Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1217 | March 2, 2020 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

Public Defender of Indiana

Liisi Brien

Deputy Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jerry W. Young,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

March 2, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-PC-1217

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court

The Honorable Kristine Osterday, 

Judge

The Honorable Dean O. Burton, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

20D01-1706-PC-33

Barnes, Senior Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Jerry Young appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. We vacate and remand in part and affirm in part.
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Issues

[2] Young presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:

I. Whether the post-conviction court erred by denying 

Young’s claim that his stipulation to habitual offender 

enhancements was not knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent because he did not personally waive his right to 

a jury trial.

II. Whether the post-conviction court erred by denying 

Young’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The underlying facts, as stated in Young’s direct appeal, are as follows:

On October 16, 2012 at around 1:00 a.m., A.B. arrived home and 

went to sleep on her couch. At around 3:00 a.m., A.B. was 

awaken[ed] by someone knocking on her door. Assuming it was 

one of her friends, A.B. opened the door. Instead, it was Young, 

who pushed his way into her apartment. A.B. did not know 

Young but had seen him before walking near her apartment.

Young, who was intoxicated, sat down on A.B.’s couch, and 

A.B. tried to convince him to leave to no avail. Young told A.B. 

he wanted to “play a sexual game.” Tr. p. 144. Despite A.B.’s 

refusal, Young said “We’re going to do this,” and forced A.B. to 

have sexual intercourse with him and to fellate him.

On April 29, 2015, the State charged Young with Class A felony 

rape, Class A felony criminal deviate conduct, and Class D 

felony intimidation. The State also alleged that Young was a 

repeat sexual offender and a habitual criminal offender. After a 

jury trial, Young was found guilty as charged and admitted to 
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being a repeat sexual offender and a habitual offender. At 

sentencing, the trial court merged the convictions for rape and 

criminal deviate conduct and sentenced Young to fifty years for 

rape and three years for intimidation to be served concurrently.

The trial court also enhanced Young’s sentence by thirty years 

due to his status as a habitual offender and an additional ten 

years based on his repeat sexual offender status, for an aggregate 

ninety-year sentence.

Young v. State, 57 N.E.3d 857, 858-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (2017).

[4] On direct appeal, this Court found the trial court erred by merging Young’s 

convictions for rape and criminal deviate conduct and by applying two 

enhancements to the single conviction. We thus remanded the case to the trial 

court with instructions to enter judgment of conviction for the lesser-included 

offense of Class B felony criminal deviate conduct. In addition, the trial court 

was instructed to attach Young’s habitual offender enhancement to his rape 

conviction and to attach his repeat sexual offender enhancement to his criminal 

deviate conduct conviction. The two enhanced sentences were to be served 

concurrently for an aggregate sentence of eighty years. See id. On remand, the 

trial court followed our sentencing directive.

[5] In June 2017, Young filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which he 

later amended by counsel. A hearing on Young’s petition was held in 

September 2018, after which the court took the matter under advisement and 

allowed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

On May 7, 2019, the court issued its order denying Young’s petition. This 

appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision

[6] To the extent the post-conviction court has denied relief, the petitioner appeals 

from a negative judgment and faces the rigorous burden of showing that the 

evidence, as a whole, leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion 

opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Harris v. State, 762 N.E.2d 

163, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. A post-conviction court’s findings 

and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error — that which 

leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 

Kistler v. State, 936 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. In this 

review, findings of fact are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous, and no 

deference is accorded to conclusions of law. Id. 

I. Personal Waiver

[7] Young contends that his stipulation to the repeat sexual offender and habitual 

criminal offender sentencing enhancements constitutes a guilty plea and that 

this plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he did not 

personally waive his right to a jury trial.

[8] First, we must determine whether Young’s acknowledgement concerning the 

habitual enhancements was a guilty plea or merely a stipulation. The postconviction court concluded that Young’s stipulation was “essentially a guilty 

plea.” Appealed Order p. 11, ¶ 23.

[9] In Garrett v. State, 737 N.E.2d 388 (Ind. 2000), the defendant claimed that his 

stipulation to the existence of prior offenses during the habitual offender phase 
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of his trial amounted to a guilty plea, and thus it was error for the trial court to 

accept the stipulation without advising him on various rights he would waive by 

pleading guilty. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed.

2d 274 (1969) (trial courts are obliged to inform defendants pleading guilty that 

they are waiving right to trial by jury, right to confront one’s accusers, and the 

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination). Our Supreme Court discussed

the distinction between a factual stipulation and a guilty plea and stated: “A 

stipulation that seeks to establish certain facts does not constitute a guilty plea.” 

Garrett, 737 N.E.2d at 392. Noting that Garrett’s stipulation did not establish 

that he was an habitual offender but rather merely established the fact that the 

prior offenses existed, the Court concluded that the stipulation did not amount 

to a guilty plea. Consequently, the trial court was not required to advise Garrett 

as to the rights he would waive by pleading guilty.

[10] Here, in its order denying Young’s petition, the post-conviction court 

reproduced, in its entirety, the parties’ Stipulation on Prior Convictions. The 

following paragraphs of the stipulation are germane to our review:

1. THAT, prior to all relevant dates alleged in this cause of 

action, JERRY W. YOUNG (“Defendant”) had accumulated the 

following prior unrelated conviction:

On April 8, 2004, JERRY W. YOUNG, in the Elkhart County 

Superior Court Three, Elkhart County, Indiana, in Cause 

Number 20D03-0310-FC-177, was Convicted of Sexual 

Misconduct with a Minor as a Class D Felony under Indiana 

Code section 35-42-4-9(b)(1).
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2. THAT Defendant, having accumulated such prior unrelated 

conviction as of the date of the offense in this action, is a Repeat Sexual 

Offender in that he had accumulated one (1) prior unrelated felony 

conviction for a sex offense under or substantially similar to I.C. 

§ 35-42-4-1 through I.C. § 35-42-4-9 or I.C. § 35-46-1-3.

3. THAT, prior to all relevant dates alleged in this cause of 

action, JERRY W. YOUNG had accumulated the following 

prior unrelated convictions:

On or about the 1st day of April, 2000, in the County of Elkhart, 

State of Indiana, JERRY W. YOUNG committed the offense of 

Sexual Battery, a Felony, and was convicted and sentenced of 

said offense on or about the 28th day of December, 2000, in the 

Elkhart County Circuit Court, Cause No. 20C01-0005-CF-33, 

Elkhart County, Indiana, and;

On or about the 6th day of July, 1997, in the County of Elkhart, 

State of Indiana, JERRY W. YOUNG committed the offense of 

Battery on a Police Officer, a Felony, and was convicted and 

sentenced of said offense on or about the 7th day of November, 

1997, in the Elkhart County Superior Court Three, Cause No. 

20D03-9707-DF-22, Elkhart County, Indiana.

4. THAT Defendant, having accumulated such prior unrelated 

convictions as of the date of the offense in this action, is a Habitual 

Criminal Offender in that Defendant had accumulated two (2) 

prior unrelated felony convictions.

Appealed Order, pp. 7-8 (emphasis added).
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[11] In addition, the transcript from Young’s trial shows that after the jury reached 

its verdict on the principal charges, the court sent the jurors back into the 

deliberation room. This colloquy then ensued:

THE COURT: Mr. Young, I’m going to go ahead and 

administer an oath to you again, sir. Would you please raise 

your right hand for me. Thank you. Sir, do you solemnly swear 

or affirm under the pains and penalties for perjury to tell the 

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 

God?

MR. YOUNG: Yeah.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Young, would you state your 

full name, please, for the record.

MR. YOUNG: Jerry Young.

THE COURT: Thank you. [Defense Counsel], with regards to 

the enhancement as to the Repeat Sexual Offender and the 

Habitual Criminal Offender Enhancement, how do you wish to 

proceed?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I believe we’re going to 

proceed by stipulation.

THE COURT: Thank you. [Defense Counsel], let’s go ahead 

and take a factual basis as to the stipulation.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If we could hold on for just a second, 

Judge.
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THE COURT: Yes, ma’am.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, if we could go back into the 

holding area so I can talk with my client for awhile.

Trial Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 128-29.

1

 The court was in recess for about four minutes; 

when it reconvened, the conversation continued as follows:

[STATE]: I’m tendering to the Court a signed stipulation 

regarding repeat sexual offense and the habitual criminal 

offenses.

THE COURT: Thank you. If I may just have a moment. 

[Court Reporter], [State] has handed to the Court a Stipulation 

on Prior Convictions. [State], on the Stipulation on Prior 

Convictions any additional record you want to make?

[STATE]: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. [Defense Counsel], any additional 

record you want to make on the Stipulation of Prior Convictions?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would just like to point out to the 

Court that to the extent my client has been able he has 

cooperated.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. We’ll go ahead and show 

a Stipulation on the Prior Convictions, which the Court 

[interprets] as an admission on the part of Mr. Young to being a 

1 Our citation to the Trial Transcript is based on the .pdf pagination.
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Repeat Sexual Offender pursuant to Page 2 of 3 of the charging 

information, as well as an admission on the part of Mr. Young to 

being an Habitual Criminal Offender as identified on Page 3 of 3 

of the charging information. [Defense Counsel], any other 

comments or objections to the Court’s interpretation as to the 

Stipulation on Prior Convictions?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. [State], any objections or 

comments on the Court’s interpretation?

[STATE]: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

Id. at 130-31.

[12] Young’s stipulation established the existence of his prior convictions, 

established that the prior convictions were unrelated, and confirmed that Young 

“is a Repeat Sexual Offender” and “is a Habitual Criminal Offender.” 

Appealed Order, pp. 7, 8. Young’s status was proved by his admissions 

contained in the stipulation, and there was nothing left to be determined. 

Moreover, the trial court accepted the stipulation, stating that it interpreted the 

stipulation as Young’s admission to being both a repeat sexual offender and an

habitual criminal offender. The court then specifically asked Young’s counsel if 

she had any objections to the court’s interpretation, and she replied in the 

negative. Young’s stipulation was the equivalent of a guilty plea.

[13] Having concluded that Young’s stipulation amounted to a guilty plea, we turn 

to whether it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Young specifically 
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asserts the lack of his personal waiver of a jury trial. In support of his 

argument, Young cites Saylor v. State, 55 N.E.3d 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. 

denied, in which this Court held that when a defendant pleads guilty to an 

habitual offender enhancement, he must personally waive his right to a jury 

trial on the enhancement. Id. at 366. For its part, the State acknowledges 

Saylor and simply states that it was wrongly decided.

[14] As evidenced by the trial transcript, Young did not personally waive his right to 

a jury trial on the repeat sexual offender and habitual criminal offender 

enhancements. Accordingly, we vacate the adjudications on these 

enhancements and remand this case for a new trial on the repeat sexual 

offender and habitual criminal offender enhancements.

II. Assistance of Appellate Counsel

[15] Young next asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on his rape conviction.

[16] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant is 

required to establish both (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) 

that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Johnson v. State, 

948 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind. 2011) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687-96, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). To satisfy the first element, 

the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s errors were so serious that the 

defendant was denied the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Bethea 
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v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2013). In order to satisfy the second 

element, the defendant must show prejudice; that is, a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Id. at 1139. There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered 

effective assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 

reasonable professional judgment, and the defendant has the burden of 

overcoming this presumption. Harris, 762 N.E.2d at 168-69.

[17] Further, because the strategic decision regarding which issues to raise on appeal 

is one of the most important decisions to be made by appellate counsel, 

counsel’s failure to raise a specific issue on direct appeal rarely constitutes 

ineffective assistance. Brown v. State, 880 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008), trans. denied. “For countless years, experienced advocates have 

‘emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal 

and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most a few key issues.’” 

Walker v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1181, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Bieghler v. 

State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind. 1997)), trans. denied. Accordingly, on review, 

we should be particularly deferential to appellate counsel’s strategic decision to 

exclude certain issues in favor of other issues more likely to result in a reversal. 

Id. To evaluate whether appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to 

raise an issue on appeal, we apply a two-part test: (1) whether the unraised 

issue is significant and obvious from the face of the record, and (2) whether the 

unraised issue is “clearly stronger” than the raised issues. Walker, 988 N.E.2d 

at 1191.
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[18] On direct appeal, counsel raised the issue of the trial court’s double 

enhancement of Young’s rape conviction. This argument was successful, and 

this Court reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to attach 

Young’s habitual offender enhancement to his rape conviction and to attach his 

repeat sexual offender enhancement to his criminal deviate conduct conviction, 

resulting in a ten-year sentence reduction.

[19] Now Young claims that his appellate counsel should have raised the issue of 

the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the threat of deadly force element of

his Class A felony rape conviction. In support of his argument, Young alleges 

that the evidence concerning a threat of deadly force was inconsistent such that, 

had counsel raised the sufficiency issue on appeal, his Class A felony conviction 

would have been reduced to a Class B felony.

[20] To be sure, the jury heard inconsistent evidence as to any threats by Young. 

For instance, A.B. testified that Young threatened to kill her but then testified 

that Young had not said he was going to kill her but that he told her to stop 

crying or it would “be bad” for her—which A.B. took to mean that he would 

hurt her. Trial Tr. Vol. 1, p. 151. A.B. later clarified:

[STATE]: And you understand your testimony has been 

different than what you told the police detective?

[A.B.]: Yes.

[STATE]: Can you explain why that is?
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[A.B.]: Some parts of it I’ve forgotten and some parts of it 

I’ve just put out of my mind. 

Id. at 161. And:

[STATE]: And you know that there are some discrepancies on 

the 911 call with what you testified today, as well. Isn’t that 

correct?

[A.B.]: Yes.

[STATE]: Didn’t you say on the 911 call that the defendant 

had a knife?

[A.B.]: Yes.

[STATE]: Why did you say that?

[A.B.]: Cuz I was – I assumed it was a knife when he had 

his hand in his pocket but I didn’t actually see the knife. 

Trial Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 23-24.

[21] The offense of rape as a Class B felony was submitted to the jury on the verdict 

form as a lesser-included offense of the Class A felony rape. The jury heard the 

evidence, viewed the witnesses as they testified, and had the option of the 

lesser-included B felony rape offense in front of them; yet, it still found Young 

guilty of the Class A felony. Where contradictory or inconsistent testimony is 

presented at trial, it is up to the jury to resolve such conflicting testimony. 

Brown v. State, 830 N.E.2d 956, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Raising this issue on 
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appeal would merely have been a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence 

and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which it cannot do. See Sandleben v. 

State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (appellate court neither reweighs 

evidence nor judges credibility of witnesses), trans. denied. Young has not 

shown that the unraised issue is clearly stronger than the issue raised by 

appellate counsel. Therefore, he has not met his burden of demonstrating that 

his appellate counsel performed deficiently.

Conclusion

[22] Based on the foregoing, we vacate Young’s habitual offender adjudications and 

remand for a new trial on those enhancements. We further conclude the postconviction court properly denied Young’s petition as to his claim of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel.

[23] Vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part.

Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur.