[Cite as State v. Overton, 2021-Ohio-3193.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

MORROW COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsDANIEL OVERTON 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: Hon. Earle E. Wise, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2020CA0010 

: 

: 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Morrow County

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

2019CR0137 

JUDGMENT: September 13, 2021 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

DAVID HOMER WILLIAM T CRAMER 

Assistant Prosecutor 470 Olde Worthigton Road 

Morrow County Suite 200 

60 East High Street Westerville OH 43082 

Mt. Gilead, OH 43338 
[Cite as State v. Overton, 2021-Ohio-3193.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant Daniel Overton appeals the October 27, 2020 judgment entry of 

the Morrow County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the State of Ohio. 

Facts & Procedural History 

{¶2} On July 8, 2019, the Morrow County Sheriff’s Office received a call about 

an unregistered sex offender living in Morrow County. An officer found this individual, 

appellant, at the Mount Gilead Library in close proximity to young children. Appellant had 

been living out of a van in Morrow County since March 2, 2019; however, he failed to 

register his address until June 17, 2019. Appellant’s status as a Tier I sex offender was 

established by a previous conviction of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material. 

His status mandated that he register a new address within three days of moving to a new 

location. 

{¶3} Appellant was indicted on August 9, 2019, for failing to personally register 

with the Morrow County Sheriff’s Office within three days, in violation of Ohio Revised 

Code 2950.04(A)(2)(a) and R.C. 2950.99(A)(1)(iii), a felony of the fourth degree. The 

indictment alleged that appellant previously pled guilty to illegal use of a minor in nudityoriented material in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a felony of the fifth degree. 

{¶4} Prior to an arraignment being held, appellant was transported to Twin Valley 

Behavioral Hospital. After his return to the Morrow County Jail, he was arraigned. 

Appointed counsel for appellant (Attorney Johnson) filed a motion for competency hearing 

on October 3, 2019. The trial court granted the motion, and referred appellant to the 

Forensic Diagnostic Center for an evaluation of competency to stand trial. 
Morrow County, Case No. 2020CA0010 3 

{¶5} Dr. O’Reilly provided the trial court with his competency report on December 

4, 2019. The doctor found that appellant was not competent to stand trial. It was also his 

professional opinion that there was a substantial probability appellant would become 

capable of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against him and of 

assisting his attorney in his defense within one year, if provided with a course of treatment. 

Dr. O’Reilly found appellant previously responded to treatment with significant 

improvement. 

{¶6} After the trial court received the report from Dr. O’Reilly, the trial court set 

the matter for hearing on December 19, 2019. Appellant declined to stipulate to the 

report, so the hearing was continued to January 15, 2020. At the hearing, counsel for 

appellant stated appellant wanted to fire him as his attorney. The trial court denied 

appellant’s request and ordered the hearing to go forward with counsel representing 

appellant. The trial court found appellant incompetent to stand trial and ordered appellant 

to Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare. As appellant left the hearing, he threated to harm 

hospital staff and stated he would refuse medication. 

{¶7} On April 28, 2020, the trial court received a report from Twin Valley stating 

appellant was competent to stand trial. The parties stipulated to the admission of the 

report, and found appellant competent to stand trial. 

{¶8} The trial court held a pre-trial on June 5, 2020. The judgment entry on June 

8, 2020 provides that Attorney Johnson indicated appellant wanted to plead guilty. The 

trial court continued the hearing to June 19, 2020, so that the plea could be on the record. 

{¶9} The trial court held the hearing on June 19, 2020. The judgment entry dated 

June 26, 2020 states that the parties were informed the trial would have to be continued 
Morrow County, Case No. 2020CA0010 4 

because of inadequate facilities being available during the pandemic. Further, Attorney 

Johnson informed the court that appellant no longer wanted to plead guilty. Appellee 

indicated on the record that, should appellant plead guilty, appellee would recommend 

community control and would not oppose the court sentencing appellant to time served. 

Appellant “believed his attorney was untruthful with him and * * * he wished to fire his 

attorney (for the fourth time).” After the trial court declined to appoint other counsel, 

appellant “indicated he wished to be his own attorney. The Court advised the Defendant 

that he would be at a great disadvantage in representing himself, but that he has the right 

to do so. The Court indicated to the Defendant that he is facing 18 months in the state 

penitentiary and he will not be treated differently when it comes to the rules of evidence, 

etc.” 

{¶10} The trial court set a hearing on July 15, 2020 for a “further explanation of 

the Defendant’s rights and responsibilities acting pro se.” The trial court stated this was 

a follow-up to the June hearing, at which appellant stated he wanted to represent himself 

at trial. At the July 15th hearing, the trial court discussed appellant’s competency situation 

with him, noting that appellant was reasonably well-educated, having good language 

skills. Appellant stated he felt comfortable with the proceedings and knew what was going 

on. The trial court told appellant it was his right to represent himself, but also “wanted to 

make sure that you understand if you choose to represent yourself that you will be held 

to the same rules of evidence that a lawyer must follow” and that his lack of knowledge 

of any of the rules will not prevent the court from enforcing those rules. The court 

cautioned appellant that because of his lack of experience and lack of knowledge of the 
Morrow County, Case No. 2020CA0010 5 

rules of evidence, he may have difficulty asking questions of the witnesses if he 

represents himself. 

{¶11} The trial judge informed appellant the court could not give him assistance, 

but that standby counsel appointed by the court was ready, willing, and able to defend 

appellant, and would either be in the courtroom or at the table with appellant, whatever 

appellant chose. 

{¶12} The trial court informed appellant of the charge against him, and specifically 

told him of the range of possible penalties he would face if convicted. The trial court also 

told appellant if he was sentenced to prison, he would be subject to post-release control, 

and, if he violated post-release control or committed a new felony offense, he could be 

sent back to prison. The trial court specifically notified appellant what the “worst case 

scenario” would be for appellant in terms of prison time and post-release control. 

{¶13} The trial court told appellant that, as his own attorney, he would have to 

raise and prove any affirmative defenses available to him, as well as any mitigating 

defenses. The trial court emphasized that appellant’s lack of knowledge of the existence 

of these defenses or the appropriate procedure to introduce them would not be grounds 

for appeal, and suggested this was a good reason to have counsel rather than proceed 

pro se; the court also stated appellant would be wise to have counsel to preserve issues 

for appeal. 

{¶14} When the trial court asked if appellant had any questions, appellant stated, 

“there is not much I have to say.” Appellant proceeded to suggest he may want to enter 

a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court stated appellant could enter that 

plea if he liked, but suggested appellant consult with counsel in order to get that plea 
Morrow County, Case No. 2020CA0010 6 

properly before the court, and suggested he would be better off having counsel assist him 

with plea due to the evidence that would likely be necessary to assist appellant, such as 

the subpoenaed testimony of psychiatrists or psychologists. 

{¶15} Due to the pandemic, the courthouse was not a setting in which the required 

social distancing could be maintained. Thus, the trial would have to be continued until 

the county obtained an alternate trial site. Appellant said, “then I should probably plead 

guilty and apologize for committing this,” because “it might be easier. There was 

extenuating circumstances and there was a big miscommunication, disinformation from, 

I guess, various places.” Appellant then spoke with his standby counsel, and confirmed 

to the court he wanted to change his plea to a no contest plea. The trial court stated 

appellant had to come to the courtroom in-person to complete the plea, and set the matter 

for July 20, 2020. 

{¶16} The trial court issued a judgment entry setting the matter for a change of 

plea hearing and stating that, after it further advised appellant of his rights and 

responsibilities acting pro se, appellant indicated he wanted to change his plea. At the 

change of plea hearing on July 20, 2020, appellant stated he no longer wished to plead 

no contest. 

{¶17} The trial court held a jury trial in October of 2020. At trial, the county clerk 

testified about court records indicating that appellant pled guilty to illegal use of a minor 

in nudity-oriented material, was declared a Tier I sex offender, and was notified of his 

registration requirements. Appellant’s sister testified that appellant was living in Indiana 

for a time, but returned to Ohio in June of 2019. She also testified that appellant threated 
Morrow County, Case No. 2020CA0010 7 

her and stated he was going to slit her throat. On July 8, 2019, Detective Smith found 

appellant’s van in the library parking lot and found appellant interacting with children. 

{¶18} Appellant testified he did everything in his power to register and that his 

sister was cyber-stalking him. Appellant stated he was not required to register because 

of the prior perjury of multiple individuals involved in the case. 

{¶19} On October 5, 2020, the jury found appellant guilty of the charge in the 

indictment. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report and set a 

sentencing hearing for October 23, 2020. 

{¶20} The trial court issued a judgment entry of sentence on October 27, 2020, 

sentencing appellant to seventeen months in prison. The trial court specifically stated it 

asked appellant if he would be willing to be on community control, but appellant clearly 

indicated he would not be willing to do so. As a result, the court found appellant not 

amenable to community control and imposed a prison term of seventeen months in 

prison, with jail time credit of 407 days. 

{¶21} Appellant appeals the October 27, 2020 judgment entry of the Morrow 

County Court of Common Pleas, and assigns the following as error: 

{¶22} “I. APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE 

CONSTITUTIONS WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT PERMITTED HIM TO 

PROCEED PRO SE WITHOUT ENSURING A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND 

VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF COUNSEL.” 

I. 

{¶23} Whether appellant waived his right to counsel is an issue that we review de 

novo. State v. Nelson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150480, 2016-Ohio-8064. 
Morrow County, Case No. 2020CA0010 8 

{¶24} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, 

Article I of the Ohio Constitution provide a criminal defendant has a right to counsel. 

Criminal Rule 44(A) provides that a defendant is entitled to counsel “unless after being 

fully advised of his right to assigned counsel, he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

waives his right to counsel.” 

{¶25} A criminal defendant also has the constitutional right to waive counsel and 

to represent himself at trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 

562 (1975). In such a situation, “the Constitution * * * require[s] that any waiver of the 

right to counsel be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent * * *.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 

124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004), Criminal Rule 44(A). “In order to establish an 

effective waiver of [the] right to counsel, the trial court must make sufficient inquiry to 

determine whether [the] defendant fully understands and intelligently relinquishes that 

right.” State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366, 345 N.E.2d 399 (1976). 

{¶26} In Gibson, the Ohio Supreme Court applied the test set forth in Von Moltke 

v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316 (1948), which established the requirements for a 

sufficient pretrial inquiry by the trial court into a waiver of counsel: 

To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature 

of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of 

allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and 

circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad 

understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an 

accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made 
Morrow County, Case No. 2020CA0010 9 

only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the 

circumstances under which such a plea is tendered. 

{¶27} Appellant contends the trial court committed error in permitting him to 

represent himself, as his waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, because the 

trial court did not sufficiently explain the disadvantages of proceeding pro se, and did not 

have a detailed discussion with appellant about the defenses available to him and the 

advantages of court-appointed counsel. We disagree with appellant. 

{¶28} The record reflects the trial court adhered to the Gibson standard and 

complied with the requirements of Criminal Rule 44(A). The trial court set aside time to 

conduct a hearing for the specific purpose of considering appellant’s decision to represent 

himself. The record reveals this hearing was not cursory, and the trial court encouraged 

appellant to reconsider and have Attorney Johnson represent him. A significant amount 

of time was spent advising appellant of the nature of the charges, advising him of the 

potential penalties, advising him about post-release control, stating he would be held to 

the same rules of evidence an attorney has to follow, and informing appellant he would 

have to raise affirmative or mitigating defenses. 

{¶29} The judgment entry from the June 19th hearing states the court informed 

appellant he would be at a great disadvantage in representing himself. 

{¶30} At the July 15th hearing, the trial court specifically cautioned appellant that 

because of his lack of experience and lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence, he may 

have difficulty asking questions of the witnesses. The court suggested appellant’s lack 

of knowledge of affirmative or mitigating defenses was a good reason to have counsel 

rather than proceed pro se; additionally, that appellant would be wise to have counsel to 
Morrow County, Case No. 2020CA0010 10 

preserve issues for appeal. The trial court informed appellant that he could plead not 

guilty by reason of insanity, but stated appellant would be wise to consult counsel in order 

to determine who would need to be subpoenaed and testify, such as a psychiatrist or a 

psychologist. Finally, the trial court appointed standby counsel to assist appellant in 

preparation for trial, and to remain throughout the trial and sentencing. State v. Gibson, 

5th Dist. Stark No. 2013CA00175, 2014-Ohio-1169. 

{¶31} Further, at the beginning of his trial during jury selection, appellant again 

stated that his attorney was not adequate and he did not want him to represent him. 

Throughout the proceedings (June 19th judgment entry, July 15th hearing, beginning of 

trial) appellant consistently stated he wanted to fire his attorney and represent himself. 

{¶32} Unlike the cases in which we have found the defendants did not knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently waive their right to counsel, in this case, the trial court 

completed a thorough review of the charge, allowable punishment, and reviewed with 

appellant the dangers of representing himself. See State v. Smith, 5th Dist. Muskingum 

No. CT2017-0066, 2018-Ohio-5121 (waiver of counsel was not voluntarily and 

intelligently made when the court did not engage Smith in a conversation regarding the 

nature of the charges, allowable punishments, possible defenses, or any of the dangers 

of representing himself); State v. Ngaka, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 19 CAC 09051, 2020-

Ohio-3106 (asking “is that what you want to do” did not sufficiently demonstrate 

appellant’s decision to waive counsel). 

{¶33} In appellant’s previous case, the trial court did not explain the charges 

against him, did not explain the dangers of self-representation, and there was concern 

expressed by counsel about appellant’s recent mental state. State v. Overton, 5th Dist. 
Morrow County, Case No. 2020CA0010 11 

Morrow No. 12CA0019, 2013-Ohio-3590. Here, the trial court explained the charge to 

appellant and explained the dangers of self-representation. There was no concern 

expressed by counsel about appellant’s recent mental state. 

{¶34} Appellant contends that because he had previously been declared

incompetent and had to be restored to competency, it should have triggered a more 

rigorous colloquy than normal. However, as this court has previously stated, “the 

competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the 

competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.” State v. 

Newman, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00219, 2018-Ohio-3253, quoting Godinez v. Moran, 

509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). Appellant’s lack of understanding 

of trial procedure and/or defenses are not relevant to appellant’s competence to waive 

his right to counsel. Id. 

{¶35} At the July 15th hearing, the trial court discussed appellant’s competency 

with him, finding he was reasonably well-educated and had good language skills. 

Appellant stated he felt comfortable with the proceedings and knew what was going on, 

and had no questions of the trial court. After appellant suggested he may want to plead 

not guilty by reason of insanity, he then stated he would plead no contest and apologize. 

At that point in the case, appellant had been restored to competency according to the 

report provided by Dr. O’Reilly, and appellant’s actions with regards to his demeanor 

during the proceedings were consistent with Dr. O’Reilly’s notes in his report declaring 

appellant competent. The record fails to reflect that appellant was incompetent to waive 

his right to counsel. 
Morrow County, Case No. 2020CA0010 12 

{¶36} The trial court did not commit error in permitting appellant to represent 

himself. Appellant’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

Appellant’s assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶37} The October 27, 2020 judgment entry of the Morrow County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Delaney, J., and 

Wise, Earle, J., concur