Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2604 | May 1, 2019 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Jason S. Gray

Certified Legal Intern

Joel M. Schumm

Appellate Clinic

Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 

School of Law

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Aryan Taylor,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 1, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2604

Appeal from the Marion Superior

Court

The Honorable Christina 

Klineman, Judge

The Honorable Marshelle Dawkins 

Broadwell, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G17-1807-F6-23021

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2604 | May 1, 2019 Page 2 of 9

Case Summary

[1] On July 15, 2018, officers responded to an altercation between Aryan Taylor 

and his on-again, off-again girlfriend B.H. Upon arriving, the officers observed 

Taylor dragging B.H. down a driveway first by her dress and then by her hair. 

As a result of Taylor’s actions, B.H. suffered injuries to her knee and hand. The 

next day, the State charged Taylor with three counts. The first two counts were 

dismissed during trial pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B). Taylor was found guilty of 

the third count, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. On 

appeal, Taylor contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his 

conviction and that the trial court erred in referring to the first two counts as 

“dismissed” on its sentencing order. We affirm and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 15, 2018, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officers Randall Koehn 

and Nathan Quinn responded to a reported altercation. When they arrived, 

they observed Taylor dragging B.H. down a driveway by her dress. After losing 

his grip on her dress, Taylor continued to drag B.H. down the driveway by her 

hair. Taylor released B.H. after being instructed to stop by Officers Koehn and 

Quinn. Officers Koehn and Quinn observed fresh injuries to B.H.’s knee, 

which was bleeding, and hand. 

[3] On July 16, 2018, the State charged Taylor with Level 6 felony kidnaping 

(“Count I”), Class A misdemeanor domestic battery (“Count II”), and Class A 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2604 | May 1, 2019 Page 3 of 9

misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury (“Count III”). The trial court 

conducted a bench trial on September 27, 2018. Following the conclusion of 

the State’s presentation of evidence, Taylor moved for an involuntary dismissal 

of the charges pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B). The trial court granted Taylor’s 

motion with regard to Counts I and II and denied the motion with regard to 

Count III. The trial court subsequently found Taylor guilty of Class A 

misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury and sentenced him to a sixty-day 

term of incarceration. 

Discussion and Decision

[4] Taylor raises two contentions on appeal. First, he contends that the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain his conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery resulting 

in bodily injury. Second, he contends that the trial court erred by referring to 

Counts I and II on its sentencing order as “dismissed.”

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[5] Taylor contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for 

Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. 

We do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of 

witnesses when reviewing a conviction for the sufficiency of the 

evidence. We view all evidence and reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom in a light most favorable to the conviction, and will 

affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value 

supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable 

trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.
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Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013) (internal citation and quotation 

omitted).

[6] A person commits Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury when 

he knowingly or intentionally “touches another person in a rude, insolent, or 

angry manner” and the touching “results in bodily injury to any other person.” 

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c), (d). In challenging his conviction, Taylor argues that 

the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense. Alternatively, he argues that 

the State failed to prove that his actions resulted in bodily injury to B.H.

1. Rebuttal of Self-Defense Claim

[7] A valid claim of defense of oneself or another person is legal 

justification for an otherwise criminal act. In order to prevail on 

such a claim, the defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place 

where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or 

participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear 

of death or great bodily harm. When a claim of self-defense is 

raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden 

of negating at least one of the necessary elements. If a defendant 

is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, this Court will 

reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense 

was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. In any 

event, a mutual combatant, whether or not the initial aggressor, 

must declare an armistice before he or she may claim selfdefense. 

Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800–01 (Ind. 2002) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). “The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same standard for any 

sufficiency of the evidence claim.” Id. at 801. 
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[8] While Taylor argues that B.H. was the initial aggressor, the evidence most 

favorable to the verdict indicates that Taylor was the only aggressor observed by 

Officers Koehn and Quinn. Officers Koehn and Quinn observed Taylor 

dragging B.H. down a driveway by first her dress and then by her hair. In 

addition, regardless of who was the initial aggressor, by the time Officers 

Koehn and Quinn arrived, Taylor was, at the very least, a mutual combatant in 

the altercation. Thus, before Taylor could successfully claim self-defense, he 

must have declared an armistice. Id.; see also Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(3) (“[A] 

person is not justified in using force if ... the person has entered into combat 

with another person or is the initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from 

the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the 

other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.”). 

Taylor did not do so. The State’s evidence, therefore, successfully rebuts 

Taylor’s self-defense claim. Taylor’s argument to the contrary effectively 

amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See

Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 726.

2. Bodily Injury

[9] “‘Bodily injury’ means any impairment of physical condition, including pain.” 

Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-29. There is “no requirement that the pain be of any 

particular severity, nor does [the statute] require that the pain endure for any 

particular length of time.” Toney v. State, 961 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012). “It must simply be physical pain.” Id. (emphasis in original).
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[10] Taylor asserts that “the State’s burden of proving pain beyond a reasonable 

doubt was not met because [B.H.] did not testify to having any pain.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 13. As we have previously noted, “[t]he State need not 

present direct evidence to support each element of a crime, and it has long been 

held that circumstantial evidence will support a conviction.” Semenick v. State, 

977 N.E.2d 7, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 

(Ind. 2000) (emphasis in original). The circumstantial evidence in this case is 

sufficient to support the reasonable inference that Taylor’s actions caused B.H. 

to suffer pain.

[11] Contrary to B.H.’s testimony that “[n]one of [the alleged acts] happened,” tr. p. 

8, Officers Koehn and Quinn testified about the portion of the altercation 

between Taylor and B.H. that they observed. Upon arriving at the scene of the 

disturbance, Officer Koehn heard B.H. screaming and observed Taylor 

“dragging [B.H.] by her dress down the driveway,” tr. p. 14, “dragging her to 

where her feet and her legs were dragging on the ground as he was walking with 

her.” Tr. p. 19. When Taylor “lost his grip” on B.H., B.H. fell “to the 

driveway on her hands and knees.” Tr. p. 19. Taylor then “grabbed [B.H.] by 

the hair and continued to pull her down the driveway.” Tr. p. 19. As a result 

of being dragged down the driveway, B.H. suffered an injury to her knee that 

“was actively bleeding” and an injury to her hand. Tr. p. 22.

[12] In making inferential decisions, the fact-finder applies its “experiences in life”

and “common sense” as it “takes into account all of the facts and 

circumstances.” McAlpin v. State, 80 N.E.3d 157, 163 (Ind. 2017) (internal 
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quotations and brackets omitted). Common sense would dictate that one who 

suffers an injury significant enough to cause “active bleeding” also suffers pain. 

Common sense would also dictate that one would also suffer pain as a result of 

being dragged by the hair and that screaming is a frequent indicator of pain. 

Thus, the circumstantial evidence supports the reasonable inference that 

Taylor’s actions caused B.H. to suffer pain and, as a result, the evidence is 

sufficient to prove that Taylor’s rude, insolent, or angry touching of B.H. 

resulted in bodily injury to B.H. Taylor’s claim to the contrary again amounts 

to an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. 

See Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 726.

II. Sentencing Order

[13] Taylor also contends that the trial court erred by indicating on its sentencing 

order that Counts I and II were “dismissed.” Following the conclusion of the 

State’s presentation of evidence, Taylor moved for an involuntary dismissal 

pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B). The trial court granted Taylor’s motion as to 

Counts I and II and the trial continued on Count III. Taylor argues that 

because relief under Trial Rule 41(B) operates as an adjudication upon the 

merits, the trial court’s sentencing order should reflect a “not guilty” verdict on 

Counts I and II. Appellant’s Br. p. 14. For its part, the State argues that the 

trial court did not err given that the plain language of Trial Rule 41(B) refers to 

relief granted thereunder as a “dismissal.” Appellee’s Br. p. 18.

[14] Trial Rule 41(B) provides as follows:
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After the plaintiff or party with the burden of proof upon an 

issue, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has 

completed the presentation of his evidence thereon, the opposing 

party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the 

motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 

that upon the weight of the evidence and the law there has been 

shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then 

determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may 

decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. 

If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff or 

party with the burden of proof, the court, when requested at the 

time of the motion by either party shall make findings if, and as 

required by Rule 52(A). Unless the court in its order for 

dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision or 

subdivision (E) of this rule and any dismissal not provided for in 

this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates 

as an adjudication upon the merits.

(Emphasis added). We agree with the State and conclude that because the 

plain language of Trial Rule 41(B) refers to relief granted thereunder as a 

dismissal, the trial court did not err in indicating on the sentencing order that 

Counts I and II were “dismissed.” However, the plain language of Trial Rule 

41(B) further indicates that unlike general dismissals which allow for the refiling 

of the dismissed charges, dismissals pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B) act as an 

adjudication on the merits, precluding the refiling of charges. We therefore, 

remand the matter to the trial court with instructions for the court to amend the 

sentencing order to indicate that Counts I and II were dismissed with prejudice 

pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B).
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[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the matter remanded with 

instructions.

Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.