### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 5, 200 5 S es sio n

PA ULA P. KING BOOKER v. TH E BOE ING C OMP AN Y, d/b/a BOE INGOAK RI DGE COMPANY

Rule 23 Cer tified Q uestion of Law United States Distr ict Court for the Eastern Distr ict of Tenn essee No. 3:01-C V-275 Thom as W. P hill ips, Ju dge

No. M2005- 00832-SC-R23- CQ - F iled April 19, 2006

We acc epted a

question certified to this Court from the United States D istrict Court for the Ea stern District of Tenne ssee to cla rify the oper ation of the statute of limit ations for discri m i n atory pay claims under the Tenne ssee Huma n Rights Act. Af ter considering the arg uments of the parties a nd the app lic able a uth or ity
, we ho ld that a c la im of dis c ri min a tory pa y ma y be br ou g ht at a ny time within one y ear that a plaintiff has rec eived discriminatory pay and that backpay is a vailable for the d u r a t i o n o f

t h e u n e q u a l p a y.

Tenn. S up. Ct. R. 23 Cer tified Q uestion of Law

E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J
., and A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ANI CE M. H OL DER ,and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J J ., joined.

David R. Wigler, K nox ville, Tennesse e, for the Appellant, Paula P. King Booke r.

E

. H

. R a ys o n a n d J o h n C

. B u r g i n , J r

. , K n o x v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e A p p e l l e e , T h e B o e i n g C o m p a n y.

OP IN ION

Ba ckg round

T he fac ts a s stated in the fede ral district c ourt’s certification order include the f o l l o wi n g. Plaintiff Paula P. King Booke r (“Booke r”) went to work for the B oeing Company , d/b/a Boe ing- Oak Ridge Company

(“B oeing ”), a s an hourly employ ee in 1982. I n 1989, she wa s promoted to a sala ried

ma na g e ri a l po sit ion in “ Sup ply Cha in Ma na g e me nt” a ndha s r e ma ine d in e sse nti a lly the sa me position ever since . I n 1997, she discover ed that she w as being paid less than her male pee rs. On Au g us t 10
, 19 98 , B oo ke r f ile d a n in te rn a l e qu a l e mpl oy me nt o pp ortun ity (“ EE O” ) c omp la int

.-2-

L acking satisfac tory

resolution, o n J u l y 2, 1999, Booke r filed a complaint with the fede ral Equa l Emp l o y m e n t O p p o r t u n i t y C o m m i s s i o n ( “ E E O C ” )

. O n M a y 1
, 2 0 0 1
, B o o k e r f i l e d t h i s la ws uitin Ander son CountyChance ry Court seeking relief under the Tenne ssee Huma n Rights Act, Te nnessee Code Annotated se ctions 4-21-101 to -1004 ( 2005) (“ THRA”) , including ba ckpay to 1989.

The c ase w as re m o v ed to the Fe dera l District Court for the Ea stern District of Te nnessee

. Am on g the dis pu te d is su e s b e fo re that c ou rt is w he the r the TH RA ’s statut e of lim itati on s p e rm its B oo ke r t o r e c ov e r ba c kp a y to 198 9, wh e n she be c a me a ma na g e r, or on ly to 200 0, on e y e ar p ri or to the date she filed her

lawsuit.

To a i d i n r e s o l v i n g t h e d i s p u t e , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c e r t i f i e d t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i on to t his Cou rt :

Whether a discriminatory salary “ce ases” within the plain meaning of

the Te nn e sse e Hu ma n Ri gh ts A c t’ s st a tut e of lim ita tio ns wh e n it ends, or whe ther it “c ease s” whe n the alleg ed discriminatory act should trigg er a n employ ee’ s awa rene ss of a duty

to assert his or he r ri g hts

.

We acc epted the c ertified que stion.

An a ly sis

Th e TH RA ’s statut e of

lim ita tio ns pr ov ide s, “ [a] c ivi l c a us e of a c tio n u nd e r this se c tio n s ha ll be filed in c hance ry

court or c ircuit court within one ( 1) y ear afte r the a lleg ed discriminatory prac tice

cea ses . . . .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-21- 311(d) ( 2005). B ooker a rg ues that the “ alleg ed discriminatory
prac tice” in this ca se, unequa l pay based on g ender
, beg an in 1989 and had not y et ce ased a s of the tim e sh e fi le d he r la ws uit

. Th us , B oo ke r arg ue s that th e TH RA pe rm its he r t o r e c ov e r b a c kp a y to 19 89 . B oe ing arg ue s th a t e a c h u ne qu a l pay c he c k Booke r rece ive d w a s a se pa rate a nddis c re te discriminatory

act s uch that B ooker ma y only rec over ba ckpay

for pa y chec ks rec eived within one
y ear of the da te she filed suit.

We note at t he outs et t hat t he certified question as articulated by the di strict court doe s not captur e the f

ull di s p u t e between the pa rties re g arding the THRA’s statute of limit ations. The
qu e sti on a s c e rt if

ie d e sse nti a lly a sk s wh e the r a pla int if f’ s re lie f m a y

be lim ite d if

sh e fa ils to f

ile su it upon lear ning of

a dis criminatory prac tice, even thoug h the discriminatory prac tice may

not y et have “ce ased.” I n other wor ds, must a plaintiff file her suit withi n one y ea r o f h er d i scovery of an

a lle g e dly dis c ri min a tory

pr a c tic e to r e c ov e r da ma g e s fo r the e nti re pr a c tic e , or do e s sh e ha ve un til
one y ear afte r the d i s cr i minatory

prac tice ce ases? I n this case, B ooker be came awa re of the pay dis pa ri ty in 1 99 7 b ut did no t file he r sui t unti l 2001

. I f the dis c ov e ry ru le op e rate s to make he r s uit fo r r e lie f t o 1 98 9 u nti me ly , she wo uld be lim ite d to see kin g re lie f f or on ly the y e ar p ri or

to the da te sh e fi le d s uit

.-3-

The que stion as certified assumes that pursua nt to the “continuing violation” doctrine,

un e qu a l pay

is a sin g le dis c ri min a tory

pr a c tic e un de r the TH RA rathe r tha n a se ri e s o f d isc re te discriminatory

acts. B oeing arg ues, howe ver, tha t in light of re cent f eder al ca se law this Court sh ou ld h oldthat th e c on tin uin g viol ati on do c tr ine is i na pp lic able to p a y

dis c ri min a tio n c a se s. There fore , Boe ing a

rg ues that under

no circ umstances should B ooker be permitted t o seek ba ckpay fo r a n y p e r io d lo n g e r th a n o n e y e ar p r io r to th e d a te s h e f il e d s u it

. B o o k e r ar g u e s that this Court should modify

the continui ng violation doctrine, but that it should hold that it is applicable to pay dis c ri min a tio n c la ims

.

Continui ng Violation Doctrine

The c ontinuing violation doctrine e ssential l y al l ows a plaintiff to bring a cla im for dis c ri min a tory

c on du c t th a t oc c ur s o uts ide the lim ita tio ns pe ri od if the dis c ri min a tory c on du c t is sufficie ntly

rela ted to c onduct occur

ring within the limit ations period. Spicer v. Be aman B ottling Co., 937 S.W .2d 884, 889 (Tenn. 1996). The doctrine affec ts both the jurisdiction of a c ourt to hear a charg e of

d is c r im in a ti o n a n d th e r e me d ie s th e c o u r t m a y imp o s e ; i t a ll o w s a

c o u r t t o a ssert jurisd ic tio n o ve r a ch arg e of dis c ri min a tio n oc c ur ri ng ou tsi de the lim ita tio ns pe ri oda nda lso pe rm its
t h e c o u r t t o f

a s h i o n a r e m e d y e x t e n d i n g b e yo n d t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d

. G a n d y v

. S u l l i v a n C o u n t y, 24 F.3d 861, 864 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Thelma A. Crivens, The Continuing Violation Theory and Sy stemic Discrimination: I n Searc h of a J udicial S tandar d for Timely Filing
, 41 Vand. L . Rev. 1171, 11 72 (1 98 8) . I n th e c on te xt of a n u ne qu a l pay c la im, the c on tin uin g vio la tio n d oc tr ine wo uldop e rate to “link” all re lated instance s of unequa l pay into a single prac tice, such that a suit for une qual pay could see k redr ess and ba ckpay for a ll the violatio ns, including those tha t occur red outside the limit ations period.

Th e c on tin uin g vio la tio n doc tr ine wa s dev e lop e d by fe de ra l cou rt s inte rp re tin g fe de ra l a nti

discrimination statutes, particular ly Title VI I of the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“ Title VI I ”). See , e.g ., Be rry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L .S.U., 7 1 5 F. 2 d 9 7 1, 979 (5th Cir. 19 83 ). B e c a us e “ the state d p ur po se a nd in te nt o f the [TH RA ] is to pr ov idefo r e xec uti on wi thi n Tenne ssee of

the policies embodied in the f eder al anti-discr imination acts,” Spicer, 937 S.W .2d at 888 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 21-101(a )( 1) (1991 Repl.)) , this Court approved the c ontinuing violation doctrine in Spicer. We obser ved in Spicer tha t

Cou rt s h a ve re c og nize d .

. . on ly tw o n arr ow ly lim ite d in sta nc e s in which the c ontinuing violation doctrine a pplies. The first c ateg ory arises w here there is some evidence of pre se nt dis c ri min a tory

a c tiv ity
g iving r ise to a cla im of a continuing violation, for ex ample whe re a n

e mpl oy e r c on tin ue s to pr e se ntl y i mp o s e d i s p a

rate wo rk a ssi g nme nt[s ]

or pa y rate s b e tw e e n s imi larl y

situa te d e mpl oy e e g ro up s. Ke y to establishing this exception is proof that at lea st one of the f orbidden discriminatory

acts oc curr ed within the re levant limitations period.A ltho u g h w e a p p ro v e d the c o n tinu ing v io la tio n d o c trine in S p ic e r, w e he ld tha t t h e p la intiff in tha t ca se c o u ld 1

not i nv oke i t becau s e t he evi dence di d not s how t hat an y i ns t anc es of di s cr i mi nat i on ha d occur r ed wi t hi n t he one- y ear l i mi t at i on s pe r i od. I d. a t 890- 91.

-4-

The sec ond cate g ory of “continuing violation” arises w here there has bee n a long standing and demonstra ble policyof discrimination such as an e stablished and repea ted patter n of paying men more tha n women. To c onstitut e such a n established pattern, the plaintiff m u s t clear ly

demonstrate some “over arc hing policy of discrimination,” and not me rely the occur renc e of a n isolated incident of discriminatory

conduct.

Spicer a t 889-90 (citations and f ootnotes omitt ed; emphasis adde d).

As these ex amples illustrate, per haps the most important fac tor supporting use of the continuing violation doctr ine in employ ment discrimination case s is th e fa ct that “many discriminatory

acts c annot be view ed as discr ete inc i d en t s , and ofte n unfold rathe r than oc cur, making it difficult to precisely pinpoint the time when they take place .” I d. at 889 (c itation omit ted). As t h i s statement implicitlyrec og nized, the doctrine doe s not apply to “discre te incidents” or individual acts of discrimination. Rather, the continuin g v i olation doctrine a pplies when the discriminatory

acts take place over time.

Noting tha t “applica tion of the continuing violation doctrine is not alway s clea r and simpl e,” id. at 889, we a dopted the doctrine as articulated by the Fif th Circuit in Berry . Spicer, 937 S.W.2d

a t 89 0. Th e B e rry

fo rm ulatio n, wh ic h w a s th e ma jority ru le a t th e tim e we de c ide d Sp ic e r, loo ks to three fac tors to determine w hether the allege d discriminatory acts a re a series of individual violations

or ar e part of a single continuing violation. The first fac tor is whether “‘the alleg ed ac ts involve the same ty pe o f d is c r im in a ti o n , te n d in g to c o n n e c t th e m

. . . . ’ ” Sp ic e r , 9 3 7 S. W. 2 d a t 8 9 0 (quoting B e rry , 7 15 F .2 d at 981 ). Th e se c on d fa c tor is “‘ fr e qu e nc y ,’ ” c on sid e ri ng wh e the r the a lle g e d a c ts

are “‘r ecur

ring (e.g ., a bi-we ekly pay chec k) or more in the nature of an isolated w ork assig nment or

e mpl oy me nt d e c isi on [.]’ ” I d. (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e thi rd fa c tor is “‘ de g re e of pe rm a ne nc e .’ ” Th is fac tor asks whe t h er the “‘ act ha [s] the deg ree of permanenc e which should trig g er a n employ ee’ s

a wa re ne ss o f a nddu ty

to a sse rt his or he r ri g hts

. . . .’” I d. I t is the int e rp la y of thi s thir d f a c tor wi th 1 the plain lang uage o f t h e THRA’ s statute of limitations t hat the district court’s certified question seeks to cla

rify . That is, is a suit onl y t i m el y once the plaintiff should be aw are of her rig hts, as provided in the B erry

rule, or is the suit timely as l o n g as t he discriminatory prac tice has not y et “ce ase[d],” a s provided in the THRA’s statute of limitations, Tennessee Code A nnotated sec tion 4- 21-311(d) ?-5- The THRA’s Statute of Limit ations

As orig inally

enact ed
, t h e THRA did not contain a statute of limit ations. See 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 748, § 2. Courts ap p lied to THRA claims the one- y ear statute of limitations for

“ [c]iv il a c tio ns fo r c omp e ns a tory or pu nit ive da ma g e s, or bo th, br ou g ht un de r the fe de ra l c ivi l r ig hts statutes” set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104( a)( 3). See Spice r, 937 S.W.2d at 8 9 0 n

. 6 ; s e e a l s o B e n n e t tv

. S t e i n e r

- Li f f Ir o n & M e t a l C o

. , 8 2 6 S

. W

. 2 d 1 1 9
, 1 2 1 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 2 )

. In 1992, the Gene ral Asse mbly amende d the THRA to a dd a statute of limitations. 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 1027, § 8. The statute states that suits must be filed “within one (1) y ear afte r the a lleg ed discriminatory

prac tice ce ases . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 21-311(d)

.

We n ote d in Spi c e r tha t th e TH RA ’s the n- ne wl y -e na c te d statut e of lim ita tio ns “ app are ntl y incorporates t h e continuing violation exception . . . .’” Spicer, 937 S.W.2d at 890 n.6. Thus, our h o ld in g in Sp ic e r th a t th e c o n ti n u in g v io lati o n d o c trin e is ap p li c ab le to c la im s b r o ug ht under the THRA was of limited import for claims broug ht after the ef fec tive date of

the leg islation crea ting the THRA’s statute of limit ations, beca use we rec og nized that the L eg islature int ended to make the continuing violation doctr ine available to c laims br oug ht a fter that date. We re iterate d in Weber v. Moses, 938 S

. W

. 2 d 3 87 (Tenn. 1996) , that “[t] he [THRA] s tatute of limitations . . . adopts the ‘continuing violation ex ception’ which we judicially adopted and explained f ully in Spice r.” I d. at 391 n.4

Shortlyafte r our de cision in Spi cer , we a ddresse d the prope r fr amewor k for a naly zing the THRA’s new statute of limitations i n Weber. I n Weber, the pla intiff alleg ed that he w as terminate d from his job beca

use he refuse d to follow his employ er’ s rac ially -discriminatory hiring policy . The plaintiff was or ally

informed of

th e t er m ination in early Aug ust of 1992, the termination wa s eff ective on A ug ust 31, 1992, a n d the plaintiff re ceive d written notice of termination on or af

ter September 1, 1992. The plaintiff filed suit on Aug ust 31, 1993. 938 S.W .2d at 388-89.

We held that beca

use the statute of limit ations directs that suits be filed within one y ear of when the “ alleg ed discriminatory prac tice ce ases .

. . we must first identify the alleg ed discriminatory
pr a c tic e .” I d. a t 39 0. Th e Cou rt ide nti fi e d the dis c ri min a tory pr a c tic e in We be r a s th e de c isi on to te r mi n a te the pla in ti f

f
, r a th e r th a n th e te r mi n a ti o n it s e lf

. T h e r e f o r e , th e Co u r t s tate d th a t th e n e xt step was to “de termine the d at e o n wh i ch the discriminatory prac tice ende d,” or c ease d. I d. The pla int if f ar g ue d tha t the dis c ri min a tory pr a c tic e did no t ce a se un til he re c e ive d wr itt e n noti c e of his termination, on or af

ter Septembe r 1, 1992. The de fenda nt employ er a rg ued that the discriminatory
pr a c tic e e nd e d on the da te in ea rl y Au g us t w he n th e pla int if f w a s o ra lly

a dv ise d o f the de c isi on to terminate his employ ment.

Th e Cou rt

a g re e d wi th the e mpl oy e r a nd he ld that the su it w a s b arr e d b y the on e -y e ar s ta tut e of limita t i o n s

. L ooking to a nalog ous case s decide d under f eder al law, we emphasized that “a discriminatory

termination ce ases and is c omplete[] when the plaintiff is g iven unequivoca l notice of the e mpl oy e r’ s te rm inatio n de c isi on , e ve n if e mpl oy me nt do e s no t c e a se un til a de sig na te d d a te in the future.” I d. at 391-92. We explained that, “‘the proper focus is on the time of the-6-

discriminatory act not the point at which the conseque nces of the a ct bec ome painful.’” I d. at 391 (q u o ti n g Ch ar d o n v

. F e r n a n d e z, 4 5 4 U

. S. 6
, 8 ( 1 9 8 1 ) )

. We b e r w a s c o n s is te n t w ith Spi cer ’s

rec og nition that the continuing violation doc trine does not a pply to discrete a cts. Where the a lleg ed discriminatory

prac tice is a discr ete a ct, such a s the dec ision to t er m i n at e an employ ee, the

c on tin uin g vio la tio n d oc tr ine is ina pp lic able to e xten d the TH RA ’s statut e of lim ita tio ns . A dis c re te discriminatory

act “ cea ses” a s of the time it occur s, not as of the time the c onsequen ces of the ac t

cea se.
The United States Supreme Court’s Morgan Decision

I n 2002, the United States Supreme Court c larified that under fede ral law
, t h e c o n tinuing violation doctrine is likewise not applica ble t o extend Titl e VI I ’s statute of limitations where a plaintiff alleg es “discr ete incide nts” of discrimination. I n Nati o n al Railroad Passeng er Corp. v. Morg an, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), the plaintiff alleg ed that he ha d been subje cted to discre te ac ts of discrimination and re taliation based on ra ce in v i o lation of Title VI I . He a lso alleg ed that he ha d been subje cted to a r acia lly hostile w ork environment in violation of Title VI I

. I d. at 104. Many of the discriminatory

acts a lleg ed in the plaintiff’ s complaint occur red outside Ti t l e VII ’s 300-day limit ations period for filing a char g e. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appea ls held that pursuant to the continuing violation doctr ine, the plaintiff could “sue on claims that would ordinarily be time bar

red

so long a s they

either a re ‘ sufficie ntly

rela ted’ to incidents that fa ll within t he statutory period or a

re part of a sy stematic policy

or pra ctice of

discrimination that took place, a t least in pa rt, within the limit ations period.” I d. at 105.

Th e Sup re me Cou rt

re ve rs e d in pa

rt a nda ff ir me d in part. The Cou rt didno t e xplic itl y approve or disapprove the use of the continuing violation doctr ine. R at h er , rely ing on T itle VI I ’s
pr oh ibi tio n of un law ful e mpl oy me nt “ pr a c tic e s, ” the Cou rt dr e w a dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n h os til e environment claims, which are “a series of separ ate a cts that collec tively constitute one ‘unlaw ful

e mpl oy me nt p ra c tic e ,’ ” a nd“ dis c re te a c ts” of dis c ri min a tio n, wh ic h c on sti tut e a sin g le , id e nti fi able prohibited “pra ctice.” I d. at 114-17.

The Court ex plained that in the case of hostile environment c laims, “[p] rovided that a n act

c on tr ibu tin g to the c la im o c c ur s w ith in the fi lin g pe ri od, the e nti re tim e pe ri odof the ho sti le environment may

be conside red by

a court for the purposes of determining liabili ty .” I d. at 117. The Court expl ained that hostile environme n t c laims “are differ ent” be cause “[t] heir ve ry nature involves

re pe a te d c on du c t.” I d. a t 11 5. Th e Cou rt the re fo re re a so ne d th a t,

A h os til e wo rk e nv ir on me nt cl a im is compo se d of a se ri e s o f s e pa rate acts that c ollectively

constitute one “unla wful employ ment prac tice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e )(1)

. The ti mely filing provision onlyrequire s t h a ta T i t l e V II p l a i n t i f

f f i l e a c h ar g e w i t h i n a

c e r t a i n n u m b e r

o f d a ys afte r the unlaw ful prac tice happe ned. It does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the c o m p o n ent ac ts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time pe riod. Provided that anM o rga n d i d
, ho w ev er, save t he q ue st i o n o f w ha t eff ec t i t s ho l d i ng wo uld ha ve o n p att ern

- an d

- p rac t i ce claim s, 2

n ot i n g t h a t “ n on e a r e a t i s s u e h e r e

. ” 536 U

. S. at 115 n

. 9. Li k e w i s e , B oo k e r doe s no t al l e g e a pa t t e r n

- or

- pr a c t i c e c l a i m.

-7- act c ontributing to the claim occur s within the filing period, the e ntire time period of the hostil e environment may be considered by a court f o r t h e p u rp o s e s o f

d e t e r m i n i n g l i ab i l i t y.

I d. at 117. I n other words, a hostile environment claim is not made timely by linking the “ component acts” toge ther throug h the continuing violation doc trine. Rather, the hostile environment constitutes

on e un if ie d, un la wf

ul e mpl oy me nt p ra c tic e , a ndfi lin g is tim e ly a s lon g a s so me a c t c on tr ibu tin g to the hostile environment occ urs within the limit ations period.

I n c o n tr a s t, th e Co u r t he ldth a t w h e r e th e a ll e g e d d is c r im in a to r y p r a c ti c e is a

“ [d ]i s c r e te a c t[ ] such as termination, failure to promote, de nial of t ra n s fe r, or r efusa l to hire,” e ach a lleg ed ac t of discrimination must be evaluate d independe ntly to determine w hether

it oc curred within the limita ti o n s p e r io d

. I d

. a t 1 1 4

. T h e Co u r t d idn o t d e f in e a “ d is c r e te d is c r im in a to r y

a c t” bey ond offe ring examples of what mig ht be a discr ete ac t

. The Court also explained, in response to the pl aint iff’s a

rg ument that Title VI I ’s use of the term “pr actice ” envisions an ong oing c ourse of

c on du c t r a the r tha n a

dis c re te a c t,

We have r epeatedly

interpre ted the ter m “pra ctice” to apply to a dis c re te a c t or

sin g le “ oc c ur

re nc e ,” e ve n w he n it

ha s a c on ne c tio n to other a cts. For

example . . . in Bazemore v. Fr i d ay , 4 7 8 U.S. 385 (1 9 8 6 ) ( p ercu ri am ), a p at t er n -o r- p ra ct i ce ca s e, wh en co n s i d er i n g a discriminatory

sal ar y structure , the Court noted that althoug h the salary discrimination beg an p ri o r t o the date tha t the act wa s actionable under Title VI I
, “[e]ach wee k’s pay chec k that deliver[ed] le ss t o a bla c k th a n to a

sim ila rl y situa te d wh ite is a

wr on g a c tio na

ble under Title VI I

. . . .” I d. at 395.

I d. a t 11 1- 12 . I n s um, Morga n e sse nti a lly re nd e re d th e c on tin uin g vio la tio n d oc tr ine ir re le va nt t o

c la ims un de r f

e de ra l di sc ri min a tio n la w, div idi ng the un ive rs e of d i s c ri m i n at o r

y p r a c t i c e s i nto ho sti le environment c laims and discre te ac ts of discrimination. 2

Since Morg an, a number of fede ral courts have held that pay discrimination claims involve “discre te ac ts” of discrimination such that plaintiffs a re limited to rec overing damag es for only the discriminatory

acts oc curring w ithin the l i m i t at i o n s period. See, e .g ., L edbetter v. Goody ear

Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1182-83 (11th Cir. 2005) (ea ch discriminatory decision setting pay is a dis cre te act); Hildebra ndt v. I ll. Dep’t of Natural Res., 347 F .3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2003) (e ach discriminatory

pay chec k is a discre te ac t). I ndeed, some fede ral c ourts so held befor e the Morg an de c isi on

. Se e , e. g ., Pol lis v. Ne w Sch . for Soc . Res e arc h, 13 2 F. 3d 11 5, 11 9 (2d Cir . 199 7) (“ a c la im of discriminatory

pay is fundamentally

unlike o t h er cl aims of ong oing disc riminatory trea tment-8-

be c a us e it inv olv e s a ser ie s o f d isc re te , in div idu a l w ro ng s r a the r tha n a sin g le a ndind ivi sib le c ou rs e of wrong ful ac tion.”).

B e c a us e it e sse nti a lly

e lim inate d th e c on tin uin g vio la tio n do c tr ine
, Mo rg a n is of lim ite d u se to us in interpr eting the THRA, since the THRA’s statute of limit ations incorporates the continuing violation ex ception. Te n n

. C o d e Ann. § 4- 21-311(d) ; Spicer, 937 S.W.2d at 890 n.6. Morga n’s holding doe s not chang e the plain lang uag e of the THRA’s statute of limi tations. As we have observe d, howeve r, we have previously deter mined that, like Title VI I ’s s tatute of li mitations, t he THRA’s statute of limitations does not operate t o extend the limi tations period on discre te ac ts of discrimination. Webe r, 938 S.W .2d at 391-92. The question we must resolve, there fore , is whether,

u n d er T en n es see la w, pay discrimination is a series of discrete acts, or w hether it is a continuing discriminatory

prac tice that is ac tionable until it ceases.

Is Discriminatory Pay a Continuing Violation under the THRA?

B oe ing arg ue s th a t becau se th e TH RA is m e a nt t o c on fo rm to T itl e VI I , th is C ou rt

sh ou ld adopt the fe dera l courts’ re asoning that discrim i n at o ry p ay is not a continuing violation. B ooker
arg ues that althoug h Tenne ssee courts use fede ral civil rights law as a g uide, this Court is not bound b y f e d e r a l c i v i l r i g h t s l a w w h e r e t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e T H R A c o m p e l s a d i f f e r e n tr e s u l t

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, B oo ke r a rg ue s th a t be c a us e the TH RA ’s statut e of lim ita tio ns pr ov ide s th a t su its mus t be fi le d w ith in
one y ear of whe n the “a lleg ed discriminatory prac tice ce ases,” Tenn. C o d e Ann. § 4- 21-311(d) (empha sis add ed ), we should not adopt the fe dera l courts’ seve re r estriction of the c ontinuing violation doctrine.

Although Boe in g is c o rr e c t th a t th e p u rp o s e o f th e T H RA is to “ [p ]r o v id e f o r e xe c u ti on within Tennessee of the policies embodied in the fede ral Civil Rights Acts,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 21-101(a )(1) (2005), a s we ha ve discussed, “ we a re ne ither bound bynor re stricted by the fe dera l law when interpreting our own anti-discrimination laws.” Barnes v. Goody ear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W .3d 698, 705 (Tenn. 2000) ; see a lso Phillips v. I nterstate Hotels Corp. No. L 07, 974 S.W .2d 680, 683-84 (Te nn. 1998) (same). There fore
, we will not apply the re asoning and conc lusions of feder al civil rig hts decisions where doing so would conflict with the THRA. At lea st one other state court has dec lined to follow Morg an strictly wher e plaintiff s al l ege claims under sta te laws prohibiting discrimination. See, e.g ., Yanowitz v. L ’Ore al, USA, I nc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1057 (2005) ( declining to apply Morg an to state-law reta liation claim because doing so “would mark a sig nificant de parture from the r easoning and under ly ing policy rationale of our pr evious ca ses”)

.

Moreove r, the THRA’ s statute of limitations i s fundamenta lly d i ff er ent t han Title VI I ’s statute of limitations. Tit le VI I provides that a char g e of discrimination must be filed within a set period “ afte r the al l ege d unlawful e mploy ment prac tice occ urre d.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5( e)( 1) (empha sis added)

. The THRA provides that a sui t must be filed “ within one (1) y ear afte r the a lleg ed discriminatory

prac tice ce ases.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311( d) (e mphasis added) . Boe ing a rg ues th a t th e d if

f e r e n c e b e tw e e n th e w o r d s “ o c c u rr e d ” a n d “ c e a s e s ” is im mate r ia l, ar g u in g th at any prac tice that has alre ady “occ urre d” mus t by definition have “ce ased.” Howeve r, B oeing ’s ar g ument-9-

ig no re s th e fa c t tha t “c e a se ” a nd“ oc c ur re d” ha ve e nti re ly

dif fe re nt m e a nin g s. To “ c e a se ” me a ns “ to bring or come to an end; stop; discontinue.” Web s t er ’s Ne w W orld Dictionary (2d ed. 1980)

. “Oc curr ed,” on the other ha nd, means “ to take plac e; happe n.” I d. Thus, “occ urre d” connote s and contemplates a

single instance, w here as “ce ases” connotes and contemplates an ong oing c ourse of conduct. I n stating tha t a claim must be broug ht within one y ear of the time a pr actice “ce ases,” as

we ha ve e xpla ine d, the L e g isl a tur e inc or po rate d the c on tin uin g vio la tio n e xce pti on int o the sta tut e of limitations. Therefor e, rather than a ccep t i ng the fe dera l courts’ limitation on the continuing vio la tio n d oc tr ine , w e mus t c on du c t ou r o wn a na ly sis

.

B oe ing arg ue s th a t pay dis c ri min a tio n is n ot a c on tin uin g vio la tio n b e c a us e e a c h p a y me nt i s a dis cre te di scriminatory act that “ce ased” at t he ti me t he payment was made . I n our view, how ever , a discriminatory

pay rate is not a discrete act in the sa me sense tha t a termination or a denial of
pr omo tio n is a

dis c re te a c t. S ome thi ng is “ dis c re te ” if it is “ se pa

rate a nddis tin c t; n ot atta c he d to others; unre lated.” I d. Pay ments of a salary are not “distinct or unconnec ted.” Rathe r, they are part of an o n go i n g course of conduc t. We do not hold t hat a sing le discriminatory pay chec k does not constitute a discriminatory act. I t doe s. But in our view, a discriminatory pay rate , whether it occurs for two we eks, two y ear s, or more, constitutes pr ecise ly the type of c ontinuing violation envisioned by the L e g isl a tur e in e na c tin g the TH RA ’s statut e of lim ita tio ns

. I nd e e d, we re c og nize d a s mu c h in Spi c e r w he n w e c ite d a s a n e xamp le of a c on tin uin g vio la tio n, “ a n e mpl oy er [wh o] c on tin ue s to prese ntly impose disparate work a ssignment or pay rate s.” 937 S .W.2d at 889 (emphasis adde d). A d is c r im in a to r y p a y r a te is a c ti o n ab le u n ti l it “ c e a s e s

. ” I t d o e s n o t c e a s e e a c h ti me a n employ ee

re c e ive s a pa y c he c k. Ra the r, it c e a se s w he n th e e mpl oy e r b ri ng s th e e mpl oy e e int o pa ri ty wi th h is

or he r p e e rs

.

Under the continuing violation doctrine as adopted in Spicer, a plaintiff must bring suit whe n the discriminatory

“‘a ct ha[s] the deg ree of permanenc e which should trig g er [the] employ ee’ s

a w ar e n e s s o f

a n d d u t y t o a s s e r t h i s o r h e r r i g h t s

. . . . ’ ” S p i c e r , 9 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d a t8 9 0 ( q u o t i n g B e rr y, 715 F.2d a t 981). I f this “d i scovery rule” applies to pay

discrimination claims, then it would not matter, for

purposes of the statute of limitations, whether the discriminatory conduct ha d “ce ased”

or no t. O nc e the dis c ri min a tory pa y rate ha d “ tr ig g e r[e d]” th e e mpl oy e e ’s a wa re ne ss o f a

du ty to

a sse rt his or he r rig hts , th e n th e statut e wo uldbe tol le d. We a g re e wi th B oo ke r that th is rule is inc omp a tib le wi th the pla in l a ng ua g e of the TH RA

. A dis c ri min a tory pa y rate “ c e a se s” wh e n it

e nd s,

no t w he n th e e mpl oy e e ’s a wa re ne ss o f i t sh ou ld a le rt

him or he r t o a sse rt

his or he r rig hts

.

We ove rrule Spicer to the extent that it impos ed a “ discovery rule” on continuing violation claims. Howe ver, w e note that e mploy ers may still invoke equitable doc trines such a s lache s and

e sto pp e l to lim it c la ims in c a se s w he re a n e mpl oy e e ha s sl e pt o n h is o r h e r rig hts

.

Conclusion After considering the applica

ble authority

and the a rg uments of the parties, we c onclude that discriminatory

pay is a continuing violation under t he THRA. We further conclude that a plaintiff
may seek backpa y for the duration of the practice, until it “ce ases,” althoug h equitable doc trines may-10-

bar some or

all of the plaintiff’ s relief . Costs of the appea l shall b e as s essed to the a ppellee, the B o e i n g C o m p a n y, d/

b / a B o e i n g

- O a k

R i d g e C o m p a n y.

______________________________ E. RI LEY AN DE RSO N, JUSTI CE