### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O CT O BE R 1 3, 200 4 S es sio n LO R EN Z O C HI LD R ES S, JR . , d /b /a S OU TH GA TE M ED IC A L G R OU P v.

UNION REAL TY COMPANY, LTD.
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. 37267 T.D. G eorgeH. Brow n, Jr., Judge

No. W2003-02934-C OA-R3-C V - F iled March 28, 2005

This appea l arises out of a n action for damag es by

a commerc ial tenant ag ainst a landlord. A fter a jury awa rded the appellee the sum of $168,000 in damag es, the a ppellee sought pre-judg ment interest, post-judg ment interest, and at t o rn ey ’s fe es. The trial court a war ded the a ppellee pr ejudgme nt and post-judg ment interest ca lculated on the ent i re aw ard of damag es but denied the appellee ’s re quest for an awa rd of attorney ’s fe es. The a ppellant see ks review of the a war d of pre

judgme nt and post-judg ment interest, and the ap p el l ee cross a ppeals, see king r eview of the trial court’s denial of attorney ’s fees. For the following rea sons, we af firm and r emand f

or any further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined. R. Doug las Hanson, Me mphis, TN, for Appe llant
Br uce D . Br ooke, Memphis, TN, for Appellee
OP IN ION
F acts and P roce dural Hi story
Th is i s th e thi rdoc c a sio n th is a c tio n h a s a pp e are d b e fo rethi s Co urt. Th e fa c ts of thi s c a se have been previously articulated by this Court i n Childress v. Union Realty Co., Limited , 97 S.W .3d 57 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) , a s f oll ow s: Plaintiff lessee in this c ase sued Def endant landlord for

damag es assoc iated wi t h l o s s of per sonal property , interruption of business, and lost prof its which-2-

re su lte d f ro m th e c oll aps e of a ro of a nd fl oo din g of Pla int if f' s le a se d me dic a l of

fi c e s. The jury awa rded Plaintiff $168,000.00 in damag es. Defenda nt appea ls, arg uing that this is, i n eff

ect, a subrog ation suit byPlaintiff's insurance c arrier.

. . . . T h e b a s ic f

a c ts inth is c a s e ar e u n d is p u te d

. I n 1 9 8 1 , th e p lain ti f f, D r
. L o r e n zo Chi ldr e ss, (" Chi ldr e ss" ) sig ne d a n ini tia l fi ve -y e ar le a se wi th de fe nd a nt Un ionRe a lty Compa ny (" Un ionRe a lty ") to ren t sp a c e in the Sou thg a te Sho pp ing Ce nte r i n Memphis for use a s a medica l clinic. Childress occupied the space on September 10, 1982, and made approximately $57,000.00 worth of improve ments. He purc hased over $135,000.00 worth of equipment and suppl ies for use in the clinic, which se rved 20 to 3 0 p a tie nts a

day
. Ch il dres s beg a n to e xpe ri e nc e ro of le aks a t th e c lin ic in Oc tob e r o f 1 98 2. Th e le aks be c a me a fr e qu e nt p ro ble m, ande ff orts b y Un ionRe a lty to repa ir the roof

wer e unsucc essful. Childress had to place g arba g e cans bene ath the leaks to collec t the water , causing considera ble embar rassment a nd inconvenienc e. Dr. Childress' s first lease expir ed in S eptember of 1986. Afte r considering the fea sibili ty of reloc ating the clinic, Childress e ntere d into ne g otiations with Union Realty for a second lease

. After sever al months of ne g otiations, the parties ente red into a second le ase. In light of the continuing problems with r oof leaks, howeve r, an additional provision was insert e d into the lease. The following lang uag e wa s inserted into parag raph 21 of

the lease :
21. L OSS OR DAMAGE TO LESSEE'S PROPER TY

. . . . *L essor will be responsible for any damag es cause d by ro o f l eaks which re cur more than four (4 ) day s after L essor ha s been g iven written notice of

problem(s). Parag raph 24 of

both the first and second l ease s require d Childress to car ry p u b l i c l i ab i l i t y

i n s u r a n c e o n t h e p r o p e r t y a n d t o l i s tU n i o n R e a l t y

a s a c o
- i n s u r e d

. It a lso re qu ir e d th a t Ch ild re ss w ou ld h oldUn ionRe a lty ha rm le ss f ro m dama g e to property on the pre mises. Ho we v er , para g raph 24 of the sec ond lease excepted da ma g e s " du e to the a c t of ne g lig e nc e of L e sso r or its a g e nts " fr om thi s ho ld h arm le ss c laus e . U nio n Re a lty

a lso a dd e d pa

ra g ra ph 48 to the se c on d le a se
. Para g ra ph 48 is e nti tle d " Wai ve r o f S ub ro g a tio n" a ndpr ov ide s:
L e sse e waive s a ndre le a se s a ny c la im or ri g ht o f r e c ov e ry

a g a ins t L essor . . . for

any loss resulting f

rom cause s cover ed by

insurance , and shall procure a waiver of subrogation ag ainst L essor on the pa rt-3- of its insurer by

an d endorse ment to all insurance policies wher eby the in s u r e r r e c o g n iz e s th a t th e in s u r e d h a s w a iv e d a n y r ig h t of rec overy from L essor
. . . . A copy of such endorse m en t s h al l be deposited with L essor. The roof l eaks beca me continually worse and Childress sent numerous complaints t o Union Realty , g iving notice of extensive damag es, interr uption of bu sin e ss a nd e mba

rr a ssm e nt. On Janu ary 19 , 19 88 , Un ion Re a lty no tif ie d Ch ild re ss by letter that a

new roof would be constructed for the building. On F ebrua ry 1, 1988, howeve r, the roof

completely

collapsed and the clinic wa s flooded with rainwater. The c linic and equipment wa s [s ic] r u i n ed and the of fice had to be c losed. Patient rec ords wer e d es troy ed and D r. Childress was una ble to salvag e his prac tice. He eventua lly

reloc ated outside of T ennesse e. Childress filed a c omplaint ag ainst Union Realty in J anuary of 1991, alleg ing brea ch of c ontrac t when Union Realty ref used to pay

his water damag e claim. Union Re a lty fi le d a c ount er com plai nt i n N ov e mbe r o f 1 99 2, a lle g ing that Ch ild re ss brea ched the same lease by failing to list Union Realty as an a dditional insured in the policy of insuranc e and by

neg lecting to obtain an endor sement of the w aiver of subrog ation. Union Realty moved for pa

rtial summary

judgme nt on t h e issue of pa ra g ra ph 24 of the c on tr a c t on June 2, 19 94

. Th is mot ion wa s de nie d a ndthec a se was tr ie d b e f

o r e a ju r y in O c to b e r o f 1 9 9 7

. T h e ju r y r e tu rn e d a v e r d ic t f or Dr. Childress and awarde d him $ 168,000.00 in damag es. Union Realty filed a motion for a new tria l which was de nied in Marc h of 1998. Childress v. Union Realty Co., Ltd. , 97 S.W .3d at 575-76 (f ootnotes omitt ed). Aft e r th is Co u r t a f

f irme d th e ju d g me n t e n te r e d in th e tria l c o u r t b e lo w , Ch il d r e s s filed a mot iona nda n a me nd e d m o ti o n , r e q u e s ti n g d i s c r e ti o na ry c os ts, a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, pr e -j ud g me nt i nte re st a ndpo st- jud g me nt i nte re st. Af

te r a he ari ng , th e tria l c ou rt a wa rd e d Childre ss p re -j ud g me nt i nte re st in the amount of $150,076.16, post-judg ment interest in the amount o f $ 8 8 , 0 5 4.41, and denie d Chi ldr e ss’ re qu e st f

or a n a wa rdof dis c re tio na

ry c os ts anda tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Un ionRe a lty fi le d it s no tic e of app e a l a ndre qu e sts thi s Co urt to re vie w the fo llo wi ng iss ue , a s w e un de rs ta ndit:
I

. Whether the trial court err ed when it a war ded pre- judgme nt and p o s t -j udg ment interest to Childress on the entire amount of t he jury awa rd wit hout considering an a m o u n tr e c e i v e d b y C h i l d r e s s p r i o r t o t h e j u d g m e n t

f r o mh i s i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n y. Ap pe lle e pr e se nts the fo llo wi ng iss ue on a c ro ss a pp e a l:
I I

. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d whe n it de nie d Childre ss his a tto rn e y ’s fe e s p ur su a nt t o the le a se a g re e me nt b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.T houg h s uch amount was not i n e vi dence at t r i al , U nio n R eal t y cont ends t hat Chi l dres s r ece i ved 1 $1 47 , 71 4. 11 pur s uan t t o an i ns ur anc e po l i cy wi t h N at i onwi de I ns ur anc e C om pany
. Such evi dence was prof fer ed i n a n of fer of pr oof du r i n g t r i al t h r ou g h t h e t es t i mon y of Chi l dr es s a n d W i l l i am St ev en s on , t h e i n s u r an ce a dj u s t er for C hi l dres s ’ cl ai m. A s we h ave not ed prev i ous l y , t he po l i cy of i ns ur anc e wa s not admi t t ed i nt o evi dence an d, t her efore, w e c a n n o t co n sid e r it he re
. Chi l dr es s v . U ni on Real t y Co. , Lt d. , 97 S.W

. 3 d 57 3 , 57 7 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 20 0 2 ). -4- F or the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff ir m a ndre ma nd for any fu rthe r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.
Stand ard of Review
Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s p re vio us ly state d the stand ard by wh ic h this Cou rt mus t re vie w an a wa

rdof pr e -j ud g me nt i nte re st:
An awa rd of pr ejudg ment interest is w ithin the sound discretion of the trial court a nd the dec ision will not be disturbed by an appe llate court unless the rec ord reve als a manifest and palpable abuse of discre tion. Spence r v. A-1 Crane Se rvice , Inc. , 88 0 S. W.2 d 9 38 , 9 44 (T e nn . 1 99 4) ; Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire I ns. Co. , 850 S.W .2d 439, 446 (Tenn. 1992). This sta ndard of revie w clea rly vests the trial court with considera

ble defere nce in the prejudgme nt interest decision. Gene rally stated, the abu se of

dis c re tio n s ta nd arddo e s n ot a uth ori z e an app e llate c ou rt to m e re ly substitut e its judgme nt for that of the trial court. Thus, in c ases wher e the evidenc e supports the trial court' s decision, no abuse of discre tion is found. See State v . Grear , 5 6 8 S

. W

. 2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978) (applying a buse of discr etion standard to tria l court' s decision to deny

reque st for suspende d sentenc e), cert. de nied , 439 U.S. 1077, 99 S. Ct . 854, 59 L . Ed. 2d 45 (1979). Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 970 S.W .2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998)

. Mo re ov e r, thi s Co urt ha s p re vio us ly he ld that th e lan gua g e of thepo st- jud g me nt i nte re st statute is ma ndatory and is not subjec t to reduction by rea son of equitable c onsiderations. Be dwe ll
v . B e dwe ll , 774 S.W .2d 953, 956 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (citing 45 Am. J ur. 2d In te re st a nd Us ur y § 73; Kaufman v. Kaufman , 166 S.W. 2d86 0 ( Ky . 1 94 2) ). Al l qu e sti on s o f l a w a rere vie we d b y

thi s Cou rt de novo aff

ording the trial court’s decisions no pre sumption of corre ctness. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 8 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 , 9 1 (T e n n
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Es tate of A dk ins v . W hite Con so l. Indus., Inc

. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989))

. P r e -J udgm e nt

Int e r e st
Union Realty

first arg ues that Childress was paid an amount from his insuranc e compa ny 1 and that any

awa rd of pr e-judg ment interest shoul d ref lect thi s payment rathe r than strictly focus on the damag e aw ard f

rom the jury . Section 47-14-123 of the Tenne ssee C o d e p ro v i d es in pertinent pa rt :W e pr es u me t h at t h e t r i al c ou rt uti l i zed t h e met h od of c al cu l at i n g pr e-

j u dg men t i n t er es t of

fer ed by 2 C hi l dres s
. C hil d r es s r eques t ed pre- j udgment i nt er es t on t he po r t i on of t he j ur y awa r d desi gn at ed propert y damage: $1 54 , 00 0. 00

. H e s ough t an i nt er es t r at e of 10% on t hi s amount for t he peri od bet ween Febru ar y 2, 198 8, an d O ct ob er 13, 1997. T h i s c al cu l at i on y i el ds a n a mou n t of $150, 076. 16. -5- Prejudg ment interest, i.e., inter est as an e lement of, or in the nature of, dama g es, as permitted by the statutory and common laws of the state as of A pril 1, 1979, may be awa rded by courts or juries in a ccor dance with the principles of e quity at any rate not in excess of a maximum eff ective r ate of

ten per cent ( 10%) pe r annum . . . .
Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 7- 14 -1 23 (2 00 1) . T he tr ia l c ou rt a wa rd e d Ch ild re ss p re -j ud g me nt i nte re st i n the a mou nt o f $ 15 0, 07 6. 16

. Th e su m w a s r e a c he d b y imp os ing a

10 % p e r ann um r a te of

int e re st 2 on the amount the jury

desig nated a s damag e to per sonal property : $154,000.00.
As noted above, an awa

rd of pre- judgme nt inter est is within the sound discretion of the trial court a nd will not be disturbed by an appe llate cou rt u n l es s we find in the r ecor d a manife st and palpable a

buse of discr etion. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 970 S.W .2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998) (citing Spence r v. A-1 Crane Se rvice , Inc. , 880 S.W. 2d93 8, 94 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) ; Ot is v . Ca mb rid ge Mu t. Fire Ins. Co. , 850 S.W .2d 439, 446 (Tenn. 1992) ). Where the evidenc e supports t he trial c ourt’s dec ision, there is no abuse of discr etion. Id

. (c i t i n g State v. Gre ar , 568 S.W .2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978) ).
Trial courts are not without g uiding principles in exer ci s i n g t h ei r discre tion to award pr ejudgme nt interest. First, they are g uided by principles of e quity

. Id . (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 47- 14-123). Simp ly stated, the c ou rt

mus t de c ide wh e the r the a wa rdof pr e jud g me nt i nte re st i s fair, g iven the particular circ umstances of the ca se. In rea ching an equitable decision, a c ou rt mu st kee p inmin d th a t th e pu rp os e of a wa rd ing the int e re st i s to fu lly c omp e ns a te a

plaint if f f or the los s o f the us e of fu nd s to wh ic h h e or sh e wa s le g a lly entitled, not to penalize a d ef en d an t for wr ong doing. Mi tc he ll v . Mitc he ll , 876 S.W. 2d83 0, 83 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) ; Ot is , 850 S.W .2d at 446.
Id

. The Tenne ssee Supreme Court ha s noted two other g uiding principles for de termining whether an aw ard of

pre- judgme nt interest is proper :
I n addition to the principles of equity , two other criteria have e merg ed fr om Te nn e sse e c omm on la w. Th e fi rs t c ri te ri on pr ov ide s tha t pr e jud g me nt i nte re st i s a l l o w e d w h e n t h e a m o u n to f t h e o b l i g a t i o n i s c e r t a i n , o r c a n b e a s c e r t a i n e d b y a proper acc ounting, a nd the amount is not disputed on rea sonable g rounds. Mi tc he ll , 876 S.W .2d at 832. The se cond provides that interest is a llowed when theexis tence of the oblig at ion itself is not di sputed on rea sonable g rounds. Id

. (c i t i n g Tex til e W orkers Union v . Brookside Mills, Inc. , 205 Tenn. 394, 402, 326 S.W.2d 671, 675 (1959))

.-6-

Id

. The supre me court has further ela borate d on the “c erta inty ” criterion. Whil e the c erta inty of the e xiste nc e or

a mou nt o f an ob lig a tio n sup po rt s an aw ard of pr e -j ud g me nt i ntere st, theun c e rt a inty of either the exist ence or the amount of the obligation does not mandate its denial. Id . at 928. “[T] he test is whether

the amount of da mag es is asce rtainable by computation or by any rec og nized stand ardof

va luatio n. Th is i s tr

ue e ve n if the reis a dis pu te ov er mo neta

ry va lue or if the pa rt ie s’ experts compute differing estimates of damag e.” Id

. (c i t i n g Cm ty

. Sta te Ba nk v . O ’N e ill , 553 N.E.2d 17 4, 17 7- 78 (Ind . Ct . A pp . 1 99 0) ; Unlimited Equip. Lin es v. Graphic Arts Ctr., Inc. , 889 S.W .2d 926, 942-43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)). To beg in, we note ther e is no evidenc e in the re cord showing that Chil d re ss rec eived a n a mou nt p ur su a nt t o a n in su ranc e po lic y wi th N a tio nw ide I ns ur a nc e Compa ny . T ho ug h U nio n Re a lty proff ere d t es t i m o n y

to support this allegation, such testimonywas not admitted into evidenc e. F urthe r, Un ionRe a lty

didno t c ite a s e rr or

the t ri al court ’s e xclu sio n o f the ins ur a nc e po lic y wi th Natio nw ide I ns ur a nc e Company or the te sti mon y of Willi a m Ste ve ns on a ndChi ldr e ss p re se nte d in an off er of proof. S e e Ch il d r e s s v . U n io n R e a lty Co., Lt d. , 97 S.W .3d 573, 577 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). For this re ason, we may not a ddress whether the exclusion of such proff ere d evidence pursuant to the collate ral sourc e rule was e rror
. Se e id . Finally , we note that trial counsel for Union Realty stated that subrog ation was not an issue at trial. There fore , this Court i s left with a re cord which lac ks any evidenc e of any prior pay ment of i nsuranc e proc eeds f rom Nationwide Insuranc e Company to Chil dress.
Union Real ty ’ s a

r g u me nt for the r eduction of the awa rd of pr e-judg ment interest is predic ated u p o n t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a tC h i l d r e s s r e c e i v e d $ 1 4 7 , 7 1 4

. 1 1 f r o mN a t i o n w i d e In s u r a n c e C o m p a n y. Ho we ve r, be c aus e we ho ld that suc h an a lle g a tio n is not in the re c or d, we c a nn ot s a y that Ch ild re ss lost the use of the funds suc h that an aw ard of pre- judgme nt interest was an abuse of discretion. Further, Union Rea lty

does not appe ar to a

rg ue that the amount of

the obligation is uncertain or c a nn ot b e a sc e rt a ine d b y

a pr op e r a c c ou nti ng , a ndit d oe s n ot d isp ute the a mou nt o n r e ason able g ro un ds . F ina lly , U nio n Re a lty , o the r than th e arg ume nt that Ch ild re ss r e c e ive d a n a mou nt f ro m hi s ins ur a nc e c omp a ny , d oe s n ot d isp ute the e xiste nc e of the ob lig a tio n o n r e a so na ble g ro un ds

. There fore , aft er considering the fa ctors articulated in Myint v. Allstate Insurance Company , we c a nn ot sa y that th e tr ia l c ou rt abu se d it s d isc re tio n w he n it a wa rd e d Ch ild re ss p re -j ud g me nt i nte re st o n t h e a m o u n td e s i g n a t e d b y t h e j u r y a s d a m a g e s f o r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y.
P os t- Judg m e nt

Int e r e st
Un ionRe a lty

fu rthe r a rg ue s th a t th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

a wa rd e d Ch ild re ss p os tjud g me nt i nterest on the e nti re a mou nt a wa rd e d b y the jury be c aus e , a s U nio n Re a lty c on te nd s, Childress rec eived a

payment of $147,714.11 fr om Nationwide Insuranc e Com p an y p u rsuant to a policy Childress held with the insurancecompany . Section 47-14-121 of the T en nessee Code p ro v i d es t h e f

o l l o wi n g:-7-

I ntere st on judgments, including decr ees, sha ll be computed at the eff ective r ate of ten per cent ( 10%) pe r annum, e x cept a s may be other wise provided or permitted by statute; provided, that where a judgme nt is based on a note, contrac t, or other writing fix ing a rate of intere st within t he limits provided in § 47-14-103 for that particular cate g ory of transa ction, the judg ment shall bear interest at the r ate so fixed.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121 (2001). Further, section 47-14-122 of the Tenne ssee Code pr ovides th a t “ [i ]n t e r e s t s h a l l b e c o m p u t e d o n e v e r y j u d g m e n t f r o m t h e d ay o n w h i c h t h e j u r y orthe c ou rt , sitti ng without a jury , returne d the ver dict without r eg ard to a motion for a new tria l.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-122 ( 2001). As with pre-

judgme nt interest, Union Realty ’s ar g ument for a reduc tion of the post-judg ment interest award center s around its contention t hat t here was evidence Childress rec eived $147,714.11 from Nationwide I nsuranc e Company or, alternati vely , that the trial court erre d when it excluded proof of such payment. Ag ain, all proffere d testimonyand exhibits perta ining to any payment from Natio nw ide I ns ur a nc e Compa ny to C hil dr e ss w e re e xclu de d by the tr ia l cou rt

. F urthe r, Un ionRe a lty did not raise the e x clusion of this evidence as er ror in its motion for a new trial. Thus, there is no evidenc e of suc h a payment properly befor e this Court. There fore , we cannot say that Childress was unjustlyenric hed, see Staggs v. National Health Corp. , 924 S.W .2d 79, 81 (Tenn. 1996) , or that the trial court e rre d when it awa rded Chil dress post-judgment i ntere st at t he mandatory rate of 10% on the entire jury

awa rd of $168,000.00.
Attor ney’s F ees
F ina lly , o n a

c ro ss a pp e a l, C hil dr e ss a

rg ue s th a t th e tria l c ou rt

e rr e d whe n it de nie d h im h is attorney ’s fe es pursua nt to the lease a g ree ment betwee n Childress and Union Realty . As this Court has pre viouslynoted,

T en n es s ee fo l l o ws t h e "A m er i ca n R u l e" w i t h re gar d t o aw ar d i n g a t t o r n e y 's f e e s
. L it ig a n ts ar e r e s p o n s ib le f o r th e ir o w n a tt o r n e y ' s f

e e s n o matt e r

" h oweve r wro ngful mayhav e been th e su it , o r ho wev er grou nd les s t he d efen se. " Corinth Bank & Trust C o. v. Sec urity Nat' l Bank , 148 Tenn. 136, 154, 252 S.W. 1001, 1006 (1923). Thus, the courts will not compel losing parties to pay the p re v ai l i ng party ' s leg al expenses unless such fe e-shifting is authorized by statute, contra ct, or some other rec og nized equitable g round. State v. Brown & W illiamson T

o b a cc o Corp. , 18 S.W. 3d18 6, 19 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Kultura, Inc

. v. Southern Leasing Corp. , 923 S.W .2d 53 6, 54 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Kimbrough v. Union Planters Nat' l Bank , 764 S.W .2d 203, 205 (Tenn. 1989)

. On e of the mos t c omm on e xce pti on s to the Am e ri c a n Ru le inv olv e s c on tr a c ts c on ta ini ng pro vis ion s e xpre ssl y a llo wi ng the pr e va ili ng pa rty to r e c ov e r i ts rea sonable attorney ' s fee s incurre d to enforc e the c ontrac t. Pullman Standard, Inc.
v. A bex Corp. , 6 93 S.W. 2d33 6, 33 8 ( Te nn . 1 98 5) ; Pinney v . Tarpley , 6 8 6 S. W. 2d-8-

57 4, 58 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 4) . T hu s, parties wh o h a ve pr e va ile d inlit ig a tio n to enfor ce c ontr act rights a

re e ntitled to recove r their r easona ble attorne y ' s fee s once the y de mon str ate that

the c on tr a c t up on wh ic h th e ir c la ims areba se d c on ta ins a pr ov isi on e nti tli ng the pr e va ili ng pa rty to i ts atto rn e y ' s f

e e s. Hosier v. Crye -Leike Commercial, Inc

. , N o
. M 2 0 0 0

- 0 1 1 8 2

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 2 0 0 1 T e n n
. A p p
. LE X IS 498, at *6-8 (T enn. Ct. App. J uly 17, 2001). Childress cites the following provision from the lea se in support of his arg ument that he may c o l l e c th i s a t t o r n e y’ s f

e e s f r o mU n i o n R e a l t y: 32. RI GHT TO T ERMI NATE NO T EXCLUSI VE
Th e ri g ht o f [U ni on Re alty ] to t e rm inate thi s L e a se a s h e re in s e t f orth i s in addition to and not in ex haustion of such other righ t s t h at [ Union Realty ] has or c aus e s o f a c tio n th a t may a c c ru e to [Uni on Re a lty ] be c aus e of [Chil dr e ss’ ] failu reto fulfill, perform or observe t he oblig ations, ag ree ment or cove nants of this L ease , and the exercise by

[Union R ealty ] of any

of th e ri ghts or cause s of ac tion accr uing here und e r s h a ll n o t b e in e xh au s ti o n o f s u c h o th e r r ig h ts o r c au s e s o f a c tion that [Un ionRe a lty ] mig ht o the rw ise ha ve ; and the prev ailing party shall recov er from the oth e r a ll a tto rn ey ’s fe e s a nd ex pe ns e s o c c as ion e d b

y the oth e r’ s de

fau lt, or fai lure to p e rfo rm an

y of t he ob lig at io ns , agre e me nt o r c ov e na nts he re of, inc ur re d in enforcing any of the prov isions hereof, or any of either party’s rights hereunde r . (empha sis added). Childress contends that this provision entitles him to an awar d of attorne y ’s fe es a ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d w he n it

de nie d h im the se fe e s.
Un ionRe a lty

c ou nte rs by

arg uin g that, b e c aus e Chi ldr e ss d id n ot s pe c if ic a lly re qu e st a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in his complaint , the tr ia l cou rt sh ou ld not ha ve c on sid e re d th is i ssu e a ndChi ldr e ss is n ot e nti tle d to a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. We a remin df ul that, w he n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r a judgm ent is be y on d th e scope of the p le a din g s, tho se ple a din g s mu st b e g ive n a lib e ral c on str

uc tio n w itha ll rea sonable int endments t aken in favor of the judg ment. Kill ingswort h v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc. , 104 S

. W

. 3 d 5 3 0 , 5 3 3 -3 4 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( q u o t i n g Br own v . B ro wn , 281 S.W .2d 492, 497 (Tenn. 1955)). This Court has pre viously held t hat failure of a plainti ff to specific ally plead attorney ’s fe es in a complaint is not fata l to the recovery of attorne y ’s fe es. Id

. at 5 3 4 (h o l d i n g t h at , b y al l egi n g a violation of the Tenne ssee Consumer Protection Act, the de fendant was ef fec tively put on notice that the plaintiffs wer e seeking all relief authorized under the Act, including attorney ’s fee s). I n this case, though he did not specific ally reque st relief in the f

orm of attorne y ’s fe es, he r equeste d in a g ener al pray er “ such other c osts, ex penses a n d o t h er relief to whic h the Plaintiff may be entitled in the premises.” Additi o n al l y , Childress attache d a Memorandum of L ease , which wa s signe d by Childre s s , Andre w Grove man, a vice president of Union Realty , and L awr ence Thomas, another vice president of

Union Realty . Su ch ex h i b i t refers to the se cond lea se betwe en Childress and Union Realty and states that the “terms and provisions a re made a part here of as f ully and particularly

as if set out verbatim herein.” G iving Childress’ c omplaint a liberal c onstructi on, we hold Union-9-

Realty was e ffe ctively

place d on notice that Childress was see king a ll relief authorized by the lease , including r elief pur suant to para g raph 32. Union Realty

next contends that the trial court’s denial of C hildress’ re quest for attorney ’s fee s should be aff

irmed bec ause the iss u e o f at t o rn ey ’s fees was not pre sented to the jury for a decision, and a

jury was de manded by both parties to decide the m atters in controve rsy . “A litigant has a c onstitut ional rig ht to have all issues of fac t tried at the same time by the same jury .” Kozy v. W e rle , 9 0 2 S

. W

. 2 d 4 0 4 , 4 1 2 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 5 ) ( ci t i n g W inters v. Floyd , 367 S.W .2d 288 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 62 )) ; se e als o M c Cor mi c v . S mi th , 668 S.W .2d 304, 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (c iting Morgan v. Tenn. Cent. Ry. Co. , 216 S.W .2d 32, 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948)). The iss ues of whe ther a plaint if f i s e nti tle d to a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a nd , if so , th e a mou nt o f atto rn e y ’s fe es are iss ue s o f f a c t. Mc Cor mi c , 668 S.W .2d at 306. I n this case , the parties demande d a jury to try all disputed issues of fa ct, which include s the issue of attorney ’s fe es. Howe ver, no e vidence was pre sented to the jury on this iss ue. The trial court was not a uthorized to resolve a jury issue without the interposition of the jury , and, ther efor e, we cannot say that the trial court e rre d when it denied Childress’ reque st for attorney ’s fe es. Koz

y , 902 S.W .2d at 412.
Conclusion
For the re asons stated he rein, we aff irm the trial court’s awa

rd of pr e-judg ment interest and post-judgme nt interest. Further, we aff irm the trial court’s denial of the appellee ’s re quest for a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Cos ts o f this app e a l areta xed equ a lly to a pp e lle e , L or e nzo Chi ldr e ss, Jr. d /b/ a Southgate Medica l Group, and theappellant, Union Rea lty Company , Limited, and i t s surety for w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE