### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-09-00154- CV

Gr eg Abbott, At torney G eneral of Texas, Appellan t

v. Texas Board of

Nursing, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 345 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-0 7-0 0268 5, H ONO RAB LE DARLENE BY RNE, JUDGE P RESIDING

C O N C U R R

I N G O P I N I O N

I ag ree that the fac simil e n u m b ers at issue are not confide ntial by law, but for differ ent rea sons than the majority , which relies on the notion that an “eme rg ency response provider” must be an ag ency

or entity rathe r than a

n individual. The Boa rd’s claim of confide ntiality ultimately turns on which noun is modified by the prepositional phrase “of the [emerg ency response ] provider [or providers]” in g overnme nt code section 418.176, subsec tion (a)( 3):
(a) I nformation is co n fi d enti al if the information is collecte d, assembled, or m ai ntained by or for a g overnme ntal entity for the purpose of preve nting, detec ting, responding to, or investiga ting an ac t of terror ism or rela ted criminal ac tivity

and: (1) rela tes to the staffing require ments of an emer g ency response provider, including a law enfor ceme nt ag ency , a fire- fig hting ag ency , or an e merg ency

service s ag ency ;(2) rela tes to a tac tical plan of the provider; or (3) co n s i s ts of a list or compilation of pag er or telephone number s , including mobile and cellular telephone numbers, of the [eme rgency response] provider [or providers]

.

Tex. Gov’t C ode Ann. § 418.176(a) (3) (West 2005) (e mphasis added)

. The prepositional phrase 1
“.

. . of the [emerg ency response ] provider [or providers]” could be viewed as mod i fy ing “list or compilation

. . .,” in which case subsection (a) (3) would protec t the eme rgency response provider’s

or providers’ list or compilation of pag er or telephone numbers. This would mean that the Boa rd’s compilation of nurses’ fac simil e numbers would not be protec ted beca use the Boa

rd conce des that it is not an “eme rg ency response provider.” Another potential interpre tation is that “.

. . of the [emerg ency response ] provider [or providers]” modifies “pag er or telephone numbers,” such that the provision protec ts a “list or compilation” of the eme rgency response provider’s or providers’ pag er

or telephone numbers. Un d er this interpre tation, the Boa rd’s compilation of nurses’ fac simil e numbers would be protec ted, assuming the nurses are “eme rg ency response prov i d er s ” and the
Boa rd collected, assemb l ed , or m aintained the numbers “for the purpose of preve nting, detecting , responding to, or investiga ting an act of terror ism or rela ted criminal activity .” Not surprising ly , the
Boa rd re lies on the latter inter preta tion and the Attorney

Gene ral the f

ormer.

T he parties ag ree that “provide r” as used in para g raphs (2) and (3) of section 418.176 , 1 subsection (a) , nece ssarily ref ers to “eme rg ency response provider,” the term used in para g raph (1) of that provision. And we are to construe “[emerg ency response ] provider” t o extend to both its singula r and plural forms. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.012(b) (West 2005) (Code Construction Act) ( “The singula

r includes the plur al and the plur al includes the sing ular.” ). 2There is support for t h e Bo ard’ s interpre tation. The Code Construction Act

require s us to construe words and phrase s “ac cording to the rules of g rammar and common usag e,” id. § 311.011(a) (West 2005) , and one g ener al rule of g rammar is tha t modify ing words or phrase s

are presumed to apply to the words or phrases t hat i mmediately prec ede them and not t h o s e m o re
remote. See Wil liam Strunk, J r. & E. B. Whit e, The Eleme nts of Style 30 (4th ed. 2000) (“Modifie rs should come, if possible, next to the words they m o d i fy

. ”); Br y an A. Gar

ner, Garner’s Modern
American Usage 431 (1998) (“When a word re fe rs t o an antec edent, the true antec edent should
g ener ally be the closest possible one.”) ; see also Spradlin v. Jim W alter Homes, Inc. , 34 S.W .3d 578,
580 (Tex. 2000) (discussing the statutory construction canon of “last an t ec ed ent,” which “states that a qualify ing phrase in a statute or the Constitution m ust be confine d to the words and phrase s immediately prec eding it to which it may , without impairing the meaning of the sentenc e, be applied” ). Howe ver, this rule “ ‘is neither c ontrolling nor inflexible,’” Jim W alter Homes, I

nc. , 34 S.W .3d at 580 (quoting City of Corsicana v. W illmann , 216 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1949)), and it rema ins that we must also construe the words in context, and this may reve al contra ry leg islative intent. See W

illmann , 216 S.W .2 d at 176-77; Stewman Ranch, Inc. v. Double M Ranch, Ltd. , 192 S.W .3d 808, 812-13 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) ; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (“Words and phr ases shall be read in c ontext and construe d acc ording to the rules of
g rammar and common usag e.”) (empha sis added)

. The contex t of i t s use wit hin section 418.176, subsection (a ), re flec ts leg islative intent that the phrase “of the [emerg ency response ] provider [or providers]” in para g raph (3) modify “list or compilation” rathe r than “pag er or telephone numbers.”

3As the Attorney Gene ral observe s, eac h of the prec eding para g raphs of subsection (a)

ref ers to information that would be utiliz ed by an emer g ency response provider in “p reventing, detec ting, responding to, or investiga t i ng an act of terror ism or rela ted criminal activity .” Parag raph (1) protec ts information rela ting to “the staffing require ments of an emer g ency response provider,” while para g raph (2) protec ts information rela ting to “a tactica l plan of the provider.” The leg islature’s evident focus in th es e provisions is information that emer g ency response providers utiliz e in combating terror ism rathe r than simply information about emer g ency response providers that someone c ould utili ze to that end.

The Attorney Gene ral’s i n t erpr etation of para g raph (3) is consistent with the
structure of the prec eding para g raph s and the policies they ref lect—par ag raph (3) protec ts an

emer g ency response provider’ s “list or compilation” of pag er or telephone numbers that it would use in combating terror ism. The Boa rd’s interpre tation—para g raph (3) protec ts an emer g ency response provider’ s own pag er or telephone numbers that are put into a list or compiled by someone other than

an emer g ency response provider—w ould not be consistent with th e s tr u c ture and policies of the other
para g raphs. Also, if the leg islature intended such numbers to be protec ted, it presumably would have said so more direc tly and clea rly —e.g ., just stating that “an emer g ency response provider’ s pag er or telephone numbe r” is conf idential—instead of e mphasizi ng a “list or compilation” of numbers. This analy sis neg ates the centr al premise of the Boa rd’s claim of confide ntiality , and
I would re v erse the district court’s judgme nt on this g round rathe r than rely ing on the majority ’s theory that “eme rg ency response providers” are solely ag encie s and not individuals. I question the majority ’s conclusions that o n l y an age ncy and not an individual would possess or utiliz e the

4“tac tical plan” ref ere nced in para g raph (2) or “list or compilation” ref ere nced in paragra p h (3 ), althoug h I ag ree that “staff ing require ments” in para g raph (1) may imply some sort of entity

. Also, while I further ag ree with the majority that ejusdem generis may g ive g uidance reg arding the scope of “eme rg ency response provider,” it is not clea r to me, considering section 418.176, subsection (a) ,

as a whole, t hat the leg islature’s ref ere nces to “a law enfor ceme nt ag ency , a fire- fig hting ag ency ,

or an emer g ency service s ag ency ” in para g raph (1) wer e intended to exclude in d i v i d u al s from “[emerg ency response ] provider” as used in the succe eding para g raphs, as opposed to illust rating the
sorts of service s that an “eme rg ency response provider” would provide. See also Dawkins v. Mey er , 825 S.W

. 2 d 444, 447 (Tex. 1992) (“U ltimately , the g oal of ever y rule of construction, including the rule of ejusdem generis , is to deter mine the intent of those who wrote the words in question. The rule of ejusdem generis can, there fore , only be used as an aid in asce rtaining the intended cover ag e of [ the provisi on], not to subvert that intent once a scer tained.”) . I n any event, I would decide this

case on the g round I

have a ddresse d above a

nd not rea ch this issue.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice
Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Filed: F ebrua

ry 3, 2010

5