IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

HAROLD E. PHILHOWER,

Defendant BelowAppellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE, 

 Plaintiff BelowAppellee.

§

§ No. 283, 2016

§

§

§

§ Court Below: Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ Cr. ID 1410003902

§ 

§

Submitted: September 7, 2016

 Decided: October 28, 2016

Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.

O R D E R 

This 28th day of October 2016, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 

filed under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and 

the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that:

(1) In January 2016, following a four-day trial, a Superior Court jury 

convicted the defendant-appellant, Harold Philhower, of one count of Rape in 

the Third Degree (as a lesser included offense to the charge of Rape in the 

Second Degree) and three counts of Dealing in Child Pornography. The jury

acquitted him of four other charges. Following a presentence investigation, the 

Superior Court sentenced Philhower on May 25, 2016 to a total period of 100 

years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after serving eight years in 
2

prison, to be followed by three years of probation supervision. This is 

Philhower’s direct appeal.

(2) Philhower’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 

under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete 

and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues. 

By letter, counsel informed Philhower of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 

provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief 

and appendix. Philhower also was informed of his right to supplement his 

attorney’s presentation. The State has responded to counsel’s position and to 

Philhower’s argument and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 

(3) The trial transcript reflects that the State introduced into evidence a 

redacted recording of Philhower’s statement to the police on October 6, 2014. 

During that statement, Philhower admitted receiving three or four nude pictures 

on his telephone from the then thirteen-year-old victim. During the same 

interview, Philhower also confessed to engaging in one incident of oral sex with 

the victim. After Philhower’s statement was introduced at trial through the 

testimony of the investigating officer, the victim testified that she had sent 

Philhower three nude photographs of herself at Philhower’s request. She 

testified that, after she sent the photographs, Philhower acknowledged looking at 

them. The victim also testified about an incident during which Philhower pulled 
3

down her pants and performed oral sex on her. Philhower testified at trial and 

denied the allegations.

(4) Philhower has raised one issue for the Court’s consideration in 

response to his counsel’s motion to withdraw. He contends that the State failed 

to establish the corpus delicti of his four convictions, independent of 

Philhower’s own taped statement to police. Philhower essentially contends that 

the victim’s testimony was coerced and that the State failed to present any 

competent evidence, independent of his taped statement, to support his 

convictions.

(5) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of 

defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 

26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 

conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could 

arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its own review of 

the record in order to determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at 

least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary 

presentation.1 

 

1

Penson v Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 

429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
4

(6) “Corpus delicti” means the “body of the crime.”2 In plain terms, 

the corpus delicti rule requires the State to prove that a crime was committed by 

somebody.3 An accused’s confession to a crime without “some” independent 

proof of the corpus delicti is insufficient evidence to support a conviction.

4

 This 

Court has held that the victim’s identification of the defendant as the perpetrator, 

even in the absence of any physical evidence linking the defendant to the crime, 

constitutes sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction of a sexual 

crime, as long as the victim’s testimony establishes every element of the offense 

charged.

5

 The victim’s identification of Philhower as the perpetrator in this case 

was independent proof of the corpus delicti and was sufficient to establish every 

element of the charged offenses.

(7) To the extent Philhower contends that the victim’s testimony was 

coerced, he did not raise this argument to the Superior Court in the first 

instance.6 Contrary to his assertion, a challenge to the credibility of a witness 

goes to the weight to be accorded to that evidence by the jury, not to its 

admissibility.7The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses 

 

2 McDonald v. State, 2016 WL 4699155, *3 (Del. Sept. 7, 2016) (internal quotations omitted).

3

Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 86 (Del. 1979).

4

Id.

5

Jacobs v. State, 2015 WL 6780786, *2 (Del. Nov. 5, 2015).

6 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2016).

7

Taylor v. State, 76 A.3d 791, 800 (Del. 2013).
5

appearing before the trial court and is responsible for resolving any conflicts in 

the testimony.8 It was within the purview of the jury in this case to determine 

what weight to give to the victim’s testimony. We find no merit to Philhower’s 

argument on appeal.

(8) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 

Philhower’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 

appealable issue. We also are satisfied that Philhower’s counsel has made a 

conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 

Philhower could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm 

is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. The 

motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice

 

8 McCoy v. State 112 A.3d 239, 268 (Del. 2014).