[Cite as State v. Woodfork, 2024-Ohio-2555.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee

v. 

RICHARD E. WOODFORK JR.

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 29967

Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 1669

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on July 3, 2024

. . . . . . . . . . . 

DAVID R. MILES, Attorney for Appellant

 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant Richard E. Woodfork, Jr. appeals from the judgment of the 

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas overruling his post-sentence motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. Woodfork also appeals from the court’s judgment finding him 

guilty of violating his community control sanctions, revoking his community control 
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sanctions, and imposing a 30-month prison term. For the reasons outlined below, the

judgments of the trial court will be affirmed.

Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} On July 13, 2022, a Montgomery County grand jury returned an indictment 

charging Woodfork with one fifth-degree-felony count of possession of drugs 

(cocaine) and one second-degree-felony count of aggravated possession of drugs 

(methamphetamine). Woodfork pled not guilty to the indicted charges at his arraignment, 

but he later negotiated a plea agreement with the State whereby he agreed to plead guilty 

to a reduced third-degree-felony charge of aggravated possession of drugs. In 

exchange for Woodfork’s plea, the State agreed to dismiss the possession of cocaine 

charge and to jointly recommend the imposition of community control sanctions at 

sentencing. 

{¶ 3} On August 30, 2023, the trial court accepted Woodfork’s negotiated guilty 

plea after engaging him in a plea colloquy. The trial court then held a sentencing hearing 

on September 27, 2023, and sentenced Woodfork to a five-year term of community 

control sanctions. The community control sanctions included several requirements, 

including that Woodfork comply with the General Conditions of Supervision and attend 

and complete inpatient drug treatment at the STAR Program (“STAR”).

{¶ 4} A week after being sentenced, Woodfork, who was represented by counsel, 

filed a pro se motion requesting that trial court modify his community control sanctions. 

Specifically, Woodfork wanted the sanction requiring him to complete inpatient drug 
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treatment to be changed to outpatient drug treatment so that he could continue operating 

his auto-detailing company. Woodfork also filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea on grounds that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. In support of 

that motion, Woodfork claimed his trial counsel had promised that his guilty plea would 

not result in his being sentenced to jail or any other correctional institution. The trial court 

did not rule on either of Woodfork’s pro se motions.

{¶ 5} Shortly after Woodfork filed his pro se motions, his trial counsel moved to 

withdraw from the case. The trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and 

appointed new counsel for Woodfork. Woodfork’s new trial counsel thereafter filed a 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea that raised the same ineffective-assistance claim 

argued in Woodfork’s pro se motion. The motion also alleged that Woodfork’s guilty plea 

was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered due to his being under the 

influence of illicit substances during the plea hearing. 

{¶ 6} Around the same time, on October 16, 2023, Woodfork’s probation officer 

filed a notice of violation/revocation hearing. The notice alleged that Woodfork had 

violated Sanction #4 of his community control sanctions, which required him to attend and 

complete inpatient drug treatment at STAR. The notice also alleged that Woodfork had 

violated Rule #6 of the General Conditions of Supervision, which prohibited Woodfork 

from using or possessing any controlled substances, drugs of abuse, or drug substitutes.

{¶ 7} On November 8, 2023, the trial court held a hearing at which it addressed the 

motion to withdraw the guilty plea that was filed by Woodfork’s counsel. After 

considering the parties’ arguments on the plea-withdrawal issue, the trial court declined 
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to hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter. The trial court did, however, permit 

Woodfork to make a statement on the record. During his statement, Woodfork claimed 

that he had been intoxicated during the plea hearing because he had used marijuana and 

Adderall earlier on the day of his plea. Woodfork also claimed that his prior trial counsel

had advised him to accept the State’s plea offer and enter a guilty plea but had failed to 

tell him that, by doing so, he could be sent to jail or be required to complete inpatient drug 

treatment at a correctional facility. 

{¶ 8} The trial court found that Woodfork’s arguments lacked merit and overruled 

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Immediately after that ruling, the State offered to 

forego the revocation proceedings for the alleged community control violations if 

Woodfork would agree to enter inpatient treatment at STAR. Woodfork, however, 

declined the offer. The State thereafter called Woodfork’s probation officer to testify 

regarding Woodfork’s alleged community control violations. 

{¶ 9} The probation officer’s testimony established that Woodfork signed his 

General Conditions of Supervision on September 27, 2023. The probation officer

thereafter met with Woodfork on October 2, 2023, and went over each sanction listed on 

the termination entry with him. The probation officer confirmed that Sanction #4 on the 

termination entry included the requirement that Woodfork “attend[ ] and complete[ ] the 

STAR Program (Probation Officer will arrange bed date), and any additional programming 

recommended by an aftercare treatment agency, Montgomery County Probation 

Services, or the Court[.]” State’s Ex. 2; Hearing Tr. (Nov. 8, 2023), p. 21. 

{¶ 10} According to the probation officer, during the October 2 meeting, Woodfork 
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told her that he had never agreed to Sanction #4 and that he did not want to do inpatient 

drug treatment at STAR. In response, the probation officer told Woodfork that he could 

either comply with Sanction #4 or face revocation of his community control sanctions. 

The probation officer testified that Woodfork initially chose not to go forward with 

revocation proceedings, but later changed his mind when he reported back to her on 

October 10, 2023. 

{¶ 11} When the probation officer met with Woodfork on October 10, Woodfork 

advised her that he was not going to complete inpatient drug treatment at STAR and 

wanted to go forward with revocation proceedings. In response, the probation officer 

told Woodfork that she would be filing for revocation of his community control sanctions. 

The probation officer testified that she prepared a notice of violation/revocation hearing 

and sent it in for filing on October 13, 2023. However, the probation officer recognized 

that the notice was not officially filed until October 16, 2023. 

{¶ 12} The probation officer testified that Woodfork reported back to her on 

October 13, 2023, and was taken into custody for refusing to complete inpatient drug 

treatment at STAR. The probation officer also testified that a bed at STAR had become 

available for Woodfork the following week, and that STAR attempted to admit Woodfork 

into the program, but Woodfork refused to go. 

{¶ 13} With regard to Woodfork’s drug use, the probation officer testified that she 

first requested a drug screen from Woodfork on October 10, 2023. On crossexamination, the probation officer confirmed that Woodfork had told her that the drug 

screen would come back positive because he had marijuana and Adderall in his system. 
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Although not directly stated on the record, it was intimated that Woodfork had claimed 

that he used those drugs prior to being placed on community control.

{¶ 14} After hearing the probation officer’s testimony, the trial court found that 

Woodfork was guilty of violating the terms of his community control sanctions. The trial 

court then immediately proceeded to sentence Woodfork. During sentencing, the trial 

court found that Woodfork was not amenable to community control and imposed a 30-

month prison sentence for his community control violation. 

{¶ 15} Woodfork now appeals from the trial court’s judgments overruling his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, revoking his community control sanctions, 

and sentencing him to prison. In doing so, Woodfork has raised three assignments of 

error for review.

First Assignment of Error

{¶ 16} Under his first assignment of error, Woodfork contends the trial court erred 

by overruling his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In support of this 

claim, Woodfork raises the same arguments that he raised in his motion, i.e., that his 

guilty plea was invalid due to his being under the influence of marijuana and Adderall at 

the time of his plea hearing and due to his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance.

{¶ 17} Under Crim.R. 32.1: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may 

be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after 

sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw 

his or her plea.” Pursuant to this rule, “a trial court may permit a defendant to withdraw 
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a plea after imposition of sentence only to correct a manifest injustice.” (Citations 

omitted.) State v. Ray, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2019-CA-31, 2020-Ohio-4769, ¶ 11. 

The burden to prove the existence of a manifest injustice rests upon the defendant and 

demands a showing of extraordinary circumstances. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261,

264, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977); State v. Turner, 171 Ohio App.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-1346, 869 

N.E.2d 708, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 18} A defendant may establish a manifest injustice “ ‘by showing that he did not 

enter the guilty plea in a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary manner.’ ” State v. Leifheit, 2d 

Dist. Clark No. 2019-CA-78, 2020-Ohio-5106, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Riley, 4th Dist. 

Washington No. 16CA29, 2017-Ohio-5819, ¶ 18. (Other citations omitted.) “ ‘Ineffective 

assistance of counsel can [also] constitute manifest injustice sufficient to allow the postsentence withdrawal of a guilty plea.’ ” State v. Banks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25188, 

2013-Ohio-2116, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Dalton, 153 Ohio App.3d 286, 2003-Ohio-3813, 

793 N.E.2d 509, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). “ ‘When arguing the ineffective assistance of counsel 

in a motion to withdraw a plea, the defendant must show that counsel’s ineffectiveness 

affected whether the defendant made a knowing and voluntary plea.’ ” Id., quoting State 

v. Doak, 7th Dist. Columbiana Nos. 03 CO 15 and 03 CO 31, 2004-Ohio-1548, ¶ 3.

{¶ 19} The decision whether to grant a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty 

plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Smith at 264; State v. Xie, 62 Ohio 

St.3d 521, 526, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). Accordingly, we review a trial court’s ruling on 

a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. State v. Rozell, 

2018-Ohio-1722, 111 N.E.3d 861, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.), citing Smith at paragraph two of the 
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syllabus. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is 

unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Darmond, 135 

Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34. However, “[a]n abuse of 

discretion most often involves an unreasonable decision that is not supported by a sound 

reasoning process.” State v. Pate, 2021-Ohio-1838, 173 N.E.3d 567, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.), 

citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio 

St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).

{¶ 20} In this case, Woodfork claims the trial court abused its discretion by failing 

to grant his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea on grounds that he was under 

the influence of marijuana and Adderall at the time of his plea hearing. According to 

Woodfork, this alleged drug use prevented him from knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily entering his guilty plea. 

{¶ 21} When considering the merits of Woodfork’s drug-use claim, the trial court 

was permitted to weigh the claim against the statements Woodfork made when he 

entered his guilty plea. State v. Summers, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2006-CA-66, 2007-Ohio3168, ¶ 20. It is well established that “[a] trial court may determine that a defendant 

understands his plea ‘by considering the surrounding circumstances such as the dialogue 

between the court and the defendant and the defendant’s demeanor.’ ” State v. 

McClendon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103202, 2016-Ohio-2630, ¶ 18, quoting State v. 

McDowell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 70799, 1997 WL 15254, *2 (Jan. 16, 1997). (Other 

citations omitted.) 

{¶ 22} “Where the record ‘directly refutes [an appellant’s] claim that he was so 
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heavily drugged that he was unable to enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea,’ 

we have overruled the appellant's assignment of error based on that allegation.” State 

v. Ashley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28377, 2019-Ohio-5007, ¶ 15, citing State v. Hess, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24453, 2012-Ohio-961, ¶ 8-14. For example, in Summers, we 

affirmed the trial court’s judgment overruling a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty 

plea where the defendant’s statements during the plea hearing “belie[d] his subsequent 

claim that his ability to understand the proceedings and enter a knowing, voluntary plea 

was affected by drugs he was taking[.]” Summers at ¶ 20. See also Ashley ¶ 17 (“[o]ur 

review of the plea hearing transcript reveal[ed] nothing that arguably could be indicative 

that [defendant] was experiencing cognitive difficulties”). 

{¶ 23} Here, the record of the plea hearing establishes that Woodfork responded 

appropriately to all of the trial court’s questions and confirmed that he understood all of 

the information provided by the trial court at the plea hearing. When the trial court asked 

Woodfork whether he was “under the influence of any alcohol, drugs, or medication that 

could affect [his] ability to understand what [they were] doing [at the plea hearing],” 

Woodfork answered: “No, sir.” Plea Hearing Tr. (Aug. 30, 2023), p. 10. When the trial 

court asked Woodfork whether he understood everything that had happened at the plea 

hearing, Woodfork answered: “[Y]es, sir.” Id. at 14. Also, while ruling on Woodfork’s 

post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court confirmed that, during the 

plea hearing, it had found that Woodfork was not influenced by any drugs, alcohol, or 

medications that day. 

{¶ 24} When considering Woodfork’s appropriate responses at the plea hearing 
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and the fact that the trial court personally observed Woodfork’s demeanor at the hearing 

and found no reason to believe that he was under the influence of drugs, we find that it 

was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to reject Woodfork’s claim 

that his alleged marijuana and Adderall use had prevented him from entering a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. Such a claim was refuted by the record, and the

trial court was not required to give it any credit. See Summers, 2d Dist. Greene No. 

2006-CA-66, 2007-Ohio-3168, at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 25} Woodfork also contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

grant his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea on ineffective assistance 

grounds. Woodfork claims his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the plea 

hearing because counsel allegedly told him that his guilty plea would not result in his

being sentenced to jail or an inpatient drug treatment facility. Woodfork claims this 

misinformation prevented him from entering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty 

plea. 

{¶ 26} In evaluating whether an ineffective assistance claim constitutes a manifest 

injustice that warrants withdrawing a plea, a defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), 

which was adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 

538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). Under that test, the defendant must establish: (1) his trial 

counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him. 

Strickland at paragraph two of the syllabus; Bradley at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 27} To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that his trial 
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counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. 

Strickland at 688; Bradley at 142. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that 

there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result 

would have been different.” State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 

N.E.2d 864, ¶ 204, citing Strickland at 687-688 and Bradley at paragraph two of the 

syllabus. The failure to make a showing of either deficient performance or prejudice 

defeats a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland at 697.

{¶ 28} It is appropriate for a trial court to overrule a defendant’s motion to withdraw 

a guilty plea alleging ineffective assistance of counsel when the ineffective assistance 

claim is only supported by the defendant’s own self-serving affidavit or statement. 

Banks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25188, 2013-Ohio-2116, at ¶ 10, citing State v. Laster, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19387, 2003-Ohio-1564, ¶ 8 (“where nothing in the record 

supports a defendant’s claim that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made other 

than his own self-serving affidavit or statement, the record is insufficient to overcome the 

presumption that the plea was voluntary”). 

{¶ 29} In this case, other than Woodfork’s own self-serving statements, there is 

nothing in the record supporting Woodfork’s claim that his trial counsel provided

misinformation about his potential sentence. Because Woodfork’s ineffective assistance 

claim relies on self-serving statements that are unsupported by the record, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the claim.

{¶ 30} Even if there had been something in the record supporting Woodfork’s 

ineffective assistance claim, Woodfork cannot establish any resulting prejudice. This is 
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because the record establishes that the trial court discussed the potential sentence with 

Woodfork at the plea hearing and specifically advised Woodfork that he could receive 

community control sanctions “for a period of up to five years, which may include some 

community residential sanctions, including up to six months of incarceration or a facility 

or other non-residential sanctions.” (Emphasis added.) Plea Hearing Tr. (Aug. 30, 

2023), p. 11. The trial court’s comments at the plea hearing, comments which Woodfork 

indicated he understood, correctly apprised Woodfork of the possibility that he would be 

subject to a residential sanction and thus negated any alleged misinformation provided 

by his trial counsel on that matter. Therefore, Woodfork cannot establish any prejudice 

resulting from the alleged misinformation provided by his trial counsel. Accordingly, his 

ineffective assistance claim fails for that reason as well.

{¶ 31} For all the foregoing reasons, we find that Woodfork failed to establish a 

manifest injustice warranting the withdrawal of his guilty plea as required by Crim.R. 32.1. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Woodfork’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

{¶ 32} Under this assignment of error, Woodfork raises an additional ineffective 

assistance claim that has no bearing on whether a manifest injustice occurred during his

guilty plea. Specifically, Woodfork argues that the trial counsel who filed the plea 

withdrawal motion on his behalf was ineffective for failing to call his prior counsel as a 

witness to testify regarding the alleged misinformation provided during his plea

negotiations. This argument should have been raised in a separate assignment of error. 

Regardless, it lacks merit for at least two reasons. 
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{¶ 33} First, Woodfork cannot establish deficient performance on the part of his 

counsel because no formal evidentiary hearing at which prior counsel could have been 

called to testify ever took place. After the trial court considered the parties’ arguments 

on Woodfork’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court found that Woodfork was 

not entitled to an evidentiary hearing and instead allowed Woodfork to make statement in 

support of his motion. See Hearing Tr. (Nov. 8, 2023), p. 7. See also State v. Johnson, 

2d Dist. Champaign No. 2018-CA-27, 2019-Ohio-1259, ¶ 15 ( “a court is not required to 

hold an evidentiary hearing on a Crim.R. 32.1 motion so that evidence outside the record 

can be presented when the motion and record do not present a reasonable likelihood of 

a manifest injustice”).

{¶ 34} Even if there had been an evidentiary hearing at which Woodfork’s prior 

counsel could have been called to testify, the decision whether to present that testimony 

was a matter of trial strategy that could not form the basis of an ineffective assistance 

claim. It is well established that “[d]ebatable strategic and tactical decisions may not 

form the basis of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, even if, in hindsight, it looks 

as if a better strategy had been available.” State v. Conley, 2015-Ohio-2553, 43 N.E.3d 

775, ¶ 56 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524-525, 605 N.E.2d 70 

(1992). “[C]ounsel’s decision whether to call a witness falls within the rubric of trial 

strategy and will not be second-guessed by a reviewing court.” (Citation omitted.) State 

v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 490, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001). More specifically, “[a] failure 

to call a witness is not ineffective assistance of counsel if calling that witness opens the 

door to unfavorable testimony that counsel might reasonably conclude would likely 
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outweigh the value of any favorable testimony the witness might offer.” State v. 

Reynolds, 148 Ohio App.3d 578, 2002-Ohio-3811, 774 N.E.2d 347, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.), citing

State v. Griffitts, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18755, 2002 WL 252786, *7 (Feb. 22, 2002). 

Accord State v. Matthews, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-140, 2003-Ohio-6307, ¶ 31. 

{¶ 35} In this case, it is possible that Woodfork’s trial counsel would have chosen 

not to have prior counsel testify out of concern that prior counsel would say he properly 

informed Woodfork about his potential sentence at the plea hearing. Accordingly, 

Woodfork’s additional ineffective assistance claim lacks merit.

{¶ 36} Because Woodfork’s additional ineffective assistance claim lacks merit, and 

because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Woodfork’s post-sentence 

motion to withdraw guilty plea, Woodfork’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Second Assignment of Error

{¶ 37} Under his second assignment of error, Woodfork contends the trial court 

abused its discretion by failing to rule on his pro se motion to modify his community control 

sanctions. There is no dispute that the trial court did not rule on the pro se motion in 

question. However, the record establishes that Woodfork was represented by counsel 

when he filed the motion.

{¶ 38} “In Ohio, a criminal defendant has the right to representation by counsel or 

to proceed pro se with the assistance of standby counsel. However, these two rights are 

independent of each other and may not be asserted simultaneously.” State v. Martin, 

103 Ohio St.3d 385, 2004-Ohio-5471, 816 N.E.2d 227, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
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“Because a defendant represented by counsel has no right to simultaneously assert the 

right to proceed pro se, a trial court may not entertain a represented defendant’s pro se 

motions.” (Citations omitted.) In re Disqualification of Allen, 172 Ohio St.3d 1217, 

2023-Ohio-3238, 223 N.E.3d 1284, ¶ 31. Therefore, “[w]hen a criminal defendant is 

represented by counsel and counsel does not join in the defendant’s pro se motion or 

otherwise indicate a need for the relief sought by the defendant pro se, the trial court 

cannot properly consider the defendant’s pro se motion.” State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio8558, 99 N.E.3d 1230, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Davis, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP193, 2006-Ohio-5039, ¶ 12. and State v. Pizzaro, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94849, 2011-

Ohio-611, ¶ 7.

{¶ 39} As previously discussed, Woodfork was represented by counsel when he 

filed his pro se motion to modify his community control sanctions. Because Woodfork’s 

counsel did not join in the motion, the trial court did not err by disregarding it.

{¶ 40} Woodfork’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Third Assignment of Error

{¶ 41} Under his third assignment of error, Woodfork contends the trial court erred 

by finding him guilty of violating his community control sanctions, revoking his community 

control sanctions, and imposing a 30-month prison term. We disagree. 

Revocation of Community Control Sanctions

{¶ 42} “The right to continue on community control depends upon compliance with 
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the conditions of community control and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 

court.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Eastman, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-5, 2021-Ohio392, ¶ 13. “Accordingly, we review the trial court’s revocation of community control for 

an abuse of discretion.” (Citation omitted.) Id. As previously discussed, “[a]n abuse of 

discretion most often involves an unreasonable decision that is not supported by a sound 

reasoning process.” Pate, 2021-Ohio-1838, 173 N.E.3d 567, at ¶ 36, citing AAAA Ents., 

Inc., 50 Ohio St.3d at 161, 553 N.E.2d 597.

{¶ 43} “Because a community control violation hearing is not a criminal trial, the 

State need not prove a violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Reed, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 29523, 2023-Ohio-1161, ¶ 11, citing State v. Cofer, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 22798, 2009-Ohio-890, ¶ 12. (Other citation omitted.) “ ‘The State need only 

present substantial evidence of a violation of the terms of a defendant’s community 

control.’ ” Id., quoting Cofer at ¶ 12. “Substantial evidence is considered to consist of 

more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but somewhat less than a preponderance.” 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Ohly, 166 Ohio App.3d 808, 2006-Ohio-2353, 853 N.E.2d 

675, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.). Accord State v. Fountain, 2023-Ohio-3111, 224 N.E.3d 97, ¶ 15 

(3d Dist.); State v. Backus, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2022 CA 0041, 2023-Ohio-3222, ¶ 33. 

“Similar to a bench trial, when reaching its decision following an evidentiary hearing, the 

trial court, as the finder of fact, [is] free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of 

each witness and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented.” State v. 

McGail, 2021-Ohio-231, 167 N.E.3d 70, ¶ 92 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Baker, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 25828, 2014-Ohio-3163, ¶ 28.
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{¶ 44} In this case, Woodfork claims the trial court abused its discretion by finding 

that he had violated Sanction #4 of his community control sanctions, i.e., the sanction that 

required him to complete inpatient drug treatment at STAR. Woodfork claims that there 

was no such violation because STAR did not have a bed available for him and was not 

ready to admit him into the program until after his probation officer had filed the notice of 

violation/revocation hearing. Woodfork also claims that the notice incorrectly alleged 

that he had violated Rule #6 of the General Conditions of Supervision, which prohibited 

him from using or possessing any controlled substances, drugs of abuse, or drug 

substitutes. Specifically, Woodfork claims that his first drug screen came back positive 

because of drugs he had ingested prior to being sentenced.

{¶ 45} Based on the testimony presented at the revocation hearing, we find that 

the trial court could have reasonably determined that Woodfork had violated his 

community control by failing to attend and complete inpatient drug treatment at STAR. It 

is clear from the record that Woodfork had no desire to participate in STAR. The record 

established that on October 10, 2023, Woodfork specifically told his probation officer that 

he would rather move forward with revocation proceedings than go to STAR. In light of 

that statement, Woodfork’s probation officer told Woodfork that she was going to file a 

notice of violation/revocation hearing, which was filed on October 16, 2023. Shortly 

thereafter, a bed at STAR became available for Woodfork and STAR attempted to admit 

him into the program, but Woodfork refused admission. 

{¶ 46} Although the notice of violation/revocation hearing was filed before 

Woodfork could be admitted into to STAR, we find it significant that Woodfork told his 
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probation officer that he was not going to participate in STAR and thereafter refused 

admission into the program when a bed became available. In our view, that conduct 

constituted substantial evidence of Woodfork failing to fulfill the STAR requirement of his 

community control sanctions. This finding was also supported by the fact that Woodfork 

declined the State’s pre-hearing offer to forego the revocation proceedings if he agreed 

to enter STAR. Because there was substantial evidence of Woodfork’s violating the 

STAR requirement of his community control sanctions, it is immaterial whether 

Woodfork’s positive drug screen also constituted a violation. 

{¶ 47} For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

finding that Woodfork had violated the terms of his community control sanctions and by 

revoking his community control on that basis.

Prison Sentence

{¶ 48} Woodfork also challenges the prison sentence he received for violating his 

community control sanctions. We note that “[w]hen a defendant violates the conditions 

of his community control, ‘R.C. 2929.15(B) provides the trial court [with] a great deal of 

latitude in sentencing the offender.’ ” State v. Hampton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29612, 

2023-Ohio-1591, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 

814 N.E.2d 837, ¶ 20. “A trial court has the option of imposing ‘a longer period of 

community control, a more restrictive community-control sanction, or a prison term of any 

length within the range of that available for the original offense, up to the maximum that 

the trial court specified at the first sentencing hearing.’ ” Id., quoting Brooks at ¶ 20, 
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citing R.C. 2929.15(B). 

{¶ 49} Appellate review of prison sentences imposed for violations of felony 

community control sanctions is governed by the standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 

State v. Gibson, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2016-CA-12, 2017-Ohio-691, ¶ 14, citing State 

v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231. Pursuant to R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2), this court may vacate or modify Woodfork’s sentence only if we 

“determine[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial 

court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” 

Marcum at ¶ 1. In this case, none of the relevant statutes mentioned in R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) apply to this case; accordingly, we must simply determine whether 

Woodfork’s sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶ 50} “ ‘[O]therwise contrary to law’ means “in violation of statute or legal 

regulations at a given time.” ’ ” State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 

198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 

N.E.3d 649, ¶ 34, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990). This court has also 

defined “contrary to law” as “ ‘a sentencing decision [that] manifestly ignores an issue or 

factor which a statute requires a court to consider.’ ” State v. Morgan, 2d Dist. Miami No. 

2023-CA-10, 2023-Ohio-3913, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Lofton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

19852, 2004-Ohio-169, ¶ 11. “For example, ‘[a] sentence is contrary to law when it does 

not fall within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the 

purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing 

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, 99 
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N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.). (Other citation omitted.) “For all revocations, the prison 

term must be within the range of prison terms available for the offense for which 

community control had been imposed and the term may not exceed the prison term 

specified in the notice provided to the offender at the original sentencing hearing.” State 

v. Monroe, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-124, 2020-Ohio-597, ¶ 41, citing R.C. 

2929.15(B)(3).

{¶ 51} In this case, Woodfork’s 30-month prison sentence is within the statutory 

range of prison terms available for the third-degree-felony aggravated possession offense

for which his community control was imposed. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). Also, 

Woodfork’s 30-month prison sentence does not exceed the prison term specified in the 

notice given by the trial court at the original sentencing hearing. At the original 

sentencing hearing, the trial court notified Woodfork that if he “violate[s] any terms or 

conditions of [his] community control sanctions, * * * the Court can impose * * * a prison 

term of 36 months as an alternate sentence.” Sentencing Tr. (Sept. 27, 2023), p. 18. 

{¶ 52} In addition, the record establishes that, when imposing the 30-month prison 

sentence, the trial court considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing in 

R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. See Sentencing Tr. (Nov. 8, 

2023), p. 32; Sentencing Entry (Nov. 9, 2023). We note that “[n]othing in R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the 

record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that 

best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 

2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, at ¶ 42. “[W]hen reviewing felony sentences that are 
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imposed solely after considering the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, this court does 

not analyze whether those sentences are unsupported by the record, but only whether 

they are contrary to law.” State v. McCoy, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2023-CA-11, 2024-

Ohio-98, ¶ 27, citing State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, 

¶ 18.

{¶ 53} Here, Woodfork’s sentence is not contrary to law because it is within the 

authorized statutory range, does not exceed the notice given at the original sentencing 

hearing, and because the trial court considered the principles and purposes of felony 

sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.

{¶ 54} Woodfork nevertheless argues that a prison sentence was unwarranted in 

this case because his community control violation, i.e. his failure to complete inpatient 

drug treatment at STAR, was a “technical violation.” This argument lacks merit because 

the distinction between a technical and nontechnical community control violation 

becomes relevant only when a trial court is sentencing an offender to prison for a violation 

of community control that was imposed for a fifth-degree felony or a fourth-degree felony 

that is not an offense of violence or a sexually oriented offense. See R.C. 

2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i)-(ii) (stating that certain sentencing caps apply to technical violations 

of community control sanctions imposed for fifth-degree felonies and fourth-degree 

felonies that are not offenses of violence or sexually oriented offenses). See also R.C. 

2929.15(E) (defining “technical violation” as “a violation of the conditions of a community 

control sanction imposed for a felony of the fifth degree, or for a felony of the fourth degree 

that is not an offense of violence and is not a sexually oriented offense”). 
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{¶ 55} In this case, the trial court sentenced Woodfork for a violation of community 

control that was imposed for a third-degree felony; therefore, the technical/nontechnical 

distinction is immaterial to Woodfork’s sentence. Also, multiple courts, including the 

Supreme Court of Ohio, have found that an offender’s failure to complete an inpatient 

drug treatment program does not constitute a technical violation of the offender’s 

community control. See, e.g., State v. Castner, 163 Ohio St.3d 19, 2020-Ohio-4950, 167

N.E.3d 939, ¶ 16; State v. Hogya, 2024-Ohio-639, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 14-17 (11th Dist.); 

State v. Elliot, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220339, 2023-Ohio-1459, ¶ 15-16; State v. 

Mannah, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17-CA-54, 2018-Ohio-4219, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 56} Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Woodfork 

violated his community control sanctions, and because the 30-month prison sentence 

imposed for the violation is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law, Woodfork’s third 

assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶ 57} Having overruled all three assignments of error raised by Woodfork, the 

judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

LEWIS, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.