1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) EDWARD A. COLLEY and FREDERICK D. MALCOMB, JR. , ) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 15-cv-1385 (TSC) ) DEBORAH LEE JAMES A ir Force Secretar y

, et al

. , ) ) ) ) Defendants. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se plaintiffs Edward A. Colley an d Frederick D. Malcomb, Jr. are r etired Air Force officers who were instructors in a n Air Force Junior Reserve Of ficer Training Corps (“AFJROTC”) unit. The Air For ce decertified Plaintiffs as AFJR OTC instructors after it found that they failed to timely submit certain records. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged the decision through an Air Force admini strative process and subseq uently filed this lawsuit against the Air Force and the two indi vidual decision makers, seeking r eversal of the decertification. 1 Plaintiffs bring claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq .; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U .S.C. § 2671 et seq .; the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq . and the Due Process clause of the Fifth and

1 Plaintiffs also named the Secret ary of the Air Force and an other Air Force official as defendants, but there is no indi cation these two individuals we re involved in the decertification or the administrative process.2 Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 2 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 194-96, 101-02, 203a, 222, 239a, 239c-239d, 242a). Before the court are the followi ng motions: (1) Defendants’ Mot ion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment or to Transfer Venue (ECF No. 6); (2) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF N o. 16); (3) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Request for a Hearing (ECF No. 20) ; and (4) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Telephone Status Conference (ECF No. 23). 3 For the reasons set forth below , the court will GRANT Defenda nts’ motion to transfer this action t o the Central Distric t of California and DENY Plaintiffs’ motions.
A. BACKGROUND Colley and Malcomb were employe d by the Hart School District in Valencia, California as JROTC instructors. (Am. C ompl. ¶¶ 19, 23-24). Pursuant to federal law, all JROTC instructors “must be certifie d by the Secretary” of that branch “as a qualified instructor” in areas such as leadership, civics a nd ROTC related topics. 10 U.S.C. § 2033(a). The Secretary for each branch of the military is responsible for “establish[ing] minim um acceptable standards for

2 The court will dismiss Plainti ffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim because such claims are not actionable agai nst the federal government. See Peavey v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 180, 186 n.6 (D.D.C. 2009) (“It is the due process clause of th e Fifth, not the Fourteenth, Amendment that applie s to actions of the f ederal government.”), aff’d, No. 09–5389, 2010 WL 3155823 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2010).

3 In response to the Air Force’ s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff s filed an Amended Complaint as of right, along with a 96-page re sponse to the Air Force’s moti on. ( See ECF Nos. 9, 10). Normally, this court would have found the Air Force’s motion mo ot and ordered the Air Force to answer or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint. However, because the Air Force raised a venue issue in their Motion t o Dismiss, which remained unsett led despite the Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and their res ponse to the motion, the court o rdered the Air Force to file a reply limited to Plainti ffs’ venue arguments. While Defendants’ motion w as pending, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 16), which they later withdr ew after filing a second prelim inary injunction motion (ECF No. 20 p. 1), now fully briefed by all parties.3 performance and achievement f or qualified [ROTC] units.” 10 U.S .C. § 2031(c)(1)-(3). Consistent with this authority, the Secretary of the Air Force publishes AFJROTC “Instructions” that cover management of the ROTC units. “ COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION
IS MANDATORY ” appears in bold near the top of those instructions. (AR 321, AFJROTC 36- 2002; AR 275, AFJROTC 36-2001; A R 177, AFJROTC 36-2001). 4 Although Plaintiffs are not Air For ce employees, the Air Force reimburses the school district for part of Plaintiffs ’ instructor salaries. ( See Am. Compl. ¶ 15). Air Force ROTC instructors must: (1) “meet t he criteria established by appropr iate instructions and meet certification . . . requirements t o perform instructor duty”; a nd (2) “meet and maintain school and Air Force requirements and sta ndards.” (AR 331, AFJROTC 36-200 2, ¶ 2.1.1; AR 339, AFJROTC 36-2002, ¶ 4.4). The Air F orce’s “Holm Center” or “Hea dquarters” (“HQ”) manages instructor compliance and may decertify instructors “for cause. ” (AR 331, AFJROTC 36-2002 ¶ 2.1.2; AR 332, AFJROTC 36-2002 ¶ 2.2.2; AR 335-36, AFJROTC 36-2 002, ¶ 3.1.1). As part of the ROTC program, the Plaintiffs used school equipme nt, as well as the Air Force’s “Automated Data Proces sing Equipment (ADPE).” (Am. Com pl. ¶ 27). Plaintiffs admit that “[t]he Air Force re quires accountability and safekee ping” of the ADPE. ( Id . ¶ 28). Specifically, instructors must “conduct an annual AIM Inventory ,” which includes accounting

4 At various times during the inc idents at issu e, three versio ns of the Instructions were in effect. AFJROTC 36-2001 was issued on September 8, 2010, updated August 1, 2011, and then replaced by Instructi on 36-2002 on October 11, 2013. (AR 177, 320). Instruction 36-2001 was re-issued on May 28, 2014, but it did not supersede Instruction 36-2002. (AR 275). The court will quote and cite to the instruction(s) in effe ct at the time of the relevant events. Additionally, when necessary to avoid confusion, the court will include the year i n its citation to the 36-2001 instructions: the current 36-2001 instruction will be cited as “AFJROTC 36-2001 (5/28/14)” and the prior 36-2001 instruction will be cited as “ AFJROTC 36-2001 (9/8/10)”4 for all computers, project ors, and digital cameras. (AR 206, AFJROTC 36-2001 (9/8/10) ¶ 13.4.5; AR 284, AFJROTC 36-2001 (5/28/14) ¶ 4.3.1).
1. 2014 PROBATION Malcomb claims that in Januar y 2014, he sent the unit’s AIM inv entory to Amy Frasier, the Equipment Control Officer (“ECO”), via facsimile and email, aft er which he telephoned her to confirm receipt. (AR 385-86, Malcomb Decl. ¶ 8; see AR 414). Several months later, on March 7, 2014, the AFJROTC Director sent an email to all units with a subject line that included “Annual IT equipment account compliance” and an April 10, 2014 deadline. (AR 149). The email explained that ADPE accountability was an Air Force requi rement that had to be completed by the deadline. ( Id .) The email also indicated t hat each unit was required to sub mit four documents in order to be considered “compliant”: (1) an eq uipment custodian appointment letter; (2) training certificates (one for each instructor); an d (3) an AIM inventory. ( Id .) The email further explained that a new submission process had been created in WINGS—a computerized software program—and instead of emailing or faxing their ADPE documents, all units had to upload documents to WINGS. ( Id .) Despite this, Malcomb asserts that he took no additional action because he had faxed and emailed the inventory on Janua ry 20, and the March 7 email did not state that Plaintiffs were not in compliance. (AR 414; AR 385-87 Malcomb Decl. ¶¶ 8, 24; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 55-56). Plaintiffs also claim they did not believe the email applied to them because they had already complied with the inventory s ubmission deadlines found in Air F orce Manual provision 33-153 (“AFM 33-153”). (AR 4, Colley D ec. ¶ 12; AR 386, Malcomb Decl. ¶ 12). As the court will discuss below, AFM 33-153 apparentl y contained more general gui delines about ADPE accountability than did the AFJRO TC instructions and the emails from HQ.5 On April 7, three days before the deadline, the AFJROTC Region 4 Director e mailed Plaintiffs and other units explai ning that WINGS showed their u nits had not started their ADPE accountability, despite prior warn ings that the April 10 deadli ne “was extremely important!” (AR 151). The units were warned t hat they should start the ADP E accountability process in order to “avoid any possible negative impacts.” ( Id .) It is undisputed t hat Plaintiffs were on spring break when the email was sent. (Am. Compl. ¶ 58). The day after the deadline, Apr il 11, the AFJROTC Director sen t noncompliant units, including Plaintiffs’, an ema il with the subject line: “ ADPE Missed Suspense.” (AR 153) (emphasis in original). The email stated: On 7 Mar we notified you of an AF level requirement to account for all AF owned ADPE. You were given a suspense of 10 April to complete your i nventory and update it in WINGS. As of today, 11 April, this requirement ha s not been completed for your ADPE account. . . . If you have not completed the suspense by 18 Apr, both instruct ors at your unit will be placed on probation until the unit’s ADPE account is fu lly compliant. If you fail to bring the ADPE account within compliance by 30 Apr, both instructors will be considered f or decertification

. (AR 153). Although Plaintiffs were on s pring break on April 11, the break ended on April 15, and both Plaintiffs saw the email upon their return. ( See Am. Compl ¶ 58). Even though the email explicitly stated the recipie nt units were non-compliant, both Plaintiffs claim that, once again, they did not believe their unit was out of compliance because t hey had faxed and emailed the equipment inventory in Janua ry. (AR 4, Colley Decl. ¶ 14; AR 3 86, Malcomb Decl. ¶ 14). On April 22, the Air Force plac ed both Plaintiffs on probation. (AR 155; Am. Compl. ¶ 61). In his email to the school pr incipal and Plaintiffs infor ming them of the suspension, the Director noted that “[a]ccounting f or ADPE is a strict Air Forc e compliance requirement. This is6 an annual recurring re quirement.” (AR 155). Finally, he warne d: “If the instruc tors fail to bring the ADPE account within comp liance by April 30, 2014, [HQ] will initiate decertification actions for both instructors.” ( Id . 156). Later that day, Malcomb emaile d the Director, indicating that because the unit had previously sent the AIM invent ory to ECO Frasier, he had though t his unit was “ahead of the game,” but that he intended to s ubmit another inventory. (AR 4 14). Malcomb also mentioned his “confusion on what documents were needed” and his discussio ns with Frasier about “how to upload [the documents] into WINGS.” ( See id .) Plaintiffs entered all of the required documents before the April 30 deadline and t he Air Force subsequently rem oved them from probation. (AR 158). The following month, the Directo r published a new set of instr uctions requiring that the units use WINGS to account for ADPE. (AR 275; AR 284, AFJROTC 36-2001 (5/28/14) ¶ 4.2.1). The instructions also requi red that instru ctors log in to WINGS and the instructors’ AFJROTC email account daily in orde r to remain current on all p olicies. (AR 299, AFJROTC 36-2001 (5/28/14) ¶ 7.2, ¶ 7.2.1).
2. 2015 DECERTIFICATION On March 14, 2015, the Regional Dir ector sent an email to the u nits providing instructions on how to determine whether they had complied with the ADPE requirements. (AR 160). Again, Plaintiffs contend tha t they believed the email d id not apply to them because they were purportedly in complianc e with AFM 33-153. (AR 5, Colley Decl. ¶ 24; AR 387, Malcomb Decl. ¶ 24). Plaintiffs also contend that the email w as unclear because it was labeled as a “‘reminder’ with no referen ce to what it purp orted to remi nd [Plaintiffs] of.” (ECF No. 10, Pls. Mot. to Dismiss SOF Respons e # 51) (hereinafter “Pls. SOF Resp.”). Although Plaintiffs7 admit Malcomb’s email account w as functioning, they defend thei r conduct in part by contending that Colley’s email account was “inactive or closed” at this time. ( Id .) (citing AR 506); ECF No. 22, Pls. Reply p. 12). On April 6, 2015, the AFJROTC Deputy D irector sent a n email to all units about the annual inventory “suspense” da te of April 10, reminding them th at the annual equipment inventory “ha[d] Air Force Level interest.” (AR 162) Plaintiffs allege they were on s pring break at the time the em ail was sent, and that Colley’s email was deactivate d. (Am Compl. ¶ 90; Pls. SOF Resp . #52) (citing AR 506). Although Plaintiffs admit there we re no problems with Malcomb’s email account, they claim he also did not receive the em ail. (ECF No. 22, Pls. Reply p. 12; Pls. SOF Resp. #52; see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 88-89, 95). They argue t hat even if they had receive d the email, they still were not on notice about the April 10 suspe nse date because, in their view, the suspense date conflicted with the published suspense date found i n the recently published ins truction, AFJROTC 36-2001 (5/28/14), which provided for submission of inventories between January 1 and April 30. (Pls. SOF Resp. #52; AR 284, AFJRO TC 36-2001 (5/28/14) ¶ 4.3.1). Spring break ended on April 12, 20 15. (Am. Compl. ¶ 90). On April 17, the AFJROTC Director sent the units, incl uding Plaintiffs’, an email with t he subject line in bold indicating a “missed suspense.” (AR 165). The email informed all recipient s that their unit had missed the suspense date and warned that if they did not comply by April 2 4, 2015, they would “certainly be placed on probation” and “considered for Decertification.” ( Id .) Recipients were asked to contact the Regional Director i f they had already completed the ir ADPE requirements. (AR 165- 66). Even though the Director sent t he email to what appears t o be Plaintiffs’ unit email address, Plaintiffs assert they did not rec eive the email at the time it was sent. (Pls. SOF Resp. #53; see8 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91-95; ECF No. 20, Pl s. Second Preliminary Injunc tion Br. p. 8) (hereinafter “Pls. PI Br.”). On April 24, 2015, Plaintiffs received an email from AFJROTC R egion 4 Director, Wayne Barron, stating that their unit had not started its ADPE compliance and asking them to call his cell phone number. ( See AR 168; Am. Compl. ¶ 97; AR 5-6 Colley Decl. ¶¶ 25, 28). Barron attached an email he had rec eived from the AFJROTC Direc tor, who warned “[t]oday is the last day to complete the su spense before probation and the AF suspense of 30 April (next Thursday) could generate some decertification[]s.” ( Id .) Colley claims that he “attempted to contact” Barron three days lat er, but was “unsuccessful.” (AR 6, Colley Decl. ¶ 29). On April 28, 2015, Plaintiffs uploade d their signed AIM invento ry and equipment custodian appointment letter t o WINGS. (AR 158; Am. Compl. ¶ 9 9). On May 7, 2015, Plaintiffs uploaded both of their training certificates. (AR 1 58). As a result of their late subm ission of the training certificat es, on May 18, 2015, Plaintiffs received a memorandum from AFJ ROTC Director Woods informing the m that they would be “Decertified for Unsatisfactory Instructor Performance” effecti ve the end of the academic year. (AR 95, 97). Woods noted that Plaintiffs had been placed on pro bation the previous year for failing to timely complete the ADP E suspense, “despite personal direction and phone calls from [the] Regional Director.” ( AR 95, 97). He concluded that Plai ntiffs’ continued inability to comply with AFJROTC requirement s was a clear indicator of unsat isfactory performance and therefore justified decertifica tion for failing to “meet the st andards expected of an Air Force officer and an Air Force Junior R OTC instructor per AFJROTC 36- 2002, paragraph 3.1.2.2.5.”9 (AR 95, 97). 5 Finally, Woods explained that Plaintiffs could appeal pursu ant to AFJROTC 36- 2002 Section 4.7.2, which allows for an appeal filed within 15 days of notification regarding the decertification. ( See id .) Plaintiffs filed timely administrative appeals, admitting that they had submitted their training certifications on M ay 7, but arguing that they had not violated the applicable submission requirements. Specifically, Pla intiffs argued that they had co mplied with AFM 33-153, which they contend does not require s ubmission of training certificat es. (AR 118-19, 121). 6 Moreover, Plaintiffs asserted that AFM 33-153 does not impose an April 30 deadline, but instead requires that units perform an annual e quipment inventory no later than 365 calendar days “from the date the commander signed the curr ent inventory listing.” (AR 118-2 0). Relying on AFM 33-153, Plaintiffs argued that they ne ver failed to meet any mandatory deadlines. Add itionally, despite the explicit warnings in the emails about possible decertificat ion, both Plaintiffs asserted that they “reasonably believed” the most serious sanction they faced for late ADPE submission was a frozen account and an opportunity t o correct any deficiencies. (AR 124, 137). Two days after Plaintiffs submitted their appeals, the decerti fications became effective. The following month, on June 30, 2015, AFJROTC Vice Commander H offman upheld the decertifications, finding that:

 Plaintiffs were decertified for failing to meet “the standards expected of an Air Force officer and an Air Force Juni or ROTC instructor per AFJRO TC136-2002, para 3.1.2.2.5 [the same provision cited by Woods], specificall y for not

5 AFJROTC 36-2002, Sections 3.1.2, 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.2.5 provi de that an instructor can be decertified for “willful misconduct,” including a “[d]eterminat on by Holm Center/JR that an instructor’s performance or c onduct does not meet the duties, r esponsibilities or conduct of an [instructor] as outlined in C hapter 1.” (AR 336). Chapter 1 r equires, inter alia , that instructors “meet standards as prescribed by a pplicable Department of Defen se (DoD), Air Force, AFJROTC and Holm Center instr uctions.” (AR 323-4, AJROTC 36-20 02, Section 1.1.3).

6 AFM 33-153 is not a part of the Administrative Record.10 complying with the AFJROTC requirements by failing to meet the ADPE suspense two years in a row de spite being reminded by HQ AFJROT C.”

 Plaintiffs were required to c omply with both the AFM and AFJROT C instructions, and that the latter may be more restrictive than the AFM. Thus, Hoffman rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that they met their o bligations because they complied with AFM 33-153.

 Although Plaintiffs had “substantia lly compl[ied] with HQ direc tives in general,” they had failed to “comply with a s pecific and clear HQ AFJROTC direction two years in a row. Other instruc tors who have failed to meet cons ecutive ADPE suspenses have been similarly decertified.”

 Plaintiffs were warned about pot ential decertif ication in both 2014 and 2015. (AR 143-44, 146-47). Hoffman noted t hat it was not in the best interest of the Air Force to expend numerous hours sending multiple emails continually remin ding instructors of their responsibilities. ( Id .)
B. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Plaintiffs ask the court to gran t a preliminary injunction requ iring the Air Force to set aside their decertifications. Inj unctive relief is an “extraor dinary and drastic remedy” that is “never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren , 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (quotation and citations omitted). Accordingl y, “the decision whether to gran t a preliminary injunction is a matter of discretion.” Sherley v. Sebelius , 644 F.3d 388, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Preliminary injunctions “shoul d be granted only when the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Cobell v. Norton , 391 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The movi ng party must demonstrate: ( i) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (ii) that he or she would suffer irrepar able injury absent the requested injunctive relief; (iii) that the balance of equities tips in h is or her favor; and ( iv) that the public interest would be furthered by the requested injunctive relief. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).11 1. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS Plaintiffs argue they are lik ely to succeed on the merits becau se they are innocent and because the Air Force violate d federal law by revoking their AF JROTC certifications. The court disagrees and addresses Plainti ffs’ claims and arguments below.
A. Paperwork Reduction Act Plaintiffs argue that the decer tifications were invalid because the Air Force’s ADPE accounting requirements violated t he Paperwork Reduction Act (“ PRA”), 44 U.S.C. § 3501, et
seq . The PRA “prohibits any federal agency from adopting regulati ons which impose paperwork requirements on the public unless th e information is not availa ble to the agency from another source within the Federal Government . . . .” Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 32 (1990). The statute describes these pape rwork requirements as a “collec tion of information” 44 U.S.C. § 3501(1), which is defined as: “(A) means the obtaining, causing to be obtained, soliciting, o r requiring the disclosure to third parties or the public, of facts or opinions by or for an agency, 7 regardless of form or format, calling for either— (i) answers to identical questions posed to, or identical reporting or recordkeeping require ments imposed on, ten or more persons, oth er than agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United St ates; or (ii) answers to questions posed to agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States which are to be used for general statistical purposes . . . .” 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (emphasis a dded). Thus, only under special circumstances does the PRA limit the collection of informati on from U.S. government employ ees.

7 The term “agency” includes “military department[s].” 44 U. S.C. § 3502(1).12 Where an agency seeks a “collecti on of information” as defined by the PRA, the agency “must submit [its] collection plan to OMB [Office of Management and Budget].’” CTIA-The
Wireless Ass’n v. F.C.C. , 530 F.3d 984, 987 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3507(e )(1)). If OMB approves the plan, it issues a control number for the infor mation collection request. See United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A. , 498 F. Supp. 2d 477, 488 (D. Conn. 2007) If a “collection of information” has not been approved by the O MB, “ no person shall be subject to any penalty for faili ng to comply” with the informat ion request. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(a). The statute defines a “penalty ” to include “the imposition by a n agency or court of a fine or other punishment; . . . [or the] suspen sion, reduction, or denial of a license, privilege , right, grant, or benefit.” 44 U.S.C. § 3502(14). A s Plaintiffs point out, in a ddition to these statutory restrictions, the regula tions further provide: Whenever a member of the public is protected from imposition of a penalty under this section for failure to comply with a collection of informa tion, such penalty may not be imposed by an agency directly, by an agency through judi cial process, or by any other person through administr ative or judicial process. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.6(d). Plaintiffs argue that because th e AFJROTC instructions and emai ls from HQ did not contain OMB control numbers, the Air Force’s requests for the t raining certifications and its deadlines violated the PRA, and t hat Plaintiffs were not oblig ated to submit the requested documents. Consequently, the Air Force cannot penalize them by suspending their certifications for failing to do so. Recognizing that the PRA only lim its the collection of informat ion from “employees of the United States” in certain i nstances, Plaintiffs contend the y are not government employees. Because the statute does not define the term, Plaintiffs cite t o several other sour ces in support of their position—none of which are compelling.13 First, Plaintiffs cite to the ROT C implementing statute, which provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a member employed b y a qualified institution pursuant to an aut horization under this subsection is not, while so employed, considered to be on active duty or inactive duty trai ning for any purpose. 10 U.S.C.A. § 2031(e)(5). They als o cite to the contract betwe en the school and the AFJROTC, which provides that they are em ployees of the school district, rather than Air Force employees. (Pls. PI Br. p. 12). However, neith er the ROTC implementing st atute nor the school contract addresses whether an ROTC inst ructor is considered a government employee for purposes of the PRA. Thus, Plaintiffs’ reliance on these two provisions is mis placed. Next Plaintiffs cite to Cavazos v. United States , 776 F.2d 1263, 1264 (5th Cir. 1985), which involved the question of whe ther the government may be he ld liable for the negligence of JROTC instructors under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA’). That case is not applicable to the facts or issues here, and therefore does not provide any us eful guidance on what constitutes a government employee for purposes of the PRA. Although Plaintiffs are not government employees in a literal s ense, the court remains unpersuaded that they can seek r efuge in the PRA, given the uni que facts of this case. The Supreme Court has described the PRA as limiting the collection of data from “the public.” Dole , 494 U.S. at 32; see also 5 C.F.R. § 1320.6(d) (protecting t he “public” from penalties as sociated with failing to comply with a data collection request) (emphasi s added). In this case, however, the requested information was not sought from the “public.” Th e Air Force is responsible for certifying Plaintiffs i n their roles as JROTC instructors, who in turn must follow JROTC directives. (AR 331, AFJRO TC 36-2002, ¶ 2.1.1; AR 339, AFJROTC 36-2002, ¶ 4.4). Additionally, the Air Force requ ires that the units provide mil itary instruction, 10 U.S.C. § 2031(b)(3), and in furtherance of t hat instruction, the Air For ce provides certain equipment,14 which instructors are require d to document and maintain. While the Air Force does not compensate Plaintiffs directly, it compensates them indirectly because it reimburses the school district for a portion of their salaries. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15). Thus, even though they are not technically government employees , Plaintiffs’ salaries are part ially subsidized by the government, they are caretakers of government property, and the y are subject to governmental laws and regulations. As such, they are more akin to governmen t employees than members of the public. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has explained, the PRA limits th e collection of information from the public when the information sought is avai lable from another source within the Federal Government. See Dole, 494 U.S. at 32, 38. Here, there is no evidence that the AIM Inventory and traini ng certifications are a vailable from anothe r source within the federal government, and a ruling in favor of Plaintiffs would jeopardiz e the federal government’s ability to maintain and account for public property. In enacting the PRA, Congress attempted to create a legislative scheme and administr ative procedures by which unnecessary and burdensome paperwork requirements would b e substantially diminishe d, if not eliminated. William F. Funk, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperw ork Reduction Meets Administrative
Law , 24 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 4 (1987). The documents and informa tion sought by the Air Force in this case can hardly be described as burdensome or unnecessa ry. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their PRA claim.
B. Administrative Procedure Act The court reviews the Air For ce’s decertification decision unde r Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See 5 U.S.C. § 706. Pursuant to the APA, a court must set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abus e of discretion,” “ otherwise not in15 accordance with law” “in excess of statutory authority,” or “wi thout observance of procedure[s] required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)-(D). The court’s review is “highly deferential” and begins with a presumption that th e agency’s actions are valid. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981). “In exercising its narrowly de fined duty under the APA, a court must consider whether the agenc y acted within the scope of its legal authorit y, whether the agency adequately explained its decision, whether the agency ba sed its decision on facts in the record, and whether the agency considered the relevant factors. ” Defenders of Wildlife v.
Babbitt , 958 F. Supp. 670, 679 (D.D.C. 1997) (some citations omitted) (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)); see Spadone v. McHugh , 864 F. Supp. 2d 181, 187 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted) ( “A decision is arbitrary or capricious under the APA if an agency failed to provide a reason ed explanation, failed to addr ess reasonable arguments, or failed to consider an important a spect of the case.”).
1. Plaintiffs’ APA Arguments Plaintiffs “bear the burden of e stablishing the invalidity of t he agency’s action.” Magneson v. Mabus , 85 F. Supp. 3d 221, 225 (D.D.C. 2015). Set forth below are t he Plaintiffs’ APA arguments, along with the cou rt’s analysis of each argument :

a. Plaintiffs allege they complied with the operative AFM guidelin es.

 Plaintiffs argue they complie d with AFM 33-153, which requires submission of an AIM Inventory once every 365 days a nd annual certification of t raining, but does not require submission of training c ertificates. (Pls. PI SOF # 6) . Therefore, their upload of the 2015 training certificates , on May 7 (after the April 30 deadline), did not violate Air Force guidelines. ( See AR 158).

 Plaintiffs contend that the pub lished policies can be “changed” only by rewriting the publication or issuing policy m emoranda. (Pls. PI Br. p. 34). They also argue that ECO Frasier “is the only indi vidual who is empowered by Air For ce regulation to direct ADPE compliance.” (Pls. PI Br. p. 7 n.8).16  Plaintiffs argue that because th e emails from HQ contained due dates and a training certificate documentation require ment that purpo rtedly conflict ed with AFM 33-153, they had no obligation to follow the directives in the emails.

 Plaintiffs also contend tha t they were not bound by AFJROTC 36- 2001 (5/28/14) ¶ 4.3.1 (one of the provisions Hoffm an cited in her denial of the appeal and which requires submission of the AIM documents by April 30), because it purportedly conflicts with AFM 33-153. (Pls . SOF Resp. #52; AR 284; AR 143 ). They also argue that even if they w ere bound by AFJROTC 36-2001 (5/28/14) ¶ 4.3.1, they complied because they submitted their inventories in a timely f ashion. Plaintiffs’ argument that they are bound only by the AFM guidel ines is unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the AFM is not part of the Administrative Re cord (“AR”), and therefore this court does not know precisely wha t the AFM provides, nor the ex tent to which it applies to ROTC units. In contrast, the AFJR OTC instructions appear in th e record and the first page of each version indicates that they are published “By Order of the Director Air Force Junior ROTC” and that compliance with the ins tructions is “Mandatory.” (AR 320, AFJROTC 36-2002; AR 275, AFJROTC 36-2001 (5/28/14); A R 177, AFJROTC 36-2001 (9/1/10 )). The court is unable to find a reason to conclude that, as a representative of the A ir Force Secretary, the Director of the AFJROTC lacked the authority to publish AFJROTC Instruction s, even if they are narrower than the provisions in the AFM. With respect to the emails from HQ, the court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument that Air Force guidelines prohibite d the Director from issuing the e mails. Citing AFI 33-360 (a different publication than they c ited previously), Plaintiffs p oint to a provisi on indicating that changes to Air Force “policie s, guidance or procedures found in official publications” can only be made by publication of rewritt en polices, interim guidance, Air Force Policy Memorandum and other official documents, whi le changes by “other vehicles/ mechanisms” are prohibited. (Pls. PI Br. p. 34).17 However, Plaintiffs did not raise t his argument in their admini strative appeal. ( See AR 117-141). Accordingly, it is not properly before this court be cause generally, “under the waiver doctrine, issues and arguments not made before the relevant mil itary correction board or administrative agency are deem ed waived and [cannot] not be rai sed in a judicial tribunal.”
Christian v. United States , 46 Fed. Cl. 793, 802 (2000) (citations omitted); see also Spadone , 864 F. Supp. 2d at 187 n.2 (refusing to cons ider claims not raised during the military administrative process). Even if Plaintiffs had raised t his argument, as noted above, th e Air Force manuals Plaintiffs cite are not a part of the AR and there is nothing i n the record explaining if and how the guidelines in those manuals appl y to the AFJROTC. Indeed, the manual that contains the guidelines on how to change Air F orce policies specifically ref erences a list of Air Force publications found in “Table 4.1, T able 4.2, and processed IAW, ” but those tables are not in the record. (Pls. PI Br. p. 34). More over, it is unclear what con stitutes a “chang e” to a policy. In this case, there is a reasonable argument that the emails did n ot “change” the requirement that units submit inventories betwee n January 1 and April 30 yearly, but instead supplemented the written AFJROTC instructions by requiring training certificates . This court is not convinced that this type of supplementation is valid only when issued through a formal policy revision process. Finally, Plaintiffs have cited no le gal authority that suggests the ECO is the only person empowered to direct ADPE compliance. Thus, they have not met t heir burden of establishing success on the merits with respect to their arguments that they were not require d: (1) to comply with AFJROTC instructions; (2) to comply with emails from the D irector; or (3) to submit training certificates.18 b. Plaintiffs allege they complie d with the training certificate s ubmission requirement. Plaintiffs point out that the AI M inventory the y uploaded into WINGS prior to the April 30 deadline in both 2014 and 2015 contai ned an affirmation that they had completed training. (Pls. PI. SOF # 8; AR 36, 54, 158). 8 Therefore, they argue that they satisfied the requirement that they submit “training cer tificates” by the same date. Again, Plaintiffs did not raise thi s argument in their administ rative appeal ( see AR 117- 141) and, therefore cannot assert it for the first time here. See Christian , 46 Fed. Cl. at 802; Spadone , 864 F. Supp. 2d at 187 n.2. Even if this argument were proper ly before this court, Plaintif fs have not pointed to any Air Force directive to support th eir argument that the training certification language on the AIM inventory satisfied the require ment to submit a “training certi ficate.” The existence of an AIM inventory, separate from the tra ining certificate, indicates th at the Air Force did not consider the AIM inventory a substitute for t he training certificate. Indee d, in the March 7, 2014 email that Plaintiffs admit receiving, ( AR 387, Malcomb Decl. ¶ 12; AR 4, Colley Decl. ¶ 12; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56-57), the Director explained that ADPE equipment accountab ility compliance required submission of the AIM inventory, a s well as training certificat es for both instructors. (AR 149). The following month, Plaintiffs were placed on probation and Ma lcomb subsequently discussed

8 Both Plaintiffs signed the AIM inventory form, which include s the following: I certify that I have reviewed the letter appointing the ECs re flected on this inventory account. The informa tion contained in the appointmen t letter is current, accurate, and complete. The ECF have received the required tra ining and have completed a physical inventory f or all equipment under their ju risdiction. (AR 36, 54).19 with ECO Frazier his “confusion [ regarding] what documents were needed and how to upload them into Wings.” (AR 414). Sever al days later, Plaintiffs su bmitted both the training certificates and the AIM inve ntory prior to the April 30, 2014 decertificati on deadline. (AR 158). Accordingly, Plaintiffs knew in 2014 that they had an ob ligation to submit the training certificates, in addition t o their AIM inventory.

c. Plaintiffs allege the 2014 probation was invalid.

 Plaintiffs submitted their AIM inventory via email and facsimil e in 2014 by January 20, before the deadline. (Pls. PI SOF #7; AR 414; AR 385-87, M alcomb Decl. ¶¶ 8, 19). At that time, there was no requirement that documents be uploaded to WINGS. (Pls. PI Br. p. 4 n.6). Therefore, Malcolmb claims that when h e received the March 7, 2014 email about uploading docum ents to WINGS, he took no fu rther action because the email did not state that Plaintiffs were not in com pliance, and Plaintiffs should not have been placed on probation in 2014 for failing to meet deadlines. (Compl ¶¶ 51, 55-56). While Plaintiffs are correct tha t the WINGS upload requirement was not in effect when they faxed and emailed their AIM inventory in January 2014, Pla intiffs should have been on notice by mid-April that the Air Force was applying the require ment retroactively. Plaintiffs admit that when they returne d from spring break in April 2014, they saw an April 11 email. ( See AR 153, AR 4, Colley Decl. ¶¶ 14, 1 2; AR 386, Malcomb Decl. ¶¶ 14, 12). Because that email specifically informed them that they had missed the April 10 AD PE suspense date, they were therefore on notice that their J anuary fax and email submission s had not been sufficient and that they faced probation if they fa iled to take action by April 18. Yet, Plaintiffs ignored the warning and instead waited until they w ere actually placed on probation to follow up. Plaintiffs’ own inaction undermines their argument that the Air Force acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it: (1) warned Plaintiffs on April 11 that they fac ed probation if they did not complete the ADPE suspense by Apr il 18; (2) gave Plaintiffs fou r additional days beyond the deadline in which to comply; and (3) placed Plaintiffs on proba tion after they failed to comply,20 or even respond to HQ’s emails. T he court finds they are ther efore unlikely to succeed on their argument that the 2014 probation was invalid. d. Plaintiffs allege they did not receive certain emails.

 Plaintiffs note they were on spr ing break when emails dated Apr il 7, 2014, April 11, 2014, and April 6, 2015 were sent. (AR 4, Colley Decl. ¶ 13; A R 386, Malcomb Decl. ¶ 13. Amen. Compl. ¶ 90).

 Plaintiffs also allege that “Colley’s AFJROTC email was either disabled or deleted by the Air Force” for “all of M arch and April 2015 . . . the email account did not ‘exist.’” (Pls. PI SOF # 20) (citing (AR 506)).

 Plaintiffs argue that even if th ey had received them, the email s did not sufficiently inform them of the deadlines. Again, Plaintiffs did not raise the se arguments in their admini strative appeal and therefore they are not pro perly before this court. Christian , 46 Fed. Cl. at 802; Spadone, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 187 n.2. However, had Plaint iffs raised these argu ments, it is unlikely they would have prevailed. First, their co ntention that the emails did no t sufficiently inform them of the deadlines is not supported by the record. 9 Second, Plaintiffs do not explain ho w being away during the bre ak excused their failure to meet the deadlines. Plaintiffs acknowledge that in 2014, up on returning from spring break, they saw an email—contai ning the subject line “ ADPE Missed Suspense ”—but they believed the email did not apply to the m, even though it clearly stated they were not in compliance with the ADPE suspense and warned them that they would be placed on probation if they failed to comply by a specified date. (AR 4, Colley Decl. ¶¶ 14, 12; AR 386, Malcomb Decl. ¶¶ 14, 12; AR 153) (emphasis in original) . They subsequently learned—we ll before 2015—that they were incorrect.

9 Plaintiffs admit they received at least two emails that con tained specific ADPE suspense deadlines. ( See AR 153, April 11, 2014 email; AR 168, April 24, 2015 email).21 In 2015, the AFJROTC instructions r equired that Plaintiffs “log into WINGS and the instructor’s AFJROTC.com ema il at least weekly.” (AR 299, AFJR OTC 36-2001 (5/28/14) ¶ 7.2.1). Thus, any failure to check their emails during spring break in 2015 violated Air Force instructions. Moreover, after they returned from spring break, Plaintiffs admit receiving an email from Regional Director Barron i nforming them they were not in c ompliance. (AR 168; Am. Compl. ¶ 97; AR 5-6 Colley Dec l. ¶¶ 25, 28). Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument that spring break prevented them from learning of t he deadlines and requirements fails. Plaintiffs’ allegation regarding C olley’s allegedly “disabled” email is similarly unpersuasive. First, the docum ents upon which Plaintiffs rely do not establish that Colley’s email account was “disabled or deleted” through no fault of his own, but instead suggest that it was disabled due to non-use. ( See AR 506). On May 11, 2015, Colley emailed HQ email support asking for a reset of his password. ( Id .) HQ email support informed him that his account no longer existed, and that “[a]ll accounts are disable d after 45 days of inactivity.” ( Id .) Thus, it appears that Colley ha d not used his account in at lea st 45 days—since at least March 27, 2015, before spring break. Plaintiffs do not proffer any expla nation for why Colley did not observe or address the email issu e earlier, particularly given his obligation to log in weekly. ( See AR 299, AFJROTC 36-2001 (5/28/14) 7.2.1) . Nor have they assert ed that Colley’s email address was the only one to which HQ sent emails. Indeed, the record indicates that on several occasions, HQ sent emails to Malcomb or to what appears to be t he unit email address. ( See AR 151, 165-66, 168). Consequently, Colley’s email problems did n ot excuse Plaintiffs’ noncompliance with the suspense d eadline and, therefore, Plaintiff s are not likely to succeed on their email arguments.22 e. The Air Force did not give Plain tiffs advance notice prior to t he decertification. While the Air Force did not give Plaintiffs advance notice of t he initial decision to decertify, it had warned them tha t they faced decertification a nd subsequently gave them notice of the decertification decision befo re it became effective. Pl aintiffs were warned in 2014 that non-compliance “would” result in decertification, and in 2015 t hat they “could” be decertified if they missed the April 30 deadline. (AR 153, 155-56, 168-69; see AR 165-66). After they missed the deadline in 2015, Woods sent them a memorandum on Ma y 18, 2015 informing them that they would be decertified “e ffective the end of the academ ic year.” (AR 95, 97). Plaintiffs admit that the school year ended on June 4, 2015. (Am. Compl. ¶ 145). Thus, the decertification did not become effective wit h the letter from Woods. Moreover, Woods informed Plain tiffs of their right to appeal hi s decision, pursuant to AFJROTC instructions, which a llow fifteen days to appeal. (AR 95, 97). Therefore, Plaintiffs had through June 2, 2015 (two days bef ore the decertification b ecame effective) to file an appeal, which they did with the assist ance of counsel. Accordingly, Pl aintiffs had an opportunity to respond fully to the decertific ation decision before it became final. f. Plaintiffs challenge the initi al decertification decision by Co lonel Woods, alleging that:

 Woods relied on false informati on when he claimed, in the decer tification notification, that Plaintiffs had f ailed to meet the suspense d eadline in 2015—despite personal direction and phone cal ls from Barron, the Regional Di rector. (Pls. PI SOF # 14) (citing AR 95, 97). Plaintiffs also appear to contend th at Woods was informed of the purported telephone call via false “testimony” that Plai ntiffs were not allowed to rebut. (Pls. PI. SOF # 13).

 Woods held a secret meeting, evide nce of which is “compelling.” (Pls. PI Br. p. 6 & n.7).

 Woods must have relied on undisclosed documents to reach his de certification decision, because Plaintiffs did not receive any documents when they requested them. (Pls. PI Br. p. 7-8 n.7).23 Plaintiffs are unlikely to esta blish arbitrary or capricious co nduct as it relates to Woods and the decertification decision. F irst, with respect to the a lleged telephone call between Barron and Colley, Plaintiffs noted in their appeal that the telephone call never occu rred and cited to emails from Barron admitting he had been mistaken about speakin g to Plaintiffs. (AR 122; see AR 495, 508). Thus, Hoffman was fu lly aware that Woods had bee n mistaken and there is no indication that she r elied on the alleged t elephone call in dec iding the appeal. Consequently, there is no evidence that the f inal decision was tainted by fal se information. Second, the court disagrees with P laintiffs’ contention that th ere is “compelling” evidence of a secret meeting. ( See Pls. PI Br. pp. 6-7 n.7). “The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and, in the abse nce of clear eviden ce to the contrary, courts presume that they have pr operly discharged their officia l duties.” United States v. Chem.
Found ., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926). Yet Plaintiffs argue, without any evidence, that there must have been a secret meeting because “they were not notified” and “no written record has been provided . . . to substantiate [thei r] alleged failure to time ly provide [ADPE] documents.” (Pls. PI Br. pp. 6-7 n.7). These facts do not warrant such an assump tion. Finally, Plaintiffs provide no suppor t for their allegation tha t Woods or any other official considered documents to which t he Plaintiffs were not privy pri or to filing their decertification appeals. This allegation appear s to center around an email exc hange between Plaintiffs and Colonel Scotty Lewis, who was the Chief of AFJROTC Instructor M anagement. ( See Pls. PI Br. pp. 6-7 n.7; AR 511). After the dece rtification decision, Plai ntiffs emailed Lewis to inquire what documents Woods had relied upon to reach the decertification de cision. (AR 511). Lewis attached a copy of the 2014 probati on email and explained that “missing [the 2015] suspense [deadline] is the only ‘documentation’ needed . . . [but] Wayn e Barron may have a copy of the24 actual dates utilized regardi ng your unit’s spec ific situation as well as the emails sent by him and the headquarters.” ( Id .) Relying on this ex change, Plaintiffs contend that “nothing in the AR provides any indication of what Mr. Lewis or Colonel Woods migh t have considered to reach the conclusions they did.” (Pls. PI Br. p. 7 n.7). The court finds this argument puzzling. The AR is replete with emails from HQ to Plaintiffs about the suspension d eadlines. While Plaintiffs co ntend that they did not receive some of the emails at the time they were sent, there is no evid ence in the record that Plaintiffs failed to receive relevant or mat erial emails prior to the date they filed their a ppeals. Indeed, Plaintiffs cite to many of the e mails in their appeal letters. ( See AR 117-141; Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 88-89). Finally, while it is cl ear that some of the documents contained in the AR were created after the decertification deci sion, Plaintiffs have not directe d the court to any evidence that might suggest that Woods or Hoffman cons idered any relevant or materi al information of which Plaintiffs were unaware before they prepared their appeal lette rs.
g. Plaintiffs challenge Hoffman’s denial of the decertification ap peal, claiming:

 On June 30, 2015, Hoffman presided over a “licensing proceeding ” relating to the appeal, which they were notinvited to attend. (Pls. PI. S OF # 17).

 Hoffman added new charges in deny ing the decertif ication appeal , to which they were not allowed to mount a defense. (Pls. PI SOF # 16; P ls. PI Br. p. 8).

 Hoffman ignored proof that Plaint iffs complied with the submiss ion deadlines by submitting their AIM inventories in compliance with AFM 33-1 53 in 2014 and 2015. (Pls. PI. Br. p . 8) (citing AR 408). As with their claims about W oods, Plaintiffs have not pointed t o any evidence in the record that Hoffman held a “licensing proceeding.”25 With respect to the new charges allegation, the record fails to support Plaintiffs’ contentions, and indicates that H offman relied on the same AFJR OTC instruction as did Woods, and responded to the arguments Pla intiffs’ raised in their appe al letters. Finally, as noted above, Plaintiffs’ are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their argument that compliance with AFM 33-153 al one was sufficient to avoid d ecertification. h. Plaintiffs allege that the s anction of decertification was too severe, claiming:

 Decertification was unauthorized, s ince the AFJROTC guidelines provide that the sanction for failing to meet ADPE deadlines is disabling a unit’s account, thereby preventing the unit fr om ordering new equipment. (Pls. PI SOF # 28; Pls. PI Br. pp. 33-34; AR 285 AFJ ROTC 36-2001 (5/28/14) ¶ 4.3.2 ).

 The “Chief of the Instructor Mana gement Branch” sent Hoffman an email indicating that Plaintiffs were th e only instructors “in [the L ieutenant’s] records that [have been] specifically decertified for suspenses alone. The rest were a combination of performance to include suspenses.” (Pls. PI SOF # 29). Plaintiffs’ arguments are not compelling. First, while the ADP E instructions warn that failure to comply with submission d eadlines will result in a di sabled account, the instructions do not indicate that this is the only sanction. Indeed, the AFJRO TC Instructions allow for decertification where an instructor fails to “meet standards as prescribed by applicable . . . AFJROTC and Holm Center [HQ] ins tructions.” (AR 323-4 AJROTC 3 6-2002, § 1.1.3) (emphasis added). Here, Plainti ffs failed to follow HQ instruc tions even after they were warned, in at least two emails they rece ived, that failure might lead t o decertification. ( See AR 153, 155- 56, 169). Plaintiffs’ decision to di sregard these warnings und ermines their argument that the decertification decision was arbitrary or capricious. See Elk Assocs. Funding Corp. v. U.S. Small
Bus. Admin. , 858 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting motion for pre liminary injunction based on alleged APA and Due Process violations because, inter alia , the agency had afforded the plaintiff “countless opportuni ties to come into compliance” ).26 Finally, the court was not provided a copy of the email allege dly sent to Hoffman from the Chief of the Instructor Mana gement Branch. But even if it had been part of the record, the email—without more—would not have been sufficient to establish that Plaintiffs were singled out for harsher treatment. i. Plaintiffs contend that becau se there was no finding of willful ness, the Air Force violated the APA by faili ng to allow Plaintiffs an opport unity to correct their alleged non-compliance prio r to the decert ification. (Pl s. PI Br. pp. 13- 14, 32-33). 10 Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 558(c), excep t where there is a finding of willfulness, “an agency must give a licensee an opportuni ty to demonstrate or achieve c ompliance with all lawful requirements before the agenc y withdraws, suspends, revokes, or annuls a license. ” Atl. Richfield
Co. v. United States , 774 F.2d 1193, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 558(c )); see Fence Creek Cattle Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv. , No. CIV 06-1236-SU, 2008 WL 4610272, at *7 (D. Or. Oct. 16, 2008) (citations omitted), aff’d , 602 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs contend the Air Force did not make a willf ulness finding, nor could it have done so because Plaintiffs believed they were in compliance . Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, in the absence of such a finding, the Air Force violated § 558(c) of the APA by not providing the m with an opportunity to “achieve compliance” before their certifications were revoked.

10 Plaintiffs rely on the follo wing provisions of the APA: 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (“ Except in cases of willfulness . . . the withdrawal, suspension, revocation, or a nnulment of a licen se is lawful only if, before the institution of agency proceedings therefor, the licensee has been given . . . (1) notice by the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which m ay warrant the action; and (2) opportunity to demonstrate or achie ve compliance with all lawfu l requirements.”); 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) ( “license” includes “an agency pe rmit, certificate, approval, re gistration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission.”); 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (“A sanction may not be imposed or a substantive rule or order issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.”).27 Whether or not this provision a pplies to the facts presented he re, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of this claim. First, the record belies Plaintiffs’ argument that the Air Force failed to provide Plaintiffs an opportunity to “achieve c ompliance” prior to decertification. Fence Creek Cattle Company v. United States Forest Service , No. CIV 06-1236-SU, 2008 WL 4610272, at *8 (D. Or. Oct. 16, 2008), aff’d, 602 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) is instructive. There, plaintiffs argued that the Depa rtment of Agriculture (“DOA”) vi olated their APA rights by revoking a grazing permit without allowing them an opportunity to achieve compliance. The court disagreed, noting: It was not until after several oral and written communications that agency action was taken. On numerous occasions, both informally and through w ritten notice, plaintiff was apprised of the f acts and conduct at issue and wa s given the opportunity to demonstrate that it had complied with the requir ements of the grazing permit.
Id. *7. Because they ignored the war nings, the plaintiffs in Fence Creek were unable to establish that the DOA violated § 558(c) ’s prohibition against revoking a license prior to allowing the licensee an opportunity to cure . Plaintiffs here, like those i n Fence Creek , were provided numerous notices of their non-compliance and were warned of pot ential negative consequences, yet ignored the warnings. Therefo re, the court finds that Plai ntiffs’ argument that the Air Force violated § 558(c)’s prohibiti on on revoking a licen se prior to allowing a licensee to “achieve compliance” is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Moreover, the court disagrees t hat the agency failed to make a willfulness finding. Indeed, while he did not quote th e text of the instruction, Woo ds determined that Plaintiffs violated AFJROTC Instr uction 36-2002 ¶ 3.1.2.2.5, which provide s that “decertification may be a result of . . . [a]n incident of willful misconduct.” (AR 3 36, 143; see AR 336, AFJROTC 36-28 2002 ¶ 3.1.2; id .¶ 3.1.2.2). On appeal, Hoffman f ound that Plaintiffs violated the same instruction. (AR 143). Thus, the r ecord establishes that the Air Force did make a willfulness finding and Plaintiffs are not ent itled to the protections of 5 U.S.C. § 558(c). Plaintiffs are also incorrect t hat a willfulness finding is imp ossible because they believed they were in compliance. “[A] vi olation is ‘willful’ if the vi olator ‘(1) intentionally does an act which is prohibited, [ ]irrespec tive of evil motive or reliance on erroneous advi ce, or (2) acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements.’” Potato Sales Co. v. Dep’t. of Agric., 92 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); see Schwebel v. Orrick , 153 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D.D.C 1957) (“Willfulness . . . has been interpreted as meanin g the intentional doing of the act charged.”) (citing Air Transport Assocs. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd. , 199 F.2d 181, 186 (1953)), aff’’d on other grounds , 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Because a willfulness finding does not require evidence of ill intent, under the facts presented here it is irrelevant that Plaintiffs believed they had legitimate reasons for failing to meet the suspense de adline or that they believed they had already submitted the necessary documentation. There is ev idence that they “act[ed] with careless disregard of [Air Force] requirements.” Potato Sales Co, 92 F.3d at 805. j. Plaintiffs allege that the Air Force failed to follow its own p ublished guidelines for decertification, claiming:

 The Air Force was required to c onsider “overall performance,” i ncluding their school performance evaluations and letters of support from the school principal, prior to decertifi cation, but failed to do so. (Pls . PI Br. p. 36-39; see AR 440-475).

 The Air Force was required to complete a Form 98 evaluation pri or to decertification, but faile d to do so. (Pls. Br. p. 26 n.18; id . pp. 36-39; Am. Compl. ¶ 203r). Plaintiffs misread the cited instructions regarding decertifica tion. First, the instructions allow for decertification either when the instructor’s “overall performance . . . is unsatisfactory”29 or when there is a finding of willfulness, as there was here. (AR 336, AFJROTC 36-2002 ¶ 3.1.2, ¶ 3.1.2.2; ¶ 3.1.2.2.5). Thus, there is no requirement that a considera tion of “overall performance” precede a decertification decision. With regard to the Air Force’s failure to complete Form 98 prio r to decertification, the Air Force considers the Form 98 and the associated performance review process “to be adequate protection for instructors from unfair evaluation” and a school official or the unit’s senior ROTC officer “may initiate” a Form 98 when an instructor’s “performa nce or conduct does not meet acceptable standards or is exemplary.” (AR 337, AFJROTC 36-200 2 ¶ 3.7.1; AR 339 AFJROTC 36-2002 ¶ 4.6.3.2.1.). In support of their Form 98 argum ent, Plaintiffs first rely on AFJROTC 36-2002 ¶ 2.3.1, which provides: When a staff visit report, unit evaluation, or other official s ource of information (i.e., school or civil investiga tion) indicates the instructor’ s performance or conduct is less than overall Satisfactory; Holm Center/JR will inform s chool officials and request they consider taking co rrective action, including evalu ation of whether the continued employment of the inst ructor is appropriate. If scho ol officials do not or are not able to take corrective measures, Holm Center will proc ess the case [using one of two options]. (AR 334). This provision, by its terms, app ears inapplicable to the cond uct at issue here because it seems to contemplate school rel ated conduct that school officia ls are authorized to correct. And even if this case did involve such conduct, HQ’s options do not require use of Form 98. Plaintiffs next cite to AFJ ROTC 36-2002 ¶ 3.8, which involves “action before [d]ecertification,” and which provides two distinct paths to de certification. (AR 338). Under paragraph one, if a “staff visit or other official source of in formation indicates the instructor’s performance or conduct is overall unsatisfactory and corrective action directed by [HQ] or30 school officials is insufficien t to correct, [HQ] will process the case under 3.1.2,”—the instruction discussed above permitting decertification if there is a finding of willfulness. (AR 338 AFJROTC 36-2002 ¶ 3.8.1; AR 336, AFJROTC 36-2002 ¶ 3.1.2; ¶ 3.1.2.2.5). Assuming arguendo that paragraph one applies here , HQ complied with its requirem ents. Specifically, HQ’s attempted corre ctive action in the form of e mail notifications failed to bring about compliance. Because these efforts were “insufficient to correct” the problem, HQ made a willfulness finding and proceeded accordingly. It did not need to complete a Form 98 to process a decertification based on willfulness. Paragraph two of AFJROTC 36-200 2 ¶ 3.8 provides that HQ “will i nitiate action to decertify an instructor wheneve r it is required because of an U nsatisfactory rating on an AFJROTC Form 98.” (AR 338). Thus, F orm 98 is not required in order to initiate decertification under paragraph two ; rather, decertification is mandated if the Form 98 evaluation and appeal process ends with an unsatisfactory rating. ( See id .)
2. Summary The court finds that the Plaint iffs’ APA claim is not likely t o succeed on the merits because the crux of that claim relies on arguments unsupported by the record, and because it asks this court to do what it is not permitted to do: “serve as a su per correction boar d that reweighs the evidence,” Charette v. Walker , 996 F. Supp. 43, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (citation omitted), and “substitute its judgment for that of the military departments . . . .” Christian v. United States , 46 Fed. Cl. 793, 801 (2000) (citing Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
C. Privacy Act

“The Privacy Act regulates the collection, maintenance, use, an d dissemination of information about individuals by federal agencies.” Wilson v. Libby , 535 F.3d 697, 707 (D.C.31 Cir. 2008) (internal quotation mar ks and citations omitted). T he Act requires that agencies “maintain all records which are used by the agency in making an y determination about any individual with such accuracy, r elevance, timeliness, and compl eteness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to t he individual in the determina tion.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5). An individual may request access to and amendment of an agency’s r ecords or information pertaining to him, see id. § 552a(d), and may file a civil ac tion if the agency “makes a determination . . . not to amend a n individual’s record in acco rdance with his request” or if the agency fails to maintain accurate records about that person and the agency subsequently makes an adverse determination based on the inaccurate records. Id . § 552a(g)(1)(A); 552a (g)(1)(C). Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving any alleged violations of the Privacy Act were intentional or willful. See Albright v. United States, 732 F.2d 181, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Here, Plaintiffs appear to argue that t he Air Force violated the Priv acy Act by maintaining inaccurate records associated with the mis information regarding whether Re gional Director Barron spoke with Plaintiffs via telephone a bout their late ADPE documents. Plaintiffs’ argument fails b ecause “an agency need not keep per fect records, but must act reasonably to assure their accuracy.” Dickson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 1991 WL 423968, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 1991). Here, the Air Force records contain an email from Barron conceding that he was mistaken and that he did not speak with Plaintiffs about the ADPE compliance deadlines. (AR 495, 508). Thus, the inaccurate information wa s corrected, Plaintiffs discussed the correction in their appeal and, as noted above, there is no indication that Hoffman relied on this misinformation when she considered the appeal. Thus, Plai ntiffs have not established that the Air Force violated the Privacy Act by engaging in willful o r intentional conduct by failing to32 “assure fairness in any determina tion relating to [Plaintiffs’] qualifications, character, rights . . . or benefits.” 5 U.S .C. § 552a(g)(1)(C). 11
D. Due Process Claim Plaintiffs contend that the in itial decertif ication decision vi olated their due process rights because Woods allegedly held a secret hearing, declined to provide Plaintiffs evidence supporting the decertification de cision and denied them an oppo rtunity to confront “false evidence.” (Pls. PI Br. pp. 6- 8 & n.7). As discussed above, t hese allegations are not supported by the record. Thus, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim, as it relates to t hese allegations. Next, Plaintiffs contend that th e Air Force failed to provide P laintiffs with an opportunity to be heard before t hey were decertified. Assuming for the purposes of argument

11 To the extent Plaintiffs alleg e violations of the Privacy Ac t over the inclusion of documents in the record containing “gossip c ollected off the internet,” P laintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits. ( See Pls. PI SOF # 19). Plaintiffs point out that the record contai ns an email dated July 13, 2015 from Woods to an unide ntified “team.” (AR 496-50 2). Included in the email is what Woods described as “antidotal [sic] information,” consisti ng of: (1) an art icle about an interview Colley apparently gave t o a local media outlet regard ing the decertification; and (2) apparent social media comment s posted on the Facebook page for the media outlet that published the article. Under the Privacy Act, opinions do not constitute “inaccur ate” information. See Allmon v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 605 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The Privacy Act is not a means to challenge . . . opinions or j udgments . . . .”) (citations omi tted); Graham v. Hawk, 857 F. Supp. 38, 40 (W.D. Tenn. 1994) (“[R]ecords are maintained with adequa te fairness if they accurately reflect the nature of the evidence,” i.e., indicate that the information i s a hearsay report from an unnamed informant.), aff’d, 59 F.3d 170 (6th Cir. 1995); Kleiman v. Dep’t. of Energy , 956 F.2d 335, 337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he P rivacy Act allows for ame ndment of factual or historical errors[, the statute] is not . . . a vehicle for amending the j udgments of federal o fficials or others as those judgments are reflect ed in records maintained by feder al agencies.”) (emphasis in original) (alterations and some citations omitted) (citing Rogers v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 607 F. Supp. 697, 699 (N.D. Cal. 1985)). Moreover, the emails contai ning these opinions were sent after Hoffman denied Plaintiffs’ appeal, and could not have tainted t he administrative process. ( See AR 496-502).33 that Plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected interest in th eir certifications, 12 their due process claim is still unlikely to succeed on the merits. Due process requires that an aggrieved party be allowed an opportunity to be heard p rior to the effective date of the alleged deprivation. See,

e.g. , Opp Cotton Mills v. Adm’r of Wage & Hour Div. of Dep't of Labor , 312 U.S. 126, 152–53 (1941) (“The demands of due pro cess do not require a[n opportun ity to be heard], at the initial stage or at any particular point or at more than one point in a n administrative proceeding so long as the [opportunity to be heard] i s [permitted] before the fina l order becomes effective.”) (emphasis added); Myersville Citizens for a Ru ral Cmty., Inc. v. F.E.R.C. , 783 F.3d 1301, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[A] rebuttal oppo rtunity that arises before the issuance of a final order is sufficient for purposes of due process.”); Brown v. United States , 367 F.2d 907, 911 (10th Cir. 1966) (“It is sufficient to satis fy the demands of due process if a[n opportunity to be heard] is provided for before a final order becomes effective.”) (emphasi s added). In order to ensure that the opportunity to be heard serve s “its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented,” and here, Pl aintiffs were allowed this opportunity via the appeal process prior to the effective date of the decertification. See Ford
Motor Co

. v. Coleman , 402 F. Supp. 475, 496 (D.D.C. 1975). Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of t his due process claim.

12 Plaintiffs are unlikely to: (1) demonstrate a property inter est sufficient to t rigger due process protections; or (2) show a const itutionally protected liberty i nterest. See Crooks v. Mabus , 845 F.3d 412, 418–19 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (examining Navy ROTC regulati ons and finding no protected property interest and a doubtful lib erty interest where former ROTC instructor challenged decertification). In any event, the court need not reach these issues given its finding that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succee d with their argument that the Air Force’s decertification procedures failed to c omply with due process.34 E. FTCA Plaintiffs did not address the likelihood of success on their F TCA claim. Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden with resp ect to this claim.
F. Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs ’ Remaining Arguments and Cla ims In their Motion for Preliminar y Injunction, Plaintiffs raised c laims that did not appear in their Amended Complaint. For example, Plaintiffs’ Motion chall enges the Air Force’s authority to decertify them because, in their view, no statutory or regul atory authority for de certification of JROTC instructors exists. ( See Pls. PI Br. pp. 14-26; see id . p. 16) Plaintiffs als o argue that the AFJROTC instructions are unenfor ceable because they constitute “regulations” that were not properly promulgated t hrough notice and comment. ( Id . pp. 27-32). “For jurisdiction to exist over the instan t motion for injuncti ve relief, the motion must be closely related to the facts, l egal issues, and parties address ed in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint[].” Adair v. England , 193 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D.D.C. 2002) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs’ challenges to t he statutory authority for dec ertification and to the legitimacy of the AFJROTC regulations are not “ closely related” to the claims or legal issues raised in their Amended Complaint. Accordingly, t he court is without jurisdict ion to consider the additional arguments raised for the first t ime in their motion for injunct ive relief.
2. REMAINING INJUNCTI VE RELIEF FACTORS Having found that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the m erits, the court must also consider whether: (1) Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injur y absent the requested injunctive relief; (2) the injunctive reli ef would further the public inte rest; and (3) the ba lance of equities tips in favor of the Plaintiffs. Winter , 555 U.S. at 20. Courts in this Ci rcuit have used a “sliding scale” approach in analyzing the se factors, meaning a particula rly strong showing in one could35 outweigh weakness in another. See Sherley v. Sebelius , 644 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 2011). However, it is unclear whether t his approach survives after th e Supreme Court’s ruling in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Incorporated, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), which “suggests if not . . . hold[s] ‘that a likelihood of s uccess is an independent, fr ee-standing requirement for a preliminary injunction.’” Sherley , 644 F.3d at 393. Under either approach, however, t he court finds that Plaintiffs are not entitled to preliminary relief, as they are unable to meet the Winter test because they are unlikely to succeed on the merits, and because, under the “sliding scale” approach, the equities tip in favor of denying preliminary relief.
A. Public Interest Although Plaintiffs have proffered evidence of some public supp ort for their case, the court finds that the public interest would not be served by gra nting injunctive relief because the impact of Plaintiffs’failure to f ollow directives from HQ is si gnificant. The public has an interest in the manner in which the military is represented, and in the perception and appr eciation of its adherence to and compliance with regulations and orders, even b y those serving in a civilian capacity.
B. Irreparable Harm Plaintiffs argue that, given the revocation of their AFJROTC ce rtifications, they face imminent irreparable harm because their teaching certifications will be revoked. The school district sent each Plaintiff a “Notice of Intent to Dismiss,” i nforming them that the loss of their JROTC certifications has made them “unemployable” by the school system. (ECF 20, Pls. First PI Br. at ECF pp. 55, 79). Subsequently, the California Commis sion on Professional36 Competence scheduled a hear ing for May 23, 2017 to consider ter minating Colley due to his failure to maintain his JROTC certification. (ECF No. 23, Pls. Mot. for Tele. Status p. 3). 13 The court finds that the anticip ated loss of the teaching certi fications is not an irreparable injury. Assuming the Californi a Commission revokes their teach ing credentials, Plaintiffs have not shown that they would be unabl e to regain those credentials and regain employment with the school district upon reinstatement of their certifications. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noti ng that “the injury m ust be beyond remediation”); Davis v. Billington , 76 F. Supp. 3d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding no irreparable harm because plaintiff had “no concrete proof that the vacancy for Deputy Assistant or some other comparable position will not be available when [t he litigation] ultimately resolved.”). In contrast, there is evidence that, without injunctive relief, Plaintiffs would suffer financial harm because they have no legal recourse to recoup th eir lost salaries from either the state or the Air Force. 14 However, the loss of employment income does not necessarily e stablish irreparable harm—even when t he loss is unrecoverable. In Sampson v. Murray , 415 U.S. 61, 92 n.68 (1974) the Supreme Court noted in dicta that “cases may arise in which the circumstances surrounding an employee’s discharg e, together with the resultan t effect on the employee, may so far depart from the normal situat ion that irreparable injury mi ght be found.” The Court cautioned, however, “[s]uch extra ordinary cases are hard to def ine in advance of their
occurrence.” Id . The court finds that this is not such an extraordinary case, especially given that

13 It is not clear whether a hear ing has been set on Malcomb’s teaching certification.

14 Despite demanding lost pay and b enefits in their Amended Co mplaint, Plaintiffs admit that the APA does not provide for of monetary damages. ( See Am. Compl. ¶ 245; ECF No. 16, Pls. First PI Br. p. 3).37 Plaintiffs are retired militar y officers who appear able to see k other employment. See Billington , 76 F. Supp. 3d at 65-66 (finding plain tiff’s inability to recov er back pay from his former employer at his primary job did not constitute irreparable harm for preliminary injunction purposes where plaintiff still received a military pension, as well as income from a second job).
C. Balancing of the Equities In balancing the equities, the c ourt “weighs the harm to [Plain tiff] if there is no injunction against the harm to the [Defendant] if there is.” Pursuing America’s Greatness v. FEC , 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Winter , 555 U.S. at 25-26). Here, “the [Defendant’s] harm and the public interest are one and the same, because the governmen t’s interest is the public interest.” Pursuing America’s Greatness , 831 F.3d at 511 (emphasis in original) (citing Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). In other wor ds, “in the context of a stay, assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest ‘merge when the Government is the opposing party.’” Pursuing America’s Greatness , 831 F.3d at 511 (quoting Nken , 556 U.S. at 435). Applying this standard, the court finds that balancing the equi ties supports denying injunctive relief because: (1) Plaintiffs are unlikely to succe ed on the merits; (2) Plaintiffs have not established that they will suffer irreparable harm; and (3) the public interest will not be served, and may in fact be harm ed by forcing the Air Force to t emporarily reinstate Plaintiffs’ certifications. Moreover, there is legal authority indicating that a governmental entity may be harmed where an injunction would r equire it to welcome back an expelled individual, because doing so would “undermin[e] the au thority of the [entity] to ta ke disciplinary action for what it believed to be a serious t hreat to . . . property.” Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield , 134 F.3d 821, 826–27 (7th Cir. 1998) (denying preliminary injun ction to expelled student whom38 school officials accused of e ndangering school property after h e distributed, on campus, copies of his publication explaining how to hack the schools’ computer s). Finally, the D.C. Circuit has wa rned that under normal circumst ances, “a preliminary injunction should not work to give a party essentially the full relief he seeks on the merits” and preliminary relief he re would do just that. See Dorfmann v. Boozer , 414 F.2d 1168, 1173 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citing Selchow & Righter Co. v. We stern Printing & Lithographing Co ., 112 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1940)). Accordingl y, the court finds that a preliminary injunction is not appropriate in this case and will deny the motion.

C. VENU E
1. LEGAL STANDARD Plaintiffs’ APA and constituti onal claims are governed by the g eneral federal venue provision 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391, 15 under which a civil action again st either the United States or one of its officials acting in her official capacity may be brought in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, o r a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plain tiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(e)(1). In this case, the named individual d efendants involved in the decertification and appeal—Woods and H offman—reside in Alabama, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred th ere, as well a s in California, whe re Plaintiffs are located. Thus, under the genera l venue provision, venue in eit her state is appropriate.

15 As noted above, Plaintiffs have not asserted any facts to sup port a Privacy Act claim. Therefore, the Privacy Act’s ve nue statute—which specifically p rovides for venue in the District of Columbia—does not factor into the court’s analysis. Even if the court were to consider the Privacy Act venue statute, the c ourt still has the authority to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406.39 FTCA claims “may be prosecuted on ly in the judicial district wh ere the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omi ssion complained of occurred.” Patel v. Phillips, 933 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b)). Thus, under t he FTCA, venue is also appropriate in either Alabama or California. Although the only connection to the D istrict of Columbia appear s to be that the Secretary of the Army is located nearby a t the Pentagon, in Virginia, and her official address is in the District of Columbia (ECF No. 12, Defs. Reply p. 1 & n.1), the Air Force did not argue in its opening brief that venue is imprope r in this district, but inst ead urged the court to transfer the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. I n its reply, however, the Air Force argued t hat venue in this district is improper, (ECF No. 12, Defs. Reply pp. 1-4), but st ill failed to cite to 28 U.S.C. § 1406, the appropriate provision gov erning actions filed in the wrong venue, and which states: The district court of a district in which is filed a case layin g venue in the wrong division or district shall dismi ss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division i n which it could have been br ought. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406(a). While this provision allows for dismiss al of a case filed in the wrong venue, the Air Force has not reque sted dismissal, but instead t ransfer under Section 1404, preferably to Alabama or California. 16 In deciding a Section 1404(a) venu e motion, a court must first determine whether the transferee district is one whe re the action “might have been br ought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). As

16 Even if the Air Force had reque sted dismissal, the court woul d have denied the request because, inter alia , the Air Force did not raise the venue argument in its princip al brief, and therefore waived it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“Every defe nse to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required”). Additionally, dismissal would not serve the int erests of justice.40 discussed above, venue in either A labama or California is prope r in light of Plaintiffs’ claims, and both these options satisfy the requirements of Section 1404

. Next, the court must consider “the convenience of the parties and witnesses,” as well as “the interest of justice” when c onsidering transfer. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). While the convenience of the parties, convenience of the witnesses, and t he interests of justice are the three principal factors to consider in determining whet her to transfer a case, courts have also considered var ious other factors, including th e private interests of the parties and the public interests of the court, as additiona l considerations ‘protected by the language of [ the change of venue statute]. Valley Cmty. Pres. Comm’n v. Mineta , 231 F. Supp. 2d 23, 44 (D.D.C. 2002) (citation omitted). The statute “is intended to place discretion in the district co urt to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (citation omitte d). “When the events oc cur in more than one district, a court can consider which jurisdi ction has the stronger factual nexus to the claims.” Miller v. Insulation Contractors, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted).
2. ANALYSIS
A. Private Interest Factors In deciding whether to transfer a case, a court considers six “ private interest” factors: 1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; 2) the defendant’s choice o f forum; 3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; 4) the convenience of the parties; 5 ) the convenience of the witnesses, particularly if important witnesses may actually be unavailable to give live trial testimony in one o f the districts; and 6) the e ase of access to sources of proof. Louis v. Hagel , 177 F. Supp. 3d 401, 406 (D.D.C. 2016) (citations omitted). Defendants argue that four of the six private inte rest factors support venue in Alabama or California: (1) defendant’s preferred forum; (2) location where the claim arose ; (3) convenience of the parties; and (4) ease of access to sources of proof.41 The court agrees that two of D efendants’ factors undoubtedly we igh in favor of transfer to Alabama or California: defenda nts’ preferred forum and locat ion where the claim arose. In contrast, the convenience of the parties does not necessarily w eigh heavily in favor of any district because Plaintiffs contend, and t he Air Force does not dispute, that the case w ill be decided on the administrative record. ( ECF No. 10, Pls. Resp. to Defs. Mo t. to Dismiss p. 95). On the other hand, this factor might come int o play if a court determined th at a hearing was necessary and ordered the parties to appear in person. While such a scenario is unlikely, were it to materialize in this district, both sides w ould be inconvenienced. On the o ther hand, if a hearing were held in California, the Air Force mi ght be inconvenienced, while a hear ing in Alabama would inconvenience the Plaintiffs. A lthough Plaintiffs are retired from the military, they assert that they are experiencing “substantia l financial hardship.” (ECF N o. 13, Pls. Sur-reply p. 4). Consequently, the court finds tha t the convenience of the parti es factor tips in favor of transfer to California. The court disagrees that the eas e of access to proof factor wei ghs in favor of transfer. Although the Air Force contends tha t records in this case are l ocated in Alabama ( see ECF No. 6, Defs. Mot. to Dismiss p. 44), that fact alone is of lesser sign ificance given that the decision will be largely based on the recor d. Although neither side addresse d it, the convenience of the witnesses factor likewise doe s not weigh in favor of either sid e for the same reason. With respect to the final priva te interest factor, Plaintiffs a re correct that their choice of forum is ordinarily accorded “ substantial deference.” Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard , 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Gross v. Owen, 221 F.2d 94, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ). That deference is lessened h ere, however, because Plaintiffs do not reside in this district and “the relevant events occurred elsewhere.” Id . (citation omitted). Additionally, there is no42 reason to defer to the Plaintiffs ’ choice of forum, since this case does not involve “a national issue [in which] federal official s in the District of Columbia had significant involvement in the agency action.” Intrepid Potash-New Mexico, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior , 669 F. Supp. 2d 88, 96 (D.D.C. 2009); see Sierra Club v. Flowers , 276 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D.D.C. 2003) (citation omitted) (refusing to give deference to plaintiff’s choice of f orum because the District of Columbia had “no meaningful ties to the cont roversy and no particular intere st in the parties or subject matter” where the dispute involved Florida environmenta l laws). Accordingly, on balance, two privat e interest factors (defend ant’s choice of forum and location where the action arose) heavily favor transfer to Alab ama or California, and the convenience of the parties fact or slightly weighs in favor of t ransfer to California. The three remaining private interest fact ors do not weigh in favor of any district, but the c ourt notes that Plaintiffs have indicated a pref erence for transfer to Californ ia should the court grant the Air Force’s motion. (Pls. Response t o Defs. Mot. to Dismiss p. 95)

. B. Public Interest Factors Next, the court must consider t he following “public interest” f actors: (1) the transferee forum’s familiarity with the governing laws . . .; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of t he potential transferee and tra nsferor courts; and (3) the local intere st in deciding local c ontroversies at home.
Louis , 177 F. Supp. 3d at 408 (citations omitted). Defendants contend, without elaboration, that “at least two” factors weigh in fa vor of transfer: the transfer ee’s familiarity with the governing law and the local interest in de ciding local controversies at h ome. Plaintiffs likewise did not address these factors, but argue t hat transfer wil l further del ay the case and increase their financial losses.43 Applying the public interest fact ors, the court disagrees with Defendants’ argument regarding the transferee’s familiarity with the governing law f actor. With respect to “adjudication of federal claim s, . . . the federal courts compr ise a single system in which each tribunal endeavors to app ly a single body of law.” In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1,
1983 , 829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (ci tation and alteration s omitted), aff’d sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd ., 490 U.S. 122 (1989). This court ha s no reason to diverge fr om “the principle that the transfer ee federal court is competent t o decide federal i ssues correctly.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey , 437 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49 (D.D.C. 2006) (citations omitted). Consequently, the familiarity with the governing law factor doe s not weigh in favor of either party. Without any evidence of the “rela tive congestion of the calenda rs” in the potential districts, this factor does not favor venue in any particular d istrict. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument that transfer would undul y delay the resolution of the case is based solely on speculation. With respect to the final factor , “local interest in deciding l ocal controversies at home,” the court agrees that tr ansfer is appropriate. The California Commission on Professional Competence has scheduled a hearin g to consider terminating Coll ey, and the Hart S chool District claims in its “Notice of Intent to Dismiss” that the loss of th e JROTC certifications has made Plaintiffs “unemployable” by the school system. (ECF No. 23, P ls. Mot. for Tel. Status p. 3; Pls. PI Br. at ECF pp. 55, 79). Thus, the outcome of this litiga tion will directly impact citiz ens of California. See Intrepid Potash-New Mexico, LLC , 669 F. Supp. 2d at 98-99 (transferring case after finding that controvers y involving approval of permits to drill oil and gas was “more local in nature and centere d on New Mexico [rather] than on the Distr ict of Columbia”). Moreover,44 there has been media coverage i n California regarding the case, and state residents have expressed strong opinions on the matter. Therefore, weighing the private interest factors and the public interest factors, the court finds that the balance tips in f avor of transfer to California. Plaintiffs reside in California, it is the Air Force’s preferred choi ce of forum, and some of the cond uct at issue occurred there. California may be a more convenien t forum for the Plaintiffs, a nd the residents of that state undoubtedly have a considerable “lo cal interest in deciding loc al controversies at home.” See Bergmann v. U.S. Dep't of Transp. , 710 F. Supp. 2d 65, 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (tr ansferring case to Michigan because, inter alia , “there can be no doubt that the [h ighway construction] projec ts at issue in this case will directly affect the lives of Michigan r esidents”). Conversely, there is nothing in the record indicating that the parties or the facts at issue are connected to this district. See Miller v. Insulation Contractors, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C. 2009) (citations omitted) (“When the events occur in mo re than one district, a court can consider which jurisdiction has the stronger factual nexus to t he claims.”). As the District of Columbia Circuit has warned: Courts in this circuit must examine challenges to . . . venue c arefully to guard against the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in the District of Columbia. By naming high government officials as defendants, a plaintiff could bring a suit here that properl y should be pursued elsewhere. Cameron v. Thornburgh , 983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Given this admonition, a nd the private/public interest factors that weigh in favor of transfer , this court finds that the interests of justice will be served by transfe rring this action to the Centr al District of California.

D. CONCLUS ION For the reasons set forth above, t he court will DENY Plaintiffs ’ motions and GRANT45 Defendants’ motion to transfer this case to California.

Date: May 15, 2017
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge