United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-3248EA

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Lucille P. Gartman, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Gencorp Inc., formerly known as *

Diversitech General, Inc., doing *

business as Gencorp Automotive, Inc., *

*

Appellant. *

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Appeals from the United States

No. 96-3466EA District Court for the Eastern 

_____________ District of Arkansas.

Lucille P. Gartman, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Gencorp Inc., formerly known as *

Diversitech General, Inc., doing *

business as Gencorp Automotive, Inc., *

*

Appellee. *
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 Submitted: April 16, 1997

Filed: July 16, 1997

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Before FAGG, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

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FAGG, Circuit Judge.

In a shake-up at its Batesville, Arkansas plant, Gencorp Inc. discharged three

managers and offered transfers to three others, including Batesville’s quality manager,

Lucille P. Gartman. Gartman rejected the offer and resigned, and then brought suit

against Gencorp under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994) (Title VII), claiming

she had been constructively discharged because of her gender. The jury found in

Gartman’s favor, awarding her $14,904 in lost wages, $67,715 in compensatory

damages, and $250,000 in punitive damages. The district court set aside the punitive

damages award, but denied Gencorp’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JAML).

Gencorp appeals, and we reverse.

Reviewing the denial of Gencorp’s motion for JAML, we view the evidence in

the light most favorable to Gartman, resolving evidentiary conflicts in Gartman’s favor

and giving Gartman the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence. See

Feltmann v. Sieben, 108 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 1997). Our summary of the facts is

shaped by these rules. Gencorp’s vehicle sealing division manufactures vehicle door

and window seals. In 1992 and 1993, Ford Motor, a major customer, rejected more

seals from Gencorp’s Batesville plant than from three other Gencorp vehicle sealing

plants combined. Over a six-month period, the Batesville plant had the worst quality

record of all thirteen Ford vehicle seal suppliers. Ford placed the Batesville plant on

its “twenty worst suppliers” list--a list Gartman testified “[y]ou do everything in your
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power to get off of”--and threatened to pull its business from Batesville. The situation

was critical for Gencorp because Batesville sold roughly seventy percent of its output

to Ford.

Although Gartman was Batesville’s quality manager, division president Wayne

Smith held Batesville’s management team as a whole responsible for the plant’s quality

failures. Smith decided to replace six Batesville managers. He fired three male

managers outright, and offered transfers to two other males and Gartman. Plant

manager J.W. Burton accepted a transfer to Gencorp’s Wabash, Indiana design and

engineering facility, and production manager Dennis DeLaat transferred to Gencorp’s

Michigan sales office. In August 1993, Gartman was offered the quality manager

position at Gencorp’s Wabash plant, with moving expenses paid and no reduction in

salary or benefits. A week later, Gartman heard Smith say the Wabash plant would be

closing. Alarmed by Smith’s statement, Gartman spoke with the president of Gencorp,

who told Gartman “we’ll relocate good people” when Wabash closes. Batesville’s

human resources manager, Gary Moore, also encouraged Gartman to view the transfer

positively, but Gartman refused the transfer and resigned. Moore testified without

contradiction that Gartman told him personal and family reasons prompted her decision.

Along the same lines, not only did Gartman reject the move to Wabash, but she

testified she would have refused the transfer Burton accepted as well.

Several months earlier, Gartman was present when division vice president Walt

Hunnicutt learned Ford Motor had named a woman to monitor supplier quality and

said, “S--t, another gal.” Hunnicutt testified he made the remark out of frustration with

the job performance of a female member of Ford’s purchasing group. Gartman also felt

belittled by several insulting comments Smith made in December 1992. Smith told

Gartman she did not know “how to belly up to the bar,” called her “kid” in a

patronizing manner, and advised her not to show her ignorance by referring to an

engine when she meant a block. Gartman testified she was told that Smith was jealous

of her presentation skills and threatened by her knowledge and competence.
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We review de novo the district court’s denial of Gencorp’s motion for JAML.

See Feltmann, 108 F.3d at 974. We must affirm “if reasonable persons could differ

regarding the conclusions to be drawn from [the] evidence.” Id. By the same token,

we must reverse if the evidence is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that

Gartman was constructively discharged, see Tidwell v. Meyer’s Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d

490, 494 (8th Cir. 1996), or, if she was, that a discriminatory attitude was a motivating

factor in her discharge, see Feltmann, 108 F.3d at 975. “Constructive discharge occurs

when an employer ‘deliberately renders the employee’s working conditions intolerable

and thus forces the employee to quit [her] job.’” Allen v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,

81 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250,

1256 (8th Cir. 1981)). The employee must show that a reasonable person in her

situation would find the working conditions intolerable. See id. In other words,

“intolerability of working conditions is judged by an objective standard, not the

[employee’s] subjective feelings.” Id. Further, the employer must have intended to

force the employee to quit. See id. Constructive discharge plaintiffs may prove intent

“by showing their resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of their

employers’ discriminatory actions.” Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating

Eng’rs, 3 F.3d 281, 285 (8th Cir. 1993).

Without doubt, the choice Gartman faced between pulling up roots for a fresh

start in a plant with an uncertain future or resigning was a painful one. But although

“[t]here may be situations in which a transfer to another location is so intolerable . . .

that a finding of constructive discharge is warranted,” Bradford v. Norfolk S. Corp., 54

F.3d 1412, 1420 (8th Cir. 1995), the record in this case does not support an inference

that a reasonable person in Gartman’s place would have considered Gartman’s situation

intolerable. Assuming Wabash would shortly close, Gencorp’s transfer offer still

presented Gartman the opportunity to retain her quality manager title and to continue

doing the same work, drawing the same pay, and enjoying the same benefits as before

while looking for something more permanent. On these facts, Gartman cannot claim

Gencorp treated her adversely when it made the transfer offer, see Harlston v. 
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McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994), and Wabash’s clouded

future was insufficient, in itself, to transform a benign employment decision into an

objectively intolerable situation. After all, it was possible Wabash would remain open,

as in fact it still was at the time of trial. Further, Gencorp president Marv Isles

reassured Gartman that Gencorp would relocate good people when Wabash closed.

Gartman disbelieved Isles, but “‘[p]art of an employee’s obligation to be reasonable

is an obligation not to assume the worst and not to jump to conclusions too fast.’”

West v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 54 F.3d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Smith

v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 895 F.2d 467, 473 (8th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in

Smith)); see also Bradford, 54 F.3d at 1420 (“[M]ere skepticism [about an employer’s]

motives is insufficient to generate an inference of discrimination.”). 

Neither does the evidence support a reasonable inference that Gencorp intended

to force Gartman to quit when it offered Gartman the Wabash transfer. Indeed, the

evidence is all to the contrary. Batesville stood to lose its biggest customer because of

its miserable record in Gartman’s area of responsibility. Although Gartman wanted to

stay on as Batesville’s quality manager, she acknowledged Gencorp had to do

everything it could to restore Ford Motor’s confidence in Batesville’s product.

Gencorp did act decisively, firing several members of Batesville’s management team

and offering transfers to several others. If Gencorp management had wanted to take

advantage of Ford Motor’s dissatisfaction with quality failures to get rid of Gartman,

they could have numbered Gartman among those to be fired. Instead, in an effort to

keep her with the company, they offered Gartman a transfer to the Wabash plant.

Smith said Wabash was going to close, but nothing in the record indicates Gencorp

offered Gartman the Wabash transfer despite having more secure positions available

for which Gartman was the best qualified candidate. Gencorp president Marv Isles

assured Gartman the future of “good people” did not depend on Wabash’s longevity.

Nevertheless, for personal and family reasons, Gartman rejected the transfer offer and

resigned. See Bradford, 54 F.3d at 1420 (no inference employer intended to force

workers to quit when they did so because of personal circumstances). She refused the
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transfer on the basis of Smith’s single remark about Wabash’s future prospects, without

checking out Wabash for herself, see id., and without giving Isles a chance to make

good on his word, see West, 54 F.3d at 498. On this record, a jury could not

reasonably find Gartman was constructively discharged.

Even if we agreed that Gencorp’s transfer offer placed Gartman in an objectively

intolerable position, and if we also agreed that Gencorp management could reasonably

foresee Gartman might reject the transfer and resign, to establish constructive discharge

in violation of Title VII Gartman still had to show her resignation was a reasonably

foreseeable consequence of discriminatory actions on Gencorp’s part. See Hukkanen,

3 F.3d at 285; Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1005 (7th Cir.

1994) (“[T]o be actionable under Title VII the work conditions . . . need to be

intolerable in a discriminatory way.”). We agree with the district court that “the

decision to replace the management team at Batesville was motivated by their

substandard performance.” Batesville’s unacceptable quality record was certainly a

legitimate reason for removing Gartman as Batesville’s quality manager. Gartman

nonetheless contends poor quality performance was a cover for gender discrimination

because Burton and DeLaat received better transfer offers than she did. Setting aside

Moore’s testimony that Gartman resigned for personal and family reasons, and

Gartman’s own testimony that she would have rejected Burton’s offer anyway,

Gartman’s pretext argument fails because Gartman introduced no evidence she was

better qualified for the positions Burton and DeLaat received than they were. On the

contrary, before their transfers Burton and DeLaat held the top two posts in Batesville’s

management hierarchy. Even assuming Gartman was equally qualified, no inference

of gender discrimination arises when an employer, choosing among similarly qualified

candidates, selects a man and not a woman. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1981); Chock v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 113 F.3d

861, 864 (8th Cir. 1997) (race discrimination).

 
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Finally, although Gartman might have felt belittled by Smith, Smith’s rude

comments were devoid of gender-conscious terms and thus did not imply a

discriminatory attitude toward women as women. See Cram v. Lamson & Sessions

Co., 49 F.3d 466, 471-72 (8th Cir. 1995). Indeed, Gartman’s own testimony points to

personal dislike born of jealousy as the motive force behind Smith’s insults. By

contrast, Hunnicutt’s remark was gender-conscious, but “‘[n]ot all comments that

reflect a discriminatory attitude will support an inference that an illegitimate criterion

was a motivating factor in an employment decision.’” Stacks v. Southwestern Bell

Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1324 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Radabaugh v. Zip

Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1993)). Specifically, an inference of

causation is not supported by “‘stray remarks in the workplace,’ ‘statements by

nondecisionmakers,’ or ‘statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional

process itself.’” Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).

Hunnicutt testified he took part in the decision to offer Gartman a transfer, but the

comment at issue was made months before the transfer offer. Unlike those

noncontemporaneous statements by decisionmakers that have been held sufficient to

support an inference of discrimination, Hunnicutt’s impulsive remark, uttered in a

passing moment of frustration, bore no relation to the decisional process itself. See

Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 95 F.3d 627, 632-33 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[I don’t]

think the beverage industry [is] where women [are] meant to be.”); Stacks, 27 F.3d at

1318 (“[W]omen in sales [are] the worst thing that ha[s] happened to this company.”);

Radabaugh, 997 F.2d at 449 (corporate planning documents citing youth of managers

as positive factor); EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 924 (11th Cir.

1990) (“[I]f it were [my] company [I] would not hire blacks.”). In sum, even if

Gartman was constructively discharged when Gencorp offered her a transfer to a plant

slated for closure, from this evidence a jury could not reasonably infer that a

discriminatory attitude was a motivating factor in Gencorp’s decision to make the offer.
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Because we reverse the district court’s denial of Gencorp’s motion for JAML,

we need not address Gartman’s cross-appeal on the issue of punitive damages.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.