NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT STRICT SCRUTINY MEDIA CO.,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. CITY OF RENO,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 19

- 15372 D.C. No. 3:16

- cv - 00734

- MMD

- WGC

MEMORANDUM

P0F *

P

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 11, 2020 San Francisco, California Before: MILLER and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges, and RAYES,

P *

1F *

P District Judge. Plaintiff

- Appella n t Strict Scru tiny Media Co . (SSM) appeals the dismissal of several of its claims and the grant of summary judgment for Defendant

- Appell ee City of Reno (Reno ) on the rest of its claims

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Douglas L. Rayes, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

JUL 8 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

§ 1291 , and we affirm. 1. The district court dismissed SSM’s claims challenging Reno’s ordinances governing on

- premises

P2F 1

P signs for lack of standing

. We review standing decisions de novo. Real v. City of Long Beach , 852 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2017)

. Standing requires (1) an injury in fact; (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct; and (3) a likelihood th at the i njury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the court. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus , 573 U.S. 149, 157

– 58 (2014)

. In Get Outdoors II, LLC v. City of San Diego , we held that an outdoor advertising company ha d standing to challenge only those ordinances that applied to it. 506 F.3d 886, 892 (9th Cir. 2007). Here , SSM

— an outdoor advertisin g company specializing in securing leases and constructing billboards on the leased property for the purpose of renting them
to third parties

— failed to demonstrate the on

- premises ordinances apply to it s business

. SSM ’s operative pleading alleges it suffered harm from Reno’s ban on

new off

- premises advertising displays . Specifically, SSM alleges it has los t revenue from third parties seeking to rent advertising space

. SSM has not allege d

1 Reno’s Land Development Code (RLDC) defines on

- premises signs , in pertinent part, as those “created for the purpose of advertising . . . the commercial interest s of any per son . . . which is princip ally sold, available or otherwise provided on the premises on wh ich the [sign] is located.” RLDC § 18. 24. 203.4570(29). Off

premises signs, on the other hand, are those that advertise commercial interests not available on the same premises as the sign

. See i d. § 18. 24. 203.4570 (24).3

that this harm arise s from the on

- premises ordinances , nor has it all eged that i t suffers any other harm because of those ordinances

. Thus, SSM lacks standing to challenge the on

- premises ordinances , s ee id. , and t he district court did not err in dismissing SSM’s claims related to th ose ordinances.

P3F 2

P 2. SSM also challenge s the district court’s dismissal of various allegations and claims as beyond the scope o f amendment the district court permitted in its first dismissal order

. We review this issue for abuse of discretion. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. C oun ty of Tulare , 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012)

. T he district court’s order dismissing the F irst Amended Complaint (FAC) with leave to amend could have been clearer regarding which claims SSM could amend and which it could not. But SSM’s briefing on this issue could hardly be more enigmatic

. Like the district court, we spent “extensive time ” attempting to

“ untangl[e]” SSM’s allegations and arguments made both here and below to little avail

. Indeed, we do not fault the district court for trying to impose some order on

2 Reno now argues SSM’s claims are moot because the existing signs SSM had

— which were on

- premises signs

— were ordere d removed by a Nevada state court in litigation between SSM and th e proper ty owner where the signs were located and SSM’s time to appeal that decision has passed

. We need not reach this issue as it relates to the on

- premises sign claims due to our decision on standing. And we conclude that these recent events, even if true, do not render moot SSM’s claims related to the off

- premises sign ordinances because SSM’s allegations indicate it faces a threat of future harm and has a continuing “personal stake” in the outcome of this litigation

. See Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist. , 228 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008)

.4

SSM’s constantly shifting arguments. See Valadez

- Lopez v. Chertoff , 656 F.3d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) ( conclu ding a district court need not “ piece together a theory of liability from a string of unrelated and incoherent assertions ”) ; Ferdik v. Bonzelet , 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (May 22, 1992) (noting “[d] istrict courts have the inherent power to control their dockets ”). “We will not manufacture arguments for [SSM] , ” and we hold that SSM waived its scope - of

amendment challenges b y fail ing “to present a specific, cogent argument for our consideration.”

P4F 3

P Greenwood v. FAA , 28 F. 3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 3. Finally, SSM challenges the den ial of its partial motion for summary judgment and grant of Reno’s motion for summary judgment

. Our above analysis resolves most of SSM’s arguments re garding its partial motion for summary judgment

. Additionally, we agree with the district court that the off

- premises ordinances are not content
- based restrictions favoring certain types of speech over others and that SSM’s arguments to the contrary are based on a misunderstanding of the on

- premises/off

- premises distinction , which applies only to commercial speech. Reno’s ban on off

- premises billboards applies only to billboards “created

3 Because we cannot determine on the record presented that the district court err ed in limiting the scope of claims SSM could amend when it dismissed the FAC, we do not address whether the district court err ed in dismissing without prejudice new claims asserted in SSM’s Second Amended Complaint as beyond the scope of allowed amendment.5

for the purpose of advertising or promoting the commercial interest of any per son . . . which is not principally sold, available or otherwise provided on the premises

. ” RLDC § 18. 24. 203.4570(24) . This is a commercial speech restriction. S ee Coyote Pu b’g , Inc. v. Miller , 598 F.3d 592, 598 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining commercial speech does “no more than propose a commercial transaction”). As such, the district court did not err in evaluating SSM’s challenge to the off

- premises ordinances under Central Hudson ’s

P5F 4

P test for commercial speech, rather than Reed ’s

P6F 5

P strict scrutiny standard

. And , on appeal, SSM does not challenge the merits of the district court’s Central Hudson analysis

. Accordingly, we conclude
t he district court did not err in granting Reno’s motion for summary judgment. Appellee’s mo tions for judicial notice [ Dkt. 41 & 44] are denied. AFFIRMED.

4 Cent

. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp

. v. Pub

. Serv. Com m ’n of N

. Y

. , 447 U.S. 557 (1980)

. 5 Reed v. Town of Gilbert , 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)

.