Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed March 17, 2021.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-0171

Lower Tribunal Nos. 19-5935 CC, 20-165 AP

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Victor R. Griffin,

Appellant,

vs.

City of Sweetwater Police Department,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Michael G. 

Barket, Judge.

Victor R. Griffin, in proper person.

The Law Office of Ray Garcia, P.A., and Ray Garcia and Nicole M. 

Garcia, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, HENDON and BOKOR, JJ. 

BOKOR, J.
2

Victor R. Griffin, appearing pro se in both the trial court and as 

appellant here, filed a complaint in county court, seeking recovery of 

monies seized by appellee under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. 

See Fla. Stat. §§ 932.701-932.7062. Appellant alleged a wide array of 

bases for recovery, and appellant sought dismissal of the complaint, 

amended complaint, and second amended complaint. The trial court 

granted each motion to dismiss, in whole or in part, and finally granted a 

dismissal of the second amended complaint in its entirety and with 

prejudice.1 Appellant timely appeals the trial court’s order of dismissal with 

prejudice.

1 Appellant makes much ado about the impropriety of the August 5, 2020 

order, now on appeal, originally being an order of dismissal without 

prejudice, later changed to a dismissal with prejudice. Appellee moved to 

dismiss the second amended complaint with prejudice. However, the order 

that resulted from the hearing granted the dismissal without prejudice. 

Appellee moved for clarification and the trial court entered a corrected 

order of dismissal with prejudice. Appellant seems to argue that the trial 

court intended to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, so this corrected 

order should not be permitted to stand. As we do not have the benefit of a 

transcript of any hearing, we must assume the trial court’s entry of a 

corrected order reflects the trial court’s expressed intention at the hearing. 

See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 

1979). Additionally, if the trial court originally intended to dismiss without 

prejudice and later changed its mind, the trial court possesses “inherent 

authority to reconsider and, if deemed appropriate, alter or retract any of its 

nonfinal rulings prior to entry of the final judgment or order terminating an 

action . . . .” Seigler v. Bell, 148 So. 3d 473, 478–79 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) 

(citing Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1998)). We 

therefore find no basis to conclude that there was anything procedurally 
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The basic factual background, greatly condensed since most of it is 

irrelevant at this stage of the pleadings, starts with appellant taking a sixmonth trip to Ghana for some internet gambling. He allegedly intended to

fund the gambling portion of this monthslong junket by sending $7,000 of 

money orders (interestingly, not one money order for the full amount but 

multiple smaller-denomination money orders) from Ghana to an internet 

sports book in Panama. However, the City of Sweetwater Police 

Department intercepted the money orders in the United States. Appellant

caught wind of the seizure and got in contact with representatives of 

appellees to figure out what happened and why. 

Without any resolution, and with the Sweetwater Police Department 

in possession of the seized gambling funds, Appellant filed a lawsuit in 

county court seeking return of the seized funds alleging a variety of 

procedural defects and substantive arguments purporting to show that he 

would have prevailed in any forfeiture action. Appellant contends the 

seizure of the funds did not comply with the requirements of the Florida 

Contraband Forfeiture Act in several aspects, most relevant for our review, 

improper with the genesis of the August 5, 2020 corrected order. This 

opinion addresses the merits of the appeal—whether the trial court erred as 

a matter of law in granting a dismissal with prejudice. 
4

that he did not receive notice of the seizure and claim for forfeiture as 

required by section 932.703(3)(a).2 

Appellee moved to dismiss the original complaint, but appellant filed 

an amended complaint. Appellee then moved to dismiss the amended 

complaint, which motion was heard by the trial court. On January 8, 2020, 

the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part.

The January 8, 2020 order specifically denied appellee’s lack of standing 

argument. Instead, the order granted dismissal without prejudice and 

required appellant to specify the basis for recovery (“i.e., to specify what 

Defendant allegedly did wrong”) and noted that the exhibits need to be 

attached to each iteration of the complaint. 

2 The action on appeal is NOT a forfeiture proceeding. Accordingly, we take 

no position as to the merits of appellee’s defenses if they had been 

presented in a forfeiture hearing. We note however that any such defense 

or argument as to the merits of the forfeiture, or defenses thereto, would 

only be proper in the context of a forfeiture proceeding and cannot form the 

basis of a standalone claim. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 932.704 (establishing 

forfeiture proceedings as a circuit court cause of action brought by the 

agency seeking seizure of alleged contraband). Appellant’s most pertinent 

factual and legal basis, likely the only one permitted in the underlying cause 

of action, is that appellee failed to provide him with the proper notice and 

therefore violated his procedural due process rights under the forfeiture 

statute. Accordingly, as explained herein, this appeal focuses on whether it 

was appropriate to dismiss THIS stand-alone claim with prejudice to the 

extent that appellant alleges he was never provided with the statutorilyrequired notice of seizure and opportunity to contest such seizure.
5

Appellant then filed a second amended complaint. Appellee again 

moved to dismiss, focusing on the conclusory nature of the allegations, the 

“jumble” of law and facts, and the purported lack of clarity as to the relief 

sought. Additionally, appellee argues that dismissal is proper due to 

appellant’s failure to request a hearing within 15 days of receipt of the 

notice that was sent via certified mail, and the applicability of a statute of 

limitations. On August 5, 2020 the unelaborated order of dismissal was 

issued with prejudice. This appeal ensues.

ANALYSIS

Where a trial court grants a motion to dismiss with prejudice based 

on too many attempts to plead a cognizable complaint, we review such 

dismissal for abuse of discretion. See Kohn v. City of Miami Beach, 611 

So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). “While there is no magical number of 

amendments which are allowed, we have previously observed that with 

amendments beyond the third attempt, dismissal with prejudice is generally 

not an abuse of discretion.” Id. While we do not hold pro se litigants to any 

lesser standards of compliance with the law and relevant rules of court, we 

also note that we cannot hold them to a greater standard. Here, appellant 

has only been permitted two attempts at amendment. Therefore, the 

unelaborated order of dismissal of the amended complaint, with prejudice, 
6

based on a supposed lack of clarity of the pleadings alone, constitutes an 

impermissible abuse of discretion under the circumstances. 

Notwithstanding the number of amendments, the court would be 

within its rights to limit amendment based on futility if it were apparent on 

the face of the pleadings that no combination of facts and legal standards 

would allow recovery. To the extent this is the basis of the dismissal, we 

review such a finding of a failure to state a claim de novo. See

Laptopplaza, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 276 So. 3d 375, 378 n.5 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2019).

Indeed, there appear to be significant issues with some of 

appellant’s theories of recovery. To wit, many of the possible causes of 

action or avenues of recovery would be appropriately brought up only in 

defense to the forfeiture proceeding, which, as explained, this isn’t.

3 The 

one issue, however, that jumps out of all complaints, from the first to the 

most recent, and shows at least a cognizable claim on its face, is that 

appellant alleges that he never got notice of the seizure of the money 

orders and his right to contest such seizure in a forfeiture proceeding. 

3 The fact that dismissal may be appropriate for some claims or on some 

legal theories does not render the properly pled portions insufficient. 

Instead, the court may dismiss in part, or dismiss certain claims without 

dismissing the properly pled portions.
7

Simply put, dismissing the cognizable claim of a failure to provide statutory 

notice constitutes reversible error under any standard of review.

4

Nor can we discern any alternative basis to support dismissal with 

prejudice of the entire operative complaint. Appellee argues in the most 

recent motion to dismiss that if the court can find a cognizable claim, “then 

it should be dismissed for failing to comply and respond to the notice by 

U.S. Certified mail within the 15 days and as required by Sec.

932.703(3)(a).” Appellee’s argument here misses the mark for two 

reasons. First, it belies appellee’s argument that the complaint fails to state 

a claim when appellee was able to discern from the complaint (and 

incorporate in the motion to dismiss) exactly the factual and legal predicate 

for the claim of lack of notice. Instead, the claim is exactly what appellee 

suggests—it is a claim that the ultimate forfeiture was procedurally 

improper because appellee allegedly failed to comply with the notice 

procedure required by the operative statute. Second, to the extent that 

appellee is correct that appellee sent such a notice by certified mail in 

compliance with the statute, absent anything of which we can appropriately 

4Most of the legal arguments would be appropriate only in a forfeiture 

proceeding and therefore cannot state a claim here. However, it would be a 

violation of any concept of due process to accept appellee’s argument that 

appellant cannot proceed on a lack of statutory notice claim because he 

didn’t seek an adversarial forfeiture proceeding under the statute within 15 

days of receiving the notice he claims he never got. 
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take judicial notice at this stage of the proceedings (i.e., res judicata based 

on a finding from another court, something attached to the complaint that 

contradicts the assertion that it was not sent), that constitutes a contested 

factual issue not properly resolved by a motion to dismiss. 

Specifically, appellant alleges he did not receive the notice, which is 

sufficient here to defeat a motion to dismiss on that issue. Similarly, the 

statute of limitations defense raised by appellee is not readily apparent on 

the face of the complaint or attachments. Both may be affirmative 

defenses and, as appropriate, bases for summary judgment. But they 

cannot support a dismissal of that well-pled portion of the operative 

complaint.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, the trial court’s order of dismissal with prejudice is affirmed 

in part as it pertains to claims other than that claim based on appellant’s 

contention that appellee failed to comply with statutory notice provisions. 

The order is reversed in part as it pertains to the claim alleging lack of 

compliance with a legal duty of notice pursuant to the statute. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.