By

or de r o f th e Ba nk

ru ptc yAp pe lla te Pa ne l, t

he pr e c e de nti al e

ffe c t of thi s d e c isi on is l im ite d to the case and parties pursuant to 6t h Cir. BAP LBR 8013-1( b) . See also 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8010- 1 (c).
F ile Nam e: 10b0003n.06

BA NK RU P TC Y A P P ELLA TE P AN EL OF THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

I n re: L evel Propa

ne Ga ses, I nc. et a l., ) ) De bto rs
. )

_____________________________________ ) ) ) Ohio Truck & Trailer , I nc., ) No. 08-8100 ) Ap pe lla nt, )

) v. ) ) L evel Propa

ne Ga ses, I nc. et a l., ) ) Ap pe lle e s. ) ) ) ) TAL Financ ial Service s, ) No. 08-8101 ) Ap pe lla nt, )

) v. ) ) L evel Propa

ne Ga ses, I nc. et a l., ) ) Ap pe lle e s. ) )
Appea l from the United States B ankruptc y Court fo r t he No rt he rn Di str ic t of

Oh io Case No. 02- 16172 Argued: Novembe r 3, 2009 Dec ided and F iled: Febr

uary 1, 2009- 2-

B e fo re : F UL TO N, Mc I VO R and , RH OD ES, B ank ru ptc y Ap pe llate Pane l Judg e s.

____________________ CO UN SEL AR GU E D: David C. Eisler, Medina , Ohio, for Appe llants. Mark A. Phillips, BENESCH, FRI EDL AND ER , C OP L AN & AR ONO FF L L P , C lev ela nd , Oh io , fo r Ap pel lee s. ON BR I EF: Da vid C. E isl e r, Me din a , O hio , f or Ap pe lla nts . M ark

A. Phi lli ps , B EN ESC H, F RI ED L AN DE R, COPL AN & ARONOF F L L P, Cl evela nd, Ohio, for Appe llees.

____________________ OP IN ION

____________________ STEVEN RHODES, B ankruptc y Appellate Pane l J udg e. The appellants seek reve rsal of the bankruptc y

court’s or der de ny ing the ir motions to vacate sever al key order s in the underlying bankruptc y

case
. The appellants argue that all of the order s wer e procur ed throug h a “f raud on the

c ourt .” Th e Pane l c on c lud e s th a t a pp e lla nt, Oh io Tr

uc k & Tr a ile r, I nc ., la c ks sta nd ing be c a

us e it i s not a cr editor. The Pane l further conclude s that the cha lleng ed orde rs wer e not proc ured throug h a

“ fr a ud on the c ourt ” and that the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt did no t e rr in d e nyingTA LF ina

nc ia l Se rv ic e s’ motion to vacate.
I. JU RI SDI CT ION AN D ST AN DA RD OF RE VI EW
Be fore rea ching the merits of the a ppeal be fore us, we m u s t ad d ress the issue of whether appellants have standing

. See H arker v . Troutman (

In re Troutman Enters., Inc .), 286 F .3d 359, 364 (6th Cir. 2002) (“ Standing is a jurisdictional re quirement and we are under a continuing oblig ation to ve rify our jurisdiction ove r a particula r case .”) “Appe llate standing in ba nkruptcy case s is more limit ed than Ar

ticle I I Istanding or the prude ntial req u i re m en t s associate d” with fe dera l standing g ener ally

. Moran v. LTV Steel Co., Inc . ( In re LTV St eel Co., Inc .), 560 F .3d 449, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2009) (c itations omi tted). As this Panel has pre viously explained:
I n order to have standingto appea l a bankr uptcy court orde r, an a

ppellant must have been “ direc tly

and adve rsely

aff ecte d pecunia

ril y by the orde r.” D erive d from the now-re peale d Ba

nkruptcy Act of 1898, “[t] his principle, also known a s the ‘per son ag g rieve d’ doctrine , limit s standing to pe rsons with a fi nancia l stake in the bankrupt c y

c o u rt' s o r d e r
. ” T h u s , a

p arty ma y o n ly a p p e a l a b an kr u p tc y c o u rt o rder wh e n it dim ini sh e s th e ir

pr op e rt y , in c re a se s th e ir

burd e ns or

imp a ir s th e ir

ri g hts

.- 3-

Tra v e le rs Cas

. & Su r. v . Co rb in ( In re First Cincinnati, Inc. ), 286 B.R. 49, 51 (B .A.P. 6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
Gene rally , bankruptc y

jurisdiction is not confe rre d for the convenie nce of those not in bankruptcy

. In re Pac or, Inc. v . Higgins , 743 F.2d 984, 996 ( 3rd Cir.1984), r e v 'd on other grounds , Things Reme mbere d, Inc. v . Petrarca , 516 U.S. 124, 134-35, 116 S.Ct . 494, 133 L .Ed.2d 461 (1995). U nless the parties involved are the debtor a nd the c re dit or s, or the ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt ha s “ re la te d to” jur isd ic tio n o ve r c e rt a in p art ie s, the bankruptc y court ha s no jurisdiction to enter orde rs per taining to pa

rties who ar e not relate d to the bankruptc y action.
In re Do w Co rn ing

Cor p ., 255 B.R. 445, 476 (E.D . Mich. 2000).
The re cord r evea ls that Ohio Truck & Trailer’ s proof of claim was disallowed. (Dkt. # 3511, Orde r Sustaining De btors’ objec tion to C laim No. 211 of Ohio Truc k & T railer , I nc., Nov. 20, 20 08 ). Oh io T ru c k & Tr a ile r d id n ot a pp e a l th e or de r d e nyingits pr oo f of c la im. Ac c or din g ly , O hio Truck & Trailer

is not a cre ditor in the prese nt case . Fur ther, the Pane l fi n d s that Ohio Truck & Trailer is not a “per son ag g rieve d.” The ref ore, the Panel hol ds that Ohio Truck & Trailer does not have sta nding to br ing this appe al. Acc ording ly , case number 08-8100 is DI SMI SSED.
The c laims r eg ister does not show a proof of claim for T AL Financ ial Service s. Howeve r, in a Stipulated O rder enter ed on J une 25, 2003, debtor and TAL stipulated that TAL shall have two allowed se cure d claims in the amount of $18,182, and in the a mount of $25,687. (Dkt. # 1706). Acc ordin gl y , t h e P anel f inds that TALFinanc ial is a cre ditor with standing unde r the “ person ag g rieve d” standa

rd.
Th e B ank ru ptc y Ap pe llate Pane l of the Sixth Cir c uit ha s juri sd ic tio n to de c ide thi s a pp e a l. Th e Un ite d Stat e s Dist

ri c t Cour t for the No rt

he rn Di str ic t of Ohi o ha s aut ho ri zed a pp e a ls t o th e B AP. A final orde r of a

bankruptc y

court may

be appe aled by

rig ht u n d er 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) . For purposes of a

ppeal, a n order is final if it “ ‘ends the litigation on the merits and lea ves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg ment.’” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States , 489 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S. Ct . 1494, 1497 (1989) ( citations omitt ed).
The de nial of a motion for relief from a judgment t hat i s not a summary judgme nt is reviewe d for a buse of discr etion. Smith v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc ., 16 7 F .3 d 2 86 , 2 89 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) . A n a bu se of dis c re tio n o c c ur s w he n th e ba nk ru ptc y c ou rt re lie s u po n c le arl y

e rr on e ou s f

ind ing s o f f

a c t,The Ver bos-Anter email evidenc e is a ser ies of ema ils purportedly betwee n J ohn Ver

bos 1 and Richar d Anter, two key employ ees of the debtors. These ema ils, which have not be en ver ified, and refer to the parties only by first name and initials, appea r t o reve al a sc heme to conc eal c ustomer chec ks, to make it appea

r t h at t h e busi ness was losing money , in order to oust Will iam Maloof, debtors’ f ormer sole share holder. I t is worth not ing that the email evidenc e was not attache d to TAL Financ ial’s motion, but was attache d to Ohio Truck & Trailer ’s motion to vacate, w hich TAL Financ ial incorpora

ted by ref ere nce.

- 4- improperly

applies the law, or uses an er roneous leg al standar d. Corzin v. Fordu ( In re Fordu ), 209 B.R. 854, 858 (B .A.P. 6th Ci r. 1997).
“The question is not how the review ing c ourt would have ruled, but rather whether a re a so na ble pe rs on c ou ld ag re e wi th the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt ' s dec isi on ; if

re a so na ble persons c ould differ

as to the issue, then ther e is no abuse of discretion.” Barlow v. M.J. W aterman &Assocs

. (

In re M .J. W aterman &Assocs .) , 227 F .3 d 6 04 , 6 08 (6 th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
In re Ge be re

ge or gis , 310 B.R. 61 , 6 4 (B

. A. P

. 6th 2004). See also Flowers v. Southe rn Regional Physician Serv ices, Inc ., 286 F.3d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 2002) (On appea l, the decision to g rant or deny relief under Rule 60( b) is revie wed f or an a buse of discr etion.).
II. ISS UES ON APP EAL
The sole issue on a

ppeal is whe ther the ba

nkruptcy court a bused its d i scre tion by

denying TAL Financ ial’s motion to vacate f ive key order s in the bankruptcy

case
. TAL

Financ ial’s primary argument is that the bankruptcy court failed t o proper ly consider the Ver

bos-Anter email evidenc e, 1 which would have shown that the orde rs wer e proc ured throug h a “f raud on the court,” neg ating the

rea sonable time re quirement of Rule 60( b). Additionally , TAL Financ ial argues that the bankr uptcy court e rre d in finding that the Plan Confirmation Order is res judicata

as to all matters ra ised in TAL Financ ial’s motion to vacate.
III . F AC TS This appea l arises fr om a bankr uptcy case that is o v er seven y ear s old, with over 3700 pleading s. The case beg an as an invol untary Chapter 7 bankruptc y petition on J une 6, 2002. The re
wer e s e v e r a l d e b to r s
. O n Ju n e 1 1 , 2 0 0 2 , th e b an kr u p tc y c o u rt e n te r e d an “ A g r e e d O r d e r and Stipul ation” which a

mong othe r thing s, consolidated the c ases a nd conver ted them to Chapter 11.- 5-

During the sec ond y ear

of t he bankruptcy case , the forme r sole shar eholder , Wil liam Maloof beg an to make a lleg ations of fra ud. Prof. Ray

Warner was appointed as examiner on April 30, 2003. On J une 6, 2003, the Examiner filed his re port with the Court. After revie wing thousands of pag es of docume nts and conducting 22 sworn and unswor n witness interviews, the E x aminer c oncluded that th e e vid e nc e did

no t su pp or t th e a lle gati on s of misc on du c t on the pa rt of de bto rs ’ atto rn e y s, Be nesch F riedlande r Coplan & Aronoff (B FCA).
On J uly 2, 2003, the debtors’ propane distribution bus iness was sold as a g oing c oncer n. On J anuar y 21, 2004, the debtors’ parking lot business was sold as a g oing c oncer n. Both sale order s
we re su bs e qu e ntl y

a ff ir me d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

on a pp e a l.
Be tween January

31, 2006 and F ebrua

ry 2, 2008, Maloof made at least five attempts to ge t the key order s overturne d based on his a lleg ations of fra ud. The ba

nkruptcy court de nied Maloof’ s mot ion s, and

tho se or de rs we re a ff

ir me d o n a pp e a l.
On Se pte mbe r 2 3, 20 08 , a

pp e lla nt TA L F ina

nc ia l Se rv ic e s fi le d a

mot ion to v a c a te c e rt a in order s entere d over the course of the L evel Propa ne bankr uptcy case . (Dkt. # 3449). This motion stated “[t] he history

of the fr aud and the supporting exhibi ts doc umenting the fra ud are set out in the Sha re ho lde r’ s R. 60 (b )( 6) Mo tio n to Va c a te

. . . and in the Sha re ho lde r’ s Ru le 60 (b )( 2) Mo tio n to Vac ate . . . a

nd Shareholde r’s Motion for Reconsider ation of the Court’s denial of his R. 60(b)( 2) motion, hereby

incorpora

ted by ref ere nce.” (Dkt. # 3397).
Th e mot ion

re qu e ste d th a t th e c ourt

va c a te fi ve ke y

or de rs : 1. The Ag ree d Orde r ente red June 11, 2002 (Dkt. # 5) ( the Conversion Orde r); 2. The orde r ente red O ctober 17, 2002 (Dkt. # 676), a pproving the manag ement ag ree ment betwee n Eag leroc k Propane a nd L evel Propa

ne (the Manag ement Or der) ; 3. The orde r ente red O ctober 17, 2002 (Dkt. # 679), amending the final orde r authorizing the D ebtors to enter into a post-petition financing agr ee m ent (the Amended F inancingOrde r); 4. The orde r ente red June 20, 2003 (Dkt. # 1667), a pproving the g lobal s et t l ement betwee n the Debtors, the “B ank Gr oup” the Equipment F inancier s and the Of ficial Commi ttee of U nsecur ed Creditors ( the Global Settlement Orde r); 5. The orde r

e n te r e d Ju n e 2 7 , 2 0 0 3 ( D kt. # 1 7 2 1 ) , a p p r o v in g th e s a le o f

th e g o ing conce rn asse ts of L evel Propa ne (the Sale Orde r).- 6-

On No ve mbe r 4 , 2 00 8, th e ban kr up tc y c ourt he ld a he ari ngon

TA LF ina

nc ia l’ s mo tio n to
vacate the orde rs
. On No v ember 14, 2008, the bankruptc y court e ntere d an opinion and orde r de nyingTA LF ina

nc ia l’ s mot ion to va c a te

. Th e ba nk ru ptc y c ourt fo un d that the mot ion to v a c a te relied e ntirely

upon arguments and allegat i o n s p re viously prese nted to the bankr

uptcy court by Maloof. Additionally , the bankr uptcy court found that the Rule 60(b)(6) motions were time bar red under both the “ rea sonable time” require ment of Fe d. R. Civ. P. 60( b) and the equitable doc trine of laches

. Fi n all y , the bankr uptcy court de nied the motion as barr ed by section 1141(a ), finding the

c on fi rm e d p lan b ind ingon c re dit or s. Th e ba

nk ru ptcy c ourt inc or po ra te d it s r e a so nin g in i ts October 27, 2008 Memorandum of Opinion and Or der. TA Lfiled a timely notice of a

ppeal on November

24, 2008.
IV . D ISC USS ION
The ba nkruptcy c ourt denied TA LFinanc ial’s motion for three rea sons. First, the bankr uptcy court found that TAL Financ ial relied upon the same arguments and alleg ations prev i o u s l y raised by Maloof and r ejec ted by

the cour t. Second, t he bankruptcy court held that the m otion was timebarr ed by Rule 60(b). Third, the bankruptc y co u rt held that the motion was bar red by section 1141(a)

. A. F raud on th e Court
Th e Pane l wi ll be g in by a dd re ssi ng the “ fr a

ud on the c ourt ” argume nt, sin c e it i s th e lin c hp in of a ll o f T AL

F ina nc ia l’ s argume nts

. Not all fra

ud is “fra

ud on the cour

t.” “[T]he ty

pe of f raud n ec es s ary

to sustain an ind e pe nd e nt a c tio n atta c kin g the fi na lity of a jud g ment is n arr ow e r i n s c op e tha n th a t w hic h is sufficie nt for re lief by

timely motion” under Rule 60(b) (3) f or fr aud on an adverse pa rty

. Gleason v. Jandruc ko , 860 F.2d 556, 558 ( 2d Cir. 1988)

. The Six th Circ uit ha s held that fra ud on the cour

t is c on du c t: 1) on the pa

rt of an office r of the cour t; 2) that is directed to the judicia l machiner y its e lf ; 3) that is int e nti on a lly

fa lse , w il ful ly bl in d to th e tr uth , o r i s in

re c kle ss dis re g ard fo r t he tr uth ; 4) that is a po sit ive a ve rm e nt o r a c on c e a lme nt w he n o ne is under a duty to disclose; 5) that dec eives the c ourt.- 7-

W or k ma n v . B e ll , 227 F.3d 331, 336 ( 6th Cir. 2000) ( citing Demjanjuk v . Petrovsk y , 10 F.3d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1993). I n Computer Leasco, Inc . v. NTP, Inc ., 1 9 4 Fe d

. Ap p x . 328, 338 (6th Cir. 2006), the Six th Circuit stated that these ele ments require “that the individual ac cused o f p e r p e trating the fr a ud mus t ha ve dir e c tly

int e ra c te d w iththe c ourt

to ‘ pr e ve nt an a dv e rs ary fr om pr e se nti nghis

case fully and fa irly .’” Id. (citation omitted). Appellant ar g ues that the Ve rbos-Ante r e-ma ils a re new evidenc e of fra

udulent activity

by employ ees of

the debtors. The Ver

bos-Anter emails might be evidenc e of a scheme to oust Maloof , but the emails do not show fra ud on the court. The e mails do not contain communication from a n office r of the c ourt. The e mails are not dire cted to the judicial mac hinery itself. Moreove r, TAL Financ ial does not make a n alleg ation of spec ific fr audulent ac tivity by an off icer of the court which ind uc e d th e ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt to e nte r a ny of the fi ve c ha lle ng e d o rd e rs
. Rather, TA LFinanc ial’s argument is that the re was a g rand c onspiracy

to oust Maloof and misrepre sent the value of t he debtors so that specific people could purcha se the de btors as a g oing

conce rn at a reduc ed price. TAL Financ ial makes va g ue alleg ations that debtors’ c ounsel, Be nesch Fr iedlander

Coplan & Aronoff (B FCA), was awa re of and pa

rticipated in this conspirac y . Howeve r, this alleg ation was ref

uted by the Ex aminer. Moreove r, the Ver bos-Anter emails do not indicate any involvement by

BF CA. There fore , the Panel conc ludes that the Ve rbos-Ante r ema ils do not prove a “f raud on the court.”
B. F e d. R . C iv. P . R ule 60 (b )
TAL Financ ial’s m ain arg ument in support of its asser tion that the bankruptcy court a bused its discretion by finding that TAL Financ ial’s motions we re not broug ht within a rea sonable time, is that the court should not have imposed any tim e lim itatio n. TA LF ina nc ia l c on te nd s th a t a

Rul e 60(d) “ fra ud on the cour

t” ar g ument can be raised at any time, without any

limit ation. Howeve r, the Panel has a lrea dy

held that there was no fr aud on the c ourt. Ther efor e, this argument fails. Fr aud by a dv e rs e pa

rt ie s, a s a lle g e d h e re , is su bje c t to Rul e 60 (b )’ s ti me lim itatio ns
. The ba nkruptcy court’s de termination that the motion to vacate was not br o u gh t wi thin a

rea sonable time is revie wed f or abuse of discre tion. The bankruptcy court did not err by holding that TA LF ina nc ia l’ s Ru le 60 (b ) m oti on

wa s n ot b ro ug ht w ith in a

re a so na ble tim e . T AL

F ina nc ia l a sse rt s- 8-

that it has only been two y ear s since parties raised the issue of fra ud, and only since J une 18, 2008 that th e newe ma ils c a me to l ig ht. Ho we ve r, a lle g a tio ns of fr a ud we re ra ise d w ith in t

he fi rs t si x months of the bankruptc y case by Maloof. The court-a ppointed Ex aminer thoroug hly investigated the a lle g a tio ns and

c on c lud e d th a t th e evi den c e did no t su pp or t th e a lle g a tio ns of

mis c on du c t. Be tween January

31, 2006 and F ebrua

ry 2, 2008, Maloof made at least five attempts to overturn ke y
or de rs ba se d o n h is al le g a tio ns of fr a ud . T he ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt de nie d M a loo f’ s mo tio ns , a nd tho se order s were aff

irmed on appe al. The district c ourt’s most rec ent opinion affir ming the ba

nkruptcy court stated:
Her e, as note d by

the B ankruptc y

Court, both t h at co u rt and the dist rict cour t on appea l reje cted the arguments made in Maloof’s First Motion to Vacate, i.e., that the banks alleg edly

committe d a “f

ra ud on the cour

t.” These same a ssertions wer e reiter a te d in M a lo o f ’ s F ir s t a

n d Se c o n d M o ti o n s to Re o p e nth e E xa mi n er’ s I nvestig ation, and his Motions to di squalify Debtors’ Counsel. Whi le Maloof a rg ues that “ the do c tr ine of

fi na lity do e s not app ly in t

his c a se sin c e the tw o M oti on s to Va c a te de pe nd

up on dis tin c tly

dif feren t e vid e nc e , f

ro m w hic h a

ri se dis tin c tly differ ent theories of the case ,” Maloof misunderstands the doctr ine of fina lity . The doctrine of

finality does not operate to g ive litigants re peate d “bites at the a pple” by simply providing nuance on their prio r ar guments or submitti ng new items of evidenc e g oin g t o t h e same issues. Both the B ankruptc y Court and cour

ts in the Norther n District of Ohio and t he Six th Circuit Court of Appeals have reje cted Maloof’s multiple attempts to invalidate the De btors’ bankr upt cy b ased on alleg ations of fraud. The iss ue raised i n the S econd Motion [t o] Vac ate is the same

. Maloof v. Leve l Propane Gases, I nc ., Case No. 1:08CV679 (N.D . Ohio J uly 28, 2009) (Appe llee’s Supplemental Appendix at 13.)
The ba nkruptcy court’s determination t hat TAL Financ ial is attempting one more bite at the

a pp le , b y su bmi tti ng“ ne w” ite ms o f e vid e nc e g oing to th e sam e iss ue s o f f ra ud , is no t c le a rl y
err oneous. The ba

nkruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Rule 60(b)(6) motion on the basis that it had not been br oug ht within a rea sonable time.
C. Sect ion 1141(a)
The ba nkruptcy court’s third ba sis for deny ing T AL Financ ial’s m otion was that it is barred by section 1141(a ) due to c onfirmation of the plan. TAL Financ ial asser

ts that the bankruptcy

court
e rr e d b e c a

us e it “ mis re a d” the c hr on olo g y of the do c ke t and fa ile d to re c og nize that the mot ion to- 9-

vacate was f

iled prior to plan conf

irmation. TAL Financial’s ar g ument fails bec ause pla n
c on fi rm a tio n e ff

e c tiv e ly fo re c los e s su c h c la ims

. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) , the eff ect of confirmation is to “ bind a ll pa rties to the terms of a plan of reor g anization.” Still v. Rossville Bank ( In re Chattanooga W

holesale Antiques, Inc

. ), 930 F.2d 458, 463 ( 6th Cir.1991). As the Six th Circuit has stated, “[c] o n fi rm at ion of a plan of

reor g anization by

the bankr

uptcy court h as t h e eff

ect of a judg ment by

the district court a

nd res judicata pr inciples bar r e-litig ation of any i s s u es raised or that could have been r aised in the confirmation procee dings.” Id. Whether an a ction is barre d by res judicata pr inciples is determined by the a pp lic a tio n o f f

our f a c tor s:
1. A final decision on the merits in the first action by a cour t o f c o m petent jurisdiction; 2. Th e se c on d a c tio n invo lve s th e same pa rt ie s, or the ir pr ivi e s, a s th e fi rs t; 3. The sec ond action ra ises an issue ac tual ly litigated or

which should have been litigated in the f

irst action; 4. An identity

of the c ause of

action.
C entur y Inde mnity Co. v. Spec ial Metals Corp. ( In re Spe cial Metals Corp. ) , 3 1 7 B

. R. 326, 331 (B an kr. E

. D. Ky

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Sanders Confectionary Prods., Inc. v . Heller Fin., Inc

. , 973 F.2d 474, 480 (6th Cir. 1992)). As a ge nera l rule, the “[ c]onfirmation of a plan of re org anization constitut es a f inal judgme nt in bankruptcy

proce eding s.” Sanders Confectionary Prods., Inc . v. He ller Fin., Inc. , 973 F.2d at 480. I n this case, the ba

nkruptcy court e ntere d a Plan Confirmation Orde r on Oc tob er 9, 2008, which constitutes a final de cision on the merits by a cour t of compete nt jurisdiction.
The sec ond prer equisite for r es judicata is also established. TAL Financi al , as a creditor, qualifies as a party for res j udicata purposes. Id. at 481. Section 1141(a ) prohibits parties, such a s TAL Financ ial from “la

unch[ing] collatera l attacks on c onfirmed plans, unde rmining the nece ssary ability of bankr

uptcy courts to settle all of the c laims ag ainst the debtor.” Id. TAL Financ ial was

a pa rt y in the ba

nk ru ptc y pr oc e e din g be fo re c on fi rm a tio n of the pla n, and is n owse e kin g to v a c a te the fi ve or de rs e nte re d b y the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt . T he re fo re , T AL

F ina nc ia l’ s mo tio n to va c a te involves the same pa

rties as those involved at confirmation.- 10-

As to t he thi rd pr e re qu isi te fo r r e s ju dic a ta , the fr a ud iss ue s cou ld have be e n ra ise d a nd de a lt with as part of the confirmation proce ss. TAL Financ ial’s contention that the l itigation is not barre d by plan confirmation be cause the fra ud issues were raised prior to c on fi rm a tio n is inc or

re c t. See I

n re Spec ial Metals Corp. , 317 B.R. 326 (B ankr. E.D. Ky

. 2004). The timing of T AL Fi n an ci al’s Motion to Vacate is irreleva nt. The bankr

uptcy confirmation process e ncompasses a ll issues that could and should have been r aised a s objections to confirmation of the Plan. The bankr uptcy court confirme d the Plan and TAL Financ ial did not appeal the c onfirmation orde r.
Th e fi na l f

a c tor re qu ir ingan id e nti ty

of c la im s is met if “ the c la ims aro se ou t of the same transac tion or series of transac tions,” or if the “cla ims a rose out of the same core operative fac ts.” Browning v. Levy , 283 F.3d 761, 774 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The fraud claims asserted by TAL Financ ial wer e raised repe atedly by Maloof prior to c onfirmation of the Plan and during plan

c on fi rm a tio n p ro c e ss. Al tho ug h T AL F ina nc ia l a tte mpt s to argue that th e Ve rb os -A nte r e -m a il evidenc e is “ne w,” the e videnc e i s i ndistinguishable f rom other a lleg ations of fra ud raised by Maloof. Those a ll ega t i o n s have be en thoroug hly considere d and re

jected by both the bankruptc y
c ourt and the dis tr ic t c ourt . T he re fo re , th e Pane l c on c lud e s th a t th e re is a n id e nti ty of c la ims a nd

a ll four f actor s used to deter

mine whether

an ac tion is bar

red by the principles of r es judicata have be en
me t. T he ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt , th e re fo re , d id no t e rr in fi nd ing that TA L F ina nc ia l’ s Mo tio n to Va c a te was ba rre d by § 1141(a)

. V. CO NC LU SION
The ba nkruptcy court’s opinion and or der de ny ing T AL Financ ial’s motion to vacate a re AF F IR M ED

.