This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1593 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Cody John Opheim, Appellant. Filed August 15, 2016 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Larkin, Judge Martin County District Court File Nos. 46-CR-14-525, 46-CR-14-817
Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Terry W. Viesselman, Martin County Attorney, Fairmont , Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Amy Lawler, Veronica M. Surges, Assistant Public Defenders, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge. 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N LARKIN , Judge Appellant challenges his convictions of second-degree assault and escape from custody, arguing that the district court erre d by denying his presentence request for plea withdrawal under the manifest-injustice and fa ir-and-just standards. We conclude that appellant’s guilty pleas are valid and that he is not entitled to plea withdrawal under the manifest-injustice standard. We therefore affi rm in part. However, because the district court failed to apply the fair-and-just standardwhen deciding appellant’s request for plea withdrawal, we reverse in part and remand for a determination under that standard. FACTS Respondent State of Minnesota charged ap pellant Cody John Opheim with seconddegree assault, two counts of fourth-degree a ssault, and obstructing legal process. The complaint alleged that on June 5, 2014, Fairmont police officers responded to Opheim’s home after receiving a report of a suicidal man with a knife. The complaint further alleged that officers encountered Opheim , who was sitting on a couch, and told hi m that they were there to help. Opheim pulled out a knife from behind a cushion and he ld it with the blade pointed out in front of him. Officers drew their weapons and ordered Opheim to drop the knife. Opheim raised the knife up to the side of his head with his elbow bent and his forearm forward, holding the kn ife blade forward toward the officers in an “aggressive” manner. Officers continued to tell Opheim to dr op the knife, and Opheim stabbed the knife into the couch cushion. Office rs obtained the knife, and took Opheim into custody. As they did so, Opheim punched on e officer and kicked another.3 On June 10, Opheim appeared before the district court, in cu stody, and asked the district court to release him to Fountain Cent ers, where he had been participating in an inpatient treatment program. The di strict court ordered the following: All right. Mr. Opheim, I’m going to set some conditions. The bail is $5,000. Now, in order for you to be released, except back to Fountai n Centers, you’d have to post a bond or bail. You cannot use alcohol or any other chemicals unless it’s prescribed to you by a physician, and you’ll be subject to random testing. You shouldn’t travel outside of Minnesota. If you change your address, you should tell your attorney and court administrator. And, you should surrender any weapons to law enforcement to be held while this case is pending. You may continue at Fountain Centers, inpatient as long as you’re following the rules there . . . . On July 11, the district court filed a writte n order, stating: “It is hereby ordered that Cody John Opheim’s furlough from jail for treatment may conti nue as long as he is in the House of Hope half way house pr ogram. If he leaves House of Hope or is discharged from House of Hope, he should immediately return to jail.” The district court mailed a notice of filing of the order to Opheim’s attorney. The record does not reveal what prompted the order. On August 14, the state charged Opheim with felony-level es cape from custody, alleging that Opheim left House of Hope on August 11 and did not return to jail as required by the July 11 order. In December, Opheim appeared in district court with a new a ttorney and reached a plea agreement with the state. Opheim agreed to plead guilty to second-deg ree assault and escape from custody, and the state agreed to dismiss the other charges. The agreement called for a 21-month stayed sentence on th e second-degree-assault charge and a gross-4 misdemeanor sentence on the escape charge. Op heim pleaded guilty a nd provided a factual basis for his pleas through a colloquy as follows: Q: Mr. Opheim, back on June 5th, 2014, . . . police officers came to your residence in Fairmont, Martin County, Minnesota; is that right? A: Yes. Q: And when they came there you were seated on a couch and while they were talking to you, you pulled out a knife and held it up; is that correct? A: Yes. Q: And the officers felt th reatened by that knife; you understand that? A: Yes. Q: And that’s the basis for your plea in this case? A: Yes. Q: And as a result of that incide nt you were placed in arrest and held here in the jail and you were furlo ughed to go to treatment at Fountain Centers and—or was it the House of Hope? A: Fountain Centers in Albert Lea, and then after I passed that it was House of Hope in Mankato. Q: Okay. And part of your furlough order [was] that when you were done with Fountain Centers, House of Hope, or discharged from treatment, you were to return immediately to jail? A: Yes. Q: Is that right? And you we re discharged from House of Hope on August 11th, 2014, and you didn’t come back to the jail; is that correct? A: Yes. Q: And the jailers found out. They called House of Hope, found out you had left and you were basically tracked down; is that right? A: Yes. Prior to sentencing, Opheim moved to with draw his guilty pleas. Opheim asserted that it was fair and just to allow plea withdr awal because he was not guilty of the charges and that his pleas were not va lid because he was not fully aw are of the ramifications of5 pleading guilty. Opheim argued that his pleas were not inte lligent because he thought he was facing seven years in prison rather than 21 months, whic h was the presumptive sentence for his second-degree-a ssault charge. Opheim also argued that his pleas were not accurate because the factual basis for each charge was established through leading questions. Opheim further argue d that he was not guilty of second-degree assault because he did not cause fear in the officers and that he was not guilty of escape from custody because he was not aware of the July 11 order requiring his return to jail if he left House of Hope. In his brief supporting the motion, Opheim’s attorney note d that “[w]hen taking over the file from [Opheim’s] previous attorney I found that I did not have a copy of [the July 11] order in the file so I am not sure if he was ever notified of that requirement.” The district court held a hearing on Opheim’s motion and heard testimony from Opheim and his mother. After the hearing, th e district court issued a written order. The order indicates that the district court consider ed whether plea withdrawal was necessary to “correct a manifest injustice,” but not whethe r plea withdrawal was fair and just. The district court concluded that Opheim’s guilty pleas were accu rate, voluntary, and intelligent and denied his request for plea withdrawal. The district court stayed imposition of sentence on the second-degree-assault conviction and placed Ophe im on probation. The district court imposed a stayed 240-day jail sentence on the escape-from-custody conviction. This appeal follows. D E C I S I O N “A defendant does not have an absolute right to with draw a valid guilty plea.” State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). Gu ilty pleas may be w ithdrawn only if one6 of two standards is met. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05 (se tting forth the manifest-injustice and fair-and-just standards for plea withdrawal). The district court must allow plea withdrawal at any time “upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Id. , subd. 1. A manifest injustice exis ts if a guilty plea is not valid. Theis , 742 N.W.2d at 646. To be valid, a guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary and intelligent.” State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). The accuracy requirement pr otects the defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he or she could be properly convicted of at tr ial. The voluntariness requirement insures that the guilty plea is not in response to improper pressures or inducements; an d the intelligent requirement insures that the defendant unders tands the charges, his or her rights under the law, and the co nsequences of pleading guilty. Carey v. State , 765 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2009). “A defendant bears th e burden of showing his plea was invalid.” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). The validity of a plea is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. The district court may allow pl ea withdrawal before sentenci ng “if it is fair and just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. “The court must give due consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant in support of the motion and any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution by reason of actions take n in reliance upon the defendant’s plea.” Id. A defendant bears the burden of advancing reasons to support withdrawal. Kim v. State , 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 19 89). The state bears the burden7 of showing prejudice caused by withdrawal. State v. Wukawitz , 662 N.W.2d 517, 527 (Minn. 2003). Although it is a lower burden, the fair-and-just standard “does not allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for simply any reason.” Theis , 742 N.W.2d at 646 (quotation omitted). Allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “for any reason or without good reason” would “undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.” Kim , 434 N.W.2d at 266. We review a district c ourt’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion, reversing only in the
“rare case.” Id

. Opheim argues for relief under both the manifest-injustice and fair-and-just standards. “[I]f a review of the record demo nstrates that [a defendant’s] plea was invalid, we need not reach the question of whether withdrawal may have been authorized under the discretionary fair-and-just standard because th e manifest injustice standard . . . requires withdrawal where a plea is invalid.” Theis , 742 N.W.2d at 646. We therefore first consider whether Opheim is entitled to plea withdrawal under the manifest-injustice standard. Manifest-Injustice Standard: Second-Degree Assault Opheim argues that his “guilty plea to second-degree assau lt was not voluntary because he was told that he would receive a dow nward departure, when in fact he received the guidelines sentence.” [W]hen a plea rests in any sign ificant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. If a promise within a plea agreement is not fulfilled,8 the defendant cannot be said to have voluntarily entered into the plea agreement. Carey , 765 N.W.2d at 400 (citation and quotations omitted). Opheim states that his tria l counsel told him that the presumptive sentence for second-degree assault under the sentencing gu idelines was a 21-month executed sentence and that, in exchange for pl eading guilty, he would receive a downward departure and a stayed sentence. Opheim argues that “[i]n fact, the Minnesota Se ntencing Guidelines called for [him] to receive a stayed senten ce, and the mandatory minimum statute that would arguably have been appli cable would only have required an executed sentence of a year and a day.” Opheim therefore contends that he “was not actually faci ng a presumptive 21-month executed sentence, and so pled guilty in order to receive a benefit that was not, and could not, be delivered.” Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subds. 4, 9 (2012), pr ovides that any defe ndant convicted of second-degree assault in which the defendant or an ac complice, at th e time of the offense, used, whether by brandi shing, displaying, threatening with, or otherwise employing, a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, shall be committ ed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than on e year plus one day, nor more than the maximum senten ce provided by law. And the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide that “ [r]egardless of whether an offender would otherwise recei ve a presumptive stayed sent ence under the Guidelines, the presumptive disposition for an offense subjec t to a mandatory sentence under Minnesota Statutes, section 609.11, is always commitm ent.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.E.2.b.(1) (Supp. 2013).9 Moreover: When an offender is convic ted of an offense with a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of one year and one day or more, the presumptive disposition is commitment even if the presumptive sentence would ordinarily fall within the shaded area on the applicable Grid. The presumptive duration of the prison sentence is the mandatory minimum sentence in statute or the duration provided in the appropriate cell on the applicable Grid, whichever is longer

. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.E.1 (S upp. 2013) (emphasis added). The comment to Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2. E.1 provides an example that explains exactly how to calculate the pr esumptive sentence for a defenda nt with a criminal-history score of zero who is convicted of seco nd-degree assault w ith a knife: For example, according to Minne sota Statutes, Section 609.11, the mandatory minimum prison sentence for Assault in the Second Degree involving a knife is one year and one day. However, according to the Gu idelines, the presumptive duration is the mandatory minimum sentence or the duration provided in the appropriate cell on the Standard Grid, whichever is longer. Therefore, for someone convicted of Assault in the Second Degree wi th a Criminal History Score of 0, the Guidelines presume a 21 month prison duration based on the appropriate cell on the Standard Grid found at Severity Level 6. Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.E.01 (Supp. 2013). In sum, because Opheim ha d a criminal-history score of zero, the presumptive sentence for the second-degree- assault offense under the se ntencing guidelines was 21 months in prison. Thus, Opheim’s argument that hi s guilty plea was involuntary and therefore invalid, because he “was not actua lly facing a presumptive 21-month executed sentence,” is without merit.10 Opheim next argues that his guilty plea to second-degree assault was inaccurate because he did not provide a su fficient factual basis for the plea. “A proper factual basis must be established for a guilty plea to be accurate.” Theis , 742 N.W.2d at 647 (quotation omitted). “The factual basis must establish sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Munger v. State , 749 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). “Although there are various ways to present the factual basis fo r a guilty plea, all of them contemplate the disclosure on the record of the specific fa cts that would establish the elements of the crime to which th e defendant is pleading guilty.” State v. Misquadace , 629 N.W.2d 487, 491-92 (Minn. App. 2001), aff’d , 644 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 2002). “Whoever assaults another with a dange rous weapon” is guilty of second-degree assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2012). The definiti on of assault includes “an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1) (2012). “‘With intent to’ . . . means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the re sult specified or believes that th e act, if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2012). Opheim argues that “[t]here is nothing in the plea colloquy th at would establish either that [he] intended to cause fear in the o fficers, or that a factfi nder could infer that he intended to cause fear.” But during the plea colloquy, Opheim agreed that he pulled out a knife, held it up, and that the officers felt th reatened by that knife. Although Opheim did not testify that he intended to cause fear of immediate bodily harm, it may be inferred that “a person intends the natural and probabl e consequences of his actions.” State v. Cooper ,11 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). Moreover, the supreme court has established that a court may consider the facts alleged in a crim inal complaint when de termining whether an adequate factual basis exists for a plea. See, e.g. , State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983) (concluding that an adequate factual basis for a plea existed in part because by pleading guilty, the de fendant “in effect judicially adm itted the allegations contained in the complaint”); State v. Hoaglund , 307 Minn. 322, 326-27 , 240 N.W.2d 4, 6 (1976) (considering the contents of the criminal co mplaint, among other docum ents in the record, before concluding that a plea lackedan adequate factual basis). The complaint in this case alleged that after officers told Opheim to drop the knife, he raised the knife up to the side of his head with his elbow bent and his forearm forward, holding the knife blade forward toward the of ficers in an “aggressive” manner. Opheim’s admissions at the plea hearing co mbined with the allegations in the complaint support an inference that he intended to caus e fear of immediate bodily harm. See State v. Neumann , 262 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1978 ) (“It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the [district court] must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime char ged can be reasonably inferred.”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Moore , 481 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1992); Smith v. State , 596 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Minn. App. 1999) (c oncluding that a manifest inju stice did not exist where the defendant’s testimony was “suffi cient to infer [his] guilt”), review denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 1999). “The main purpose of the accuracy requ irement is to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convic ted of were he to insist on12 his right to trial.” Trott , 338 N.W.2d at 251. That is not a concern given the record in this case. In sum, Opheim has not met his burden to show that his guilty plea was inaccurate and therefore invalid. Manifest-Injustice Standard: Escape from Custody Opheim argues that his guilty plea to es cape from custody was inaccurate because he did not provide a sufficient factual basis fo r the plea. Whoever “escapes while . . . in lawful custody on a charge or conviction of a crime” is guilty of escape from custody. Minn. Stat. § 609.485, subd. 2(1) (2014). “‘ Escape’ includes departure without lawful authority and failure to return to custody fo llowing temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period.” Id. , subd. 1 (2014). Failure to return from a furlough constitutes an escape under Minn. Stat. § 609.485, subd. 1. Headbird v. State , 375 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Dec. 13, 1985). At the plea hearing, Opheim admitted that he was arrested and heldin jail as a result of the knife incident, he was furloughed from ja il to the House of H ope for treatment, he was ordered to return to jail if he completed treatment or was discharged from House of Hope, he was discharged from Ho use of Hope, and he did not re turn to jail. Thus, Opheim provided a factual basis that establishes the elements of the offense and supports a conclusion that his conduct falls within the charge to which he pleaded guilty. See Munger , 749 N.W.2d at 338 (stating that a defendant’s factual basis must “support a conclusion that [the] defendant’s conduct falls within the ch arge to which he desi res to plead guilty” (quotations omitted)).13 Opheim also argues that his escape-from-cu stody guilty plea is in accurate “because the record shows that the conditions of his release were never properly modified to place him on furlough status.” E ssentially, Opheim attempts to raise a legal challenge to the underlying custody order in the context of his challenge to the factual basis for his plea. Because a counseled guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects, we do not consider this argument. See State v. Ford , 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Min n. 1986) (“A guilty plea by a counseled defendant has traditiona lly operated, in Minnesota a nd in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects ar ising prior to the entry of the plea.”); see also State v. Johnson , 422 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. App. 1988) (“Appellant ’s guilty plea waived his nonjurisdictional statute of limitations defense.”), review denied (Minn. May 16, 1988). In sum, Opheim has not met his burden to show that his guilty plea to escape from custody was inaccurate and ther efore invalid. Because we are satisfied that Opheim’s guilty pleas are valid and do not discern a manifest injustice necessitating plea withdrawal, we turn to the fair-and-just standard. Cf. Theis , 742 N.W.2d at 646 (stating that it is unnecessary to determine whether plea withdr awal is authorized under the fair-and-just standard if a defendant’s plea was invalid). Fair-and-Just Standard Opheim argues that “[i]t woul d have been fair and just to allow [him] to take his [second-degree assault] case before a jury, and to present evidence that he did not use the knife with the intent to cause fear in the officers of grea t bodily harm,” noting that a police officer admitted that four of the officers who res ponded to his home “were not trained to handle situations involving a suicidal pe rson who called the police for help” and the14 officers mocked him during the incident. Ophe im also argues that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to escapefrom custody under the fair-and-just standard because “he was never told that he was on furlough status or had to return to prison” and “he pled guilty to violating a co ndition of his release that wa s likely not lawfully imposed.” Even though Opheim requested plea withdrawal under both th e manifest-injustice and fair-and-just standards, as he was allowed to do before sentencing, the district court’s order does not suggest that it considered or app lied the fair-and-just standard. In fact, the order does not mention the fair-and-just standard . Instead, it sets fo rth only the manifestinjustice standard, despite acknowledging th at the motion was for presentence plea withdrawal. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2 (“ In its discretion the court may allow the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to do so.”). And the district court ruled only that withdraw al of Opheim’s guilty pleas is not “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” A decision whether to allow presentence plea withdrawal is entrus ted to the district court’s discretion, and we ge nerally defer to an exercise of that discretion. See Kim , 434 N.W.2d at 266 (stating that the district cour t’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the fair-and-ju st standard is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and appellate courts reverse only in a “rare case” ). Here, however, the district court failed to exercise its discretion. Because the district court did not consider Opheim’s presentencing request for plea withdrawal unde r the fair-and-just standard, we reverse in part and remand for the district court to consider the request under that standard. See State v. Cubas , 838 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Minn. App. 2013) (“Although a decision to allow plea withdrawal is15 discretionary under [rule 15.05,] subdivision 2, a district c ourt must apply the standard mandated by the rule when exercising its discretion.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2013). The district court is not requi red to reopen the record on remand. See Taylor v. LSI Corp. of Am. , 781 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that it is in the district court’s discretion whether to re open the record on remand), aff’d , 796 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2011). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.