IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

§ No. 354, 2023

§

IN RE COVID-RELATED § Courts Below: Court of 

RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS § Chancery of the State of Delaware

SERVICES § C.A. No. 2021-1036

§

§ Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware

§ C.A. No. N23C-01-123

Submitted: May 22, 2024

Decided: August 1, 2024

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and 

GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.

Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery and the Superior Court of the State of 

Delaware. AFFIRMED.

Stephen J. Neuberger, Esquire (argued), Thomas S. Neuberger, Esquire, THE 

NEUBERGER FIRM, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Thomas C. Crumplar, Esquire,

JACOBS & CRUMPLAR, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellants Pastor Alan 

Hines and Reverend David W. Landow.

Zi-Xiang Shen, Esquire, Esquire, Zachary S. Stirparo, Esquire (argued), STATE OF 

DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee, 

Governor John Carney.

LEGROW, Justice:
In the early days of a global pandemic, the Governor of Delaware utilized his 

powers under the State’s emergency management act to impose restrictions on 

individuals and businesses with the intent of protecting public health and slowing 

the spread of the virus. Some of those restrictions, although neutrally focused, had 

the effect of limiting how people observed and practiced their religions, while other 

restrictions were specifically focused on the activities of “houses of worship.” The 

restrictions on religious worship became the subject of litigation and are the focus 

of this appeal.

All the challenged restrictions were lifted by June 2020. More than 18 months 

later, the appellants filed suit in the Court of Chancery, seeking injunctive relief 

against restrictions that no longer were in effect. The Court of Chancery dismissed 

that action because it concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 

dispute. The appellants then transferred their action to the Superior Court, seeking 

declaratory judgment and damages regarding the past restrictions on their 

constitutional religious rights. The Superior Court also dismissed that action, 

concluding that the appellants’ claims for declaratory relief were not justiciable and 

that the Governor was immune from suit for the damages claims. 

The appellants have challenged the dismissal of their claims by both courts. 

The appellants—two religious leaders—advance passionate arguments regarding the 

essential nature of religious freedom in this State and this country. We agree that 
2

freedom of religion is an essential tenet of our democracy and that restrictions on 

religious worship must be viewed with a great deal of skepticism. On the other hand, 

the judiciary is not the forum to debate and resolve hypothetical questions regarding 

the constitutionality of restrictions that were lifted long before any legal action was 

filed. Moreover, public officials who act under emergent conditions and make 

careful, discretionary decisions based on the best information available are immune 

from personal liability if those actions are later determined to be contrary to the law. 

For those reasons, we agree with our trial courts that the appellants’ claims could not 

proceed. We therefore affirm the decisions challenged on appeal.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

A. COVID-19 Pandemic 

In January 2020, public health officials in China identified a novel 

coronavirus that later came to be known as the SARS CoV-2 virus (“COVID-19”).2 

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the spread of COVID19 a global pandemic.3

 In the days and weeks that followed, the COVID-19 virus 

1 Unless otherwise noted, the recited facts are taken from the Superior Court’s August 28, 2023, 

Opinion and the Court of Chancery’s November 21, 2022, Opinion. See In re COVID-Related 

Restrictions on Religious Services, 302 A.3d 464 (Del. Super. 2023) (hereinafter “Superior Court 

Opinion at __.”); In re COVID-Related Restrictions on Religious Services, 285 A.3d 1205 (Del. 

Ch. 2022) (hereinafter “Chancery Opinion at __.”). 

2 Superior Court Opinion at 472.

3 Chancery Opinion at 1211; Superior Court Opinion at 472–73.
3

began spreading rapidly across the United States.4 Federal, state, and local 

authorities enacted various mandates and guidelines in an attempt to address the 

ensuing public health crisis. 

1. The State of Emergency

On March 13, 2020, Governor John C. Carney Jr. (the “Governor”) issued a 

“Declaration of a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware Due to a Public 

Health Threat” (the “Emergency Declaration”).5 The Emergency Declaration stated 

that it would remain in effect “until terminated as provided under state law.”6 The 

Emergency Declaration recommended social distancing and the cancellation of 

“non-essential mass gatherings” of one hundred people or more, and addressed the

operation of schools and senior care facilities, but did not otherwise prescribe 

specific rules for businesses or gatherings of fewer than one hundred people.

7 The 

Governor issued the Emergency Declaration in accordance with powers granted to 

him under Title 20, Chapter 31 of the Delaware Code (the “Emergency Management 

Act”).

8

4 Superior Court Opinion at 472.

5 App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B1–4.

6

Id. at B1.

7

Id. at B1–4.

8

Id. at B1.
4

2. The Governor’s Authority Under the Emergency Management Act

The Emergency Management Act provides that the Governor is “responsible 

for addressing the dangers to life, health, environment, property or public peace 

within the State presented by emergencies or disasters . . . .”9 The Emergency 

Management Act further provides that “the Governor may issue, amend and rescind 

all necessary executive orders, emergency orders, proclamations and regulations, 

which shall have the force and effect of law.”10 Section 3115(c) of the Emergency 

Management Act grants the Governor the power to proclaim a state of emergency. 

It provides:

In addition to the powers conferred upon the Governor by this chapter, 

a state of emergency may be proclaimed by emergency order of the 

Governor upon a finding that an emergency or disaster has occurred or 

that such occurrence or threat of that occurrence is imminent. The state 

of emergency shall continue until the Governor finds that the threat or 

danger has passed or the emergency or disaster has been dealt with to 

the extent that conditions necessitating a state of emergency no longer 

exist and terminates the state of emergency by subsequent order. No 

state of emergency can continue for more than 30 days without being 

renewed by the Governor.11

9

20 Del. C. § 3115(a).

10 20 Del. C. § 3115(b).

11 20 Del. C. § 3115(c).
5

Additionally, the Emergency Management Act permits the Governor to “[t]ake such 

other actions as the Governor reasonably believes necessary to help maintain life, 

health, property, or public peace.”12 

B. The Pre-May 15th Orders and Actions

As the COVID-19 pandemic worsened, and in conjunction with updates to 

guidance from public health authorities, the Governor issued a series of 

modifications to the Emergency Declaration.13 

1. The Fourth Modification

On March 22, 2020, the Governor issued the “Fourth Modification of the 

Declaration of a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware Due to a Public Health 

Threat” (the “Fourth Modification”).14 The Fourth Modification categorized certain 

“businesses, establishments, and enterprises . . . as ‘Essential Businesses’ and ‘NonEssential Businesses.’”15

 Essential Businesses could remain open; Non-Essential 

Businesses had to close their physical locations.16

Under the Fourth Modification, “[h]ouses of worship and other place[s] of 

religious expression or fellowship” (collectively, “Houses of Workship”) were 

12 20 Del. C. § 3116(b)(13).

13 This Opinion does not include every modification to the Emergency Declaration but only those 

pertinent to this appeal.

14 App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A210–27.

15 Id.

16 Id. at A226–27.
6

deemed Essential Businesses and could remain open.17 The Fourth Modification 

went on to state that Houses of Worship were “subject to the requirements of existing 

emergency orders, which requirements are not affected by this Order.”18 Included 

in “existing emergency orders” was the “Second Modification of the Declaration of 

a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware Due to a Public Health Threat” (the 

“Second Modification”).19 The Second Modification mandated that “organizers and 

sponsors of public gatherings of 50 or more people shall cancel the gatherings 

immediately and not reschedule them until after May 15, 2020, or the public health 

threat of COVID-19 has been eliminated.”20

The Fourth Modification included a list of mandates and restrictions, titled 

“Responsibilities of Essential Businesses,” which included adherence to the 

guidance set forth on flexible sick-leave policies, social distancing, cleaning, and 

sanitizing.21 The Fourth Modification stated that it had “the force and effect of law,” 

and that “[a]ny failure to comply with [its] provisions . . . constitutes a criminal 

offense.”22

17 Id. at A225.

18 Id. at A225.

19 App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B5–9.

20 Id. at B6.

21 App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A213. 

22 Id. at A227.
7

2. The Ninth Modification

On April 1, 2020, the Governor issued the “Ninth Modification of the 

Declaration of a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware Due to a Public Health 

Threat” (the “Ninth Modification”).23 The Ninth Modification reduced the number 

of people permitted to gather from fifty to ten “until after May 15, 2020 or the public 

health threat of COVID-19 has been eliminated.”24 The Ninth Modification 

contained an exception for “gatherings of employees engaged in work at [E]ssential 

[B]usinesses,” which were “not prohibited by th[e] Ninth Modification . . . but 

remain subject to requirements for hand hygiene and social distancing.”25

The Ninth Modification expanded the Responsibilities of Essential 

Businesses.26 The additional mandates included: allowing no more than 20% of 

stated fire occupancy requirements in the building at one time and no more than 10% 

during exclusive hours for high-risk populations; clearly marking six-foot spacing 

in checkout lines and in high-traffic areas of stores; discontinuing self-serve foods 

and product sampling; and designating staff to count the number of customers in the 

store and enforce social distancing and guidelines set by the CDC.27

23 Id. at A234–40.

24 Id. at A237.

25 Id.

26 Id. at A238.

27 Id.
8

3. The Tenth Modification

On April 6, 2020, the Governor issued the “Tenth Modification of the 

Declaration of a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware Due to a Public Health 

Threat” (the “Tenth Modification”).28 The Tenth Modification modified language 

in the Fourth Modification regarding Houses of Worship.29 Houses of Worship were 

now ordered to “comply with all social distancing requirements set forth in the 

COVID-19 State of Emergency declaration and all modifications, including 

attendance of no more than 10 people for in-person services under any 

circumstances” (the “Ten-Person Restriction”).30 The Tenth Modification “strongly 

encouraged [Houses of Worship] to transition any in-person services to remote 

services broadcast by telephone or video.”31

Of the 237 categories of Essential Businesses identified by the State of 

Delaware, only Houses of Worship were subject to the Ten-Person Restriction.32 

The categories of “Social Advocacy Organizations” and “Business, Professional, 

Labor, Political, and Similar Organizations” were designated as Essential Businesses 

in the same industry subsector as religious groups, but were not required to comply 

28 Id. at A242–54.

29 Id. at A247.

30 Id.

31 Id.

32 Id. at A242–54.
9

with the Ten-Person Restriction.33 Other organizations deemed Essential Businesses 

were only subject to the 20% restriction34 within the same industry subsector.35

The only other category of Essential Businesses that faced a special limitation 

comparable to Houses of Worship were “Restaurants and Other Eating Places.”36 

These businesses were only permitted to provide takeout and delivery.37

4. Guidance on Worship Services

On April 7, 2020, a day after the Governor issued the Tenth Modification, the 

Delaware Division of Public Health issued “Guidance on Worship Services” (the 

“April Worship Guidance”).38 The April Worship Guidance imposed additional 

mandates and restrictions on Houses of Worship. Some of these additional 

restrictions included: whenever possible, conducting activities from home through 

remote audio or video services; limited in-person services with no physical 

interaction with “clergy, staff, or other participants” including, but not limited to, 

“collecting donations by basket or plate”; adherence to social distancing; four-hour 

33 Id. at A232.

34 Under the 20% restriction, Essential Businesses could allow no more than 20% of the permitted 

fire occupancy of their premises at any one time, and during exclusive hours for high-risk 

populations (including seniors) could allow no more than 10% of the permitted fire occupancy of 

their premises at any one time. 

35 Chancery Opinion at 1214–15.

36 App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A231.

37 Id.

38 Id. at A206–08.
10

gaps between in-person services; additional cleaning and disinfection guidance; and 

a series of rules relating to drive-in services.39

C. May 15 Press Conference 

“On May 15, 2020, the Governor held a press conference during which he 

addressed concerns about the ‘need for churches to be reopened.’”40 The Governor’s 

full remarks were as follows:

One of the things we need to make clear is that we never as an essential 

function, as a constitutional right, we never did close churches and 

places of worship in the first place, we just limited public gatherings to 

ten or fewer, which effectively for many of those places of worship 

meant that there wasn’t a way for them [to] stay open.41

With respect to the Governor’s remarks at the May 15 press conference, the 

Court of Chancery stated that: 

The Governor did not close Houses of Worship, as he closed NonEssential Businesses. Nevertheless, because the Governor made 

Houses of Worship subject to the Ten-Person Requirement, many of 

them as a practical matter could not open. For those Houses of Worship, 

the Ten-Person Requirement operated as a de facto prohibition on 

opening.42

39 Id.

40 Chancery Opinion at 1215–16.

41 Id. at 1216.

42 Id.
11

D. The Eighteenth Modification and Revised Guidance on Worship Services

On May 18, 2020, the Governor issued the “Eighteenth Modification of the 

Declaration of a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware Due to a Public Health 

Threat” (the “Eighteenth Modification”).43 The Eighteenth Modification stated that 

“in-person worship can be safely resumed with appropriate precautions to protect 

health of worshipers and the public.”44 Although the Eighteenth Modification 

permitted in-person worship to resume, it provided that Houses of Worship could 

either hold: (1) “in-person services and gatherings of 10 or fewer people”; or (2) “inperson services and gatherings” of up to 30% capacity only if all attendees observed 

CDC social-distancing guidelines.45

On the same day, the Division of Public Health issued revised guidance for 

communities of worship (the “May Worship Guidance”).46 The May Worship 

Guidance included four pages of restrictions and requirements on Houses of 

Worship. These restrictions included the prohibition of: communion, baptism, 

worship over 60 minutes, preachers without masks, and services on six out of seven 

days each week.47 These requirements included: the posting of signage regarding 

43 App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A309–14.

44 Id. at A313.

45 Id. at A314.

46 Id. at A316–19.

47 Id.
12

who may enter, masking requirements, and social distancing requirements; 

requirements on cleaning and sanitization; and recommendations regarding the 

preparation and distribution of materials.48 Although the Governor banned touching 

for baptisms, he issued no such restrictions on Jewish circumcisions.49

E. The Bullock Action, Nineteenth Modification, Phase 1 Reopening Plan, 

and Additional Guidance on Worship Services

On May 19, 2020, Reverend Dr. Christopher Bullock filed a lawsuit against 

the Governor in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware 

(respectively, the “Bullock Action” and the “District Court”).50 Bullock asserted 

that the Emergency Declaration, April Worship Guidance, and May Worship 

Guidance violated his rights under the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal 

Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.51 Bullock sought injunctive 

relief, including a temporary restraining order (“TRO”).52

On May 22, 2020, the Governor issued the “Nineteenth Modification of the 

Declaration of a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware Due to a Public Health 

Threat” (the “Nineteenth Modification”).53 Effective June 1, 2020, the Nineteenth 

48 Id.

49 See id.

50 App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B10–40.

51 Id.

52 Id. at B37.

53 App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A325–40.
13

Modification eliminated the “Essential” versus “Non-Essential” categorization of 

businesses and replaced it with industry-specific guidance set forth by the Governor 

in the Delaware Phase 1 Reopening Plan.54 Under the Phase 1 Reopening Plan, 

Houses of Worship could operate at 30% of their permitted fire occupancy.55 On the 

same day, the Division of Public Health issued updated Worship Guidance (the 

“Reopening Worship Guidance”).56 Under the Reopening Worship Guidance, inperson youth events, education, and support groups were permitted but limited to ten 

persons per group.57 The Reopening Worship Guidance eliminated the rule 

restricting religious services to less than one hour, expanded the circumstances in 

which an individual did not need to wear a face covering, modified the signage 

requirements, and continued to regulate the methods for preparing and distributing 

consecrated or blessed food or drink.58 Under the Reopening Worship Guidance it 

remained true that an officiant could not physically hold a candidate for baptism.”59

54 Id.; App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B60–87.

55 App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B82.

56 App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A342–46.

57 Id.

58 Id.

59 Id.
14

On May 28, 2020, the District Court heard oral argument and denied Bullock’s 

motion for a TRO.

60

 The District Court held that the relief Bullock requested was 

more restrictive to Houses of Worship than the current guidance under the 

Reopening Worship Guidance and concluded that Bullock had not established a 

threat of “irreparable harm” required to grant a TRO.61 The United States Court of 

Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the TRO.62

F. The Twentieth and Twenty-First Modifications

On May 31, 2020, the Governor issued the “Twentieth Modification of the 

Declaration of a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware Due to a Public Health 

Threat” (the “Twentieth Modification”).63 The Twentieth Modification eliminated 

the restrictions applicable to Houses of Worship set forth in the Eighteenth 

Modification and provided that the 30% capacity limit remained in effect for Houses 

of Worship and other Essential Businesses.64

On June 14, 2020, the Governor issued the “Twenty-First Modification of the 

Declaration of a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware Due to a Public Health 

60 Id. at A37–143; Bullock v. Carney, 463 F. Supp. 3d 519, 525 (D. Del. 2020), aff’d, 806 F. App’x 

157 (3d Cir. 2020), and aff’d, 2020 WL 7038527 (3d Cir. June 4, 2020).

61 App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A342–346; Bullock, 463 F. Supp. 3d at 525.

62 Bullock v. Carney, 806 Fed. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2020), amended and superseded by Bullock v. 

Carney, 2020 WL 7038527 (3d Cir. June 4, 2020).

63 App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B41–56.

64 Id.
15

Threat” (the “Twenty-First Modification”).65 The Twenty-First Modification 

increased the capacity limit for Essential Businesses, including Houses of Worship, 

to 60%.

66

G. The Bullock Settlement 

On November 10, 2020, the parties to the Bullock Action—Bullock and the 

State—reached a settlement after court-ordered mediation (the “Settlement 

Agreement”).

67

 Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Governor agreed 

“not to impose restrictions that specifically target [H]ouses of [W]orship,”

68

including but not limited to restricting gatherings in Houses of Worship to ten 

persons.69 The Governor “reserve[d] the right to impose or maintain neutral rules of 

general applicability” and agreed to pay $157,200 “for the benefit of” Reverend 

Bullock and his counsel.70 The parties stipulated that the Settlement Agreement did 

not constitute “an admission or acknowledgement of guilt, wrongdoing, liability, or 

financial responsibility whatsoever on the part of the Governor, including any former 

or present employees or agents of the Governor.”71

65 Id. at B88–106.

66 Id.

67 Chancery Opinion at 1221; Superior Court Opinion at 476–77.

68 App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A562.

69 Superior Court Opinion at 476–77.

70 Chancery Opinion at 1221–22; App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A483.

71 Chancery Opinion at 1222. 
16

H. State of Emergency Lifted 

On July 13, 2021, the Governor ended the State of Emergency and terminated 

all restrictions imposed by the Emergency Declaration, including all its 

modifications.72

I. The Court of Chancery Action 

On December 1, 2021, Pastor Alan Hines of the Townsend Free Will Baptist 

Church and Reverend David W. Landow of Emmanuel Orthodox Presbyterian 

Church filed separate complaints in the Court of Chancery.73 The Court of Chancery 

consolidated the actions, and Hines and Landow (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or 

“Appellants”) filed a consolidated amended complaint challenging restrictions that 

the Governor imposed on Houses of Worship during the early days of the COVID19 pandemic (the “Challenged Restrictions”).

74

 

As the Court of Chancery accurately recounted, “[t]he Challenged 

Restrictions evolved over time. Initially, they were quite strict, reflecting the 

profound threat that COVID-19 posed in early 2020. As the state of scientific 

knowledge progressed, and particularly after the arrival of vaccines, the Governor 

72 Id.; Superior Court Opinion at 477.

73 Chancery Opinion at 1222; Superior Court Opinion at 477; App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at 

A1–4.

74 Chancery Opinion at 1222; App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A1–4; App. to Appellee’s 

Answering Br. at B167–282.
17

relaxed the Challenged Restrictions.”

75

 Although all the Challenged Restrictions 

had been lifted entirely by the time Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint, Plaintiffs 

sought broad equitable relief and declaratory judgments regarding the Challenged 

Restrictions. Specifically, in the consolidated amended complaint Plaintiffs sought 

the following remedies: (1) a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of 

the Challenged Restrictions, (2) a permanent injunction against the Governor and 

his successors to prevent them from enacting similar restrictions in the future, and 

(3) nominal and compensatory damages.76 

On November 21, 2022, the Court of Chancery dismissed Plaintiffs’ 

consolidated complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.77 Significant to the 

court’s analysis was the fact that all the Challenged Restrictions had been lifted by 

June 2, 2020, more than a year before Plaintiffs initiated the Chancery actions.78 The 

Court of Chancery found that “the plaintiffs cannot meet the operative standard” of 

demonstrating “a reasonable apprehension that the Governor would engage in 

conduct that would warrant a permanent injunction.”

79

75 Chancery Opinion at 1209.

76 App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B167–282.

77 Chancery Opinion at 1235.

78 App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B167–282.

79 Chancery Opinion at 1233, 1235.
18

J. Superior Court Action 

On January 24, 2023, Plaintiffs transferred their action to the Superior Court 

pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902 and filed the operative complaint.80 Plaintiffs alleged 

violations of their constitutional rights under: Article I, Section 1 of the Delaware 

Constitution; the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States 

Constitution; the Free Speech, Free Exercise, Free Assembly, and Free Association 

Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; the Establishment 

Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; and the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.81 

Plaintiffs requested nominal and compensatory damages and a declaratory 

judgment.82

On April 14, 2023, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims in their 

entirety.

83

 The Superior Court granted those motions.

84

 The court dismissed the 

claims for nominal and compensatory damages under the U.S. and Delaware 

Constitutions on the basis of the qualified immunity doctrine and the State Tort 

Claims Act, respectively.85 The Superior Court dismissed the declaratory judgment 

80 Superior Court Opinion at 477; App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at A20–29.

81 Superior Court Opinion at 477.

82 Id. at 478.

83 Id.

84 Id. at 498.

85 Id.
19

claims on the basis that they were not justiciable because Plaintiffs failed to establish 

(i) the existence of a current case or controversy; and (ii) that declaratory relief could

redress the harm they allegedly suffered.

86

On appeal, Appellants challenge the holdings of the Court of Chancery and 

the Superior Court. Appellants argue that: (i) there is no adequate remedy at law for 

their irreparable injuries and the Court of Chancery therefore erred in concluding 

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (ii) the Governor does not have discretion 

to exercise a power expressly forbidden to him by the Delaware Constitution and the 

Superior Court’s holdings with respect to justiciability accordingly should be 

reversed; and (ii) the Governor does not have qualified immunity and therefore the 

Superior Court’s holdings on the State Tort Claims Act and qualified immunity 

constituted reversible error.

86 Id.
20

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review questions of law de novo, including issues relating to subject 

matter jurisdiction,87 justiciability,88 standing,89 and constitutional questions.

90

 

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Court of Chancery correctly dismissed Appellants’ claim for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction.

On November 21, 2022, the Court of Chancery dismissed Appellants’

consolidated complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.91 In the Chancery 

proceedings, Appellants argued that:

they have a reasonable apprehension that the Governor will re-impose 

restrictions on worship comparable to the Challenged Restrictions 

because (1) the COVID-19 pandemic is not over, (2) the Governor 

continues to maintain that he never violated the plaintiffs’ 

constitutional rights by imposing the Challenged Restrictions, (3) the 

Governor has not issued a sworn statement averring that he will not 

impose similar policies affecting religious worship in the future, and 

(4) there is no mechanism to prevent the Governor from reimplementing similar restrictions.92

87 Imbragulio v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 223 A.3d 875, 878 (Del. 2019) (citing Linn v. 

Delaware Child Support Enf't, 736 A.2d 954, 959 (Del. 1999)).

88 Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Dr Pepper Bottling Co. of Texas, 962 A.2d 205, 208 (Del. 

2008); see Candlewood Timber Group, LLC v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 997 (Del.

2004) (subject matter jurisdiction reviewed de novo); see also Roark & Hardee LP v. City of 

Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 542 (5th Cir. 2008) (all justiciability issues are reviewed de novo).

89 Albence v. Higgin, 295 A.3d 1065, 1085 (Del. 2022); Rosenbloom v. Esso Virgin Islands, Inc., 

776 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2000).

90 City of Wilm. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 154 A.3d 1124, 1127 (Del. 2017); Clark v. Clark, 47 A.3d 

513, 517 (Del. 2012).

91 Chancery Opinion at 1235.

92 Id. at 1233–34.
21

The Court of Chancery held that “[v]iewed individually or collectively, these 

concerns are not sufficient to support equitable jurisdiction.”93 The court went on to 

reason that “[a]lthough it is true that the virus continues to circulate and mutate, the 

possibility of a future surge, much less one that will necessitate emergency measures 

on par with what the world experienced in the first half of 2020, is speculative at 

best.”

94

 The Court of Chancery found that “the plaintiffs cannot meet the operative 

standard” of demonstrating “a reasonable apprehension that the Governor would 

engage in conduct that would warrant a permanent injunction.”

95

 

Appellants raise a wide-ranging series of alleged errors on appeal. They

contend that the Court of Chancery erred in finding that there is an adequate remedy 

at law for the irreparable injuries they suffered.96 They argue that the threat of

“future irreparable injury [] exists because of the amount of time it will take to seek 

emergency injunctive relief the next time the Governor and his successors shut down 

and otherwise interfere with religious worship in violation of Article I, § 1.”

97

 

Appellants argue that “the more time it takes, the greater the irreparable injury to the 

93 Id. at 1234.

94 Id.

95 Id. at 1233, 1235.

96 Appellants’ Opening Br. at 55.

97 Id. at 56.
22

pastor’s religious worship and other religious constitutional rights.”98 Further, 

Appellants contend that the Court of Chancery’s ruling that there was no reasonable 

apprehension of the Governor reimposing his policies in the future sufficient to 

establish equity jurisdiction, “was the functional equivalent of a merits ruling on the 

disputed defense motion that the case was moot, but without any consideration of 

the fully briefed legal questions of whether this Court’s exceptions to the mootness 

doctrine were met, and the merits test also.”99 Finally, Appellants argue that the 

Bullock settlement agreement did not address the protection of Article I, § 1 or the 

Establishment Clause but only the protections of the Free Exercise Clause.100 

The Governor (“Appellee”) responds that the Court of Chancery correctly 

held that Appellants had an adequate remedy at law.101 Appellee argues that 

Appellants “ignore the Court of Chancery’s conclusion that their failure to seek a 

preliminary injunction to prevent the Governor from acting in 2022 evidences that 

they could wait until a final adjudication by a court of law in the form of declaratory 

98 Id. at 58.

99 Id. at 59.

100 Id. at 60. Appellants contend that they are not adequately protected by the Bullock Settlement 

because “we have no consent decree, no binding judicial ruling on the merits, no action by the 

legislature cancelling his authority, no sworn statement denying in a future emergency the right to 

affect Sunday worship, and no settlement agreement granting third party rights to enforcement.” 

Id. 

101 Appellee’s Answering Br. at 43–49.
23

judgment.”102 Further, Appellee points out that the Bullock action directly belies the 

notion that it will take a church pastor a lengthy amount of time to file an action. 

Appellee also disputes Appellants’ contention that the Governor treated the Court of 

Chancery’s ruling as resolving the question of mootness. Instead, Appellee asserts

that “[t]he Governor argued—and the Superior Court agreed—that the mootness 

doctrine is inapplicable because the controversy was never ripe to begin with.”103

The first issue that this Court must address on appeal is whether the Court of 

Chancery erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The Court of Chancery is a court of limited jurisdiction and 

[a]s Delaware’s Constitutional court of equity, the Court of Chancery 

can acquire subject matter jurisdiction over a cause in only three ways, 

namely, if: (1) one or more of the plaintiff’s claims for relief is equitable 

in character, (2) the plaintiff requests relief that is equitable in nature, 

or (3) subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by statute.104

In the present case, Appellants “ground the existence of equitable jurisdiction on 

their request for a permanent injunction.”105 

As this Court stated in North River Insurance Company v. Mine Safety 

Appliances Company, “[t]o succeed in a request for a permanent injunction, a party 

must show (i) actual success on the merits; (ii) that it would suffer irreparable harm 

102 Id. at 45.

103 Id. at 47.

104 Candlewood Timber, 859 A.2d at 997 (internal citations omitted).

105 Chancery Opinion at 1224.
24

if the injunction is not granted; and (iii) that the balance of the equities favors it.”106 

Subsumed within the second element is the statutory command that the Court of 

Chancery lacks jurisdiction to hear a matter where there is a sufficient remedy at law

for the alleged harm.

107

On July 13, 2021, the Governor ended the State of Emergency and terminated 

all restrictions imposed by the Emergency Declaration, including all its 

modifications.108 Appellants filed their Court of Chancery complaints on December 

1, 2021.109 By the time the complaints were filed, the challenged conduct had 

ceased. Because the Governor had already rescinded the Challenged Restrictions at 

the time the Court of Chancery issued its decision, the permanent injunctive relief 

sought was forward looking. “A permanent injunction against future conduct is not 

warranted simply because a court has found past conduct illegal.”110 

106 105 A.3d 369, 379 n.47 (Del. 2014) (citing Christiana Town Ctr., LLC v. New Castle

County, 2003 WL 21314499, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2003), aff’d, 841 A.2d 307 (Del. 2004) 

(TABLE)).

107 10 Del. C. § 342 (“The Court of Chancery shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter 

wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other court or 

jurisdiction of this State.”).

108 Chancery Opinion at 1222; Superior Court Opinion at 477.

109 Chancery Opinion at 1222; Superior Court Opinion at 477; App. to Appellee’s Opening Br. at 

A1–4.

110 Young v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 2271390, at *53 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2017); see 

Organovo Hldgs., Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 114–15 (Del. Ch. 2017) (“An injunction against 

future wrongdoing is not generally available.” (citations omitted)).
25

“For forward-looking relief to be warranted the plaintiff must establish a 

reasonable apprehension of a future wrong.”111 That does not mean that a litigant 

may not seek any legal redress for a past wrong. But the standard to obtain injunctive 

relief is higher; to prohibit future action through an injunction, a litigant must show 

a reasonable apprehension of future wrong in order to establish irreparable harm, 

which is a threshold for injunctive relief, and thus for subject matter jurisdiction in 

the Court of Chancery. 

Plaintiffs could not demonstrate reasonable apprehension of future conduct. 

As the Court of Chancery noted below, “[a]lthough it is true that the virus continues 

to circulate and mutate, the possibility of a future surge, much less one that will 

necessitate emergency measures on par with what the world experienced in the first 

half of 2020, is speculative at best.”

112

 Appellants do not confront the speculative 

nature of the future threat they allege, and instead invoke a generalized refrain that 

any restriction on their religious freedom causes irreparable harm. This argument, 

such that it is, does not address the Court of Chancery’s analysis or carry Appellants’

burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The importance of Appellants’ 

constitutional rights is not disputed, but it also is not dispositive. The fact remains 

that, by the time Appellants filed suit, the Challenged Restrictions had been lifted, 

111 Organovo Hldgs., 162 A.3d at 114–15 (citations omitted).

112 Chancery Opinion at 1234.
26

the Governor had entered into a binding agreement not to impose future restrictions 

targeting Houses of Worship, and the apprehension of a future pandemic and 

conditions like those of the early days of the emergency was hypothetical and 

speculative. This Court “decline[s] to render an advisory opinion on a hypothetical 

scenario.”113

Our ruling does not mean that the Governor is free to impose similar 

restrictions in the future. Rather, we conclude that the Court of Chancery did not err 

in concluding that Appellants failed to show a reasonable apprehension of future 

conduct from the Governor that would warrant invoking the jurisdiction of our court 

of equity.114

B. The Superior Court correctly held that Appellants’ declaratory 

judgment claim was not justiciable.

Appellants next challenge the Superior Court’s conclusion that the declaratory 

judgment claims were not justiciable. “In order to adjudicate a matter, a court must 

have a justiciable controversy before it.”115 Justiciability describes “whether a case 

113 Facer v. Carney, 277 A.3d 937, 2022 WL 1561444 (Del. 2022) (TABLE), reargument denied

(June 1, 2022).

114 The Court of Chancery dismissed the action with leave to transfer under 10 Del. C. § 1902. 

The Governor’s conduct did not moot the action, rather it eliminated the equitable hook needed to 

sustain the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. 

115 Emps. Ins. Co. of Wausau v. First State Orthopaedics, P.A., 312 A.3d 597, 606–07 (Del. 2024) 

(citing Crescent/Mach 1 Partners, L.P. v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Texas, 962 A.2d 205, 208 

(Del. 2008) (quoting Warren v. Moore, 1994 WL 374333, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 6, 1994))).
27

is properly suited for resolution by” a court.116 The four aspects of justiciability are

standing, mootness, ripeness, and political question.117 “Although we refer to the 

federal courts’ interpretation of Article III standing, Delaware courts are not bound 

by the federal rules of justiciability.”118

The Superior Court held that Appellants’ request for a declaratory judgment 

was not justiciable for two independent reasons: the complaint failed to establish the 

existence of a case or controversy, and the plaintiffs failed to establish standing.119 

Appellants waived any claim of error as to the Superior Court’s case-or-controversy 

analysis by failing to meaningfully challenge it on appeal. As to standing, we 

116 Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684, 691 (2019).

117 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“The doctrines of mootness, 

ripeness, and political question all originate in Article III's ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language, no 

less than standing does.”). See Bankruptcy Litigation § 1:2 (“Issues of justiciability can arise, for 

example, in instances where a matter is not ripe, where an advisory opinion is sought, where a 

matter is moot, where a party lacks standing, and where the parties in the dispute do not hold 

adverse interests.”); 13B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 3531.12 (3d ed.) (“Although discrete names have been given to the several nominate 

categories of justiciability, they are tied closely together. Standing generates the most excitement, 

because it focuses directly on the question whether a particular interest or injury is adequate to 

invoke the protection of judicial decision. Ripeness and mootness easily could be seen as the time 

dimensions of standing. Each assumes that an asserted injury would be adequate; ripeness then 

asks whether an injury that has not yet happened is sufficiently likely to happen, and mootness 

asks whether an injury that has happened is too far beyond a useful remedy. Political-question 

analysis also is affected by the extent of individual injury.”).

118 Albence v. Higgin, 295 A.3d 1065, 1086 (Del. 2022) (citing ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 

605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state 

courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy 

or other federal rules of justiciability[.]”)).

119 Superior Court Opinion at 492.
28

conclude that the Superior Court correctly held that the harm alleged in the complaint

was not redressable through entry of a declaratory judgment.

1. Case or Controversy

Before a court may adjudicate a dispute and determine whether relief—

including declaratory relief—is warranted, it must have a justiciable controversy 

before it.

120

 The judiciary’s power to issue a declaratory judgment “is limited by the 

well-settled principle that a declaratory judgment must ‘address an actual 

controversy between parties with affected rights.’”121 In Rollins Int’l v. Int’l 

Hydronics Corp., we adopted a four-part test to determine whether a case or 

controversy exists:

(1) It must be a controversy involving the rights or other legal relations 

of the party seeking declaratory relief; (2) it must be a controversy in 

which the claim of right or other legal interest is asserted against one 

who has an interest in contesting the claim; (3) the controversy must be 

between parties whose interests are real and adverse; [and] (4) the issue 

involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination.122

The Superior Court applied that test and held that “Plaintiffs have failed to establish 

an actual case or controversy[.]”123

120 Id. (citing Crescent/Mach I Partners, 962 A.2d at 208) (quoting Warren, 1994 WL 374333, at 

*2)).

121 Gower v. Trux, Inc., 2022 WL 534204, at *12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2022) (quoting Lynch v. 

Gonzalez, 2020 WL 5648567, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 2020)).

122 Rollins Int’l v. Int’l Hydronics Corp., 303 A.2d 660, 662–63 (Del. 1973).

123 Superior Court Opinion at 493–95 (citing and quoting Rollins Int’l, 303 A.2d at 662–63).
29

Appellants do not meaningfully address the Superior Court’s case-orcontroversy analysis, nor do they cite Rollins in any of their submissions on appeal. 

The only time Appellants mention the case-or-controversy requirement in their 

opening brief is in a single sentence in a section addressing standing. There, 

Appellants argue that “[t]he interrelated conclusion that Plaintiffs lack standing and 

there is no case or controversy when their rights under the Delaware Constitution 

are denied is in error.”124

The rules of this Court specifically require an appellant to raise and argue 

claims of error in both the Summary of Argument and the Argument portions of their

Opening Brief in order to assure consideration by this Court.

125

 Most importantly,

Rule 14(b)(vi)(2) provides that “[t]he merits of any argument that is not raised in the 

body of the opening brief [is] deemed waived and will not be considered by the Court 

on appeal.”126

Appellants’ passing mention of the case-or-controversy requirement in a 

section otherwise addressed to standing is not sufficient to raise the merits of the 

argument. Although Appellants conflate the two doctrines, they are independent 

124 Appellants’ Opening Br. at 41.

125 Del. Sup. Ct. R. 14(b)(iv), (vi); Roca v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 842 A.2d 1238, 1242 

(Del. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (“It is well established that to assure 

consideration of an issue by the court, the appellant must both raise it in the Summary of the 

Argument and pursue it in the Argument portion of the brief.”).

126 Del. Sup. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(2).
30

requirements of justiciability, and both must be met.127 Nowhere in their opening 

brief do Appellants either identify or present an argument on the issue of case or 

controversy in the manner that is required by the Rules of this Court. “This Court 

has held that the appealing party’s opening brief must fully state the grounds for 

appeal, as well as the arguments and supporting authorities on each issue or claim of 

reversible error.”128 “[C]asual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment 

insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.”129 Accordingly, we hold that 

Appellants abandoned and waived this issue on appeal, and we therefore affirm the 

Superior Court’s holding that the complaint failed to raise a case or controversy for 

adjudication.

2. Standing

Although Appellants address standing in their briefs on appeal, they do not 

directly engage with the Superior Court’s redressability analysis and instead insist

127 First State Orthopaedics, 312 A.3d at 607 (“The four aspects of justiciability include standing, 

mootness, ripeness, and political question.”); DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 352 (“The 

doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and political question all originate in Article III's ‘case’ or 

‘controversy’ language, no less than standing does.”).

128 Roca, 842 A.2d at 1242 (citing Turnbull v. Fink, 644 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Del. 1994)). See also 

Willhauck v. Halpin, 953 F.2d 689, 700 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 

F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)). (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by 

some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived . . . . It is not enough merely to 

mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work . . . . 

Judges are not expected to be mindreaders. Consequently, a litigant has an obligation to spell out 

its arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold its peace.”).

129 Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).
31

that the alleged violations of their constitutional rights necessarily confer standing 

upon them.130 At oral argument, Appellants argued that standing exists “because the 

Constitutional protection is there to protect them” and “by having their religious 

worship rights stripped away, they suffered injury that gives them standing.”131

This Court has previously held that:

The term “standing” refers to the right of a party to invoke the 

jurisdiction of a court to enforce a claim or to redress a grievance. 

Standing is a threshold question that must be answered by a court 

affirmatively to ensure that the litigation before the tribunal is a ‘case 

or controversy’ that is appropriate for the exercise of the court's judicial 

powers.132 

Further, “[t]he party invoking the jurisdiction of a court bears the burden of 

establishing the elements of standing.”

133

 Absent a: 

specific statutory grant of review, to establish standing in Delaware, . . 

. a plaintiff must demonstrate that:

(i) the plaintiff has suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ i.e., a concrete and 

actual invasion of a legally protected interest;

(ii) there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 

complained of; and

(iii) it is likely the injury will be redressed by a favorable court 

decision.134 

130 Appellants’ Opening Br. at 41–42.

131 Oral Argument at 3:50–5:01.

132 Dover Hist. Soc. v. City of Dover Plan. Comm'n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1110 (Del. 2003).

133 Id. at 1109.

134 Albence, 295 A.3d at 1086 (citing Reeder v. Wagner, 974 A.2d 858, 2009 WL 1525945, at *2 

(Del. 2009) (TABLE)); O'Neill v. Town of Middletown, 2006 WL 205071, at *28 (Del. Ch. Jan. 

18, 2006) (internal quotations omitted)).
32

The Superior Court held that a declaratory judgment would not redress Plaintiffs’ 

alleged injuries and that therefore standing was lacking.

135

 

Under the standing doctrine’s redressability prong, the relief sought must be 

capable of redressing the plaintiff’s injury or grievance.136 When the challenged 

conduct has ceased before litigation is filed, redressability can be difficult to 

demonstrate. We recently discussed redressability in Emps. Ins. Co. of Wausau v. 

First State Orthopaedics, P.A.

137

 There, we reversed the Superior Court’s holding

that the appellee had standing when it sought declaratory judgment regarding a 

billing code that the appellant stopped using six months before the complaint was 

filed.

138

 We ruled that the appellee’s request for declaratory relief did not seek to 

redress an actual or imminent injury and was only prospective.139 We explained that 

“to determine whether an injury is redressable, a court will consider the relationship 

between the judicial relief requested and the injury suffered. Additionally, the 

plaintiff must show that it is likely, not just speculative, that the requested relief will 

redress the injury.”

140

 In First State Orthopaedics, we concluded that “a defendant’s 

135 Superior Court Opinion at 497.

136 Albence, 295 A.3d at 1085.

137 312 A.3d 597, 613 (Del. 2024).

138 Id. at 600.

139 Id. at 613.

140 Id. (citing California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 671 (2021); Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington 

Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 904 (Del. 1994)) (internal quotations omitted).
33

voluntary cessation of conduct before litigation begins generally renders a 

controversy non-justiciable for lack of standing.”141

Here, the Superior Court correctly held that Appellants’ injury could not be 

redressed through a prospective declaratory judgment. In much the same way that 

Appellants’ irreparable harm argument crumbled because the Challenged 

Restrictions no longer were in effect and any future action imposing similar 

restrictions was speculative, the declaratory judgment sought in the Superior Court

would not alter the status quo. Moreover, Appellants’ constitutional rights would 

not be restored or further protected by declaratory relief because the complained-of 

harm had long since ceased and the threat of future harm was speculative.

142

Appellants’ argument on appeal does not address redressability and thus fails 

to properly address an element of standing. Had they filed their action while the 

challenged conduct was ongoing, Appellants would have had standing to pursue 

their claims, subject to mootness considerations if the challenged conduct ceased 

during the course of the litigation. But Appellants inexplicably waited to pursue 

their claims and in doing so lost standing under established and binding precedent. 

Much like in First State Orthopaedics, at the time Appellants filed the complaint, 

141 First State Orthopaedics, 312 A.3d at 600.

142 Superior Court Opinion at 497.
34

there was no ongoing harm from which a declaratory judgment would provide 

relief.143

C. The Superior Court correctly concluded that Appellee was immune from 

Appellants’ damages claims for alleged violations of their constitutional 

rights. 

After dismissing Appellants’ declaratory judgment claims as nonjusticiable, 

the Superior Court concluded that the Governor was immune from suit for 

Appellants’ claims seeking monetary damages. Appellants challenge all of the 

Superior Court’s immunity holdings on appeal. As explained below, we affirm those 

holdings.

1. Delaware’s State Tort Claims Act.

The Superior Court first held that Plaintiffs’ request for damages for alleged 

violations of their rights under Article 1, Section 1 of the Delaware Constitution was

barred by the Delaware State Tort Claims Act (“STCA”).144 Specifically, the 

Superior Court found as a matter of law “that the Governor is immune from damages 

pursuant to the STCA for actions taken pursuant to the Emergency Management Act 

143 312 A.3d 597, 613 (Del. 2024).

144 Superior Court Opinion at 486. On appeal, Appellee argued for the first time that Plaintiffs do 

not have a private right of action for claims arising under the Delaware Constitution. Appellee’s 

Answering Br. at 11–12. We reject this argument without reaching its merits because it was not 

raised below. The argument is precluded by Rule 8 of this Court, which provides that arguments 

not fairly presented to the trial court will not be considered by this Court. Del. Sup. Ct. R. 4.
35

because those actions were discretionary in nature, and made in good faith without 

gross or wanton negligence.”145

The STCA is titled “Limitation on civil liability,” and it exempts State 

employees “from civil liability for acts or omissions taken in their capacity as such 

. . . .”146 Under the STCA, “no claim or cause of action shall arise, and no judgment, 

damages. . . shall be awarded against a public officer or employee. . .” where the 

official’s actions were: (1) discretionary; (2) undertaken in “good faith and in the 

belief that the public interest would best be served thereby;” and (3) undertaken 

without gross or wanton negligence.147 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the 

absence of one or more of the elements of immunity in a suit against a state employee 

for damages.

148

145 Superior Court Opinion at 489.

146 Jackson v. Minner, 2013 WL 871784, at *5 (Del. Super. Mar. 1, 2013), aff’d, 74 A.3d 654 (Del. 

2013).

147 10 Del. C. § 4001. With respect to the first element, the official's actions are discretionary if:

The act or omission complained of arose out of and in connection with the 

performance of an official duty requiring a determination of policy, the 

interpretation or enforcement of statutes, rules or regulations, the granting or 

withholding of publicly created or regulated entitlement or privilege or any other 

official duty involving the exercise of discretion on the part of the public officer, 

employee or member, or anyone over whom the public officer, employee or 

member shall have supervisory authority.

10 Del. C. § 4001.

148 10 Del. C. § 4001(c).
36

Appellants did not argue in the Superior Court or on appeal that the 

Governor’s actions were not taken in good faith or that he acted with gross or wanton 

negligence.

149

 Having failed to contest the second and third elements of the STCA, 

Appellants are left to argue that the Governor’s acts were ministerial. But even on 

this element, Appellants do not directly contest the point. Instead, Appellants 

contend that the Governor did not have the discretion to impose the Challenged 

Restrictions because he did not possess the power to do so under the Delaware 

Constitution.150 As Appellee points out, this argument is circular and fails to 

confront the relevant question under the first prong of the STCA, which addresses 

the type of authority being wielded, not whether it was wielded properly.151 

Appellee contends that the Superior Court correctly held that the Governor’s 

exercise of authority under the Emergency Management Act was discretionary.152 

Appellants failed to carry their burden of showing that the Governor’s conduct 

was ministerial rather than discretionary.153 “Whether an act is discretionary or 

ministerial is a legal determination.”

154

 “Discretionary acts are those which require 

149 Superior Court Opinion at 492.

150 Appellants’ Opening Br. at 38–40.

151 Appellee’s Answering Br. at 16.

152 Id. at 14.

153 Minner, 2013 WL 871784, at *5–6.

154 Wonnum v. Way, 2017 WL 3168968, at *3 (Del. Super. July 25, 2017); Guitierrez v. Advanced 

Student Transp., Inc., 2015 WL 4460342, at *4 (Del. Super. July 14, 2015); Hale v. Elizabeth W. 

Murphey Sch., Inc., 2014 WL 2119652, at *4 (Del. Super. May 20, 2014).
37

some determination or implementation which allows a choice of methods, or, 

differently stated, those where there is no hard and fast rule as to a course of 

conduct.”

155

 When the law prescribes only a general mandate for officials’ actions, 

we have concluded that it provides for discretionary decision making.156 In contrast, 

ministerial acts are performed in a prescribed manner without requiring an official 

to exercise judgment regarding what should be done.157 Ministerial actions “involve 

less in the way of personal decision or judgment.”158

This Court has previously held that “the Governor’s exercise of emergency 

powers is a discretionary act.”

159

 The language of the Emergency Management Act 

is broad and provides that the Governor “may issue, amend and rescind all necessary

executive orders, emergency orders, proclamations and regulations, which shall have 

the force and effect of law.”160 Additionally, the Emergency Management Act 

permits the Governor to “[t]ake such other actions as the Governor reasonably 

believes necessary to help maintain life, health, property, or public peace.”161 The 

Emergency Management Act does not identify any specific actions that the 

155 Simms v. Christina Sch. Dist., 2004 WL 344015, at *8 (Del. Super. Jan. 30, 2004).

156 Superior Court Opinion at 488 (citing Minner, 2013 WL 871784, at *5–6).

157 Simms, 2004 WL 344015, at *8.

158 Sussex County v. Morris, 610 A.2d 1354, 1359 (Del. 1992).

159 Facer, 2022 WL 1561444, at *1.

160 20 Del. C. § 3115(b) (emphasis added).

161 20 Del. C. § 3116(b)(13) (emphasis added).
38

Governor must take or refrain from taking to “maintain life, health, property, or 

public peace” in response to the pandemic.162 There are no “hard and fast rules” as 

to how the Governor is to respond to an emergency of this sort or any other.

163

In enacting the Emergency Management Act, the legislature accorded the 

Governor broad authority to make policy decisions and choices that he believed were 

reasonable and necessary to address the emergency at hand. As the Superior Court 

explained:

The Governor’s authority under the Emergency Management Act is 

broad so that he may best apply his well-reasoned judgment and tailor 

the State’s response to a novel crisis without having to be overly 

concerned that his actions might violate the law. The COVID-19 

pandemic is precisely the type of unprecedented, unpredictable 

emergency the Delaware legislature likely contemplated when enacting 

this statute.164

Thus, we affirm the Superior Court’s finding that the Governor’s adoption of the 

Challenged Restrictions was an exercise of his discretionary authority, and he 

therefore is immune under the STCA from Appellants’ damages claims arising under 

the Delaware Constitution.

162 20 Del. C. § 3116(b)(13).

163 Simms, 2004 WL 344015, at *8 (finding immediate supervisor’s conduct was discretionary 

because there were no “hard and fast” rules concerning the manner in which he was to supervise a 

residential advisor).

164 Superior Court Opinion at 490.
39

2. Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity.

Appellants also contend that the Superior Court erred in holding that their 

claims arising under the United State Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were barred 

by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

165

 Section 1983 provides that: 

Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . 

subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . .

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 

at law . . .

166

To succeed on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a 

deprivation of a right under the United States Constitution (2) by a person acting 

under color of State law.167 In addition, a plaintiff must establish that the official’s

conduct is not protected by qualified immunity.168 

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold 

public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to 

shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their 

duties reasonably.”

169

 The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect officials when 

165 Superior Court Opinion at 480.

166 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

167 Hunt ex rel. DeSombre v. State, Dep’t of Safety & Homeland Sec., Div. of Del. State Police, 69 

A.3d 360, 365 (Del. 2013) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)); West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)).

168 Hunt ex rel. DeSombre, 69 A.3d at 365 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).

169 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
40

their jobs require them to make difficult on-the-job decisions or when they make 

“reasonable mistakes about the legality of their actions . . .”170 Qualified immunity 

applies whether the “government official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of 

fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.”171

Under established precedent, qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim so 

long as the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional or 

statutory right.172 “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that 

every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that 

right.”173 Qualified immunity broadly protects government officials, shielding “all 

but the plainly incompetent” and “those who knowingly violate the law.”

174

It is important to evaluate whether a right was “clearly established” when it 

allegedly was violated, without relying on information not available at that time and 

developments in the law that occurred later. Now, the emergency has passed, public 

170 Mauro v. Cuomo, 2023 WL 2403482, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2023). See Sudler v. City of New 

York, 689 F.3d 159, 174 (2d Cir. 2012); Zieper v. Metzinger, 474 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2007); 

Hanson v. Del. State Pub. Integrity Comm'n, 2012 WL 3860732, at *15 (Del. Super. Aug. 30, 

2012), aff'd, 69 A.3d 370 (Del. 2013).

171 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (internal quotation marks omitted).

172 White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78–79 (2017) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Mullenix v. 

Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). The trial court has broad discretion to decide the order in which 

they analyze the two inquiries of a qualified immunity analysis. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 

(holding that the more stringent two step inquiry for deciding government officials’ qualified 

immunity claims outlined in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) was no longer mandatory).

173 Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 658 (2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

174 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 335 (1986).
41

opinions vary widely about decisions made in emergent conditions, and many courts 

have had the opportunity to consider “on a clear day” the constitutional parameters 

of emergency restrictions imposed on religious worship during the pandemic. But 

we must eschew the temptation to use the benefit of hindsight to evaluate whether 

the Governor’s conduct violated “clearly established” rights. 

Equally as important, our analysis cannot rest on generalities regarding the

importance of Appellants’ First Amendment rights. When defining “clearly 

established” rights, the United States Supreme Court has instructed courts that “[t]he 

dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly 

established.’”175 The clearly established law must be “particularized to the facts of 

the case.”176

The facts of this case arose during a period of uncertainty and at the beginning 

of an unprecedented public health crisis in which a previously unknown, deadly 

virus with no available treatment was spreading rapidly through the population and 

overwhelming health systems.177 The mechanism for spreading the virus was 

initially unclear. The Challenged Restrictions were adopted in the first two-and-ahalf months of the pandemic and changed continuously as the Governor and his 

175 Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).

176 White, 580 U.S. at 79 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 

635, 640 (1987)).

177 Chancery Opinion at 1211; Superior Court Opinion at 472–74.
42

administration attempted to respond to developing information and guidance from 

public health officials.

Appellants contend that because the Governor’s “misconduct was illegal 

under multiple provisions of the Delaware Constitution, [the Governor] had fair 

warning of the law and the right was clearly established.”178 Appellants argue that 

the Third Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court “have ‘consistently’ and repeatedly held 

that when the challenged state actions already are illegal under state law, the state 

law violation makes the federal violation ‘obvious’ even in the absence of materially 

similar cases.”179 Appellants allege that the Governor’s “de facto exemption of 

Jewish religious rites of circumcision and the Minyan from his Orders while 

targeting the Protestant religious rites of baptism and communion has long violated 

Free Exercise.”180 Further, Appellants argue that the Superior Court erred by 

requiring factually “identical cases addressing church closures and establishment 

issues occurring during a pandemic.”181 Appellants note that health crises, plagues, 

and pandemics are not new in our country’s history and do not give the Governor 

the right to violate citizens’ rights to freely exercise their religion.

182

178 Appellants’ Opening Br. at 44–45.

179 Id. at 44.

180 Id. at 52.

181 Id. at 48.

182 Id. at 48–54.
43

Despite Appellants’ argument that the Governor’s actions were “obvious” 

violations of Appellants’ First Amendment rights even in the absence of materially 

similar cases, courts around the country have held that it is “irrational” to claim that 

similar actions taken in response to a pandemic clearly violated Supreme Court 

precedent.183 During this time “there was no clear consensus among federal or state 

courts that the Governor’s actions were unlawful.”184 In its decision, the Superior 

Court conducted a thorough analysis of cases around the country and found that “the 

law was wholly unsettled as to whether officials could issue certain restrictions for 

the purpose of preventing the spread of the coronavirus that may have also curtailed 

individuals’ First Amendment or Equal Protection rights.”185 In particular, the 

Superior Court pointed to U.S. District Court decisions in Northland Baptist Church 

of St. Paul, Minnesota v. Walz,

186 Case v. Ivey,187 and Mader v. Union Township,188

183 See Hinkle Fam. Fun Ctr., LLC v. Grisham, 586 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1129 (“[I]t is simply 

irrational to assert that a reasonable health official would have known that imposing business 

closings in response to a pandemic clearly violated Supreme Court precedent.”) (quoting Bojicic 

v. DeWine, 569 F. Supp. 3d 669, 692 (N.D. Ohio 2021)); Bastian v. Lamont, 2022 WL 2477863, 

at *7 (D. Conn. 2022) (“[I]t is implausible that ‘every reasonable official’ would have understood 

issuing or enforcing public health policies violated the plaintiffs’ rights.”).

184 Superior Court Opinion at 482.

185 Id.

186 530 F. Supp. 3d 790, 806–07 (D. Minn. 2021), aff'd sub nom. Glow In One Mini Golf, LLC v. 

Walz, 37 F.4th 1365 (8th Cir. 2022).

187 542 F. Supp. 3d 1245, 1269–80 (M.D. Ala. 2021), aff'd, 2022 WL 2441578 (11th Cir. July 5, 

2022).

188 2021 WL 3852072, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2021).
44

all of which found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from 

claimed violations of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights because the plaintiffs 

could not demonstrate that the defendants violated a clearly established right.189 

Appellants have not pointed to any binding precedent from the United States 

Supreme Court or the Third Circuit, or to a “robust consensus” in other courts

addressing the particularized facts of this case. Instead, Appellants rely on cases 

generally addressing the scope of free exercise rights. But identifying generalized 

rules regarding the First Amendment and the free exercise of religion does not 

overcome qualified immunity because the purpose of the doctrine is to protect 

officials who make difficult decisions on the basis of developing facts. A plaintiff’s 

burden under qualified immunity does not end when a constitutional violation is 

pinpointed; it rests on whether the official should have known that their actions 

violated a clearly established constitutional right. In hindsight, we can identify a 

possible constitutional violation arising from the Challenged Restrictions’ nonneutral treatment of Houses of Worship or of particular types of worship, but we 

cannot find that it was clearly established at the time the restrictions were in effect

that these temporary, emergency limitations intended to shield human life were 

unconstitutional. Consequently, Appellants have not carried their burden to lift the 

shield of qualified immunity.

189 Superior Court Opinion at 482.
45

Case law that has developed since the Challenged Restrictions were lifted 

supports the view that the restrictions violated Appellants’ rights. Well after the 

Challenged Restrictions were lifted, the United States Supreme Court issued its 

opinion in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, in which the Court held 

that a church and synagogue established that they would likely prevail in proving 

that occupancy limitations at public places of worship violated the Free Exercise 

Clause of the First Amendment.

190 A future governor confronted with a future 

public-health emergency would have the benefit of that precedent, but it was not 

available at the time Appellee made the decisions at issue. Although singling out 

Houses of Worship for heightened restrictions was a probable constitutional 

violation under Cuomo, we affirm the Superior Court’s holding that at the time the 

Challenged Restrictions were adopted there was no “clearly established law” 

addressing these particularized facts.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the holdings of the Court of Chancery 

and the Superior Court. 

190 592 U.S. 14 (2020).