Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-864 | December 31, 2018 Page 1 of 20

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana 

Frances Barrow 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Arend J. Abel 

Cohen & Malad, LLP 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

The Commissioner of the 

Indiana Department of 

Insurance,

Appellant,

v.

Jeffrey A. Schumaker, 

Appellee. 

December 31, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-MI-864 

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Patrick J. Dietrick, 

Judge 

Trial Court Cause No.

49D12-1703-MI-11747 

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-864 | December 31, 2018 Page 2 of 20

[1] The Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) for the Indiana Department of 

Insurance (the “Department”) appeals the trial court’s order vacating its 

decision to not renew Jeffrey A. Schumaker’s insurance producer license. We 

affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Schumaker has held an insurance producer license since 1990 and concentrates 

his business in life, health, disability, and Medicare supplement insurance. He 

also held a license with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 

(“FINRA”) permitting him to sell securities. In 2011, Mr. Schumaker 

experienced financial difficulties1 and took $8,300 from his homeowners 

association, for which he volunteered as the treasurer. In March 2014, 

Schumaker repaid the money he had taken from the homeowners association 

along with two years of dues he owed and one year of future dues. He 

disclosed his actions to the homeowners association and resigned as treasurer, 

and the association elected not to pursue charges. Schumaker reported his 

actions to his broker-dealer, the broker-dealer in turn communicated with 

FINRA, and Schumaker elected not to challenge the suspension issued by 

FINRA. Schumaker believed FINRA communicated with the Commissioner, 

 

1

Schumaker indicated he had been in an accident and was being sued and that a large medical bill had come

due. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-864 | December 31, 2018 Page 3 of 20

and when completing his license renewal application, he disclosed his FINRA 

bar.

2

 

[3] On August 12, 2016, the Commissioner issued an Administrative Order Notice 

of Nonrenewal of License which stated the enforcement division of the 

Department received untimely notification of Schumaker’s securities license 

suspension and permanent bar, stated Schumaker had disclosed that he 

misappropriated funds for personal use as treasurer of his homeowners 

association, cited Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-17(a)3 and Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-

12(b)(8),4 and stated that Schumaker’s producer license would not be renewed. 

 

2 The administrative record contains a letter by Lincoln Financial Group dated April 25, 2016, to the 

Department stating that it requested an appointment termination for Schumaker as a result of his permanent 

bar by FINRA. An employee of the Department testified that the Department received the letter and sent a 

communication to Schumaker which was returned because it was addressed incorrectly and that, on the day 

the communication came back through the mail, the employee received Schumaker’s renewal application 

from the licensing division. 

3

Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-17(a) provides “[a] producer shall report to the commissioner any administrative 

action taken against the producer in another jurisdiction or by another governmental agency in Indiana not 

more than thirty (30) days after the final disposition of the matter.” 

4

Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b) provides in part: 

The commissioner may reprimand, levy a civil penalty, place an insurance producer on 

probation, suspend an insurance producer’s license, revoke an insurance producer’s 

license for a period of years, permanently revoke an insurance producer’s license, or 

refuse to issue or renew an insurance producer license, or take any combination of these 

actions, for any of the following causes:

(1) Providing incorrect, misleading, incomplete, or materially untrue 

information in a license application.

* * * * *

(8) Using fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest practices, or demonstrating 

incompetence, untrustworthiness, or financial irresponsibility in the conduct of 

business in Indiana or elsewhere. 
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At Schumaker’s request, a hearing was scheduled before an administrative law 

judge (the “ALJ”). 

[4] On September 14, 2016, the ALJ held a hearing. In November 2016, the ALJ 

issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. The ALJ found, “[i]n 

response to Question 2, of his application for renewal to [the Department] 

Schumaker made a full and complete disclosure of the FINRA bar and the 

circumstances leading thereto.”5 Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 35. The 

ALJ found that no evidence was presented that Schumaker has ever committed 

any conduct that is fraudulent, coercive, dishonest, incompetent, 

untrustworthy, or financially irresponsible in the conduct of his insurance 

business or any other business venture. The ALJ also found “the evidence in 

this case demonstrates that Schumaker took $8300 from the homeowners’

association bank account with the intent to repay it” and “[w]hile dishonest, all 

evidence presented at the hearing was that this was a singular issue, out of 

character for Schumaker, and not part of a pattern of deceit or a series of 

‘practices’ in either his personal or professional life.” Id. at 37. The ALJ 

recommended that the order of nonrenewal be reversed on the conditions that 

Schumaker’s license be granted on a two-year probationary basis and that he 

pay a civil penalty of $1,000. 

 

5 The ALJ indicated that Question 2 stated: “Have you been named or involved as a party in an 

administrative proceeding, including a FINRA sanction or arbitration proceeding regarding any professional 

or occupational license or registration, which has not been previously reported to this insurance department?” 

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 31. 
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[5] On February 20, 2017, the Commissioner issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions 

of Law, and Final Order. The Commissioner stated that the Department filed 

an objection to the ALJ’s recommended order and challenged, in relevant part, 

the ALJ’s conclusions relating to Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b)(8). The 

Commissioner found that Schumaker violated subsections (1) and (8) of Ind. 

Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b) and ordered that his insurance producer license not be 

renewed. 

[6] On March 22, 2017, Schumaker filed a petition for judicial review with the trial 

court. The parties submitted briefs6 and on February 1, 2018, the court held 

argument. On March 19, 2018, it issued its Findings of Fact,7 Conclusions of 

Law and Order which vacated the Commissioner’s February 20, 2017 order

and provided: 

Findings of Fact

1. Mr. Schumaker concentrates his business in life and health 

insurance, disability and Medicare supplement insurance. Ex. 5. In 

his insurance business, Mr. Schumaker does not handle any cash for 

insureds. Tr. 35. Instead, the insured pays all premiums directly to 

the insurance company. Id. The only funds Mr. Schumaker deals 

with are his own commission checks from which he pays his salary 

and his office expenses. Id. 

 

6

Schumaker argued that FINRA is not a governmental agency but an independent, non-for-profit 

organization and that the FINRA action was not an administrative action which was required to be disclosed 

under Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-17(a). The Commissioner replied that FINRA actions “are precisely the types of 

sanctions the Department needs to know about.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 69. 

7 The parties do not challenge the factual findings. 
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2. At the time of the administrative hearing, Mr. Schumaker had

held a license from the Department for 26 years and was serving 

about 300 customers. Ex. 5. He has never [had] a complaint 

relating to [the] manner in which he conducted his business. Id. 

3. Mr. Schumaker also served as treasurer of his homeowners’

association, an unpaid, volunteer position that was neither elected 

nor appointed. Mr. Schumaker held the position because the 

association needed volunteers for various positions due to its small 

size. Tr. 24-25. 

4. In 2011, Mr. Schumaker experienced significant personal issues. 

At a school sporting event on a rainy evening, two young girls ran 

out in front of his car and, because one stopped and the other ran, 

Mr. Schumaker could not avoid hitting one of them and injuring 

her. Tr. l6. The accident exacted a heavy emotional toll on Mr. 

Schumaker and his family. Tr. l6, Tr. 55. It also had a big impact 

on his business. Tr. 16. In addition to the emotional turmoil the 

event caused, Mr. Schumaker incurred expenses because he was 

sued over the accident. Id; Ex. 5. 

5. Mr. Schumaker was expecting a substantial commission check 

and wrote an equally substantial check to pay a medical bill. Tr. l7. 

When the commission check did not arrive, Mr. Schumaker took 

$8300 in homeowner’s association funds for his own use, without 

authorization. Tr. 41. He always intended to pay the money back, 

and no one with the homeowners’ association discovered his 

actions. TR. 17; Ex. 5. 

6. In 2014, the homeowners’ association had bills coming due and 

needed funds. Tr. 18. Mr. Schumaker returned the funds he had 

taken, depositing $9000, which included the $8300 and his own 

dues. Tr. 19-20. He disclosed to the association what he had done 

and how he had corrected it. Tr. 22. He also resigned as treasurer. 

Id. 

7. After hearing Mr. Schumaker’s disclosures, the other members 

of the homeowners’ association deliberated. Id. Tom Mack, a 

neighbor who was present when Mr. Schumaker told the 

homeowners what he had done, noted that Mr. Schumaker was 
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very remorseful. Ex. 2. Mr. Mack and the other home owners 

concluded Mr. Schumaker made a bad decision, but that because he 

informed them, repaid the funds, and was being investigated at 

work, they would not pursue charges. Tr. 22; Ex. 2. According to 

Mr. Mack “Jeff is a very reliable, honest and kind person that had 

made a bad choice.” Ex. 2. Mr. Schumaker’s wife testified how 

out of character the actions were for her husband, describing them 

as “an aberration.” Tr. 56. 

8. One association member was a former registered representative 

(a person who buys or sells securities for a registered broker-dealer) 

and said Mr. Schumaker should report the incident to his brokerdealer, so he did. Tr. 24-25. The broker-dealer reported the 

incident to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, also 

known as FINRA, a private self-regulatory entity in the securities 

business. Tr. 25. 

9. FINRA began an investigation, which its attorneys pursued 

aggressively. Tr. 27. Mr. Schumaker learned that even if [he] 

avoided being barred from association with FINRA, the process 

would be expensive. Id. He heard from one individual who spent 

approximately $100,000.00 in attorneys’ fees, costs, and fines. Id. 

Accordingly, Mr. Schumaker did not contest or otherwise 

participate in the investigation. Ex. 5. Under FINRA’ rules, nonparticipation leads to a bar against further association with FINRA. 

Id. FINRA’s attorneys and his own counsel assured him he could 

continue in his insurance business, he just could no longer sell 

securities. Tr. 27-28. 

10. After Mr. Schumaker could no longer serve his broker/dealer 

clients, another registered representative, William Novack began 

serving them. Tr. 50. Novack testified Mr. Schumaker’s clients 

“spoke very highly of him.” Id. Novack further testified to his own

assessment that Mr. Schumaker “did quite well” and “did a very 

nice job in putting things together for his clients.” Id. Novack also 

testified Mr. Schumaker’s clients could be negatively affected if Mr. 

Schumaker could not assist them with their insurance needs. Id. at 

51. 
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11. Mr. Schumaker did not know he was supposed to disclose the 

FINRA bar to the Department until he was in the process of

renewing his producer’s license. Tr. 31. Question 2 of the 

application asked “Have you been named or involved as a party in 

an administrative proceeding, including a FINRA sanction or 

arbitration proceeding regarding any professional or occupational 

license or registration, which has not been previously reported to 

this insurance department?” Filing No. 10 (ALJ’s Order) p. 2, ¶ 3. 

Mr. Schumaker disclosed the FINRA bar and the circumstances 

leading to it. Ex. l. 

12. On August 12, 2016, the Department notified Mr. Schumaker 

his license would not be renewed in an “Administrative Order —

Notice of Nonrenewal of License.” Record Doc. 16. The reasons 

given for the non-renewal were that Mr. Schumaker failed to report 

the FINRA suspension within 30 days of its final disposition and 

that he allegedly used “fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest practices, 

or demonstrate[d] incompetence, untrustworthiness, or financial

irresponsibility in the conduct of business in Indiana or elsewhere,” 

which Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b)(8) lists as a basis for discipline. 

Id.

13. Mr. Schumaker timely sought administrative review. 

14. Mr. Schumaker acknowledged his personal use of association 

funds was wrong, but stated the events were caused by extreme 

circumstances not likely to recur and had no relationship to his 

blemish-free, 26-year record in providing services under his Indiana 

insurance producer’s license. He denied the conduct amounted to 

“fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest practices, or demonstrate[d] 

incompetence, untrustworthiness, or financial irresponsibility in the 

conduct of business in Indiana or elsewhere” within the meaning of 

Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b)(8). 

15. Mr. Schumaker further argued it was arbitrary and capricious 

to refuse to renew his insurance producer’s [license] based on the 

belated disclosure of the FINRA action. 
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16. Mr. Schumaker’s Indiana producer’s license expired on June 

30, 2016, while his application was pending. Record Doc. l6 

(Administrative Order - Notice of Nonrenewal) ¶ 2.

17. The Honorable Reuben B. Hill, Administrative Law Judge, 

held an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Schumaker presented his own 

testimony, his wife’s, and that of the homeowner and registered 

representative described above. He also presented evidence of his 

most recent Field Office Review Worksheet and a post-audit letter 

stating, “Congratulations! I would like to commend you on how 

well you have been managing the affairs of your branch office. I am 

pleased to inform you that there were no material exceptions found 

during the audit of your branch office. This is a great 

accomplishment and a direct reflection of your commitment to 

excellence.” Ex. 3. Mr. Schumaker also testified he has made 

changes to his business to avoid the extreme financial pressures that 

led to his actions. Tr. 36-37. 

18. Mr. Schumaker is the sole financial supporter for his family, 

which includes his wife, two sons in college, his mother-in-law who 

lives with him, and a young family member placed in their home by 

family services. Tr. l l-12; Tr. 53. Losing his producer income 

would be devastating to the family, Ex. 5; And, at age 53 with 26 

years in the insurance industry, Mr. Schumaker does not know 

what he would do to replace that income. Ex. 5; see also Tr. 37. 

19. At the hearing, the Department took the position that the 

statutory term “fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest practices” was not 

modified by the closing phrase “in the conduct of business in 

Indiana or elsewhere.” In other words, the department took the 

position that Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b)(8) provided two separate 

bases for discipline: 

(A) fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest practices; or

(B) incompetence, untrustworthiness, or financial 

irresponsibility in the conduct of business in Indiana or 

elsewhere.

Filing No. 10 (ALJ’s Order), Conclusion ¶ 7. 
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20. In his conclusions of law, ALJ Hill noted, but did not resolve 

the different interpretations urged by the parties. Id., Conclusion ¶ 

6-7. Instead, he found that “all evidence presented at the hearing 

was that [Mr. Schumaker’s conduct] was a singular issue, out of

character for Schumaker, and not part of a pattern of deceit or a 

series of ‘practices’ in either his personal or professional life.” Id. 

Conclusion ¶ 8. For the late reporting of the FINRA proceeding, 

ALJ Hill recommended that “the order of nonrenewal be reversed 

under the following conditions:

1. Applicant’s independent adjuster’s license shall be granted 

on a two year probationary basis, during which time, 

Applicant shall adhere to all insurance laws or the 

Department will seek immediate revocation of his license.

2. Applicant shall pay the sum of One Thousand Dollars 

($1,000.00) civil penalty in accordance with Indiana Code 

27-1-28-18 (e).”

Id. at p.9. 

21. The Department sought review of ALJ Hill’s Order, arguing its 

interpretation of the statute to the Commissioner and asking for a 

review of ALJ Hill’s finding concerning the payment of interest. 

Filing No. 9. The Commissioner agreed with the Department on 

both issues. Concerning the statutory interpretation issue, the 

Commissioner concluded:

The term ‘in the conduct of business in Indiana or 

elsewhere,’ when used in Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b)(8), 

should not be read in conjunction with the terms ‘fraudulent, 

coercive, or dishonest practices.’ Ind. Code § 27-1-l5.6-

12(b)(8) provides the Commissioner the authority to take 

administrative action when a producer uses fraudulent, 

coercive, or dishonest practices in any event, whether in the 

conduct of business in Indiana or not. 

Filing No. 4 (Commissioner’s Final Order of Nonrenewal) ¶ 12. 

The Commissioner did not address the ALJ’s conclusion that a 

single instance of misconduct did not amount to “practices.” Nor 
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did the Commissioner find that any of Mr. Schumaker’s conduct 

occurred “in the conduct of business.” The Commissioner 

concluded that “The appropriate penalty for such a violation is 

refusal to renew the license.” Id. 

22. As a factual matter, the administrative record in this case 

establishes the following:

1. The ALJ ruled Mr. Schumaker had not engaged in 

fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest practices, or even one such 

practice, but a single isolated instance of dishonesty.

2. The Commissioner made no contrary finding, nor would 

the evidence support a contrary finding.

3. Neither the Commissioner nor the ALJ made any finding 

on the appropriateness of the sanction if the Division could 

not establish Mr. Schumaker engaged in fraudulent, coercive, 

or dishonest practices, but established Mr. Schumaker 

violated a technical reporting requirement by voluntarily 

disclosing the FINRA action on his next renewal 

application, rather than within 30 days.

Conclusions of Law

1. The ALJ ruled Mr. Schumaker did not engage in fraudulent, 

coercive or dishonest practices, whether in the conduct of business 

or otherwise. Filing No. 10 (ALJ’s Order), Concl. ¶ 8. According 

to the ALJ, “all evidence presented at the hearing was that this was 

a singular issue, out of character for Mr. Schumaker, and not part of 

a pattern of deceit or a series of ‘practices’ in either his personal or 

professional life.” Id. The Commissioner did not find otherwise.

2. Thus, as the record stands, neither the ALJ nor the 

Commissioner found a violation of Ind. Code § 27-1-15-6-12(b)(8). 

The Court owes no deference to the arguments the Commissioner’s 

lawyers make that the record is sufficient to show a violation. 

Instead, the Court owes deference to the ALJ’s finding that no 

violation of that statute occurred and the Commissioner made no 

contrary finding. 
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3. Because neither the ALJ nor the Commissioner found that Mr. 

Schumaker engaged in “fraudulent, coercive or dishonest 

practices,” whether in the conduct of business or otherwise, this 

Court need not decide whether a connection to Mr. Schumaker’s 

business was required. Rather, the fact that, as the ALJ found, Mr. 

Schumaker’s conduct was a single instance of dishonesty, rather 

than “practices,” means that the statutory language is not met.

4. In addition, the Court finds the Commissioner’s reading of the 

statute implausible. If any dishonest “practice” were a sufficient 

basis for the Commissioner to take action against a licensee, then 

the statute would also sweep in a wide variety of socially and 

personally “dishonest” conduct, such as cheating at golf or in card 

games. Nothing in the statutory text suggests such a broad reading.

5. Reading the statute to reach isolated instances of dishonesty 

would also render meaningless other subsections of the same 

statute. Subsection (b)(4), for example, authorizes the 

Commissioner to discipline a licensee for “Improperly withholding, 

misappropriating, or converting any monies or properties received 

in the course of doing insurance business.” Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12 

(b)(4). If a single instance of misappropriation, whether inside or 

outside the insurance business, violates subsection (b)(8), then 

subsection (b)(4) becomes meaningless. 

6. A Court must give effect “to all of the provisions and words of a 

statute where it is possible.” Read v. Beczkiewicz, 215 Ind. 365, 382, 

18 N.E.2d 789, 796, reh’g denied 19 N.E.2d 465 (1939). Our 

Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that rule multiple times: “No 

word or part of the statute should be rendered meaningless if it can 

be reconciled with the rest of the statute. Indiana Alcohol & Tobacco 

Commission v. Spirited Sales, LLC, 79 N.E.3d 371, 376 (Ind. 2017) 

(citing West v. Indiana Secretary of State, 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 

2016), which in turn cited Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 

N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind. 2011)). 

7. Here, reconciling the statutory provisions gives meaning to the 

General Assembly’s decision that a single misappropriation in the 

insurance business is sufficient basis for action against a license in 
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paragraph (b)(4), and that repeated misappropriations that become 

“practices” need not occur in that context, but only in any kind of 

business, to provide a ground for discipline under paragraph (b)(8). 

But there is not any portion of the statute that makes a single, 

isolated act, not occurring in the insurance business, a ground for 

discipline.

8. The Commissioner relies heavily on the notion that the Court 

must afford deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute, 

but even the case the Commissioner cites, Jay Classroom Teachers 

Ass’n v. Jay School Corp., 55 N.E.3d 813 (Ind. 2016), holds that “we 

review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo.” Id. at 816 (Ind. 

2016); see also Indiana Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n v. Spirited Sales, 

LLC, 79 N.E.3d 371, 375 (Ind. 2017); 813; Moriarity v. Department of

Natural Resources, 2018 WL 828492, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 

2018).

[8]

 

9. Deference is only appropriate when an agency’s interpretation of 

an ambiguous statute is reasonable. State v. Mills, 76 N.E.3d 861, 

870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Here, the Commissioner’s interpretation, 

which would apply the statute to isolated, non-business acts of 

dishonesty, such as cheating at cards or golf, and which would 

render Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b)(4) completely meaningless, is 

not reasonable. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s Order must be 

vacated.

10. The appropriate remedy in this case is not, however, simply a 

remand. There is no dispute what the facts are or any suggestion 

that they could be found differently on remand. Once the 

Commissioner’s erroneous reliance on Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-

12(b)(8) is removed, all that is left of the case is an inadvertent 

failure to report the FINRA suspension, which was voluntarily 

reported, unprompted, on the next renewal application.

 

8 The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer in Moriarity on May 24, 2018, after the trial court issued its 

order. See Moriarity v. Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res., 102 N.E.3d 288 (Ind. 2018). 
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11. It would be unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion, to deny 

the renewal of Mr. Schumaker’s license based on tardiness alone, 

particularly when that tardiness was inadvertent. 

12. At the hearing, Mr. Schumaker’s lawyer suggested that the 

appropriate remedy would be for the Court to order Mr. 

Schumaker’s license renewed, in accordance with the ALJ’s 

proposed order. Unfortunately, the Court cannot order such relief 

and must remand to the Commissioner under Indiana State Bd. of 

Health Facility Adm’rs v. Werner, 841 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. Ct. App.

[(2006)]), decision clarified on reh’g, 846 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006).

13. While the Court has held that Mr. Schumaker did not engage in 

“fraudulent, coercive or dishonest practices” under the statute, and 

has further found that non-renewal is too harsh a sanction, the 

Commissioner has other remedies he can impose. For example, the 

Commissioner can “reprimand, levy a civil penalty, [or] place an 

insurance producer on probation. . .” Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b). 

Other statutory sanctions, such as a revocation or suspension are 

either inapplicable in the circumstance where a producer does not 

have a current license or are, like non-renewal, too harsh for a 

minor reporting violation. Nevertheless, the Commissioner must be 

afforded an opportunity to determine whether to reprimand Mr. 

Schumaker or place him on probation and whether to impose a civil 

penalty. That choice belongs to the Commissioner on remand. 

Entry of Judgement

For the reasons stated above, the Petition for Judicial Review is 

GRANTED and this matter is REMANDED for consideration of 

the appropriate penalty short of non-renewal.

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 7-17. The Commissioner appeals. 
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Discussion

[7] The issue is whether the trial court erred in vacating the Commissioner’s 

February 20, 2017 order and remanding for consideration of the appropriate 

penalty. Agency action subject to the Administrative Orders and Procedures 

Act will be reversed only if the court determines that a person seeking judicial 

relief has been prejudiced by an agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to 

constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory 

jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; without 

observance of procedure required by law; or unsupported by substantial 

evidence. Fishburn v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 2 N.E.3d 814, 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), 

trans. denied; see Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d). A trial court and an appellate court 

both review the decision of an administrative agency with the same standard of 

review. Fishburn, 2 N.E.3d at 821. The burden of demonstrating the invalidity 

of agency action is on the party to the judicial review proceeding asserting 

invalidity. Id.; Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(a). We give deference to an 

administrative agency’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

but review questions of law de novo. Fishburn, 2 N.E.3d at 821. See LTV Steel 

Co. v. Griffin, 730 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Ind. 2000) (“While an appellate court 

grants deference to the administrative agency’s findings of fact, no such 

deference is accorded to the agency’s conclusions of law.”). 

[8] To the extent we must interpret statutory language, our goal is to determine and 

give effect to the intent of the legislature. Fishburn, 2 N.E.3d at 824. We review
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an issue of statutory interpretation de novo. Id. If the statutory language is clear 

and unambiguous, we require only that the words and phrases it contains are 

given their plain, ordinary, and usual meanings to determine and implement the 

legislature’s intent. Id. If a statute is ambiguous, we seek to ascertain and give 

effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. In doing so, we read the act as a whole 

and endeavor to give effect to all of the provisions. Id. Deference to an 

agency’s interpretation of a statute becomes a consideration when a statute is 

ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, and an 

agency’s incorrect interpretation of a statute is entitled to no weight. Ind. Horse 

Racing Comm’n v. Martin, 990 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations 

omitted). 

[9] Ind. Code §§ 27-1-15.6 govern the qualifications and procedures for the 

licensing of insurance producers. Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-1. An insurance 

producer is a person required to be licensed under the laws of Indiana to sell, 

solicit, or negotiate insurance. Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-2. 

[10] Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b) provides: 

The commissioner may reprimand, levy a civil penalty, place an 

insurance producer on probation, suspend an insurance producer’s 

license, revoke an insurance producer’s license for a period of years, 

permanently revoke an insurance producer’s license, or refuse to 

issue or renew an insurance producer license, or take any 

combination of these actions, for any of the following causes: 

(1) Providing incorrect, misleading, incomplete, or 

materially untrue information in a license application.
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(2) Violating:

(A) an insurance law;

(B) a regulation;

(C) a subpoena of an insurance commissioner; or

(D) an order of an insurance commissioner;

of Indiana or of another state.

* * * * *

(4) Improperly withholding, misappropriating, or converting 

any monies or properties received in the course of doing 

insurance business.

* * * * *

(8) Using fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest practices, or 

demonstrating incompetence, untrustworthiness, or financial 

irresponsibility in the conduct of business in Indiana or 

elsewhere. 

[11] Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-17(a) provides:

A producer shall report to the commissioner any administrative 

action taken against the producer in another jurisdiction or by 

another governmental agency in Indiana not more than thirty 

(30) days after the final disposition of the matter. The report 

shall include a copy of the order, consent to order, or other 

relevant legal documents. 

[12] The Commissioner asserts that the phrase “in the conduct of business” does not 

apply to “fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest practices” in Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-

12(b)(8) and that the statute does not apply solely to the conduct of business. 

The Commissioner argues that the statute applies to a single incident of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-864 | December 31, 2018 Page 18 of 20

dishonesty and that the use of the phrase “fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest 

practices” demonstrates that the use of “practices” refers to more than one type 

of misconduct. The Commissioner further argues that the decision to not 

renew Schumaker’s license was justified given his failure to disclose the FINRA 

action. The Commissioner also argues that the sanction of nonrenewal was 

reasonable and points to Schumaker’s decision to take $8,300 and the resulting 

FINRA bar which he failed to timely disclose to the Department. 

[13] Schumaker maintains that the Commissioner’s interpretation of Ind. Code § 27-

1-15.6-12(b)(8) is not reasonable and that the absence of any finding or evidence 

that his actions were taken in the conduct of business is fatal to the 

Commissioner’s conclusion. He further maintains that a single instance of 

dishonesty does not constitute “practices” under subsection (8) and that the 

legislature could easily have used language to specify that a single act could 

result in discipline but chose instead to use plural terms and terms that require 

regularity in the conduct. He also argues that it is unreasonable to deny his 

renewal based on an inadvertent failure to report the results of the FINRA 

action within thirty days. 

[14] Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b)(8) provides the Commissioner may take action with 

respect to a producer’s license for the causes of “[u]sing fraudulent, coercive, or 

dishonest practices, or demonstrating incompetence, untrustworthiness, or 

financial irresponsibility in the conduct of business in Indiana or elsewhere.” 

The ALJ found, and the Commissioner does not dispute, that Schumaker’s 

action of taking funds from his homeowners association did not occur “in the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-864 | December 31, 2018 Page 19 of 20

conduct of business.” Thus, the subsection is inapplicable in this case to the 

extent the phrase “in the conduct of business” modifies each of the causes listed

in subsection (8). Even assuming the phrase “in the conduct of business” does

not modify the phrase “[u]sing fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest practices,” we 

note that the ALJ found as noted by the trial court that Schumaker “took $8300 

from the homeowners’ association bank account with the intent to repay it” and 

that, “[w]hile dishonest, all evidence presented at the hearing was that this was 

a singular issue, out of character for Schumaker, and not part of a pattern of 

deceit or a series of ‘practices’ in either his personal or professional life.” 

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 37. The evidence supports the conclusion 

that Schumaker’s action of taking money from his homeowners association, 

under the specific circumstances of this case as set forth in the administrative 

record, did not constitute “practices” in Schumaker’s professional or personal 

life which warrant the severe sanction of refusal to renew his insurance 

producer license. 

[15] Also, the ALJ found that Schumaker “made a full and complete disclosure of 

the FINRA bar and the circumstances leading thereto” in his application for 

renewal, and the Commissioner, in its decision, adopted this finding and noted 

that the Department’s objection to the ALJ’s recommended order challenged in 

relevant part the ALJ’s conclusions related to subsection (8), not subsection (1), 

of Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-12(b). Id. at 35. To the extent that he did not timely
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-864 | December 31, 2018 Page 20 of 20

report the FINRA action to the Department and was required to do so,

9

Schumaker testified that, because he was going through everything with 

FINRA, he assumed FINRA shared all of that information with the 

Commissioner, that he did not realize that was something he needed to do as 

well, and that as soon as he went online to complete his renewal he provided an 

explanation for what had happened. We agree that any delay does not merit 

the strict sanction of nonrenewal of Schumaker’s license. We do not disturb the 

trial court’s ruling. 

[16] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court. 

[17] Affirmed. 

Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

 

9 As previously noted, Ind. Code § 27-1-15.6-17(a) requires a producer to report an administrative action 

against the producer “in another jurisdiction” within thirty days.