COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00169-CV

Betty Lou Bradshaw

v.

R.J. Sikes, Roger Sikes, Kathy 

Sikes, Greg Louvier, Pam Louvier, 

Christy Rome, Dacota Investment 

Holdings, L.L.P., a/k/a Dacota 

Investment Holdings, L.P., Colorado 

State Bank & Trust as Custodian of 

the R.J. Sikes IRA Account, R. Crist 

Vial, IRA Plus Southwest, LLC as 

Custodian of the R. Crist Vial Roth 

IRA Account, and Range Texas 

Production, L.L.C.

§

§

§

§

From the 355th District Court

of Hood County (C2010739)

March 14, 2013

Opinion by Justice McCoy

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed.

It is further ordered that appellant Betty Lou Bradshaw shall pay all costs of 

this appeal, for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 
2

By_________________________________

 Justice Bob McCoy
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00169-CV

BETTY LOU BRADSHAW APPELLANT

V.

R.J. SIKES, ROGER SIKES, KATHY 

SIKES, GREG LOUVIER, PAM 

LOUVIER, CHRISTY ROME, 

DACOTA INVESTMENT HOLDINGS, 

L.L.P. A/K/A DACOTA INVESTMENT 

HOLDINGS, L.P., COLORADO 

STATE BANK & TRUST AS 

CUSTODIAN OF THE R.J. SIKES IRA 

ACCOUNT, R. CRIST VIAL, IRA 

PLUS SOUTHWEST, LLC AS 

CUSTODIAN OF THE R. CRIST VIAL 

ROTH IRA ACCOUNT, AND RANGE 

TEXAS PRODUCTION, L.L.C.

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
4

I. Introduction

In three issues in this interpleader-based appeal, Appellant Betty Lou 

Bradshaw appeals the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment for, and 

distributing the interpleaded proceeds to, Appellees R.J. Sikes, Roger Sikes, Kathy 

Sikes, Greg Louvier, Pam Louvier, Christy Rome, Dacota Investment Holdings, 

L.L.P. a/k/a Dacota Investment Holdings, L.P., Colorado State Bank & Trust as 

custodian of the R.J. Sikes IRA account, R. Crist Vial, IRA Plus Southwest, LLC, as 

custodian of the R. Crist Vial Roth IRA account, and Range Texas Production, 

L.L.C., (collectively, the Interpleader Appellees), after denying her motion to dismiss 

for lack of jurisdiction and to abate pending the resolution of her appeal in cause 

number 02-10-00369-CV. We affirm.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Prior Appeals

The background of this litigation is set out in Range Resources Corp. v. 

Bradshaw (Bradshaw I), 266 S.W.3d 490, 491–92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. 

denied) (op. on reh’g), and Bradshaw v. Steadfast Financial, L.L.C. (Bradshaw II), 

No. 02-10-00369-CV, 2013 WL 530969, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 14, 

2013, no pet. h.).

In short, after acquiring the executive right over property in which Bradshaw 

owned a nonparticipating royalty interest (NPRI), Steadfast Financial L.L.C. leased 
5

the property to Range Production I, L.P.2for a 1/8 royalty. Bradshaw I, 266 S.W.3d 

at 491–92. Bradshaw sued, alleging that Steadfast had conspired with Range for a 

1/8 royalty in the lease and an excessive leasing bonus instead of a 1/4 royalty in 

the lease, thereby breaching its fiduciary duty to her. Id. Bradshaw sued Steadfast, 

Range, and several of the Interpleader Appellees—who we referred to as the 

Royalty Holders in Bradshaw II3—among others, seeking the difference between the 

royalty she actually received and the royalty she would have received had no 

alleged breach occurred. Id.; see also Bradshaw II, 2013 WL 530969, at *2, 26.

Steadfast and some of the Royalty Holders filed a counterclaim at the outset 

of Bradshaw’s lawsuit, asking for a declaratory judgment to define Bradshaw’s NPRI 

under the applicable deeds as a “fractional royalty” and to construe the terms of the 

lease to find that Steadfast did not owe, and had not breached, a duty to Bradshaw. 

They also asked the trial court to declare that oil and gas production from the 

property “be distributed by the oil and gas lessee to each such party in accordance 

with the interest conveyed to them by Steadfast Financial LLC.”

The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment on how to define

Bradshaw’s NPRI. Bradshaw I, 266 S.W.3d at 491–92. The trial court concluded 

 

2Range Texas Production, L.L.C. (Range) is the successor of Range 

Production I, L.P.

3

That is, R.J. Sikes, R. Crist Vial, Roger and Kathy Sikes, Greg and Pam 

Louvier, Christy Rome, and Dacota Investment Holdings, L.L.P. a/k/a Dacota 

Investment Holdings, L.P. Bradshaw II, 2013 WL 530969, at *1.
6

that her NPRI was a “fraction of royalty,” and, in an agreed interlocutory appeal from 

the trial court’s order, we affirmed this conclusion in Bradshaw I. Id.

Upon remand, Bradshaw sought to set aside Steadfast’s transfers of NPRIs to

the Royalty Holders, claiming that the transfers were fraudulent and seeking a 

constructive trust. Bradshaw II, 2013 WL 530969, at *2. Steadfast and the Royalty 

Holders, among others,4then moved for summary judgment on whether Steadfast 

owed Bradshaw a duty.5 Id. The trial court found that Steadfast did not owe 

Bradshaw a duty, and its final summary judgment ordered that Bradshaw take 

nothing on her causes of action against all of the defendants, ordered her to pay 

costs, and stated, “This judgment finally disposes of all claims and parties and is 

final and appealable. All relief not expressly granted is DENIED.” Bradshaw’s 

appeal in cause number 02-10-00369-CV followed, and she superseded the 

judgment for costs by posting a $413 cash bond.

 

4

The trial court granted Bradshaw’s motion to consolidate the two interpleader 

actions brought by Range, which involved all of the Interpleader Appellees here, as 

well as Peter G. Bennis, Cleburne Bible Church, and Gary Humphreys. After the 

trial court ruled on the Interpleader Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, it 

granted their motion for severance from Bennis and the others. The trial court’s 

interpleader ruling in that case is now pending in this court in cause number 02-12-

00262-CV.

5Steadfast moved for summary judgment on the basis of duty and estoppel by 

deed. Bradshaw II, 2013 WL 530969, at *3. The Royalty Holders relied on 

Steadfast’s motion and also moved for summary judgment on Bradshaw’s fraudulent 

transfer claims, opposing the imposition of a constructive trust on the proceeds of 

their royalty interests. Id. at *1, 23.
7

While Bradshaw’s appeal was pending in cause number 02-10-00369-CV, the 

interpleader events at issue described below took place, ultimately resolved by the 

trial court with a summary judgment for the Interpleader Appellees and distribution of 

the interpleaded proceeds to them. On February 14, 2013, we reversed in part the 

trial court’s summary judgment in cause number 02-10-00369-CV, after concluding 

that Steadfast owed Bradshaw a duty, and we remanded the case to the trial court 

for further proceedings. Id. at *20, 26.

B. Interpleader Proceedings

Range filed its original petition in interpleader after the Interpleader Appellees 

demanded that it distribute their royalty proceeds to them after the trial court’s 

summary judgment in the underlying case. The Interpleader Appellees then filed a 

cross claim, arguing that they were the rightful owners of the funds based on the

fractional royalty interests that Steadfast had conveyed to them and based on the 

trial court’s summary judgment denying Bradshaw’s constructive trust and fraudulent 

transfer claims against them. They asked the trial court to grant Range’s 

interpleader request, to enter judgment declaring their entitlement to the funds, and 

to award those funds and any future payments attributable to their royalty interests 

to them.

Bradshaw filed a denial to the Interpleader Appellees’ cross claim, raising the 

affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and issue preclusion, as well 

as complaining that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. She filed a motion to dismiss 

for want of jurisdiction and alternatively sought to have the interpleader action 
8

abated during the pendency of her appeal in cause number 02-10-00369-CV. She 

did not file a specific cross claim asserting that she was entitled to the funds at 

issue.6

The trial court signed the order authorizing interpleader,

7

and the Interpleader 

Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment to “vindicate[ ] their ownership of the 

interplead funds and determin[e] that any adverse claim by Betty Lou Bradshaw is 

barred by [the] res judicata, collateral estoppel and claim preclusion effect of the 

take[-]nothing judgment.” Bradshaw responded to their summary judgment motion 

but did not file her own separate motion for summary judgment.

In the March 16, 2011 order granting summary judgment for the Interpleader 

Appellees, the trial court ordered the release of over $3 million in royalty proceeds

and provided for the distribution of any future royalty proceeds to the Interpleader 

Appellees. The trial court refused to allow Bradshaw to supersede that judgment.8

III. Interpleader

 

6

In her reply to the Interpleader Appellees’ response to her motion to dismiss 

for want of jurisdiction, Bradshaw stated that her action in the previous case was 

“aimed at the damages from the breach of fiduciary duty [by Steadfast] as embodied 

in the suspended payments rather than seeking royalty that will never be 

Bradshaw’s because it is Steadfast Financial’s one-half (1/2).”

7

The trial court also signed orders denying Bradshaw’s motion to dismiss for 

lack of jurisdiction and her motion to abate.

8

The Texas Supreme Court denied Bradshaw’s June 22, 2011 petition for writ 

of mandamus in this case on July 15, 2011. See In re Bradshaw, No. 11-0468, 

available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2011/jul/071511.htm 

(last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
9

Bradshaw argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss 

the interpleader action for lack of jurisdiction, as well as by dismissing her motion to 

abate and by adjudicating the Interpleader Appellees’ claimed entitlement to the 

disputed royalty proceeds. The Interpleader Appellees respond that Bradshaw lacks 

standing for this appeal because she failed to assert her own claim to the funds 

interpleaded into the trial court’s registry and that their claim is not barred by res 

judicata.

A. Jurisdiction

1. Standing

We will address the Interpleader Appellees’ allegation with regard to 

Bradshaw’s standing for this appeal first. See Town of Flower Mound v. Rembert 

Enters., Inc., 369 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (op. 

on reh’g) (stating that we review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo); 

see also Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 n.3 (Tex. 2001) (noting that “standing 

is a component of subject matter jurisdiction”).

While the Interpleader Appellees are correct in their assertion that Bradshaw 

did not file a specific document entitled “Cross claim,” the substance of Bradshaw’s 

various filings in this interpleader case—rather than their titles—indicate that she 

asserted a claim to the interpleaded funds. See, e.g., 51 Tex. Jur. 3d Motion 

Procedure § 3 (2008) (“The character of a motion is determined by its substance, 

not from its title, caption, or form. The substance of a motion is determined by its 

body and prayer for relief.”) (footnotes omitted). Further, in their response to 
10

Bradshaw’s motion to dismiss, the Interpleader Appellees acknowledged that 

Bradshaw had laid claim to the funds at issue. See, e.g., Olmstead v. Napoli, 383 

S.W.3d 650, 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (noting that the 

trial court determined that the interpleader defendants’ trial briefs were in substance 

cross-motions for traditional summary judgment and treated them as such). And 

during the February 3, 2011 hearing on Range’s interpleader petition and 

Bradshaw’s motion to dismiss, when counsel for some of the Interpleader Appellees 

asked whether Bradshaw was “asserting in open court a claim to the funds that are 

sought to be interpled today,” Bradshaw’s counsel replied, “Your Honor, we’ve only 

been doing that since 2007, the date that we filed our original petition, and we 

continue to do that, and we say that those are Ms. Bradshaw’s funds, not the other 

side’s funds.” [Emphasis added.] Therefore, we believe that Bradshaw sufficiently 

raised her claim to the interpleaded funds to have standing for this appeal.
11

2. Counterclaim

In part of her first issue, Bradshaw asserts that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to dispose of the merits of the interpleader action because it had 

previously denied the Interpleader Appellees’ counterclaim to the disputed royalty 

proceeds in the underlying lawsuit. Specifically, she argues that when the trial court

denied “all relief not expressly granted” in the final summary judgment in that case, it 

denied the Interpleader Appellees’ counterclaim and that when they did not appeal 

this ruling, they could not resurrect this counterclaim as a cross claim in Range’s 

interpleader action.

In support of this argument, Bradshaw relies on In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 

247 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding). In Daredia, a credit card company sued both 

Daredia and Map Wireless, Inc. to recover money due on three credit card accounts. 

Id. at 248. Daredia answered, but Map Wireless did not, and the credit card 

company moved for a default judgment against Map Wireless. Id. The credit card 

company’s proposed order included the following Mother Hubbard clause, “All relief 

not expressly granted herein is denied. This judgment disposes of all parties and all 

claims in this cause of action and is therefore FINAL,” and the trial court signed it. 

Id. No one appealed from the judgment. Id.

Fifteen months later, the credit card company moved for a judgment nunc pro 

tunc so that it could proceed against Daredia, the trial court granted the motion, and 

we denied Daredia’s petition for writ of mandamus, concluding that the default 

judgment order was ambiguous and interlocutory because it had failed to address 
12

the company’s claims against Daredia, allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction 

over the case. Id. The supreme court disagreed, holding that the default judgment’s 

language was clear enough to conclude that it was final, and it granted Daredia’s 

petition for writ of mandamus. Id. at 249–50.

While the language in the final summary judgment order appealed in cause 

number 02-10-00369-CV makes clear that the trial court intended its order to be 

final, Daredia is inapposite here. First, Range—not the Interpleader Appellees—

filed the interpleader action in the trial court. In its petition, Range asked the court to 

determine to whom it had to pay the royalty proceeds it had held in suspense during 

the pendency of the underlying case in the trial court, and the trial court had 

jurisdiction to consider Range’s request, as Range had no ownership interest in 

those proceeds.

9

 See Tex. Natural Res. Code Ann. § 91.402(b) (West 2011) 

(stating that payments may be withheld when there is a dispute concerning title that 

would affect distribution of payments); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 43; Madeksho v. 

Abraham, Watkins, Nichols & Friend, 112 S.W.3d 679, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (noting that a post-judgment interpleader is a new 

filing and stating that the trial court had to have jurisdiction to determine ownership 

of funds tendered into its registry because it “cannot simply toss the money back out 

the clerk’s window”); Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assur. Servs., N.A., 984 S.W.2d 

 

9

Further, we need not address Bradshaw’s argument in part of her first issue 

that the trial court’s judgment here interfered with our jurisdiction over the appeal in 

Bradshaw II, as we have already disposed of that appeal.
13

292, 296 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (noting that the standard of review 

of a trial court’s decision to grant a party’s right to interpleader is an abuse of 

discretion and that any reasonable doubt about a stakeholder’s right to interpleader 

must be resolved in the stakeholder’s favor).

Further, Bradshaw’s counterclaim argument misinterprets the result of the trial 

court’s final, take-nothing judgment when viewed within the case’s context: At the 

time that Bradshaw filed her original petition in Bradshaw I, Steadfast had already 

assigned to the pertinent Interpleader Appellees—i.e., the Royalty Holders—their 

fractional shares of Steadfast’s royalty interest. 266 S.W.3d at 492. The trial court 

then subsequently addressed via summary judgment the two grounds in the 

counterclaim that affected those interests—defining whether Bradshaw’s NPRI was 

a “fraction of royalty” or a “fractional royalty,” and defining Steadfast’s duty to 

Bradshaw as holder of the executive right. Id. at 492, 497–98. It also incorporated 

into the final summary judgment its earlier granting of the motions for summary 

judgment brought by the Royalty Holders, who sought summary judgment on 

Bradshaw’s fraudulent transfer claims and sought to avoid the imposition of a 

constructive trust on the proceeds of the NPRIs they had received from Steadfast.

10

 

See Bradshaw II, 2013 WL 530969, at *3, 20, 26. When the trial court granted the 

 

10In its order granting the Royalty Holders’ second motion for summary 

judgment, the trial court expressly stated that Bradshaw should take nothing on her 

claims against the Royalty Holders “for imposition of a constructive trust on such 

parties’ fractional royalty interests or the proceeds attributable to production arising 

from their ownership of a fractional royalty interest in or to the approximately 1,774 

acres the subject of this suit.” [Emphasis added.]
14

final take-nothing judgment against Bradshaw, incorporating its previous summary 

judgments for the Royalty Holders, it essentially put the parties back into their 

original positions at the litigation’s outset, which was all that the final portion of the 

counterclaim sought to achieve.

11

And although in the final part of her first issue, Bradshaw contends that when 

she superseded the judgment for costs in her appeal of the take-nothing judgment in 

cause number 02-10-00369-CV, this should have prevented the trial court from 

enforcing its earlier judgment, the Interpleader Appellees are correct by pointing out 

that this ignores the nature of the interpleader action here and of the take-nothing 

judgment itself in the underlying case.

12 See Tex. R. App. P. 24.1(a) (setting out the 

 

11Indeed, in her response to the Royalty Holders’ motions for summary 

judgment in the underlying case, Bradshaw acknowledged that she would not have 

a fraudulent transfer claim against them if Steadfast had committed no breach of 

duty owed to her. See Bradshaw II, 2013 WL 530969, at *24.

12There was nothing, other than the judgment for costs, for Bradshaw to 

supersede, as the trial court’s take-nothing judgment against her left her and the 

opposing parties in the same position they had been in prior to her lawsuit. See

Tex. R. App. P. 24.2(a) (describing the types of judgment that can be superseded—

other than conservatorship or cases involving a governmental entity—as judgments 

for recovery of money, real property, and “other”; all three of these require that there 

be a judgment debtor); In re marriage of Richards, 991 S.W.2d 30, 31–32 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo 1998, no pet.) (noting, in divorce appeal, that when a judgment does 

not provide for the recovery of money or property in the possession of the other 

party, there is nothing for the appellee to execute nor any need of the appellant to 

supersede an attempt by the appellee to execute on the decree); see also Robert B. 

Gilbreath and Curtis L. Cukjati, Superseding the “Other Judgment,” 12 App. Advoc. 

11, 11–13 (1998) (discussing how to handle supersedeas situations in which 

judgments for something other than money or property occur; a take-nothing 

judgment is not listed in the summary of case law describing “other judgments” that 

can be superseded). Here, because costs were the only item awarded in the 

otherwise take-nothing judgment, there was no other enforcement item to suspend. 
15

methods by which a judgment debtor may supersede a judgment to suspend its 

enforcement against her), 24.2(a)(1) (noting that for the recovery of money, such as 

costs awarded in the judgment, the amount of the bond, deposit, or security must 

equal the sum of the award); cf. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002 (West

2008) (providing that a judgment creditor is entitled to aid from a court of appropriate 

jurisdiction through injunction or other means in order to reach property to obtain 

satisfaction of judgment), § 63.001(3) (West 2008) (stating that a writ of garnishment 

is available if the plaintiff has a valid, subsisting judgment, among other 

requirements); Madesksho, 112 S.W.3d at 701 n.16 (citing other means by which 

judgment creditors may reach a debtor’s assets). We overrule Bradshaw’s first 

issue.

B. Summary Judgment

In her second issue, Bradshaw states that even if the trial court had the 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the interpleader action’s merits, it nonetheless erred by 

granting summary judgment for the Interpleader Appellees and ordering the 

distribution of the interpleaded royalty proceeds to them when their claim to the 

disputed royalty proceeds was barred by res judicata and they did not establish their 

entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. Because Bradshaw premises 

her res judicata argument on the same counterclaim argument that we have already 

addressed above, we overrule this portion of her second issue.

 

In other words, “Nothing comes from nothing. Nothing ever could.” Richard Rogers 

and Oscar Hammerstein II, Something Good, on The Sound of Music (1959).
16

Bradshaw also argues that none of the grounds presented by the Interpleader 

Appellees can support the trial court’s judgment.

In their motion for summary judgment, the Interpleader Appellees argued that 

the final summary judgment in the underlying case conclusively established as a 

matter of law that they were entitled to the respective funds being held in the trial 

court’s registry, as well as future funds payable as royalties attributable to their 

respective fractional NPRIs, and that any adverse claims by Bradshaw were barred 

by the summary judgment in the underlying case. To their motion, they attached 

copies of the royalty deeds pertaining to the respective NPRIs, as well as copies of 

the documents filed in the underlying case: Bradshaw’s second amended petition, 

the various motions for summary judgment, the trial court’s interim summary 

judgment orders and final judgment, and Bradshaw’s second amended and restated 

lis pendens filed after she appealed the final summary judgment.

“[A] judgment is final for the purposes of issue and claim preclusion ‘despite 

the taking of an appeal unless what is called an appeal actually consists of a trial de 

novo.’” Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); 

see also Street v. Honorable Second Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 

1988) (orig. proceeding) (stating that a judgment that is not superseded can be 

executed upon regardless of its appellate status);

13 Am. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. 

 

13As discussed above, other than the judgment for costs in the underlying suit, 

which Bradshaw superseded, there was nothing for her to supersede from the takenothing judgment.
17

Schattman, 761 S.W.2d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no writ) (noting that 

in Scurlock, the supreme court held that judicial policy required that judgments 

become final for res judicata, collateral estoppel, and issue preclusion purposes 

once the trial court loses plenary power, regardless of whether the judgment is 

appealed). In Hearn, on facts that are very similar to the instant case, the 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals relied on Scurlock to conclude that the trial court did 

not err by applying collateral estoppel to an interpleader action while the underlying 

suit was still pending on appeal. See Hearn v. Cox & Perkins Exploration, Inc., No. 

14-98-01275, 2000 WL 977372, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no 

pet.) (not designated for publication).

14

 Based on the record before us, we reach the 

same conclusion, hold that summary judgment for the Interpleader Appellees was 

appropriate, and overrule the remainder of Bradshaw’s second issue.15

 

14In Hearn, Cox & Perkins filed an interpleader action to determine the 

appropriate payee of oil and gas proceeds derived from land under title disputes. 

2000 WL 977372, at *1. The interpleader court awarded summary judgment against 

Hearn and Lara Energy, and on appeal—among other things—the appellants 

complained that the trial court erred by applying collateral estoppel to the question of

who was entitled to the interpleaded funds while the underlying suit was still on 

appeal. Id. The court also concluded that when the interpleader appellants had not 

been ordered to transfer money or property to anyone, had not been enjoined either 

temporarily or permanently, and had not been ordered to take any action by the 

interpleader court, and their claims to the interpleaded proceeds were no greater 

than their claims in the underlying lawsuit, they were not judgment debtors and 

therefore had no absolute right to suspend the judgment. Id. at *5.

15In her third issue, Bradshaw asserts that we should not only reverse the trial 

court’s judgment here but also order the Interpleader Appellees to return all of the 

disputed royalty proceeds. However, based on our disposition of Bradshaw’s first 

two issues in this case, we need not reach her third issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 

47.1.
18

IV. Conclusion

Having overruled Bradshaw’s dispositive issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

BOB MCCOY

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MCCOY and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: March 14, 2013