FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 05-50962 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-05-00159-PA

MAHER HAMDAN ABBOUCHI,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 18, 2006—Pasadena, California

Filed July 13, 2007

Before: Harry Pregerson, Ronald M. Gould, and

Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

8437
COUNSEL

Gail Ivens, Acting Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles,

California, for the defendant-appellant. 

Douglas M. Fuchs, Assistant United States Attorney, Los

Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee. 

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: 

In this case, we consider the contours of a customs official’s border search authority at a regional sorting hub for

express consignment services like those offered by UPS. We

hold that customs inspections conducted at UPS’s regional

sorting hubs like the one at Louisville, Kentucky, take place

at the functional equivalent of the border. 

Defendant-Appellant Maher Hamdan Abbouchi was convicted and sentenced for having committed four counts of

8440 UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI
transfer of false identification documents in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2). The government brought criminal

charges against Abbouchi after U.S. Bureau of Customs and

Border Protection (“Customs”) officers who conducted random customs inspections of cargo at the UPS sorting hub in

Louisville opened a package sent by Abbouchi to Lebanon.

The package contained counterfeit social security and resident

alien identification cards. The district court denied

Abbouchi’s motion to suppress this incriminating evidence,

and a jury found him guilty as charged. 

Abbouchi timely appeals. He contends on appeal that the

contents of his UPS package were inadmissible in evidence

and should have been suppressed. He argues that the Customs

officers needed reasonable suspicion to open his UPS package

because the UPS hub at Louisville is not the functional equivalent of the border, but rather is part of the “extended border.”

He also argues that social security cards are not “identification documents” within the meaning of § 1028(a)(2). Finally,

Abbouchi challenges several aspects of the district court’s

supervised release conditions. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm

his convictions, but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

UPS operates a regional sorting hub in Louisville, Kentucky. UPS routes outbound international packages through

the Louisville hub, where employees sort packages by country

of destination. At these hubs, used by express consignment

services like UPS or FedEx, the federal government stations

Customs officers to inspect outbound international packages

that pass through these hubs. Customs officers open and

inspect packages, selected at random, to determine whether

they contain prohibited articles or contraband. After Customs

officers finish their inspections, UPS employees place the

UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI 8441
packages into sealed containers and load the containers onto

airplanes. The airplanes may depart for foreign airports or

first fly to another domestic hub before leaving the United

States. 

On September 30, 2003, as part of an outbound interdiction

operation, Customs Officer Christopher Crace opened a randomly selected package sent by Abbouchi from Diamond Bar,

California, and addressed to someone in Lebanon. Inside the

package was a sealed envelope containing two social security

cards and two permanent resident alien cards. Crace also

found a photocopy of a permanent resident alien card, handwritten notes, and an identification booklet written in Arabic.

Crace notified his superior, and they determined that the package may contain fraudulent immigration documents. They forwarded the package to the Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) office in Louisville for further investigation. 

The Louisville ICE office forwarded the package to the Los

Angeles ICE office on October 24, 2003. ICE Senior Special

Agent Christopher Laska used the UPS airbill to trace the origin of the package to the UPS Store in Diamond Bar, California. The store’s owner identified Abbouchi as the package’s

sender. 

On January 21, 2004, Agent Paul Yokoyama from the

Office of the Inspector General for the Social Security

Administration interviewed Abbouchi. Abbouchi signed a

Miranda waiver and admitted mailing a UPS package to Lebanon. Abbouchi claimed the package contained his military

booklet and some other personal documents. Initially,

Abbouchi denied that he knowingly sent the social security

and permanent residency cards. Further investigation produced evidence that Abbouchi had on other occasions sent to

Lebanon fraudulent documents that the recipients could have

used to enter the United States illegally. 

8442 UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI
On February 17, 2005, a grand jury returned an indictment

charging Abbouchi with four counts of transferring false identification documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2),

and one count of making a false statement, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1001. 

Before trial, Abbouchi filed a motion to suppress all evidence derived from the search of his UPS package. At a suppression hearing, Customs Officer Crace testified to Customs

inspection practices at regional sorting hubs. District Judge

Percy Anderson denied the motion to suppress. 

The prosecution dropped the § 1001 false statement charge.

At the end of the government’s case-in-chief, Abbouchi

moved for a partial judgment of acquittal on the counts relating to the social security documents. The district court denied

the motion. 

On September 29, 2005, the jury found Abbouchi guilty on

the four counts of transferring false identification documents.

The district court sentenced Abbouchi to sixteen months

imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.

Among other things, the supervised release conditions

required Abbouchi to enter a domestic violence treatment program. The conditions also required Abbouchi to report to his

probation officer within seventy-two hours of reentering the

country, and required Abbouchi to “answer truthfully all

inquiries by the probation officer. . . .” Abbouchi then brought

this appeal.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

We begin our analysis by addressing Abbouchi’s primary

contention that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the Customs officers lacked sufficient

predicate, i.e., reasonable suspicion, to open and search his

UPS package. Abbouchi argues that the search of his UPS

package did not occur at the functional equivalent of the borUNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI 8443
der, but was an “extended” border search that required reasonable suspicion. We disagree.1

[1] The border search doctrine is a narrow exception to the

Fourth Amendment’s usual requirement that searches be supported by a warrant approved by a magistrate and issued upon

a showing of probable cause. United States v. Sutter, 340 F.3d

1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2003). Border searches are grounded on

the government’s right to protect the United States’ territorial

integrity by examining persons and property entering and

leaving the country, and “are reasonable simply by virtue of

the fact that they occur at the border.” United States v. FloresMontano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004) (quoting United States

v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)); see also United States

v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1118-19, 1123 (9th Cir.

2005). As a consequence, most searches at the international

border need not be justified by a search warrant or by individualized suspicion. See Sutter, 340 F.3d at 1025. The border

search doctrine applies equally to searches of persons and

property exiting the United States as to those entering the

country. See United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 629 (9th

Cir. 1985) (explaining that “the border search exception

applies to exit searches”). 

[2] Despite its name, a border search need not take place at

the actual international border. See Almeida-Sanchez v.

United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). These searches

may take place at the physical border or its “functional equivalent.” Id.; see also Duncan, 693 F.2d at 977. This extension

of the border search doctrine reflects “[t]he practical difficulty

of getting to and searching every vehicle or carrier at the precise moment it crosses land or sea borders.” United States v.

Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1985). 

1A district court’s ruling on the legality of a border search is reviewed

de novo. United States v. Ani, 138 F.3d 390, 391 (9th Cir. 1998). A district

court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. United States v.

Mendoza-Ortiz, 262 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001). 

8444 UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI
[3] We have also recognized another category of border

search: the extended border search. Extended border searches

are typically separated from the border by “a greater spatial

and temporal distance” from the actual border than searches

at the functional equivalent of the border. Cardona, 769 F.2d

at 628. Because “the delayed nature of an extended border

search . . . necessarily entails a greater level of intrusion on

legitimate expectations of privacy than an ordinary border

search,” the government must justify an extended border

search with reasonable suspicion that the search may uncover

contraband or evidence of criminal activity. See United States

v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984) 

[4] We have recognized that comparison of absolute time

and spatial differences alone is not enough to distinguish

between a search at the border’s functional equivalent and an

extended border search. Rather, we also look to whether the

search, as was true of Abbouchi’s package, occurred at the

last practicable opportunity before its passage over the international border. Thus, in Almeida-Sanchez, the Supreme

Court noted that “a search of the passengers and cargo of an

airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight

from Mexico City” would be at the functional equivalent of

the border. See 413 U.S. at 273. Similarly, in Duncan, we

held it would be “unreasonable” to require federal agents to

wait until a suspect boards his airplane to conduct a search.

See 693 F.2d at 977. Rather, it was enough that the defendant

had checked his luggage, obtained his boarding pass, passed

through security, and embarked on the ramp to his flight

because these acts “manifest[ed] a definite commitment to

leave the United States,” and the search occurred “in reasonable temporal and spatial proximity to the departure.” See id.

[5] Applying these principles, we hold that the search of

Abbouchi’s UPS package at the Louisville hub took place at

the functional equivalent of the border. The Louisville sorting

hub represents the last practicable opportunity for Customs

officers to inspect international packages before UPS places

UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI 8445
them into sealed containers for departure from the United

States. Even if the airplanes briefly stop at another hub or airport to refuel or redistribute cargo before departing our country, it is unreasonable to require customs officials to wait until

that last domestic stop to unload the packages from the airplane, reopen the sealed containers, and conduct an inspection

before allowing the airplane to proceed to its international

destination. See id. Certainly, the search at the Louisville hub

represents no greater intrusion on Abbouchi’s privacy interests than a search at the last possible moment before the package’s departure from the United States.2

Finally, Abbouchi argues that under Cardona, the potential

length of time between a package’s inspection at the Louisville hub and its departure from the United States rendered it

an extended border search. Cardona, however, is inapposite.

In that case, federal agents opened two FedEx packages

shortly after being placed on a truck for delivery, and long

before they arrived at a regional hub. Cardona, 769 F.2d at

627. It was only in that context that we held the 3,000 mile

distance and 24-hour time interval separating the search from

the packages’ passage over the international border compelled

us to treat it as an extended border search. See id. at 628-29.

By contrast, we deal here with a search at the last practicable

opportunity for inspection. 

[6] In sum, we hold that Customs officers at the Louisville

UPS hub did not need reasonable suspicion to search the contents of Abbouchi’s UPS package because the search took

2Abbouchi argues that the government failed to develop the factual

record sufficiently to establish that this search took place at the functional

equivalent of the border. We disagree. Officer Crace’s testimony about

Customs practices at regional sorting hubs sufficed to establish that these

are the last practicable places where customs inspections may take place.

Even if further evidence had shown that the UPS airplane might also land

at another airport, there is simply no reason to believe that Customs would

inspect the airplane’s cargo a second time, or that it would be reasonable

to expect Customs to do so. 

8446 UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI
place at the functional equivalent of the border.3

 Consequently, the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress

is affirmed. 

III. MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL

Abbouchi next contends that he is entitled to acquittal as a

matter of law on the two counts predicated on his transfer of

fraudulent social security cards. He argues that social security

cards are not “identification documents” within the meaning

of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2). We disagree.4

[7] Section 1028(a)(2) provides criminal penalties for anyone who “knowingly transfers an identification document . . .

or a false identification document knowing that such document . . . was stolen or produced without lawful authority.”

3Abbouchi also contends that customs inspectors lacked statutory

authority to conduct the search. This argument lacks merit. Customs

inspectors had statutory authority to conduct these border searches under

31 U.S.C. § 5317, a statute authorizing inspections to enforce a statute

prohibiting transport of undeclared high-value monetary instruments

across the border, see United States v. Gomez-Osorio, 957 F.2d 636, 643

(9th Cir. 1992), as well as under 19 U.S.C. § 1582, the general source of

Customs’s border search authority, cf. United States v. Taghizadeh, 41

F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that § 1582 border

search authority for “persons and baggage” extends to international mail).

Customs also had inspection authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which

authorizes searches of any person, trunk, package, or cargo loaded onto a

vessel or into a vehicle. It does not matter under which statute Customs

officers believed they were operating. See Whren v. United States, 517

U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 

4At the close of the government’s case-in-chief, the district court, acting

on the defendant’s motion, “must enter a judgment of acquittal of any

offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed.

R. Crim. P. 29. A district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion is reviewed

de novo. United States v. Johnson, 357 F.3d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 2004). We

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and ask

whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v.

Carranza, 289 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI 8447
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2). An “identification document”

includes documents “made or issued by or under the authority

of the United States Government . . . which, when completed

with information concerning a particular individual, is of a

type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(3). 

[8] In United States v. Quinteros, 769 F.2d 968 (4th Cir.

1985), the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Congress did not

initially intend that social security cards be used for identification. 769 F.2d at 970. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit

accepted the testimony of a Social Security Administration

expert that social security cards are commonly accepted as

identification. Id. Indeed, the expert for the Social Security

Administration testified that the Administration issues cards

to senior citizens for use as identification for cashing checks,

and that the Administration removed the “Not for Identification Purposes” legend from these cards in 1972 to reflect their

emerging use as a form of identification. Id. The Fourth Circuit also cited legislative history for § 1028(a)(2) suggesting

that Congress contemplated the statute would cover social

security cards.5See id.

[9] We find the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning persuasive.

Therefore, we hold that Social Security Administration Agent

Paul Yokoyama’s expert testimony in the instant case that

social security cards are commonly used for identification was

sufficient to establish this element of § 1028(a)(2). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Abbouchi’s

motion for acquittal on the two counts of transferring fraudulent social security identification cards. 

5Congress has since amended § 1028(d)(3). See USA PATRIOT

Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177 § 603(3),

120 Stat. 192, 253 (2006). Because the amendment came after Abbouchi

committed his offense, it is irrelevant to this appeal. 

8448 UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI
IV. SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS

Abbouchi challenges several aspects of his supervised

release conditions. We remand for resentencing so that the

district court may re-sentence Abbouchi without the supervised release condition that Abbouchi participate in a domestic violence treatment program. 

A. Domestic Violence Treatment Condition

Abbouchi first challenges the supervised release condition

requiring him to participate in a domestic violence treatment

program. Because Abbouchi did not object to this condition

in the district court, we review for plain error. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 52(b); United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir.

2001). The existence of plain error requires “(1) error, (2) that

is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to [reverse for plain error], but only if (4) the error

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States,

520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)). 

[10] Supervised release conditions must be reasonably

related to the state’s interest in promoting deterrence, public

protection, and rehabilitation of the offender. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(1); United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1239-40

(9th Cir. 2003). The conditions must also “involve[ ] no

greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for

the purposes [of deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation].” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). The conditions must also be

consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policies. 18

U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3). The justification for imposition of a nonstandard probation condition must be supported by the record.

See United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040, 1044-45 (9th Cir.

2006). 

UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI 8449
[11] We find plain error. The only evidence considered by

the district court to support the domestic violence condition

was a paragraph in the Presentence Report suggesting

“strains” in Abbouchi’s relationship with his wife and that he

and his wife had separated. This evidence is insufficient to

support imposition of the domestic violence treatment condition. Cf. Napier, 463 at 1045 (holding that convictions that

were twenty-years old for selling cocaine and some evidence

of unusual behavior did not support imposition of a substance

abuse treatment condition as part of the sentence for a fraud

conviction). Imposition of the condition requiring domestic

violence treatment affected Abbouchi’s substantial rights. See

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (holding

that in most cases, error affects substantial rights when it “affect[s] the outcome of the district court proceedings”).

Finally, considering the paucity of the evidence in the record

to support the domestic violence treatment condition, we conclude that erroneous imposition of that condition “seriously

affect[ed] the fairness . . . of [the] judicial proceedings.” See

Jordan, 256 F.3d at 926 (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-

67). We therefore vacate Abbouchi’s sentence and remand to

the district court to re-sentence Abbouchi without the domestic violence treatment condition and its associated payment condition.6

B. Reporting Requirement

[12] Abbouchi also claims that the requirement that he

report to a probation officer within seventy-two hours of reentry into the United States and that he truthfully answer any

questions asked of him by the probation officer violates his

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. His challenge to the seventy-two hour reporting requirement itself is

6Although the condition in the written judgment requires Abbouchi to

pay for treatment of “the defendant’s psychiatric disorder,” the sentencing

transcript makes clear that the sentence as orally pronounced links the

payment condition to domestic violence treatment. 

8450 UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI
foreclosed by United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 441 F.3d

767, 772-73 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a requirement that

the defendant report to the probation office upon reentering

the country does not require the defendant to incriminate himself). Furthermore, it is premature to decide Abbouchi’s challenge to the requirement that he answer truthfully any

questions asked of him by the probation officer. Nothing prevents Abbouchi from raising a Fifth Amendment issue should

it arise. See id. (holding that the defendant could assert his

Fifth Amendment privilege if asked a question that would

tend to incriminate him). We affirm the district court’s

remaining supervised release conditions. 

V. CONCLUSION

The search of Abbouchi’s UPS package at the Louisville

UPS hub took place at the functional equivalent of the border

because it was the last practicable opportunity for Customs

officers to conduct an inspection before Abbouchi’s package

departed from the United States. Thus, the Customs officers

did not need reasonable suspicion to open and inspect the contents of his randomly selected package intended for overseas

delivery. We also hold that there was sufficient evidence to

establish that social security cards are “identification documents” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2). We

agree that the district court committed plain error by requiring

Abbouchi to participate in a domestic violence treatment program while on supervised release. Accordingly, we affirm the

convictions but vacate the sentence. We remand for resentencing without the domestic violence treatment condition. 

AFFIRMED in PART, VACATED in PART, and

REMANDED.

UNITED STATES v. ABBOUCHI 8451