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Filed 3/28/14 Noble Security v. Wells Fargo Bank CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

NOBLE SECURITY, INC. et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

A134142

(Marin County

 Super. Ct. No. CV082499)

This is an appeal from final judgment after the trial court granted the summary 

judgment motion of defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Wells Fargo & Company and 

two individual employees, Ghada Yasin and Helen Owyang (collectively, Wells Fargo). 

Plaintiffs Noble Security, Inc. (Noble Security), Noble Locks Enterprises, Inc. (Noble 

Locks) and Office Security Systems, Inc. (OSSI) challenge this judgment, arguing, 

among other things, that a triable issue of fact exists and that summary adjudication, not 

summary judgment, should have been ordered. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are affiliated corporations owned or controlled by Meir Avganim and 

engaged in manufacturing and selling mechanical locking systems for laptop computers. 

Noble Security is a California corporation with a Wells Fargo checking account opened 

in February 2003 and closed in January 2007; Noble Locks is a Nevada corporation that 

qualified to do business in California with a Wells Fargo checking account opened in 
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February 2004 and closed in June 2007; and OSSI is a Texas corporation with no Wells 

Fargo checking account. 

Beginning in 2005, some plaintiffs and Avganim became involved in various 

lawsuits against, among others, their sales representative, Jane Ratto, and accountant, 

Penelope Kane. Briefly stated, these lawsuits involved Ratto’s and Kane’s alleged 

misappropriation of Avganim’s and plaintiffs’ corporate funds, including funds held in 

plaintiffs’ Wells Fargo bank accounts. Relevant here, in August 2003, Kane opened a 

Wells Fargo checking account in the name of “Noble Enterprises,” which was 

subsequently closed in October 2007. In May 2005, Ratto and her husband opened a 

Wells Fargo checking account in the name of “JR Marketing LLC dba Noble Locks 

Enterprises,” which was subsequently closed in October 2006. Eventually, after the 

dispute between plaintiffs, the Rattos and Kane erupted, Wells Fargo filed an interpleader 

action to determine the proper owner of the funds held in the Noble Locks and Noble 

Security checking accounts. During discovery in these lawsuits, Wells Fargo produced to 

the plaintiffs records regarding, among other things, checks deposited in the accounts 

opened by Noble Security and Noble Locks, as well as in the JR Marketing accounts 

opened by Ratto, her husband or Kane. Ultimately, judgment was entered against Ratto 

and Kane awarding Avganim and the plaintiffs the corporate funds held in the Wells 

Fargo accounts, but denying them any damages based on the alleged wrongdoing. 

On April 1, 2008, the California Franchise Tax Board forfeited the corporate 

powers of Noble Locks due to the corporation’s failure to file tax returns or pay franchise 

taxes. This forfeiture of corporate powers lasted at least through January 2011. The 

corporate status of Noble Locks was subsequently reinstated and its corporate powers 

revived on February 14, 2011. Similarly, OSSI forfeited its corporate powers under 

Texas law as of January 2011 (after becoming inactive in 2005), and was then revived as 

a corporation in June 2011. 

Meanwhile, on May 21, 2008, plaintiffs filed the operative complaint in this action 

asserting the following causes of action against Wells Fargo: conversion, breach of 

fiduciary duty, fraud/concealment, interference with economic advantage, negligence, 
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breach of contract and conspiracy. These causes of action were based on two primary 

theories. First, plaintiffs alleged that Wells Fargo allowed unauthorized persons to act as 

signatories on their accounts. Second, they alleged Wells Fargo deposited checks paid by 

third parties to one or more plaintiffs into accounts owned by other persons, including the 

Rattos. Wells Fargo answered the complaint, raising affirmative defenses based on, 

among other things, lack of capacity to sue and statutes of limitations. 

On January 25, 2011, Wells Fargo moved for judgment on the pleadings based on 

its discovery during the course of litigation that Noble Locks had forfeited its corporate 

powers in California, during which forfeiture the statutes of limitations had run. Two

months later, on March 11, 2011, Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment or, 

alternatively, summary adjudication on statute-of-limitations grounds and, as to OSSI, on 

the ground that it had forfeited its corporate powers under Texas Law and thus lacked the 

capacity to sue.

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Following a hearing on these motions, the trial court granted Wells Fargo’s motion 

for summary judgment against Noble Locks, Noble Security and OSSI on statute-oflimitations grounds, and then denied as moot its motion for judgment on the pleadings 

against Noble Locks. Judgment was then entered in favor of Wells Fargo on October 25, 

2011, prompting this timely appeal.2

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs raise the following issues on appeal. First, plaintiffs contend the statutes

relied upon to find that Noble Locks forfeited its right to bring suit in California when it 

forfeited its corporate powers in California are needlessly “draconian” and should be 

relaxed in their case. (See Rev. & Tax Code, §§ 23301, 23301.5.) Second, plaintiffs 

repeat this essentially equitable argument with respect to the trial court’s finding that 

 

1 Wells Fargo also moved for summary judgment against plaintiff OSI, a Texas 

corporation. The court denied its motion as to OSI, a ruling not challenged on appeal. 

2 Before entering judgment, the trial court granted Wells Fargo’s application to 

correct a clerical error in its summary judgment order misidentifying Noble Security 

(instead of Noble Locks) as the corporate entity that forfeited its corporate status in 2008. 

The court thus filed an amended order on October 4, 2011. 
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OSSI, a Texas corporation, had also forfeited its corporate powers, including its right to 

bring suit. Third, plaintiffs contend summary judgment should not have been granted 

because a disputed issue of fact exists regarding whether Noble Locks actually forfeited 

its corporate powers in California. And, lastly, plaintiffs contend summary adjudication, 

not summary judgment, should have been granted because some claims are subject to 

longer statutes of limitations that did not expire. We address each issue below in logical 

order. 

The relevant standard of review is not in dispute. Summary judgment may be 

granted “if it is contended that the action has no merit . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, 

subd. (a).) A defendant moving for summary judgment has met the burden of showing 

that a cause of action has no merit if that party “has shown that one or more elements of 

the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a 

complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the 

burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts 

exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff . . . may not rely upon 

the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact 

exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material 

fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. 

(p)(2). See also Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 168-169.)

“We review an order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment de 

novo, examining the evidence before the trial court. We independently determine the 

effects of that evidence as a matter of law. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 

151, 161, 163 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 66].) ‘In undertaking our independent review of the 

evidence submitted, we apply “ ‘ “the same three-step process required of the trial court: 

First, we identify the issues raised by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to which 

the motion must respond; secondly, we determine whether the moving party’s showing 

has established facts which negate the opponent’s claims and justify a judgment in 

movant’s favor; when a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment, the 

third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a 
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triable, material factual issue. [Citations.]” ’ ” ’ (Dawson v. Toledano (2003) 109 

Cal.App.4th 387, 392 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 689].)” (Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 

138 Cal.App.4th 593, 601-602.)

I. Summary Judgment Against Noble Locks.

In granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo, the trial court reasoned 

with respect to Noble Locks that it had forfeited its corporate status in California by 

failing to file tax returns or pay overdue taxes in California, which in turn precluded the

corporation from bringing litigation in California during the forfeiture period. Further, 

during Noble Locks’ forfeiture period, the relevant limitations periods – to wit, one year 

for claims based on payment of checks by unauthorized signatories and three years for 

claims based on depositing of checks intended for Noble Locks into the Rattos’ JR 

Marketing account – had run. As such, the trial court concluded, all of Noble Locks’ 

claims against Wells Fargo were now time-barred. We agree.

The following facts are relevant. Noble Locks’ causes of action against Wells 

Fargo accrued no later than 2006, when Wells Fargo provided regular statements and 

checks to plaintiffs regarding their accounts. At that time, the applicable statutes of 

limitations began to run – to wit, one year, or until 2007, for the claims based on the 

alleged payment of checks to unauthorized signatories (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. 

(c)), and three years, or until 2009, for the claims based on depositing checks intended by 

third parties for plaintiffs into others’ accounts (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3118, subd. (g)). 

On April 1, 2008, Noble Locks’ corporate powers were suspended by the Franchise Tax 

Board pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code sections 23302 and 23301.5 based upon 

its failure to, among other things, file tax returns and/or pay overdue taxes.3 On May 21, 

2008, plaintiffs filed the operative complaint in this lawsuit. In February 2011, Noble 

Locks was revived as a corporation in California upon the issuance of a certificate of 

reviver. 

 

3 Unless otherwise stated, statutory citations herein are to the Revenue & Taxation 

Code.
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That Noble Locks forfeited its right to sue when it forfeited its corporate powers is 

a matter of statutory law. Under section 23301, “the corporate powers, rights and 

privileges of a domestic taxpayer, may be suspended, and the exercise of the corporate 

powers, rights and privileges of a foreign taxpayer in this state may be forfeited” if, 

among other things, the corporation fails to pay any tax or penalty “on the last day of the 

12th month after the close of the taxable year,” or fails to pay any tax or penalty “due and 

payable under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 19001) of Part 10.2, or under this 

part, upon notice and demand from the Franchise Tax Board . . . on or before 6 p.m. on 

the last day of the 11th month following the due date of the tax.” (§ 23301, subds. (a), 

(b).) Similarly, section 23301.5 provides “the corporate powers, rights and privileges of a 

domestic taxpayer may be suspended, and the exercise of the corporate powers, rights 

and privileges of a foreign taxpayer in this state may be forfeited if a taxpayer fails to file 

a tax return.” (§ 23301.5.) 

Further, as our appellate colleagues in the Second Appellate District have 

explained: “A corporation which has its powers suspended pursuant to these sections 

lacks the legal capacity to prosecute or defend a civil action during its suspension. 

[Citations.] Accordingly, when a suspended corporation commences an action during its 

suspension, the statute of limitations continues to run. [Citations.] [¶] A suspended 

corporation may revive its corporate powers by complying with the requirements set forth 

in section 23305 which provides: ‘Any taxpayer which has suffered the suspension or 

forfeiture provided for in Section 23301 or Section 23301.5 may be relieved therefrom 

upon making application therefor in writing to the Franchise Tax Board and upon 

payment of the tax and the interest and penalties for nonpayment of which the suspension 

or forfeiture occurred, together with all other taxes, deficiencies, interest and penalties 

due under this part, and upon the issuance by the Franchise Tax Board of a certificate of 

revivor. . . .’ [¶] If the statute of limitations runs out prior to revival of a corporation’s

powers, the corporation’s action will be time barred even if the complaint would 

otherwise have been timely. [Citations.] A corporation is so barred because, under 

section 23305a, the issuance of a certificate of revivor is ‘without prejudice to any action, 
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defense or right which has accrued by reason of the original suspension or forfeiture.’ 

[Citations.]” (Sade Shoe Co., Inc. v. Oschin & Snyder (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1509, 

1512-1513 [italics added].) 

Thus, applying this law to the undisputed facts of our case, the trial court correctly 

found Noble Locks’ claims time-barred, given that its corporate powers were suspended 

in April 2008, a month before plaintiffs filed their complaint against Wells Fargo, with 

the result that the complaint’s filing did not trigger commencement of this action or toll 

the applicable statutes of limitations. Further, the statutes of limitations continued to run 

until expiring, in 2007, for payment-to-unauthorized-signatories claims and, in 2009, for 

depositing-checks-in-other-accounts claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c); Cal. U. 

Com. Code, § 3118, subd. (g).) Noble Locks was then not revived until 2011, when a 

certificate of revivor issued, a date beyond the limitations period. (§ 23305.)

In challenging the trial court’s reasoning, plaintiffs insist there is a triable issue of 

fact as to whether Noble Locks actually forfeited its corporate powers in California. We, 

however, disagree. The trial court, on Wells Fargo’s motion, took judicial notice of a 

Secretary of State certificate dated January 6, 2011, stating as follows: “The records of 

this office indicate the California Franchise Tax Board forfeited [Noble Locks’] powers, 

rights and privileges on April 01, 2008, pursuant to the provisions of the California 

Revenue and Taxation Code, and the entity’s powers, rights and privileges remain 

forfeited.” Under California statutory law, no other proof was required. (§ 23302, subd. 

(c) [“The Franchise Tax Board shall transmit the names of taxpayers to the Secretary of 

State as to which the suspension or forfeiture provisions of Section 23301, 23301.5, or 

23775 are or become applicable, and the suspension or forfeiture therein provided for 

shall thereupon become effective. The certificate of the Secretary of State shall be prima 

facie evidence of the suspension or forfeiture”] [italics added].)

Plaintiffs do not challenge the trial court’s taking of judicial notice of the 

Secretary of State certificate. Plaintiffs insist, however, that they rebutted the 

certificate’s “prima facie evidence” by offering the declarations of three corporate 

officers, including Avganim, in which they denied receiving notice of Noble Locks’ 
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forfeiture of corporate powers.4 As plaintiffs note, a corporation’s powers cannot be 

forfeited pursuant to sections 23301 or 23301.5 until the Franchise Tax Board has mailed 

to the corporation “a notice preliminary to suspension which indicates that the taxpayer 

will be suspended by a date certain,” and that “date certain” has passed without the 

corporation coming into compliance. (§ 21020, § 23302, subds. (a)-(c).) However, as 

Wells Fargo points out, nothing in plaintiffs’ proffered evidence actually contradicts the 

certificate’s statement that Noble Locks’ corporate powers were forfeited on April 1, 

2008. Simply put, even assuming the veracity of the declarants’ denials of receiving the 

requisite notice, such facts would not prove the corporation failed to receive notice. 

Generally speaking, a corporation is deemed to have received notice when such notice is 

mailed to the corporation at its ordinary place of business. It need not be mailed to any 

specific corporate officer or employee. (Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Board of 

Equalization (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 149, 153-154 [“When the notice is mailed correctly 

directed to the corporation as such at its own address, the service is completed and 

whether it reaches the specific agent or division which must act on it is the risk of the 

addressee corporation and depends on its care”].) Accordingly, we conclude plaintiffs 

have failed on this record to rebut the presumption that the Franchise Tax Board’s official 

duty to mail to Noble Locks notice preliminary to suspension pursuant to section 21020 

“has been regularly performed.” (Evid. Code, § 664; § 23302; § 21020.) While plaintiffs 

may have produced evidence three Noble Locks representatives received no notice of 

forfeiture, they produced no evidence the corporation did not receive notice, much less 

that the requisite notice was never mailed. Such evidence does not, as the trial court 

found, create a disputed issue of material fact capable of defeating summary judgment. 

Accordingly, the trial court had a proper basis for finding its claims time-barred. (Sade 

Shoe Co., Inc. v. Oschin & Snyder, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1513 [a corporation’s 

revival is without prejudice to the limitations defense accruing during the forfeiture 

 

4 According to these declarations, Avganim was Noble Locks’ “World Wide Group 

Director;” Shimon Yair was one of its “principal[s], with signing authority; and Rodney 

Lewin was its designated agent for service of process. 
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period]; § 23305a [“Upon the issuance of the certificate by the Franchise Tax Board the 

taxpayer therein named shall become reinstated but the reinstatement shall be without 

prejudice to any action, defense or right which has accrued by reason of the original 

suspension or forfeiture”].)

Further, we decline plaintiffs’ request to excuse Noble Locks from compliance 

with sections 23301 and 23301.5 based on purported wrongdoing by Wells Fargo. 

Plaintiffs theorize that Noble Locks could not file mandatory tax returns or pay overdue 

taxes because Wells Fargo mishandled its accounts or otherwise tied up their corporate 

funds in the interpleader action. However, they present no actual evidence of 

wrongdoing, much less legal authority for the proposition that wrongdoing may provide a 

basis for excusing a corporation from otherwise mandatory tax laws. As such, they 

provide no legal basis for reversal. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 

826, 853 [plaintiff may not rely on speculation to defeat summary judgment].) Moreover, 

while plaintiffs urge this court to fashion an exception to the forfeiture rules similar to the 

recognized exception for delinquent corporate taxpayers that substantially comply with 

the State’s corporate revival statute, plaintiffs neither claim nor attempt to prove Noble 

Locks substantially complied in this case. (See Sade Shoe Co., Inc. v. Oschin & Snyder, 

supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1515 [“a corporation which has been suspended pursuant to 

sections 23301 and/or 23301.5 may nonetheless prosecute or defend an action prior to its 

official revivor provided there has been substantial compliance with the revival statute”].)

We thus decline their request for lack of legal and factual support. 

II. Summary Judgment Against OSSI.

Plaintiffs then argue without offering additional legal support or analysis that 

summary judgment against OSSI was error for all the same reasons summary judgment 

against Noble Locks was error. Specifically, as with Noble Locks, the trial court found 

OSSI’s claims were time-barred because the applicable one- and three-year statutes of 

limitations had run while its corporate powers under Texas law had been forfeited. Even 

assuming this argument was not waived based on plaintiffs’ failure to provide proper 

legal authority or analysis in their briefs on appeal (Provost v. Regents of University of 
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California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294), the undisputed law and facts nonetheless 

support the trial court’s ruling. 

Similar to California corporations, Texas corporations failing to pay taxes and file 

tax returns forfeit corporate powers, including the power to sue. (Texas Tax Code Ann., 

§§ 171.251, 171.252.) Further, under California law, a foreign corporation lacking the 

power to sue in its state of incorporation likewise lacks power to sue in California. (CM 

Record Corp. v. MCA Records, Inc. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 965, 969.) That is precisely 

what occurred here, and thereby allowed the expiration of OSSI’s claims – to wit, OSSI’s 

corporate powers were forfeited in October 2005 and were still forfeited as of January 

2011, a date after the limitations periods had ended (in 2007, for payment-tounauthorized-signatories claims and, in 2009, for depositing-checks-in-other-accounts 

claims). (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c); Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3118, subd. (g).) Thus, 

for all the reasons already explained, we conclude no basis exists for disturbing the trial 

court’s grant of summary judgment against OSSI. 

III. Summary Judgment Against Noble Security.

Finally, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by granting summary judgment 

rather than summary adjudication against Noble Security because certain of its claims 

survived the statute of limitations. As plaintiffs note, Noble Security did not forfeit its 

corporate powers like the other plaintiffs. As such, plaintiffs insist claims raised by 

Noble Security that accrued no later than 2006 and that have a three-year limitations 

period were not time-barred when the complaint became operative as to Noble Security 

upon its filing in May 2008.5

Wells Fargo disputes this contention. It reasons that the operative complaint does 

not include any claim by Noble Security subject to a three-year limitations period (i.e., 

those based on the bank’s alleged depositing of third-party checks intended for one or 

more plaintiffs into the accounts of third parties). Rather, Wells Fargo continues, the 

complaint only raises claims based on this theory on behalf of Noble Locks and “those 

 

5

Plaintiffs implicitly concede claims governed by the one-year statutory limitations 

period are time-barred. 
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Plaintiff corporations which did not have Wells Fargo accounts.” Undeniably, Noble 

Security did have a Wells Fargo account during the relevant time period. Moreover, 

Wells Fargo adds, the trial court expressly invited plaintiffs to address the issue of

whether Noble Security asserted other claims that would survive the statute of limitations 

by “fil[ing] an appropriate motion,” but plaintiffs admittedly did not do so. We agree 

with Wells Fargo that, on this record, the trial court’s ruling as to Noble Locks must 

stand.

The complaint, in paragraphs 7 through 10, makes several allegations relating to

Wells Fargo’s alleged permitting of unauthorized persons to act as signatories on 

plaintiffs’ accounts, including by “delet[ing] the names of the Plaintiffs’ agents who were 

proper signatories on the Plaintiffs’ accounts, and add[ing] the names of other 

unauthorized persons to act as signatories on Plaintiffs’ accounts.” (Italics added.)

The complaint, in paragraphs 11 through 14, then makes several allegations with 

respect to Wells Fargo’s alleged depositing of checks into accounts opened or owned by 

third parties with no right to plaintiffs’ corporate funds. However, unlike the allegations 

in paragraphs seven through ten, which refer to “plaintiffs” collectively, the allegations in 

paragraphs 11 through 14 mention only specific plaintiffs, namely Noble Locks and those 

plaintiffs without Wells Fargo accounts. Specifically, the complaint states: 

“Wells Fargo, through the actions of certain of the Individual Defendants, opened an 

account under the name of JR Marketing, LLC, dba Noble Locks Enterprises. When 

Wells Fargo received checks for deposit which were written to the corporate Plaintiff, 

Noble Locks Enterprises, Inc., instead of depositing these checks into the proper account 

owned by the Plaintiff corporation, Wells Fargo deposited them into the JR Marketing 

LLC account, thereby converting Noble Locks Enterprises, Inc.’s checks. (Italics added.)

“Wells Fargo and the Individual Defendants also received checks made payable to those 

Plaintiff corporations which did not have Wells Fargo accounts. Defendants deposited 

these checks into accounts owned by other persons or entities who had no right to receive 

those funds, thereby converting Plaintiffs’ checks.” (Italics added.)
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Finally, in the later sections of the complaint in which specific causes of action are 

raised (including conversion, interference with economic advantage and negligence), the 

complaint generally states as to each cause that it “incorporate[s] each of the foregoing 

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.” The complaint does not, however, set forth any 

additional facts or allegations purporting to add Noble Security as a party claiming to 

have been injured by Wells Fargo’s alleged depositing of checks into accounts opened or 

owned by third parties with no right to plaintiffs’ corporate funds. 

Plaintiffs direct us specifically to paragraphs 36 and 37, which provide in relevant 

part: “Defendants . . . failed to deposit checks payable to Plaintiffs into Plaintiffs’ 

accounts. In doing so, Defendants disrupted Plaintiffs’ economic relations with their 

customers.” However, we decline to read this sentence in isolation from the rest of the 

complaint, particularly from those paragraphs incorporated by reference that, as we just 

explained (pp. 10-11, ante), limit claims arising from Wells Fargo’s alleged depositing of 

checks in the wrong accounts to plaintiffs other than Noble Security. (Zhang v. Superior

Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370 [courts must give the complaint “a reasonable 

interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context”].) As such, we agree 

with Wells Fargo summary judgment, not summary adjudication, against Noble Security

was proper because the operative complaint failed to raise any claims against the bank

based on its depositing of checks into third parties’ accounts. (Turner v. State of 

California (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 883, 891 [“The pleadings delimit the issues to be 

considered on a motion for summary judgment”]; Government Employees Ins. Co. v. 

Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98-99, fn. 4 [“defendant moving for summary 

judgment need address only the issues raised by the complaint; the plaintiff cannot bring 

up new, unpleaded issues in his or her opposing papers”].)

Accordingly, we stand by our conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to prove error 

in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against each of the three plaintiffs – Noble 

Locks, Noble Security and OSSI – based on the running of the statutes of limitations. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________

Jenkins, J.

We concur:

_________________________

McGuiness, P. J.

_________________________

Pollak, J.