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T h i s C o u rt , w i t h t h e co n cu rr en ce o f al l j u d g es p art i ci p at i n g i n t h e case, m ay affi rm , reve rs e o r m o d i fy t he ac t i ons of

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r eas on i n any unrel at ed cas e. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON A ugus t 19 , 200 8 S es sio n
VICKI E F. (LOUT) HUDSON v . DAVID P. LOUT

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Tip ton County No. 12,151 Mar tha B. Brasfield, Chan cellor

No. W2007-02704-C OA-R3-C V - Filed September 9, 2008

Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancer y Court Af firme d in part; Vacat ed in p art; and Remanded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H OL LY M. K I RBY , J. , a ndJ. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined.

Je ff e ry L. Stimps on , M un fo rd , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Da vidP. L ou t.
Bradley C. Ball, Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, Vickie F. (Lout) Hudson.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION 1

This domestic relations action require s us to construe a pr ovision of the parties’ 1993 divorce decr ee w ith respec t to the divisi on of De fenda nt/Ap p el lant David P. L out’s (Mr. L out’s) military

re tir e me nt p ay . The tr ia l c ourt c on str ue d th e 19 93 de c re e a s r e qu ir ingMr . L ou t to pa y to Plaintiff/Appellee Vic kie F. L out Hudson (Ms. Hudson), Mr. L out ’s fo rm er w ife, a n amount equivalent to 28 per cent of his milit ary retire ment pay . The trial c ourt ca lculated this amount as onehalf the r etireme nt pay

rec eived by

Mr. L out, multi plied by

a fr action re prese nting the n u m b er of y ear s the parties w ere marrie d divided by the number of

y ear s Mr. L out serve d in the m ilitary . The trial court a lso ordere d Mr. L out to pa y arr ear ag es and awa

rded Wife her attorney ’s fe es as damag es predic ated on a

finding of conte mpt. Mr. L out a ppeals; we aff

irm the trial cour

t’s construction of-2-

the par ties’ 1993 dec ree of di vorce , vacate t he finding of contempt and awa rd of attorney ’s fe es, and

rema nd.

Backg ro und a nd P

ro c e dural H

ist or y

The facts relevant to our di sposition of t his matter ar e undisputed. Mr. L out entere d active duty in the United States Navy in 1976. Mr . L out and Ms. Hudson wer e mar ried in 1977 and div or c e d in 1993

. F oll ow ing he ari ng s, in May 19 93 the tr ia l c ourt g a ve an o ra l r

uli ngawa rd ingMs. Hudson “ha lf of the pr esent value of [Mr. L out’s] m ilitary

retire ment as of Ma

y 27, 1993.” A wr itten order was prepar ed by the parties and entered by the t rial court in September 1993. The written orde r pr ov ide d, in r e le va

nt p art :
[P ]l aintiff (Ms. Hudson) is awar ded half of t he present value of defe ndant’s military retire ment as of May 27, 1993; the pre sent value of plaintiff’s intere st in defenda nt’s mil ita ry re tir e me nt i s d e te rm ine d b y the fo llo wi ngfr a c tio n:

1 6 x 5 0 % total number of y ear s of def endant’ s service in mili tary

befor e re tirement
Both pa rties shall execute a ll documents nece ssary to co n v ey

the intere st in the mil ita ry re tir e me nt awa

rd e d to pla int if

f to he r, and to make thi s o rd e r e ff e c tiv e wi th defe ndant’s employ er a

nd pension bene fits administrator.
Although the 1993 divorce action was contested, the parties do not dispute that the l ang uag e utiliz ed by the trial cour

t in providing for

the div i s i o n of Mr. L out’s milit ary pension bene fits was dra fted and ag ree d to by

both parties. The 1993 decr ee w as not appe aled.

Mr . L ou t r e tir e d f

ro m mi lit ary se rv ic e in Ma y 20 05

. Whe n he re tir e d, Mr . L ou t w a s e lig ibl e to rec eive 71.83 pe rce nt of hi s base pa y of $5,231.70 as r etireme nt pay . Thus, his monthl y retire ment pay is $3,757.93. Mr. L out did not pay a portion of his military

retire ment benef

its to Ms . Hudson despite the provision re quiring him to do so contained in the 1 9 9 3 d i v o rc e d ecr ee. Ms. Hudson contac ted the De fense Financ e and Accounting Service (“D FAS”) , which notified he r that the lang uag e used in the 1993 de cre e wa s insufficient to allow t he DFAS to directly disperse pa

y ment to her. In Dec ember 2005, Ms. H udson filed a motion to amend the f inal decr ee of

divorce . I n her motion, Ms. Hudson asser ted that, under the formula utiliz ed in the 1993 decr ee, she was e ntitled to rec eive 28 perc ent of Mr. L out’s pension, or .5 multipl ied by 16 y ear s of marr iag e divided by 29 y ear s of military

service

.
I n his re sp on se , Mr. L ou t den ie d tha t th e fi na l de c re e sh ou ld b e a me nd e d a s p ro po se d b y Ms. Hudson, and counter-c laimed for an amended decre e using an “a ppropriate formula a cce pted by the U.S. Mili tary

financ e office ” to substitute for “a ny defic ient provision of the dec ree .” In May 2007, Mr. L out filed an amended a nswer pr aying that the trial court “ corr ect” the 1993 provision pursuant-3-

to R ule 60 .0 1. I n th e me anti me , in June 20 06 , M s. Hu ds on fi le d a pe tit ion for civi l c on te mpt , a lle g ingtha

t Mr . L ou t ha d “ wi llf

ull y dis ob e y e d th e or ders of the Court a lth ou g h a

ble and c a pa ble of complianc e wi t h s aid order by failing or re fusing to pay ANY military

retire ment proce eds as order ed” by

the cour t.
Following a hea

ring in May

2007, the trial cour

t held that the formula a g ree d to by the par ties in 1993 resulted in an awar d to Mr. Hudson in the amount of “ 16/29 x 50% of [Mr. L out’s] present milit ary retire ment.” In so holding, the tria l court noted, “[t] he Final Dec ree of Divorc e wa s entere d on September 2, 1993, twelve y ear s befor e the Plaintiff filed t he Mot ion to Amend the Final Dec ree of Divorc e. I t appea

rs to the [c]ourt t hat it is now too late to complain of the ter ms of the orde r.”

I n J une 2007, Mr. L out filed a motion to alter or a mend, asser

ting that the 1993 pr ovision sh ou ld b e pu t a sid e purs ua nt t o Ru le 60 .0 1 in

or de r t o c or

re c t th e “ c le ri c a l mi sta

ke in t he fo rm ula incorpora ted in the final decr ee of divorce [.] ” I n October 2007, the trial court ente re d an o rder de nyingMr . L ou t’ s mo tio n a nd g ra nti ngMs. Hu ds on ’s mot ion to a men d th e fi na l de c re e . In it s order , the trial court found that the lang uag e used in the orig inal decr ee was insufficient for the purp os e of

a llo wi ngthe DF AS to dis burs e Mr

. L ou t’ s mil ita ry pe ns ion , re a ff

ir me d that th e fo rm

ula utiliz ed should be 16/29 x 50% of Mr. L out’s “disposable milit ary retire ment pay ,” and or dere d that Ms. Hudson should therefor e re ceive 28 perc ent of Mr. L out’s retire ment pay

. I n November 2007, the trial cour

t e ntere d an orde r holding that any err or in the for

mula enter ed by

the cour t in 1993 was not a “cle rica l error .” The court noted that, assuming the 1993 or der c ontained an e rror of law, a ny
s u c h e r r o r w a s n o t“ c l e r i c a l ” i nn a tu r e , b u tw a s “ ane r r o r s e t o u t i n an o r d e r

s i g n e d b y b o t h a t t o r

n e ys
and the jud g e wh o h e ard

the ma tte r[. ]” A lso in N ov e mbe r 2 00 7, Ms. Huds on fi led a mot ion to reduc e the a

rre ara g es to judgme nt, se eking arr ear ag es plus inter est in the amount of $26,820.67. She also pray ed for

attorney ’s fe es.

I n Fe bruar

y 2008, the trial court enter ed a final judg ment supplementing its orders of Ma y
and Oc tob e r 2 00 7. Th e tr ial cou rt den ie d M r. L ou t’ s mo tio n to a lte r o r a me nd or fo r a ne w tri a l; g rante d Ms. Hudson’s motion to reduce the arr ear ag es t o judgme nt; found that the parties a g ree d that the arr e ara g e ow e d b y

Mr . L ou t w a s $19 ,1 70 .3 7, inc lud ing sim ple int e re st; and

fo un d M r. L ou t to be in contempt for

his failure to pa

y any part of his mi litary pension to Ms. Hudson. The trial cour t’s

awa rd of attorney ’s fe es in the amount o f $4,000 to Ms. Hudson is contained in the numbere d para g raph containing the court’s finding of contempt and is , as we construe it, an award of damag es
ari sin g fr om t

hat c on te mpt . M r. L ou t f ile d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t.

Issues Presented

Mr. L out presents the f

ollowing issues, a s slightly rew orded, f

or our r eview:
(1) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in clarifying the final dec ree of divorce to awar d M s

. H u d s o n2 8 % o f

M r

. L o u t ’ s m i l i t ar

y r e t i r e m e n tp ay.-4-

(2) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding Mr. L out in contempt and in awa rding Ms. Hudson a judg ment for a rre ara g es in pay

ment of mi l i t ar y

retire ment be ne fi ts.
(3 ) Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in awa rd ingMs. Hu ds on ’s a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

Stan dard of Revie w

We reviewth e t ri al co u rt’s finding s of fa ct with a pre sumption of corre ctness unless the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise

. Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13( d). Thus, we may not reve rse the tr ial court’s fac tual finding s unless they are contra

ry to the prepondera

nce of the evidenc e. We re view the tria l court’s conclusions on matters of la w de novo , with no presumption of correc tness. Tenn. R. App. P. 1 3( d) ; Bo wde n v . W

ar d , 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000)

.

Anal y sis

We turn first to Mr. L out’s as s er t i o n t hat the trial c ourt err ed by awa rding Ms. Hudson 28 perc ent of his re tirement bene fits. I n his brief to this Court, Mr. L out asser ts the formula c ontained in the 1993 divorce decr ee w as er roneous unde r the lawas it exis ted at the tim e of the divorce and that such alleg ed error was “clerica l” i n nature

. He asserts t he trial court ther efor e er red by denying his Rule 60.01 moti on to corre ct the 1993 dec ree provision. Tennesse e Rule of C i v i l Procedure 60.01 permits the trial cour t to corre ct a judg ment containing a cle rica l e rror or an er ror of oversig ht

or omi ssi on

. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 60 .0 1; Dunlap v. Dunlap , 996 S.W .2d 803, 811 (Tenn. A pp. 1998). We r e vie w a

tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on re g ard ingwh e the r t o g ra nt a Rul e 60 .0 1 mo tio n und e r a n a bu se of discre tion standard. Anderson v. Ande rson , No. M2004-01570-COA- R3-CV, 2 0 0 6 WL 1627181, at *6 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 9, 2006) ( no perm app. filed ).

We a g ree with the trial court that, a ssuming, arguendo , that the 1993 provision reg ardingthe division o f M r

. L o u t’ s mi li ta r y p e n s io n d id n o t r e f

le c t th e la w a s it e xis te d a t th a t ti me , an y such

err or wa s not clerica l in nature. The provision was ag ree d t o b y t h e p ar ties; it was not appeale d. T h a t M r

. L o u t is n o w u n h a p p y w it h it s a p p li c a ti o nd o e s n o t r e n d e r an y a s s e rte d e r r o r “ c le r ic a l. ” We find no abuse of

discretion in the trial c ourt’s denia l of Mr. L out’s Rule 60.01 motion.

Howeve r, d e s p it e a g r e e in g w it h th e tr ia l c o u rt th a t an y e r r o r in th e 1 9 9 3 d e c r e e was not

“ c le ri c a l,” we no te that the re is no dis pu te in thi s ca se that th e pr ov isi on wa s ambi g uo us , at le a st t o the extent that the DFAS wa s unable to distribute benef its under its lang uag e. This dispute, as we pe rc e ive it, re qu ir e d the tr ia l c ourt to c on str ue rathe r tha

n a me nd the 19 93 de c re e pr ov isi on . Co ur ts construe a

judgmen t l i k e any

other wr itten instrument . Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Tennesseev. Eddins , 516 S.W .2d 76, 78 (Tenn. 1974) (citations omitted). The de terminative fa ctor is the intent of the re nderingcourt a s discerne d from all par ts of the judg ment

. Id. A judg ment should be

c on str ue d s o a s to g ive “ fo rc e and e ff e c t to e ve ry wo rd of it, if po ssi ble , and make its se ve ra l pa rt s consistent, eff

ective a nd rea sonable.” Id.-5-

We ag ree with the t rial court that the 1993 decr ee awar ds Ms. Hudson one-ha lf of the military pension pay

ments rec eived by

Mr. L out, multi plied by

16/29. The trial co u rt’s orde r def ines the “pre sent value” of t he retirement benefit as 16 divided by the total number of y ear s of def endant’ s service in military befor e retire ment x 50 perc ent. Def endant’ s total number of y ear s of servic e wa s 29. Moreove r, we cannot ag ree with Mr

. L out that the dollar amount to be multiplied by 50 perc ent is the re tir e me nt b e ne fi t Mr . L ou t w ou ld h a ve re c e ive d h a d h e re tir e d wi th a ba se pa y e qu a l to his ba se pa y a t th e tim e of t he di vo rce. Ha d th a t be e n th e int e nt o f t he jud g me nt, it i s r e a so na ble to
a s s u me th a t t

h e ju d g me n t w o u ld

h ave simpl y

in c lu d e d th a t a mo u n t i nth e c a lc u lati o n

. We

a c c or din g ly

a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s awa

rd of 28 pe rc e nt o f M r. L ou t’ s mi lit ary re tir e me nt p ay

to M s. Hudson.

We ne xt t ur n to Mr

. L ou t’ s a sse rt ion that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in awa rd ingarr e ara g e s to Ms. Hudson. Mr. L out’s argument, as we understand it, is that the trial cour t’s awa rd of a rre ara g es wa s predic ated on the c ourt’s finding of conte mpt. We must disag ree . The trial c ourt’s orde r of F ebrua ry 2008 includes a f

inding that the p ar t i es agr ee d that Mr. L out owed ar rea rag es in the amount of $1 9, 17 0. 37 , in c lud ingint e re st, and or de rs Mr . L ou t to pa y that amou

nt at th e ra

te of $3 50 pe r m on th be g inn ingJanu ary

20 08 . T he arr e ara g e a mou nt c on sti tut e s p ro pe rt

y ri g htf ull y be lo ngin g to Ms

. Hu ds on . We a ff

ir m.

We f in a ll y tu r n to M r

. L o u t’ s a s s e rti o n th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d in aw ar d in g Ms. L out her

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Mr . L ou t ass e rt s the tr ia l court e rr e d in mak ing thi s aw ard fo r t wo re a so ns . F ir st, beca use an a wa rd o f attorney ’s fe es is not appropriate in an ac tion to enforce a prope rty division. Second, bec ause he was not in contempt.
We beg in our ana ly sis by

noting that the trial court’s awar d of attorney ’s fe es in this case w as pr e dic a te d u

po n the tr ia l court ’s de te rm inatio n th a t Mr . L ou t w a s in c on te mpt of c ourt fo r f a ilure to pay any part of his pe nsion to Ms. Hudson upon his retire ment. The awa rd was an aw ard of

damag es based upon a

finding of conte mpt. This C ourt previously has held that an aw ard of attorney ’s fe es
m ay b e ap p ro p ri at e a s an aw ar d o f c o mp en s at o ry d am age s i na s u cc es s fu l ci v i l co n t em p tp ro ce ed i n g. Ree d v. Hamilton , 39 S.W .3d 115, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)( citations omitt ed). We re view such

an aw ard unde r an a

buse of discr etion standard. Id.

Mr . L ou t a sse rt s th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y fi nd inghim

in c on te mpt

be c a us e the c ourt

fa ile d to

con d uct any

hear ing on Ms. Hudson’ s petition for contempt and be cause he had no notice of a contempt citation. Ms. Hudson does not dispute that no hea ring was held on her

contempt petition, bu t me re ly

a sse rt s th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t e rr by fi nd in g M r. L ou t in

c ivi l c on te mpt

wh e re it i s undisputed that Mr. L out f ailed to pa y any part of his military

retire ment benef

it to Ms. Hudson prior to the commence ment of this action. I n light of the absenc e of a hear ing de monstrating that Mr. L out was willfully

in contempt of an order that was undisputedly ambig uous, we va cate the trial cour t’s finding of conte mpt. W e ac cording ly vacate the trial c ourt’s judg ment aw ar d i n g Ms. Hudson her

a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s a s anaw ar d o f c o mp e n s a to r y d a ma g e s p r e d ic a te d u

p o n a f in d in g o f c o n te mp t. We

re mand to t he tr ia l c ourt

fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s li mit e d to Ms. Hu ds on ’s pe tit ion fo r c on te mpt

.-6- Hol din g

We vacate the trial court’s judgme nt f inding Mr. L out in contempt and awa rding Ms. Hudson he r atto rn e y ’s fe e s. We r e mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s li mit e d to Ms. Hu ds on ’s pe tit ion fo r c ivi l contempt. The trial co u rt ’s judgme nt is otherwise af firmed. Ms. Hudson’s r equest for attorney ’s fee s on appea l is den ied. Costs of this appeal ar e taxed one-ha lf to the Appellee , Vickie F . L out Hudson, and one- half to the Appe llant, David P. L out, and his surety , for whic h execution may issue i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER , JUDGE