United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-1944

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United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa. 

Lori Lynn Coyle, * 

 *

Appellee. *

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Submitted: March 4, 2005

Filed: November 17, 2005

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Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by the government challenging the degree to which the

district court reduced a sentence based on the defendant’s provision of substantial

assistance in the investigation and prosecution of another person. We conclude that

the extent of reduction was unreasonable, and we therefore remand for resentencing.

Lori Lynn Coyle pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. A

presentence investigation report, to which Coyle did not object, recommended a

sentencing range of 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment under the then-mandatory

sentencing guidelines. The applicable statutory minimum term was 120 months. 21
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U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). At sentencing, the government filed substantial-assistance

motions pursuant to both USSG § 5K1.1, which authorized the court to depart

downward from the applicable guideline range, and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), which

permitted the court to sentence below the statutory minimum.

At a sentencing hearing, the government detailed Coyle’s cooperation with

authorities, which included a “proffer” of information, participation in two controlled

purchases of methamphetamine from a suspect, and testimony before a grand jury

regarding those purchases, which led to an indictment of the suspect. The

government indicated that “we didn’t have any concerns about her truthfulness” and

that “[s]he came clean,” and “did pretty much everything she was asked to do.” (S.

Tr. at 5). The government also reported that there were threats made to Coyle’s

family members that apparently arose out of Coyle’s cooperation with the

government. The prosecutor explained that Coyle “came in sort of at the tail end” of

an investigation, and that “a lot of the people that she had information about had been

done before.” (S. Tr. 18). Based on this report, the government recommended a

reduction of 15 percent, which would have placed her within the sentencing range

two offense levels below the range that was otherwise applicable under the

guidelines.

In support of her contention that a greater departure was warranted, Coyle

testified that she had given names, phone numbers, license plate numbers, and other

information about drug sources to police. She also detailed attempted purchases that

she was not able to complete. In addition, Coyle’s daughter testified that she had

received phone calls identifying her mother as a “snitch” and threatening harm to

Coyle. Coyle’s counsel argued for a reduction of 50 percent from the bottom of the

applicable guideline range of 135 to 168 months, or a total term of about 62 months.

The court granted both of the government’s substantial-assistance motions, and

advised Coyle that “based on my evaluation of the substantial assistance you’ve
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provided using the five factors set forth in United States Sentencing Guideline 5K1.1,

I am going to reduce your sentence to 36 months.” (S. Tr. at 24). The government

appeals the extent of the reduction.

In three opinions filed earlier this year, and in another opinion filed today, we

have described the standards applicable to our review of a district court’s decision to

reduce a sentence based on substantial assistance. See United States v. Saenz, No. 04-

2673 (8th Cir. Nov. 17, 2005); United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir.

2005); United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pizano,

403 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2005). We review the extent of a reduction to determine

whether it is “reasonable,” under an abuse of discretion standard. E.g., Dalton, 404

F.3d at 1032.

“An extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary

circumstances.” Id. at 1033. The district court’s reduction of 75 percent and 12

offense levels in Dalton was viewed as “extraordinary,” and we reach the same

conclusion regarding the reduction of 73 percent and 14 offense levels in this case,

which the district court itself characterized as “a whopping reduction.” (S. Tr. at 27).

We must consider, therefore, whether the district court’s decision is supported by

extraordinary circumstances that could reasonably justify such a reduction.

We are hampered to some extent by the limited record of the district court’s

reasoning in making such a large reduction. It is evident, however, that Ms. Coyle

did provide assistance that could justify a reduction that is more than minimal. She

worked undercover by making controlled purchases, served as a primary witness

against one defendant, and experienced threats to her and her family as a result of

assisting the government. These factors are among those we have used to illustrate

the type of assistance that may support an increased reduction. See Dalton, 404 F.3d

at 1033; Haack, 403 F.3d at 1005; Saenz, No. 04-2673, slip op. at 6. We thus believe
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the district court acted reasonably in exceeding the government’s recommended

reduction of less than two full offense levels.

It is another question, however, whether an extraordinary reduction of the

magnitude involved here can be characterized as reasonable. The district court did

not merely reduce the sentence by, say, 30 or 40 percent, but 73 percent. This

equated to a reduction of not, say, four or six offense levels, but 14 levels. It seems

to us that a reduction of this degree must be reserved for cooperating defendants who

provide assistance that is much more extensive and significant than what Coyle

offered. There undoubtedly are defendants who provide long-term undercover

assistance that is greater than the two controlled transactions involved here, who

assist with the investigation of multi-member conspiracies rather than the single

defendant prosecuted in this matter, whose cooperation results in the apprehension

of particularly dangerous offenders or “kingpins,” and who suffer a more tangible risk

of injury or actual harm as a result of their cooperation with the government. Cf.

Pizano, 403 F.3d at 995-96. We are loathe to conclude, as we would by upholding

as reasonable the departure in this case, that defendants offering a greater degree of

assistance must receive reductions in the range of 80 to 100 percent in order to avoid

unwarranted sentence disparities. There is a good deal of room between the

government’s modest recommendation and the district court’s generous departure to

recognize this defendant’s assistance without at the same time skewing the degree of

reduction that must be granted to future defendants whose performance on the

continuum of substantial assistance deserves more credit than Coyle’s.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the extent of reduction granted to

Ms. Coyle was unreasonably large, and we therefore vacate the judgment of the

district court and remand for resentencing.

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