2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-26-2002

Mancuso v. Comm Social Security

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 02-2088

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Mancuso v. Comm Social Security" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 773.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/773
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 __________ 

 No. 02-2088 

 __________ 

 

 NANCY MANCUSO, 

 o/b/o MATTHEW M. MANCUSO, a minor, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

 

 *JOANNE B. BARNHART, 

 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

 

 * (Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43(c)) 

 __________ 

 

 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-02303 

 District Judge: The Honorable Gustave Diamond 

 __________ 

 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 November 20, 2002 

 __________ 

 

Before: BARRY, AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and ACKERMAN, District Judge 

 (Opinion Filed: November 26, 2002) 

 ____________ 

 OPINION 

 ____________ 

BARRY, Circuit Judge 

 We dispense with a full recitation of the facts of this case because we write for the 

parties, who are already familiar with them. This action was brought by appellant Nancy 

Mancuso on behalf of her son, Matthew Mancuso, under 42 U.S.C. 1383(c)(3), seeking 

review of the Commissioner’s denial of her claim for child’s supplemental security 

income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 

 Ms. Mancuso claims that her son has been afflicted with attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD") since April 1, 1995, and we agree that he surely has 

had his share of problems over the years. Her initial application for benefits was denied 

both initially and upon reconsideration, and an administrative hearing was held. On 

March 30, 2000, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued a determination that 

although Matthew suffered from ADHD and a bipolar disorder, his impairments were not 

of such severity that he was disabled and, thus, entitled to benefits. The Appeals Council 

found that there was no basis to review the ALJ’s decision. Ms. Mancuso filed this 

action in the United States District Court with the parties thereafter filing cross-motions 

for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Commissioner’s motion and 

denied Ms. Mancuso’s motion. Ms. Mancuso timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and will affirm. 

 Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 

Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the "Act") on August 22, 1996. See 42 U.S.C. 

1382(a)(3)(C). The Act amended the statutory standard such that children seeking SSI 

benefits due to a disability must demonstrate a medically determinable impairment 

"which results in marked and severe functional limitations," and which meets the 
statutory duration requirement of 12 months. Id. The Social Security Administration 

published interim final rules to implement the childhood disability provisions of the 1996 

Act on February 11, 1997. See 62 Fed.Reg. 6408; 20 C.F.R. 416.902, .906, .924(a) 

(2000). These rules articulated a new three-step sequential evaluation process pursuant to 

which a qualifying claimant must demonstrate: (1) that he or she is not working; (2) that 

he or she has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments; and (3) that his or 

her impairment or combination of impairments is of "listing-level" severity, which 

essentially means that the impairment meets, medically equals, or functionally equals the 

severity of an impairment in the Listings of Impairments found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1, Regulations No. 4; 20 C.F.R. 416.924 (2000). 

 Functional equivalence is demonstrated where a child has two "marked" 

limitations or one "extreme" limitation in a broad area of functioning, such as cognition/ 

communication; motor; social; personal; and concentration, persistence and pace. See 20 

C.F.R. 416.926a. Applying the interim final rules, the ALJ found that Matthew did 

not have a medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of 

impairments which resulted in marked or extreme functional limitations. 

 The narrow issue before us, albeit presented in various ways, is whether this 

determination by the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence in the record of this case. 

Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir.1999) (citing Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 

43, 46 (3d Cir.1994)). This is the same standard of review employed by the District 

Court. Id.; 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Substantial evidence must be "more than a mere 

scintilla" and has been interpreted to mean "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate." Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427 (internal quotations omitted). See 

also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.389, 401 (1971). 

 Ms. Mancuso argues that because Matthew has marked limitations in two of the 

relevant areas of functioning, he has the functional equivalent of a listed impairment 

from Listing 112.11. This argument is unavailing, essentially for the reasons set forth 

in the thorough and thoughtful opinion of the District Court; indeed, there is ample 

evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination that because Matthew had no 

marked limitation in any designated area of functioning, he was not afflicted with the 

functional equivalent of a listed impairment. 

 Matthew’s cognitive capabilities were attested to by his teachers and doctors who, 

at bottom, concurred that whatever psychological and academic problems Matthew had, 

his cognitive capabilities were not limited. Furthermore, in the area of motor skills, the 

ALJ correctly found that while Matthew may have had a mild restriction, this was not 

sufficient to be deemed "marked." Record evidence, consisting of findings and 

observations by Doctors Sopher and Skloma, bears out this conclusion. 

 The ALJ also correctly found that while Matthew evinced "difficulties in social 

functioning . . . [c]onsidered as a whole, the evidence indicates that the degree of 

impairment . . . is less than marked." Indeed, Matthew’s interpersonal relationships and 

interactions were characterized by his teachers and doctors as within the realm of normal 

and appropriate. The ALJ’s finding that no marked limitation existed in the category of 

personal functioning was similarly supported. Dr. Sopher and the state agency 

physicians concurred that Matthew did not have a significant limitation in this area, and, 

as the District Court noted, Matthew, then sixteen years of age, "drove himself to the 

appointment with Dr. Sopher, arrived in a timely manner and presented with a neat 

physical appearance." Finally, with reference to the ALJ’s determination that Matthew 

had no marked limitation in the area of concentration, persistence, and pace, the District 

Court concluded that while there was some conflicting evidence, "[e]ven assuming . . . 

that plaintiff has a marked degree of limitation in [this] area . . ., a finding of disability 

would not be warranted . . . because plaintiff must have a marked limitation of 

functioning in at least two areas of development before a finding of functional 

equivalency would be appropriate". 

 In sum, based upon the evidence in the record, the ALJ correctly found that 

Matthew did not have an impairment or combination of impairments which met, 

medically equaled, or functionally equaled any impairment contained in the Listings. 

The ALJ’s determination that Matthew is "not disabled" and is thus not eligible for SSI 

benefits is supported by substantial evidence. 

 For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order of 
February 19, 2002. 

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 

 Kindly file the foregoing Opinion. 

 __________________________ 

 Circuit Judge