IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-10517

DIANE WEAVER, formerly known as Diane Hickey, 

 Plaintiff-Counter Defendant–Appellant

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Defendant-Counter Claimant–Appellee

UNKNOWN PAYEE, 

 Defendant–Appellee

METROPOLITAN TOWER LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, formerly known 

as Metropolitan Insurance and Annuity Company, 

 Counter Claimant–Appellee

v. 

JAMES M. PERRY, 

 Counter Defendant–Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 20, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Before DAVIS, HIGGINSON, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges. 

DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:

This contract-interpretation case under Texas law concerns Diane 

Weaver’s then-husband Larry Hickey, who suffered a diving accident in 1989. 

The couple received a structured settlement from the premises owner and its 

insurers. The couple later divorced, and Larry passed away in 2014. The issue 

is whether the settlement agreements gave Larry the right to replace Weaver 

as beneficiary of an annuity.

Before deciding the merits, we must decide if the district court had 

diversity jurisdiction. Weaver initially sued Metropolitan Life Insurance 

Company and the “Unknown Payee” receiving the annuity payments. Met Life 

removed the case, then interpleaded James Perry—Larry’s brother and the 

previously unknown payee. Weaver and Perry are both Texans. But, under the 

diversity and removal statues, the parties were diverse throughout this action.

And the district court thus had jurisdiction.

Turning to the merits, summary judgment was correctly granted based 

on the settlement agreements. These documents, read as a cohesive, 

contextual, harmonious whole, grant Larry the unilateral right to change the 

beneficiary. We decline to rewrite the agreements under the guise of 

interpreting them.

We AFFIRM the judgment.

I

In 1989, Larry suffered a diving accident that left him quadriplegic. 

Weaver and Larry sued the premises owner for negligence. Larry sought 

damages for pain, disfigurement, lost income, and medical expenses. Weaver 

sought damages for loss of consortium, mental pain, and loss of monetary 

contributions. They obtained a settlement and dismissed the case. Four 

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documents comprise the settlement—the Release, the Settlement Agreement, 

the Assignment, and the Annuity. Their contents overlap somewhat.

In the Release, Weaver and Larry released their claims in exchange for 

$850,000. Weaver, Larry, and their attorney were to receive $300,000 

immediately, and Met Life was to receive $550,000 from another insurer, 

Metro Tower, to fund an annuity. 

In the Settlement Agreement, Weaver and Larry agreed to dismiss the 

case in exchange for those payments. The premises owner’s insurer, Wausau 

Lloyds Insurance Companies, agreed to give Larry monthly payments for the 

longer of either his lifetime or 30 years. The Settlement Agreement addresses 

beneficiaries and changes:

If Larry Hickey dies before receiving all payments set forth in this 

paragraph, such payments shall be made as due to Diane Hickey 

[Weaver], his wife, if living, otherwise to the Estate of Larry 

Hickey, upon proof of death being furnished to Wausau Lloyds 

Insurance Company, or its assignee. Claimant reserves the right 

to request to change the beneficiary of future periodic payments.

The Settlement Agreement does not define “Claimant.” It goes on to provide 

that Wausau Lloyds would assign its duty to make payments to Metropolitan 

Insurance and Annuity Company, later renamed Metropolitan Tower Life 

Insurance Company. Metropolitan Tower would fund the periodic payments by 

purchasing an annuity contract from Met Life.

In the Assignment, Wausau Lloyds assigned its duty to make payments 

to Metropolitan Tower. The Assignment identifies Larry as the “Claimant” in 

its parties list. Its addendum provides who to pay: “Payee: Larry Hickey, if 

living, otherwise to Diane Hickey, his wife. If Diane Hickey is not living, then 

payments shall be made to the Estate of Larry Hickey.”

In the Annuity, Met Life agreed to make payments. The Annuity 

provides that the “Measuring Life” is Larry; “Owner” is Metropolitan Tower; 

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and “Beneficiary” is “Diane Hickey, wife if living; otherwise the Estate of Larry 

Hickey.” If the Measuring Life died before the 30 years expired, Met Life 

agreed to make payments to the beneficiary.

In 1999, Weaver and Larry divorced. Among the divorce decree’s 

property distributions, Larry received “[a]ny property not otherwise awarded 

herein” that was in his possession or sole control.

In 2002, unbeknownst to Weaver, Larry requested to change the 

annuity’s beneficiary from her to his brother Perry. In 2014, Larry died. 

Weaver, believing she was now entitled to the annuity payments, demanded 

payment from Wausau Lloyds and Met Life. Met Life responded that it could 

not direct payments to Weaver because the beneficiary had been changed.

Weaver initially sued Met Life and “Unknown Payee” in Texas state 

court. She asserted one cause of action: breach of contract against “Defendant.” 

As used in the petition, “Defendant” meant Met Life. In a factual allegation, 

not a count or claim, she alleged that Unknown Payee was “believed to be a 

resident of the State of Texas who is currently receiving the periodic payments 

the subject of this suit.” She did not assert a cause of action against Unknown 

Payee.

Met Life removed the case to federal court. It alleged diversity 

jurisdiction because Weaver is a citizen of Texas and Met Life is a citizen of 

New York. It asserted that Unknown Payee was a defendant sued under a 

fictitious name, who must be disregarded for diversity purposes under 28 

U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1). Alternatively, it alleged that diversity jurisdiction existed 

because Weaver’s petition asserted no claims against Unknown Payee.

The day after Met Life removed the case, Met Life and Metropolitan 

Tower (the Met Life parties) filed an amended answer and counterclaim. The 

counterclaim was an interpleader action against Weaver and Perry. This 

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pleading was both Metropolitan Tower’s and Perry’s first appearance in the 

case. It alleged that diversity jurisdiction remained proper because the Met 

Life parties, citizens of New York and Delaware, were diverse from Weaver 

and Perry, citizens of Texas. 

After learning Perry’s identity from the answer and counterclaim, 

Weaver moved to amend her complaint to assert a claim against Perry for 

money had and received. She also moved to remand the case to state court 

because Perry’s joinder destroyed diversity. The district court granted leave to 

amend but denied the motion to remand. It held that diversity jurisdiction over 

the interpleader action, combined with supplemental jurisdiction over the 

money-had-and-received claim, made remand unnecessary.

The district court later granted summary judgment to the Met Life 

parties and Perry. It denied Weaver’s motion for summary judgment. Weaver 

appealed the order denying remand, the summary judgment orders, and the 

final judgment.

II

The district court held it had jurisdiction based on diversity; Weaver 

challenges that decision on appeal. 

We “review the denial of a motion to remand de novo.”1 Similarly, we 

“review[] de novo an order granting summary judgment, ‘applying the same 

standard as the district court.’”2 Summary judgment is proper if “there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.”3

 

1 Miller v. Diamond Shamrock Co., 275 F.3d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 2001).

2 SCA Promotions, Inc. v. Yahoo!, Inc., 868 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Vela 

v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 666 (5th Cir. 2001)).

3 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

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III

We view the district court’s jurisdiction in three procedural stages.

Diversity jurisdiction existed at each stage.

A

Diversity jurisdiction was proper when Met Life removed the case. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), defendants may generally remove “any civil action 

brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have 

original jurisdiction.” District courts have original jurisdiction over civil 

actions between citizens of different states if the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000, which it did here.4

And, as Met Life correctly alleged, Unknown Payee could be disregarded 

for diversity purposes. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) provides that “[i]n 

determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of [diversity 

jurisdiction], the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be 

disregarded.”5 Although “John Doe” is a more common version, Unknown 

Payee is the kind of fictitious name this provision covers.6

Weaver suggests Met Life acted improperly by removing the case or 

waiting to identify Unknown Payee. But she relies on cases decided before the 

1988 enactment of § 1441(b)(1). That provision abrogated the earlier cases 

permitting fictitious defendants to defeat removal.7 In short, this case was 

 

4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

5 See also Vaillancourt v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 771 F.3d 843, 848 n.38 (5th Cir. 

2014) (stating “John and Jane Doe” defendants did not affect removability because fictitiousname defendants shall be disregarded and no claims were asserted against them).

6 See, e.g., Griffin v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2:13–cv–10002, 2013 WL 

2237974, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 21, 2013) (“‘Unknown Trustee’ and ‘Unknown Trust’ are 

precisely the type of ‘defendants sued under fictitious names’ that are not to be considered in 

determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1).”).

7 See, e.g., Wilson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 782 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989).

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removable because Met Life was diverse from Weaver; Unknown Payee was a 

fictitious-name defendant to be disregarded for diversity purposes; and, 

alternatively, Weaver’s state-court petition asserted no claim against 

Unknown Payee.

B

Diversity jurisdiction continued to be proper when the Met Life parties 

counterclaimed against Weaver and Perry. Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 22(a)(2), “[a] defendant exposed to [double or multiple] liability may 

seek interpleader through a crossclaim or counterclaim.” For Rule 22 

interpleader, diversity requires the stakeholder—the party seeking 

adjudication of multiple claims against it—to be diverse from the claimants.8

So Perry did not destroy diversity when the Met Life parties named him in 

their counterclaim. Weaver argues that interpleader was not raised in the 

notice of removal. But under Rule 22(a)(2), it was a separate claim that could 

properly be asserted later. 

C

And diversity jurisdiction remained proper when Weaver added her 

money-had-and-received claim against Perry. Initially, it is true that joining a 

new party can destroy diversity. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), “[i]f after removal 

the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy 

subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and 

 

8 Travelers Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 675 F.2d 633, 637 n.9 (5th Cir. 

1982) (stating district court had jurisdiction over Rule 22 interpleader because stakeholder 

was diverse from all claimants, although claimants were not diverse from each other); see 

Eikel v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 473 F.2d 959, 964 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973); 7 CHARLES ALAN 

WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1710 (3d ed. 2019). 

In statutory interpleader, the rule is opposite: At least two of the claimants must be 

diverse from each other. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 

523, 530 (1967).

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remand the action to the State court.” We explained in the past that “Congress 

has indicated that federal diversity jurisdiction is defeated so long as, after 

removal, fictitious defendants are replaced with nondiverse, named 

defendants.”9

But Weaver’s money-had-and-received claim was not a “joinder” as 

provided in § 1447(e). It was a new claim against an existing party. The district 

court correctly treated this as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction. When a 

district court has jurisdiction over one claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) authorizes 

supplemental jurisdiction over other claims so related to it “that they form part 

of the same case or controversy.” It is true that when jurisdiction is based on 

diversity, the statute excludes certain additional-party claims. Under 

§ 1367(b), there is no supplemental jurisdiction over

claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 

19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims 

by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such 

rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such 

rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims 

would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of 

section 1332.10

But, reading the pleadings literally, Perry was not “made [a] part[y]” under 

any of the rules in this exclusion.11 He was made a party by Met Life under 

Rule 22. 

It is also relevant that district courts generally have supplemental 

jurisdiction over transactionally-related crossclaims between interpleader 

 

9 Doleac ex rel. Doleac v. Michalson, 264 F.3d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Casas 

Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668, 674 (1st Cir. 1994)).

10 (emphasis added).

11 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).

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claimants.12 Weaver’s claim against Perry is not styled a crossclaim and may 

be distinguishable from one in some ways. But its practical similarity to a 

crossclaim between interpleader claimants is further support for supplemental 

jurisdiction. Both a literal reading of the 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) exclusion and a 

practical view of Weaver’s claim against Perry show that supplemental 

jurisdiction was proper.

Met Life threaded the procedural needle to establish diversity in this 

case. But diversity jurisdiction was proper for other reasons too. The court has 

a duty to realign the parties based on their sides in the dispute. In City of 

Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, the Supreme Court held that “[d]iversity 

jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the federal courts by the parties’ own 

determination of who are plaintiffs and who defendants. It is [the court’s] duty 

. . . to look beyond the pleadings, and arrange the parties according to their 

sides in the dispute.”13 We have elaborated that “[t]he objective of City of 

Indianapolis realignment is only to insure that there is a bona fide dispute 

between citizens of different states.”14 For diversity jurisdiction to be proper in 

this case, the real dispute must be Weaver and Perry against the Met Life 

parties.

It is fair to say that’s the case. The reason that diversity in Rule 22 

interpleader cases is measured between the stakeholder and the claimants is 

that the stakeholder has its own interest in the case—to be relieved of double 

 

12 See Travelers, 675 F.2d at 638 (stating that “ancillary” jurisdiction includes 

crossclaims arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the interpleader claim); 7 

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1715 (3d 

ed. 2019).

13 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941) (internal quotation marks omitted).

14 Zurn Indus., Inc. v. Acton Const. Co., 847 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1988).

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or multiple liability.15 That is the Met Life parties’ position here. It may seem 

odd that the interpleader counterclaim effectively pivoted the diversity 

analysis. But the counterclaim was proper as a formal matter, and it served at 

least some substantive interest.16

Our decision Eikel v. States Marine Lines, Inc. confirms the same 

principle in a non-interpleader context.17 It was a fee dispute between a 

Delaware- and Connecticut-citizen client and its Texan former lawyers.18 The 

court joined another Texan lawyer, who had a competing claim against the 

client, as an indispensable party.19 Despite his adversity to the other Texans, 

diversity jurisdiction remained proper.20 This was because the “crux” of the 

suit was to recover payment from the client—even though the client had 

admitted liability.21 The court said in dicta that a Rule 22 interpleader 

counterclaim by the client—exactly Met Life’s course of action here—would 

have simplified the case and preserved diversity.22

Existing law is relatively uniform that, in Rule 22 interpleader, a 

stakeholder diverse from the claimants supports diversity jurisdiction.23 And 

the interests here are not sufficient to put aside form and realign the parties 

as they were arranged in Weaver’s original suit.24

 

15 See Stewart Oil Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 315 F.2d 759, 761–62 (7th Cir. 1963); 7 

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1710 (3d 

ed. 2019). 

16 See Stewart, 315 F.2d at 761–62.

17 473 F.2d at 960–61.

18 Id.

19 Id. at 961.

20 Id. at 964.

21 Id. at 964–66.

22 Id.

23 See Travelers, 675 F.2d at 637 n.9; 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1710 (3d ed. 2019). 

24 Cf. Zurn, 847 F.2d at 237 (declining to realign parties where there was a bona fide 

dispute between diverse parties).

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IV

Since the district court had jurisdiction, we next review Weaver’s merits 

argument that summary judgment should not have been granted. “As this is a 

diversity case, [the court] interpret[s] the contract at issue under Texas law.”25

“If the written instrument is so worded that it can be given a certain or definite 

legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and the court will 

construe the contract as a matter of law.”26 “[C]ourts should examine and 

consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the 

provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless.”27

The first issue is whether Larry had a contractual right to change the 

beneficiary. The law begins with language. And whether the language is 

contractual, as here, or statutory, we give words their ordinary, natural 

meaning. “Text is the alpha and the omega of the interpretive process.”28 And 

when decoding language, judges “must be attentive not to words standing alone 

but to surrounding structure and other contextual cues that illuminate 

meaning.”29 Here, we decline to engraft what the parties declined to enact.

The Settlement Agreement provides that “Claimant reserves the right to 

request to change the beneficiary of future periodic payments.” After such a 

request, the right to accept or reject the change belongs to Metropolitan Tower. 

The question is whether “Claimant” means Larry alone or both Weaver and 

Larry.

The Claimant was Larry alone because the Settlement Agreement 

granted periodic payments to him alone. Under that agreement, the initial 

 

25 Gonzalez v. Denning, 394 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).

26 Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983).

27 Id.

28 United States v. Maturino, 887 F.3d 716, 723 (5th Cir. 2018). 29 Reed v. Taylor, 923 F.3d 411, 415 & n.16 (5th Cir. 2019).

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lump sum payment was for Weaver, Larry, and their attorney: “$300[],000.00 

Cash payment to Larry Hickey, Diane Hickey and Edward McAninch . . . .” But 

the periodic payments from the remaining $550,000 were for Larry alone while 

he lived: “Periodic Payments 1. Wausau Lloyds Insurance Company hereby 

agrees to make the following monthly payments to Larry Hickey . . . .” This 

description of the periodic payments heads the same paragraph that ends with 

“Claimant reserves the right to request to change the beneficiary of future 

periodic payments.” It suggests Larry is the Claimant. Finally, the Settlement 

Agreement links the term “Claimant” to the periodic payments’ sole recipient 

again two pages later. “The periodic payments to be received by Claimant 

pursuant to Periodic Payments . . . are not subject in any manner to [forms of 

assignment].” These provisions support the Claimant being Larry and not 

Weaver and Larry together.

And the Assignment explicitly defines “Claimant” to be Larry. Granted, 

the Assignment is a separate instrument from the Settlement Agreement 

(which contains the beneficiary-change provision). But the Assignment is part 

of the same settlement and central to Weaver’s contract theory here.30

Weaver generally contends that she shared in the right to the periodic 

payments. In the Settlement Agreement she gave consideration separate from 

Larry because she released her own claims for mental pain and loss of 

consortium. But the Settlement Agreement’s most natural reading is that she 

received the lump sum in return for those, and Larry received the periodic 

payments in return for his personal-injury claims.

 

30 Cf. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394 (“Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law 

for the court to decide by looking at the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances 

present when the contract was entered.”).

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Our plain-language reading honors Texas courts’ text-centric approach. 

The Supreme Court of Texas has observed that the interpretive role of judges 

“is to be neither generous nor parsimonious”31 but unswervingly faithful to 

what the words actually say. Looser atextual readings may scratch an 

equitable itch, or at times seem more pragmatic. But the Texas High Court 

adheres to this centuries-old principle—“law, without equity, though hard and 

disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public good, than equity without 

law: which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce the most infinite 

confusion.”32 Texas precedent is no-nonsense about giving words their most 

forthright, contextual meaning. Plain language forbids judicial ad-libbing. 

Here, the text is clear. And, at least in Texas, clear text = controlling text.33

Weaver also lacks a right to sue. Her operative complaint alleges breach 

of the Settlement Agreement, but Met Life and Metropolitan Tower are not 

parties to the Settlement Agreement. Weaver alternatively contends she is a 

third-party beneficiary of the Assignment and the Annuity. But Texas contract 

law from life insurance cases undermines this. “When an insured retains the 

right to change the beneficiary in a life insurance policy, a beneficiary 

ordinarily acquires no vested rights, by virtue of designation, in either the 

policy or its proceeds until the insured’s death . . . .”34 That is, a revocable lifeinsurance beneficiary has no vested contract right unless she is the designated 

beneficiary when the insured dies.35 By the same principle, an annuity 

 

31 BankDirect Capital Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d 76, 85 (Tex. 2017).

32 Id. at 86 (citing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 62 (4th ed. 1770)).

33 Id. at 84. 

34 Fid. Union Life Ins. Co. v. Methven, 346 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. 1961).

35 See id.

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beneficiary has no vested contract right if she is properly removed before the 

principal claimant dies.36

Larry requested a beneficiary change before Weaver had any vested 

right in the periodic payments. So Weaver has no rights under the Assignment 

or Annuity, which are the only agreements that bind the Met Life parties. This 

frustrates Weaver’s breach of contract claim. It also means Weaver cannot 

object to Met Life’s or Metropolitan Tower’s procedures for implementing 

Larry’s change request.37

Weaver cannot recover from Perry either. The money-had-and-received 

claim is based on Weaver’s right to receive the annuity payments after Larry’s 

death. Since Weaver had no such contractual right, she is not entitled to 

recover from Perry.38 Weaver’s declaratory judgment claim, based on the same 

contracts, also lacks merit.

V

We AFFIRM the judgment.

 

36 Cf. Royal Indem. Co. v. Bates, 314 F. App’x 732, 733 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that 

annuity payments vested only as they came due).

37 See Methven, 346 S.W.2d at 800 (holding plaintiff had no right to insist that change 

of beneficiary be endorsed on policy paper itself).

38 See Staats v. Miller, 243 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1951) (holding that money-had-andreceived claim asks “to which party does the money, in equity, justice, and law, belong”).

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