FILED 

 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 July 22, 2004 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 03-13784 

____________________

D. C. Docket No. 02-00233 CR-4 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JAMES CASWELL JONES,

a.k.a. James Caswell Banaha,

Defendant-Appellee.

_____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

_______________________

(July 22, 2004)

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and COX, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In 2002, James Caswell Jones was arrested on an outstanding warrant for

failure to pay child support. Based on statements Jones made after his arrest, the
2

police obtained a search warrant for Jones’s home and discovered firearms in the

home. Thereafter, Jones was indicted for firearms violations.

Before trial, Jones moved to suppress the firearms as the fruit of an illegal

search. Jones argued that the arresting officer delayed serving the child-support

warrant in hopes of arresting Jones while he was committing a drug-related

offense. The district court found that the officer had intentionally delayed serving

the arrest warrant and had used the warrant as a pretext to catch Jones in a drug

offense. Based on those findings, the district court concluded that the arrest was

unconstitutional and granted the motion to suppress. 

The Court considers under a mixed standard the grant of a motion to

suppress, reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its

application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342

F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). 

“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth

Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). 

Instead, an arrest will be upheld if the objective circumstances justify the arrest. 

See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 1878 (2001) (rejecting the conclusion

that the “subjective intent” language of Whren was nonbinding dicta, inapplicable
 To the extent that Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1968), 1

holds that pretext can make an arrest unreasonable, that holding is overruled by the Supreme Court’s

rulings in Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1774, and Sullivan, 121 S.Ct. at 1878. See United States v.

Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 194 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that Whren “conclusively refutes the notion”

that subjective intent may invalidate police conduct justified on probable cause); see also United

States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (overruling Amador-Gonzalez).

3

to a pretextual arrest). Therefore, the district court erred in considering the

arresting officer’s subjective intent in serving the warrant.1

In Jones’s case, the objective circumstances are that the arresting officer

discovered an outstanding warrant for Jones and executed the warrant within 30

days. The warrant was still valid. Although the officer did not serve the warrant

immediately upon his discovery of it, delay in executing a warrant is not itself

unlawful. See United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[A]

suspect has no constitutional right to be arrested earlier than the police choose.”);

see also Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1776 (stating that, if probable cause exists for a

seizure, there is no need for more balancing analysis except for seizures conducted

in an extraordinary manner, e.g., deadly force).

Therefore, because Jones’s arrest was based upon a warrant supported by

probable cause, his arrest was not unconstitutional, and the district court erred in

granting Jones’s motion to suppress.

REVERSED.