NUMBER 13-21-00263-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

RONNIE RODRIGUEZ JR., Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 36th District Court 

of San Patricio County, Texas.

 

OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina

Opinion by Justice Tijerina

A jury found appellant Ronnie Rodriguez Jr. guilty of capital murder of Juan 

Sandoval III a/k/a Juan Jose Martinez Sandoval III (“Baby Juan”) and Nicky Sandoval

(“Nicky”), and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. §§ 19.02, 19.03. By four issues, appellant contends that (1) the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court improperly submitted the case to 
2

the jury on the second amended indictment, (3) a different date was in the jury charge 

than alleged in the indictment, thus, the trial court should have submitted the case on the 

original date in the unamended indictment, and (4) the trial court’s denial of his request 

for a ten-day continuance was erroneous and caused him harm.

1 We affirm.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

By his first issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

jury’s verdict. Specifically, appellant argues that although “[t]here is no dispute that [an 

eyewitness, Juan Espinosa2] testified that [appellant] shot [the victims, Baby Juan and 

Nicky],” in this case “no rational jury could have believed this evidence.” Appellant claims 

that “a rational juror could not have believed” Espinosa’s testimony “because [appellant’s] 

father [Big Ronnie] had just shot [Espinosa] in the head with the same gun” used to kill 

the victims and Espinosa “testified that his sons were shot in the back of their heads” but 

“the medical examiner testified that the victims were shot from the front.” Appellant further 

argues that all other eyewitnesses testified that Big Ronnie shot the victims; “[t]hus, no 

rational juror could have believed that [appellant] shot the victims.” Appellant also asserts 

that even under the law of parties, he is not guilty.

1 We have reorganized and renumbered appellant’s issues for purposes of our analysis.

2 The parties refer to this witness as Juan Espinosa who is also referred to in the record as Juan 

Sandoval. We will refer to this witness as Espinosa throughout this memorandum opinion for ease of 

reading.

Espinosa’s father, Juan Sandoval Sr. (“Sandoval Sr.”), and Espinosa’s three sons, Baby Juan, 

Nicky, and Jeremy Rodriguez were all killed during an altercation with appellant, his father, Ronnie 

Rodriguez Sr. (“Big Ronnie”) and his brother, Jeremey Rodriguez (“Little Jeremy”). We will use the 

nicknames of the parties used by the witnesses at trial for consistency.

Appellant is not charged with the deaths of Sandoval Sr. and Jeremy Sandoval.
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A. The Evidence

Espinosa testified that a confrontation occurred between appellant’s family 

members and him and his four sons, Baby Juan, Justin Sandoval, Nicky, and Jeremy 

Sandoval. According to Espinosa, the situation began on the evening of October 12,

2018, when appellant’s brother, “Little Jeremy,” came to his house insisting that

Espinosa’s father, Sandoval, Sr. needed to contact Little Jeremy’s father, Big Ronnie. 

Espinosa stated that Little Jeremy was cussing and seemed upset, so Espinosa asked 

Little Jeremy to leave, but Little Jeremy refused. Espinosa testified that he and Nicky then 

went inside and waited for Little Jeremy to leave, which he eventually did without further 

incident. 

Espinosa stated that the next day, he, his wife, sons, and Sandoval Sr., went about 

their usual routine; but suddenly, Jeremy Sandoval “comes inside and he goes, ‘Hey, they 

got grandpa in the barrio,’ in the neighborhood.” Espinosa clarified that he believed that 

Little Jeremy and appellant had “barricaded” Sandoval Sr. in the neighborhood, and 

Jeremy Sandoval said, “They’re going to hurt him.” Espinosa said that Jeremy Sandoval 

then “booked it out the door . . . [a]nd we ran right after him” and “got in the car and took 

off.” The group consisted of Espinosa, Jeremy Sandoval, Baby Juan, and Nicky. The 

group then arrived at a home where Big Ronnie stopped his vehicle. Espinosa stated that 

the group then exited the vehicle, and appellant’s relative, Rudy Rodriguez, who was on 

the front porch of the home, started “cussing [the group] out.” The group then approached 

a stop sign where Big Ronnie had parked his vehicle, and Espinosa spoke with Big 

Ronnie. When asked what they discussed, Espinosa replied, “About sons.” Espinosa 
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clarified that the men discussed that appellant and Little Jeremy were harassing Sandoval 

Sr., and according to Espinosa, Big Ronnie agreed that his sons had been bothering 

Sandoval Sr., and said, “I already talked to them. I don’t know what their deal is . . . . They 

don’t listen.” Espinosa said, “Right when he said that, all I heard was ‘Boom.’” According 

to Espinosa, “the dirt in front of [his] foot just . . . . And [he] looked over and it was 

[appellant]. [Appellant] fired another shot, ‘Boom.’ That time to [his] boys.” Espinosa 

clarified that he saw appellant shoot “twice” in his direction. Espinosa said, “That’s when 

I told my boys to get the hell out of the way . . . . And then they started scattering.”

Espinosa stated that appellant then handed the gun to Big Ronnie. During his 

testimony, Espinosa pointed at a diagram he drew of the location with marks showing 

where appellant and all the parties had been when the shootings occurred. Espinosa said 

that after appellant shot at him, he “went behind the truck by the road.” Espinosa stated:

“[Appellant] and [Little Jeremy] came at me. They wanted to fight. So when I was going 

to hit him, [Big Ronnie] blew out my face.” Espinosa clarified that when he said that Big 

Ronnie “blew out” his face, he meant that Big Ronnie shot him on the left side of his face.

Espinosa testified that he then witnessed Big Ronnie shoot Sandoval Sr., and 

Sandoval Sr. “fell down.” Espinosa continued as follows: “And then my boy, Jeremy 

[Sandoval], grabs Big Ronnie and they are struggling. And that’s when [appellant] hits 

[Jeremy Sandoval] in the back of the head. And that’s when [Jeremy Sandoval] got shot.” 

Espinosa clarified that although he did not remember when Big Ronnie lost the gun, he 

“saw [appellant] grab the gun and [shoot] towards” Baby Juan and Nicky. In summary, 

Espinosa testified that after Big Ronnie shot him and Sandoval Sr., Jeremy Sandoval 
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wrestled with Big Ronnie for the gun, appellant hit Jeremy Sandoval over the head, at 

some point Big Ronnie lost possession of the gun, and appellant then shot Baby Juan 

and Nicky. The prosecutor asked Espinosa if Baby Juan and Nicky were also wrestling 

Big Ronnie for the gun. Espinosa replied, “No sir.”

Christian Payne, a patrol deputy with the San Patricio County Sheriff’s Department, 

testified that he received a dispatch prior to the murders at approximately 5:30 p.m. 

Deputy Payne said, “For the call that I heard the dispatch [report] there was an elderly—

dispatch advised an elderly man was being assaulted by two juveniles with weapons 

around . . . Dolores Street.” Deputy Payne stated that he went to the Sheriff’s office to get 

his patrol unit, and while en route, he received another dispatch that “advised there’d 

been shots fired and multiple victims were at [a residence on] Wilburn.” When Deputy 

Payne arrived at the scene, he was ushered to an area where four males were “laying on 

the ground relatively in a semi-circular fashion and another male subject standing” who 

“appeared [to have] been shot in the face. Blood coming down his face.” Deputy Payne 

stated that he witnessed other officers arrest appellant near the scene of the killings, and 

subsequently, he located appellant’s vehicle and secured consent from the co-owner to 

search it. Deputy Payne testified that he ran to the location of the arrest, and he arrived

after appellant had been taken into custody.

Adel Shaker, M.D., the medical examiner for Nueces County, Texas, testified that 

Baby Juan and Nicky died due to gunshot wounds to each of their heads. Dr. Shaker 

stated that regarding Baby Juan, “the gunshot wound of entrance was on the right side of 

the face below the top of the head” and the bullet “exited the left posterior occipital scalp.”
6

Dr. Shaker clarified that “[p]osterior means back. Occipital means . . . [s]kull.” On crossexamination, Dr. Shaker reiterated that the bullet entered Baby Juan’s head on the front 

and exited on the back of his head. Appellant asked, “So he did not have a gunshot entry 

wound to the back of his head?” Dr. Shaker replied, “No. It was front to back.”

Regarding Nicky, Dr. Shaker testified that the cause of his death was a 

“[p]enetrating gunshot wound to the head. Dr. Shaker opined that the bullet “penetrated 

the body in a backwards—from the front to the back—downwards and rightwards,” and 

he “retrieved it from the back of the head.” In addition, Dr. Shaker said that he “noticed 

another gunshot wound to the left side of the head.” Dr. Shaker explained, that although 

not terminal, the bullet “grazed the skin and subcutaneous tissue without entering the 

cranial cavity on the left side.” The cause of Nicky’s death was the bullet that entered his 

head. On cross-examination, appellant asked, “Nicky was not shot in the back of the head, 

correct?” Dr. Shaker responded, “Correct.”

The trial court also admitted several pictures of Baby Juan’s and Nicky’s bodies

taken during their autopsies. These pictures showed the entry and exit wounds. Nolanna 

Ortiz, an officer who responded to the shootings, testified that “State’s Exhibit 19 shows 

the entry wound and Nick Sandoval’s face” and “State’s Exhibit 20 shows the trajectory 

in which the bullet passed through” Nicky. On cross-examination, appellant asked, “None 

of the victims were shot in the back of the head, based upon your examination, correct?” 

Ortiz replied, “No, they were not.”

Joshua Sepulveda, a trooper with the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified 

that he arrived at the scene after the murders occurred. Trooper Sepulveda stated that 
7

he was “watching” a residence near the area where the murders occurred and where a 

suspect’s vehicle had been parked. Sepulveda noticed a white Dodge Charger “driving 

around very suspiciously” in that “[i]t would stop in front of the house, wait a few minutes 

and then take off again.” Trooper Sepulveda said, “And then it would circle back around 

the block. It was circling a few times. And that is what caught my attention on that.”

Trooper Sepulveda noticed that at one point a male exited the home where the

suspect’s vehicle, a Charger, was parked, and the man entered the Charger, which

belonged to appellant and his girlfriend. The Charger left the home, which was not the 

home where the killings occurred. Based on this, Trooper Sepulveda decided to make a 

traffic stop on the Charger “[b]ecause there was a possible suspect that left the 

residence.” Trooper Sepulveda testified that he was looking for an appropriate place to 

make the traffic stop, but the driver of the Charger eventually pulled over before Trooper 

Sepulveda turned on his overhead lights. Trooper Sepulveda then turned on his overhead 

lights. Trooper Sepulveda identified appellant as the person sitting in the passenger side 

of the Charger, and Trooper Sepulveda detained appellant and then transported him “to 

the county.” Trooper Sepulveda clarified that he took appellant to the Criminal 

Investigation Division, “escorted him inside to a holding room and [another officer] 

interviewed him.”

The State played a surveillance video taken by neighbors of the residence where 

the murders occurred. Samuel Cody Lankford, a Texas Ranger, testified that in the video, 

appellant, Big Ronnie, and Little Jeremy left the scene of the murders approximately four 

minutes prior to the police arriving at the scene. On cross-examination by appellant, 
8

Ranger Lankford agreed that Espinosa told officers in three separate statements that 

appellant shot Baby Juan and Nicky in the back of the head. Ranger Lankford also agreed 

that none of the victims were shot in the back of the head.

On redirect examination by the State, Ranger Lankford stated that “there is no 

doubt in [his] mind” that appellant discharged a firearm toward Espinosa on the date of 

the murders. The State asked, “If you believed that [appellant] was acting lawfully while 

discharging that firearm at [Espinosa], would you have requested an arrest warrant for 

the deadly conduct?” Ranger Lankford replied, “[F]iring a weapon at somebody is deadly 

conduct . . . So, yes, I would have filed that warrant with the information that I had.”

Although Ranger Lankford could not recall “who they said initially the shots were fired 

at[,] . . . [he] had statements from multiple people that [appellant] fired the weapon in the 

direction [of the victims].” Ranger Lankford stated that he found the gun used to kill Baby 

Juan and Nicky buried in a field. According to Ranger Lankford, no one other than the 

victims that were shot reported sustaining any injuries during the incident, and when he 

encountered appellant, Ranger Lankford did not observe any injuries and appellant made 

no complaints of any injuries. Ranger Lankford described appellant’s demeanor as 

“somewhat nonchalant. Relaxed.”

Appellant called his cousin, Vanessa Ramirez, to testify. She testified that on the 

day of the murders, she was in a vehicle with her husband when she saw that appellant 

and Little Jeremy used appellant’s Charger to block Sandoval Sr.’s vehicle with Sandoval 

Sr. and his wife in the vehicle. Ramirez saw Sandoval Sr. punching appellant’s vehicle 

and “swearing at them.” Ramirez scolded Sandoval Sr. and instructed him to discuss the 
9

problem with appellant’s father because appellant and Little Jeremy “were young.”

According to Ramirez, a neighbor then informed the arguing parties that the police were 

coming, and Sandoval Sr. told his wife to call his children and to send everyone. Ramirez 

testified that Sandoval Sr. “ends up taking off, you know, burning rubber. And then [all 

present parties] end up leaving.” On cross-examination, Ramirez acknowledged that she 

and appellant were being aggressive during the incident. However, she claimed that 

Sandoval Sr. had been more aggressive. Ramirez stated that she was not aware that the 

person who called 911 told the dispatcher that two juveniles with weapons were 

assaulting an old man.

Appellant then called Roberto Rodriguez, appellant’s uncle, who testified that “the 

Sandovals” arrived at the home where a party was being held for his sister’s son. Roberto

did not see appellant with a gun. However, when asked what happened, Roberto stated 

that appellant “got the gun out” because according to Roberto, the Sandovals were there 

to fight. Appellant asked, “At any point, did you see [appellant] pull a gun out?” Roberto

replied, “Yes.” Appellant asked, “What did he do,” and Roberto said, “Warning shots to 

the ground.” Roberto claimed that the Sandovals did not leave and “they went towards 

them. . . [so, t]hat’s when my brother[, Big Ronnie,] took the gun away from [appellant] 

and then told them again, ‘Please. Please leave.’” Roberto testified that the Sandovals 

did not leave, Espinosa “came towards” Big Ronnie, and Big Ronnie then shot Espinosa.

Roberto testified that Big Ronnie shot all of the victims and that appellant did not 

shoot anyone.3 Roberto clarified that appellant only fired two warning shots “to the 

3 Roberto did not specify exactly who he claimed Big Ronnie shot.
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ground.” On cross-examination, Roberto denied that appellant fired the warning shots in 

the Sandovals’ direction, but he admitted that they were close. According to Roberto, after 

Big Ronnie killed Sandoval Sr., four of the Sandovals attacked Big Ronnie, took him down 

to the ground, he removed Espinosa from Big Ronnie, and Big Ronnie “shot three shots 

up to the sky” killing Jeremy Sandoval, Nicky, and Baby Juan. Roberto stated that Big 

Ronnie stayed at the home “for a while and then just—he got up and just left.” Roberto 

clarified that appellant left with Big Ronnie.

Little Jeremy testified that on the date of the murders, Sandoval Sr. “got out of the 

vehicle and tried threatening [appellant],” and he hit the back of appellant’s vehicle. 

According to Little Jeremy, appellant “got off and he told him, ‘Leave me alone.’” Little 

Jeremy stated that Sandoval Sr. refused to stop, so he exited the vehicle and “told him, 

‘Can you leave?’” Little Jeremy testified that his cousin Vanessa Ramirez, who arrived at 

the scene, told Little Jeremy to leave because the police were contacted. Little Jeremy 

denied that he or appellant had a weapon during this incident.

Regarding the incident at the residence, Little Jeremy said that Big Ronnie and 

appellant asked the Sandovals “to leave nicely,” but the Sandovals “kept coming, 

coming.” According to Little Jeremy, when appellant’s warning shots failed to stop the 

Sandovals from approaching, Sandoval Sr. said, “F them, sons. Go get ‘em.” Little Jeremy 

claimed that he asked Big Ronnie for help, “[a]nd after that, like, just everything 

happened. . . . I didn’t really see nothing.” Little Jeremy admitted that he did not see who 

shot the victims, but he still claimed that Big Ronnie was responsible for the killings.

On cross-examination by the State, Little Jeremy claimed that Sandoval Sr. 
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attacked appellant’s car and wanted to fight appellant and Little Jeremy, who were 

blocked in by Sandoval Sr.’s vehicle. Little Jeremy stated that Sandoval Sr. and his wife 

exited their vehicle, and Little Jeremy was scared because he thought they had a weapon. 

According to Little Jeremy, he and appellant left because his cousin Vanessa Ramirez 

told the elderly couple to leave him and appellant alone. Little Jeremy stated, “I was just 

telling him to leave us alone. Like, ‘Leave us alone. Leave us alone,’” and appellant said, 

“To go away. Like, ‘Stop hitting my vehicle.’”

Little Jeremy testified that when he was at the scene of the killings, he saw 

appellant with a gun. He said, “I just seen that he had the weapon[,] and he just let off the 

warning shot towards the grass.” Little Jeremy stated that he ran to his grandmother’s 

house prior to the victims being shot.

Appellant testified that on the date of the murders, he encountered Sandoval Sr. 

in his vehicle and Sandoval Sr. “rolled down his window[,] and he started [w]hooping and 

hollering saying why was I accusing him of being a Peeping Tom at my grandfather’s 

house.” According to appellant, eventually Sandoval Sr. exited his vehicle and “started 

hitting” appellant’s vehicle and “wanted to fight” appellant. Appellant said that he told 

Sandoval Sr., “Man, you are an older man, you know, I’m not going to fight you.” Appellant 

stated, “So after he did not want to leave, I decided to be the bigger person and get into 

my vehicle and leave. So we left that scene. And that’s what happened there in that area.”

Appellant testified he then went to the residence where a party was being held, 

and Sandoval Sr. arrived shortly thereafter again wanting to fight; however, appellant and 

Big Ronnie “ran him off.” Appellant stated that Sandoval Sr. came back to the residence 
12

with other members of his family, and Big Ronnie asked Espinosa, “What’s going on? 

Why did y’all come back over here? We just ran your dad off.” According to appellant the 

Sandovals then “started to proceed forward” and Big Ronnie “started stepping back.” 

Appellant explained, “So then I pulled out the gun from my side of my hip and I fired—

[and] said, ‘Y’all need to go ahead and leave. . . . This is the wrong place, wrong time. 

We’re at a birthday party here and y’all want to start drama.’” Appellant testified that the 

Sandovals continued their forward movement and “[s]o, at that point, [he] shot to the floor 

one time. Boom.” Appellant claimed this caused the Sandovals to get mad, and “[t]hey 

decide[d] to push forward . . . so we started stepping back—backpedaling.”

Appellant said, “And then . . . I seen that they were coming at me, but I didn’t 

want . . . none of my intention was to hurt them with the gun or anything. So my instant 

thought was to just drop the gun. So when I am backpedaling, I dropped the gun.” 

According to appellant, the Sandovals and Big Ronnie “tried to jump on the gun,” and 

“then they were there tussling for the gun.” Appellant stated, then “the gun starts going 

off.”

When asked if he was in fear of “serious bodily injury,” appellant said, “Of course. 

Yes, sir.” Appellant explained that he weighs 130 pounds, and the majority of the 

Sandovals were much bigger. Appellant agreed with his trial counsel that the Sandovals 

were “two times” his size. Appellant’s trial counsel asked, “And did [the Sandovals] have 

a reputation for going as a group to take care of business?” Appellant responded, “Plenty. 

Plenty. A lot of things have happened with them . . . .”

Appellant testified that Big Ronnie shot the five Sandovals and that appellant did 
13

not shoot anyone. Appellant stated that after Big Ronnie shot the alleged attackers, 

appellant “ended up getting into [his] car and looking for [his] brother.” He then went to 

his mother’s house because” he “knew” that “there w[ere] more people coming.”

According to appellant, he did not stay very long at his mother’s house, and he went to 

his girlfriend’s house where he left his car. Appellant testified that he stayed at his 

girlfriend’s house briefly because her parents said that the police were looking for 

appellant, and appellant’s aunt then picked him up, and he went to his grandmother’s 

house.

On cross-examination by the State, appellant denied that he is in a gang or that he 

has gang affiliation. Appellant claimed that he does not understand the concept of a gang 

member wearing certain colors, and when the State asked if he associated with people 

who wore a “vest with their nickname and the gang association,” appellant replied, “It’s 

just a vest that they use.” Appellant however acknowledged that he knows “gang 

members.” When asked, “So you don’t know what wearing their colors is” or “what driving 

around dirty is,” appellant said that he did not know either phrase.

Regarding the incident wherein appellant claimed that Sandoval Sr. attacked his 

car, appellant acknowledged that he could have driven away from the scene. The 

following exchange occurred:

[The State]: Okay. So [Little] Jeremy came up and said that Juan

Sandoval, Sr., blocked your car and you couldn’t leave. That’s 

not true?

[Appellant]: Yes, it is true. That’s how it started. When I’m at the stop 

sign—I was already approaching the stop sign. His truck was 

turning into the street that I was already in. And, like I said, the

streets are real narrow. So, I mean, he was trying to—his 
14

bumper was already almost close to my car. So then, he 

made—he finally made it in there and then we stayed like that, 

sideways. At first it was like that. He was catty-corner blocking 

my car.

Appellant agreed with the State that he was “able to leave” when Vanessa Ramirez 

arrived at the altercation and Sandoval Sr. started hitting his car. Appellant explained that 

he did not call the police when the altercation with Sandoval Sr. occurred because “it 

wasn’t necessarily at my house or my father’s house. . . .” Appellant testified that when 

he exited his vehicle, he “was upset, because [he] respect[s] everyone. And whenever 

[Sandoval Sr.] rolled down his window, he was being very disrespectful.” Appellant said, 

“I was mad because of what he was saying—the way he was coming for me.” Appellant 

acknowledged that Sandoval Sr. did not have any weapons. Appellant testified that he 

decided to leave the scene when Vanessa Ramirez told him to leave. Appellant stated 

that although he had the weapon that was used to kill the victims in his vehicle, he did not 

use or exhibit it during his altercation with Sandoval Sr. Appellant also claimed that Little 

Jeremy did not have a weapon during the altercation.

Regarding the incident at the party, appellant testified that Sandoval Sr., Espinosa, 

and Baby Juan “went for the gun,” were on top of and “tussling” with Big Ronnie while he 

was on the ground, and then Big Ronnie shot the three men as they were on the ground 

tussling. Appellant told the State that Espinosa was not standing when he was shot and 

that everyone except Nicky and Jeremy Sandoval who were on the ground when Big 

Ronnie shot the other three men. Appellant stated that he did not see who Big Ronnie 

shot first because he and Little Jeremy were running from Jeremy Sandoval and Nicky. 

Appellant said, “We circled around my car and [Jeremy Sandoval and Nicky], they circled 
15

around my car as well. So, as I was approaching back to where my dad was on the

ground,” Big Ronnie had already shot Sandoval Sr., Baby Juan, and Espinosa. Appellant 

continued as follows:

At that point . . . , I tried to—I think, if I’m not mistaken, I hit the surviving

victim. I hit him in the mouth, because he was still—after he was shot he 

was bleeding, but I did hit him in the mouth because he was on top of [Big 

Ronnie] still. But after I hit him, [Espinosa’s] two sons [Jeremy Sandoval and 

Nicky] are barely circling around my car and that’s whenever my dad got to

get up. After I hit the surviving victim, that’s when my dad got to get up and 

then more shots went off. The other two shots went off.

The State asked appellant if he agreed with some of Espinosa’s statements 

concerning the timeline of events and the positions of the parties involved. Appellant 

agreed that he shot the warning shot in the area where Espinosa’s sons were standing, 

but he disagreed that the bullet ricocheted off the ground by Espinosa’s feet. Appellant 

agreed that after he fired the warning shot, Espinosa’s sons and Sandoval Sr. “went 

toward” him, that Big Ronnie also moved to his area, and that the Sandovals “started 

charging” at appellant and Big Ronnie when appellant exhibited his gun. Appellant 

disagreed with Espinosa’s testimony that appellant and Little Jeremy then went over to 

Espinosa to fight with him. Appellant disagreed that Espinosa was standing when Big 

Ronnie shot him. Appellant stated that he did not see Big Ronnie shoot Sandoval Sr. 

Appellant said, “I only seen whenever the third shot happened, when he got his mouth 

shot in the face—the survivor,” Espinosa.

Appellant clarified that Big Ronnie shot Espinosa, Sandoval Sr., and Baby Juan 

“while they were on top of him,” while Jeremy Sandoval and Nicky were chasing appellant 

and Little Jeremy. Appellant agreed with the State that Big Ronnie lay on the ground as 
16

Jeremy Sandoval and Nicky chased appellant and then got up when the men ran toward 

Big Ronnie’s direction. Appellant said, “Yes, sir, because [Espinosa] was still on him when 

he was shot. When he got shot, he was still on top of [Big Ronnie]. They were still fighting 

for the gun.” According to appellant, he then hit Espinosa “on his face” to “get him off” of 

Big Ronnie. Appellant explained, “So while I was—while I already circled my car, I ran as 

fast as I could to [Big Ronnie] and I hit [Espinosa] off [Big Ronnie]. And that’s whenever 

[Big Ronnie] kind of got to move away from [Espinosa]. And then that’s whenever Nicky 

and Jeremy [Sandoval] . . . got killed.” Appellant stated that after Jeremy Sandoval and 

Nicky died, Big Ronnie “didn’t know what to do. He was—he wanted to stay around and 

then he ended up walking towards the front.”

According to appellant, Little Jeremy ran after Big Ronnie; however, Big Ronnie 

continued running so appellant got in his vehicle. Appellant stated that he located Little 

Jeremy in a field chasing Big Ronnie. Appellant said, “I seen [sic] [Little Jeremy] chasing 

after [Big Ronnie] and I told him to get in my car. Because I didn’t know where [Big Ronnie] 

was going.” Appellant admitted that he did not call 911, and instead took Little Jeremy to 

their mother’s home.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational factfinder could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the 

evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 

159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. 
17

App. 2010) (plurality op.). Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative. 

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The factfinder is the 

exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be given their 

testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in 

favor of the judgment. Id.

We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the 

offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 

321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the 

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily 

restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for 

which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d 

at 240).

Under the Texas Penal Code, a person commits the offense of murder if the person 

“intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 19.02. A person commits capital murder if he “murders more than one person . . . during 

the same criminal transaction.” Id. § 19.03.

C. Discussion

Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient because there is conflicting 

evidence showing that he did not shoot Baby Juan and Nicky in this case. He specifically 

points to testimony stating that Big Ronnie shot them. In addition, appellant complains 

that Espinosa testified that appellant shot the victims in the back of the head, while 
18

evidence was presented that the victims were shot in the front of the head.

These contentions attack the credibility of Espinosa’s testimony, not its sufficiency.

See Criff v. State, 438 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d)

(“Courts have consistently held that eyewitness testimony can be sufficient to support a 

conviction absent additional corroborating evidence, so long as the testimony proves 

every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Our standard of review

requires that we defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in 

the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts 

to ultimate facts.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We may not re-weigh 

the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 

S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In addition, as the sole judge of the weight and 

credibility of the evidence, the jury is free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of all 

witnesses and to accept or reject any or all of the defensive evidence. Braughton v. State, 

569 S.W.3d 592, 608–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also Chambers v. State, 805 

S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“As factfinder, the jury is entitled to judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony 

presented by the parties.”). Under our standard of review, we presume that the jury 

resolved conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to its determination of 

the evidentiary weight and witness credibility. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608; see Criff, 

438 S.W.3d at 136–37.

Accordingly, the jury could have chosen to disbelieve any testimony claiming that

Big Ronnie shot and killed Baby Juan and Nicky, rather than appellant. In addition, the 
19

jury could have reasonably found that Espinosa saw appellant shoot the victims but 

mistakenly believed that appellant shot the victims in the back of the head—especially 

considering the following: Espinosa had been shot in the face, Espinosa had witnessed

his family members being shot and killed, and chaos occurred during the melee. See

Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608–09.

Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude 

that any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from that 

evidence.4 See Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99.

II. THE DATE IN THE INDICTMENT

By his second issue, appellant contends that the date of the incident in the 

indictment was incorrect, and the trial court “never amended the date in the indictment.” 

Appellant argues that although the trial court attempted to orally amend the date in the 

indictment, that effort was futile; therefore, the trial court should have submitted the case 

to the jury with the date on the original indictment.5 Specifically, as we understand it, 

4

In addition, under the law of parties, the jury could have reasonably found that the evidence 

supported a finding that appellant acted with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense

by soliciting encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid Big Ronnie to commit the murders. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02. The evidence showed that appellant was involved in an altercation with 

Sandoval Sr. just prior to the shooting where someone informed the 911 dispatcher that appellant and his 

brother had boxed in Sandoval Sr. and were attacking Sandoval with a weapon; appellant had a gun;

appellant shot at the Sandovals prior to giving the gun to Big Ronnie, who then used the gun to shoot and 

kill some of the victims; and appellant fled from the scene of the crimes without calling law enforcement. 

Therefore, even assuming for argument’s sake that appellant is correct that the jury should have 

disregarded Espinosa’s testimony, the jury could have still reasonably found that appellant had aided Big 

Ronnie in killing the victims. See id.

5 An indictment to be sufficient must give day, month and year of the commission of the 

offense. Failure of an indictment to allege the date of the commission of an offense 

constitutes fundamental error. 

It has been frequently said[, however, that] when an “on or about” date is alleged 
20

appellant claims that the trial court orally amended the indictment, which is impermissible,

and the record does not contain a signed written order amending the date of the offense 

in the indictment.6 By his third issue, appellant “contends that the trial court erred in 

including the date October 13, 2018, in the jury charge when the indictment alleged May 

16, 2019” because the trial court failed to amend the indictment.

In Guerrero-Acosta v. State, this Court analyzed the nature of an amendment to 

an indictment noting that “the court of criminal appeals, explained ‘that neither the State’s 

motion to amend nor the trial court’s granting thereof is an amendment; rather the two 

comprise the authorization for the eventual amendment of the charging instrument.’” See

No. 13-17-00560-CR, 2018 WL 5832097, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 

Nov. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing and quoting Riney 

v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). In our analysis of the State’s 

attempted amendment to the indictment, we stated that the purported amendment would 

“have elevated” the originally charged offense to a third-degree felony. Id. at *5. We 

explained that the State “received authorization to amend the indictment, but it never took 

any steps to effect the amendment.” Id. at *4. Additionally, we stated that there is no 

as the date of the commission of the offense the time mentioned must be a date anterior 

to the presentation of the indictment and not so remote that prosecution is barred by the 

statute of limitation[s]. Under such circumstances, the State is not bound by the date 

alleged, but conviction may be had upon proof that the offense was committed any time 

prior to the return of that indictment that is within the period of limitation.

Ex parte Hyett, 610 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

6

“The requirement of an objection under article 1.14(b) applies only to a defect, error, or irregularity 

in an indictment, and not to procedural matters such as an error in the process of amending an indictment.” 

Guerrero-Acosta v. State, No. 13-17-00560-CR, 2018 WL 5832097, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Nov. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, under these 

circumstances, appellant was not required to preserve error. See id.
21

authority supporting a conclusion “that an indictment is effectively amended through an 

oral motion and ruling from the trial court.” Id. Accordingly, we explained that the State’s 

oral motion to amend the indictment and the trial court’s oral grant of such motion “merely 

authorized the State to amend the charging instrument” and “the State failed to file an 

amended indictment.” Id. We held, “While the methods for amending an indictment may 

vary, it is clear that a written amendment, standing alone or incorporated into the motion 

or order, must be included in the record for the amendment to be valid.” Id. In addition, 

we explained that “the State never filed a written motion containing the proposed 

amendment” and the State did not “file a written amendment with the trial court after 

receiving authorization to amend the indictment.” We concluded that “under these 

circumstances . . . the indictment was never amended, and the original indictments

remain in full force and effect.” Id.

The facts here are distinguishable from Guerrero-Acosta. Here, the record reflects 

that on August 5, 2021, the State filed its second amended motion to amend the 

indictment. The trial court signed an order granting the State’s motion to amend the 

indictment on August 5, 2021, and the amended indictment is included in the record.

Thus, unlike the facts of Guerrero-Acosta, here, the State received authorization from the 

trial court to amend the indictment, and the record contains a written amended 

indictment.

7

Id. We overrule appellant’s second and third issues.

8

7 The amended indictment correctly states that the offense was committed “on or about the 13th 

day of October, 2018.” Appellant did not file a motion to quash the amended indictment.

8 Appellant’s third issue is premised on a conclusion that the trial court’s amendment to the 

indictment was ineffective. However, because we have determined that the trial court properly amended 

the indictment, appellant’s third issue is meritless.
22

III. ARTICLE 28.10

By his fourth issue, appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his 

request for a ten-day continuance for trial pursuant to article 28.10(a) of the Texas Code 

of Criminal Procedure because the trial court allowed the State to amend the indictment 

two days before trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(a) (providing that once 

the trial court allows the State to amend the indictment before trial on the merits 

commences, “[o]n the request of the defendant, the court shall allow the defendant not 

less than 10 days . . . to respond to the amended indictment.”). The State responds that 

appellant has not shown that he suffered prejudice due to the trial court’s denial of his 

motion for continuance.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance for an abuse of 

discretion. Cruz v. State, 565 S.W.3d 379, 381 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.). 

No abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s ruling is within the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. See id.

A defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his

motion for continuance to prevail on appeal. Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 511

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995). To establish an abuse of discretion, an appellant must show that 

the trial court erred in denying the motion for continuance and that the denial actually and 

specifically prejudiced appellant’s defense. See Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 842 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). That a party “merely desired more time to prepare does not alone 

establish an abuse of discretion.” Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 
23

1996) (per curiam).

“Article 28.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the guidelines for when 

an indictment can be amended.” James v. State, 425 S.W.3d 492, 499 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). Specifically, an indictment may be amended at any 

time before the date of trial on the merits commences as to a matter of form or substance. 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(a). “On the request of the defendant, the court 

shall allow the defendant not less than 10 days, or a shorter period if requested by the 

defendant, to respond to the amended indictment or information.” Id. (Emphasis added).

Here, the trial court properly allowed the State to amend the indictment prior to 

trial, but the trial court erred by denying appellant’s request for a ten-day continuance. 

See id. Thus, we must determine if appellant was harmed by the trial court’s error. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2; Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Flores 

v. State, 139 S.W.3d 61, 65–66 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. ref’d).

B. Harm Analysis Applies to an Article 28.10 Violation

Appellant, citing Beebe v. State, argues that because the trial court had a 

mandatory duty to grant his motion for continuance pursuant to article 28.10 the “error 

under article 28.10 is categorically exempt from harmless-error analysis.” 811 S.W.2d 

604, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Thus, appellant claims that because this error is exempt 

from the harmless-error analysis, we must remand the case to the trial court for a new 

trial pursuant to article 28.10. See id. (citing and relying on Sodipo v. State, 815 S.W.2d 

551, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on motion for reh’g)).
24

In Beebe, the court of criminal appeals held that article 28.10 was mandatory, and 

the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a continuance was error, which 

required no harm analysis. Id. The court remanded the case to the trial court for a new 

trial. Id.

There are two reasons why we believe that Beebe no longer applies to article 

28.10. First, Beebe relied on Sodipo and Hillin, which were both implicitly overruled by 

Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 531–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). See Flores, 139 S.W.3d 

at 65–66 (acknowledging that although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not 

explicitly overruled Sodipo, “the court’s more recent jurisprudence suggests harm 

analysis is required”) (first citing Matchett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. Crim. App.

1996); and then citing Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264).

In both Sodipo and Hillin, the court of criminal appeals held that an error pursuant 

to article 28.10 did not require a harm analysis. Sodipo v. State, 815 S.W.2d 551, 556 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on motion for reh’g) (“We conclude that in order to give effect 

to the full meaning and intent of Article 28.10, . . . the error complained of in the instant 

case, i.e., that the State should not be permitted to amend a charging instrument on the 

day of trial prior to commencing trial on the merits over the defendant’s objection, should 

not be subjected to a harm analysis.”); Hillin v. State, 808 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1991) (plurality op.) (concluding that “the court of appeals was erroneous in its 

determination under the facts of this case that the harmless error rule applied to Section 

(a)” of article 28.10).
25

Subsequently, in Wright, the court of criminal appeals relying on Cain and Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2, held that the amendment of an indictment in violation 

of article 28.10 is subject to a harm analysis. Wright, 28 S.W.3d at 531–32 (“We need not 

determine whether the amendment to the indictment was indeed effective or whether the 

trial court erred in denying appellant ten days to prepare for trial [pursuant to article 28.10]. 

Rather, we hold that appellant was not harmed by these events.”); Hamann v. State, 428 

S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (stating that we 

disregard violations of article 28.10 “unless the trial court’s error affects the defendant’s 

substantial rights”); see also Dukes v. State, 239 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that Cain and Wright implicitly overruled “Sodipo’s holding that 

violations of article 28.10 are reversible without a harm analysis”); Padilla v. State, 278 

S.W.3d 98, 102 n.2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d) (recognizing that although 

“Sodipo has not been formally overruled by this state’s highest criminal court, that court’s 

subsequent jurisprudence suggests Sodipo is, in fact, no longer sound” and listing courts 

of appeals’ decisions that have now determined that a harm analysis applies to Article 

28.10 error) (first citing Trejos v. State, 243 S.W.3d 30, 41–42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d); then citing Dukes, 239 S.W.3d at 446–48; and then citing Curry v. 

State, 1 S.W.3d 175, 178–80 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999), aff’d, 30 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2000)); see also Flores, 139 S.W.3d at 65–66.

Second, Rule 44.2 was amended after Sodipo and Hillin. See Curry, 1 S.W.3d at

178 (explaining that the rules of appellate procedure in effect as of September 1, 1997, 

now provide that in criminal cases, we subject all errors constitutional or otherwise to an 
26

appropriate harm analysis); see Sodipin, 815 S.W.2d at 556 (determining issue prior to 

September 1, 1997); Hillen, 808 S.W.2d at 488 (same); see also Beebe, 811 S.W.2d at

606 (same). Regarding an alleged violation of art. 28.10, many of our sister courts of 

appeal have determined a harmless error analysis is appropriate. See James, 425 

S.W.3d at 500 (explaining that the court has recognized that Sodipo’s holding that no 

harm analysis is required when a 28.10 violation occurs has been implicitly overruled); 

Padilla, 278 S.W.3d at 102; Trejos, 243 S.W.3d at 41 (determining whether the trial court’s 

erroneous ruling under article 28.10 was harmless error under Rule 44.2(b)); Dukes, 239 

S.W.3d at 447; Flores, 139 S.W.3d at 66 (recognizing that the court of criminal appeals 

has not overruled Sodipo in the specific context of 28.10 but following Cain determining 

that a harm analysis is required); Valenti v. State, 49 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2001, no pet.) (assuming that the trial court committed error under 28.10 and 

applying a harm analysis); Curry, 1 S.W.3d at 178; Westfall v. State, 970 S.W.2d 590, 

596 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref’d); see also Tucker v. State, No. 10-17-00154-CR, 

2018 WL 6543944, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 12, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (applying a harm analysis to a 28.10 violation after 

acknowledging that Sidpo and Hillin were impliedly overruled); Mason v. State, No. 10-

05-00053-CR, 2006 WL 348578, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 15, 2006, pet. ref’d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication); Scoggins v. State, No. 03-04-00555-CR, 2006 

WL 1126185, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 27, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). Accordingly, we conclude that a harm analysis applies to a 

violation of article 28.10.
27

Appellant acknowledges that in the event we determine that a harm analysis 

applies, the error in this issue is statutory, not constitutional, and that rule 44.2(b) is 

applicable to determine whether the error is reversible. Under rule 44.2(b), any statutory 

“error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be 

disregarded.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).

To determine whether the error affected a substantial right, we consider 

whether the [indictment], as written, informed the defendant of the charge 

against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare an adequate defense at trial 

and whether prosecution under the erroneous [indictment] would subject 

the defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime.

Dukes, 239 S.W.3d at 447–48.

C. Change of Date

First, appellant complains that he was harmed when the State amended the date 

in the indictment because although “the indictment alleged ‘on or about’ there is a 

meaningful difference between an offense that occurred in May 2019 and one that 

occurred in October 2018.” This issue has already been addressed by the Texas Court 

of Criminal Appeals, which concluded that the denial of a continuance on the basis that 

the State amended the date in the indictment is harmless. See Wright, 28 S.W.3d at 532.

In Wright, the court explained the following:

It is well settled that the “on or about” language of an indictment allows the 

[S]tate to prove a date other than the one alleged as long as the date proven 

is anterior to the presentment of the indictment and within the statutory 

limitation period. There is no statute of limitations period for murder. Hence, 

when [the] appellant was indicted for murder, he was put on notice to 

prepare for proof that the crime happened any time before the presentment 

of the indictment.

Id.
28

Here, the original date and the date of the amended indictment were both prior to 

the presentment of the indictment. Moreover, there was no confusion shown in the record 

about the incident, which occurred at a residence where appellant participated in a brawl 

resulting in the death and injury of multiple members of the Sandoval family. Therefore, 

appellant was put on notice to prepare for proof that the crime happened any time before 

the presentment of the indictment. See id. (concluding that “[b]ecause both the original 

date and the date of the attempted amendment, which differed by two days, were prior to 

the presentment of the indictment, the indictment provided adequate notice for proof of 

either date”). We overrule appellant’s fourth issue to the extent he argues that he was 

harmed by the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance. See id.

D. Change of Victim’s Name

Next, appellant asserts that he was harmed by the trial court’s denial of his motion 

for continuance because the State amended the name of one of the victims which should 

cause this Court to “harbor grave doubt about the sustainability of the convictions absent 

the error.” Specifically, as we understand it, appellant argues that confusion about the 

victims’ names occurred because three of the victims went by the name Juan Sandoval

and there was “no evidence of [the victim’s alias in the autopsy report] in the trial.”

The original indictment listed the victim, Baby Juan, as Jose Martinez Sandoval. 

The amended indictment listed Baby Juan as Juan Sandoval III, a/k/a Juan Jose Martinez 

Sandoval III. At trial, the parties and the witnesses referred to Juan Sandoval III as “Baby 

Juan.” There is nothing in the record indicating that appellant or the witnesses were 

confused about which victim the State accused appellant of killing. When he testified,
29

appellant was not confused about which victims he allegedly shot, and he specifically 

denied shooting Baby Juan and claimed that Big Ronnie shot Baby Juan. At no time 

during the trial was there any indication that the trial court’s failure to grant a ten-day 

continuance had any impact on appellant’s ability to prepare a defense. Additionally,

appellant does not claim that it did so, and he does not point to anywhere in the record 

where his defense was affected by the trial court’s failure to grant him the ten-day 

continuance. See Flowers v. State, 815 S.W.2d 724, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“The 

‘substantial right’ affected may [require] that the inquiry will be whether the amendment 

had an impact on the defendant’s ability to prepare a defense, or it may concern some 

other ‘substantial right’ claimed by a defendant so that the inquiry or focus of prejudice is 

different depending on the ‘substantial right’ violated.”).

In addition, the amended indictment does not put appellant at risk of being 

prosecuted later for the same crime. Dukes, 239 S.W.3d at 447–48. Therefore, under the 

circumstances in this case, we are unable to state that appellant suffered any harm from 

the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance.9 See Flowers, 815 S.W.2d at 729 

(finding no prejudice to any substantial rights, when the trial court allowed the State to 

change the name of the owner of the property from the State to “George Autry” because 

“[t]he record of the hearings clearly show[ed] that all the parties knew this amendment 

9 Appellant does not claim that he was unable to prepare an adequate defense due to the trial 

court’s failure to grant his request for a ten-day continuance, and he does not state that his substantial 

rights were harmed in any other way. See Flowers v. State, 815 S.W.2d 724, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) 

(“For example, if the record shows that the amendment is made so as to charge a different occurrence or 

incident than that originally alleged in the indictment, the substantial rights of a defendant would be 

prejudiced in part because he has been denied any grand jury review of the offense.”). He simply states 

that we should “harbor grave doubt” of the jury’s verdict. That is the extent of his argument.
30

dealt with the same occurrence of theft as that alleged prior to any amendments” and

“[t]he amendment simply altered the allegation in a fact situation where the State had 

several choices of owners under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 1.07(a)(24)”). We overrule 

appellant’s fourth issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAIME TIJERINA

Justice

Publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Delivered and filed on the

13th day of April, 2023.