Filed 2/13/24 Nartey v. Regents of the University of Califoria CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MYRALYN OA NARTEY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B317392

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19SMCV01426)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Craig D. Karlan, Judge. Affirmed.

Benjamin Law Group and Na’il Benjamin for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Don Willenberg and Amber A. Eklof 

for Defendant and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

A former student alleges she was the victim of discrimination while she 

was pursuing a doctorate at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA). 

She filed suit against UCLA as well as several individual faculty members

alleging violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act or the Act). The 

trial court sustained the university’s demurrer to the student’s claims, 

finding UCLA is not subject to the Unruh Act. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Our summary of facts is limited to those pled in the complaint and 

matters that have been judicially noticed. (Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. 

Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 504–505; Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 

Cal.4th 1, 6.)

A. Nartey’s Complaint

Plaintiff and appellant Myralyn OA Nartey (Nartey) filed her original 

complaint on August 12, 2019. Her complaint alleged eleven causes of action 

against defendant and respondent The Regents of the University of 

California (the Regents) and individual defendants Paula Tavrow (Tavrow), 

Hilary Godwin (Godwin), and Michael Prelip.1 The following factual 

allegations are taken directly from Nartey’s complaint. 

1 Specifically, Nartey’s complaint asserted causes of action for gender 

discrimination (first and fourth causes of action), marital status 

discrimination (second and fifth causes of action), racial discrimination (third 

and eighth causes of action), gender discrimination (seventh cause of action), 

retaliation (ninth cause of action), unfair business practices under Business 

and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. (tenth cause of action), and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress (eleventh cause of action). 
3

Nartey was born in the United States to parents of African descent. 

Nartey began the doctoral program at UCLA’s Fielding School of Public 

Health in 2009. She advanced to doctoral candidacy in 2014. At an 

unspecified time, she was told that she would need to replace her committee 

chair if she wanted to defend her dissertation. The new committee instructed 

Nartey to “throw away” her entire dissertation and start anew. The new 

committee forced her to prepare a detailed analytic plan on short notice,

which was not required of other candidates. The committee deemed her plan 

inadequate and recommended that she be disqualified from doctoral 

candidacy based on her “lack of progress towards the degree and failure to 

make timely and substantive progress” in completing her dissertation. 

Nartey appealed her disqualification, and her appeal was denied. 

At unspecified times during her tenure as a doctoral student, Nartey 

was “subjected to repeated gender stereotyping and several inappropriate 

comments about her family structure.” These comments included 

suggestions that having children was bad for Nartey’s career and that she 

would have to sacrifice time with her children to get her dissertation work 

approved. Other comments were directed at Nartey’s husband and his 

ethnicity. Tavrow also commented on Nartey’s appearance. 

In December 2017, Nartey sent an email to Godwin—who at the time 

held the position of Assistant Dean—stating that she was experiencing 

harassment based on gender and family responsibility. Following this email 

complaint, Tavrow retaliated against Nartey by staying late at work to 

research recently published articles that Nartey would have to address in her 

dissertation. 

Nartey was also repeatedly questioned about her capacity to write and 

speak English, her first language. On multiple occasions she was “compared 
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to a student of a similar ethnic background.” In meetings, she was subjected 

to comments that stated she did not have the capacity to complete a doctoral 

program and was “just slow.” 

After initially instructing Nartey not be not to be concerned about 

completing citations until the final stages of the dissertation process, Godwin 

used one of Nartey’s incomplete citations as the basis to accuse Nartey of 

plagiarism during the appeal of her disqualification from the program. 

These allegations are incorporated into every cause of action asserted 

in Nartey’s original complaint. 

B. The Regents’ Demurrer

The Regents filed a demurrer and a motion to strike Nartey’s 

complaint. The Regents’ demurrer argued, among other things, that 

(1) Nartey had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing 

suit, (2) to the extent Nartey’s complaint was challenging her disqualification 

from the doctoral program, she was required to pursue such a challenge by 

way of writ petition, (3) UCLA was not subject to the Unruh Act and could 

not be held liable for Nartey’s claims arising from the Act, and (4) Nartey’s 

complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action 

against the Regents. 

The trial court sustained the Regents’ demurrer to Nartey’s ninth, 

tenth, and eleventh causes of action without leave to amend, finding the 

Regents were immune from liability on these causes of action under 

Government Code section 815 and because government entities are not 

subject to claims under Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. 

The trial court also found multiple grounds to sustain the demurrer to 

Nartey’s first through eighth causes of action with leave to amend. First, the 
5

court determined Nartey had failed to properly allege that she had exhausted 

her administrative remedies before filing suit. Specifically, the court held 

Nartey did not show she complied with the procedures outlined in UCLA’s 

Grievance Procedure 230.1. The court held “UCLA Procedure 230.1 does not 

apply to academic decisions regarding dismissal; it relates to alleged 

discrimination by the University, which Plaintiff alleges occurred before she 

was disqualified from her program. Given all of Plaintiff’s causes of action 

appear to arise from purported discrimination by Defendant, Plaintiff was 

required to exhaust the grievance procedure set forth in UCLA Procedure 

230.1.” 

The trial court also found Nartey’s first through eighth causes of action

failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against the Regents. 

Specifically, the court held that merely alleging discriminatory statements 

were made is insufficient to state a claim for discrimination without 

allegations of damages flowing from discrimination. The court stated it could 

not determine the precise nature of Nartey’s claimed damages as her first 

through eighth causes of action do not identify the specific conduct that

underlies each cause of action and instead simply incorporate by reference all 

allegations in the complaint. 

The court also held that Nartey’s complaint appeared to be seeking 

damages for the discrimination she suffered while enrolled in the doctoral 

program rather than challenging the decision to disqualify her from the 

program and seeking reinstatement. However, the court cautioned Nartey 

that if she was alleging improper disqualification from the program, she was 

required to seek review of that decision by way of a writ of mandate rather 

than by lawsuit. 
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The trial court denied the Regent’s motion to strike as moot given its 

ruling on the demurrer. 

C. Nartey’s First Amended Complaint

Nartey filed a first amended complaint alleging eight causes of action 

against the Regents and individual defendants.2 The first amended 

complaint added two paragraphs responding to the trial court’s finding that 

Nartey failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit. In 

these paragraphs, Nartey claimed she was not required to exhaust 

administrative remedies because her claims arise under the Unruh Act and 

“there is no administrative exhaustion requirement” for claims brought under 

the Act. She also asserted UCLA Grievance Procedure 230.1 is inapplicable 

to her claims because by its terms it does not apply to claims of 

discrimination concerning grading and evaluation. Nartey alleged her claims 

in this action all stem from discrimination she faced in the grading and 

evaluation of her work in the doctoral program. 

Nartey’s first amended complaint also claimed that she did, in fact, 

exhaust all her administrative remedies by emailing school officials and filing 

complaints with the Discrimination Prevention Office and Title IX Office 

within the UCLA Office of Equity, Diversity and Inclusion. 

The substance of the individual causes of action asserted in the first 

amended complaint is nearly identical to those in her original complaint. No 

changes were made to the first amended complaint to address the trial court’s 

finding that the original complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute 

a cause of action against the Regents. The first amended complaint contains 

2 These eight causes of action are identical to the first eight causes of 

action asserted in Nartey’s original complaint. 
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the same factual allegations which are incorporated into every cause of action 

without identifying what specific facts each cause of action is based on. 

D. The Regents’ Second Demurrer

The Regents filed a demurrer to Nartey’s amended complaint. In their 

demurrer, the Regents again argued Nartey had failed to exhaust her 

administrative remedies before filing suit, that the Regents could not be held 

liable under the Unruh Act, and that Nartey failed to set forth sufficient facts 

to constitute a cause of action against them for discrimination. 

On September 2, 2021, the trial court issued an order sustaining the 

Regents’ demurrer to all causes of action in the first amended complaint 

without leave to amend. The court acknowledged the first amended 

complaint now specially alleged Grievance Procedure 230.1 did not apply but

held Nartey did “not allege her disqualification from the doctoral program 

was the result of Defendant’s discrimination, aside from a conclusory 

statement to that effect.” The court also noted the amended complaint “fails 

to specifically allege Defendant’s discrimination applied to decisions 

regarding admission, grading and evaluation, or dismissal, which would place 

Plaintiff’s claims outside of the Grievance Procedure as an ‘academic 

decision.’” The trial court found Nartey’s amended complaint failed to link 

any of the alleged discriminatory statements to any “improper academic 

decisions by Defendant that resulted in her disqualification from the doctoral 

program.” The trial court concluded Nartey’s claims were thus subject to 

Grievance Procedure 230.1. The court determined the amended complaint 

failed to show that Nartey had complied with Grievance Procedure 230.1 or 

was otherwise excused from exhausting this administrative remedy. The 

court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, noting it had 
8

previously granted Nartey leave to amend to cure this defect and she had 

failed to do so. 

The court also sustained the Regents’ demurrer on the alternative 

ground that all of Nartey’s causes of action arose under the Unruh Act, and 

the university was not a “business establishment” that was subject to the Act. 

The court further held Nartey’s amended complaint failed to set forth 

sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against the Regents for the 

same reasons as set forth in its prior ruling. Finally, the trial court found to 

the extent that Nartey was challenging the decision to disqualify her from 

the program, her claims were barred because she was required to seek such 

review by way of a writ petition and had not done so. 

E. Judgment and Appeal

On September 28, 2021, the trial court entered judgment for the 

Regents against Nartey. Nartey timely appealed. On appeal, Nartey argues 

the trial court erred in sustaining the Regents’ demurrer to her first amended 

complaint. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading. 

(Milligan v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transportation Dist. (2004) 120 

Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a demurrer. 

(Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 51.) In our review, 

“We assume the truth of properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that 

reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and matters that 

are judicially noticeable.” (Genis v. Schainbaum (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1007, 
9

1015.) However, we do not credit “‘“contentions, deductions or conclusions of 

fact or law.”’” (Evans v. City of Berkeley, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 6.) We affirm 

“‘if proper on any grounds stated in the demurrer, whether or not the court 

acted on that ground.’” (Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179 

Cal.App.4th 390, 399.) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating the 

trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. (Id. at pp. 399–400.)

We review the denial of leave to amend a pleading after the sustaining 

of a demurer for an abuse of discretion. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.

(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 970–971; City of Torrance v. Southern California Edison 

Co. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1091.) When a trial court sustains a 

demurrer without leave to amend, “we decide whether there is a reasonable 

possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Blank v. Kirwan

(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) If we find an amendment could cure the defect, 

we conclude the trial court abused its discretion and we reverse. (Ibid.) The 

appellant has the burden of proving that an amendment would cure the 

defect. (Ibid.; see Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 

1081.)

B. Unruh Act

Nartey’s first amended complaint expressly states that her entire 

action “is brought pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Section 51 et seq. 

of the California Civil Code.” In ruling on the Regents’ demurrer, the trial 

court found all of Nartey’s claims against the Regents were barred because 

UCLA was not a “business establishment” which was subject to the Unruh 

Act. On appeal, Nartey does not contest that all of her causes of action arise 

under the Unruh Act. Instead, she argues the trial court erred in finding the 

university is not subject to the Act. 
10

The Unruh Act provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this 

state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, 

ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, 

marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or 

immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, 

advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of 

every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) The question before us 

is whether the trial court erred when it found UCLA is not subject to the Act. 

We find the trial court correctly determined UCLA is not a “business 

establishment” for purposes of the Unruh Act.

It is undisputed that UCLA is a public school.3 (See Regents of 

University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619 [“UCLA 

is a public entity”].) In Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662

(Brennon), our California Supreme Court held public school districts cannot 

be deemed “business establishments” that are subject to the Unruh Act. As 

Brennon is directly relevant to the question raised by Nartey’s briefing, we 

will discuss the case in depth.

The Brennon court began its analysis by turning to the plain language 

of the Unruh Act, finding the “everyday meaning of ‘business 

establishments’—even with the statute’s expansive ‘of every kind whatsoever’

clause—conveys reference to commercial entities, those whose principal 

mission is the transactional sale of goods or services.” (Brennon, supra, 13 

Cal.5th at p. 674.) The court noted “A public school district engaged in the 

task of educating its students does not easily fit within” this understanding 

3 Nartey’s operative complaint expressly alleges UCLA is “a public 

entity” which is “open to and offers educational services to members of the 

public.” 
11

as “a school district’s provision of public education is not generally 

understood as being carried out in the commercial, transactional manner that 

is characteristic of a ‘business establishment.’” (Ibid.)

However, the court found that “whether or not an entity is ‘generally 

thought of as a traditional business establishment is not, in itself, necessarily 

determinative of whether such an entity falls within the aegis of the act.’ 

[Citation.]” (Brennon, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 674.) The court then turned to 

the purpose and legislative history of the Unruh Act, finding “that the focus 

of the Act is the conduct of private business establishments” and the Act’s 

legislative history “suggests the Legislature did not intend the Act to subject 

public school districts to liability.” (Id. at p. 675.) The court also noted that, 

as initially drafted, the Unruh Act “mentioned schools as one of the numerous 

entities covered by the bill,” before undergoing a series of amendments 

“which ultimately eliminated reference to schools altogether.” (Id. at pp. 

676–677.) The Brennon court additionally stated that “the Legislature is 

capable of bringing government entities within the scope of specific 

legislation when it intends to do so, and it has done so with other 

antidiscrimination legislation” such as the California Fair Employment and 

Housing Act. (Id. at p. 678.) 

Ultimately, our California Supreme Court reasoned that “in order to be 

a ‘business establishment’ under the Act . . . an entity must operate as a 

business or commercial enterprise when it discriminates.” (Brennon, supra, 

13 Cal.5th at p. 679.) Accordingly, the court concluded that the Unruh Act “is 

not directed at school districts when they are acting to fulfill their 

educational role.” (Id. at pp. 680–681.) “In parsing the boundaries of what 

constitutes a ‘business establishment,’ our cases have focused on attributes—

performing business functions, protecting economic value, operating as the 
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functional equivalent of a commercial enterprise, etc.—that are not shared by 

public school districts engaged in the work of educating students. When 

acting in their core educational capacity, public school districts do not 

perform ‘customary business functions,’ nor is their ‘overall function . . . to 

protect and enhance . . . economic value.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 681.)

The Regents rely on Brennon in arguing they are not subject to liability 

under the Unruh Act. By contrast, Nartey’s briefing before us references the 

now superseded lower appellate court opinion in Brennon without offering 

any discussion of the California Supreme Court decision. In arguing that the 

university is subject to the Unruh Act, Nartey relies primarily on the 

assertion that because UCLA generates substantial revenue through sources 

such as its athletic department, it is a business enterprise for purposes of the 

Unruh Act. We note these factual allegations regarding UCLA’s sources of 

revenue do not appear in Nartey’s first amended complaint and Nartey did 

not request the trial court take judicial notice of these alleged facts in ruling 

on the Regents’ demurrer. As such, Nartey cannot rely on these factual 

assertions to establish the trial court erred in ruling on the Regents’ 

demurrer. (Genis v. Schainbaum, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.) 

Even if these facts were properly before the court, however, they would 

not lead us to conclude that the Regents are subject to the Unruh Act. As the 

Brennon court made clear, an entity is only subject to the Unruh Act if it 

discriminates in its capacity as a business or commercial enterprise. 

(Brennon, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 679.) Here, all of Nartey’s causes of action 

arise from her treatment as a doctoral candidate in UCLA’s Fielding School 

of Public Health. Nartey has not alleged that her claims implicate athletics, 

intellectual property, or any other alleged business or commercial enterprise 

undertaken by UCLA. Instead, by her own admission, Nartey’s claims arise 
13

solely from the “grading and evaluation” of her work as a student in the 

School of Public Health. Her first amended complaint specifically alleges 

“The principal purpose of UCLA is education. As an educational institution, 

as a matter of law, pursuant to the California Education Code, the primary 

purpose of UCLA is to provide educational services to its students.” 

Under Brennon, when public schools are “acting in their core 

educational capacity,” they are not subject to the Unruh Act. (Brennon, 

supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 681.) The grading and evaluation of Nartey’s work as 

a student is squarely within UCLA’s core educational capacity. As Nartey’s 

claims all arise from UCLA’s activity as an institution of public education, 

the trial court correctly determined the Regents could not be held liable for 

Nartey’s claims under the Unruh Act. We thus affirm the trial court’s 

sustaining of the Regents’ demurrer.

As Nartey has made no showing that this defect could be cured by 

further amendment, the trial court correctly sustained the Regents’ demurrer 

without leave to amend. (Lawrence v. Bank of America (1985) 163 

Cal.App.3d 431, 436 [“Leave to amend should be denied where the facts are 

not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no liability exists 

under substantive law”].) We note Nartey does not contend the trial court 

erred in determining all of her causes of action arise under the Unruh Act, 

nor has she alleged there are alternative statutory grounds upon which she 

could base her claims if given further leave to amend. “Ultimately, it is 

plaintiff’s burden as appellant to show grounds for reversal. [Citation.] Since 

plaintiff ignores the issue on appeal, so shall we.” (Claudio v. Regents of 

University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230, fn. 4.)

Accordingly, we do not reach the question of whether Nartey’s causes of 

action arising from the Unruh Act could be restated under an alternative 
14

legal basis. “‘The burden of showing that a reasonable possibility exists that 

amendment can cure the defects remains with the plaintiff; neither the trial 

court nor this court will rewrite a complaint. [Citation.] Where the appellant 

offers no allegations to support the possibility of amendment and no legal 

authority showing the viability of new causes of action, there is no basis for 

finding the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the demurrer 

without leave to amend.’” (Total Call Internat., Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co. (2010) 

181 Cal.App.4th 161, 173.) We, therefore, find the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Nartey further leave to amend the operative 

complaint.

Having determined the trial court properly sustained the Regents’ 

demurrer without leave to amend on this basis, we need not address the 

other potential grounds set forth in the Regents’ demurrer and decline to do 

so. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment entered in favor of the Regents is affirmed. The Regents 

are awarded their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J. COLLINS, J.