Filed 7/21/11

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

In re K. C., a Person Coming )

Under the Juvenile Court Law. )

___________________________________ )

)

KINGS COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES ) S183320

AGENCY, )

) Ct.App. 5 F058395

Plaintiff and Respondent, )

) Kings County

v. ) Super. Ct. No. 08JD0075

)

J.C., )

)

Defendant and Appellant. )

____________________________________)

The question before us in this dependency case is whether a father whose 

parental rights have been terminated (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)),1

and who does not challenge that decision, has standing to appeal an order entered 

at the same hearing denying a petition by the dependent child‟s grandparents to 

have the child placed with them (§§ 361.3, 366.26, subd. (k), 388). We hold the 

father does not have standing to appeal the order concerning placement. 

 

1 All further statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, 

except as noted. 
2

I. BACKGROUND

Only the question of standing is before us. We have no occasion to review 

the merits of the superior court‟s order denying the petition concerning placement 

(§ 388) or the judgment terminating parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)). 

Accordingly, the facts underlying those rulings do not affect our decision, and we 

offer only the briefest summary of them. 

K.C., the subject of this proceeding, is the youngest of eight children born to 

father, the appellant in this case, and to mother, who has not appealed. K.C. was 

born in September 2008. Five of his siblings survive. Another sibling died at 

birth, and the eldest, J.C., died in October 2008 at the age of 15 after jumping from 

a moving car driven by mother. In separate proceedings, the juvenile court in 

Tulare County has declared K.C.‟s siblings to be dependents, terminated mother‟s 

and father‟s parental rights as to them, and placed the siblings with their paternal 

grandparents (grandparents). 

Six weeks after J.C. died, K.C. was removed from mother‟s custody in Kings 

County, declared to be a dependent child (§ 300), and placed with a foster parent 

who wishes to adopt him. Grandparents asked respondent Kings County Human 

Services Agency (agency) to place K.C. in their home with his siblings. Although 

grandparents‟ home met the applicable licensing requirements, the agency denied 

the request based on a variety of concerns, including, among others, mother‟s and 

father‟s continuing access to grandparents‟ home, questions about grandparents‟ 

ability to care for a sixth child, and a suicide attempt in grandparents‟ home by 

J.C. in 2007. The Kings County Juvenile Court bypassed reunification services 

for both parents because of their failure to reunify with K.C.‟s siblings (§ 361.5, 

subd. (b)(10)), as well as their history of drug and alcohol abuse (id., subd. 

(b)(13)), and scheduled a hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for 

K.C. (§ 366.26). 
3

Grandparents filed a petition to modify K.C.‟s existing placement (§ 388) by 

placing him in their home. The juvenile court heard the matter at a contested 

hearing immediately preceding the selection and implementation hearing. At the 

hearing, the agency reiterated its previously expressed concerns about placing 

K.C. with grandparents and called witnesses to support its position. In opposition, 

grandparents called child welfare officials from Tulare County, who testified that 

K.C.‟s siblings were doing well in grandparents‟ care, and the principal of the 

siblings‟ school, who expressed satisfaction with their academic progress. Father, 

who was transported from prison in custody to appear at the hearing, stated he 

believed K.C. should be placed with grandparents. Neither father nor his counsel, 

however, offered any argument against terminating father‟s parental rights. 

Mother, who was incarcerated and awaiting deportation, did not appear. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court denied grandparents‟ 

petition to modify K.C.‟s placement, selected adoption as the permanent plan, and 

terminated mother‟s and father‟s parental rights. Father filed a notice of appeal 

from both the order denying grandparents‟ petition and the judgment terminating 

his rights. In the ensuing appeal, however, father did not argue the court erred or 

abused its discretion in terminating his rights. Instead, father limited his argument 

to the question of K.C.‟s placement and contended that, should the Court of 

Appeal reverse the placement order, the court should also reverse the judgment 

terminating parental rights to restore the parties to their prior positions. (Cf. In re 

Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1061-1062; In re H.G. (2006) 146 

Cal.App.4th 1, 18.) The Court of Appeal, reasoning that father was not aggrieved 

by the placement decision because it could not be shown to affect his parental 

rights, dismissed father‟s appeal. The court also dismissed grandparents‟ appeal 

as untimely. We granted father‟s petition for review. 
4

II. DISCUSSION

The issue before us is one of standing, not appealability. Orders denying 

petitions under section 388 to modify prior orders of the juvenile court, such as the 

grandparents‟ petition in this case to modify the dependent child‟s placement, are 

appealable under section 395. Section 395 expressly provides that any order 

subsequent to the judgment under section 300 declaring a child to be a dependent 

“may be appealed as an order after judgment.” (§ 395, subd. (a)(1); see In re 

Aaron R. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 697, 702-703.) 

Not every party has standing to appeal every appealable order. Although 

standing to appeal is construed liberally, and doubts are resolved in its favor, only 

a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal. (E.g., In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 

Cal.App.4th 942, 948; cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 902 [“Any party aggrieved may 

appeal . . . .”].) An aggrieved person, for this purpose, is one whose rights or 

interests are injuriously affected by the decision in an immediate and substantial 

way, and not as a nominal or remote consequence of the decision. (In re L.Y.L., 

supra, at p. 948; see County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737; In 

re Estate of Colton (1912) 164 Cal. 1, 5.) These rules apply with full force to 

appeals from dependency proceedings. (E.g., In re L.Y.L., supra, at p. 948.) 

To determine whether father is aggrieved by the juvenile court‟s order 

declining to place K.C. with grandparents, we must therefore precisely identify 

father‟s interest in the matter. All parents, unless and until their parental rights are 

terminated, have an interest in their children‟s “companionship, care, custody and 

management . . . .” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.) This interest is 

a “compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights.” (Ibid.) While 

the overarching goal of the dependency law is to safeguard the welfare of 

dependent children and to promote their best interests (e.g., In re Nolan W. (2009) 

45 Cal.4th 1217, 1228; In re A.M. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 914, 925), the law‟s 
5

first priority when dependency proceedings are commenced is to preserve family 

relationships, if possible. (In re Nolan W., supra, at p. 1228.) To this end, the law 

requires the juvenile court to provide reunification services unless a statutory 

exception applies. (See ibid.; § 361.5.) In contrast, after reunification services are 

terminated or bypassed (as in this case), “the parents‟ interest in the care, custody 

and companionship of the child [is] no longer paramount. Rather, at this point „the 

focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability . . . .‟ ” (In re 

Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317, quoting In re Marilyn H., supra, at 

p. 309.) For this reason, the decision to terminate or bypass reunification services 

ordinarily constitutes a sufficient basis for terminating parental rights. (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1).) A few statutory exceptions to this rule permit the juvenile court not 

to terminate parental rights when compelling reasons show termination would be 

detrimental to the child. (Id., subd. (c)(1) (B)(i)-(vi).) But father did not argue 

below, and does not argue now, that any such exception applies. Indeed, as noted, 

father does not contend the order terminating his parental rights was improper in 

any respect. That he has no remaining, legally cognizable interest in K.C.‟s 

affairs, including his placement, logically follows. 

For this reason, the present case is distinguishable from the cases on which 

father primarily relies, In re H.G., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 1, and In re Esperanza 

C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1042. In both cases, the Court of Appeal concluded 

that parents whose rights had been terminated were aggrieved by, and thus did

have standing to appeal, pretermination orders concerning their children‟s 

placement, because the possibility existed that reversing those orders might lead 

the juvenile court not to terminate parental rights. These cases do not assist father 

because he makes no such argument. 
6

In re H.G., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 1, was an appeal by parents of an order 

removing their daughter from her grandparents‟ custody (see § 387)2 and a 

judgment terminating parental rights. The Court of Appeal reversed the order 

taking the child from her grandparents because the juvenile court had failed to 

comply with section 361.3, which mandates preferential consideration of a request 

for placement with relatives of the dependent child. (In re H.G., supra, at pp. 10-

11; see § 361.3, subd. (a).) Because the court failed properly to consider the 

request for placement with relatives, the order terminating parental rights was at 

least premature and possibly erroneous: The placement of a dependent child with 

relatives can, under certain circumstances, make the termination of parental rights 

unnecessary. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).)3 Because the propriety of terminating 

parental rights depended partly on the placement decision, the order removing the 

child from her grandparents‟ custody affected the mother‟s interests sufficiently to 

confer upon her standing to appeal that order as well. As the Court of Appeal 

explained, “a placement decision under section 387 has the potential to alter the 

court‟s determination of the child‟s best interests and the appropriate permanency 

 

2 Section 387 governs proposed orders that would have the effect of 

imposing a more restrictive placement, i.e., by “removing a child from the 

physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or friend and directing placement 

in a foster home, or commitment to a private or county institution . . . .” (Cf. 

§ 388 [concerning petitions to modify juvenile court orders generally].) 

3 The court need not terminate parental rights when “[t]he child is living with 

a relative who is unable or unwilling to adopt the child because of circumstances 

that do not include an unwillingness to accept legal or financial responsibility for 

the child, but who is willing and capable of providing the child with a stable and 

permanent environment through legal guardianship, and the removal of the child 

from the custody of his or her relative would be detrimental to the emotional wellbeing of the child. . . .” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) 
7

plan for that child, and thus may affect a parent‟s interest in his or her legal status 

with respect to the child.” (In re H.G., supra, at p. 10.) 

In re Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, extended the reasoning of 

In H.G., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 1, to the procedural mechanism employed in the 

case before us, namely, a petition under section 388 to modify an existing order 

concerning placement. A mother whose parental rights had been terminated 

sought to appeal an order, entered immediately before termination, denying a 

relative‟s petition for placement under section 388. Adopting the reasoning of In 

re H.G., the court concluded the mother did have standing because the resolution 

of the placement issue had the potential to alter the decision to terminate parental 

rights. (In re Esperanza C., supra, at p. 1054.) The court thus reversed both the 

order concerning placement and the judgment terminating parental rights. (Id., at 

p. 1062.) 

From these decisions we derive the following rule: A parent‟s appeal from a 

judgment terminating parental rights confers standing to appeal an order 

concerning the dependent child‟s placement only if the placement order‟s reversal 

advances the parent‟s argument against terminating parental rights. This rule does 

not support father‟s claim of standing to appeal because he did not contest the 

termination of his parental rights in the juvenile court. By thus acquiescing in the 

termination of his rights, he relinquished the only interest in K.C. that could render 

him aggrieved by the juvenile court‟s order declining to place the child with 

grandparents.4 

 

4 On appeal, father argued perfunctorily that, if the placement order were 

reversed, the court should also reverse the order terminating parental rights under 

the authority of In re H.G., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 1 and In re Esperanza C., 

supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1042. Nothing in those decisions suggests, however, that 

(footnote continued on next page)
8

Arguing against this conclusion, father suggests the court‟s placement order 

touches upon interests other than his interest in avoiding the termination of his 

parental rights. First, he argues he has standing to appeal simply because he is a 

party of record and because standing to appeal is construed liberally and doubts 

resolved in its favor. (E.g., In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 948.) These 

very general principles, however, do not displace the fundamental rule that only a 

person aggrieved by a decision may appeal. (See ibid.; see also County of 

Alameda v. Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [only person aggrieved by decision 

may appeal]; In re Estate of Colton, supra, 164 Cal. 1, 5 [same]; Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 902 [same].) 

Next, father argues he has standing to appeal the order denying placement 

with grandparents (i.e., his own parents) because, if the order were reversed and 

the grandparents were eventually to adopt K.C., father would in some sense 

become K.C.‟s legal sibling and thus acquire a new set of rights connecting him 

with K.C. We find no merit in the argument, because the rights father posits are 

potentially inconsistent with the judgment terminating his parental rights. For 

example, while the dependency law does permit postadoption contact between 

siblings (§ 366.29), we doubt the Legislature intended the term “sibling” to 

include a parent whose rights as to a child have been terminated and who may 

appropriately be ordered not to have any contact with the child. Similar objections 

apply to father‟s additional arguments that his status as a “relative” would entitle 

him to preference as a foster parent if K.C. once again entered the foster care 

 

(footnote continued from previous page)

a reviewing court must reverse an order terminating the rights of a parent who did 

not oppose that order when it was entered. 
9

system (see Fam. Code, § 7950, subd. (a)(1)), and to enjoy certain rights as a 

“relative” in the event a guardianship were ever proposed for K.C. (see Prob. 

Code, § 1510). 

Finally, father contends he has standing to appeal because he joined in 

grandparents‟ motion for placement and took an active part in litigating the motion 

in the juvenile court. However, “the mere fact that a parent takes a position on a 

matter at issue in a juvenile dependency case that affects his or her child does not 

constitute a sufficient reason to establish standing to challenge an adverse ruling 

on it.” (In re Carissa G. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 [mother lacked standing 

to appeal dependency petition].) The decision in Cesar V. v. Superior Court

(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, on which father relies, is not to the contrary. 

Although the father in that case was held to lack standing to appeal, the court 

nevertheless permitted him to offer argument in support of an appellant who did 

have standing because the father had “extensively litigated the issue below . . . .” 

(Id., at p. 1035.) What the father in Cesar V. appears to have won was not 

standing to appeal, but a status loosely akin to that of amicus curiae. Here, in 

contrast, there is no appeal on the merits in which father might participate in a 

similar capacity. The only parties with standing to appeal — grandparents —did 

not file a timely notice of appeal.

In conclusion, father has not shown that he is aggrieved by the juvenile 

court‟s order denying grandparents‟ motion concerning placement. That the Court 

of Appeal properly dismissed his appeal for want of standing necessarily follows. 
10

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 

WERDEGAR, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

KENNARD, J.

BAXTER, J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

GILBERT, J.

*

 

* Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 

Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re K.C.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 184 Cal.App.4th 120

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S183320

Date Filed: July 21, 2011

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Kings

Judge: George Orndoff

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Peter D. Moock and Colleen Carlson, County Counsel, and Johannah Hartley, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 

and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Monica Vogelmann

P.O. Box 1034

Cooperstown, NY 13326

(607) 547-7058

Johannah Hartley

Deputy County Counsel

County Government Center

1400 West Lacey Blvd., Law Bldg. No. 4

Hanford, CA 93230

(559) 582-3211, ext. 2445