Filed 7/31/18; Certified for Publication 8/16/18 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

AMALIA WEBSTER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CLAREMONT YOGA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B279272

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC587100)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Patricia Nieto, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Greg W. Garrotto and Greg W. Garrotto 

for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Bonne, Bridges, Mueller, O’Keefe & Nichols, 

Mitzie L. Dobson and Michael K. Liu for Defendants and 

Respondents.

____________________
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Plaintiff Amalia Webster appeals from a grant of summary 

judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Claremont 

Yoga and Kurt Bumiller. Plaintiff alleged that Bumiller had 

injured her while adjusting her posture during a yoga class in 

which he was the instructor. Defendants moved for summary 

judgment and filed expert declarations stating that defendants 

had not breached the standard of care and that Bumiller had not 

caused plaintiff ’s injuries. Plaintiff put forth no experts of her 

own, instead opposing the motion with her own deposition 

testimony and medical records. The trial court granted the 

motion, finding that plaintiff had failed to put forth evidence 

conflicting with that of defendants’ experts. We agree with the 

trial court’s conclusion and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 11, 2014, plaintiff attended a yoga class at 

Claremont Yoga taught by Bumiller. According to plaintiff, 

Bumiller injured her several times during the class. He placed a 

belt around her waist and right leg to help her position her right 

leg over her left, which plaintiff claimed was painful. He pushed 

down on her lower back while she was in a “cow position,” which 

plaintiff claimed hurt her knee. Plaintiff contended that while 

she was laying on her back, Bumiller twisted her neck to both 

sides three times, which she asserted caused her pain. At no 

point did plaintiff inform Bumiller that she was in pain or ask 

him to stop what he was doing. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging a 

single cause of action for negligence. Defendants moved for 

summary judgment, arguing that defendants complied with the 

relevant standard of care for yoga facilities and instructors and 
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that Bumiller’s actions did not cause or contribute to plaintiff ’s 

alleged injuries.1 

In support of their motion, defendants filed declarations 

from Jeffrey Deckey, M.D., and Jonathan Simons, Psy.D. 

Deckey, an orthopedic surgeon, declared that plaintiff ’s injuries 

were due to “chronic degenerative disc disease and arthritic 

changes,” not “a traumatic injury or acute injury” occurring 

during the yoga class. He opined that plaintiff ’s medical records 

and level of activity following the yoga class were “not consistent 

with a traumatic or forceful injury at the hands of her yoga 

instructor.” 

Simons, a psychotherapist and yoga instructor, opined that 

Bumiller’s actions as alleged by plaintiff “were within the 

standard of care for a yoga instructor teaching a Restorative yoga 

class.” He declared that it was “quite common for yoga teachers 

to touch students during class and assist them when they are 

improperly doing yoga positions. Further, yoga instructors often 

adjust students and help them stretch during certain poses.” 

Simons stated that “[t]he majority of yoga students desire the 

touching and assistance with poses described . . . by [plaintiff]. 

This is a regular part of the yoga practice and an instructor 

would not know the student was unhappy or felt any pain unless 

the student so advised the instructor.” 

Plaintiff opposed the motion but did not file any witness 

declarations. She objected to the Simons declaration as lacking 

foundation and the Deckey declaration as “inherently 

 

1 Defendants also argued that plaintiff had signed a 

contract limiting defendants’ liability. The trial court rejected 

the contract as a basis for granting summary judgment and it is 

not at issue in this appeal. 
4

unbelievable.” (Boldface, underlining, and capitalization 

omitted.) She disputed the conclusions in those declarations, 

citing her own deposition testimony and medical records as well

as the deposition of one of Claremont Yoga’s owners, Nicole Riel. 

The trial court overruled plaintiff ’s objections to the 

Simons and Deckey declarations and granted the motion for 

summary judgment. It found that plaintiff had failed to produce 

evidence disputing Simons’s conclusion that Bumiller’s conduct 

met the applicable standard of care. It further found that 

defendants had established that they had not caused plaintiff ’s 

injuries, and plaintiff had failed to provide any competing expert 

testimony. 

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide 

courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in 

order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in 

fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic 

Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party 

moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion 

that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 850.) A 

defendant can meet this burden by “present[ing] evidence which, 

if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence 

that an essential element of the plaintiff ’s case cannot be 

established.” (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 

870, 879 (Kids’ Universe).) “Once the [defendant] has met that 

burden, the burden shifts to the [plaintiff] to show that 

a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause 

of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1) & (2); see Aguilar, 
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supra, at p. 850.) A triable issue of material fact exists when 

“the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the 

underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in 

accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, 

supra, at p. 850.)

“We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, 

‘considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and 

opposition papers except that to which objections have been 

made and sustained.’ ” (Sakai v. Massco Investments, LLC (2018) 

20 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1183 (Sakai).) “ ‘In performing our de novo 

review, we must view the evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff 

as the losing party [citation], liberally construing [his or] her 

evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendants’

own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or 

ambiguities in plaintiff ’s favor.’ ” (Ibid.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Failed To Show A Triable Issue Of 

Material Fact That Defendants Breached The 

Applicable Standard Of Care.

Plaintiff argues that her deposition testimony regarding 

Bumiller’s actions as well as Nicole Riel’s testimony were 

sufficient to show a triable issue of material fact as to defendants’ 

breach of their duty of care. We disagree.

To prove negligence, a plaintiff must show breach of a legal 

duty and “ ‘that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of 

injuries suffered by the plaintiff.’ ” (Sakai, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 1183.) “Breach is the failure to meet the standard of care.” 

(Coyle v. Historic Mission Inn Corporation (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 

627, 643.)
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“In negligence cases arising from the rendering of 

professional services, as a general rule the standard of care 

against which the professional’s acts are measured remains a 

matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts. Only their 

testimony can prove it, unless the lay person’s common 

knowledge includes the conduct required by the particular 

circumstances.” (Unigard Ins. Group v. O’Flaherty & Belgum

(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1239 (Unigard); see 

Sanchez v. Brooke (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 126, 127 [“Generally, 

expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care 

that applies to a professional.”].) “ ‘ “When a defendant moves for 

summary judgment and supports his motion with expert 

declarations that his conduct fell within the community 

standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless 

the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.” ’ ” 

(Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 607.)

Here, defendant’s expert Simons explained in his 

declaration the normal practices of yoga instructors in touching 

students to adjust their position and help them stretch, and 

opined that Bumiller’s conduct was consistent with those 

practices and met the standard of care in the industry. The trial 

court overruled plaintiff ’s objection to Simons’s declaration and 

plaintiff does not challenge that ruling on appeal. Therefore 

Simons’s opinion, “if uncontradicted, would constitute a 

preponderance of evidence that an essential element of the 

plaintiff ’s case,” namely breach of the standard of care, “cannot 

be established.” (Kids’ Universe, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 879.) 

It was incumbent on plaintiff to contradict this evidence 

with competing expert testimony. She did not do so. There is no 

suggestion in the record, nor does plaintiff argue on appeal, that 
7

she herself is an expert on the standard of care in the yoga 

instruction industry. And Riel, even if she could be considered an 

expert, did not opine on the standard of care or whether Bumiller 

met it; the portion of her testimony cited by plaintiff simply 

stated that Bumiller “has a very gentle touch. I have never seen 

him touch in a way that would suggest otherwise.” We reject 

plaintiff ’s suggestion that her testimony that Bumiller was 

aggressive, contrasted with Riel’s testimony that Bumiller 

normally was gentle, was sufficient to show a deviation from the 

standard of care absent expert testimony as to what the 

appropriate standard of care was. 

Plaintiff argues that an expert’s testimony is not 

determinative, even when uncontradicted, because a jury 

may reject it. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of McKeown (1994) 

25 Cal.App.4th 502, 509.) But even if a jury rejected Simons’s 

opinion, plaintiff would still have the burden affirmatively to 

establish the applicable standard of care and a breach thereof, 

which she cannot do without an expert. In the absence of an 

expert, she could not show a triable issue of material fact, and 

defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

Plaintiff argues that yoga teachers are not subject to the 

rules for professional negligence, and there is no standard of care 

for all practitioners of yoga, just “many methods and . . . means 

by which one may be a practitioner of yoga.” Surely, however, 

“the lay person’s common knowledge” would not include “the 

conduct required by the particular circumstances” of a yoga 

instructor in Bumiller’s position, and an expert’s opinion on the 

question would be of benefit. (Unigard, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1239.) Although many cases discussing standard of care 

involve medical malpractice, the rule requiring expert testimony 
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to establish the standard of care has been applied in other 

industries as well. (See, e.g., ibid. [legal malpractice]; Stonegate 

Homeowners Assn. v. Staben (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 740, 749 

[construction defects].) As for plaintiff ’s contention that the yoga 

instruction industry has no uniform standard of care, she cites no 

evidence to support her contention; indeed, an expert would be 

needed on this point as well.

The trial court correctly held that plaintiff had failed to 

show a triable issue of material fact as to whether defendants 

breached the standard of care, and properly granted summary 

judgment on that basis.

B. Plaintiff Failed To Show A Triable Issue Of 

Material Fact That Defendants Caused Her 

Alleged Injuries.

Plaintiff contends that her medical records were sufficient 

to dispute defendants’ expert’s opinion2 that her injuries were not 

caused by defendants’ negligence. Plaintiff also appears to 

suggest, without stating so specifically, that causation in this 

case could be shown without expert testimony. We disagree with 

both contentions.

As a general matter, juries may decide issues of 

causation without hearing expert testimony. (Jones v. Ortho 

Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 403 (Jones).) 

But “[w]here the complexity of the causation issue is beyond 

common experience, expert testimony is required to establish 

causation.” (Garbell v. Conejo Hardwoods, Inc. (2011) 

193 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1569 [expert testimony required to 

 

2 Plaintiff does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s 

overruling of her objections to the opinion.
9

determine cause of house fire]; see Jones, supra, at pp. 402-403 

[expert testimony required to determine whether pharmaceutical 

caused cancer].)

Here the causation issue was complex. In moving for 

summary judgment, defendants contended, per the Deckey 

declaration, that plaintiff ’s injuries “were due to chronic 

degenerative disc disease and arthritic changes” as opposed to 

“an acute or traumatic injury.” It would be beyond the ability of 

a lay juror to determine, in the absence of expert testimony, 

whether plaintiff ’s injuries were caused by Bumiller’s actions, a 

chronic condition, or some other mechanism. Plaintiff cites no 

authority to the contrary. The trial court did not err in 

concluding that proof of causation in this case required expert 

testimony. 

Plaintiff ’s medical records did not satisfy this requirement. 

Setting aside the question whether medical records standing 

alone can substitute for expert testimony, the records here did 

not indicate that any medical professional had concluded that 

plaintiff ’s injuries were caused by Bumiller. Plaintiff identifies 

several records she claims establish causation, but at most they 

reflect plaintiff had neck pain that she herself believed was 

caused by Bumiller. We summarize these medical records below.

An October 15, 2014 record indicates that plaintiff reported 

neck pain “caused by yoga instructor per patient,” with plaintiff 

explaining that the instructor pulled on her neck and pushed on 

her shoulders. Although the doctor apparently diagnosed 

plaintiff with “neck muscle strain” (capitalization omitted), the 

record does not indicate the doctor concluded that the strain was 

caused by plaintiff ’s yoga instructor, only that plaintiff believed 

the yoga instructor’s actions were the cause. The record states 
10

“trap muscle strain 2/2 yoga,” but this is not a finding of 

causation. To the extent plaintiff believes otherwise, she would 

need to establish it through testimony by her treating physician 

or an expert familiar with medical shorthand. A lay juror could 

not reach that conclusion in the absence of expert assistance.

An October 31, 2014 record again notes neck strain “per 

[patient] due to yoga,” with no indication that the doctor agreed 

with plaintiff ’s assessment. 

A November 24, 2014 record indicates a follow-up exam for 

the neck strain, with no reference to its cause. 

A January 20, 2015 record refers to neck strain, with 

plaintiff herself reporting that the pain had been a “[p]ersistent 

issue since straining it in yoga 2-3 months ago.” 

A January 26, 2015 record from a physical therapy 

appointment quotes plaintiff ’s report of yoga injury from the 

previous record, and also indicates that plaintiff told the 

therapist she was injured when her “[yoga] instructor twisted 

her.” This information is repeated in a subsequent record from 

the physical therapist dated February 13, 2015. 

A February 3, 2015 record indicates plaintiff spoke by 

telephone with a registered nurse and later a doctor and reported 

neck pain and swelling. 

A February 18, 2015 record indicates under “History” 

(underlining omitted) that plaintiff reported pain triggered by her 

“new yoga instructor” pulling on her neck. Later, the report 

states, “Chronic neck pain after neck was manipulated by a new 

yoga instructor.” This would appear to be an indication of what 

plaintiff was reporting as opposed to a conclusion by the doctor as 

to causation; again, to the extent plaintiff contends otherwise, 
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she would have to establish it through testimony from the doctor 

or a medical expert.

Absent additional explanatory testimony from plaintiff ’s 

treating physicians or a medical expert, the medical records 

identified by plaintiff establish nothing more than that she had 

neck pain and believed her yoga instructor had caused it. The 

records do not contain any sort of competent expert opinion 

regarding causation; they only document plaintiff ’s non-expert 

opinion, with no indication whether the treating professionals 

agreed with that opinion. The records therefore were insufficient 

to show a triable issue of material fact as to causation. The trial 

court properly granted summary judgment on that basis as well.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded their 

costs on appeal.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

JOHNSON, Acting P. J.

CURREY, J.*

 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
Filed 8/16/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

AMALIA WEBSTER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CLAREMONT YOGA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B279272

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC587100)

CERTIFICATION AND ORDER 

FOR PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed 

July 31, 2018, was not certified for publication in the 

Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion 

should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

BENDIX, J. JOHNSON, Acting P. J. CURREY, J.*

 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.