### FILED 

### COURT OF APPEALS DIVVOKI!I. 2015 

### FEB 18 

### AM 9: 17 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASH RY
STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION II
Respondent,

v. CHRISTOPHER ROY SMITH, Appellant. No. 45432 - 7 -II

PUBLISHED OPINION
WORSWICK, P. J. — 

### Following a bench trial,the trial court found Christopher Roy Smith guilty offailure to register as a sex offender.' 

### Smith appeals his conviction, asserting thatthe sex offender registration statute, RCW 9A.44. 130, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him because the statute is overbroad and burdens his fundamental rightto travel. Smith also asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Because the sex offender registration statute is constitutional and sufficient evidence supports Smith' s conviction, we affirm. FACTS 

### Smith has previously been convicted ofa sex offense, which conviction required Smith to . register his residence under RCW 9A.44. 130. Smith registered his Longview, Washington 

### residence with the Cowlitz County Sheriff's Office in December 2006. In November 2011, the sheriff's office received a letter signed by Smith stating that he was providing notice ofhis

1 RCW 9A.44. 132 criminalizes a convicted sex offender' s failure to comply with the registration requirements of RCW 9A.44. 130.No. 45432 - 7 -II change of address from a location on Rose Place in Longview to a location on 9th Avenue in Longview. The sheriff's office sex offender registration clerk, Kristine Taff,completed a change 

### ofaddress form for Smith after receiving the letter.

On March 8, 2012, Longview Police Department investigator Olga Lozano went to the 

### 9thAvenue addressto verifythat Smithwas living at his registered residence. When Lozano arrived at the 9th Avenue address, she saw that the house was vacant and that a rental sign was placed in front ofthe house. Based on Lozano' s investigation, the State charged Smith with failure to register as a sex offender. 

### Atthe bench trial, Tafftestified thatthere are two ways in which an offender may register 

### a change ofaddress, either by coming to the sheriffs office in person or by sending a signed and dated " certified return receipt requested letter that includes their old address and their new
address." Report of Proceedings at 16. On cross - examination, Tafftestified that she informs 

### every offenderthat he or she must submit a certified return receipt letter in order to register a change of address 

### by mail. She further testified on cross - examination that she registered Smith' s change of address after the sheriffs office received his November 2011 letter. 

### Lozano testified that she contacted the Cowlitz County Sheriff's Office afterfinding that 

### Smith was not residing at his registered address on 9th Avenue. Lozano did nottestifythat she went to Smith' s prior address on Rose Place to see ifhe still resided there. 

### Troy Savelli, the property manager ofthe 9th Avenue house,testified that someone named Aaron 

### Weatherly had rented the 9th Avenue house in November 2011. Savelli also testified that Smith was not on the lease and was not permitted to reside at the house. Savelli furthertestified that, although Smith was not permitted to reside at the house, he had seen Smith

2No. 45432 - 7 -II 

### atthe house on afew occasions. Savelli stated that Weatherly and Smith vacated the property in December 2011, after he evicted them for failing to pay rent. Savelli also stated thatthe house remained vacant from December 2011 until March 28, 2012, the date he rented it to a different tenant. 

### The trial court found Smith guilty offailure to register as a sex offender and later entered the following findings offact and conclusions oflaw: Findings of Fact 1. On December 14, 2006, based upon a conviction for a sex offense, the 

### Defendant registered with the Cowlitz County Sheriff's Office (CCSO) as a sex offender.

2. On November 10, 2011, the CCSO received a certified letter from the Defendant. 

### The letter informed CCSO that the Defendant was changing his registered address from 2240 Rose Place, Longview, WA to 1111 9th Ave, 

### Longview,WA. The letterwas signed bythe Defendant.

3. The CCSO permits people to update their registered address through certified mail. Upon receipt of such a mail, the CCSO will create a new Change of Address Form and update their file.

4. On March 8, 2012, Longview Police Investigator Olga Lozano attempted 

### to verifythe Defendant's address at 1111 9th Ave, Longview, WA. Upon arrival, Inspector Lozano observed thatthe residencewas vacantand a "Troy / Arrow" rental sign was posted in the front. 

### 5. Inspector Lozano contacted Troy Savelli, apropertymanagerwith Arrow Property Management, and learned that the house had been rented to Aaron 

### Michelle Weatherly. Ms. Weatherlywas the girlfriend ofthe Defendant. Inspector Lozano further learned that Ms. Weatherly had been evicted from 1111 9th Ave, Longview, WA around December 24, 2011.

6. Mr. Savelli had personal contact with the Defendant, both in person and 

### on the phone while Ms. Weatherly resided at 1111 9th Ave, Longview, WA. Mr. Savelli had seenthe Defendant while performing maintenance atthe residence. Mr. Savelli spoke with the Defendant when he called the residence to discuss their delinquent rent payments.

7. 

### According to Mr. Savelli' s records, no one resided at 1111 9th Ave, Longview, WA from the end of December, 2011 to March 28, 2012. The residence 

### was vacant during thattime period.

8. On March 13, 2012, Inspector Lozano confirmed with the CCSO that the Defendant' s last registered address was 1111 9th Ave, Longview, WA.

3No. 45432 - 7 -II 9. On April 10, 2012, Inspector Lozano requested abench warrant be issued for the Defendant' s arrest. 

### On May 5, 2012, the Defendant was arrested on the bench warrant. Conclusions of Law

1. The Defendant was required to register as a sex offender. 2. Between December 24, 2011 and March 8, 2012, the Defendant was 

### registered as a sex offenderwiththe Cowlitz County Sheriff's Office.

3. 

### The letter received by the Cowlitz County SheriffOffice on November 

### 10, 2011 was sent by the Defendant. When comparing the signature on the letter with the registration documents previously signed by the Defendant, it is clear thatthe letter was written and signed bythe Defendant. 4. The Defendant changed his address from 2240 Rose Place, Longview, WA to 1111 9th Ave, Longview, WA. 

### 5. The Defendant and his girlfriend, Aaron Michelle Weatherly, were evicted from 1111 9th Ave, Longview, WA on or around December 24, 2011. 

### 6. The Defendant was not residing at 1111 9th Ave, Longview,WA from on or around December 24, 2011 through March 8, 2012. 

### 7. The Defendant failed to notifythe Cowlitz County Sheriffs Office within three business days after moving from 1111 9th Ave, Longview, Washington. 

### 8. The Defendant is guilty offailing to register as a sex offender. Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 40 - 42. Smith appeals his conviction.

ANALYSIS I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RCW 9A.44. 130 Smith first contends that we must reverse his failure to register as a sex offender 

### conviction because the sex offender registration statute, RCW 9A.44.130,2 is unconstitutional on 

### its face and as applied to him. Specifically, Smith contends thatthe statute is unconstitutionally broad and burdens his fundamental right to travel and right to freedom ofmovement. We disagree.

2 RCW 9A.44. 132( 1) provides that "[ a] person commits the crime offailure to register as a sex 

### offender ifthe person has a dutyto register under RCW 9A.44. 130 forafelony sex offense and knowingly fails to complywith any ofthe requirements ofRCW 9A.44. 130."
4No. 45432 - 7 -II 

### We review the constitutionality ofa statute de novo. State v. Enquist, 163 Wn.App. 41, 45, 256 P. 3d 1277 (2011). To demonstrate that RCW 9A.44. 130 is unconstitutional on its face, 

### Smith must showthat "no set ofcircumstances exists in which the statute, as currently written,

can be constitutionally applied." 

### City ofRedmondv.Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 669, 91 P.3d 875 2004). A statute that is unconstitutional on its face is rendered " totally inoperative." Moore, 151 Wn.2d at 669. To demonstrate that RCW 9A.44. 130 is unconstitutional as applied to him, Smith must show that " application ofthe statute in the specific context ofthe party' s actions or intended actions is unconstitutional." Moore, 151 Wn.2d at 669. In contrast with a statute that is 

### unconstitutional on its face, a statute that is unconstitutional as applied prohibits only "future application ofthe statute in a similar context, but the statute is not totally invalidated." Moore, 151 Wn.2d at 669. To succeed in his claim under either standard, Smith must show that RCW 9A.44. 130 impairs a constitutional right. Smith asserts that the statute impairs the constitutional right to travel. 

### The right to travel is a part ofthe ` liberty' ofwhich the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law under the Fifth Amendment" ofthe United States Constitution. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125, 78 S. Ct. 1113, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 ( 1958). The right to travel 

### includes the rightto travel within a state. City ofSeattle v. McConahy, 86 Wn.App. 557, 571, 937 P. 2d 1133 ( 1997). The United States Constitution also protects an adult' s fundamental right to freedom of movement. State v. J.D., 86 Wn.

### App. 501, 506, 937 P. 2d 630 ( 1997) ( quoting Aptheker v. Sec. ofState, 378 U.S. 500, 520, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992 ( 1964)). A state 

### law implicates the rightto travel when the law actually deters such travel and where deterring 

### travel is the law's primary objective. State v. Lee, 135 Wn.2d 369, 389 - 90, 957 P.2d 741 ( 1998)

5No. 45432 - 7 -II citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 72 L. Ed. 2d 672 ( 1982)). 3 A state law
also implicates the right to travel when the law uses "` any classification which serves to penalize the exercise ofthat right.'" 

### Attorney Gen. ofNew Yorkv. Soto - Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903, 106 S. Ct. 2317, 90 L. Ed. 2d 899 ( 1986) ( internal quotation marks omitted) (

### quoting Dunn v Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 ( 1972). A. RCW9A.44. 130 Does Not Impair the Constitutional Right To Travel. Smith contends that RCW 9A.44. 130 impairs his fundamental right to travel because he 

### may be subjectto criminal prosecution for leaving his residence for more than three days. He is incorrect. 

### Nothing within RCW 9A.44. 130 prevents Smith from traveling within or outside ofthe
state. 

### See, e.g.,Enquist, 163 Wn.App. at 50 -51 ( rejecting claim that RCW 9A.44. 130 implicates the right to travel in the context ofoffender subject to the statute' s transient reporting requirements). The statute does not require Smith to provide notice ofhis intent to travel from his residence. RCW 9A.44. 130. Rather, the statute requires Smith to register either his 

### residence address ortransient status only when he changes his residence address orwhen he

ceases to have a fixed residence. RCW 9A.44. 130(4), ( 5). And it is well established that the term " residence" as used in RCW 9A.44. 130 means " a place to which one intends to return, as distinguished from a place oftemporary sojourn or transient visit." 

### State v. Pickett, 95 Wn.App. 475, 478, 975 P. 2d 584 ( 1999); 

### see also State v.Jenkins, 100 Wn.App. 85, 91, 995 P.2d 1268

3 In Lee, our Supreme Court treated the right to travel as a component ofthe right to freedom of movement. 

### 135 Wn.2d at 389 - 90. Accordingly,the principle that a state law does not implicate 

### the rightto travel unless it actually deters travel and unless such deterrence is the law's primary goal applies equally to the rightto freedom ofmovement. 6No. 45432 - 7 -II 2000) ( applying Pickett court' s definition of "residence "). 

### Accordingly, RCW 9A.44. 130 is not 

### triggered by Smith's travel unless he does not intend to return to his registered address or ifhe ceases to have a residence address. 

### Smith has not demonstrated that RCW 9A.44. 130 actually deters him from traveling or that the statute penalizes him for exercising his right to travel.4 

### Accordingly we hold thatthe statute does not impair the constitutional right to travel and, thus, Smith cannot show that the statute is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to him. B. 

### Compelling State Interest 

### Even accepting, forthe sake ofargument,that RCW 9A.44. 130 limits convicted sex offenders, such as Smith, oftheir ability to travel, such limitation is not unconstitutional because 

### it isjustified by acompelling state interest in promoting the safety and welfare ofWashington
citizens. Laws that limit fundamental rights such as the right to travel and the right to freedom of
movement " may bejustified only 

### by a compelling state interest." 

### Enquist, 163 Wn.App. at 50. 

### The state has a compelling interest in promoting the health, safety, and welfare ofits citizens. State v. Balzer, 91 Wn.

### App. 44, 56, 954 P. 2d 931 ( 1998). Thus, where a statute' s primary 

### purpose is to promote safety and welfare,we will presume thatthe statute is constitutional ifit bears a reasonable and substantial relationship to that purpose." State v. Glas, 147 Wn.2d 410, 422, 54 P.3d 147 (2002).



### 4 As will be discussed below, Smith also cannot showthat RCW 9A.44.130' s primary purpose is to deter travel.
7No. 45432 - 7 -II 

### RCW 9A.44. 130 serves the State' s compelling interest in promoting the safety and welfare ofits citizens as it "was enacted to ` assist local law enforcement agencies' efforts to
protect their communities 

### by regulating sex offenders ' 

### based on the legislature' s finding that

sex offenders often pose a high risk of reoffense." 

### Enquist, 163 Wn.App. at 51 ( quoting LAWS OF WASHINGTON 1990, ch. 3, § 401); LAWS OF WASHINGTON 1990, ch. 3, § 401 at 49. 

### Smith contends that, even ifjustified by a compelling state interest in promoting safety, the registration statute is overbroad because it reaches people who are neither dangerous nor 

### likelyto reoffend. In support ofthis claim, Smith citesto numerous articles that question the legislative assumption that all people convicted ofsex offenses pose a dangerto society" and

are 

### likely to reoffend. Br. of Appellant at 8. 

### Butthe contrary conclusions contained in these cited articles are not sufficient to invalidate RCW 9A.44. 130 as the constitution does not require legislatures to " have scientific or exact proof of the need for legislation." 

### J.D., 86 Wn.App. at 

### 508 (citing Ginsberg v. New York,390 U.S. 629, 642, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 ( 1968)). Rather, there need only be an evidentiary nexus between the law's purpose and its effectto demonstrate thatthe law is narrowly tailored to meet a governmental purpose. J.D.,86 Wn. App. at508. 

### Here, the legislature enacted RCW 9A.44. 130 upon its finding that sex offenders pose a high risk ofreoffense after considering recommendations from the Governor' s Task Force on 

### Community Protection and after hearing testimony from representatives ofseveral interested groups, includingthe Washington Defenders Association,the Washington Coalition ofCrime Victims, the Committee for Children, and the Washington Coalition of Sexual Assault Program, 

### to namejust a few. See S. B. REP. ON ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE S.B. 6259, 51st Leg. Reg.

8No. 45432 - 7 -II Sess. ( Wash. 1990). 

### In light ofthe legislature' s consideration ofrecommendations bythe 

### Governor' s Task Force on Community Protection and ofthe testimonypresented by interested groups and concerned citizens, we cannot saythat the legislature' s finding that sex offenders 

### pose adanger to society is unfounded orthat RCW 9A.44. 130' s registration requirements do not furtherthe State' s compelling interest in the safety ofcitizens ofWashington. Because RCW 9A.44. 130 does not impair the constitutional right to travel, Smith fails to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to him. Further, even 

### assuming thatthe statute impaired the constitutional rightto travel, such impairment isjustified 

### bya compelling state interest and,thus, Smith's constitutional challenge to RCW 9A.44.130 fails for this reason as well. II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Next, Smith contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his failure to register as a sex offender conviction. Again, we disagree. 

### When reviewing the sufficiency ofevidence in support ofaconviction following abench trial, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings offact and 

### whether the findings support the trial court' s conclusions of law. State v.Alvarez, 105 Wn.App. 215, 220, 19 P. 3d 485 ( 2001). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair - 

### minded, rational person that the findings are true. State v. Stevenson, 128 Wn. App. 179, 193, 114 P. 3d 699 (2005). 

### A defendant challenging atrial court's finding offact bears the burden of 

### demonstrating thatthe finding is not supported by substantial evidence. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 116, 59 P. 3d 58 ( 2002). 

### A challenge to the sufficiency ofevidence in support ofa conviction admits the truth ofthe State' s evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be

9No. 45432 - 7 -II drawn from it. State v. Kintz, 169 Wn.2d 537, 551, 238 P. 3d 470 (2010). 

### In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, " circumstantial evidence is not to be considered any less reliable than direct evidence." State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 1980). 

### Smith contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence that he failed to comply with the registration requirements of RCW 9A.44. 130 because it did not present evidence that he changed his address from a location on Rose Place to the house on 9th Avenue that Lozano 

### found was vacant. Specifically, Smith contends that substantial evidence did not support the trial 

### court's findings that he (1) signed the letter changing his registered address and (2) sent the letter 

### bycertified mail,both ofwhich were required to effectively change his residence address by
mail under RCW 9A.44. 130(4)( a). We disagree. 

### Although Taffdid not specificallytestifythat the letter received by the sheriff's office 

### was sent by certified mail,she did testifythat (1) offenders are required to send letters by
certified mail when registering a change of address, (2) she informs all offenders ofthis requirement, and (3) she changed Smith's registered address upon receipt ofthe letter sent to the sheriff's office. Taken together and viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the trial court 

### could have reasonably inferred from Taffstestimonythatthe letterwas sent by certified mail. Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the.trial court's finding that "the [sheriff's office]
received a certified letter from the Defendant." CP at 40.

Substantial evidence also supports the trial court' s 

### finding that "[

### t]he letter was signed by the Defendant." CP at 40. Here, the trial court had before it the change of address letter 

### purportedly containing Smith's signature. The trial court compared that signature with other

10No. 45432 - 7 -II 

### documents signed by Smith and found thatthe signatures matched, noting distinctive features in the manner that Smith signed the letter " S ". RP at 57. As the trier offact, it was proper for the 

### trial court to make this comparison to find that the letter was signed by Smith. See, e.g.,Mitchell

v. Mitchell, 24 Wn.2d 701, 704, 166 P.2d 938 ( 1946). 5 

### Accordingly,we hold that substantial evidence in the record supported the trial court' s challenged findings offact.

We affirm Smith' s conviction for failure to register as a sex offender.

We concur:
Melnick, J.

Eton u , J.



### 5 In his reply brief,Smith argues that Mitchell is distinguishable from this case because Mitchell involved a divorce case where the standard ofproofwas by a preponderance ofthe evidence. But Smith fails to show how this is a meaningful distinction. When reviewing the sufficiency of 

### evidence to support a conviction,we evaluate onlywhetherthe evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for a trier offact to find that the State proved beyond a 

### reasonable doubt all ofthe elements ofthe offense. That Mitchell involved a divorce proceeding 

### where the standard ofproofwas by a preponderance ofthe evidence does not undermine the applicability of its 

### holding — 

### that trial courts conducting bench trials are permitted to make signature comparisons — to the facts ofthis case. 

### Smith also asserts in his reply briefthat 

### Mitchell is distinguishable because in that case there was testimony that the signature belonged to one ofthe parties. Again,this is not a meaningful distinction. Here, the letter bearing Smith' s purported signature was, itself,sufficient evidence that he had signed the letter. Therefore absent 

### a showing thatthe trial court improperly admitted the letter as evidence or improperly compared the signature on the letter with Smith' s signatures on other documents, issues which Smith does 

### not raise in his appeal, his sufficiency claim fails. 11