NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

XUE RONG ZHANG, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-71694 

Agency No. A088-289-357 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 13, 2022**

San Francisco, California

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, and BAKER,***

International Trade Judge.

Xue Rong Zhang petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 

(“BIA”) dismissal of her appeal from an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) decision denying 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge for the United States Court of 

International Trade, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 30 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Zhang raised two grounds for relief before 

the BIA and in her petition for review: (1) a forced abortion claim; and (2) a religious 

persecution claim. We review denials of those claims for substantial evidence. See 

Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant in part, deny in part, and remand to the BIA. 

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of relief based on 

Zhang’s religious persecution claim. The BIA affirmed the denial of relief on 

adverse credibility grounds, which the record as a whole supports. See Alam v. 

Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (holding that courts must 

review the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors in evaluating adverse 

credibility determinations). For example, Zhang inconsistently reported her divorce 

date. At a 2015 hearing, Zhang testified that she divorced in 2009, after arriving in 

the United States. But at a 2017 hearing, she testified that her husband divorced her 

in 2000 because she received an abortion. Further, Zhang’s testimony was 

inconsistent with her household registry, which indicated she was divorced in or 

before 1997.

Additionally, substantial similarities between Zhang’s declaration and those 

of other applicants, including verbatim matches, undermine Zhang’s credibility. The 

BIA agreed with the IJ that Zhang’s purported use of a prepared template did not 
3 

adequately explain the similarities because her declaration contained the same 

grammatical errors as others’. Finally, the BIA rejected Zhang’s argument on appeal 

that she could have explained the similarities if allowed to confront the other 

applicants. That argument, the BIA said, was unpersuasive since the other

declarations were created before Zhang’s.1 These inconsistencies sufficiently 

support the adverse credibility determination in light of the totality of the 

circumstances. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that 

inconsistencies “need not go to the heart of a petitioner’s claim” and even “minor 

inconsistencies that have a bearing on a petitioner’s veracity may constitute the basis 

for an adverse credibility determination” (citation omitted)).

Zhang’s documentary evidence does not compel a conclusion that she testified

credibly, nor that she was persecuted or would be tortured on the basis of her religion 

if returned to China. See Yali Wang, 861 F.3d at 1007.2 Substantial evidence thus 

supports the BIA’s denial of Zhang’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, 

and CAT relief based on religious persecution. 

1 Zhang’s assertion on appeal that she was denied an ability to confront 

potential witnesses because the declarations did not include certificates of translation 

is also unpersuasive. She makes no cogent argument about the significance of the 

certificates, especially since the other applicants’ declarations were created months

before Zhang’s.

2 Because the adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial 

evidence, the notice and opportunity requirements of Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 

1090−93 (9th Cir. 2011), are inapplicable. See Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 

927 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Yali Wang, 861 F.3d at 1008−09.
4 

2. However, the BIA erred in failing to consider whether, notwithstanding 

the BIA’s adverse credibility determination, Zhang’s documentary evidence 

independently establishes her claim that she was persecuted when the government

forced her to undergo an abortion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (providing that, “for 

purposes of determinations under [the asylum statute,] a person who has been forced 

to abort a pregnancy . . . shall be deemed to have been persecuted”). The 

administrative record contains copies of both Chinese-language and English 

translations of (1) a “Certificate of Diagnosis” referring to Zhang either having an 

abortion or being referred for an abortion and (2) a “Notice to Fire” dated the same 

day as the Certificate of Diagnosis stating that Zhang was fired from her public 

employment because of “family planning” violations. 

The IJ and the BIA failed to consider whether these documents independently 

establish Zhang’s eligibility for relief, and the BIA instead considered only whether 

they “corroborated” Zhang’s testimony. See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 

1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The BIA is obligated to consider and address in its 

entirety the evidence submitted by a petitioner, and where its failure to do so could 

have affected its decision, remand is appropriate.” (simplified)); Etemadi v. 

Garland, 12 F.4th 1013, 1026 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Where there is any indication that 

the BIA did not consider all of the evidence before it[,] the decision cannot stand. 

Such indications include misstating the record and failing to mention highly 
5 

probative or potentially dispositive evidence.” (simplified)). On remand, the 

agency should address the independent significance of these documents, especially 

as they relate to each other. While neither document refers to the abortion as 

involuntary, authoritarian states are not known for transparency in the more brutal 

aspects of their repression. The “Notice to Fire,” dated the same day as the abortion 

certificate, states that Zhang was fired for violating the “one-child policy,” which 

may be evidence of a forced abortion when viewed together with the abortion 

certificate. 

We therefore remand this case to the BIA to further remand for the IJ to 

consider (1) the independent significance of the firing notice and the abortion 

certificate, as read together, separately from Zhang’s testimony and, depending on 

the outcome of that issue, (2) whether Zhang has established eligibility for asylum, 

withholding, or CAT relief.

PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.