MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Marce Gonzalez, Jr.

Dyer, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jodi Kathryn Stein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Wyatt Clayton Squyres,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 15, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A05-1502-CR-56

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, 

Judge.

Cause No. 45G01-1312-FB-118

Darden, Senior Judge

Statement of the Case

[1] Wyatt Clayton Squyres appeals the sentence the trial court imposed after he 

pleaded guilty to one count of sexual misconduct with a minor, a Class C 

felony. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9 (2007). We affirm.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1502-CR-56 | September 15, 2015 Page 1 of 6
Issue

[2] Squyres raises one issue, which we restate as: whether Squyres’ sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the evening of November 23, 2013, fifteen-year-old J.H. and other family 

members attended a party in Lowell, Indiana. Squyres, who was twenty-three 

years old, was also present. He knew J.H. and her siblings because he was a 

friend of J.H.’s older brother. Squyres was aware that J.H. was only fifteen

years old. At the time, Squyres was facing a pending felony charge of theft, 

having been released on bail just five days earlier.

[4] As the party progressed, Squyres went inside a camper parked on the property 

where the party was taking place and laid down on the bed. Later, around one 

or two a.m., J.H., along with others, went to the camper. Squyres was lying in 

the bed where J.H. was supposed to sleep. She asked him to leave, but he 

refused, saying he had nowhere to sleep. J.H. lay down next to him and went 

to sleep.

[5] J.H., who had never had sexual intercourse before, awoke to discover that her 

pants had been pulled down and one of her legs was wrapped around Squyres’ 

legs. Squyres’ penis was inside her vagina. J.H. had not consented to the 

sexual intercourse, and Squyres stopped after she woke up. J.H. immediately 

left the camper and got a ride home.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1502-CR-56 | September 15, 2015 Page 2 of 6
[6] J.H. became extremely depressed after the incident and had to seek counseling 

and therapy. She was still attending weekly therapy sessions at the time of the 

sentencing hearing, over a year later. Subsequently, J.H. became “terrified of 

boys” due to the sexual assault and stayed at home whenever possible. Tr. p. 

19. She was embarrassed and dropped out of school, and her mother had to 

homeschool her. Prior to the sexual assault, J.H. had had her mind set on 

going to college, but, according to her mother, decided that she did not want to 

go because “she’s terrified of what’s out there.” Id. She mostly stopped 

socializing with her friends and turned down baby-sitting jobs if there was a 

man in the house. At home, J.H. stayed in her room all the time and did not 

sleep at night because she was afraid of the dark. Her mother had to stop 

hugging her because J.H. could not “stand to be touched.” Id. According to 

J.H.’s mother, J.H. will continue with her therapy for the foreseeable future, 

perhaps “for the rest of her life.” Id.

[7] The State had originally charged Squyres with rape, a Class B felony, and three 

counts of sexual misconduct with a minor, one as a Class B felony and two as 

Class C felonies. The parties later reached a plea agreement; wherein, Squyres 

agreed to plead guilty to one count of sexual misconduct with a minor as a 

Class C felony, and the State agreed to dismiss the companion charges, in 

addition to a pending Class D felony theft unrelated charge. Sentencing was 

left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court accepted Squyres’ guilty 

plea and, after presentation of evidence and argument by counsel, sentenced 

him to six and one-half years. Squyres filed a motion to correct error, 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1502-CR-56 | September 15, 2015 Page 3 of 6
requesting an alternative sentence not to exceed four years and/or probation. 

The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a 

sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize 

independent appellate review and revision of sentences through Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B). Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 

Rule 7(B) allows an appellate court to revise a sentence that is otherwise 

authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 

Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender.”

[9] The principal role of appellate review under Rule 7(B) is to attempt to leaven 

the outliers, not to achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Garner v. 

State, 7 N.E.3d 1012, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). When assessing the nature of 

the offense and the character of the offender, we may look to any factors 

appearing in the record. Thompson, 5 N.E.3d at 391. It is the defendant’s 

burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is 

inappropriate. Id.

[10] At the time Squyres committed this offense, the advisory sentence for a Class C

felony was four years, the minimum sentence was two years, and the maximum 

sentence was eight years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2005). The trial court 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1502-CR-56 | September 15, 2015 Page 4 of 6
imposed an enhanced sentence of six and one-half years. Squyres asks the 

Court to reduce his sentence to the advisory sentence of four years.

[11] Regarding the nature of the offense, Squyres forced himself upon a sleeping girl

at a party. Squyres was a friend of J.H.’s family and was aware that she was 

only fifteen years old at the time. J.H. had not ever had sexual intercourse 

before the sexual assault. The sexual assault had a severe impact upon J.H., to 

the extent that she became so embarrassed that she dropped out of school and 

had to be homeschooled. She had to seek counseling and therapy. At the time 

of sentencing, J.H. continued to attend therapy weekly and had abandoned her 

dreams of attending college. She has become so terrified of males that she 

rarely leaves her house and will not accept a baby-sitting job if she knows a man 

will be present. The harm done to the victim was significant and much greater 

than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense. See Ind. 

Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1) (2012).

[12] Now, we turn to the character of the offender. Although Squyres has no prior 

criminal convictions, we cannot overlook the fact that he was out on bond for a 

prior unrelated felony offense when he committed the crime at issue here. He 

pleaded guilty, thereby conserving judicial resources and relieving the victim 

from having to testify. However, Squyres also received a substantial benefit 

from the plea, specifically, dismissal of a Class B felony rape charge that carried 

a much longer prison sentence, as well as the earlier unrelated felony offense. 

Furthermore, the unrelated felony charge could have warranted a sentence to be 

served consecutively to the sentence for the instant offense. See Westlake v. State, 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1502-CR-56 | September 15, 2015 Page 5 of 6
987 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (a guilty plea does not rise to the level 

of significant mitigation where the defendant substantially benefits from the 

plea agreement). Squyres asserts that he suffers from depression, but he does 

not argue that his depression influenced his decision to commit the crime at 

issue.

[13] Considering the nature of the offense, particularly the severe degree of harm to 

the victim, and the fact that Squyres was out on bond when he committed the 

current crime, he has failed to convince us that his enhanced sentence is 

inappropriate.

Conclusion

[14] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[15] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1502-CR-56 | September 15, 2015 Page 6 of 6