J-A12018-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

EDWARD RUCH AND DORIS JEANNE 

O’HANDLY RUCH,

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

Appellees :

:

v. :

:

VERNE WILLIAMS, II AND ANGELA M. 

WILLIAMS,

:

:

:

Appellants : No. 1052 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment entered June 19, 2014,

Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County,

Civil Division at No. 2010-CV15485-EJ

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and ALLEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED MAY 05, 2015

Appellants, Verne and Angela Williams (together, the “Williams”), 

appeal from the order entered on June 19, 2014, following the trial court’s 

entry of an order requiring the Williams to, inter alia, relocate a fence 

constructed on the property of Appellees, Edward and Doris Ruch (together, 

the “Ruches”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in 

part. 

After a bench trial commencing on January 23, 2014 and concluding 

on April 1, 2014, the trial court decided the case in favor of the Ruches by 

order dated April 30, 2014. In its subsequent written opinion in support of 

its order, the trial court set forth the following findings of fact relevant to the 

determination of this appeal:
J-A12018-15

- 2 -

In 1976, Edward Ruch [] purchased the property 

located at 106 Nagle Street. At that time a hedge 

existed between the properties of 106 and 108 Nagle 

Street. The hedge was a privet hedge and 

approximately five feet tall and three feet wide. All 

parties believed that the property line was 

somewhere within this hedge. Also, on the 108 side

of the hedge there was an old fence. Mr. Ruch 

believed that at least a portion of the hedge was on 

his property and he would care for the hedge by 

routinely trimming his side of the hedge and the top, 

and removing dead branches from within the hedge. 

It is believed that the prior owner of 106 Nagle 

Street also cared for the hedge, as Mr. Ruch 

purchased hedge clippers from the prior owner when 

he purchased the property. Mr. Ruch's children and 

wife would also help maintain the hedge by caring 

for the portion of the hedge that was located on the 

property at 106 Nagle Street. This care for the 

hedge had continued up until the hedge was 

removed by [the Williams], and all parties are in 

agreement that Mr. Ruch would care for the hedge.

Around 1987, a dog owned by the individual residing 

at 108 Nagle Street got through the hedge and bit 

[the Ruches’] son. To keep this from reoccurring, 

Mr. Ruch trimmed the hedge back and placed a new, 

green painted four-feet fence within the hedge. As 

Mr. Williams [] was removing the hedge in March of 

2010, he discovered a chain-link fence within the 

hedge. Mrs. Williams [] discovered the fence 

approximately six months prior when her dog tried to 

get through the fence.

Verne Williams first saw the properties of 108 and 

106 Nagle Street in 2001, when he moved into the 

property at 110 Nagle Street with his wife, Angela 

Williams. Mrs. Williams was familiar with the 

properties all her life, but only obtained title to the 

property at 108 Nagle Street in 2004. Prior to [the 

Williams] residing at that property, James Miller 

resided there until 1972. At the time Mr. Miller 

resided at the property, he recalled a hedge as the 
J-A12018-15

- 3 -

boundary between 108 and 106 Nagle Street and a 

wire fence on the 106 side of the properties. Mr. 

Miller described the fence as a "wire-mesh fence,” 

located down around the roots of the hedge on the 

106 side of the roots. When he moved from the 

property in 1972, the property became a rental 

property. In 1988, Mr. Miller obtained the property 

by deed from his father, but continued to use it as a 

rental. 

Mr. Williams claimed that he spoke with Mr. Ruch 

many times about the hedge and about replacing the 

hedge with a fence, to be placed where the roots of 

the hedge were located. Mr. Ruch denied ever 

having an agreement, and Mr. Williams admitted 

that the two never discussed any details. Mr. 

Williams stated that he had to rely on the fence as a 

property line when he removed the hedge. The wire 

fence within the hedge was apparently attached to 

[the Ruches] shed. When [the Williams] removed 

the fence, they cut the wire fence at the shed line. 

As [the Williams'] were removing the hedge, they 

decided that the property line must be along the root 

base of the hedge, but apparently placed the new 

fence directly where the old fence was located.

In March of 2010, Mr. Ruch retumed to his property 

to find pieces of the hedge in a pickup truck and a 

new fence on his property, erected by [the Williams]. 

[The Ruches’] backyard should be approximately 12 

1⁄2 feet wide, however, the fence reduces the width of 

their property by about two feet. In addition to the 

fence encroachment, [the Williams] have nailed 

things to [the Ruches’] roof and shed wall. [The 

Ruches] shortly thereafter commenced this action to 

eject [the Williams] from their property. 

[The Ruches’] expert, Keith Heigel, is a professional 

land surveyor with Light-Heigel & Associates, Inc. 

Mr. Heigel has been a surveyor since 1983 and is 

licensed in the state of Pennsylvania. Mr. Heigel 

testified that there were encroachments from the 

108 Nagle Street property (owned by [the Williams]) 
J-A12018-15

- 4 -

onto the 106 Nagle Street property (owned by [the 

Ruches]). Mr. Heigel further testified that that the 

fence located between the two properties is 

encroaching on [the Ruches’] property.

[The Williams] attempted to offer to the court the 

opinion of Bruce Yager. Mr. Yager was unable to 

produce his license number for the court on January 

23, 2014. The court scheduled the conclusion of the 

non-jury trial for April 1, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. At the 

conclusion of the April 1, 2014 non-jury trial, [the 

Williams] were unable to produce the license number 

of Mr. Yager. Numbers that were given to [the 

Williams'] counsel in regards to Mr. Yager's license 

did not match up with any of the records that the 

Department of State has for his registration. [The 

Ruches’] counsel spoke to somebody who works at 

the Bureau of Professional Occupational Affairs. This 

individual confirmed that she never sent an E-mail 

confirming Mr. Yager's license number. This E-mail 

had stated that there was a mix-up with numbers 

and that Mr. Yager was actually licensed. It turns 

out this E-mail was completely false and was never 

sent. This individual also confirmed to [the Ruches] 

counsel that Mr. Yager is not licensed and that they 

have no knowledge of him being a licensed surveyor. 

Furthermore, Mr. Yager was not in court on April 1, 

2014 due to "allegedly" being in the hospital.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/2014, at 1-5.

In its April 30, 2014 order, the trial court, inter alia, ruled that the 

property line between 106 and 108 Nagle Street is defined as set forth in the 

Light-Heigel & Associates, Inc. survey, and requires the Williams (1) to 

remove the fence between the two properties, (2) remove the 

encroachments to the Ruches’ roof and shed, and (3) to be responsible for 
J-A12018-15

- 5 -

the creation of a new survey prepared by Light-Heigel & Associates, Inc. and 

recorded with the Dauphin County Recorder of Deeds.

On appeal,1the Williams raise four issues for our consideration and 

review:

1. Did the [trial court] err in refusing to permit Bruce 

Yager to testify as an expert witness [?]

2. Did the [trial court] err in locating the property line 

between the lands of [the Ruches and the Williams], 

in accordance with the Light-Heigel survey, east of 

the line of the fence and hedge, where both deeds of 

the parties failed to have a metes and bounds 

description other than to call the other property as 

an adjoiner?

3. Did the [trial court] err in failing to find that the old 

fence which existed between the properties of [the 

Ruches and the Williams] for over twenty-one years 

and which was replaced by [the Williams] was a 

consentable boundary line between the lands of [the 

Ruches and the Williams]?

4. Did the [trial court] err in ordering [the Williams] to 

make changes to roof encroachments which have 

existed for more than twenty-one years, and which 

 

1

 On appeal, the Ruches contend that this appeal is untimely because the 

Williams’ Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 days of the entry of the 

trial court’s April 30, 2014 order. We disagree. The April 30, 2014 order set 

forth the trial court’s verdict following trial, and thus post-trial motions were 

required before judgment could be entered resulting in an appealable order. 

See, e.g., Chalkey v. Roush, 805 A.2d 491, 496 (Pa. 2002) (“a trial 

court's order at the conclusion of a trial, whether the action is one at law or 

in equity, simply cannot become final for purposes of filing an appeal until 

the court decides any timely post-trial motions”). In this case, on May 9, 

2014, the Williams timely filed a Motion for Post-Trial Relief, which the trial 

court denied by order dated May 21, 2014. The Williams thereafter 

praeciped for the entry of judgment on June 19, 2014 and filed a timely 

Notice of Appeal therefrom. 
J-A12018-15

- 6 -

were not made the subject of the request for relief 

by [the Ruches] in the pleadings filed in this 

action[?]

Williams’ Brief at 2-3.

For their first issue on appeal, the Williams argue that the trial court 

erred in “failing to permit Bruce Yager (“Yager”) to testify as an expert 

witness based upon the qualifications submitted into the record.” Williams’ 

Brief at 6. Whether to qualify a person to testify as an expert witness rests 

within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not reverse 

absent an abuse of that discretion. Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., 664 

A.2d 525, 528 (Pa. 1995). A person need not necessarily be licensed to 

testify as an expert witness, and also need not “be possessed of all of the 

knowledge in a given field.” Id. To qualify as an expert witness in a given 

field, “the test to be applied when qualifying an expert witness is whether 

the witness has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the 

subject under investigation.” Freed v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 971 A.2d 

1202, 1206 (Pa. 2009), on reargument, 5 A.3d 212 (Pa. 2010).

Based upon our review of the certified record in this case, we must 

agree with the Ruches that the Williams have not preserved this issue for 

appellate review, since counsel for the Williams never asserted any objection 

to the trial court’s preclusion of Yager’s testimony on the grounds now 

claimed. During the first day of trial on January 23, 2014, Yager testified as 

to his qualifications generally but could not provide his surveyor’s license 
J-A12018-15

- 7 -

number. The trial court, recognizing that trial would not be concluded that 

day, proposed that Yager’s testimony be continued so that he could obtain 

his license information. N.T., 1/23/2014, at 74-75. The trial court then 

stated, “Once that is resolved, I don’t think I have any issue with him 

testifying as an expert.” Id. at 75. Counsel for the Williams did not object 

to this approach, and instead agreed to it and called his next witness. Id. at 

75-76. 

On March 31, 2014, the day before the scheduled resumption of trial 

on April 1, 2014, counsel for the Williams filed a motion for continuance 

because “no satisfactory evidence of his [Yager’s] registration has been 

forthcoming,” and because Yager was apparently hospitalized. Motion for 

Continuance, 3/31/2014, ¶¶ 5-6. At the beginning of trial the next day, the 

trial court reviewed the issues relating to Yager’s registration number and 

the fraudulent facsimile. N.T., 4/1/2014, at 3-6. Counsel for the Williams 

represented that “I’m not sure whether that [the license information] will 

ever be forthcoming.” Id. The trial court denied the motion for 

continuance,2 noting that despite the more than two-month time period 

between the first and second days of trial, the issues regarding Yager’s 

license still had not been resolved. Id. at 6 (“this matter should have been 

handled probably in the first two weeks afterwards”). 

 

2

 The Williams have not appealed this ruling.
J-A12018-15

- 8 -

Counsel for the Williams commented that “Well, we’ve been trying to 

get it, Your Honor,” id., but did not object either to the denial of the motion 

for continuance or the refusal to permit Yager to testify in the absence of 

providing his license number. Instead, counsel for the Ruches called the 

next witness to testify, without further comment from either counsel. As a 

result, counsel for the Williams never raised before the trial court the issue 

now raised on appeal, namely whether Yager should have been permitted to 

testify despite his failure to produce his license number. The Williams’ first 

issue on appeal is thus waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Commonwealth v. 

Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[O]ne must object to errors, 

improprieties or irregularities at the earliest possible stage of the criminal or 

civil adjudicatory process to afford the jurist hearing the case the first 

occasion to remedy the wrong and possibly avoid an unnecessary appeal to 

complain of the matter.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 667 A.2d 

1123, 1126 (Pa. Super. 1995), affirmed, 699 A.2d 710 (Pa. 1997)).

For their second issue on appeal, the Williams contend that the trial 

court erred in finding that the property line was in the location set forth in 

the Light-Heigel & Associates, Inc. survey, because “both deeds of the 

parties failed to have a metes and bounds description other than to call the 

other property as an adjoiner.” Williams’ Brief at 2. Again, however, we are 

constrained to conclude that this issue has not been preserved for appellate 

review. Rule 2119 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
J-A12018-15

- 9 -

an appellant to set forth in the argument section of the appellate brief 

“discussion and citation to authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 

2009(a). Where an appellant fails to do so, this Court has routinely found 

the issue to be waived. See, e.g., Connor v. Crozer Keystone Health 

System, 832 A.2d 1112, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2003); Middleton/DPW v. 

Robinson, 728 A.2d 368, 371 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1999).

The argument section of the Williams’ appellate brief contains no 

discussion or citation to authorities relating to the contention that the trial 

court erred with respect to its rulings related to the testimony of Keith Heigel 

and/or the conclusions of the Light-Heigel & Associates, Inc. survey. The 

brief does reference a variation between the Ruches’ “own deed and their 

survey,” Williams’ Brief at 9, but offers no explanation regarding either the 

nature of this alleged variation or its relevance in the present dispute. 

Instead, the argument section of the Williams’ appellate brief is primarily 

limited to a discussion of the Williams’ contention, pursuant to Zeglin v. 

Gahagen, 812 A.2d 558 (Pa. 2002), that the property line here should have 

been determined based the doctrine of consentable line (to be discussed 

hereinbelow in connection with the Williams’ third issue on appeal).

For their third issue on appeal, the Williams claim that the trial court 

should have held “that the property line in issue was defined by the hedge 

and fence for such a long time and recognized by the respective owners as 

the line dividing their properties that the hedge with fence became the 
J-A12018-15

- 10 -

property line.” Williams’ Brief at 6. Our standard and scope of review in an 

appeal from a non-jury verdict is as follows:

Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial 

verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the 

trial court are supported by competent evidence and 

whether the trial court committed error in any 

application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial 

judge must be given the same weight and effect on 

appeal as the verdict of a jury. We consider the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict 

winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its 

findings of fact are not supported by competent 

evidence in the record or if its findings are premised 

on an error of law.

J.J. DeLuca Co. v. Toll Naval Associates, 56 A.3d 402, 410 (Pa. Super. 

2012) (quoting Rissi v. Cappella, 918 A.2d 131, 136 (Pa. Super. 2007); 

Corbin v. Cowan, 716 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa. Super. 1998). 

The Williams contend that the trial court failed to recognize that the 

conduct of the parties over many years had established the boundary line 

between the two properties. The doctrine of consentable lines has its 

doctrinal roots in adverse possession theory, as “occupancy with open 

manifestations of ownership throughout the statutory period will generally 

satisfy the traditional elements of adverse possession.” Zeglin, 812 A.2d at 

562. In Moore v. Moore, 921 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2007), this Court 

described the doctrine of consentable lines in detail:

“The establishment of a boundary line by 

acquiescence for the statutory period of twenty-one 

years has long been recognized in Pennsylvania” to 

quiet title and discourage vexatious litigation. 
J-A12018-15

- 11 -

Zeglin v. Gahagen, 571 Pa. 321, 812 A.2d 558, 

561 (2002); see also Corbin [v. Cowan], 716 A.2d 

[614,] 617 [(Pa. Super. 1998)]. Based upon a rule 

of repose sometimes known as the doctrine of 

consentable line, the existence of such a boundary 

may be proved either by dispute and compromise 

between the parties or recognition and acquiescence 

by one party of the right and title of the other. See 

Corbin, 716 A.2d at 617...

“Acquiescence,” in the context of a dispute over real 

property, “denotes passive conduct on the part of 

the lawful owner consisting of failure on his part to 

assert his paramount rights or interests against the 

hostile claims of the adverse user.” Zeglin, 812 

A.2d at 562 n. 5 (quoting Edward G. Mascolo, A 

Primer On Adverse Possession, 66 Conn. B.J. 303, 

312–13 (Aug. 1992)). A determination of 

consentable line by acquiescence requires a finding 

1) that each party has claimed the land on his side of 

the line as his own and 2) that he or she has 

occupied the land on his side of the line for a 

continuous period of 21 years. See Zeglin, 812 

A.2d at 561. Significantly, because the finding of a 

consentable line depends upon possession rather 

than ownership, proof of the passage of sufficient 

time may be shown by tacking the current claimant's 

tenancy to that of his predecessor. See id. at 566. 

To do so, however, the claimant must show 

“sufficient and credible proof of delivery of 

possession of land not within (but contiguous to) 

property described by deed of conveyance, which 

was previously claimed and occupied by the grantor 

and is taken by the grantee as successor in such 

interest.” Id. “[W]hen a consentable line is 

established, the land behind such a line becomes the 

property of each neighbor regardless of what the 

deed specifies. In essence, each neighbor gains 

marketable title to that land behind the line, some of 

which may not have been theirs under their deeds.” 

Soderberg v. Weisel, 455 Pa. Super. 158, 687 

A.2d 839, 843 (1997) (internal citation omitted).
J-A12018-15

- 12 -

Id. at 5. 

In considering whether the trial court should have applied the doctrine 

of consentable lines to establish the boundary line here, we must first 

determine where the Williams claim the boundary line is. In their appellate 

brief, the Williams alternatively point to the hedge between the properties 

and to the fence within the hedge. Williams’ Brief at 6, 10. The hedge 

cannot be the boundary, as it was three feet wide and thus cannot serve as 

a precise property “line” at all, particularly where the present dispute 

involves a claimed intrusion of only about two feet onto the Ruches’ 

property. Instead, the Williams’ Answer and New Matter and Counterclaim 

makes clear that the Williams’ actual contention is that the fence inside the 

hedge should demarcate the boundary, as they allege that “there had been 

an existing wire fence between the two properties which had been in 

existence for more than forty (40) years separating the lands of Plaintiffs 

and Defendants.” Answer and New Matter and Counterclaim, 9/12/2011, ¶ 

7. Moreover, while the trial court found that there were two fences inside or 

near the hedge (a white wire mesh fence at the base of the roots of the 

hedge, and a green four-feet fence installed by Mr. Ruch in 1987 after a dog 

bit his son), the Williams consentable line argument focuses on the white 

wire mesh fence inside the hedge. We note that on the second day of trial, 

the Williams introduced into evidence a portion of a white wire mesh fence, 
J-A12018-15

- 13 -

which the Williams’ current tenant testified was retrieved from inside the 

hedge. N.T., 4/1/2014, at 7-16, Exhibit 16. 

Accordingly, we proceed to consider the Williams’ contention that the 

white wire mesh fence within the hedge marked the consentable line of 

demarcation between 106 and 108 Nagle Street. As set forth in Moore, the 

existence of a consentable line may be proved either by (1) dispute and 

compromise between the parties, or (2) recognition and acquiescence by 

one party of the right and title of the other. Moore, 921 A.2d at 5. With 

respect to dispute and compromise, there is no evidence in the record to 

support the existence of a compromise of a dispute between the owners or 

possessors of 106 and 108 Nagle Street for 21 years regarding the boundary 

line. While not referencing any dispute, Mr. Williams did testify that he and 

Mr. Ruch had agreed to remove the hedge and put up a new fence running 

at the roots of the hedge. N.T., 1/23/2014, at 100. Mr. Ruch did not so 

testify, however, and his reaction when discovering the new fence (he was 

“livid” and immediately called his attorney, id. at 36-37) strongly suggests 

that he did not believe there was a firm agreement to replace the hedge with 

a new fence. The trial court, as the finder of fact, noted the conflicting 

testimony and concluded that no firm agreement had been reached. Trial 

Court Opinion, 10/8/2014, at 3. 

With regard to the second alternative, recognition and acquiescence by 

one party of the right and title of the other, there is again insufficient 
J-A12018-15

- 14 -

evidence to establish a consentable line. As rehearsed above, acquiescence 

requires a finding (1) that each party has claimed the land on his side of the 

line as his own and (2) that he or she has occupied the land on his side of 

the line for a continuous period of 21 years. Moore, 921 A.2d at 5. For 

each of the landowners to “claim the land on his side of the line as his own,” 

they must first acknowledge (implicitly or explicitly) the existence of the 

specific boundary during the period of adverse possession and then act in 

accordance with this acknowledgement (by occupying “the land on his side 

of the line for a continuous period of 21 years”). The certified record, 

however, contains insufficient evidence to satisfy this requirements for either 

the Ruches or the Williams. While Mr. Ruch testified that he was aware that 

there was a white mesh fence inside the hedge, he did not testify that he 

ever believed that this fence constituted the boundary between the two 

properties. To the contrary, Mr. Ruch testified that he always understood 

the boundary to be approximately two feet from the edge of his sidewalk. 

N.T., 1/23/2014, at 29. While Mr. Ruch maintained his side of the hedge, 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/2014, at 2, this did not constitute any proof that 

Mr. Ruch acknowledged that the white mesh fence inside the hedge marked 

the property line with the Williams’ property.

With respect to the Williams, Mr. Williams testified that he was not 

even aware of the existence of the white mesh fence until he removed the 

hedge in 2010. Because he did not know of its existence until 2010, he 
J-A12018-15

- 15 -

could not possibly have “claim[ed] the land on his side of the line as his 

own” and occupied it. Moreover, because the Williams did not purchase 108 

Nagle until 2001, to establish the 21-year period of adverse possession, it 

would be necessary to “tack” their possession with that of the predecessor 

owner. A predecessor owner, James Miller, testified that he was aware of 

the existence of a white mesh fence within the hedge, but he did not testify 

that he ever considered this fence to constitute the boundary line between 

the two properties. N.T., 1/23/2014, at 78-80.

For their fourth issue on appeal, the Williams argue that the trial court 

erred in ordering them to make changes to their porch and roof overhang, 

since the Ruches made no claim for such damages in their pleadings. 

Williams’ Brief at 6. The Williams properly preserved this issue for appellate 

review. Motion for Post-Trial Relief, 5/12/2014, ¶ 4. 

As a general matter, there must be consistency between the 

allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint and the proof presented at trial in 

support of claims for relief. Holt's Cigar Co. v. 222 Liberty Associates, 

591 A.2d 743, 750 (Pa. Super. 1991). The required consistency between 

the allegata and the probata “derives from the belief that absent prior notice 

of what an opponent intends to prove at trial, a party may be surprised at 

trial and thereby deprived of the opportunity to prepare an adequate 

defense.” Id. (citing Freer v. Parker, 192 A.2d 348, 349 (Pa. 1963) and 

Computer Print Systems, Inc. v. Lewis, 422 A.2d 148, 152 (Pa. Super. 
J-A12018-15

- 16 -

1980)). Rule 1021 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring 

that “[a]ny pleading demanding relief shall specify the relief sought,” codifies 

this policy against prejudicial surprise. Id. 

The Ruches’ amended complaint sets forth causes of action for 

ejectment and trespass. All of the allegations in connection with both counts 

relate solely and specifically to the Williams’ removal of the hedge and 

placement of a new fence on their property. With respect to the ejectment 

count, the prayer for relief requests “an order directing Defendants to 

remove the fence.” Amended Complaint, 3/18/2011, ¶¶ 7-8. Similarly, the 

trespass count demands money damages resulting from the need to employ 

a professional surveyor and legal counsel “as a result of placing the fence on 

Plaintiffs’ property.” Id. ¶¶ 11-12. The Ruches’ pleadings (including their 

subsequently filed answer to the Williams’ new matter and counterclaim), do 

not allege any encroachment related to the porch or roof overhang or 

request any relief in connection therewith. 

In fact, it would appear that the first reference to the porch and roof 

overhang in the certified record on appeal was during Mr. Ruch’s testimony 

at trial on January 23, 2014, in response to a question from his counsel 

regarding any other encroachments by the Williams. N.T., 1/23/2014, at 

40-41. The only other testimony regarding the porch and roof overhang was 

a brief exchange on April 1, 2014, when Mr. Ruch indicated that he built the 

roof in question in 1979. N.T., 4/1/2014, at 32-33.
J-A12018-15

- 17 -

For these reasons, we agree with the Williams that the trial court 

lacked any basis for awarding the Ruches relief related to the porch and roof 

overhang. In this regard, we note that the trial court denied the Williams’ 

post-trial motions without comment on this issue and did not offer any 

explanation for its decision in its subsequent written opinion in support of its 

order awarding relief to the Ruches. As a result, we must reverse paragraph 

3 of the trial court’s April 30, 2014 order. 

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part as set forth herein. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/5/2015