NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LISA RANDALL, individually; BRENNA RANDALL, individually; 

TRACY ALLEN, individually, Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 

v.

MARICOPA COUNTY; KEVIN D. HORN, Defendants/Appellants/CrossAppellees. 

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0431 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CV2011-011867 

The Honorable Robert H. Oberbillig, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix 

By William R. Jones, Jr., Kathleen S. Elder, 

Lori L. Voepel, Eileen D. GilBride 

Counsel for Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees 

Aiken Schenk Hawkins & Ricciardi, P.C., Phoenix 

By Richard M. Gerry 

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Randall

Plattner Verderame, P.C., Phoenix 

By Richard Plattner 

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Tracy Allen
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined. 

P O R T L E Y, Judge: 

¶1 Maricopa County and Dr. Kevin D. Horn (collectively 

“Defendants”) appeal the ruling granting a new trial to Lisa Randall 

(“Randall”), Brenna Randall, and Tracy Allen1 (collectively “Plaintiffs”). 

Plaintiffs also challenge, by cross-appeal, the ruling granting Defendants 

partial summary judgment on the issue of Dr. Horn’s qualified immunity. 

For the following reasons we affirm the superior court’s rulings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 A four-and-a-half month-old infant was found unresponsive 

in Randall’s in-home daycare in April 2007, and passed away the next day. 

Dr. Horn, the Maricopa County medical examiner, conducted an autopsy 

and determined the infant’s death was a homicide, caused by blunt force 

trauma of the head and neck. Randall was indicted for the infant’s murder, 

but the case was remanded back to the grand jury. The charges were 

dismissed, then refiled by direct complaint, and, at the preliminary hearing, 

the court found probable cause to proceed to trial. 

¶3 The State became concerned, however, after receiving a report 

from another of its experts that was inconsistent with the Horn report. 

Internally, the case was submitted to the County Attorney Office’s Incident 

Review Committee, which determined it should not be pursued, and the 

State subsequently dismissed the criminal charges with prejudice. 

 

1 Lisa Randall was married to Tracy Allen at the time of the incident and 

subsequent prosecution, and Brenna Randall is Lisa Randall’s adult 

daughter. 
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3

¶4 After filing a notice of claim, Randall filed this civil action 

against multiple parties,2 including Defendants. The case proceeded to trial 

against Defendants,3 and the jury returned a defense verdict. Plaintiffs filed 

motions for mistrial, sanctions, and a new trial. After the oral argument, 

the court granted the motion for new trial. Defendants moved for 

reconsideration and filed a notice of appeal. We stayed the appeal to allow 

the superior court to resolve the pending motion and after the motion was 

denied, the appeal was reinstated, including Plaintiffs’ challenge to the 

ruling granting Dr. Horn common-law qualified immunity. We have 

jurisdiction over the appeal and cross-appeal under Article 6, Section 9 of 

the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 

12-2101(A)(1), (5)(a).4

DISCUSSION 

I. Motion for New Trial 

¶5 Defendants argue the superior court abused its discretion by 

granting a new trial. Specifically, they argue the court applied an incorrect 

legal standard in granting the new trial because the court improperly 

presumed prejudice under Leavy v. Parsell, 188 Ariz. 69, 932 P.2d 1340 

(1997), given that the case was not close, no motion for mistrial was filed, 

and the court never found that any trial misconduct was serious, knowing, 

and deliberate, and disregarded its curative instruction to the jury. They 

also argue the court abused its discretion by granting the motion for new 

trial based “solely” on “one question to Dr. Posey” even though the court 

struck the question and instructed the jury to disregard it. 

¶6 We review a grant of a new trial for an abuse of discretion. 

McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs., Inc., 228 Ariz. 262, 266, ¶ 16, 265 P.3d 1061, 1065 

(App. 2011). If the court gives multiple reasons for its decision, we will 

uphold the ruling if justified on any of the grounds. Johnson v. Elliott, 112 

Ariz. 57, 61, 537 P.2d 927, 931 (1975) (citation omitted); see Crowe v. Miller, 

27 Ariz. App. 453, 455, 555 P.2d 1141, 1143 (1976) (citations omitted). We, 

 

2 Plaintiffs’ amended complaint listed claims of malicious prosecution, 

abuse of process, false arrest and imprisonment, defamation, false 

light/invasion of privacy, intentional and negligent infliction of emotion 

distress, negligence per se, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, and 

racketeering against Maricopa County, the City of Peoria, and various 

individuals and their spouses. 

3 The other defendants were dismissed before trial. 

4 We cite the current version of the statute unless otherwise noted. 
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4

however, review the court’s interpretation of a rule of procedure de novo 

because it is a matter of law. See Felipe v. Theme Tech. Corp., 235 Ariz. 520, 

524, ¶ 10, 334 P.3d 210, 214 (App. 2014). 

A. Legal Standard 

¶7 A superior court may vacate a verdict and order a new trial 

under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). The court must find that a 

party’s rights are materially affected by one of many causes, including “1. 

[i]rregularity in the proceedings . . . whereby the moving party was 

deprived of a fair trial,” or “2. [m]isconduct of the jury or prevailing party.” 

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1), (2). However, the court should only grant a new 

trial when it believes “that there has been some error in the conduct of the 

original trial which, in all probability, has affected the verdict.” S. Ariz. 

Freight Lines v. Jackson, 48 Ariz. 509, 512, 63 P.2d 193, 195 (1936). 

¶8 Our supreme court has stated that the grant of a “new trial on 

the grounds of misconduct of counsel is a matter within the trial court’s 

discretion” but it is “only to prevent a miscarriage of justice . . . or . . . for a 

cause materially affecting [the] rights . . . of the aggrieved party.” Grant v. 

Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 451, 652 P.2d 507, 524 (1982) (citing 

Zugsmith v. Mullins, 86 Ariz. 236, 238, 344 P.2d 739, 740 (1959) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). In Leavy, the court revisited its 

analysis and stated “misconduct alone will not warrant a new trial and that 

the grant . . . of a new trial based on misconduct is within the judge’s 

discretion.” 188 Ariz. at 73, 932 P.2d at 1344 (citing Grant, 133 Ariz. at 454, 

652 P.2d at 527). However, after noting “it is impossible for a party to carry 

the burden of proving prejudice when the misconduct or error prevents the 

court from determining the exact extent of prejudice,” the court stated “the 

trial [court] should find prejudice,” when: 

(1) the misconduct is significant, especially if the record 

establishes knowing, deliberate violations of rules or court 

orders that a litigant may confidently expect to be observed 

by his or her adversary; (2) the misconduct is prejudicial in 

nature because it involves essential and important issues, but 

the extent is impossible to determine in a close case; and (3) 

the misconduct is apparently successful in achieving its goals. 

Id. The court also noted that when the factors are present “prejudice should 

be inferred, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary by the guilty 

party.” Id. Consequently, because the trial judge sits as the “ninth juror” 

in a civil case, Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 55, ¶ 23, 961 P.2d 
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5

449, 453 (1998), we defer to the court’s ruling, recognizing that the “judge 

sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of the 

relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be 

recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.” Id. at 53, ¶ 12, 961 

P.2d at 451 (citation omitted). 

¶9 Moreover, and contrary to Defendants’ argument that 

Plaintiffs’ failure to seek a mistrial questions whether they thought “the 

alleged misconduct [w]as prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial,” a 

motion for mistrial is not a prerequisite to requesting a new trial. See Miller 

v. Palmer, 143 Ariz. 84, 86, 691 P.2d 1112, 1114 (App. 1984) (“A motion for a 

new trial need not be predicated upon a failed motion for mistrial.”). 

Similarly, a court does not have to sua sponte grant a mistrial for 

misconduct, and the court’s failure to do so gets no greater weight than its 

ultimate conclusion that a new trial is warranted because of prejudicial 

misconduct. See Liberatore v. Thompson, 157 Ariz. 612, 621, 760 P.2d 612, 621 

(App. 1988) (finding that initial trial determination that misconduct did not 

warrant a mistrial would not be given priority over “ultimate conclusion, 

informed by the verdict, that misconduct had cumulatively colored the 

result.”). 

B. Analysis 

¶10 Here, after an extensive argument about the facts and law, the 

superior court summarized Leavy as follows: (1) the misconduct has to be 

significant, such as violations of rules or “court orders, that a litigant may 

confidently expect to be observed by his or her adversary;” (2) the 

misconduct is prejudicial “because it involves essential and important 

issues that the extent is impossible to determine in a close case;” and (3) 

“the misconduct is apparently successful in achieving its goals.” Then, after 

noting the case was “very difficult . . . with really all issues hotly contested,” 

the court found “it’s a close case” with “multiple violations of court rule or 

court order.”

¶11 The court then found three acts of misconduct warranting a 

new trial. First, the court found that Defendants violated the discovery 

rule/disclosure rule by failing to disclose that there were two linear 

fractures to the deceased infants’ skull, which Defendants’ expert had made 

clear to them on the eve of trial, and then using the information in the 

opening statement without notifying Plaintiffs. Second, despite the court’s 

ruling that the probable cause finding could not be discussed, counsel asked 

Dr. Posey a question about the criminal judge’s opinion, and the court 

found it “was a direct violation of the ‘[c]ourt’s Motion in Limine ruling’” 
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6

and violated both the spirit and intent of the ruling. Finally, the court found 

that Defendants’ questioning of the treating physicians “was done in a way 

that elicited objections that were sustained . . . all creating an impression . . . 

that [Plaintiffs] are trying to keep something from th[e] jury that . . . had 

[been] ordered the jury shouldn’t hear.” The court subsequently denied 

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, which focused on whether the 

question about the criminal judge’s probable cause ruling, which had been 

struck with an instruction to the jury to disregard the question, was 

sufficiently prejudicial to justify a new trial. 

¶12 Although Defendants challenge the court’s analysis of the 

law, we see no error. Leavy, like its predecessors, gives the trial court 

discretion to grant a new trial where there is misconduct and prejudice 

because “misconduct alone will not warrant a new trial.” 188 Ariz. at 73, 

932 P.2d at 1344. Historically, a new trial should be granted to prevent a 

miscarriage of justice or for a cause materially affecting the rights of the 

aggrieved party. Zugsmith, 86 Ariz. at 238, 344 P.2d at 740. As the court 

noted in Grant, “the prime factor to consider is whether the record clearly 

establishes that the improper conduct caused the jury to return a verdict 

which was the result of passion and prejudice.” 133 Ariz. at 452, 652 P.2d 

at 525. 

¶13 Leavy, however, involved violations of pre-trial orders which 

precluded the defendants from raising the seat-belt defense and an expert’s 

testimony about the credibility of certain accident witnesses, as well as 

evidence that the plaintiff’s bottle of whiskey was found near the accident 

site because there was no evidence of use or impairment. 188 Ariz. at 70-

71, 932 P.2d at 1341-42. After a defense verdict, the trial court denied the 

plaintiff’s motion for new trial, and the ruling was affirmed on appeal. Id.

at 71-72, 932 P.2d at 1342-43. In reversing the ruling and focusing on the 

lawyer’s conduct violating pre-trial court orders, our supreme court 

constructed an analysis to judge any prejudice when “there has been 

significant misconduct affecting the essential rights of a litigant and when 

the very nature of the misconduct makes it impossible to determine the 

extent of prejudice.” Id. at 73, 932 P.2d at 1344. The court established a 

three-pronged prejudice analysis for guidance to find prejudice “absent an 

affirmative showing to the contrary.” Id. As a result, the trial court, as the 

ninth juror, has to decide whether the misconduct significantly tipped the 

scales of justice such that a new trial is warranted. 
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

Decision of the Court 

7

¶14 Here, Plaintiffs filed a successful motion in limine to preclude 

any evidence about the finding of probable cause for the criminal charges. 

Despite the ruling, one of Defendants’ lawyers asked Dr. Posey:

Q. So while your professional opinions as to the cause and 

manner of [the child’s] death were presented at a preliminary 

hearing, they were not accepted? 

The court struck the question after an objection, and instructed the jury “I’m 

going to strike counsel’s statement. It’s not evidence and the jury is to 

disregard it.” Later, out of the presence of the jury, Plaintiffs argued the 

question violated the court’s prior ruling by mentioning that Dr. Posey’s 

opinions had been rejected at a preliminary hearing, thereby implying that 

a probable cause finding had been made, without explicitly using those 

terms. In response, counsel stated that the error was inadvertent, and the 

court accepted her explanation. 

¶15 During the post-trial hearing on the motions, the court found 

that despite the assertion that the question was inadvertent, it still qualified 

as significant and prejudicial misconduct. Later, and in denying the motion 

for reconsideration, the court explained that even if the misconduct was 

limited to the improper question, the misconduct was significant, involved 

“important and essential issues” in a case that was hotly contested on all 

issues,5 and, as a result, Defendants achieved their desired verdict. 

¶16 Although Defendants contend that any prejudice was 

remedied by the court’s curative instruction to the jury, the court disagreed. 

Our supreme court has long held that a trial court “can best determine 

whether [its] admonition is effective,” given any “improper attempts by 

counsel to mislead and arouse the prejudices of the jury,” Sanchez v. Stremel, 

95 Ariz. 392, 395, 391 P.2d 557, 559 (1964), and given that the “atmosphere 

or climate of the trial is peculiarly within the knowledge and experience of 

the trial court.” Colfer v. Ballantyne, 89 Ariz. 408, 409, 363 P.2d 588, 589 

(1961). Moreover, we routinely defer to the court’s determination that there 

was prejudicial misconduct that affected another’s rights. See Ritchie v. 

Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 303, ¶ 52, 211 P.3d 1272, 1287 (App. 2009) (“The trial 

judge is in the best position to ‘decide whether the misconduct materially 

affected the rights of the aggrieved party.’”) (citations omitted).

 

5 In discussing whether the case was a “close case,” the court did not find 

the phrase informative. 
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

Decision of the Court 

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¶17 Defendants also argue that the one question to Dr. Posey was, 

in essence, the only basis for the grant of a new trial. Although the ruling 

on reconsideration did not change the grant of new trial or its three factual 

reasons, the “court’s fundamental finding [was] that the misconduct of 

counsel warranted a new trial.” Liberatore, 157 Ariz. at 621, 760 P.2d at 621. 

Even though, as Defendants note, the court had addressed the issues as they 

arose during trial, those “contemporaneous [rulings]” are not given priority 

“over [the court’s] ultimate conclusion, informed by the verdict, that 

misconduct ha[s] cumulatively colored the result.” Id. As a result, we do 

not find an abuse of discretion warranting reversing the ruling. 

II. Medical Examiner and Qualified Immunity 

¶18 In their cross-appeal, Plaintiffs argue the superior court erred 

by granting Defendants’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment on 

qualified immunity. We disagree. 

¶19 We review the grant of partial summary judgment de novo to 

determine “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and 

whether the trial court erred in applying the law.” Adams v. State, 185 Ariz. 

440, 443, 916 P.2d 1156, 1159 (App. 1995) (citation omitted). We view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary 

judgment was entered, resolving all inferences arising from the evidence in 

that party’s favor. Id. We review questions of statutory construction and 

the existence and scope of privilege de novo. Advanced Cardiac Specialists, 

Chartered v. Tri-City Cardiology Consultants, P.C., 222 Ariz. 383, 386, ¶ 6, 214 

P.3d 1024, 1027 (App. 2009) (citations omitted); State v. Gallagher, 205 Ariz. 

267, 269, ¶ 5, 69 P.3d 38, 40 (App. 2003). 

¶20 In interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to determine and 

give effect to the legislature’s intent. Greenwood v. State, 217 Ariz. 438, 442, 

¶ 16, 175 P.3d 687, 691 (App. 2008) (citation omitted). We first consider the 

statutory language which provides “the best and most reliable index of a 

statute’s meaning.” Indus. Comm’n of Ariz. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 223 Ariz. 

75, 77, ¶ 6, 219 P.3d 285, 287 (App. 2009) (quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 

Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991)). If the language is clear and 

unambiguous, we will follow the text as written and need not resort to other 

methods of statutory construction. Id. at 78, ¶ 7, 219 P.3d at 288. Only if the 

statute is ambiguous will we examine “the context of the statute, the 

language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and 

consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” Glazer v. State, 237 Ariz. 160, 163, 

¶ 12, 347 P.3d 1141, 1144 (2015) (citation omitted). 
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

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¶21 Immunity is the exception in Arizona, and we “narrowly 

construe immunity provisions applicable to government entities.”

Greenwood, 217 Ariz. at 442-43, ¶ 16, 175 P.3d at 691-92 (citation omitted). 

When the Actions Against Public Entities or Public Employees Act was 

enacted in 1984, Glazer, 237 Ariz. at 163, ¶ 11, 347 P.3d at 1144 (citing 1984 

Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 285 (2d Reg. Sess.) (codified at A.R.S. §§ 12–820 to –

826)), the legislation provided that “[e]xcept as specifically provided in this 

article, this article shall not be construed to affect, alter or otherwise modify 

any other rules of tort immunity regarding public entities and public 

officers as developed at common law and as established under the statutes 

and the constitution of this state,” A.R.S. § 12-820.05(A). The plain language 

of the statute clearly provides that common-law immunity was not 

displaced, and, as a result, common-law immunity may still apply under 

some circumstances not explicitly stated in the immunity statutes. See, e.g.,

State v. Superior Court (Ford), 186 Ariz. 294, 297, 921 P.2d 697, 700 (App. 1996) 

(applying common-law immunity to quasi-judicial prosecutorial acts after 

enactment of Actions Against Public Entities or Public Employees Act). 

¶22 A county medical examiner is statutorily required during a 

death investigation to determine whether an autopsy is necessary, and to

“[c]ertify to the cause and manner of death following completion of the 

death investigation . . . reduce the findings to writing and promptly make 

a full report on forms prescribed for that purpose.” A.R.S. § 11-594(A)(2). 

Because of their statutory duties, the Arizona legislature granted immunity 

to medical examiners for death investigations. Specifically, and at the time 

of this investigation, § 11-597(H) provided that “[w]hen an autopsy or other 

tests are performed by a forensic pathologist, no cause of action shall lie 

against the physician or any other person for requesting the autopsy, for 

participating in the autopsy.” A.R.S. § 11-597(H) (2012).6 Although there is 

an argument that the statutory language granted absolute immunity, the 

superior court found the statute did not cover the manner of conducting the 

investigation resulting in the cause and manner-of-death determination. 

The court, as a result, found Defendants were protected by common-law 

qualified immunity, and allowed the case to proceed because Plaintiffs had 

 

6 The Legislature modified the statute in 2014, and it now provides: 

“[w]hen a death investigation, including an . . . autopsy or other tests are 

performed by the county medical examiner . . . no cause of action shall lie 

against the physician or any other person for requesting, performing, 

participating in or determining the cause and manner of death or otherwise 

reporting the results from the external examination, death investigation, 

autopsy or other tests.” A.R.S. § 11-597(H) (West 2016).
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

Decision of the Court 

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alleged that Dr. Horn acted with a reckless disregard for the truth in 

reaching his conclusions on the cause and manner of the child’s death and 

“failed to competently and good faith perform [his] statutory duties.”

¶23 Plaintiffs now contend, however, that Dr. Horn should not 

have any immunity, much less qualified common-law immunity, because 

of the manner in which he conducted the death investigation and came to 

his conclusions about the cause and manner of death. Defendants, on the 

other hand, argue the court did not err because Dr. Horn is entitled to 

common-law qualified immunity.7 

¶24 The Legislature did not abrogate common-law qualified 

immunity with the enactment of § 11-597(H). The statute did not clearly 

and expressly abrogate common-law immunity or common-law qualified 

immunity. See Pleak v. Entrada Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 207 Ariz. 418, 422, ¶ 12, 

87 P.3d 831, 835 (2004) (holding that to change or abrogate common law by 

statute, legislature must do so expressly, and “[a]bsent a clear manifestation 

of legislative intent to abrogate the common law, we interpret statutes with 

‘every intendment in favor of consistency with the common law.’”) (citation 

omitted). 

¶25 Moreover, common-law qualified immunity applies when 

“officials are setting policy or performing an act that inherently requires 

judgment or discretion.” Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. 551, 555, 729 P.2d 

905, 909 (1986); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895(D)(3) (1979) (“A 

public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is not subject 

to tort liability for an administrative act or omission if (a) he is immune 

because engaged in the exercise of a discretionary function.”); id. at cmt. b 

(stating that common-law immunity for public officer performing 

discretionary function based on need to preserve “independence of action 

without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and 

vexatious suits” and the unfairness of requiring officer to exercise 

discretion and be held responsible according to judgment of those who are 

less qualified and may have no experience in the area, or who may be acting 

 

7 Defendants unsuccessfully sought to be dismissed from the case based on 

absolute immunity. The court subsequently denied Plaintiffs’ motion for 

summary judgment on gross negligence and recognized that Dr. Horn has 

common-law qualified immunity. Defendants neither sought judgment as 

a matter of law on the absolute-immunity claim under Arizona Rule of Civil 

Procedure 50(b), nor raised the issue in their opening brief. As a result, we 

will not address the absolute-immunity ruling. See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 

424, 452 n.9, ¶ 101, 94 P.3d 1119, 1147 n.9 (2004). 
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

Decision of the Court 

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in hindsight). Although common-law qualified immunity does not apply 

to acts “such as driving a car or moving furniture,” Chamberlain, 151 Ariz. 

at 556, 729 P.2d at 910, acts by executive government officials are entitled to 

qualified immunity “in order to advance important public objectives: 

effective government administered by skilled government officials.” Id. In 

fact, our supreme court stated that “[q]ualified immunity protects 

government officials from liability for acts within the scope of their public 

duties unless the official knew or should have known that he was acting in 

violation of established law or acted in reckless disregard of whether his 

activities would deprive another person of their rights.” Id. at 558, 729 P.2d 

at 912 (citation omitted); see also Pinal Cty. v. Cooper, 238 Ariz. 346, 349-50, ¶ 

10, 360 P.3d 142, 145-46 (App. 2015). 

¶26 There is no doubt that Dr. Horn is an executive government 

official - the county medical examiner, who is statutorily charged with 

conducting death investigations. See Chamberlain, 151 Ariz. at 553, 555, 729 

P.2d at 907, 909 (mentioning examples of executive government officials 

that include police officers, members of the board of pardons and paroles, 

and other state employees); see also A.R.S. § 11-201(A) (stating a county’s 

power is exercised by the board of supervisors and agents and officers 

acting under its authority); A.R.S. § 11-592(A) (stating the board of 

supervisors have authority to appoint a forensic pathologist to position of 

medical examiner); Bd. of Sup’rs of Maricopa Cty. v. Stanford, 70 Ariz. 277, 

282, 219 P.2d 769, 772 (1950) (“[C]ounty is a political subdivision of the state 

existing and created to aid in the administration of the state’s laws and for 

purposes of self government.”) (citation omitted). And in conducting the 

death investigation, he had to decide the manner and cause of death, factors 

involving experience, discretion, and judgment. Although Plaintiffs argue 

he should be held liable for the manner in which he conducted an autopsy 

and came to his conclusions about the manner and cause of death, the court 

properly found that Dr. Horn was entitled to common-law qualified 

immunity because he was exercising his judgment within the scope of his 

duties in conducting the death investigation and issuing his report. 

Consequently, the court did not err in finding that Dr. Horn was entitled to 

common-law qualified immunity. 
RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. 

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CONCLUSION 

¶27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

order granting a new trial, as well as the ruling recognizing that Dr. Horn 

has, in this case, common-law qualified immunity.