In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 19, 2023

S22Y0631, S23Y0279. IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT MALLORY 

CRAWFORD (two cases).

PER CURIAM.

These disciplinary matters are before the Court seeking the 

disbarment of former Superior Court Judge Robert Mallory “Mack” 

Crawford (State Bar No. 194192), who has been a member of the Bar 

since 1987. Both of these matters arise from an incident in which 

Crawford obtained funds from the registry of the court on which he 

served as a judge, under circumstances that, according to the Bar, 

demonstrate that he was not entitled to the funds. In Case No. 

S22Y0631, Crawford is charged with a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) of 

the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), based on his 

first-offender Alford1 plea to a misdemeanor count of theft for his 

1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1969).
2

conduct in obtaining the registry funds. In Case No. S23Y0279, 

Crawford is charged with having violated the following provisions of 

the GRPC for his mishandling of client funds and dishonest conduct: 

Rules 1.5, 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (I) (c), 1.15 (I) (d), 1.15 (II) (a), 1.15 (II) (c), 

and 8.4 (a) (4). As explained more below, we impose a three-year 

suspension on the basis of Crawford’s violation of numerous GRPC in 

Case No. S23Y0279 and decline to consider the merits of Case No. 

S22Y0631.

I. Procedural History

Crawford was previously the subject of a judicial discipline 

proceeding, and the allegations in that proceeding regarding 

Crawford’s underlying conduct were largely the same as those at issue

here – namely, that Crawford “‘impermissibly convert[ed] money from 

the registry of the Superior Court of Pike County . . . when he ordered 

the Pike County Clerk via handwritten note to disburse $15,675.62 in 

funds from the court registry to him via check’ and ‘then cashed and 

used a portion of the check for his personal benefit and deposited the 

remainder of this money in his personal checking account.’” Inquiry 
3

Concerning Judge Crawford, 310 Ga. 403, 404 (851 SE2d 572) (2020).

In that matter, we ultimately declined to answer the question of 

whether clear and convincing evidence supported a finding that 

Crawford violated the Code of Judicial Conduct because Crawford 

voluntarily resigned his office.

Following his appointment to oversee the two instant matters, 

Special Master Adam M. Hames entered an order, with the agreement 

of the parties, consolidating the two proceedings and setting an 

evidentiary hearing. The hearing was held and the parties filed 

motions and briefs, after which the special master issued a report and 

recommendation. The special master’s report addressed and rejected 

several general legal objections raised by Crawford and provided 

findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each of these disciplinary 

matters, ultimately determining that the evidence established that 

Crawford had committed each of the charged violations of the GRPC

except Rule 1.5. The special master then conducted an extensive 

analysis of the appropriate discipline and recommended that Crawford 

be disbarred.
4

In the matter underlying Case No. S23Y0279, Crawford filed 

exceptions to the special master’s report, seeking review from the Bar’s 

Review Board. After the Bar filed a response, the Review Board issued 

its report and recommendation, in which it agreed with the special 

master’s analysis and conclusions, except the Review Board ultimately 

concluded that the appropriate discipline was a three-year suspension. 

Having now undertaken our own review of the record for Case No. 

S23Y0279, we also conclude that a three-year suspension is the 

appropriate discipline for that matter. Given that both of these 

matters arise from the same single course of misconduct, we see no 

reason to levy additional discipline based on the alleged violation of 

Rule 8.4 (a) (3) in Case No. S22Y0631 and therefore decline to consider 

the issues raised by Crawford concerning that matter. See generally

In the Matter of Morris, 302 Ga. 862, 864 n.3 (809 SE2d 799) (2018) 

(declining to reach question of whether attorney violated Rule 8.4 (a) 

(3) because attorney clearly violated a number of other Rules for which 

disbarment was an appropriate sanction). As a result, the discussion 
5

that follows is confined solely to the issues relevant to Case No. 

S23Y0279.

II. Special Master’s Recitation of the Underlying Facts

In his report, the special master laid out the underlying facts as 

follows. In August 2002, Crawford was hired by D.C. and B.W. to 

answer a summons in a foreclosure action seeking a writ of possession, 

which concerned a property that was titled to another individual, A.T. 

Crawford filed a complaint for redemption of a tax deed in the Pike 

County Superior Court on September 12, 2002. The next day, the court 

entered an order staying the writ of possession until a hearing could 

be held on the redemption complaint, but apparently, no hearing was 

ever held. In connection with the filing of the redemption action, 

Crawford deposited into the court’s registry $15,675.62 on behalf of 

D.C. and B.W. The $15,675.62 was composed of a $9,675.62 overage 

collected by the tax commissioner at the tax sale and cash provided by 

D.C. Although Crawford acknowledged at the hearing before the 

special master that there was an unresolved issue regarding whether 

the overage funds belonged to A.T. or D.C., Crawford signed the 
6

receipt for the overage funds as A.T.’s “attorney-in-fact,” apparently 

because D.C. presented Crawford with a power of attorney from A.T.,

although Crawford did not represent A.T.

Crawford did not have a written fee agreement with D.C. or B.W., 

but he maintained that he had an oral agreement with D.C. to the 

effect that, if Crawford kept D.C. from being removed from the 

property during D.C.’s life, Crawford could keep the money in the 

court’s registry as his fee. Crawford rarely had fee agreements with 

clients and would not get paid until after his work had been completed, 

if he got paid at all; if, after completion of his work, Crawford and a

client could not agree on a fee, Crawford would simply move on and 

forget about being paid for his work. Crawford was not paid anything 

for his work for D.C. and in fact paid D.C.’s filing fees. Crawford 

believed that, had the property been redeemed during D.C.’s life, they 

would have worked out a fee. 

D.C. died in April 2004, and Crawford reached out to D.C.’s

brother about the funds in the registry, but D.C.’s brother apparently 

did not want anything to do with matters concerning D.C. In 
7

September 2005, Crawford filed a motion seeking the appointment of 

a special master in the redemption action and listing B.W. as the 

executrix of D.C.’s estate. Crawford did not assert an interest in the 

registry funds as a fee at that time.

In November 2009, a judge of the superior court entered an order 

dismissing the redemption complaint for want of prosecution and 

directing the clerk of court to pay the registry funds to the redemption 

plaintiffs upon their submission to the clerk of the certificate required 

by then-Rule 19 (now Rule 23) of the Uniform Superior Court Rules 

(“USCR”).2 Crawford consented to the dismissal order without 

2 This Rule provided that “[u]pon any order being presented to a judge 

requiring the court clerk to pay out funds from the registry of the court, except in 

garnishment proceedings, counsel for the parties presenting the order shall at 

the same time submit to the court” a certificate formatted as follows:

I hereby certify that the order presented in case no. ____ on this the 

______ day of ____________, 20__, to draw down funds from the 

registry of court, is done with written consent of all parties, or their 

counsel, who have filed claims of record in this case, and whose 

interest has not previously been foreclosed by judicial decree. In 

condemnation matters only, I further certify that provision is made 

in this order for the payment of all local, state and federal 

government taxes, or assessments of record. 
8

speaking with B.W. and, again, did not assert at that time that he was 

owed any of the registry funds as a fee. 

The clerk of the superior court, Linda Williams, initially 

attempted to send the registry funds to B.W. or to someone on D.C.’s 

behalf, as she believed that the funds belonged to them, but she was 

apparently unable to find them. In 2017, Williams spoke to Crawford, 

who was by then a judge on the superior court, about what to do with 

the registry funds. The special master recounted that Williams 

initially testified that, although she was not sure, she thought it had 

been her idea to give the funds to Crawford. However, when Williams 

was presented with testimony that she had given in connection with 

the Judicial Qualifications Commission (“JQC”) proceeding to the 

effect that it had been Crawford’s idea to give him the money, she 

acknowledged that her prior statement had been truthful but stated 

I understand that the truth of the statements contained in this 

certificate is a condition precedent to the issuance of a valid order to 

pay the funds from the registry of the court. 

Date __________________________________ 

Signed ________________________________ 

Attorney for ___________________________
9

that she simply did not remember at the time of these proceedings the 

particular details of her testimony in connection with the JQC matter.

3

In any event, Williams stated that Crawford had not ordered her to 

give him the funds. Williams considered sending the registry funds to 

the Department of Revenue as unclaimed, and Crawford asked her, if 

she were to do so, to list him as a claimant. Williams stated that this 

was the first time that she could recall Crawford telling her that he 

was entitled to any of the registry funds.

On December 11, 2017, Williams issued to Crawford a check for 

the full amount of the registry funds. Of those funds, $10,000 was 

deposited into Crawford’s personal bank account, which was, at that 

time, overdrawn by $2,232.21. Crawford took the remaining $5,675.62,

and he admitted at the hearing before the special master that he used 

that money for personal purposes. Thereafter, Crawford was contacted 

3 The special master stated that he did not find Williams’s testimony to be 

“particularly helpful,” as it appeared clear to him that she did not wish to harm 

Crawford, with whom she had apparently been friends for more than 30 years. 

The special master “did not get the impression that Ms. Williams was attempting 

to be deceitful,” instead stating that “a passage of time, personal tragedy, and a 

desire not to hurt a friend created gaps and shade in her memory.”
10

about the matter by the JQC, and, as a result of that conversation, he 

raised and returned the money in February 2018. The special master 

noted that Crawford acknowledged at the hearing that, in having the 

funds removed from the registry, he had not complied with the judge’s 

2009 order to file a certificate in compliance with the USCR, but he 

claimed that he had taken money out of the registry without a 

certificate before, presumably in other cases.

4

On the same day Crawford received a check for the registry 

funds, Crawford gave Williams unsigned, handwritten notes to 

include in the file but not to be stamped in on the docket. Crawford 

acknowledged at the hearing that he wrote these notes and stated that 

they were put into the file on the day he received the registry funds for 

the purpose of establishing a “roadmap” of what had happened to the 

funds. The notes included a brief procedural history of the redemption 

case, a recitation of Williams’s actions in attempting to contact the 

case plaintiffs, an acknowledgement of D.C.’s death, and an assertion 

4 Crawford also asserted at the hearing that, in his experience, the clerk 

had a legal right to pay whomever she chose to pay, even in contradiction of a 

court order, and that this was done “all the time.”
11

that Williams would have paid the funds in 2009. The last two items 

in the notes stated that: (1) “[t]he funds are being returned to Robert 

M. Crawford,” followed by two words that were crossed out but 

appeared to the special master to have been “to make”; and (2) “[t]hese 

notes cannot be filed in the case since the case has been closed for 8 

years, they are to be placed in the file but not recorded.” The special 

master pointed out that the notes were not signed, did not include any 

mention of the funds representing an earned attorney fee for 

Crawford, and did not otherwise comply with the certification 

requirement for the withdrawal of funds under what is now USCR 23.

III. Crawford’s General Legal Objections

In the proceedings before the special master, Crawford raised a 

number of legal objections that did not concern the specific allegations 

of his violations of the GRPC, but instead concerned issues regarding 

the general propriety of the disciplinary proceedings. The first of these 

issues concerned Crawford’s request for a jury trial of this matter. In 

rejecting this argument, the special master correctly recognized that 

he was bound to follow the precedent set by this Court in cases such 
12

as In the Matter of Jefferson, 307 Ga. 50 (834 SE2d 73) (2019), which 

rejected a similar request for a jury trial. In his exceptions to the 

special master’s report, Crawford argued this issue at length and 

urged that this Court should reconsider its case law on this point. We 

decline the invitation to do so.

The next two issues were raised by Crawford in the alternative: 

(1) whether the Bar, the special master, and this Court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over this matter because Crawford was a sitting 

judge at the time of the alleged misconduct and the JQC, which has 

exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline of judges, had already 

prosecuted the matter; and (2) whether this matter was barred by res 

judicata because of the prior JQC proceeding brought against him. As 

to the question of subject-matter jurisdiction, after reviewing the 

pertinent law, the respective scope of the jurisdictions of the JQC and 

the Bar, and the authority of this Court to govern the practice of law 

in Georgia, the special master determined that there was no subjectmatter jurisdiction problem, as the record showed that Crawford 

claimed that he did not overtly use his position as a judge to commit 
13

the acts constituting the alleged misconduct; that he was, at the time

of his misconduct, a member of the Bar as well as a sitting superior 

court judge; and that he believed that he was acting in his capacity as 

an attorney in committing the acts at issue. We agree that, even to the 

extent that the Bar lacks the authority to discipline a judge who is also 

an attorney for conduct that was clearly committed in his judicial 

capacity, under the particular facts here, where Crawford’s alleged 

misconduct occurred in his capacity as a private attorney, and not as 

a judge, there is no basis for concluding that there was a subjectmatter jurisdiction problem as to the Bar’s attorney disciplinary 

proceedings here.

With regard to res judicata, the special master recounted that 

Crawford argued that res judicata applied to preclude the Bar’s ability 

to bring this matter because both the JQC matter and this matter 

concern the same underlying acts and omissions; the JQC investigated 

the matter and made a recommendation to this Court; and this Court 

ruled on that recommendation. After reciting law concerning the 
14

application of res judicata,5 the special master recounted that the JQC 

complaint alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 

specifically, of Rule 1.1, which requires that judges respect and comply 

with the law, and Rule 1.3, which requires that judges not use the 

prestige of their office to advance their private interests or those of 

others. The special master then concluded that Crawford had failed to 

establish that there was an identity of the causes of action between 

this matter and the JQC matter, given that this matter concerns

alleged violations of the GRPC, which were not and could not have 

been before the JQC, and that this matter would require the Bar to 

offer facts proving numerous allegations that were not at issue in the 

JQC proceeding, such as that Crawford mishandled client funds as 

proscribed by the GRPC.

5 As we have previously explained, “the doctrine of res judicata prevents 

the re-litigation of all claims which have already been adjudicated, or which could 

have been adjudicated, between identical parties or their privies in identical 

causes of action,” and “three prerequisites must be satisfied before res judicata 

applies – (1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their 

privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent 

jurisdiction.” Rockdale County v. U.S. Enterprises, Inc., 312 Ga. 752, 758 (865 

SE2d 135) (2021) (cleaned up).
15

We have not previously addressed the res judicata effect of a prior 

JQC proceeding on a subsequent attorney discipline proceeding such 

as this. But we can assume (without deciding) that res judicata 

applies to a disciplinary proceeding like this one, because we agree 

that, under these circumstances, res judicata does not bar this 

disciplinary proceeding. “‘Cause of action’” is “‘the entire set of facts 

which give rise to an enforceable claim’ . . . with special attention given 

to the ‘wrong’ alleged.” Coen v. CDC Software Corp., 304 Ga. 105, 112

(816 SE2d 670) (2018) (citation omitted). The special master correctly 

concluded that there was not an identity of the causes of actions 

between this matter and the JQC matter because (1) the violations of 

the Code of Judicial Conduct charged in the JQC matter involved 

alleged wrongs – specifically, that Crawford failed to respect and 

comply with the law and that he used the prestige of his office to 

advance his private interests – that were different from those alleged 

in this matter; and (2) there were many facts that the Bar was 

required to prove in this matter that were not required to be proved in 

the JQC matter. Thus, regardless of whether the Bar and the JQC are 
16

privies and whether the resolution of the prior JQC matter constituted 

an adjudication on the merits, the Bar was not prevented by res 

judicata from seeking to discipline Crawford.

The special master also addressed Crawford’s assertion that this 

matter was time-barred under Bar Rule 4-222 (b). With regard to that 

claim, the special master reviewed the record and concluded that this

matter complied with Bar Rule 4-222 (b) and thus denied Crawford’s 

motion to dismiss on that basis. Crawford’s final objection was styled 

as an equal protection argument, which the special master determined 

was a species of a selective prosecution claim. The special master 

rejected that argument because Crawford failed to develop a factual 

record in support of such a claim. Crawford did not renew his 

argument as to either of these final two issues in any of his filings 

following the issuance of the special master’s report, such that they 

appear to have been abandoned. In any event, we agree with the 

special master’s resolution of these issues.

IV. Disciplinary Analysis by Special Master and Review Board
17

The special master began by addressing whether the Bar had 

adequately demonstrated that Crawford’s conduct violated Rule 1.5.6

In making this determination, the special master first considered the 

plausibility of Crawford’s story that he was entitled to the funds as an 

earned fee for his work on behalf of D.C. The special master 

acknowledged Crawford’s testimony that he was generally not paid a 

fee until work was completed for a client, that written fee agreements 

were uncommon in his practice, and that he would not collect any fee 

if he and a client could not reach an agreement on a fee. Nevertheless, 

the special master concluded that no reasonable attorney who believes 

that he has earned a $15,000 fee would allow that fee to sit in the 

registry of the court for nearly 14 years without claiming those funds 

or at least attempting to assert an interest in them.

The special master reasoned that if Crawford had an agreement 

with D.C. that, if Crawford were able to keep D.C. on the property 

until D.C. died, the registry funds would be Crawford’s as a fee (as 

6 Rule 1.5 makes it a violation for a lawyer to “make an agreement for, 

charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”
18

Crawford asserted during the hearing before the special master), then

the time to claim that fee was upon D.C.’s death. The special master 

noted, however, that Crawford did not attempt to claim or assert any 

interest in the funds in 2004 when D.C. died, in 2005 when Crawford 

filed a motion seeking the appointment of a special master in the 

redemption action, or in 2009 when a judge of the superior court 

entered an order dismissing the redemption complaint for want of 

prosecution and directing the clerk of court to pay the registry funds 

to the redemption plaintiffs. Instead, at the earliest, Crawford did not 

assert an interest in the registry funds until 2017, when Williams 

informed him that she planned to escheat the funds to the Department 

of Revenue. Nevertheless, the special master concluded that, because 

there was not sufficient evidence in the record to determine whether, 

to the extent that the registry funds may have constituted a fee, such 

a fee was unreasonable, the Bar had failed to demonstrate by clear 

and convincing evidence that Crawford had violated Rule 1.5.
19

As to the various alleged violations of Rules 1.15 (I) and (II),7 the 

special master stated that they were premised on the facts that 

Crawford took the funds from the registry, placing them in his 

7 Rule 1.15 (I) (a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall hold 

funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer’s 

possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own 

funds or other property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts 

maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1).” Rule 

1.15 (I) (c) provides that “[u]pon receiving funds or other property in which a 

client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or 

third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by 

agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third 

person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to 

receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a 

full accounting regarding such property.” Rule 1.15 (I) (d) provides that “[w]hen 

in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property 

in which both the lawyer and a client or third person claim interest, the property 

shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance 

of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the 

portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is 

resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or 

property as to which the interests are not in dispute.” Rule 1.15 (II) (a) provides 

that “[e]very lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices 

as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional 

corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any 

other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust 

accounts as required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and 

all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in 

and administered from a trust account.” Rule 1.15 (II) (c) requires, in pertinent 

part, that “[a]ll client’s funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account 

at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interestbearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution.” The maximum sanction for 

a single violation of Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (I) (c), 1.15 (I) (d), and 1.15 (II) (a) is 

disbarment. The maximum sanction for a single violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a 

public reprimand.
20

personal account and using them for his personal purposes. Although 

the special master acknowledged that Crawford asserted that the 

funds constituted an earned fee, he reiterated his conclusion that the 

record did not support such an assertion, as the only evidence that 

Crawford was entitled to the funds was Crawford’s own post hoc 

statement, which was supported by no other evidence. The special 

master further noted that, even to the extent that Crawford believed 

that he had a fee agreement with D.C. that may have entitled him to 

some of the registry funds, Crawford acknowledged that there was 

uncertainty regarding whether a substantial portion of the funds had 

even belonged to D.C. in the first place, but that Crawford failed to 

seek a judicial determination to resolve that question.

The special master thus concluded that clear and convincing 

evidence showed that Crawford violated Rule 1.15 (I) (a) by failing to 

hold the funds of his client separate from his own funds in an approved 

institution; violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing, upon receipt of the 

funds from the registry, to notify and promptly deliver those funds to 

the client; violated Rule 1.15 (I) (d) by keeping funds in which, 
21

arguably, both he and his client had an interest and by failing to keep 

those funds separate until there had been an accounting; violated Rule 

1.15 (II) (a) by failing to hold the funds of his client in a trust account 

and to administer those funds from that trust account; and violated 

Rule 1.15 (II) (c) by failing to place his client’s funds in an interestbearing account at an approved institution.

Finally, the special master considered whether Crawford had 

violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4).8 The Bar had alleged five bases for such a 

violation: (1) that Crawford had falsely told Williams that he was 

entitled to the funds; (2) that he had falsely stated that Williams had 

urged him to take the funds; (3) that he had acquired the funds 

without complying with the 2009 superior court order or with the 

relevant provision of the USCR; (4) that he had used his judicial office 

to acquire the funds; and (5) that he had acquired the funds without 

notifying his client or delivering the funds to his client. The special 

8 Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides that “[i]t shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules 

of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in professional conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” The maximum 

sanction for a single violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment.
22

master concluded that the Bar failed to demonstrate that Crawford 

used his judicial office to obtain the funds, noting that, although there 

was a “stench around this transaction” and Crawford’s position likely 

helped to enable the transaction, his actions were done as a private 

attorney and he had not compelled Williams to turn over the funds.

However, the special master concluded that clear and convincing 

evidence did support the Bar’s remaining allegations. The special 

master found that Crawford used deceit and misrepresentation in 

telling Williams that he was entitled to the registry funds, as Crawford

conceded at the hearing that it was not clear whether he would have 

been entitled to the $9,675.62 overage from the tax sale, which was 

made out to A.T., not D.C. The special master noted that Crawford was 

experiencing financial difficulties at the time he obtained the registry 

funds and expressly found his explanation denying such difficulties 

not credible. As to Crawford’s representation that Williams had urged 

him to take the funds, the special master found that Williams’s 

seemingly favorable testimony on this point in these proceedings was 

undercut by her previous conflicting testimony before the JQC, her 
23

failure to give Crawford the funds in 2009 after the superior court’s 

order was entered, and her attempts to find B.W. over the years. The 

special master determined that Crawford’s inclusion in the file of the 

handwritten notes that Crawford gave to Williams to place in the case 

file, purportedly for the purpose of establishing a “roadmap” of what 

had happened to the funds, did not demonstrate good faith on 

Crawford’s part but instead demonstrated that Williams wanted to at 

least have something in the file showing some attempt to comply with 

the court’s order.

The special master then concluded that Crawford engaged in 

deceit when he acquired the funds without complying with the 

superior court’s 2009 order or the USCR. Crawford admitted that he 

did not comply with the certification requirement, and the special 

master was unmoved by his explanation that he had taken money from 

the registry before without the required certificate, noting that this 

was in clear violation of the USCR. The special master further noted 

that Crawford could not have complied with the relevant rule and 

removed the funds for himself, as he knew that other people had an 
24

arguable claim to at least a substantial portion of the funds. As to the 

final allegation, regarding Crawford’s failure to notify his client, the 

special master acknowledged that D.C. had died in 2004 and that 

Crawford maintained that he had been unable to contact B.W., but 

nevertheless concluded that Crawford knew that others had at least 

an arguable claim to the funds and that Crawford eschewed seeking a 

judicial determination on the question of ownership of the funds, 

which would have allowed for delivery to clients of any funds to which 

they were entitled, and instead used deceit and misrepresentation to 

claim the funds for himself.

The special master then undertook the analysis regarding the 

appropriate level of discipline. The special master considered the ABA 

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992), see In the Matter of 

Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996), noting that the ABA 

Standards require consideration of the ethical duty violated; the 

lawyer’s mental state; the actual or potential injury caused by the 

lawyer’s conduct; and the existence of aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances. See ABA Standard 3.0. The special master concluded 
25

that Crawford violated a duty to his clients and the legal profession; 

that he acted knowingly and showed no remorse; and that, although 

he returned the funds to the registry, the potential injury could have 

been severe. The special master noted that, under the ABA standards, 

disbarment is generally appropriate “when a lawyer knowingly 

converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a 

client,” ABA Standard 4.11; “engages in any other intentional conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that 

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice,” ABA 

Standard 5.11 (b); or “knowingly violates a court order or rule with the 

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer,” ABA Standard 6.21.

In aggravation of discipline, the special master found that the 

record supported the conclusion that Crawford had a dishonest and 

selfish motive, see ABA Standard 9.22 (b); that he has refused to 

acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, see ABA Standard 

9.22 (g); that the victims of his conduct – D.C., B.W., and A.T. – were 

vulnerable, see ABA Standard 9.22 (h); that he has substantial 

experience with the law, see ABA Standard 9.22 (i), a factor which the 
26

special master found to weigh particularly heavily against Crawford, 

especially given Crawford’s service as a judge, see In the Matter of 

Blitch, 288 Ga. 690, 692 (706 SE2d 461) (2011) (noting that “a judge 

occupies a unique and crucial position of power, trust and 

responsibility in our society” and that Blitch’s conviction for felony 

Honest Services Fraud Conspiracy “deal[t] a serious blow to the 

public’s confidence in the legal system and, given his position as a 

judicial officer, his admitted violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) warrant[ed] a 

severe level of discipline”); and that he broke the law, see ABA 

Standard 9.22 (k), another factor that the special master found 

weighed heavily against him.

In mitigation, the special master noted that Crawford had no 

prior disciplinary history, see ABA Standard 9.32 (a), and that he 

made a timely, good faith effort to make restitution,9 see ABA 

9 The Bar argued below that the special master improperly credited 

Crawford’s restitution of the registry funds as mitigating evidence, contending

that the record showed that restitution was only made after the initiation of the 

JQC proceedings and at the behest of the JQC. See In the Matter of Brantley, 311 

Ga. 61, 65 (855 SE2d 625) (2021) (stating that “[t]he fact that [Brantley] has made 

restitution carries no mitigating weight given that she did so only after the 
27

Standard 9.32 (d). The special master acknowledged that, at the time 

of the alleged misconduct, Crawford was experiencing financial 

difficulties, see ABA Standard 9.32 (c) (personal or emotional problems 

are mitigating), but he concluded that this fact simply provided an 

explanation for Crawford’s conduct but did not mitigate its 

seriousness. The special master also stated that, in light of Crawford’s 

extensive record of public service, his character or reputation should 

have been mitigating, see ABA Standard 9.32 (g), but he noted that 

there was no evidence of Crawford’s good character in the record, such 

that there was no mitigation on that basis.10

The special master then considered and rejected three further

arguments raised by Crawford, by which Crawford sought to mitigate 

initiation of disciplinary proceedings”); In the Matter of Hunt, 304 Ga. 635, 641-

642 (820 SE2d 716) (2018) (noting that restitution was not mitigating because it 

had been ordered by a judge and citing ABA Standard 9.4 (a), which provides that 

forced or compelled restitution is neither aggravating nor mitigating). Because

we conclude that a three-year suspension is the appropriate discipline in this 

matter regardless of whether this mitigating factor was properly credited in 

Crawford’s favor, we pretermit the question in this matter.

10 The special master further determined that any delay in the disciplinary 

proceedings did not weigh in Crawford’s favor, see ABA Standard 9.32 (j), as any 

such delay was at least partly attributable to Crawford.
28

his culpability. As to Crawford’s argument that he “has already 

suffered enough,” ABA Standard 9.32 (k) (providing mitigation for the 

imposition of other penalties or sanctions), the special master noted 

that, in his criminal case, Crawford received a favorable plea deal, 

according to which he did not have to report to probation, pay a fine, 

or perform community service; he was treated as a first offender; and 

he was able to keep his pension. See also In the Matter of Levin, 289 

Ga. 170, 175 (709 SE2d 808) (2011) (noting that imposition of a 

criminal penalty is not mitigating). Although the initiation of the prior 

JQC proceeding led to Crawford’s resignation from the superior court 

bench, the special master noted that, by resigning, Crawford was able 

to avoid a final determination from this Court as to whether he 

impermissibly converted funds and concluded that, in any event, such 

a proceeding was not the type of sanction contemplated to be 

mitigating by this standard. See In the Matter of Tucker, 295 Ga. 357, 

358 (759 SE2d 854) (2014) (concluding that a suspension imposed by 

a federal bankruptcy court as a result of the same conduct involved in 
29

the disciplinary action does not qualify as a mitigating factor in 

determining the appropriate discipline).

Next, the special master considered Crawford’s argument that, 

in this Court’s prior opinion in the JQC matter, “the Supreme Court 

has already ruled that there may not be clear and convincing evidence 

in his actions.” We did not make any ruling on the merits in that 

opinion, but Crawford based this argument on our statement that “[i]t 

also seems clear that, while the evidence before the Hearing Panel 

likely was sufficient to support a finding that Crawford violated [Code 

of Judicial Conduct] Rule 1.1 by impermissibly converting the funds 

he obtained from the court registry under a preponderance of the 

evidence standard of proof, and perhaps even under the higher clear 

and convincing evidence standard, that is a close question; we note 

that the evidence on that issue certainly was not overwhelming.”

Crawford, 310 Ga. at 405. The special master rejected this argument, 

noting that the full record of the JQC proceedings was not before him 

and that he was making his decision based on the record established 

at these proceedings.
30

Concerning Crawford’s argument that “other attorneys have

committed far more heinous crimes and not been disbarred” (as the 

special master characterized it), the special master acknowledged that 

Crawford had submitted a “databank” of supporting case authorities, 

but the special master found those distinguishable, in that Crawford’s 

actions directly concerned his fitness to practice law; only one of the 

cases Crawford cited involved harm to a client or other party in a legal 

proceeding, such as Crawford’s misappropriation of client funds; and, 

in most of the cited cases, the attorney had expressed remorse for his 

actions. Accordingly, the special master recommended that Crawford 

be disbarred.

Crawford filed a request for review by the Review Board, and the 

Bar filed its response. The Review Board then issued its report and 

recommendation. The Review Board first considered the special 

master’s findings of fact and determined that the findings were 

supported by the record and that Crawford had failed to demonstrate 

that the findings were clearly erroneous or manifestly in error. The 

Review Board thus adopted the special master’s findings. With regard 
31

to the special master’s conclusions of law as to the specific alleged 

Rules’ violations, the Review Board stated, as to each alleged violation, 

that based on the findings of fact, it agreed with the special master’s 

conclusion that the Rules in question had been violated. In reviewing 

the special master’s conclusion that Rule 1.15 (I) (c) had been violated, 

the Review Board specifically noted that Crawford had argued that 

some or all of the funds had been a fee for work for which he had 

otherwise not been compensated, but the Review Board rejected that 

argument, determining that, had that been the case, Crawford could 

have sought declaratory or other relief in a proper court proceeding, 

rather than simply directing that the funds be turned over to him. The 

Review Board also agreed with and adopted the special master’s 

analysis regarding the legal duties Crawford violated, Crawford’s

mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by his misconduct, 

and the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. However, the 

Review Board agreed with Crawford that a lesser sanction was 

appropriate, and it recommended that Crawford instead receive a 

three-year suspension of his license to practice law.
32

V. Our Review of This Matter

The resolution of this matter ultimately turns on the answers to

two questions: was Crawford entitled to the funds that he obtained 

from the court registry, based on a fee agreement with a long-deceased 

client, and, if he was not, what is the proper discipline for his 

misconduct? As to the first question: if our job were to review the 

record de novo, some of us might have come to a different conclusion 

than did the special master. But we have recently reiterated that

“because this Court recognizes that the special master is in the best 

position to determine the witnesses’ credibility, it generally defers to 

the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the special 

master unless those findings or determinations are clearly erroneous.” 

In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. 409, 416 (877 SE2d 248) (2022). See 

also Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10, 13 (727 SE2d 112) (2012) (noting that, 

“[i]n Georgia, it is well-settled that the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard for 

reviewing findings of fact is equivalent to the highly deferential ‘any 
33

evidence’ test”).11 Here, the special master unquestionably made a 

finding that Crawford’s story regarding his alleged fee agreement with 

D.C. “does not make sense and is not credible.” And we cannot say that 

this credibility finding was clearly erroneous: it was based on some 

evidence, most notably the facts that the funds were allowed to sit in 

the registry of the court for nearly 14 years after D.C.’s death without 

Crawford attempting to claim or otherwise assert an interest in the 

funds; that Crawford reached out to D.C.’s brother about the funds in 

the registry; that Crawford made no attempt to assert an interest in 

the funds until told by Williams that she intended to escheat them to 

the State; that his personal bank account was overdrawn at the time 

Crawford was issued a check for the registry funds; and that the 

handwritten notes that Crawford gave to Williams to place in the case 

file did not mention an attorney fee.

11 As we recently explained, there are caveats to this general standard, 

particularly when our review of the record indicates that the special master’s 

“rendition of the facts was incomplete in significant ways,” omitting numerous 

undisputed, relevant facts. In the Matter of Tuggle, Case Nos. S23Y0500 & 

S23Y0501, slip op. at 8 (decided Sept. 6, 2023). Our review of the record here 

shows no such defect in the special master’s findings, so we apply the general 

standard.
34

Moreover, Crawford has not made a meaningful attempt to show 

that the special master’s conclusion was clearly erroneous. Instead, 

Crawford’s arguments have focused on faulting the Bar for failing to 

introduce any evidence to rebut his story and faulting the special 

master for refusing to credit his story. As to the former point, although 

the Bar is required to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence, 

see Bar Rule 4-221.2 (b), it is difficult to imagine what evidence the 

Bar could have presented that could have rebutted Crawford’s story 

that he had a purely oral fee agreement that was known only to him 

and to his long-deceased client; in any event, once the special master 

made a credibility finding on this point, our question on review in this 

case became whether the special master’s finding was clearly 

erroneous. With regard to the special master’s refusal to credit 

Crawford’s fee-agreement story, the special master expressly

acknowledged and considered Crawford’s account of what had 

transpired, and, in declining to credit Crawford’s story, made the sort 

of credibility determination that was within his province as the finder 

of fact. See generally Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 56 (440 SE2d 646) 
35

(1994) (noting that “[t]he trier of fact is not obligated to believe a 

witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or 

reject any portion of the testimony”).

Having reviewed the record and concluded that the special 

master did not clearly err in finding that Crawford did not have a fee 

agreement with D.C., such that he was not entitled to the registry 

funds, the next issue to be addressed in conducting this inquiry is to 

determine which Bar Rules Crawford has violated. As noted, the 

special master determined that the Bar had failed to sufficiently 

establish that Crawford had committed the charged violation of Rule 

1.5, and we cannot say under these circumstances that the special 

master erred in reaching that conclusion. With regard to the alleged 

violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (I) (c), 1.15 (I) (d), 1.15 (II) (a), and 

1.15 (II) (c), Crawford did not meaningfully challenge the special 

master’s conclusion that he had violated these Rules, other than by 

asserting that he was entitled to the registry funds as a result of the 

purported fee agreement with D.C. We thus agree with the special 
36

master’s conclusion that Crawford violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (I) 

(c), 1.15 (I) (d), 1.15 (II) (a), and 1.15 (II) (c).

Concerning the alleged violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4), as noted 

above, the Bar alleged five separate bases on which this Rule was 

supposedly violated. We question whether several of those bases are 

adequately supported by the facts and whether they sufficiently 

support a violation of this Rule, which, as we have previously held, is 

aimed at policing “‘conduct that is intended or likely to mislead 

another.’” In the Matter of Golub, 313 Ga. 686, 691 (872 SE2d 699) 

(2022) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, we conclude that the record 

supports the special master’s determination that Crawford violated 

Rule 8.4 (a) (4) when he falsely told Williams that he was entitled to 

the registry funds. However, we are still left with the question of the 

appropriate discipline to be imposed in this matter. Crawford, the Bar, 

the special master, and the Review Board have collectively cited a 

legion of cases on this point, but all of those cases are distinguishable

on one basis or another. Nevertheless, even though we must assess 

each case’s unique factors on a case-by-case basis, the sanctions 
37

imposed in prior, similar cases can be useful in establishing a baseline 

against which the facts of the instant matter can be compared. See In 

the Matter of Veach, 310 Ga. 470, 472 (851 SE2d 590) (2020) (noting 

favorably that a proposed suspension was “within the range of 

punishments that have been imposed by this Court for similar 

violations”).

In determining the appropriate level of discipline in this matter, 

we view it to be of particular importance that Crawford has engaged 

in only a single course of misconduct. We recently concluded in a 

matter concerning a single course of misconduct involving the 

misappropriation of client funds for personal use, violations of the 

provisions of the GRPC governing the use of trust accounts, and a 

violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4), that a two-year suspension was the 

appropriate discipline. See In the Matter of Morgan, 303 Ga. 678 (814 

SE2d 394) (2018). However, the matter in Morgan contained 

additional mitigating factors not present here and, more importantly, 

this matter contains additional aggravating factors not present in 

Morgan, namely that Crawford has not acknowledged the wrongful 
38

nature of his conduct and that the victims of his misconduct were 

vulnerable. 

Moreover, the special master found that the fact that Crawford 

broke the law weighed heavily against him as a factor in aggravation 

of discipline, and, although, as noted above, we have declined to reach 

the question of whether the alleged violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) charged 

in the matter underlying Case No. S22Y0631 provides an additional 

basis for discipline, we agree that the unlawful nature of Crawford’s 

conduct is aggravating. These facts suggest that a suspension longer 

than the two years imposed in Morgan is appropriate here, and three 

years is, generally, the longest suspension that we impose. See ABA 

Standard 2.3; In the Matter of Briley-Holmes, 304 Ga. 199, 207-208 

(815 SE2d 59) (2018). See also In the Matter of Favors, 283 Ga. 588 

(662 SE2d 119) (2008) (imposing a three-year suspension for a single 

course of misconduct involving the misappropriation of client funds for 

personal use and an attempt to dishonestly cover up the circumstances 

of the misconduct). Thus, although the special master recommended 

that Crawford be disbarred, we have reviewed the record as a whole
39

and conclude, as the Review Board also concluded, that—in light of 

the fact that Crawford’s violations of the GRPC, while serious, 

involved only a single course of misconduct—the next-most serious 

discipline that we generally impose, a three-year suspension, is the 

appropriate discipline here. Accordingly, we hereby order that 

Crawford be suspended from the practice of law in this State for three

years. Because there are no conditions on Crawford’s reinstatement 

other than the passage of time, there is no need for him to take any 

action either through the State Bar or through this Court to effectuate 

his return to the practice of law. Instead, the suspension arising from

this opinion will take effect as of the date this opinion is issued and 

will expire by its own terms three years later. Crawford is reminded 

of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Three-year suspension. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J.,

not participating.