Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 20, 2011.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-10-00953-CR

RONNEY WEEMS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 182nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1194236

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Ronney Weems appeals his felony conviction for murder, challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and claiming that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made at the scene and at the police 

station. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of murder, to which 

appellant pleaded ―not guilty.‖ In the jury trial that followed, the evidence showed that
2

emergency responders arrived at appellant‘s home in response to appellant‘s 9-1-1 call 

reporting that his girlfriend, the complainant, had shot herself. 

A firefighter testified that he observed the complainant, who was visibly pregnant,

lying in front of a couch inside the home and a firearm laying beside her underneath a 

coffee table. The complainant had been injured by a gunshot wound to her head. The 

complainant was transported by ambulance to the hospital, where she later died.

1

According to the firefighter, appellant explained at the scene that he and the 

complainant had argued. The complainant brandished a firearm and told him to leave. 

Appellant claimed to have retreated to gather some belongings from another room and

was returning to the living room when he heard a shot. 

Officer Crowder testified that he arrived on the scene and observed paramedics 

tending to the complainant in an ambulance. Upon finding appellant inside the home, the 

officer asked him what had happened. Appellant told the officer that the complainant had 

shot herself and that he did not see the firearm until after she fired the shot. 

Because appellant was in the home at the time of the shooting, Officer Crowder

believed that protocol necessitated testing appellant‘s hands for gunshot residue. The 

officer placed appellant in handcuffs to prevent appellant from washing or wiping his 

hands until the test had been conducted. As he was doing so, the officer explained to 

appellant that the handcuffs were strictly for preservation of evidence. According to the 

officer, appellant appeared to understand the purpose of the handcuffs. At some point

while he was handcuffed, appellant asked to wash his hands; Officer Crowder did not 

observe any blood on appellant‘s hands and declined appellant‘s request.

 

1 Medical records reflect that narcotics were found in the complainant‘s system. Doctors 

delivered the complainant‘s baby by Caesarean section. The baby had a gestational age of approximately 

36 weeks at the time of delivery. According to two healthcare providers, the child suffers from limited 

mental and physical capabilities likely attributable to the gunshot wound the complainant sustained 

shortly before the child‘s birth. 
3

Officer Crowder stated that he was accompanied by a rookie officer at the scene 

and that he explained the procedure of securing the scene and the need for handcuffs to

the new officer. After hearing this explanation, appellant, who was wearing handcuffs,

volunteered that his fingerprints might be on the firearm because he moved it to attempt

resuscitation of the complainant.

A crime scene investigator testified that, upon his arrival, he took photographs of 

the scene, conducted the gunshot-residue test of appellant‘s hands, and collected 

evidence. This investigator discovered that the revolver at the scene was missing a spent 

casing, which should have been located under the hammer inside the cylinder of the 

revolver unless it had been removed. Instead, the revolver contained a live shell inside

and nothing else. The crime scene investigator notified the homicide division that the 

complainant‘s death was not necessarily a suicide. Appellant explained to the crime 

scene investigator that he was facing away and heard a ―pop‖ and that he did not see the 

complainant shoot herself.

Although Officer Crowder testified that he intended for appellant to remain in 

handcuffs for a brief time—for the interval it took for the crime scene investigators to 

arrive and conduct the gunshot-residue test—appellant‘s handcuffs were not removed 

until about an hour-and-a-half later when the homicide investigators arrived and after the 

gunshot-residue test had been performed. According to the record, during the time when 

appellant remained handcuffed, Officer Crowder and the other officers engaged in 

conversation, but they did not direct questions to appellant. Some of the conversations 

involved contacting the complainant‘s next of kin. During those conversations, appellant 

volunteered relevant information. 

Homicide investigators testified that they came to the scene because information 

about the missing fired casing from the revolver was considered a ―red flag‖ about 

whether the complainant had committed suicide. As soon as the homicide investigators 

arrived, appellant‘s handcuffs were removed. In response to questions about what 
4

happened, appellant explained to Investigator Martinez, a homicide investigator, that the 

complainant, who was sitting on a large sofa, placed a blanket over her head, and shot 

herself. Investigator Martinez noted a few inconsistencies in appellant‘s explanation, 

namely, that he did not observe any bullet holes in the blanket and did not locate any 

spent shell casings on the scene. The investigator also noted that most of the blood at the 

scene was in front of the loveseat and on its cushions and not on or near the large sofa. 

But, the investigators stated that they had no information upon which to detain appellant. 

Appellant left the home briefly and returned. Appellant went inside the home and 

answered more questions from the homicide investigators. Officer Crowder heard 

appellant explain that he and the complainant were arguing when the complainant 

produced a firearm and threatened to shoot him. According to appellant‘s explanation, he 

struggled with the complainant over control of the firearm and the complainant 

eventually gained control of the weapon; appellant claimed to have backed away into a 

hallway and that is when he heard the gunshot. At one point, appellant had indicated to 

Officer Crowder that the complainant had been sitting on a loveseat; appellant indicated 

to Investigator Martinez that the complainant had been sitting on the large sofa.

Investigator Martinez testified that he received appellant‘s consent to search the 

home. After examining the revolver found at the scene and noting that a fired casing had 

been removed from the weapon, Investigator Martinez asked appellant about the missing 

fired casing. Appellant did not offer an explanation. 

Investigator Martinez explained to appellant that the police would transport him to 

a police station to give a recorded witness statement about the incident. Appellant was 

placed in handcuffs according to department protocol and transported in a patrol cruiser 

to the police station. Each officer testified that department protocol required any 

individual that is to be transported in a police unit to be handcuffed to ensure officers‘ 

safety; however, the officers did not explain this protocol to appellant.
5

Meanwhile, officers continued their investigation at the scene. After appellant left 

for the police station, officers discovered narcotics under a mattress in appellant‘s home. 

After appellant arrived at the police station, appellant was not advised of his rights

and he was not in handcuffs. The record does not reflect when the handcuffs were 

removed. Appellant gave a recorded statement to Officer Nabors about the events 

surrounding the shooting. In the recorded statement, appellant described attempting to 

take the gun from the complainant‘s hands by grabbing the end of the barrel and that he 

pushed the complainant away from him onto a sofa. In his statement, appellant 

demonstrated for Officer Nabors and explained how the complainant held the revolver 

with her left hand several inches away from her temple on the left side of her head so that 

the trajectory of the bullet would have been straight across her head. Officer Nabors 

replicated appellant‘s actions at trial. The audio recording of appellant‘s statement was 

played in open court during trial.

Sergeant Wyers testified that he arrived at the police station to advise appellant of 

his Miranda rights and to place appellant under arrest for possession of the narcotics

found in appellant‘s home.

2

 Sergeant Wyers also planned to speak with appellant about 

inconsistent statements about the complainant‘s death that appellant made at the scene. 

According to Sergeant Wyers, appellant requested a lawyer at that time, and the officer

ended the interview. Appellant subsequently was arrested and charged with the 

complainant‘s death.

At trial, a medical examiner testified that the complainant suffered a fatal gunshot 

wound to her head. The bullet‘s trajectory began at the top left side of her head, traveled

downward, and lodged in the lower right part of her jaw. The medical examiner opined 

that, based on the presence of stippling, the weapon was held from one to three feet away 

from the complainant‘s head. The medical examiner stated that the wound was atypical 

 

2 The record does not reflect whether appellant was charged with any offense related to the 

narcotics found in his home.
6

of a suicide wound and once characterized the circumstances as ―impossible‖ that the 

complainant shot herself, noting the difficulty in maintaining a distance of one to three 

feet from her head while firing the weapon resulting in the same trajectory. According to 

the medical examiner, given the trajectory of the bullet and the stippling indicative that 

the firearm was held from one to three feet away, it would be ―awkward,‖ but ―possible,‖

for the complainant to have shot herself. The medical examiner testified that it was not 

reasonable to believe that the complainant committed suicide. 

The results from the gunshot-residue test were inconclusive. The test results 

reflect low levels of gunshot residue found on appellant‘s hands, but the forensic 

evidence manager could not state conclusively based on the test results whether appellant 

had fired a weapon. The revolver found at the scene was identified as the firearm that 

fired the bullet lodged in the complainant‘s jaw bone.

The complainant‘s sister testified that she received a call from appellant earlier on 

the day of the complainant‘s death, from the complainant‘s cell phone. Appellant asked 

the complainant‘s sister to send someone to get the complainant from his home. The 

sister testified that the complainant was right-handed. The record reflects that the 

complainant was not depressed and was looking forward to the birth of the baby and the 

upcoming Christmas holiday.

According to appellant‘s testimony at trial, he and the complainant had argued on 

the day before her death because he had cheated on her. Appellant testified that he 

contacted the complainant‘s mother and sister to ask them to pick her up from his home; 

the complainant spent the night at a hotel. She arrived at his home the next morning to 

retrieve her belongings and pulled a weapon from her coat pocket and aimed it at him as 

she sat on the large sofa. Appellant claimed to have struggled with the complainant for 

control of the weapon and that he pushed her down. Appellant testified that he ran from 

the front door of the home and heard the gun fire as he was coming back inside, after 

being away from the home for less than two minutes. He notified authorities that the 
7

complainant had shot herself and attempted to resuscitate her; emergency responders 

arrived shortly thereafter. 

When asked about the inconsistencies between his testimony at trial and his 

recorded statement to authorities, appellant explained that the events unfolded quickly. 

Appellant testified that as he came into the home, he saw the complainant‘s left arm 

raised in a ―gesture‖ and that he did not see the gun fire; he only heard the gun fire.

The jury found appellant guilty as charged. Appellant was sentenced to seventyfive years‘ confinement. Appellant now appeals his conviction, challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court‘s ruling on the suppression of evidence.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In appellant‘s second issue, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the jury‘s verdict that he committed the offense of murder. A 

majority of the judges of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that ―the 

Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court 

should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of 

a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Brooks 

v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (Hervey, J., joined 

by Keller, P.J., Keasler, and Cochran, J.J.); id. at 912–15 (Cochran, J., concurring, joined 

by Womack, J.) (same conclusion as plurality). Therefore, in this case we review the 

evidence under the Jackson v. Virginia standard and do not separately refer to legal or 

factual sufficiency.

In evaluating a legal-sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

The issue on appeal is not whether we, as a court, believe the State‘s evidence or believe 

that appellant‘s evidence outweighs the State‘s evidence. Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 

137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The verdict may not be overturned unless it is 

irrational or unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Matson v. State, 819 
8

S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The trier of fact ―is the sole judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses and of the strength of the evidence.‖ Fuentes v. State, 991 

S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The trier of fact may choose to believe or 

disbelieve any portion of the witnesses‘ testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986). When faced with conflicting evidence, we presume the trier of 

fact resolved conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Therefore, if any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must affirm. McDuff v. 

State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

A person commits the offense of murder if that person intentionally or knowingly 

causes the death of an individual or if that person intends to cause serious bodily injury 

and intentionally or knowingly commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that 

causes the death of an individual. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (West 

2011). 

Appellant claims that the evidence against him is entirely circumstantial. 

Sufficiency of the evidence does not require each fact to point directly and independently 

to a party‘s guilt; rather, the jury‘s verdict will withstand a sufficiency challenge as long 

as the combined and cumulative force of all the circumstances permits the conclusion that 

the jury was rationally justified in finding the accused guilty of each element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1993). 

Although appellant claimed that the complainant shot herself, the medical 

examiner testified that it was not reasonable to believe that the complainant committed 

suicide. See Williams v. State, 294 S.W.3d 674, 687 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2009, pet. ref‘d) (concluding evidence was sufficient to support conviction for capital 

murder based on the medical examiner‘s testimony that a child‘s injuries could not have 

been inflicted in the manner the accused offered as an explanation). The medical 
9

examiner found evidence of stippling on the complainant‘s skin indicative that a firearm 

was held from one to three feet away from the complainant‘s left temple. The trajectory 

of the bullet followed a downward path from the complainant‘s left temple to the back of 

her lower right jaw. At one point, the medical examiner characterized the evidence as 

indicating it was ―impossible‖ that the complainant shot herself. Later, the medical 

examiner characterized such an event as ―possible,‖ yet ―awkward,‖ noting that the

evidence is atypical of the prior one hundred suicide autopsies that he had performed. 

The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony is 

exclusively within the purview of the jury, who apparently chose to believe the medical 

examiner‘s theory over appellant‘s explanation of the events. See Porter v. State, 86 Tex. 

Crim. 23, 215 S.W. 201, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918) (providing that factfinder was 

entitled to credibility determinations of witnesses in case in which accused was convicted 

of murdering his pregnant girlfriend despite appellant‘s contention that the complainant 

committed suicide). Given the medical examiner‘s testimony, it is reasonable for the jury 

to have concluded that the complainant did not shoot herself. See Williams, 294 S.W.3d 

at 687. 

The jury heard testimony from multiple emergency responders and investigators 

that appellant offered inconsistent accounts of what happened. Contrary to appellant‘s 

claims on appeal that every version of his story in giving his recorded statement was 

consistent in that he did not see the complainant shoot herself, the record reflects that 

appellant demonstrated for Officer Nabors that he had seen the complainant hold the 

firearm in her left hand and point it at her head. At other times, appellant denied having 

seen the complainant shoot herself. The jury reasonably could have concluded, based on 

the testimony they heard regarding appellant‘s various versions of the events, that 

appellant was lying and that he was the one who shot the complainant. See Kemmerer v. 

State, 113 S.W.3d 513, 516 & n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref‘d) 

(providing that jury could have viewed an accused‘s changing accounts of what happened 

as evidence of guilt). 
10

Although appellant asserts that no evidence reflects that he shot the complainant, 

the physical evidence did not match appellant‘s inconsistent accounts of what happened.

According to the investigators, some evidence suggests that the complainant‘s death was 

not a suicide. They specifically pointed to the following: (1) the fired bullet casing was 

missing from the chambers of the revolver and only a live round was found in the 

firearm; (2) no holes were found in the blanket that appellant claimed the complainant 

placed over her head before shooting herself; and (3) most of the blood was found on or 

near a loveseat when appellant claimed, in one account, that the complainant was sitting 

on a large sofa at the time of the shooting. Investigators did not locate the fired bullet in 

the chambers of the revolver, and investigators did not ever locate the spent bullet 

elsewhere. Accepting as true that only appellant and the complainant were in the home at 

the time of the shooting, the record reflects that the complainant was incapacitated by the 

gunshot wound and could not have removed the spent shell from the revolver. Likewise, 

an expert testified that the spent casing would not have discharged from the revolver‘s 

chamber, even if the firearm were dropped, and that the fired casing would have had to 

have been manually removed from the chambers. The jury reasonably could have 

believed that the only other person who could have removed the spent casing was 

appellant. 

Appellant asserts that no evidence connected him to the weapon because the 

gunshot-residue tests were inconclusive. According to one witness, an inconclusive test 

indicates that some gunshot residue was found in a sample, but it cannot be concluded 

that the person from whom the sample was taken fired a weapon. Although the tests 

were inconclusive, some residue was detected on each of appellant‘s hands. The forensic 

evidence manager testified that it is easy to remove gunshot residue from a person‘s 

hands by rinsing with water, or even touching a wall or putting his hands in his pocket. 

Officer Crowder noted that appellant‘s hands appeared to have no blood on them even 

though appellant claimed to have used a rag on the complainant‘s wound to stop the 

bleeding. The jury reasonably could have believed from this testimony that appellant 
11

washed his hands and removed the blood and thereby also removed gunshot residue 

before the police arrived. 

The record reflects that the complainant was eager for her baby‘s arrival and 

looked forward to celebrating the upcoming Christmas holiday with an older daughter;

the complainant was not depressed or suicidal. See Porter, 86 Tex. Crim. 23, 215 S.W. at

204 (providing that evidence that the complainant was cheerful, in good humor, jolly, and 

apparently in good spirits shortly before her death was evidence tending to disprove an 

accused‘s contentions that the complainant committed suicide); Horinek v. State, 977 

S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref‘d); (holding evidence was 

sufficient to support conviction for murder instead of a suicide by the victim when the 

evidence showed, in part, that the complainant had plans for the future and was not 

depressed). The State offered evidence that the complainant‘s death was not the result of 

suicide, and a rational finder of fact reasonably could have determined from the 

cumulative force of the circumstantial evidence that the State proved the essential 

elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Porter, 86 Tex. Crim. 

23, 215 S.W. at 204 (providing that evidence supported conviction for murder instead of 

accused‘s claims that the complainant committed suicide); Horinek, 977 S.W.2d at 701 

(holding evidence sufficient to support conviction for murder). We conclude the 

evidence is sufficient to support appellant‘s conviction. Appellant‘s second issue is 

overruled.

RULING ON APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR SUPPRESSION OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first issue, appellant claims the trial court should have granted his motion to 

suppress inculpatory statements he made at the scene and at the police station. According 

to appellant, he was in custody at the time he made those statements, and police officers 

did not advise appellant of his Miranda rights.

We review a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See Villareal v. State, 935 S.W.3d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
12

At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of 

the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 

539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We afford almost complete deference to the trial 

court‘s determination of historical facts supported by the record, as well as to mixed 

questions of law and fact dependent on the determination of a witness‘s credibility and 

demeanor. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We consider 

issues that present purely legal questions under a de novo standard. See id. As relevant 

in the case at hand, a trial court‘s ultimate determination whether an individual was in 

custody presents a mixed question of law and fact. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 

526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

The State may not use exculpatory or inculpatory statements stemming from the 

custodial interrogation of an accused unless procedural safeguards were effectively used 

to secure the accused‘s privilege against self-incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The Texas Legislature has

codified these procedural safeguards in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. 

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 (West 2005). Specifically, article 38.22, section 3 

prohibits the admission of an accused‘s oral statement made as a result of custodial 

interrogation unless, among other prerequisites, the Miranda warnings and one additional 

warning prescribed in article 38.22 were given, and the accused knowingly, intelligently 

and voluntarily waived any rights set out in the warnings. See id. § 3(a).

At the suppression hearing, Officer Crowder, Investigator Martinez, Officer 

Nabors, and Sergeant Wyers testified. The officers each described their respective roles 

in the investigation surrounding the complainant‘s death. Each officer undertook 

separate parts of the investigation at or about the same time. The investigation was a 

fluid process that unfolded bit by bit as the officers compiled information and evidence 

simultaneously. The trial court ruled that appellant was not in custody when he made the 

statements at the scene and at the police station. The trial court found that there was no 
13

probable cause for a formal arrest ―even up to the very end of the conversations.‖ 

According to the trial court‘s findings, appellant was not significantly deprived of his 

freedom, and he was not under arrest, in custody, or clearly the focus of a murder 

investigation at the time he gave statements to the officers. The trial court found 

appellant‘s statements to be voluntary and that—even to the extent appellant was being 

interrogated—because he was not in custody—officers were not required to have given

appellant Miranda warnings.

It is undisputed that the officers did not give appellant these warnings until 

Sergeant Wyers spoke with appellant at the police station. When appellant asked for an 

attorney, Sergeant Wyers terminated the interview. Appellant refers to being handcuffed 

for a long period of time and being in a ―strong police presence over a matter of hours‖ as 

creating a situation in which he was not free to leave, and was in police custody, such that 

his statements made at the scene and at the police station should have been suppressed. 

Consequently, we must determine whether the statements appellant made at the scene and 

at the police station (before Sergeant Wyers read appellant these warnings) were made as 

a result of custodial interrogation. 

―Custodial interrogation‖ means ―questioning initiated by law enforcement 

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom 

of action in any significant way.‖ Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. ―A person is in  ̳custody‘ 

only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of 

movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.‖ Dowthitt v. 

State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 

U.S. 318, 322, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994)). Under this reasonable-person 

standard, we presume that person is innocent. Id.

The ―custody‖ determination must be made on a case-by-case basis considering all 

objective circumstances of the interrogation. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323; Dowthitt, 931 

S.W.2d at 255. We consider four factors in determining whether a person is in custody: 
14

(1) probable cause to arrest; (2) subjective intent of the police officers; (3) focus of the 

investigation; and (4) subjective belief of the accused. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254. The 

subjective intent of law enforcement officers to arrest is irrelevant unless the intent is 

somehow communicated or otherwise manifested to the suspect. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.3d at 

254.

Four general situations may constitute custody: (1) when a suspect is physically 

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; (2) when a law-enforcement 

officer tells a suspect he cannot leave; (3) when a law-enforcement officer creates a 

situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement 

has been significantly restricted; and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and lawenforcement officers do not tell the suspect he is free to leave. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.3d at 

255. The mere fact that an interrogation begins as noncustodial does not prevent custody 

from arising later; police conduct during the encounter may cause a consensual inquiry to 

escalate into custodial interrogation. Id. at 255. A person is ―in custody‖ only if, under 

the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of 

movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. See Stansbury, 

511 U.S. at 322; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254.

The record does not reflect that any officer communicated to appellant that he was 

not free to leave. The record reflects two times in which appellant was placed in 

handcuffs, both of which were intended as protocol for an ongoing investigation or for 

officer safety. Even though Officer Crowder testified that appellant was not free to leave 

once he placed appellant in handcuffs at the scene for preservation of evidence, the 

officer did not tell appellant he was not free to leave. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254 

(requiring manifestation by words or conduct of an officer). According to the record, 

appellant appeared to understand that the handcuffs were intended for preservation of 

evidence. The record reflects that after appellant‘s handcuffs were removed at the scene, 
15

he was free to leave—and, in fact, did leave the house briefly to go outside before 

returning inside to speak with officers and ultimately depart for the police station.

Appellant complains that officers detained him, handcuffed him, and participated 

in a ―show of force‖ that made it obvious he could not leave. A person may be detained 

for the purpose of conducting a police investigation without being ―in custody.‖ See id. 

An officer conducting a temporary investigative detention may use such force as is 

reasonably necessary to effect the goal of detention: investigation, maintenance of status 

quo, or officer safety. See Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 771; Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 

117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Dang v. State, 99 S.W.3d 172, 182–84 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2002), reversed on other grounds by, 154 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2005) (concluding that a juvenile‘s temporary detention inside of a police patrol 

unit for two-and-a-half hours was not unreasonable because the record did not reflect that 

the pace of the investigation at the scene was unreasonable). Being in handcuffs does not 

automatically equate with being in police custody or under arrest. See Balentine, 71 

S.W.3d at 771; Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2008, pet. ref‘d) (citing Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 771). Officer Crowder testified that he 

placed appellant in handcuffs for the purpose of preserving evidence until the gunshotresidue test had been conducted. Officer Crowder explained to appellant that the need for 

handcuffs was to preserve any evidence and was protocol for any witnesses present in the 

home at the time of the shooting; appellant appeared to understand this explanation. An 

officer may place an accused in handcuffs in order to safely investigate the scene and 

preserve the status quo. See Zayas v. State, 972 S.W.2d 779, 790 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi 1998, pet. ref‘d) (concluding trial court had enough information to have 

reasonably concluded that an accused was not under arrest when officer immediately 

conducted investigation on the scene and questioned the accused). The record reflects 

that for the duration appellant was in handcuffs at his home, the investigation was 

ongoing. See Dang, 99 S.W.3d 172, 182–84. As to appellant‘s assertion that the officers 

on the scene demonstrated a ―show of force,‖ the record reflects that Officer Crowder 
16

entered the home with his weapon unholstered because he was not certain whether the 

scene had been secured after the shooting or whether more people were in the home with 

firearms; the record does not reflect that officers drew their weapons at any other time at 

the scene. Just because appellant was the focus of an investigation did not convert the

investigative detention into custody or an arrest. See State v. Stevenson, 958 S.W.2d 824, 

829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

Appellant claims that the presence of the crime-scene investigators and the 

homicide investigators at the scene demonstrated the officers‘ subjective intent that the 

officers had developed probable cause to arrest and that they were not investigating a 

suicide. But, each of the officers testified that he had no probable cause to arrest 

appellant. The officers testified that they were investigating a suicide. As the 

investigation continued to unfold, additional information came to light, but the officers 

testified that they did not have probable cause to arrest appellant. The trial court was in 

the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. See Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 

581. According to the officers, at no point prior to appellant being Mirandized was he 

under arrest. See Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 293–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)

(involving evidence that officers did not have probable cause to arrest an accused). 

Appellant complains he was told to make a formal statement at the station and was 

transported in a marked patrol cruiser while he wore handcuffs, amounting to custody. 

Stationhouse questioning in and of itself does not constitute custody. Nickerson v. State, 

312 S.W.3d 250, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). The record 

reflects that Sergeant Wyers and Investigator Martinez each explained to appellant the 

purpose in speaking with him both at the scene as part of the investigation and later in 

appellant‘s giving a formal, eyewitness statement at the police station to aid the 

investigation. According to Investigator Martinez, appellant appeared willing to go to the 

station and give the statement. See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 294 (involving evidence that 

appellant appeared to go voluntarily to a sheriff‘s office to talk to officers). If police 
17

officers request that a person speak with them and the person is acting on this request 

without force, threat, or coercion, then the act is voluntary and the person is not in 

custody. See Nickerson, 312 S.W.3d at 257 (concluding that accused was not in custody 

even when some evidence at the suppression hearing reflected that as many as twenty 

officers with guns drawn had taped brown bags to the accused‘s handcuffed hands, but

when the accused was not threatened or forced to go with the officers in an unmarked 

police cruiser to police station to make a voluntary statement as requested by officers); 

Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 580 (concluding that accused voluntarily accompanied the officers 

to the station and subsequent handcuffing did not transform the accompaniment into an 

arrest). The record reflects sufficient evidence to determine that appellant voluntarily 

accompanied the officers to the police station. See Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 580.

The officers testified that department protocol, for the officers‘ safety, required 

handcuffing any witness or suspect who was to be transported in a police unit. Placing 

appellant in handcuffs is reasonably necessary force to effect officer safety. See 

Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 771. Moreover, placing a person in handcuffs does not 

automatically mean that person is in custody. See Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 580. The 

officers claimed to have had no probable cause to arrest appellant at the time appellant 

left the scene and that appellant was not a suspect at the time he departed for the police 

station. See id. (involving evidence that officers had no probable cause to arrest a witness 

who was involved in incident, but handcuffed the witness during transport to the police 

station to give a formal statement of the incident). Sergeant Wyers answered 

affirmatively when asked specifically, ―Did you explain to the defendant about going to 

the station and getting a formalized statement?‖ The record does not affirmatively reflect 

that the officers explained to appellant that handcuffs were part of protocol in 

transporting witnesses. An officer‘s motivation in handcuffing a witness for officer 

safety, without explaining why the handcuffs were used, does not speak to how the 

officer‘s actions would be reasonably understood. See id. at 582. However, the record 

reflects the following: appellant was told by at least two officers of the purpose in giving 
18

a formal eyewitness statement at the station and he appeared to understand; he voluntarily 

accompanied the officers to the station; he was placed in handcuffs only after consenting 

to accompany the officers; the handcuffs were used for the relatively short trip to the 

station3; and the handcuffs were removed shortly after arriving at the station. See id. at 

580–82 (involving evidence that handcuffs were placed on witness after he consented 

accompany officers in a police unit to give statement at stationhouse thirty miles away

and the handcuffs were removed upon arrival at police station). In considering the 

totality of the circumstances, an objective person reasonably could have believed 

appellant was a witness who was voluntarily accompanying officers to give a statement 

of the events he saw and that he was not in custody. See id. at 582 (considering officer‘s 

subjective intent manifested in words to the accused).

In sum, having considered all the objective circumstances, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellant was not significantly 

deprived of his freedom and he was not under arrest, in custody, or the focus of a murder 

investigation at the time he gave statements to the officers at the scene and later at the 

police station while making his recorded statement. See Nickerson, 312 S.W.3d at 257. 

Based on the evidence, appellant was not physically deprived of his freedom, never told 

he could not leave, never restricted in his movement in a way that would be tantamount 

to arrest, or a subject with enough probable cause to arrest him at the scene. See id. 

Likewise, appellant was not in custody when he was escorted from his home to the police 

station. See id. For this reason, article 38.22 was not applicable in that appellant was not 

in custody at the time he made any of the statements. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 

art. 38.22. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant‘s motion to 

suppress the statements appellant made at the scene and at the police station. See Turner, 

252 S.W.3d at 580. Appellant‘s second issue is overruled.

 

3 The record suggests that the drive to the station could have been as short as fifteen minutes.
19

Having overruled each of appellant‘s issues, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Seymore, and Jamison.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).