United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

VOICE TECH CORP.,

Appellant

v.

UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC,

Appellee

______________________ 

2022-2163

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2020-

01018.

______________________ 

Decided: August 1, 2024

______________________ 

ERIC MICHAEL ADAMS, Tumey LLP, Houston, TX, argued for appellant. 

 ADAM LLOYD ERICKSON, Haynes and Boone, LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by 

ANGELA M. OLIVER; DEBRA JANECE MCCOMAS, DAVID L.

MCCOMBS, Dallas, TX; ROSHAN MANSINGHANI, JORDAN 

MICHAEL ROSSEN, Unified Patents, LLC, Chevy Chase, 

MD. 

 ______________________ 

Before LOURIE, CHEN, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.

Case: 22-2163 Document: 44 Page: 1 Filed: 08/01/2024
2 VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC

CHEN, Circuit Judge. 

Unified Patents, LLC (Unified) petitioned the Patent 

Trial and Appeal Board (Board) for inter partes review 

(IPR) of claims 1–8 of U.S. Patent No. 10,491,679 (’679 patent), owned by Voice Tech Corporation (Voice Tech). The 

Board determined all challenged claims to be unpatentable 

under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Voice Tech appeals. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The ’679 patent relates to the use of voice commands at 

a mobile device to remotely access and control a computer. 

’679 patent col. 1 ll. 30–34. The patent asserts that, although such functionality was known in the art, the priorart systems were application-specific, meaning they allowed a person to use a mobile device to remotely access 

and control only a specific application at a computer. Id.

col. 1 ll. 15–21. The prior-art systems “require[d] the person to have multiple mobile devices and/or systems to remotely access and control the different applications at a 

computer.” Id. col. 1 ll. 22–24 (emphasis added). The ’679 

patent purports to improve upon the prior art by enabling

a single mobile device to remotely access and control multiple native applications and operating system functions at

the computer. Id. col. 4 ll. 45–49.

Figure 1 (reproduced below) diagrams an embodiment

of the disclosed system. “Mobile device 102 is coupled to 

general purpose computer 104 via communications medium 114.” Id. col. 2 ll. 62–63. General purpose computer 

104 includes mobile device interface 106 to receive voice or 

data information from mobile device 102, and audio command interface 108 to detect audio commands in the voice 

or data information. Id. col. 2 ll. 40–42, col. 3 ll. 13–14, 44–

48. According to the ’679 patent, the disclosed system “allows mobile device 102 to switch between native applications that are configured and operating system functions 

and native applications that are not configured for interaction with mobile device 102.” Id. col. 4 ll. 59–63.

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VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 3

’679 patent FIG. 1. 

Claims 1–4 are method claims, and claims 5–8 are corresponding system claims. Claims 1 and 5 are representative. For ease of reference, we adopt the claim limitation 

labeling that the parties employ. Claim 1 recites:

[1.0] A method of accessing and controlling a computer from a mobile device, comprising: 

[1.1] receiving audio data from the mobile device, 

at the computer, at an audio command interface; 

[1.2] the audio command interface decodes the audio data into a command; 

[1.3] the audio command interface selects, from at 

least one operating system and at least one application, one operating system or one application, 

wherein the audio command interface decides is 

the appropriate operating system or application to 

execute at least one process in response to the command; 

[1.4] executing with the selected operating system 

or application the at least one process in response 

to the command; 

[1.5] generating output data in response to the selected operating system or application executing 

the at least one process; and 

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4 VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC

[1.6] transmitting the output data to the mobile 

[de]vice. 

Id. at claim 1 (emphasis added). Claim 5 recites:

[5.0] A system for accessing and controlling a computer from a mobile device, comprising: 

[5.1] a computer; 

[5.2] a communications medium that couples the 

mobile device to the computer; and 

[5.3] an audio command interface, at the computer, 

the audio command interface: 

receives audio data from the mobile device; 

[5.4] decodes the audio data into a command; 

[5.5] selects, from at least one operating system 

and at least one application, one operating system 

or one application, wherein the audio command interface decides is the appropriate operating system 

or application to execute at least one process in response to the command; 

[5.6] executes with the selected operating system or application the at least one process at the 

computer in response to the command; and 

[5.7] generates output data in response to the 

selected operating system or application executing 

the at least one process; 

[5.8] wherein a mobile device interface at the computer transmits the output data to the mobile device. 

Id. at claim 5 (emphasis added).

Unified’s IPR petition contended that claims 1–8 are 

unpatentable as obvious over (1) U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 

2006/0235700 (Wong) and U.S. Patent No. 6,438,545 

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VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 5

(Beauregard); and (2) U.S. Patent No. 7,203,721 (BenEfraim) and U.S. Patent No. 6,233,559 (Balakrishnan). 

The Board instituted review and issued a Final Written 

Decision finding all claims unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 103(a) over Wong and Beauregard. Because this ruling 

was dispositive of Unified’s patentability challenge, the 

Board declined to address the other proposed ground. 

Voice Tech appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(4)(A). 

DISCUSSION

I 

Voice Tech first argues that Unified’s petition failed to 

identify any disclosure in Wong that teaches the “mobile 

device interface” recited in claims 5 and 7, and that failure

should have precluded the Board from finding such a disclosure. Like the Board, we disagree with Voice Tech’s 

reading of the petition.

Unified’s petition stated that because “[c]laim 5 is substantively similar to claims 1 and 2,” claim 5’s “limitations 

are obvious for the same reasons as the corresponding limitations in claims 1 and 2.” J.A. 130. Unified presented a 

chart listing limitation [5.8] as “cross-reference[d]” to limitation [1.6]. Id. at 131–32. In the same chart, Unified incorrectly indicated that limitation [5.8] recites

“transmitting the output data to the mobile device,” which 

is the text of limitation [1.6], instead of “wherein a mobile 

device interface at the computer transmits the output data 

to the mobile device.” Id. at 132; ’679 patent at claim 5

(emphasis added). Similarly, for claim 7, Unified cross-referenced limitation [7.8]—which is identical to limitation 

[5.8]—with limitation [1.6], and incorrectly indicated that

limitation [7.8] recites the text of limitation [1.6]. Id. at 

135.

In its Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, Voice 

Tech argued that the Board should deny institution 

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6 VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC

because Unified failed to mention the claimed “mobile device interface” in its petition, as Unified’s discussion of limitations [5.8] and [7.8] omitted the term. The Board 

disagreed, reasoning in its Institution Decision that 

“[a]lthough Petitioner quotes only the function performed 

by the mobile device interface limitation, Petitioner maps 

its analysis of [the 5.8 and 7.8] limitation[s] to its claim 1 

analysis.” J.A. 281. Relying on Unified’s analysis of the 

prior art’s disclosures for claim limitation [1.6], particularly Unified’s discussion of Wong’s “PC 210” and Unified’s 

expert testimony relating to “built-in services of [Wong’s]

computer operating system,” the Board found Unified 

demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that the

prior-art combination of Wong and Beauregard teaches the 

claimed “mobile device interface.” Id. at 281–82.

The Board reaffirmed its reading of the petition in its 

Final Written Decision, pointing out that “[a]lthough Petitioner’s cross-referencing tables misquote the ‘mobile device interface’ limitation by reciting the function performed 

and omitting the structure that performs that function, Petitioner’s analysis refers back to its claim 1 analysis of a 

limitation that performs the same ‘transmitting’ function.” 

J.A. 42. Importantly, “Petitioner’s claim 1 analysis demonstrates not only how the combination of Wong and Beauregard performs the ‘transmitting’ function, but identifies the 

structure that performs the function”—i.e., Wong’s PC 210 

and its built-in services. Id. at 42–43 (citations omitted). 

The Board thus found that Wong teaches the “mobile device interface” limitation of claims 5 and 7 and concluded 

that claims 5 and 7 are unpatentable over Wong and 

Beauregard.

On appeal, Voice Tech argues that the Board erred by 

creating obviousness arguments for the “mobile device interface” limitation on Unified’s behalf. In Voice Tech’s 

view, because the petition’s analysis for limitation [1.6]

does not expressly mention a “mobile device interface,” 

“there is no evidence, much less substantial evidence, to 

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VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 7

support a finding that Unified met its burden to prove that 

the combination of Wong and Beauregard teaches the [mobile device interface] in claims 5 and 7.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 20.

We find Voice Tech’s argument unpersuasive. We have 

explained that “the Board is not permitted to entertain 

shifting arguments but must, instead, reject any entirely 

new theory of prima facie obviousness absent from the petition, if the petitioner attempts to inject such a theory into 

the proceeding post-petition.” Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple 

Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). But

the Board in this case did not consider or rely on a new 

theory absent from the petition. The petition identified, via 

cross-reference, that its prior art analysis on limitation 

[1.6] equally applied to limitations [5.8] and [7.8]. That 

analysis included discussion of Wong’s PC 210 and the computer’s built-in services. The Board mapped the “mobile 

device interface” limitations to Wong’s PC 210 and its builtin services because the petition itself—by referring to the 

analysis for limitation [1.6] that specifically discussed 

Wong’s PC 210 and its built-in services—raised this theory. 

The Board thus properly adhered to the petition’s theory 

for how Wong teaches limitations [5.8] and [7.8], and substantial evidence supports its finding that Wong teaches a 

“mobile device interface.” 

II

Next, Voice Tech argues that the Board misinterpreted

the claim terms “audio command interface” and “mobile device interface.” The Board construed “audio command interface” to have its plain and ordinary meaning, and 

construed “mobile device interface” “to include hardware, 

software, or a combination thereof that enables communication between a computer and a mobile device.” J.A. 15–

16 (emphasis omitted).

Voice Tech argues that “audio command interface” 

means “a functional component of a computer, which may 

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8 VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC

be implemented in hardware, software, or a suitable combination of hardware and software, that enables a mobile 

device to access and control one or more operating systems 

and/or one or more applications at the computer without 

requiring voice command interoperability between the mobile device and each separate operating system or application.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 31. Voice Tech also argues 

that “mobile device interface” means “a functional component of a computer, which may be implemented in hardware, software, or a suitable combination of hardware and 

software, that enables the computer to communicate with 

a mobile device through an appropriate communications 

medium.” Id. at 35. Voice Tech timely raised these proposed constructions in its Patent Owner Response, but the 

Board did not adopt them in its Final Written Decision. 

J.A. 349, 353.

Unified argues Voice Tech forfeited these claim construction arguments because they were not included with 

the arguments Voice Tech made in its request for rehearing 

before the Board. Unified further argues that neither of 

Voice Tech’s proposed constructions would change the outcome of the patentability analysis. We address each of Unified’s arguments in turn.

A 

“A party dissatisfied with a [Board] decision may file a 

single request for rehearing” and the “request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Unified 

argues that, under Section 42.71(d), Voice Tech has forfeited its claim construction arguments on appeal because 

Voice Tech filed a request for rehearing to the Board, but 

did not repeat in that request its previously raised claim 

construction arguments for “audio command interface” and 

“mobile device interface” that the Board had rejected in its 

Final Written Decision. We disagree with Unified’s reading of the regulation.

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VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 9

As an initial matter, we note that nothing in the statutes or regulations requires a party to an IPR to file a request for rehearing to preserve a right to appeal to this 

court. By statute, a party’s appeal right is tied to the 

Board’s issuance of a “final written decision.” 35 U.S.C. 

§§ 141(c), 319. The regulation likewise does not require a 

party to seek further agency review of an issue in order to 

preserve it for this court’s review. Indeed, the regulation 

provides that filing a rehearing request is optional. 37 

C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“A party dissatisfied with a decision may

file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board.” (emphasis added)). 

The regulatory requirement that a rehearing request 

“identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked,” id., simply requires the party to 

identify the issues it wishes to present for rehearing by the 

agency after the agency has rendered a final decision. 

Nothing in the regulation appears to contemplate that the 

Board would expect requests for rehearing, if filed, to regurgitate all arguments the Board had already considered 

and rejected, simply to preserve them for appeal. The language in the regulation specifying that a party identify only 

matters it believed the Board “misapprehended or overlooked” is narrower in scope than the set of all matters in 

a Board’s final decision that a party may disagree with. In 

addition, given the optional nature of rehearing requests, 

it would make little sense to find all issues preserved for 

appeal if a party declined to request rehearing, but to find 

certain issues forfeited if the party exercised its option to 

request rehearing on the subset of issues it believed the 

Board to have misapprehended or overlooked—which may 

not necessarily encompass all issues that would constitute 

error before this court. We thus hold that a party’s choice

to not re-raise an argument in the party’s request for rehearing to the Board does not, in and of itself, forfeit the 

argument for review by this court. 

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10 VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC

We have long held that a party forfeits an argument 

that it fails to present to the Board because that failure deprives this court of the benefit of the Board’s informed judgment. In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (citing In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 

2004)). Here, Voice Tech presented its claim construction 

arguments to the Board in its Patent Owner Response, 

Unified responded to the arguments, and the Board expressly declined to adopt Voice Tech’s proposed constructions. The arguments on appeal were thus presented to 

and fully considered by the Board in the underlying proceedings. This is true even though Voice Tech did not include those arguments in its rehearing request to the 

Board. We therefore conclude that Voice Tech did not forfeit its claim construction arguments on appeal. 

In support of its forfeiture argument, Unified relies on

this court’s non-precedential decision in Polycom, Inc. v. 

Fullview, Inc., 767 F. App’x 970 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Polycom

is not binding, and moreover is distinguishable due to its 

unique procedural posture. Polycom involved an appeal of 

an inter partes reexamination with a convoluted procedural 

history before the Board and Examiner. After the Examiner rejected certain patent claims during reexamination, 

the Board upheld the unpatentability finding, but based on 

a new ground of rejection, and did not address the Examiner’s ground. The Board allowed the patent owner to reopen prosecution, and the patent owner overcame the new 

ground of rejection before the Examiner. On the reexamination requester’s appeal, the Board affirmed the Examiner. The requester did not argue to the Board during that 

appeal that the Board should have considered the Examiner’s original ground of rejection. The requester then 

sought rehearing, but again failed to tell the Board that it 

should consider the Examiner’s original ground of rejection. Instead, the requester waited to raise that issue with 

this court in the first instance. The Board thus never ruled 

on the issue that the requester sought to raise in this court. 

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VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 11

The Polycom court found that the reexamination requester had forfeited1 its argument relating to the Examiner’s original ground of rejection by failing to raise it in 

the request for rehearing to the Board. Id. at 980. As described above, the Board’s first decision on appeal did not 

address the Examiner’s original ground of rejection, instead concluding that the claims were unpatentable over a 

new ground. For the second Board appeal, this time by the 

reexamination requester, the Board again never ruled on 

the issue, but that is because the requester neglected twice 

to ask it to do so, in either its appeal briefing or request for 

rehearing. Because “this court should not be put in the position of reviewing an alleged error in the Board’s reasoning that the Board itself was not given a chance to address 

when it considered [the requester’s] other arguments on rehearing,” we found that the requester forfeited its arguments regarding the Examiner’s original ground of 

rejection. Id.

The instant appeal is not analogous to Polycom. Here, 

Voice Tech proposed its constructions of “audio command 

interface” and “mobile device interface” to the Board in its 

Patent Owner Response; Unified addressed the constructions of these terms in the Petitioner’s Reply; and the 

Board affirmatively ruled on the constructions in the Final 

Written Decision. Polycom is therefore inapposite, and we 

reject Unified’s forfeiture theory.

1 The Polycom court found waiver, but for consistency we use forfeiture here. See In re Google Tech. 

Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“By and 

large, in reviewing this court’s precedent, it is evident that 

the court mainly uses the term ‘waiver’ when applying the 

doctrine of ‘forfeiture.’”).

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12 VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC

B 

We next address Unified’s argument that neither of 

Voice Tech’s proposed constructions would change the outcome of the patentability analysis, given the prior art findings the Board made. Unified cites to the Board’s findings 

that all computer components may be implemented in 

hardware, software, or a suitable combination; that the 

prior art discloses an “interface”; that the prior art discloses receiving information from a mobile device; and that 

the prior art discloses accessing and controlling operating 

systems or applications without requiring voice command 

interoperability. Appellee’s Response Br. 21–22 (citing J.A. 

14, 27–28). Thus, in Unified’s view, despite ultimately rejecting Voice Tech’s proposed construction, the Board nonetheless made findings that the prior art discloses the 

claimed “audio command interface” that corresponds to

Voice Tech’s proposed construction. 

Voice Tech’s reply does little to dispute this argument. 

Voice Tech argues that its “proposed definition of [audio 

command interface] differentiates it from the prior art because the [audio command interface] does not require configuration or interoperability,” while in contrast “Wong 

requires the user to preconfigure a database” and “Beauregard does the same thing.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 23. But 

Voice Tech does not elaborate further on this argument and 

also fails to acknowledge or address the Board’s contrary

finding that the prior-art combination teaches “accessing 

and controlling one or more operating systems or applications without requiring voice command interoperability.” 

J.A. 28. 

Voice Tech’s attempt to distinguish the prior art under 

its proposed construction of “mobile device interface” is 

similarly conclusory and inadequate. Voice Tech argues 

that the “Board’s decision not to clearly construe ‘mobile 

device interface’ was in error” because “the Board did rely 

on [the Board’s own partial] construction of [mobile device 

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VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 13

interface] when it equated [mobile device interface] with 

‘built-in services.’” Appellant’s Opening Br. 38. But Voice 

Tech stops short of explaining why its proposed construction would change the Board’s obviousness findings, instead asserting only that “[t]his term must be defined in 

order to properly evaluate the obviousness challenges to 

claims 5 and 7.” Id. 

We need only construe claim terms that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean 

Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Further, 

we need not construe claim limitations “where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. 

Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); 

Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 

1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (declining to consider a party’s claim 

construction arguments after the party “failed to clearly explain what result would occur if this court adopted [the 

party’s] proposed claim constructions” and “gave this court 

little guidance and cited no record support regarding why 

a modified claim construction would affect the infringement judgment”); Comcast IP Holdings I LLC v. Sprint 

Commc’ns Co., L.P., 850 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 

(“[Appellant] fails to identify any prejudice associated with 

the district court’s claim construction as it never explains 

in its opening brief how its purportedly correct and narrower claim construction would have affected the infringement verdict.”); see also In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1369

(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have previously made clear that the 

harmless error rule applies to appeals from the Board just 

as it does in cases originating from district courts. Thus, 

to prevail the appellant must not only show the existence 

of error, but also show that the error was in fact harmful 

because it affected the decision below.” (citations omitted)). 

Because Voice Tech has not shown any prejudice resulting from the Board’s constructions of “audio command 

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14 VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC

interface” or “mobile device interface,” we decline to consider Voice Tech’s claim construction arguments. 

III

We next address Voice Tech’s challenges to the Board’s 

obviousness findings. We review the Board’s ultimate obviousness determinations de novo and its underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. Novartis AG v. 

Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 

“Motivation to combine is one of those underlying factual 

issues.” Id. (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000)). “What a reference teaches and the differences 

between the claimed invention and the prior art” are also

questions of fact. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 

1268, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

Voice Tech argues that the Board erred in finding that 

the Wong-Beauregard combination teaches certain claim 

limitations, referred to below as the “receiving” limitation, 

the “decodes” limitation, and the “deciding/selecting” limitation.2 Voice Tech separately argues that Unified’s obviousness analysis was based on hindsight bias. We address 

each argument in turn.

First, Voice Tech argues that the prior art does not disclose “receiving audio data from the mobile device, at the 

computer, at an audio command interface” (i.e., the “receiving” limitation), as required by claims 1, 3, 5, and 7. Voice 

Tech argues that the prior-art combination does not disclose the “receiving” limitation because Wong does not disclose an “audio command interface” that performs the 

“deciding and selecting actions required of the [audio command interface]” in other claim limitations. Appellant’s 

Opening Br. 41. This argument appears to rely on an 

2 The language of these limitations varies slightly 

among the claims. No party contends that these differences are material.

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VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 15

implicit claim construction of “audio command interface,” 

raised for the first time on appeal, that would require the 

interface to perform the “deciding” and “selecting” actions

as part of the “receiving” limitation. 

Looking to claim 1 as an example, Voice Tech’s position 

would incorporate the steps recited in claim limitation [1.3] 

(deciding and selecting) directly into claim limitation [1.1]

(receiving), thereby leaving claim limitation [1.3] no work 

to do. Such a construction would improperly impute other 

limitations into the claim term, rendering those other limitations superfluous. See SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericsson 

Mobile Commc’ns AB, 820 F.3d 419, 429 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 

(“[I]nterpretations that render some portion of the claim 

language superfluous are disfavored.” (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)); Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. 

USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim 

construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the 

claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”). Accordingly, we reject Voice Tech’s argument. 

Voice Tech also argues that the combination of Wong 

and Beauregard fails to disclose the “audio command interface” recited in the “receiving” limitation because a skilled 

artisan would not have been motivated to combine Wong 

and Beauregard. According to Voice Tech, a skilled artisan 

“would not have looked to Beauregard’s teachings related 

to MIKE 330 if the [skilled artisan] was considering modifying Wong’s speech engine for receiving audio data” because Beauregard’s “component MIKE 330 has nothing to 

teach regarding receiving audio data; Beauregard’s MIKE 

330 receives translated text” from third-party voice-to-text 

software. Appellant’s Opening Br. 42. But the Board reasonably credited Unified’s argument that modifying Wong 

in view of Beauregard’s teachings involved simply applying 

known techniques to a similar device and relied on expert 

testimony to conclude that a skilled artisan would have 

been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior-art 

references. J.A. 23–26. Substantial evidence supports the 

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16 VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC

Board’s findings that the combination of Wong and Beauregard teaches the “receiving” limitation, including the “audio command interface.” 

Second, Voice Tech argues that the prior art does not 

disclose that “the audio command interface decodes the audio data into a command” (i.e., the “decodes” limitation), as

required by claims 1, 3, 5, and 7. The Board found that 

“Wong’s speech recognition engine 213 decodes received 

audio data into a command” because “Wong discloses [that] 

PC 210 receives voice commands from smart phone 202 and 

speech recognition engine 213 ‘parses the command[s]’ in 

order to ‘identify voice commands and keywords.’” J.A. 30 

(second alteration in original) (quoting Wong ¶¶ 32, 37–

39). The Board further found that “Beauregard discloses 

converting voice data to text, [] providing the text to MIKE 

330’s command interpreter 430,” searching for matching 

action words, and providing a script associated with a 

matching action word. Id. (citing Beauregard col. 28 l. 

65 – col. 29 l. 1, col. 28 ll. 56–69, col. 29 ll. 9–12). 

According to Voice Tech, the Board erred because 

“Wong’s speech engine is not an audio command interface” 

and because Wong’s “‘parsing’ is simply speech-to-text 

translation.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 46. Voice Tech also 

argues that the Board erred because “Beauregard’s matching function does not disclose or teach decoding.” Id. at 49. 

As discussed above, however, the Board reasonably concluded that Wong’s speech engine as modified by Beauregard discloses the claimed “audio command interface.” 

Furthermore, Voice Tech does not explain why speech-totext translation does not sufficiently disclose the “decodes” 

limitation. Voice Tech’s arguments appear to rely on an 

implicit claim construction of “decodes” that would exclude 

“parsing,” “speech-to-text translation,” or “matching,” but 

Voice Tech never sought construction of the claim term “decodes.” We thus reject Voice Tech’s arguments and find 

that the Board reasonably found that the combination of 

Wong and Beauregard teaches the “decodes” limitation. 

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Third, Voice Tech argues that the prior art does not disclose “the audio command interface selects, from at least 

one operating system and at least one application, one operating system or one application, wherein the audio command interface decides is the appropriate operating system 

or application to execute at least one process in response to 

the command” (i.e., the “deciding/selecting” limitation), as 

recited by claims 1 and 5. Voice Tech similarly argues that 

the prior art does not disclose the “deciding/selecting” limitation in claims 3 and 7, which recite “the audio command 

interface selects, from two or more applications, one application, wherein the audio command interface decides is the 

appropriate application to execute at least one process in 

response to the command.” 

The Board agreed with Unified that the combination of 

Wong and Beauregard teaches this limitation because “a 

person skilled in the art would have found it obvious to 

modify Wong’s system, including speech recognition engine 

213 and keyword database 225, ‘to incorporate Beauregard’s teachings related to logic capable of interpreting 

natural-language voice commands to select from a database (e.g., wordbase [340])’ commands to control a variety 

of services, including commands for the operating system 

and multiple applications.” J.A. 33 (quoting J.A. 112) (emphasis omitted). Voice Tech argues that the Board erred 

because “[t]here is nothing in Beauregard disclosing or 

teaching a component that decides the appropriate operating system or application to execute at least one process in 

response to the command and then selects, from at least

one operating system and at least one application, one operating system or one application”; instead, the “user controls all of these activities by preconfiguring the system 

with specific instructions.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 54 

(emphasis added). The Board considered and rejected this 

argument, crediting Unified’s expert testimony explaining 

that “a person skilled in the art at the time of the invention 

would have known that computers ‘decide’ which 

Case: 22-2163 Document: 44 Page: 17 Filed: 08/01/2024
18 VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC

operations to perform based on preconfigured instructions.” J.A. 34. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

findings.

Finally, Voice Tech argues that Unified’s obviousness 

theory—and hence the Board’s obviousness theory—succumbed to hindsight bias by failing to address why a skilled 

artisan at the time of invention—June 4, 2007—would have 

been motivated to combine Wong and Beauregard. The 

Board considered and rejected this argument, finding that 

“Petitioner’s analysis relies on and cites the declaration of 

[expert witness] Mr. McNair,” J.A. 24, including statements from the declaration addressing obviousness 

“through the eyes of a person having ordinary skill in the 

art at the time of the invention,” J.A. 1220 ¶ 12. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that a skilled artisan at the time of the invention would have been 

motivated to combine Wong and Beauregard. 

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s obviousness findings as to all challenged claims.

CONCLUSION

We find none of Voice Tech’s remaining arguments persuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s 

determinations of unpatentability as to all claims. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 22-2163 Document: 44 Page: 18 Filed: 08/01/2024