[Cite as In re Everitt, 2010-Ohio-6710.]

Court of Claims of Ohio 

Victims of Crime Division

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Fourth Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9860 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us

IN RE: PATTY EVERITT 

PATTY EVERITT 

 Applicant 

 

 Case No. V2009-40633 

Commissioners: 

Gregory P. Barwell, Presiding 

Elizabeth Luper Schuster 

Randi Ostry LeHoty 

COMMISSIONER PANEL ORDER OF A THREE-

 {1}On March 5, 2009, the applicant, Patty Everitt, filed a compensation 

application as the result of an assault which occurred on December 12, 2008. On June 

19, 2009, the Attorney General issued a finding of fact and decision finding the applicant 

qualified as a victim of criminally injurious conduct but denying reimbursement of a Civil 

Protection Order (C.P.O.) attorney fee the applicant incurred. The Attorney General 

stated the C.P.O. did not physically separate the parties as is required by R.C. 

2743.51(F)(4). On June 23, 2009 and July 23, 2009, the applicant submitted requests 

for reconsideration. On August 24, 2009, the Attorney General rendered a Final 

Decision finding no reason to modify the initial decision. On August 31, 2009, the 

applicant filed a notice of appeal from the August 24, 2009 Final Decision of the 

Attorney General. Hence, a hearing was held before this panel of commissioners on 

November 19, 2009 at 10:05 A.M. 

 {2}Assistant Attorney General Mark Zemba appeared via video teleconference 

and Assistant Attorney General Amy O’Grady appeared in person on behalf of the state 

of Ohio. Neither the applicant nor her attorney appeared at the hearing. Assistant 
Case No. V2009-40633 - 2 - ORDER

Attorney General Mark Zemba made a brief statement for the panel’s consideration. 

The Attorney General’s position is that the statute in question is clear and unambiguous; 

the C.P.O. was to physically separate the parties for attorney fees to be compensable. 

The C.P.O. in question has an exception where they could be in the same location in 

Michigan and therefore the attorney fees are not compensable. Whereupon, the 

Attorney General rested its case. 

 {3}Former R.C. 2743.51(F)(4) states: 

“(4) ‘Allowable expense’ includes attorney’s fees not exceeding two thousand 

five hundred dollars, at a rate not exceeding one hundred fifty dollars per hour, 

incurred to successfully obtain a restraining order, custody order, or other order 

to physically separate a victim from an offender, if the attorney has not received 

payment under section 2743.65 of the Revised Code for assisting a claimant 

with an application for an award of reparations under sections 2743.51 to 

2743.72 of the Revised Code.” 

 {4}We look to the plain language of the statute to determine the legislative 

intent. State ex rel. Burrows v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 676 N.E.2d 

519. We apply a statute as written when its meaning is unambiguous and definite. 

Portage Cty. Bd. Of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 2006-Ohio-954, 846 N.E.2d 

478, ¶ 52, citing State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. Of Edn.

(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463. Finally, an unambiguous statute must 

be applied in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language. 

Burrows, 78 Ohio St.3d at 81, 676 N.E.2d 519. 

 {5}The provision of the Civil Protection Order in question in pertinent part 

states: 

“As an exception to this order, the parties may have contact in the State of 

Michigan due to their son-in-law’s serious illness.” 

 {6}From review of the file and after careful consideration of the information 

presented at the hearing, we find the attorney fees incurred for the civil protection order 
Case No. V2009-40633 - 3 - ORDER

are compensable pursuant to former R.C. 2743.51(F)(4). This decision is reached 

based upon the unique fact situation presented in this case. The Civil Protection Order 

in question prohibits the offender from in any manner coming in contact with the 

applicant or following, stalking, harassing or contacting the applicant at her residence, 

business, or place of employment. Furthermore, the C.P.O. orders the offender to stay 

away from the victim and not be present within 500 feet of her. Accordingly, this 

provision complies with the requirement contained in former R.C. 2743.51(F)(4) to 

“physically separate” the victim from the offender. 

 {7}However, during the pendency of the litigation the applicant and offender’s 

son-in-law became gravely ill in Michigan. At the time of the hearing for the C.P.O. it 

was likely that the son-in-law would not survive and the limited exception was included 

in the order so that both parties could attend the funeral service. We believe this 

narrow, fact specific exception should not prohibit the payment of attorney fees for an 

otherwise legally compliant C.P.O. This decision is confined to this narrow fact 

situation and should not be considered precedent for broadening the scope of the 

physical separation provision of R.C. 2743.51(F)(4). Therefore, the August 24, 2009 

decision of the Attorney General is reversed. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT 

 {8}1) The August 24, 2009 decision of the Attorney General is REVERSED 

and judgment is rendered in favor of the applicant; 

 {9}2) This claim is remanded to the Attorney General for calculation and 

payment of the award; 

 {10}3) This order is entered without prejudice to the applicant’s right to file a 

supplemental compensation application, within five years of this order, pursuant to R.C. 

2743.68; 
Case No. V2009-40633 - 4 - ORDER

 {11}4) Costs are assumed by the court of claims victims of crime fund.

 _______________________________________ 

 GREGORY P. BARWELL 

 Presiding Commissioner

 _______________________________________ 

 ELIZABETH LUPER SCHUSTER 

 Commissioner

 _______________________________________ 

 RANDI OSTRY LE HOTY 

 Commissioner 

ID #I:\VICTIMS\2009\40633\12-17-09 panel decision.wpd\DRB-tad 

 A copy of the foregoing was personally served upon the Attorney General and 

sent by regular mail to Summit County Prosecuting Attorney and to: 

Filed 1-14-10 

Jr. Vol. 2274, Pgs. 136-139 

Sent to S.C. Reporter 10-6-11