UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-1433

R.J. INVESTMENTS, L.L.C.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

and

MARIE E. ROBINSON; TERRI SORRELL; ENTERPRISE HOMES, INC.; 

LACROSSE HOMES, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY, 

MARYLAND; ERIC S. WARGOTZ, M.D., in his personal capacity, 

in his capacity as Board Member of the County Commissioners 

for Queen Anne’s County Maryland, and in capacity as 

Sanitary Commissioner; COURTNEY M. BILLUPS, in his personal 

capacity, in his capacity as Board Member of the County 

Commissioners for Queen Anne’s County, Maryland, and in his 

capacity as Sanitary Commissioner; PAUL L. GUNTHER, in his 

personal capacity, in his capacity as Board Member of the 

County Commissioners for Queen Anne’s County, Maryland, and 

in his capacity as Sanitary Commissioner; GENE M. RANSOM, 

III, in his personal capacity, in his capacity as Board 

Member of the County Commissioners for Queen Anne’s County, 

Maryland, and in his capacity as Sanitary Commissioner; 

CAROL R. FORDONSKY, in her personal capacity, in her 

capacity as Board Member of the County Commissioners for 

Queen Anne’s County, Maryland, and in her capacity as 

Sanitary Commissioner; QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY SANITARY 

COMMISSION,

Defendants - Appellees.
2

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. 

(1:07-cv-01903-RDB)

Argued: January 25, 2011 Decided: March 4, 2011

Before KING, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam decision.

ARGUED: Anthony Gene Gorski, RICH & HENDERSON, PC, Annapolis, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Victoria M. Shearer, KARPINSKI, 

COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON 

BRIEF: James J. Doyle, III, Warren K. Rich, RICH & HENDERSON, 

PC, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Richard Colaresi, 

KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

R.J. Investments, L.L.C. (“R.J.”) appeals from the judgment 

of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland 

in favor of the Board of County Commissioners for Queen Anne’s 

County, Maryland (“the Board”), the Queen Anne’s County Sanitary 

Commission, and the members of the Board of County Commissioners 

in their official capacities (collectively, “the Defendants”) on 

its Fair Housing Act and Equal Protection claims. Finding no 

error, we affirm.

I.

Queen Anne’s County (“the County”) is a rural agricultural 

county located on Maryland’s Eastern Shore. To build on land in 

the County, a developer must demonstrate to the Board that the 

property can be adequately served by the County’s water and 

sewer systems. Having executed a contract to purchase property 

in the County, R.J. applied for an amendment to the County’s 

Comprehensive Water and Sewerage Plan which would allow R.J. to 

continue with the development process for the property. After 

two public hearings on the matter, the Board unanimously denied 

R.J.’s proposed amendment. In so doing, Board members expressed

their concern that the existing water and sewage treatment 

facilities were insufficient to meet the needs of the proposed 

development. 
4

Shortly thereafter, R.J.1 filed suit, alleging, among other 

things, violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-

3619, and the Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

R.J. claims that by denying its proposed amendment, the 

Defendants negatively affected potential minority homebuyers and 

prevented the expansion of affordable housing. Following a 

four-day bench trial, the district court entered judgment in 

favor of the Defendants; thereafter, R.J. noted a timely appeal. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

On appeal from a bench trial, “[w]e review a judgment . . . 

under a mixed standard of review — factual findings may be 

reversed only if clearly erroneous, while conclusions of law . . 

. are examined de novo.” Roanoke Cement Co., LLC v. Falk Corp., 

413 F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Williams v. Sandman, 

187 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 1999); Scarborough v. Ridgeway, 726 

F.2d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1984)).

 1 Enterprise Homes, Inc., Reverend Marie Robinson, Terri 

Sorrell, and Lacrosse Homes, Inc. also were named plaintiffs in 

the suit. The district court, however, dismissed these 

additional parties for lack of standing prior to holding its 

bench trial; hence, they are not parties to this appeal.
5

III.

A.

We utilize the four-prong analysis set forth in Smith v. 

Town of Clarkton to evaluate Fair Housing Act claims advanced 

against governmental entities. 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982);

see also Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 n.5

(4th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he Clarkton test has been applied only in 

situations where a public body is the defendant.”). Pursuant to 

this inquiry, we assess: 

(1) how strong is the plaintiff’s showing of 

discriminatory effect; (2) is there some evidence of 

discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy 

the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis

Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1065 (quoting Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. 

Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), 

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978)(“Arlington Heights II”)).

[,

426 U.S. 229 (1976)]; (3) what is the defendant’s 

interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) 

does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to 

affirmatively provide housing for members of minority 

groups or merely to restrain the defendant from

interfering with individual property owners who wish 

to provide such housing. 

R.J. contends the district court erred in applying each of 

the Clarkton factors.2

 2 As it does with its Fair Housing claim, R.J. argues with 

respect to its Equal Protection claim that the district court

erred in concluding that it presented no evidence of 

discriminatory intent. As we conclude below, however, the 

district court did not err in so finding. Because “[a] violation 

For the purposes of this opinion, we 

(Continued)
6

assume,3 without deciding, that the district court erred in 

finding that R.J. failed to establish the Board’s actions had a 

disparate impact on potential minority homeowners.4 Of course, 

not “every action which produces discriminatory effects is 

illegal.” Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1290. We therefore 

turn to the remaining Clarkton factors to evaluate whether the 

Board’s denial of R.J.’s proposed amendment violated the Fair 

Housing Act.

 

[of the Equal Protection Clause] is established only if the 

plaintiff can prove that the state intended to discriminate,” 

Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir. 

1995)(emphasis in original), R.J. plainly fails to establish an 

Equal Protection violation. We therefore do not discuss the 

issue further.

3 We note that our assumption is constrained by the evidence 

offered by R.J. at trial. It is clear from our review of the 

record that the district court did not err when it found that, 

if it were to accept the entirety of the evidence submitted by 

R.J., any showing of disparate impact would be minimal, at best. 

J.A. 2360. Thus, the outer limit of our assumption is that R.J. 

established a minimal disparate impact.

4 R.J. further contends that the district court erred by 

admitting the testimony of Peter Scanlon, Director of Housing 

and Community Services for the County and the Executive Director 

of the County’s Housing Authority, under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 701. Scanlon’s improper testimony, R.J.’s argument 

goes, led the district court to find that R.J. did not establish 

a disparate impact. We need not address the issue here, however, 

because in resolving this appeal we assume without deciding that 

R.J. has satisfied the first Clarkton factor regarding disparate 

impact. 
7

B.

Our review of the record indicates that the district court, 

at a minimum, did not err in applying the second and third

Clarkton factors. The district court, as to the second factor, 

explicitly found “there is not a scintilla of evidence that the 

Board . . . acted with racially discriminatory intent. . . . 

[T]his Court finds . . . that the Plaintiff’s case was based on 

conjecture and supposition.” J.A. 2361-62. We have thoroughly 

examined the record and find the district court’s conclusion to 

be amply supported by the record and certainly not clearly 

erroneous. Further, the district court did not commit clear 

error when it found that the Board’s concern over the lack of 

sewer capacity presented a legitimate basis for denying R.J.’s 

proposed amendment. Moreover, we agree with the district court 

that the Board made its decision while acting within the scope 

of its authority. The record plainly supports the district 

court’s conclusion that “the Board possessed a significant and 

legislative interest in exercising [its] legislative prerogative 

to protect and preserve the County’s valuable sewer treatment 

resources . . . .” J.A. 2363.5

 5 Having concluded that the district court correctly 

determined R.J. failed to meet the second and third Clarkton

factors, it is unnecessary to address the fourth factor, which 

the district court found did “not favor either party.” J.A. 

2363.
8

Thus, even assuming that R.J. established a minimal 

disparate impact, because the district court did not err in 

finding that R.J. failed to produce any evidence of 

discriminatory intent and the Board made its determination while 

exercising its legislative prerogative to preserve and to 

protect the county’s sewer treatment resources, we agree with 

the district court that R.J. failed to establish a violation of 

the Fair Housing Act.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err 

in concluding that R.J. failed to establish a violation of the 

Fair Housing Act or the Equal Protection Clause. We therefore 

affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED