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******************************************************MICHAELPERUGINIv

. ROSEMARYGIULIANO ETAL. (AC 35167)
Bear, Keller and Harper, Js. Argued December 2, 2013—officially released March 25, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Trombley, J. [request for leave to amend]; Dooley, J. [judgment of dismissal in part]; Shapiro, J.

[judgment].)
Michael Perugini, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Amber J. Hines, with whom was Paul Grocki, for the appellees (defendants).Opinion KELLER, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Michael Perugini, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor ofthe defendants, attorney Rosemary Giuliano and the law firm with which she is associated, Giuliano & Richardson, LLC, in his action alleging misconduct in the defendants’ representation ofthe plaintiff’swife duringthe couple’spriordivorceproceedings. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) suspending his February 8, 2012 deposition untilthe pleadings were closed, (2) denying his February 22, 2012 requestforleaveto amendhis complaint, (3) dismissing his claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress for lack of subject matterjurisdiction, and (4) striking hisAugust 6, 2012 substitute complaintfromthe docket and rendering judgment for the defendants. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following procedural history. On September 9, 2010, the plaintiff, appearing before the court as a self-represented party, filed a two count complaint against the defendants for wilful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleged that Giuliano had engaged in misconduct during her representation of Kimberly Gamble-Perugini, the plaintiff’s former wife, in prior marriage dissolution proceedings againsttheplaintiff. Specifically, itallegedthat Giuliano failed to disclose a conflict of interest resulting from her prior representation of Judge Elizabeth Bozzuto, who presided over postjudgment proceedings and issued various rulings between April 27, 2009, and June 8, 2010. Although the complaint acknowledgedthat any allegedly inappropriate orders issued byJudge Bozzuto had been vacated, the plaintiff sought damages from the defendants for the stress, agony, depression and expense he claims to have endured as a result of Giuliano’s alleged misconduct.
This action was commenced on September 10, 2010. The defendants filed a request to revise the plaintiff’s complaint on September 21, 2011, to which the plaintiff did not properly object until December 30, 2011. In the interim, the plaintiff noticed Giuliano’s deposition for October 20, 2011. On October 14, 2011, the defendants filedamotionforaprotective orderonseveralgrounds, includingthe claimthatprivileged documents involving the defendants’ representation of Gamble-Perugini should not be explored and the deposition should be limited to the allegations in the complaint. On December 6, 2011, the court, Trombley, J ., issued an order allowing the deposition to proceed by February 17, 2012, which further stated: ‘‘The areas inquired into at said deposition shall be those that are framed by the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint

. . . .’’ He furtherindicatedthat ‘‘[t]he defendants are notrequiredto produce their file or any documents in theirpossessionpertaining to the dissolution action

. . . entitled Kimberly Gamble-Perugini v. Michael Perugini, as the information contained therein is protected by attorneyclient privilege.’’
On January 17, 2012, Judge Trombley, pursuant to PracticeBook § 10-37 (b),1 orderedtheplaintifftorevise his complaintasrequestedbythe defendants. Theplaintiff filed a motion to reargue to which the defendants objected. On February 8, 2012, Judge Trombley denied the motionto reargue and orderedtheplaintiffto revise his complaint and to incorporate the revisions ordered by the court on January 17, 2012. On February 8, 2012, the plaintiff, having not yet revised his complaint, commencedadepositionofGiuliano. Duringthe deposition, the plaintiff asked Giuliano questions regarding her communications with Gamble-Perugini duringtheprior divorceproceedings. The defendants objected, claiming that the information was protected by the attorneyclient privilege and that the questions were outside the scope of the pleadings. Judge Trombley was asked to resolve the issue and, upon learning that the plaintiff still had not revised his complaint, ordered, suasponte, that a revised complaint be filed within two weeks. Additionally, JudgeTrombleysuspendedthe deposition until, absentamotionforsummaryjudgment, thepleadings were closed and all the issues were framed. On February27, 2012, theplaintifffiled amotionto reargue asking Judge Trombley to reconsider the suspension of the deposition of Giuliano, which the court denied.
On February 21, 2012, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint that still contained only two counts, wilful violationoftheRulesofProfessionalConductandnegligent infliction of emotional distress. Although the revised complaint addressed some of the defendants’ requested revisions, it also included new factual allegations that Giuliano had engaged in representation of Gamble-Perugini without her consent. Only one day later, on February 22, 2012, the plaintiff filed arequestforleaveto amendhis revised complaint, to which the defendants objected. The proposed amended complaint included with the request, dated February 22, 2012, deletedthe countforwilfulviolation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, maintained the count for negligent infliction of emotional distress and added three new counts: fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracyto defraud, andviolation ofthe Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The proposed amended complaint, in paragraphs 10 and 12 of the second count, further expanded the facts alleged in support of the plaintiff’s claim that Giuliano had engaged in unauthorized representationofGamble-PeruginiwhileGiulianohadknowledge ofthe couple’s reconciliation. On March 21, 2012, Judge Trombley sustained the defendants’ objection to the plaintiff’s request to file a proposed amendedcomplaint and established the two count February 21, 2012 revised complaint as the operative complaint. The court’s orderstated: ‘‘While ourcourtshavebeenliberal in permitting amendments

. . . this liberality has limitations. Amendments should be made seasonably. Factorstobe consideredinpassing on a [request] to amend

are the length of the delay, fairness to the opposing parties and the negligence, if any, of the party offering the amendment.

. . . Whether to allow an amendment is amatterleftto the sound discretion ofthe trial court.

. . . Practice Book § 10-60 (b) provides: The judicial authority may restrain such amendments so far as may be necessary to compel the parties to join issue in a reasonable time for trial.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) OnApril 6, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion to recuse Judge Trombley, which the court denied on April 23, 2012.
OnApril 9, 2012, the defendants filed anotherrequest to revise the plaintiff’s February 21, 2012 revised complaint, to which the plaintiffobjected. On May 14, 2012, the court,Dooley, J

., overruledtheplaintiff’sobjections, thereby requiring plaintiff to revise his complaint as requested by the defendants. The plaintiff’s second revised complaint, dated and filed on May 22, 2012, again set forth two counts of wilful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendants then moved to strike the second revised complaint, arguing that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not give rise to a
cause ofactionandthatthe count ofnegligentinfliction of emotional distress was barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity for attorney conduct in the course ofajudicialproceeding.2 OnJuly26, 2012, Judge Dooley grantedthe defendants’ motionto strike as to the count sounding in wilfulviolation ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conduct3anddismissedthe countsoundinginnegligent inflictionofemotionaldistressforlackofsubjectmatter jurisdiction under the doctrine of absolute immunity.
On August 6, 2012, pursuant to Practice §10-44,4 the plaintifffiled a substitute complaint, premised on similarfacts aspreviously setforth, but asserting six counts sounding in conspiracy to defraud, alienation of affection, violation of CUTPA, abuse of process, vexatious litigation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants objected to this substitute complaint, arguing that the plaintiff was required to request leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-605 and that the amendments made by the plaintiff were retaliatory, violated prior court orders, and were prejudicial to the defendants, given the age of the case and the fact that that many of the claims and allegations already had been ruled legally insufficient and improper. The plaintifffiled an oppositiontothe defendants’ objection, arguingthathehadthe right to file a substitute complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44 and that the defendants’ objection was aprocedurally improper pleading. The plaintiff’s opposition also addressed the defendants’ nonprocedural arguments that the substitute complaint violated the law ofthe case and prejudiced the defendants. On September 25, 2012, the court, Shapiro, J ., sustained the defendants’ objection and struck the August 6, 2012 substitute complaint from the record. On September 27, 2012, the defendants filed a motion for judgment. On October 11, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for extension oftime to plead and a motion to reargue. On October 17, 2012, Judge Shapiro denied the plaintiff’s motions, granted the defendants’ motion forjudgment and renderedjudgment for the defendants. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I
On appeal, the plaintiff first challenges Judge Trombley’s order suspendingthe deposition ofGiuliano until the pleadings were closed, and his order denying the plaintiff’s February 22, 2012, requestforleave to amend his complaint.
A
The plaintiff first claims that Judge Trombley erred insuspendingthe deposition ofGiuliano until suchtime thatthepleadingswere closed. Specifically, theplaintiff argues that Judge Trombley’s order suspending the deposition represented a reversal of the court’s previous ordercompelling Giulianoto submitto adeposition before a certain date. We consider this claim to be abandoned.
Atthe February8, 2012 hearinginwhichJudge Trombley was asked to resolve the dispute concerning Giuliano’s invocation of the attorney-client privilege, the judge learned that the plaintiff had not yet revised his complaint as required by a previous order. As a result, he ordered that the plaintiffsubmit arevised complaint within two weeks from the date ofthe hearing. Following this order, Judge Trombley stated: ‘‘The second thing we are going to do is we are going to suspend this deposition as ofnow, until such time as the pleadings are closed and the issue isjoined.’’ He went on to explainthattheplaintiffstillwouldhave an opportunity to complete the deposition before pleadings were closed ifthe defendants moved for summaryjudgment. He then askedthe plaintiff: ‘‘Fair enough?’’ The plaintiff responded: ‘‘Fair enough.’’ At no point during this hearing6 did the plaintiff object to the court’s order. ‘‘It is fundamental that claims of error must be distinctly raised and decided in the trial court.

. . . Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part that our appellate courts shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial

. . . . That requirement means that it must be so stated as to bring tothe attentionofthe courttheprecisematteronwhichits decision is being asked.

. . . As our Supreme Court has explained, [t]he reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised attrial—afterit is too late forthe trial court
or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party

.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn

. v. Iaquessa, 132 Conn. App. 812, 814–15, 34 A.3d 1005 (2012). Here, by failing to object to the court’s suspension ofthe deposition, the plaintiffdid notprovide the court with a timely opportunity to reconsider the order. The recordtherefore is devoid ofany deliberation as to why the deposition should have continued on February 8, 2012, or how its suspension might have prejudiced the plaintiff. Furthermore, having expressly agreed to the court’s decision, the plaintiffcannotnow seekto attack the order on appeal. See Menon v. Dux, 81 Conn. App. 167, 170–71, 838 A.2d 1038 (claim unpreserved where appealing party expressly acquiesced to court’s evidentiary ruling at trial), cert. denied, 269 Conn. 913, 852 A.2d 743, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1003, 125 S. Ct. 623, 160 L. Ed. 2d 463 (2004). Accordingly, we decline to review this unpreserved claim.
B Next, the plaintiff claims that Judge Trombley erred in sustaining the defendants’ objection to his February 22, 2012 request for leave to amend his complaint. Specifically, he argues that the court abused its discretion in failing to take a liberal approach to Practice Book § 10-60. We disagree. ‘‘Ourstandard ofreview oftheplaintiff’s claimis well settled. While our courts have beenliberal inpermitting amendments

. . . this liberality has limitations. Amendments should be made seasonably. Factors to be considered in passing on a motion to amend are the length of the delay, fairness to the opposing parties and the negligence, if any, of the party offering the amendment.

. . . The motion to amend is addressed to the trial court’s discretion which may be exercised to restrain the amendment ofpleadings so far as necessary to prevent unreasonable delay of the trial.

. . . Whether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. This court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a proposed amendment unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.

. . . It is the [plaintiff’s] burden in this case to demonstrate that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., 259 Conn. 114, 128, 788 A.2d 83 (2002).
At the time of Judge Trombley’s ruling, the action had been pending more than seventeen months, sinceSeptember 10, 2010. Thepleadings stillwere not closed. In sustaining the defendants’ objection to the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint, the court noted that the plaintiff already had filed several complaints and cited the provision in Practice Book § 10- 60 (b) that allows the court to restrain amendments in orderto compelthe parties tojoin issue in areasonable time for trial. These were proper considerations within the court’s discretion in ruling on the issue and, therefore, we decline to upset the court’s decision.
II
The plaintiff also challenges Judge Dooley’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s claim ofnegligent infliction of emotional distress for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, hearguesthatthe doctrine ofabsolute immunity does not apply to claims alleging attorney misconduct for the purpose ofpersonal financial gain.7 We are not persuaded. ‘‘[W]hether attorneys are protected by absolute immunity for their conduct duringjudicial proceedings is a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 530, 69 A.3d 880 (2013). As the doctrine of absolute immunity concerns
a court’s subject matter jurisdiction; Stone v. Pattis, 144 Conn. App. 79, 96–97, 72 A.3d 1138 (2013); we are ‘‘mindful of the well established notion that, in determiningwhetheracourthassubjectmatterjurisdiction, everypresumption favoringjurisdiction should be indulged.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 95. The question before us is whether the facts as alleged in the pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to survive dismissal on the grounds of absolute immunity. Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 341, 343 927 A.2d 304 (2007).
Our case law differentiates between actions based

on alleged misconduct by an attorney in his role as advocate, such as defamation and fraud, and actions that challenge the underlying purpose of the litigation itself, such as vexatious ligation and abuse ofprocess. Simmsv. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 546. Fortheformer category, the law protects attorneys from suit in order to encourage zealous advocacy on behalf of their clients, unrestrained by the fear ofexposure to tort liability. Id., 535–36. On this basis, we recently have held that claims against attorneys for negligent infliction of emotional distress are barredwhenthe alleged conduct giving rise to the action occurs in the course ofjudicial proceedings. Stone v. Pattis, supra, 144 Conn. App. 98.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleged Giuliano, in the course of representing Gamble-Perugini in divorce proceedings againstthe plaintiff: (1) failedto disclose a conflict ofinterestwith the presidingjudge, (2) exerted improper influence over the judge to obtain favorable monetary rulings, and (3) filed court actions withoutGamble-Perugini’s consent for her own financial benefit. All of this alleged conduct occurred in the context ofthe dissolutionproceedingsbetweentheplaintiffand Gamble-Perugini. Giuliano therefore is immune from any claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from that conduct. See id.
We recognize that the plaintiff alleged that certain proceedings at issue were not brought for a proper purpose, as they were allegedly initiated by Giuliano without Gamble-Perugini’s consentforthe solepurpose ofself-enrichment. These allegationsmayhaveproperly formed the basis for an abuse ofprocess action, where ‘‘a legal process [is used] against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed’’; [internal quotation marks omitted] Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 494, 529 A.2d 171 (1987); and absolute immunitydoesnotnecessarilyattach. Id., 497. Nonetheless, the allegation that certain judicial proceedings

were notbroughtforaproperpurpose does notin itself

remove immunity for attorneys in negligent infliction of emotional distress actions. See Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 526–28, 569–70 (attorney who allegedly misrepresented client’s financial situation in order to seek court ordered payments immune from action forintentional infliction ofemotional distress). In order to avoid dismissal, such an action against an attorney must allege conduct that occurred outside the scope ofjudicialproceedings. SeeHeimv. CaliforniaFederal Bank, 78 Conn. App. 351, 367, 828 A.2d 129 (holding that absolute immunity did not apply to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where ‘‘some of the allegations

. . . [were] based on

. . . conduct that occurred outside the scope of judicial proceedings’’), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 911, 832 A.2d 70 (2003). Thus, the court’s decisionto dismisstheplaintiff’s claim

on the basis of absolute immunity was proper. III Next, the plaintiff challenges Judge Shapiro’s orders striking the plaintiff’s August 6, 2012 substitute complaint from the docket and entering judgment for the defendants.
A First, the plaintiff argues that the defendants’ objection to his substitute complaint, ratherthan amotion to strike, wasanimpropervehicleto challengeacomplaint filed pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44. We disagree. ‘‘The interpretive construction of the rules of practice.

. . . involves a question of law and our review

. . . is plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Social Services v

. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 733–34, 830 A.2d 228 (2003). Judge Shapiro, in determining he could consider the defendants’ objection, first noted that the procedural posture in this case differs from those in the two casescited by the plaintiff in support of his argument. The court noted that in each ofthe cases cited by the plaintiff, Smith v. Furness, 117 Conn. 97, 100, 166 A. 759 (1933), andNewman v. Golden, 108 Conn. 676, 679–80, 144 A. 467 (1929), permission was sought to file the amended pleading. Here, the plaintiff did not seek permission to file the August 6, 2012, substitute complaint. In addition, neither of these cited cases involved an objection, as in this case, that the substitute complaint violated prior court orders. The court then indicated, ‘‘[O]ther courts have considered objections to complaints which were filed after a motion to strike was granted.’’8 Second, the court, notingthatthe defendants

were claiming that the substitute complaint violated prior orders in the case, stated: ‘‘It is fundamental that

no one has a right to disobey the orders ofany court of this state

. . . . Consideration of an objection where a party asserts that a pleading has been filed in violation of a court order, even though the Practice Book does not specifically provide for such an objection, is also supported by Practice Book § 1-89

. . . which requires that Practice Book provisions be construed to advance justice.

. . . The proper administration of justice includes the necessity of enforcement of compliance with courtorders.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The defendants, aspartoftheirobjection, arguedthat the substitute complaint violated the orders of Judge TrombleyandJudge Dooley, andthatitwas ‘‘prejudicial in that, two years into the case, the plaintiff seeks ‘another bite ofthe apple’ by stating claims and allegations already ruled to have be legally insufficient and improper

. . . .’’
We agree that to permit a party to persist in refiling pleadings in a form previously disallowed does not advance the interests ofjustice. Rather, it encourages needless delay and places an unnecessary and unfair burden on the party who previously has successfully strickenorobjectedtotheimproperfiling. Whenparties engage in such tactics, their opponent and the court needlessly and repetitively are forced back to square
one. Furthermore, we conclude, after reviewing the defendants’ objection and the plaintiff’s reply to it, that the court proceeded properly. Those pleadings provided the parties with a full and fair opportunity to be heard, quite similar in nature to a case where a request to revise, and a consequent objection thereto, has been filed.10
B Next, the plaintiff claims that Judge Shapiro erred in striking the plaintiff’s August 6, 2012 substitute complaint from the docket because the court lacked the authority to disallow a substitute complaint filed by right pursuant to Practice Book §10-44. We disagree.As previously noted in part III A of this opinion, because this claim involves the interpretive construction of the rules of practice, our review is plenary. Practice Book § 10-44 provides that ‘‘[w]ithin fifteen days after the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been stricken may file a new pleading.’’ This court has clarified that this right ‘‘is limited to making those corrections needed to render the claims setforth in the originalpleading legally sufficient. It is not an opportunity to file wholly amended pleadings that assert new legal claims

. . . permission for which ordinarily could be obtained only in accordance with the provisions of Practice Book § 10-60.’’ GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn. App. 165, 180–81, 73 A.3d 742 (2013); see also Stone v. Pattis, supra, 144 Conn. App. 94–95 (‘‘Practice Book § 10-44 does not permit [a party] to add new counts in subsequent amended complaints following the court’s decision striking the

. . . complaint in accordance with

ourrules ofpractice’’). Anexample ofaproperpleading filedpursuantto Practice Book § 10-44 is one that ‘‘suppl[ies] the essential allegation lacking in the complaint thatwasstricken.’’AlarmApplications Co. v.Simsbury VolunteerFire Co., 179 Conn. 541, 551–52 n.4, 427 A.2d 822 (1980).
In the present case, subsequent to the granting ofthe defendants’ motion to strike, the plaintiff had the right to file a substitute complaint correcting the legal deficiencies of the stricken count alleging wilful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. As the plaintiff has since acknowledged, however, the Rules ofProfessional Conduct do not give rise to a private cause of action. See Noble v. Marshall, 23 Conn. App. 227, 231, 579 A.2d 594 (1990). Thus, there was no ‘‘essential allegation’’ or any other correction to be added that would have made the stricken count legally sufficient. Instead, the plaintiff filed an entirely new complaint asserting six legal theories for relief that had not been asserted in his stricken complaint. As Practice Book § 10-44 does not provide for the assertion of new legal claims, the courtproperlyconcludedthatthissubstitute complaint should have been accompanied by a request for leave to amend pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60 (a), only to be accepted at the court’s discretion. To allow the plaintiffto state new causes ofaction following the granting of a motion to strike under Practice Book § 10-44 would nullify the procedure of requiring courtapprovedamendmentspursuantto Practice Book § 10-60. Accordingly, Judge Shapiro properly held that the plaintiff could not file new causes ofaction following the granting ofthe defendants’ motion to strike and thattheplaintiffviolatedPractice Book § 10-60infailing to seek leave to amend his complaint.
CWe next consider whetherJudge Shapiro improperly concluded that the plaintiff, in filing the August 6, 2012 substitute complaint, disregardedthe law ofthe caseby violatingJudgeTrombley’sandJudgeDooley’sprevious orders. We do not agree. We consider whether a court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine under an abuse of discretion standard. ‘‘The law of the case doctrine provides that [w]here a matter has previously been ruled upon interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding in the

case may treat that decision as the law of the case, if it is ofthe opinion thatthe issue was correctly decided, in the absence of some new or overriding circumstance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Signore v. Signore, 110 Conn. App. 126, 133, 954 A.2d 245 (2008).
In sustaining the defendants’ objection to the plaintiff’sAugust6, 2012 substitute complaint, Judge Shapiro found that on February 22, 2012, the plaintiff filed a request to amend his February 21, 2012 revised complaint, which was substantially premised on claimed violations by Giuliano ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conductandallegations concerningunauthorizedrepresentation ofhis formerwife by Giuliano.11 He furtherfound that in objecting to the February 22, 2012 proposed amended complaint, the defendants claimed that that proposed amendment was untimely, as it was filed sixteen months after the return day. The defendants also claimed that the proposed amended complaint expanded previous factual allegations and added new
causes of action despite the fact that the additional events alleged by the plaintiff all occurred before the return day. The defendants ‘‘asserted thatthe proposed amendment would delay trial

. . . [and] cause them inconvenience, inthat, sincetheinceptionofthematter, theyhad defendedthe actionbased on one set ofallegations and causes of action, and should not be forced to start over in protracted litigation.’’ Judge Shapiro also foundthatJudge Dooley’s memorandum of decision striking the first count ofthe plaintiff’sMay22, 2012 secondrevised complaintspecifically determined that ‘‘any count based on a violation ofthe Rules of Professional Conduct is legally insufficient.’’ Judge Shapiro then stated: ‘‘In the [substitute] complaint, the first count is again premised on numerous alleged violations ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conduct by [Giuliano] in her representation of the plaintiff’s former wife.

. . . In each of the subsequent counts of the [substitute] complaint, the plaintiffincorporates all of the allegations contained in the first count.12 Thus, the core ofeach countispremised on allegedviolations of the Rules of Professional Conduct by [Giuliano]

. . . .13 In addition, starting with the second count, the plaintiff adds in again the expanded allegations as to alleged unauthorized representation [that] were first contained in the first proposed amended complaint [ofFebruary 22, 2012].

. . . Judge Trombley’s March 21, 2012 order sustained the defendants’ objection, [such that] the first proposed amended complaint did not become operative. These expanded allegations are also incorporated by reference in each of the subsequent countsofthe currentlyproposed [substitute] complaint. In the sixth count, the plaintiff expands on the allegations to add that he suffered additional stress and anguish in the course ofthe dissolution action.’’ (Footnotes added.)
It is clear in striking the substitute complaint that Judge Shapiro concludedthattheplaintiffwasviolating the prior orders of both Judge Trombley and Judge Dooley. Judge Shapiro stated: ‘‘[The] plaintiff has not restated a cause of action by supplying the essential allegation lacking in the complaint that was stricken.

. . . Rather, he has alleged a set offacts which are not materiallydifferentthanthatsinglegroup offactswhich

was the subject of Judge Dooley’s memorandum of decision.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) With respect to Judge Trombley’s prior orders, Judge Shapiro further articulated: ‘‘[C]ontrary to Practice Book § 10-60 (a), and Judge Trombley’s [March 21, 2012] order, in the [substitute] complaint, the plaintiff seeks, without consent or the court’s permission, to amend the complaint to add factual allegations and legal theories which were not allowed by Judge Trombley’s ruling sustaining the plaintiff’s previous objection to the plaintiff’s request to amend.

. . . [T]he plaintiff previously sought to add the expanded allegations concerning alleged unauthorized representation, which was not permitted. In addition, the plaintiff previously sought to claim conspiracy to defraud andviolationofCUTPA,bothofwhicharenowincluded

as theories in the [substitute] complaint. Judge Trombley’s ruling precluded these amendments. The plaintiff’s [substitute] complaint’s changes in legal theories

are evenmoreuntimelynowthanwhenJudgeTrombley sustained the defendants’ objection to the plaintiff’s request to amend in March 2012.’’14
In summary, Judge Shapiro found that the plaintiff, in his substitute complaint, soughtto addthe expanded allegations concerning alleged unauthorized representation, which previously were not permitted by Judge Trombley. Inaddition, theplaintiffsoughtto addcounts sounding in conspiracy to defraud and violation of CUTPA, which Judge Trombley also had disallowed. Furthermore, all of his proposed new counts included references to violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, whichJudge Dooleyruledrenderedanycount legallyinsufficient. Finally, alloftheplaintiff’sproposed

new counts were untimely in light ofthe time the case hadbeenpending andthe factthat all ofthe new allegations pertained to events that occurred prior to the initiation ofthis action. After a thorough review ofthe pleadings, we do not find error in Judge Shapiro’s con-clusion that all ofthe newly alleged counts in the plaintiff’s substitute complaint contained materially similar allegations to those in his February 22, 2012 first proposed amended complaint, as rejected by Judge Trombley, and the first count of his May 22, 2012 second revised complaint, as rejected by Judge Dooley. Given that similarityandthe considerable amount oftime that had passed since the action initially was brought, it
was within Judge Shapiro’s discretion to sustain the defendants’ objection to the plaintiff’s substitute complaint.
In his claim as to the impropriety ofJudge Shapiro’s rulings, the plaintiff also argues, in conclusory fashion with scant analysis, that he was denied due process when Judge Shapiro struck the plaintiff’s substitute complaint from the docket and subsequently rendered judgment for the defendants. We disagree.
‘‘Afundamentalpremise ofdueprocessisthatacourt cannot adjudicate any matter unless the parties have been given areasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues involved

. . . . It is a fundamental tenet of due process of law

. . . that persons whose

. . . rights will be affected by a court’s decision are entitled to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone v. Pattis, supra, 144 Conn. App. 87 n.6.
Practice Book § 10-44 provides that ‘‘in those instances where an entire complaint

. . . has been stricken, and the party whose pleading

. . . has been

so stricken fails to file a new pleading within [a] fifteen day period, the judicial authority may, upon motion, enterjudgment against saidparty on said stricken complaint

. . . .’’ Here, the plaintiff’s entire complaint was stricken on July 26, 2012. On or before August 9, 2012, the plaintifffailed to file aproper new pleading. Before his substitute complaint was stricken, he had ample opportunity to reply to the defendants’ objection to it. After Judge Shapiro considered all of the plaintiff’s arguments and ruled on the defendants’ objection, the

case fell squarely within the provision ofPractice Book § 10-44, allowingJudge Shapiroto grantthe defendants’ September 27, 2012 motion for judgment. Despite his reliance on Practice Book § 10-44, the plaintiff had no right underthat provision to replead the August 6, 2012 substitute complaint, as that complaint was not disposed of by means of a motion to strike, but rather by objection. On September 25, 2012, Judge Shapiro’s decision on the defendants’ objection to the substitute complaint gave the plaintiff guidance as to a possible way to remedy the legal and procedural deficiencies of his pleading. He could have requested leave to file an amended complaint, but he failed to do so before the court ruled on the defendant’s motion for judgment, despite the factthat aproperly amended complaintwas long overdue as aresult ofJudge Dooley’s July 26, 2012ruling. SeePeoplesv. Carberry, Superior Court,judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV-10-5013413-S (June 14, 2011) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 106) (plaintiff who improperly filed amended complaint alleging new causes of action in derogation of Practice Book § 10-44 would likely be able to subsequently file request for leave to amend absent any claim of unfair prejudice). Aperiod oftwenty days then elapsedbefore Judge Shapiro granted the defendants’ September 27, 2012 motion for judgment on October 17, 2012, after the court considered the plaintiff’s dilatory motions for

an extension of time to plead and to reargue for the acceptance of his August 6, 2012 substitute complaint, which motions were not filed until October 11, 2012. Given the ample time and opportunity afforded to the plaintiff, it cannot be said that his due process rights

were violated.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Practice Book § 10-35 provides: ‘‘Whenever any party desires to obtain (1) a more complete orparticular statement ofthe allegations ofan adverse party’s pleading, or (2) the deletion ofanyunnecessary, repetitious, scandalous, impertinent, immaterialorotherwise improperallegationsinanadverse party’s pleading, or (3) separation of causes of action which may be united in one complaint when they are improperly combined in one count, or the separation of two or more grounds of defenses improperly combined in

one defense, or (4) any other appropriate correction in an adverse party’s pleading, the party desiring any such amendment in an adverse party’s pleading may file a timely request to revise that pleading.’’ Practice Book § 10-37 (b) explainstheprocedure forobjectingto arequest to revise, and provides in relevant part: ‘‘If the judicial authority overrules the objection, a substitute pleading in compliance with the order of the judicial authority shall be filed within fifteen days of such order.’’

2 The plaintiff argues that his May 22, 2012 second revised complaint contained the expanded allegations as to unauthorized representation that Judge Trombley had disallowed in his order ofMarch 21, 2012, and that the defendants’ failure to file a request to revise for a second time to object to these expanded allegations constituted a waiver of any objection to their inclusion. A review of the first and second revised complaints, however, indicates that the expanded allegations as to unauthorized representation in the first proposed amended complaint that were prohibited by Judge Trombley are not contained in the plaintiff’s second revised complaint. Accordingly, we find no waiver on the part ofthe defendants that somehow would have negated Judge Trombley’s order.
3 The plaintiff has not appealed the order striking the first count of his May 22, 2012 second revised complaint.

4 Practice Book § 10-44provides inrelevantpart: ‘‘Withinfifteen days after the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been stricken may file a new pleading

. . . .’’

5 Practice Book § 10-60 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)

. . . [A] party may amend his or her pleadings or other parts of the record or proceedings at any time subsequent to [the first thirty days after the return day] in the following manner: ‘‘(1) By order ofjudicial authority; or ‘‘(2) By written consent of the adverse party; or ‘‘(3) By filing a request for leave to file such amendment, with the amendment appended, after service upon each party

. . . and with proofofservice endorsed thereon.

. . . ‘‘(b) The judicial authority may restrain such amendments so far as may benecessaryto compelthepartiestojoinissueinareasonabletimefortrial.’’

6 Nearly a month later, on February 27, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue, askingJudge Trombleyto reconsiderthe decisionsuspendingthe February 8, 2012 deposition. By that point, the parameters of any proposed rescheduled deposition had been greatly altered, as the court had pending beforeittheplaintiff’srequestforleavetofilehisFebruary22, 2012proposed amended complaint. Itwould have been impossible forthe courtto resched-ule the deposition after only reconsidering the status ofthe parties’ dispute

as of February 8, 2012. Judge Trombley summarily denied the motion to reargue. The plaintiff has not sought articulation of this order or appealed the denial of the motion to reargue.
7 The plaintiff also claims that the court acted improperly in dismissing the claim absent the defendant’s filing of a motion to dismiss. This claim is without merit, as ‘‘[i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue ofsubject matterjurisdiction at any time.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone v. Pattis, 144 Conn. App. 79, 96, 72 A.3d 1138 (2013).

8 See Walker v. Temple Surgical Center, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X10-CV-06-5005306-S (February 7, 2008) (objectionto revised complaint considered and sustained after granting ofmotion to strike); Estate ofRidgawayv

. Cowles & Connell, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X04-CV-03-0103516-S (October 14, 2004) (objection to substitute complaint filed after granting of motion to strike accepted and treated in nature ofrequest to revise by court); Dodgev

. Lane, Superior Court,judicial district ofFairfield, Docket No. CV-96-0332808-S (April 9, 1998) (request for leave to amend complaint denied pursuant to doctrine of law of the case based on defendant’s objection after court already had sustained objection to same claim asserted in prior complaint).

9 Practice Book § 1-8provides: ‘‘The designoftheserulesbeingtofacilitate business and advance justice, they will be interpreted liberally in any case where it shall be manifest that a strict adherence to them will work surprise

or injustice.’’

10 Our Supreme Court has found it appropriate for a defendant to file either a motion to strike or a request to revise when an allegedly improper revised complaint replaces a stricken complaint, especially when the allegations ofthe revised complaint appear to be the same in substance as those of the earlier, stricken complaint. See Royce v

. Westport, 183 Conn. 177, 180–81, 439 A.2d 298 (1981); Good Humor Corp. v. Ricciuti, 160 Conn. 133, 137, 273 A.2d 886 (1970); see also Parker v. Ginsburg, 85 Conn. App. 777, 781, 859 A.2d 46 (2004) (when allegations of amended complaint appear to be same in substance as those ofearlier complaint that was stricken, defendant may challenge amended complaint by filing request to revise); P & L Properties, Inc. v

. Schnip Development Corp., 35 Conn. App. 46, 50, 643 A.2d 1302 (either motion to strike or request to revise may be used when amended complaint merely restates original cause of action that was previously stricken), cert. denied, 231 Conn. 913, 648 A.2d 155 (1994). None of these cases, however, involve a plaintiffattempting to utilize Practice Book § 10-44 to circumvent the sustaining of an objection to a previous request to amend the complaint prior to the decision granting a motion to strike. Thus, the factors to be considered in whether to permit the amendment, as set forth in Practice Book § 10-60 and cited in Judge Trombley’s order, were not at issue in those cases. It is undeniable that an objection to an amended complaint is apropervehicle to ask the court to preclude aparty from filing

an amended complaint pursuant to § 10-60 for reasons such as delay or prejudice, reasons cited by the defendants in this case. See Rizzuto v. DavidsonLadders, Inc., 280Conn. 225, 257–58, 905A.2d 1165 (2006) (upholding court’s decision to sustain objection to amended complaint on grounds of delay and prejudice).

11 The unauthorized representation allegations that first appeared in the plaintiff’s February21, 2012 revised complaintare expandeduponbyincluding three additional sentences in plaintiff’s February 22, 2012 proposed amended complaint

12 See paragraph 7 of all counts of the substitute complaint.

13 ‘‘The Rules of Professional Conduct caution those who seek to rely on their provisions. They provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.

. . . Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules

are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 403, 766 A.2d 416 (2001). Notably, the defendants, in their objection to the plaintiff’s request for leave to file his February 22, 2012 proposed amended complaint, alleged that the grievance panel for the statewide grievance committee had dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint against Giuliano on November 30, 2011, finding no probable cause. The defendants attached a copy of the panel’s decision to their objection.14 In his memorandum of decision on the plaintiff’s motion to reargue, Judge Shapiro also noted that ‘‘[s]tyling the facts, as alleged in the [August 6, 2012 substitute] complaint, as supporting claims ofalienation ofaffection (second count); abuse of process (fourth count); vexatious litigation (fifth count); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (sixth count), does not change the fact that the expanded allegations were not permitted by Judge Trombley and that the allegations are not materially different from those addressed by Judge Dooley’s decision, which

. . . is the law of the case.’’