IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tyree Lawson

, : Petitioner :

:

v. :

: Pa. Department of Corrections : Secretary John Wetzel, SCI : Graterford Superintendent Cynthia : Link, and SCI Graterford’s I n mate : Accountant/s /

, : No. 178 M. D. 2018 Respondent s : Submitted: November 2 , 2018

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT

, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY FILED: January 1 6 , 2019

Before this C ourt are the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
(Department) Secretary John Wetzel, State Correctional Institution (SCI) G rat e rford
(Graterford) Superintendent Cynthia Link

, and SCI Graterford’s inmate

accoun tant(s)’ (collectively, DOC) preliminary objections (Preliminary Objections) to
Tyree Lawson’s (Lawson) pro se petition for review (Petition) filed in this Court’s
original jurisdiction. After review, we sustain the Preliminary Objections, and

dismiss the Petition.2 Background 1
On August 2, 2011, Lawson was transferred out of SCI Camp Hill and
processed into SCI Forest

, and designated to receive General Labor Pool (GLP) 2 p ay

until Lawson obtained institutional employment. On or about June 20, 2012, La wson was assigned to work in SCI Forest’ s inmate l ibrary at a starting wage of $0.33 per

hour. The re after

, Lawson received a $0.02 raise every 60 days until March 2013

, when he reached top inmate pay of $0.42 per hour. I n February 2017, Lawson filed a

re quest with the Department seeking an incentive

- based facility transfer. 3

On May 24, 2017, SCI Forest’ s officials informed Lawson that he was being transferred out of SCI Forest within 24 hours. On May 25, 2017, Lawson was

transferred from SCI Forest to G raterford. On May 26, 2017, Lawson informed

Graterford’ s inmate employment department that he was recent ly transfer red to

Graterford based upon an i ncentive

- based transfer

, was seeking immediate
employment

, and was ready and willing to work to maintain co ntinued pay and
ordinary routine.

On May 31, 2017, Graterford’ s inmate employment department replied

to Lawson’s May 26, 2017 written request, stating that t he facility does not fill job
positions by request and he would need to contact each worksite to r equest

e mployment

. On July 6, 2017, after discovering that he was receiving Graterford ’s

GLP pay, Lawson w rote to Graterford’ s inmate accountant seeking correction of his

back prison pay. On July 13, 2017, rather than being assigned to one of several

1 The following facts are as alleged in the Petition

. 2 An inmate who is not compensated for work or school may be placed in the GLP. Therein

, t he inmate is required to maintain an acceptable level of personal hygiene, cleanliness of his living quarters, and accept work assignments within the housing unit. The inmate must follow all rules, participate in recommended programs, and be willing to accept any employment or school assignment offered

. See Petition at 2 n.1.

3 “ Inmates ma intaining a [l] evel 2 [c] ustody misconduct history for two consecutive years [] are eligible . . . [ to ] request[] a transfer closer to [their] home based county.” Lawson Br. at 5.3

inm ate worksites Lawson contacted

, he was instructed to report to Graterford’ s

inmate k itchen II, on July 14, 2017, at 1:00 p.m. , second shift. On July 14, 2017,

Lawson reported to Graterford’ s k itchen II, and inquired into how he had been

selected for a pos ition he did not request

. Kitchen II p ersonnel informed Lawson that

such was not their concern

, and instructed him to either wash pots and pans or return

to his housing unit with a write

- up for refusing a direct order.

On July 18, 2017, Lawson filed an official inmate grievance regarding

the forced kitchen II position, and Graterford’s refusal to abide by DC

- ADM 816

, 4
stating that he unreasonabl y received GLP c ompensation/pauperis wages a nd that he
diligently sought back pay and inmate employment reclas sification to one of his
requested inmate worksites. On July 21, 2017, Graterford’ s Employment Vocational

Coordinator responded to Lawson’s grievance that inmate s ha ve no right to refuse
inmate employment, vaguely denied his other grievances

, and instruct ed him to raise

his purported medical issues with Graterford’s medical department

. 5

On or about August 4, 2017, after discovering via his inmate account
monthly statement, that Graterford o fficials were still paying him GLP pay i nstead of

the DC

- ADM 816 wages to which he was allegedly entitled , Lawson filed a second
official inmate grievance stating Graterford’ s officials continue d to violat e DC

- ADM

816. On or about August 7, 2017, the Graterford grievance department rejected

Lawson’s grievance, respondi ng that Lawson already filed a p rison pay

- wages ’
grievance that wa s pending resolution. On August 30, 2017, Graterford’ s officials

4 DC

- ADM 816 (U)(4) provides: “ An inmate who is granted an incentive base d .

. . transfer shall keep his/her pay rate when transferred to another [DOC] facility

. The inmate does not have to be placed in the exact job assignment to keep his/her same pay rate [.]” Petition App. A.

5 Lawson set forth in the Petition that he develope d a visible foot fungus / infection from working in the pot

- washing room without protective equipment.4

denied Lawson’s payroll grievance because he was then being paid his previous
hourly wage of $0.42 for his kitchen II respon sibilities

.

Facts

On Ma rch 15, 2018, Lawson filed the P etition seeking that “ this [C] ourt issue declaratory relief declaring [DOC] in default and compel [DOC] to compensate
[Lawson] with policy [

- ] dictated entitled back pay

. . . to be credited to [Lawson ’s ]
inmate account without unnecessary delay. ” Petition at 5. By April 3

, 2018 order,
this Court granted L awson’s application to proceed in forma pauperis , waived the
Court’s filing fee and directed DOC to file an answer or otherwise plead within 30
days

. On May 3, 2018, DOC filed the Preliminary Objections i n the nature of a

demurrer for L awson’s failure to establish a clear legal right to relief regarding his
request for back pay. Lawson did not respond. By June 19, 2018 order, this Court

directed this matter to be decided on briefs without oral argument.

The law is well

- settled:

I n ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as true all well

- pleaded material allegations in the petition for review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that the law will not per mit recovery , and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain them.
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits every well

- pleaded fact in the [petition for review in the nature of a] complaint and all inferences reasonably deducib le therefrom. It tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When ruling on a demurrer,5 a court must confine its analys is to the [ petition for review in the nature of a ] complaint

.
Torres v. Beard , 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) ( emphasis added; citations
omitted). “[C]ourts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider the facts
pled in the complaint, bu t also any documents or exhibits attached to it.” Allen v.
Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Thus, when deciding
preliminary objections, this Court’s analysis is limited to the Petition and attachments

thereto

. “An examination of the relief requested establishes the nature of the
cause of action and, thus, the standards to be applied to a demurrer.” Garber v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr. , 851 A.2d 222, 225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). In support of its demurrer,

DOC asserts that the P etition should be treated as an action in mandamus. The
Petition provides that Lawson seeks “ declaratory relief” and for this Court “ to
compel [ DOC ] to compensate [Lawson]

. . . . ” Petition at 5 (emphasis added).

A mandamus action is one where the petitioner seeks to

c ompel the performance of a mandatory duty or a ministerial act by a governmental unit.
Here, the remedy [Lawson] seeks is to compel [] DOC to take certain actions

. It is clear [the P] etition is in fact seeking a writ of mandamus

. Therefore, we will trea t it as such.

Kretchmar v. Commonwealth , 831 A.2d 793, 797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (citation
omitted).

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that compels the

official performance of a ministerial act or a mandatory duty. We may issue a writ of mandamus only whe re, ‘(1) the petitioner has a clear legal right to enforce the performance of an act, (2) the defendant has a corresponding duty to perform the act and (3) the petitioner has no other adequate or appropriate remedy.’ Saunders [ v. Dep’ t of Corr

. ] , 749 A.2d [ 553 ,] 556 [( Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) ]

. Mandamus , ‘will not lie to control the exercise of discretion6 unless the defendant’ s action is so arbitrary as to be no exercise of discretion at all. ’ Atlantic

- Inland, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of W [.] Goshen [ Twp. ]

, 4 10 A.2d 380, 383 ( [Pa. Cmwlth.] 1980) [.]
Kretchmar , 831 A.2d at 79 8 (citation s omitted).

“ In general, allegations that [DOC] failed to follow its

. . . internal
policies cannot support a claim based upon a vested right or duty because these

administrat ive rules and regulations, unlike statutory provisions, usually do not create
rights in prison inmates. ” Shore v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. , 168 A.3d 374, 386 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2017). Further, “[i] n Miles v. Wiser

, 847 A.2d 237 (Pa. Cmwlth. [2004] ),

. .

. (citing Br

yan v. Werner

, 516 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1975)), this [C] ourt stated that an

inmate has no property right in keeping a prison job. ” Bush v. Veach , 1 A.3d 981,
984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

Here, Lawson alleges he is entitled to back pay pursuant to DC

- ADM

816

. However, DC

- ADM 816 is an internal prison policy and

, as such

, does not
bestow any rights upon Lawson. Accordingly, since Lawson cannot establish his
eligibility for back pay because his employment status and the wages he receives
therefor are not protect ed by any statute, regulation or right , he does not have “ a clear
legal right to enforce the ” payment of back pay. Kretchmar , 831 A.2d at 797

.

Moreover, i n the Petition, Lawson claims DOC violated his F irst and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing t o pay him his higher wa ges upon tran sfer

because

while at

. . . SCI Forest, [Lawson] filed various official

inmate grievances stemming [sic] officials there unreasonable official oppression, retaliation, harassment,
etc. etc. [sic] Here, and presumably officials at [ Graterford ] effectively sought to retaliate against [Lawson] by refusing to abide and/or uphold and compensate [Lawson] with DC [

- ] ADM 816 Policy [

- ] entitled back pay, directive.

Petition at 5.7 “ [I] n order to properly state an equal protection claim

, [Lawson] must allege that he is receiving different treatment from that received by other similarly

situated individuals due to his membership in a particular class and his assertions of
intentional disparate treatment must be supported by specific factual allegations

. ”
Mobley v. Coleman , 110 A.3d 216, 222 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “[O] ur Supreme Court
held that to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim , the complainant must

state sufficient facts to show that [, inter alia

, ]

. . . the protected conduct was a
substantial and motivating factor for the retaliation .” Richardson v. Wetzel , 74 A.3d
353, 357 (Pa. Cmwth. 2013) (citing Yount v. Dep ’ t of Corr

. , 966 A.2d 1115 ( Pa.
2009) ).
In his brief, Lawson argues that although similarly

- situated person s are to be treated alike, “[DOC] is incapable of producing either data or a similar scenario
where the transferee was denied same compensation pay rate when transferred into
another departmental facility,” and

specifically in light of [Lawson’s] history of valid choice of exercising First Amendment rights, [DOC] is therefore even

more incapable of attributing its refusal to uphold the letter of DC [

- ] ADM 816 [] policy as being rationally related to
any

. . . legitimate penological objective of any of its [S CI] facilities.

Lawson Br. at 7.

However , nowhere in the Petition does Lawson allege that he was
subjected to treatment different from how other Graterford prisoners were treated

. Without such an allegation, Lawson has not stated a valid equal protect ion claim

. Further, Lawson fails to aver any facts in the P etition to support his assertion that the
protected conduct

, i.e. , the filing of his grievances, was a substantial and motivating

factor for his alleged payment discrepancies . Thus, Lawson did no t set forth a8

retaliation or equal protection claim. Accordingly, Lawson cannot establish a clear
legal right to relief.

For all of the above reasons, DOC’s P reliminary O bjections are

sustained and we are constrained to dismiss Lawson’ s Petition

.

___________________________ ANNE E. COVEY, JudgeIN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tyree Lawson, : Petitioner :

:

v. :

: Pa. Department of Corrections : Secretary John Wetzel, SCI : Graterford Superintendent Cynthi a : Link, and SCI Graterford’s Inmate : Accountant/s/

, : No. 178 M.D. 2018 Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 1 6 th day of January , 201 9

, the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections Secretary John Wetzel, State Correctional Institution
(SCI) Grat e rford Superintendent Cynthia Link and SCI Graterford’s inmate
accountant(s)’ preliminary objections to Tyree Lawson’s (Lawson) pro se petition for

review ( Petition ) are sustained

, and Lawson’s Petition is dismissed.

___________________________ ANNE E. COVEY, Judge