Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 29 , 201 3

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 1 1

- 0 0 862

- CR

JOSE FRANCISCO IBARRA , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 1 7 8 th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1276105

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In two issues, appellant Jose Francisco Ibarra challenges his conviction of aggravated assault

. We affirm.

I. B ACKGROUND During 2010, appellant had a dating relationship with the complainant. On August 28, 2010, appellant ’s friend drove appellant a nd the complainant to appellant’s house ; appellant’s friend then left

. Once inside, appellant hid the2

complainant’s cell phone and identification card. He berated t he complainant and
made her perform a varie ty of demeaning tasks, such as sweeping while naked
, washing his feet , and eating the contents of a seasoning packet . He al so brandished a box cutter and threatened to kill the complainant. Appellant refused to allow the complainant to leave and sexually assaulted her.
At some point, when appellant left the room, the complainant found her cell phone and called a family member who in turn contacted the police. O fficers soon surrounded appellant’ s house . A ppellant and the complainant exited through a window. Officers arrested appellant, and the complainant was taken to a hospital. Officers conducted a protective sweep of appellant’s house, during which they took photographs. Officers later procured and executed a search warrant for the house. Officers seized several items from the house, including the box cutter, a wallet, and the seasoning packet (the “challenged items”).
Appellant was charged with aggravated assault. The jury convicted appellant and sentenced him to thirty years’ confinement.

II. M OTION TO S UPPRESS

In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the challenged items seized from his ho use because the seizure was tainted by the allegedly unlawful pr otective sweep

. We review a trial court’ s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard , affording almost total deference to the court’ s determination of historical facts that depend on credibility and demeanor, but review ing de novo the court’s application of law to the facts. Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)

. When, as in this case, there are no findings of fact in the record , we uphold the trial court ’ s ruling on any theory of law applicable to the case and3

pre sume the court made implicit findings in support of its ruling if those findings are supported by the record. State v. Ross , 32 S.W.3d 853, 855

– 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)

. Appellant spends several pages of his brief arguing why the offic ers’ protective sweep of his house was unl awful

. He also contends the officers exceeded any basis for , and the scope of, a protective sweep by photographing the challenged items during the sweep

. According to appellant, officers used information gained during the unlawful protective sweep to secure the search warrant, meaning all evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was inadmissible.
See Pitonyak v. State , 253 S.W.3d 834, 848 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2008, pet. ref’d ) (“A search warrant may not be procured lawfully by the use of unlawfully
obtained information .”). We disagree.

T here is no evidence in the record supporting appellant’s contention that information gained, or photographs taken, during the protective sweep were used

to secure the warrant. Neither the warrant n or the affidavit use d to secure the
warrant mention this information. Photographs incorporated into the warrant and
affidavit depict the hous e’s exterior, not the challenged items. T he officer who prepared the affidavit testified that he used “p ictures to get a warrant,” but clarified that he “got the photographs of the front of the residence.” Moreover, the officer gathered information regarding the crime by interviewing the complainant at the hospital . In fact, the officer testified he was un aware of the allegation that appellant used a weapon during the incident until told so by the complainant

. Appellant has not established that the search warrant was tainted by information garnered during the allegedly unlawful protective sweep.
Accordin gly, t he trial court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
See , e.g. , State v. Powell
, 306 S.W. 3d 761, 769

– 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)4

(holding evidence was not tainted by alleged ly unlawful seizure because the
evidence was ultimately discovered pursuant to lawful search warrant) . We overrule appellant’s first issue.

III. E XTRANEOUS O FFENSE In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing the complainant to testify regarding the sexual assault he committed against her

. Specifically, appellant ar gues this evidence was inadmissible under Texas Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403.

The State contends that, even if the trial court erred by allowing the complainant to testify about the sexual assault, the error was rendered harmless
because the same evidence was later admitted without objection. See Anderson v.
State , 717 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Crim. App . 1986) (“Inadmissible evidence can be rendered harmless if other evidence at trial is admitted without objection and it proves the same fact that the inadmissible evidence sought to prove.”). We agree.
The sexual

- assault nurse who examined the complaina nt testified without objection regarding the complain an t’s account of the sexual assault. Additionally, the nurse’s medical report , containing the same information, was admitted without objection

. Therefore, any error the trial court committed by allowing the complainant to testify about the sexual assault was rendered harmless. We overrule appellant’s second issue. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ John Donovan Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Boyce and Donovan

. Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. P

. 47.2( b).