UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4177

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARLON T. ANDERSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:16-cr-00041-TDS-1)

Submitted: August 25, 2016 Decided: August 29, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. John Mcrae Alsup, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Marlon Tyrone Anderson appeals his sentence of one year and 

one day of imprisonment, followed by 36 months of supervised 

release, imposed upon the revocation of his supervised release 

term. On appeal, Anderson’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court imposed a plainly unreasonable sentence. 

Anderson was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental 

brief but has not done so. The Government has declined to file 

a response brief. Following a thorough review of the record, we 

affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a 

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States 

v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We review a 

revocation sentence to determine whether it was within the 

prescribed statutory range and not “plainly unreasonable.” 

United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015). In this inquiry, we first 

determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable, applying the same general considerations employed 

when reviewing original sentences. United States v. Crudup, 461 

F.3d 433, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2006). Only if we determine the 

sentence is unreasonable need we decide whether it is plainly 
3

so. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 

2007).

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the 

district court expressly considered the Chapter Seven policy 

statement range and the pertinent 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) 

factors. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) 

(2012) (detailing applicable § 3553(a) factors). The court 

“must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed,” 

although it “need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a 

revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a postconviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 

547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court 

stated a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should 

receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. We 

presume that a sentence within the policy statement range is 

substantively reasonable. Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.

Our review of the record reveals that Anderson’s sentence 

is reasonable. The district court properly calculated the 

policy statement range and sentenced Anderson within that range 

and below the statutory maximum. During the revocation hearing, 

the court heard testimony from Anderson’s brother, discussed 

Anderson’s circumstances with the probation officer and parties, 

and carefully considered the parties’ arguments. The court 
4

provided a reasoned basis for the sentence it imposed, grounded 

in the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Although the court 

declined Anderson’s request to continue the matter, its decision 

to do so, and the length of the sentence imposed, were justified 

by Anderson’s numerous violations and his pattern of continued 

drug use, despite a prior lengthy sentence and the probation 

officer’s attempts to intervene. Anderson has not rebutted the 

presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded his withinrange sentence. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Anderson, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Anderson requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Anderson.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED