UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4944

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CARL QUENTIN WOODS, a/k/a Q, a/k/a Carl Quentin Davis,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District 

Judge. (3:12-cr-00040-JFA-2)

Submitted: July 24, 2014 Decided: July 28, 2014

Before FLOYD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William W. Watkins, Sr., WILLIAM W. WATKINS, PA, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. William Kenneth Witherspoon, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Carl Quentin Woods pled guilty to two counts of using 

a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) and aiding and abetting 

under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). He was sentenced to a total of 384 

months of imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting 

there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but raising the 

following issues: (1) whether the appeal in the case was timely 

filed; (2) whether Woods’ guilty plea was conducted in 

compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; and (3) whether Woods’ 

sentence was properly imposed and substantively reasonable. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

Regarding the first issue, we agree with Anders

counsel that the notice of appeal is late. In criminal cases, 

the defendant must file the notice of appeal within fourteen 

days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). 

With or without a motion, upon a showing of excusable neglect or 

good cause, the district court may grant an extension of up to 

thirty days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(b)(4); United States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 

1985). Here, the district court entered judgment on August 22, 

2013. Woods filed the notice of appeal, at the earliest, on 

November 25, 2013, after both the fourteen-day appeal period and 
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the thirty-day excusable neglect period had expired. Because 

the Government has not filed a motion to dismiss on this basis, 

we consider this appeal on the merits.

Second, because Dixon did not seek to withdraw his 

guilty plea or otherwise preserve any allegation of Rule 11 

error, this court reviews his plea colloquy for plain error. 

United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). 

Our review of the record reveals that the district court 

substantially complied with Rule 11 and that Woods knowing and 

voluntarily pled guilty.

Finally, we find that Woods’ sentence was reasonable. 

We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). This review requires consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id.

We first assess the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, 

whether the district court properly calculated the Sentencing 

Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) 

factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49–50; see

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). We 

next consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, 

examining the totality of the circumstances to see whether the 

sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the 
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sentence it chose satisfied the § 3553(a) standards. United 

States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). 

If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, we presume on 

appeal that the sentence is reasonable. See Rita v. United 

States, 551 U.S. 338, 346–56 (2007) (permitting appellate 

presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence). 

We find that the sentence is procedurally and substantively 

reasonable and note that Woods asked for and received the 

statutory mandatory minimum sentence for both counts, 84 months 

for Count 5, for brandishing under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and 300 

months to be served consecutively (25-year sentence because it 

is a second or successive § 924(c) offense under 

§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i)) for Count 9, for discharging under 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case, including the issues raised in Woods’ pro se 

supplemental briefs, and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. This court requires that counsel inform Woods, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Woods requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Woods. We dispense with 
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oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED