This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 PEGGY ZAMORA, 7 Worker-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 29,775 9 EXCEL HOSPITALITY, INC., and 10 REPUBLIC INDEMNITY COMPANY OF 11 AMERICA, 12 Employer/Insurer-Appellees. 13 APPEAL FROM THE NEW MEXICO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 14 ADMINISTRATION 15 Helen L. Stirling, Workers’ Compensation Judge 16 Rod Dunn 17 Rio Rancho, NM 18 for Appellant 19 Lisa T. Mack 20 Albuquerque, NM 21 for Appellees 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION 23 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 24Worker appeals from an order denying her claim for workers’ compensation 1 benefits, asserting that there was insu fficient evidence to support the workers’ 2 compensation judge’s (WCJ) determination that Worker failed to establish that her 3 work-related injury caused her disability. In this Court’s notice of proposed summary 4 disposition, we proposed to affirm. Worker has timely responded with a 5 memorandum in opposition. We have consider ed Worker’s arguments, and as we are 6 not persuaded by them, we affirm. 7 There was evidence presented at Worker’s trial that Worker was hit in the knee 8 by a laundry cart while at work on Fe bruary 9, 2007. [RP 134 (¶¶ 10-11)] There was 9 also evidence presented that on February 13, 2007, just a few days after the accident 10 with the laundry cart, Worker injured hers elf while not at work when she fell on a 11 patch of ice. [RP 140 (¶ 51)] In this Court’s notice of proposed summary disposition, 12 we proposed to hold that there was s ubstantial evidence to support the WCJ’s 13 conclusion that Worker had not met her bur den of proving that her disability was 14 caused by her work-related injury of being hit by the laundry cart. 15 In her memorandum in opposition, Workerargues that there was no evidence 16 that Worker actually injured herself when she slipped on the ice or that any injury 17 resulting from the slip was to her knee, as opposed to some other body part. [MIO 1- 18 5] In response to this argument regardi ng the quantum of evidence on the issue of 19 whether Worker’s injuries resulted from her non-work-related accident of slipping on 202 the ice, we note that Employer was not actually required to prove that the non-work1 related slip caused Worker’s disability; the burden of proof always remained with 2 Worker to prove that it was her work-relate d accident with the laundry cart that caused 3 her disability. See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-28(B) (1987) (“In all cases where the 4 employer or his insurance carrier deny that an alleged disability is a natural and direct 5 result of the accident, the worker must establish that causal connection as a probability 6 by expert testimony of a health care provi der, as defined in Section 52-4-1 NMSA 7 1978, testifying within the area of his expertise.”); Mayfield v. Keeth Gas Co. , 81 8 N.M. 313, 315, 466 P.2d 879, 881 (Ct. App. 1970) (“The statute places the burden of 9 persuasion upon the [Worker]. The statute di d not shift the burden of persuasion once 10 she introduced evidence whic h would have supported a finding in her favor. Even 11 after the introduction of conflicting eviden ce [by the Employer], it remained her 12 burden to convince the trial court of suchcausal connection as a medical probability.” 13 (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The evidence of the non-work14 related accident served only to call into ques tion Worker’s claim that her injuries were 15 caused by the work-related accide nt. However, because this was apparently the only 16 evidence that would have undermined Worker’s evidence that her injuries were caused 17 by the laundry cart, we examine it to see if it was sufficient to raise doubts that would 183 render Worker’s theory sufficiently impr obable that the WCJ could determine that 1 Worker had failed to meet her burden of proof. 2 Evidence supporting a determination thatWorker injured herself when she 3 slipped on the ice included: Worker calle d into work saying that she was unable to 4 come in as a result of the fall on the ice, Worker later told her friend and supervisor 5 that she had not come into work as a result of the fall, and Worker did not begin 6 limping until after the fall. [RP 140 (¶ 51), RP 144 (¶ 77), RP 145 (¶¶ 79-81)] 7 Worker’s story about what happened withthe laundry cart vari ed over time and had 8 a number of discrepancies, such that Worke r’s claim that her injuries were caused by 9 the cart lacked credibility. [RP 146 (¶ 88)] All three doctors agreed that it would 10 have been unusual for Worker to suffer the kind of injury she suffered as a result of 11 being struck with the laundry cart, since the type of injuries she had were usually the 12 result of some kind of rotation of the jo int. [RP 146 (¶ 86)] Evidence supporting a 13 determination that Worker hurt her knee (as opposed to some other body part) as a 14 result of the fall on the ice included: Worker began limping and sought medical 15 treatment for a knee injury after th e fall. [RP 135 (¶ 20), 145 (¶¶ 79, 81)] All three 16 doctors agreed that Worker’s knee injuries could have b een caused by her fall. [DS 17 2-3; RP 139 (¶ 44)] 184 As we conclude that this evidence wa s adequate to rais e doubts about Worker’s 1 reports to her doctors thather injuries were caused by the laundry cart, and as we 2 conclude that the WCJ could have prop erly found that it was more likely that 3 Worker’s injuries were actually caused by her fall on the ice, we hold that there was 4 substantial evidence to support the district court’s determination that Worker failed 5 to meet her burden of proof that her disability was caused by her work-related 6 accident. Worker points out that the physic ians did not change their opinions that 7 Worker’s injuries were caused by the laundry cart, even when they were informed of 8 Worker’s fall on the ice. [M IO 4] However, the testimony of the experts indicated 9 that their training requires them to rely on patients’ self-reports about the causes of 10 their injuries [RP 138 (¶ 41)], and where ev idence of another accident was presented 11 and all three doctors agreed that this other accident could have caused Workers’ 12 disability, the question of which accident cau sed Worker’s injuri es essentially came 13 down to a determination in light of th e surrounding evidence about whether Worker’s 14 self-reports to the physicians were credib le. It was for the WCJ to make this 15 credibility determination, and we will not reconsider it on appeal. See Moya v. City 16 of Albuquerque , 2008-NMSC-004, ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 258, 175 P.3d 926 (filed 2007) 17 (stating that it is for the WCJ as the f act finder to assess credibility and weigh the 18 evidence); Dewitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. , 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 453, 212 195 P.3d 341 (“Substantial evidence on the recordas a whole is evidence demonstrating 1 the reasonableness of [the WCJ’s] decisi on, and we neither re weigh the evidence nor 2 replace the fact finder’s conclusions with our own.” (citation omitted)). 3 Therefore, for the reasons stated in this opinion and in our notice of proposed 4 summary disposition, we affirm. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6
7 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 8 WE CONCUR: 9

10 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 11

12 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 13