No. 84-452 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF PlONTAPJA 

1985 

STATE OF MOZJTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsWESLEY SHARP, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lincoln, 

The Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Reller & German; Ann C. German, Libby, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Eon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

William A. Douglas, County Attorney, Libby, Montana 

Susan Loehn, Deputy County Atty., Libby, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Play 3, 1985 

Decided: July 8, 1985 

- Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of 

violating section 61-8-406, MCA. We affirm. 

The defendant initially appeared before the justice of 

the peace in Lincoln County, Montana, on a charge of driving 

under the influence of alcohol. At that time, he moved the 

justice court to suppress the results of a breathalyzer test 

on the grounds that such test was the result of an illegal 

arrest and therefore inadmissible. The motion was denied, 

and the justice court, in a bench trial, found the defendant 

guilty. Defendant appealed this conviction to the District 

Court and renewed his motion to suppress. The parties agreed 

that the trial court would rule upon the motion based upon a 

set of stipulated facts. Ruling thereon, the District Court 

denied defendant's motion. 

Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial 

was also denied, and a jury trial in District Court commenced 

October 1, 1984. At trial the motion to suppress was again 

renewed. The six-person jury found the defendant not guilty 

of driving while under the influence of alcohol, an offense 

defined by section 61-8-401, MCA, but found the defendant 

guilty of the offense of operation of a motor vehicle with a 

blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more, defined in 

section 61-8-406, MCA. The District Court entered an oral 

judgment on the jury's verdict. Defendant waived a 

pre-sentence report, and the District Court imposed the 

maximum penalty: 10 days in jail and a $500 fine, plus 

license revocation. The same day oral judgment was entered, 

the defendant appealed to this Court. The judgment and 

execution of sentence was stayed pending the determination of 

this appeal. 
Several days after filing his notice of appeal from the 

judgment, the defendant filed a statement of record on appeal 

wherein he stated, pursuant to section 46-20-302, MCA, that 

because he was only appealing from the trial court's denial 

of the pre-trial motion to suppress, which was submitted to 

that court on stipulated facts alone, he did not intend to 

order a transcript for appeal. He contends that since the 

District Court considered the matter on a set of stipulated 

facts alone, that the same facts control our consideration of 

the denial of the motion. 

The State, in response, argues that the motion was 

properly granted on the stipulated facts alone, hut in the 

alternative, that other evidence adduced at trial supports 

the District Court's order. The defendant renewed his motion 

at trial, and thus any evidence in the record supporting the 

District Court's order should be considered. To that end, 

the State attached as an appendix a portion of the transcript 

of the trial where other relevant evidence pertaining to the 

issue of the stop and arrest of the defendant was produced. 

We will consider the entire record, including the 

appendix provided by the State, for two reasons: (1) the 

defendant has not moved us to strike this evidence from the 

record; and (2) because of the rule that a ruling denying a 

motion to suppress is not final and may be reversed at any 

time, and thus a reviewing court may consider evidence 

subsequently received during trial. People v. Jones 

(I11.App. 1983), 449 N.E.2d 547; People v. Taylor (I11.App. 

1981), 424 N.E.2d 1246. This rule is recognized in Illinois, 

c.f. People v. Taylor (Ill. 1971), 277 N.E.2d 878, 881; 

People v. Schlemm (1ll.App. 1980), 402 N.E.2d 810, from where 

much of our criminal procedure code is derived. Discussing 

this rule, the Appellate Court of Illinois, in People v. 

Schlemm, 402 N.E.2d at 816, observed: 
"Had the motion to suppress been denied 

at the suppression hearing, and had this 

Court determined that the evidence 

produced at that hearing did not justify 

denial of the suppression motion, this 

Court could consider the evidence 

introduced at trial to uphold denial of 

the suppression motion. (People v. 

Braden 1966, 34 I11.2d 516, 216 N.E.2d 

808) In commenting upon the above 

doctrine, Professor LaFave has stated: 

'the notion that the trial record may be 

used by the appellate court to uphold a 

search or seizure notwithstanding the 

fact that the lower court erred in 

failing to suppress on the lesser amount 

of evidence produced at the pretrial 

hearing is an attractive one--after all, 

if it now appears that the fourth 

amendment was not violated, then why 

should the defendant be entitled to a 

windfall reversal of his conviction? ' 

LaFave, Search and Seizure (1978) , Vol. 

3, S 11.7(c), p. 732." 

See also, People v. Hall (111.App. 1980), 414 N.E.2d 201, 

The rule stated above does not alter the rule stated in 

State v. Rader (1978), 177 Mont. 252, 255, 581 P.2d 437, 

where we noted that "the general rule . . . is that when a 

motion is granted or denied, such becomes the law of the 

case, and the alleged illegality of the search cannot 

ordinarily be relitigated." F.ader dealt with a situation 

where one judge had replaced another on the case. The 

policies supporting the "law of the case" doctrine do not 

apply in a situation, such as in the case at bar, where the 

same judge is on the case for its duration, accord, People v. 

Taylor (Ill. 1971), 277 N.E.2d 878. Further, in Rader, we 

recognized exceptions to the "law of the case" rule. In 

recognizing these exceptions to that rule, we cited to the 

annotation at 20 A.L.R.Fed. 13 (1974), which lists one of 

them as being where new evidence previously unavailable to 

the court is made known. Under either the Illinois rule 

stated above, or the Rader rule, we may in these 

I 
circumstances properly consider the whole record and apply it 

to appellant's allegation of error. 

Here, the District Court, in considering the motion to 

suppress was restricted by the parties' stipulations. Alone, 

the stipulations provide minima 1 support for the court ' s 

ruling. Subsequently, though, new evidence not contained in 

the stipulations was adduced at trial that lends support to 

the District Court's order. 

From a review of the record, the following appear to be 

the relevant facts: At 4:10 p.m., December 22, 1983, Joyce 

Hudson, the town clerk of Eureka, Montana, received an 

anonymous telephone call from a female at the First and Last 

Chance Saloon, who reported a possible DUI. The caller gave 

the license number of the vehicle involved, a description 

thereof, and the direction being traveled by the motor 

vehicle. Officer Jim Williams of the Montana Highway Patrol 

was .in the office when the call came in. He got into his 

patrol car and headed north on Highway 93. He soon saw the 

described vehicle parked halfway off the road pointing in a 

southerly direction. On pulling around to approach the car 

from behind, Officer Williams noted skid marks leading to the 

vehicle, later determined to be 57 feet in length. As 

Officer Williams pulled up behind the vehicle, it slowly 

began to pull away. Officer Williams then stopped the 

vehicle. The driver was Ron Truman. Williams gave Truman a 

field sobriety test and determined that Truman was not under 

the influence of alcohol. When he was talking to Truman, 

Officer Williams noted a passenger in the vehicle, the 

defendant, Wesley R. Sharp. Officer Williams testified at 

trial that " [Sharp] was slumped down and looking like he was 

about halfway passed out. He was obviously either sick or 

drunk." Officer Williams then asked Ron Truman whether he 

had been driving since he had left the bar. Truman told 
Officer Williams that he had just taken over driving when 

they were parked there, and that he did so "because Wes was 

too drunk to drive." Officer Williams then called back to 

the dispatcher and had her get ahold of the caller at the 

First and Last Chance Saloon. The caller was identified as 

Patty Garris, the bartender at the saloon. She was asked who 

had been driving the vehicle when it left the bar and 

answered that it was Wesley Sharp. Officer Williams then 

gave the defendant Miranda warnings and a field sobriety 

test. Based on that test, he arrested Sharp for driving 

while under the influence and took him to the police station, 

where the breathalyzer test was conducted. The test, given 

approximately an hour after the arrest, showed that the 

defendant Sharp had a blood alcohol level of .17 percent. 

The defendant alleges that Officer Williams was without 

authority to stop the defendant's vehicle because he lacked 

probable cause to do so. This contention is erroneous. All 

that is required of an officer in making an investigatory 

stop is that he have a "particularized" or "reasonable" 

suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. This is the 

applicable standard for an investigative stop of a vehicle; 

or in other words "some basis from which the court can 

determine that the detention was not arbitrary or 

harrassing." State v. Gopher (Mont. 1981), 631 P.2d 293, 

295, 38 St.Rep. 1078, 1081, relying on United States v. 

Cortez (1981), 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d. 621. 

Here, Officer Williams had a sufficient basis for his 

particularized suspicion of illegal activity. A citizen had 

just called the police to report a possible DUI offense and 

had given the police dispatcher the car's license plate 

number and description and the direction of travel. These 

facts were corroborated when Office Williams found the 

described vehicle going in the direction and on the highway 
reported by the telephone caller. When Williams came upon 

the automobile, it was stopped halfway off the roadway and 

began to pull away when he approached. Officer Williams 

noticed skid marks coming from the vehicle. He had a right 

at that time, based on reasonable suspicion and logical 

inference, to stop the defendant's vehicle to investigate a 

possible crime. 

Appellant emphasizes the fact that the initial tip was 

given by an anonymous informant. Aside from the fact that 

all of the information given by the informant was 

corroborated at the scene, we also note that when information 

is provided by a "citizen informant" that information is 

considered presumptively reliable. See State v. Kelly (Mont. 

1983), 668 P.2d 1032, 1043, 40 St.Rep. 1400, 1411; State v. 

Liestiko (1978), 176 Mont. 434, 439, 578 P.2d 1161, 1164; and 

1 LaFave Search and Seizure Sections 3.3 and 3.4, (1978). 

Alternatively , appellant argues that once Officer 

Williams determined that Ron Truman, the driver of the 

vehicle at the time of the stop, was not under the influence, 

that the scope of the permissible investigatory stop was 

ended and that anything that occurred thereafter was 

impermissible. This contention is also not persuasive. A 

founded suspicion to stop for investigative detention may 

ripen into probable cause to arrest through the occurrence of 

facts or incidents after the stop. United States v. 

Medina-Gasca (9th Cir. 1984), 739 F.2d 1451, 1453; United 

States v. Portillo-Reyes (9th Cir. 1975), 529 F.2d 844, 850. 

Here, Officer Williams, after running a field sobriety test 

on Ron Truman, observed the passenger Wesley Sharp in the 

vehicle slouched over and apparently intoxicated. Based on 

that observation, Officer Williams inquired further. In 

response to the officer's questions, Ron Truman stated that 

the two had just switched places and that they did so because 
Sharp was "too drunk to drive." To further corroborate this, 

Officer Williams went back to the squad car and had the 

dispatcher call the First and Last Chance Saloon. The 

informant, then identified, stated that Wesley Sharp was 

driving the car when it left the saloon. At that time, 

Officer Williams' investigation had produced facts that 

ripened into the probable cause to arrest Wesley Sharp. He 

did so, gave Sharp his Miranda warnings, and brought him to 

the stationhouse, where the breathalyzer test was 

administered. Clearly, in this case Officer Williams was 

simply investigating an alleged criminal activity and using 

all of his facilities to determine what had occurred. That 

was his job, and his duty. We do not find appellant's 

argument persuasive. An investigation or investigatory stop 

is guided by principles of reasonableness. Effective law 

enforcement requires some latitude to be given to 

investigating officers to react to and follow up on their 

observations. Drawing artificial distinctions or "time 

lines" in situations such as these does not comport with 

reality or common sense. All that is required, as stated 

above, is that the officer had some articulable, or 

particularized suspicion that criminal activity was afoot; in 

other words, that the particular investigation or stop was 

not solely arbitrary or for the purposes of harrassment. As 

long as the scope and duration of that investigation stays 

within these parameters, we have no difficulty with upholding 

such an investigation and any evidence of criminal activity 

adduced therefrom. 

Justice Sheehy, in his dissent, has raised various 

issues and has expressed his opinion of the handling of this 

case in the District Court and this Court. 

It is my opinion that defense counsel, both having 

excellent reputations, chose to present this appeal solely on 
the issue of the validity of the order refusing to suppress 

the breathalyzer test results. No transcript was submitted, 

so it is not possible to determine the extent of 

participation by the defense in the settlement of jury 

instructions, submission of the special verdict form, or in 

the examination of witnesses. Therefore the opinion has been 

restricted to the issue presented on appeal. 

Based on the foregoing reasons, the order of the 

District Court denying the defendant's motion to suppress the 

results of the breathalyzer test, and the judgment, are 

affirmed. 

We concur: H 

Justices 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: 

I dissent. I do not understand how the Court can 

sustain this conviction in the face of its obvious 

imperfections. Sharp has been deprived of due process, 

subjected to double jeopardy, and denied a speedy trial. Not 

one but three violations of the State's Constitutional rights 

have occurred. We should reverse the judgment of his 

conviction sua sponte. 

Due Process 

The defendant Sharp has been convicted of a crime for 

which no complaint, indictment or information was ever filed 

against him. 

This case arrived in the District Court by way of appeal 

from a criminal conviction in a justice court. This means 

that there is not in the District Court file any information 

filed by a county attorney, nor a true bill by a grand jury. 

The founding papers on which the charges against Sharp are 

based must rest then in the papers that were transferred to 

the District Court from the justice court in which his 

original conviction was obtained. 

In the justice court, the only charge against Sharp is 

that filed by highway patrolman James Williams on January 3, 

1984, charging that Sharp, on December 22, 1983 committed the 

offense of "driving while under the influence of alcohol, 

second offense." No other charges were made a.gainst Sharp in 

the justice court. His sentence in the justice court on 

conviction was a fine of $500, his driver's license suspended 

for one year, and 173 days of jail sentence to be suspended 

on the condition that he take a chemical dependency program 

treatment. 
Under S 46-17-311, MCA, all criminal cases on appeal 

from justices courts must be tried anew in the District 

Court. In this type of case, the District Court acts under 

its appellate jurisdiction. Section 3-5-303, MCA. 

In the District Court, after trial, Sharp was found "not 

guilty of the offense of driving while under the influence of 

alcohol, a misdemeanor." His J.P. conviction was reversed. 

However, Sharp was found "guilty of the offense of 

operation of a motor vehicle by a person with alcohol 

concentration of 0.10 or more." 

Thus, Sharp was found guilty in the District Court of an. 

offense for which he was never charged by information, true 

bill, or complaint. 

Under Art. 11, S 20, 1972 Montana Constitution, criminal 

offenses within the jurisdiction of any court inferior to the 

District Court "shall-" he prosecuted by complaint. The 

iustice court file does not contain a complaint based on 

alcohol concentration of 0.10. The same state constitutional 

provision relating to criminal actions in the District Court 

require either information or indictment. Neither an 

information nor indictment is contained. in the District Court 

file. 

With respect to justice courts, 5 46-17-101, MCA, 

requires that all criminal prosecutions in the justice court 

be commenced by complaint under oath. 

Under 46-11-401, MCA, all charges against a defendant 

in a criminal prosecution must be in writing and charge the 

offense by stating the name of the offense, the statute 

invol-ved, and the facts constituting the offense in the 

ordinary concise language. No such charge in writing appears 
in the District Court file rel-ating to the "operation" of a 

motor vehicle. 

Sharp has been deprived of due process in that he has 

been convicted of a crime in a District Court for which he 

has never been charged. 

The first time that the charge of operating a motor 

vehicle while having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 

appears is in the instru-ctions of the District Court to the 

jury. 

The test of the sufficiency of the information (and 

presumably of the justice court complaint) is whether the 

defendant is apprised of the charges brought against him and 

whether he will be surprised. State v. Bogue (Mont. 1963), 

142 Mont. 459, 384 P.2d 749. 

Double Jeopardy 

It is necessary to understand the state's statutes 

respecting driving under the influence of alcohol and of 

operating a motor vehicle under that influence to see that 

the District Court got trapped in egregious error because it 

did not understand the statutes. 

There are two ways in which the State may prosecute a 

defendant for driving or operating motor vehicles under the 

influence of alcohol. 

Under S 61-8-401 (1) (a), MCA, it is unlawful for any 

person who is under the influence of alcohol "to drive or be 

in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the 

highways of this State open to the public." 

Note, please, that under S 61-8-401, MCA, the offense is 

committed if one is driving, or is in actual physical control 

of a motor vehicle upon a highway while under the influence 

of alcohol. 
With respect to the quantum of proof to establish a 

violation of S 61-8-401, MCA, relating to alcohol, the 

statutes establishes certain presumptions with respect to 

blood alcohol tests. If at the time of the alleged offense 

there is an alcohol concentration of 0.05 or less it is 

presumed that the person was not under the influence of 

al-cohol. Section 61-8-401 (3) (a) , MCA. If there was at the 

time a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 0.05 but less 

than 0.10, there is no presumption, --- but the fact may - be 

considered with other competent evidence - in determininq the 

guilt or - innocence -- or the person. Section 61-8-401 (3) (b) , 

MCA . 

If at the time there is an alcoholic concentration of 

0.10 or more, it is presumed that the person was under the 

influence, but the presumption is rebuttable. Section 

61-8-401 (3) (c) , MCA. 

A different crime for operating a vehicle under the 

influence of alcohol is provided in S 61-8-406, MCA. There 

it is unlawful "for any person to drive or be in actual 

physical control of a motor vehicle upon the ways of this 

State open to the public while the alcohol concentration in 

his blood, brea.th, or urine is 0.10 or more." 

Note please under 61--8-406, the crime is defined by 

the status of the blood alcohol content. Nothing more than 

the blood alcohol concentration is required to be proved if 

the person is driving or in actual physical control of the 

motor vehicle at the time. 

In sum, then, under S 61-8-401, MCA, a person may be 

convicted of driving or being in actual physical control of a 

motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol if his 

blood alcohol concentration is in excess of 0.05 (50 
milligrams per 100 milliliters) but less than 0.10 (100 

milligrams per 100 milliliters) and other competent evidence 

shows he was guilty; if his blood alcohol concentration is 

0.10 (100 milligrams per 100 milliliters) or more, there is a 

rebuttable presumption that he was under the influence of 

alcohol. Under 5 61-8-406, MCA, proof of the blood alcohol 

concentration of 0.10 (100 milligrams per 100 milliliters) or 

more is sufficient proof of the alcohol influence. 

The District Court did not so instruct the jury. 

Instead the District Court instructed the jury erroneously as 

follows: 

"The crime charged against the defendant is driving 

while under the influence of alcohol, a misdemeanor 

and all six of your numbeFmust agree j.n order to 

return either a verdict of guilty or not guilty. 

"To do so, it is necessary that you consider the 

crime of driving while under the influence of 

alcohol first and that all six of you find the 

defendant either guilty or not guilty of that 

charge. 

"In the event you find the defendant guilty of 

driving while under the influence of alcohol, you 

need go no further as you will have reached a 

verdict in this case. And shall contact the 

bailiff to return you to open court. 

"In the event you find the defendant not guilty of 

driving while under the influence of alcohol-, you 

must then consider the lesser included offense of 

operation of motor vehicle & - a person with alcohol 

concentratzn ---- of 0.10 or more. You must then find 

the defendant guilty or not guilty of that charge. 

When you have done so, you have reached. a verdict 

and need not proceed further but shall contact the 

bailiff to return you to open court." 

The District Court erred in giving that instruction, 

first, because it divided the elements provided in both 

statutes "to drive or be in actual physical control of a 

motor vehicle" while und.er the influence of alcohol. The 

court dissected the statutes and erroneously determined that 

one statute concerned itself with actually driving the motor 
vehicle, and the other statute concerned itself with 

"operation" of a motor vehicle. It committed grievous error 

when it instructed the jury that the "operation" of a motor 

vehicle was a lesser included offense of "driving" a motor 

vehicle. 

Was the jury confused? It certainly was. During its 

deliberation, it sent out a question to the court, asking the 

following: 

"What is the definition of "driving" while under 

the influence of alcohol? And does this differ 

from "operation of a motor vehicle by a person with 

alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more?" 

The District Court answered the question to the effect 

that "the instructions that have been given contain the law 

that defines these offenses." Again the District Court 

committed an egregious error. 

Having been so erroneously instructed, and so 

erroneously answered, as might be expected, the fury returned 

a baffling verdict. It found Sharp "not guilty of the 

offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol a 

misdemeanor," but "guilty of the offense of operation of a. 

motor vehicle by a person with alcohol concentration of 0.10 

or more. " 

The District Court, having first erred by charging the 

defendant with an offense not stated in a complaint, 

information, or an indictment, compounded the error by 

determining that "operation" of a motor vehicle is a lesser 

included offense of "driving" a motor vehicle. This in spite 

of the fact that in each of the two statutes that relate to 

driving under the influence of alcohol, there is also 

included the "actual physical operation" of a motor vehicle. 
Section 46-11-501, MCA, d-efines what is an "included 

offense" under our State statutes. The offense is included. 

when it is established by proof of the same or less than all 

the facts required to establish a commission of the offense 

charged, or a lesser kind of cul-pability suffices to 

establish its commission. 

As is demonstrated above, a crime of "operation" of a 

motor vehicle by driving or being in actual physical control 

of a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 100 

milligrams per 100 milliliters or more cannot be a. lesser 

included offense of the crime described in 5 46-11-401, MCA, 

driving or being in actual physical control of a motor 

vehicle under the influence of alcohol, because under the 

latter crime, a conviction may be had if the blood alcohol 

concentration is 50 milligrams per 100 milliliters. In other 

words, it takes a greater degree of proof or a greater degree 

of culpability to establish the "operation" crime than the 

"driving crime" as described by the ~istrict Court. 

"A lesser included offense exists when all of the 

elements of the lesser offense are necessary 

elements of the greater offense. Put another way, 

if it is possible to commit the greater offense 

without having committed the lesser offense, the 

latter is not an included crime." State v. Roybal 

(Wash. 1973), 512 P.2d. 718. 

It should be apparent that Sharp has been subjected to 

double jeopardy in this case. Section 46-11-503, MCA. The 

offenses under §§ 61-8-401 (driving) and 61-8-406, MCA, 

(operation) were known to the attorney prosecuting the case 

in the justice court, were consummated prior to the original 

charge and jurisdiction and venue of both offenses lay in the 

iustice court. A judgment of conviction for driving under 

the influence of alcohol second offense was obtained. in the 

justice court. That conviction was reversed by the jury in 
the District Court. Charging him in the District Court on 

the appeal with criminal operation constituted a new charge 

based upon the same transaction which could and should have 

been prosecuted in the justice court. Double jeopardy 

attaches to the conviction of "operation" in the District 

Court. 

Again, Sharp has been deprived of a State Constitutional 

right, the right not to be "again put i.n jeopardy for the 

same offense previously tried in any jurisdiction." Art. 11, 

5 25, 1972 Montana Constitution. 

Speedy Trial 

Under State v. Knox (Mont. 19841, 675 P.2d 950, 41 

St.Rep. 126, a misdemeanor charge must be dismissed if the 

defendant's trial, following appeal from the conviction in 

the justice court, is not brought to trial speedily. Here 

the appeal was filed February 23, 1984 and trial commenced 

October 1, 1984, a lapse of 220 days. A motion was made to 

dismiss for lack of speedy trial and the trial court record 

does not show the disposition of that motion. The trial 

court record does reflect that there was a denial of the 

motion to suppress, based upon a purported stipulation, but 

the stipulation is not contained in the District Court file. 

I therefore would accord no respect to the order denying the 

motion to suppress and determine that the lapse of 220 days 

exceeded the permissible six months to bring this case to 

trial. 

This case is a disgrace to the administration of 

criminal justice. The defense attorney did not raise the 

objections I have stated here, the county prosecutor did not 

charge the defendant in the justice court with all of the 

offenses chargeable under the laws at the time, and the 
District Court compounded the errors either by disregarding 

the statutes or not reading them. The defendant's conviction 

should be reversed as a lesson to all concerned. Otherwise 

this Court continues the disgrace. 

f 

/ Justice / 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. dissenting and concurring: 

I concur in the dissenting opinion of of Mr. Justice 

Sheehy except that I do not find anything in the record to 

indicate that the defendant was not well represented by his 

attorney.