J-A06033-24

2024 PA Super 182

W. SCOTT BACLIT, ADMINSTRATOR 

OF THE ESTATE OF TIMOTHY S. 

BACLIT

v.

STEVEN C. SLOAN, AN ADULT 

INDIVIDUAL, SEA SHELL BAR, INC., 

A CORPORATION, KENNETH KUGEL, 

AN ADULT INDIVIDUAL, AND UNITED 

FINANCIAL CASUALTY COMPANY, A 

CORPORATION

APPEAL OF: UNITED FINANCIAL 

CASUALTY COMPANY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 793 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered July 3, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Civil Division at No(s): 

10675 of 2022

W. SCOTT BACLIT, ADMINISTRATOR 

OF THE ESTATE OF TIMOTHY S. 

BACLIT,

v.

STEVEN C. SLOAN, AN ADULT 

INDIVIDUAL, SEA SHELL BAR, INC., 

A CORPORATION, KENNETH KUGEL, 

AND ADULT INDIVIDUAL, AND 

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 

COMPANY, A CORPORATION

APPEAL OF: UNITED FINANCIAL 

CASUALTY COMPANY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 794 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered July 3, 2023
J-A06033-24

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In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Civil Division at No(s): 

10675 of 2022

W. SCOTT BACLIT, ADMINISTRATOR 

OF THE ESTATE OF TIMOTHY S. 

BACLIT

v.

STEVEN C. SLOAN, AN ADULT 

INDIVIDUAL, SEA SHELL BAR, INC. A 

CORPORATION, KENNETH KUGEL, AN 

ADULT INDIVIDUAL, AND UNITED 

FINANCIAL CASUALTY COMPANY, A 

CORPORATION

APPEAL OF: UNITED FINANCIAL 

CASUALTY COMPANY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 795 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered June 5, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Civil Division at No(s): 

10675 of 2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and BECK, J.

OPINION BY BECK, J.: FILED: August 16, 2024

United Financial Casualty Company (“United”) appeals from orders 

granting summary judgment in favor of W. Scott Baclit, Administrator of the 

Estate of Timothy S. Baclit, (“Administrator”) and denying United’s motion for 

summary judgment.1 United claims that the commercial insurance policy 

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1 This action was originally filed against Progressive Insurance Company 

(“Progressive”) and other defendants. On June 5, 2023, the trial court granted 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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issued to TKC Trucking, LLC (“TKC Trucking”) did not cover its owner, Timothy 

S. Baclit (“Baclit”), individually, and therefore, Administrator is entitled to no 

recovery. Finding that Baclit is an “insured” entitled to receive stacked 

underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage under the Pennsylvania’s Motor 

Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”),

2 we affirm.

The parties stipulated to the following facts. On December 5, 2021, 

Baclit sustained fatal injuries while aiding Steven Sloan (“Sloan”), who had 

been involved in a single car accident in Hopewell Township, Beaver County. 

Sloan’s vehicle had crashed into a bridge retaining wall. Baclit, who had been 

driving the automobile owned by his mother Lorri A. Hagwood (“Hagwood”), 

exited the vehicle to provide assistance. While aiding Sloan, Baclit fell from 

the bridge retaining wall and suffered injuries resulting in his death. 

Sloan maintained automobile liability coverage through Farmers 

Insurance (“Farmers”) in the amount of $100,000. Farmers tendered the 

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summary judgment in favor of Administrator and against Progressive, while 

the claims against the other defendants remained pending. On July 3, 2023, 

the trial court substituted United for Progressive, amended the case caption 

to remove Progressive, severed Administrator’s claims against United from 

the remaining claims, and specified that the order disposed of all claims 

against United. Furthermore, on that same date, the trial court entered a 

separate order stating that the June 5, 2023 order constituted a final order 

with respect to Administrator’s claims against United. Thereafter, 

Administrator filed separate appeals as to the June 5, 2023 order (794 WDA 

2023) and both of the July 3, 2023 orders (793 and 795 WDA 2023). 

Subsequently, these appeals were consolidated for our review. 

2

 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701-1799.7.
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limits of the policy to Administrator. Hagwood’s vehicle was insured under a 

multi-vehicle policy provided by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company 

(“State Farm”) with stacked UIM limits of $300,000.3 As Sloan’s policy was 

not sufficient to cover the damages sustained by Baclit, State Farm paid the 

limits in connection with Hagwood’s policy. Baclit also insured his motorcycle 

through Progressive, which included $15,000 in UIM coverage. Progressive 

paid the limits to Administrator in accordance with this policy. 

At the time of his death, Baclit was the president and sole officer of TKC

Trucking, a trucking business. In October 2020, United issued a commercial 

automobile insurance policy to TKC Trucking (the “Policy”). In October 2021, 

United sent TKC Trucking a renewal declarations page, which renewed the 

Policy.

Under the Policy, TKC Trucking was the “named insured,” and Baclit and 

Brian Matheny were designated as rated drivers. Policy Declarations Page, 

10/2/2021, at 1-2. The Policy covered a 2008 GMC Sierra and a 2020 load 

trail trailer. Id. at 2-3. The Policy provided $100,000 of stacked UIM coverage 

for the 2008 GMC Sierra.4 Id. at 2.

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3

 At the time of his death, Baclit was forty-two years old and lived with 

Hagwood. 

4 The Policy did not provide UIM benefits on the trailer. See Policy 

Declarations Page, 10/2/2021, at 2; see also Policy, 10/2/2021, at 46 (noting 

“we will pay no more than the Limit of Liability shown for [UIM] Coverage on 

the declarations page”) (emphasis omitted), 47 (“For purposes of Stacked 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Relevantly, the Policy stated the following regarding UIM coverage:

INSURING AGREEMENT – UNDERINSURED MOTORIST 

COVERAGE

Subject to the Limits of Liability, if you pay the premium for 

Underinsured Motorist Coverage, we will pay for damages, other 

than punitive or exemplary damages, which an insured is legally 

entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured 

auto because of bodily injury: 

1. sustained by an insured; 

2. caused by an accident; and 

3. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or 

unloading of an underinsured auto. 

* * *

ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS 

When used in this endorsement, whether in the singular, plural, 

or possessive:

1. “Insured” means: 

a. if the named insured shown on the declarations page is 

a natural person: 

(i) you or a relative; 

(ii) any person occupying your insured 

auto or a temporary substitute auto; 

and

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Limits of Liability, an insured auto does not include any trailer listed on the 

declarations page[.]”) (emphasis omitted). Notably, section 1731 of the 

MVFRL “does not require UIM coverage to be offered on a trailer because a 

trailer does not qualify as a motor vehicle[.]” Erie Ins. Exch. v. Backmeier, 

287 A.3d 931, 942 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2022); see also 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(a).
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(iii) any person who is entitled to recover 

damages covered by this endorsement 

because of bodily injury sustained by a 

person described in (i) or (ii) above; or

b. if the named insured shown on the declarations page is 

a corporation, partnership, organization, or any other 

entity that is not a natural person:

(i) any person occupying your insured 

auto or a temporary substitute auto; 

and

(ii) any person who is entitled to recover 

damages covered by this endorsement 

because of bodily injury sustained by a 

person described in (i) above.

Policy, 10/2/2021, at 43-44 (emphasis omitted).5 Additionally, the Policy 

defines “insured auto” or “your insured auto” as, in pertinent part, “[a]ny auto 

specifically described on the declarations page[.]” Id. at 2 (emphasis 

omitted). Further, “‘You, ‘your’ and ‘yours’ refer to the named insured shown 

on the declarations page.” Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).

On April 14, 2022, Administrator sent a letter to United demanding UIM 

payment under the Policy. By letter dated April 19, 2022, United responded 

to Administrator’s UIM demand, stating the following:

As previously noted, the handling of this claim is conducted under 

a Reservation of Rights. To date, our preliminary investigation 

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5 The MVFRL defines “insured” as any of the following: “(1) An individual 

identified by name as an insured in a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance. 

(2) If residing in the household of the named insured: (i) a spouse or other 

relative of the named insured; or (ii) a minor in the custody of either the 

named insured or relative of the named insured.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702. There 

is no definition for an “insured” who is not a natural person under the MVFRL.
J-A06033-24

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indicates the policy may not provide coverage for this loss because 

it does not appear that [] Baclit will meet the definition of an 

“insured” per the policy language cited above nor does he appear

to be “occupying” an insured auto or temporary substitute auto.

United Letter, 4/19/2022. Administrator provided United additional 

documentation on the claim and requested United confirm its position 

regarding UIM coverage. United ultimately denied Administrator’s claim for

coverage, stating:

As the [automobile] [] Baclit drove to the scene of the incident is 

not a listed vehicle, it does not meet the definition of an insured 

auto nor does it meet the definition of a temporary substitute auto 

per the policy language. Also, [] Baclit was not occupying an

insured auto when the loss occurred. [United] will not be 

responsible to pay for [UIM] Coverage to the Estate of Timothy 

Baclit as a result of this loss.

United Letter, 6/14/2022.

Administrator filed a complaint against United, which Administrator later 

amended, asserting claims of breach of contract, bad faith, wrongful death, 

and survival. Subsequently, United filed a motion for summary judgment as 

to Administrator’s claims and Administrator filed a motion for summary 

judgment as to his breach of contract claim. As noted above, the trial court 

granted Administrator’s motion for summary judgment and denied United’s 

motion for summary judgment. 

United filed a motion for reconsideration or motion for certification of 

interlocutory appeal. In response, the trial court severed the claims against 

United from the claims raised in the amended complaint against the other 

defendants, and Administrator withdrew the bad faith, wrongful death, and 
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survival claims against United. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order 

stating that its entry of summary judgment was a final order under 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(b)(1). United then timely 

appealed and complied with the court’s order for the filing of a concise 

statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 1925.

On appeal, United raises the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [Baclit] is entitled 

to [UIM] coverage without a requisite finding that [Baclit] met 

the definition of an “Insured” under the [United] Policy? 

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the issue before it 

was one of first impression when various courts applying 

Pennsylvania law in analogous factual circumstances addressed 

the question of whether such claimants are entitled to UIM 

coverage and held that they are not? 

3. Whether the trial court erred by relying on inapposite cases 

which discussed UIM exclusions and “stacking” issues?

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying [United’s] Motion for 

Summary Judgment by basing its conclusion on the mistaken 

belief that the additional benefit of stacked coverage on the 

Policy was “illusory”?

United’s Brief at 4.

Our standard of review of an order granting or denying a motion for 

summary judgment is as follows:

We view the record in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine 

issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. 

Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law will summary judgment be entered. 
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Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting or 

denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review

is clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is 

established that the court committed an error of law or abused its 

discretion.

Erie Ins. Exch. v. Eachus, 306 A.3d 930, 932-33 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation 

omitted).

“Additionally, we note that interpretation of an insurance policy presents 

a pure question of law, over which our standard of review is de novo.” Rourke 

v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 116 A.3d 87, 91 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citation omitted); see also Kramer v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 

313 A.3d 1031, 1039 (Pa. 2024). “[W]e are not bound by the trial court’s 

conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.” Kline v. Travelers 

Personal Sec. Ins. Com., 223 A.3d 677, 686 (Pa. Super. 2019).

As United’s claims are interrelated, we address them together. United 

contends that the plain and clear language of the Policy establishes that Baclit 

did not meet the definition of an “insured” under the Policy, noting that the 

only named insured on the Policy was TKC Trucking. United’s Brief at 15, 18-

19, 29. According to United, Pennsylvania courts have consistently rejected 

claims that an individual’s position as an officer of a corporation confers UIM 

benefits to the claimant under a commercial auto insurance policy, and United 

condemns the trial court’s attempt to distinguish these decisions. Id. at 19-

24, 27 (citing, inter alia, Ins. Co. of Evanston v. Bowers, 758 A.2d 213 (Pa. 
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Super. 2000); Hunyady v. Aetna Life & Cas., 578 A.2d 1312 (Pa. Super. 

1990)).6 

United further asserts that the plain language of the definitions section 

of the UIM coverage endorsement required Administrator to prove that Baclit 

was operating an “insured auto” at the time of the accident to obtain stacked

UIM coverage. Id. at 15-17. United observes that Baclit was driving 

Hagwood’s vehicle at the time of his death, and this vehicle was not covered 

under the Policy. Id. at 17-18. United therefore claims that, contrary to the 

trial court’s finding, Baclit was not entitled to UIM benefits and stacking did 

not apply in this case. Id. at 25, 27. United assails the trial court’s reliance 

upon Gallagher v. Geico Indemnity Co., 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019),7to reach 

its decision, contending that it is factually distinct from the present case—

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6 United also cites to federal district court cases to support its argument; 

however, we have long recognized that decisions issued by federal courts 

other than the United States Supreme Court “offer this Court persuasive, but 

not binding, authority.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Scott, 271 A.3d 897, 910 n.6 

(Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). As we conclude that Pennsylvania state 

court decisions provide precedential authority to support our resolution of this 

matter, we do not address the cited federal cases. 

7

 In its brief, United also argues that Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch., 265 A.3d 794 

(Pa. Super. 2021), is inapposite to this case. United, however, filed a postsubmission communication to this Court, noting that the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court recently issued a decision reversing this Court’s decision. 

Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch., 308 A.3d 780 (Pa. 2024). We do not find the 

reasoning in Rush, which dealt with the interplay between the “regular use” 

exclusion and the scope of UIM coverage under section 1731, to be applicable 

to the instant case, which deals with stacking UIM benefits under section 1738. 

See id. at 802; see also id. at 811 (Wecht, J., concurring).
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specifically, that the Gallagher claimant was a named insured under a policy 

that extended coverage and the pertinent issue related to the validity of an 

exclusion. United’s Brief at 25-26. Lastly, United maintains that the stacked 

coverage under the Policy was not illusory here because there was a 

“possibility” that Baclit would qualify for stacked UIM benefits if he had been 

an occupant of an “insured auto” at the time of his injuries. Id. at 27-28. 

The record reflects that in addressing the competing motions for 

summary judgment, the trial court first highlighted the UIM provisions in the 

MVFRL. Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/2023, at 10-12. The trial court further 

reviewed Gallagher and noted that Pennsylvania courts have not addressed 

the “issue of de facto waiver in connection with the commercial insurance 

policy language,” concluding that “this is a case of first impression.” Id. at 

17; see also id. at 14-15, 21, 23-24 (addressing and reviewing cases cited 

by both parties). The trial court found that Administrator properly recovered 

or attempted to recover UIM coverage pursuant to section 1733 of the MVFRL8

by obtaining coverage from Hagwood’s State Farm policy, then other policies 

covering vehicles not involved in the accident, including seeking stacked 

coverage from United under the Policy. Id. at 20, 22.

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8 75 Pa.C.S. § 1733(a) (“Where multiple policies apply, payment shall be made 

in the following order of priority: (1) A policy covering a motor vehicle 

occupied by the injured person at the time of the accident. (2) A policy 

covering a motor vehicle not involved in the accident with respect to which 

the injured person is an insured.”).
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The trial court observed that Baclit never signed any stacking waiver 

forms on the Policy; United charged, and TKC Trucking (through Baclit) paid, 

an increased premium for stacked coverage; and as the sole officer of the 

business, Baclit was an intended beneficiary of the coverage by paying 

premiums for stacked coverage. Id. at 24. Noting that United chose to 

provide stacked insurance coverage on a one-vehicle commercial policy where 

the injured party was both the sole officer of TKC Trucking and named as a 

rated driver in the Policy, the trial court found that United’s attempt to deny 

coverage “serve[d] as a de facto waiver in violation of the language of the 

MVFRL.” Id. at 27. Therefore, the trial court found Administrator, on behalf 

of Baclit, is entitled to collect UIM benefits from United, and granted his motion 

for summary judgment. Id. at 27-28.

As stated hereinabove, the facts of this case are uncontested; the only 

question before us is purely one of law, requiring us to determine whether 

Baclit was entitled to UIM benefits under the Policy. In addressing the 

question of law presented here, we begin by examining the interplay between 

provisions of the MVFRL and the plain language of the Policy. The MVFRL is 

“comprehensive legislation governing the rights and obligations of the 

insurance company and the insured under liability insurance policies covering 

motor vehicles.” Rush, 308 A.3d at 790 (citation omitted). “[T]he provisions 

of the MVFRL pertaining to the required scope of coverage and content of 

automobile insurance policies, and benefits payable thereunder, impose 
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mandatory obligations applicable to all automobile insurance providers in this 

Commonwealth[.]” Id. (citation omitted). 

The MVFRL specifically addresses the provision of UIM coverage by 

insurance companies, requiring “every motor vehicle insurance policy issued 

in Pennsylvania to include an offer of both [uninsured motorist (“UM”)] and 

UIM [] coverage equal to the bodily injury liability amount.” 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1731(a); see also Rush, 308 A.3d at 790 (“Insurers in Pennsylvania are 

obligated to offer UIM coverage to their customers.”). “[UIM] coverage shall 

provide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the maintenance 

or use of a motor vehicle and are legally entitled to recover damages therefor 

from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles.” 75 Pa.C.S.

§ 1731(c). UIM coverage may be waived only through the use of the statutory 

waiver form appearing in section 1731(c); “[a]ny rejection form that does not 

specifically comply with this section is void.” Id. § 1731(c.1).

Section 1738(a) of the MVFRL states that when multiple vehicles are 

insured on one or more policies providing UIM coverage, any UIM coverage is 

“stacked” by default, i.e., the amount of coverage “shall be the sum of the 

limits for each motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured.” 

Id. § 1738(a); see also Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 137 (noting that “stacked 

UM/UIM coverage is the default coverage available to every insured and 

provides stacked coverage on all vehicles and all policies”). As our High Court 

has recognized, section 1738(a) “unambiguously provides for inter- as well as 
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intra-policy stacking.” Craley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 895 A.2d 

530, 539 (Pa. 2006). “Intra-policy stacking is when more than one vehicle is 

insured under a single policy of insurance.” Backmeier, 287 A.3d at 938 

(citation omitted). “Inter-policy stacking[] is the addition of coverages for 

vehicles insured under different policies of insurance.” Id. at 939 (citation 

omitted).

Although UM/UIM coverage is stacked by default, “a named insured may 

waive coverage providing stacking of uninsured or underinsured coverages[,]

in which case the limits of coverage available under the policy for an insured 

shall be the stated limits for the motor vehicle as to which the injured person 

is an insured.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738(b). Further, “each named insured 

purchasing” UM/UIM coverage must be “provided the opportunity to waive the 

stacked limits of coverage and instead purchase coverage as described in 

subsection (b). The premiums for an insured who exercises such waiver shall 

be reduced to reflect the different cost of such coverage.” Id. § 1738(c). As 

is the case for waiver of UIM coverage, stacking may also be waived through 

the statutorily prescribed form contained in section 1738(d)(2); “[a]ny 

rejection form that does not comply with this section is void.” Id. § 1738(e).

Additionally, when interpreting a policy of insurance, “we must apply 

general principles of contract interpretation, as, at base, an insurance policy 

is nothing more than a contract between an insurer and an insured.” 

Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 137 “[A]s such, the overarching goal of our 
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interpretation of an insurance policy is to ascertain the intent of the parties as 

manifested by the language of the written instrument.” Kramer, 313 A.3d

1039. “In doing so, we are bound by the clear and unambiguous meaning of 

the policy; however, we are obligated to construe ambiguities in a light most 

strongly supporting the insured.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); 

see also Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 137 (noting that “when the language of the 

policy is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that 

language”) (citation omitted). “The plain and ordinary meaning of a policy is 

also contextually constrained, as our understanding of the mutual intent of 

the parties in forming the insurance contract derives from consideration of the 

whole written instrument, not by reading its individual provisions in isolation.” 

Kramer, 313 A.3d at 1039 (citation omitted); see also Cigna Corp. v. Exec. 

Risk Indem., Inc., 111 A.3d 204, 212 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that “an 

insurance policy, like every other written contract, must be read in its entirety 

and the intent of the policy is gathered from consideration of the entire 

instrument”) (citation omitted).

“Importantly, however, provisions of insurance contracts are invalid and 

unenforceable if they conflict with statutory mandates because contracts 

cannot alter existing laws.” Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 137 (citation omitted);

see also Backmeier, 287 A.3d at 946 (noting that “[a]s a general rule, 

stipulations in a contract of insurance in conflict with, or repugnant to, 

statutory provisions which are applicable to, and consequently form a part of, 
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the contract, must yield to the statute, and are invalid, since contracts cannot 

change existing statutory laws”) (citation omitted). To that end, “[t]he 

provisions of the MVFRL are mandatory, and where insurance policy provisions 

fail to comply with the provisions of the MVFRL, the policy provisions will be 

found unenforceable.” Eachus, 306 A.3d at 933 (citation omitted).

Against this backdrop, we observe the following, undisputed facts: TKC 

Trucking was the only “named insured” on the Policy; Baclit was the sole

officer and president of TKC Trucking; Baclit was listed as a rated driver on 

the Policy; the Policy covered a single vehicle; Baclit, on behalf of TKC 

Trucking, did not sign either the statutorily-prescribed UIM coverage waiver 

form or stacking waiver form; and Baclit paid increased premiums under the 

Policy commensurate his decision to have UIM coverage and stacking benefits. 

See Policy Declarations Page, at 1-3. Thus, we must interpret the Policy in 

the context of Pennsylvania law to determine whether Baclit, as the sole 

officer, must be regarded as an insured under the Policy and therefore entitled 

to stacked UIM benefits.

9

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9 As the Policy covered only one vehicle and stacking premiums were paid, 

“there can be no intra-policy stacking ... because there is no second motor 

vehicle with UIM benefits covered by that single insurance policy upon which 

to combine, or ‘stack,’ the UIM coverage from the first motor vehicle with UIM 

benefits.” Backmeier, 287 A.3d at 940; see also Donovan v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 256 A.3d 1145, 1153 (Pa. 2021) (noting that “there 

could be no intra-policy stacking with only one vehicle on ‘the policy’”) 

(citation omitted). Consequently, in this case, stacked benefits under the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Our Court has previously recognized that “the owner and/or officers of 

a corporation are ‘class one’ insureds[10] under a policy issued in the name of 

a corporation.” Miller v. Royal Ins. Co., 510 A.2d 1257, 1258 (Pa. Super. 

1986), aff’d, 535 A.2d 1049 (Pa. 1988) (per curiam order). In Miller, 

appellee Mary Ann Miller (“Miller”) was involved in an accident with an 

uninsured motorist while she was driving a vehicle owned by Wes II Air Freight 

(“Wes II”) and assigned to her husband, Wes II’s corporate secretary. Id. 

The vehicle was covered under a fleet vehicle insurance policy. Id. Without 

discussion of the policy language, this Court found that Miller was a class one

insured under the policy.

11

 Id. The Court went on to hold, however, that 

despite her status as an insured, she was not entitled to coverage because 

stacking was unavailable under a fleet insurance policy. Id. at 1258-59.

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Policy were only available through inter-policy stacking. Backmeier, 287 

A.3d at 939.

10 “Class-one insureds include (1) the named insured, (2) any designated 

insureds, and (3) the spouse and relatives of either, while residents of the 

same household.” Est. of O’Connell ex rel. O’Connell v. Progressive Ins. 

Co., 79 A.3d 1134, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

11 In making this determination, the Miller Court noted that our Supreme 

Court had previously reserved the question of whether the owner and/or 

officers of a corporation are class one insureds under a policy issued in a 

corporation’s name, stating “[t]hat other day has arrived in the form of the 

case sub judice.” Miller, 510 A.2d at 1258 (citing Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Contrisciane, 473 A.2d 1005, 1011 n.4 (Pa. 1984)).
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Although the Miller Court does not provide clear reasoning to support 

its finding that Miller was an insured, it appears that the Court found that 

owners/corporate officers constitute de facto named insureds under a

business automobile policy, and, as a result, the spouse of a corporate officer

was also a “class one insured.” See Lastooka v. Aetna Ins. Co., 552 A.2d 

254, 256 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1988) (observing that the Miller claimant was not, 

in the traditional sense, a named insured nor the family member of a named 

insured, and recognizing that finding Miller to be a class one insured was likely 

“based upon the unanswered question posed in Constriciane, that being, 

whether the officers of a corporation are class one insureds under a policy 

issued in the name of the corporation”).12

The facts of the instant case are far more compelling than Miller, as 

Baclit was the sole officer and president of TKC Trucking, not one of many

corporate officers. Nor was he the family member of a corporate officer. 

Indeed, Baclit was the person responsible for paying the premiums for the 

Policy and was the one who declined to waive UIM and stacking coverage for 

TKC Trucking. See O’Connell, 79 A.3d at 1139 (“The significance of the 

class-one designation lies in that there is a correlation between the premiums 

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12

 The Lastooka Court took issue with the conclusory holding in Miller that 

the wife of a corporate officer to be a class one insured under a corporate 

policy of insurance. See Lastooka, 552 A.2d at 256 n.1. We recognized, 

however, that Miller has not been expressly overruled, and we are therefore 

“compelled to follow Miller because the principle is stated so broadly and 

unequivocally.” Id.
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paid by the insured and the coverage a claimant could reasonably expect to 

receive.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Contrisciane, 

473 A.2d at 1010 (identifying one of the bases for stacking, as determined by

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, to be “that the intended beneficiary of an 

uninsured motorist policy is entitled to multiple coverage when multiple 

premiums have been paid”).

Further, United’s reliance on Hunyady and Bowers is unavailing, as 

those cases are wholly distinguishable. See Bowers, 758 A.2d at 214-17 

(holding that the ward of a rehabilitation center was not “family” as defined 

by the center’s insurance policy and thus not entitled to stacked UIM coverage 

after being struck by a vehicle); Hunyady, 578 A.2d at 1312-13 (finding that 

wife of a corporate officer who had unlimited use of a company vehicle insured 

to the corporation was not entitled to stacked UIM benefits following a car 

accident in which she was driving her personal vehicle because she had no 

reasonable expectation of coverage under the corporate policy).

13 We are 

bound by the Miller decision and therefore conclude that Baclit, as the sole 

____________________________________________

13

 We note that the Hunyady Court’s decision contradicts the holding in 

Miller. Curiously, Hunyady stated that Miller “did not ... make a specific 

determination as to whether the “class one” designation applied to the 

claimant, wife of a corporate officer, who was driving a company car at the 

time of her accident.” Hunyady, 480 A.2d at 1314. As our discussion of 

Miller above reflects, the Court did so hold, but ultimately held that the 

designation did not matter because stacking was unavailable for fleet policies. 

See Miller, 510 A.2d at 1258.
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officer and president of TKC Trucking, was a named insured under the Policy. 

See Miller, 510 A.2d at 1258; Lastooka, 552 A.2d at 256 n.1; see also 

Commonwealth v. May, 271 A.3d 475, 482 (Pa. Super. 2022) (stating that 

a three-judge panel of this Court “is bound by existing precedent and, 

therefore, lacks the authority to overturn another panel decision”).

14

To conclude otherwise would, as the trial court found, render the 

stacking benefit under the Policy illusory. United argues that coverage would 

not be illusory, as stacked UIM coverage would have been available if Baclit 

had been operating a vehicle insured under the Policy at the time of the 

accident. United’s Brief at 28. This contention, however, ignores the 

distinction between UIM coverage and stacked UIM coverage under the 

MVFRL. 

As to UIM coverage, our Supreme Court has explained:

UM/UIM coverage is triggered when the tortfeasor’s liability 

coverage is not sufficient to cover the injuries incurred in an 

accident. Once implicated, the provision of underinsured motorist 

coverage is governed by Section 1733 ... . [T]he “policy covering 

a motor vehicle occupied by the injured person at the time of the 

accident” is in first priority (“First Priority UIM policy”), regardless 

of whether the injured person would otherwise be an “insured” 

under the policy. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1733(a)(1). ... If the injuries 

exceed the coverage of the First Priority UIM policy, then the 

injured person may seek recovery under a “policy covering a 

____________________________________________

14

 While this is not the precise basis for the trial court’s decision below, the 

law is clear that “we may affirm a trial court’s ruling on any basis supported 

by the record on appeal.” Lynn v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 70 A.3d 814, 823 

(Pa. Super. 2013).
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motor vehicle not involved in the accident with respect to which 

the injured person is an insured” (“Second Priority UIM policy”). 

75 Pa.C.S. § 1733(a)(2).

Generette v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 957 A.2d 1180, 1189 (Pa. 2008). In 

the facts as presented in the case at bar, the First Priority UIM policy was 

Hagwood’s State Farm policy, as that was the vehicle Baclit occupied at the 

time of the accident,

15 and the Policy constitutes a Second Priority UIM policy. 

In the scenario presented by United in its brief, the Policy would be the 

First Priority UIM policy. The concept of “stacking,” however, does not come 

into play unless the insured has “more than one vehicle ... insured under one 

or more policies providing uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.” 75 

Pa.C.S. § 1738(a). In United’s hypothetical, the insured (Baclit) would be 

____________________________________________

15

 A person is considered to have been “occupying” a vehicle if, while lawfully 

using an insured vehicle,

(1) there is a causal relation or connection between the injury and 

the use of the insured vehicle;

(2) the person asserting coverage must be in a reasonably close 

geographic proximity to the insured vehicle, although the person 

need not be actually touching it;

(3) the person must be vehicle oriented rather than highway or 

sidewalk oriented at the time; and

(4) the person must also be engaged in a transaction essential to 

the use of the vehicle at the time.

Contrisciane, 473 A.2d at 1009 (citation omitted).
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seeking “primary” UIM coverage under the Policy as a single policy of 

insurance that insures a single vehicle. See Nationwide Ins. Co. v. 

Schneider, 906 A.2d 586, 590 (Pa. Super. 2006) (noting that a recovery from 

insurance covering the insured’s vehicle involved in the accident was the 

appellant’s “primary UIM insurer” under section 1733). Following the 

hypothetical through to its logical conclusion, Baclit would thereafter seek 

“stacked” UIM coverage from Hagwood’s State Farm Policy and his motorcycle 

policy through Progressive. Simply stated, as a driver or operator of a vehicle 

insured under the Policy involved in an accident wherein Baclit was not at 

fault, he would recover First Priority UIM coverage from the Policy under 

sections 1731 and 1733, not stacked UIM coverage under section 1738.

16

 

Consequently, there is no mechanism for any individual to utilize the

stacking benefits paid for by TKC Trucking under the Policy. As our Supreme 

Court held in Gallagher, this constitutes a de facto waiver of stacking benefits 

in violation of the MVFRL. See Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 132.

In Gallagher, our Supreme Court was presented a question as to the 

validity of “household vehicle” exclusion in a personal automobile insurance 

policy. In that case, Brian Gallagher (“Gallagher”) purchased two policies from 

GEICO, one for his motorcycle and one for his automobile. Id. at 132-33. 

____________________________________________

16

 The two concepts are unquestionably distinct, as evidenced by the fact that 

the MVFRL requires insureds to execute separate waivers for UIM coverage 

(under section 1731(c)) and stacked UIM coverage (under section 1738(d)). 

See supra, pages 13-14.
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Gallagher “opted and paid for stacked UM and UIM coverage when purchasing 

both policies.” Id. at 133. Gallagher was operating his motorcycle when 

William Stouffer (“Stouffer”) drove through a stop sign without stopping and 

collided with Gallagher, causing Gallagher serious injuries. Id. at 132. 

Because Stouffer was underinsured, Gallagher sought stacked UIM coverage 

under his motorcycle and automobile policies. Id. at 133. GEICO paid 

Gallagher’s UIM claim under his motorcycle policy; however, it denied the UIM 

claim under his automobile policy based on the household vehicle exclusion. 

Id. 

The exclusion contained in the insurance contract stated: “This coverage 

does not apply to bodily injury while occupying or from being struck by a 

vehicle owned or leased by you or a relative that is not insured for 

Underinsured Motorists Coverage under this policy.” Id. (citation omitted). 

GEICO determined that Gallagher suffered bodily injury while occupying his 

motorcycle, which was not insured under his automobile policy, and the 

household vehicle exclusion therefore precluded him from receiving stacked 

UIM coverage. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in GEICO’s 

favor in an ensuing declaratory judgment action, and this Court affirmed. Id.

at 134-35.

Our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal and ultimately held that 

the “household vehicle” exclusion was unenforceable under section 1738 of 

the MVFRL because, under the facts of the case, the exclusion impermissibly 
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acted as a de facto waiver of stacked UIM coverage. Id. at 132, 137-38. More 

specifically, the Court concluded:

Here, it is undisputed that: (1) Stouffer, the tortfeasor who 

caused the accident, was underinsured; (2) Gallagher did not sign 

the statutorily-prescribed UIM stacking waiver form for either of 

his GEICO policies; and (3) he would have received the UIM 

coverage that he bought and paid for under both of his GEICO 

policies pursuant to [s]ubsection 1738(a) of the MVFRL, save for 

the “household vehicle exclusion” found in an amendment to the 

[a]utomobile [p]olicy for which no explicit, formal 

acknowledgement was provided....

This policy provision, buried in an amendment, is 

inconsistent with the unambiguous requirements [s]ection 1738 

of the MVFRL under the facts of this case insomuch as it acts as a 

de facto waiver of stacked UIM coverage provided for in the 

MVFRL, despite the indisputable reality that Gallagher did not sign 

the statutorily-prescribed UIM coverage waiver form. Instead, 

Gallagher decided to purchase stacked UM/UIM coverage under 

both of his policies, and he paid GEICO premiums commensurate 

with that decision. He simply never chose to waive formally 

stacking as is plainly required by the MVFRL.

One of the insurance industries’ age-old rubrics in this area 

of the law is that an insured should receive the coverage for which 

he has paid. Here, GEICO argues against this maxim by invoking 

the household vehicle exclusion to deprive Gallagher of the 

stacked UIM coverage that he purchased. This action violates the 

clear mandates of the waiver provisions of [s]ection 1738. 

Indeed, contrary to [s]ection 1738’s explicit requirement that an 

insurer must receive an insured’s written acknowledgement that 

he knowingly decided to waive UM/UIM coverage, the household 

vehicle exclusion strips an insured of default UM/UIM coverage 

without requiring an insurer to demonstrate, at a bare minimum, 

that the insured was even aware that the exclusion was part of 

the insurance policy. This practice runs contrary to the MVFRL 

and renders the household vehicle exclusion invalid and 

unenforceable. In fact, this case is a prime example of why 

household vehicle exclusions should not and cannot operate as a 

pretext to avoid stacking.

Id. at 137-38 (citation omitted).
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In the absence of finding Baclit was an insured under the Policy pursuant 

to Miller, the language of the Policy (defining an “insured” in a corporate 

policy for purposes of stacking UIM benefits) operates as a de facto waiver of 

stacking coverage because, as in Gallagher, there is no ability for anyone to 

obtain stacked UIM benefits, despite the fact that United did not obtain the 

requisite waiver in direct violation of section 1738. See id. To the contrary, 

as in Gallagher, Baclit paid the increased premiums to obtain stacked UIM 

benefits under the Policy, and, as the sole officer of the company and the one 

who made the payments, reasonably expected to receive such benefits. See 

id. Therefore, unless Baclit is a named insured under the Policy, United’s 

limited definition of who can constitute an “insured” for purposes of collecting 

stacked UIM benefits under this single-vehicle business automobile policy 

would violate the MVFRL. See Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 138 (“There simply is 

no reason that insurers cannot comply with the Legislature’s explicit directive 

to offer stacked UM/UIM coverage on multiple insurance policies absent a 

knowing [s]ection 1738 waiver[.]”). 

Based on the foregoing, we find no error of law or abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s decision. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order granting 

Administrator’s motion for summary judgment on his claim for stacked UIM 

benefits under the Policy and denying United’s motion for summary judgment.

Order affirmed.
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DATE: 08/16/2024