J-S39032-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

KENNETH WILLIAMS, :

:

Appellant : No. 2140 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on September 10, 2012

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0001587-2010;

CP-51-CR-0003262-2010; CP-51-CR-0003265-2010; 

CP-51-CR-0007274-2010

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2015

Kenneth Williams (“Williams”) appeals, nunc pro tunc, from the 

judgment of sentence entered following his conviction of six counts each of 

robbery and criminal conspiracy, and four counts of possessing an 

instrument of crime “(PIC”).1 We affirm.

In its Opinion, the trial court summarized the procedural and factual 

history of this case, which we adopt as though fully restated herein. See 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 1-5. 

Williams presents the following claims for our review:

I. Is [Williams] entitled to an arrest of judgment with regard 

to his conviction for six counts of robbery, six counts of 

criminal conspiracy and four counts of [PIC] since the 

evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdicts of guilt as 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(i), 903, 907.
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the Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of proving 

[Williams’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

II. Is [Williams] entitled to a new trial as a result of the 

pretrial [O]rder that granted the Commonwealth’s [M]otion 

to [C]onsolidate? 

III. Is [Williams] entitled to an arrest of judgment since the 

trial court erred when it denied [Williams’s M]otion to 

dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600?

IV. Is [Williams] entitled to a new trial as a result of the trial 

court’s ruling that denied his request to redact a portion of 

the statements he gave to police?

Brief for Appellant at 5.

Williams first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his 

convictions. Id. at 15. Williams argues that “the testimony presented at 

trial did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] was a co-conspirator 

or accomplice to the crimes of robbery, criminal conspiracy or [PIC].” Id. at 

20. Williams contends that he was not identified by any Commonwealth 

witness as being involved in the crimes. Id. Rather, Williams asserts, the 

case against him violated the corpus delicti rule, as it was “almost 

exclusively based on the statements he provided to police.” Id. 

In its Opinion, after setting forth the appropriate law, the trial court 

thoroughly addressed Williams’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

underlying each of his convictions, and concluded that they lack merit. Trial 

Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 6-11. We agree with the sound reasoning of 

the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on the basis of its 

Opinion with regard to Williams’s first claim. See id.
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Williams next claims that the trial court improperly granted the 

Commonwealth’s Motion to Consolidate the charges against him. Brief for 

Appellant at 38. According to Williams, “[a] review of the facts of each of 

the incidents shows that there are more differences than similarities that 

would militate against consolidation.” Id. at 42. Williams contends that 

“there is no evidence that each of the robberies is unique[,] or that the 

evidence of each robbery would have been admissible in the trial of the 

others to prove common plan or scheme by [Williams].” Id. Williams 

acknowledges that at the hearing on the Commonwealth’s Motion, the 

Commonwealth presented evidence that Williams allegedly drove his coconspirator to each location to commit the robbery; the crimes occurred 

within a period of 31 days; the crimes occurred within a three-mile radius of 

each other; the crimes occurred between 9:00 p.m. and 11:15 p.m.; and 

each victim was robbed by the co-conspirator at gunpoint. Id. at 45. 

Notwithstanding, Williams asserts that the location, time manner and 

circumstances of each crime was not unique, and did not exhibit a pattern 

warranting consolidation. Id. 

“In reviewing a trial court decision to consolidate offenses for trial, our 

standard is abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 

246, 260 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

Offenses charged in separate informations may be tried together 

if they are “based on the same act or transaction” or if “the 

evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a 

separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the 
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jury so that there is no danger of confusion.” 

[Pa.R.Crim.P.] 582(A)(1). The court has discretion to order 

separate trials if “it appears that any party may be prejudiced” 

by consolidating the charges. [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 583.

Our Supreme Court has established a three[-]part test, 

incorporating these two rules, for deciding the issue of joinder 

versus severance of offenses from different informations. The 

court must determine 

whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be 

admissible in a separate trial for the other; whether such 

evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to 

avoid danger of confusion; and, if the answers to these 

inquiries are in the affirmative, whether the defendant 

will be unduly prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses. 

Thomas, 879 A.2d at 260 (some citations omitted). 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Williams’s challenge to the 

consolidation of the charges for trial, and concluded that it lacks merit. Trial 

Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 11-12. We agree with the sound reasoning of 

the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis. See id.

In his third claim, Williams argues that the trial court erred in denying 

his Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. Brief for Appellant at 

47. In particular, Williams disputes the trial court’s failure to attribute to the 

Commonwealth the delay from November 2, 2009, to February 4, 2010. Id.

at 49. Williams asserts that during this time period, he was not transported 

from Montgomery County to Philadelphia, as “February 4, 2010 was given as 

the earliest possible day for a protracted room.” Id. Williams contends that 

it is the Commonwealth’s responsibility to assure that he was transported to 

Philadelphia. Id.
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Williams states that during the June 16, 2010 scheduling conference, 

he was given a trial date of January 13, 2011. Id. Williams argues that this 

delay was not necessarily beyond the Commonwealth’s control, “since, as 

previously stated, it is the Commonwealth’s obligation to assure that the 

accused is tried within the time limitations of Rule 600.” Id. Therefore, 

Williams claims, the trial court improperly determined “that the time frame 

totaling 306 days was excusable delay[,] and that the Commonwealth

exercised due diligence in bringing [him] to trial.” Id. 

We review such claims according to the following principles:

In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of 

a trial court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with 

law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, 

after hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is 

not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion 

the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, 

discretion is abused.

The proper scope of review ... is limited to the evidence on 

the record of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the 

findings of the [trial] court. An appellate court must view the 

facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this 

Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 

[600]. Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) 

the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the 

protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right 

to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given 

to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both 

to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those 

contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule 

[600] was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from 
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good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the 

Commonwealth.

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of 

the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy 

trial rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a 

manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. 

In considering [these] matters ..., courts must carefully factor 

into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the 

individual accused, but the collective right of the community to 

vigorous law enforcement as well.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 486-87 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted).

Rule 600 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to 

commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial, 

or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed 

against the defendant shall commence within 365 

days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

***

(C) Computation of Time

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any 

stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when 

the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall 

be included in the computation of the time within which trial 

must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be 

excluded from the computation.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
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In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Williams’s claim and concluded 

that it is without merit. Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 12-14. 

Specifically, the trial court determined that “the time frame totaling 306 

days was excusable delay and the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in 

bringing [Williams] to trial.” Id. at 14. We agree with the sound analysis 

and conclusion of the trial court, as expressed in its Opinion, and affirm on 

this basis. See id. at 12-14. 

Finally, Williams claims that the trial court improperly failed to redact a 

portion of Williams’s statements to police. Brief for Appellant at 51. 

Specifically, Williams argues that the trial court should have redacted the 

portion of his statement “that referenced other robberies for which he was 

convicted in another jurisdiction or never charged or convicted.” Id. 

According to Williams, “[b]y allowing the Commonwealth to present 

testimony concerning other robberies that [Williams] may have committed 

resulted in the trial court’s permitting the jury to hear evidence of unrelated 

criminal activity.” Id. at 52. 

The following standard governs our review of the admissibility of 

evidence:

Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the 

trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial 

court clearly abused its discretion. Admissibility depends on 

relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically 

tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a 

fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable 

inference or presumption regarding a material fact.
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Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, 

upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after 

hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not 

merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the 

law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, 

discretion is abused.

Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 907 A.2d 3, 13-14 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (en banc) (internal citations omitted)). 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim and concluded that 

it lacks merit. Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 14-15. We agree with the 

sound reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on the basis of its Opinion with 

regard to this claim. See id. 

Additionally, we note the following.

The harmless error doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects 

the reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect 

trial.” We have described the proper analysis as follows:

Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either: 

(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the 

prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the erroneously 

admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other 

untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the 

erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly 

admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so 

overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was 

so insignificant by comparison that the error could not 

have contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671-72 (Pa. 2014) (citations 

omitted). 
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Here, the challenged statements are cumulative of other, previously 

admitted evidence. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 15 (citing N.T., 

1/26/12, at 8). As such, our review discloses that any error by the trial 

court was harmless. See Hairston, 84 A.3d at 671-72. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

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