# C_2006065EN.01003001.xml

| 17.3.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 65/30 |
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17.3.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/30

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Security of modes of transport’

(2006/C 65/06)

By letter of 2 June 2005, the Commission asked the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, to draw up an opinion on the Security of modes of transport.

Security of modes of transport

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 24 November 2005. The rapporteur was Mr Simons.

At its 422nd plenary session, held on 14 and 15 December 2005 (meeting of 14 December 2005), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion with 124 votes in favour and four abstentions.

1.   Introduction

| 1.1 | Interest in the subject of security has increased enormously since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (New York), November 2003 (Istanbul), 11 March 2004 (Madrid), 7 July 2005 (London) and other attacks elsewhere. Preventive and operational measures have been taken everywhere to protect people, means of transport and goods as much and as effectively as possible. Security has become a hot policy-making issue. |
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1.1

Interest in the subject of security has increased enormously since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (New York), November 2003 (Istanbul), 11 March 2004 (Madrid), 7 July 2005 (London) and other attacks elsewhere. Preventive and operational measures have been taken everywhere to protect people, means of transport and goods as much and as effectively as possible. Security has become a hot policy-making issue.

| 1.2 | In this context, the term ‘security’ is understood to mean measures to prevent both terrorist attacks and ordinary crime, and especially theft. |
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1.2

In this context, the term ‘security’ is understood to mean measures to prevent both terrorist attacks and ordinary crime, and especially theft.

| 1.3 | The Committee has been playing its part. Several opinions have been adopted, including the exploratory opinion of 24 October 2002 (1) (rapporteur: Ms Bredima-Savopoulou), which was particularly valuable as it dealt comprehensively with security in shipping and civil aviation. |
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1.3

The Committee has been playing its part. Several opinions have been adopted, including the exploratory opinion of 24 October 2002 (1) (rapporteur: Ms Bredima-Savopoulou), which was particularly valuable as it dealt comprehensively with security in shipping and civil aviation.

1

| 1.4 | On 23 December 2003 the European Commission published a Consultation Paper on Freight Transport Security, in which it sought the views of interested parties with regard to the subject of security. Furthermore, in a Communication to the Council (2), the Commission proposed a framework programme in the field of security, and on 12 August 2005 a work programme on combating terrorism was published in the Official Journal (3). A number of points from these publications have been of value in drawing up this exploratory opinion. |
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1.4

On 23 December 2003 the European Commission published a Consultation Paper on Freight Transport Security, in which it sought the views of interested parties with regard to the subject of security. Furthermore, in a Communication to the Council (2), the Commission proposed a framework programme in the field of security, and on 12 August 2005 a work programme on combating terrorism was published in the Official Journal (3). A number of points from these publications have been of value in drawing up this exploratory opinion.

2

3

| 1.5 | This exploratory opinion seeks above all to bring clarity to the role and responsibility of the various actors, both nationally and internationally, in the security field relating to:






  — | passengers (and staff employed in the transport chain); |
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1.5

This exploratory opinion seeks above all to bring clarity to the role and responsibility of the various actors, both nationally and internationally, in the security field relating to:

—

passengers (and staff employed in the transport chain);

| — | modes of transport, goods and infrastructure, with the ultimate aim of improving the security of persons, goods, means of transport and infrastructure. |
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modes of transport, goods and infrastructure, with the ultimate aim of improving the security of persons, goods, means of transport and infrastructure.

| 1.6 | This opinion is focussed solely on the security of modes of transport and not on transport safety. A complicating factor is that there is no linguistic distinction in several European Union countries between the two concepts. |
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1.6

This opinion is focussed solely on the security of modes of transport and not on transport safety. A complicating factor is that there is no linguistic distinction in several European Union countries between the two concepts.

| 1.7 | With regard to the security of the infrastructure used by the inland modes of transport, a distinction is to be made between the TEN corridors, including nodes and the national infrastructure, although it is not always immediately clear where subsidiarity in the inland modes of transport begins and where it ends.
  It must be realised, as far as security measures in the inland modes of transport are concerned, that there is a considerable degree of interdependence between all modes of transport in the logistics chain, and not only inland modes. This requires a great deal of coordination when adopting security measures. An intermodal approach to security is in any case also necessary to prevent distortion of competition between the different modes, although we should realise that security costs can differ sharply from one mode of transport to another.
  Issues arising in connection with increased security measures will also be looked at in detail. These include questions such as:






  — | what is the impact of security measures on employees? |
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1.7

With regard to the security of the infrastructure used by the inland modes of transport, a distinction is to be made between the TEN corridors, including nodes and the national infrastructure, although it is not always immediately clear where subsidiarity in the inland modes of transport begins and where it ends.

It must be realised, as far as security measures in the inland modes of transport are concerned, that there is a considerable degree of interdependence between all modes of transport in the logistics chain, and not only inland modes. This requires a great deal of coordination when adopting security measures. An intermodal approach to security is in any case also necessary to prevent distortion of competition between the different modes, although we should realise that security costs can differ sharply from one mode of transport to another.

Issues arising in connection with increased security measures will also be looked at in detail. These include questions such as:

—

what is the impact of security measures on employees?

| — | should ‘crisis management’ be included in management training courses? |
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should ‘crisis management’ be included in management training courses?

| — | who should meet the cost of security? |
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who should meet the cost of security?

| — | what is the role of the insurance companies? |
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—

what is the role of the insurance companies?

In view of the wide-ranging nature of this subject, it is advisable to bring some order to bear and to indicate how this exploratory opinion has been structured. In chapter 2, the General section, the broader issues of security are dealt with. It covers subjects such as the division of responsibilities and competences respectively of the European Union, the national governments, the modes of transport themselves, the passengers and management of the companies. In addition, the legislative aspect is discussed in this chapter. Chapter 3, the section which deals with specific issues, begins with an outline of initiatives taken at different levels to improve security. Closer attention is then paid to the security of modes of transport themselves. Chapter 4 examines the cost of security and the question of who should meet this cost. The role of the insurance companies is also discussed in this context. Chapter 5 presents a summary and draws the final conclusions.

2.   General

2.1   Security: General

| 2.1.1 | Ensuring the security of persons and goods in all modes of transport is now high on the agenda of politicians, policy makers and the business community. The term security means measures against both terrorism and ordinary crime. Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that no adequate coordinated approach yet exists. And this is indeed urgently needed because in a chain the weakest link determines the strength of the whole. |
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2.1.1

Ensuring the security of persons and goods in all modes of transport is now high on the agenda of politicians, policy makers and the business community. The term security means measures against both terrorism and ordinary crime. Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that no adequate coordinated approach yet exists. And this is indeed urgently needed because in a chain the weakest link determines the strength of the whole.

| 2.1.2 | The complexity of the subject matter makes it difficult to define easily and unambiguously. The issue of subsidiarity is fully relevant to the security of modes of transport. It concerns both the demarcation of competences between the European Union and the national governments as regards the measures to be taken and their financing. But it also concerns the responsibilities and competences of the modes of transport themselves: those of passengers, employees and management. |
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2.1.2

The complexity of the subject matter makes it difficult to define easily and unambiguously. The issue of subsidiarity is fully relevant to the security of modes of transport. It concerns both the demarcation of competences between the European Union and the national governments as regards the measures to be taken and their financing. But it also concerns the responsibilities and competences of the modes of transport themselves: those of passengers, employees and management.

2.2   Security in maritime and air transport

| 2.2.1 | Since 11 September 2001, there has been some improvement in the security of air and maritime transport. The European Council introduced measures partly on the basis of the EESC report of 24 October 2002 which covered in particular security proposals in the aviation and maritime transport sectors. Most noteworthy are the following: EU Regulation 2320/2002 on civil aviation security, EU Regulation EC 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security and draft Directive COM(2004) 76 on enhancing port security. All these measures make provision for EU inspections. These involve quality checks in these sectors. These rules for shipping were also laid down in a Directive adopted on 10 May 2005. |
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2.2.1

Since 11 September 2001, there has been some improvement in the security of air and maritime transport. The European Council introduced measures partly on the basis of the EESC report of 24 October 2002 which covered in particular security proposals in the aviation and maritime transport sectors. Most noteworthy are the following: EU Regulation 2320/2002 on civil aviation security, EU Regulation EC 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security and draft Directive COM(2004) 76 on enhancing port security. All these measures make provision for EU inspections. These involve quality checks in these sectors. These rules for shipping were also laid down in a Directive adopted on 10 May 2005.

2.3   Security in inland modes of transport

| 2.3.1 | The situation in the EU differs considerably from country to country with regard to inland modes of transport. In major cities such as Madrid and London, but also in Paris, security measures have been taken on public transport partly because of the terrorist attacks. Other cities and countries have not yet reached this stage, but even there the recent attacks have created an awareness of the importance of security measures (4). |
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2.3.1

The situation in the EU differs considerably from country to country with regard to inland modes of transport. In major cities such as Madrid and London, but also in Paris, security measures have been taken on public transport partly because of the terrorist attacks. Other cities and countries have not yet reached this stage, but even there the recent attacks have created an awareness of the importance of security measures (4).

4

| 2.3.2 | The question which arises in the first instance is who is authorised to adopt security measures which cover more than one inland mode of transport? Is it the responsibility of the European Union or of the national governments? And, if the latter is the case, what is the role of the EU in this? |
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2.3.2

The question which arises in the first instance is who is authorised to adopt security measures which cover more than one inland mode of transport? Is it the responsibility of the European Union or of the national governments? And, if the latter is the case, what is the role of the EU in this?

| 2.3.3 | The Committee takes the view that ‘security’ is the shared responsibility of the Member States and the European Union, but that the Member States themselves are responsible for ensuring that security measures are taken by the various inland modes of transport. For this they need to create a framework of minimum standards for the inland modes of transport i.e. this should not be left to their own discretion. The national governments should set up a specialist body to coordinate the measures to be adopted by the inland modes of transport and local authorities. The authority would also ensure implementation. |
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2.3.3

The Committee takes the view that ‘security’ is the shared responsibility of the Member States and the European Union, but that the Member States themselves are responsible for ensuring that security measures are taken by the various inland modes of transport. For this they need to create a framework of minimum standards for the inland modes of transport i.e. this should not be left to their own discretion. The national governments should set up a specialist body to coordinate the measures to be adopted by the inland modes of transport and local authorities. The authority would also ensure implementation.

| 2.3.4 | In the Committee's opinion, the role of the European Union is above all to coordinate measures at international level. At the same time, the Union should urge the Member States to adopt a unified approach. Intensive cooperation between the national governments and the European Union is necessary in view of the cross-border nature of the transport of persons and goods and the need to coordinate national security measures. |
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2.3.4

In the Committee's opinion, the role of the European Union is above all to coordinate measures at international level. At the same time, the Union should urge the Member States to adopt a unified approach. Intensive cooperation between the national governments and the European Union is necessary in view of the cross-border nature of the transport of persons and goods and the need to coordinate national security measures.

| 2.3.5 | The national governments should realise that a great deal of work remains to be done concerning the inland modes of transport. A sense of urgency must be created. The national governments should urge the modes to consider and adopt security measures. A first step in this direction would be for minimum security standards to be set at a European level for the inland modes of transport. The individual modes of transport need to realise that without security measures they are extremely vulnerable. |
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2.3.5

The national governments should realise that a great deal of work remains to be done concerning the inland modes of transport. A sense of urgency must be created. The national governments should urge the modes to consider and adopt security measures. A first step in this direction would be for minimum security standards to be set at a European level for the inland modes of transport. The individual modes of transport need to realise that without security measures they are extremely vulnerable.

| 2.3.6 | Furthermore, it must be realised that cooperation is necessary. For example, there must be coordination of measures between train, underground and bus companies. Information campaigns targeted at passengers and employees on how to act in the event of emergency should be coordinated. |
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2.3.6

Furthermore, it must be realised that cooperation is necessary. For example, there must be coordination of measures between train, underground and bus companies. Information campaigns targeted at passengers and employees on how to act in the event of emergency should be coordinated.

| 2.3.7 | With regard to goods transport, close attention will have to be paid to vulnerable intersections such as terminals and marshalling yards. Cooperation will be needed between national and local government, the individual transport branches and the managers of transfer installations and terminals. |
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2.3.7

With regard to goods transport, close attention will have to be paid to vulnerable intersections such as terminals and marshalling yards. Cooperation will be needed between national and local government, the individual transport branches and the managers of transfer installations and terminals.

2.4   The role of the various actors

| 2.4.1 | The safeguarding of the physical infrastructure is, in the Committee's view, a matter for national, regional or local government. |
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2.4.1

The safeguarding of the physical infrastructure is, in the Committee's view, a matter for national, regional or local government.

| 2.4.2 | The specialist body mentioned in point 2.3.3 should act as the coordinating body. This would prevent fragmentation at national level as well as promote the policy internationally and would facilitate coordination at EU level. |
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2.4.2

The specialist body mentioned in point 2.3.3 should act as the coordinating body. This would prevent fragmentation at national level as well as promote the policy internationally and would facilitate coordination at EU level.

| 2.4.3 | The Committee has noted with satisfaction that, in addition to the EU's coordinating role, a sum of EUR 3,5 million has been made available at Community level, under the 6th Framework Programme, for security measures in the passenger and goods transport sectors as well as in the energy sector. |
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2.4.3

The Committee has noted with satisfaction that, in addition to the EU's coordinating role, a sum of EUR 3,5 million has been made available at Community level, under the 6th Framework Programme, for security measures in the passenger and goods transport sectors as well as in the energy sector.

| 2.4.4 | Since modes of transport are an abstract concept which can only operate with the support of the people who use the mode (passengers, customers) as well as those who work there (employees), action specifically targeted at these groups is indispensable. This should be expressed above all in a continuous publicity campaign aimed at passengers and customers. The attitude of transport users should be transformed from one of passivity to a more alert and conscious one. The employees of a mode of transport are of crucial importance for the development and application of security measures. In order to fulfil their role properly, the Committee considers it to be of great importance that the employees are offered special training geared to their role in security. |
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2.4.4

Since modes of transport are an abstract concept which can only operate with the support of the people who use the mode (passengers, customers) as well as those who work there (employees), action specifically targeted at these groups is indispensable. This should be expressed above all in a continuous publicity campaign aimed at passengers and customers. The attitude of transport users should be transformed from one of passivity to a more alert and conscious one. The employees of a mode of transport are of crucial importance for the development and application of security measures. In order to fulfil their role properly, the Committee considers it to be of great importance that the employees are offered special training geared to their role in security.

| 2.4.5 | The role of management is to integrate security concepts into the company ethos and culture. Furthermore, management must give employees an opportunity to undertake special training in this field. Management training should include crisis management. |
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2.4.5

The role of management is to integrate security concepts into the company ethos and culture. Furthermore, management must give employees an opportunity to undertake special training in this field. Management training should include crisis management.

2.5   Way in which security must be implemented

| 2.5.1 | The question arises of the extent to which security measures in inland modes of transport should be laid down in a more informal way, such as in the form of a certificate or quality mark, or alternatively in a more mandatory way, for example by legislation. In the Committee's judgement, the subject is far too important to tackle in an informal manner. |
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2.5.1

The question arises of the extent to which security measures in inland modes of transport should be laid down in a more informal way, such as in the form of a certificate or quality mark, or alternatively in a more mandatory way, for example by legislation. In the Committee's judgement, the subject is far too important to tackle in an informal manner.

| 2.5.2 | The Committee considers that in any event national minimum standards for security measures should be laid down, with a recommendation to go further than the minimum. It should also be made compulsory to exchange information about security measures adopted or planned. At international level, countries should be obliged to harmonise measures and to forward information to the international coordinating bodies. |
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2.5.2

The Committee considers that in any event national minimum standards for security measures should be laid down, with a recommendation to go further than the minimum. It should also be made compulsory to exchange information about security measures adopted or planned. At international level, countries should be obliged to harmonise measures and to forward information to the international coordinating bodies.

3.   Specific comments

| 3.1 | Before looking at any security measures that have been or ought to be taken in the individual inland modes of transport, it is first advisable to have an overview of measures which have been taken at an international level by the coordinating organisations. |
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3.1

Before looking at any security measures that have been or ought to be taken in the individual inland modes of transport, it is first advisable to have an overview of measures which have been taken at an international level by the coordinating organisations.

| 3.1.1 | International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
  The IMO is mentioned here because a number of measures have already been taken in maritime transport which could serve as a model for the inland modes of transport.






  a. | The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. This Code puts into practice a framework for cooperation between central government, local government, shipping companies and port authorities with the aim of pinpointing security risks and taking measures. It concerns security requirements for ships and port facilities. The Code entered into force on 1 July 2004. |
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3.1.1

International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

The IMO is mentioned here because a number of measures have already been taken in maritime transport which could serve as a model for the inland modes of transport.

a.

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. This Code puts into practice a framework for cooperation between central government, local government, shipping companies and port authorities with the aim of pinpointing security risks and taking measures. It concerns security requirements for ships and port facilities. The Code entered into force on 1 July 2004.

| b. | Amendments made to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS). The amendments to this Convention also led to changes to the mandatory International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. The IMDG code makes detailed recommendations for the packing, labelling and storage of dangerous substances. |
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b.

Amendments made to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS). The amendments to this Convention also led to changes to the mandatory International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. The IMDG code makes detailed recommendations for the packing, labelling and storage of dangerous substances.

The amendments came into force on 1 January 2004.

| 3.1.2 | International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
  Since 1971 binding international agreements have been made in the civil aviation sector in order to combat crime and terrorism. As a result of a number of aircraft hijackings at the end of the 1960s, the ICAO decided to draw up a basic agreement regulating civil aviation. Thus it was laid down in Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention that all passengers on civil commercial flights should be systematically screened. This measure has been in force since 1972 and it is difficult to imagine now that things were once otherwise. Following the attack on the Twin Towers in 2001 Annex 17 was radically overhauled. New specifications were made mandatory, for instance with regard to the reinforcement and locking of cockpit doors as well as air freight transport. In addition, training and quality requirements for security checks were tightened. |
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3.1.2

International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)

Since 1971 binding international agreements have been made in the civil aviation sector in order to combat crime and terrorism. As a result of a number of aircraft hijackings at the end of the 1960s, the ICAO decided to draw up a basic agreement regulating civil aviation. Thus it was laid down in Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention that all passengers on civil commercial flights should be systematically screened. This measure has been in force since 1972 and it is difficult to imagine now that things were once otherwise. Following the attack on the Twin Towers in 2001 Annex 17 was radically overhauled. New specifications were made mandatory, for instance with regard to the reinforcement and locking of cockpit doors as well as air freight transport. In addition, training and quality requirements for security checks were tightened.

| 3.1.3 | European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)
  At European level too a policy on air transport security was developed within the framework of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC). This was, of course, based on international standards such as those laid down by the ICAO. This resulted in a European security handbook, Document 30, which contains security regulations which, although regarded as authoritative, are unfortunately not binding because of the ECAC's statute. That is why on 14 September 2001, three days after 9/11, the European Council decided that the EU should take on responsibility for aviation security. This decision resulted in Regulation 2320/2002, establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security. The Regulation entered into force on 19 January 2003. At the same Council of Ministers of 14 September it was also decided that the Commission would be empowered to carry out direct quality checks in the Member States. |
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3.1.3

European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)

At European level too a policy on air transport security was developed within the framework of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC). This was, of course, based on international standards such as those laid down by the ICAO. This resulted in a European security handbook, Document 30, which contains security regulations which, although regarded as authoritative, are unfortunately not binding because of the ECAC's statute. That is why on 14 September 2001, three days after 9/11, the European Council decided that the EU should take on responsibility for aviation security. This decision resulted in Regulation 2320/2002, establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security. The Regulation entered into force on 19 January 2003. At the same Council of Ministers of 14 September it was also decided that the Commission would be empowered to carry out direct quality checks in the Member States.

| 3.1.4 | International Labour Organisation (ILO)
  This concerns the revision of the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention. The purpose of the revised Convention is to improve the security of seafarers' identification so that passengers and crew are better protected and the safety of ships increased. At the same time seafarers' freedom of movement is not restricted, so that they may freely go ashore. The revised Convention is focused in particular on guidelines for the composition and issue of identity documents for seafarers. The ILO and the Convention are mentioned here as a model for inland modes of transport. |
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3.1.4

International Labour Organisation (ILO)

This concerns the revision of the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention. The purpose of the revised Convention is to improve the security of seafarers' identification so that passengers and crew are better protected and the safety of ships increased. At the same time seafarers' freedom of movement is not restricted, so that they may freely go ashore. The revised Convention is focused in particular on guidelines for the composition and issue of identity documents for seafarers. The ILO and the Convention are mentioned here as a model for inland modes of transport.

| 3.1.5 | World Customs Organisation (WCO)






  a. | Revised WCO Kyoto Convention
  In June 1999 the WCO Council adopted revisions to the WCO Convention of 1974, known as the Kyoto Convention. It is concerned with the simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures. An important aspect of the revised Convention is the increased attention paid to transparency and predictability in the chain. Important aspects of the revised Convention include:






  — | the use of pre-arrival information to enable prior selections to be made |
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3.1.5

World Customs Organisation (WCO)

a.

Revised WCO Kyoto Convention

In June 1999 the WCO Council adopted revisions to the WCO Convention of 1974, known as the Kyoto Convention. It is concerned with the simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures. An important aspect of the revised Convention is the increased attention paid to transparency and predictability in the chain. Important aspects of the revised Convention include:

—

the use of pre-arrival information to enable prior selections to be made

| — | risk management techniques |
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—

risk management techniques

| — | maximum use of automated systems |
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—

maximum use of automated systems

| — | interventions coordinated with other bodies |
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—

interventions coordinated with other bodies

| — | continuous monitoring and availability of information regarding customs requirements, laws, and |
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—

continuous monitoring and availability of information regarding customs requirements, laws, and

| — | Directives. |
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—

Directives.

| b. | WCO Customs Data Model
  This model contains a standardised international set of data which meets the demands which governments place on international transport. It means a step forward in the direction of harmonised customs information that is useable for security purposes. The model has been designed to work in a fully automated environment. |
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b.

WCO Customs Data Model

This model contains a standardised international set of data which meets the demands which governments place on international transport. It means a step forward in the direction of harmonised customs information that is useable for security purposes. The model has been designed to work in a fully automated environment.

| c. | The WCO Unique Consignment Reference
  The advantage is that every consignment is provided with a unique number so that identification of the consignment and the compiling of information on the consignment is simplified. |
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c.

The WCO Unique Consignment Reference

The advantage is that every consignment is provided with a unique number so that identification of the consignment and the compiling of information on the consignment is simplified.

| d. | The Advanced Cargo Information guidelines are, in accordance with the revised Kyoto Convention, aimed at gathering security-related information and provides guidelines for rapid compilation of data by Customs authorities. |
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d.

The Advanced Cargo Information guidelines are, in accordance with the revised Kyoto Convention, aimed at gathering security-related information and provides guidelines for rapid compilation of data by Customs authorities.

| e. | The Customs Convention on Containers contains technical specifications for containers used in international transport with a customs seal and also procedures for the type approval of such containers. At present the Convention, which dates from 1972, is being revised in the light of the increased attention paid to security. |
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e.

The Customs Convention on Containers contains technical specifications for containers used in international transport with a customs seal and also procedures for the type approval of such containers. At present the Convention, which dates from 1972, is being revised in the light of the increased attention paid to security.

This information on the World Customs Organisation could be of benefit to the inland modes of transport. The important thing is to focus on aspects of relevance to the inland modes.

| 3.1.6 | International Standards Organisation (ISO)
  In 2003 this organisation adopted guidelines with specifications for the mechanical sealing of freight containers.
  In addition, the organisation has developed a standard for the use of radio-frequency identification tags fitted in freight containers; it has also developed a joint communication protocol for digital sealing. |
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3.1.6

International Standards Organisation (ISO)

In 2003 this organisation adopted guidelines with specifications for the mechanical sealing of freight containers.

In addition, the organisation has developed a standard for the use of radio-frequency identification tags fitted in freight containers; it has also developed a joint communication protocol for digital sealing.

| 3.1.7 | The European Union (EU)






  a. | The EU has been particularly active in the field of security of maritime transport, ports and air transport. Several examples were given in point 2.3.
  In the field of intermodal transport, the European Commission published in December 2003 the consultation paper on Freight Transport Security which noted the possible threats and the measures that could be taken to protect the transport chain.
  The Commission indicated in this document that for all measures proposed, a risk profile should be drawn up for each mode individually, and for the whole transport chain.
  The measures proposed in the consultation paper are:






  — | the securing of infrastructure of European interest by the Member States by a number of detailed measures (a security plan to be updated annually, risk assessment, the designation of a contact point and the appointment of persons responsible for securing infrastructure, and the designation of a public audit body); |
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3.1.7

The European Union (EU)

a.

The EU has been particularly active in the field of security of maritime transport, ports and air transport. Several examples were given in point 2.3.

In the field of intermodal transport, the European Commission published in December 2003 the consultation paper on Freight Transport Security which noted the possible threats and the measures that could be taken to protect the transport chain.

The Commission indicated in this document that for all measures proposed, a risk profile should be drawn up for each mode individually, and for the whole transport chain.

The measures proposed in the consultation paper are:

—

the securing of infrastructure of European interest by the Member States by a number of detailed measures (a security plan to be updated annually, risk assessment, the designation of a contact point and the appointment of persons responsible for securing infrastructure, and the designation of a public audit body);

| — | the development of security standards for service providers (at Community level the development of minimum standards of security for international service providers, the introduction of the regulated agent and known shipper concepts in the inland transport chain; |
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—

the development of security standards for service providers (at Community level the development of minimum standards of security for international service providers, the introduction of the regulated agent and known shipper concepts in the inland transport chain;

| — | the use of the advanced information concept in electronic form; depending on a risk analysis, this could be made compulsory for certain routes or shipments; |
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—

the use of the advanced information concept in electronic form; depending on a risk analysis, this could be made compulsory for certain routes or shipments;

| — | the use of special seals and locks for high-risk and, from the security point of view, vulnerable shipments; |
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—

the use of special seals and locks for high-risk and, from the security point of view, vulnerable shipments;

| — | ensuring that Member States do not adopt different standards which hinder the efficient functioning of the market. The Commission proposes a number of measures in this regard in its document. |
| --- | --- |

—

ensuring that Member States do not adopt different standards which hinder the efficient functioning of the market. The Commission proposes a number of measures in this regard in its document.

| b. | The Communication from the Commission of 24 July 2003 and the Proposal for a Regulation of the same date, in which the Commission proposed to amend the Community Customs Code. This Proposal aimed to adapt the role of the customs authorities at the EU's external borders to make them able to deal with the increased security standards for the import and export of goods. |
| --- | --- |

b.

The Communication from the Commission of 24 July 2003 and the Proposal for a Regulation of the same date, in which the Commission proposed to amend the Community Customs Code. This Proposal aimed to adapt the role of the customs authorities at the EU's external borders to make them able to deal with the increased security standards for the import and export of goods.

| 3.1.8 | The UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
  The Working Party on Customs Questions affecting Transport (WP30) and the Administrative Committee of TIR (Transports Internationaux Routiers) reached an agreement in February 2003 to gradually computerise TIR procedures, which are at present still paper-based. With a TIR carnet, goods can be transported to countries outside the EU with minimum delay at borders, as the carnet is an internationally recognised customs document.
  This concerns the security of goods transported by road. The Committee recommends a study of the extent to which measures of this kind are applicable to other modes. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.8

The UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)

The Working Party on Customs Questions affecting Transport (WP30) and the Administrative Committee of TIR (Transports Internationaux Routiers) reached an agreement in February 2003 to gradually computerise TIR procedures, which are at present still paper-based. With a TIR carnet, goods can be transported to countries outside the EU with minimum delay at borders, as the carnet is an internationally recognised customs document.

This concerns the security of goods transported by road. The Committee recommends a study of the extent to which measures of this kind are applicable to other modes.

| 3.1.9 | Measures taken by the USA
  It goes without saying that, after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States took the lead in enacting security measures. Thus, a Bioterrorism Act came into force in 2002. This requires certain information relating to the import of food products to be submitted prior to arrival in the United States. In addition, food producers and storage facilities must be registered with the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and they have to appoint a local representative in the USA. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.9

Measures taken by the USA

It goes without saying that, after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States took the lead in enacting security measures. Thus, a Bioterrorism Act came into force in 2002. This requires certain information relating to the import of food products to be submitted prior to arrival in the United States. In addition, food producers and storage facilities must be registered with the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and they have to appoint a local representative in the USA.

| 3.1.10 | In order to maintain the readability of this exploratory opinion, a number of measures are noted here without going into further details.
  When taking measures in Europe, it is of course recommended that the experience acquired in the USA be studied and taken into account. The following should be mentioned here:






  a. | the Container Security Initiative (CSI), |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.1.10

In order to maintain the readability of this exploratory opinion, a number of measures are noted here without going into further details.

When taking measures in Europe, it is of course recommended that the experience acquired in the USA be studied and taken into account. The following should be mentioned here:

a.

the Container Security Initiative (CSI),

| b. | the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), |
| --- | --- |

b.

the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT),

| c. | the 24 Hour Advance Manifest, |
| --- | --- |

c.

the 24 Hour Advance Manifest,

| d. | the Bio-Terrorism Act. |
| --- | --- |

d.

the Bio-Terrorism Act.

| 3.2 | Initiatives taken by the industry either alone or in conjunction with government






  a. | The Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition Programme, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.2

Initiatives taken by the industry either alone or in conjunction with government

a.

The Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition Programme,

| b. | The Memorandum of Understanding on Electronic Business, |
| --- | --- |

b.

The Memorandum of Understanding on Electronic Business,

| c. | Resolution of the International Road Transport Union (IRU) on security in road transport, |
| --- | --- |

c.

Resolution of the International Road Transport Union (IRU) on security in road transport,

| d. | The Road Transport Security Guidelines drawn up by the IRU, |
| --- | --- |

d.

The Road Transport Security Guidelines drawn up by the IRU,

| e. | The IRU Standard Security Plan currently being developed, |
| --- | --- |

e.

The IRU Standard Security Plan currently being developed,

| f. | The Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) programme, |
| --- | --- |

f.

The Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) programme,

| g. | The Smart and Secure Tradelanes initiative. |
| --- | --- |

g.

The Smart and Secure Tradelanes initiative.

| 3.3 | The majority of initiatives noted in the above paragraphs are concerned with security measures for the transport of goods in general and for container transport in particular. In the Committee's opinion, a number of these measures could also be applicable to passenger transport. |
| --- | --- |

3.3

The majority of initiatives noted in the above paragraphs are concerned with security measures for the transport of goods in general and for container transport in particular. In the Committee's opinion, a number of these measures could also be applicable to passenger transport.

| 3.4 | The security measures in the individual transport sectors are rather diverse. As already noted, maritime transport/ports and air transport are the modes which are furthest advanced in the implementation of measures. This was excellently illustrated in the Committee's Opinion of 24 October 2002 (5) (rapporteur: Ms Bredima-Savopoulou). These modes of transport will not therefore be further examined separately in this exploratory opinion. |
| --- | --- |

3.4

The security measures in the individual transport sectors are rather diverse. As already noted, maritime transport/ports and air transport are the modes which are furthest advanced in the implementation of measures. This was excellently illustrated in the Committee's Opinion of 24 October 2002 (5) (rapporteur: Ms Bredima-Savopoulou). These modes of transport will not therefore be further examined separately in this exploratory opinion.

5

| 3.5 | One point meriting attention is the position of vulnerable inland terminals and transfer points. Pipelines can in this context also be mentioned as a separate mode of transport. The owners of the terminal operations indeed devote a great deal of energy to securing their sites. However, the Committee has the impression that it is not sufficiently understood that it is precisely the transfer points that are vulnerable and that cooperation is much needed with the modes that use the transfer facilities. |
| --- | --- |

3.5

One point meriting attention is the position of vulnerable inland terminals and transfer points. Pipelines can in this context also be mentioned as a separate mode of transport. The owners of the terminal operations indeed devote a great deal of energy to securing their sites. However, the Committee has the impression that it is not sufficiently understood that it is precisely the transfer points that are vulnerable and that cooperation is much needed with the modes that use the transfer facilities.

| 3.6 | In the Committee's view, there is also an insufficient sense of urgency concerning the dangers connected with the transport and transfer via pipelines. The Committee points out that this awareness needs to be fostered as a matter of urgency and that the competent authorities should adopt security measures for both staff and infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

3.6

In the Committee's view, there is also an insufficient sense of urgency concerning the dangers connected with the transport and transfer via pipelines. The Committee points out that this awareness needs to be fostered as a matter of urgency and that the competent authorities should adopt security measures for both staff and infrastructure.

| 3.7 | Traditionally, the railways have always attached high importance to the safety of employees, passengers and equipment alike. It is to be hoped that this will also apply to security. Extra attention will have to be devoted to sensitive locations such as stations and marshalling yards. The International Union of Railways (UIC) should come up with some recommendations for the necessary international coordination.
  The national railway companies should produce information material in order to inform passengers and staff what to do in the event of an emergency. This ought to become a standard part of staff training. |
| --- | --- |

3.7

Traditionally, the railways have always attached high importance to the safety of employees, passengers and equipment alike. It is to be hoped that this will also apply to security. Extra attention will have to be devoted to sensitive locations such as stations and marshalling yards. The International Union of Railways (UIC) should come up with some recommendations for the necessary international coordination.

The national railway companies should produce information material in order to inform passengers and staff what to do in the event of an emergency. This ought to become a standard part of staff training.

| 3.8 | The inland waterways sector makes use of ports to load and to unload. The ISPS (International Ship & Port Facility Security) Code thus also applies to inland waterway transport. In the Committee's view, a strict application of the Code would not lead to disruption of the logistics chain. It is the responsibility of the ports, shipping companies and inspection services to ensure that the ISPS Code is complied with. The Committee believes that security should form an integral part of the training of inland waterway workers. |
| --- | --- |

3.8

The inland waterways sector makes use of ports to load and to unload. The ISPS (International Ship & Port Facility Security) Code thus also applies to inland waterway transport. In the Committee's view, a strict application of the Code would not lead to disruption of the logistics chain. It is the responsibility of the ports, shipping companies and inspection services to ensure that the ISPS Code is complied with. The Committee believes that security should form an integral part of the training of inland waterway workers.

| 3.9 | Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London there is a general awareness of the vulnerability of public transport. Measures have been taken in the form of surveillance and checks in order to drastically increase the security level and thus the sense of security of passengers and staff. |
| --- | --- |

3.9

Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London there is a general awareness of the vulnerability of public transport. Measures have been taken in the form of surveillance and checks in order to drastically increase the security level and thus the sense of security of passengers and staff.

| 3.10 | The road transport and haulage sector is extremely vulnerable in view of the great number of coach and road haulage companies: we are dealing with several hundred thousand companies which are extremely mobile. This sector has been plagued by crime for many years. Theft of vehicles, loaded or unloaded, is an every day occurrence, frequently with psychological consequences for the drivers. The IRU (International Road Transport Union) is doing all it can to persuade governments and market players to adopt security measures. One example is the call to increase the number of secure parking areas. In view of the high-risk nature of the sector the International Road Transport Union has, as indicated in point 3.2, drawn up Security Guidelines. These contain a number of recommendations for managers, drivers and consignors. In addition, a framework has been drawn up for voluntary cooperation with the customs authorities. |
| --- | --- |

3.10

The road transport and haulage sector is extremely vulnerable in view of the great number of coach and road haulage companies: we are dealing with several hundred thousand companies which are extremely mobile. This sector has been plagued by crime for many years. Theft of vehicles, loaded or unloaded, is an every day occurrence, frequently with psychological consequences for the drivers. The IRU (International Road Transport Union) is doing all it can to persuade governments and market players to adopt security measures. One example is the call to increase the number of secure parking areas. In view of the high-risk nature of the sector the International Road Transport Union has, as indicated in point 3.2, drawn up Security Guidelines. These contain a number of recommendations for managers, drivers and consignors. In addition, a framework has been drawn up for voluntary cooperation with the customs authorities.

| 3.11 | The basic principles underlying these Security Guidelines mentioned in point 3.10 are:






  — | Security measures should not be so strict as to make normal business impossible. |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.11

The basic principles underlying these Security Guidelines mentioned in point 3.10 are:

—

Security measures should not be so strict as to make normal business impossible.

| — | Newly introduced security measures should be proportionate to their purpose, the costs involved and the consequences for traffic. |
| --- | --- |

—

Newly introduced security measures should be proportionate to their purpose, the costs involved and the consequences for traffic.

| — | Unilateral measures by states are not acceptable. |
| --- | --- |

—

Unilateral measures by states are not acceptable.

| — | Security measures must be readily understood and reasonable. |
| --- | --- |

—

Security measures must be readily understood and reasonable.

| — | In view of the international nature of transport, the measures to be taken should be applied uniformly, proportionately and without discrimination, and little or no disruption to the efficient business flows. |
| --- | --- |

—

In view of the international nature of transport, the measures to be taken should be applied uniformly, proportionately and without discrimination, and little or no disruption to the efficient business flows.

Generally speaking, before taking measures, it is essential that the target group be aware of the need for security measures. No measures should be taken as long as the target group is not fully informed. The Committee therefore urges that this information be distributed in good time.

| 3.12 | As far as own-account transport is concerned, the Committee recommends that, irrespective of the mode of transport to be used, the person responsible within the company should adopt appropriate security measures for staff, means of transport and infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

3.12

As far as own-account transport is concerned, the Committee recommends that, irrespective of the mode of transport to be used, the person responsible within the company should adopt appropriate security measures for staff, means of transport and infrastructure.

| 3.13 | The Committee finds that there is an increasing awareness on the part of governments and the inland modes of transport that security measures must be incorporated into daily working practices. However, consistency is still a long way off. Of the individual modes of transport, a great deal has been done in particular in maritime and air transport because of their global nature. The public transport sector has become more alert, but in the goods transport sector initiatives have for the most part remained limited to measures within the branch itself. Measures that involve the whole logistics chain have not yet been taken, whilst vulnerability lies precisely at the interchanges between one mode and another. The Committee advises governments to set up a coordinating body at national level to cover the whole chain. |
| --- | --- |

3.13

The Committee finds that there is an increasing awareness on the part of governments and the inland modes of transport that security measures must be incorporated into daily working practices. However, consistency is still a long way off. Of the individual modes of transport, a great deal has been done in particular in maritime and air transport because of their global nature. The public transport sector has become more alert, but in the goods transport sector initiatives have for the most part remained limited to measures within the branch itself. Measures that involve the whole logistics chain have not yet been taken, whilst vulnerability lies precisely at the interchanges between one mode and another. The Committee advises governments to set up a coordinating body at national level to cover the whole chain.

4.   The cost of security measures

| 4.1 | It is obvious to everyone that, under the impact of increased crime and terrorism, measures must be taken to protect passengers, staff, means of transport and cargoes. It is less clear, however, who should meet the cost of the security measures. And clearly the cost of security is high. Thus, it is estimated that the security cost of transporting one container overseas is between 30 and 40 US dollars. |
| --- | --- |

4.1

It is obvious to everyone that, under the impact of increased crime and terrorism, measures must be taken to protect passengers, staff, means of transport and cargoes. It is less clear, however, who should meet the cost of the security measures. And clearly the cost of security is high. Thus, it is estimated that the security cost of transporting one container overseas is between 30 and 40 US dollars.

| 4.2 | In order to gain a clear understanding of who should be responsible for costs, it is necessary to consider what types of cost we are talking about. Costs can be categorised as follows:






  a. | costs incurred in drawing up and monitoring implementation of the rules; |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.2

In order to gain a clear understanding of who should be responsible for costs, it is necessary to consider what types of cost we are talking about. Costs can be categorised as follows:

a.

costs incurred in drawing up and monitoring implementation of the rules;

| b. | cost of analysing the degree of threat and helping non-EU countries to bring their security standards up to EU levels; |
| --- | --- |

b.

cost of analysing the degree of threat and helping non-EU countries to bring their security standards up to EU levels;

| c. | cost of investing in selection and training of security staff and purchase of security equipment; |
| --- | --- |

c.

cost of investing in selection and training of security staff and purchase of security equipment;

| d. | running costs, such as cost of security staff, maintenance of security equipment, security information, insurance and public order measures to ensure compliance with the law. |
| --- | --- |

d.

running costs, such as cost of security staff, maintenance of security equipment, security information, insurance and public order measures to ensure compliance with the law.

In addition, there is the cost of measures preceding or following an exceptional event such as a terrorist attack. A separate solution will have to be found for the allocation of these costs. In the Committee's view, the government should meet these costs in the first instance.

| 4.3 | Regarding the question as to who or which body should be considered primarily responsible for the cost, it seems logical in the case of the first two categories to opt for the national or local and regional authorities, whilst for categories c and d the private sector could be involved to a greater extent. |
| --- | --- |

4.3

Regarding the question as to who or which body should be considered primarily responsible for the cost, it seems logical in the case of the first two categories to opt for the national or local and regional authorities, whilst for categories c and d the private sector could be involved to a greater extent.

| 4.4 | From the economic point of view, the cost should ultimately be met by the activity from which the costs arise, so that it is incorporated into the price (a public transport ticket or tariff for goods transport). After all, the prices of goods and services should as far as possible cover the marginal social costs, including the security costs. The measures to be taken could, however, sometimes be of such great public interest that the costs involved should be met by the whole community. |
| --- | --- |

4.4

From the economic point of view, the cost should ultimately be met by the activity from which the costs arise, so that it is incorporated into the price (a public transport ticket or tariff for goods transport). After all, the prices of goods and services should as far as possible cover the marginal social costs, including the security costs. The measures to be taken could, however, sometimes be of such great public interest that the costs involved should be met by the whole community.

| 4.5 | If this distinction is taken into consideration, it means that ultimately the cost of security is borne by the consumer, who pays for them in the form of a higher price for the end product. However, in the case of government financing security measures which are in the public interest, the cost will be met by the taxpayer. |
| --- | --- |

4.5

If this distinction is taken into consideration, it means that ultimately the cost of security is borne by the consumer, who pays for them in the form of a higher price for the end product. However, in the case of government financing security measures which are in the public interest, the cost will be met by the taxpayer.

| 4.6 | The role of the insurance companies is, in the Committee's view, a secondary one. For providing that policies do not exclude terrorist acts, any payments will always be passed on to the insured in the form of higher premiums. There is an obvious causal connection between the degree of security and the level of premium to be paid. As security measures are enhanced, the premium should fall correspondingly. |
| --- | --- |

4.6

The role of the insurance companies is, in the Committee's view, a secondary one. For providing that policies do not exclude terrorist acts, any payments will always be passed on to the insured in the form of higher premiums. There is an obvious causal connection between the degree of security and the level of premium to be paid. As security measures are enhanced, the premium should fall correspondingly.

| 4.7 | The role of the European Union can, from the point of view of its duties and competences, only be a coordinating and supervisory one. Financial resources can, at the most, be made available for publicity campaigns and information. Thus, for example, EUR 3,5 million has been set aside for security in the 6th Framework Programme. |
| --- | --- |

4.7

The role of the European Union can, from the point of view of its duties and competences, only be a coordinating and supervisory one. Financial resources can, at the most, be made available for publicity campaigns and information. Thus, for example, EUR 3,5 million has been set aside for security in the 6th Framework Programme.

5.   Summary and recommendations

| 5.1 | The Committee notes that, as a result of the terrorist attacks of recent years, there has been an enormous increase at all levels in the attention paid to security. |
| --- | --- |

5.1

The Committee notes that, as a result of the terrorist attacks of recent years, there has been an enormous increase at all levels in the attention paid to security.

| 5.2 | The required agreements, laid down under international rules, have been reached in the maritime and air transport sectors in particular. Implementation is via EU inspections. |
| --- | --- |

5.2

The required agreements, laid down under international rules, have been reached in the maritime and air transport sectors in particular. Implementation is via EU inspections.

| 5.3 | In the inland modes of transport, the Committee considers that the necessary work remains to be done, partly because of the high degree of interdependence between the modes and the vulnerable intermodal storage and transfer points. A coordinated approach is urgently needed, because the weakest link determines the strength of the whole chain. |
| --- | --- |

5.3

In the inland modes of transport, the Committee considers that the necessary work remains to be done, partly because of the high degree of interdependence between the modes and the vulnerable intermodal storage and transfer points. A coordinated approach is urgently needed, because the weakest link determines the strength of the whole chain.

| 5.4 | The Committee points out that no distinction is made in several European Union languages between the terms ‘security’ and ‘safety’. It notes that this leads to confusion and recommends that unambiguous terminology be used. |
| --- | --- |

5.4

The Committee points out that no distinction is made in several European Union languages between the terms ‘security’ and ‘safety’. It notes that this leads to confusion and recommends that unambiguous terminology be used.

| 5.5 | In the Committee's judgement, the responsibility for adopting security measures lies with the Member States. They should create a framework of minimum standards for the modes of transport. To coordinate the measures to be taken, the governments should set up a special body to ensure implementation. |
| --- | --- |

5.5

In the Committee's judgement, the responsibility for adopting security measures lies with the Member States. They should create a framework of minimum standards for the modes of transport. To coordinate the measures to be taken, the governments should set up a special body to ensure implementation.

| 5.6 | In the Committee's view, the role of the European Union lies in coordinating measures at Community and international level, while that of national and local government lies more in actually taking measures, monitoring implementation, providing information and promoting awareness of terrorism and crime at all levels. The national and local governments should also promote cooperation between the modes of transport and, in the Committee's view, the protection of physical infrastructure should be part of their responsibilities. |
| --- | --- |

5.6

In the Committee's view, the role of the European Union lies in coordinating measures at Community and international level, while that of national and local government lies more in actually taking measures, monitoring implementation, providing information and promoting awareness of terrorism and crime at all levels. The national and local governments should also promote cooperation between the modes of transport and, in the Committee's view, the protection of physical infrastructure should be part of their responsibilities.

| 5.7 | The users of the modes of transport play a vital role in security. Passengers and customers must be encouraged by publicity campaigns to be more active and alert; employees in the inland mode of transport should receive special training geared to their role in the security of the mode. In the Committee's opinion, the role of company management lies in making security concepts an integral part of the company ethos and culture, allowing employees to undertake training courses in this field and ensuring that management training includes crisis management. |
| --- | --- |

5.7

The users of the modes of transport play a vital role in security. Passengers and customers must be encouraged by publicity campaigns to be more active and alert; employees in the inland mode of transport should receive special training geared to their role in the security of the mode. In the Committee's opinion, the role of company management lies in making security concepts an integral part of the company ethos and culture, allowing employees to undertake training courses in this field and ensuring that management training includes crisis management.

| 5.8 | The Committee finds that the position in the various inland modes of transport remains diverse. There is an increasing awareness on the part of governments and modes of transport that security measures should be incorporated into daily working practices. Consistency is still a long way off, however. The situation in the public transport sector in this respect is better than in the goods sector. Initiatives in the latter sector are still chiefly limited to the sector itself. The Committee therefore advises governments to establish one coordinating organisation to cover the whole chain. |
| --- | --- |

5.8

The Committee finds that the position in the various inland modes of transport remains diverse. There is an increasing awareness on the part of governments and modes of transport that security measures should be incorporated into daily working practices. Consistency is still a long way off, however. The situation in the public transport sector in this respect is better than in the goods sector. Initiatives in the latter sector are still chiefly limited to the sector itself. The Committee therefore advises governments to establish one coordinating organisation to cover the whole chain.

| 5.9 | In the case of own-account transport, the Committee believes that, irrespective of the mode used, the person responsible within the company should adopt the necessary security measures for employees, means of transport and infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

5.9

In the case of own-account transport, the Committee believes that, irrespective of the mode used, the person responsible within the company should adopt the necessary security measures for employees, means of transport and infrastructure.

| 5.10 | In the Committee's opinion, the cost of security should be reflected in the price of the end product, so that the consumer pays for it directly or, if the measures are taken by government, ultimately the public through taxes. |
| --- | --- |

5.10

In the Committee's opinion, the cost of security should be reflected in the price of the end product, so that the consumer pays for it directly or, if the measures are taken by government, ultimately the public through taxes.

| 5.11 | In the view of the Committee, the role of the insurance companies is a secondary one. Any payments will ultimately be passed on to the insured in the form of higher premiums. As security measures reach a higher level, the premiums to be paid should fall. The level of the premiums will have to be closely monitored to ensure that they reflect market risks. |
| --- | --- |

5.11

In the view of the Committee, the role of the insurance companies is a secondary one. Any payments will ultimately be passed on to the insured in the form of higher premiums. As security measures reach a higher level, the premiums to be paid should fall. The level of the premiums will have to be closely monitored to ensure that they reflect market risks.

| 5.12 | The financing role of the European Union will focus mainly on research, information and awareness-raising campaigns. |
| --- | --- |

5.12

The financing role of the European Union will focus mainly on research, information and awareness-raising campaigns.

Brussels, 14 December 2005

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Anne-Marie SIGMUND

---

(1)  OJ C 61, 14.3.2003, p. 174.

1

(2)  COM(2005) 124 final, 6.4.2005.

2

(3)  OJ C 198, 12.8.2005, p. 1.

3

(4)  For a wide-ranging discussion of the security of public transport systems in the major cities, see the outlook opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Safety of all modes of transport, including the the issue of financing (rapporteur: Mr Robert Neill, Member of the London Assembly (CdR 209/2005)).

4

Safety of all modes of transport, including the the issue of financing

(5)  OJ C 61, 14.3.2003, p. 174.

5

---