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MICHAEL PERUGINI v. ROSEMARY GIULIANO ET AL.

(AC 35167)

Bear, Keller and Harper, Js.

Argued December 2, 2013—officially released March 25, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Waterbury, Trombley, J. [request for leave to amend];

Dooley, J. [judgment of dismissal in part]; Shapiro, J.

[judgment].)

Michael Perugini, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff).

Amber J. Hines, with whom was Paul Grocki, for

the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Michael

Perugini, appeals from the judgment of the trial court

rendered in favor of the defendants, attorney Rosemary

Giuliano and the law firm with which she is associated,

Giuliano & Richardson, LLC, in his action alleging misconduct in the defendants’ representation of the plaintiff’s wife during the couple’s prior divorce proceedings.

The plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) suspending his February 8, 2012 deposition until the pleadings were closed, (2) denying his February 22, 2012

request for leave to amend his complaint,(3) dismissing

his claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (4) striking

his August 6, 2012 substitute complaint from the docket

and rendering judgment for the defendants. We affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following procedural history.

On September 9, 2010, the plaintiff, appearing before

the court as a self-represented party, filed a two count

complaint against the defendants for wilful violation of

the Rules of Professional Conduct and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleged that

Giuliano had engaged in misconduct during her representation of Kimberly Gamble-Perugini, the plaintiff’s

former wife, in prior marriage dissolution proceedings

against the plaintiff. Specifically, it alleged that Giuliano

failed to disclose a conflict of interest resulting from

her prior representation of Judge Elizabeth Bozzuto,

who presided over postjudgment proceedings and

issued various rulings between April 27, 2009, and June

8, 2010. Although the complaint acknowledged that any

allegedly inappropriate orders issued by Judge Bozzuto

had been vacated, the plaintiff sought damages from

the defendants for the stress, agony, depression and

expense he claims to have endured as a result of Giuliano’s alleged misconduct.

This action was commenced on September 10, 2010.

The defendants filed a request to revise the plaintiff’s

complaint on September 21, 2011, to which the plaintiff

did not properly object until December 30, 2011. In the

interim, the plaintiff noticed Giuliano’s deposition for

October 20, 2011. On October 14, 2011, the defendants

filed a motion for a protective order on several grounds,

including the claim that privileged documents involving

the defendants’ representation of Gamble-Perugini

should not be explored and the deposition should be

limited to the allegations in the complaint. On December 6, 2011, the court, Trombley, J., issued an order

allowing the deposition to proceed by February 17,

2012, which further stated: ‘‘The areas inquired into at

said deposition shall be those that are framed by the

allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint . . . .’’ He further indicated that ‘‘[t]he defendants are not required to

produce their file or any documents in their possession
pertaining to the dissolution action . . . entitled Kimberly Gamble-Perugini v. Michael Perugini, as the information contained therein is protected by attorneyclient privilege.’’

On January 17, 2012, Judge Trombley, pursuant to

Practice Book § 10-37 (b),1 ordered the plaintiff to revise

his complaint as requested by the defendants. The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue to which the defendants

objected. On February 8, 2012, Judge Trombley denied

the motion to reargue and ordered the plaintiff to revise

his complaint and to incorporate the revisions ordered

by the court on January 17, 2012. On February 8, 2012,

the plaintiff, having not yet revised his complaint, commenced a deposition of Giuliano. During the deposition,

the plaintiff asked Giuliano questions regarding her

communications with Gamble-Perugini during the prior

divorce proceedings. The defendants objected, claiming

that the information was protected by the attorneyclient privilege and that the questions were outside the

scope of the pleadings. Judge Trombley was asked to

resolve the issue and, upon learning that the plaintiff

still had not revised his complaint, ordered, sua sponte,

that a revised complaint be filed within two weeks.

Additionally, Judge Trombley suspended the deposition

until, absent a motion for summary judgment, the pleadings were closed and all the issues were framed. On

February 27, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue

asking Judge Trombley to reconsider the suspension

of the deposition of Giuliano, which the court denied.

On February 21, 2012, the plaintiff filed a revised

complaint that still contained only two counts, wilful

violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Although the

revised complaint addressed some of the defendants’

requested revisions, it also included new factual allegations that Giuliano had engaged in representation of

Gamble-Perugini without her consent.

Only one day later, on February 22, 2012, the plaintiff

filed a request for leave to amend his revised complaint,

to which the defendants objected. The proposed

amended complaint included with the request, dated

February 22, 2012, deleted the count for wilful violation

of the Rules of Professional Conduct, maintained the

count for negligent infliction of emotional distress and

added three new counts: fraudulent misrepresentation,

conspiracy to defraud, and violation of the Connecticut

Unfair Trade Practice Act (CUTPA), General Statutes

§ 42-110a et seq. The proposed amended complaint, in

paragraphs 10 and 12 of the second count, further

expanded the facts alleged in support of the plaintiff’s

claim that Giuliano had engaged in unauthorized representation of Gamble-Perugini while Giuliano had knowledge of the couple’s reconciliation. On March 21, 2012,

Judge Trombley sustained the defendants’ objection

to the plaintiff’s request to file a proposed amended
complaint and established the two count February 21,

2012 revised complaint as the operative complaint. The

court’s order stated: ‘‘While our courts have been liberal

in permitting amendments . . . this liberality has limitations. Amendments should be made seasonably. Factors to be considered in passing on a [request] to amend

are the length of the delay, fairness to the opposing

parties and the negligence, if any, of the party offering

the amendment. . . . Whether to allow an amendment

is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court.

. . . Practice Book § 10-60 (b) provides: The judicial

authority may restrain such amendments so far as may

be necessary to compel the parties to join issue in a

reasonable time for trial.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) On April 6, 2012, the plaintiff

filed a motion to recuse Judge Trombley, which the

court denied on April 23, 2012.

On April 9, 2012, the defendants filed another request

to revise the plaintiff’s February 21, 2012 revised complaint, to which the plaintiff objected. On May 14, 2012,

the court, Dooley, J., overruled the plaintiff’s objections,

thereby requiring plaintiff to revise his complaint as

requested by the defendants. The plaintiff’s second

revised complaint, dated and filed on May 22, 2012,

again set forth two counts of wilful violation of the

Rules of Professional Conduct and negligent infliction

of emotional distress. The defendants then moved to

strike the second revised complaint, arguing that the

Rules of Professional Conduct do not give rise to a

cause of action and that the count of negligent infliction

of emotional distress was barred by the doctrine of

absolute immunity for attorney conduct in the course

of a judicial proceeding.2 On July 26, 2012, Judge Dooley

granted the defendants’ motion to strike as to the count

sounding in wilful violation of the Rules of Professional

Conduct3 and dismissed the count sounding in negligent

infliction of emotional distress forlack of subject matter

jurisdiction under the doctrine of absolute immunity.

On August 6, 2012, pursuant to Practice §10-44,4

the

plaintiff filed a substitute complaint, premised on similar facts as previously set forth, but asserting six counts

sounding in conspiracy to defraud, alienation of

affection, violation of CUTPA, abuse of process, vexatious litigation and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. The defendants objected to this substitute

complaint, arguing that the plaintiff was required to

request leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-605 and that the amendments made by

the plaintiff were retaliatory, violated prior court

orders, and were prejudicial to the defendants, given

the age of the case and the fact that that many of the

claims and allegations already had been ruled legally

insufficient and improper. The plaintiff filed an opposition to the defendants’ objection, arguing that he had the

right to file a substitute complaint pursuant to Practice

Book § 10-44 and that the defendants’ objection was a
procedurally improper pleading. The plaintiff’s opposition also addressed the defendants’ nonprocedural

arguments that the substitute complaint violated the

law of the case and prejudiced the defendants. On September 25, 2012, the court, Shapiro, J., sustained the

defendants’ objection and struck the August 6, 2012

substitute complaint from the record. On September

27, 2012, the defendants filed a motion for judgment.

On October 11, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for

extension of time to plead and a motion to reargue. On

October 17, 2012, Judge Shapiro denied the plaintiff’s

motions, granted the defendants’ motion for judgment

and rendered judgment for the defendants. This appeal

followed. Additional facts and procedural history will

be set forth as necessary.

I

On appeal, the plaintiff first challenges Judge Trombley’s order suspending the deposition of Giuliano until

the pleadings were closed, and his order denying the

plaintiff’s February 22, 2012, request for leave to amend

his complaint.

A

The plaintiff first claims that Judge Trombley erred

in suspending the deposition of Giuliano until such time

that the pleadings were closed. Specifically, the plaintiff

argues that Judge Trombley’s order suspending the

deposition represented a reversal of the court’s previous order compelling Giuliano to submit to a deposition

before a certain date. We consider this claim to be

abandoned.

At the February 8, 2012 hearing in which Judge Trombley was asked to resolve the dispute concerning Giuliano’s invocation of the attorney-client privilege, the

judge learned that the plaintiff had not yet revised his

complaint as required by a previous order. As a result,

he ordered that the plaintiff submit a revised complaint

within two weeks from the date of the hearing. Following this order, Judge Trombley stated: ‘‘The second

thing we are going to do is we are going to suspend

this deposition as of now, until such time as the pleadings are closed and the issue is joined.’’ He went on to

explain that the plaintiff still would have an opportunity

to complete the deposition before pleadings were

closed if the defendants moved for summary judgment.

He then asked the plaintiff: ‘‘Fair enough?’’ The plaintiff

responded: ‘‘Fair enough.’’ At no point during this hearing6 did the plaintiff object to the court’s order.

‘‘It is fundamental that claims of error must be distinctly raised and decided in the trial court. . . . Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part that our

appellate courts shall not be bound to consider a claim

unless it was distinctly raised at the trial . . . . That

requirement means that it must be so stated as to bring

to the attention of the court the precise matter on which
its decision is being asked. . . . As our Supreme Court

has explained, [t]he reason for the rule is obvious: to

permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not

been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court

or the opposing party to address the claim—would

encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both

the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Iaquessa, 132 Conn.

App. 812, 814–15, 34 A.3d 1005 (2012).

Here, by failing to object to the court’s suspension

of the deposition, the plaintiff did not provide the court

with a timely opportunity to reconsider the order. The

record therefore is devoid of any deliberation as to why

the deposition should have continued on February 8,

2012, or how its suspension might have prejudiced the

plaintiff. Furthermore, having expressly agreed to the

court’s decision, the plaintiff cannot now seek to attack

the order on appeal. See Menon v. Dux, 81 Conn. App.

167, 170–71, 838 A.2d 1038 (claim unpreserved where

appealing party expressly acquiesced to court’s evidentiary ruling at trial), cert. denied, 269 Conn. 913, 852

A.2d 743, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1003, 125 S. Ct. 623, 160

L. Ed. 2d 463 (2004). Accordingly, we decline to review

this unpreserved claim.

B

Next, the plaintiff claims that Judge Trombley erred

in sustaining the defendants’ objection to his February

22, 2012 request for leave to amend his complaint. Specifically, he argues that the court abused its discretion

in failing to take a liberal approach to Practice Book

§ 10-60. We disagree.

‘‘Our standard of review of the plaintiff’s claim is well

settled. While our courts have been liberal in permitting

amendments . . . this liberality has limitations.

Amendments should be made seasonably. Factors to

be considered in passing on a motion to amend are the

length of the delay, fairness to the opposing parties

and the negligence, if any, of the party offering the

amendment. . . . The motion to amend is addressed

to the trial court’s discretion which may be exercised

to restrain the amendment of pleadings so far as necessary to prevent unreasonable delay of the trial. . . .

Whether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the

sound discretion of the trial court. This court will not

disturb a trial court’s ruling on a proposed amendment

unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.

. . . It is the [plaintiff’s] burden in this case to demonstrate that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., 259 Conn. 114, 128,

788 A.2d 83 (2002).

At the time of Judge Trombley’s ruling, the action

had been pending more than seventeen months, since
September 10, 2010. The pleadings still were not closed.

In sustaining the defendants’ objection to the plaintiff’s

request for leave to amend his complaint, the court

noted that the plaintiff already had filed several complaints and cited the provision in Practice Book § 10-

60 (b) that allows the court to restrain amendments in

order to compel the parties to join issue in a reasonable

time for trial. These were proper considerations within

the court’s discretion in ruling on the issue and, therefore, we decline to upset the court’s decision.

II

The plaintiff also challenges Judge Dooley’s order

dismissing the plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of

emotional distress for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, he argues that the doctrine of absolute

immunity does not apply to claims alleging attorney

misconduct for the purpose of personal financial gain.7

We are not persuaded.

‘‘[W]hether attorneys are protected by absolute

immunity for their conduct during judicial proceedings

is a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’

Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 530, 69 A.3d 880

(2013). As the doctrine of absolute immunity concerns

a court’s subject matter jurisdiction; Stone v. Pattis,

144 Conn. App. 79, 96–97, 72 A.3d 1138 (2013); we are

‘‘mindful of the well established notion that, in

determining whether a court has subject matterjurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be

indulged.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 95.

The question before us is whether the facts as alleged

in the pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, are sufficient to survive dismissal on the

grounds of absolute immunity. Rioux v. Barry, 283

Conn. 338, 341, 343 927 A.2d 304 (2007).

Our case law differentiates between actions based

on alleged misconduct by an attorney in his role as

advocate, such as defamation and fraud, and actions

that challenge the underlying purpose of the litigation

itself, such as vexatious ligation and abuse of process.

Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 546. For the former

category, the law protects attorneys from suit in order

to encourage zealous advocacy on behalf of their clients, unrestrained by the fear of exposure to tort liability. Id., 535–36. On this basis, we recently have held

that claims against attorneys for negligent infliction of

emotional distress are barred when the alleged conduct

giving rise to the action occurs in the course of judicial

proceedings. Stone v. Pattis, supra, 144 Conn. App. 98.

In the present case, the plaintiff alleged Giuliano, in

the course of representing Gamble-Perugini in divorce

proceedings against the plaintiff: (1) failed to disclose a

conflict of interest with the presiding judge, (2) exerted

improper influence over the judge to obtain favorable

monetary rulings, and (3) filed court actions without
Gamble-Perugini’s consent for her own financial benefit. All of this alleged conduct occurred in the context

of the dissolution proceedings between the plaintiff and

Gamble-Perugini. Giuliano therefore is immune from

any claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress

arising from that conduct. See id.

We recognize that the plaintiff alleged that certain

proceedings at issue were not brought for a proper

purpose, as they were allegedly initiated by Giuliano

without Gamble-Perugini’s consent forthe sole purpose

of self-enrichment. These allegations may have properly

formed the basis for an abuse of process action, where

‘‘a legal process [is used] against another primarily to

accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed’’;

[internal quotation marks omitted] Mozzochi v. Beck,

204 Conn. 490, 494, 529 A.2d 171 (1987); and absolute

immunity does not necessarily attach. Id., 497. Nonetheless, the allegation that certain judicial proceedings

were not brought for a proper purpose does not in itself

remove immunity for attorneys in negligent infliction

of emotional distress actions. See Simms v. Seaman,

supra, 308 Conn. 526–28, 569–70 (attorney who allegedly misrepresented client’s financial situation in order

to seek court ordered payments immune from action

for intentional infliction of emotional distress). In order

to avoid dismissal, such an action against an attorney

must allege conduct that occurred outside the scope

of judicial proceedings. See Heim v. California Federal

Bank, 78 Conn. App. 351, 367, 828 A.2d 129 (holding

that absolute immunity did not apply to intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim where ‘‘some of

the allegations . . . [were] based on . . . conduct

that occurred outside the scope of judicial proceedings’’), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 911, 832 A.2d 70 (2003).

Thus, the court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim

on the basis of absolute immunity was proper.

III

Next, the plaintiff challenges Judge Shapiro’s orders

striking the plaintiff’s August 6, 2012 substitute complaint from the docket and entering judgment for the

defendants.

A

First, the plaintiff argues that the defendants’ objection to his substitute complaint, rather than a motion to

strike, was an improper vehicle to challenge a complaint

filed pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44. We disagree.

‘‘The interpretive construction of the rules of practice. . . . involves a question of law and our review

. . . is plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Commissioner of Social Services v.

Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 733–34, 830 A.2d 228 (2003).

Judge Shapiro, in determining he could consider the

defendants’ objection, first noted that the procedural

posture in this case differs from those in the two cases
cited by the plaintiff in support of his argument. The

court noted that in each of the cases cited by the plaintiff, Smith v. Furness, 117 Conn. 97, 100, 166 A. 759

(1933), and Newman v. Golden, 108 Conn. 676, 679–80,

144 A. 467 (1929), permission was sought to file the

amended pleading. Here, the plaintiff did not seek permission to file the August 6, 2012, substitute complaint.

In addition, neither of these cited cases involved an

objection, as in this case, that the substitute complaint

violated prior court orders. The court then indicated,

‘‘[O]ther courts have considered objections to complaints which were filed after a motion to strike was

granted.’’8 Second, the court, noting that the defendants

were claiming that the substitute complaint violated

prior orders in the case, stated: ‘‘It is fundamental that

no one has a right to disobey the orders of any court of

this state . . . . Consideration of an objection where a

party asserts that a pleading has been filed in violation

of a court order, even though the Practice Book does

not specifically provide for such an objection, is also

supported by Practice Book § 1-89

. . . which requires

that Practice Book provisions be construed to advance

justice. . . . The proper administration of justice

includes the necessity of enforcement of compliance

with court orders.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

The defendants, as part of their objection, argued that

the substitute complaint violated the orders of Judge

Trombley and Judge Dooley, and that it was ‘‘prejudicial

in that, two years into the case, the plaintiff seeks

‘another bite of the apple’ by stating claims and allegations already ruled to have be legally insufficient and

improper . . . .’’

We agree that to permit a party to persist in refiling

pleadings in a form previously disallowed does not

advance the interests of justice. Rather, it encourages

needless delay and places an unnecessary and unfair

burden on the party who previously has successfully

stricken or objected to the improperfiling. When parties

engage in such tactics, their opponent and the court

needlessly and repetitively are forced back to square

one. Furthermore, we conclude, after reviewing the

defendants’ objection and the plaintiff’s reply to it, that

the court proceeded properly. Those pleadings provided the parties with a full and fair opportunity to be

heard, quite similar in nature to a case where a request

to revise, and a consequent objection thereto, has

been filed.10

B

Next, the plaintiff claims that Judge Shapiro erred in

striking the plaintiff’s August 6, 2012 substitute complaint from the docket because the court lacked the

authority to disallow a substitute complaint filed by

right pursuant to Practice Book §10-44. We disagree.
As previously noted in part III A of this opinion,

because this claim involves the interpretive construction of the rules of practice, our review is plenary.

Practice Book § 10-44 provides that ‘‘[w]ithin fifteen

days after the granting of any motion to strike, the

party whose pleading has been stricken may file a new

pleading.’’ This court has clarified that this right ‘‘is

limited to making those corrections needed to render

the claims set forth in the original pleading legally sufficient. It is not an opportunity to file wholly amended

pleadings that assert new legal claims . . . permission

for which ordinarily could be obtained only in accordance with the provisions of Practice Book § 10-60.’’

GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn. App. 165,

180–81, 73 A.3d 742 (2013); see also Stone v. Pattis,

supra, 144 Conn. App. 94–95 (‘‘Practice Book § 10-44

does not permit [a party] to add new counts in subsequent amended complaints following the court’s decision striking the . . . complaint in accordance with

our rules of practice’’). An example of a proper pleading

filed pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44 is one that ‘‘suppl[ies] the essential allegation lacking in the complaint

that was stricken.’’Alarm ApplicationsCo. v. Simsbury

Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541, 551–52 n.4, 427 A.2d

822 (1980).

In the present case, subsequent to the granting of the

defendants’ motion to strike, the plaintiff had the right

to file a substitute complaint correcting the legal deficiencies of the stricken count alleging wilful violation

of the Rules of Professional Conduct. As the plaintiff

has since acknowledged, however, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not give rise to a private cause of

action. See Noble v. Marshall, 23 Conn. App. 227, 231,

579 A.2d 594 (1990). Thus, there was no ‘‘essential allegation’’ or any other correction to be added that would

have made the stricken count legally sufficient.

Instead, the plaintiff filed an entirely new complaint

asserting six legal theories for relief that had not been

asserted in his stricken complaint. As Practice Book

§ 10-44 does not provide for the assertion of new legal

claims, the court properly concluded that this substitute

complaint should have been accompanied by a request

for leave to amend pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60

(a), only to be accepted at the court’s discretion. To

allow the plaintiff to state new causes of action following the granting of a motion to strike under Practice

Book § 10-44 would nullify the procedure of requiring

court approved amendments pursuant to Practice Book

§ 10-60. Accordingly, Judge Shapiro properly held that

the plaintiff could not file new causes of action following the granting of the defendants’ motion to strike and

that the plaintiff violated Practice Book § 10-60 in failing

to seek leave to amend his complaint.

C
We next consider whether Judge Shapiro improperly

concluded that the plaintiff, in filing the August 6, 2012

substitute complaint, disregarded the law of the case by

violating Judge Trombley’s and Judge Dooley’s previous

orders. We do not agree.

We consider whether a court correctly applied the

law of the case doctrine under an abuse of discretion

standard. ‘‘The law of the case doctrine provides that

[w]here a matter has previously been ruled upon interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding in the

case may treat that decision as the law of the case, if

it is of the opinion that the issue was correctly decided,

in the absence of some new or overriding circumstance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Signore v.

Signore, 110 Conn. App. 126, 133, 954 A.2d 245 (2008).

In sustaining the defendants’ objection to the plaintiff’s August 6, 2012 substitute complaint, Judge Shapiro

found that on February 22, 2012, the plaintiff filed a

request to amend his February 21, 2012 revised complaint, which was substantially premised on claimed

violations by Giuliano of the Rules of Professional Conduct and allegations concerning unauthorized representation of his former wife by Giuliano.11 He further found

that in objecting to the February 22, 2012 proposed

amended complaint, the defendants claimed that that

proposed amendment was untimely, as it was filed sixteen months after the return day. The defendants also

claimed that the proposed amended complaint

expanded previous factual allegations and added new

causes of action despite the fact that the additional

events alleged by the plaintiff all occurred before the

return day. The defendants ‘‘asserted that the proposed

amendment would delay trial . . . [and] cause them

inconvenience, in that, since the inception of the matter,

they had defended the action based on one set of allegations and causes of action, and should not be forced

to start over in protracted litigation.’’

Judge Shapiro also found that Judge Dooley’s memorandum of decision striking the first count of the plaintiff’s May 22, 2012 second revised complaint specifically

determined that ‘‘any count based on a violation of the

Rules of Professional Conduct is legally insufficient.’’

Judge Shapiro then stated: ‘‘In the [substitute] complaint, the first count is again premised on numerous

alleged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct

by [Giuliano] in her representation of the plaintiff’s

former wife. . . . In each of the subsequent counts of

the [substitute] complaint, the plaintiff incorporates all

of the allegations contained in the first count.12 Thus,

the core of each count is premised on alleged violations

of the Rules of Professional Conduct by [Giuliano]

. . . .

13 In addition, starting with the second count, the

plaintiff adds in again the expanded allegations as to

alleged unauthorized representation [that] were first

contained in the first proposed amended complaint [of
February 22, 2012]. . . . Judge Trombley’s March 21,

2012 order sustained the defendants’ objection, [such

that] the first proposed amended complaint did not

become operative. These expanded allegations are also

incorporated by reference in each of the subsequent

counts ofthe currently proposed [substitute] complaint.

In the sixth count, the plaintiff expands on the allegations to add that he suffered additional stress and

anguish in the course of the dissolution action.’’ (Footnotes added.)

It is clear in striking the substitute complaint that

Judge Shapiro concluded that the plaintiff was violating

the prior orders of both Judge Trombley and Judge

Dooley. Judge Shapiro stated: ‘‘[The] plaintiff has not

restated a cause of action by supplying the essential

allegation lacking in the complaint that was stricken.

. . . Rather, he has alleged a set of facts which are not

materially different than that single group of facts which

was the subject of Judge Dooley’s memorandum of

decision.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) With respect to Judge Trombley’s prior

orders, Judge Shapiro further articulated: ‘‘[C]ontrary

to Practice Book § 10-60 (a), and Judge Trombley’s

[March 21, 2012] order, in the [substitute] complaint,

the plaintiff seeks, without consent or the court’s permission, to amend the complaint to add factual allegations and legal theories which were not allowed by

Judge Trombley’s ruling sustaining the plaintiff’s previous objection to the plaintiff’s request to amend. . . .

[T]he plaintiff previously sought to add the expanded

allegations concerning alleged unauthorized representation, which was not permitted. In addition, the plaintiff previously sought to claim conspiracy to defraud

and violation of CUTPA, both of which are now included

as theories in the [substitute] complaint. Judge Trombley’s ruling precluded these amendments. The plaintiff’s [substitute] complaint’s changes in legal theories

are even more untimely now than when Judge Trombley

sustained the defendants’ objection to the plaintiff’s

request to amend in March 2012.’’14

In summary, Judge Shapiro found that the plaintiff,

in his substitute complaint, sought to add the expanded

allegations concerning alleged unauthorized representation, which previously were not permitted by Judge

Trombley. In addition, the plaintiff sought to add counts

sounding in conspiracy to defraud and violation of

CUTPA, which Judge Trombley also had disallowed.

Furthermore, all of his proposed new counts included

references to violations of the Rules of Professional

Conduct, which Judge Dooley ruled rendered any count

legally insufficient. Finally, all ofthe plaintiff’s proposed

new counts were untimely in light of the time the case

had been pending and the fact that all of the new allegations pertained to events that occurred prior to the

initiation of this action. After a thorough review of the

pleadings, we do not find error in Judge Shapiro’s con-
clusion that all of the newly alleged counts in the plaintiff’s substitute complaint contained materially similar

allegations to those in his February 22, 2012 first proposed amended complaint, as rejected by Judge Trombley, and the first count of his May 22, 2012 second

revised complaint, as rejected by Judge Dooley. Given

that similarity and the considerable amount of time that

had passed since the action initially was brought, it

was within Judge Shapiro’s discretion to sustain the

defendants’ objection to the plaintiff’s substitute complaint.

In his claim as to the impropriety of Judge Shapiro’s

rulings, the plaintiff also argues, in conclusory fashion

with scant analysis, that he was denied due process

when Judge Shapiro struck the plaintiff’s substitute

complaint from the docket and subsequently rendered

judgment for the defendants. We disagree.

‘‘A fundamental premise of due process is that a court

cannot adjudicate any matter unless the parties have

been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the

issues involved . . . . It is a fundamental tenet of due

process of law . . . that persons whose . . . rights

will be affected by a court’s decision are entitled to be

heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone v.

Pattis, supra, 144 Conn. App. 87 n.6.

Practice Book § 10-44 provides that ‘‘in those

instances where an entire complaint . . . has been

stricken, and the party whose pleading . . . has been

so stricken fails to file a new pleading within [a] fifteen

day period, the judicial authority may, upon motion,

enter judgment against said party on said stricken complaint . . . .’’ Here, the plaintiff’s entire complaint was

stricken on July 26, 2012. On or before August 9, 2012,

the plaintiff failed to file a proper new pleading. Before

his substitute complaint was stricken, he had ample

opportunity to reply to the defendants’ objection to

it. After Judge Shapiro considered all of the plaintiff’s

arguments and ruled on the defendants’ objection, the

case fell squarely within the provision of Practice Book

§ 10-44, allowing Judge Shapiro to grant the defendants’

September 27, 2012 motion for judgment. Despite his

reliance on Practice Book § 10-44, the plaintiff had no

right under that provision to replead the August 6, 2012

substitute complaint, as that complaint was not disposed of by means of a motion to strike, but rather

by objection. On September 25, 2012, Judge Shapiro’s

decision on the defendants’ objection to the substitute

complaint gave the plaintiff guidance as to a possible

way to remedy the legal and procedural deficiencies of

his pleading. He could have requested leave to file an

amended complaint, but he failed to do so before the

court ruled on the defendant’s motion for judgment,

despite the fact that a properly amended complaint was

long overdue as a result of Judge Dooley’s July 26, 2012
ruling. See Peoples v. Carberry, Superior Court, judicial

district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No.

CV-10-5013413-S (June 14, 2011) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 106)

(plaintiff who improperly filed amended complaint

alleging new causes of action in derogation of Practice

Book § 10-44 would likely be able to subsequently file

request for leave to amend absent any claim of unfair

prejudice). A period of twenty days then elapsed before

Judge Shapiro granted the defendants’ September 27,

2012 motion for judgment on October 17, 2012, after

the court considered the plaintiff’s dilatory motions for

an extension of time to plead and to reargue for the

acceptance of his August 6, 2012 substitute complaint,

which motions were not filed until October 11, 2012.

Given the ample time and opportunity afforded to the

plaintiff, it cannot be said that his due process rights

were violated.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Practice Book § 10-35 provides: ‘‘Whenever any party desires to obtain

(1) a more complete or particular statement of the allegations of an adverse

party’s pleading, or (2) the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious, scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations in an adverse

party’s pleading, or (3) separation of causes of action which may be united

in one complaint when they are improperly combined in one count, or the

separation of two or more grounds of defenses improperly combined in

one defense, or (4) any other appropriate correction in an adverse party’s

pleading, the party desiring any such amendment in an adverse party’s

pleading may file a timely request to revise that pleading.’’

Practice Book § 10-37 (b) explains the procedure for objecting to a request

to revise, and provides in relevant part: ‘‘If the judicial authority overrules

the objection, a substitute pleading in compliance with the order of the

judicial authority shall be filed within fifteen days of such order.’’

2 The plaintiff argues that his May 22, 2012 second revised complaint

contained the expanded allegations as to unauthorized representation that

Judge Trombley had disallowed in his order of March 21, 2012, and that the

defendants’ failure to file a request to revise for a second time to object to

these expanded allegations constituted a waiver of any objection to their

inclusion. A review of the first and second revised complaints, however,

indicates that the expanded allegations as to unauthorized representation

in the first proposed amended complaint that were prohibited by Judge

Trombley are not contained in the plaintiff’s second revised complaint.

Accordingly, we find no waiver on the part of the defendants that somehow

would have negated Judge Trombley’s order.

3 The plaintiff has not appealed the order striking the first count of his

May 22, 2012 second revised complaint.

4 Practice Book § 10-44 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Within fifteen days after

the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been

stricken may file a new pleading . . . .’’

5 Practice Book § 10-60 provides in relevant part:

‘‘(a) . . . [A] party may amend his or her pleadings or other parts of the

record or proceedings at any time subsequent to [the first thirty days after

the return day] in the following manner:

‘‘(1) By order of judicial authority; or

‘‘(2) By written consent of the adverse party; or

‘‘(3) By filing a request for leave to file such amendment, with the amendment appended, after service upon each party . . . and with proof of service

endorsed thereon. . . .

‘‘(b) The judicial authority may restrain such amendments so far as may

be necessary to compel the parties to join issue in a reasonable time fortrial.’’

6 Nearly a month later, on February 27, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion

to reargue, asking Judge Trombley to reconsider the decision suspending the

February 8, 2012 deposition. By that point, the parameters of any proposed

rescheduled deposition had been greatly altered, as the court had pending

before it the plaintiff’s request forleave to file his February 22, 2012 proposed

amended complaint. It would have been impossible for the court to resched-
ule the deposition after only reconsidering the status of the parties’ dispute

as of February 8, 2012. Judge Trombley summarily denied the motion to

reargue. The plaintiff has not sought articulation of this order or appealed

the denial of the motion to reargue.

7 The plaintiff also claims that the court acted improperly in dismissing

the claim absent the defendant’s filing of a motion to dismiss. This claim

is without merit, as ‘‘[i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and

review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone v. Pattis, 144 Conn. App. 79, 96, 72 A.3d 1138

(2013).

8 See Walker v. Temple Surgical Center, Superior Court, judicial district

of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X10-CV-06-5005306-S

(February 7, 2008) (objection to revised complaint considered and sustained

after granting of motion to strike); Estate of Ridgaway v. Cowles & Connell,

Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Complex Litigation Docket,

Docket No. X04-CV-03-0103516-S (October 14, 2004) (objection to substitute

complaint filed after granting of motion to strike accepted and treated in

nature of request to revise by court); Dodge v. Lane, Superior Court, judicial

district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-96-0332808-S (April 9, 1998) (request for

leave to amend complaint denied pursuant to doctrine of law of the case

based on defendant’s objection after court already had sustained objection

to same claim asserted in prior complaint).

9 Practice Book § 1-8 provides: ‘‘The design of these rules being to facilitate

business and advance justice, they will be interpreted liberally in any case

where it shall be manifest that a strict adherence to them will work surprise

or injustice.’’

10 Our Supreme Court has found it appropriate for a defendant to file

either a motion to strike or a request to revise when an allegedly improper

revised complaint replaces a stricken complaint, especially when the allegations of the revised complaint appear to be the same in substance as those

of the earlier, stricken complaint. See Royce v. Westport, 183 Conn. 177,

180–81, 439 A.2d 298 (1981); Good Humor Corp. v. Ricciuti, 160 Conn. 133,

137, 273 A.2d 886 (1970); see also Parker v. Ginsburg, 85 Conn. App. 777,

781, 859 A.2d 46 (2004) (when allegations of amended complaint appear to

be same in substance as those of earlier complaint that was stricken, defendant may challenge amended complaint by filing request to revise); P & L

Properties, Inc. v. Schnip Development Corp., 35 Conn. App. 46, 50, 643

A.2d 1302 (either motion to strike or request to revise may be used when

amended complaint merely restates original cause of action that was previously stricken), cert. denied, 231 Conn. 913, 648 A.2d 155 (1994). None of

these cases, however, involve a plaintiff attempting to utilize Practice Book

§ 10-44 to circumvent the sustaining of an objection to a previous request

to amend the complaint prior to the decision granting a motion to strike.

Thus, the factors to be considered in whether to permit the amendment, as

set forth in Practice Book § 10-60 and cited in Judge Trombley’s order, were

not at issue in those cases. It is undeniable that an objection to an amended

complaint is a proper vehicle to ask the court to preclude a party from filing

an amended complaint pursuant to § 10-60 for reasons such as delay or

prejudice, reasons cited by the defendants in this case. See Rizzuto v.

Davidson Ladders,Inc., 280Conn. 225, 257–58, 905A.2d 1165 (2006)(upholding court’s decision to sustain objection to amended complaint on grounds

of delay and prejudice).

11 The unauthorized representation allegations that first appeared in the

plaintiff’s February 21, 2012 revised complaint are expanded upon by including three additional sentences in plaintiff’s February 22, 2012 proposed

amended complaint

12 See paragraph 7 of all counts of the substitute complaint.

13 ‘‘The Rules of Professional Conduct caution those who seek to rely on

their provisions. They provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.

. . . Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should

it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules

are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for

regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to

be a basis for civil liability.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v.

Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 403, 766 A.2d 416 (2001). Notably, the defendants,

in their objection to the plaintiff’s request for leave to file his February 22,

2012 proposed amended complaint, alleged that the grievance panel for

the statewide grievance committee had dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint

against Giuliano on November 30, 2011, finding no probable cause. The

defendants attached a copy of the panel’s decision to their objection.
14 In his memorandum of decision on the plaintiff’s motion to reargue,

Judge Shapiro also noted that ‘‘[s]tyling the facts, as alleged in the [August

6, 2012 substitute] complaint, as supporting claims of alienation of affection

(second count); abuse of process (fourth count); vexatious litigation (fifth

count); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (sixth count), does

not change the fact that the expanded allegations were not permitted by

Judge Trombley and that the allegations are not materially different from

those addressed by Judge Dooley’s decision, which . . . is the law of the

case.’’