[Cite as In re J.L., 2020-Ohio-5254.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

: 

IN RE J.L. : 

 : No. 109626 

A MINOR CHILD : 

 : 

[Appeal by J.A., Mother] : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: DISMISSED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 12, 2020 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Juvenile Division 

Case No. AD 18905081 

 _________ 

Appearances: 

Scalise Legal Services, L.L.C., and Stephanie B. Scalise, for 

appellant. 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

Appellant-mother J.A. (“Mother”) appeals the decision of the 

Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (the “juvenile 

court”) terminating her parental rights and granting permanent custody of her son 

J.L. (d.o.b. December 5, 2006) to appellee, the Cuyahoga County Division of 

Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or the “agency”). 

Mother’s appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), in which 
she asserts that (1) despite multiple attempts, she has been unable to locate and 

communicate with Mother regarding her goals and wishes in this case and (2) she 

cannot find any meritorious issue for appellate review. This court held the motion 

in abeyance and afforded Mother an opportunity to file a pro se brief. Mother has 

failed to avail herself of that opportunity. Following our own independent review, 

this court grants appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we dismiss the 

appeal. 

Factual Background and Procedural History 

On April 18, 2018, CCDCFS filed a complaint for neglect and 

protective supervision. The complaint alleged that Mother and J.L.’s alleged father, 

J.L., Sr. (“Father”), had failed to meet J.L.’s basic needs on a consistent basis, 

including providing adequate food, clothing and shoes for J.L. and ensuring that J.L. 

attended school on a regular basis. The complaint further alleged that Mother and 

Father had failed to address J.L.’s special needs, including refusing to attend 

meetings at school to discuss his Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”), and that 

J.L. had appeared at school with soiled clothing and poor hygiene. The complaint 

also alleged that Mother had an unresolved criminal matter for drug possession and 

possession of criminal tools and that Father had failed to establish paternity and had 

failed to support, visit or communicate with J.L. since birth. The agency requested 

a disposition of legal custody to Mother with protective supervision to CCDCFS. 

On June 1, 2018, CCDCFS filed an amended complaint, amending the 

dispositional prayer of the complaint from protective supervision to temporary 
custody to CCDCFS. The agency also filed a motion for predispositional temporary 

custody. In support of the motion, the agency attached an affidavit from CCDCFS 

social worker Megan Sunyak in which she averred that Mother had failed to care for 

J.L., that, on a regular basis, Mother’s whereabouts were unknown and that Mother 

had left J.L. with Father, who was “overwhelmed” and unable to care for J.L. Sunyak 

further averred that there were no known relatives who were able to care for J.L. 

The juvenile court granted emergency temporary custody of J.L. to the agency. On 

June 28, 2018, J.L. was removed from Mother’s custody. Shortly thereafter, J.L. 

was placed with a foster family. 

J.L. has a brother, P.L., who was also removed from his Mother’s 

custody in or around this time. P.L. was placed with maternal cousins. 

On August 31, 2018, the guardian ad litem filed an initial report and 

recommendation. She reported that J.L. and P.L. had been removed from their 

parents’ care due to Mother’s legal issues and Mother and Father’s substance abuse, 

housing issues and “general neglect of the children.” The guardian ad litem 

indicated that it had been reported that J.L. and P.L. were sent to school unbathed 

in dirty clothing, that no arrangements had been made for them to eat throughout 

the day and that the parents did not bring the children to necessary medical 

appointments. The guardian ad litem reported that J.L. has “severe special needs” 

and that although he is “mostly nonverbal,” he seems to understand “almost 

everything” that is said to him. She indicated that the parents had “a huge task in 

front of them” if they wanted their children returned to their care and custody, 
including finding employment and independent housing, addressing their 

substance abuse issues and learning how to parent their children and accommodate 

J.L.’s special needs. The guardian ad litem recommended that temporary custody 

be granted to the agency. 

On November 28, 2018, the magistrate conducted an adjudicatory 

hearing. On December 21, 2018, J.L. was adjudicated to be neglected. On 

February 5, 2019, emergency custody was terminated, and J.L. was committed to 

the temporary custody of CCDCFS. 

CCDCFS filed a case plan that required Mother to complete a 

substance abuse assessment and comply with any recommendations, to submit to 

drug screens, to obtain stable housing and to demonstrate the ability to meet J.L.’s 

basic and special needs, including his educational and medical needs. The 

permanency goal was reunification with Mother. The juvenile court approved the 

case plan. 

On May 1, 2019, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody 

to permanent custody. In an affidavit submitted in support of the motion, CCDCFS 

social worker Ariana Bey averred that Mother had failed to address her substance 

abuse issues and that Mother and Father did not have stable housing, had failed to 

follow up with medical providers and services for J.L. and had failed to demonstrate 

that they could provide for J.L.’s special needs. She also averred that Father had 

failed to make himself available for case plan services and had abandoned J.L. 
On May 23, 2019, the guardian ad litem filed an updated report and 

recommendation. The guardian ad litem reported that since his removal from 

Mother’s custody, J.L. had been living in a specialized foster home, was regularly 

seeing medical specialists for the first time and was doing “very well” both at home 

and at school. The guardian ad litem further reported that neither Mother nor 

Father had made “any effort to work on case plan services,” that both parents had 

“disappeared” during the pendency of the case — “eventually turning up in county 

jail” — and that neither parent “appear[ed] interested or capable of caring for their 

children.” Based on the progress J.L. had made while in custody and the fact that 

his parents had “shown no interest” in him, the guardian ad litem recommended 

that permanent custody of J.L. be granted to CCDCFS. 

Hearing on Motion for Permanent Custody 

On January 28, 2020, the juvenile court held a hearing on the 

agency’s motion for permanent custody. At that time, J.L. was 13 and had been 

living with a foster family for more than 18 months. Mother was transported from 

the Medina County Jail to attend the hearing. Father did not attend the hearing. 

At the outset of the hearing, counsel for Mother and Father made oral 

motions for the extension of temporary custody. 

Two witnesses testified on behalf of CCDCFS at the permanent 

custody hearing — M.W., J.L.’s foster mother (“Foster Mother”), and CCDCFS social 

worker Ariana Bey. 
Foster Mother testified that J.L. was placed with her family on July 5, 

2018 and had been living with the family continuously since that time. She indicated 

that she and her husband are licensed therapeutic foster parents and that they 

specialize in special needs children, including deaf children, autistic children and 

children with mobility issues, and sibling groups. Foster Mother described J.L. as a 

“nonverbal child who also presented with autistic-like behaviors.” She indicated 

that when J.L. was first placed with them, she had been told that he had been 

diagnosed with a craniofacial deformity, craniosynostosis. Foster Mother stated 

that after J.L. was placed with them, he began regularly seeing a neurodevelopment 

pediatrician and neurologist, who identified other medical conditions, and a 

physiatrist, who deals with walking and gait training. 

Foster Mother indicated that J.L. has only a few words that he uses 

and that he has trouble putting words together but that his receptive language is 

“very good” and that he can express his needs and wants by gesturing or nodding or 

shaking his head. Foster Mother indicated that they are working on sign language 

with him but that J.L.’s progress is complicated by his vision issues. 

Foster Mother testified that J.L. has been diagnosed with cortical 

vision impairment or cerebral vision impairment (which means his brain does not 

interpret what he’s seeing) and strabismus (a turning of the eye). She indicated that 

J.L. sees an eye specialist and has had eye surgery. She indicated that J.L. has also 

been diagnosed with a seizure disorder and now takes daily seizure medication, 
which has made him “a new kid,” “way more alert” and “engaged with the people 

around him,” but that emergency medicine must be kept on hand at all times. 

Foster Mother indicated that when J.L. initially came to live with 

them, J.L. also saw a cardiologist for a heart deformity he had had since birth and a 

gastroenterologist for gastric problems he was then experiencing. She stated, 

however, that those issues had resolved. 

Foster Mother indicated that J.L. is in an inclusion classroom in 

Hudson City Schools where the children all have similar developmental issues. She 

stated that J.L. has an IEP with speech and language goals and occupational and 

physical therapy goals and that he also works with a teacher for the visually 

impaired. Foster Mother stated that another foster sibling is in the same classroom 

and that J.L. loves school. 

Foster Mother testified that she currently has five other minor 

children at home — four adopted children with special needs and one other foster 

child with special needs — all of whom are 12 or 13 years old. She stated that two of 

her adult children also currently live with her — an adult daughter, who is a 

registered nurse, and an adult son, who is a high school science teacher. Foster 

Mother indicated J.L. loves his foster family, that he is a “blessing” to the family and 

that he regularly interacts with and goes to church and on other outings with his 

foster family. 

Foster Mother testified that routines are a critical aspect of J.L.’s life 

and care. She indicated that J.L. requires regular medication and that J.L. is not 
potty-trained, will likely never be potty-trained and is, therefore, on a bowel 

regimen. She stated that J.L. can partially feed himself but, at times, requires 

assistance with eating and also requires assistance getting dressed. She indicated 

that J.L. wears braces on his legs and, in unfamiliar settings, does best when in a 

therapeutic stroller. 

Foster Mother testified that neither Mother nor Father had ever 

visited J.L. during the time he had been placed with their family but that J.L. has 

had regular visits with his brother and extended family and is “excited” for those 

visits. Foster Mother stated that she believed it was important for J.L. to maintain 

relationships with his brother and extended family and that if permanent custody of 

J.L. was granted to CCDCFS, she would ensure that J.L.’s connection to his brother 

and extended family was maintained, as she does for her other adopted children. 

Bey testified that she was assigned to the case in April 2018. She 

indicated that J.L. came into CCDCFS custody in June 2018 due to “medical and 

educational neglect” after it was reported to the agency that J.L. was missing school 

and that when he was sent to school, he had unclean clothes, inappropriate 

undergarments, was wearing shoes that were too small for him and was not given a 

lunch or money to purchase lunch. 

Bey testified that Mother’s case plan included completing parenting 

classes, complying with mental health services and substance abuse services and all 

recommendations made by the service providers, maintaining stable housing, 

following up with medical service providers for J.L. and demonstrating an ability to 
meet J.L.’s basic and special needs. Bey testified that she believed the “root cause” 

of Mother and Father’s inability to care for their children was substance abuse. 

Bey testified that the only time she ever observed Mother with J.L. 

was prior to his removal from Mother’s care and custody. Bey indicated that she had 

provided Mother with a referral for developmental disability services and asked 

Mother to follow up with medical providers regarding J.L.’s initial diagnosis of 

craniosynostosis, but that Mother never followed through. Bey stated that she had 

approximately three home visits with the family prior to the removal of the children 

and that, at the time, Mother and the children were staying with a family friend. She 

indicated that when she visited the home, P.L. would be gone and that J.L. would 

normally be in the front of Mother’s car or in the home “just laying there.” Bey 

testified that she saw no signs of physical abuse but that J.L.’s parents “were not * * * 

attentive to his needs” and that “[i]t was just kind of like he was just there.” Bey 

described one visit where J.L. had on unclean clothes and there were gnats flying 

around his face. 

Bey testified that she soon lost contact with Mother and Mother’s 

whereabouts were unknown. Bey stated that she later learned that Mother was 

incarcerated in the Medina County Jail. She indicated that Mother was in and out 

of jail from May 2018 until July 2019. Bey testified that whenever she learned 

Mother had been released from jail, she would reach out to Mother to see if Mother 

wanted to reconnect, initiate visits with her children or engage in services. Bey 

testified that when Mother resurfaced in July 2019, she made referrals for Mother 
for mental health services, substance abuse services and parenting classes. Bey 

stated that Mother completed an intensive inpatient substance abuse program but 

refused to comply with the recommended after care because she did not want to stay 

in the recovery house. Bey indicated that in December 2019, she asked Mother to 

submit to a drug screen but that Mother did not comply. Shortly thereafter, Bey 

learned Mother was back in jail. 

Bey testified that neither Mother nor Father ever visited with J.L. 

after he was in agency custody. Bey stated that in or around April 2019, shortly after 

she had visited P.L., Mother requested a visit with J.L., but that Mother was 

reincarcerated before the visit could be arranged. 

Bey testified that Father never established paternity or engaged in 

services and that Father’s current whereabouts were unknown. She indicated that 

her last contact with Father was in June 2018 and that subsequent efforts to contact 

Father were unsuccessful. Bey stated that the agency had spoken with several 

members of J.L.’s extended family to see if they could be a possible placement for 

J.L. but that no one could meet his substantial medical needs. 

Bey testified that J.L. had “flourished” while in foster care and was 

now “thriving.” She indicated that J.L. appeared to have been malnourished 

previously and had “really grown” since he was removed from his Mother’s custody. 

Bey stated that J.L. had made “significant progress” both at school and at home and 

that his medical needs were being met. Bey indicated that J.L. had had eye surgery 

and now wears glasses, that he was walking straighter as a result of new orthotics he 
had received and that the family “has done a lot of different things to help the child 

improve with his quality of life,” including engaging in therapies and doing various 

activities with him. 

Bey testified that, in her view, it was important to J.L.’s well-being 

that he remain in his current placement to ensure the consistency of his medical care 

and because of the close, interactive relationship he has with his foster family. Bey 

stated that the agency believed it was in J.L.’s best interest to grant permanent 

custody to the agency rather than extend temporary custody because (1) J.L. had 

already been in agency custody for 18 months, (2) J.L. needs and deserves 

permanency, stability and consistency, (3) J.L. was comfortable in his placement, 

(4) the foster family was providing for all of his basic, medical and educational needs 

“to the highest ability that they can” and (5) Mother had made no effort to maintain 

a connection with J.L. or to develop the skills and resources necessary to “effectively 

care for” J.L. Bey indicated that, as of the date of the hearing, it was anticipated that 

Mother would remain incarcerated for another six months. 

Mother did not testify and did not present any witnesses at the 

hearing. 

The juvenile court also heard from J.L.’s court-appointed special 

advocate and J.L.’s guardian ad litem. Based on the significant progress J.L. had 

made while in foster care, the level of care he was receiving in his current placement 

and the parents’ lack of involvement, both J.L.’s court-appointed special advocate 
and J.L.’s guardian ad litem recommended granting permanent custody of J.L. to 

CCDCFS in the hope that he would be able to remain with his current foster family. 

The Juvenile Court’s Decision to Grant Permanent Custody to 

CCDCFS 

On February 20, 2020, the juvenile court granted CCDCFS’ motion to 

modify temporary custody to permanent custody, terminating the parental rights of 

Mother and Father and awarding permanent custody of J.L. to CCDCFS. Based on 

the evidence presented at the hearing and the recommendation of the guardian ad 

litem, the juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the agency 

had proven the allegations of its motion, that J.L. had been abandoned and could 

not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed 

with his parents and that it was in J.L.’s best interest to grant permanent custody to 

the agency. 

Law and Analysis 

Anders Standard 

Anders outlines the procedure that counsel must follow to withdraw 

due to the lack of any meritorious grounds for appeal. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 

S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493. In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held that 

if appointed counsel, after a conscientious examination of the case, determines an 

appeal to be wholly frivolous, he or she should advise the court of that fact and 

request permission to withdraw. Id. This request, however, must be accompanied 

by a brief identifying anything in the record that could arguably support the appeal. 
Id. Counsel must also provide the client with a copy of the brief and allow the client 

sufficient time to file his or her own brief. Id. 

Once the appellant’s counsel satisfies these requirements, this court 

must fully examine the proceedings below to determine if any arguably meritorious 

issues exist. Id. If the court determines that the appeal is wholly frivolous, the court 

may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id.; see also State 

v. Sims, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107724, 2019-Ohio-4975, ¶ 7-9. 

Although Anders arose in a criminal context, this court has applied 

Anders in appeals involving the termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re A.M., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106789, 2018-Ohio-3186; In re C.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

105700, 2017-Ohio-8664. 

Previously, former Loc.App.R. 16(C) set forth the specific procedure 

governing Anders briefs and motions to withdraw followed by this court. That rule 

was amended on February 1, 2019 and no longer includes any procedure for the 

filing of Anders briefs. However, as this court has previously stated, “the absence of 

a local rule governing Anders briefs does not prevent this court from accepting these 

briefs nor from following the procedure the United States Supreme Court outlined 

in Anders.” Sims at ¶ 7-14 (discussing “the duties of appellate counsel when filing 

an Anders brief and our duties when ruling on counsel’s motion to withdraw on the 

grounds that the appeal would be frivolous” even in the absence of former 

Loc.App.R. 16(C), different Ohio appellate courts’ views on Anders briefs and this 

court’s decision that “until the Ohio Supreme Court resolves the split among the 
Ohio Appellate Districts regarding the application of Anders * * * we will continue 

to adhere to the procedures outlined in Anders pertaining to both counsel and the 

court when appointed appellate counsel files a motion to withdraw because an 

appeal would be wholly frivolous”); see also State v. Lariche, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

108512, 2020-Ohio-804, ¶ 7. 

 Independent Review 

The right to raise one’s own child is ‘“an essential and basic civil 

right.’” In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67, quoting In 

re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997); see also In re Murray, 52 

Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990) (a parent has a “‘fundamental liberty 

interest’ in the care, custody, and management” of his or her child), quoting 

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). 

However, this right is not absolute. It is “‘always subject to the ultimate welfare of 

the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re L.D., 

2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59 

Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979). 

Because termination of parental rights is “‘the family law equivalent 

of the death penalty in a criminal case,’” In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 

2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66, quoting In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 

776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14, it is “an alternative of last resort,” In re Gill, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 79640, 2002-Ohio-3242, ¶ 21. It is, however, “sanctioned when necessary for 

the welfare of a child.” In re M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101693 and 101694, 
2015-Ohio-1028, ¶ 7, citing In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619, 624, 645 N.E.2d 812 

(9th Dist.1994). ‘“All children have the right, if possible, to parenting from either 

natural or adoptive parents which provides support, care, discipline, protection and 

motivation.’” In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, at ¶ 66, quoting In re Hitchcock, 120 Ohio 

App.3d 88, 102, 696 N.E.2d 1090 (8th Dist.1996). Where parental rights are 

terminated, the goal is to create “a more stable life for the dependent children” and 

to “facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.” In re N.B. at ¶ 67, citing 

In re Howard, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 85 A10-077, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7860, 

5 (Aug. 1, 1986). 

Standard for Terminating Parental Rights and Granting 

Permanent Custody to CCDCFS 

 Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and grant 

permanent custody of a child to CCDCFS, it must satisfy the two-prong test set forth 

in R.C. 2151.414. First, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence 

that one of the following conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) 

exists: 

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) 

of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the 

temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the 

child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a 

reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents. 
(b) The child is abandoned. 

(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who 

are able to take permanent custody. 

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve 

or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child 

has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children 

services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more 

months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in 

division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was 

previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another 

state. 

(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents 

from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated 

an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions 

by any court in this state or another state. 

For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be 

considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the 

earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 

of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of 

the child from home. 

Second, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence 

that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child. 

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). “Clear and convincing evidence” is that “measure or degree of 

proof” that “produce[s] in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as 

to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 

118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus; In re M.S., 2015-Ohio-1028, at ¶ 8. A 

juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody will not be reversed as being 

against the manifest weight of the evidence “‘if the record contains some competent, 

credible evidence from which the court could have found that the essential statutory 
elements for permanent custody had been established by clear and convincing 

evidence.’” In re G.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107512, 2019-Ohio-1533, ¶ 62, 

quoting In re A.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104130, 2016-Ohio-5849, ¶ 16. 

The Juvenile Court’s Decision to Grant Permanent Custody 

of J.L. to CCDCFS 

With respect to the first prong, the agency moved for permanent 

custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). The record reflects that J.L. was 

removed from his Mother’s home on June 28, 2018. R.C. 2151.414(E) states that 

“[i]n determining * * * whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a 

reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court shall 

consider all relevant evidence.” If the court determines, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that one or more specified circumstances exist as to each of the child’s 

parents, “the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either 

parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.” R.C. 

2151.414(E). 

Here, the juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (4) and (10) applied, supporting its determination that J.L. 

could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be 

placed with his parents: 

One or more of the factors in division (E) of section 2151.414 of the 

Revised Code exist and the child cannot be placed with one of the 

child’s parents within a reasonable period of time or should not be 

placed with either parent[.] 
Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and 

notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the 

agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially 

caused the child to be removed from the parents, the parent has failed 

continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions 

causing the child to be placed outside the home. 

The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child 

by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child 

when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to 

provide an adequate permanent home for the child. 

* * * 

The parent has abandoned the child. 

With respect to the second prong, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) states that in 

determining whether permanent custody is in a child’s best interest, the court “shall 

consider all relevant factors,” including, but not limited to, the following: 

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s 

parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home 

providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; 

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through 

the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the 

child; 

(c) The custodial history of the child * * *; 

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and 

whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of 

permanent custody to the agency; 

(e) Whether any of the factors in [R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11)] apply in 

relation to the parents and child. 

For the purposes of division (D)(1) of this section, a child shall be 

considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the 

earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 

of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of 

the child from home. 
The best interest determination focuses on the child, not the parent. 

In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, at ¶ 59. Although the juvenile court is required to 

consider each statutory factor in determining what is in a child’s best interest under 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), no one factor is to be given greater weight than the others. In 

re T.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100852, 2014-Ohio-2985, ¶ 23, citing In re 

Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56. A juvenile 

court has considerable discretion in weighing the factors set forth in R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1). Only one of the factors needs to be resolved in favor of permanent 

custody to terminate parental rights. In re A.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99836, 

2013-Ohio-3818, ¶ 17; In re N.B. at ¶ 53. We review a juvenile court’s determination 

of a child’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 

In re P.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 109518 and 109519, 2020-Ohio-4471, ¶ 76, citing 

In re D.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95188, 2010-Ohio-5618, ¶ 47. 

The record reflects that the juvenile court considered each of the 

relevant R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors in determining that an award of permanent 

custody was in J.L.’s best interest. The juvenile court explained its reasoning as 

follows: 

The Court finds that the child’s continued residence in or return to the 

home of [J.A.] and [J.L., Sr.] will be contrary to the child’s best interest. 

The Court further finds that reasonable efforts were made to prevent 

the removal of the child from his home, or to return the child to the 

home, and to finalize the permanency plan, to wit: reunification. 

Relevant services provided to the family were attempts to have mother 

successfully complete a substance abuse program[,] mental health 

counseling, provide a stable home, meet J.L.’s (DOB 12/5/06) basic 
needs and address J.L.’s (DOB 12/5/06) extensive medical and mental 

health issues. The latter was not successful because mother failed to 

complete all of the recommendations from her substance abuse 

assessment. Mother did complete intensive outpatient treatment, but 

failed to benefit from said treatment when she declined to follow [the] 

recommended after care program. Additionally, mother failed to 

benefit from treatment when she failed to submit [to a] random 

urinalysis request after being released from prison. Mother also does 

not have a stable home that she either leases or owns. Mother also does 

not have a job or any verifiable income to demonstrate that she can 

provide for J.L.’s ([DOB]12/05/06) basic needs let alone her own. 

 * * * 

The parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and the repeated incarceration 

prevents the parent from providing care for the child. The parent is 

unwilling to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities 

for the child or to prevent the child from suffering physical, emotional, 

or sexual abuse or physical, emotional, or mental neglect. 

Other relevant factors: The child has special needs that Mother has 

failed to demonstrate she could manage and accordingly provide J.L. 

(DOB 12/5/06) adequate care. 

The juvenile court’s findings are supported by competent, credible, 

clear and convincing evidence in the record. 

J.L. requires a caregiver with specialized skills and training. He has 

multiple medical conditions for which consistent medical care from multiple 

specialists is required. He is nonverbal, has certain autistic-like behaviors and 

requires specialized education. He will likely never be able to use the bathroom on 

his own and needs help getting dressed. In addition, he takes medication for 

seizures and has serious vision and mobility issues. 

The record reflects that during most of the time J.L. has been in 

agency custody, Mother was in and out of jail. As of the time of the hearing, Mother 
had made little progress on her case plan. Although Mother did complete an 

intensive inpatient drug program, she refused to participate in the recommended 

after care or to submit to a requested drug screen. During the periods in which 

Mother was out of jail, she did not stay in contact with the agency. She made no 

effort to obtain stable housing or employment or take other steps to meet J.L.’s basic 

needs much less acquire the skills she would need to address his special medical and 

educational needs. The record reflects that Mother had not visited or otherwise 

communicated with J.L. since he was removed from her custody in June 2018. 

Although J.L. was unable to visit Mother while she was in jail, and although Mother 

once requested a visit with J.L. after she was released from jail, she was back in jail 

before arrangements could be made for a visit. 

With respect to Mother’s request that the juvenile court extend 

temporary custody rather than grant permanent custody, a temporary custody order 

issued pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A) terminates after one year. R.C. 2151.353(G). At 

the end of that year, the juvenile court “may extend the temporary custody order of 

the child for a period of up to six months, if it determines at the hearing, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that the extension is in the best interest of the child, there 

has been significant progress on the case plan of the child, and there is reasonable 

cause to believe that the child will be reunified with one of the parents or otherwise 

permanently placed within the period of extension.” R.C. 2151.415(D)(1). 

As of the time of the hearing, Mother was back in jail. It was 

anticipated that she would remain incarcerated for another six months. There is 
nothing in the record to support a reasonable belief that J.L. could be reunified with 

Mother within any reasonable time or that an extension of temporary custody was 

in the best interest of J.L. 

Following a thorough, independent examination of the record as 

required by Anders, we cannot say, based on the record before us, that the juvenile 

court abused its discretion in determining that an award of permanent custody of 

J.L. to CCDCFS was in his best interest or otherwise erred in granting permanent 

custody of J.L. to CCDCFS. 

Accordingly, we agree that there is no merit to an appeal and that this 

appeal is wholly frivolous. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss this 

appeal. 

Appeal dismissed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

________________________ 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, A.J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR