UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ MATTHEW WURM, Pl aintiff - Appellant,

v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
De fendant - Appellee. No. 20-3126 (D.C. No. 2:18- CV-02322-HLT) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HOLMES , BACHARACH , and MCHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ This is a product liab ility case. Mr. Matthew Wurm was riding in a Ford truck when it crashed and rolled over, resulting in se rious injuries. He sued Ford for a design defect and proffered testimony by two expert witnesses. One expert attributed the injuries to a crushed roof, and the other expert concluded that the truck’s roof had been defectively designed.

* Because oral argument would not materially help us decide the appeal, we base our decision on the briefs and appendix. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment does not co nstitute binding pr ecedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgmen t may be cited for its persuasi ve value if otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 13, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 In response, Ford denied a design defect, arguing that the force of the collision had caused Mr. Wurm to “div e” into the roof, which led to his injuries. Based on this ar gument, Ford moved for exclusion of the expert testimony and an award of summary j udgment. The district court granted both motions. Mr. Wurm challenges the rulings, and we affirm. Mr. Wurm hasn’t adequately developed an argument that either ruling was wrong. Even without such an ar gument, however, we have independently reviewed the rulings and detect no error.
1. Mr. Wurm proffered opinion testim ony by two expert witnesses, and the district co urt excluded both. To support his allegation s, Mr. Wurm re tained two expe rt witnesses: Shawn Parcells and David McLellan. Ford moved to exclude their opinion testimony based on inadequate qualifications. First, Mr. Wurm proffered expert testimony by Mr. Pa rcells, who had participated in autopsies while wo rking as a pathology assistant; Mr. Parcells was to testify th at Mr. Wurm’s injuries had been consistent with a “roof crush” injury (caused by a design defect) rather than a “dive” injury (caused by the driver’s or passenger’s negligen ce). This testimony called for expertise in the cause of injury (biomechanics), rec onstruction of Mr. Wurm’s movements after the crash (occ upant kinematics), and the risk of injury in an auto accident (epidemiol ogy). The district court excluded Mr.3 Parcells’s testimony, reasoning that he lacked the qualifications required for expert opinions in these fields. Second, Mr. Wurm proffered expe rt testimony by Mr. McLellan, a mechanical engineer who had worked as a chief engineer at General Motors. He was to testif y about a design defect in the truck’s roof. The district court concluded that Mr. McLellan had lacked the required qualifications and used an unreliable methodology. Though Mr. McLellan had ex pertise in car design, the district court found that he lack ed expertise on truc k design, vehicle roof design, or rollover testing. The co urt also questioned his methodology. Mr. McLellan had relied on a 2005 Exponent Roof Crus h Test perf ormed on a later model of the truck, which contained a cab th at was longer than the cab on the truck involved in the accident. Mr. McLellan observed that the truck at issue and the trucks being tested had collapsed into similar V shapes. But Mr. McLellan did not explain how or why the V-shaped collapses had proven design defects. Nor could he compare the for ce involved in Mr. Wurm’s crash with the force involved in the tests. Based on the lack of relevant qualifica tions and a reliable methodology, the district court ex cluded Mr. McLe llan’s testimony.4 2. The district court awarded summary judgment to Ford. With exclusion of both expert witnesses, Mr. Wurm lacked any evidence of causation or a design de fect. With no such evidence, he conceded that the expert testimony was “integral to any possibility of recovery.” Appellant’s A pp’x vol. X, at 1242. Th e district court thus granted summary j udgment to Ford.
3. Mr. Wurm waived an appellate challenge based on inadequate briefing in his opening brief. An opening brief must identify the “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to th e authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8) (A). Issues not raised or inadequately presented in an appella nt’s opening brief are considered waived. See Burke v. Regalado , 935 F.3d 960, 1014 (10th Cir. 2019). In his opening brief, Mr. Wurm does not expl ain how the district court erred in excluding the two expert witnesses or in granting summary judgment. In a “statement of applicab le law,” Mr. Wurm asserts eight legal propositions:
1. A “pattern of injury” should be consid ered a viable method to prove the mechanics of an injury.
2. In another case, a court allowed opinion testimony from an expert witness who had experience in “forensic biomechanics occupant kinematics.”5 3. Expert testimony must be relevant and reliable.
4. Expert witnesses should not be allowed to testify if they lack qualifications in the relevant field.
5. Kansas’s pattern jury instructions provide that when two expert witnesses have the required expertise but differ in their credentials, th e jury should be allowed to weigh the expert testimony.
6. Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc ., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), an expert wi tness can testify regarding an alternative design withou t constructing a model.
7. A duty to warn may arise after the sale took place.
8. An expert opinion on caus ation need not involve a “scientific absolute.” Appellant’s Opening Br . at 7–11. Mr. Wu rm then provi des a factual statement, recites the standard of review, and says how a defective condition can be proven under Kansas law. Though Mr. Wurm assert s eight legal propositions , provides a factual statement, recites the standard of re view, and says how he could prove a defective condition, he never states in his opening brie f how the district court erred in excluding the two expert witnesses or in granting summary judgment. He thus waived all i ssues in his op ening brief.
4. Mr. Wurm’s new arguments in hi s reply brief are too late and inadequately developed. In his reply brief, Mr. Wurm

 argues that the exclusion of the expert testimony violated his Seventh Amendmen t right to a ju ry trial and6  urges application of the purported “gimlet eye test” from Lee v. Max International, LLC , 638 F.3d 1318 ( 10th Cir. 2011). This argument bears three defects. Mr. Wurm rais ed the argument for the first time in hi s reply brief, which was too late. Anderson v. Spirit Aerosystems Holdings, Inc. , 827 F.3d 1229, 1236 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016). And he does not say

 how exclusion of expert testimony violated the Seventh Amendment or

 what the “gimlet eye test” is or how it applies. For these reasons, we decline to consid er this new, inadequately developed argument.
5. After independently evaluating the rulings, we see no error. We ordinarily “decline to reach the merits of waived issues.” See United States v. Walker , 918 F.3d 1134, 1151 (10th Cir. 2019). But “even when a party waives an issue, our pre cedent affords us ‘d iscretion to raise and decide issues sua s ponte, even for th e purposes of reversing a lowercourt judgment,’ because ‘[w]aiver . . . binds on ly the part y, not the
court.’” Margheim v. Buljko , 855 F.3d 1077, 1088 (10th Cir. 2017) (alterations in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo.
v. Moser , 747 F.3d 814, 837 (10th Cir. 2014)). This Court will “revers[e] sua sponte only when the circ umstances are exceptional.” United States v.
Tee , 881 F.3d 1258, 1269 (10t h Cir. 2018). This cas e does not present an extraordinary ci rcumstance to justify sua sponte reversal.7 A. The court didn’t err in ex cluding expert testimony. After independently reviewing the exclusion of expert testimony, we conclude that the district cour t acted within its discretion.
1. The abuse-of-discretio n standard applies. If Mr. Wurm had developed an argument on the exclusion of expert testimony, we would review fo r an abuse of discretion. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). The district court has “broad discretion . . . in decidi ng how to assess an expert ’s reliability, including what procedures to utili ze in making that assessme nt, as well as in making the ultimate determination of reliability.” Dodge v. Cotter Corp. , 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003). In applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, we consider whether the district court “present[ed] an explana tion for its choice suff icient to enable a reviewing court to dete rmine that it did not act thoughtlessly, but instead considered the factors relevant to its decision and in fact exercised its discretion.” HCG Platinum, LLC v. Prefe rred Prod. Placement Corp. , 873 F.3d 1191, 1203 (10th Ci r. 2017) (quoting Jewell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 508 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Ci r. 2007)). A court abuses its discretion when the ruling is “arbitrary, capricio us, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control , 165 F.3d 767, 777 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting FDIC v. Oldenburg , 34 F.3d 1529, 1555 (10th Cir. 1994)).8 2. The court acted with in its discretion. Mr. Parcells. The district court properly considered Mr. Parcells’s education and professiona l history in concluding that he lacked the required qualifications. His educati on reflected extensive study in life sciences, anatomy, and physiology; and his primary work experience involved autopsies. But Mr. Parcells has no professional license and is not a doctor, chiropractor, or engineer. The court thus acted reasonably in finding inadequate qualif ications in biomechanics, occupant kinematics, and epidemiology. Mr. McLellan. According to our precedents, a wi tness with general expertise on a particular subject ma tter does not necessa rily qualify to opine on issues requiring specific expertise. See Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc. , 275 F.3d 965, 970 (10th Ci r. 2001) (cautioning that possession of a medical degree “is not sufficient to permit a physician to testify concerning any medical-related issue”); Ho v. Michelin N. Am., Inc. 520 F. App’x 658, 663 (10t h Cir. 2013) (concluding th at the district court did not err in excluding opinion testim ony from an expert witness who had failed to tie general experience in the tire industry to the pertinent opinions). Mr. McLellan’s testimony involved opinions regarding the structure, design, and safety of the truck’s roof. But Mr. McLellan conceded that he had never9  worked on truck de sign or vehicle roof structures or

 performed intentional rollover tests. The district court thus acted within its discretion in concluding that Mr. McLellan lacked the required expe rtise for his opinion testimony. The district court also found four flaws in Mr. McLellan’s methodology. First, he didn’t explain how the 2005 Exponent Roof Crush Test had established a design defect . Second, he couldn’t compare the force in Mr. Wurm’s accident to the force invo lved in the 2005 test. Third, the 2005 test used a truck with a diff erently designed ca b. Finally, Mr. McLellan did not know the ro of strength of the tr uck at issue or how it compared to the roof strength of othe r trucks or to industry standards. Given Mr. McLellan’s la ck of relevant expe rtise and questionable methodology, we conclude that the court acted with in its discretion in excluding Mr. McLellan’s expert testimony.
B. We also uphold the grant of summary judgment to Ford. Following the exclusion of this op inion testimony, the district court properly granted summary judgmen t to Ford. Mr. Wurm had opposed summary judgment based so lely on expert testimony , and he didn’t identify a genuine dispute of material fact on ce his expert testimony was excluded. We thus see no error in th e award of summary judgment.10 6. Conclusion We affirm. The district court acted within its di scretion in excluding the expert testimony, and Mr. Wurm di d not argue in dist rict court or on appeal that he could avoid summar y judgment without expert testimony. The absence of expert testimony t hus required the award of summary judgment to Ford. Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge