MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2019 ME	113

Docket: Cum-18-432

Submitted

On	Briefs: May	30,	2019

Decided: July	18,	2019

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	and	HJELM,	JJ.

ROBERT	GOGUEN

v.

JON	HADDOW

SAUFLEY,	C.J.

[¶1]	 	 Robert	 Goguen	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 Superior	 Court	

(Cumberland	 County,	 Mills,	 J.)	 dismissing, for	 failure	 to	 state	 a	 claim,	 his	

complaint	alleging	professional malpractice	and	related	causes	of	action	arising	

from	Jon	Haddow’s	legal	representation	of	him	in	federal	criminal	proceedings.		

We	affirm	the	judgment.

[¶2]		The	federal proceedings	at	issue	here	began	in	January	2011	when

Goguen	was	indicted	in	the	United	States	District	Court	for	the	District	of	Maine	

for	knowingly	 failing	 to	register	as	a	sex	offender.

1 See 18	U.S.C.S.	§	2250(a)	

(LEXIS	 through	 Pub.	 L.	 No.	 116-19).	 Goguen,	 represented	 by other counsel,

 1		Goguen	was	convicted	of	sexual	assault	in	the	second	degree	in	Connecticut	in	1996.
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pleaded	 guilty to	 the	 federal	 charge,	 admitting	 in	 open	 court	 that	 he had	

knowingly	failed to	update	his	registration.		

[¶3]		At	the	same	time,	Goguen	was	facing	state	charges	filed	in	2010	in	

Maine	 for	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact	 with	 a	 minor	 (Class	 B),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 255-A(1)(E-1)	 (2018).	 	He	 was	 represented	 by	 another	 attorney on	 those	

charges.		It	was	understood	that	the state	charge	could	be	used	by	the	federal	

government	to	enhance	the	federal	sentence.		

[¶4]		In	October	2011,	Goguen,	personally	and	not	through	counsel, filed	

a	motion	in	federal	court	asking	for	his	then	counsel	to	withdraw and	seeking

to	 withdraw	 his	 plea	 of	 guilty to	 the	 charge	 of	 failing	 to	 register.	 	 That	

December,	 the	 court	 (J. Woodcock,	 J.)	 granted	 Goguen’s	 motion	 allowing his	

counsel	to	withdraw	and	appointed	Haddow	to	represent	Goguen.		

[¶5]		In	May	2012,	Goguen	withdrew	his	motion	to	withdraw	the	guilty	

plea in	 the	 federal	prosecution	 for	 failure	 to	register,	and	the	state	charge	of	

unlawful	sexual	contact	with	a	minor	was dismissed	in	July	2012	on	the	ground	

that	Goguen	was	“being	sentenced	in	Federal	Court.”		

[¶6]	 	 At	 Goguen’s	 September	 2012 federal sentencing	 hearing on	 the	

failure	to	register	charge, the	court informed	Goguen, thoroughly	and	in	great

detail, of	the	possible	consequences	of	his	decision	whether	to	admit	or	proceed	
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to	trial	on the	allegation	that	he	had	committed	a	sex	offense	while	in	failure	to	

register status—a	 fact	 that,	 if	 proved,	 would	 generate	 a	 federal	 sentencing	

enhancement.		Following	that	explanation,	the	court	afforded	Goguen	another

hour	to	consult	with	Haddow.		After	consulting with	Haddow,	Goguen	stated	in	

open	court	that	he	did	not	dispute	that	he	had	committed	a	sex	offense	while	in	

failure	to	register	status.		The	court	sentenced	Goguen	to	a	term	of	months	and	

a	period	of	supervised	release with	conditions.		

[¶7]		In	2013,	after Goguen	left	prison on	supervised	release,	the	United	

States	Probation	Office moved	to	revoke	his	release	on	the	ground	that	he	had	

accessed	pornography	at the	Penobscot	Judicial	Center	law	library in	violation	

of	his	conditions	of	release.		Haddow	was again	appointed	to	represent	Goguen.		

In	open	court,	Goguen	waived	his	right	to	an	evidentiary	hearing	and	admitted

that	he	had	viewed	pornography	in	violation	of	the	conditions	of	his	supervised	

release.		Goguen	was	sentenced,	and	his	conviction	was	affirmed	on	appeal	to	

the	United	States	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	First	Circuit.		United	States	v.	Goguen,	

No.	13-2230	(1st	Cir.	Oct.	9,	2014).		

[¶8]		More	 than three years	later,	in	March	2018,	Goguen	 filed	his	civil	

complaint	against	Haddow	in	the	Superior	Court, alleging	legal	malpractice	and	

related	claims arising	from	Haddow’s	representation	of	him	both	at sentencing	
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for	 failure	 to	 register	 and	 during	 the	 proceedings	 to	 revoke his	 supervised	

release.	 	 Upon	 Haddow’s	 motion,	 the	 court (Mills,	 J.)	 dismissed Goguen’s	

complaint	for	failure	to	state	a	claim.		See M.R.	Civ.	P.	12(b)(6).		

[¶9]		Because	undisturbed	judgments	have	been	entered, here	based	on	

Goguen’s	in-court	admissions, finding	that	he	committed a sex	offense while	in	

failure	to	register status	and	that	he	accessed pornography	in	violation	of	his	

conditions	 of	 release,	 Goguen is	 collaterally	 estopped	 from	 asserting	 that	

inaccurate	legal	advice—rather	than	his own	conduct—caused	the	injuries	that	

he	alleges.

2		See Butler	v.	Mooers,	2001	ME	56,	¶¶	8-9,	771	A.2d	1034;	Brewer	v.	

Hagemann,	2001	ME	27,	¶¶	7-10,	771	A.2d	1030.		

[¶10]		As	the	trial	court	noted,	in	many jurisdictions,	a	person	bringing	a	

professional	malpractice	claim against	 former	criminal	defense	counsel must

plead	and	prove	the	additional	element	of	exoneration,	if	not	actual	innocence,	

of	the	criminal	charge to	seek any	relief	on	the	basis	of	incarceration.		Brewer,	

2001	ME	27,	¶	6	&	nn.3-4,	771	A.2d	1030.		Most	states	require	actual	innocence,	

see	Wiley	v.	County	 of	San	Diego,	966	P.2d	983,	991	 (Cal.	1998);	Rodriguez	v.	

 2		All torts	that	Goguen	has	alleged	require	proximate	causation.		See	Argereow	v.	Weisberg,	2018	

ME	140,	¶ 27,	195	A.3d	1210	(intentional	infliction	of	emotional	distress); Steadman	v.	Pagels,	2015	

ME	122,	¶	26,	125	A.3d	713 (negligent	infliction	of	emotional	distress);	Bell	ex	rel.	Bell	v.	Dawson,	

2013	ME	108,	¶¶	17,	24,	82	A.3d	827 (negligent supervision);	Butler	v.	Mooers,	2001	ME	56,	¶	9,	771	

A.2d	1034 (professional	malpractice).		
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Nielsen,	609	N.W.2d	368,	374-75	(Neb.	2000);	Mahoney	v.	Shaheen,	Cappiello,	

Stein	&	Gordon,	P.A.,	727	A.2d	996,	999-1000	(N.H.	1999),

3 though	some	states	

require	 only	 exoneration,	 see	 Shaw	 v.	 State,	 861	 P.2d	 566,	 569-73	 (Alaska	

1993);	 Stevens	 v.	 Bispham,	 851	 P.2d	 556,	 561	 (Or.	 1993);	Peeler	 v.	Hughes	&	

Luce,	909	S.W.2d	494,	498	(Tex.	1995).		See	Brewer,	2001	ME	27,	¶ 6	&	nn.	3-4,	

771	A.2d	1030.

[¶11]	 	Goguen	 has	 not,	 however, alleged	 that	 any	one	of	 the	pertinent	

court	orders—the	judgment	of	conviction	 for	 failing	 to	register,	 the	sentence	

imposed	upon	that	conviction,	or	the	order	revoking	his	release—has	been	set	

aside for	 any reason.	 	 Because	 Goguen	 has	 not,	 through	 his	 complaint,

presented	any facts	necessary to	overcome	the	Maine	collateral	estoppel	bar,	

we	need	not,	on	the	record	presented	here,	opine	on	whether	the elements of	

actual	innocence	or	exoneration are necessary	or	sufficient	to	proceed	with	a	

professional	malpractice	claim	under	Maine	law	when	the	alleged	malpractice	

involved	 the	entry	of	a	judgment	of	conviction	or	a	subsequent	revocation	of	

release.		Further,	to	the	extent	that	Goguen’s	complaint	may	be	seen	to	allege	

 3	 	 Cf.	 Hilario v.	 Reardon,	 960	 A.3d	 337,	 339,	 343-45	 (N.H.	 2008) (vacating	 the	 dismissal	 of	 a	

complaint	 alleging	 that	 counsel’s	 unauthorized	 motion	 to	 withdraw	 a	 guilty	 plea	 resulted	 in	 the	

convicted	 offender’s	 breach	 of	 the	 plea	 agreement	 and	 a	 ruling	 that	 the	 offender	 could	 not	 seek	

suspension	of	a	portion	of	his	sentence	pursuant	to	the	terms	of	that	agreement).
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malpractice	affecting	the	sentence	imposed	by	the	federal	court after	Goguen	

pleaded	guilty	to	failing	to	register,	the	complaint	fails	to	state	a	claim	for	relief	

because,	 as	 is	 revealed	 by	 Goguen’s	 allegations	 themselves,	 the	 sentence	

imposed	was	 at	 the	bottom	 of	 the	applicable	 range	 of	 the	 federal	 sentencing	

guidelines	 given	 the	 offense	 level	 that	 pertained	 to	 Goguen	 for	 his	 crime	 of	

failure	to	register.	

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Robert	Goguen,	appellant pro	se

Benjamin	J.	Wahrer,	Esq.,	and	James	M.	Bowie,	Esq.,	Thompson	Bowie	&	Hatch	

LLC,	Portland,	for	appellee	Jon	Haddow

Cumberland	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV-2018-117

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY