VIRGINIA:

 In the Supreme Court of Virginia Held at the Supreme Court 

Building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 2nd day of 

November, 2001. 

Drew Virgil Tidwell, Appellant, 

 against Record No. 010692 

VSB Docket No. 00-000-1453 

Virginia State Bar, Appellee. 

 Upon an appeal of right from an order entered by the 

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board on the 8th day of 

December, 2000. 

 Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument by the 

appellant, in proper person, and by counsel for the appellee, the 

Court is of opinion there is no error in the order of the Virginia 

State Bar Disciplinary Board revoking appellant's license to 

practice law in this Commonwealth pursuant to the provisions of 

Part Six, § IV, Para. 13(G)(2001) of the Rules of Court (Paragraph 

13(G)). 

On September 3, 1999, appellant, Drew Virgil Tidwell, entered 

a plea of guilty in the state of New York to a class E felony, 

Leaving the Scene of an Incident without Reporting, New York 

Vehicle & Traffic Law § 600(2)(a). At the plea hearing, the 

prosecutor represented to the court that Tidwell "will surrender 

his license to practice law immediately – immediately upon his 

entering this plea." Thereafter, the court accepted the plea and 

entered an order of conviction. Upon notification of Tidwell's 
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conviction, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate 

Division, Fourth Judicial Department, entered an order striking 

Tidwell's name from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice 

law in New York state. Pursuant to New York Judiciary Law 

§ 90(4)(a), Tidwell's disbarment was automatic on his conviction of 

a felony, and no additional procedures were provided under these 

circumstances. 

 Paragraph 13(G) requires that the Disciplinary Board issue an 

order to show cause why an attorney should not be disbarred from 

the practice of law in this jurisdiction when the Disciplinary 

Board is notified that the attorney has been disbarred from the 

practice of law in another jurisdiction. The rule provides only 

three grounds upon which an attorney, in response to a show cause 

order, may allege that disbarment is improper. 

The Disciplinary Board received notice that Tidwell was 

disbarred by New York state and issued a show cause order directed 

to him. In response, Tidwell alleged that disbarment was improper 

because "the record of the proceeding in the other jurisdiction 

would clearly show that such proceeding was so lacking in notice or 

opportunity to be heard as to constitute a denial of due process." 

Part Six, § IV, Para. 13 (G)(1). Following a hearing, the 

Disciplinary Board found that Tidwell failed to show that he was 

denied due process and ordered that his license to practice law in 

this Commonwealth be revoked. 
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On appeal, Tidwell's primary complaint is that the 

Disciplinary Board erred in concluding that he failed to show that 

he was denied due process because he established that New York did 

not afford him the opportunity for notice and hearing prior to 

disbarment. In making this assertion, Tidwell maintains that under 

Paragraph 13(G), the relevant proceeding under review is the 

disbarment proceeding alone which, under New York law, consists of 

automatic disbarment upon conviction of a felony. 

This construction of Paragraph 13(G) is too narrow. It is 

well settled that legislatures have a right to prescribe standards 

of practice for attorneys and may identify situations in which an 

attorney's misdeeds will result in automatic disbarment. See, 

e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1898); In re 

Collins, 188 Cal. 701, 704-06, 206 P. 990, 991-92 (1922). 

Therefore, the question in this case is not whether automatic 

disbarment violates due process, but whether the record shows that 

the entire process resulting in disbarment was so flawed that it 

denied Tidwell due process.* Thus the Disciplinary Board properly 

considered the record of the criminal proceeding along with the 

disbarment proceeding in making its determination. 

In considering a license revocation order of the Disciplinary 

Board, this Court makes an independent review of the record, giving 

 *

 Tidwell's specific assignment of error challenging the 

admission of the transcript of the criminal proceeding was waived 

because he did not object to its admission at the hearing before 

the Disciplinary Board. 
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the factual findings of the Disciplinary Board substantial weight 

and viewing them as prima facie correct. The conclusions of the 

Board will be sustained unless they are not justified by a 

reasonable view of the evidence or are contrary to the law. Blue 

v. Seventh Dist. Comm. of Virginia State Bar, 220 Va. 1056, 1061-

62, 265 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1980). 

The record clearly establishes that Tidwell was not denied 

notice because he had notice of the crime of which he was charged 

and notice that conviction of such crime would result in 

disbarment. 

Similarly, the record shows Tidwell was not denied the 

opportunity to be heard. Tidwell had the right to defend against 

the criminal charge but he chose to plead guilty. Regardless of 

whether Tidwell "surrendered his license" or his license was 

revoked automatically, he knew that as a result of pleading guilty 

to the felony, he would be disbarred. Tidwell does not claim he 

was coerced or otherwise denied due process in connection with his 

guilty plea and criminal conviction. He chose to plead guilty and 

was fully aware of the consequences that decision would have for 

his law license. Furthermore, Tidwell was entitled to appeal the 

disbarment order to the New York Court of Appeals, which he did not 

do. (N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(8)). 

Based on our review of the record, we hold that the 

Disciplinary Board did not err in concluding that Tidwell failed to 

satisfy his burden to show that he was denied due process because 
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the evidence before the Disciplinary Board supported a finding that 

the New York proceedings resulting in Tidwell's disbarment did not 

violate Tidwell's due process rights. 

 Tidwell's remaining assignments of error are without merit. 

 Accordingly, the order of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary 

Board is affirmed. The appellant shall pay to the appellee $30.00 

damages. 

 This order shall be certified to the Virginia State Bar 

Disciplinary Board and shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 

 A Copy, 

 Teste: 

 David B. Beach, 

Clerk