NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MONTEZ LAVELL WRIGHT, III, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0251

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-005699-001 

The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Terry M. Crist, III

Counsel for Appellee

Bain & Lauritano, PLC, Glendale

By Amy E. Bain

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 5-28-2020
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Maria Elena Cruz

joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Montez Lavell Wright, III, appeals his convictions and 

sentences for 11 counts, including two counts of first-degree murder. For 

the following reasons, this court affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the jury’s verdicts, resolving all reasonable inferences against 

Wright. See State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 2 (App. 2015). This court 

does not weigh the evidence or assess witness credibility, because those 

are jury functions. See State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 6 (App. 2004); 

State v. Salman, 182 Ariz. 359, 361 (App. 1994).

¶3 In early 2016, Wright met Andrew Lauro while they were 

working for a landscaping company. Because of money problems, Wright 

and Lauro developed a plan to burglarize a house in the retirement 

community where their employer had them doing landscaping work.

¶4 On Sunday, the day before the burglary, Wright and his 

then-wife, Tichinia Shephard, met with Lauro and finalized a plan to 

commit a burglary the next day. The plan was to drive around on Monday 

morning until they selected a house with an open garage door. According 

to their plan, Wright and Lauro would enter the house, and Wright would 

hold the victims at gunpoint while Lauro tied them up. Shephard was to 

drive the getaway car. 

¶5 Later on Sunday, Shephard created a “Stripe” account. A 

Stripe account can be used for companies to move money around to 

different bank accounts. Shephard’s Stripe account, purportedly for a wig 

business, was registered using Shephard’s phone, and was linked to her 

email address. The Stripe account was subsequently linked to two bank 

accounts, one belonging to Shephard and one belonging to Wright. 
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

3

¶6 On Monday morning, when Wright and Lauro were 

scheduled to work, Wright, Lauro, and Shephard drove around the 

retirement community to search for houses to rob. They identified a house 

with an open garage door. A homeowner, A.D., saw the three park near 

his house, watched Wright and Lauro put on their work vests, and 

approach his open garage door. A.D. closed his garage door and called the 

police. 

¶7 The three left and within minutes, came across another open 

garage door at B.L.’s home a few blocks away. Wright and Lauro went 

into the house through the garage. Shephard stayed in the car.

¶8 When Wright and Lauro entered the house, B.L.’s friend, 

R.S., was reading a newspaper. Wright told her “it’s a stick up.” Wright 

then shot her. Hearing the disturbance, B.L. came out of a bedroom, and 

Wright also shot her. Wright then shot R.S. a second time as she was about 

to use her cell phone. Both victims died.

¶9 Wright and Lauro stole the victims’ purses and fled in B.L.’s 

SUV. They met Shephard at a nearby church. Wright realized he had 

dropped his cell phone at B.L.’s home, and he returned to retrieve it but 

was unable to do so. Wright abandoned B.L.’s SUV in Avondale. Later, 

Wright and Shephard made several transactions using the victims’ credit 

cards with the Stripe account they had created the day before. 

¶10 The next day, police went to B.L.’s home for a welfare check 

and discovered the victims. Police found Wright’s cell phone and

recovered his DNA from it. Police soon located B.L.’s stolen SUV and 

found Wright’s DNA on the steering wheel. B.L.’s iPad was inside her 

vehicle, and Wright’s DNA was on it as well. Using cell phone records for 

Wright and Shephard, police established they were in the immediate area 

of B.L.’s home before and after the murders.

¶11 The State charged Wright with two counts of first-degree 

murder,1 one count of first-degree burglary, one count of theft of means of 

transportation, one count of attempted first-degree burglary, one count of

fraudulent schemes and artifices, one count of attempted fraudulent 

1 Shephard was jointly prosecuted with Wright. In Shephard’s case counts 

1 and 2 were charges for felony murder based on accomplice liability. See 

A.R.S. §§ 13-1105.A.2, 13-301.
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

4

schemes and artifices, one count of aggravated taking identity of another, 

one count of computer tampering, and two counts of theft of credit card.

¶12 Lauro pled guilty to felony murder.

2 Wright and Shephard 

went to trial. Under the terms of his plea deal, Lauro testified against 

Wright and Shephard and received a life sentence with the possibility of 

parole on the murder. After a 12-day trial, the jury convicted Wright and 

Shephard as charged.

¶13 The superior court sentenced Wright to serve the sentence 

for the first, first-degree murder conviction concurrently with the 

sentences for first-degree burglary, theft of means of transportation, and 

attempted first-degree burglary, for which Wright was given 1,160 days 

presentence incarceration credit (Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5). The longest 

sentence in this group is natural life in prison on the first count of firstdegree murder. 

¶14 The superior court sentenced Wright to serve the sentence 

for the second, first-degree murder conviction concurrently with the 

sentences for fraudulent schemes and artifices, attempted fraudulent 

schemes and artifices, aggravated taking identity of another, computer 

tampering, and two counts of theft of credit card but consecutively to the 

sentences on Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5. The longest sentence in this group is 

natural life in prison on the second count of first-degree murder.

¶15 Wright timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction pursuant 

to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-

120.21.A.1, 13-4031, and 13-4032.A.1.

ANALYSIS

I. The superior court did not err by admitting evidence of Wright’s 

other acts.

¶16 Wright argues the superior court erred by admitting 

evidence of his other acts under Rule 404(b) of the Arizona Rules of 

Evidence. This court reviews “the admission of prior act evidence under 

Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion.” State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, 337, ¶ 

14 (App. 2003).

2 Lauro entered a “free talk” agreement with the prosecution in which he 

agreed to testify against Wright and Shephard for a lesser sentence.
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

5

¶17 Generally, evidence of a person’s character “is not 

admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith.” See 

Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a). Yet, “evidence of other acts may be admissible under 

Rule 404(b) to show proof of ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” State v. 

VanWinkle, 230 Ariz. 387, 393, ¶ 21 (2012) (quoting Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)). 

¶18 Four “protective provisions” control the admission of other

act evidence: (1) the evidence must be admitted for a proper purpose; (2) 

the evidence must be relevant; (3) the superior court may exclude 

evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403; and (4) if requested, the 

superior court must give a proper limiting instruction. State v. Lee, 189 

Ariz. 590, 599 (1997). “Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to 

suggest decision on an improper basis . . . such as emotion, sympathy or 

horror.” State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 52 (1993) (quotation omitted). “Rule 

403 weighing is best left to the trial court and, absent an abuse of 

discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.” State v. Spencer, 176 Ariz. 36, 

41 (1993). In addition, “the profferer must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the prior bad acts were committed and that the defendant 

committed the acts.” State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 582 (1997) (emphasis 

omitted). “Whether evidence is sufficient to be clear and convincing is for 

the trial court and its findings will not be disturbed unless as a matter of 

law no one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and 

convincing.” Stevenson v. Stevenson, 132 Ariz. 44, 46 (1982).

¶19 Before trial, the State sought to introduce evidence of 

Wright’s following other acts to show his motive, intent, and identity: (1) 

stealing (with Lauro) a hedge trimmer from the landscaping company and 

pawning it; and (2) Wright’s unsuccessful attempt to cash a stolen check in 

an amount over $36,000. Wright committed both acts within a week of the 

crimes at issue here. The State argued “the murder was not committed in a 

vacuum. It was the culmination of a week where the defendants became 

increasingly worried about money and their criminal behavior 

intensified.” Wright objected. After oral argument, the superior court 

granted the State’s motion.

¶20 Specifically, the superior court found the other act evidence 

was offered for a permissible purpose of establishing “the defendants’ 

motive and intent to rob houses in Surprise due to financial desperation,” 

to prove identity, and to rebut a mere presence defense. The superior 

court acknowledged the evidence was prejudicial but found the prejudice 

did not substantially outweigh its probative value. At trial, the State
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

6

presented the evidence, and the superior court gave the jurors a proper 

limiting instruction.

¶21 Wright argues the superior court erred by finding the 

evidence was relevant and offered for a proper purpose. This court 

disagrees. The State contended Wright planned to commit the burglary 

because of financial concerns. The State demonstrated Wright’s financial 

difficulties by offering evidence showing Wright and Shephard had 

moved to Arizona a month earlier to stay with a friend, N.M., but no

longer had a place to live. Within a few weeks of their arrival, N.M. was 

evicted, and Wright and Shephard moved in with N.M.’s neighbors. The 

neighbors told Wright and Shephard they had to move out by early 

February. Shephard was pregnant and did not have a job. Wright had 

been working at the landscaping business for only a few weeks, earning 

$9 an hour. While staying with the neighbors, Wright asked their 

daughter if she knew how to cash a check online. He also asked her if she 

wanted to make money by robbing “old people” where Wright worked.

¶22 Lauro’s testimony reinforced the State’s theory about 

Wright’s motive and plan. Lauro testified he met Wright when Wright 

began working for the landscaping company, and Wright soon told Lauro 

he needed money because he was going to be homeless. Lauro testified he 

and Wright stole the hedge trimmer and pawned it for $80. Lauro also 

testified Wright stole the check from a mailbox while at work, and the two 

tried to cash it. Lauro told the jury he and Wright then came up with a 

plan to rob houses in the retirement community by “act[ing] like [they] 

were going to work” dressed in “regular work clothes and everything.”

¶23 Though Wright contended the evidence was admitted 

improperly, he did not dispute his participation in the acts. At trial, 

Wright testified and told the jurors he and Lauro sold the hedge trimmer 

and he attempted to cash the stolen check after he “washed” it. The 

record, therefore, supports the superior court’s finding the evidence was 

relevant and probative of proper non-propensity purposes, including 

Wright’s financial motive, intent, opportunity, and plan. See State v. 

Hargrave, 225 Ariz. 1, 8, ¶ 14 (2010) (“[M]otive is relevant in a murder 

prosecution.”).

¶24 Wright further contends the other act evidence was unduly 

prejudicial. The superior court expressly rejected his argument, and this 

court defers to the superior court’s Rule 403 determination. See Spencer, 

176 Ariz. at 41; State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 545-46 (1997) (“Not all harmful 

evidence . . . is unfairly prejudicial.”). This court discerns nothing in the 
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

7

record to overcome this deference. Unlike the charged offenses, the other 

acts did not involve violence or a burglary. Because the charged offenses 

were far more egregious than the other acts, this court cannot conclude the 

evidence of nonviolent thefts would have an “undue tendency to suggest 

decision on an improper [propensity] basis” for first-degree murder and 

first-degree burglary charges. See Schurz, 176 Ariz. at 52; see State v. Via, 

146 Ariz. 108, 122 (1985) (any potential error from admitting evidence of a 

prior drug deal “was harmless as dealing with conduct far less egregious 

than that with which the defendant was charged.”).

¶25 In addition, the superior court instructed the jurors they 

could consider the other acts only to establish “identity, motive, or intent, 

and/or whether the defendants were merely present.” This instruction

prevented any unfair prejudice as a result of admitting the evidence. State 

v. Villalobos, 225 Ariz. 74, 80, ¶ 20 (2010). Accordingly, the superior court 

acted well within its discretion by admitting the evidence. 

II. Sufficient evidence supports Wright’s convictions.

¶26 Wright next argues the superior court erred by denying his 

motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 20 of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. Specifically, Wright challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the murder and burglary convictions solely on 

Lauro’s credibility. With respect to the remaining convictions, Wright 

admitted to the jury he committed the fraud, credit card theft, computer 

tampering, and identity theft offenses. In closing argument, Wright’s 

counsel told the jurors Wright only contested the murder, burglary, and 

car theft charges. This court reviews de novo the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting a conviction and the superior court’s denial of a Rule 20 

motion. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011).

¶27 The superior court must enter a judgment of acquittal if 

“there is no substantial evidence to support a conviction.” Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 20(a)(1). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16 (emphasis original). Sufficient 

evidence may be direct or circumstantial and “is such proof that 

reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. 

Borquez, 232 Ariz. 484, 487, ¶¶ 9, 11 (App. 2013) (quotation omitted). This 

court considers the entire record in its review of the superior court’s 
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

8

ruling on a Rule 20 motion, including evidence admitted after the ruling. 

See State v. Nunez, 167 Ariz. 272, 279 (1991).

¶28 Lauro testified he and Wright came up with a plan to rob 

houses in B.L.’s community, they invaded B.L.’s home, and Wright shot 

the victims. At the conclusion of the State’s case, Wright moved for a 

judgment of acquittal, contending it did not present substantial evidence 

for the murder and burglary charges because “the only person that can 

place Mr. Wright at the scene and within the victim’s home is Mr. Lauro” 

and Lauro “confirmed on the stand that he’s a . . . liar.” The superior court 

found the State presented substantial evidence to warrant a conviction for 

each count “notwithstanding credibility issues which might be something

for the jury’s consideration” and denied the Rule 20 motion. 

¶29 On appeal, Wright reasserts his challenges to Lauro’s 

credibility, arguing Lauro’s testimony was biased, unsubstantiated, and 

contradicted. Determining Lauro’s credibility, however, is entirely “within 

the province of the jury.” See State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 335, ¶ 39 (2008).

This court, therefore, “will not second-guess the jury’s decision.” State v. 

Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 501 (App. 1995).

¶30 Wright’s counsel extensively cross-examined Lauro about 

his veracity and bias, and specifically questioned Lauro about the terms of 

his plea agreement and benefits he received as a cooperating witness. 

Lauro conceded he lied “441 times.” Wright’s counsel attacked Lauro’s 

credibility throughout closing argument and proposed to the jurors 

“there’s absolutely no conceivable way you can believe—can or should 

believe anything that Andrew Lauro said.” Likewise, the State placed 

Lauro’s credibility squarely before the jury: in closing argument, the 

prosecutor said, “I told you in opening statement, do not believe a word 

Mr. Lauro says unless you can verify it with the other records.” The jurors, 

therefore, fully considered Wright’s challenges to Lauro’s testimony and 

rejected them. See State v. Manzanedo, 210 Ariz. 292, 293, ¶ 3 (App. 2005) 

(resolving conflicts in testimony is the jury’s role).

¶31 Wright claims the “case rested on [Lauro’s] testimony.” A

reasonable juror could have found Wright guilty of the murder and 

burglary charges based on Lauro’s testimony alone. See id. The State, 

however, offered significant evidence to corroborate Lauro’s testimony: 

Wright’s cell phone was found in B.L.’s home with his DNA on it; 

Wright’s DNA was on the steering wheel of B.L.’s SUV and her iPad; bank 

records showed Wright used the victims’ credit cards shortly after the 

murders; phone records placed Wright near B.L.’s home around the time 
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

9

of the murders; and A.D. saw Wright, Lauro, and Shephard near B.L.’s 

home minutes before the murders. 

¶32 Finally, though Wright denied committing the burglary, he 

admitted to the jury he drove to the retirement community with Lauro 

and Shephard and he acknowledged A.D. saw them. He also admitted the

cell phone found in B.L.’s home was his, but said he had recently sold it to 

Lauro. Cell phone records, however, showed the cell phone was in 

Wright’s apartment early in the morning on the day of the murders. And, 

Wright’s DNA was found in B.L.’s stolen SUV. Therefore, the State

presented substantial evidence to support the convictions, and the 

superior court properly denied Wright’s Rule 20 motion and permitted 

the jury to determine his guilt. See Lee, 189 Ariz. at 615 (when evidence 

points to differing results, the superior court “has no discretion to enter a 

judgment of acquittal.”).

CONCLUSION

¶33 For the above reasons, this court affirms Wright’s 

convictions and sentences.