[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-13746

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00674-WTH-PRL

GLOVER A. YAWN, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

 versus

FCC COLEMAN - MEDIUM WARDEN, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(August 28, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Glover Yawn appeals pro se the denial of his motion for relief from a

judgment dismissing his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 60(b)(6). The district court dismissed Yawn’s second petition for lack of 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2255(e). Yawn argued that he was entitled to 

relief from the judgment under Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. ____, 133 S. 

Ct. 2276 (2013), and recent decisions of this Court. Because Yawn failed to 

establish that extraordinary circumstances required the district court to vacate its 

judgment, we affirm.

Yawn pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1), and to distributing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Yawn 

admitted that he had prior convictions for armed robbery, selling a controlled 

substance, and selling cocaine. The district court sentenced Yawn, as an armed 

career criminal, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and a career offender, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, to 

188 months of imprisonment. Yawn challenged his sentence unsuccessfully on 

direct appeal, United States v. Yawn, 200 Fed. App’x 970 (11th Cir. 2006), in a 

motion to vacate, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see 

id. § 2241.

We review the denial of a motion for relief for an abuse of discretion. 

Jackson v. Crosby, 437 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). To obtain relief under 

Rule 60(b)(6), the movant must prove “that the circumstances are sufficiently 

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extraordinary to warrant relief.” Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 

2006) (quoting Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir.

2000)). “[S]omething more than a ‘mere’ change in the law is necessary to provide 

the grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.” Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1401 (11th 

Cir. 1987). The movant “must demonstrate a justification so compelling that the 

district court was required to vacate its order.” Cano, 435 F.3d at 1342 (quoting

Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Yawn’s motion

for relief from the dismissal of his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Descamps did not represent a change in the law because it was decided while 

Yawn’s second petition was pending and available to challenge the validity of his 

sentence. See Ritter, 811 F.2d at 1401. And Yawn failed to explain how Descamps, 

which prohibits district courts from “apply[ing] the modified categorical approach 

when the crime of . . . convict[ion] has a single, indivisible set of elements,” 133 S.

Ct. at 2282, affected the legality of his sentence. Yawn was convicted of armed 

robbery, Fla. Stat. § 812.13, which qualifies as a violent felony because it “has as 

an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 

person of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Yawn’s convictions for selling 

drugs, Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a), appear to qualify as “serious drug offense[s]”

because they are “offense[s] under State law, involving manufacturing, 

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distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled 

substance, . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is 

prescribed by law,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). See United States v. Smith, 775 

F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2827 (2015). Yawn’s 

arguments for relief under Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 

1253 (11th Cir. 2013), Mackey v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 739 F.3d 657 

(11th Cir. 2014), and McKinney v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 562 Fed. 

App’x 917 (11th Cir. 2014), were equally unavailing because those decisions do 

not affect our precedents establishing that Yawn’s prior convictions qualify as 

predicate offenses.

We AFFIRM the denial of Yawn’s motion for relief.

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