SELENA E. MOLINA

 MASTER IN CHANCERY

COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

 LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER

 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 11400

 WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3734

Final Report: May 4, 2023

Date Submitted: January 30, 2023

Jason C. Powell, Esquire Tiffany M. Shrenk, Esquire 

Thomas J. Reichert, Esquire MacElree Harvey, LTD. 

The Powell Firm, LLC 5721 Kennett Pike 

1813 N. Franklin St. Centerville, DE 19801 

Wilmington, DE 19802

Re: Deborah Harker v. Kwanza Grimes and Ashley Vogel,

C.A. No. 2021-0751-SEM

Dear Counsel:

On May 31, 2022, I issued a final report finding the petitioner had failed to 

plead a prima facia claim that the principal of the contested power of attorney lacked 

capacity. Following the lead of Vice Chancellor Glasscock, I found the petitioner 

should be granted leave to amend. But before the petitioner could do so, the principal 

died. Her death mooted the petitioner’s requests for removal of the agents under, or 

invalidation of, the power of attorney, which the petitioner has withdrawn. But the 

petitioner continues to seek an accounting from the agents and return of assets and 

property owned by the principal or purchased with her funds. The petitioner also 

seeks rescission of financial transactions for lack of capacity or undue influence and 

challenges the principal’s will and the respondents’ request to admit it to probate. 
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The respondents have moved to dismiss these claims, arguing (1) the 

petitioner has failed, again, to plead sufficient factual predicate making the 

principal’s alleged lack of capacity reasonably conceivable, (2) the petitioner has 

failed to plead facts supporting reasonably conceivable inferences that the principal 

was susceptible to undue influence or that the respondents had the opportunity to 

and actually asserted undue influence, and (3) the accounting request fails without 

viable claims that the principal lacked capacity or was unduly influenced. I find 

these arguments unpersuasive and recommend that the motion to dismiss be denied. 

The petitioner has fixed the earlier deficiencies and pled cognizable claims for relief.

Thus, this matter should move into discovery, where the concerning allegations 

against the respondents can be explored. 

This is my final report.

I. BACKGROUND1

The motions before me arise from a dispute over the treatment of Betty B. 

Harker (the “Decedent”) and the execution of various documents in her late age. 

Initially, the Decedent’s daughter, Deborah Harker (the “Petitioner”) challenged the 

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts recited herein are taken from the second amended 

petition. Docket Item (“D.I.”) 37. I reject the respondents’ attempt to insert additional 

facts. See D.I. 63, p. 13. 
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validity of a power of attorney executed by the Decedent.2 On January 3, 2022, the 

Decedent filed a motion to intervene in this action and dismiss the underlying 

petition.3 I issued a final report recommending that both motions be granted on May 

31, 2022 (the “First Report”).

4

 In the First Report, I found the Petitioner failed to 

state a prima facia claim that the Decedent lacked capacity to challenge this action; 

thus, her request that the action be dismissed should have been granted.5 But, 

following Vice Chancellor Glasscock’s decision in a similar case, I found that 

dismissal should be stayed, and the Petitioner should be permitted to amend her 

petition.6

On June 22, 2022, after the First Report was confirmed as an order of the 

Court, I issued a minute order clarifying that the amended petition needed to be filed 

by July 5, 2022.7 Little did I know, the Decedent had passed eight (8) days before 

2 D.I. 1.

3 D.I. 12.

4 D.I. 32.

5

Id.

6

Id. See Parkhurst v. Nalley, C.A. No. 11930-VCZ (Del. Ch.).

7 D.I. 35. See also D.I. 34 (seeking clarification). 
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my minute order at the age of 94.8 Her death did not, however, end this litigation; 

rather, it ignited new issues.9

The Petitioner filed her second amended petition on June 24, 2022 (the 

“Petition”).

10

 In the Petition, the Petitioner withdrew her claimsto remove the agents 

under, and invalidate, the power of attorney. She replaced them with a caveat against 

the Decedent’s purported last will and testament. She also bolstered her factual 

averments in support of the remaining claims for an accounting, undue influence, 

lack of capacity, and unjust enrichment.

A. The Bolstered Factual Predicate

In the interest of efficiency, I will not restate the factual predicate as 

summarized in the First Report.

11

 Rather, I highlight the amendments as relevant to 

the motion pending before me.

The Petition contains additional details regarding the Decedent’s capacity, 

health, and welfare from 2019 through 2021. After the Decedent’s fall in October 

2019, she “was dependent upon others for assistance and was no longer able to 

8 D.I. 36; D.I. 37, ¶4.

9 See, e.g., D.I. 46-47; Grimes v. Harker, C.A. No. 2022-1143-SEM.

10 D.I. 37. 

11 D.I. 32. See also D.I. 33 (adopting order). 
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adequately care for herself living alone in her house. She required significant 

assistance in her daily living.”12 Thus, she moved in with the Petitioner. But after 

only a couple of days with the Petitioner, the Decedent moved to Cadia Healthcare 

Broadmeadow in Middletown, Delaware, where she stayed “for a few months for 

rehabilitation.”13 She returned to the Petitioner’s home in December 2019 and 

stayed there until May 2021.

While the Decedent lived with the Petitioner, the Petitioner assisted her with 

her finances and medical care, seeing firsthand how the Decedent’s “memory and 

mental abilities began to decline along with her physical limitations.”14 The 

Decedent would forget conversations and events and failed to take care of her person 

and property. For example, the Decedent would often forget where the Petitioner 

was, despite conversations that the Petitioner was running errands.15 The Decedent 

also forgot ordering new hearing aids or that her audiologist had given her cleaning 

tools for those devices.16 

12 D.I. 37, ¶7.

13 Id. at ¶8.

14 Id. at ¶¶9, 13.

15 Id. at ¶13. The Petitioner provided another example, where the Decedent forgot that she 

had requested to cancel a doctor’s appointment. Id.

16 D.I. 37, ¶13.
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During this time, the Petitioner also learned that the Decedent had a line of 

credit with PNC Bank, which “had already been in existence for several years.”17 

But the Decedent did not have a clear memory of the account “and instead possessed 

delusional beliefs in connection therewith.”18 Specifically, the Decedent and 

Kwanza Grimes and Ashley Vogel (together the “Respondents”)19 saw the account 

as proof the Petitioner was stealing from the Decedent.20 Similar confusion was 

evident regarding the Investment Account.21 Although the Petitioner was added as 

a joint owner over ten (10) years ago, the Decedent “expressed delusional beliefs 

that the Petitioner is not an owner of the Investment Account and that the Petitioner 

[was] stealing from her.”22

The Petitioner avers that the Respondents preyed upon the Decedent’s 

memory issues and delusions to enrich themselves. Such enrichment, per Petitioner, 

included the aforementioned power of attorney, living in the Decedent’s house rent 

free, and new estate planning documents benefitting the Respondents over other 

17 Id. at ¶9.

18 Id. at ¶17.

19 The Petitioner has also named the Decedent’s estate as a respondent. D.I. 37. 

20 D.I. 37, ¶17.

21 As defined in the First Report. D.I. 32, p. 3.

22 D.I. 37, ¶22.
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heirs, including the Petitioner.

23

 Despite controlling and administering every aspect 

of the Decedent’s life from June of 2021 until her death, the “Petitioner does not 

believe that [the Respondents] took [the Decedent] to see the . . . doctors that were 

necessary to maintain her health.”24 This control kept the Decedent from her friends 

and family during the final year of her life.25 Further, “upon information and belief,” 

the Petitioner avers that Mr. Grimes used the Decedent’s funds to purchase a BMW 

and Tesla solely for the Respondents’ use.26

This was not, per the Petitioner, the first time Mr. Grimes took advantage of 

the Decedent financially. 

Several years ago, [Mr. Grimes] convinced [the Decedent] to co-sign 

for a $40,000 college loan so that he could resume his studies at the 

University of Delaware to finish his degree. After receiving the funds, 

he never took any classes and instead spent the money he received for 

improper purposes and failed to make payments on the loan. Since [the 

Decedent] had co-signed for the loan, she repaid the loan herself with 

interest to avoid incurring liability or damage to her credit score.27

During her year with the Respondents, the Decedent also undertook some 

estate planning. The Petitioner avers that the Decedent had several wills over the 

23 Id. at ¶18.

24 Id. at ¶¶20-21.

25 Id. at ¶24.

26 Id. at ¶¶22-23.

27 Id. at ¶30.
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years, including a reciprocal will with her husband before his death in 2011.28 In 

2018, the Petitioner and the Decedent executed new wills with the assistance of 

Daniel McCollom, Esquire.29 But the Petitioner has been unable to find these 2018 

wills and the Decedent appears to have executed a new will in 2021.30

On or about July 2022, Mr. Grimes filed an opening petition seeking to admit 

a purported last will and testament of the Decedent dated December 30, 2021 (the 

“Will”) to probate and be appointed as the executor of the Decedent’s estate.31 When 

the Petition was filed, the Will had not been admitted, nor had Mr. Grimes been 

appointed.32 As of July 7, 2022, however, the Will was admitted to probate and Mr. 

Grimes was granted letters testamentary.33

28 Id. at ¶31.

29 Id. at ¶31.

30 Id. at ¶32. The Petitioner avers that the Respondents “took, or otherwise disrupted the 

Petitioner’s files and important documents” when they removed the Decedent from the 

Petitioner’s home in June of 2021. Id.

31 D.I. 37, ¶18. See In re Betty B. Harker, ROW 181292 (“ROW”), D.I. 3. “Because the 

Register of Wills is a Clerk of the Court of Chancery, filings with the Register of Wills are 

subject to judicial notice.” Arot v. Lardani, 2018 WL 5430297, at *1 n.6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 

2018) (citing 12 Del. C. § 2501; Del. R. Evid. 202(d)(1)(C)). 

32 D.I. 37, ¶18.

33 ROW D.I. 3.
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B. Procedural Posture

After the Petition was served, the Respondents, on July 20, 2022, filed a 

motion to dismiss the Petition (the “Motion”).

34

 Two days later, the Respondents 

submitted a stipulated and proposed scheduling order for briefing the Motion, which 

I granted.

35

 But, on August 8, 2022, counsel for the Respondents provided a status 

report, informing me that the parties were engaging in mediation.36 Thus, on August 

11, 2022, I issued an order staying this case pending mediation and vacating the 

briefing schedule on the Motion.37

But the calm did not last long. On September 26, 2022, the Petitioner filed a 

motion for a temporary restraining order, with a motion expedite, arguing that assets 

of the Decedent’s estate were being dissipated and were at risk of being destroyed 

absent a professional trustee and administrator for the Decedent’s estate (the 

“Emergency Motions”).

38

 I heard the Emergency Motions on October 4, 2022, and 

finding the alleged harm “speculative and largely the type of harm that could be 

remedied by money damages, if necessary[,]” I denied the request for a temporary 

34 D.I. 40-41.

35 D.I. 42-43.

36 D.I. 44.

37 D.I. 45.

38 D.I. 46-47.
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restraining order, expedited exceptions, and instructed the parties to submit another 

status report by October 14, 2022.

39

 

No exceptions were filed and on October 14, 2022, the parties requested a 

continued stay in favor of mediation.

40

 I issued a minute order on October 17, 2022, 

granting that request.41 But, ultimately, mediation proved unsuccessful, and the 

Motion is now back in play.42 The Motion was fully briefed on January 30, 2023, at 

which time it was submitted for my consideration.43

II. ANALYSIS 

The Respondents seek dismissal of the entire Petition under Court of 

Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), the standard of review under which is settled:

(i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; (ii) even 

vague allegations are “well-pleaded” if they give the opposing party 

notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the non-moving party; and [(iv)] dismissal is inappropriate 

unless the “plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any 

reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.”44

39 D.I. 57 at 8:2-17, 10:3-11. 

40 D.I. 58.

41 D.I. 59.

42 D.I. 60-62.

43 D.I. 66.

44 Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002) (citations omitted).
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The Petition contains five (5) counts titled: (1) caveat against allowance of the Will; 

(2) demand for an accounting; (3) undue influence; (4) lack of capacity; and (5) 

unjust enrichment. I address counts (1) and (4) together, as both require specific 

factual averments that the Decedent lacked capacity. Then I address count (3) 

(undue influence), count (5) (unjust enrichment), and, finally, count (2) (seeking an 

accounting). 

A. The Petitioner has pled sufficient factual predicate supporting lack 

of capacity. 

The Petitioner avers that the Decedent lacked capacity after May 2021 to 

execute any estate documents (including the Will and power of attorney) or 

documents necessary to retitle assets or change beneficiary designations or deeds. 

The Respondents seek dismissal arguing the Petitioner has failed to plead nonconclusory facts to support the alleged lack of capacity. I disagree. 

The Petitioner’s claims invoke both testamentary and contractual capacity. To 

possess testamentary capacity, a testator must “be capable of exercising thought, 

reflection and judgment, and must know what he or she is doing and how he or she 

is disposing of his or her property. The person must also possess sufficient memory 

and understanding to comprehend the nature and character of the act.”45 This is not 

45 In re Est. of W., 522 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Del. 1987).
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a particularly high bar, as “only a modest level of competence is required for an 

individual to possess the testamentary capacity to execute a will.”46 

Similarly, someone lacks contractual capacity if they are “incapable of 

understanding the nature and effect of the transaction or [their] mental faculties were 

so impaired as to render [them] unable to properly, intelligently and fairly protect 

and preserve [their] property rights.”47 A lack of contractual capacity must be shown 

by more than a “gradual weakening of mental capacity[.]”48

Taken together, to state a claim for lack of testamentary or contractual 

capacity, the Petitioner needed to plead specific, non-conclusory facts as to the 

Decedent’s diminished capacity.49 As I highlighted in the First Report, Vice 

Chancellor Glasscock’s decision in Parkhurst v. Nalley demonstrates what is 

enough;50 then-Master LeGrow’s decision in In re Hurley, demonstrates the 

opposite.51

46 Id.

47 McAllister v. Schettler, 521 A.2d 617, 621 (Del. Ch. 1986) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted).

48 Id. “A gradual weakening of mental capacity, even when accompanying extreme old age 

and serious illness, will not alone disable someone from making a contract.” Id.

49 See In re Hurley, 2014 WL 1088913, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2014).

50 Parkhurst v. Nalley, C.A. No. 11930-VCZ, D.I. 107 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2018) (Glasscock, 

V.C.) (TRANSCRIPT).

51 In re Hurley, 2014 WL 1088913, at *4.
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In Parkhurst, the petitioner alleged facts showing the principal believed (1) 

she was being followed, (2) her deceased husband was still alive, and (3) people 

were lurking in her attic.52 The petitioner further averred that the principal was 

unable to recollect legal actions she had taken.53 Based on these averments, Vice 

Chancellor Glasscock found the petitioner pled a prima facia, or reasonably 

conceivable, claim for lack of capacity and ordered further evaluation of the 

principal’s capacity.54

In Hurley, such detail was lacking. Then-Master LeGrow explained the 

allegations before her were “minimal under the best of circumstances.”

55

 She 

expanded:

It is debatable that a court could infer a lack of testamentary capacity 

from the mere fact that a testator was of advanced age, had surgery to 

remove a tumor three years before the estate planning documents were 

executed, and experienced unspecified “serious” medical problems. 

The Court cannot infer a lack of capacity solely based on a testator’s 

advanced age, and advanced age coupled with surgery on a tumor and 

other non-specific medical problems does not, in my opinion, support 

a reasonable inference that a testator did not comprehend the nature and 

character of her acts when she executed testamentary documents. 

52 Parkhurst v. Nalley, C.A. No. 11930-VCZ, D.I. 107 at 44:9-14 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2018) 

(Glasscock, V.C.) (TRANSCRIPT).

53 Id.

54 Id.

55 Hurley, 2014 WL 1088913, at *4.
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On this record, then-Master LeGrow held an “inference of a lack of capacity would 

be unreasonable under the facts [p]etitioners concede in the [a]mended [p]etition.”

56

The same cannot be said here. The Petition contains specific averments of 

incapacity; averments that were missing before and rise above those found 

insufficient in Hurley. Like the plaintiff in Parkhurst, the Petitioner has pled facts 

demonstrating a pattern of the Decedent failing to recognize and remember 

personally important information.57 The Petitioner has bolstered the prior averments 

of forgetfulness or delusions with specific instances that make it reasonably 

conceivable that the Decedent lacked capacity to contract or make a will. I find these 

averments sufficient at the pleading stage.58

56 Id.

57 Cf. In re Gordy, 658 A.2d 613, 617 (Del. Ch. 1994) (“the mental incapacity to which 

[the adult guardianship statute] refers includes (1) a pattern demonstrating an inability to 

recognize as relevant to decisions of significance, facts or considerations that one would 

expect reasonable and competent persons to recognize as relevant to such a decision; (2) a 

pattern demonstrating an inability to reason with respect to decisions that are relatively 

simple but personally important, in a way that is internally consistent; or (3) the presence 

of a mental disease or condition that interferes with the operation of the prospective ward’s 

perceptions or reasoning to such an extent as to raise a substantial likelihood that decisions 

relating to matters of importance to her have been affected by that mental disease or 

condition”).

58 The Respondents argue that even if they otherwise survive, counts (1) and (4) should be 

dismissed as to Ms. Vogel. But, as I read them, counts (1) and (4) are not pled against Ms. 

Vogel. Count (1), seeking a caveat against the Will, is against the Decedent’s estate. Count 

(4) seeks to invalidate other documents for lack of capacity; it is not against Ms. Vogel,

but she may have an interest in the validity of those documents. Because these claims, as 

pled, are not against Ms. Vogel, I see no justification to dismiss them as to her.
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B. The Petitioner has pled a reasonably conceivable claim for undue 

influence.

The Respondents also seek dismissal of the Petitioner’s undue-influence 

claim. An undue-influence claim must be supported by well-pleaded facts 

substantiating five elements: “(1) the susceptibility of the donor to undue influence, 

(2) the opportunity to exert undue influence, (3) disposition or motive to do so for 

an improper purpose, (4) actual exertion of undue influence, and (5) a result 

demonstrating its effect.”59 The Respondents argue the Petitioner fails on prongs 

(1), (2), and (4), which I address in turn. In doing so, I find the Petitioner has pled a 

reasonably conceivable claim of undue influence.

First, for the reasons provided above, it is reasonably conceivable that the 

Decedent lacked testamentary and contractual capacity. For the same reasons, 

susceptibility to undue influence is reasonably conceivable.

60

59 Hurley, 2014 WL 1088913, at *5.

60 See Sweeney v. Sweeney, 2021 WL 5858688, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2021), adopted, 

(Del. Ch. 2021) (finding the petitioner failed to plead a reasonably conceivable claim for 

lack of capacity but that the same averments supported susceptibility). The Respondents 

find fault in the Petitioner’s failure to identify a medical diagnosis of cognitive impairment. 

D.I. 63, p.18. Although such averments are persuasive, the lack of such is not dispositive

at the pleading stage. Cf. In re Gordy, 658 A.2d at 617.

The Respondents also point me to In re McElhinney for the proposition that testators 

are presumed to execute their estate planning documents of their own free will. In re 

McElhinney, 2007 WL 2896013, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2007). Although the proposition

is apt, McElhinney was a post-trial decision, implicating a preponderance of the evidence

burden applied to a full evidentiary record. Id. We are at the pleading stage, where the test 
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Second, it is reasonably conceivable that the Respondents had the opportunity 

to assert undue influence. The Petitioner avers that the Decedent was dependent on 

others for her care, activities of daily living, and travel. The Petitioner further avers 

that the Decedent lived with the Respondents, who isolated her from others during 

the relevant period. These averments make it reasonably conceivable that the 

Respondents had the opportunity to assert undue influence. 

Third, the Petitioner has pled non-conclusory facts supporting actual 

assertion. The Petition paints a picture of the Respondents gaining full control over 

the Decedent’s assets during a period of susceptibility, withdrawing substantial 

funds, and using those funds and other assets in ways that solely benefitted 

themselves.61 It is reasonably conceivable that the Respondents gained such control 

through the actual assertion of undue influence. 

is reasonable conceivability. The Petitioner has pled facts that make it reasonably 

conceivable that the Decedent lacked capacity; whether those claims will prevail remains 

to be seen.

61 This distinguishes the Petition from the averments found lacking in Sweeney v. Sweeney, 

2021 WL 5858688, at *4. The Respondents argue that the averments after the qualifiers 

“upon information and belief” should be disregarded under O’Gara v. Coleman, 2020 WL 

752070, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2020). But that leaves the concerning allegations that the 

Respondents were motivated by unemployment and lack of financial assets and withdrew 

over $400,000.00, causing the bank to freeze the Decedent’s account. D.I. 37, ¶23. I find 

these averments sufficient to state a claim for undue influence. 
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C. The Petitioner has pled a reasonably conceivable claim for unjust 

enrichment.

To state a claim for unjust enrichment, the Petitioner must plead factual 

averments supporting four elements “(1) an enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) 

a relation between the enrichment and the impoverishment, and (4) the absence of 

justification.”

62

 The Respondents argue that the Petitioner seeks to improperly 

upend the Decedent’s estate planning without demonstrating an impoverishment or 

lack of justification. I address these arguments in turn and find the claim reasonably 

conceivable.

First, the Respondents argue that the Petitioner has failed to plead an 

impoverishment because the Petitioner was not entitled to the Decedent’s assets and 

the Decedent is free to dispose of her assets as she chooses; a choice Delaware law 

respects and upholds. This argument, however, ignores the portion of the 

Petitioner’s claim that relates to the Respondent’s withdrawal from the Investment 

Account; there, the Petitioner pled a direct impoverishment, accepting the 

Petitioner’s averments that the Investment Account was jointly owned by the 

62 Riverside Risk Advisors LLC v. Chao, 2022 WL 14672745, at *28 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 

2022), as corrected (Oct. 28, 2022), judgment entered sub nom. Riverside Risk Advisors 

LLC v. Ching Chao (Del. Ch. 2023) (citing Garfield ex rel. ODP Corp. v. Allen, 277 A.3d 

296, 341–51 (Del. Ch. 2022) (clarifying that, absent a dispute over jurisdiction, “the 

absence of a remedy at law” is not a necessary element of a claim of unjust enrichment)).
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Petitioner and the Decedent. The unjust-enrichment claim does, however, go further 

and implicates assets that would have passed through the Decedent’s estate. For 

such assets, the Respondents’ argument is more persuasive. But I find the 

Petitioner’s claim should nonetheless survive the pleading stage.

Vice Chancellor Laster’s decision in Garfield ex rel. ODP Corp. v. Allen is

instructive.63 Therein, the Vice Chancellor explained that unjust enrichment is a 

flexible test, despite the rigid prongs often quoted.64 Applying the appropriate 

flexibility, “a plaintiff need not plead a personal ‘impoverishment’ in the sense of a 

pecuniary loss. Rather, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant received a benefit, 

that the defendant’s receipt of the benefit was unjustified, and that there is some

connection between the benefit unjustly received and an invasion of the plaintiff’s 

legally protected rights. The claim is about unjust enrichment, not the plaintiff’s 

impoverishment.”

65

Here, applying the flexible standard highlighted in Garfield, I find the 

Petitioner’s claim should survive the pleading stage. The Petitioner has pled 

sufficient factual predicate that the Decedent lacked capacity or was otherwise 

63 277 A.3d 296 (Del. Ch. 2022).

64 Id. at 344.

65 Id. at 345 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
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susceptible to undue influence at the time she engaged in estate planning and 

financial transactions. That planning and those transactions benefitted the 

Respondents to the detriment of other heirs of the estate, including the Petitioner. 

Second, it is reasonable to infer from the non-conclusory facts in support of 

lack of contractual or testamentary capacity that the enrichment and impoverishment 

was without justification.66

D. The Petitioner’s accounting request should survive. 

Finally, the Respondents argue that the Petitioner’s request for an accounting 

depends upon, and fails with, her other claims. This argument is moot with my 

finding that the Petitioner’s claims were adequately pled and are reasonably 

conceivable.

67

 

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, I recommend that the Motion be denied. The Petitioner 

has pled reasonably conceivable claims for relief, and it is time for this matter to 

66 Cf. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 2021 WL 5858688, at *5 (“Because Petitioner failed to plead 

non-conclusory facts in support of a lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence, it 

would be unreasonable to infer that Decedent's testamentary plan as reflected in the 2019 

Will and the 2019 Trust was not justified.”).

67 MCG Cap. Corp. v. Maginn, 2010 WL 1782271, at *25 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2010) (“So 

long as the underlying cause of action is well plead, requested relief styled as a claim will 

not be stricken from the complaint”).
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move into discovery so those claims can be explored and addressed on a more 

developed record. This is my final report and exceptions may be filed under Court 

of Chancery Rule 144.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Selena E. Molina 

Master in Chancery