# C_2009166EN.01001401.xml

| 18.7.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 166/14 |
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18.7.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/14

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions given at its meeting of 30 November 2007 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/A.37.792 — Microsoft (1)

Rapporteur: Spain

2009/C 166/05

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the WSPP Pricing Principles appropriately reflect the rationale of the Decision of 24 March 2004 in Case COMP/C-3/37.792 and can therefore serve as a basis to assess the reasonableness of the remuneration schemes established by Microsoft for the purposes of the present Decision. |
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1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the WSPP Pricing Principles appropriately reflect the rationale of the Decision of 24 March 2004 in Case COMP/C-3/37.792 and can therefore serve as a basis to assess the reasonableness of the remuneration schemes established by Microsoft for the purposes of the present Decision.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the interpretation provided in the Decision of the three criteria contained in the WSPP Pricing Principles (i.e., Microsoft's own creation, innovation and comparison with similar technologies) reflects adequately the value of Microsoft's interoperability Information for its users, to the exclusion of the ‘strategic value’ stemming from Microsoft's market power in the client PC operating system market or in the work group server operating system market. |
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2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the interpretation provided in the Decision of the three criteria contained in the WSPP Pricing Principles (i.e., Microsoft's own creation, innovation and comparison with similar technologies) reflects adequately the value of Microsoft's interoperability Information for its users, to the exclusion of the ‘strategic value’ stemming from Microsoft's market power in the client PC operating system market or in the work group server operating system market.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Microsoft's remuneration schemes for the ‘No Patent’ Agreement prior to 22 October 2007 were not ‘reasonable’, in the meaning of Article 5(a) of the Decision of 24 March 2004 in case COMP/C-3/37.792. |
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3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Microsoft's remuneration schemes for the ‘No Patent’ Agreement prior to 22 October 2007 were not ‘reasonable’, in the meaning of Article 5(a) of the Decision of 24 March 2004 in case COMP/C-3/37.792.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with that Commission may fix the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment for Microsoft's non-compliance with Article 5(a) of the Decision of 24 March 2004 pursuant to Article 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. |
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4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with that Commission may fix the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment for Microsoft's non-compliance with Article 5(a) of the Decision of 24 March 2004 pursuant to Article 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees on ‘the relevant period’ of non-compliance concerned by the Decision. |
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5.

The Advisory Committee agrees on ‘the relevant period’ of non-compliance concerned by the Decision.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official journal of the European Union. |
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6.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official journal of the European Union.

Official journal of the European Union

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