COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 22, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2023AP757 Cir. Ct. No. 2000GN206

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PLACEMENT OF

B.L.M.:

RACINE COUNTY,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

B.L.M.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Racine County: 

WYNNE P. LAUFENBERG, Judge. Affirmed. 
No. 2023AP757

2

¶1 LAZAR, J.1 Bonnie2appeals from the 2021 order continuing her 

protective placement. She raises (for the first time) the question of whether the 

circuit court lost competency to proceed with the review of her protective 

placement under WIS. STAT. ch. 55 when it failed to appoint (or reappoint) a 

guardian ad litem under § 55.18 after Racine County filed an annual report in 

2021. She further contends that this was a violation of a statutory time limit, and 

as such, her challenge was not waived when she did not raise it before the circuit 

court. The County notes that a guardian ad litem was appointed in 2019 and never 

discharged until 2022, when a new guardian ad litem was appointed. It argues that 

the circuit court retained competency over Bonnie’s protective placement 

proceedings because the court was not required to reappoint a guardian ad litem 

each year and that Bonnie either waived her right to challenge competency on 

appeal or that any errors below in that regard were harmless. 

¶2 After a careful review of statutory provisions and relevant case law, 

this court concludes that the circuit court was not required to reappoint a guardian 

ad litem each year. The circuit court retained competency, and there is no 

potential violation of a statutorily mandated time limit. Thus, Bonnie’s challenge 

could be—and was—waived when it was not raised in the circuit court. 

Accordingly, this court affirms the order of the circuit court.

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2021-22). 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.

2

 This court refers to the subject individual by a pseudonym pursuant to WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.19(1)(g), to protect her confidentiality.
No. 2023AP757

3

BACKGROUND

¶3 As far back as 2000, the County first filed a petition for guardianship 

for Bonnie when she was found unresponsive and ataxic.3 She was diagnosed 

with alcohol dementia4and significant memory impairment and found to be 

unable to live independently. Since at least 2005, Bonnie has also been placed in 

protective placement in Racine County (most often in a locked facility). 

¶4 Every year before this appeal, the County filed petitions and annual 

reports seeking to maintain Bonnie’s protective placement and the guardians ad 

litem filed responsive reports. The Record shows that the first guardian ad litem 

(GAL) Report, by Attorney Francis J. Endejan, was filed in June 2006.5 Attorney 

 

3

 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “ataxia” as “an inability to coordinate 

voluntary muscular movements that is symptomatic of some central nervous system disorders and 

injuries and not due to muscle weakness.” Ataxia, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 

https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ataxia (last visited Nov. 8, 2023).

4

 Bonnie was further diagnosed with Wernicke’s encephalopathy as well as Korsakoff’s 

syndrome. Wernicke’s encephalopathy is “an acute inflammatory hemorrhagic encephalopathy 

that is caused by thiamine deficiency (such as that associated with chronic alcoholism or 

malnutrition) and is characterized by loss of muscle coordination, visual disturbances (such as 

abnormal eye movement and diplopia), and confusion and memory loss.” 

Wernicke’s encephalopathy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER MEDICAL DICTIONARY, https://merriamwebster.com/medical/Wernicke%27s%20encephalopathy (last visited Nov. 8, 2023). That

affliction can lead to Korsakoff’s syndrome, which is “a chronic memory disorder that is caused

by brain damage related to a severe deficiency of thiamine (as that associated with alcoholism or

malnutrition) and is characterized by impaired ability to form new memories and by memory loss

for which the patient often attempts to compensate through confabulation.” 

Korsakoff syndrome, MERRIAM-WEBSTER MEDICAL DICTIONARY, https://merriamwebster.com/medical/Korsakoff%20syndrome (last visited Nov. 8, 2023).

5 The order appointing that guardian ad litem is not in the Record.
No. 2023AP757

4

Endejan filed a second GAL Report in May 2007.6 On March 13, 2008, Attorney 

Endejan was discharged as guardian ad litem by court order. On April 30, 2008, 

the probate court commissioner appointed Attorney Walter Joseph Kryshak as 

Bonnie’s new guardian ad litem. No County petition had been filed nor were there

any pending hearings at that time. On September 8, 2008, Attorney Kryshak filed 

his first GAL Report7following the County’s August 15, 2008 petition for annual 

review of protective placement. 

¶5 On April 21, 2009, a new guardian ad litem (James W. Pruitt) was 

appointed.8 On August 4, 2009, the County filed its petition for annual review, 

and Attorney Pruitt filed his GAL Report9 on September 8, 2009. For the next 

nine years, Attorney Pruitt filed GAL Reports following each petition for annual 

review by the County.10 All GAL Reports were on the same state forms with the 

 

6

 The May 2007 report filed by Attorney Endejan was submitted on the State of 

Wisconsin’s fillable Form GN-4110 entitled “Report and Recommendation of Guardian ad Litem 

(Annual Review of Protective Placement)” pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 55.18(2). The form states 

that it cannot be modified and it begins with the preliminary phrase that the “report is being filed 

within 30 days of [the GAL’s] appointment.” Obviously, that statement was not correct.

7

 This GAL Report was also on Form GN-4110 and contained the certification that it was 

being filed within 30 days of the GAL’s appointment. Again, that statement is not accurate.

8

 There is no order in the Record indicating that Attorney Kryshak’s guardian ad litem 

appointment was terminated.

9

 This Report, too, was filed on Form GN-4110 and contained the same certification.

10

 After the August 13, 2010 petition, a GAL Report by Attorney Pruitt was filed on 

September 14, 2010. Petitions and GAL Reports, respectively, were then filed as follows: 

August 15, 2011, and September 13, 2011; August 9, 2012, and August 31, 2012; August 8, 

2013, and September 13, 2013; August 7, 2014, and September 9, 2014; August 6, 2015, and 

September 2, 2015; August 15, 2016, and September 13, 2016; August 17, 2017, and 

September 12, 2017; and July 26, 2018, and September 11, 2018. 
No. 2023AP757

5

same certification.11 Only one time during those ten years was Attorney Pruitt 

appointed again as Bonnie’s guardian ad litem. 

¶6 Attorney Noah Wishau was appointed12 guardian ad litem on 

June 12, 2019. From 2019 through 2022 (when a new13 guardian ad litem was 

appointed), Attorney Wishau filed three GAL Reports following petitions for 

review by the County, all but one within thirty days from the petition filing date.

(The petition dates and GAL Report dates are as follows: August 27, 2019, and 

September 16, 2019; September 18, 2020, and October 19, 2020; and August 19, 

2021, and October 18, 2021.)

¶7 All of Bonnie’s guardians ad litem used the same form for their 

GAL Reports: Wisconsin State Form GN-4110. While the form was revised four

times over the course of Bonnie’s guardianship and protective placement, it 

consistently contained the boilerplate certification that the report was being filed 

within thirty days after appointment of a guardian ad litem. In almost every filing 

since 2006, that certification was inaccurate in Bonnie’s case. There is no way to 

modify or remove that line from the form.

 

11

 A different GAL Report (for guardianship due to incompetency), Wisconsin Form 

GN-3160, was also filed by Attorney Pruitt on October 7, 2011 in response to a request to change 

Bonnie’s guardian. That form did not include the thirty-day certification. 

12

 Without explanation in the Record, another attorney was appointed guardian ad litem 

on January 24, 2019, but that attorney never filed a report and Attorney Wishau was appointed six 

months later. No County reports were on file and no hearings were pending when either guardian

ad litem appointment was made.

13

 Attorney Megan McGee Norris was appointed on July 27, 2022, and, following a 

petition by the County on August 11, 2022, she filed a GAL Report on September 6, 2022. 
No. 2023AP757

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¶8 Bonnie’s appeal looks back only to 2019 when Attorney Wishau was 

appointed as her fifth guardian ad litem. She asserts that, because his appointment 

was not made again in 2020 (after the County filed its September 2020 petition for 

review and continuation of Bonnie’s protective placement) or in 2021 (after the 

County’s August 2021 petition) the circuit court lost competency to hold the 

review hearing following Attorney Wishau’s October 18, 2021 GAL Report. The 

circuit court did hold a due process hearing on December 20, 2021, and ordered a 

continuation of Bonnie’s protective placement that same date. 

¶9 The court also ordered continuation of protective placement on 

October 28, 2022. Bonnie appealed on May 2, 2023, challenging the 

December 2021 circuit court order. Bonnie’s competency challenge is first raised 

before this court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 This court reviews independently the question of law whether a 

circuit court has lost competency. Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 

79, ¶7, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190. “Whether an objection to the 

competency of the circuit court can be waived is also a question of law that [this 

court] review[s] de novo.” Id. Likewise, questions involving statutory 

interpretation are questions of law that this court reviews de novo. Fond du Lac 

County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, ¶10, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179; Reyes 

v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 357, 364-65, 597 N.W.2d 687 (1999); see also 

State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44-51, 271 

Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. “Finally, when engaging in statutory 

interpretation, [this court is] assisted by prior decisions that have examined the 
No. 2023AP757

7

relevant statutes.” State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶20, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 

848.

¶11 To the extent that there are any circuit court findings of fact that are 

on appeal, they are not to be overturned unless they are “clearly erroneous.” 

Walworth County v. Therese B., 2003 WI App 223, ¶21, 267 Wis. 2d 310, 671 

N.W.2d 377 (quoting Coston v. Joseph P., 222 Wis. 2d 1, 22, 586 N.W.2d 52 (Ct. 

App. 1998)). A circuit court’s “factual findings will be upheld as long as they are 

supported by any credible evidence or reasonable inferences that can be drawn 

therefrom.” Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. DEC Int’l, Inc., 220 Wis. 2d 840, 845, 

586 N.W.2d 691 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of 

Wis., 217 Wis. 2d 94, 102, 579 N.W.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 223 Wis. 2d 

417, 588 N.W.2d 26 (1999)).

DISCUSSION

¶12 The legislature took care to enact a statutory provision to provide a 

protective placement system for certain vulnerable citizens that was “designed to 

encourage independent living and to avoid protective placement whenever 

possible.” County of Dunn v. Goldie H., 2001 WI 102, ¶29, 245 Wis. 2d 538, 629 

N.W.2d 189 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 55.02). The purpose of WIS. STAT. ch. 55 is 

spelled out in § 55.001:

The legislature recognizes that many citizens of the state, 

because of serious and persistent mental illness, ...

developmental disabilities, or other like incapacities, are in 

need of protective services or protective placement. [These

services] should, to the maximum degree of feasibility ... 

allow the individual the same rights as other citizens, and 

... protect the individual from financial exploitation, abuse, 

neglect, and self-neglect. This chapter is designed to 

establish those protective services and protective 

placements, to assure their availability to all individuals 

when in need of them, and to place the least possible 
No. 2023AP757

8

restriction on personal liberty and exercise of constitutional 

rights consistent with due process and protection from 

abuse, financial exploitation, neglect, and self-neglect.

¶13 Our supreme court, concerned that protective placements under WIS.

STAT. ch. 55 were “indefinite in duration and thereby [were] tantamount to a life 

sentence to a nursing home or other custodial setting,” held that the former 

statutory provisions violated equal protection because there were “no periodic, 

automatic reexaminations of the need for continued placement.” State ex rel. 

Watts v. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd., 122 Wis. 2d 65, 76-77, 362 N.W.2d 104 

(1985). Accordingly, “[t]he Watts court established rules for extending Chapter 

55 protective placements.” Goldie H., 245 Wis. 2d 538, ¶25. 

It required an annual review by a judicial officer and the 

appointment of a guardian ad litem, who is to meet with the 

protectively placed person, review the protective service 

agency’s report, and after consultation with the protectively 

placed individual, report to the court with recommendations 

regarding the need for protective placement. 

Id.

¶14 This appeal asks this court to examine part of that annual judicial 

review procedure and challenges the competency of the circuit court due to the 

fact that a guardian ad litem was not reappointed every year for Bonnie.

I. The circuit court did not lose competency.

¶15 “The circuit court’s competency refers to its ‘ability to exercise the

subject matter jurisdiction vested in it’ by Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 

Constitution.” State v. Green, 2021 WI App 18, ¶64, 396 Wis. 2d 658, 957 

N.W.2d 583 (quoting Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶¶8-10). A circuit court’s 

competency is implicated “when the failure to abide by a statutory mandate is 

‘central to the statutory scheme.’” Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶10 (citation omitted).
No. 2023AP757

9

A. The statute does not require annual reappointments of guardians

ad litem.

¶16 The statute in question does not reference the duration or termination 

of a guardian ad litem. WISCONSIN STAT. § 55.18(2) states only that “[a]fter a 

county department has filed a report with the court under sub. (1)(a)1., the court

shall appoint a guardian ad litem in accordance with s. 757.48(1).” The referenced 

statutory provision, WIS. STAT. § 757.48(1), likewise does not list the duration of a 

guardian ad litem’s service, nor does it state when the appointment should be 

terminated. It merely speaks to the necessary qualifications of a guardian ad litem. 

¶17 “[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; 

not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 

closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” 

Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. It necessarily follows that the court may not add 

language to a statute. This canon of construction was nicely summarized by our 

supreme court in State v Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶¶22-23, 390 Wis. 2d 248, 938 

N.W.2d 521, as follows:

 We also attempt “to give reasonable effect to every 

word, in order to avoid surplusage,” [Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 

633, ¶46], and apply the fundamental canon of statutory 

construction that “[n]othing is to be added to what the text 

states or reasonably implies[.]” Id.; Antonin Scalia & 

Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of

Legal Texts 93 (2012). “A matter not covered is to be 

treated as not covered.” Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 

2019 WI 58, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 N.W.2d 480

(quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 93).

 “One of the maxims of statutory construction is that

courts should not add words to a statute to give it a certain 

meaning.” Fond du Lac Cty. v. Town of Rosendale, 149 

Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989)

(citation omitted); see also Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 

2011 WI 77, ¶42, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316 (“We 

decline to read into the statute words the legislature did not 

see fit to write.” (citation omitted)); State v. Wiedmeyer, 
No. 2023AP757

10

2016 WI App 46, ¶13, 370 Wis. 2d 187, 881 N.W.2d 805

(“It is not up to the courts to rewrite the plain words of

statutes[.]”). “[R]ather, we interpret the words the 

legislature actually enacted into law.” State v. Fitzgerald, 

2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165.

Id. (alterations in original).

¶18 Bonnie appears to be asking this court to add words into the relevant 

statute. She argues that it is not just that a circuit court “shall” appoint a guardian 

ad litem after an annual report is filed, but that the appointment must be made 

immediately after such a filing. And, she asserts that the appointment somehow 

expires right after a hearing is held so that it must be made immediately after each 

filing. None of those words are included in the statute. It is not this court’s 

“function to add language or exceptions to a statute because the statute, as written, 

may seem unwise.” A. & A.P. v. Racine County, 119 Wis. 2d 349, 355, 349 

N.W.2d 743 (Ct. App. 1984). In this case, it cannot even be said that the statute as 

written is unwise. Bonnie is correct that the County’s filing of a report “triggers” 

the appointment of a guardian ad litem, but she is incorrect that the statute 

demands that a guardian ad litem appointment is terminated after a hearing or that 

reappointments are required annually. Her position, aside from being contrary to 

the plain language of the statute, is frankly absurd and unreasonable for several 

reasons.

¶19 First, the legislature has clearly sought to protect the rights and 

interests of individuals deemed to need guardianships and protective placements. 

See WIS. STAT. § 55.001. That explains why guardians ad litem are to be 

appointed for these vulnerable individuals. Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 84-85. Such 

guardians ad litem are to speak with and garner the wishes of their wards; they are 

to understand what is in the best interest of their wards. See Goldie H., 245 

Wis. 2d 538, ¶25. 
No. 2023AP757

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¶20 This leads to the second reason: a guardian ad litem who has had the 

opportunity to speak with and observe the ward over more than just a month or 

two provides better assistance to the circuit court and support to the ward. See 

Helen E.F., 340 Wis. 2d 500, ¶26 (guardians ad litem provide “a second set of 

watchful eyes sensitive to [the ward’s] needs at each step of the commitment 

process”). Individuals who are subject to protective placements may have mental 

or physical disabilities that change over time and a guardian ad litem who has a 

relationship built over time with the ward has a better ability to more fully apprise 

the court of the ward’s current condition, circumstances, and wishes. 

¶21 Also, it makes little sense to terminate guardians ad litem after the 

court’s hearing and protective placement order; better that they should remain in 

place in case the ward has any issues or concerns that arise in the time between a 

court order and the next petition. An automatic termination of the appointment

runs the significant risk that the ward would be left without an advocate for ten 

months out of each year. As our supreme court explains in Helen E.F., a guardian 

ad litem “must file periodic reports with the court outlining the need for continued 

protective placement and services, see [WIS. STAT.] § 55.18(2), and the need for 

continued involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, see [WIS. STAT.]

§ 55.19(2).” 340 Wis. 2d 500, ¶27. Thus, there are duties that remain even after a 

protective placement order has been executed. 

¶22 Finally, turning to practical and logistical matters, there is a limited 

pool of individuals who are available for guardian ad litem appointments. 

Reappointments may diminish that pool or create conflicts of interest. And 

continually appointing, terminating and reappointing the same attorney could

cause multiple billing accounts and a waste of judicial time and resources.
No. 2023AP757

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¶23 “The purposes underlying a statute are also useful in ascertaining a 

statute’s meaning.” Soto, 343 Wis. 2d 43, ¶20. WISCONSIN STAT. ch. 55

“implicate[s] the rights of thousands of persons who have been protectively placed 

in Wisconsin institutions because of the infirmities of age, chronic mental illness, 

developmental disabilities, or similar incapacities.” Goldie H., 245 Wis. 2d 538, 

¶4. It was enacted to “address the legislature’s concern that these citizens be given 

the maximum freedom with the minimum restriction that their troubled conditions 

allow.” Id. There is no question that “[t]he legislature has consistently 

demonstrated its concern for the protection of individuals suffering from mental 

[and other] infirmities.” Helen E.F., 340 Wis. 2d 500, ¶11.

¶24 WISCONSIN STAT. chs. 51 and 55 provide distinct and unique 

protective statutes that were designed to protect distinct sets of individuals. Watts, 

122 Wis. 2d at 74-75. It is only in ch. 55, however, that the legislature has 

mandated that wards shall have their interests protected by a guardian ad litem. 

Helen E.F., 340 Wis. 2d 500, ¶24; § 55.10(4)(b). This is because “[t]he 

appointment of a GAL ensures that individuals like [Bonnie] are provided 

adequate and specialized care.” See Helen E.F., 340 Wis. 2d 500, ¶24. The 

legislature put this provision in place 

because it recognized that individuals subject to the chapter 

need an additional advocate for their best interests, given 

that ch. 55 is focused on the provision of long-term care to 

individuals with incurable conditions. See § 55.195(1-9) 

(explaining the duties of the GAL); see Jennifer M. v. 

Maurer, 2010 WI App 8, ¶7, 323 Wis. 2d 126, 779 N.W.2d 

436 (stating that a GAL provides “an advocate for the best 

interest of the ward.”)[.]

Helen E.F., 340 Wis. 2d 500, ¶25. When compared to ch. 51, ch. 55 “is designed 

for long-term management of disorders that cannot be treated, and therefore are 

unlikely to subside, meaning that the individual in need of protection is unlikely to 
No. 2023AP757

13

return to society.” Helen E.F., 340 Wis. 2d 500, ¶25. This, our supreme court 

explains, is precisely why “periodic assessments by a GAL of the individual’s 

situation are essential to the continual provision of appropriate care.” Id.

¶25 If Bonnie’s argument is successful, it will have the immediate and 

dire consequence that individuals in protective placement will automatically lose

their guardian ad litem’s advocacy after protective placement is reordered each 

and every year and will be at the mercy of their guardian and their county of 

residence until a petition and annual report is filed ten or eleven months later. Any 

issues that a guardian ad litem could learn during that timeframe, and any new 

information that could have been seen by that “second set of watchful eyes” would 

remain undisclosed to the court for almost one full year. See id., ¶26. This was 

the underlying rationale that led our supreme court to extend statutory protections 

to wards under WIS. STAT. ch. 55’s auspices in Watts. Bonnie’s interpretation 

would lay waste to this additional layer of protection.

¶26 This unreasonable reading of the statute would leave a large 

population of vulnerable individuals unprotected for a majority of the time. As 

our supreme court noted in Watts, the procedure by which a guardian or ward can 

seek court modification of an order for protective placement (now codified at WIS.

STAT. § 55.16) is inherently inadequate:

 “[T]heir protection is illusory when a large segment of 

the protected class cannot realistically be expected to set 

the proceedings into motion in the first place. It is the state, 

after all, which must ultimately justify depriving a person 

of a protected liberty interest by determining that good 

cause exists for the deprivation.”

Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 78 (alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 

1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1981)).
No. 2023AP757

14

¶27 In general, the appointment of a WIS. STAT. ch. 55 guardian ad litem 

continues until a circuit court terminates the appointment, appoints a new guardian 

ad litem, or the guardian ad litem withdraws from the appointment.

14

 Bonnie is 

incorrect in asserting that the statutes mandate annual reappointments of guardians

ad litem in order for a circuit court to maintain competency.

¶28 So, what happened here, and did it follow the legislature’s mandate? 

Racine County filed a petition for annual review on July 26, 2018. A guardian ad 

litem was already in place; that attorney filed a GAL Report, the circuit court 

conducted a hearing, and a new protective placement order was issued on 

November 8, 2018. But on January 24, 2019, for unknown reasons, the circuit 

court appointed a different guardian ad litem for Bonnie. That guardian ad litem 

never filed a report. And, on June 12, 2019, the court appointed Attorney Wishau 

as Bonnie’s new guardian ad litem. On August 27, 2019, the County filed a 

petition for annual review and Attorney Wishau filed a GAL Report on 

September 16, 2019. 

¶29 That means that the circuit court appointed a guardian ad litem for 

Bonnie after the 2010 annual report was filed, and he remained in place until 

January, 2019; that satisfied the statutory requirement. Then, the court appointed

 

14

 Bonnie’s reference to the state forms as evidence that a guardian ad litem may only

file a GAL Report within thirty days of their appointment gives undue weight to a form; it 

elevates a form over the statute’s clear language. It further misconstrues the language in the 

form.

The order states that a “matter is pending” in the circuit court and Bonnie “requires the 

appointment of a guardian ad litem.” The order did not state how long the appointment of 

Attorney Wishau as guardian ad litem was to last, and it did not state that a guardian ad litem 

would have to be reappointed every year if a subsequent petition for annual review was filed by 

the County. Nor did the order state that the appointment of Attorney Wishau was solely with 

respect to a specific hearing or hearings.
No. 2023AP757

15

a guardian ad litem after the 2018 petition for annual review. That makes clear 

that the circuit court complied with WIS. STAT. § 55.18(2) and did appoint a 

guardian ad litem after the County filed a report. In point of fact, the court kept in 

place the prior 2010 guardian ad litem and then appointed two more guardians ad 

litem in 2019. Thus, there was a guardian ad litem for Bonnie when the County 

filed its 2019 petition for annual review. The legislature’s statutory mandate that 

Bonnie have a guardian ad litem representing her interests whenever an annual 

report was filed was satisfied. Her interests in the ten months in between were 

also protected by the continual service of the appointed guardian ad litem. There 

remained “a second set of watchful eyes sensitive to [Bonnie’s] needs at each step 

of the commitment process and on a regular basis after the issuance of a protective 

order.” Helen E.F., 340 Wis. 2d 500, ¶26.

B. Case law confirms there is no reappointment requirement.

¶30 In determining which option to select in order to remedy the 

unconstitutionality of the guardianship law, the Watts court stated it could 

“[r]equire annual implementation of the procedure ... for initial guardianship and 

protected placement actions,” but it expressly declined to do so:

We hold it is not necessary for equal protection purposes to 

annually commence the procedure as if it were the initial 

petition for placement. A periodic consideration by a court 

affords an independent, impartial reconsideration of the 

existing circumstances of the placed person.

Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 83-84. This is further evidence that neither Watts nor the 

statutes require annual guardian ad litem appointments under WIS. STAT. ch. 55.

¶31 Finally, without a conclusion directly on this point, the state supreme 

court in Helen E.F. implicitly indicated in three separate statements that guardians
No. 2023AP757

16

ad litem need not be reappointed annually but rather may have an appointment that 

spans more than one year. First, the court held that “periodic assessments by a 

GAL of the individual’s situation are essential to the continual provision of 

appropriate care.” Helen E.F., 340 Wis. 2d 500, ¶25 (emphasis added). The court 

mentioned assessments (plural) and continual care, implying guardian ad litem 

service of more than one year. Next, the court stated that “[a]lthough Helen’s 

appointed counsel also had Helen’s best interests in mind, a GAL would have 

provided a second set of watchful eyes sensitive to Helen’s need at each step of 

the commitment process and on a regular basis after the issuance of a protective 

order.” Id. at ¶26 (emphasis added). Again, this implies that a guardian ad litem 

has more duties to the ward than just filing one report. Finally, the court explained

that 

the GAL must file periodic reports with the court outlining 

the need for continued protective placement and services, 

and the need for continued involuntary administration of 

psychotropic medication. In short, the GAL would have 

provided the court with advice as to Helen’s best interest 

regarding psychotropic medication throughout the 

pendency—and continuance—of the protective placement 

under [WIS. STAT.] ch. 55. Such advice would have given 

the court valuable assistance in overseeing Helen’s care 

with particular sensitivity to her unique needs.

Id. at ¶27 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

¶32 Each of these references can be read to indicate that a guardian ad 

litem could serve—and maybe should serve—for an extended period of time in 

order to provide the most assistance to both the ward and the circuit court. There 

is a strong presumption that the more knowledge a guardian ad litem has of the 

ward, the better that ward’s interests would be protected both during the time 

between annual reports and at any due process hearings before the circuit court. 

This further negates Bonnie’s interpretation of the statutory language.
No. 2023AP757

17

C. The local rules also support the County’s interpretation.

¶33 Finally, the County argues that the Racine County Circuit Court 

Rules further support the statutory interpretation that guardians ad litem in chapter 

55 protective placements continue to serve until they are terminated. The rules 

provide with respect to the “ANNUAL REVIEW OF PROTECTIVE 

PLACEMENT (WATTS REVIEW) §55.18 AND ANNUAL REVIEW OF 

INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION ORDER UNDER §55.19” that “[t]he GAL

appointment will continue for all annual reviews. If a new GAL is needed, the 

court will appoint one.” Racine County Circuit Court Rules, Rule V.O.b. (2022).15

¶34 Bonnie correctly notes that if procedures set forth in local rules 

conflict with a statute, the statute applies. But the local rule here does not conflict 

with the statute. They actually both stand for the same proposition: a guardian ad 

litem, appointed by the circuit court after a petition for annual review, remains in 

place until that appointment is terminated by the court. Bonnie is incorrect when 

she asserts that the tethering of the GAL’s Report deadline to the appointment date 

necessarily means that a guardian ad litem must be reappointed each and every 

year.

¶35 This court concludes that there is no requirement for an annual 

reappointment of a guardian ad litem for wards under state protective placement 

services. It is correct that a guardian ad litem shall be appointed after a petition is 

filed, but, once that appointment is made, the circuit court retains competency over 

the protective placement proceedings until the appointment is terminated and a 

 

15

 The Racine County Circuit Court Rules are available at 

https://www.racinecounty.com/home/showpublisheddocument/44321/638142972264670000.
No. 2023AP757

18

new guardian ad litem is not appointed. Even though this conclusion fully 

resolves this appeal, this court addresses the other competency question at issue.

II. The competency challenge could be and was waived.

¶36 There is a general rule that “challenges to the circuit court’s 

competency are waived if not raised in the circuit court.” Tina B. v. Richard H., 

2014 WI App 123, ¶23, 359 Wis. 2d 204, 857 N.W.2d 432 (quoting Mikrut, 273 

Wis. 2d 76, ¶30). 

However, the Mikrut court noted a longstanding 

qualification to the general rule, namely, an exception for 

limitation periods within which courts must act as 

mandated by statutes: [W]e have consistently ruled that a

court’s loss of power due to the failure to act within

statutory time periods cannot be stipulated to nor waived.

Tina B., 359 Wis. 2d 204, ¶23 (quoting Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶25); see also 

Sheboygan Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Matthew S., 2005 WI 84, ¶37, 282 

Wis. 2d 150, 698 N.W.2d 631 (“[A] competency challenge based on the violation 

of the statutory time limitation of WIS. STAT. § 48.422(2) cannot be waived, even 

though it was not raised in the circuit court.”).

¶37 In cases where a party need not first challenge competency in the 

circuit court, a specific time limit or mandated deadline must be at issue. For 

instance, a circuit court in a termination of parental rights case is required, under 

WIS. STAT. § 48.422(2), to hold a fact-finding hearing within forty-five days of a 

contest to the petition, and if it fails to do so, and no extensions or continuances 

have been legally granted, that court not only loses competency but a parent may 

raise that challenge for the first time on appeal. This is because it is such a 

fundamental basis underlying the ultimate conclusions that it cannot be ignored no 

matter when it is raised. See Tina B., 359 Wis. 2d 204, ¶¶19-20 (explaining that 
No. 2023AP757

19

circuit court lost competency when it held a hearing under WIS. STAT. ch. 54 more 

than ninety days after the petition filing date even though all parties agreed to an 

extension of time and no party raised a challenge to competency). There can be no 

valid order or judgment when a court has no legal authority to act.

¶38 But the statute at issue here requires that a guardian ad litem be 

appointed by the circuit court after a petition for annual review regarding 

protective placement services is filed by a county. See WIS. STAT. § 55.18(2). 

There is no time limit in which that appointment must be made; the only 

requirement is that it be made at some point in time. Thus, the competency 

challenge made here by Bonnie is not based, as she asserts, on a violation of a 

statutory time limit, much less one that cannot be waived even if it is not made in 

front of the circuit court. See Matthew S., 282 Wis. 2d 150, ¶2; Mikrut, 273 

Wis. 2d 76, ¶3 n.1. 

¶39 Bonnie contends that statutory time limit violations may never be 

waived in any type of case. The court in Matthew S. certainly implies the 

same16—but that case focused on the Children’s Code (WIS. STAT. ch. 48) and not 

guardianship (WIS. STAT. ch. 54) or protective placement services (WIS. STAT.

ch. 55) cases. A review of unpublished ch. 55 protective placement appellate 

decisions is instructive; it reveals that, while circuit court competency challenges 

have been raised in limited circumstances, they have only been successful if a 

 

16

 In fact, albeit in an unpublished opinion, the court in Constance N. v. Anna Maye Z., 

No. 2009AP795, unpublished slip op. ¶15 (WI App Feb. 9, 2010), distinguished the “never 

waived” holding of Matthew S. even where there was a statutory time limit when the subject 

individual sought the delay and expressly consented to an extension she stated was “necessary for 

her to properly contest the petitions.” Unpublished Wisconsin cases, issued on or after July 1, 

2009, may not be cited for precedential value, but may be cited for persuasive value. See WIS.

STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(a), (b). 
No. 2023AP757

20

statutory deadline has been missed. 17 Bonnie’s broad-stroke contention, however, 

need not be resolved in this appeal because no statutory time limits or mandatory 

deadlines are applicable to her competency challenge. See, e.g., State v. 

Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997) (appellate courts need not 

address nondispositive issues).

CONCLUSION

¶40 This court agrees with our state supreme court that “[t]aking a few 

moments to protect the rights of our most vulnerable citizens is not an 

unacceptable cost to society. It is an expression of our humanity.” Goldie H., 245 

Wis. 2d 538, ¶35. Even more than that, “[i]t is a commitment that no person will 

be warehoused and forgotten by the legal system.” Id. This appeal—and others 

concerning wards under protective placement—is important and deserves careful 

consideration.

¶41 Based upon the foregoing, this court concludes that there is no 

statutory requirement that a circuit court in a WIS. STAT. ch. 55 protective 

placement proceeding must annually reappoint a guardian ad litem for the ward. 

The legislative mandate favors the continued service of a guardian ad litem to 

provide “a second set of watchful eyes sensitive” to the ward’s needs “at each step

 

17

 See Department on Aging v. R.B.L., No. 2022AP1431, unpublished slip op. ¶7 (WI 

App June 27, 2023) (concluding circuit court lost competency when petition for annual review of 

protective placement was filed after statutory deadline and R.B.L.’s physical presence at annual 

review hearing was required and not properly waived); Lipp v. Outagamie Cnty. Dep’t of Health 

& Hum. Servs., No. 2011AP152, unpublished slip op. ¶2 (WI App June 5, 2012) (concluding 

“circuit court lost competency to act on the guardianship petition by failing to complete the 

hearing within the statutorily mandated time limitation”); Brown County v. Marilyn M., No. 

2005AP3051, unpublished slip op. ¶10 (WI App June 27, 2006) (determining that “the Watts rule 

is not a mandatory statutory time limit” so a challenge to the circuit court’s competency to 

proceed with a “Watts review” can be waived if not raised before the circuit court).
No. 2023AP757

21

of the commitment process and on a regular basis after the issuance of a protective 

order.” Helen E.F., 340 Wis. 2d 500, ¶26. Accordingly, the circuit court in this 

appeal did not lose competency over Bonnie’s protective placement proceeding.

¶42 In addition, while some competency challenges may never be 

waived, the procedure at issue here is not subject to a statutorily mandated 

deadline, and thus, Bonnie waived her right to challenge the circuit court’s 

competency by failing to raise that objection below.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.