J-S41003-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RAYMOND ARMSTRONG 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3465 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 12, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008303-2009

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 30, 2018

Appellant Raymond Armstrong appeals from the Order entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on October 12, 2017, 

dismissing his first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”).1 We affirm. 

This Court offered the following summary of the case history in deciding 

Appellant’s direct appeal:

These charges arose out of a September 27, 2008, incident 

in which police responded to a radio call for a person with a 

weapon at 2629 Wilder Street in the city and county of 

Philadelphia. Upon arrival, the police found [A]ppellant lying 

naked in the street and upon inspection of the home found the 

decedent, later identified as Anthony Williams (Williams), a thirtyseven (37) year-old black male lying on the living room floor 

unresponsive. Williams was pronounced dead by paramedics at 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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the scene at 10:55 p.m. An autopsy later revealed that the 

decedent’s cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation and 

manner of death was homicide. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/12, at 2. 

Commonwealth v. Armstrong, No. 1851 EDA 2012, unpublished 

memorandum at 1-2 (Pa.Super. filed Sept. 3, 2013), appeal denied, 624 Pa. 

685, 87 A.3d 317 (2014), cert. denied, Armstrong v. Pennsylvania, 135 

S.Ct. 275, 190 L.Ed. 2d, 202, 83 USLW 3192 (Oct. 6. 2014). 

 Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on August 21, 2015, and 

thereafter filed his Amended PCRA Petition on April 3, 2016. The 

Commonwealth filed its Motion to Dismiss on November 28, 2016, and on 

February 21, 2017, and June 12, 2017, the PCRA court held evidentiary 

hearings. On July 14 and 20, 2017, Appellant and the Commonwealth filed 

post-hearing briefs, respectively, following which the PCRA court held an 

additional evidentiary hearing on August 29, 2017. The PCRA court ultimately 

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on October 12, 2017, at which time it also 

filed its Order and Opinion. 

 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on October 20, 

2017. The trial court did not order Appellant to file a statement of the matters 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant did not 

file a concise statement. In his “Petitioner-Appellant’s Opening Brief,”

(hereinafter “Appellant’s Brief”), Appellant presents the following issues for 

this Court’s consideration:
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I. The PCRA court erred by denying [Appellant’s] Brady[2]

claim because the record evidence establishes: (1) 

[Appellant], while at Homicide, gave two exculpatory 

statements to Detectives Harkins and Morton, where he 

explained how Anthony Williams attempted to sexually 

assault him and this is what precipitated the events that 

ultimately led to Williams’s death; (2) Homicide 

suppressed these exculpatory statements by not 

disclosing them to the District Attorney’s Office; and (3) 

the suppression of these two exculpatory statements 

prejudiced [Appellant], particularly in light of the 

prosecutor’s closing arguments where he accused 

[Appellant] of fabricating the sexual assault narrative 

only after reviewing the discovery and crime scene 

photographs. U.S. Const. Amdts. 5, 6, 8, 14; 

Pa.Const.art.1, sec.8,9. 

II. The prosecutor’s false argument to the jury where he told 

the jury [Appellant] fabricated the sexual assault 

narrative only after he viewed the discovery and physical 

evidence prejudiced [Appellant] warranting a new trial. 

U.S. Const. amdts. 5,6, 8, 14’ Pa. Const. art.1, §§ 8,9.

 III. The PCRA court erred by not granting an evidentiary 

hearing where [Appellant] could present several 

witnesses in support of his claim trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to present substantial testimony and 

evidence that corroborated [Appellant’s] testimony that 

Anthony Williams died as a result of [Appellant] defending 

himself against Williams’s attempted sexual assault. U.S. 

Const. amdts. 5,6,8,14; Pa. Const. art.1, §§ 8,9.

[IV.] The PCRA court erred because trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to request an involuntary 

manslaughter instruction. U.S. Const. amdts. 5,6,8,14; 

Pa. Const. art. 1, §§ 8,9. 

[V.] The PCRA court erred because trial counsel was 

ineffective for not requesting a sudden provocation 

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2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
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instruction in connection with the trial court’s voluntary 

manslaughter instruction. U.S. Const. amdts. 5,6,8,14; 

Pa. Const. art.1, §§ 8,9.

[VI.] The cumulative errors- from the Brady violations, to the 

prosecutor’s false argument, to trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness- rendered [Appellant’s] trial 

fundamentally unfair. U.S. Const. amdts. 5,6,8,14; Pa. 

Const. art.1, §§ 8,9. 

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4. (boldface type and unnecessary capitalization 

omitted).3

“Our standard of review for issues arising from the denial of PCRA relief 

is well-settled. We must determine whether the PCRA court’s ruling is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153, 1156 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

Prior to considering Appellant’s first two issues presented, we note that 

issues which could have been raised on direct appeal but were not are waived 

for the purposes of the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b) (providing that “an 

issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before 

trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction 

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3 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2135, “a principal brief shall not exceed 14,000 words

and a reply brief shall not exceed 7,000 words.” Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1). 

Appellant’s brief exceeds 14,000 words; however, he properly filed a motion 

requesting to exceed that word limit on March 16, 2018, and this Court 

granted the motion in a Per Curiam Order filed on April 10, 2018. 
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proceeding”). As we find both of these claims could have been raised

previously, they are waived. 

Appellant argues in his brief that his Brady claim4 arises following the 

testimony of Detectives Brian Peters, John Harkins and Levi Morton at the 

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4 “The crux of the Brady rule is that due process is offended when the 

prosecution withholds material evidence favorable to the accused.” 

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, ___ Pa. ___, ____, 177 A.3d 136, 158 (2018)

(citation omitted). “To succeed on a Brady claim, the defendant must show: 

(1) evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; (2) the evidence, whether 

exculpatory or impeaching, was favorable to the defendant; and (3) prejudice 

resulted.” Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 638 Pa. 336, 358, 156 A.3d 197, 

209 (2016). “A Brady violation exists only where the suppressed evidence is 

material to guilt or punishment, i.e., where there is a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” Id.

Brady does not require the disclosure of information that is not 

exculpatory but might merely form the groundwork for possible 

arguments or defenses, nor does Brady require the prosecution 

to disclose every fruitless lead considered during a criminal 

investigation. The duty to disclose is limited to information in the 

possession of the government bringing the prosecution, and the 

duty does extend to exculpatory evidence in the files of police 

agencies of the government bringing the prosecution. Brady is 

not violated when the appellant knew or, with reasonable 

diligence, could have uncovered the evidence in question, or when 

the evidence was available to the defense from other sources. 

Brady sets forth a limited duty, not a general rule of discovery for 

criminal cases. 

Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1, 23, 79 A.3d 595, 608 (2013), cert. 

denied, 135 S.Ct. 56, 190 L.Ed.2d 56, 83 USLW 3185 (2014) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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PCRA hearing held on July 12, 2017, at which time they indicated Appellant 

had made certain statements concerning the circumstances of Mr. Williams’ 

death which neither reduced to writing. See Appellant’s Brief at 52-59. 

Appellant surely was aware prior to trial that he had spoken with police 

on the night of the murder because he detailed for the PCRA court at the initial 

evidentiary hearing his conversations with Detectives Harkins and Morton. 

N.T. Hearing, 6/12/17, at 8-49. He indicated that Detective Harkins was 

“writing things down on the desk” before he placed his pen down and “just 

started listening” to Appellant. Id. at 14. He recalled reiterating his account 

of the events leading to Mr. Williams’ death to Detective Morton and another 

police officer who stood and listened. Id. at 16-20. Appellant also stated that 

he recollected his conversations with Detectives Morton and Harkins and that 

he had informed trial counsel both prior to and during the trial in 2012 that 

he had provided these detectives with a statement. Id. at 49-50.

Furthermore, counsel for Appellant argued Appellant had stated that on 

the night of the murder he was transported from the hospital to the Homicide 

Unit where he gave statements and biographical information to a detective. 

Counsel characterized Appellant’s explanation of what happened next as 

follows: 

They transported him to Homicide and he gave statements to a 

detective. Harkins took it. They take biographical information 

and while Detective Harkins took that biographical information, he 

told Detective Harkins, Look, I did this. I defended myself 

because Mr. Williams was sexually assaulting me.
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They did a formal interview with Detective Morton, and 

according to [Appellant], he, again, gave another statement 

consistent with what he told Detective Harkins.

None of those statements—there’s no Miranda[5] waiver 

statement or sheet in the discovery. And there is no statements 

from [Appellant] anywhere. 

N.T. Hearing, 2/21/17, at 22. 

In light of the foregoing, Appellant could have made a motion prior to 

August 21, 2015, the date on which he filed the instant PCRA petition, either 

pre-trial, mid-trial or post trial for a Brady hearing to determine whether or 

not there had been any notes, recordings, or other transcriptions of 

Appellant’s interview with police to bolster his claim that he had revealed he 

was defending himself because Mr. Williams was sexually assaulting him. See 

Commonwealth v. Ovalles, 144 A.3d 957, 965–66 (Pa.Super. 2016). Thus, 

Appellant could have alleged that the Detectives withheld any resultant 

notes/statement and/or failed to disclose the same to the District Attorney’s 

Office prior to the time he filed the instant PCRA petition. Therefore, we find 

this issue waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).6

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5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

6 Even were we to find Appellant’s Brady claim was not viable until the 

Detectives testified in June of 2017, we agree with the PCRA court that 

Appellant cannot demonstrate he was prejudiced. Appellant had provided

Detectives Harkins and Morton with inconsistent, undocumented versions of 

the cause of Mr. Williams’ death. As the court found, if such contradictory 

statements were introduced at trial, “the inconsistency surely would have 

been used against [Appellant].” In addition, the PCRA court stressed 

Appellant cannot establish the prejudice prong of the Brady test, for “[b]ased 

on the amount of time it takes to strangle someone to death-two to five 
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It follows that Appellant could have challenged the prosecutor’s alleged 

“false argument” to the jury during closing argument on direct appeal at which 

time he, in fact, challenged the prosecutor’s closing argument on other 

grounds. See Armstrong, supra, No. 1851 EDA 2012, at 8-11; therefore, 

this issue is waived as well.

7 Based on the foregoing, Appellant is not entitled 

to relief on either of these initial two claims.

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minutes- even if [Appellant’s] police statements had been disclosed and 

admitted into evidence, it would have been exceedingly unlikely that the result 

of the proceeding would have been different. . . . if [Appellant] had initially 

acted in self-defense, his excessive force negated any self-defense claim.”

Trial Court Order and Opinion, filed 10/12/17, at 9-11.

Furthermore, Appellant claims that because he “immediately told 

detectives Williams attempted to sexually assault him and that this was what 

precipitated the altercation that ultimately led to William’s death, there is a 

reasonable probability this evidence would have altered at least one juror’s 

view of the Commonwealth’s first-degree murder narrative.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 68 (emphasis added). However, the testimony of Detective Brian Peters 

at the June 12, 2017, PCRA hearing revealed Appellant initially identified 

himself as “Adam” and informed police the murder was “a cleansing for the

revival, and that it had to be done,” N.T. Hearing 6/12/17, at 53-55. In 

addition, Detective Harkins stated Appellant both indicated he thought Mr. 

Williams had broken his neck as a result of a fall down the steps and that he 

had choked Mr. Williams until he stopped struggling. 

In addition, Detective Harkins did not take a formal written statement 

from Appellant because of his agitated mental state, and he had no further 

involvement in the trial process. Id. at 68-71. Detective Levi Morton testified 

that he had no pen or notepad when he spoke to Appellant, and ultimately 

decided not to obtain a written statement from Appellant due to the 

inconsistencies in his account. Id. at 107, 128-29. Thus, Appellant further 

has failed to prove that the Commonwealth suppressed the alleged material 

evidence. 

7 Assistant District Attorney Mark Levenberg testified at the August 29, 2017, 

that he could not recall specifically speaking with any detective regarding 

Appellant’s statements to them and his review of the discovery did not reveal 
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We now consider Appellant's three claims pertaining to the ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. In doing so, we bear in mind that counsel is 

presumed to be effective. Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698, 

712, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (2007). To overcome this presumption and establish 

the ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA [petitioner] must prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence: “(1) the underlying legal issue has arguable 

merit; (2) that counsel's actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) 

actual prejudice befell the [appellant] from counsel's act or omission.” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 346, 966 A.2d 523, 533 (2009) 

(citations omitted). “[A petitioner] establishes prejudice when he 

demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Id. A claim will be denied if the petitioner fails to meet any one of these 

requirements. Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa. 

Super. 2008).

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any report indicating Appellant had provided detectives at Homicide with a 

statement. See N.T. Hearing, 8/29/17, at 18-25, 29-31. Notwithstanding, 

Attorney Levenberg’s closing argument would have been appropriate even if 

he were aware of the testimony Detectives Harkins and Morton had provided 

at the June 12, 2017, hearing, for his reference to Appellant’s contradictory 

testimony during his closing argument at trial was supported by the record. 

Appellant testified both that he never struck Mr. Williams in the face and that 

he hit him in the left side of his face when Mr. Williams was biting Appellant’s 

hand. N.T. Trial, 6/21/12, at 154, 158-59. Moreover, as we stated on direct 

appeal, the trial court instructed the jury that statements made by counsel do 

not constitute evidence. Armstrong, supra at 9-10. 
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 Appellant maintains trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to 

present the testimony of numerous defense witnesses- Tayo Afolabi, Michele 

Canales, Hayley Sydor, Eric Tolbert, Linda Armstrong (Appellant’s mother), 

Drs. Michals and Manion, and Harold Robinson. Appellant argued before the 

PCRA court that had each of the proposed witnesses testified at trial, he or 

she would have corroborated Appellant’s claims he acted in self-defense as a 

result of a sexual assault on the night of the murder. N.T. Hearing, 2/21/17, 

at 7-8. Appellant agreed with the PCRA court’s characterization of the 

proposed testimony as “they’re basically all repeats or a variation on the same 

thing; that the decedent was obsessed with [Appellant].” Id. at 10. 

 In his appellate brief, Appellant avers the opinion testimony of lay 

witnesses “would have been ‘helpful to a clear understanding’ of why Williams 

attacked [Appellant].” Appellant further reasons that “[s]imply saying 

Williams attempted to sexually assault him is a start, but to ensure [Appellant] 

raised reasonable doubt regarding the murder charge, trial counsel needed to 

present this type of evidence to corroborate [Appellant’s] testimony that 

Williams was sexually attracted to and obsessed with him.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 75. Appellant asserts such testimony was admissible to support his selfdefense theory at trial under Pa.R.Evid. 404(a)(2)(B) and 405(b)(2)8 as 

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8 Rule 404 entitled “Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts” reads in 

pertinent part as follows: 
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(a) Character Evidence.

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person's character or 

character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular 

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character 

or trait.

(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case. The 

following exceptions apply in a criminal case:

(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant's 

pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the 

prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it;

(B) subject to limitations imposed by statute a defendant 

may offer evidence of an alleged victim's pertinent trait, and 

if the evidence is admitted the prosecutor may:

(i) offer evidence to rebut it; and

(ii) offer evidence of the defendant's same trait; and

(C) in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of the 

alleged victim's trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that the 

victim was the first aggressor.

Pa.R.E. 404. Pa.R.E. 405(b)(2) entitled “Methods of Proving Character” 

states:

(b) By Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of 

conduct are not admissible to prove character or a trait of 

character, except:

***

(2) In a criminal case, when character or a character trait of an 

alleged victim is admissible under Pa.R.E. 404(a)(2)(B) the 

defendant may prove the character or character trait by specific 

instances of conduct. 

Pa.R.E. 405. 
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evidence of a personal character trait of the alleged victim, and “not only 

admissible, but extremely probative to the issue of whether Williams 

attempted to sexually assault [Appellant.]” Appellant’s Brief at 76, 85. 

 “Counsel has a general duty to undertake reasonable investigations or 

make reasonable decisions that render particular investigations unnecessary.” 

Johnson, at 350, 966 A.2d at 535. “The duty to investigate, of course, may 

include a duty to interview certain potential witnesses; and a prejudicial failure 

to fulfill this duty, unless pursuant to a reasonable strategic decision, may lead 

to a finding of ineffective assistance.” Id. at 350, 966 A.2d 535-36.

[W]hen raising a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call a 

potential witness, a petitioner satisfies the performance and 

prejudice requirements of the [Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984)] test by establishing that: (1) the witness 

existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense; 

(3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the existence of 

the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense; 

and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness was so 

prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial[.]

 To demonstrate Strickland prejudice, a petitioner must show 

how the uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been beneficial 

under the circumstances of the case. Counsel will not be found 

ineffective for failing to call a witness unless the petitioner can 

show that the witness’s testimony would have been helpful to the 

defense.

Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810-11 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 671, 74 A.3d 1030 

(2013).

 In determining these claims lacked merit, the trial court reasoned as 

follows: 
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[Appellant] asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

call as witnesses, Harold Robinson, Semaj Howard, Tayo Afolabi, 

Michele Canales, and Hayley Sydor. Each witness would have 

testified to the victim's obsession with [Appellant] and his 

unwanted sexual advances toward others. [Appellant] argues 

that this testimony would have helped establish that [Appellant] 

acted in self-defense at the time of the murder.

Robinson, who previously lived with the victim, would have 

testified that the victim made unwanted sexual advances toward 

him (Robinson) and a friend, Jerome, while Robinson lived at the 

victim's home. According to Robinson, the victim arranged for 

attractive men from out of town to travel to his home to have 

sex with. Robinson also claims that the victim, who took 

photographs of male models, had more photographs of 

[Appellant] than any other male model. Similar to Robinson, 

Howard would have testified that the victim "inappropriately 

touched him [(Howard)] repeatedly by grabbing his buttock and 

trying to kiss him." Howard would have further testified that he 

witnessed the victim become angry when [Appellant] was with 

women.

Afolabi would have testified that the victim led men to 

believe that he had a modeling company to bait them to have 

sex with him. He would have also testified that the victim was 

fascinated with [Appellant][.] Similarly, Canales and Sydor 

would have testified that young men frequently stayed with the 

victim and that the victim was sexually obsessed with 

[Appellant].

To obtain relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a petitioner must show that such ineffectiveness "in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth -

determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place." Commonwealth v Jones, 912 

A.2d 268, 278 (Pa. 2006); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Counsel 

is strongly presumed to have rendered effective assistance and 

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 

professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984); Commonwealth v Weiss, 81 A.3d 767, 783 (Pa. 2013).

To overcome this strong presumption, the Petitioner has to 

satisfy the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland 

v Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Commonwealth v 

Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). The Strickland/Peirce test 

applies by looking to three elements-whether: (1) the underlying 

claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for 

counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner has 
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shown that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's lapse, 

i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v 

Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195-96 (Pa. 2012) (citing Pierce, 527 

A.2d at 975). Failure to satisfy any prong of this test for 

ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim. Commonwealth 

v. Daniels, 104 A.3d 267 (Pa. 2014). If a claim fails under any 

necessary element of the Strickland/Pierce test, the court may 

proceed to that element first. Bennett, 57 A.3d at 1196. A "claim 

has arguable merit where the factual averments, if accurate, 

could establish cause for relief." Commonwealth v Pander, 100 

A.3d 626, 631 (Pa. Super. 2013).

In addition to meeting the Strickland/Peirce requirements 

for ineffectiveness, to establish that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to call a witness, the Petitioner must demonstrate that: 

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify 

for the defense; (3) counsel knew of the witness; (4) the witness 

was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the

witness's testimony was so prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial. 

Commonwealth v Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 599 (Pa. 2007) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 561 Pa. 266, 750 A.2d 261,

275 (Pa. 2000)).

Because none of the proffered testimony of Robinson, 

Howard, Afolabi, Canales, and Sydor is relevant to prove selfdefense, these claims are devoid of merit. Further, claims that 

the victim made unwanted sexual advances toward [Appellant] 

are inadmissible. As the Commonwealth correctly asserts, a 

defendant is permitted to introduce specific acts of violence by 

the victim only "if an accused has knowledge of the victim's prior 

violent conduct"; or if the victim had a prior conviction that 

showed his aggressive propensities. Commonwealth v McClain, 

587 A 2d 798, 802-03 (Pa.Super. 1991) (emphasis original).

[Appellant’s] claims fail under both prongs. For the first 

prong, [Appellant] never stated during his trial testimony that he 

was aware that the victim attacked anyone prior to the instant 

murder. Further, nothing indicates that [Appellant] was afraid of 

the victim. [Appellant] testified that he stayed over the victim's 

house roughly two hundred times before the murder. He also 

testified that he never had a problem with the victim, that the 

victim never injured, hurt, or attacked him before, and that the 
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victim was a good friend. N.T., 6/21/2012 at 141.[9] The second 

McClain prong is inapplicable as [Appellant] fails to assert that 

the victim was convicted for any of the alleged unwanted sexual 

advances claimed by the aforesaid witnesses. Because the 

alleged testimony from these five witnesses is irrelevant and 

would be inadmissible at trial, counsel cannot be deem[ed]

ineffective for failing to call them[.]

[Appellant] next claims that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to call his mother, Linda Armstrong, to testify at trial. The 

[Appellant’s] mother would have testified that she was on the 

phone with [Appellant] right before the murder and heard the 

victim say to [Appellant], "you're mine now, oh yeah, you're 

mine now." Presumably, this testimony would have helped 

establish that [Appellant] acted in self-defense.

This claim is without merit as [Appellant] cannot 

demonstrate prejudice. Even if, arguendo, Linda Armstrong's 

testimony were admissible to show that [Appellant] acted in selfdefense, [Appellant] cannot escape the fact that he strangled the 

victim to death. The medical examiner testified that after thirty 

seconds, a person being strangled loses consciousness; to cause 

death, the strangulation must last two to five minutes. N.T., 

6/20/2012 at 96-97. If [Appellant] had initially acted in selfdefense, his use of excessive force-strangling the victim past the 

point of unconsciousness-negated any self-defense claim and 

demonstrated his specific intent to kill. See Commonwealth v 

Harris, 703 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1997) (when the defendant's first shot 

disabled the victim, the next five shots to the victim were 

excessive force); see Commonwealth v Tilley, 595 A.2d 575 (Pa. 

1991) (after the first two shots paralyzed the victim, the third 

shot to his face was excessive force). As such, no relief is due.

[Appellant] also claims that counsel failed to call Eric 

Tolbert as a witness. Tolbert would have testified that [Appellant] 

had planned to move out of the victim's home before the murder. 

[Appellant] would have offered this testimony to counter a 

Commonwealth theory that a possible motive for the murder was 

that the victim had planned to evict [Appellant][.] Tolbert's 

testimony, however, would be inadmissible hearsay. 

Furthermore, [Appellant] testified at trial, and never mentioned 

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9

Indeed, Appellant stressed that in all the time he had known Mr. Williams, 

who was raising a young teenager, “nothing like this had ever happened,” and 

he agreed he had “never had any problems at all with him: or ever knew him 

to act in a similar way.” N.T. Trial, 6/21/12 at 172-73. 
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any plans to move out. For these reasons, this issue warrants no 

relief.

[Appellant] claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

calling Dr. Michals and Dr. Manion, both psychiatrists, as 

witnesses.3 [Appellant] avers that the psychiatrists would have

testified to his state of mind at the time of the murder, in that, 

after an alleged sexual assault by the victim, [Appellant] either 

acted in a heat of passion (sufficient to reduce the murder to 

voluntary manslaughter), in self-defense, or did not have the 

requisite mens rea.

This claim is meritless. As the Commonwealth correctly 

points out, there is no scientific component to these reports-the 

reports are merely based on what [Appellant] told the 

psychiatrists. Moreover, [Appellant] never asserted at trial that 

he had acted under a heat of passion; instead, he claimed that 

he accidently strangled the victim. N.T., 6/21/2012 132-33. 

Lastly, these reports would not rebut [Appellant’s] use of 

excessive force in strangling the victim to death. See Harris and 

Tilley, supra[.]

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3

 Dr. Manion interviewed [Appellant] on June 1, 2012[;] the date 

of Dr. Michaels’ interview is unknown.

Order and Opinion, filed October 12, 2017, at 4-8 (emphasis in original). Upon 

our review, we have no need to expand upon the PCRA court’s analysis in 

finding this claim lacks merit, and we rely upon it in disposing of Appellant’s 

third issue. 

 Appellant next posits trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request 

both an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction and a sudden provocation 

instruction. However, a review of the record reveals trial counsel did request 

an involuntary manslaughter instruction, and the trial court refused that 

request:

Defense Counsel: I would ask for voluntary manslaughter as to 

justification, mistaken self-defense. I would ask for self-defense 

and I think what goes with that is the voluntary part of 
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manslaughter which is imperfect self-defense or mistaken selfdefense. And I would also ask, Your Honor, for involuntary 

manslaughter. And I have the jury instruction with me. There’s 

also some case law on point that talks about a fight and somebody 

dying as a result of the fight.

N.T. Trial, 6/21/12, at 186; N.T. Hearing, 2/21/17, at 18. 

 Although counsel did not ask the trial court to provide the jury with a 

specific voluntary manslaughter (sudden and intense passion) instruction, the 

trial court stated on the record it had contemplated so instructing the jury, 

but found no support for it in the trial evidence. N.T. Trial, 6/22/12, at 5. The 

PCRA court reiterated that “[e]ven if counsel had made the request, it would 

have been denied.” N.T. Hearing, 2/21/17, at 19. Thus, Appellant has failed 

to establish trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on these grounds. 

 Finally, Appellant contends the cumulative effect of the aforementioned 

alleged errors rendered his trial “fundamentally unfair.” Appellant’s Brief at 

95. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that: 

no number of claims which fail on their merits may collectively 

warrant relief. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17, 18 A.3d 

244, 320–21 (2011). However, “[w]hen the failure of individual 

claims is grounded in lack of prejudice, then the cumulative

prejudice from those individual claims may properly be assessed.” 

Id. at 321.

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, ___ Pa. ____, 177 A.3d 136, 180 (2018).

As we determined above, none of Appellant's issues entitle him to relief. 

We have disposed of Appellant's issues in a number of ways, including waiver, 

lack of merit and Appellant's failure to carry his burden of persuasion on 

appeal. To the extent that we have rejected some of Appellant's issues based 
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upon a prejudice analysis, we also find that collective prejudice is lacking and, 

thus, deny relief on this last issue. Id. 

 Order Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/30/18