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In re Francisco Javier MONREAL-Aguinaga, Respondent 

File A93 093 210 - Dallas 

Decided May 4, 2001 

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

(1) To establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” an applicant for cancellation 

of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b) (Supp. V 1999), must demonstrate that his or her spouse, parent, or child 

would suffer hardship that is substantially beyond that which would ordinarily be expected 

to result from the alien’s deportation, but need not show that such hardship would be 

“unconscionable.” 

(2) Although many of the factors that were considered in assessing “extreme hardship” for 

suspension of deportation should also be considered in evaluating “exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship,” an applicant for cancellation of removal must demonstrate 

hardship beyond that which has historically been required in suspension of deportation 

cases involving the “extreme hardship” standard. 

(3) In establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal, only hardship to qualifying

relatives, not to the applicant himself or herself, may be considered, and hardship factors 

relating to the applicant may be considered only insofar as they might affect the hardship 

to a qualifying relative. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Juan Luis Burgos-Gandia, Esquire, Richardson, Texas 

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Heidi Graham, 

Assistant District Counsel 

BEFORE: Board En Banc: SCIALABBA, Acting Chairman; DUNNE, Vice Chairman; 

HEILMAN, SCHMIDT, HOLMES, HURWITZ, VILLAGELIU, FILPPU, 

COLE, GUENDELSBERGER, MATHON, JONES, GRANT, MOSCATO, 

MILLER, BRENNAN, ESPENOZA, OSUNA, and OHLSON, Board 

Members. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: ROSENBERG, Board 

Member. 

HOLMES, Board Member: 

The respondent has filed a timely appeal from an Immigration Judge’s 

May 19, 1998, decision finding him removable as charged, denying his 

application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. V 1999), and 

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granting his request for voluntary departure under section 240B(b) of the Act, 

8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (Supp. V 1999). The respondent appeals solely from the 

denial of his application for cancellation of removal. The appeal will be 

dismissed. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In proceedings conducted in 1998, the respondent conceded that he was 

removable from the United States but applied for cancellation of removal under 

section 240A(b) of the Act, as well as for voluntary departure. Section 240A(b) 

of the Act provides that the Attorney General may cancel the removal of, and 

adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an 

alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien: (A) 

has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not 

less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; (B) has 

been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has not been 

convicted of specified criminal offenses; and (D) establishes that removal would 

result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, 

parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully 

admitted for permanent residence. Section 240A(b) of the Act; see also 

8 C.F.R. § 240.20 (2001). 

The respondent is a 34-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who has been 

living in the United States since his entry in 1980. He has not returned to 

Mexico since coming to this country as a 14-year-old child. His wife, who was 

not statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal, voluntarily departed to 

Mexico shortly before the respondent’s hearing on his application for 

cancellation of removal, and she took their infant United States citizen child 

with her. The couple’s two older children have remained with the respondent in 

the United States. The oldest child is now 12 years old and the middle child is 

8 years old. Both are United States citizens. 

The respondent has been gainfully employed in this country since his entry 

as a teenager, and he provides the sole support for his two citizen children in this 

country, as well as sending money to his wife in Mexico. He has worked in an 

uncle’s business continuously since 1991. The respondent’s parents lawfully 

immigrated to this country in 1995, and his children sometimes spend time with 

these grandparents when their father is working. In addition, the respondent has 

seven siblings who reside lawfully in the United States, as well as a brother in 

Mexico who also works for the respondent’s uncle. The respondent’s oldest 

child testified at the hearing about his life in this country and his desire not to 

depart for Mexico, which he would do if his father was required to leave the 

United States. 

There is no dispute that the respondent satisfies the good moral character and 

continuous physical presence requirements for cancellation of removal. 

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Moreover, if he were found statutorily eligible for cancellation, we would grant 

relief in the exercise of discretion. In this latter regard, the Immigration Judge 

noted that this was a “sad” case, particularly in view of its effect on the United 

States citizen children, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service trial 

attorney characterized the respondent and his family as “really good people.” 

Thus, the determinative issue before us is whether this respondent’s United 

States citizen children or his lawful permanent resident parents will suffer 

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if the respondent is ordered 

deported, as is required for him to establish statutory eligibility for cancellation 

of removal. The Immigration Judge concluded that this hardship requirement 

had not been met. We agree. 

II. MEANING OF THE TERM “EXCEPTIONAL AND 

EXTREMELY UNUSUAL HARDSHIP” 

This case requires that we address the meaning of the term “exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship,” as used in section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act. 

Under the prior law regarding suspension of deportation, an alien, such as this 

respondent, seeking that form of relief had to establish that he or his qualifying 

relative would suffer “extreme hardship” if deported. See section 244(a)(1) of 

the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996). In 1996, Congress 

replaced the suspension of deportation provisions of the Act with a form of 

relief entitled “Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain 

Nonpermanent Residents.” See section 240A(b) of the Act. 

In enacting the cancellation statute, Congress narrowed the class of aliens 

who could qualify for relief. Under the present cancellation statute, an alien 

must have 10 years of continuous physical presence in this country, rather than 

the 7 years necessary under the previous requirements for suspension of 

deportation. Furthermore, under the new statute, hardship to the applicant for 

relief is not considered; only hardship to the alien’s United States citizen or 

lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child may be considered. Finally, 

as indicated above, an alien must show that his or her qualifying relative would 

suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if the alien is deported. 

The cancellation statute does not further define the term “exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship.” It is axiomatic, however, that the interpretation of 

statutory language begins with the terms of the statute itself, and if those terms, 

on their face, constitute a plain expression of congressional intent, they must 

be given effect. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Citing INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 

189 (1984), we have also recognized that the “legislative purpose is presumed 

to be expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.” Matter of 

Crammond, 23 I&N Dec. 9, 11 (BIA 2001). 

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The terms “exceptional” and “extremely unusual” seemingly have ordinary 

meanings. “Exceptional” is defined as “[f]orming an exception; not ordinary; 

uncommon; rare.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 888 (2d ed. 1959). 

The added phrase “extremely unusual” plainly indicates circumstances in which 

the exception to the norm is very uncommon. The “plain meaning” of these 

terms becomes somewhat less clear, however, when appended to the term 

hardship, which can have multiple manifestations and inherently introduces an 

element of subjectivity into this statutory phrase. If the past 50 years have 

demonstrated nothing else with regard to the phrases “exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship” and “extreme hardship,” they have shown that reasonable 

people can agree that the meaning of these terms is “clear,” but come to quite 

different conclusions as to their application in various factual situations. These 

are not terms of “fixed and inflexible content or meaning.” Matter of Hwang, 

10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964) (addressing “extreme hardship”). 

It is obvious, however, under the plain meaning of the words used in the two 

statutes, that the hardship standard for cancellation of removal is a higher one 

than that under the suspension of deportation statute. See generally CortesCastillo v. INS, 997 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship standard is more restrictive than the extreme 

hardship standard); Brown v. INS, 775 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); see 

also Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rubin, J., 

dissenting) (“Had Congress intended to restrict relief so narrowly [in section 

244(a)(1) of the Act], it could easily have substituted words like those used in 

the next part of section 244(a), where relief for certain groups of aliens such as 

convicted criminals and anarchists is limited to cases of ‘exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship.’”) The legislative history also plainly states that 

Congress intended to tighten the hardship standard, in part as a response to what 

it saw as a weakening of the extreme hardship requirement in certain precedent 

decisions of this Board. See, e.g., Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 

1996); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996). 

Although the legislative history of section 240A(b)(1)(D) does not attempt 

to further define the term “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” it does 

provide some guidance as to Congress’ intent in adopting the term. The House 

Conference Report states that “[t]he managers have deliberately changed the 

required showing of hardship from ‘extreme hardship’ to ‘exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship’ to emphasize that the alien must provide evidence 

of harm to his spouse, parent, or child substantially beyond that which 

ordinarily would be expected to result from the alien’s deportation.” H.R. 

Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (emphasis added). The legislative history also talks of 

this relief being available “in truly exceptional cases.” Id. Thus, it appears that 

Congress intended that cancellation of removal should be available to 

nonpermanent residents only in compelling cases. 

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We are aware of the general rule that when “Congress adopts a new law 

incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to 

have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least 

insofar as it affects the new statute.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 

(1978); see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). Here, only 

a phrase, not a whole section of law, was adopted from the prior law. The 

origins of the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” are in the 

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (“1952 Act”). 

There is both legislative history from the 1952 Act and subsequent case law 

involving this phrase that we can look to in an attempt to clarify its meaning. 

Under the 1952 Act, as originally enacted, “exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship” was the hardship standard applicable to all applicants for 

suspension of deportation.1 The legislative history of the 1952 Act reflects that, 

at the time, Congress intended that the exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship standard be a very high one indeed. The House Report states that 

suspension of deportation “should be available only in the very limited category 

of cases in which the deportation of the alien would be unconscionable.” H.R. 

Rep. No. 82-1365 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1718; S. Rep. 

No. 82-1137, at 25 (1952); see also INS v. Phinpathya, supra, at 190-92; 

Asikese v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Matter of M-, 5 I&N 

Dec. 261 (1953). 

We are not persuaded, however, that the relevant cancellation standard should 

be that a respondent’s deportation be “unconscionable” in its effect on a 

qualifying relative before a respondent can be found eligible for cancellation of 

removal under section 240A(b) of the present Act. The legislative history of the 

1952 Act referencing such hardship is nearly 50 years old and arose in a 

different statutory context. Moreover, although the hardship term used then is 

the same as the one we consider now, there is nothing in the legislative history 

of the current cancellation statute to suggest that such an extreme standard 

should be applied. In fact, as discussed above, that history suggests a standard 

that, although high, is clearly less than “unconscionable.” Furthermore, 50 years 

of case law regarding the meaning of both “extreme hardship” and “exceptional 

1 In 1962, Congress amended the suspension of deportation provisions, reconfiguring former 

section 244(a) from five subsections into two. The prior “exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship” standard was retained for immigration offenders deportable under specified 

statutory grounds, principally relating to crime, fraud, and security, who also had to show 

10 years of continuous physical presence. See section 244(a)(2) of the Act. The then new 

section 244(a)(1) established, inter alia, the “extreme hardship” standard for all other 

applicants for suspension who only needed to show 7 years of continuous physical presence. 

Congress’ intent was to lessen the degree of hardship required of applicants for suspension 

under section 244(a)(1). See Matter of Hwang, supra, at 452. The shifts in legislation 

regarding this form of relief reflect something of the ebb and flow of Congress’ reaction to 

immigration over the last century. 

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and extremely unusual hardship” have intervened since the legislative history of 

the 1952 Act was promulgated. Finally, the Board case law that immediately 

followed the 1952 Act adopted the “unconscionable” standard, but found that the 

standard was met in circumstances that arguably would not now be deemed “truly 

exceptional.” See, e.g., Matter of H-, 5 I&N Dec. 416 (BIA 1953) (focusing 

principally on long residence and an inability to return to the United States); see 

also Cortes-Castillo v. INS, supra, at 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1993). Therefore, we 

do not find that an “unconscionable” standard is an appropriate one to apply in 

evaluating a respondent’s eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 

240A(b) of the Act. 

Similarly, we do not find determinative guidance from the series of cases 

dating from 1953 to 1957, which applied the “exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship standard” in the suspension of deportation context prior to the 

amendments to section 244 of the Act in 1962. See, e.g., Matter of C-, 7 I&N 

Dec. 608 (BIA 1957); Matter of M-V-, 7 I&N Dec. 571 (BIA 1957); Matter of 

Z-, 7 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 1956); Matter of M-, 7 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 1956); 

Matter of B-, 6 I&N Dec. 713 (BIA, A.G. 1955); Matter of A-, 6 I&N Dec. 242 

(BIA 1954); Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 695 (BIA 1954); Matter of W-, 5 I&N 

Dec. 586 (BIA 1953); Matter of J-, 5 I&N Dec. 509 (BIA 1953); Matter of M-, 

5 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1953); Matter of P-, 5 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1953); Matter 

of Z-, 5 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1953); Matter of H-, supra; Matter of U-, 5 I&N 

Dec. 413 (BIA 1953); Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1953).2 

This case law covers only that period of time when the “exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship” standard was applied to all applicants for 

suspension of deportation, predating the period during which the standard was 

required principally for criminal aliens. Furthermore, in many of these cases 

the focus was on hardship to the alien, a hardship element that cannot even be 

considered under the present statute. See, e.g., Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409 

(setting out the factors to consider in evaluating the necessary degree of 

hardship for suspension of deportation eligibility). Finally, all of this case law 

arose in a different overall statutory context and obviously significantly predated 

the decades of interpretation of the “extreme hardship” standard that culminated 

in Congress’ enactment in 1996 of the cancellation of removal provisions in 

section 240A(b) of the Act. See, e.g., Cortes-Castillo v. INS, supra, at 1204 

(“The definition of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’, now applied 

2 In Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409, we identified five factors to be considered in evaluating 

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” This decision was issued simultaneously with 

four other published Board decisions, cited above, which applied the standard in varying 

factual circumstances. The approach of providing examples and discussion in published 

Board decisions in varying factual settings likely remains the best manner in which to provide 

content to the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” in the context of 

applications for cancellation of removal under the present law. 

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only to aliens seeking relief under section 244(a)(2), has become more 

stringent in the forty years since the Board decided Matter of S. and Matter of 

U.”).3 In view of these considerations, as well as the fact that so many years 

have passed and so much intervening (and not necessarily consistent) case law 

has developed regarding the term “extreme hardship” since these cases were 

decided, we do not find that any determinative guidance considering the phrase 

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” in the cancellation of removal 

context arises from these early suspension of deportation cases. 

Thus, although both the relevant legislative history from the 1952 Act and the 

old case law discussed above provide an historical context for evaluating the 

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard in applications for 

cancellation of removal, our principal focus is on the statutory language itself 

and the legislative history of the revisions that were enacted in 1996. What is 

clear is that the term “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a more 

restrictive standard than the “extreme hardship” standard applied in section 

244(a)(1) suspension of deportation cases, particularly as it was applied in 

Matter of O-J-O-, supra. The new standard requires a showing of hardship 

beyond that which has historically been required in suspension of deportation 

cases involving the “extreme hardship” standard. As the legislative history 

indicates, the hardship to an alien’s relatives, if the alien is obliged to leave the 

United States, must be “substantially” beyond the ordinary hardship that would 

be expected when a close family member leaves this country. Cancellation of 

removal under section 240A(b) of the Act is to be limited to “truly exceptional” 

situations. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828.4 

3 A more recent Board precedent, Matter of Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994), 

involved a respondent who was required to meet the more exacting exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship standard for suspension of deportation because he had been 

convicted of a controlled substance violation. Under the particular circumstances of that 

case, we found that the respondent had shown a prima facie case of exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship where he had been in the United States for more than 20 years, 

and where the Service had “affirmatively permitted” him to remain here for many years by 

granting his request for deferred action. Id. at 846. However, that case did not provide a 

discussion of the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard and involved a motion 

to reopen where only a prima facie showing of the requisite hardship had to be made. Thus, 

it is of limited value to us today. 

4 The concurring and dissenting opinion argues that the Board has enunciated a new 

standard for considering applications for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) and 

that fairness dictates a remand of this case for further proceedings. However, the standard 

is that set forth by the new law itself and does not arise from any sudden change or 

unexplained departure by the Board from settled law. Moreover, although one can argue 

over the degree of hardship that has been demonstrated by the evidence presented by an 

applicant for relief in a given case, the underlying requirement of presenting the evidence 

(continued...) 

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At the same time, we recognize that some cases in which this Board or the 

Immigration Judges have found “extreme hardship” under the suspension statute 

may also have presented facts and circumstances that rose to the level of 

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Moreover, although guidance as 

to this term’s meaning can be provided, each case must be assessed and decided 

on its own facts. 

III. FACTORS TO CONSIDER 

We do find it appropriate and useful to look to the factors that we have 

considered in the past in assessing “extreme hardship” for purposes of 

adjudicating suspension of deportation applications, as set forth in our decision 

in Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978). That is, many of the 

factors that should be considered in assessing “exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship” are essentially the same as those that have been considered for 

many years in assessing “extreme hardship,” but they must be weighed according 

to the higher standard required for cancellation of removal. However, insofar 

as some of the factors set forth in Matter of Anderson may relate only to the 

applicant for relief, they cannot be considered under the cancellation statute, 

where only hardship to qualifying relatives, and not to the applicant, may be 

considered. Factors relating to the applicant himself or herself can only be 

considered insofar as they may affect the hardship to a qualifying relative. 

In Matter of Anderson, supra, we stated that such factors as the age of a 

respondent, both at the time of entry and at the time of the application for relief, 

family ties in the United States and abroad, length of residence in this country, 

the health of the respondent and qualifying family members, the political and 

economic conditions in the country of return, the possibility of other means of 

adjusting status in the United States, the alien’s involvement and position in his 

or her community here, and his or her immigration history are all proper factors 

to be considered. Id. at 597; see also Matter of Kao and Lin, 23 I&N Dec. 45 

(BIA 2001); Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996). 

For cancellation of removal, we consider the ages, health, and circumstances 

of qualifying lawful permanent resident and United States citizen relatives. For 

example, an applicant who has elderly parents in this country who are solely 

dependent upon him for support might well have a strong case. Another strong 

applicant might have a qualifying child with very serious health issues, or 

compelling special needs in school. A lower standard of living or adverse 

country conditions in the country of return are factors to consider only insofar 

as they may affect a qualifying relative, but generally will be insufficient in 

4(...continued)

of any hardship that would arise from one’s forced departure from this country has remained

unchanged under the old and new laws. 

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themselves to support a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. 

As with extreme hardship, all hardship factors should be considered in the 

aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See 

generally Matter of Kao and Lin, supra. 

IV. APPLICATION OF THE EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTREMELY 

UNUSUAL HARDSHIP STANDARD TO THE RESPONDENT 

This case presents a good example of the difference between the “extreme 

hardship” and the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standards. Were 

this a suspension of deportation case, where only extreme hardship is required 

and where hardship to the respondent himself could be considered, the 

respondent might well have been found eligible for that relief. The hardship to 

the respondent, particularly in view of his 20 years of residence after his entry 

at age 14, his loss of long-standing employment, the adverse effect of his forced 

departure from this country on his two school-age United States citizen 

children, and the separation from his lawful permanent resident parents would 

likely have been found to rise to the level of “extreme” hardship by a majority 

of this Board. However, under the cancellation of removal requirements, we 

cannot conclude that the respondent has established that the hardship to his 

citizen children or lawful permanent resident parents rises to the higher level of 

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”5 

The respondent’s two oldest children will likely relocate to Mexico with him. 

However, although he has lived here for many years, the respondent is 34 years 

old and is apparently in good health and able to work. There is nothing to show 

that he would be unable to work and support his United States citizen children 

in Mexico. His wife is also from Mexico and, as indicated above, departed the 

United States shortly before the respondent’s hearing, taking their infant child 

back to Mexico with her. Therefore, should the children go to Mexico with 

their father, the family will be reunited. The respondent testified that his 

children are in good health. 

The respondent’s oldest child is 12 years old. He testified at the hearing that 

he has classes in both English and Spanish and can speak, read, and write in both 

languages. He testified that although he is close to his grandparents in the 

United States, if his father leaves this country, he will go with him. He stated 

that he is doing well in school, where he has friends. Asked if he would prefer 

to stay in the United States or go to Mexico, the child replied that he would like 

to stay here, “because I think it’s better here than in Mexico.” 

Although the concurring and dissenting opinion indicates otherwise, we have not 

characterized this as a “close case” under the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” 

standard that must be met to demonstrate eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 

240A(b) of the Act. 

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The respondent’s parents have been lawful permanent residents since 1995. 

His father still works, but his mother is not employed. The respondent did not 

present any evidence to show that they have any particular health problems or 

that there are any other unusual factors that might make it an exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship for them if the respondent is returned to Mexico. 

The record does not reflect the ages of the respondent’s parents. We note that 

the respondent testified that he has siblings who also live in the Dallas area, and 

presumably they could help their parents, should that become necessary. 

Even considering all of the factors presented cumulatively, we find that the 

respondent has not met his burden of establishing that either his children or his 

parents would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he is 

deported. The respondent has not provided evidence to establish that his 

qualifying relatives would suffer hardship that is substantially different from, or 

beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien 

with close family members here. 

We recognize that the respondent’s children will suffer some hardship, and 

likely will have fewer opportunities, should they go to Mexico, and we further 

recognize that the respondent’s parents will suffer some hardship from having 

their son living farther away. We have no doubt that if the respondent were 

eligible for cancellation of removal, we would grant such relief in the exercise 

of discretion. However, Congress has established an “exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship” standard of eligibility for cancellation of removal, and we 

cannot find that the evidence presented in this case rises to the high level of 

hardship required under section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act.6 Accordingly, the 

respondent’s appeal must be dismissed. 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the Immigration Judge’s order and 

conditioned upon compliance with conditions set forth by the Immigration 

Judge and the statute, the respondent is permitted to voluntarily depart from the 

United States, without expense to the Government, within 30 days from the date 

of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district 

director. See section 240B(b) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. §§ 240.26(c), (f) (2001). 

NOTICE: If the respondent fails to depart the United States within the time 

period specified, or any extensions granted by the district director, the 

respondent shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 and not 

more than $5,000 and shall be ineligible for a period of 10 years for any further 

The concurring and dissenting opinion reflects strong advocacy for the respondent. 

However, the burden of proof and persuasion rests on the respondent, and not the 

Immigration Judge, to establish that the respondent’s removal would result in “exceptional 

and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. In the end, the concurring and 

dissenting opinion seemingly acknowledges that this showing has not been met on the record 

before us. 

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relief under section 240B and sections 240A, 245, 248, and 249 of the Act. See 

section 240B(d) of the Act. 

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Lory Diana 

Rosenberg, Board Member 

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 

concur with the majority’s conclusion that in enacting section 

240A(b)(1)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1999), Congress foreclosed certain aliens from 

eligibility for relief from removal based on long-term residence in the United 

States. I also agree that while the plain meaning of the individual words in the 

standard “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” may be commonly 

understood to refer to some type of difficulty or burden that is uncommon, rare, 

or different from the norm, these are not terms of “fixed and inflexible content 

or meaning.” Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). 

As the majority acknowledges, our interpretation of this standard, even as 

defined by the plain meaning of the words used, tends to be subjective in nature 

and is largely dependent on definition through case-by-case application. 

Therefore, I believe that the critical elements in any cancellation of removal 

adjudication always will be the evidentiary factors and how they are presented. 

As discussed below, I am not comfortable with the majority’s attempt to 

distinguish the meaning of the language of this standard, as a matter of law, 

from the very same language that has existed and been applied in the Act since 

1952. In light of the fact that we are pronouncing a different interpretation of 

this standard in the context of cancellation of removal for the first time, I 

believe it more prudent to remand this case to give the respondent an 

opportunity to submit evidence that might allow him to satisfy the standard that 

we have articulated today. 

I. EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTREMELY UNUSUAL HARDSHIP 

The majority’s effort to justify our giving a different meaning to Congress’ 

repeated use of the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” as the 

standard for certain cancellation of removal applications is simply unpersuasive. 

I find no basis for invoking an exception to the principle that “Congress 

normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to 

the incorporated law,” merely because Congress adopted only a phrase and not 

a whole section of prior law. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978); see 

also Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 60 (BIA 2001). More specifically, 

“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation 

of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without 

change.” Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 580-81 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. 

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Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 

366 (1951); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920); 

2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 49.09, and cases cited 

(4th ed. 1973)). 

The “exceptional and extremely unusual” language was not only the hardship 

standard that applied to all suspension of deportation applications under the Act 

between 1952 and 1962, but represents the standard that, until 1996, continued 

to govern our hardship adjudications in suspension of deportation claims 

presented by aliens who were subject to deportation for criminal, fraud, or 

security violations of the Act.1

 The legislative history reflects that in enacting 

this form of cancellation of removal, Congress apparently examined closely the 

historical underpinnings and application of the suspension of deportation 

provisions. Indeed, Congress not only explicitly adopted the stricter hardship 

standard, which had existed all along, but also eliminated altogether access to 

this form of relief for individuals convicted of criminal offenses and 

incorporated across the board the requirement that an individual have 10 years 

of continuous physical presence to qualify for relief. 

Each of the changes reflects Congress’ awareness of the prior 10-year 

suspension of deportation provision, including the specific hardship standard 

that had been applied over the years. Surely, by virtue of making these changes, 

Congress must be deemed to have considered how we had interpreted and 

applied that standard. Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority’s wholesale 

rejection of our case law addressing the “exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship” standard as providing nothing more than an “historical context.” 

Rather, it provides the context that gives this phrase meaning. See Matter of 

O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 389-90 (BIA 1996) (Holmes, concurring) (“In my 

view, the best manner in which to provide ‘content’ to this ‘ambiguous phrase’ 

is to provide examples and discussion in published Board decisions of factual 

circumstances in which the Board has concluded that the ‘extreme hardship’ 

requirement for suspension of deportation eligibility either has or has not been 

met.”). 

1 See Matter of Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994); see also cases involving the 

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard as construed under the Immigration and 

Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (“1952 Act”), in which the more stringent 

standard was met, e.g., Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1953) (holding that the standard 

was satisfied by a 27-year residence, limited savings, and the prospect of severe financial 

hardship); Matter of W-, 5 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 1953) (finding that the standard was 

satisfied by a married female with residence of 9 years, few assets, and five dependent 

children). But see Matter of V-, 7 I&N Dec. 348 (BIA 1956) (holding that a stowaway with 

9 years of residence, no dependents, and no home to be broken up failed to meet the 

standard). 

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Similarly, I do not agree that we somehow are being evenhanded in rejecting 

this case law, while also rejecting a statement in the legislative history of the 

1952 Act that the hardship must rise to an “unconscionable” level before it will 

meet the standard. It is the case law that interprets the legislative provisions, 

and not a prior legislative statement intended to guide that interpretation, that 

makes up our jurisprudence as to what constitutes exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship. It is that jurisprudence of which Congress is presumed to be 

aware when it legislates anew and uses the same language. See Lorillard v. 

Pons, supra. Therefore, I believe that the existing body of our prior case law 

does provide useful guidance in determining whether a showing of exceptional 

and extremely unusual hardship has been made. 

II. DUE PROCESS AND EVIDENTIARY FACTORS 

Whatever “meaning” is settled upon as a matter of law, the application of the 

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to individual cases is 

dependent on a variety of factors and variables, considered individually and in 

combination. In the instant case, the removal hearing took place 3 years ago, in 

1998. Although the statute was amended in 1996 to include the cancellation of 

removal provision at issue here, the new provisions only took effect on April 1, 

1997. The Notice to Appear (Form I-862) in the respondent’s case was filed 

with the Immigration Court on October 16, 1997. The respondent was 

represented by counsel and filed for cancellation of removal. 

According to the transcript, when the removal hearing convened, the 

respondent was represented by counsel. In a perfunctory exchange that filled 

less than half of a page in the transcript, the Immigration Judge and the 

respondent’s counsel agreed that the respondent would apply for cancellation 

of removal. In his decision, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent 

was truthful in his testimony and that he was a person of good moral character 

who had resided in the United States since 1980, when he was approximately 

15 years of age. However, the first time there is ever any meaningful discussion 

of the standard applicable to the respondent’s cancellation of removal 

application is in the Immigration Judge’s decision. 

There is no evidence that the Immigration Judge put the respondent on notice 

of the burden of proof he must meet, or that he specified what he understood 

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to mean, or how he would apply 

that standard to the evidence provided by the respondent. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.11 

(2001). At best, after all of the evidence had been presented, the Immigration 

Judge, at the end of his oral decision, offered some allusion to ball parks and 

parking lots. Accordingly, all that the respondent had to rely on to determine 

what standard he had to meet would have been our earlier decisions interpreting 

the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard. 

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We now have declared that we understand “exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship” to mean something other than what is expressed in those precedent 

decisions. I conclude that under these circumstances, the prudent course of 

action is to remand the case and allow the respondent to present whatever 

evidence he may have to meet the standard that we just have articulated. See 

Matter of Alarcon, 20 I&N Dec. 557, 562-63 (BIA 1992) (remanding to allow 

adjudication of an application under a new standard); see also Singh v. INS, 213 

F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (criticizing the Board for applying a new 

standard that went beyond the terms of the regulation without giving the 

respondent notice or an opportunity to comply). 

When the removal hearing began, the respondent’s infant son Javier had just 

been born. The respondent and his wife had been married since 1987 and had 

lived together in the United States at all times. The respondent and his wife have 

two other children, Daisy and Eric, both born in the United States, who are now 

8 and 12 years old respectively. The children’s father—the respondent—had 

lived in the United States since he was a teenager. The children have a substantial 

extended family in the United States. The respondent and his entire family lived 

together until, apparently, the respondent’s wife was denied cancellation of 

removal and was required to leave the United States for Mexico. The two older 

children, who had lived in the United States their entire lives, remained here with 

their father and their grandparents, aunts, and uncles. 

This is the backdrop against which we must consider whether the children’s 

hardship, should their father be removed, would be “exceptional and extremely 

unusual.” The majority admits that this is a close case. The majority states 

specifically that under the “extreme hardship” standard, the respondent likely 

would have prevailed. Matter of Monreal, supra, at 64 (finding that under the 

extreme hardship standard, the respondent might well have been found eligible 

for suspension of deportation). Moreover, the majority states specifically that 

there is no dispute that the respondent satisfies the good moral character and 

continuous physical presence requirements for cancellation of removal and that, 

had the respondent satisfied the hardship standard, we would likely grant relief 

in the exercise of discretion. Id. at 57-58, 64-65. 

So, why does the respondent not qualify under the exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship standard? I agree that our determinations should comport with 

Congress’ expression in the legislative history of the 1996 revisions to the Act 

that cancellation of removal should be based on hardship that is “substantially 

beyond that which ordinarily would be expected to result from the alien’s 

deportation.” H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-828 (1996) (emphasis added). However, 

it is clear to me that, given the subjective nature of the relief at issue, the reason 

that the respondent may have fallen short of qualifying for relief is not 

necessarily attributable to substantive considerations. Rather, as with many 

other such cases, the ultimate determination in this case actually turns on 

evidentiary considerations. 

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In Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), we emphasized that the 

principal problem with the case was an evidentiary one. See id. at 630 (“[W]e 

find the testimony and evidence insufficient to demonstrate that their 

deportation would cause extreme hardship to themselves.” (Emphasis added.)). 

For example, we found that respondents’ claims were largely based on the 

general economic conditions in Poland and not on any condition or 

circumstance unique to them. Id. In addition, we noted that “[i]n any case, there 

is minimal evidence that he would be unable to recoup his investment in the 

business he and his partner established in 1993.” Id. at 631 (emphasis added). 

In addressing the claimed hardship to the respondents’ children, we stated that 

“[t]here is no evidence that the children suffer from any physical or mental 

disabilities . . . [and] no evidence that they would be deprived of educational 

opportunities if they go to Poland.” Id. at 632 (emphasis added). 

Had the evidence been presented differently in Matter of Pilch, supra, the 

outcome might have been different under the extreme hardship standard. 

Likewise, if the evidence offered in the respondent’s case is presented 

differently, the outcome may well be different under the exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship standard. 

The majority contends that “[t]his case presents a good example of the 

difference between the ‘extreme hardship’ and the ‘exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship’ standards. Were this a suspension of deportation case, . . . the 

respondent might well have been found eligible for that relief.” Matter of 

Monreal, supra, at 64. However, we are not considering only the hardship to 

the respondent or an aggregate of the hardship to the respondent and his 

qualifying family members. We are considering only the hardship to his United 

States citizen children and his lawful permanent resident parents. 

The significance of the respondent’s 8- and 12-year old children’s 

acculturation as United States citizens in an American family is very likely far 

greater than what is suggested by the minimal amount of evidence that was 

presented at the hearing or considered by the Immigration Judge. Specifically, 

the children’s birthright citizenship status, their ties to their grandparents and 

extended family in the United States, the substantial amount of time they have 

been schooled in the United States educational system, and their socialization 

in the United States generally, are all factors that are unique to these children. 

The potential value of these United States citizen children’s ties certainly is in 

the “parking lot” or a “ball park,” not out of it, as the Immigration Judge put it. 

Consequently, with a proper and extensive evidentiary presentation, it is possible 

that the children’s loss and the nature of the hardship they would suffer if their 

father is removed and those ties are severed may very well be “exceptional and 

extremely unusual.” 

Neither the majority nor the Immigration Judge really articulate why the 

evidence in the case might not be found to satisfy the “exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship” standard, other than to say that the new standard 

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requires a more unique and extreme form of hardship. Yet the respondent who 

was granted suspension of deportation in Matter of O-J-O-, supra, merely came 

to the United States at a young age, lived here for a significant period of years, 

worked, and became acculturated. This respondent not only came to the United 

States at a young age, worked, and lived here several years longer than did the 

respondent in Matter of O-J-O-, but he also established an entire immediate 

family—and has close ties with his siblings and parents—in this country. These 

factors have a significant bearing on the hardship to his children. 

Unlike the respondent in Matter of O-J-O-, this respondent likely has 

inculcated into his children the American values he himself adopted over the 

20-year period of his residence. Similarly, unlike in Matter of Pilch, supra, 

these children are not just 4 and 5 years old. Cf. id. at 632. Simply by virtue of 

being 8 and 12 years old, they are more than likely to have been socialized 

through years in the school system and in their communities. Although they 

have been exposed to the Spanish language, the record is not as clear as it is 

represented to be that even the older child, Eric, can really manage academic 

studies in the Spanish language. 

The issue before us really is whether their father’s removal will cause 

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to these two preteen-age children, 

who already have been separated from their mother and younger sibling. Is there 

hardship that is “‘substantially beyond that which ordinarily would be 

expected to result’” from their father’s deportation? Matter of Monreal, 

supra, at 59 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828). 

Unquestionably, the children face a dramatic change in their day-to-day lives. 

Even putting the potential change in their economic circumstances and standard 

of living aside, they face a change of geography, climate, cuisine, culture, 

language, and social mores. They face a loss of their home, their childhood 

roots, their friends, and their customary family circle. They face separation 

from their grandparents. They face a completely different school system and 

classes taught in a completely different language. Are the hardships resulting 

from these involuntary changes “truly exceptional”? 

The legislative history emphasizes that the ordinary results of a parent’s 

removal are not to be considered in determining the existence of exceptional 

and extremely unusual hardship to qualifying family members. The ordinary 

results of a parent’s deportation relative to his or her United States citizen 

children may well be leaving one’s home and friends for another country and 

possibly having to adapt to a new school system or a reduced standard of living. 

However, not every United States citizen child of a parent who is subject to 

removal has spent his or her whole life in this country, maintaining no ties to his 

father’s homeland. Just as the respondent’s arrival as a teenager and lengthy 

residence here make it more likely that he also is assimilated to the United 

States, these children very likely lit sparklers on the Fourth of July, marched in 

the Columbus Day parade, and cheered as loudly as any other American during 

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the World Series. Not every child has a parent subject to removal who has lived 

here since his formative years. Not every child of a removable parent is 

approaching his or her teenage years. Not every child has grandparents who have 

immigrated here from their home country. Not every child would have to 

readjust to a society and a school system where classes are conducted in a 

different language. 

Moreover, the Immigration Judge grossly erred in his assumption that it 

would be “counterproductive” to grant cancellation because the respondent’s 

wife had returned to Mexico. Amazingly, the majority seems to accept the 

notion that under the circumstances of the children’s mother having had to 

return to Mexico, their having to accompany the respondent upon his removal 

would likely be the occasion for a family reunion, rather than an exile. To the 

contrary, the fact that their mother was forced to leave them and go back to 

Mexico with their little brother is more than likely an exacerbating condition 

that makes the potential hardship faced by these children even greater. Their 

mother’s departure with their infant sibling was not a joyful or desired event, but 

one that the family was required to face owing to her lack of lawful immigration 

status in the United States. 

Accordingly, I believe that the children’s inevitable departure with their father 

can be seen as a very serious additional loss that they will be forced to bear 

when they are most vulnerable, and when the stability of their family life already 

has been shattered. Their father’s removal, and their departure with him, will 

force them to face even greater disruption in the regularity and stability of their 

lives. To simply say that the respondent’s wife is from Mexico, and the 

respondent is from Mexico, as though that makes it an “ordinary,” rather than an 

unusual, hardship for the children to have to leave their home forever to 

accompany their father to that country, completely ignores the fact that these 

children are Americans. See Matter of Cervantes, Interim Decision 3380, at 

31 (BIA 1999) (Rosenberg, dissenting) (criticizing the majority for minimizing 

the hardship that a naturalized citizen would face merely because she speaks 

Spanish and was born in Mexico). 

Although I believe that some of my suppositions regarding the extraordinary 

nature of the ties that the children will be forced to sever and the hardship they 

will have to endure may well be correct, they are not substantiated in the record. 

The deficiency in the record before us is the lack of corroborating and 

supporting evidence that forcefully demonstrates that the hardships to the 

children truly will be of a level that meets the exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship standard. 

Such evidence might include a professional evaluation of the children’s 

language capabilities; individual medical and psychological reports by expert 

witnesses indicating the potential impact of relocation to Mexico on the 

children’s development and ability to flourish; authoritative documentation 

indicating the similarities and differences between the United States and 

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Mexican school systems; recognized sociological studies reflecting the ability 

of United States citizen children to adapt to different cultures and countries; 

economic studies indicating the likely employment prospects for the respondent 

and the resulting effect on the children’s standard of living; reports regarding the 

anticipated ease or difficulty of later adjustment to United States social and 

educational standards, should the children wish to return when they reach 

college age; and any information concerning the children’s ability to maintain 

contacts with their aunts, uncles, grandparents, friends, teachers, or other 

influential figures in the United States. In all cases, were evidence of this type 

to be presented, it must be specifically linked to these individual children, in 

terms of their gender, age, level of development, level of achievement, and any 

special problems or needs that they may have. Any reports should be 

authenticated. Any evaluations should be attested to under oath, with a recitation 

of the qualifications of the maker of the document. All expert witnesses should 

be available to appear in court, give direct testimony, and be cross-examined. 

I note that a motion to reopen that states new facts to be proved at a reopened 

hearing and establishes that such evidence is material and was not previously 

available or discoverable may be filed within 90 days of a final administrative 

order. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c) (2001). However, in light of the fact that neither 

the parties nor the Immigration Judge had the benefit of our interpretation of the 

statutory standard at the time of the hearing, I would remand the record for 

further proceedings. This will give all the opportunity to present any available 

evidence that may better substantiate the respondent’s claim and will allow the 

Immigration Judge to make a decision consistent with our interpretation of the 

statute. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. 

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