UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KIRK J. NYBERG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, 

LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-35315 

D.C. No. 3:15-cv-01175-PK 

District of Oregon, 

Portland 

ORDER

Before: McKEOWN, MILLER, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

The panel has voted to grant the petition for rehearing. An Amended 

Memorandum Disposition is being filed simultaneously with this Order.

The petition, Dkt. No. 101, is GRANTED. The court will accept a petition 

for rehearing or rehearing en banc of the Amended Memorandum Disposition 

within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order.

FILED

JUL 6 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KIRK J. NYBERG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, 

LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-35315 

D.C. No. 3:15-cv-01175-PK 

AMENDED MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Paul J. Papak II, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 9, 2022**

Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, MILLER, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Kirk Nyberg appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims brought 

under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 6 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Nyberg filed a complaint against Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC 

(“PRA”), claiming that PRA violated the FDCPA by bringing a state-court action 

against Nyberg to collect an alleged credit-card debt. The district court granted 

PRA’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Nyberg’s claims. 

PRA contends that this case must be dismissed for lack of Article III 

standing. We hold that Nyberg, the party invoking federal court jurisdiction, has 

satisfied his burden to establish standing. See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 

1264, 1270 (9th Cir. 2019). Nyberg demonstrated a concrete injury by showing that 

he incurred attorney’s fees defending against PRA’s state-court action. See 

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203–04 (2021); Czyzewski v. Jevic 

Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 464 (2017).

Although Nyberg has standing, his claims were properly dismissed on 

summary judgment. Nyberg argues that PRA committed unfair debt collection 

practices by providing him false information, and by bringing an account-stated 

claim against Nyberg that was legally baseless and time-barred. These arguments 

fail as a matter of law.

Nyberg’s falsity argument fails because he does not establish that the alleged 

falsities were material. Even if we assume PRA made a false statement in its debtcollection notice, Nyberg does not demonstrate that the statement of what he owed 

“affected [his] ability to make intelligent decisions” about how to respond to the 
3 

collection effort. See Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 

2010). Likewise, even if PRA’s state-court complaint falsely suggested that the 

FDCPA permitted Nyberg only 60 days to object to the credit-card statement, 

Nyberg does not identify how this communication was materially misleading, when

Nyberg’s credit-card holder agreement independently required that he make any 

objections within 60 days.

Nyberg’s argument that the account-stated claim was legally baseless and 

therefore in violation of the FDCPA also fails. A claim for account stated was

recognized in Oregon law at the time PRA filed its complaint. See, e.g., Sunshine 

Dairy v. Jolly Joan, 380 P.2d 637, 638 (Or. 1963); see also Portfolio Recovery 

Assocs., LLC v. Sanders, 462 P.3d 263, 275 (Or. 2020) (en banc) (subsequently 

confirming the viability of account-stated claims and citing cases). It is undisputed 

that PRA acquired Nyberg’s credit-card debt, PRA demanded payment of that debt, 

and Nyberg neither objected to the demand nor paid PRA. While PRA concedes 

that its complaint failed to plead the necessary mutual asset for account stated, that 

deficiency under Oregon law is not a per se violation of the FDCPA. See Wade v. 

Reg’l Credit Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 1996). Nyberg does not identify

how this deficiency rendered PRA’s complaint materially false or deceptive or an

unfair or unconscionable debt-collection method. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e–f.

Nor was PRA’s collection action time-barred. Cf. Kaiser v. Cascade Cap., 
4 

LLC, 989 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2021) (filing a lawsuit to collect debts that are 

outside the applicable statute of limitations violates the FDCPA). Because PRA’s 

action was filed in Oregon while Nyberg’s credit-card agreement was governed by 

Virginia law, we apply Oregon conflict-of-laws rules to determine whether the 

relevant Oregon or Virginia statute of limitations applied to the action. See 

Sanders, 462 P.3d at 267, 274. Since both states have a relevant connection to the 

dispute and neither party has identified a substantive conflict between Virginia and 

Oregon laws governing claims for account stated, Oregon’s statute of limitations 

applied to PRA’s action. See id. at 268–74. Nyberg does not contest that PRA filed 

its account-stated claim within Oregon’s applicable statute of limitations period. 

Nyberg’s argument that, under the concurrent remedy doctrine, Virginia’s time bar 

on a breach-of-contract claim precludes an account-stated claim in Oregon is not 

persuasive.

The district court’s order is AFFIRMED.