Whether Government Reproduction of Copyrighted Materials

is a Noninfringing “ Fair Use”

Although government reproduction o f copyrighted material for governmental use would in many contexts be a noninfringing fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, such governm ent 

reproduction of copyrighted material does not invariably qualify as a “ fair use ”

April 30, 1999

M e m o r a n d u m O p in io n f o r t h e G e n e r a l C o u n s e l

D e p a r t m e n t o f C o m m e r c e

You have requested an opinion from this Office on a legal question raised in 

connection with an attempt by the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (“ CCC” ) 

to negotiate licenses with the Department of Commerce and other federal government agencies, pursuant to which such agencies would, in exchange for a fee, 

obtain permission to reproduce certain copyrighted materials by photocopying.' 

See Letter for Dawn E. Johnsen, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

Legal Counsel, from Andrew J. Pincus, General Counsel, Department of Commerce at 1 (June 23, 1998) (“ Pincus Letter” ). You inform us that a “ key factor 

in our decision whether such negotiations [with the CCC] even are appropriate 

is whether there are any circumstances under which the Copyright Act might 

require a government agency to obtain such a license: if a license is never necessary, there would be no reason to consider entering into negotiations with the 

CCC, or with individual authors of works.” Id. Accordingly, you have asked for 

our opinion on the following question: “ whether a government agency ever is 

required to secure either permission or licensing before making unauthorized 

reproduction and use of materials that are protected by copyright law, or whether 

all government reproduction and use of such materials per se qualifies for the 

‘fair use’ exception from the obligations of the Copyright Act.” Id. You further 

assert that “ [t]here appears to be substantial disagreement within the government 

with-respect to this issue.” Id. In particular, you suggest that the Commercial 

Litigation Branch of the Department of Justice’s Civil Division may have conveyed to certain agencies the view that “ virtually all photocopying for government 

use is permitted under the fair use doctrine,” and that that view of the Commercial

‘ The CCC, a nonprofit consortium, or “ clearing house,” established in 1977, acts as an agent for participating 

publishers. Under one of the CCC’s offered services, a user pays a flat fee, in exchange for which it receives a 

blanket annual license to make photocopies for internal use of any copyrighted material contained in any of the 

works registered with the CCC. The license fee is based on a limited photocopying survey that accounts for the 

license’s employee population and the copying fees for the journals regularly copied by that licensee Upon payment 

of the fee, the licensee is authorized for a specified term to make unlimited numbers of photocopies, for internal 

use, from CCC-registered publications The revenue that the CCC derives from the licensee then is allocated among 

the publishers that have registered publications with the CCC, with the CCC retaining certain service charges See

American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp 1, 7-8 (S.D N.Y 1992) (discussing this CCC licensing 

practice), a jfd , 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir 1994), cert, dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995)

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Opinions of the Office o f Legal Counsel in Volume 23

Litigation Branch was “ based upon the decision in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 

United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a ff d by an equally divided Court,

420 U.S. 376 (1975).” Id. at 2.

As we explain below, while government reproduction of copyrighted material 

for governmental use would in many contexts be noninfringing because it would 

be a “ fair use” under section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 

(1994), there is no “ per se” rule under which such government reproduction of 

copyrighted material invariably qualifies as a fair use.2 It is important to note, 

however, that we have been unable to discern any disagreement within the federal 

government on this specific question: To our knowledge, no agency of the executive branch has argued, or advised, that government copying is per se a fair use. 

In particular, the Department of Justice did not urge such a categorical rule in 

the Williams & Wilkins litigation, see infra note 15 (brief for the United States 

in the Supreme Court did not dispute that photocopying by the government may 

in some circumstances constitute copyright infringement); and, to our knowledge, 

the Department has not thereafter proffered any arguments, nor provided any 

advice, inconsistent with the views expressed in that brief.3

We do not, in this opinion, reach any conclusions about the circumstances under 

which government agencies should negotiate to obtain photocopying licenses. We 

caution, however, that a general practice of government agencies entering into 

licensing agreements in which they pay licensing fees for uses that are fair may, 

over time, undermine the government’s ability to argue successfully that such uses 

are fair. For this and other reasons, government agencies may wish to ensure that, 

if they do negotiate licensing arrangements, such arrangements cover only those 

government photocopying practices that otherwise would, in fact, be infringing.

In Part I of this opinion, we provide some background on the fair use doctrine. 

In Part II, we review the case law regarding government photocopying and fair 

use, as well as Congress’s enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, and conclude 

that government photocopying of copyrighted materials does not invariably qualify 

as a fair use. Finally, in Part III, we provide some guidance on the factors that 

an agency should consider in determining whether a particular photocopying practice would be a fair use and whether to negotiate a license with respect to particular photocopying practices.

2 In framing the particular question you have asked us to consider, you refer to “ unauthorized reproduction and 

use of materials that are protected by copyright law.” Pincus Letter at 1. The bulk of your letter and supporting 

materials, however, indicates that your inquiry specifically concerns “ photocopying for government u s e ” Id at 

2 Accordingly, we will in this opinion focus, not on all potential federal government uses of copyrighted materials, 

but instead, on government photocopying o f copyrighted materials for internal government use. We note, in particular, 

that this opinion does not specifically consider the circumstances under which it would be a fair use for an agency 

to republish copyrighted materials in government publicauons or in publicly available databases.

3 Indeed, a Department of Energy memorandum that you provided as an attachment to your letter indicates that 

the Commercial Litigation Division of the Department of Justice has informed the Department of Energy that, in 

its view, some cases of government photocopying likely would not be fair uses. See Memorandum for Jim Chafin 

and All Field Offices, from Paul A Gottlieb, Assistant General Counsel for Technology Transfer and Intellectual 

Property, United States Department of Energy, Re: Copyright Clearance Center at 2 (May 23,1995).

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Whether Government Reproduction o f Copyrighted Materials is a Noninfringing “Fair Use'

I. The Fair Use Doctrine

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to “ promote the 

Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 

and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 

U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Pursuant to that power, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended 

at 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq. (1994)) (the “ Copyright Act” or the “ 1976 Act” ). 

Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides, inter alia, that the owner of a copyright under Title 17 of the United States Code “ has the exclusive rights . . . 

to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies,” and to “ authorize” such reproduction. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994). Those “ exclusive rights,” however, are 

“ [sjubject to” limitations codified in “ sections 107 through 120” of the 1976 

Act. Id. § 106. For present purposes, the most important of those limitations is 

found in section 107 of the Copyright Act, id. § 107. That section, which is entitled 

“ Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use,” provides, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding the provisions of section[] 106 . . ., the fair use 

of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies 

. . ., for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 

teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, 

or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining 

whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair 

use the factors to be considered shall include —

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 

use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 

to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 

of the copyrighted work.

Section 107’s “ fair use” limitation on copyright, and the particular factors 

enumerated in that section, reflect and incorporate a longstanding common law 

doctrine. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 

539, 549 (1985). From the “ infancy of copyright protection,” courts have found 

it necessary to provide some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials 

in order “ to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science

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Opinions o f the Office o f Legal Counsel in Volume 23

and useful Arts.’ ” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). 

Before enactment of the 1976 Act, however, the fair-use doctrine was “ exclusively [a] judge-made doctrine.” Id. at 576. When it codified the fair use doctrine 

in section 107 of the 1976 Act, “ Congress meant ‘to restate the present judicial 

doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way’ and intended 

that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication.” Id. at 

577 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) ( “ House Report” ), reprinted

in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679; S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 62 (1975) (“ Senate 

Report” )); accord Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554.4

As noted above, the fair use doctrine, like the copyright protections that it qualifies, is necessary in order “to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the 

Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ ” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575; see also, e.g.,

H arper & Row, 471 U.S. at 545 (“ copyright is intended to increase and not to 

impede the harvest of knowledge” ). As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, 

“ [t]he fair use doctrine thus ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity 

which that law is designed to foster.’ ” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting 

Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)).5

4 In 1992, Congress added the following senience to the end of 17 U S C §107, in order to clanfy that the 

fair-use limitation is applicable to unpublished works: “ The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar 

a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors ” Pub L No. 102-492,

106 Stat 3145 (1992). Arguably, application of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works is one way in which 

section 107 departs from the common law. See, e g , H.R Rep No 102-836, at 4 (1992) (“ The common law, 

going back to late eighteenth century English cases, had been stnct in prohibiting fair use of unpublished works 

under the theory that the author should decide when and in what form his or her work should first reach the public ” ), 

reprinted in 1992 U S C.C A.N. 2553, 2556; Salinger v Random House, Inc, 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.) (“ Though 

common law, especially as developed in England, appears to have denied the defense of fair use to unpublished 

works, see W. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 436—41 (1985), the 1976 Act explicitly makes all 

of the rights protected by copynght, including the right of first publication, subject to the defense of fair use.” ), 

cert denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); New Era Publications In t’l, APS v Henry Holt & C o, 695 F Supp. 1493, 

1502 (S D N.Y 1988) (Copyright Act’s application of fair use doctnne to unpublished work was “ in departure 

from the common law rule” ), a jfd , 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S 1094 (1990) But see

Harper &. Row, 471 U.S. at 550-51 (although “ fair use traditionally was not recognized [at common law] as a 

defense to charges of copying from an author’s as yet unpublished works . . . [t]his absolute rule . . was tempered 

in practice by the equitable nature of the fair use doctnne” )

5 See also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv L Rev 1105, 1110 (1990) (“ The doctnne 

of fair use limits the scope of the copynght monopoly in furtherance of its utibtanan objective. Fair use should 

not be considered a bizane, occasionally tolerated departure from the grand conception of the copynght monopoly 

To the contrary, it is a necessary part o f the overall design ” ); Fogerty v Fantasy, Inc., 510 U S 517, 526-27 

(1994) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U S 151, 156 (1975))1

The limited scope of the copynght holder’s statutory monopoly reflects a balance of competing claims 

upon the public interest: CreaUve work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but pnvate motivation must

• ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public avajlability of literature, music, and the other arts.

The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor But 

the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good

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Whether Government Reproduction o f Copyrighted Materials is a Noninfringing ‘ ‘Fair U se'

II. Fair Use and Government Photocopying

The federal government can be liable for violation of the copyright laws. Congress has expressly provided that a work protected by the copyright laws can 

be “ infringed by the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1994),6 and further 

has provided that “ the exclusive action which may be brought for such infringement shall be an action by the copyright owner against the United States in the 

Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation as damages for such infringement,” 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (Supp. Ill 1997). 

At the same time, it cannot be disputed that the federal government’s copying 

(and other use) of copyrighted materials is subject to the fair use doctrine codified 

in 17 U.S.C. § 107.7 It follows that any federal government photocopying that 

is a fair use is not infringing. However, there is no basis for concluding that 

the photocopying of copyrighted materials by the federal government automatically or invariably constitutes a fair use.

The case law provides very little guidance on the question of when government 

photocopying is a fair use. Reported cases involving application of the fair use 

doctrine to governmental conduct are rare. Indeed, the Williams & Wilkins decision, to which your letter refers and which we discuss below, is one of the only 

published opinions containing a significant discussion of governmental fair use.8 

And, outside the context of public schools, we have found only one case — 

involving circumstances far removed from those at issue in this opinion — in 

which a court has rejected a government’s assertion that its use of copyrighted 

materials was fair.9 What is more, even outside the context of governmental use,

6 See also H.R. Rep. No 86-624, at 2 (1959) (“ When the Government deliberately publishes a copyrighted article 

without obtaining the prior consent of the copynght proprietor, the general assumption would be lhat the holder, 

pursuant to the pnnciples of ‘just compensation’ under the fifth amendment of our Constitution, should be entitled 

to an action against the Government for infringement ” )

7 There is nothing in the statute to suggest that the federal government cannot invoke the fair use doctnne. The 

legislative history indicates lhat cenain governmental uses can be fair. See infra notes 19, 24 And the courts uniformly have assumed that the fair use analysis provided in section 107 of the Act applies to government uses of 

copynghted matenals See, e.g., the cases cited in note 8, infra

8 A few other cases contain less extensive discussion of governmental fair use. See, e g . Association o f Am. Med.

Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 523-26 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S 862 (1991), College Entrance Examination

Bd. v Pataki, 889 F. Supp 554, 564-75 (N.D N Y 1995), Sinai v California Bureau o f Automotive Repair, No 

C-92-0274—VRW, 1992 WL 470699, at *3-*4 (N.D. Cai. Dec 21, 1992), College Entrance Examination Bd. v

Cuomo, 788 F. Supp 134, 140-^3 (N.D.N Y. 1992), West v City o f New York, No 78 Civ. 1981 (MJL). 1985 

WL 202, at *24—*25 (S.D N Y Jan. 18, 1985), Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp 33, 37-38 (S.D Tex. 1978). 

Of these, only West and Key Maps involved decisions, necessary to the judgment, on the ments of the fair use 

question; and only Key Maps involved a government entity making and distnbuiing multiple copies of copynghted 

materials for internal government use

9 See College Entrance Examination B d , 889 F Supp at 564-75. In that case, the distnct court, on a motion 

for preliminary injunction, found a likelihood of success on plaintiffs’ infringement claim against a state government. 

That case did not involve government copying for internal government use. See supra note 2. Instead, the case 

involved a challenge to a state statute that required testing organizations to disclose copies of their copynghted, 

confidential tests and related materials, and that further provided that such materials, once disclosed, would become 

public records.

There also are at least two decisions in which courts have found that a distnbution of multiple copies of copyrighted 

materials to students in a public school was not a fair use. See Marcus v Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1174—79 (9th

Continued

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Opinions o f the Office o f Legal Counsel in Volume 23

there is only a small handful of reported cases involving whether and under what 

circumstances photocopying is a fair use.10

The sole reported decision (apart from the classroom context) concerning 

whether government photocopying is a fair use is Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 

United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), a jf d by an equally divided Court,

420 U.S. 376 (1975). The plaintiff in that case challenged certain practices of 

the National Institutes of Health ( “ NIH” ) and the National Library of Medicine 

(“ NLM” ). The NIH library ran a photocopying service for the benefit of its 

research staff: On request, researchers could obtain a photocopy of an article from 

any of the journals in the library’s collection, typically to assist them in their 

on-going projects or for background reading. As a general matter, NIH would 

agree to provide a requester only one copy of a particular article, only one article 

per journal issue, and no article of over 50 pages. In 1970, the library filled 85,744 

requests for photocopies of journal articles (including journals published by Williams & Wilkins), constituting about 930,000 pages. See 487 F.2d at 1348. NLM 

is a repository of much of the world’s medical literature, in essence a “ librarians’ 

library.” Id. Upon request, NLM would provide photocopies of journal articles, 

free of charge, to other libraries and like research- and education-oriented institutions, both public and private (including commercial organizations, such as drug 

companies). NLM provided only one photocopy of a particular article per request, 

and would not honor a request for photocopying of an entire journal issue. In 

1968, a representative year, NLM filled about 120,000 requests by photocopying 

journal articles. NLM made no effort to ascertain the ultimate use to which the

Cir. 1983), Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780-81 (8lh Cir 1962) Such classroom cases may be instructive on 

the general matter of fair use in the context of reproduction for nonprofit purposes However, such cases typically 

involve archival collection or distribution o f multiple copies of copynghted materials that were, in the first instance, 

prepared and marketed primarily for use in the very same classroom setting. See, e.g., Marcus, 695 F.2d at 1175 

We assume that the government photocopying practices about which you are concerned will rarely, if ever, involve 

federal government duplication for educational use m a classroom, or practices that fairly can be said to be analogous 

to those at issue in Marcus O f course, insofar as certain federal government practices are akin to those at issue 

in the classroom cases, then the courts’ reasoning in decisions such as Marcus would be germane to the fair use 

analysis (The holding in Wihtol is of less practical value, since the court in that case merely held that “ [w]hatever 

may be the breadth of the doctnne of ‘fair use,’ it is not conceivable to us that the copying of all, or substantially 

all, of a copynghted song can be held to be a ‘fair use’ merely because the infnnger had no intent to infringe ” 

309 F.2d at 780.) Furthermore, with respect to such cases it may be mstrucuve to look to the legislative history 

of the 1976 Act, m which the House Committee on the Judiciary reproduced (i) an “ Agreement on Guidelines 

for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals,” which 

had been drafted by representatives of author/publisher and educational organizations, and (n) a similar, more specialized set of “ Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music,” which had been drafted by representatives of music publishing and educational organizations See House Report at 66-72, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N at 5680-86. The 

House Committee expressed its belief that “ the guidelines are a reasonable interpretation of the minimum standards 

of fair use” in the classroom context, id. at 72, reprinted in 1976 U.S C C A N at 5686, and the House and Senate 

Conferees “ accept[ed]” the guidelines “ as part of their understanding of fair use,” H R Rep No. 94-1733, at 

70 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C A N. 5810, 5811. (On the question of the legal effect, if any, of these guidelmes, 

see, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F3d 1381, 1390-91 (6th Cir 1996) (en 

banc), cert, denied, 520 U S 1156 (1997); id at 1410-12 (Ryan , J., dissenting); 4 Melville B Nimmer & David 

Nimmer, Nimmer on Copynght § 13 05[E][3][a), at 13-241-42 (1998))

l0See, e g , Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d 1381; American Geophysical Union v Texaco, In c , 60 F.3d 913 

(2d Cir 1994), cert, dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995); Duffy v. Penguin Books USA Inc., 4 F. Supp 2d 268, 274- 

75 (S D N.Y 1998), Television Digest, Inc. v United States Telephone Ass'n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9-11 (D.D.C 1993); 

Basic Books, Inc v Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F Supp 1522 (S D N Y 1991)

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Whether Government Reproduction o f Copyrighted Materials is a Noninfringing ' 'Fair Use ’

copied articles were put. Although NLM did provide some photocopies to institutions outside the government, NLM declined to provide to non-government 

libraries copies of articles published within the preceding five years in any of 

104 journals included on a so-called “ widely-available list.” Id. at 1348-49.

The Court of Claims, in a 4-to-3 decision, held that the NIH and NLM 

photocopying practices were noninfringing because such practices were fair uses. 

The majority discussed at length eight separate “ considerations which merge to 

that conclusion,” id. at 1353:

(i) NIH and NLM are nonprofit institutions, see id. at 1354;

(ii) the libraries’ photocopying policies were “ within appropriate 

confines” — in particular, the libraries did not sell the copies, distribute them broadly, or, with slight exceptions by NLM, distribute 

the copies to nongovernmental entities, id. at 1354-55;

(iii) such library photocopying practices had long been carried out 

across the nation “ with apparent general acceptance,” id. at 1355- 

56;

(iv) medical science would be seriously hurt by a finding that such 

library photocopying was infringing, see id. at 1356-57;

(v) the plaintiff had failed to prove economic detriment as a result 

of the libraries’ practices, see id. at 1357-59;

(vi) the statutory language and history were singularly unclear on 

the question, and it would be “ less dangerous” to rule in favor 

of the libraries until Congress acted to clarify the fair use question, 

id. at 1359-61;

(vii) contemporaneous legislative history of proposed legislation 

(that had not yet resulted in the 1976 amendment of the copyright 

law) “ indicate[dj the correctness of our general approach,” id. at 

1361; and

(viii) the law in many foreign countries was that such practices 

were not infringing, see id. at 1361-62.

The Court of Claims in its decision also urged Congress to enact legislation to 

resolve the difficult fair use questions raised by the increasingly prevalent practice 

of photocopying — questions that were, in the court’s words, “ preeminently a 

problem for Congress.” 487 F.2d at 1360; see also id. at 1353, 1363 (“ Hopefully,

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Opinions o f the Office o f Legal Counsel in Volume 23

the result in the present case will be but a ‘holding operation’ in the interim period 

before Congress enacts its preferred solution.” ).

Williams & Wilkins appealed to the Supreme Court. In that Court, the Department of Justice argued that the Court of Claims correctly analyzed the fair use 

question, and that the Court should affirm the judgment in favor of the United 

States. See Brief for the United States, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,

420 U.S. 376 (1975) (No. 73-1279); Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway 113— 

26 (1994) (describing Supreme Court proceedings). An equally divided Court, 

without opinion, affirmed the lower court judgment. See 420 U.S. 376 (1975).

Congress was well aware of the dispute in Williams & Wilkins and of the Court 

of Claims’ plea that Congress enact legislation to resolve the difficult fair use 

questions raised in that case. See, e.g., Senate Report at 71. And, in the 1976 

Act, Congress did take three steps with respect to the matter of photocopying. 

First, in section 106 of the Act, Congress expressly affirmed that the rights of 

a copyright owner include the rights “ to reproduce the copyrighted work in 

copies” and to “ authorize” such reproduction. 17 U.S.C. §106(1) (1994).11 

Second, the text of section 107 of the Act — in which Congress for the first time 

formally codified the fair use doctrine — expressly provides that “ reproduction 

in copies . . . for purposes such as . . . news reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research,” can be “ the fair use of a copyrighted work.” Finally, in section 

108 of the Act, Congress provided that certain forms of library and archival 

photocopying are not infringing, see 17 U.S.C.A. § 108 (West 1996 & Supp. 

1999), thereby creating a discrete carve-out, or safe harbor, that does not “ in 

any way affect[] the right of fair use as provided by section 107,” 17 U.S.C. 

§ 108(f)(4) (1994). However, Congress did not otherwise resolve the fair use questions raised in Williams <£ Wilkins, and, in particular, did not identify the circumstances under which photocopying — and government photocopying in particular— would, or would not, constitute fair use under section 107 of the 1976 

Act.12 Instead, as explained above, Congress simply enacted 17 U.S.C. §107 in

11 As the court in Williams & Wilkins indicated, see 487 F.2d at 1350-51, 1359, there had been some question 

whether, under the then-existing copynght laws, the exclusive nghts of the copyright owner included the right to 

control the copying of books and penodicals for personal use. See also Bnef for the United States at 16 n26, 

Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S 376 (1975) (No 73-1279) (discussing this question).

12 In a memorandum attached to your letter, counsel for the CCC argue that section 108 of the 1976 Act “ expressly 

proscnbes the copymg at issue in Williams & Wilkins,” and that congressional enactment of section 108 “ signalled 

Congressional disapproval of [Williams & Wilkins] on fair use grounds, and instead indicated that the photocopying 

activities in question should be covered by a separate statutory provision, namely Section 108.” Memorandum of 

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Re* Government Photocopying as Copyright Infringement at 22-23 (July 30, 1997) 

(“ Weil, Gotshal M emo” ). See also United States Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and

the National Information Infrastructure: The Report o f the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, at 82 

n.262 (Sept. 1995) (“ White Paper” ) (“ precedential value of Williams & Wilkins may be reduced” because 

of, inter aha, “ Section 108’s proscnption on most ‘systematic’ photocopying” ), quoted with approval in Weil, 

Gotshal Memo at 22; William F. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 210 (2d ed 1995) (“ In 1976, 

Congress by subjecting the activity before the Court of Claims to a statutory exemption m Section 108 of the Copynght Act, available only to hbranes and archives qualifying under Section 108(a) and then only in the enumerated 

instances described in Sections 108(d), 108(e), and further subject to the conditions of Section 108(g), indicated 

its disapproval of the Court of Claims’ fair use holding.” ).

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Whether Government Reproduction o f Copyrighted Materials is a Noninfringing ' ‘Fair Use ’

order to “ codify the common-law doctrine.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549. 

Accordingly, the Court of Claims decision in Williams & Wilkins remains binding 

precedent in the Federal Circuit, where infringement claims against the federal 

government must be brought.13

The continued vitality of Williams & Wilkins in the Federal Circuit does not, 

however, mean that all federal government photocopying is a fair use. The Williams & Wilkins court, after discussing at length the eight different considerations, 

or “ elements,” that contributed to its decision, 487 F.2d at 1353-62, emphasized 

that its holding (that the library copying practices at issue were noninfringing)

This is incorrect, because section 108 of the 1976 Act does not narrow the protection for fair use provided by 

the common-law doctnne codified in section 107 Section 108(a) of the Act, 17 U.S.C A § 108(a) (West 1996 & 

Supp 1999), provides that, under certain conditions, it is “ not an infringement of copynght for a library or archives 

. to reproduce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work, or to distribute such copy or phonorecord,” 

“ [notwithstanding the provisions of section 106.” Section 108(g)(2), in turn, states that “ (t]he rights of reproduction 

and distnbution under this section . . . do not extend” to certain cases involving the “ systematic reproduction 

or distribution of single or multiple copies.” (Emphasis added) Section 108(g)(2) does not “ expressly proscnbe[]” 

the copying practices at issue in Williams & Wilkins — indeed, nothing in section 108 “ proscnbes” any practice 

at all. Nor is there anything in section 108 suggesting that “ systematic” reproduction is “ lawful only via the [section 

108(g)(2)] proviso, [and] could not be a fair use ” United States Copynght Office, Report o f the Register o f Copyrights' Library Reproduction o f Copyrighted Works (17 U.S.C. 108), at 98 (1983) ( “ 1983 Register Report” ) At 

most, section 108(g)(2) merely provides that the “ nghts” to copy and distribute that are provided “ under” section 

108 “ do not extend to” the “ systematic” practices descnbed in section 108(g)(2) To be sure, “ section 108 authorizes certain photocopying practices which may not qualify as a fair use,” House Report at 74 (emphasis added), 

reprinted in 1976 U.S C.C.A N. at 5688, see also Senate Report at 67 However, the statute does not provide, or 

even suggest, that the circumstances under which copying is noninfringing under section 108(a) are those “ lhat 

would typically not amount to fair use [under section 107],” White Paper at 84-85 (emphasis added), nor that 

“ Section 108 was enacted to make lawful some types of copying which would otherwise be infringements of copyright, fair use notwithstanding,” 1983 Register Report at 96 (emphasis added) Indeed, by its express terms, nothing 

in section 108 “ in any way affects the nght of fair use as provided by section 107.” 17 U.S.C § 108(f)(4) (1994); 

see uiso House Report at 74 (“ No provision of section 108 is intended to lake away any nghts existing under 

the fair use doctrine.” ), reprinted in 1976 U .S C C .A N at 5687-88, Senate Report at 67 (same); 122 Cong. Rec. 

3836 (1976) (statement of Sen Magnuson) (“ the Judiciary Committee clearly sel out in iheir report that the 

fair use doctrine not only applies to reproduction practices of libraries, but that in no way did they intend section 

108 to be a limitation upon the fair use doctnne” ).

Accordingly, whether section 108 renders certain copying practices “ not an infringement” does not affect whether 

such practices are noninfringing fair uses under section 107 See Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 28 & n 26 (emphasizing 

that “ Section 108 is a separate special statutory exemption governed by an entirely different set of standards [than 

under section 107],” and rejecting the argument “ that the understanding of Section 107 should be influenced by 

what is permitted under Section 108” ); accord 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright

§ 13.05[E][2], at 13-240 (1998) A certain copying practice can be “ noninfnnging” under section 107, under section 

108, under both provisions, or under neither. In ils 1983 Report, the Register of Copyrights suggested that such 

a construction of the statute, in which practices permissible under section 108 might also be permissible under section 

107, would “ render §108 superfluous.” 1983 Register Report at 96 n.4 That is not the case, however. As the 

Register noted, “ the library community sought § 108 to permit copying that had not been spelled out in the proposed 

fair use provision ” Id. (emphasis added). Section 108 identifies (“ spell[s] out” ) as noninfnnging a category of 

library photocopying that may, or may not, constitute fair use Section 108 thus fairly can be viewed as a very 

valuable— and not superfluous— safe harbor: If a certain library practice is noninfringing under the specific and 

detailed provisions of section 108(a) (as confined by section 108(g)(2)), a library need not be concerned about how 

that particular photocopying practice would fare under section 107’s more complex and indeterminate fair use standards.

13 Section 1498(b) of title 28 provides that “ the exclusive action which may be brought for mfnngement [by 

the federal government] shall be an action by the copynght owner against the United States in the Court of Federal 

Claims ” 28 U.S.C § 1498(b) (Supp. Ill 1997). Decisions of lhat court are appealable to the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, see 28 U S C § 1295(a)(3) (1994), which in turn considers itself bound by 

decisions (such as Williams & Wilkins) that the former Court of Claims issued pnor to October 1982. See South

Corp v. United States, 690 F 2d 1368, 1370 & n.2 (Fed Cir 1982); see also, e.g., Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States,

113 F 3d 1572, 1576 (Fed Cir 1997).

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was based upon all of the elements present in that case, and that its decision 

would not necessarily resolve different cases “ with other significant variables,” 

id. at 1362. The court expressly noted that it was not determining whether any 

of the particular elements in the Williams & Wilkins case would be sufficient 

for a finding of fair use, nor whether all of the relevant elements cumulatively 

were “ essential” to the finding of fair use: It sufficed for the court simply to 

decide that “ at least when all co-exist in combination a ‘fair use’ is made out.” 

Id.\ see also id. (“ we feel a strong need to obey the canon of judicial parsimony, 

being stingy rather than expansive in the reach of our holding” ).14 Implicitly, 

then, the decision in Williams & Wilkins itself suggests that there may be some 

circumstances under which government photocopying might be infringing. See

also Brief for the United States at 14, Williams. & Wilkins Co. v. United States,

420 U.S. 376 (1975) (No. 73-1279) (“ The doctrine is applied as its rationale 

dictates in each case, and has no sharp edges.” ).15

A ‘ ‘per se’ ’ rule also would be inconsistent with the approach that the Supreme 

Court subsequently has taken in its decisions involving section 107 of the Copyright Act. The Court repeatedly has emphasized that the task of determining 

whether a particular use is fair “ is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, 

for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.” 

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; accord id. at 584 (Congress “ ‘eschewed a rigid, 

bright-line approach to fair use,’ ” in favor of “ a ‘sensitive balancing of 

interests.’ ” ) (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 

U.S. 417, 449 n.31, 455 n.40 (1984)); Harper & Row, A ll U.S. at 552 (“ fair 

use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case” ).

III. Determining Whether a Particular Government Photocopying Practice is a

Fair Use

Our conclusion that government photocopying is not invariably noninfringing 

does not, of course, answer the question whether government agencies should 

enter into licensing agreements for photocopying, and if so, what the terms and

14 M ore recent fair use decisions involving photocopying similarly have been confined narrowly to the particular 

copying practices in dispute See, e g , Texaco, 60 F.3d at 931 (“ Our ruling is confined to the institutional, systematic, 

archival multiplication of copies revealed by the record— the precise copying that the parties stipulated should be 

the basis for . . .d ecisio n . ” )

15 As we discuss supra p. 88, we have no reason to believe that any agency of the executive branch has argued, 

or advised, that government copying is “ per se a fair use.” In this respect, it is notable in particular lhat, in its 

Supreme Court brief in Williams <6 Wilkins, the United States cited a House Report as “ indicating] . that 

photocopying by the government may in some circumstances constitute copynght infringement ” B nef for the United 

States at 15 n 24, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (No 73-1279) (citing H.R. Rep. 

No 86-624, at 5 (1959)) In the cited House Report, a House Committee indicated that the federal government 

could infringe a copyright when it “ publishes” an article without permission See supra note 6. The Committee 

did not indicate what it meant by “ publishes,” and did not expressly mention photocopying At the page of the 

House Report (page 5) that the Solicitor General cited, however, a letter wntten by the Department of Commerce 

assumes that government photocopying could be infringing. See also id. at 8 (reflecting a similar assumption conveyed 

by the Librarian of Congress) There is no suggestion in the House Report that the House Committee disagreed 

with this assumption.

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Whether Government Reproduction o f Copyrighted Materials is a Noninfringing “Fair Use ’

conditions of such agreements should be. In answering that question, there is an 

inescapable tension. On the one hand, because of the highly fact-bound nature 

of the fair use inquiry, it is difficult to ascertain in advance which governmental 

practices will, or will not, be fair uses: There is an “ endless variety of situations 

and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases.” House Report 

at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680. Such uncertainty, when viewed 

in isolation, might weigh in favor of entering into relatively broad licensing agreements, so as to ensure that an agency’s photocopying will never be infringing. 

On the other hand, and in addition to the desire to avoid unnecessary costs, there 

is an important legal consideration that counsels against entering into unnecessary 

licensing agreements and in favor of limiting such agreements to encompass only 

those photocopying practices that are infringing — namely, the concern that general custom and usage may be integral to the fair use analysis.16 Indeed, at least 

one court has opined, in particular, that whether it is “ fair,” under the copyright 

law, to engage in a photocopying practice without compensation may depend, 

in part, on whether similarly situated entities customarily agree to pay a fee to 

the copyright holders.17 We have no occasion here to consider whether that court 

was correct in this regard; but it is possible that other courts may follow suit. 

Accordingly, if government agencies routinely agree to pay licensing fees to 

engage in photocopying practices that were fair uses at the time, there is a chance 

some courts may conclude that a growing or longstanding custom of paying such 

fees weighs against a finding that such photocopying practices are fair uses when 

unlicensed. Thus, an agency that decides to negotiate a photocopying license 

should seek to limit the scope of the licensing agreement so as not to cover those 

photocopying practices that the agency, in good faith, concludes are not infringing.

In the end, each agency must do its best to evaluate whether any of its 

photocopying practices are infringing, and, if so, to obtain proper authorization 

for such uses of copyrighted materials. Although, as we have explained, there 

may be many government photocopying practices that are fair uses (or that are, 

for other reasons, not infringing), under some circumstances government 

photocopying may not be a fair use. In evaluating whether their practices are 

infringing, agencies should be guided by Williams & Wilkins, which, as noted 

above, is still binding precedent in the Federal Circuit. However, as explained 

above, the holding in Williams & Wilkins itself was dependent on the particular 

facts of that case, and the 8150 calculus may be different with respect to govern16 See, e g , Williams & Wilkins * 487 F 2 d at 1355-56, see also Harper & Row, 471 U S. at 550 (the fair use 

doctnne traditionally “ was predicated on the author’s implied consent to ‘reasonable and customary’ use when he 

released his work for public consumption” )

17 See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387 (consideration of the potential licensing revenues for photocopying 

in a fair use analysis is “ especially” appropnate where the copynght holder not only has an interest in exploiting 

the licensing market, but also “ has actually succeeded in doing so” ) But c f Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18 (defendants’ request for permission to use copyrighted song in a parody does “ not necessarily suggest that they believed 

their version was not fair use; the offer may simply have been made in a good-faith effort to avoid this litiganon” ).

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ment photocopying practices that diverge in material ways from the NIH and NLM 

practices at issue in Williams & Wilkins.18

Moreover, agencies should be aware that, in two important recent cases in other 

circuits, sharply divided courts of appeals have held that certain commercial 

photocopying practices were not fair uses. In Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan

Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert, denied, 520 

U.S. 1156 (1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 

that a commercial copyshop had engaged in willful infringement by reproducing 

substantial segments of copyrighted works of scholarship and binding such reproductions into coursepacks that the copyshop then sold to students. In American

Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert, dismissed,

516 U.S. 1005 (1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 

held that Texaco’s systematic photocopying of scientific journal articles for its 

researchers’ archival use was infringing. Even if the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Federal Circuit were to adopt the reasoning of these decisions, 

the rationale of those decisions would not apply with full force in the context 

of government photocopying, since the decisions each rested, in part, on the fact 

that each of the defendants “ acquire[d] conspicuous financial rewards from its 

use of the copyrighted material.” Id. at 922; see also Princeton Univ. Press, 99 

F.3d at 1386, 1389. Moreover, as the Texaco court noted, “ courts are more willing 

to find a secondary use [i.e., the use that is made of the photocopies] fair when 

it produces a value that benefits the broader public interest.” 60 F.3d at 922. 

Nevertheless, the ongoing debate among the judges in cases such as these (and 

in Williams & Wilkins) demonstrates that the boundaries of fair use in the 

photocopying context are uncertain, highly contested, and especially dependent 

upon the particulars of a given case. And, while in some cases it might be fairly 

easy for an agency to determine that a government practice is noninfringing,19 

usually that will not be the case: Whether a particular government photocopying 

practice is a fair use often will depend upon a “ ‘sensitive balancing of

18 Moreover, the subsequent advent of the CCC, and the possibility of reasonable licensing agreements with that 

organization, may affect at least one of the factors that led the Court of Claims to rule against the copyright holder 

in Williams & Wilkins. The Court of Claims reasoned that medical science would be seriously hurt by a finding 

that the NIH and NLM photocopying was infringing, since the result of such a holding could have been that libraries 

would have to cease their photocopying practices. See 487 F.2d at 1356-57 But insofar as such libraries now could 

avoid a finding of fair use by agreeing to pay a reasonable and affordable licensing fee — that is, a fee that would 

not materially deter the actual making and use of valuable photocopies — the harm that the Williams & Wilkins

court foresaw could be diminished See Texaco, 60 F 3d at 924 (“ To the extent the copying practice was ‘reasonable’ 

in 1973 [when Williams & Wilkins was decided], it has ceased to be ‘reasonable’ as the reasons that justified it 

before [photocopying licensing] have ceased to exist ’) (quoting the district court opinion, 802 F. Supp. at 25) 

But see id at 934 (Jacobs, J , dissenting).

19 For an example outside the context of photocopying, see, e.g., House Report at 73 (“ The Committee has considered the question of publication, in Congressional hearings and documents, of copynghted material. Where the length 

of the work or excerpt published and the number of copies authonzed are reasonable under the circumstances, and 

the work itself is directly relevant to a matter of legitimate legislative concern, the Committee believes that the 

publication would constitute fair use.” ), reprinted in 1976 U.S C.C A.N at 5687

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Whether Government Reproduction o f Copyrighted Materials is a Noninfringing "Fair U se’

interests.’ ” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting Sony Corp. o f America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984)).

In the text of section 107 of the Copyright Act itself, Congress has instructed 

that, in determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is 

a fair use, ‘ ‘the factors to be considered shall include’ ’ the following:

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 

use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantially of the portion used in relation 

to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 

of the copyrighted work.

These four statutory factors should not be treated in isolation, one from another. 

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. Nor are those factors exhaustive. See Harper & Row,

471 U.S. at 560; H.R. Rep. No. 102-836, at 9-10 (1992), reprinted in 1992 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2561-62.20 Most importantly, it is critical that the statutory 

factors, as well as all other pertinent factors and considerations, “ be explored, 

and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes o f copyright." Campbell,

510 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added); see also id. at 581 (the fair use inquiry requires 

that any particular use of copyrighted material “ be judged, case by case, in light 

of the ends of the copyright law” ).21 Accordingly, before turning to particular 

factors and considerations that agencies should consider in the context of government photocopying, it is important once again to identify the “ purposes of copyright.”

Copyright law “ ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public 

through access to creative works.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517-18, 

527 (1994); see also Harper <£ Row, 471 U.S. at 545 (“ copyright is intended 

to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge” ). Thus, in determining 

whether a particular photocopying practice is a fair use, the ultimate question to 

be answered is whether permitting the government to continue to engage in the 

practice without paying a licensing fee would “ serve[] the copyright objective

20 Section 107 expressly provides that “ the factors to be considered shall include” the four enumerated factors 

(emphasis added), and the 1976 Act elsewhere provides that the term “ including” is “ illustrative and not limitative,”

17 U S.C. § 101 (1994)

21 See also 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13 05[A][5], at 13-195 (1998) (“ the 

protean factors enumerated in Section 107, standing by themselves, lack the concreteness to provide definite answers 

to difficult cases” ); Lloyd L Weinreb, Fair Use, 61 Fordham L. Rev 1291, 1306 (1999) ( “ fair use depends on 

a calculus of incommensurables” ).

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of stimulating productive thought and public instruction without excessively 

diminishing the incentives for creativity.” Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use

Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1110 (1990), cited with approval in Campbell,

510 U.S. at 5 7 8 .2 2

Moreover, although the point is less clearly established, the fair use doctrine 

may be understood to contemplate permitting uses that serve “ not only . . . the 

purpose of copyright but also . . . other socially recognized purposes.” Lloyd 

L. Weinreb, F air’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. 

Rev. 1137, 1144 (1990). For example, the Supreme Court in the Sony case held 

that consumer videotaping of television broadcasts for purposes of “ time-shifting” 

was a fair use, in part because such a practice “ yields societal benefits.” 464 

U.S. at 454. Elaborating on this point, the Court cited the example of using a 

videotaping machine “ to enable a [hospital] patient to see programs he would 

otherwise miss,” which, as the Court explained, “ has no productive purpose other 

than contributing to the psychological well-being of the patient.” Id. at 455 n.40. 

O f greater pertinence to the subject matter at hand — namely, government 

copying — the Court further suggested that “ a legislator who copies for the sake 

of broadening her understanding of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies a news program to help make a decision on how to vote,” 

are examples of uses that could be “ fair.” Id.

Thus, it fairly can be argued that, as a general matter, “ courts are more willing 

to find a secondary use fair when it produces a value that benefits the broader 

public interest,” Texaco, 60 F.3d at 922, in contrast with a use that “ can fairly 

be characterized as a form of ‘commercial exploitation,’ i.e., when the copier 

directly and exclusively acquires conspicuous financial rewards from its use of 

the copyrighted material,” id.23 For instance, the federal government typically 

photocopies materials in order to facilitate some other, “ secondary” use of such 

materials, and such secondary use generally is aimed at providing a public benefit, 

or at serving a “ broad[] public purpose.” Id. Insofar as an agency’s photocopying 

is intended to facilitate such public purposes, that should weigh in favor of a 

finding of fair use.24 See also infra p. 101 (discussing whether purpose of the 

photocopying is to enhance profitmaking).

22 See also, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v Nintendo o f Am., Inc., 975 F 2 d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir 1992) (where, m 

“ reverse engineering” of computer software, “ intermediate” copying permitted the user to study that software and 

thereafter design new video game programs, the resultant “ growth in creative expression” weighed in favor of 

finding that the copying was a fair use).

23See also, eg., Nimmer, § 13.05[B][4], at 13-205 (“ The public interest is also a factor that continually informs 

the fair use analysis ” ) (footnote omitted).

24 See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins, 487 F 2 d at 1353 (“ We cannot believe, for instance, that a judge who makes 

and gives to a colleague a photocopy o f a law review article, m one of the smaller or less available journals, which 

bears directly on a problem both judges are then considering in a case before them is infringing the copynght, 

rather than making ‘fair use’ of his issue of that journal.” ), Key Maps, In c , 470 F. Supp at 38 (county fire marshal’s 

distribution of copies of copynghted maps to 50 fire departments, law enforcement agencies, and civil defense units 

in the county was “ legitimate, fair, and reasonable,” since the copies were disseminated “ solely for internal purposes 

which related to a discemable public interest,” namely, “ the coordination of fire prevention activities in the unincorporated areas of [the] county” ), see also House Report at 65 (noting that, under section 107 of the 1976 Act,

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Whether Government Reproduction o f Copyrighted Materials is a Noninfringing “Fair Use'

In order to decide whether a particular government use of copyrighted materials 

would, on the whole, “ promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” it is 

necessary to take into account an “ ample view of the universe of relevant evidence.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575, 584. Similarly, in order to determine whether 

any other benefits to the broader public interest would sufficiently outweigh the 

costs of any reduction in the incentives for creativity, it is necessary to engage 

in a comprehensive evaluation of all pertinent factors. We think that, in the particular context of government photocopying, the following specific considerations 

(each of which bears on the four enumerated statutory factors) might have a 

significant impact on the fair use calculus:

(a) One important consideration that courts typically address under the first 

statutory factor (“ the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 

use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes” ) is whether 

the use in question is undertaken in order to increase the user’s profits. In most, 

if not all, cases, the purposes for which the government makes photocopies do 

not include profitmaking or commercial exploitation. Although the nonprofit 

nature of the government’s use of photocopies would not be dispositive, see

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584, it certainly would be “ one element,” id., germane 

to the fair use question.25 The commercial/nonprofit distinction may be especially 

significant where, as in most cases of photocopying, the secondary use is not 

“ transformative” — i.e., where the copyrighted material is merely copied in its 

original form and is not transformed into another valuable product. See id. at 579 

(the more transformative the use, the less significant to the analysis will be the 

question of commercialism).26

“ courts might regard as fair” the “ reproduction of a [copynghted] work in legislative or judicial proceedings or 

reports” ), reprinted in 1976 U.S C.C.A N. at 5678-79; Senate Report at 61-62 (same). Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 

at 584-85 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (example of a judicial opinion quoting extensively from copynghted materials), 

Sinai, 1992 WL 470699, at *3 (state Bureau of Automotive Repairs used matenals for a “ public purpose” when 

it disseminated an auto emissions chart to field offices throughout the state so that those offices could assist smog 

check stations and consumers in complying with the state’s emission laws).

25 See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S at 562, Texaco, 60 F 3d at 921-22

26 Counsel for the CCC, citing Campbell, suggest that nontransformative uses “ are unlikely to be regarded as 

fair ones.” Weil, Gotshal Memo at 8 However, the Court in Campbell simply indicated that, because “ the goal 

of copynght, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works, . . . 

(sjuch works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctnne’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of 

copyright, . . . and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 

commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair u s e ” 510 U.S. at 579. The Court expressly cautioned 

that such transformative use “ is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use,” id., and in support of that 

proposition, the Court cited (i) a case (Sony Corp o f Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)) 

in which the Court found a nontransformative use to be noninfringing, and (n) the express indication in section

107 of the 1976 Act that reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distnbution can be a fair use. Id at 579

& n .ll, see also id. at 584—85 (eschewing fair use analysis that relies on a “ hard evidentiary presumption,” in 

light of the need for a “ sensitive balancing” of interests). It is important to note, as well, that the very first example 

that section 107 provides of a use that can be “ fair” is “ reproduction in copies or phonorecords,” even though 

such “ reproduction” in most cases would not be “ transformative” in the sense the Court described in Campbell

See also House Report at 66 (“ the reference [m 17 U.S C. §107] to fair use ‘by reproduction in copies or 

phonorecords or by any other means’ is mainly intended to make clear that the doctrine has as much application 

to photocopying and taping as to older forms of use” ), reprinted in 1976 U.S C C A.N. at 5679.

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(b) Photocopying more likely will be deemed “ fair” where the photocopies 

are disseminated to a discrete and limited audience within the government. To 

the extent that copies are sold, or distributed broadly, especially outside the 

government, that likely would weigh against a finding of fair use. See Williams

& Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353 & n.12, 1354—55. (This consideration likely would 

be germane to the first (“ purpose and character of the use” ) and fourth ( “ effect 

of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work” ) statutory factors.)

(c) Copying that is done “ spontaneously],” for the purpose of facilitating an 

immediate and discrete objective, is more likely to be a fair use than systematic 

“ archival” copying of extensive materials for possible future use. See Texaco,

60 F.3d at 919-20. (This consideration, too, would bear on the first and fourth 

statutory factors.) And, as the third statutory factor expressly indicates, “ the 

amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 

as a whole’ ’ also is relevant to determining whether a use is fair.

(d) Copying materials for the purpose of collecting or studying certain facts 

or ideas contained therein — as opposed to the work’s original expression — 

increases the likelihood that the reproduction will be a fair use. In Feist Publ ’ns,

Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), the Court emphasized that, 

as a matter of constitutional law, “ facts are not copyrightable.” Id. at 344. All 

facts — scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day — ‘ ‘ ‘may not be 

copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every person.’ ” Id.

at 348 (citation omitted); accord Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (“ No author 

may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.” ). Furthermore, 17 U.S.C. 

§ 102(b) (1994) provides that “ [i]n no case does copyright protection for an 

original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method 

of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” The exclusion of facts and ideas 

from copyright protection, like the fair use doctrine, serves the goal of promoting 

the progress of science and useful arts. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 n.5.27 

Accordingly, copyright protection for a work containing facts or ideas “ is limited 

to those aspects of the work — termed ‘expression’— that display the stamp of 

the author’s originality.” H arper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547. Indeed, as the Court 

reemphasized in Campbell, “ ‘facts contained in existing works may be freely 

copied.’ ” 510 U.S. at 575 n.5 (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 359).28 Thus, where 

the government’s copying is limited to the bare facts contained in particular mate27 Moreover, the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopynghtable facts and ideas 

is necessary in order to reconcile the restrictions of the Act with the First Amendment. See Harper & Row, 471 

U.S. at 556, 560, see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring), cited with approval in Harper &. Row, 471 U.S. at 556

28 Thus, for example, the Court in Harper & Row implied that although direct quotations from President Ford’s 

biography were subject to copynght protection, the histoncal facts contained in that biography were not entitled 

to such protection and could be freely copied. See 471 U.S at 565-66 & n.8 (applying copynght analysis only 

to “ verbatim quotes” from the biography, and excluding from infringement consideration historical quotations attnbuted to third parties and to government documents)

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Whether Government Reproduction o f Copynghted Materials is a Noninfringing ‘ ‘Fair Use ’

rials, and there is no copying of protected expression, there is no possibility of 

copyright infringement, and the fair-use question is inapposite.

Moreover, even if a document or book is entitled to some copyright protection, 

nevertheless, as a general matter “ fair use is more likely to be found in factual 

works than in fictional works.” Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990). 

Accordingly, even where the government copies materials that contain protected 

“ expression,” or factual compilations that arrange or select facts in a manner 

sufficiently original to trigger some limited, “ thin” copyright protection,29 the 

photocopying more likely will be a fair use if the purpose of the copying is simply 

to obtain, collect, or study the facts and ideas contained in the materials. This 

will be the case especially where, for purposes of photocopying, the facts and 

ideas cannot readily be segregated from the protected expression, and where the 

government’s copying of the protected expression therefore is merely incidental 

to its copying of unprotected facts and ideas.30

(e) The fourth factor that the statute expressly identifies as relevant to the fairuse analysis is the “ effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 

the copyrighted work.” This factor requires courts “ to consider not only the extent 

of the market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but 

also ‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the 

defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential 

market’ for the original.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (quoting 3 Nimmer

§ 13.05[A][4], at 13-102.61 (1993)). The importance of this factor “ will vary, 

not only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of the 

showing on the other [fair-use] factors.” Id. at 590 n.21.

29“ [T]he copynght in a factual compilation is thin,” extending only to the selection or arrangement of the facts, 

if any, that is original or expressive Feist, 499 U S at 348 As the Court explainedThe mere fact that a work is copynghted does not mean that every element of the work may be protected 

Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright, accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to 

those components of a work that are original to the author. . . Thus, if the compilation author clothes 

facts with an onginal collocation of words, he or she may be able to claim a copynght in this written 

expression. Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not the precise words used 

to present them.

Id at 348-49

30 See. eg., Texaco, 60 F 3d at 925 & n .ll. National Rifle A ss’n o f Am v Handgun Control Fed. o f Ohio, 15 

F 3d 559, 562 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 513 U.S 815 (1994), Texaco, 802 F Supp at 15 (although such a factcentered justification for photocopying “ has some m erit,'’ and is “ ingenious,” it “ simply does not fit the facts 

of the case” ); see also, e g , Atari Games Corp , 975 F 2d at 843 (“ When the nature of a work requires intermediate 

copying to understand the ideas and processes in a copyrighted work, that nature supports a fair use for intermediate 

copying Thus, reverse engineenng object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair 

u s e ” ); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc, 977 F.2d 1510, 1524—26 (9th Cir. 1992). By analogy, in the context 

of publication (rather than mere reproduction) of copynghted materials, the Supreme Court has indicated that it 

may be permissible to copy protected expression verbatim where “ necessary adequately to convey the facts,” or 

where particular expression is “ so integral to the idea expressed as to be inseparable from it ” Harper & Row,

471 U S at 563, see also Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv L Rev. at 1113-15. Perhaps the most 

famous case of this sort is Time Inc v Bernard Geis A ssocs, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S D N Y 1968), in which the 

court held that it was fair use to depict frames from the copyrighted Zapruder film in a book about the Kennedy 

assassination, where there was “ a public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President 

Kennedy,” and where such photographs made the author’s theory of the assassination “ easier to understand,” id

at 146.

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Opinions o f the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 23

The most obvious way in which copying can have an adverse market effect 

is where it directly curtails demand for purchase of the original work, such as 

where an entity uses photocopying in lieu of additional subscriptions of the 

original work that it otherwise would purchase. See, e.g., Texaco, 60 F.3d at 927- 

29. Furthermore, with the advent of the CCC, it now can be argued that the failure 

to pay a licensing fee for the photocopying of materials covered by the CCC 

has an adverse effect on another potential “ market” that was not present at the 

time of Williams & Wilkins — namely, the potential “ licensing fee” market. See,

e.g., Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387-88; Texaco, 60 F.3d at 929-31. 

Because this sort of “ harm” to a licensing fee “ market” could, by definition, 

exist whenever an entity refuses to provide the requested compensation for its 

copies, what is significant is not the simple question of whether any such market 

harm exists, but rather, the magnitude and effect of the harm. “ Market harm is 

a matter of degree.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 n.21.31 Harm to this potential 

“ licensing fee” market, like other forms of market harm, should be germane to 

the fair-use analysis only if, and to the extent that, such harm would deter “ ‘the 

creation and publication of edifying matter.’ ” Id. at 578 n.10 (quoting Leval, 

Toward a Fair Use, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1134). If “ unrestricted and widespread 

[photocopying] of the sort engaged in by the [government],” Campbell, 510 U.S. 

at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted) would not appreciably alter the incentives to create and disseminate the underlying works (and other “ edifying” 

original creations), the harm to the fee “ market” should have correspondingly 

limited impact when evaluating this fair use factor.

Conclusion

There is no “ per se” rule that government reproduction of copyrighted material— including, in particular, government photocopying of copyrighted materials 

for internal government use — automatically qualifies as a fair use under section 

107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. However, government photocopying would 

in many contexts be noninfringing because it would be a “ fair use” ; and there 

are good reasons that, if an agency decides to negotiate photocopying licensing 

agreements, it should seek to limit the scope of any such arrangement to cover 

only those government photocopying practices that otherwise would, in fact, be 

infringing.

RANDOLPH D. MOSS 

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

31 See also W illiam W Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctnne, 101 Harv L. Rev 1659, 1671-72 (1988).

104