MA RK

DA NI EL L EI TN ER, Plaintiff,
v. UNI TED STATES, e t al

. , De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil No. 09-2342 (CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (January 18, 2010) P l ai n t i ff M ark Da n i el L ei tn er , ac t i n g pr o s e , o ri g ina lly fi le d th e a

bo ve -c a pti on e d a c tio n in the Superior Court for

the District of Columbia. Whil e the c ase w as still pending in Superior Court, Plainti ff a lso filed a “Motion Request for Emerg ency

Injunction” see king issuanc e of a preliminary

injunction terminating his cr iminal prosecution in the United States District Court for the No rt he rn Di str ic t of

F lor ida , Pe ns a c ola

Di vis ion . T he c a se wa s su bs e qu e ntl y

re mov e d to thi s Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1442(a )(1) . Plaintiff has since objec ted to remova l and has move d for r emand of this case ba ck to Superior Court. Pr e se ntl y be fo re the Court

are tw o mo tio ns : ( 1) Pla int if f’ s f ili ngma de in r e sp on se to Def endants’ N otice of Remova l, which the Court construe s as a Motion to Remand pursuant to 28 U. S
. C
. § 1 4 4 7 (c ); an d

(2 ) P l ai n t i ff

’s “M o t i o nR equ es tfo r E m er gen cy In j un ct i o n . ” U p o nth o ro u gh consideration of the parties’ filings, the r eleva nt case law and the rec ord of this ca se as a whole, the Court conclude s that the above -ca ptioned case was prope rly remove d to this C ourt and that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction. Accor dingly , the Court shall DENY Plaintiff’s motion for re mand as we ll as his “Motion Request for Emer g encyAt the time the Notice of Removal was f

iled, counsel ha d not y et enter ed an a ppear ance 1 on behalf of De fenda

nts W illiam M. McCool and Judge M. Case y Rodge rs. B enjamin J . Weir, Trial Attorne y

with the Depa

rtment of Just ice, Tax Division, who is counsel for the othe r Def endants in this action, has since enter ed an a ppear ance on behalf

of De fenda

nts McCool and J udg e Rodg ers a s well. 2 Injunction,” for the rea sons set forth below. I. BACKG ROUND As indicated a

bove, the a

bove-c aptioned ac tion was remove d to this C ourt from the Superior Court for the District of Columbia on Dece mber 9, 2009. See No tic e of Re mov a l, 1 Do ck etNo
. [ 1 ]
. P l ai n t i ff M ar k Da n i el L ei tn er , ac t i n g pr o s e , o ri g ina lly fi le d th is c ivi l a c tio n in Superior Court on Novembe r 13, 2009, namingas De fenda nts: (a) the United States; (b) United State s A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l E ri c Ho lde r; (c ) T if fa ny Eg g e rs , A ssi sta

nt Unit e d St ate s A tto rn e y , who se assig ned post of duty

is in P ensac ola, Flor ida; (d) Thoma s Kirwin, United States Attorney for the Norther n District of F lorida; (e) Michae l J ohn Watling, a Tr ial Attorney within the Criminal Enforc ement Section Southern Reg ion of the Tax Division, Unit ed States De partment of Justice; (f) Wil liam M. McCool, Cl erk of Court for the United States D istrict Court in the Northern Di str ic t of

F lor ida ; and

(g ) t he Ho no ra

ble M. Ca se y

Rod g e rs , U nit e d St ate s D istri c t Co ur t Judg e in the Northe rn District of F lorida, Pensac ola Division (collectively , “De fenda nts”). Although the exact contours of Plaintiff’s c laims are dif ficult to asce rtain, g iven the
ra mbl ingand

of te n in c oh e re nt n atur e of

his pro se complaint, Plaintiff’s lawsuit appea rs to be principally

direc ted at cha lleng ing his c riminal indictment in the Northern D istrict of Florida for fede ral tax violations. To t hat end, Plaintiff see ks injunctive relief vacating his indictment in the United States District Court for the N orthern D istrict of Florida and enjoiningall further proce eding s in that criminal action; a wr it of habea s corpus re g ardingpretria l conditions placed3

upon him by

J udg e Rodg ers, a

nd damag es of $525,000 stemmingfrom his incar cer ation for “ near seven hour s.” SeeNotice of Removal, Docke t No. [1] , Ex . A at pp. 6-57 ( here inafter , “Complaint”). In addition, Plainti ff’ s complaint purports to alleg e seve ral c laims premised upon violations of various fe dera l statutes, including the T radingwith the Enemy Act, the Rac ketee r Influenc ed Corrupt Or g anizations Act (RI CO), and the F ree dom of Information Ac t (FO I A). See id. On Dec ember

3, 2009, while the ca se re mained pendingin Superior Court, Plaintiff filed a “Motion Request for Eme rg ency Injunction.” As set for

th therein, Plaintiff see ks an “e merg ency injunction” pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 65 enjoining “ all proce eding s relatingto Petiti oner specific ally

in reg ards to alleg ed indictment/case No. 3:08-cr -0079 MCR out of the United States District Court Northern D istrict of Florida , Pensacola Division.” See Notice of Removal, Docke t No. [1] , Ex . A at pp. 58-73 ( here inafter , “Pl.’s Mot. for P.I .”). A ccor dingly , on Dec ember 11, 20 09 , s ho rt ly

a ft e r t he c a se wa s r e mov e d, thi s Co ur t is su e d a min ute or de r a dv isi ngDe fe nd ants that their re sponse to Plaintiff’s reque st for a pr eliminary injunction was due by

no later tha

n Dec ember

14, 2009, pursuant to L CvR 65.1(c). See12/11/09 Min. Order. De fenda nts tim ely filed the re quired re sponse to Plaintiff’s motion on Decembe r 14, 2009. SeeDe fs .’ Op p’ n to Pl. ’s Mo t. f o r P
. I. , D o c k e tN o . [ 3 ]
. T h ats am e d ay, th e C o urti s s u e d a no r d e r a dv i s i n gP l a i n t i f

f th ath i s r e p l y, if any , in support of his reque st for a pr eliminary injunction was due a

nd had to be postmarke d by no later tha

n Dec ember

21, 2009. See12/4/09 Order, D ocket No. [4]. Plaintiff filed a re sponse in compliance with the Court’s order . Howeve r, rather than f ile a
su bs tanti ve re ply

in s up po rt

of his mot ion

fo r a pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n, Pla int if

f i ns te a d c ho se to file a r esponse c halleng ing the validity of the De fenda

nts’ Notice of

Removal and a

rguing that the4

C o urt w a s w i th o u tj ur i s d i c t i o nt o c o n s i d e r P l a i n t i f f ’ s m o t i o nf

o r e m e r g e n c y r e l i e f

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, Plaintiff argues that re moval is improper and that this case must be re manded ba ck to the Superior Court for the District of

Columbi a, such that this C ourt lacks jurisdiction to rule on his motion for a pre liminary

injunction. Although styliz ed as a n “objec tion to noti ce of

remova l,” it is appare nt that Plaintiff intended this filing to serve as a motion for r emand pur suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),
and the Court

— c og niza

nt o f P la int if

f’ s pro se status — indicated that it would treat Plainti ff’ s filing a s such. See1/5/10 Order, D ocket No. [9]; P l.’s Mot. to Remand, Docket No. [6]. Def endants filed a

n opposition t o Plaintiff’s motion to remand on J anuar y 4, 2010, arguing that
remova l was prope r and that this C ourt has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s c omplaint. SeeDef s.’ Opp’n, Doc ket No. [7] . Upon re ceipt of D efe ndants’ opposition, the Court issued an order advising Plaintiff that his reply , if any , in support of his motion t o rema nd was due by

no later tha

n J anuar y 15, 2010. See1/5/10 Order. Plaintiff ha s since timely filed a r eply , see P l
. ’ s R e p l y, Docke t No. [11] , and brie fingon both Plainti ff’ s motion t o rema nd and his motion for a preliminary

injunction is now complete. Acc ording ly , Plaintiff’s motions are ripe for the Court’ s revie w. II. LEGAL STA ND AR DS A ND DI SCU SSIO N As Pla int if

f h a s r a ise d a

jur isd ic tio na l c ha lle ng e to t his Court ’s a

uth or ity to d e c ide his motion for a pre liminary

injunction, the Court mustfirst resolve the question of its jurisdiction be fo re it m ay

c on sid e r P la int if

f’ s r e qu e st f

or inj un c tiv e re lie f. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court tur ns fi rs t to consider Plaintiff’ s motion t o rema nd befor e then turningto consider Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary

injunction.5

A. Plaintif

f’s Motion to Remand As se t f or th i n th e No tic e of

Re mov a l, D e fe nd ants a sse rt that r e mov a l is a

pp ro pr iate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1442( a)( 1). See Notice of Removal, Docke t No. [1]
. Section 1441(b) pr ovides that “[a]ny civil action of whic h the district courts have orig inal jurisdiction founded on a c laim or rig ht arisingunder the Constit ution, treaties or la ws of the United States shall be re movable without reg ard to the c itiz enship or re sidence of the pa rties.” Section 1442(a) (1) pr ovides that a c ivil action is removable to the district cour t for the district embra cingthe place wher e the a ction is pending if the suit is brought a g ainst “[t] he United States or any ag ency there of or a

ny office r (or

any person a ctingunder that office r) of the United States or of a ny ag ency there of, sued in an of

ficial or individual ca

pacity for a ny act unde r color of

such office or on ac count of a

ny rig ht, titl e or a

uthority claimed unde r any

Act of Cong ress for

the appre hension or punishment of cr iminals or the collection of the reve nue.” As discussed above , Plaintiff has named the United States and seve ral off icer s thereof

as Def endants, includingAttorney Gene ral Holde r, Assistant United States Attorney Eg g ers, United States Attorney

Kirwin, De partment of Justice Trial Attorne y Watling, the Clerk of

the Court for the Northe rn District of F lorida, and United States District Court J udg e Rodg ers. Se e ge ne ra lly Compl. As such, the Court finds that removal is appropr iate under section 1442(a )(1) . In addition, Plaintiff’s complaint purports to asser t various violations of fede ral statutes — includingthe Tradingwith the Enemy

Act, RI CO, and F OIA — and se eks to cha lleng e his indictment in the Norther n District of F lorida as a

violation of, inte r a lia , “ his fu nd ame nta l r ig hts se c ur e d to him under the Constit ution for the United States of America .” See id. Be cause the Court has orig inal fede ral que stion subject matter jurisdiction over suc h claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the6

Court concludes that removal is prope r under section 1441(b) as we ll. Pl aintiff’s a rguments to the contra ry are wholly

without merit and requir e no discussion. Acc ording ly , the Court shall DENY Plaintiff’s motion to remand this case ba ck to the Superior Court f or the District of Columbia. B. Plaintif

f’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Plaintiff asks this Court t o enjoin criminal proc eeding s curr ently ong oing in the United State s D istri c t Co ur

t f or the No rt he rn Di str ic t of

F lor ida , b ut h a s ma de no atte mpt wh atso e ve r t o demonstrate that the four f actor s outlined above have bee n met. As it is P laintiff’s burde n to do so, his request for

a pre liminary

injunction fails for this rea son alone. Reg ardle ss, the case law makes c lear

that such extraordinar

y relief as is reque sted by

Plaintiff is neither war

rante d nor appropr iate. Th e sta nd ard fo r o bta ini ngpr e lim ina

ry inj un c tiv e re lie f p ur su ant t o F e d. R. C iv. P. 6 5 is
we ll e sta bli sh e d. A m ov ingpa

rt y mus t sh ow : ( 1) a

su bs tanti a l li ke lih oo d o f s uc c e ss o n th e me ri ts; (2) that it would suffe r irre para ble injury if the injunction were not gr anted; (3) that an injunction would not substantially

injure other inter ested pa rties; and (4) that the public intere st would be further ed by

the injunction. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In applying this four -fa ctore d standard, district c ourts may employ a sliding
sc a le a s to wh ic h a

pa rt ic ula rl y str on gsh ow ingin o ne are a c an c omp e ns ate fo r w e akn e ss i n another
. Id
. (qu o t i n g CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision , 5 8 F .3 d 7 38 , 7 47 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 5) ). Thus , “ [a]n

inj un c tio n ma

y be jus tif ie d, fo r e xamp le , whe re the re is a pa rt ic ula rl y str on glik e lih oo d o f s uc c e ss o n th e me ri ts e ve n if the re is a re lativ e ly sli g ht s ho wi ngof

ir re pa ra ble injury .” CityFed ., 58 F.3d at 747. Notwithstanding the f luid nature of this familiar four-pa rt inquiry , “[i] t is particularly important for the [movant] t o demonstrate a substantial likelihood of7

succe ss on the merits.” Barton v. Dist. of Columbia, 131 F. Supp. 2d 236, 242 (D.D .C. 2001) (c i t i n g Benten v . Kessler , 505 U.S. 1084, 1085 (1992)). I f the movant fa ils to do so, “it would t ake
a ve ry str on gsh ow ingwi th r e sp e c t to the oth e r p re lim ina ry inj un c tio n f

a c tor s to tur

n th e tid e in plaintiff[‘s] favor .” Da v e np or t v . I nt’ l B hd . o f Te am ste rs , 166 F.3d 356, 366 ( D.C. Cir. 1999). B oth the Un ite d St ate s Su

pr e me Court

and the Court

of Ap pe a ls f

or the D. C. C ir c uit

have a lso
e mph a size d th at a

pla int if f m us t sh owat le a st some likelihood of irrepa rable harm in the a

bsence of an injunction. See W

inter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc

. , __ U.S. __ , 129 S. C t. 365, 375 (2 00 8) (h old ingthat a

pla int if f m us t “ de mon str ate that ir

re pa ra ble inj ur y is lik e ly in the absenc e of
an in jun c tio n, ” and

no t a me re “ po ssi bil ity” ) ( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; CityFed , 58 F.3d at 747 (h old ingthat a

pla int if f m us t de mon str ate “ ‘a

t le a st s ome inj ur

y ’ f or a pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n to issue . . . [because] ‘the ba sis of injunctive relief in fede ral c ourts has alwa y s been irr epar able ha

rm

. . . . ’” (qu o t i n g Sampson v. Murray , 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974)). Applying the se standar ds to the case at hand, it is clea r that Plaintiff has not demonstrate d that he is e nti tle d to e me rg e nc y inj un c tiv e re lie f. As an in iti a l matte r, “ [i]t is we ll- se ttl e d .
. . that a court will not act to re strain a c riminal prosec ution if the moving pa rty has an a dequate reme dy

at law and w ill not s uffe r irre para ble injury if denied e quitable re lief.” Miranda v. Gonzales , 173 F e d. Ap px. 8 40 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 6) (p e r c ur iam) ; see also De aver v . Seym our , 8 22 F .2 d 6 6, 69 (D .C. Cir. 1987). “Cong ress ha s established a c omprehe nsive set of rule s g overningfede ral c riminal prosec utions — the Fede ral Rules of Criminal Proce dure,” and “de fenda nts cannot, by

bring ing ancillar y equitable pr ocee dings, c ircumvent fe dera l criminal proce dure.” Deav er , 822 F.2d at 71. In this case, Plaintiff primar ily seeks to cha lleng e the va lidity of his indictment in the Northern District of F lorida, alleg ing that Defe ndants have “no author ity to take ac tions ag ainst” him; that8

the ir pr os e c uti on

of him fo r f e de ra l tax viol atio ns is “ arb itr ary , c a pr ic iou s, wi tho ut f

ound atio n;”
and that he wa s se ize d “ wi tho ut a wa rr ant t hu s d e pr ivi ng[Pla int if

f] o f h is f un dame nta l r ig hts
secur ed to him under the Constitution [ of] the United States of Amer ica.” SeeCom pl. at p. 9; see als o Pl.’s Mot. for P.I . at 2-3. On the curr ent re cord nowbefor e the Court, ther e appe ars to be no
rea son why

such ar g uments may

not be asser

ted by Plaintiff in the pendingcriminal ac tion in the United States District Court for the N orthern D istrict of Florida . To the extent Pl aintiff may do so, he has a n adequa te re medy at law f or any asser ted violations of his constituti onal rig hts and there fore may

not secure equitable r elief in this Court. See D eave r , 822 F.2d at 69-71. F ur the rm or e , to the e xtent Pla int if f s e e ks inj un c tiv e re lie f a

nd dama g e s a g a ins t D e fe nd ants Mc Coo l and

Judg e Rod g e rs , h e is unli ke ly to s uc c e e d a s “ [j]ud g e s a nd c le rk s a re a bs olute ly immune from lawsuits predic ated on a cts taken . . . in their judicia l capa cities.” Krug v. Steve ns , Civ. Act. No. 08-891, 2008 WL2331313 (D.D.C. June 2, 2008), aff’d 30 9 F e d. Ap px. 4 23 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 9) ; see also Sindram v. Suda , 986 F.2d 1459 ( D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). In addition, while Plaintiff’s complaint purporte dly asser ts various statutory

claims pursuant to, inte r a lia , the Tr a din gwi th t

he En e my Ac t, R I CO , a

nd F OIA, he ha s n ot a lle g e d a ny fa c ts t hat w ou ld a

pp e ar t o support such cla ims nor has he a ddresse d those claims in his moti on for e merg ency relief
. See ge ne ra lly Com pl. ; see also Pl.’s Mot. for P.I . Acc ording ly , the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a

substantial likelihood of success on the me rits. Given Plaintiff’s fa ilure to show that he is likely to succe ed on the mer its of his lawsuit, he
mus t make “ a

ve ry str on gsh ow ingwi th r e sp e c t to the oth e r p re lim ina ry inj un c tio n f

a c tor s” in order to justi fy issuance of

a pre liminary

injunction. Se e Da v e np or t , 1 66 F .3 d at 36 6. Th is Plaintiff has not done. Althoug h Plaintiff claims that he “ha s been, a nd is curre ntly

beingharme d,9

by a c tio ns of

the De fe nd ants wh o a

re dir e c tly

inv olv e d in

his pr op e rt

y be ingta ke n f ro m hi m, h is rig hts being denied, [and] his l iberties beingrestra ined,” suc h alleg ations are insufficient to show the nec essar

y likelihood of irrepa

rable harm in the a

bsence of an injunction. Cf. Y ounger v. Ha rri s , 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (“ Certain ty pes of injury , in particular , the cost, anxiety , and inconvenienc e of ha

ving to de fend a g ainst a sing le [state] criminal prose cution, could not by the mse lve s b e c on sid e re d ‘ ir re pa ra ble ’ i n th e sp e c ia l le g a l se ns e of that te rm . Ins te a d, the thr e at to the pla int if

f’ s f e de ra lly pr ote c te d r ig hts mus t be on e that c ann ot b e e lim inate d b y his de fe ns e ag ainst a sing le cr iminal prosecution.”) . Simi larly , the Court finds that issuance of a pre liminary injunction would harm both the Gover nment’s and the public’ s interest in the prope r
a dmi nis tr atio n o f f

e de ra l tax law s. As su c h, the thi rd and fo ur th f a c tor fu rt he r c ouns e l a g a ins t g rantingPlaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. Accor dingly , the Court finds that issuance of a pr eliminary

injunction to enjoin the ongoingcriminal proc eeding s in the Norther n District of Florida is not appropriate , and Plaintiff’s “Motion Request for Emerg ency

Injunction” is DENI ED. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons outlined above, Plaintiff’ s Motion to R emand a nd his “Motion Request for Emerg ency

Injunction” ar e DEN I ED. An a ppropriate Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion. Date: J anuar

y 18, 2010

/ s / CO LLEEN K OLLA R- K OTEL LY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge