[Cite as State v. Jillson, 2012-Ohio-1034.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

SAMUEL JILLSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NO. C-110430 

TRIAL NO. B-1004714 

O P I N I O N.

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 16, 2012 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Christine Y. Jones, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Please note: This case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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SYLVIA S. HENDON, Judge. 

{¶1} Following a jury trial, defendant-appellant Samuel Jillson was found 

guilty of two counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). 

The trial court imposed five years’ imprisonment for each offense. It made the 

sentences consecutive, for an aggregate term of ten years’ imprisonment. The trial 

court additionally classified Jillson as a Tier II sexual offender pursuant to 

Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“Senate Bill 10”). 

{¶2} Jillson now appeals, raising eight assignments of error for our review. 

Because we find no merit to Jillson’s arguments, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

Factual Background 

{¶3} The evidence presented during trial established that the victim of these 

offenses, nine-year-old D.R., resided in the same trailer park as Jillson. Jillson 

owned several Jack Russell terriers, and on July 12, 2010, D.R. walked to Jillson’s 

home and asked if she could pet his dogs. D.R. and Jillson stood on Jillson’s porch, 

separated by a small gate used to contain the dogs. As D.R. played with the dogs, 

Jillson reached over the gate and touched her breast. He then took her hand and 

placed it on his penis. D.R. testified that these incidents made her feel frightened, so 

she told Jillson that her mom was looking for her and that she needed to leave. 

Jillson instructed D.R. not to tell anyone what had transpired. When D.R. reached 

her home, she immediately wrote a letter to her mother explaining how Jillson had 

touched her. D.R.’s mother contacted the police. Jillson was arrested later that 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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evening outside his home, transported to the Madeira Police department, and 

interviewed. 

{¶4} Jillson was subsequently indicted for two counts of gross sexual 

imposition. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress the statement obtained 

during the interview on the grounds that he had been intoxicated at the time that the 

statement was given. The trial court denied Jillson’s motion to suppress. The case 

proceeded to trial, where Jillson was found guilty of both offenses. The trial court 

sentenced Jillson to an aggregate term of 10 years’ imprisonment and classified him 

as a Tier II sexual offender. 

Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence 

{¶5} In his first three assignments of error, Jillson argues that his 

convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, and that the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29 

motion for an acquittal. We consider these assignments together. 

{¶6} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must view 

all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution 

to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found all the elements of 

the offenses proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 

172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st. Dist.1983). We employ the same standard when 

determining whether a trial court properly denied a defendant’s Crim.R. 29 motion 

for an acquittal. State v. Brumbach, 1st Dist. No. C-100792, 2011-Ohio-6635, ¶ 14. 

In contrast, when reviewing the manifest weight of the evidence, this court must 

weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences and consider the credibility of the 

witnesses to determine whether the trier of fact lost its way and created such a 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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manifest miscarriage of justice that the convictions must be reversed. State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. 

{¶7} Jillson was found guilty of two counts of gross sexual imposition in 

violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). This statute states in relevant part that 

 No person shall have sexual contact with 

another, not the spouse of the offender; cause 

another, not the spouse of the offender, to have 

sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or 

more other persons to have sexual contact when * 

* * [t]he other person, or one of the other 

persons, is less than thirteen years of age, 

whether or not the offender knows the age of that 

person. 

{¶8} D.R. testified that, at the time of trial, she was ten years old. She 

additionally testified that Jillson had pinched her breast and had placed her hand 

upon his penis by grabbing her wrist. This was sufficient to establish the elements of 

gross sexual imposition. 

{¶9} We further find that Jillson’s convictions were not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. The jury was in the best position to judge the credibility of 

the witnesses. It was entitled to reject Jillson’s assertion that he had not touched 

D.R. and to find the testimony offered by D.R. to be credible. The first, second, and 

third assignments of error are overruled. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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Sentencing 

{¶10} In his fourth assignment of error, Jillson argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion by imposing an excessive aggregate sentence. This court’s 

review of a sentence is two-part. First, we must determine if the sentences imposed 

were clearly and convincingly contrary to law. State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 

2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 14. Here, the sentences imposed fell within the 

available statutory ranges and were not contrary to law. Next, we must determine if 

the trial court abused its discretion in the imposition of sentence. Id. at ¶ 17. Jillson 

touched the breast of a nine-year-old girl and forced her to place her hand on his 

penis. He committed these acts on his front porch, in daylight, on a child who had 

come to his home to play with his dogs. Jillson showed no remorse for his crimes. 

Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in the imposition of sentence. The fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶11} In his seventh assignment of error, Jillson argues that the trial court 

erred by sentencing him on both counts of gross sexual imposition because they were 

allied offenses of similar import that were subject to merger. 

{¶12} Under R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, a trial court may 

convict and sentence a defendant for two or more offenses that arose out of the same 

criminal transaction if the offenses (1) were not allied offenses of similar import, (2) 

were committed separately, or (3) were committed with a separate animus as to each 

offense. State v. Bickerstaff, 10 Ohio St.3d 62, 65-66, 461 N.E.2d 892 (1984); see 

also State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 51; 

State v. Evans, 1st Dist. No. C-100028, 2011-Ohio-2356, ¶ 6. The Ohio Supreme 

Court has recently clarified that, when determining whether two offenses are allied 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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offenses of similar import subject to merger under R.C. 2941.25, the conduct of the 

accused must be considered. Johnson at syllabus. 

{¶13} Here, although the offenses occurred near each other in time, we find 

that Jillson committed two separate acts. First, Jillson pinched D.R.’s breast. Upon 

completion of that act, he grabbed D.R.’s wrist and placed her hand upon his penis. 

The two acts occurred in close proximity, but were separate actions involving 

different types of sexual conduct. See State v. Nicholas, 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 435, 613 

N.E.2d 225 (1993). For that reason, the offenses were not allied offenses of similar 

import subject to merger. Consequently, the trial court did not err by imposing 

sentence on both offenses. The seventh assignment of error is overruled. 

Motion to Suppress 

{¶14} In his sixth assignment of error, Jillson argues that the trial court 

erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress the statement obtained on the night 

of his arrest. Jillson argues that he had not voluntarily waived his Miranda rights 

and that the statement had not been given voluntarily because he had been 

intoxicated at the time. 

{¶15} Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a 

mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence. But we review de novo the application of 

the law to those relevant facts. Id. Here, our review involves two distinct issues: 

whether Jillson knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and whether 

his statements to the police were made voluntarily. See State v. Cedeno, 192 Ohio 

App.3d 738, 2011-Ohio-674, 950 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶16} The state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his 

Miranda rights. Id. at ¶ 15. In the absence of evidence of coercive police conduct or 

that the defendant’s will was overborne, a waiver of Miranda rights will be deemed 

voluntary. State v. Slaughter, 1st Dist. No. C-980702, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1821 

(Apr. 28, 2000). The record before us contains no evidence of police coercion or 

intimidation. Jillson was read his Miranda rights, indicated that he understood 

those rights, and proceeded to waive them by speaking with the police. As the 

interview proceeded, Jillson at some point chose to invoke his Miranda rights and 

requested an attorney. The interview ceased at that point. Jillson’s invocation of his 

Miranda rights is strong evidence that he understood those rights and had 

voluntarily waived them until that point in time. We find that the state proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Jillson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

waived his Miranda rights. 

{¶17} We now consider whether Jillson’s statement to the police was made 

voluntarily. Jillson argues that, due to his level of intoxication, it was not. The state 

again bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a 

defendant voluntarily provided a statement. Id. A court must look at the totality of 

the circumstances in making such a determination, including “the age, mentality, 

and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of 

interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the 

existence of threat or inducement.” Id. Intoxication is one factor to consider in this 

analysis, but intoxication in and of itself will not render a confession or statement 

involuntary. Id. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶18} The record indicates that Jillson was intoxicated at the time that his 

statement was obtained. When the Madeira police first encountered Jillson outside 

his home, they witnessed him place an open container on the passenger seat of his 

vehicle as he exited. Jillson smelled of an alcoholic beverage, admitted that he had 

been drinking, and stumbled and slurred his words at times. Madeira police officer 

Timothy Vogel, who had interviewed Jillson, testified that although Jillson seemed 

too appreciably impaired to operate a motor vehicle, he was not too appreciably 

impaired to hold a conversation. The trial court believed the officer’s testimony. In a 

suppression hearing, matters of credibility are for the trier of fact to resolve. State v. 

Jones, 1st Dist. No. C-080518, 2009-Ohio-4190, ¶ 22, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio 

St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). And in this case, the record supports the 

officer’s conclusion. Jillson provided appropriate answers to questions, answered 

the questions coherently, and later knowingly invoked his right to counsel. Under 

these circumstances, we cannot find that Jillson’s intoxication rendered his 

statement involuntary. Slaughter at 10. 

{¶19} The state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Jillson 

voluntarily provided a statement to the police. The trial court properly denied 

Jillson’s motion to suppress. The sixth assignment of error is overruled. 

Mayerson Center Interview 

{¶20} In his eighth assignment of error, Jillson argues that the trial court 

erred in admitting D.R.’s interview at the Mayerson Center. Jillson argues that this 

evidence was inadmissible under Evid.R. 803(4) because the evidence was collected 

to be used at trial, rather than for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶21} The Children’s Hospital Mayerson Center is a child-advocacy center 

for child victims of abuse. Rather than having a child-abuse victim sit through 

numerous interviews with representatives from different agencies, a social worker 

interviews the child and obtains the information needed by each agency, including 

medical staff, the police, and the prosecutor’s office. D.R. was interviewed by 

Alexandra Tucker at the Mayerson Center on the day after the offenses in this case 

took place. During the interview, D.R. explained to Tucker how Jillson had touched 

her. Tucker testified concerning the statements that D.R. had made, and her 

interview of D.R. was played for the jury over Jillson’s objection. 

{¶22} Evid.R. 803(4) provides that statements given for the purposes of 

medical diagnosis and treatment are not excludable as hearsay. We have previously 

found that statements given by child-abuse victims to social workers at the Mayerson 

Center were admissible under this rule. See State v. Walker, 1st Dist. No. C-060910, 

2007-Ohio-6337, ¶ 36. The determination of whether a statement by a child-abuse 

victim was given for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment falls within the 

discretion of the trial court. State v. Lukacs, 188 Ohio App.3d 597, 2010-Ohio-2364, 

936 N.E.2d 506, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.). Relevant factors to such a determination include “(1) 

whether the child was questioned in a leading or suggestive manner; (2) whether a 

motive to fabricate existed, such as a custody battle; (3) whether the child 

understood the need to tell medical personnel the truth; (4) the child’s age; and (5) 

the consistency of the child’s declarations.” Id. 

{¶23} Application of these factors indicates that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by allowing admission of D.R.’s interview. Tucker needed to ascertain 

the extent of harm, both physical and psychological, suffered by D.R. in order to 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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determine if further treatment was necessary. D.R. was nine years old, appeared to 

understand the necessity for truth, and had no motive to fabricate her allegations. 

Further, D.R. was consistent in her declarations and description of the offenses. We 

conclude that a majority of D.R.’s statements in the interview were given for 

purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. And, to the extent that any individual 

statement could be deemed forensic in nature, rather than medical or diagnostic, we 

conclude that no error occurred in the admission of such statements. D.R. testified 

at trial and was subject to cross-examination on all statements given during the 

interview. See State v. Daniels, 1st Dist. No. C-090566, 2010-Ohio-5258, ¶ 15. In 

fact, Jillson’s counsel questioned D.R. about her statements made during the 

interview prior to the interview’s admission at trial. 

{¶24} The trial court properly admitted D.R.’s interview at the Mayerson 

Center under Evid.R. 803(4). The eighth assignment of error is overruled. 

Senate Bill 10 

{¶25} In his fifth assignment of error, Jillson argues that the trial court erred 

in classifying him under Senate Bill 10, Ohio’s version of the federal Adam Walsh 

Act, because it violates the due process clauses of both the United States and Ohio 

Constitutions. 

{¶26} R.C. Chapter 2950 contains Ohio’s statutory scheme for the 

classification and registration of sex offenders. State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 

2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 3. This scheme was significantly amended in 

2007 by the enactment of Senate Bill 10, which is largely based on the federal Adam 

Walsh Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901 et seq. State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 7. Under the provisions of Senate Bill 10, judges have no 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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discretion in the classification of and registration requirements imposed upon sex 

offenders. Rather, offenders are automatically classified as either Tier I, Tier II, or 

Tier III offenders based solely upon the offense committed. Bodyke at ¶ 21-22. 

Because classification is automatic, the need for a classification hearing was 

dispensed with under Senate Bill 10. Once an offender is classified in the 

appropriate tier, he or she must register accordingly. Id. at ¶ 23. The registration 

and reporting requirements are more expansive under Senate Bill 10 than the former 

scheme, and also require registration for lengthier periods of time. Id. at ¶ 24-28. 

{¶27} Jillson argues that his classification as a Tier II offender under Senate 

Bill 10 based solely upon the offense committed, in the absence of a classification 

hearing, violates his due-process rights and is unconstitutional. Due-process 

protections are triggered when a sexual offender is “deprived of a protected liberty or 

property interest as a result of the registration requirement.” State v. Hayden, 96 

Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, ¶ 6. 

{¶28} This is an issue of first impression in this district. But the Fifth 

Appellate District has considered this same argument and held that “[n]o due 

process violation occurs where ‘the law required an offender to be registered based 

upon the fact of the conviction alone.’ ”. In Re Adrian R., 5th Dist. No. 08-CA-17, 

2008-Ohio-6581, ¶ 33, quoting Doe I v. Dann, N.D. Ohio No. 1:08 CV 220, 2008 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45228 (June 9, 2008). The Fourth Appellate District has reached 

the same conclusion and likewise held that classification of a sexual offender without 

a hearing does not violate due process. State v. Netherland, 4th Dist. No. 

08CA3043, 2008-Ohio-7007, ¶ 21, rev’d on other grounds, sub. nom. In Re Sexual 

Offender Reclassification Cases, 126 Ohio St.3d 322, 2010-Ohio-3753, 933 N.E.2d 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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801, ¶ 15-16. The Ohio Supreme Court has not considered this argument with 

respect to the current version of R.C. Chapter 2950. But that court has previously 

determined that, under Ohio’s former sexual-offender-classification scheme, 

classification by operation of law did not violate due process. Hayden at ¶ 18. 

{¶29} Following our review of the relevant law, we are not persuaded by 

Jillson’s arguments that his classification as a Tier II offender without a hearing 

violated his due-process rights. Jillson has failed to establish what protected liberty 

or property interest he has been deprived of by being classified without a hearing. 

Jillson’s classification was automatic and was determined based upon the offense 

committed. No discretion on the part of the trial court was involved, and, because 

offenders are classified by operation of law, the classification system is uniformly 

applied and all offenders are treated alike. In fact, because classification is based 

upon the offense committed, an offender has advance notice upon indictment as to 

how he or she will be classified, if later convicted of the offense. Therefore, we 

conclude that sexual-offender classification under Senate Bill 10 in the absence of a 

hearing does not violate an offender’s due-process rights. The fifth assignment of 

error is overruled. 

{¶30} The judgment of the trial court is, accordingly, affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

HILDEBRANDT, P.J., and FISCHER, J., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.