United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted October 23, 2019*

Decided October 23, 2019 

Before 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1720 

ARTHUR BEATTY, SR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 

v. 

MICHAEL PERSON, Doctor, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:17-cv-02149-TWP-TAB 

Tanya Walton Pratt, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Arthur Beatty, Sr., an Indiana inmate with flat feet, sued prison medical staff and 

their corporate employers for their deliberate indifference to his ankle and foot pain in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted the 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Because no reasonable jury could find that 

the defendants deliberately ignored his condition, we affirm. 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-1720 Page 2 

Beatty requested treatment for a painful, swollen ankle in June 2016. A nurse 

examined him, provided ibuprofen and a compression bandage, and referred him to a 

doctor. Before he met the doctor, Beatty complained of more pain and requested gel 

insoles and an x-ray or CT scan. Prison staff provided the insoles, and Dr. Michael 

Person, the prison’s medical director, saw Beatty shortly thereafter and diagnosed him 

with flat feet. When Beatty’s pain persisted, even with the pain relievers and footwear, 

he asked for more medical attention. Because he was a “chronic care” patient for his 

diabetes and hypertension, Beatty saw a doctor at 90-day intervals. At his next chroniccare visit, Dr. Person examined Beatty’s feet again, diagnosed a sprain, and ordered a 

large lace-up ankle brace and physical therapy. The following week, a physical therapist 

met with Beatty and taught him flexibility and strengthening exercises. 

Despite the medication, foot supports, and physical therapy, Beatty’s pain 

endured, and the next month he asked for yet more treatment. Dr. Person examined 

Beatty again and referred him to an orthopedist, whom Beatty saw the following week. 

x-rays showed that Beatty’s ankles were normal except for the flat feet, and the 

orthopedist recommended customized arch inserts. The next day, in adherence to the 

orthopedist’s recommendation, Dr. Person ordered a consult to have Beatty fitted for 

custom orthotics. He then ordered the molded-arch footwear that the specialist 

recommended. Before this footwear arrived, Beatty continued to complain of pain and 

request more care, including an MRI and a bottom-bunk pass. A nurse who received 

some of these requests, Tina Collins, told Beatty to discuss them with Dr. Person at his 

upcoming chronic-care appointment. But Dr. Person deemed the MRI unnecessary 

because the orthopedist had already confirmed the cause of Beatty’s pain. He also 

denied the bottom-bunk pass because Beatty did not suffer from a sprain or break, and 

Corizon’s medical policy limited bottom-bunk passes to inmates with those conditions. 

Beatty received the custom orthotic boots, but he now says that they exacerbated 

his pain. In his written request for further treatment after he received the boots, 

however, he did not state that the boots worsened his pain. Instead, he asked to see a 

doctor and to schedule an MRI, insisting that his bones were out of place. Collins, who 

received these requests, determined that Beatty’s condition had not changed and told 

him that no MRI was scheduled. She advised him to discuss his issues at his next 

chronic-care appointment. 

Dissatisfied, Beatty filed two grievances in 2017, which an administrator 

handled. The first stated that the prison had refused to give him needed emergency 

medical assistance. The administrator confirmed that Dr. Person had treated Beatty for 
No. 19-1720 Page 3 

his condition and had deemed an MRI unnecessary. The second grievance stated that 

Beatty’s year-long pain had worsened since wearing orthotic boots, that Collins had 

told him to wait until his chronic-care appointment to see a doctor, and that Dr. Person 

had promised him an MRI but never scheduled one. The administrator spoke with 

Dr. Person, who committed to addressing Beatty’s concerns at the next visit. 

Beatty sued Dr. Person; Nurse Collins; the administrator; their employer, 

Corizon Health Sources, Inc.; and its successor in March 2017, Wexford of Indiana, LLC. 

He alleged that they were deliberately indifferent to his foot pain by, among other acts, 

ordering the wrong orthotic and never ordering an MRI. The district court entered 

summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find 

that the medical staff impermissibly ignored or delayed his medical treatment or that 

Corizon or Wexford had a policy that violated Beatty’s constitutional rights. We review 

the entry of summary judgment de novo. See Johnson v. Rimmer, 936 F.3d 695, 705 

(7th Cir. 2019). 

Beatty contends on appeal that the district court improperly resolved genuine 

fact disputes in the defendants’ favor, but he is incorrect. Beatty begins by arguing that 

the district court impermissibly rejected his contention that Dr. Person had ordered the 

wrong orthotic. But the medical records show that Dr. Person ordered the exact shoes 

with custom molded-arch support that the specialist had recommended. If he had 

ordered a different orthotic, he would have risked a charge of deliberate indifference. 

See Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Beatty next argues that 

the district court ignored his assertion that Dr. Person had promised him an MRI. But 

the relevant issue is not whether Dr. Person had promised an MRI but whether not 

ordering one, in the context of Beatty’s overall care, was reckless. See id. at 728 (“we look 

to the totality of an inmate’s medical care when considering whether that care evidences 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”). It was not. “An MRI is simply a 

diagnostic tool, and the decision to [forego] diagnostic tests is ‘a classic example of a 

matter for medical judgment.’” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal 

citations omitted). Finally, Beatty argues that the court improperly found that his 

treatment cured his condition. But the court did not find that the defendants healed 

Beatty’s pain, only that they were not indifferent to it. 

Beatty’s principal argument on appeal is that a reasonable jury could have found 

that the prison’s medical staff ignored and delayed his foot treatment in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. To survive summary judgment on this claim, Beatty needed to 

offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants knew 
No. 19-1720 Page 4 

of and deliberately disregarded a serious health condition. See Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994); Petties, 836 F.3d at 727–28 (7th Cir. 2016). A medical 

provider impermissibly disregards a health condition when it responds as “no 

minimally competent professional would have so responded under those 

circumstances.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 729 (internal citation omitted). 

The record undisputedly shows that the medical staff provided Beatty overall 

with constitutionally adequate treatment. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. The staff 

repeatedly examined Beatty’s foot and ankle, referred him to a physical therapist and an 

orthopedic specialist, ordered custom orthotics, took an x-ray, and provided insoles, 

ankle braces, and pain medicine. Beatty responds that Nurse Collins should have 

changed this treatment after he received the orthotic boots because they worsened his 

pain. But in his requests for treatment after receiving the boots, Beatty did not tell 

Collins that they exacerbated his pain. Therefore, she did not deliberately disregard this 

condition. See Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Rather, in his requests Beatty asked for an MRI and a doctor. It is undisputed that in 

response Collins, seeing no change to his condition, answered his queries and advised 

him to discuss any concerns at an upcoming appointment with Dr. Person. Nothing in 

this record suggests that more was required of a minimally competent professional. See 

Wilson v. Wexford, 932 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2019). 

We can quickly dispatch Beatty’s last two arguments. First, he contends that the 

grievance administrator violated the Eighth Amendment by not ordering enhanced 

medical care following his two grievances. But the administrator relied on Dr. Person’s 

professional judgment in addressing both grievances, which she was entitled to do. 

See Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 478–79 (7th Cir. 2017). Second, Beatty argues that 

Corizon and Wexford were deliberately indifferent to his pain. To avoid summary 

judgment in their favor, Beatty needed to point to a policy that caused a constitutional 

injury. See Whiting, 839 F.3d at 664. The only corporate policy in the record is the one 

limiting bottom-bunk passes to inmates with sprains or broken bones. Beatty has not 

furnished any evidence that policymakers at Corizon or Wexford had reason to believe 

that people with flat feet who are otherwise receiving constitutionally adequate care 

also require bottom bunks. Therefore, summary judgment in their favor was proper. 

AFFIRMED