COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 20, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP1758 Cir. Ct. No. 2017CV83

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

ANUSHREE MEHROTRA AND HIMANSHU SHARMA,

 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

 V.

WILLIAM M. CAMPBELL, SANDRA A. CAMPBELL AND

RICHARD W. SCHALK,

 DEFENDANTS,

ROBERT KRECAK,

 DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha County: 

JENNIFER DOROW, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded. 

Before Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Gundrum, J.
No. 2018AP1758

2

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Anushree Mehrotra and Himanshu Sharma 

(collectively, the Sharmas) appeal from an order granting summary judgment to 

Robert Krecak. They contend that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 

discretion in concluding that their witness, James Jendusa, was not qualified to 

give an expert opinion, which was necessary to advance their claims against 

Krecak. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings.

¶2 The Sharmas are first time homeowners residing in the City of 

Brookfield. They purchased their home in May 2016.

¶3 Prior to their purchase, the Sharmas hired Krecak to perform a home 

inspection. Krecak noted some cracks in the basement walls but dismissed them

as cosmetic and a normal consequence of concrete shrinkage. 

¶4 After the purchase, the Sharmas observed many more cracks, most 

of which were not reflected in Krecak’s report. They hired Jendusa to examine 

their home.

¶5 Jendusa is a structural engineer who has inspected over 500 

basements for structural and water leakage issues. Upon examining the Sharmas’

home, he opined that it had a sinking foundation. He faulted Krecak for not 

bringing the issue to the Sharmas’ attention.

¶6 The Sharmas filed suit against Krecak, alleging breach of contract 

and negligence. They also sued the sellers of the home and another structural 

engineer; however, those claims are not part of this appeal.
No. 2018AP1758

3

¶7 Krecak eventually moved for summary judgment. He argued that 

the Sharmas’ sole expert witness, Jendusa, was not qualified to give an expert 

opinion as to the standard of care for a home inspector, which was necessary to 

advance the Sharmas’ claims against Krecak. 

¶8 Following a hearing on the matter, the circuit court granted Krecak’s 

motion. The court agreed that Jendusa lacked the qualifications to testify as an 

expert in the home inspection industry. It noted that Jendusa had never taken a 

home inspection test or performed a home inspection himself. It further noted that 

Jendusa had admitted in his deposition that he was unfamiliar with WIS. STAT.

§ 440.975 (2017-18),1 which sets forth the standards of practice for home 

inspectors in Wisconsin. Although Jendusa submitted a follow-up affidavit 

incorporating § 440.975 into his analysis, the court rejected it as a sham. 

Accordingly, it excluded Jendusa’s testimony and dismissed the Sharmas’ claims

against Krecak. The Sharmas now appeal. 

¶9 We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, employing the 

same methodology as the circuit court. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 

Wis. 2d 304, 314-15, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). Summary judgment is proper when 

there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2).

¶10 The summary judgment decision in this case turned entirely on the 

circuit court’s conclusion that Jendusa lacked the qualifications to testify as an 

expert in the home inspection industry. We review a circuit court’s decision to 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version.
No. 2018AP1758

4

exclude testimony under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard. State v. 

Giese, 2014 WI App 92, ¶16, 356 Wis. 2d 796, 854 N.W.2d 687. 

¶11 On appeal, the Sharmas contend that the circuit court erroneously 

exercised its discretion in concluding that Jendusa was not qualified to testify as 

an expert in the home inspection industry. They accuse the court of exceeding its 

gatekeeping function. We agree.

¶12 It is true that Jendusa has never taken a home inspection test or 

performed a home inspection himself. However, one does not have to be licensed 

in a profession in order to testify about its standard of care. See Kerkman v. 

Hintz, 142 Wis. 2d 404, 423, 418 N.W.2d 795 (1988). Rather, one simply has to 

be qualified as an expert in the area in which the testimony will be given. Id.; see

also Green v. Rosenow, 63 Wis. 2d 463, 471, 217 N.W.2d 388 (1974) (“It is the 

particular qualifications of the witness in relation to the particular issue which 

should control rather than the label of a profession or trade.” (quoting Roberts v. 

State, 41 Wis. 2d 537, 551, 164 N.W.2d 525 (1969))).

¶13 Here, the record establishes that Jendusa was qualified as an expert 

in the home inspection industry. As noted in his affidavit, Jendusa is the author of 

standards adopted by the State of Wisconsin in its code for foundation repair. He 

is a member of the Wisconsin Association of Home Inspectors. He has given 

instruction and lectures to home inspectors on how to inspect and report on 

basement walls. He has also been asked to sit on an arbitration panel to review 

claims of negligence against home inspectors and then to render an opinion as to 

whether they were negligent or not. Thus, his background as a structural engineer 

overlapped considerably with the work of home inspectors.
No. 2018AP1758

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¶14 Although Jendusa expressed unfamiliarity with the statutory 

standards of practice for home inspectors at the time of his deposition, the fact that 

he later reviewed and incorporated them into his analysis does not render his 

follow-up affidavit a sham. Any initial unpreparedness on his part simply goes to 

the weight of his expert opinion, not its admissibility in the first instance.

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.