FIRST DIVIS ION September 2 0, 2010 No. 1-09-05 83 LOUIS MANIE Z, ) Appeal from

the ) Circuit Cou rt of Plain tiff-Appell ant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) ) CITIBANK, F .S.B., HARB OR DRIVE ) CONDOMINIUM

ASSOCIATIO N, ) No. 05 CH 20618 UNKNOWN OWN ERS and NON RECORD ) CLAIMANTS, ) ) Defen dants ) Honorable ) Darryl B. S imko, (Masayo Kos hiyama and Robert ) Judge Presi ding. Jolly, )2 ) Defen dants-Appel lees). ) PRESID ING JUSTICE HALL deliv ered the opinionof the cou rt: This i s the secon d appeal generated b y the effor ts of the plaintiff, Louis Manie z, to preva il on his complai nt to forec lose a judgment lien agains t the defen dants, Masa yo Koshiyama a nd her husb and, Robert Jolly. In answer to acertified question, t his court h eld that a 1997 memorandum of judgmentrecorded b y the plaintiff d id not crea te a valid lien3 against the defendants ' real prop erty. See Maniez v. C itibank, F. S.B. , 383 Ill. App. 3 d 38, 890 N .E.2d 662 (2008). On rem and, the ci rcuit court granted the defendants ' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-6 19 of the C ode of Civi l Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/ 2-619 (West 2008)) (the Code). Th e plaintiff appeals, ra ising the f ollowing is sues: (1) whetherthe doctri nes of judi cial estoppel an d equitable estoppel b ar Ms. Koshiyama from ass erting the1 Defendant Robert Jolly died during the pendency of the

original circuit court proceedings. 4 invalidity of the plai ntiff's 199 7 judgment li en; (2) whe ther the plaintiff's 2004 memor andum of judgment cr eated a val id judgmentlien that is bin ding on the Jolly esta te; 1 and (3) whe ther this c ourt's prio r decision in Maniez should be overruled under the e xceptions t o the law o f the case doctri ne. Our pr ior opinionwas limite d to answering t he certifie d question. The issues pres ented in th is appeal require a m ore detaile d history o f5 this litiga tion.

BACKGROUND I. Circuit Court Proce edings In 199 3, the plai ntiff, Loui s Maniez, and

the defend ants entere d into a sett lement agre ement to re solve pending lit igation. T he order en tered by the circ uit court p rovided tha t Ms. Koshiyama w as to make certain payments to the plai ntiff. In the event s he failed to m ake the payments, a de fault judgment wo uld be ente red againstboth defendants for the rem aining bala nce. Ms. Koshiyama failed t o make theNo. 1-09-0583

6 payments, a nd on Febru ary 28, 199 7, the plainti ff obtained a default judgment ag ainst the d efendants i n the amount of $ 110,348.83, plus statu tory interest. It is undis puted that a memorandum of judgmentwas record ed on February 28 , 1997, and that the memorandum specified t he judgmentdate as February27, 1997, rather than February 28 , 1997, the actual dat e of the judgmen t. On Feb ruary 6, 19 98, Ms. Koshiyama f iled for ba nkruptcy. On her Schedul e A - Real Property, s heNo. 1-09-0583

7 listed a 50 % interest in a condom inium unit at 155 Harbor Dri ve, Chicago , Illinois (t he Harbor D rive Unit), which she o wned in joi nt tenancy with Mr. Jolly. On her Sch edule D - Creditors H olding Secu red Claims, she listed the plaintiff a nd describe d his claim as a "Judicial L ien" agains t the Harbor Driv e Unit. Sh e listed th e value of th e property as $550,000 and the amount of the plai ntiff's cla im as $110,348.83 . She did not indicat e on the schedul e that the plaintiff's claim was d isputed.No. 1-09-0583

8 On Feb ruary 25, 2 004, the ci rcuit court grant ed the plai ntiff's mot ion to revive h is judgmentagainst th e defendants. The orderspecified the correct jud gment date of February28, 1997, and p rovided tha t the judgment was revived

against bo th defendan ts. However, as to Ms. Kos hiyama, it was "limited to in remeffect and only as to real est ate owned b y Masayo Koshiyama a t the time she filed h er bankruptcy proceedings ." Based o n the revived jud gment, the plaintiff recorded a memorandum of judgmentonNo. 1-09-0583

9 February 26 , 2004. H owever, the memorandum stated the year of the judgment as 1998 rathe r 1997, the correct yea r of the ju dgment. Ms. Ko shiyama's b ankruptcy c ase was closed on January 21, 2005. On October 24, 2005, the plaintiff recorded the circuit court's February 25, 2004, order reviving the judgment and which specified the correctjudgment d ate of Febr uary 28, 1997. On Dec ember 1, 20 05, the plaintiff f iled the in stant foreclosure complaint against the defendants. The defen dants filed aNo. 1-09-0583

2 Hereinafter, the word "defendants" refers to Ms. Koshiyama 10 motion to d ismiss the complaint pursuant tosection 2- 619(a)(9) o f the Code (735 I LCS 5/2-619 (a)(9) (Wes t 2006)). Th e defendant s alleged t hat the 1997 me morandum ofjudgment d id not create a judgment lien on the Harbor Driv e Unit beca use the memorandum referred tothe judgme nt as having beenentered onFebruary 2 7, 1997, where as the judgment was en tered on February28, 1997. Defend ant Robert Jolly died on June 21, 20 06. 2 On Octob er 19, 2006 ,No. 1-09-0583

and the Jolly estate. 11 the circuitcourt gran ted the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint t o add Ms. K oshiyama, a s executrix o f Mr. Jolly 's estate, as a party defen dant. The court enter ed an order denyi ng the defe ndants' mot ion to dismiss. On Decemb er 13, 2006 , the court modif ied its ord er by certi fying the followi ng questionto this co urt: "'[w]hethera Memorandum of Judgment in accurately describing a judgment as having bee n entered o n a specific date can se rve to crea teNo. 1-09-0583

12

a lien as p rovided by the relevan t statute.'" Maniez , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 39. This court allowed the appeal pur suant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Il l. 2d R. 308). II. Appell ate Court P roceedings In answ er to the c ertified question, t his court h eld that a memorandum of judgmentinaccurate ly describing a judgment as having b een entered on a specific date did no t create a li en under se ction 12-10 1 of the Code. Maniez , 383 Ill. App. 3d atNo. 1-09-0583

13 45. In rea ching that conclusion, the court noted

that undersection 12 -101, a judgment was a lien on real est ate only from t he time the memorandum of judgment wa s filed in the recorde r's office. Se e 735 ILCS 5/12-101 (W est 2002). How ever, there must also be an enforceable judgment s tanding beh ind the memoran dum. Maniez , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 41, c iting Northwest Diversified , Inc. v. D esai , 353 Ill. App. 3d 378 , 388, 818 N.E.2d 753 (2004). The pl aintiff arg ued that th eNo. 1-09-0583

14 memorandum was a notic e document and pointed outthat the d efendants n ever denied thata judgmentwas entere d on February 28 , 1997. Wh ile the plaintiff d id not disp ute the fac t that the me morandum ofjudgment contained t he wrong ju dgment date , he maintained that the mi stake was merely a scrivener 's error. This c ourt reject ed the plaintiff's arguments. The court pointed outthat the memorandum g ave notice to p rospective purchasers as well as the debtor. T he memorandumNo. 1-09-0583

15 setting for th February27, 1997, as the date ofthe judgme nt did not place a prospecti ve purchase r on notice that a judgment had been en tered on February 28 , 1997. Maniez , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 43. The pl aintiff's scrivener's error argument lacked merit becau se case lawrequired s trict compliance with sectio n 12-101. Maniez , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 44, citing Northwest D iversified, Inc. , 353 Ill. App. 3d at 391. Even if the wron g date was a scrivener's error, no judgment wa s entered o n February 28,No. 1-09-0583

16 1997. With out a judgment on that date, the 1 997 memoran dum referre d to a nonexiste nt judgment ; therefore , it did not cre ate a judgment lien ag ainst the defenda nts' real p roperty. Maniez , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 44. Havinganswered t he certifie d question, t his court d eclined the defendants' request togo beyond the certified question and dismiss th e complaint o n the basis that the 2 004 revival of the judgmen t lien was a nullity. T he case was remanded t o the circuit cou rt. Maniez , 383 Ill. App.No. 1-09-0583

17 3d at 44-45 . The plai ntiff did n ot seek leave to appeal t o the supre me court. III. Circui t Court Pro ceedings on Remand Upon r emand to th e circuit c ourt, the defenda nts moved t o dismiss the foreclosure complaint based on th is court's det ermination in Maniez that no lien was created. They allege d that, as nosubsequentlien could have been create d due to Ms . Koshiyama 's discharge o f the debt in bankrupt cy, the complai nt should b e dismissed withNo. 1-09-0583

18 prejudice. The defend ants allege d further tha t, even if the 2004 memorandum created a v alid lien, it impaired Ms . Koshiyama 's survivor ship rights, ren dering the lien void u nder the automat ic stay iss ued in her bankruptcy case. In his response t o the motio n to dismiss, th e plaintiffmaintained that Ms. Koshiyama was barr ed by judic ial and equitab le estoppel from asser ting that he did

not have avalid lien against herinterest i n the Harbo r Drive Unit. The plain tiff furthe rNo. 1-09-0583

19 argued that , even if t he 1997 memorandum was invalid , the 2004 memorandum created a v alid lien against the Jolly esta te's half interest inthe HarborDrive Unit because Ms. Koshiyama' s and Mr. Jolly's joi nt tenancy ownership o f the Harbor Driv e Unit was severed whe n Ms. Koshiyama f iled her ba nkruptcy petition. On Jan uary 27, 20 09, the cir cuit court grant ed the defe ndants' mot ion to dismiss. The plain tiff filed a timely noti ce of appea l.No. 1-09-0583

20 ANALYSIS I. Dismissa l of the Fo reclosure Complaint

A. Standard ofReview This c ourt review s the dismi ssal of a compla int under s ection 2-61 9 de

novo . Westmeyer v . Flynn , 382 Ill. App. 3d 952 , 954-55, 8 89 N.E.2d 6 71 (2008). Re view of an appeal from a section 2-6 19 dismissa l is simila r to the review of an appea l from the grant of summary judgment. Westmeyer , 382 Ill. App. 3 d at 955. The court considers whether a ge nuine issue ofNo. 1-09-0583

3 The plainti ff acknowle dges that h is 21 material fa ct exists t hat would preclude th e dismissal , or whethe r the dismissal i s proper as a matter o f law. Westmeyer , 382 Ill. App. 3d at 955. B. Discussion 1. Judicial and Equita ble Estoppe l The pl aintiff con tends that Ms. Koshiyama i s judiciall y and equit ably estopped fr om contesti ng the vali dity of his 1997 judgment l ien because she listed the plaintiff a s a secured creditor onher bankru ptcy schedu le. 3No. 1-09-0583

estoppel ar guments do not apply t o the Jolly estat e. 22 The plainti ff argues t hat judicia l estoppel ap plies becau se, in the foreclosure case, Ms. Koshiyama t ook a position th at conflict ed with the position sh e took in h er bankrupt cy case. He f urther argu es that equitable e stoppel app lies becaus e the scheduling of the lienin her bankruptcy case caused the plaint iff to refrain from assert ing rights he might other wise have a sserted in the bankruptcy proceeding.No. 1-09-0583

4 The defendants do not specifically address equitable estoppel in their waiver and forfeiture arguments. 23 a. Waiver and Forfeiture The de fendants re spond that the plaintiff h as either w aived or forfeited h is right toraise judi cial estoppel. 4 They poin t out that in their origi nal motion to dismiss, they raised the validity ofthe judgme nt lien, but t he plaintif f failed to argue judic ial estoppe l, either i n the original ci rcuit courtproceeding s or in the Rule 308 appeal to this co urt. "Waiv er" means t he voluntar yNo. 1-09-0583

24 relinquishment of a kn own right. People v. B lair , 215 Ill. 2d 427, 444 n.2, 831 N. E.2d 604 (2 005). Waiv er arises from

an affirma tive act, i s consensual and consist s of an intentional relinquishment of a k nown right. People v. H ouston , 229 Ill. 2d 1, 9 n.3, 8 90 N.E.2d 4 24 (2008). Forfeiture occurs whena party se eks to raise anissue on a ppeal it fa iled to raise inthe lower court. Blair , 215 Ill. 2d

at 443-44. Notwithstan ding the di stinction between "wa iver" and " forfeiture, "No. 1-09-0583

25 neither app lies in thi s case. Contra ry to the d efendants' argument, t he plaintif f was not required toraise judi cial estopp el as a defense t o the defen dants' moti on to dismiss. S ection 2-61 3 of the Co de requires th at affirmat ive defense s, such as est oppel, mustbe raised in the answer to the comp laint or inthe reply to th e answer. See 735 ILC S 5/2-613(d) (West 2008) . In R&B Kapital Dev elopment, L LC v. North Shore Commu nity Bank & Trust Co. , 358 Ill. App. 3 d 912, 921, 832 N.E.2d 246No. 1-09-0583

26 (2005), thi s court hel d that an affirmative defense is properly asserted ina section 2-615 motio n to dismiss onl y if the de fense is apparent fr om the face of the complaint. R&B Kapital Developmen t, LLC , 358 Ill. App. 3d at 921. The court did n ot hold tha t the defen dant was require d to raise the affirma tive defense in the motion to dismiss. Therefore, the plainti ff has not intentional ly relinqui shed his ri ght to raise th e defense o f judicial estoppel.No. 1-09-0583

27 Simila rly, the pl aintiff did not forfeit his right to r aise judici al estoppel inthe presen t proceedin gs by not raisingit in the prior proceedings . The circ uit court d enied the defenda nts' motionto dismiss , rejecting t he defendan ts' argumen t challengingthe validi ty of the plaintiff's lien. Due to the interveningRule 308 a ppeal, and the filing of t heir motionto dismiss after reman d to the ci rcuit court , the defendants had not yetanswered t he complaint. Only then would theNo. 1-09-0583

28 plaintiff b e required to file a r eply, if he wishe d to raise any estoppe l defenses. Finall y, the prin ciples of w aiver and forfeit ure are bin ding on the parties butdo not lim it this cou rt's jurisdictio n. See People v. M cCarty , 223 Ill. 2d

109, 142, 858 N.E.2d 15 (2006); Redelmann v . K.A. Stee l Chemicals, Inc. , 377 Ill. App. 3d 971 , 879 N.E.2d 505 (2007). We turn t o the merits of t he plaintif f's estoppe l arguments.

b. Judicial Es toppelNo. 1-09-0583

29 Under the doctrin e of judici al estoppel, aparty who takes a particular position ina legal proceeding is estopped from takin g a contrary po sition in asubsequent legal proce eding. Moy v. Ng , 371 Ill. App. 3d 957 , 962, 864 N.E.2d 752 (2007). Ou r courts ha ve identifi ed five elemen ts necessar y for judic ial estoppel toapply: (1) the party must have taken two positio ns; (2) the positions must be fact ually inconsisten t; (3) the positions w ere taken in se parate judi cial or qua si-No. 1-09-0583

5 While Johnson v. Du Page Airport Authority , 268 Ill. App. 3d 409, 644 N.E.2d 802 (1994), extended judicial estoppel to legal inconsistencies, the supreme court's decision in People v. Jones , 223 Ill. 2d 569, 861 N.E.2d 967 (2006), restored the understanding of judicial estoppel as barring factual 30 judicial pr oceedings; (4) the per son intended th e trier of fact to acc ept the truth o f the facts alleged; a nd (5) the par ty succeede d in the fi rst proceeding and receive d some bene fit therefrom. Moy , 371 Ill. App. 3d at 962. Judic ial estoppe l applies t o statements of fact and not to leg al opinions orconclusion s. McNamee v. Sandore , 373 Ill. App. 3d 636 , 650, 869 N.E.2d 1102 (2007) . 5No. 1-09-0583

inconsistencies, not legal inconsistencies. McNamee , 373 Ill. App. 3d at 650. 31 In the present ca se, Ms. Koshiyama d isclosed th e existence of the plainti ff's judgme nt lien in her bankruptcy case. She later conte sted the validit y of the li en in the instant pro ceedings wh en the plai ntiff sought to f oreclose it . The list ing of the clai m was a sta tement of f act. By challeng ing the val idity of th e lien, she w as not deny ing the fac t that the pl aintiff had recorded a memorandum of judgmentagainst th eNo. 1-09-0583

32 Harbor Driv e Unit. The plaintiff points out that Ms. Ko shiyama fai led to indicate on her ban kruptcy sch edule that the li en claim wa s disputed. However, th ere is no e vidence tha t the lien claim was the sub ject of a dispute at the time th e schedule was filed. The refore, Ms. Koshiyama did not take a position inthe forecl osure case factua lly inconsi stent with the one she too k in her ba nkruptcy ca se.

c. Equitable E stoppel "Equit able estopp el is typic ally invoked 'wh ere a perso n by his orherNo. 1-09-0583

33 statements and conductleads a pa rty to do somet hing that t he party wo uld not have do ne but for such statements and conduct .'" Trossman v. Philipsborn , 373 Ill. App. 3d 102 0, 1040, 869 N .E.2d 1147 (2007), quo ting Geddes v. M ill Creek C ountry Club , Inc. , 196 Ill. 2d 302, 313 , 751 N.E.2 d 1150 (2001) . Our supr eme court h as defined equ itable esto ppel "as th e effect of t he person's conduct wh ereby the person is barred f rom asserti ng rights thatmight othe rwise have existed aga inst the ot her party who,No. 1-09-0583

34 in good fai th, relied upon such conduct and

has been t hereby led to change his or her posi tion for th e worse." Geddes , 196 Ill. 2d at 313. In ord er to estab lish equita ble estoppel, t he party cl aiming it must demonstrate : (1) that the other p arty misrepresen ted or conc ealed mater ial facts; (2) that the ot her party k new at the time that he orshe made t he representat ions that t hey were un true; (3) that th e party cla iming estop pel did not kno w that the representat ions were untrue when they were made a ndNo. 1-09-0583

35 when they w ere acted u pon; (4) th at the other p erson inten ded the par ty claiming es toppel woul d act upon the representat ions; (5) t hat the par ty claiming es toppel reas onably reli ed on the represe ntations tohis or her detriment; and (6) tha t the party claiming es toppel woul d be prejud iced by his or h er reliance on the representat ions if the other pers on were allowe d to deny t he truth thereof. Geddes , 196 Ill. 2d at 313- 14. The "f raud elemen t" may be satisfied where a frau dulent or u njustNo. 1-09-0583

36 effect resu lts from al lowing anot her person to r aise a clai m inconsist ent with his orher formerdeclaratio ns. Geddes , 196 Ill. 2d at 314. The pa rty claimin g estoppel has the burden of proving it by clearand unequivocal evidence. Geddes , 196 Ill. App. 3 d at 314. Whether est oppel has been es tablished i s dependanton the facts o f each case . Geddes , 196 Ill. 2d at 314. The pl aintiff mai ntains thathe relied to h is detrimen t on Ms. Koshiyama's representa tion in herNo. 1-09-0583

37 bankruptcy proceeding that he had a judgment li en against the Harbor Drive Unit. The plaintiff a lleges that , had Ms. Koshiyama's 50% in terest in t he Harbor Driv e Unit beenliquidated , the unsecured c reditors wo uld have received an$80,000 di stribution from her bankrup tcy estate, rather the n the $15,000 act ual distrib ution. He further all eges that s ince Ms. Koshiyama l isted him a s a secured creditor, h e was unabl e to file a n unsecured c laim, whichwould have allowed him

to partici pate in theNo. 1-09-0583

38 $15,000 dis tribution. There is no evide nce that atthe time she fi led her ban kruptcy pet ition in 1998, Ms . Koshiyamaknew that the plaintiff's judgment l ien was inv alid and conceal ed that fac t from the plaintiff. The plaint iff could n ot claim that he reasonab ly relied o n the bankruptcy filing beca use he poss essed the same kn owledge reg arding the date of the judgment and th e date on t he memorandum of judgmentthat he attributed to Ms. Kosh iyama. In other words, if M s. Koshiyam a knew at t heNo. 1-09-0583

39 time she fi led for ban kruptcy tha t the plaintiff's lien was i nvalid, so did the plainti ff because the basis o f their knowl edge was th e same. The pl aintiff arg ues that estoppel ma y be based on a failur e to disclose wh en coupled with an affirmative statement or act, misleading the party a sserting estoppel. Estoppel bysilence ma y arise only where there is knowled ge of the facts o n one side and ignoran ce on the other. In Town & Coun try Bank of Springfield

v. James M . CanfieldNo. 1-09-0583

40 ContractingCo. , 55 Ill. App. 3d 91, 370 N.E.2d 630 (1977), the court explained: "'[I]f the means of kn owledge are equally ope n to both p arties, the re can be no e stoppel. *** A per son is not estopped by his silence where ther e is no positive duty and opportun ity to speak, or theNo. 1-09-0583

41 party is in ignoranc e of his rights.' " Town & Country Bank of Springfi eld , 55 Ill. App. 3d at 95,No. 1-09-0583

42 quoting Puterbau gh, Chancery Pleading & Practice §675, at 1372 (7th ed. 1930). In this cas e, both the plaintiff and Ms. Koshiyama were ign orant of th e fact that t he 1997 jud gment lien wasNo. 1-09-0583

43 invalid at the time ofthe bankru ptcy proceedings . The pl aintiff cit es Bianucci v. Prairie Pro duction Cre dit Ass'n , No. 92-3046 (C. D. Ill. Aug ust 21, 199 2) (not report ed in F. Su pp.), aff'd sub

nom In re Bianu cci , 4 F.3d 52 6 (7th Cir. 1993), and In re Elmes , 289 B.R. 100 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003). In Bianucci , the distr ict court r uled that the de btors waite d too long before movi ng to reope n their bankruptcy to discharg e a judgmen t lien they f ailed to li st in theirNo. 1-09-0583

44 bankruptcy proceedings . In Elmes , the court held that a lienholder did not violate the debtors' b ankruptcy discharge b y filing co ntempt acti on in state courtagainst th em to enfor ce a lien. Howe ver, the co urt then he ld that the de btors could properly a void the lien, r ejecting th e lienholde r's argument th at the debt ors had wai ted too long be fore movingto avoid t he lien. Neit her the fac ts nor the holdings inthose case s support t he plaintiff's estoppel a rguments. We con clude that neither jud icialNo. 1-09-0583

45 estoppel no r equitable estoppel b arred Ms. Koshiyama from ass erting thatthe plaintiff's 1997 judgment lien wa s invalid. 2. Validityof the 200 4 Judgment Lien Against the Jolly E state The pl aintiff mai ntains thatthe 2004 memora ndum create d a valid l ien, enforceable against th e Jolly est ate. The defenda nts respond that the 2 004 memorandum was void be cause it violated th e automaticstay order entered in Ms. Koshiyama's bankru ptcyNo. 1-09-0583

46 case by int erfering wi th her righ t of survivorshi p in the Ha rbor Drive Unit. See In re Berg , 387 B.R. 524, 564 (Bankr. N.D . Ill. 2008 ); but see In re Lipuma , 167 B.R. 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (reco gnizing a s plit of authority among the fe deral circu its as to wheth er an act v iolating an automatic s tay was voi d or voidab le). At ora l argument of this cas e, counsel forthe defend ants pointe d out that the 20 04 memorandum specifie d the wrong year, 1998 inste ad of 1997. Therefore, under Maniez , as the 20 04No. 1-09-0583

6 Under section 12-101, a memorandum includes a copy of the judgment "signed by a judge." 735 ILCS 5/12-101(d) (West 2004). We note that, while it contains the information required by 47 memorandum failed to c omply with the requirement s of sectio n 12-101, i t failed to c reate a val id lien. However, fo llowing the close of M s. Koshiyama's bankruptcycase, the plaintiff r ecorded the order revi ving the judgmen t. The ord er containe d the correct dat e of the ju dgment, and under secti on 12-101, the order qualified a s a memoran dum of judgment. See Maniez , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 40-41; 735 ILCS 5/ 12-101 (Wes t 2004). 6No. 1-09-0583

section 12-101, the October 24, 2005, order does not bear the judge's signature. However, the order is stamped with the judge's name and the date. As this court has recognized, "the law has consistently interpreted 'signed' to embody not only the act of subscribing a document, but also anything which can reasonably be understood to symbolize or manifest the signer's intent to adopt a writing as his or her own and be bound by it. This may be accomplished in a multitude of ways, only one of which is a handwritten subscription." Just Pants v. Wagner , 247 Ill. App. 3d 166, 173-74, 617 N.E.2d 246 (1993). 48 Therefore, while the 2 004 memoran dum was void, t he October 24, 2005, recording o f the courtorder revi ving the judgmen t created avalid lienand did not vio late the au tomatic sta y because it was filed a fter the cl ose of Ms. Kosh iyama's ban kruptcy cas e. The de fendants th en argue th at,No. 1-09-0583

49 even if the plaintiff had a valid judgment li en against the Harbor Drive Unit that h e could enf orce agains t Mr. Jolly, uponMr. Jolly' s death, th e lien was no t enforceab le against Ms. Koshiyama, the survivi ng joint te nant. In Harms v. Sp rague , 105 Ill. 2d 215, 473 N.E.2d 930 (1984), the supreme court held that a mort gage execut ed by one joint t enant did n ot survive as a lien on the property u pon the dea th of the joint t enant/mortg agor. The court explained a s follows: "A survivin g joint ten ant succeed sNo. 1-09-0583

50

to the shar e of the de ceased join t tenant by v irtue of th e conveyanc e which creat ed the join t tenancy, not as the successor o f the deceased. [ Citation.] The proper ty right of th e mortgagin g joint tenant is e xtinguished at the moment of h is death. While John Harms was a live, the m ortgage existed as a lien on h is interest in the join t tenancy. Upon his death, his interest ce ased to exi st and along w ith it the lien of the mortgage." Harms , 105 Ill. 2d atNo. 1-09-0583

51

224. In the present ca se, the plaintiff's judgment a gainst Ms. Koshiyama w as discharg ed in bankruptcy. While Mr. Jolly was alive, the plaintiff h ad a judgme nt lien agains t Mr. Jolly 's interestin the joint t enancy, as of October 24, 2005, when the court o rder revivi ng the judgmen t was recor ded. As in Harms , when Mr. Jolly died in 2006, his interes t ceased toexist, and Ms. Koshiyama, as the surv iving joint tenant, too k the prope rty free oftheNo. 1-09-0583

52 plaintiff's judgment l ien. The pl aintiff the n asserts t hat the judgmen t lien surv ived the de ath of Mr. Joll y because t he filing o f the bankruptcy petition se vered the j oint tenancy and

rendered M s. Koshiyam a and Mr. Jolly t enants-in-c ommon. Therefore, the judgmen t lien rema ined on Mr. Joll y's undivid ed one-half interest inthe HarborDrive Unit because it passed to M s. Koshiyam a by inheritance , not as th e surviving joint tenan t. In orde r to resolv e whether the plaintiff' s judgmentNo. 1-09-0583

53 remained a lien on the Harbor Dri ve Unit upon M r. Jolly's death, we must determine i f the filin g of a peti tion in bankrupt cy severs t he joint te nancy There is a split of authorit y among the c ourts on th is issue. Some federal and

state cour ts have concluded t hat the fil ing of a bankruptcy petition se vers the jo int tenancy. S ee Taylor v. C anterbury , 92 P.3d 961 (C olo. 2004); In re Chadw ick , 113 B.R. 54 0 (Bankr. W .D. Mo. 199 0); In re Tyson , 48 B.R. 4 12 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1985); In re Panho lzer , 36 B.R.No. 1-09-0583

54 647 (Bankr. D. Md. 198 4); In re Lambert , 34 B.R. 4 1 (Bankr. D . Colo. 1983). Ot her courts have found that the filing of the peti tion does n ot sever the j oint tenanc y. See In re DeMarco , 114 B.R. 121 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1990); In re Antho ny , 82 B.R. 3 86 (Bankr. W.D . Pa. 1987) ; In re Spain , 55 B.R. 849 (N.D. Ala. 1985). The Ba nkruptcy Co de (11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006)) do es not addr ess specificall y whether t he filing o f a petition inbankruptcysevers the joint tenan cy. The co urts in theNo. 1-09-0583

55 above cases arrived attheir conclusions by analyzi ng the provisions of the Bank ruptcy Code in light of th eir own sta te laws governing p roperty int erests. Se e Lambert , 34 B.R. a t 42 (state law determines the nature, extent and effect of t he debtor's interest i n property). We examine first the interest ofa joint te nant under Illinois la w.

a. Property In terests Und er Illinois Joint Tenan cy Law A join t tenancy i s "'a prese ntNo. 1-09-0583

56 estate in a ll the join t tenants, each being seize d of the wh ole.'" Harms , 105 Ill. 2d

at 224, qu oting Partridge v. Berliner , 325 Ill. 253, 257, 1 56 N.E.2d 352 (1927). An inherent feature in the estate of joint te nancy is the righ t of surviv orship, whi ch is the right o f the last survivor totake the whole o f the estat e. Harms , 105 Ill. 2d at 224. The c reation and the perpetuatio n of the jo int tenancyare dependent o n four unit ies: intere st, title, time , and posse ssion. Harms , 105 Ill. 2d

at 220. T he voluntar y orNo. 1-09-0583

57 involuntarydestructio n of any ofthe unities by one of the joint tenan ts will sever the joint t enancy. Harms , 105 Ill. 2d

at 220. T he severanc e of the joint t enancy exti nguishes th e right of su rvivorship. Jackson v. O'Connell , 23 Ill. 2 d 52, 55, 1 77 N.E.2d 194 (1961). Illino is courts h ave held th at a joint tenan t can severa joint te nancy by conveyin g his or he r interest to a third party , even with out the con sent or permissi on of the o ther joint tenant. Se e Olney TrustBank v.No. 1-09-0583

58 Pitts , 200 Ill. App. 3d 917 , 921, 558 N.E.2d 398 (1990), cit ing Johnson v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Illinoi s, Inc. , 154 Ill. App. 3d 672 , 674, 506 N.E.2d 1025 (1987), an d Johnson v. Johnson , 11 Ill. App. 3d 681, 684, 297 N.E.2d 285 (1973). In Olney Trust Bank , the courtheld that the joint tenancy was severed wh ere one joi nt tenant conv eyed his in terest by w ay of a deed in l ieu of fore closure. Olney Trust Bank , 200 Ill. App. 3d at 921. Our co urts have h eld that a lien or a mortga ge on a joi nt tenant'sNo. 1-09-0583

59 interest do es not seve r the joint tenancy. S ee Harms , 105 Ill. 2d at 223; Jackson v. Lacey , 408 Ill. 530, 97 N.E.2d 8 39 (1951); Van Antwerpv. Horan , 390 Ill. 449, 61 N.E .2d 358 (1945). Even the ma king of a l evy upon a join t tenant's interest do es not sever t he joint te nancy. As the court in Van Antwerpexplained: " Under the l aw and proc edure in this Sta te, it appe ars that the levy is just anotherNo. 1-09-0583

60 step in the process directed toward a final sale. It is, however, not such an act

as can be said to haveNo. 1-09-0583

61 the effect of a divestit ure of title. There has not been, as yet, the destruct ion of identity ofNo. 1-09-0583

62 interest or of any other unity which must

occur before

we can say the estate of joint tenancyNo. 1-09-0583

63 has been severed and destroye d. There does not appear to have been, by

reason of the levy, suchNo. 1-09-0583

64 interfer

ence with, or diminuti on of, the interest of the

one joint tenant as to enable us toNo. 1-09-0583

65 say that there has been

a destruct ion of the identity of interest ; and such a destruct ion isNo. 1-09-0583

66 necessar y before

we can say that there has been

a terminat ion and

severanc e of the joint tenancy. WeNo. 1-09-0583

67 therefor e hold that the levy of the executio n upon the share of one of the joint tenants does notNo. 1-09-0583

68 sever or terminat e the joint tenancy. " Van Antwerp , 390 Ill. at 455. In Jackson , the courtheld that, even though ther e had been a sale of t he joint tenan t's interes t, there wa s no conveyance until the p eriod of redemption had passed. The courtNo. 1-09-0583

69 concluded t hat the tit le was not divested an d, therefor e, the join t tenancy was unaltered. Jackson , 408 Ill. at 533 . We con clude that Illinois requires a conveyance of the join t tenant's in terest in t he propertyto sever a joi nt tenancy. We now tu rn to the relevan t sections of the Bankruptcy Code to det ermine if t he filing of apetition i n bankruptc y constitutes a conveyan ce of the debtor/join t tenant's interest inthe property.No. 1-09-0583

70

b. The Bankrup tcy Code Prior to the refo rms to bankruptcy law in the late 1970s, section 70aof the Ban kruptcy Act(11 U.S.C. §70a(1976)) pr ovided thatthe bankruptcy trustee was vested wit h the title of th e debtor toall his orher nonexempted

property a s of the da te of the filing of the bank ruptcy peti tion. Spain , 55 B.R. a t 852; 4A C ollier on Bankruptcy §70, at 60 (14th ed. 1 978);

see Flynn v. O' Dell , 281 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1960) (holding th at the fili ng of the bankrup tcy petitio n severed t heNo. 1-09-0583

71 joint tenan cy since th e debtor's interest (t itle) was t ransferred to the trustee , distingui shing Jackson and Van Antwerp ). The 19 79 Bankrupt cy Code omi tted section 70a . In its p lace, Congress en acted secti on 541, whi ch provides inpertinent part as follows: "Sec. 541. Property o f the estat e (a) Th e commencement of a ca se *** creates an estate. Such esta te is comprise d of all ofthe following p roperty, wh ereverNo. 1-09-0583

72

located and

by whomeve r held: (1) *** all legal or equitable i nterests ofthe debto r in prope rty as of the

comme

nceme nt of the

case. " 11No. 1-09-0583

73 U.S.C

. §541( a) (1994 ). In place ofthe title of the debt or's property pa ssing to th e trustee, th e debtor's legal and equitable i nterests inthe proper ty become partof the ban kruptcy est ate. In sup port of his position t hat filing a pe tition in b ankruptcy s evers a joint ten ancy, the p laintiff re liesNo. 1-09-0583

74 on Tyson . The defenda nts respond that decis ions of the fede ral courts are not bin ding on this cou rt. See SI Securiti es v. Bank of Edw ardsville , 362 Ill. App. 3d 925, 933, 8 41 N.E.2d 9 95 (2005). However, th is court ma y follow fe deral decisions i f it finds them persua sive. Baker v. Je wel Food St ores, Inc. , 355 Ill. App. 3 d 62, 69, 8 23 N.E.2d 9 3 (2005). In Tyson , the bankr uptcy court held that t he filing o f a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition se veredNo. 1-09-0583

7 The debtor in Lambert filed a chapter 7 petition. 75 the joint t enancy, rel ying on Lambert . 7 The court i n Lambert noted that , while cases underthe prior Bankruptcy Act held that afiling in bankruptcy severed a j oint tenanc y, the pres ent Bankruptcy Code did no t explicitl y provide forthe transf er of title of the debtor' s property to the bankruptcy trustee; me rely that t he trustee cou ld administ er the prop erty of the esta te. The co urt found t hat the legisla tive histor y provided clarificati on, explain ing as foll ows:No. 1-09-0583

76

"'The debto r's interes t in proper ty also includ es "title" to property , which is aninterest, just as are a possessory interest, o r leasehold interest, f or example. ' [Citation .] And furthe r, in that same report , it is state d: 'Once th e estate is created, nointerests in property of the esta te remain i n the debtor.'" Lambert , 34 B.R. a t 43, quoting S. Rep. No. 95 -989, at 82

- 83 (1978), reprinted i n 1978 U.S.C.A.N. 5758, 5868. While some sectio ns of theNo. 1-09-0583

77 Bankruptcy Code appear ed to indicate th at a joint tenancy sur vived the filing of a bankru ptcy petiti on, the court in Lambert found thatthe same sectio ns supporte d a findingthat the joint t enancy was severed, fu rther explaining as follows: "Sec[tion] 363(h) prov ides in pertinent p art, '... t he trustee may sell bo th the esta te's intere st ... and the interest o f any coowner in pr operty whic h the debto r had , immediate ly before t he

commencemen t of the ca se, anNo. 1-09-0583

78

undivided i nterest as a ... joint tenant ... .' (Emphasi s added.) Likewise, S ec[tion] 52 2(b)(2)(B) provides inpertinent part that a debtor may exempt from property o f the estate '... any in terest in property inwhich the debtor had , immediatelybefore the commenceme nt of the case , an intere st as a ... joint tenan t ... . (Emphasis added.)" Lambert , 34 B.R. a t 43, quoting 11 U.S.C. §§36 3(h), 522(b)(2)(B ) (1982). Relyin g on Lambert , the courtinNo. 1-09-0583

79 Tyson held that, by filing his petitio n in bankru ptcy, the husband los t any jointtenancy interest he may have h ad in real property he owned withhis wife. Therefore, his bankrup tcy estate had a one-half in terest in t he real property. Tyson , 48 B.R. a t 412. Notwit hstanding t heir positi on that federa l decisions are not bi nding on this cou rt, the def endants mai ntain that the decision in Anthonydemonstrat es that where state law requir esNo. 1-09-0583

80 the severan ce of title and not ju st the possibi lity of a c hange in ti tle, the filing of a chapte r 7 bankrup tcy petition wi ll not seve r the joint tenancy. In Anthony , the debto r owned property injoint tena ncy with he r mother. Fo llowing the filing of the debtor's ba nkruptcy pe tition, her mother died . A credit or argued t hat the filing of the bank ruptcy peti tion severed the joint tena ncy, render ing the debtor and her mot her, tenant s-incommon. Th e creditor further arg uedNo. 1-09-0583

81 that the de btor "inher ited" her mother's on e-half inte rest with t he judgment li en attached because sh e did not acquire her mother 's interestby right of su rvivorship. The bankr uptcy court held that the fi ling of the petition di d not severthe joint tenancy. In rea ching that conclusion, the court, as d id the cour t in Lambert , examined th e language of section 363(h) of t he Bankrupt cy Code und er which the t rustee was given the authority t o use, sell or lease a nNo. 1-09-0583

82 undivided i nterest in property, s uch as a joint tenancy. U nlike the c ourt in Lambert , the courtin Anthonydid not find th e use of th e past tens e "had" to de scribe the debtor's interest inthe proper ty signific ant. Instead, th e court foc used on the provision t hat the tru stee was permitted t o sell the debtor's interest on ly if parti tion were impractical , if the sa le would pr oduce significant ly more tha n its parts and if the bene fits to the estate outweighed the detrime nt to the c o-No. 1-09-0583

83 owners. Th e court con cluded as follows: "The langua ge of 11 U. S.C. §363(h ), (i), and (j ) does not sound as though a jo int tenancyis automatical ly severed by the fili ng of a bankru ptcy petiti on as a federal rul e of bankru ptcy law. It sounds perm issive, as though the trustee maysever a jo int tenancy if the esta te benefits and if the rights of t he non-debt or/co-tenan t are protect ed. In th is case the trustee ha sNo. 1-09-0583

84

not attempt ed to admin ister this property bysevering o r selling t he whole. We hold that t he filing o f a petition does not se ver a joint tenancy wit h right of survivorshi p, unless the trustee act ually executes ag ainst such property by attempting to sever orto sell th e whole in or der to liqu idate such property. Pennsylvani a does not sever a joi nt tenancy upon the entry of a judgment, b ut severs upon aliena tion, such as executio n. We would gono further ." Anthony ,No. 1-09-0583

85

82 B.R. at 388. Additi onal suppor t for the defendants' position i s found in Spain . There, t he bankrupt cy court maintained that the fa ilure of th e Code to car ry forward section 70a , which trans ferred the title of th e debtor to t he trustee was an erro r. The court in Spain found no a uthority inthe Code for th e decisions in Panholzer and Lambert , where the courts hel d that the fi ling of the petition w as a conveyance that severe d the jointNo. 1-09-0583

86 tenancy. T he court in Spain concluded as follows: "The debtordoes not t ransfer his title to [s ection] 541 property o f the estate but holds h is title subject to the exercis e by the trustee of his rights to sell, us e or lease su ch propertyby appropriati on ***. Th e debtor retains the full use, possession and enjoyme nt jointly with the trustee and

the right to refuse t o turn over o r deliver s uch propert y in proper c ases. Ther e is noNo. 1-09-0583

87

voluntary o r involunta ry transfer of propertyupon filin g. It may never take place at th e option of the trustee and never occurs as t o wholly exempt property . The trustee has no title t o property of the estate until he el ects to tak e affirmative action and proceeding s are had or orders made ." Spain , 55 B.R. at 854 . As did the court in Anthony , the court relied on s ection 363( h) to find that no transfertook place by the fil ing of the peti tionNo. 1-09-0583

88 and that th e trustee's rights wer e no better thanthose of a creditor wh o proceeds to levy and sale. Spain , 55 B.R. a t 855. In summary, the Bankru ptcy Code provides th at the debt or's legal and equitable i nterests inproperty a re transferred

to the ban kruptcy est ate. However, un der Illinoi s law, more than a transfer of the debt or's intere st in property is required t o sever the joint tenan cy. Illino is law requ ires a conveyanc e, which do es not occu r until the t rustee sell s or otherw iseNo. 1-09-0583

89 disposes ofthe proper ty and titl e passes. Th erefore, inIllinois, the filing of abankruptcypetition d oes not sever ajoint tena ncy. We conclude that the f iling of Ms. Koshiyama's bankru ptcy petiti on did not sev er the join t tenancy. The October 24, 2005, reco rding of th e court orderreviving t he judgment created a v alid lien a gainst Mr. Jolly's int erest in th e Harbor Dr ive Unit. But, upon his de ath, his interest inthe proper ty ceased t o exist and w ith it the plaintiff'sNo. 1-09-0583

90 judgment li en. Harms , 105 Ill. 2d at 224. There fore, the p laintiff do es not have a judgment li en on the H arbor Drive Unit, enforceabl e against t he Jolly estat e. II. Whetherthe Decisi on in Maniez Should be O verruled A. Law of the Case Doctri ne Under the law of the case doctrine, p arties may not relitig ate issues prev iously deci ded in the same

case. Long v. Elb orno , 397 Ill. App. 3d 982, 989 , 922 N.E.2 d 555 (2010 ). Questions o f law that were decide d onNo. 1-09-0583

91 a previous appeal are binding on the trial courtas well as on the appellate c ourt in sub sequent app eals. Long , 397 Ill. App. 3d at 989. The purpose of the doctrin e is "to protectsettled expectations of the parties , ensure un iformity of decisions, maintain co nsistency during the course of asingle cas e, effectuate proper admi nistration of justice, an d bring lit igation to an end. [Citat ion.] An a dditional concern add ressed by t he law of t he case doctri ne is the m aintenance ofNo. 1-09-0583

92

the prestig e of the co urts, for t he reason thatif an appe llate court issues cont rary opinio ns on the same issue in the same case, its prestige is undercut. [Citation.] " Emerson Ele ctric Co. v . Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. , 352 Ill. App. 3d 399 , 417, 815 N.E.2d 924 (2004). There are two rec ognized exceptions to the law of the case doctrine: ( 1) when a h igher court makes a con trary rulin g on the same issue subse quent to th e lower cou rt'sNo. 1-09-0583

93 decision, a nd (2) whena reviewin g court finds that its p rior decisi on was palpabl y erroneous . Long , 397 Ill. App. 3 d at 989. The plainti ff asserts tha t the law o f the case doctrine do es not prec lude reconsidera tion where the facts b efore the court h ave changed or error o r injustice i s manifest. See Aardvark Art, Inc. v . Lehigh/St eck-Warlick , Inc. , 284 Ill. App. 3d 627 , 633, 627 N.E.2d 1271 (1996).

B. Discussion The pl aintiff ack nowledges t hatNo. 1-09-0583

94 this court' s prior opi nion in Maniez constitutes the law ofthe case. However, he maintains that this c ourt may reconsi der its dec ision underthe exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. 1. The Palp ably Errone ous Excepti on The de fendants ma intain thatthe palpably er roneous exc eption appl ies only where the appella te court ha s remanded th e case for a new trial on all issues. See Alwin v. Vi llage of Wheeling , 371 Ill. App. 3d 898 , 911, 864 N.E.2d 897 (2007). However, inNo. 1-09-0583

95 People v. S utton , 375 Ill. App. 3d 889, 894, 8 74 N.E.2d 2 12 (2007), this court refer red to the palpably

erroneous e xception wi thout the n ew trial quali fier. See Sutton , 375 Ill. App. 3d at 894. Recen tly, in People v. Jacobazz i , 398 Ill. App. 3d 890 (2009), the Second Dis trict Appel late Court revie wed the rel evant case law and conclud ed that the new trial qualifier w as not a de finitive pa rt of the palpabl y erroneous exception. Jacobazzi , 398 Ill. App. 3d at 931. Because its prior deci sion "wasNo. 1-09-0583

8 The plaintiff's reformation argument referred to the 2004 96 palpably er roneous and worked a manifest in justice," t he court ch ose to revisit it. See Jacobazzi , 398 Ill. App. 3 d at 932. In arg uing that t he decisionin Maniez was palpab ly erroneous, the plainti ff maintain s that this c ourt should have determined that the or der revivin g the judgment an d the recor ding of the order with the correctdate of th e judgment ac ted to refo rm the orig inal judgment me morandum. 8 The plain tiff'sNo. 1-09-0583

memorandum of judgment. As we have found that the 2004 memorandum did not create a valid judgment lien, we will consider the October 24, 2005, order, which did create a valid lien, in connection with the reformation argument. 97 reliance on L. E. Myers Co. v. Har bor Insurance C o. , 67 Ill. App. 3d 496, 384 N.E.2d 1340 (1978) , is mispla ced. In that cas e, the cour t held thata third partywas bound by the volu ntary reformationof an insu rance polic y to correct a mutual mista ke by the contractingparties. The court determined that the th ird party's lack of knowledg e of the mi stake was n ot determinati ve because there was n oNo. 1-09-0583

98 reliance onthe mistak e. L. E. Myers Co. , 67 Ill. App. 3d at 5 04. In the present cas e, the part ies never a greed that there was a mutua l mistake, and the plainti ff never so ught reform ation of the 1997 memorandum . The pl aintiff the n maintains that this court' s decision in Maniez is erroneous b ecause it c ontradicted the holding in Dillman v. Nadelhoffer , 23 Ill App. 16 8 (1887). In that cas e, the appella te court he ld that a judgment de btor could not defeat the execution o f a judgmen t by showin gNo. 1-09-0583

99 that the ju dgment date was incorr ect. Dillmanwas decide d prior to 1935 and therefore l acks preced ential authority. See Bryson v. N ews America Publication s, Inc. , 174 Ill. 2d 77, 95, 672 N.E .2d 1207 (1 996) (appel late decisions i ssued priorto 1935 ha ve no binding aut hority). M oreover, th e plaintiff's reliance o n Dillmanis misplaced. In the pre sent case, there was no issu e as to the correctnes s of the date ofthe plaint iff's judgment and no ques tion that t he plaintif f could execu te on his j udgment, wh ichNo. 1-09-0583

100 were the is sues in Dillman . Dillman did not add ress whethe r an incorr ect judgment da te in the r ecorded memorandum of judgmentcreated a lien on real pro perty. The pl aintiff doe s not addre ss or distinguishthe cases this court relied on i n reaching its decisio n in Maniez . While ma intaining t hat it was error to al low a scriv ener's erro r to defeat the lien in thi s case, the plaintiff i gnores the basis for t his court's dec ision: thatthe record ing of the memo randum of j udgment wit h anNo. 1-09-0583

101 incorrect j udgment dat e did not satisfy the strict compliance sta ndard required incomplying with sectio n 12- 101. Maniez , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 42. Moreover, t his court e xplained wh y the scrivener's error argument did no t aid the plainti ff. See Maniez , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 44 ("Even i f we were t o agree with the plainti ff that the inclusion o f the incor rect date i n the memorandum of judgmentwas a scrivener's error, we must strict ly adhere to t he requirements of sec tion 12-101"). Therefore, the plainti ffNo. 1-09-0583

102 has failed to establis h that this court's dec ision in Maniez was palpably er roneous. 2. Best Int erest of So ciety and Manifest In justice As an alternative ground for overturningthis court 's decisionin Maniez , the plain tiff conten ds that the decisio n was contr ary to the best interests o f society a nd resulted in a manifest in justice in this case, citing Devines v. Maier , 728 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1 984). In t hat case, t he court held that the la w of the ca seNo. 1-09-0583

103 doctrine sh ould not be applied "' where the law as announced i s clearly erroneous, and establi shes a prac tice which is co ntrary to t he best interests o f society, and works a manifest in justice in a particula r case.'" Devines , 728 F.2d at 880, quoting United Stat es v. Habig , 474 F.2d 57, 60 (7th Cir. 1973). As we noted previ ously, fede ral decisions a re not bind ing on this court. The two I llinois cas es cited by th e plaintiffdo not reference c onsideratio n of the "b estNo. 1-09-0583

104 interest ofsociety." See People v. Williams , 138 Ill. 2d 377, 391 -92, 563 N.E.2d 385 (1990); Aardvark Ar t, Inc. , 284 Ill. Ap p. 3d at 63 3; see also Jacobazzi , 398 Ill. App. 3d at 931. The plainti ff's discus sion of the reformationof judgmen ts under th e mortgage fo reclosure l aw fails to consider th at, because the requirement s of sectio n 12-101 we re not strictl y adhered t o, no lien was created in this case. Therefore, there was n othing to b e reformed or foreclosed upon. In a ny event, w eNo. 1-09-0583

105 strongly di sagree withthe plaint iff that the de cision in Maniez was contrary tothe best i nterests of society. A s we explai ned in Maniez , "the purpos e of record ing the memorandum of judgmentis not jus t to alert the d ebtor that a judgment had been entere d but prosp ective purchasers as well." Maniez , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 43. Strictadherence to section 12- 101 assures that the public, as well as the judgment debtor, has reliable i nformation as to existence o f a lien onreal prope rty.No. 1-09-0583

106 Finall y, the plai ntiff argue s that the de cision in Maniez resulted in a manife st injustic e to him. He incorporate s his priorarguments on judicial an d equitable estoppel. As neither judicial no r equitable estoppel b arred Ms. Koshiyama from asserting t he invalidi ty of the plaintiff's lien, thos e arguments d o not estab lish that a n injustice o ccurred. The pl aintiff als o argues th at it would be a manifestNo. 1-09-0583

107 injustice t o allow Ms. Koshiyama, as the survivi ng joint te nant, to benefit by receivin g the prope rty free from t he plaintif f's judgment li en because of a scrive ner's error. As we explaine d in reject ing the plainti ff's palpab ly erroneou s argument, t his was nota case of scrivener's error. Mo reover, if the plaintiff b elieved tha t he had a valid judgment li en on the H arbor Drive Unit property, h e fails to explain whyhe waited almo st a year a fter the cl ose of Ms. Kosh iyama's ban kruptcy cas e toNo. 1-09-0583

108 seek to for eclose the judgment li en. Finally, th e plaintiffis not wit hout a remedy fo r inaccurac y of the judgment da te in the memorandums. We conclude th at the plai ntiff has f ailed to establis h that the decision in Maniez resulted i n a manifes t injustice u nder the ci rcumstances of this case. CONCLUSION As the plaintiff no longer h ad a valid judgment lien ag ainst the H arbor Drive Unit, the circui t court's dismissal o f the compl aint toNo. 1-09-0583

109 foreclose t he judgmentlien was proper. The ju dgment of t he circuit court of Cook Cou nty is aff irmed. Affirmed. GARCIA

and LAMPKI N, JJ., con cur.No. 1-09-0583

110No. 1-09-0583

111No. 1-09-0583

112No. 1-09-0583

113