SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1310 

CA 15-01031 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

SANTOKH S. BADESHA, SUDARSHAN S. BAINS, 

BHOOPINDER S. MEHTA, HARBHAJAN S. PUREWAL, 

MAGHAR S. CHANA, RAJDEEP K. CHEEMA, AS MEMBERS 

OF BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GURUDWARA OF ROCHESTER, 

AND GURUDWARA OF ROCHESTER, A CORPORATION 

ORGANIZED AND EXISTING UNDER RELIGIOUS 

CORPORATION LAW OF STATE OF NEW YORK, 

PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, 

 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PARMINDER S. SOCH, MANDEEP (MAKHAN) SINGH, AJAY 

SINGH, PUSHPINDER ANEJA, GURRINDER S. BEDI, IN 

HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 

GURUDWARA OF ROCHESTER, DAMAPAUL SONDHI AND 

SANDEEP S. GREWAL, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS 

PURPORTED AUDITORS OF GURUDWARA OF ROCHESTER, 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

 

HARRIS BEACH PLLC, PITTSFORD (MICHAEL J. MASINO OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

WOODS OVIATT GILMAN LLP, ROCHESTER (WARREN B. ROSENBAUM OF COUNSEL),

FOR PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from a judgment (denominated decision) of the Supreme

Court, Monroe County (Matthew A. Rosenbaum, J.), entered November 14,

2014. The judgment, inter alia, declared that the Board of Trustees

of Gurudwara of Rochester is a self-perpetuating board under article 9

of the Religious Corporations Law.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking, inter

alia, judgment declaring that the Board of Trustees (Board) of

plaintiff Gurudwara of Rochester (GOR) is a self-perpetuating board

under article 9 of the Religious Corporations Law. Defendants, by

their second counterclaim, sought judgment declaring, inter alia, that

GOR is incorporated under article 10 of the Religious Corporations

Law, and that the Board is not self-perpetuating and must be elected

pursuant to the GOR constitution. When this case was previously

before us on appeal, we affirmed an order denying plaintiffs’ motion

and defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment (Badesha v Soch, 104
-2- 1310 

CA 15-01031 

AD3d 1268). Supreme Court thereafter conducted a nonjury trial and

granted, inter alia, judgment in favor of plaintiffs for the relief

sought in the complaint. We affirm. 

It is undisputed that, although GOR was incorporated in 1983

under the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, it was intended to be a

religious corporation and operated as such. Thus, it “may be

considered a ‘de facto’ religious corporation” (Temple-Ashram v

Satyanandji, 84 AD3d 1158, 1160). The Board, however, did not comply

with the formalities for incorporation under article 9 of the

Religious Corporations Law, nor did it meet the requirements for

incorporation under article 10 of the statute. 

The focus of the parties’ dispute at trial was whether GOR was

intended to, and did in fact, operate with a self-perpetuating board

pursuant to article 9 or an elected board pursuant to article 10. 

Contrary to defendants’ contention, the record supports the court’s

conclusion that the type of governance intended and effectuated by the

founders of GOR was a self-perpetuating board and, thus, GOR operated

as a de facto religious corporation under article 9 of the Religious

Corporations Law (see generally Matter of Venigalla v Nori, 11 NY3d

55, 62, rearg denied 11 NY3d 774). Although GOR had a constitution

that contemplated elections and democratic governance, the weight of

the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that the Board did not

adhere to the requirements of the constitution in practice (see id.).

We reject defendants’ further contention that they are entitled

to a new trial based upon the court’s allegedly erroneous evidentiary

rulings. The court properly excluded testimony proffered by

defendants concerning the tenets and principles of the Sikh religion,

inasmuch as it was required to resolve the parties’ dispute without

inquiring into Sikh religious doctrine (see Matter of Congregation

Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. v Kahana, 9 NY3d 282, 286-287). Testimony

concerning an unrelated Sikh gurudwara was also properly excluded as

having no relevance to the issue whether GOR is a religious

corporation under article 9 or article 10 of the Religious

Corporations Law (see generally Morris v Patane, 39 AD3d 1054, 1055).

Entered: February 11, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court