United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 96-3248EA

_____________ Lucille P. Gartman, * * Appellee, *

*
v. * * Gencorp Inc., formerly known as * Diversitech General, Inc., doing * business as Gencorp Automotive, Inc., * * Appellant. *

_____________ Appeals from the United States No. 96-3466EA District Court for the Eastern

_____________ District of Arkansas. Lucille P. Gartman, * * Appellant, *

*
v. * * Gencorp Inc., formerly known as * Diversitech General, Inc., doing * business as Gencorp Automotive, Inc., * * Appellee. *-2- _____________ Submitted: April 16, 1997

Filed: July 16, 1997

_____________ Before FAGG, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

_____________ FAGG, Circuit Judge.

In a shak e-up at its Batesville, Arkansas plant, Gencorp Inc. discharged thre e managers and offered transfers t o three others, including Batesville’s quality manager, Lucille P. G artman. Gartman rejected the offer and resigned, and then brought sui t against Gencorp under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994) (Title VII), claiming she ha d been constructively discharged because of her gender. The jury found i n Gartman ’s favor, awarding her $14,904 in lost wages, $67,715 in compensator y damages, an d $250,000 in punitive damages. The district court set aside the punitive damages award, but denied Gencorp’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JAML). Gencorp appeals, and we reverse.
Reviewing th e denial of Gencorp’s motion for JAML, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Gartman, resolv ing evidentiary conflicts in Gartman’s favor and givin g Gartman the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Se e Feltmannv. Sieben , 108 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 1997). Our summary of the facts is shaped by these rul es. Gencorp’s vehicle sealing division manufactures vehicle door andwindow seals. In 1992 and 1993, Ford Motor, a major customer, rejected mor e seal s from Gencorp’s Batesville plant than from three other Gencorp vehicle sealin g plant s combined. Over a six-month period, the Batesville plant had the worst quality record of all thirteen Ford vehicle seal suppliers. Ford placed the Batesville plant on its “twenty worst suppliers” list--a list Gartman testified “[y]ou do everything in your-3-

power to get off of”--and threatened to pull its business from Batesville. The situation was critical for Ge ncorp because Batesville sold roughly seventy percent of its output to Ford.
Although Gartman wa s Batesville’s quality manager, division president Wayne Smith held Batesville’s management team as a whole responsibl e for the plant’s quality failures. Smith decided to replace six Batesville managers. He fired three mal e manag ers outright, and offered transfers to two other males and Gartman. Plan t
mana ger J.W. Burton accepted a transfer to Gencorp’s Wabash, Indiana design an d engineering facility, and production manager Dennis DeLaat transferred to Gencorp’s Michigan sa les office. In August 1993, Gartman was offered the quality manage r position at Gencorp’s Wabash plant, with moving expenses paid and no reduction in salary or benefits. A week later, Gartman he ard Smith say the Wabash plant would be closing. Alarmed by Smith’s statement, Gartman spoke wi th the president of Gencorp, wh o told Gartman “we’ll relocate good people” when Wabash closes. Batesville’ s human resources manager, Gary Moore, also encouraged Gartman to view the transfer positively , but Gartman refused the transfer and resigned. Moore testified withou t contradiction that Gartman told him personal and family reasons prompted h er decision. Along the same lines, not only did Gartman reject the move to Wabash, but sh e testified she would have refused the transfer Burton accepted as well.
Several months earlier, Gartman was present when division vice president Walt Hunnicuttlearned Ford Motor had named a woman to monitor supplier quality an d said, “S--t, another gal.” Hunnicutt testified he made the remark out of frustration with the job performance of a female member of Ford’s purchasing group. Ga rtman also felt belit tledby several insulting comments Smith made in December 1992. Smith tol d Gartman she did not know “how to belly up to the bar,” called her “kid” in a patronizi ng manner, and advised her not to show her ignorance by referring to a n engine when she meant a block. Gartman testified she was told that Smith was jealous of her presentation skills and threatened by her knowledge and competence.-4-

We review de novo the district court’s denial of Gencorp’s motion for JAML. See Feltmann , 108 F.3d at 974. We must affirm “if reasonable persons could diffe r regarding the conclusions to be drawn from [the] evidence.” Id. By the same token,
we mustreverse if the evidence is insufficient to support a reasonable inference tha t Gartman was constructively discharged, see Tidwell v. Meyer’s Ba keries, Inc. , 93 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1996), or, if she was, that a discriminatory attitude was a motivating factor in her discharge, see Feltmann , 108 F.3d at 975. “C onstructive discharge occurs when an employer ‘deliberately renders the em ployee’s working conditions intolerable and thus for

ces the employee to quit [her] job.’” Allen v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. , 81 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co. , 64 6 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981)). The employee must show that a reasonable person in he r situation would find the working conditions intolerable. See id. In other words , “intolerability of working conditions is judged by an objective standard, not th e [employee’s] subjective feelings.” Id. Further, the employer must have intended t o force the employee to quit. See i d. Constructive discharge plaintiffs may prove intent “by showing their resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of thei r employer s’ discriminatory actions.” Hukkanen v. International Union of Operatin g Eng’rs , 3 F.3d 281, 285 (8th Cir. 1993). Without doubt, the choice Gartman faced between pulling up roots for a fres h start in a plant with an uncertain future or resigning was a painful one. But although “[t] here may be situations in which a transfer to another location is so intolerable . . . that a finding of constructive discharge is warranted,” B radford v. Norfolk S. Corp. , 54 F.3d 1412, 1420 (8t

h Cir. 1995), the record in this case does not support an inference that a reasonable person in Gartman’s place would have considered Gartman’s situation intolerab le. Assuming Wabash would shortly close, Gencorp’s transfer offer stil l p resented Gartman the opportunity to retain her quality manager title and to continue doing the same work, drawing t he same pay, and enjoying the same benefits as before while looking for something more permanent. On these facts, Gartman cannot claim Gencorp treated her adversely when it made the transfer offer, see Harlston v.-5-

McDo nnell Douglas Corp. , 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994), and Wabash’s clouded futu re was insufficient, in itself, to transform a benign employment decision into a n objectively intolerable situation. After all, it was p ossible Wabash would remain open,
as in fact it still was at the time of trial. Further, Gencorp president Marv Isle s
reassur ed Gartman that Gencorp would relocate good people when Wabash closed

. Gartman disbelieved Isles, but “‘[p]art of an employee’s obligation to be reasonabl e is an o bligation not to assume the worst and not to jump to conclusions too fast.’ ” Westv. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc. , 54 F.3d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Smith

v. Good year Tire & Rubber Co. , 895 F.2d 467, 473 (8th Cir. 1990) (emphasis i n Smith )); see also Bradford , 54 F.3d at 1420 (“[M]ere skept icism [about an employer’s] motives is insufficient to generate an inference of discrimination.”).
Neither does the evidence support a reasona ble inference that Gencorp intended to forc e Gartman to quit when it offered Gartman the Wabash transfer. Indeed, th e evidence is all to the contrary. Batesville s tood to lose its biggest customer because of its miserable record in Gartman’s area of responsibility. Although Gartman wanted to stay on a s Batesville’s quality manager, she acknowledged Gencorp had to d o every thing it could to restore Ford Motor’s confidence in Batesville’s product

. Gencorp did act decisively, firing several members of Batesville’s management team andoffering transfers to several others. If Gencorp management had wanted to take ad vantage of Ford Motor’s dissatisfaction with quality failures to get rid of Gartman, they could have numbered Gartman among those to be fired. Instead, in an effort t o keep her with the company, they offered Gartman a transfer to the Wabash plant

. Smith sa id Wabash was going to close, but nothing in the record indicates Gencor p offeredGartman the Wabash transfer despite having more secure positions available for whic h Gartman was the best qualified candidate. Gencorp president Marv Isle s
assure d Gartman the future of “good people” did not depend on Wabash’s longevity. Nevertheless, for personal a nd family reasons, Gartman rejected the transfer offer and resig ned. See Bradford , 54 F.3d at 1420 (no inference employer intended to forc e workers to quit when they did so beca use of personal circumstances). She refused the-6-

transfer on the basis of Smith’s single remark about Wabash’s future prospects, without checking out Wabash for herself, see id. , and without giving Isles a chance to mak e good on his word, see West , 54 F.3d at 498. On this record, a jury could no t reasonably find Gartman was constructively discharged.
Even if we agreed that Gencorp’s transfer offer placed Gartman in a n objectively intolerable position, and if we also agreed that Gencorp management could reasonably foresee Gartman might reject the transfer and resign, to establish co nstructive discharge in viola tion of Title VII Gartman still had to show her resignation was a reasonabl y foreseeable consequence of discrimina tory actions on Gencorp’s part. See Hukkanen , 3 F .3d at 285; Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc. , 17 F.3d 998, 1005 (7th Cir

. 199 4) (“[T]o be actionable under Title VII the work conditions . . . need to b e intolerable in a discriminatory way.”). We agree with the district court that “th e decisio n to replace the management team at Batesville was motivated by thei r substan dard performance.” Batesville’s unacceptable quality record was certainly a leg itimate reason for removing Gartman as Batesville’s quality manager. Gartma n nonetheless contend s poor quality performance was a cover for gender discrimination because Burton and

DeLaat received better transfer offers than she did. Setting aside Moore’s testimony that Gartman resigned for personal and family reasons, an d Ga rtman’s own testimony that she would have rejected Burton’s offer anyway , Gartman’ s pretext argument fails because Gartman introduced no evidence she wa s better qualified for the positions Burton and DeLaat received than they were. On the contrary, before their transfers Burton and DeLaat held the top two posts in Batesville’s management

hierarchy. Even assuming Gartman was equally qualified, no inference of gender discrimination arise s when an employer, choosing among similarly qualified candidates, selects a man and not a woman. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1981) ; Chock v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. , 113 F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 1997) (race discrimination).-7-

Fina lly, although Gartman might have felt belittled by Smith, Smith’s rud e
commen ts were devoid of gender-conscious terms and thus did not imply a discriminatory attitude toward women as women. See Cram v. Lamson & Session s Co. , 49 F.3d 466, 471-72 (8th Cir. 1995 ). Indeed, Gartman’s own testimony points to person al dislike born of jealousy as the motive force behind Smith’s insults. B y contrast , Hunnicutt’s remark was gender-conscious, but “‘[n]ot all comments tha t refle ct a discriminatory attitude will support an inference that an illegitimate criterion
was a motivating factor in an employment decision.’” Stacks v. Southwestern Bel l Yellow Pag es, Inc. , 27 F.3d 1316, 1324 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Radabaugh v. Zi p Feed M ills, Inc. , 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1993)). Specifically, an inference o f causation is not supported by “‘stray remarks in the workplace,’ ‘statements b y nond ecisionmakers,’ or ‘statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisiona l proc ess itself.’” Beshears v. Asbill , 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991) (quotin g Price Waterhous e v. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Hunnicutttestified he took part in the decision to offer Gartman a transfer, but th e commentat issue was made months before the transfer offer. Unlike thos e noncontemporaneous statements by decisionmakers that have been held sufficient t o suppo rt an inference of discrimination, Hunnicutt’s impulsive remark, uttered in a passi ng moment of frustration, bore no relation to the decisional process itself. Se e Emmel v. Coc a-Cola Bottling Co. , 95 F.3d 627, 632-33 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[I don’t ] think the beverage i ndustry [is] where women [are] meant to be.”); Stacks , 27 F.3d at 1318 (“[W]omen in sales [are] the worst thing that ha[s] happened to this company.”); Radabaugh , 997 F.2d at 449 (corporate planning documents citing youth of managers
as posit ive factor); EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp. , 901 F.2d 920, 924 (11th Cir

. 1990) (“[I]f it were [my] company [I] would not hire blacks.”). In sum, even i f Gartman was constructively discharged wh en Gencorp offered her a transfer to a plant slated for c losure, from this evidence a jury could not reasonably infer that a discriminatory attitude was a motivating factor in Gencorp’s decisio n to make the offer.-8-

Be cause we reverse the district court’s denial of Gencorp’s motion for JAML, we need not address Gartman’s cross-appeal on the issue of punitive damages.
A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.