Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 89 / Tuesday, May 8, 2001 / Notices 23279

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), the

underlying purpose of the NRC

regulations to ensure an acceptable

margin of safety.

3.0 Discussion

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the

Commission may, upon application by

any interested person or upon its own

initiative, grant exemptions from the

requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, when

(1) the exemptions are authorized by

law, will not present an undue risk to

public health or safety, and are

consistent with the common defense

and security; and (2) when special

circumstances are present. The staff

accepts the licensee’s determination that

an exemption would be required to

approve the use of Code Case N–641.

The staff examined the licensee’s

rationale to support the exemption

request and concurs that the use of the

Code case would meet the underlying

intent of these regulations. Based upon

a consideration of the conservatism that

is explicitly incorporated into the

methodologies of 10 CFR part 50,

appendix G; Appendix G of the Code;

and Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2,

as discussed above, the staff concludes

that application of the Code case as

described would provide an adequate

margin of safety against brittle failure of

the RPV. This conclusion is also

consistent with the determinations that

the staff has reached for other licensees

under similar conditions based on the

same considerations.

Therefore, the staff concludes that

granting an exemption under the special

circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii)

is appropriate and that the

methodologies of Code Case N–641 may

be used to revise the P–T limits, LTOP

setpoints, and Tenable for North Anna

Power Station, Units 1 and 2.

4.0 Conclusion

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by

law, will not endanger life or property

or common defense and security, and is,

otherwise, in the public interest.

Therefore, the Commission hereby

grants the licensee an exemption from

the requirements of 10 CFR part 50,

appendix G, for North Anna Power

Station, Units 1 and 2.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment (66 FR 22018).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day

of May 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John A. Zwolinski,

Director, Division of Licensing Project

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–11567 Filed 5–7–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–289]

Amergen Energy Company, LLC; Three

Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1

Environmental Assessment and

Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is considering

issuance of an exemption from certain

provisions of Sections 50.44 and 50.46

and Appendix K of Title 10 of the Code

of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50

for Facility Operating License No. DPR–

50, issued to AmerGen Energy

Company, LLC (the licensee), for

operation of the Three Mile Island

Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI–1), located

in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The licensee requests an exemption

from the provisions of: (1) 10 CFR 50.44,

‘‘Standards for combustible gas control

system in light-water-cooled power

reactors,’’ which provide requirements

to control hydrogen generated by

Zircaloy or ZIRLO fuel cladding after a

postulated loss-of-coolant accident

(LOCA); (2) 10 CFR 50.46, ‘‘Acceptance

criteria for emergency core cooling

systems for light-water nuclear power

reactors,’’ which requires the calculated

emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

performance for reactors with Zircaloy

or ZIRLO fuel cladding to meet certain

criteria; and (3) Appendix K, ‘‘ECCS

Evaluation Models,’’ which presumes

the use of Zircaloy or ZIRLO fuel

cladding when doing calculations for

energy release, cladding oxidation, and

hydrogen generation after a postulated

LOCA.

The proposed action would allow the

licensee to generally use the M5

advanced alloy for fuel rod cladding in

fuel assemblies at TMI–1. Limited use of

M5 alloy in demonstration assemblies at

TMI–1 had previously been approved.

M5 alloy would also be used in fuel

assembly spacer grids and fuel rod end

plugs and fuel assembly guide and

instrument tubes. M5 alloy material

would be used in lieu of Zircaloy or

ZIRLO, the materials assumed to be

used in the cited regulations. The fuel

assemblies would be loaded into the

TMI–1 reactor core during the refueling

outage in the fall of 2001, and in use

during Cycle 14 and beyond operation.

The proposed action is in accordance

with the licensee’s application for

exemption dated December 20, 2000, as

supplemented by letter dated March 14,

2001.

The Need for the Proposed Action

Appendix K of 10 CFR part 50 and 10

CFR 50.46(a)(1)(i) require the

demonstration of adequate ECCS

performance for light-water reactors that

contain fuel consisting of uranium oxide

pellets enclosed in Zircaloy or ZIRLO

tubes. In addition, 10 CFR 50.44(a)

addresses requirements to control

hydrogen generated by Zircaloy or

ZIRLO fuel after a postulated LOCA.

Each of these three regulations, either

implicitly or explicitly assume that

either Zircaloy or ZIRLO is used as the

fuel rod cladding material. In order to

accommodate the high fuel rod burnups

that are required for modern fuel

management and core designs,

Framatome Cogema Fuels (FCF),

developed the M5 advanced fuel rod

cladding and fuel assembly structural

material. M5 is an alloy comprised

primarily of zirconium (∼99 percent)

and niobium (∼ 1 percent) that has

demonstrated superior corrosion

resistance and reduced irradiation

induced growth relative to both

standard and low-tin Zircaloy. However,

since the chemical composition of the

M5 advanced alloy differs from the

specifications of either Zircaloy or

ZIRLO, use of the M5 advanced alloy

falls outside of the strict interpretation

of these regulations. Therefore, approval

of this exemption request is needed to

permit the use of the M5 advanced alloy

as a fuel rod cladding material at TMI–

1. Limited use of the M5 alloy in

demonstration assemblies at TMI–1 had

previously been approved.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the NRC

may grant exemptions which are

authorized by law, will not present an

undue risk to the health and safety of

the public, and are consistent with the

common defense and security, provided

that special circumstances are present.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), the

Commission believes that special

circumstances are present whenever

application of the regulation in the

particular circumstances is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of the rule. The underlying

purpose of 10 CFR 50.46 is to ensure

that facilities have adequate acceptance

criteria for ECCS. FCF demonstrates in

its topical report BAW–10227P–A,

‘‘Evaluation of Advanced Cladding and

23280 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 89 / Tuesday, May 8, 2001 / Notices

Structural Material (M5) in PWR

[pressurized-water reactor] Reactor

Fuel,’’ submitted to the NRC for review

and approval on September 30, 1997,

and approved by the NRC in a letter

dated February 4, 2000, that the

effectiveness of the ECCS will not be

affected by a change from Zircaloy fuel

rod cladding to M5 fuel rod cladding.

The analysis described in BAW–

10227P–A also demonstrates that the

ECCS acceptance criteria applied to

reactors fueled with Zircaloy clad fuel

are also applicable to reactors fueled

with M5 fuel rod cladding. Therefore,

since the underlying purpose of 10 CFR

50.46 is achieved through the use of the

M5 advanced alloy as a fuel rod

cladding material, the special

circumstances required by 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(ii) for granting an exemption

from 10 CFR 50.46 exist. The underlying

purposes of 10 CFR 50.44 and appendix

K of 10 CFR 50 are to ensure that

cladding oxidation and hydrogen

generation are appropriately limited

during a postulated LOCA and

conservatively accounted for in the

ECCS evaluation model. The NRC staff

has evaluated the impact of using M5

advanced alloy as fuel cladding material

and determined that the impact is

within that considered in the design

basis for TMI–1. Therefore, the

underlying purposes of 10 CFR 50.44

and appendix K of 10 CFR Part 50 are

met. Since the underlying purposes of

10 CFR 50.44, 50.46, and appendix K of

10 CFR Part 50 are achieved with the

use of M5 advanced alloy as fuel rod

cladding material, the special

circumstances required by 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(ii) for granting the

exemption are met.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

The NRC has completed its evaluation

of the proposed action and concludes

that the use of M5 advanced alloy as

fuel rod cladding will not have a

detrimental effect during a postulated

LOCA. The NRC staff has further

determined that since the geometry

differences between the M5 alloy and

Zircaloy are slight and would have

virtually no thermal-hydraulic effect

while fuel rods utilizing the two alloys

as cladding material are co-resident in

the same core, there is no need for a

mixed-core penalty in LOCA ECCS

model evaluations to compensate for

material differences.

The proposed action will not

significantly increase the probability or

consequences of accidents, no changes

are being made in the types of any

effluents that may be released off site,

and there is no significant increase in

occupational or public radiation

exposure. Therefore, there are no

significant radiological environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

action.

With regard to potential

nonradiological impacts, the proposed

action does not involve any historic

sites. It does not affect nonradiological

plant effluents and has no other

environmental impact. Therefore, there

are no significant nonradiological

environmental impacts associated with

the proposed action.

Accordingly, the NRC concludes that

there are no significant environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

As an alternative to the proposed

action, the staff considered denial of the

proposed action (i.e., the ‘‘no-action’’

alternative). Denial of the application

would result in no change in current

environmental impacts. The

environmental impacts of the proposed

action and the alternative action are

similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use

of any resources not previously

considered in the Final Environmental

Statement for the Three Mile Island

Nuclear Station, Unit 1, dated December

1972.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy,

on April 4, 2001, the staff consulted

with the Pennsylvania State official, Mr.

Michael Murphy of the Bureau of

Radiation Protection, regarding the

environmental impact of the proposed

action. The State official had no

comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

On the basis of the environmental

assessment, the NRC concludes that the

proposed action will not have a

significant effect on the quality of the

human environment. Accordingly, the

NRC has determined not to prepare an

environmental impact statement for the

proposed action.

For further details with respect to the

proposed action, see the licensee’s letter

dated December 20, 2000, as

supplemented by letter dated March 14,

2001. Documents may be examined,

and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC’s

Public Document Room, located at One

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland.

Publicly available records will be

accessible electronically from the

ADAMS Public Library component on

the NRC Web site, http:www.nrc.gov

(the Electronic Reading Room).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day

of May 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Timothy G. Colburn,

Senior Project Manager, Section 1, Project

Directorate I, Division of Licensing Project

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–11568 Filed 5–7–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards; Notice of Joint Meeting of

the ACRS Subcommittees on Materials

and Metallurgy, Thermal-Hydraulic

Phenomena and Reliability and

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

The ACRS Subcommittees on

Materials and Metallurgy, ThermalHydraulic Phenomena and Reliability

and Probabilistic Risk Assessment will

hold a joint meeting on May 25, 2001,

Room T–2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike,

Rockville, Maryland.

The entire meeting will be open to

public attendance.

The agenda for the subject meeting

shall be as follows:

Friday, May 25, 2001–8:30 a.m. Until

the Conclusion of Business

The Subcommittees will discuss

proposed risk-informed revisions to 10

CFR 50.46 for emergency core cooling

systems. The Subcommittees will also

discuss proposed revisions to the

framework for risk-informing the

technical requirements of 10 CFR Part

50. The purpose of this meeting is to

gather information, analyze relevant

issues and facts, and to formulate

proposed positions and actions, as

appropriate, for deliberation by the full

Committee.

Oral statements may be presented by

members of the public with the

concurrence of the Subcommittee

Chairman; written statements will be

accepted and made available to the

Committee. Electronic recordings will

be permitted only during those portions

of the meeting that are open to the

public, and questions may be asked only

by members of the Subcommittee, its

consultants, and staff. Persons desiring

to make oral statements should notify

the cognizant ACRS staff engineer

named below five days prior to the

meeting, if possible, so that appropriate

arrangements can be made.

The Subcommittees will then hear

presentations by and hold discussions