt ed

by sub stan ti al e vid en ce . W e dis ag re e. T he re is ev ide nc e in the 7 record, includin g Plaintiff’ s testim ony and adm itted exhib its, to suppo rt the district 8 co urt’ s f

ind ing that P la int if

f did suf fe r the r em ai nin g c onse que nti al da m ag es . T he se 9 inc lud ed

the c ost of f ili ng the appl ic at ionf

or the w el l, the c ost

of pub lis hin g th e 10 re qui re d le ga l no tic e fo r the ap pli catio n fo r the w el l, the fe es pa id f or the w el l c le an 11 out , the f

ee s pa id f or w el l e va lua tio n r ep orts, a nd the fe e pa id f or avid eo sur

ve y of 12 the w el l t o de te rm ine the c au se of the w el l’ s pr obl em s. Be ca use e ac h of

the se 1 3 da m a g e s i s s up p o rt e d b y t e s t i m o n y a n d a d m i t t e d e x h i b i t s , i n c l u d i n g r e c e i p t s a nd 14 in vo ic es , we lea ve th es e award s i nt act an d u nd is tu rb ed

. 15 { 37} Seco nd , Defen da nt arg ue s t ha t ab se nt a sh owi ng of “ sp eci al cir cu m st an ces ,” 16 the re c anbe no aw ar d of c onse que nti al da m ag es . A s su ppor t f or thi s pr opos iti on, 17 D ef en dant c ite s Su nn

yl an d Fa rms , Inc. in w hic h our Su pr em e Co urt state d th at

it 18 “ would expect the trial cou rt to find special circum stances, bey ond th e ordinary 19 co ur se of

e ve nts ” to supp ort a

f ind ing that the pla int if

f’ s dam ag es w er e fo re se ea ble23

1 to defendant. 2013-NMSC- 017, ¶ 17 (internal q uotatio n m arks and citation om itted). 2 In Su nn

yl an d Fa rms , the plaintiff sued its electr ic provider, a lleging that it suffered 3 co n s eq u en t i al d amag es fr o m a f i r e a ti t s fa ci l i t y as t h e r es u l to f t h e d ef en d an t ’s 4 wr ongful term ination of service. I d. ¶ 1 . Wh en a f

i re b r o k e o u tat t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s 5 facility , e m

ploy ees and fire fighters we re un ab le to extingu ish the fire since its fire 6 s up p r e s s i o n s ys t e ms w e r e p o w e r e db y e l e c t r i c i t y. I d. T he pla int if

f ar gue d th at

but f or 7 th e d efen da nt ’s co n d u ct , th e fac il it y co ul d h av e b een sav ed

. Id

. The district court 8 found th at the defendant wa s liable to the plaintiff for consequential dam ages that 9 res ul te d fr om

th e fi re. Id

. ¶ 7 . Our Suprem e Cou rt rever sed the award of consequential 10 dam ages, holding th at the cause of the fire wa s so a ttenuated f rom the wa ter shut o ff 1 1 t h at , ab s en ts p ec i al ci rc u m s t an ce s d emo n s t ra t i n g t h e d efendantkn ew o f t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s 12 part ic ular vul ne rabi lity to fi re or it s de pe nde nc e on e le ctri ci ty f or f ir e supp re ssi on, 13 the re c oul d be no f

ind ing that the pla int if

f’ s dam ag es w ere f

ores ee ab le to the 14 de fen da nt

. Id

. ¶ 24

. 15 { 38} D ef

en dant w oul d have us r ea d Sunn yl an d Far

m s as requiring special 16 ci rc um stanc es i n all c as es w ithc onse que nti al da m ag es . W e de cl ine to ex te nd 17 Su nn yl an d Fa rms to the degree requested. He re, the consequent ial dam ages aw arded 18 to Pl ai nti ff fo r D ef

en dant’ s cond

uc t ar e m uc h le ss atte nua te d th antho se a w ar de d and 19 re ve rs ed

in Su nn yl an d Fa rms and thus th ere is no need for a finding of special24

1 circum stances. I n Su nn yl an d Fa rms , t h e c o u r t st at edth at“ [i]n a co nt ract act io n, a 2 de fe ndant is li able onl y f or tho se c onse que nti al da m ag es that w er e obj ec tiv el y 3 foresee able as a probable re sult of his or her breach when the contract w as m ade.” Id

. 4 ¶ 16. T he co ur t looke d f or spe ci al c ir cu m stanc es in tha t c as e onl y be ca use the 5 re sul tin g dam ag es we re so far re m ove d f ro m the de fe ndant’ s a ct ion s th at , abse nt 6 s p e c i a l ci r c u ms t a n c e s , t h e d e f e n d a n tc o u l dn o th a v e b e e n e x p e c t e dt o a n t i c i p a t e t h e m. 7 Id

. ¶¶ 2 1, 2 4. 8 { 39} Inthi s c as e, the f oll ow ing c onse que nti al da m ag es w er e aw ar de d: the c ost of 9 fi lin g th e ap pli catio n f or the w el l, the c ost

of pub lis hin g ale gal no tic e fo r the w el l 10 ap pli catio n, the c ost s of the w el l c le anout , a nd the c ost s of the e ngi ne er ’ s e va lua tio n 11 of the w el l. A ll of

the se f al l w ith in the “ or din ar

y c ourse of

e ve nts , ” tha t c oul d 12 fo re seeab ly f

lowf ro m D ef en dant’ s br ea ch , thu s r el ie vin g P la int if f of the ne ed to 13 prove “ special circum stances.” Id

. ¶ 17 ( int er

na l qu ota tion m ark s and c itatio n 14 om itted). 15 { 40} Fo r h i s fi n al ar g u m en to n t h i s i s s u e, De fe n d an tco n t en d s t h at t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 16 fa ilure to m ak e an ex pli ci t fi ndi ng tha t the da m ag es w er e obj ec tiv el y f or es ee ab le is 1 7 g ro u n d s fo r r ev er s al . No t ab l y, Def en d an td o es n o tap p ea r t o ar g u e t h at Pl ai n t i ff ’s 1 8 co n s eq u en t i al d amag es we re i n fa ct n o tfo re s ee ab l e, ra t h e r t h a t t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 19 alleged err o r i n failin g to m ake an explicit finding that such dam ages we re25

1 foresee able precludes Plaintiff f rom rec overy . H owever , Def

endant cites no case law 2 to sup port his assertion that such an explicit find ing is re quired. It is w ell established 3 tha t this Co urt w ill not co ns id er propos iti ons tha t are uns uppo rt ed by c itatio n to 4 au th or it y . See ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. T axation & Re venue D ep’t , 199 8- N MC A -0 78, 5 ¶ 1 0, 1 25 N.M. 24 4, 9 59 P.2d 96 9. 6 { 41} A lth oughw e de cl ine to ad dr es s w he the r our lawreq uire s an e xpl ic it fi ndi ng 7 o f o b je ct i v e f o re s ee ab i l i t y, be ca u s e t h e u n d er l yin g i s s u e i s wh et h ert h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 8 co nc lus ionof law tha t Pl ai nti ff is en tit le d to co nse que nti al da m ag es is supp orte d by 9 its findin gs, we do a ddress that questio n here. The district c ourt f ound that Plaintiff 10 “ suf fe re d a ddi tio na l r ec ove ra ble c onse que ntial da m ag es , be y ond the a m ount s pa id 11 directly

to Def endant.” A s discuss ed above, that find ing wa s supp orted by subst antial 12 ev ide nc e, w iththe e xc ep tio n of da m ag es in the am ount of $2, 500 fo r the f

uture c ost 13 of filling the we ll. While “ [i] t is basic that a j udgm ent cannot be sustained on appeal 14 un le ss th e co nc lu si on up on whi ch it res ts fin ds su pp or t i n t he fin di n g s of fact ,” 15 Galvan v. Miller , 1968-NMS C-139, ¶ 7, 79 N. M. 540, 445 P. 2d 9 6 1 , “ fi n ding s are 16 sufficient if a f

air construction of all of them , taken togeth er, j ust i f[ i es ] th e trial 17 court’ s judgm ent.” H. T. Coker Constr. Co. v. W h i tfield Trans

p., Inc. , 1 8 1 9 7 4 -N M CA -0 0 2 , ¶9 , 8 5 N.M . 8 0 2 , 5 1 8 P. 2 d7 8 2 . He re , t h e d i s t r i ct co u rt ’s 19 co nc lus ionr es te d on its fi ndi ngs of f ac t, a nd c onsi de ri ng those f ind ing s c oll ec tiv el y26

1 we can re asonabl y i n fe r that im plicit in th e district court’ s finding that Plaintiff 2 suffere d co nsequent ial dam ages is that thos e consequential dam ages we re indeed 3 fo res eeable

. “ If

, f ro m the f ac ts f ound , the oth er

ne ce ssary

f ac ts m ay be r ea sona

bly 4 inferre d, the j udgm ent will not be distu rbed.” H erre ra , 19 91 -NMCA- 08 9, ¶ 1 4. 5 { 42} W e co nc l ud e t hatt he d i str i c tc ourt ’ s f i nd i ng s of

c on se qu e nt i a l d a m a ge s a re 6 supp orted by

subst antial evidence, w ith the one exception of the $2,500 in dam ages 7 fo r t h e f

u tu re c o s t o f p l u g g i n g t h e w el l . We a re n o tp er s u ad ed b y De fe n d an t ’s 8 argum ents that consequenti al dam ages m ust be sup ported by

a finding of special 9 c i r c u ms t a n c e s a n dh e r e r e qu i r e da n e x p l i c i tf i n d i n g o f o b je c t i v e f o r e s e e ab i l i t y. 10 Co nse que ntl y , w e re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s aw ar d of c onse que nti al da m ag es in the 11 am ount

of $2, 500, but

le av e the r em ai nde r of its co nse que nti al da m ag es a w ar d in ta ct

. 12 6. Th e D ist ri ct C ou rt D id N ot Er r in D et er m in in g Th at P lai nt if f’s Un fa ir 13 Trade P ractice s Act(U PA ) C laim Was Not Gr o un dl es s and in D enying 14 De fend ant an A w ard of A ttorn ey Fe es 15 { 43} Fo r h i s fi n al cl ai m o f e rr o r, De fe n d an tch al l en g es t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 16 “ Co nc lus ionN o. 70” that Plaintiff’ s UPAcl ai m wa s not grou ndless and that17 G ive n th e re st of D ef en dant’ s ar gum en t and tha t the re is no “ Co nc lus ionN o. 2 18 70,” we assu m e th at Defendant’ s intent is to challenge the district court’ s finding that 19 Pl ai nti ff

’ s UP A cl ai m w as not gr ound le ss, al ong w ith its c onc lus ionthat D ef en dant 20 was no t en ti tl edto att orne y fees

. 27 1 D ef en dant w as not

e nti tle d to atto rn ey

f ee s. W e re

j ec t D ef en dant’ s arg um en ts a s to 2 2 th es e is su es . 3 { 44} Under the U PA , a party who prevails against a U PAclaim is entitled to recover 4 a t t o rn ey fe es i f t h e c o u rtfi n d s t h at t h e o p p o s i n g p ar t y b ro u g h ta g ro u n d l es s cl ai m. 5 NMS A 1978, § 57-12-10(C) (2005). “ In interpreting Section 57-12-10 (C), however, 6 w e do n ot re ad the statut e to a uth or iz e ana w ar d of

a tto rn ey [] f

ee s to [ the d] ef

en dants 7 m er el y be ca use the y suc ce ssf ull y pr ev ai le d a ga ins t th e cl ai m s a sse rt ed by [ the 8 p] laintiff.” G

. E

. W

. M ec h. Co ntr ac tor

s, In c. v. J ohns ton Co

. , 199 3- N MC A -0 81, ¶ 23, 9 115 N

. M. 727 , 858 P. 2d 103. A cl ai m is con sid er ed gr ound le ss, w hic h w e ha ve he ld 10 is synon ym ou s wi th fri vo lo us , id. ¶ 24, when “ there is no arguable basis in law or fa ct 11 to s uppo rt

the c au se of

a ct iona nd the cl ai m is not supp orte d by a good -f ai th arg um en t 12 for the extension, m odification, or rever sal of existing law.” Id

. ¶ 23

. 13 { 45} D ef

en dant’ s on ly ba sis fo r thi s cha lle nge is tha t P la int if f did not “ m ak e a good 14 fa itha rg um en t f

or the e xte nsi on, m odi fi catio n or re ve rs al of w el l- es ta bli she d e xis tin g 15 law

. . . ,” se e D av is , 195 9- N MS C-08 4, ¶ 6, that a w el l dr ill er

c an not w ar rant the 16 perform ance or longevity of a w ell. D efendant m is ch ar ac t erizes the text of D av is ,28

1 however. W e have alr eady noted that while Davis d o es not im pose an im

plied 2 w ar ranty in a co ntr ac t f

or the dr ill ing of

apr oduc ing w el l, the re is nothin g in D av is 3 t o s up p o rtD e f

e n d a n t ’ s c o n t e n t i o n t h a taw e l l

- d r i l l e r c a n n o to f f e r a n e x p r e s s wa r

r an ty. 4 Pl ai nti ff

ne ve r cl ai m ed

a n impl ie d w ar

ranty , but r athe r tha t D ef

en dant t old

him the 5 we ll would last fifty y ears. The dist rict cou rt con cluded that this statem ent created an 6 express warranty

betwee n the p ar t i es . Thus, Pla intiff had no ob ligation to m ake an 7 ar gum en t f

or the e xte nsi on, m odi fi catio n, or re ve rs al of es ta bli she d law be ca

use the 8 law ci te d by D ef

en dant ha d no ap pli catio n to thi s c as e. Be ca use D ef en dant o ff

er s no 9 argum ent other than his concluso ry assertion that Plaintiff failed t o m ak e a p roper 10 argum ent, w e hold that the district court did not err in finding Plaintiff’ s claim wa s 11 no t g ro un dl es s. 12 { 46} D ef

en dant f urthe r ch al le nge s th e dis tr ic t co ur t’s c onc lus ionthat he is not 13 entitled to attorney fees. Our Suprem e Court has stated num erous tim es in this regard 14 th at “ [c]on cl us io ns of la w m us t be su pp or te d b y

fin di ng s o f ul ti m at e fac t.” Torres v. 15 P las te ch Co rp. , 199 7- N MS C- 053, ¶ 13, 1 24 N. M. 197 , 947 P

. 2d 1 54. H er e, the 16 dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ind ing that P la int if

f’ s c la im was not

gr ound le ss p ro vid es suf

fi ci en t 17 supp ort f

or it s c onc lus ion

. Fo r D ef

en dant to pr ev ai l on his c la im f or a tto rn ey f ee s, “ it 18 is n ot e noug h to sho wthat [ the p] la int if f did not pr ev ai l on s uc h c la im s. T he party 19 m ust a lso es ta bl is h that, a t the ti m e suc h c la im w as f ile d, the c la im

w as ini tiate d in29

1 bad faith or there w as no credible ev i d en ce to suppo rt it.” Jo nes v . B ea ve rs , 2 1993 -N MCA -100, ¶ 23, 116 N.M. 634, 866 P.2d 362. Other than his con cl u s ory 3 as se rt ionthat P la int if

f fa ile d to m ak e ana rg um en t f or the e xte nsi on, m odi fi catio n, or 4 re ve rs al of

e xis tin g law, Def

en dant m ak es no arg um en t tha t P la int if f ini tiate d hi s 5 cl ai m in ba d f ai th o r w ith out

e vid en tiary

su pp or t. “ It is not

our pr ac tic e to r el y

on 6 as se rt ion s of

c ouns el una cc om

panie d by supp ort in the r ec or d. T he m er e as se rt ion s 7 and argum ents of counsel are not evidence[. ] ” Chan v. M onto ya , 201 1- N MC A -0 72, 8 ¶ 9 , 15 0 N.M . 44 , 25 6 P. 3 d 9 8 7 (i n t er n al qu o t at i o n m ar k s an dci t at i o n o m i t t ed ). We 9 the re fo re c onc lud e tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt di d not er r in fi ndi ng tha t D ef

en dant is n ot 10 en ti tl edto att orne y

fees

. 11 P lai nt if

f’ s C lai m s of

Er ro r 12 7. Th e D ist ri ctC ou rtD id N ot Er r in D eny in g Pla in ti ff ’s C lai m f

or U nf air 13 Trade P ractice s 14 { 47} Inhis c ro ss- ap pe al , P la int if f fi rs t arg ue s tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in de ny ing 15 his claim

for unfair trade prac tices. A s g ro u nds for this app eal, Plaintiff c hallenges 16 se ve ra l of

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ind ing s of fa ct an d its conc lus ion tha t “ Pl ai nti ff did not 17 dem onstrate Def

endant engaged in any

unfair or dece pti v e [trade] practice that 18 vio la te d N ewMe xi co’ s U nf ai r [T ra de ] P ra ct ic es A ct

. ” Pl ai nti ff a rg ue s th at

the 19 re m ai nin g find ing s of fa ct de m onstrate tha t Pla int if f in f ac t di d sa tis fy

the e le m en ts 2 0 o f aU P A c l a i m, a n dt h u s t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rte rr e di n d e n yi n g h i s c l a i m.30

1 U nde r the U PA , a n un fa ir tr ad e pr ac tic e is: 2 a fa lse or

m isl ea din g or al or

w ri tte n st at em en t, vis ua l de sc ri pti on o r 3 oth er

r ep re se nta tio n of

a ny kin d kn ow ing ly

m ad e in co nne ct ionw iththe 4 sale , l ease , r en ta l or loan of goo ds o r se rv ic es or

in the e xte nsi on o f 5 cred it or in the c oll ec tio n of de bts by ape rs on i n th e re gul ar

c our se of 6 the pe rs on’ s tr ad e or c om m er ce , that m ay , te nds to o r doe s de ce ive or 7 m is le adan y

pe rs on . 8 NMS A 1978, § 57-12-2(D) (2009). W e agre e w ith Plaintiff that the first elem ent, that 9 De fendant m ade fa lse or m isleading representations , is supported bythe district 10 court’ s unchalleng ed finding s. W e disagree, however, with Plaintiff’ s assertion that 1 1 the f a l s e o r m i s l e a d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w e r e kn o w i n g l y m a d e . B e c au s e t h e s e co nd 12 el em en t re qui re d fo r a cl ai m und er the U PAis not

sa tis fi ed , w e de cl ine to ad dr es s th e 13 th ird ele m en t. 14 { 48} Pl ai nti ff

a rg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ind ing s of

m ult ipl e ne gl ig ent 15 m isrepres en tations “ m ust” lead to the conclusi on that th ose representations wer e 16 knowingl y

m ade. W e disagree. Our S uprem e Court has said that a “ knowingl y m ade” 17 sta te m en t i s m ad e w he n the “ party w as ac tua lly aw ar e tha t the state m en t w as f al se or 18 m isleading when m ade, or in the exercise of reasonable d iligence shou ld have been 19 aw are that the statem ent wa s false or m isleading.” Ste ve nson v . L oui s D re yf us C orp. , 20 1991 -N MS C- 051, ¶

17, 112 N

. M. 97, 81 1 P. 2d 1 308 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks 21 om itted). U nder our case law , “‘ knowingl y m ade’ is an integral part of all U PA 22 cl ai m s an d . .

. m ust be the sub

j ect of a ctual proof.” A th e r t o n v . G opi n ,31

1 2015 -N MCA -003, ¶ 47, 340 P. 3d 630. Anegligent m isrepresentation is m ade w hen 2 a pa rty fai ls to ex erci se reas on ab le care or c om pe te nc e in co m

m un ic at ing inf

or m at ion

. 3 W

. Sta tes Me ch

. Co ntr ac tor s, In c. v . San dia Co rp ., 1990 -N MCA -094, ¶ 15, 110 N.M. 4 676 , 7 98 P

. 2d

1 06 2. P l a i nt i f

f a r gu e s t hatt he r e a so na

bl e ne ss s t a nd a r d i s i m

pl icated 5 in bot h neglig ently made and knowingl y m ade m isrepresentations, and thus th e “ 6 ‘ know ing ly ’ r equire m en t sh oul d be e sta bli she d w he n r ep re se nta tio ns are m ad e 7 ne gli ge ntl y

about m at er ia l f

ac ts th at are w ith in the e xpe ct ed kno w le dge of 8 [D]efend an t.” We are n ot pe rs ua de d. If we ad op t Pl ai nt iff’s v i e w of t he UPA, a 9 ne g l i g e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w o u l d a l w a y s b e kn o w i n g l y m a d e a n d t h e r e w o u ld b e no 10 dis tin ct ionbe tw ee n th e tw o st an dard s. 11 { 49} Pl ai nti ff

’ s a sse rt ion re gard ing his c onc lus ionthat ne gli ge ntl y m ad e 12 represe ntation s are ipso facto kn owingly m ade app ears to be based on his theory that 13 know ing ly is a le sse r standard than tha t of ne gli ge nc e. T o supp ort h is arg um en t, 14 Pl ai nti ff

c ite s Co tte r v . No va k , 1953-NMS C-093, 57 N. M

. 6 3 9, 261 P.2d 827. In 15 Cotter , the pla int if

f, a y oung c hil d, w as inj ur ed w he n anothe r ch ild

dis ch ar ge d ana il 16 in to th e ch il d’s e ye us in g a da rt g un . Id

. ¶ 1. T he pla int if

f br ough t su it ag ai nst

the 17 pr ope rty ow ne r, al le gin g th at by “ know ing ly

pe rm itt [i ng] ” cans o f na ils to re m ai n on 18 th e pr em is es , t he de fen da nt ha d act edne gl ig en tl y . Id

. Our Suprem e Court held that 19 be ca use the re w as nothin g in he re ntl y dange ro u s a

b o u t n ai ls, a nd b ec au se ar ea sona ble32

1 pe rs on c oul d no t f

or es ee a n in

j ur y r es ult ing f

ro m the na ils be ing le ft on the pr em ise s, 2 the pla int if

f fa ile d to state ac la im

f or w hic h r el ie f co uld

be gr an te d. Id

. ¶¶ 7 , 9. 3 U nli ke P la int if

f, w e se e nothin g w ith in o ur S upr em e Co ur t’ s r

uli ng tha t l ea ds u s to 4 co nc lud e know ing ly

a nd n eg lig en tly

a re nowto be int er ch an ge ab lyuse d te rm s or 5 el em en ts, a nd c er

ta in ly n ot hin g to ind ic at e tha t w hic h is ne gli ge ntl y or im pr ope rl y 6 co nstru ct ed

w as the re fo re kno w ing ly so. 7 { 50} Pl aintiff further s argues that De fendant “ certa inly had knowledge of such 8 ci rc um stanc es that w oul d or din ar ily le ad to k now le dge of

the a ct ua l f ac ts c onc er

nin g 9 his various statem ents.” H owever , i n fi n ding s not di sputed b y Plaintiff, the district 10 co urt f

ound that D ef en dant f ai le d to ke ep suf

fi ci en t r ec or ds abo ut the w el l and the 11 work perf

orm ed constructing it, and could not state with any certa inty what w ork was 12 pe rf orm ed on the w el l. T his wou ld seem to co ntr ad ic t the ide a tha t D ef en dant 13 “ knowi n g l y” m ade re presentations to Plaintiff bec ause at the tim e they we re m ade, 1 4 D e f e n d a n td i dn o th a v e kn o w l e d g e o n e wa y o r a n o t h e r r e g a r d i n g t h e i r

t r u t h o r f a l s i t y. 15 { 51} Fi na lly , w e be lie ve that i f th e Le gis la tur e int en de d to a llo wc la im s un de r the 16 U PAto pr oc ee d un de r a neg lig en ce standard , it w oul d have ind ic at ed

a s m uc h inthe 17 langua ge of

the U PA

. “ Inint er

pr et ing statut es , [ the appe llate c ourts] se ek to giv e 18 ef fe ct to the L eg isl at

ur e’ s in te nt, a nd in dete rm ini ng inte nt w e loo k to the langua ge 19 used[.] ” Ke

y v. Ch ry sle r M oto rs C orp. , 1996 -N MS C- 038, ¶ 13, 121 N

. M. 764 , 91833

1 P. 2d 35 0. Be cause t h e l an g uage used by the UP A r equires a “ knowingl y m ade” 2 m isr ep re se nta tio n, r athe r than ane gli ge nt misr epres en tati on, w e co nc lud e tha t the 3 Le gislature intenti onally chose the high er “ knowingl y ” standard over the negligence 4 st an da rd

. See § 57 -1 2- 2( D ). Be ca use P la int if

f ha s f ai le d to poi nt t o e vid en ce in the 5 re co rd to de m onstrate tha t D ef en dant’ s m isr ep re se nta tio ns s at isf y thi s st an dard , a nd 6 because he has not persuaded this court that knowinglyis a lesser s t an d ard than 7 ne gli ge ntl y , w e co nc lud e tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt di d not er r in fi ndi ng tha t D ef

en dant 8 di d n ot kn owi ng ly m ak e m is rep res en ta ti on s t o P la in ti ff. 9 8. Th e D ist ri ctC ou rtD id N ot Er r in D en yi ng Plai nt if f’ s C lai m f

or 10 “Unc onscionable Trade Pr actice” 11 { 52} Pl ai nti ff

’ s se co nd i ssu e is whe the r

th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in ef fe ct ive ly de ny ing 12 his c la im

f or unc onsc ion ab le tr ad e pr ac tic e by f ind ing th at

“ Pl ai nti ff

f ai le d to 13 es ta bli sh D ef

en dant’ s a ct s and p ra ct ic es c onst itu te d an un co nsc ion ab le tr ad e 14 practice. ” Plaintiff contends that this finding is m ore accurately categorized as a legal 15 co nc lus iona nd thus w ar rants de nov o r ev ie w . “ Fi ndi ngs of f ac t and c onc lus ion s of 16 lawa re of

te n in dis tin gui sha

ble , a nd a r ev ie w ing c ourt i s no t bo und by ade sig na tio n 17 as a finding.” Mil le r v. Ba nk of Am., N.A. , 201 5- N MSC-0 22, ¶ 27, 352 P

. 3d 1 162 18 (a lte ratio ns, int er

na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). Furthe r, “ [t ] o the ex te nt 19 tha t [ the p] la int if

f co nte nds tha t the re ar e er ro rs of lawin the tr ia l c ourt’ s c onc lus ion s 20 or in th os e fin dings tha t f

unc tio n a s c onc lus ion s, w e ap ply ade nov o st an dard

of34

1 rev ie w.” Jones , 2005 -N MCA -124, ¶ 8. W e agre e w ith Plaintiff that what c onsti tutes 2 an uncons cionable trade practice i s a question o f law , dependent on the factual 3 ci rcu m st an ces pre se nt . W e th eref or e ap pl y de no vo rev ie w. 4 T he U PAde fi ne s an un co nsc ion ab le tr ad e pr ac tic e as : 5 [A ] n a ct

or pr ac tic e in con ne ct ionw iththe sa le , le as e, r en ta l or loan, or 6 in c onne ct ionw iththe of fe ri ng f or sa le , le as e, re nta l or

loan, of a ny 7 good s or

se rv ic es , inc lud ing s e r

v i c e s p r o v i d e d

b y l i ce nse d pr of

es sio na ls, 8 or i n t h e e x t e n s i o n o f c r e d i t o r i n t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f d e b t s tha t t o a 9 pe rs on’ s de tr im en t: 10 11 (1) takes advantage of the lac k of knowledge, ability , e xperience 12 or

c ap ac ity of ape rs on t o agr oss ly

unf ai r de gr ee ; or 13 1 4 ( 2 ) r e s u l t s i n ag r o s s d i s p a r i t y b e t w e e n t h e v a l u e r e c e i v e d b y a 15 pe rs on an d t he pri ce p ai d. 1 6 Se ct i o n 5 7

- 1 2

- 2 ( E )

. H e r e , P l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e v a l u e h e r e c e i v e d f r o m the 1 7 c o n tr a c t i s g r o s s l y d i s p r o p o rt i o n a t e t o t h e p r i c e h e p a i d

. A s g r o u n d s f o r t h i s c l a i m, 18 Plaintiff bases his deter m ination of value on the long evity of the w ell. P laintiff w as 19 tol d by

D ef en dant tha t P la int if

f co uld e xpe ct th e w el l t o la st a bout f if ty y ears , a nd 20 in st eadit las te d l es s t ha n fo urbe fo re i t “ su bs ta nt ia ll y fai le d.” 21 { 53} T he le ad ing c as e on unc onsc ion ab ili ty is St at e ex re l. Ki ng v. B & B Inv. Gr p., 22 Inc. , 2014-NMS C-024, 329 P.3d 6 5 8

. In that case, our Suprem e Court declar ed 23 certain pay day loans to be unc onsc ion ab le , the le as t ex pe nsi ve of w hic h carr ie d a 24 1,1 47 .14 pe rcen t in te res t ra te

. Id

. ¶ 36. T he Co urt he ld tha t the loans w er e obj ec tiv el y35

1 low-value products which we re “ grosslydisprop ortionate t o t h eir price .” Id

. T he 2 pr im ary co nsum er s of the pay day

loans w er e tho se in pove rty , the unb an ke d and 3 unde rb an ke d m em

be rs of soc ie ty w ho are part ic ularl y vul ne ra ble to the pr ac tic es of 4 p a yd ay lo an co m

pa ni es . Se e id. ¶

6

. T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rth a dc o n s i d e r e d“ v a l u e ” in 5 subjective ter

m s, w hich our Suprem e Court stated wa s the sam e as say ing “ the m ore 6 de sp erat e a p ers on is form on ey , th e m or e ‘val ue ’ th atpe rs on rece iv es fro m a lo an .” 7 Id

. ¶ 35. T he Court further stated that “ [u] nder that erroneous reading of the statute, 8 co nsum er

e xpl oit at ionw oul d be le ga l i n di re ct pr opor tio n to th e ex te nt of

the 9 consum er’ s desperation[.] ” Id

. T he C o ur

t , c onsi de ri ng v al ue in obj ec tiv e te rm s, f ound 10 tha t w he n th e va lue s r ec ei ve d, f or e xa m ple , $10 0 or

$20 0, w er e co m

pare d to the 11 prices paid, $999.71 or $2,160.04 respectively , ther e w as a gross disparity betwee n 12 th e p ric e p ai d a nd va lu e rec ei ve d. Id

. ¶ ¶ 7, 8, 38. T he Co urt f

urthe r sta te d: 13 T he U PAis a lawthat pr ohi bit s th e ec onom ic e xpl oit at ionof oth er s. T he 14 langua ge of the U PAe vin ce s ale gis la tiv e re co gni tio n th at , und er c er ta in 15 co ndi tio ns, the m ar ke t i s tr uly not f re e, le av ing it

f or c ourts t o de te rm ine 16 w he n th e m ar

ke t i s no t f

re e, a nd e m

pow er ing c ourts t o stop and pr ec lud e 17 tho se w ho p re y on t he de spe ratio n of

oth er s f ro m be ing r ew ar de d w ith 18 w ind fa ll pr of

its

. 19 Id

. ¶ 34

. 20 { 54} I n aU PAc la im f or unc onsc ion ab ili ty , the bur de n is on the pla int if f to p ro vid e 21 th e co ur t wi th ev id en ce t o d em on st rat e a g ro ss di sp ari ty. See Lenscr a f t er s , I nc. v . 22 Ke hoe , No . 28 ,14 5, 2 01 0 WL 49 24 99 2, at *8 (Oct . 15 , 20 10 ) (n on -p rece de nt ia l), aff’d36

1 in part , re v’ d in part

on o the r gr ound

s , 201 2-NMS C-020, 28 2 P. 3d 758. In this case, 2 Pl ai nti ff

ha s no t m et

that burd en , a s he ha s su m m ar ily of fere d ana rg um en t f

or 3 uncons cionabilit y without havi ng provi ded evidence that the value received w as 4 gr oss ly dis pr opor

tio na te t o th e pr ic e pa id, oth er than to state that be ca

use the w el l 5 la ste d f or le ss than f

our y ears , he r ec ei ved le ss than 10 pe rc en t of the lon ge vity

he 6 wa s prom ised. Plaintiff conflates longevit y and value without offeri n g t h e cou rt 7 ev ide nc e as to howlon ge vity de te rm ine s va lue in thi s ca se . U nde r Pl ai nti ff ’ s vie wof 8 B & B I n v e s tm e n t

G r oup , an y t i m e a d ef

en d an tb re ac h es a c o n t ra ct , t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s 9 subj ec tiv e, pe rc ei ve d va lue of the c ontra ct

w oul d be low er ed

a nd thus be 10 dis pr opor

tio na te to the pr ic e paid. U nde r thi s th eo ry , pr ac tic al ly e ve ry br ea chof 11 contract claim

would also be an uncons cionabilit y claim , wh i ch is not, we believe, 12 wha t t he Legi sl atur e in te nd edin en act in g t he UPA. 13 { 55} Under

B & B I nv es tm en t G roup , w e do n ot l ook to a br ea chto de te rm ine 14 w he the r the re e xis ts a dis pari ty that is di sp ro portio na te

. Rathe r, w e loo k to the 15 barg ai n of

the part ies an d dete rm ine w he the r on i ts f ac e the be ne fi t of

the barg ai n 16 (v al ue r ec ei ve d) a nd the pr ic e pa id are gr oss ly dis parate

. W e co nc lud e tha t is n ot the 17 ca se he re . P la int if

f barg ai ne d for

aw el l w itha n im

pli ed w ar ranty of aw orkm an lik e 18 standard and an express warranty of fifty y ears of use for j ust un der $38,000. O ther 19 than th at

it f ai le d to pe rf

orm a s e xpe ct ed , P la int if

f poi nts to nothin g inthe r ec or d to37

1 dem onstrate that what he bargained for was d ispropo rtionate to that price. P ut anoth er 2 way , P laintiff provides thi s court with no evidence that the well, as bargained for, wa s 3 not w orth $38, 000, nor did he of fe r ev ide nc e to s howthat, e ve n takin g in to a cc ount 4 the f ac t the w el l l as te d on ly

af ra ct ionof the tim e pr om ise d, the va lue re ce ive d f or the 5 well as b arg ai ne d fo r was gro ss ly dis pr op or ti on at e to th e p ric e h e p ai d. 6 { 56} Given Plaintiff’ s potenti al aw ard for treble dam ages an d at t o rn eyfee s in an 7 unc onsc ion ab le tr ad e pr ac tic e cl ai m , S ec tio n 57 -1 2- 10, w e be lie ve that the 8 L eg isl at

ur e int en de d th at

tho se se ek ing r el ie f fo r anunc onsc ion ab ili ty c la im m ust 9 es tabl is h t ha t t he de fen da nt eco no m ic al ly exp lo it edth e p la in ti ff. Se e B & B Inv. Gr p., 10 Inc. , 2 0 1 4

- N M S C

- 0 2 4 , ¶ 3 4

. We f i n dn o e x p l o i t a t i o n b e yo n dt h e b r e a c h o f wa rr a n t y, 1 1 up o n wh i ch cl ai m

Pl ai n t i ff h as al re ad y re co v er ed a g a i n s tDe fe n d an t . P l ai n t i ff ’s 12 uncons cionabilit y

claim is ground ed solely on the basis that the we ll did no t last as 13 lon g a s D ef

en dant s ai d it

w oul d and thus the re m

ust be a gr oss dis pari ty be tw ee n th e 14 pr ic e pa id and v al ue r ec ei ve d. H ow ev er , w he the r the D ef en dant bre ac he d th e part ie s’ 15 ag re em en t and w he the r the w el l la ste d as lon g as D ef en dant as sur ed Pl ai nti ff it w oul d 16 we re iss u es appropriately considered and disp osed of by the district court und er 17 Plaintiff’ s other causes of action. Ther efore, we hold th at the district court did no t err 18 in deny ing Plaintiff’ s claim for unconscionabl e trade practice.38

1 CONCLUSI ON 2 { 57} W e re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s aw ar d of c onse que nti al da m ag es in the a m ount 3 of $2 ,50 0, an d a ffi rm

th e d is tri ctco ur t’s jud gm en t i n a ll ot he r res pe ct s. 4 { 58} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

5

___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ ____ ____ 6 J. M ILES HA NISE E, Judge

7 WE CO NCUR:

8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 9 M IC HA EL E. V IG IL , C hi ef Ju dg e

10

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 11 M . M ON IC A Z A M OR A , Ju dg e