NO. 12-16-00283-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

VAN ZANDT HEALTH CARE 

PROPERTY, INC., D/B/A ANDERSON 

NURSING CENTER, 

APPELLANT

V.

MARY REDD AND RODNEY REDD,

APPELLEES

§

§

§

APPEAL FROM THE

COUNTY COURT AT LAW

VAN ZANDT COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Van Zandt Health Care Property, Inc., d/b/a Anderson Nursing Center (Van Zandt) 

appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Rodney and Mary Redd. In 

one issue, it argues that the trial court erred in granting the Redds’ motion for summary judgment. 

We dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

In October 2013, Van Zandt sued the Estate of Arletta Turner and Turner’s heirs, the 

Redds. In its petition, Van Zandt alleged that it had a contract to provide nursing care and 

maintenance for Turner and that the contract was breached when payments were not made in 

accordance with the contract’s terms.

In their answer, the Redds asserted a counterclaim for conversion. They also moved for 

summary judgment, alleging that Van Zandt’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations 

because suit was required to be brought within six months of Van Zandt’s appointment as 

dependent administrator of Turner’s estate. The Redds argued that this Court previously 

determined that Van Zandt’s claim was untimely and that, consequently, the current suit was also 
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barred under res judicata.1 Following a hearing, the trial court granted the summary judgment. 

This appeal followed.

JURISDICTION

Before we address Van Zandt’s sole issue, we first consider the Redds’ argument that the 

summary judgment order is not a final and appealable order and that this Court does not have 

jurisdiction over Van Zandt’s appeal.

Standard of Review and Governing Law

Appellate jurisdiction is never presumed. Beckham Group, P.C. v. Snyder, 315 S.W.3d 

244, 245 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2010, no pet.). Unless the record affirmatively shows the propriety 

of appellate jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. See id. This court’s jurisdiction is 

established exclusively by constitutional and statutory enactments. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. V, 

§ 6; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.220(c) (West Supp. 2016). Unless one of the sources of our 

authority specifically authorizes an interlocutory appeal, we only have jurisdiction over an appeal 

taken from a final judgment. See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); 

N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966).

“‘[A] judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and 

only if either (1) it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of 

its language, or (2) it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims 

and all parties.’” Farm Bureau Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 455 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. 2015) 

(quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93). “An order does not dispose of all claims and all 

parties merely because it is entitled ‘final’, or because the word ‘final’ appears elsewhere in the 

order, or even because it awards costs.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. “Rather, there must be 

some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the 

entire case.” Id.

Analysis

In this case, there is no unmistakably clear statement on the face of the trial court’s 

summary judgment order indicating that the trial court intended the order to be a final judgment 

as to all claims and parties. See Rogers, 455 S.W.3d at 163; see also Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 

205. Rather, the order simply states that Van Zandt’s claim is without merit and “the Motion for 

 

1 See In re Estate of Turner, No. 12-14-00055-CV, 2014 WL 3845803 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 6, 2014, 

pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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Summary Judgment of Rodney Redd and Mary Redd is granted.” Thus, the express terms of the 

order itself clearly indicate that it is not a final judgment.

Furthermore, the record does not indicate that the trial court’s order actually disposed of 

all claims and parties before the court. In their answer, the Redds asserted a counterclaim for 

conversion and sought an award of damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees. The summary 

judgment order, however, does not address or dispose of the Redds’ conversion claim. See

Garcia v. Equity Trust Co., No. 07-15-00184-CV, 2016 WL 736151, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Feb. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction because 

summary judgment order did not dispose of counterclaims).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s order did not state with 

unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and parties or actually dispose of 

all claims and parties then before the court. See Rogers, 455 S.W.3d at 163. Accordingly, we 

hold that the order is not a final or otherwise appealable interlocutory order. See id.; see also 

Dowtech Specialty Contractors, Inc. v. City of Nacogdoches, No. 12-15-00236-CV, 2016 WL 

3050061, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 27, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal 

for want of jurisdiction when judgment was not final or otherwise appealable); see also TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (West. Supp. 2016). For this reason, we lack jurisdiction to 

consider Van Zandt’s appeal. See Rogers, 455 S.W.3d at 163; see also Dowtech Specialty 

Contractors, Inc., 2016 WL 3050061, at *3.

DISPOSITION

Having held that the trial court’s order granting the Redds’ motion for summary judgment 

is not a final judgment or otherwise appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss this appeal for 

want of jurisdiction. 

GREG NEELEY

Justice

Opinion delivered May 24, 2017.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

MAY 24, 2017

NO. 12-16-00283-CV

VAN ZANDT HEALTH CARE PROPERTY, INC., D/B/A ANDERSON NURSING

CENTER,

Appellant

V.

MARY REDD AND RODNEY REDD,

Appellees

Appeal from the County Court at Law 

of Van Zandt County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. CV05010)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and the briefs filed 

hrein; and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that this court is without 

jurisdiction of the appeal, and that the appeal should be dismissed.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this court that 

this appeal be, and the same is, hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction; and that this decision 

be certified to the court below for observance.

Greg Neeley, Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.