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IN RE EGYPT E.—DISSENT

ESPINOSA, J., dissenting. I disagree with the majority

that the clerical errors in the record of the present case

require that we reverse the judgment of the trial court

terminating the parental rights of the respondents,

Morsy E. (father) and Natasha E., with respect to their

minor children, Egypt E. and Mariam E. In my view,

the majority is too quick to assume that the appealrights

of the respondents were implicated by those clerical

errors. With the information we currently have available

to us, it is not yet clear that the respondents have been

prejudiced. We have the means to attempt to determine

whether their appeal rights were affected, and we

should use those means before reversing the trial

court’s judgment. Clarifying whetherthe errors affected

the respondents’ rights while retaining jurisdiction over

the appeal accords the proper balance between the

respondents’ right to due process and the children’s

right to have an efficient and timely final judgment in

this matter. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

The majority focuses on the absence of answers for

the clerical errors in the record. I choose instead to

focus on what we do know. The father filed with this

court a motion for review of the trial court’s June 9,

2016 articulation. It is undisputed that, in support of

that motion, the father produced a copy of the trial

court’s signed June 1, 2015 order granting the motion

of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and

Families, that the petitioner was not required to make

reunification efforts pursuant to General Statutes (Rev.

to 2013) § 17a-111b (a) (1) and (b) (1) (B) on the basis

of ‘‘the aggravated circumstance of severe physical

abuse.’’ It is also undisputed that the father provided

no explanation whatsoever as to how and when he

came to be in possession of this signed and dated order,

which by his own admission was not in the copy of the

trial court file that was certified by the trial court in

this appeal. Finally, it is undisputed that the trial court,

in its June 9, 2016 articulation, stated that it granted the

petitioner’s motion for a finding that no reunification

efforts were required. If the father were not claiming

on appeal that he did not receive notice of this order,

I would conclude that the judgment of the trial court

should be affirmed.

The father, however, does claim that he lacked notice

of the June 1, 2015 order. Accordingly, I would remand

the case to the trial court with direction to clarify

whether it had provided such notice to the parties. See

Practice Book § 60-2.1

If the trial court were to respond

that it had not provided such notice orthat it was unable

to confirm whether it had provided such notice, then—

and only then—reversal would be required. If the trial

court, however, were to issue an articulation confirming
that it had provided the parties with such notice, the

record would be adequate for review, because the sole

relevance of the clerical errors to any due process rights

of the respondents is to the extent that notice is not

clear, without an articulation by the trial court.2

This approach would be more consistent with this

state’s policy of resolving in as expeditious a manner

as possible the question of whether a parent’s rights

should be terminated. See General Statutes § 46b-142

(d).3 By reversing the trial court’s judgment and

remanding the case for a new trial, the majority risks

unnecessary delay, inconsistent with this state’s policy

as expressly stated by the legislature in § 46b-142 (d).

I finally observe that the mere fact that the majority

states that the new trial is ‘‘to begin no later than September 15, 2016,’’ does not ensure speedy resolution of

this matter. It is not possible to predict what issues will

arise on remand. For instance, the parties may request

and be granted continuances, or unavoidable scheduling issues may create further delay. And once the trial

court arrives at a final judgment, the appeals process

will begin anew. The majority has prolonged this matter

without first determining whether doing so is necessary.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

1 Practice Book § 60-2 provides in relevant part that with respect to an

appeal before this court, the court may ‘‘on its own motion . . . (1) order

a judge to take any action necessary to complete the trial court record for

the proper presentation of the appeal . . . .’’

2

I also observe that if the court deemed it advisable in order to ensure

that the respondents suffered no prejudice, we could allow the parties to

submit supplemental briefs addressing the effect of the court’s June 1,

2015 order.

3 General Statutes § 46b-142 (d) provides: ‘‘Notwithstanding subsections

(a), (b) and (c) of this section, the Department of Children and Families,

or any party to the action aggrieved by a final judgment in a termination

of parentalrights proceeding, shall be entitled to an expedited hearing before

the Appellate Court. A final decision of the Appellate Court shall be issued

as soon as practicable after the date on which the certified copy of the

record of the case is filed with the clerk of the Appellate Court.’’