### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE June 29, 200 7 S es sio n
JONA THA N P ATRICK HA YES v. D EBOR AH INGR ID HA YES

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Rutherford County No. 03-7565DR

Hon. Royce Taylor, Chancellor

No. M2006- 02356-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on S eptem ber 6, 2007

The Tr ial Court denied t h e h u s band Te nn. R. Civ. P . 60.02 relief from a de fault judg ment in the d i v o r c e c a s e

. W e g r an ta n e w t r i a l a s t o e qu i t a

b l e d i v i s i o no f

m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y. Tenn. R. App . P .3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court V a ca te d as to pr ope r tydiv isi on.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., and S HAR ON G. L EE , J ., joined.

F . M ic hie Gi bs on , Jr. , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or Ap pe lla nt.

J ames P. Ba

rg er, Mur fre esboro, Te nnessee , for Appe llee.

OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

On Oc tob e r 3 1, 20 03 , p la int if f h us ba nd fi le d a c omp la int

fo r d ivo rc e a g a ins t de fe nd ant w if

e . T he c omp la int

c ite d ir re c on c ila ble dif fe re nc e s a s th e g ro un ds fo r d ivo rc e , a nd in Fe bruar y 2004, defe ndant answe red a nd filed a c ounter-c omplaint for divorce based upon irrec oncilable diff

ere nces.
On May 6, 20 05 , the Tr ia l Court e nte re d an a g re e d or de r that Ro na ld L . St on e sh ou ld be s ubstitut ed as c ounsel for the plaintiff, in the stead of Kar la C. Hewitt. Subsequently , plaintiff filed a motion to amend, a nd an ag ree d order

authorizing the a

mendment was e ntere d in the Trial Court.-2- I n D e c e mbe r 2 005, de fe nd ant f ile d a mot ion to c omp e l th e pla int if

f t o r e sp on d to outstanding discove ry

reque sts. The Trial Court f ound that the plaintiff had failed to re spond to the defe ndant’s first set of

interrog atories submitted on Novemb er 1 , 2 005, and ente red a n order requiringplaintiff to produce response s to the interrog atories be fo re January 27, 2006. The orde r further stated that fa ilure to produce response s could result in a de fault judg ment.

I n Fe bruar

y 2006, defe ndant filed a

motion for defa

ult judgment, st ating the plaintiff failed to re spond to the defe ndant’s amended counte r-c omplaint and failed to c omply with the Trial Court’s order

conce rning the def

en d ant’s int err og atories. On F ebrua ry 24, 2006, the Trial Court
e nte re d a de c re e g ra

nti ng the de fe nd ant a

n a bs olute div or c e , b a se d u

po n th e pla int if

f’ s in a pp ro pr iate
mari ta l c on du c t, a

nd a lso g ra nte d th e wi fe a ll p e rs on a l pr op e rt y in he r p os se ssi on , a ll a sse ts a nd de bts in her individual name, a 2001 L exus automobile, and the marital residence and all equity there in. The Court also re stored the de fenda nt her maide n name.
On J uly 25, 2006, plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the de fault judg ment, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 60, stati n g t h at h is attorney did not inform him of the defa ult judgment proce eding s. On Octobe r 6, 2006, the Tr ial Court entere d an orde r deny ing the p laintiff’s motion to s e t a sid e the de fa

ult jud g me nt, and

pla int if f a pp e a le d to thi s Co ur

t.

Issues on Ap peal

Wheth er the Cha

nc e ry Court a bu se d it s d isc re tio n w he n it re fu se d to se t a sid e its d e f a u l tj u d g m e n t ? We apply

an abuse of discretion standard when revie wing a trial court’s entry of a defa ult judgment and its denia l of a Rule 60.02 mot i on to set that judgme nt aside. Tenn. Dept. of Human Serv

s. v. Barbee , 68 9 S.W. 2d 86 3, 86 6 ( Te nn . 1 98 5) ; Rey nolds v. Battles , 108 S.W .3d 249, 25 1 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 3) ; se e als o Henry v. Goins , 104 S.W .3d 475, 479 (Tenn. 2003) (applying Rule 60.02 to a dismissal for failure to pr osecute ). A trial cour t has abused its discre tion when it has applied an inc orre ct leg al standar d or has rea ched an illogica l or unrea sonable de cision that cause s injusti ce to the pa

rty complaining

. He nr

y , a t 47 9. “ Th e a

bu se of dis c re tio n s tand ard

do e s n ot p e rm it an appe llate cour

t to merely

substitut e its judgme nt for that of the trial court.” Id.

“F or g ood cause shown the cour t may set aside a

judgme nt by

defa ult in accor dance
w it h Ru le 6 0

. 0 2

. ” T e n n

. R. Ci v

. P. 5 5

. 0 2 ( 2 0 0 5 )

. T h e r e le v an t p o rti o n o f Ru le 6 0

. 0 2 s tates, “On motion and upon such terms as a re just, the cour

t may re l i ev e a party

or the pa

rty ’s leg al repr esentative from a f

inal judgme nt, order or

proce eding for the f

ollowing r easons: (1) mistake, inadver tence , surprise or excusable neg lect

. . . .” Te nn. R. Civ. P . 60.02 (2005). “ Under Rule 60 ‘t he burd e n is on

the mov ant t o s e t f

or th, in a mot ion or petitio n a

nd su pp or tin g a ff ida vit s, fa c ts explaining why

the movant was justifi ed i n fa i l ing to avoid the mistake, inadver tence , surprise or neg lect.’” Tenn. Dept. of Human Se rvs. v. Barbe e , 689 S.W .2d 8 6 3 , 8 6 6 (Tenn. 1985) (quoting Tenn. State Bank v . Lay , 60 9 S. W.2 d 5 25 , 5 27 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 98 0) ). Th e c ourt s a re re qu ir e d toThe Te nnessee Supreme Court orig inally adopted this three -fa ctor analy sis from the United 1 States Court of Appea ls f

or the Sec ond Circuit. Barbee , 689 S.W .2d at 866 (quoting the three -fa ctor
ana ly sis fr om Davis v. M

usler , 713 F.2d 907, 915 ( 2d Cir. 1983)).
Barbee , 689 S.W .2d at 865, 868 (de fenda nt’s defa ult not willful, althoug h defa ult was due 2 to d e fe ns e c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to c he c k h is m a il while ou t of the c ountr

y ); Evans v. W

introw , No. M2003-00788-COA

- R3-CV, 2005 WL 2416634, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2005) (plaintiff
c ouns el’ s fa ilure to c he c k h is m a il w hil e ou t of sta te , w hic h r e su lte d in

dis mis sa l f

or fa ilure to pr os e c ute , wa s “sl op py and c are le ss, ” bu t no t w ill fu l) ; see Campbell v. Arche r , 555 S.W .2d 110, 111, 112–1 3 (T en n

. 1 9 77) (de fense counsel’s f ailure to be awa

re of notices sent to his office was e xcu sa ble ne g le c t) ; Keck

v. Nationwide Systems, Inc

. , 499 S.W

. 2d 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (cor porate defe ndant’s conduct was ex cusable err or whe re the defe ndant re ceive d the complaint and summons, but subsequently failed to convey them to the corpor ate he adquar ters, re sulting in failure to file an a

nswer a nd defa ult judgment).
See Barber & McM

urry, Inc. v. Top-Flite Dev . Corp. Inc. , 7 20 S.W. 2d 46 9, 47 1 ( Te nn . Ct

. 3 App. 1986) (D efe nse counse l knew the tria l date, but elec ted not t o at t en d t ri al because he had another trial schedule d in a diffe rent c ounty .).

-3- construe Rule 60 liberally when a party seeks relief from a de fault judg ment. Barbee , 689 S.W .2d
a t86 7; N elson v. Simpson , 826 S.W .2d 483, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). I f any rea sonable doubt exis ts a s to w hether the def ault judgme nt should be set aside, the c ourts should gr ant re lief. Nelson , 826 S.W .2d at 486.

When e valuating a motion to set aside a defa ult judg ment based upon t h e grounds specifie d in Rule 60.02(1), courts are require d to consider thre e fa ctors: “( 1) whe ther the de fault wa s willful; (2) whethe r the de fenda nt has a mer itorious defense ; and (3) whether the non-de faulting party would be pre

judiced if re lief we re g rante d.” Henry v. Goins , 104 S.W .3 d 475, 481 (Tenn. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Barbee , 689 S.W .2d at 866). 1

Both pa rties ag ree that the conduc t of th e plaintiff’s for mer attorney , Ronald L . Stone,
was ne g lige nt, but disagr ee a s to whether his c onduct may be imputed to the plaintiff and whether the pla int if

f’ s c on du c t du

ri ngthe c a se wa s ine xcu sa bly ne g le c tf

ul. Th e iss ue of

wi llf uln e ss i n th is
c a se c on sis ts o f t

wo c omp on e nts : ( 1) wh e the r the fa ilure of the Pla int if

f’ s f or me r atto rn e y , Ro na ld L . St o n e , to r e s p o n d

to th e D e f

e n d an t’ s a me n d e d

c o u n te r
- c o mp la in t, th e Ch an c e r y Co u rt’ s order compelling disc overy , and the De fenda nt’s motion for a def

ault judgme nt constitutes willful conduct and (2) the extent to which the attorney ’s conduc t may be attributed to the pla intiff.

An a tto rn e y ’s ne gli gen c e may c on sti tut e e xcu sa

ble ne g le c t un de r T e nn . R. Civ . P. 6 0

. 02(1) so longas that conduc t is not wil lful. He nr y , 1 0 4 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 8 1 ( d i r e c t i n g t h e c ou rt s to
c on sid e r “ wh e the r t

he de fa ult wa s w ill fu l” ); Barbee , at 8 66 . Wil fu l c on du c t do e s n ot i nc lud e sim ple neg lige nce or

car elessness. I t does i nclude conduct resulting from “deliber ate choices” as we ll as

2 3See Mu nd ay v . B ro wn , 617 S.W .2d 897 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (“[O]n ten occa sions counsel 4 for the de fenda

nt wa s s erved with ample wa rning that if his client intended to furthe r def end plaintiff’s suit that action in that r eg ard must be taken,” but de fense counsel, without explanation, took no action.).
Am. Alliance I

ns. Co. , 9 2 F. 3 d

at 6 1 (c i t i n g Un ite d S

tates v . E rd os s, 440 F.2d 1221 ( 2d Cir. 5 19 71 ); Dal Int’l Trad ing Co. v. Sword L ine, Inc
., 28 6 F .2 d 5 23 (2 d Ci r. 19 61 ); Benton v. Vinson, El k ins , W e e ms & Se ar ls, 255 F.2d 299 ( 2d Cir. 1958)).

Mc Nul ty , 137 F .3 d at 73 8; see, e .g. , Commercial Bank of Kuwait v

. Rafidain Bank , 15 F.3d 6 238, 243–44 (2d Cir.1994) (f ailing, f or incre dible rea son s , to respond to the complaint, af ter purposely evadingservice for months); Chira v. L o ckhe ed Aircraft Corp. , 634 F.2d 664, 666 ( 2d Cir .1 98 0) (f

a ili ng , w ith ou t e xplanatio n, to c om pl y wi th sc he du lin g or de rs ); Dominguez v . United States , 583 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1978) (fa iling, for incre dible rea sons, to appea r at a s ch ed u l ed pre- trial confe renc e and de laying, due t o the collapse of counse l’s office floor, more than ten months be fo re mov ing to se t a sid e the re su lti ngde fa ult ); United States v. Cirami , 535 F.2d 736, 739 ( 2d Cir. 19 76 ) ( fa ili ng , w ith ou t e xplanatio n, to r e sp on d to a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g ment ); Schwarz v. United States , 384 F.2d 833, 835–36 (2d Cir.1967) (attorne y ’s decision to w ait until the eve of tria l to inform the Court that he would be una vailable to try

the ca se the ne x t day

was inexcusable)

. -4- conduct that is flag rant a

nd unexplained. 4

This view of willfulness finds fur ther support fro m t he United States Court of Appea ls for the Sec ond Circuit, setting for th the wi l lfulness standar d which our Supre me Court adopted in Barbee . T he Se c on d Ci rc uit de fi ne s w ill fu lne ss as “cond uc t th a t is mor e tha

n me re ly neg lige nt or ca

rele ss.” SE C v . M

c Nul ty , 13 7 F .3 d 7 32 , 7 38 (2 d Ci r. 19 98 ); ac c or d Am . A lli an c e In s. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co. , 92 F.3d 5 7 , 6 1 (2 d Cir. 1996) (“We se e no re ason to expand this C ourt’s willfulness standard to include car eless or ne g lige nt e rror s in the defa ult judgment conte x t.”). The Se c on d Ci rc uit ’s de fi nit ion do es in clude “ str a te g ic de c isi on [s] to d e fa ult ” and c on du c t th a t is 5 “eg reg ious and not satisfactor ily explained.” 6

At the Rul e 60 he aring, atto rn e y Sto ne te sti fi e d th a t he mov e d o ut o f h is o ff ic e in November

2005, and his mail was interr upted. Although he sent his updated addr ess to the cler k’s office s, the Boa

rd of Profe ssional Resp o n s ibilit y , and the Te nnessee Commi ssion on Cont inuing L e g a l E du c a tio n a

nd Spe c ia lizatio n, he ne g le c te d to se nd his up date d a dd

re ss t o d e fe nd ant’ s c ouns e l. As a re sult of this neg lect, defe ndant’s motion to compel re sponses to discovery , the Trial Court’s order compelling such re s p o nses, the def endant’ s motion for a def ault judgme nt, and the Tria l Court’s defa

ult judgment we re a ll sent to the wrong addre ss.
Mr. Stone’s letter to the B oard of Professional R esponsibility indicates that a fter the Trial Court enter ed its defa ult judgment in Fe bruar

y 2006, Stone was under

the impression that the previously

schedule d trial date of

April 17, 2006 was sti ll in eff ect. The letter further

indicates that
mor e tha n 30 day s aft er the Tr ia l Co ur t e nte re d it s d e fa

ult jud g me nt, bu t pr ior

to t he pr e vio us ly-5-

schedule d trial date, St one called defendant’s counsel i n an attempt to settle the case. As a re sult of this phone call, Stone lear ned of the Trial Court’s def ault judgme nt.

The de fenda

nt argues that plaintiff’s r efusa l to answer inter rog a to ries wa s willful, but plaintiff testified that Mr. Stone neve r sent him the int er rog atories. Stone told the B oard of Pr of e ssi on a l Re sp on sib ili ty

tha t he se nt the int e rr og a tor ie s to pla int if f, bu t Sto ne su

bs e qu e ntl y te sti fi e d h e wa s un sure wh e the r he se nt the int e rr og a tor ie s to t he pla int if

f o r n ot. Pla int if

f f a ile d to provide Stone wit h an up-to-date maili ng addre ss, but did provide Stone with an up-to-date phone
numbe r. Th e pla int if

f t e sti fi e d th a t he c a lle d Mr

. Sto ne “ a fe w tim e s, ” bu t Sto ne did no t r e tur n h is calls and did not inform him of the divorc e proc eeding ’s status.

At so me su

bs e qu e nt po int , th e Pla int if f’ s p are nts fi le d a

c omp la int

a g a ins t Sto ne wi th the B oard of

Professional Responsibility , and accor ding to plaintiff’ s aff idavit, plaintiff did not learn of the de fa ult un til the B oa

rd of Pr of e ssi on a l Re sp on sib ili ty

re sp on de d to his pa

re nts’ c omp la int

. Th e pla int if

f r e c e ive d this re sp on se aro un d J uly 20 06 , a nd fi le d h is m oti on

to s e t a sid e the de fa

ult judgme nt on J uly

25, 2006.

Th e ou tli ne d c on du c t of the pla int if f an d his fo rm e r attor

ne y is m or e a kin

to s imp le neg lect or c are lessness traditionally deeme d excusable by Tenne ssee’ s courts; it doe s not rise to the leve l o f wi l fu l conduct. Tenn. Dept. of Human Se rvs. v. Barbe e , 689 S.W .2d 863 (Tenn. 1985) ; Campbell v. Arche r , 55 5 S.W. 2d 11 0 (T e nn . 1 97 7) ; Keck v. Nationwide Systems, Inc

. , 499 S.W .2d 26 6 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 97 3) ; Evans v. W introw , No. M2003-00788-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 2416634 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2005).

Th e a sse rt ion

of a me ri tor iou s d e fe ns e is a

n e ss ent ial pre re qu isi te fo r r e lie f f ro m a defa ult judgment. Patterson v. Rock well Intern. , 665 S.W .2d 96, 100–01 (Tenn. 1984) . Def endant argues that pl aintiff’s assertion of a meritorious defe nse i s too conclusory to satisfy the meritorious defe nse pre requisite. The plaintiff’s affidavit supporting his moti on states, “[I ]f Ihad known that
a de fa ult jud g me nt w a s b e ingso ug ht a g ain st me and a tr ia l ha d b e e n s e t, I

wo uld have c ome int o Court and def

ended this ac tion ag ainst me and made a claim for my portion of the mar ital estate.”

This Court has found a sim i l ar statement to be too conclusory to constitute a meritorious defe nse t o a sui t for divorc e. Turner v. Turner , 739 S.W .2d 779, 781 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 86 ) ( fi nd ingthe fo llo wi ngstate me nt t o b e too c on c lus or y : “ My wi fe ha s ta

ke n a c on sid e ra

ble amount of our property which I fee l the court would have aw arde d to me if Icould have been pr esent at the hea ring .”).

I n Turner , however, t h i s Court did not have a tra nscript of the pr ocee dings f or the Rule 60 motion. Id. a t 780. I n the pr e se nt ca se , the tr ans c ri pt of the Rul e 60 mot ion he ari ngis i n the re cord, and it shows that the pl aintiff, while not disputing t he grounds of divorce , did dispute the division of m arital property and presented testim ony indicating the larg est marital asse ts were g iven to the defendant. Be cause plaintiff onl y disputes the di vision of m arital property , we c onclude the fore g oing satisfies the meritorious def ense pr ere quisite. Cooper v. Cooper , No. M2007-1002-COA--6-

R10CV, 2007 W L1791678, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 8, 2007) (“While a party seeking to set aside a def ault judgme nt may not rely on mere conclusory statements reg arding a meritorious defense , the pa rt y is a lso no t r e qu ir e d to de mon str a te that the pa rt y ’s de fe ns e s w ill ult ima

te ly pr e va il. ” ); Mo

y e rs v . M oy e rs , No. 03A01-9207-CH-240, 1992 WL 354850, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1992) (stating that strict ap p l i ca t i o no f t h e m er i t o ri o u s d ef en s e p re re qu i s i t e i s qu es t i o n ab l e “ i na d i v o rc e p ro ce ed i ng which questions only

the division of marital proper ty ”). Finally , defe ndant ar g ues that going to trial will cause he r to incur attorney ’s fe es and
c ourt c os ts a nd that to o mu c h time ha s pas se d sinc e the pa rt ie s se pa ra te d. Ye t, “ [s]imp ly

havin g to proce ed to trial does not constitute pre judice, nor doe s the mere passag e of time.” Henry v. Goins , 104 S.W .3d 475, 482 (Tenn. 2003) . Moreove r, we note t hat t he judi cial sy stem’s g ener al objective is to dispos e of c ases on the me rits. Id. at 481. Acc ording ly , “whe n there is a rea sonable doubt as to w he the r a

de fa ult jud g me nt sho uld be se t asi de up on pr op e r a pp lic a tio n, the c ourt

sh ou ld e xer c ise its discretion in favor of

g rantingthe application so as to per mit a determination of the c ause upon the merits.” Keck

v. Nationwide Systems, Inc

. , 499 S.W .2d 266, 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). For the fore g oing r easons, the T rial Court’s refusal to set aside the de fault judg ment was e rror . We affir m that portion of the Dec ree g ranting the parties a divorce , but vacate that portion of the Tr ial Court’s D e c r e e w h i c h aw ar d e d

t h e m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y.
The c ase is re manded, a

nd the Trial Court is direc ted to hold a n evidentiar

y hear ing
o nt h e i s s u e o f

ane qu i t a b l e d i v i s i o no f

m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y.
Th e c os t of

the c a us e is a sse sse d to De bo ra h H ay e s.

_________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.