COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

September 17, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP193-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2016CM3647

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

TAURUS DONNELL RENFRO,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: JEAN M. KIES, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 KESSLER, J.1 Taurus Donnell Renfro appeals a judgment of 

conviction, following a jury trial, of one count of carrying a concealed weapon. 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2017-18). All 

references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2019AP193-CR

2

Renfro also appeals the postconviction order denying his motion to vacate his 

conviction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On November 2, 2016, Taurus Donnell Renfro was charged with one 

count of carrying a concealed weapon. According to the criminal complaint, on 

the night of October 31, 2016, Milwaukee police conducted a traffic stop of a 

vehicle with tinted windows. Officer Tiffany Koch asked the passenger, Renfro, if 

he was carrying a weapon. Renfro responded that he had a firearm in his pants 

pocket and admitted that he did not have a conceal carry permit (CCW permit).

¶3 The matter proceeded to trial where multiple witnesses testified. 

Officer Koch testified that she and her partner conducted a traffic stop of the car 

Renfro was in. Officer Koch stated that the stop was conduced in a high-crime 

area. Officer Koch stated that she approached the passenger side of the vehicle 

and asked Renfro for his identification and whether he had a CCW permit. Officer 

Koch then asked Renfro whether he was in possession of a weapon. Renfro 

responded, “I am not going to lie; I’ve got my gun on me.” Officer Koch stated 

that she did not observe a gun in the car or on Renfro’s person, but once she 

alerted her partner that a firearm was in the vehicle, her partner was able to 

retrieve the weapon.

¶4 Sergeant Lucas McAleer testified that he was on patrol with Officer 

Koch the night of the traffic stop. Sergeant McAleer testified that after speaking 

with the driver of the vehicle, Keith Brown, Officer Koch signaled “that there was 

something in the car.” Sergeant McAleer then asked Renfro if there was anything 

“illegal” in the car. Renfro responded that he had a gun in his pants pocket. 

Sergeant McAleer testified that the gun was not in a holster and “was positioned 
No. 2019AP193-CR

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so the grip of the gun was to the right, and the top or the slide of the gun was to his

groin area.” The gun was loaded.

¶5 Brown testified that the night of the traffic stop, he was driving 

Renfro from Renfro’s home to Renfro’s parents’ home because Renfro was in the 

process of moving. Brown described Renfro’s neighborhood as “high crime.” 

Brown stated that he was not “really” aware that Renfro had a gun on him.

¶6 Renfro testified that on the night of the traffic stop, he was moving 

from his home to his parents’ home and Brown was driving him. Renfro testified 

that he had a gun on his person, but claimed it was attached to his belt. Renfro 

stated that he was carrying a gun because he was living in an unsafe neighborhood 

and his young child had recently witnessed a shooting in the neighborhood. 

Renfro admitted that the gun was not visible inside the car, but stated that when he 

stood up and exited the gun would have been visible to officers.

¶7 The jury found Renfro guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced 

Renfro to four days—time served—in the House of Correction. Renfro filed a 

motion for postconviction relief seeking to vacate his conviction. Renfro argued

that pursuant to State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 

785, it was “unreasonable for the State to impair [his] constitutional right to bear 

arms by punishing him for carrying a concealed weapon.” Renfro argued that 

under the Hamdan test,

the facts adduced at trial showed that: (1) he was 

exercising the constitutional right to keep and bear arms 

(Wis. Const., Article I, Section 23) under circumstances in 

which the need to do so was substantial, as he was moving 

the firearm which he had purchased for home security

purposes from his old home, which was located in a highcrime area and which had been next door to a recentlycommitted violent crime; (2) the temporarily concealed 

state of the firearm on his person, while he was seated in 
No. 2019AP193-CR

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[Brown’s] vehicle, was the only reasonable means under 

the circumstances to exercise that right and to move his 

firearm from his old residence to the new one; and (3) no 

unlawful purpose motivated his temporary concealment of 

the firearm.

¶8 The postconviction court denied the motion, finding that Renfro 

failed to establish an as-applied constitutional violation pursuant to Hamdan. This 

appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Renfro argues that under Hamdan and the Wisconsin Constitution, 

WIS. STAT. § 941.23 is unconstitutional as applied to him because article I, section 

25 of the Wisconsin Constitution specifically states: “The people have the right to 

keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful 

purpose.”

¶10 Under the test established in Hamdan, to sustain an as applied 

challenge to WIS. STAT. § 941.23, a defendant must show that: (1) the defendant’s 

need to conceal the weapon substantially outweighed the State’s interest in 

enforcing the concealed weapons statute, and (2) the defendant lacked any other 

reasonable alternative to concealment, under the circumstances, to exercise his or 

her constitutional right to bear arms. Hamdan, 264 Wis. 2d 433, ¶86.

¶11 In granting Hamdan’s “as applied” challenge, our supreme court 

used a reasonableness balancing test and concluded that Hamdan’s right to possess 

a weapon—concealed in his pocket, in his place of business, to protect his 

business—substantially outweighed the State’s interest in enforcing the concealed 

weapons statute. Id., ¶81. The court concluded that a person’s interest in the right 

to bear arms for security purposes is at its highest “when undertaken to secure 
No. 2019AP193-CR

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one’s home or privately owned business.” Id., ¶67. Conversely, “the [S]tate’s 

interest will generally be strong when a concealed weapon is being carried in a 

vehicle.” State v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, ¶27, 290 Wis. 2d 121, 714 N.W.2d 495. In 

Fisher, the supreme court explained:

[O]nly in extraordinary circumstances will an individual 

carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle be able to 

demonstrate that his or her interest in the right to keep and 

bear arms for security substantially outweighs the [S]tate’s 

interest in prohibiting that individual from carrying a 

concealed weapon in his or her motor vehicle. If a 

defendant reasonably believes that he or she is actually 

confronted with a threat of bodily harm or death and that 

carrying a concealed weapon is necessary for protection 

from the threat, extraordinary circumstances would be 

present. Absent such circumstances, an individual carrying 

a concealed weapon in a vehicle will generally be unable to 

demonstrate that his or her interest in the right to keep and 

bear arms for security substantially outweighs the [S]tate’s

interest in prohibiting that individual from carrying a 

concealed weapon in a motor vehicle.

Id., ¶32. Applying this holding to the facts of this case, in order to establish an as

applied constitutional violation, Renfro must demonstrate “extraordinary 

circumstances” justifying carrying a concealed weapon in the vehicle. See id.

This means that Renfro must show that he reasonably believed that he was 

actually confronted with the threat of great bodily harm or death and that carrying 

a concealed weapon was necessary for his protection. See id. We agree with the 

State that Renfro has not met this burden.

¶12 The gist of Renfro’s argument is that he was moving out of a highcrime neighborhood and was transporting the firearm “from one constitutionallyprotected site (his old home) to another constitutionally-protected site (his new 

residence).” Renfro points to no case law to support his contention that 

transporting a firearm between homes requires the same level of constitutional 
No. 2019AP193-CR

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protection as keeping a firearm in the home. The supreme court’s conclusion in 

Hamdan—that a person’s interest in the right to bear arms for security purposes is 

at its highest “when undertaken to secure one’s home or privately owned 

business”—was based on the facts that Hamdan’s place of business had been 

subject to multiple robberies, that it was the site of a previous homicide, and that 

Hamdan himself had been victimized at his place of business. Id., 264 Wis. 2d 

433, ¶82.

¶13 Renfro likens the facts of his case to the facts of Hamdan based on 

what he describes as “a fact of critical importance”—that his “family had recently 

been exposed to a shooting in the front yard next door to the home which they 

were then leaving.” The shooting incident took place months before Renfro’s 

arrest. Renfro does not explain how this “fact of critical importance” reflects an 

imminent danger requiring Renfro to carry a concealed weapon on the night of his 

arrest. Renfro did not testify about any other incidents or threats to his safety in 

the time period between the shooting incident and his arrest. Nor did Renfro offer 

an explanation as to why the firearm was concealed. Indeed, trial testimony 

establishes that the firearm was not only concealed, but improperly holstered. The 

facts of this case do not support Renfro’s contention that his need to carry a 

concealed weapon outweighed the State’s interest in regulating the concealment of 

firearms in vehicles. See Fisher, 290 Wis. 2d 121, ¶32.

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and order of the 

circuit court.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 

809.23(1)(b)4.