I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1811 

To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China 

with respect to the United States, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 18, 2019 

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. CUELLAR, Mrs. HARTZLER, Mr. 

GALLAGHER, Mr. RATCLIFFE, Mr. MEADOWS, and Mr. PERRY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period 

to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 

concerned 

A BILL 

To require an unclassified interagency report on the political 

influence operations of the Government of China and 

the Communist Party of China with respect to the 

United States, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Countering the Chinese 

5 Government and Communist Party’s Political Influence 

6 Operations Act’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT4 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com5 mittees’’ means— 

6 (A) the Committee on Appropriations of 

7 the Senate; 

8 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of 

9 the Senate; 

10 (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

11 the Senate; 

12 (D) the Committee on Health, Education, 

13 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate; 

14 (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

15 Senate; 

16 (F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of 

17 the Senate; 

18 (G) the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

19 and Urban Affairs of the Senate; 

20 (H) the Committee on Appropriations of 

21 the House of Representatives; 

22 (I) the Committee on Armed Services of 

23 the House of Representatives; 

24 (J) the Committee on Education and 

25 Labor of the House of Representatives; 


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1 (K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

2 the House of Representatives; 

3 (L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

4 House of Representatives; 

5 (M) the Permanent Select Committee on 

6 Intelligence of the House of Representatives; 

7 and 

8 (N) the Committee on Financial Services 

9 of the House of Representatives. 

10 (2) POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.—The 

11 term ‘‘political influence operations’’ means the co12 ordinated and often concealed application of disin13 formation, press manipulation, economic coercion, 

14 targeted investments, corruption, or academic cen15 sorship. Such efforts are often intended— 

16 (A) to coerce and corrupt United States in17 terests, values, institutions, or individuals; and 

18 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, 

19 or outcomes in the United States that support 

20 the interests of the Government of the People’s 

21 Republic of China or the Communist Party of 

22 China. 

23 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) The Government of China and the Com2 munist Party of China employ a wide range of polit3 ical, informational, and economic measures to influ4 ence, coerce, intimidate, or undermine the United 

5 States interests or the interests of United States 

6 partners and allies. 

7 (2) The December 2017 National Security 

8 Strategy of the United States of America states, 

9 ‘‘Although the United States seeks to continue to co10 operate with China, China is using economic induce11 ments and penalties, influence operations, and im12 plied military threats to persuade other states to 

13 heed its political and security agenda.’’. 

14 (3) The political influence operations efforts of 

15 the Government of China and the Communist Party 

16 of China have received less scrutiny than similar ef17 forts of the Government of the Russian Federation, 

18 but given China’s economic strength and the grow19 ing apparatus being used to spread its influence 

20 globally, efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal 

21 pose significant and consequential long-term chal22 lenges to United States interests and values. 

23 (4) The Government of China and the Com24 munist Party of China use overt and covert means 

25 to target the political and economic elite, the media 


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1 and public opinion, civil society and academia, and 

2 members of the Chinese diaspora. 

3 (5) The Government of China and the Com4 munist Party of China employ an array of govern5 ment entities, friendship and exchange organiza6 tions, private entities and businesspeople, and gov7 ernment-funded foundations, think tanks, edu8 cational and other projects to carry out political in9 fluence operations, which is often referred to as 

10 united front work. 

11 (6) These political influence operations violate 

12 national sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally 

13 different from traditional efforts by states to shape 

14 international policy debates and improve their public 

15 image through public diplomacy and strategic com16 munications campaigns. 

17 (7) The aims of the political influence oper18 ations of the Government of China and the Com19 munist Party of China are— 

20 (A) to protect the political security of the 

21 Chinese Communist Party, both within China 

22 and globally; 

23 (B) to domestically and globally promote 

24 the idea that the Chinese Communist Party’s 


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1 political and economic model is superior to the 

2 governments of Western democracies; and 

3 (C) to promote the interests of the regime 

4 globally. 

5 (8) The political influence operations of the 

6 Government of China and the Communist Party of 

7 China take advantage of the open and democratic 

8 nature of the United States, including— 

9 (A) constitutional protections for free 

10 speech and a free press; and 

11 (B) the desire of some individuals or insti12 tutions to attract Chinese investment, gain ac13 cess to Chinese markets, or attain greater glob14 al influence. 

15 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con16 gress that— 

17 (1) the political influence operations of the Gov18 ernment of China and the Communist Party of 

19 China are not ‘‘soft power’’ intended to persuade, 

20 but ‘‘sharp power’’ intended— 

21 (A) to penetrate or corrupt democratic 

22 countries and undermine democratic institu23 tions and freedoms; 

24 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and 

25 policies favorable to the Government of China’s 


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1 interest through disinformation, coercion, cor2 ruption, and other means; 

3 (C) to widen the scope of Chinese authori4 tarian influence around the world, including— 

5 (i) to suppress political opposition to 

6 the Chinese Communist Party; and 

7 (ii) to violate the internationally rec8 ognized human and civil rights of Chinese 

9 citizens living in nations around the world; 

10 and 

11 (D) to undermine the strength of American 

12 alliances around the world; and 

13 (2) the American people need reliable and cur14 rent information— 

15 (A) to identify the key institutions, individ16 uals, entities, and ministries that carry out such 

17 operations; and 

18 (B) to distinguish between malign political 

19 influence operations intended to undermine core 

20 American freedoms, democratic institutions, 

21 and cultural, educational, business, and people22 to-people exchanges that may benefit the 

23 United States and China. 

24 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

25 United States— 


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1 (1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese 

2 people and culture and the Government of China 

3 and the Communist Party of China in official state4 ments, media, and messaging, and to ensure that ef5 forts to curtail Beijing’s political influence oper6 ations do not lead to the targeting of Chinese-Ameri7 cans or the Chinese diaspora; 

8 (2) to clearly differentiate between legal, inter9 nationally accepted public diplomacy and strategic 

10 communications campaigns and illicit activities to 

11 undermine democratic institutions or freedoms; 

12 (3) to protect United States citizens and legal 

13 residents from malign or coercive political influence 

14 operations; 

15 (4) to enhance cooperation and coordination 

16 with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Taiwan (offi17 cially known as the ‘‘Republic of China’’), and Mon18 golia, whose governments and institutions have faced 

19 acute pressure from the political influence operations 

20 of the Government of China and the Communist 

21 Party of China, and with other allies throughout the 

22 world; 

23 (5) to create strategies to ensure that countries 

24 in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, 

25 and elsewhere are aware of China’s ‘‘sharp power’’ 


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1 and provide needed capacity to counter them effec2 tively; 

3 (6) to implement more advanced transparency 

4 requirements concerning collaboration with Chinese 

5 actors for media agencies, universities, think tanks, 

6 and government officials; 

7 (7) to use various forums to raise awareness 

8 about— 

9 (A) the goals and methods of the political 

10 influence operations of the Government of 

11 China and the Communist Party of China; and 

12 (B) common patterns and approaches used 

13 by Chinese intelligence agencies or related ac14 tors; 

15 (8) to require greater transparency for Confu16 cius Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and 

17 nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by 

18 the Government of China, the Communist Party of 

19 China, or by individuals or public or private organi20 zations with a demonstrable affiliation with the Gov21 ernment of China or the Communist Party of China 

22 that are operating in the United States to register 

23 through the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 

24 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a comparable mech25 anism; 


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1 (9) to seek ways to increase Chinese language 

2 proficiency among mid-career professionals that do 

3 not rely on funding linked to the Government of 

4 China; 

5 (10) to ensure that existing tools are suffi6 ciently screening for the risk of Chinese influence 

7 operations; and 

8 (11) to create more flexible tools, as needed, 

9 with the goals of— 

10 (A) screening investments from the Gov11 ernment of China or sources backed by the 

12 Government of China to protect against the 

13 takeover of United States companies by Chinese 

14 state-owned or state-driven entities; and 

15 (B) protecting institutions or business sec16 tors critically important to United States na17 tional security and the viability of democratic 

18 institutions. 

19 SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ‘‘SHARP POWER’’ POLIT20 ICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND TO PRO21 TECT UNITED STATES CITIZENS. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi23 nation with all relevant Federal agencies shall develop a 

24 long-term strategy— 


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1 (1) to carry out the policy statements set forth 

2 in section 3(c); 

3 (2) to effectively counter the ‘‘sharp power’’ po4 litical influence operations of the Chinese Com5 munist Party globally and in the United States; 

6 (3) to ensure that United States citizens, par7 ticularly Chinese Americans and members of the 

8 Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan diaspora who are who 

9 are often the victims and primary targets of malign 

10 political influence operations, are protected; 

11 (4) to ensure that— 

12 (A) the United States Government strategy 

13 to protect the communities described in para14 graph (3) is clearly communicated by relevant 

15 Federal officials; and 

16 (B) secure outlets are created for reporting 

17 on intimidation and surveillance; 

18 (5) to ensure that Chinese nationals who are le19 gally studying, living, or working temporarily in the 

20 United States know that intimidation or surveillance 

21 by the Government of China and the Communist 

22 Party of China is an unacceptable invasion of their 

23 rights while they reside in the United States; and 

24 (6) to provide secure outlets for reporting on in25 timidation and surveillance. 


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1 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

2 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, or 

3 an appropriate high-ranking official, shall— 

4 (1) submit an unclassified report containing the 

5 strategy required under subsection (a) to the appro6 priate congressional committees; or 

7 (2) describe the strategy required under sub8 section (a) through unclassified testimony before the 

9 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or 

10 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 

11 Representatives. 

12 SEC. 5. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPER13 ATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND 

14 THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA. 

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Because it is important for Amer16 ican policymakers and the American people to be informed 

17 about the influence operations described in section 3, not 

18 later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of 

19 this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 

20 Director of National Intelligence, and in consultation with 

21 the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, 

22 shall submit an unclassified report to the appropriate con23 gressional committees that describes the political influence 

24 operations of the Government of China and the Com25 munist Party of China affecting the United States and 


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1 not more than 5 allies and partners most impacted by the 

2 Government of China’s influence operations in their coun3 tries (as determined by the Director of National Intel4 ligence), including efforts— 

5 (1) to exert influence over United States gov6 ernmental or nongovernmental institutions or indi7 viduals, or government officials among United States 

8 allies and partners; 

9 (2) to coerce or threaten United States citizens 

10 or legal permanent residents or their families and 

11 associates living in China or elsewhere; 

12 (3) to undermine democratic institutions and 

13 the freedoms of speech, expression, the press, asso14 ciation, assembly, religion, or academic thought; 

15 (4) to otherwise suppress information in public 

16 fora, in the United States and abroad; or 

17 (5) to develop or obtain property, facilities, in18 frastructure, business entities, or other assets for 

19 use in facilitating the activities described in para20 graphs (1) through (4). 

21 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required under sub22 section (a) shall also include recommendations for the 

23 President and Congress relating to— 

24 (1) the need for additional resources or authori25 ties to counter political influence operations in the 


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1 United States directed by the Government of China 

2 or the Communist Party of China, including oper3 ations carried out in concert with allies; 

4 (2) whether a permanent office to monitor and 

5 respond to political influence operations of the Gov6 ernment of China and the Communist Party of 

7 China should be established within the Department 

8 of State or the Office of the Director of National In9 telligence; and 

10 (3) whether regular public reports on the polit11 ical influence operations of the Government of China 

12 and the Communist Party of China are needed to in13 form Congress and the American people of the scale 

14 and scope of such operations. 

Æ 


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