COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-17-00157-CR

THURMAN DEHORNEY JR. APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 431ST DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. F16-2968-431

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Thurman Dehorney Jr. appeals from a judgment convicting him 

of assault-family violence, impeding breath. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§ 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2017). In a single issue, he challenges the 

trial court’s decision to admit a prior judgment of conviction during the 

punishment phase. We will affirm.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

One morning in October 2016, Dehorney’s then wife Latrica gave him a 

ride to work. The conversation on the way “wasn’t friendly.” Dehorney had 

borrowed Latrica’s car the night before but failed to timely return it to her that

morning. The argument escalated to such an extent that when Latrica exited the 

highway, Dehorney “threw [the] car in park” and removed his key from the 

ignition. After Latrica inserted her key into the ignition and drove to the side of 

the service road, the two became involved in a physical altercation. Dehorney 

punched Latrica, choked her, and tried to pull her out of the car. When a witness 

from another vehicle intervened and confronted Dehorney, he pulled out a box 

cutter. The police arrived at that point and ultimately arrested Dehorney.

A jury acquitted Dehorney of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon but 

convicted him of assault-family violence, impeding breath. At the punishment 

phase, in addition to showing that Dehorney’s backpack contained 

methamphetamine, the State sought to prove up his criminal history by 

introducing several prior judgments of conviction, including State’s Exhibit 50, a 

1993 judgment convicting Dehorney of robbery in Hunt County. With the 

exception of State’s Exhibit 50, the State linked Dehorney to the prior convictions

by comparing the fingerprints contained on his fingerprint card to the fingerprints 

contained in the prior judgments. The State relied on other proof to link 

Dehorney to State’s Exhibit 50 because its fingerprint expert could not positively 

identify the fingerprint contained in the judgment. The trial court admitted State’s 

Exhibit 50 over Dehorney’s objection that the State had failed to show that he 
3

was the same person identified in the judgment. The jury assessed Dehorney’s 

punishment at 90 years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d) 

(West Supp. 2017) (establishing enhanced punishment range for habitual 

offenders).

2

In his only issue, Dehorney argues that the trial court reversibly erred by 

admitting State’s Exhibit 50 because the State failed to sufficiently link him to the 

judgment.3

We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. 

on reh’g). A trial court abuses its discretion in admitting evidence only if its ruling 

is so clearly wrong that it lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. 

Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391.

“[T]o establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the 

State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, 

and (2) the defendant is linked to that conviction.” Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 

919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “No specific document or mode of proof is 

required to prove these two elements.” Id. “Any type of evidence, documentary 

or testimonial, might suffice.” Id. at 922. Without evidence linking the defendant 

 

2State’s Exhibit 50 was not one of the two sequential prior felony 

convictions that the State relied upon to enhance Dehorney’s conviction.

3Dehorney thus raises only an evidentiary-admissibility issue.
4

to the prior conviction, evidence of the prior conviction is simply not relevant. 

Menefee v. State, 928 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no writ.).

Here, Dehorney’s rather unique name matches the name of the defendant

in State’s Exhibit 50—“Thurman Clenton Dehorney, Jr.” The birthdate identified 

on Dehorney’s fingerprint card is “03/18/1975,” and the birthdate on a document 

associated with State’s Exhibit 50 is “03/18/75.” With the exception of a single 

digit, the social security number on Dehorney’s fingerprint card matches the 

social security number in State’s Exhibit 50. The evidence at trial showed that 

Dehorney is a black male, and the documents associated with the judgment in 

State’s Exhibit 50 describe Dehorney as a black male. And Dehorney signed the 

fingerprint card, and the trial court could have drawn a comparison between that 

signature and the signature contained in State’s Exhibit 50. See Benton v. State, 

336 S.W.3d 355, 359‒60 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d).

The State sufficiently linked Dehorney to the judgment of conviction 

contained in State’s Exhibit 50. See Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921 (reasoning 

similarly). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the prior 

judgment of conviction. We overrule Dehorney’s sole issue and affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

/s/ Bill Meier

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE
5

PANEL: MEIER, GABRIEL, and KERR, JJ.

GABRIEL, J., concurs without opinion.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: March 29, 2018