NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT 

PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

WILLIAM SCOTT HARVEY, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

HON. MITCHELL KALAULI, Magistrate of the Lake Havasu City 

Municipal Court, Respondent/Appellee,

STATE OF ARIZONA, Real Party in Interest/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0848

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. B8015CV2015-04145

The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Knochel Law Offices, Bullhead City

By Keith S. Knochel, Aline K. Knochel, Joshua C. Smith 

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Lake Havasu City Attorney’s Office, Lake Havasu

By Charles F. Yager

Counsel for Real Party in Interest/Appellee
HARVEY v. HON. KALAULI/STATE

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge John C. Gemmill1 joined.

D O W N I E, Judge:

¶1 William Scott Harvey challenges the superior court’s denial 

of special action relief. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On March 15, 2015, Harvey was arraigned in Lake Havasu 

City Municipal Court on charges of assault and disorderly conduct. He 

entered a not guilty plea and was released on his own recognizance. During 

a June 25, 2015 hearing, the municipal court set Harvey’s trial for October 

28, 2015. 

¶3 On September 15, 2015, Harvey moved to dismiss the criminal 

charges pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 8.6, 

arguing his trial did not occur within 180 days of his arraignment, as Rule 

8.2(a)(2) requires. (The 180th day was September 11, 2015.) It is undisputed 

that the municipal court denied Harvey’s motion, though the appellate 

record does not include that ruling. 

¶4 Harvey filed a special action petition in the superior court on 

October 21, 2015. He did not ask the superior court to stay the municipal 

court proceedings, and his trial took place as scheduled on October 28. See 

Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 5 (“The filing of a complaint in a special action and the 

setting of the matter for hearing shall not stay any proceedings in the court 

or tribunal as to which special relief is sought unless a stay is specifically 

ordered.”).

¶5 The superior court considered Harvey’s special action 

petition on November 30, 2015. Although the municipal court trial had 

concluded four weeks earlier, the municipal court had not yet issued its

decision. The superior court accepted special action jurisdiction but denied 

 

1 Pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the 

Arizona Supreme Court designated the Honorable John C. Gemmill, 

Retired Judge of the Court of Appeals, to sit in this matter.
HARVEY v. HON. KALAULI/STATE

Decision of the Court

3

relief. Harvey filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 We review the denial of special action relief for abuse of 

discretion. Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Goodyear, 223 Ariz. 

193, 195, ¶ 8 (App. 2009). This Court will affirm the superior court’s ruling 

if it is correct for any reason. Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. 

Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 154 (App. 1989).

¶7 Rule 8.1(d) states that defense counsel shall “advise the court 

of the impending expiration of time limits in the defendant’s case” and 

provides that the failure to do so “should be considered by the court in 

determining whether to dismiss an action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 

8.6.” Relying on State v. Tucker, 133 Ariz. 304 (1982), Harvey contends his 

defense counsel had no such reporting obligation because there were no 

“intervening delays between the event that trigger[ed] Rule 8.2 and the 

expiration of the Rule 8.2 time limit.” See id. at 308 n.5. The State cites 

subsequent appellate decisions holding that a defendant “cannot wait until 

after the [Rule 8.2] period has expired and then claim a Rule 8 violation after 

it is too late for the trial court to prevent the violation.” State v. Swensrud, 

168 Ariz. 21, 23 (1991); see also State v. Vasko, 193 Ariz. 142, 148, ¶ 25 (App. 

1998) (“Rule 8 requires a defendant to notify the court of an impending 

speedy trial deadline in order to preserve his objection to a Rule 8 

violation.”). If a trial court concludes that the failure to advise of impending 

speedy trial deadlines is intentional, “the only appropriate sanction in some 

cases may be to consider the time during which such conduct has occurred 

as excluded, thus resulting in a denial of a motion to dismiss.” State v. 

Techy, 135 Ariz. 81, 85 (App. 1982). 

¶8 Our review is materially hampered by the lack of an adequate 

record from the municipal court. Indeed, Harvey has provided nothing 

from that court other than his motion to dismiss, the State’s response, and 

his reply. In the superior court, the State argued that the municipal court 

found it “hard to believe” defense counsel had not intentionally failed to 

advise it of the speedy trial deadline and thus “felt the appropriate action 

in this case was to sanction based on Techy and Spreitz and deny the motion 

to dismiss.” Harvey disagreed with that assertion, stating, “there’s no 

record of what [the prosecutor] is saying is accurate.” 
HARVEY v. HON. KALAULI/STATE

Decision of the Court

4

¶9 In denying special action relief, the superior court 

emphasized the lack of an adequate record from the municipal court,

stating: 

I think the case law is clear, in the absence of a record, I have 

to presume that the record supports the decision by the judge, 

that it supports what the judge did in connection with this 

case. Judges are presumed to know the law, presumed to act 

according to the law, so in the absence of a record, I have to 

presume that the record would support the Judge’s decision. 

Although the superior court went on to discuss the interpretation and 

application of Rule 8.1(d), immediately before ruling, it again stressed the 

lack of an adequate record, stating:

[T]he parties seem to agree, although, again, I don’t have a 

record, that the municipal court Judge did rely or at least did 

reference Techy . . . and Spreitz when making his decision in 

connection with this case. I am assuming that he is aware of 

it and that he made a decision based on that case which does 

require some perhaps intentional conduct on the part of the 

defendant in failing to advise the Court prior to the expiration 

of the time limit.

When I consider the arguments that have been made to me in 

connection with this case, the information that has been 

presented to me, the Court finds that there is not any specific 

indication or evidence that the municipal court Judge abused 

his discretion or acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 

I am denying the relief. 

¶10 As did the superior court, we presume that the missing record 

items would support the municipal court’s decision. See State ex rel. Baumert 

v. Superior Court, 118 Ariz. 259, 260–61 (1978) (“[W]hen an incomplete 

record is presented to an appellate court, it must assume that any testimony 

or evidence not included in the record on appeal supported the action taken 

by the trial court.”); see also Renner v. Kehl, 150 Ariz. 94, 97 n.1 (1986) 

(“Without a record we must presume that . . . there was substantial evidence 

in the complete record to support the findings of the trial court.”). The 

record that is before us suggests the municipal court may have determined 

that actions or omissions by the defense warranted exclusion of an 

indeterminate amount of time. Without a complete record, the superior 

court could not conclude the municipal court erred, and the same deficiency 
HARVEY v. HON. KALAULI/STATE

Decision of the Court

5

prevents us from concluding that the superior court abused its discretion 

by denying special action relief. 

CONCLUSION

¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

superior court.