### NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ANNA STAHL , Debtor

. BAP No. CC

- 20

- 1254

- SGF

Bk. No. 2:20

- bk

- 11739

- WB

MEMORANDUM 1 EMCYTE CORP

. , Appellant,

v. ANNA STAHL , Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptc y Court for the Central Dist rict of California Julia Wagner Brand , Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: SPRAKER , GAN , and FARIS , Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

A ppellant EmCyte Corp. appeals the bankruptcy court ’ s order

con firming debtor A nna St ahl ’ s chapte r 13 2 p l an over its objection that

S ta hl ’ s unsecured debt exceeded the limits allowed under § 109 (e)

. Emcyte

1 Th is disposition is not appropriate for publicat ion. Alt hough it may be cited for whatever pers uasiv e value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, se e 9th Cir. BAP R ule 8 024

- 1.

2 Unless specified otherwise, al l cha pter and secti on references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 1 1 U .S.C. §§ 101

– 1 532, and all “Rule” references ar e to the Fed eral Ru les of Bankruptcy P rocedure

. 

# FILED

APR 7 2021

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT2 argues that the bankruptcy court erred by not including the state d amount of its proof of c laim when calcu lating Stahl ’ s unsecured debt for eligibility

purposes

. On th e record before us , the ban kruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion by r ely ing exclusively on the s ch edules to calculate S tahl ’ s chapte r 13 el igibility

. Similarly, we rej ect EmCyte ’ s argument that th e
bankr uptcy court was bound to include the sta ted amount of its pr oof of
claim in determining Stah l ’ s chapter 13 eligibility because Stahl did not object to it s claim

. Ac cordingly, we AF FIRM

. FACTS
A. S tahl ’ s initial s chedu les , statement of financial af fairs , and plan

. Stah l commenced her chapte r 13 b ankruptcy in February 2020. In her
schedu les and st a tement of financ ial affairs , she disclosed tha t she was the principal of two companies

– XL medica, Inc. ( “ XL medic a ” ) and Lifef orm Healing Research LLC ( “ Li fef or m ” ).
I n her initial schedules , Stahl listed $47,975.80 in priority u nsecured debt and $127,714.7 9 in nonprio rity unsecured debt for a grand t otal of $175,690.59 in unsecured debt. None of this amount was listed as contingent or unliquidated. Also, no n e of t h is a mount was attributable to anything she might owe to EmCyte

. S tahl list ed EmCyte in t h ree different
entries in he r schedule E/F , but she stated no specific fixed amount of debt in any of these e ntr ies

. In the first entry , she listed the amount of EmCyte ’ s3 cla im as “ $0.00 ” a nd provided the following additional information: “ Debt
of $13 5 ,000 owed exclusively by [ Lif ef orm ] , De btor ’ s no w defun c t busi ness (closed 2018); notice only ” ( t he “ Notice Only Claim ” )

. Stah l listed the Notice Only Claim as d isp u ted, b ut she did not check the boxes for continge nt or unliquidated

. In the se cond entry naming EmCyte as a creditor , she list ed the

amount owed a s “ unk nown ” and fu rther state d as the basis of the claim:

“ EmCyte Corp. v. Apex Bilogix, et al; Case No. 2:19

- cv
- 007 69

- JES

- NPM;
trade mark i nf ringement allegations ” ( t he “ Trademark Claim ” )

. St ahl listed
the Trad emark Clai m as disputed, but she did not chec k the boxes for contingent or unliquidated.
In the third e ntry naming EmCyte as a creditor , she li st ed the am ou nt

ow ed as “ unk nown ” and fu rther state d as the basis of the claim : “ EmCyte Corp. v. Lifef o r m H ealing Res earch, LLC et al; Case No. 19

- CA

- 005819; breach of contract allegations ” ( t he “ Breach o f Contract Claim ” ). Stahl
listed the B reach o f Cont ract Claim as disp uted, but again she did not check the boxes for contingent o r unliquidated.
Sta hl filed her initia l chapter 13 plan in March 2020. She prop osed a
five

- yea r plan , with mo nthly payment s of $1,091.00 per m onth. She

esti mated that this would result in pay ment of $1,868.70 on account of $127,714.79 in ge neral unse cured claims, f or a distr ibut ion o f roughly 1 .4 %

. The re maining balance of plan payme nts of $63,591.30 would be use d to pay trustee ’ s fees and adminis trative and priori ty creditors.4 B. EmCyte ’ s re lief from stay motion and its underlying litigation against Stahl and others

. In April 2020, EmCyte moved for rel ief from the automa tic st ay. 3 EmCyte sought to modify the s t ay to permit two lawsuits in volving Stahl

t o proceed in the non

- bankrupt c y c ou r ts in w hich the y were pending

. In the process of explaining why it needed relief from stay, EmCyte admitted
that its claim s arising from the two la wsuits were unliquidated: EmCyte seeks modification of the auto matic stay to adjudicate its claims against An na Stah l and XLMedica up to t he point of final judgment in order to liquidate its claim amounts . EmCyte will look to the respective Estates for any recoveries. ( E mphasis added

. )
O f the two lawsuits dis cussed in the rel ief f rom stay motion, one is
the federal trademar k and unfa ir competition action refer enc ed above as
the Trademark Claim

. EmCyte attached to i ts relief from stay motion as
exh ibit A its tra demark and unf a ir competition compl aint

. Generally speaking, EmCyte alleged that Stahl, her wholly

- owned co rporation
XLmedic a, and other s conspired to unfairly comp ete with EmCyte and to
infrin ge on its tr ademark rights by se lling b lo od c oncent rating produ cts , or

3 EmCyte ’s r eli ef fr om sta y motion wa s not included in th e parties’ exc erpts of record. W e exerc i se o ur discretion to take judici al notice of the relief from stay motion

a nd all other documents filed in Stahl ’s ba nkruptcy case

. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood ) , 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th C ir . BAP 2003).5 similar p roducts, that bear EmCyte ’ s registered “ PURE ” trademarks or
similar marks

. The trademark and unf a ir competition complaint does n o t specify
what amount Stahl owes EmCyte for her allegedly wrongful acts. Instead,
the c omplaint conte mplates that d amages will be deter min ed at tri al.
The second lawsuit discussed in EmCyte ’ s relief from stay motio n is
the F lorida state c ourt action refe renced above as the Breach of Contract

C laim

. EmCyte attac hed to its relief from stay motion as exhibit D a c opy of

its st ate court complaint. In it , EmCyte a lleges ca uses of ac tion a gainst Stahl, Life form , and XL me d ica for acco untin g, fraud, bre ach of con tract ,

us ur patio n of cor porate opportunities, alter e go, a nd misappropriation o f
trade secrets

. But the hear t of th a t com plaint is EmCyte ’ s c ontention that
Stahl both individ ually and t hrough Lifeform a nd XLmedica br eache d her
distributor ship agreement wit h EmCyte by competing for direct sales with EmCyte . The co mpl aint also allege s that Stahl and her affiliated entitie s
mis appropriated EmCyte ’ s t rade secrets and sold to custo mers p roduc ts manufactured by EmCyte ’ s com peti tors

. Like i ts trademark and unfair compe tition complaint, E mCyte ’ s state
court breach o f con tract complaint does not specif y a n amount of damag es
but inst ead contemplates th at the dam ages amount will be determine d at
trial. EmCyte additionally refer enced a third lawsuit

. I t attached the findings of fact , conclusions of law , and jud gment f r om th is third laws u i t6 as exhibit E to its relief from sta y mot ion. The lawsuit, however, did not include Stahl as a party

. Rather, EmCyte obtained a Flor ida state c ourt judgment agai nst a business associate of Stahl’s named Emery Smith. The judgment in cludes find ings of fact and conclusions of law regarding

S mit h’s misc o nduct, whic h overlap with t he alleged misconduct of Stahl,
Lif eForm, an d XL medica as stated in the b reach of c ontract lawsui t and the

t rademark infringement la wsuit

. In the process of rendering judgment against Smith in th is third lawsuit, the s tate c ourt made a number of findings in volv ing Lifefo rm

. As
be st we c an discern fro m the record, Lifeform w as not a named party in
this third lawsuit , and no judgment was entered against it. N either Stahl

nor XLmedica were parties to th e action involv ing S mith . Even so, the state

court st ated in its findings that Lifeform owed EmCyte a t otal of $312,434. 07

. Tha t am ount is the sum of : (1) $147,739.07 owed based on
Lifefor m ’ s pr ocure m ent and sale of EmCyte products ; and (2) an additional $164,695.00 ow ed base d on Lifeform ’ s conver s ion of EmCyte’s direct sales

customers. In June 2020, the b ankruptcy court ente red an or de r gran t ing EmCyte ’ s relief from stay m otion.
C. EmCyte ’ s proof o f cla im.
Aro und the same time EmCyte moved for relief from the stay , it also
f iled a proof of claim. EmCyte filed an unsecured claim for $31 2,434. 07 , the

same am ount found

– b ut not adj udged

– a gainst Life f orm in the third7 l aw s uit

. The exhibit s attached to EmCyte ’ s proof of claim largely mirror
those attached to its relief from sta y motion. EmCy t e explain ed that its proof of claim was based on t he complaints fr om its federal tr ademark a nd unfair compet ition lawsuit and
from its state cou rt breach of contract lawsuit

. W hile there is some ove rl ap
between these two lawsuits and the th ird lawsuit against Smith , neither the
de fendants no r the misconduct alleged com plet ely overlap

. M o r e
i m p o r t a n t l y , the re is not hing i n the se complaints or anywhere else in the
record fi xing the amount o f damages Stahl might owe EmCyte individually

or as a n alter ego of Lifeform and XLmedica

. D. The objections to Stahl ’ s plan.
In July 202 0, t h e chapter 13 truste e objected to St ahl ’ s plan. Th e

trustee raised several con cerns, some pertain ing to the reasonableness and

necess ity of St ahl ’ s claimed ex penses and other s pertaining to her reportin g of her ta x es , her income , and the finances o f XL medica. In Sep tember 20 20 , Em Cyte o bjected to Stahl ’ s plan. EmCyte join ed in
the trustee ’ s obje ctions bu t also stated a few of its own. According to EmCyte , Stahl was not allocating all of h er disposa b l e income to her proposed plan and instead was div erti ng f un ds from XLmedic a t o h er
sister s, which funds sho uld have been paid inst ead to Stahl and ma de
available for a larger distribut ion to her un secur ed creditors. 4 EmCy te

4 The bankruptcy court o verru led these obje ctions

. EmCyte has abandoned them

on a ppeal , so th ere is no need to fur ther address them

.8 a ssert e d that Stahl ’ s h andling of XLmedi ca ’ s funds amounted to bad faith for purp os es of Stahl ’ s chapter 13 p lan

. But EmCyte mainly argue d that Stahl ’ s unsec ured debts excee ded § 109 (e) ’ s unsecured debt eligibility limit

. According to EmCyt e , the
combi n ed unsecu re d claims reflected in Stahl ’ s sc hedules and in the c laims register

– in cl ud ing EmCyte ’s $312,434. 07 proof of claim

– demonstrate d

t hat Stahl had to tal unsecured claims exce ed ing $500,000.00

. EmCyte pointed out that § 109(e) capped the el igibi lity limit a t $419,275.00 in noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts

. I n short, Em Cy t e contended
that its $312, 434. 07 proof of claim was liquidated

– even though i t had

s ought relief from s tay to proceed with its n o n
- bankruptcy litigation for the specific purpose of liquidating it s claim agai nst Stahl. EmCyte at ta ched to i ts plan obje ction a declaration and num ero us pages of ex hibits. These exhibits inclu ded a copy o f its proof of claim and copies of papers f i led i n its non bankrupt cy litigati on with Stah l, Lifeform,

a nd XLmedica. 5
E. Amendment of St ahl ’ s schedules and plan , and her reply in support of her plan

. A week after EmCyte fi led its plan objection , Stahl a mended her
sche dules and her plan. In her amended schedule E/F , Stahl now listed the

5 EmCyte did not arg ue in its written plan objection that the stated amount of its proof of claim co unted for eligibility purpose s because it had n ot been objected to

. EmCyte raised this argument for the first time at the plan confirmation hearing. The bankruptc y court implic itly rejected th is argument when it overruled EmCyte ’ s plan9 Notice On ly Claim as contin g ent , unliquidated , and d i sputed. S he also changed the stated amount Lifeform owed for that c lai m from $0 .00 to $3 12 , 434.07

– the same amount stated in EmCyte ’ s p roof of claim

. Stahl also
amended the Trademark Cla im and the B reach of Cont ract C laim to list
them both as u nliquidated and disp uted. Otherwis e, the listing of these

t wo claims did not c hange.
Stahl ’ s amen ded schedule s listed t ot al un secu red debt of $455 , 737.85 , of which $312,434.07 consi s ted o f the disputed and unliquidated Not ice Only C laim. Thus, accord ing to Stahl ’ s ame nded schedules, her

no n contingent and liquidated unsecured debt a mounted to $143,303.78 , which did not materially differ from what she had listed in h e r ini ti al
schedules

. As fo r S t ahl ’ s am ended plan, s he both increased the amount of her

m onthly plan payment s and decreas ed the estimated amount of her priority tax de bt. As a result, she p roje cted $61, 496.11 in aggregate payment s to general unsecured credi t o rs over the lif e of the plan

. At the s ame time Stahl amen d ed her schedules and plan, she filed a reply respond ing t o EmCyte ’ s objections

. As St ahl expl ained, the amoun t

a nd sta tus of the debts s et forth in her schedules was contro lling and the resulting li q uidated and non contin gent debts listed in her schedules was
well under the § 109(e) debt el igibility limit. With respect to EmCyte ’ s cla ims, St ah l pointed out th at the $3 12 , 434.07 Notice O nly C la im in her

obj ection.10 sch edules was listed as only owin g by Lif eform and not by h er. As for the
Trademark Claim and the Breach of Contract Claim, St ahl point ed out that
the amount of both w as listed as u n known , and t hat both were unliquidated an d the subject of pendin g litigation in which the amoun t
owed by St ahl , if any, would need t o be det ermined. According to Stahl,
the bankruptcy court needed to rely on h er schedules to determin e her § 1 09(e) e ligibility because there w e re no allegations or evidence suggest ing
tha t her sche dules were f iled in bad faith.
As for E mCyte ’ s bad faith allegations, St ahl noted that XLmedica was
a debtor in it s own chapter 11 ca s e . She pointed out that it s insider payments to h er sis ters had been d uly notice d and no one had objecte d to

t h ose p ayments. She also contended that the insider payments were both reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. In any event, she

maint ai ned tha t a ny is sue reg arding the propriety of the i n sider payments
should be taken up in XLmedica ’ s chapt er 11 c ase.
F. The confirmation hearing and the order confirmin g Stah l ’ s pl an.
T he bankruptcy court held a plan confirmation hearing on September
23, 2020. The court overruled EmCyte ’ s obje cti o ns. 6 T he cour t stated that,
unless it was appar ent on the face of th e schedules that they were n ot fil ed

in good faith, the court should and would rely o n the schedules to
determine Stahl ’ s eligibility under § 10 9(e)

. As the court obs e rve d, the

6 At the confir mation hearing, the trustee acknowledged tha t Stahl effect ively had res olved all of the t rust ee ’ s plan objections

.11 sc hedules reflected that Stahl did not exceed the un secured debt eligibil ity
li mit se t forth in t he statute. In addition, the bankruptc y court reje cted EmCyte ’ s bad f aith contention . The bankruptcy court essentially adopted

St a h l ’ s positio n on good faith , for the reas ons stated in her reply brief in support of plan confi rmation.
On Oct ober 15, 2020, the bankruptcy court ente red its order
conf irming St ahl ’ s plan. EmCyte timely appealed o n Octob e r 29, 2020

. JURISDICTION
The ba nkru ptcy court h ad jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 133 4 and 157(b) (2)( L ). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1 58.
ISSU E S

1. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretio n by bas ing its § 109(e) eligibility det er m inati on sole ly on Stahl ’ s schedu les ?

2. E ven if the bankruptcy court had consi dered EmCyte ’ s pr oof of claim , would that have demo nstrated that Stahl ’ s u nse cured debt exceeded § 109(e) ’ s eligibility limit ?
STAN DARD S OF REVIEW
We review for an abuse of disc r etion the ba nkruptcy court ’ s decision
whe the r or not to look beyond the debtor ’ s schedules for purp oses of § 109(e) el i gibility

. See Guastella v. Hamp ton ( In re Guastella ) , 341 B.R. 908, 918 ( 9th Cir. BAP 2006) (h o lding tha t “ it was properly within the
di s creti on of t he bankruptcy court to make a li m ited inquiry outside of the
schedules to determine first wheth er Guastella estimated her debts in good12 fa ith a nd, if not, whether Guastella was in fact eligible for cha pter 13
rel i ef

. ” ( em phasis adde d) )

. The b a nkrup tcy cou rt abuse d its discretion if it a pplie d an incorrect legal standard or ma de factual findings tha t were illogical, implausible, or
without s uppor t in the record. See TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver In c. , 653

F.3 d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011) (cit i ng Un ited St ates v. Hinkson , 585 F.3d 1247,

1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
The effect of EmC yte ’ s proof of claim on Stahl ’ s el igibility turn s on
wh ether or not the claim wa s liquidate d at the time of her bankru ptcy filing

. Answering t h at question requi r es in terpret ation of the Bankruptcy
Code , wh ich we review de novo. Fou ntain v. Deutsche Bank Na t’l Tr. Co. (In
re Fountain) , 612 B.R. 743, 74 7 (9th Ci r. BA P 2020) (citing Nicholes v. Johnny Appleseed of Wash. (In re Nicholes ) , 184 B.R. 82, 86 (9th Cir. BA P 1995 ) )

. DIS CUSSION
A. General legal stand ar ds applicable to chapter 13 eligibility.
Section 1 09(e) govern s who is eligible to be a chapter 13 debtor. It

p rovides in relevant par t : “ Only an indivi dual with regular income tha t owes, on the date of the fil i ng of the pe tition, noncontingent, liquidated , unsecured debts of less than $419,275

. . . and noncontingen t, liquidated,

se cured debts of less than $1 ,257, 850

. . . may be a debtor under chapter 13
of this title. ” 7

7 Though the dollar amoun ts of the debt limits under th e statut e are adjusted periodi ca ll y, the a mounts effe ctive at the time of St ahl ’ s chap ter 13 filin g were the same13 The sta t ute specific ally excludes c on t ingen t and u nliquidat ed debts from the eligib ility ca lculation. Ho v. D owell ( In re Ho ) , 274 B. R. 867, 871 ( 9th
Cir. BAP 2002 ) . A debt is continge nt if one or more extrin sic event s must
occur before the debtor will be liable f o r it. In re Fou ntain , 612 B.R. at 74 9 (c iting Fostvedt v. Dow (In re Fostv edt) , 823 F.2d 3 05, 306 (9th Cir. 1987) )

. And a debt i s unliqu idat ed unless the amount of the debt is “ re a dil y
determinable

. ” Slack v. Wilshire I ns. Co. ( In re Slack ) , 187 F.3d 10 7 0, 107 3 (9th Cir. 1999) . In turn, “ [t] he definition of ‘ready determination ’ turns on the distinction between a simple hearing to determ ine th e amount of a certain debt, and an exte nsiv e and contested evidentiary hearing in which
sub stantial e vidence may b e necessary to establish amounts o r liab ility.” In
re Slack , 187 F.3d at 10 73

- 74 ( quoting Fed

. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wenberg (I n re Wenberg ) , 94 B.R. 631, 633 (9th Cir. BAP 1988), a ff'd & adopted , 902 F.2d 768 (9th Cir

. 1990) ); se e also In re Nicholes, 184 B.R. at 89 (“The test for ‘ready
de termin ation’ is whether the amount due is fi xed or certa in or otherwise ascertainable by referen ce to an agr eement or by a simple computation

. ” ).
Under t he p l a in la nguage of the statute , th e amoun t of debt is
determined a s of “ the date of the filing of the petition

. ” 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)

. Thus, “ a bankruptcy court cann ot loo k to p ost

- petition events to determine
the amount of the debt. ” In re Slack , 187 F.3d at 1073

. Un like c ontinge nt and unliq u idat ed debt s , disputed de bts

– that i s debt s wher e debto rs d ispute their li ability

– s hould not be excluded from

as stated ab o ve.14 eligibility c alculations solely on that basis. In re Fountain , 612 B.R. at 748 (citing In re Nic holes , 184 B .R. at 8 8 )

. “ On the o ther hand, i f the dispute itself
makes the claim diffi cult to ascertain or prevents the ready determinati on of the amount due, the debt i s unliq uidated and excluded from the § 109(e) computation. ” In re Ho , 274 B.R. at 874 (citing In re Nich oles , 184 B. R. at 8 91 ) (emphasis omitted)

. 8

B. T he ba n kruptcy court did not abuse its dis cretio n by basing its eligibility determ ination solely on St ahl ’ s schedules

. I t is well establ ished in thi s cir cuit that § 109(e) eligibility issues

“ should normally be determined by th e debtor ’ s o riginally filed schedu l es, checking only to see if the sch edules were made in good faith.” In re S covis , 249 F.3d at 9 82. However, “ where a good faith ob jection to e l igibility has been filed by a party in in t erest, the bankruptcy court can make a limited

i nquiry ou tside of the s chedules to determine if the Deb tor estim ated her debts in good faith, and if not, whether she was eligible for chapter 13
relief. ” In re Foun t ain , 612 B.R. at 748 (citing In re Guaste l la , 341 B.R. at 918 ) (emphasis added )

. Neither Fountain nor Guastell a specifical ly defined what i t me ans to
fil e a “ good faith obje ction to eligi b ility

. ” But Guastella g a ve some
indication what it mea n t in usin g t his term. I n Guastella , the debtor ’ s

8 As the Ninth Cir cuit has pu t it : “ i f th e amo unt of the creditor ’ s c laim at the time of t he filing the petition is ascertainable with certaint y, a dispute regarding liability will not necessarily render a debt unliquidated

. ” Scovis v. H enrichse n (In r e Scovis) , 249 F.3d 97 5, 983

– 84 ( 9th Cir. 2001 ) ( qu oting In re Slack , 18 7 F.3d at 1074 ) (emphas is added)

.15 chap t er 13 filing followed on the hee ls of a stat e court tenta tive dec ision liquidat ing a debt against her pare nts fo r $495,000 .00

. 34 1 B.R. at 912. Though the state court did not finally det ermin e the debto r ’ s li a bilit y for
that debt , it did tentatively find that “ Guastella conspired with her p ar ents

to conc eal the proce eds ” from the sale of certain real property and

t entati vely held th at “ under California law, Guastella could be civilly liable for damages r esulting fro m the conspiracy even though she was not a

mem b er of the conspiracy at the time of its ince ption. ” I d. at 917

. Guastella
then filed her b ankru ptcy to prevent the state cou rt from ruling on her liability. Id . at 912, 917.

W e held in Guas tella that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding
that the debtor failed to schedule t he creditors ’ cl aim in go od faith b ecause
the debtor admitte d her knowledge of the a bove

- refere nced facts , and
based on th o se facts, “ it appeared to a legal certainty

. . . that the [ creditor s ’ ] claim was not $0. 0 0 as stated on the schedules

. ” Id. at 9 2 1. In the process of explaining that the ban kruptc y court acted within it s discreti on
in making “ a limited inquiry outside of the schedules, ” G uastell a observed
that : (1) the objecti ng creditor objected to plan confirmation “ on the

g rou nds t hat Gua ste lla was not el igible for chapter 13 relief and th at the
sche dules were ‘ knowi ngly false ’ ” ; and (2) the debtor did not argue that the plan confirmation object ion was filed in bad faith

. I d. at 918

. Guastella genera ll y acknowl e d ged t he Scovis rule

– that § 109(e) eligibility issues n ormall y are determined by the initial version of the16 debtor’s s chedules, checking on ly to see if th ose schedules were made i n good faith

. Id. at 917

. But Guastella reasoned that th e Sc ovis rule did not

app ly becau se the creditor s objected “ based on eligibility and lack of go od
faith

. ” Id. at 9 18. Guastella u ltimately held that it was not an abuse of
discret i on for the bankruptcy cou rt to look b eyond the debtor ’ s s chedules
and c onsider other facts in the rec ord where the debtor had acted in bad
faith in schedul ing th e debt owed to th e creditor a t “ $0.00

. ” Id

. Meanwhile, Fount ain involved a debtor who schedul e d a deb t arising from a p romissory no te for $1, 00 0.00

. Th e creditor in Fountain filed a proof
of clai m es tablis hing that th e promissory note on which this claim was
based was for a principal amount exce ed ing $1,000,000.00

. In re Fountain , 612 B.R. at 74 7

. Further , Fountain admitte d that she s igned the note. I d. at
74 7 , 749 . A s the BAP in Fountain further poin ted ou t , the debtor ’ s dispute regarding the debt concerned the bank ’ s rig ht to enforc e the note a nd not
the amount owed under the note. Id. a t 749. Fo u ntain ultimately held tha t
the bankru ptcy court was jus ti fied in look in g beyond debtor ’ s schedules on
the se fac ts because th e creditor “ made a good faith objection to eligibility
and asked t he court to review its proof of claim ” and because the proof of

c l aim, when combined with t he debtor ’ s concession that she signed the

not e demonstrated “ to a legal cer tain ty tha t [the creditor ’ s] claim was not $1,000 as stated in Debtor's sched ules. ” Id. 9

9 E mCyte also relie s on Sode rlund v. Cohen (In re Soderlund ) , 236 B .R. 27 1, 273 (9t h Cir. BAP 1999)

. Soderl und pre

- date s S covis and seem s to rej ec t Co mprehensive Acc ounti ng17 Nei ther Fountain nor Guastella s tand s for the prop os i tio n that a bankrup tcy court must consider facts outside th e schedule s in the absen ce of specif ic , concrete alleg atio ns tha t the debtor has, in bad faith, scheduled
her debts in o rder to fal l within § 1 09(e) ’ s eligibility limit s , and without

pres enting some evidence t o support t hose allegation s . Nor are we aware

o f any such cases from th is Pa nel o r the Ninth Circuit

. As a pract ical m atter, prohibit ing the bankruptcy court f rom
exerci sing its discretio n , when appropriate, to curtail the eligibilit y inquir y

wo uld f ly i n the face of the principle that chapter 13 elig ibility
de termi nations n eed to be made e xpeditiously a nd should no t be p ermitted

Corp

. v. Pearson ( In re Pearson ) , 773 F.2d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1985)

-- the pr im ary case on whic h S covis based its ru le re g arding h ow chapter 13 el i gibility shoul d be determined

. See In re Scovis , 249 F.3d at 98 1

- 8 2. In any event , the rule Sod erlund ultimately followed did not materially d iffer from the rule as articulate d in Founta in and Guastel la : “ a bankruptcy court m ay look past t he schedules to o ther evi dence submitted when a good faith object ion to the d ebt or ’ s eligibility under § 109(e) is raised. ” In re Soderlund , 236 B.R. at 273 ( e mphasis added) . Furthermore, the debtor s in Soderlund file d multiple versions of t h ei r schedul es , stating drastica lly diff erent amounts of non

- con tingent, liquida ted unsecure d d ebt

. In fact, in the in itial ver s ion of their sch edules, the debtor s in Soderlu nd listed their aggregate unsecured debt at $ 500,000.00 , n one of which was listed

a s contingent o r unliquidated. I d. at 27 2. Thi s amount was well beyond the § 109 (e) eligibil ity limit. Though the debt ors later amend ed their schedules to reduce their contin gent and unliquidated de bt to $30,000.00 , th e initial sche dulin g of their debt abov e the § 109(e) eligibility leve l, by it self , would seem to provide sufficien t i ndicia that sub sequent amend men ts of t he debtor ’ s schedules might have been filed in bad faith as to permit the bankruptcy court to conduc t a limited in quiry beyond the debtor ’ s schedules for purposes of determining chapter 13 el igibility. See In re Smith , 419 B. R. 826, 829 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2 009), a ff'd sub n om. , Smith v. Rojas (In re Smith) 435 B .R. 637 ( 9 t h C i r

. BAP 2010) ( citing Soderlun d and stating that a bankruptcy court “ may look beyon d the schedules if there are all egatio ns or indicia that the schedules w ere not fill ed out in good fait h ” ( e mp hasis adde d) )

.18 to dominate the chapter 13 case. We have followed this princ ip le where it appeared “ to a legal certainty ” tha t the deb tor had m a n ipulated the

amounts listed in her schedule s i n order to fall within § 109 (e) ’ s eligibility
limits

. See In re Guast e lla , 3 41 B.R. at 9 21

. Similarly, we a lso have stated : When a party cha ll enges a debtor ’ s eligibility for Chapter 13

re lief, the ba nkrup t cy court needs to make a prompt and effective d eterminati on of a debtor ’ s eligi bility. Failure to pr omptly and effect ively determine the debtor ’ s eligibility results in a wa ste of judicial r es ources and inefficient administration of a cas e

— contraveni ng th e legislative intent for expedient resolution of Chapter 1 3 cases.
In r e Nichol es , 184 B.R. at 87

. These same typ es of co ncerns led the Si xth Circuit in Pearson to adopt
f or § 109(e) eligibility purposes the approach ut ilize d in di versi t y cases to resolve disputes regarding whether t he amount claim ed by the p lainti ff

met or exceeded the floor for feder al div ersity jurisdiction: “ the amount claimed in good faith by the plain ti ff controls unless it appears to a legal

certa inty that th e cla i m is for less than the jurisdictional amount or the

amoun t claimed is m er ely co lorable

. ” In re Pearson , 773 F.2 d at 7 57 ( ci ting
St. Paul Indem

. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 2 88

- 90 (1938 ) )

. At bottom, the exigencies of chapter 13 pra ctice and th e st r o ng need for prompt and efficient § 109(e) eligi bility det erminations mi li tate i n favor
of a rul e that affords t he ban kruptc y court with broad discretion to rely exclusively on the debto r ’ s s ch edules

. Based on our analysis of the19 decisions discussed above , s uch exclusive reliance does not const itute an
abuse of d iscretion unle ss a creditor ( or the trustee ) : (1) obje cts on eligibility

g rounds ; (2) allege s in g ood faith that the debtor ’ s schedul es were f iled in
bad faith ; and (3) points to or presents concret e , specific e vi dence indicating t hat the debtor manipul ate d the schedule d d ebt amounts in
order to fall within § 109(e) ’ s debt limits.
Here, EmCyte faile d to make the re quisite allegations a nd failed to point to or present the requisi te evidence. In fact, the evidence in the record supports the view th at Stahl d id no t overrea ch in the way she characterized EmCyte ’ s claims in her schedules. If any pa rty is overreach in g in this
matter, it i s Em Cy te . It sought and obtained relief from the automatic stay
based on its contention that its claim s against Stahl w ere unli quidated

. T hen , it objected to Stahl ’ s plan on eligibi lity grounds b ased on the exact opposite contention

– that its claim s against S tahl w ere li qu idat ed

. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by rel ying on Stahl ’ s schedules to determine her eligibility to be a chapter 13 debtor.

C. Con s i derat ion of EmCyte ’ s claim do es no t establish th at Stahl ’ s unsecured debts exceeded § 10 9(e) ’ s eligibility limits.

E ven if we were to consider EmCyte ’ s proof of claim, th e claim does

not esta blish that Stahl ’ s liquidated, noncontinge nt , unse cu red debts
exceed e d § 10 9( e) ’ s eligibility lim it s. Inde ed, EmCyte ’ s argument to the contrary fails a s a ma tter of binding BAP precedent.20 In its appeal brief , EmCyte argues that its claim shou l d ha ve be en
treated as liquidate d in the amount of $312,43 4. 07 solely because it file d a proof of claim f or t ha t amount a nd Stahl had not object ed to its claim as o f
the time of plan confirmation. As EmCyte notes , Rule 3001(f) governs the evidentiary effect of duly

- filed proof s of claim . Under this rule , EmCyte

p oint s out that its proo f of claim constitute s p rima f acie evid e nce of the validity and am ount of its clai m

. Th e refore, EmCyte conclude s that under Rule 3001(f) its cl aim was liquidated for el i gibility pu rposes in the amount stated in the proof of c laim

. Th at a p ro of o f claim fi led in accordance with the Rule s constitutes pri ma facie evidence of the valid i t y a nd amount of the claim is well

e stablished. See Lundell v. Anchor Const r . Specialists, Inc., 223 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2000) . Moreover, “ [ a ] p roof of cla im is deemed all owed unless a party in interest objects

. ” Id. (c iting § 50 2(a) ). But Rule 3001(f) s olely

p e r ta ins to the claims filing process

. T h ere generally is no deadline for filing claim objections in bankruptcy cases

. Ashford v. Consol. Pioneer Mortg

. (In re Consol. Pio neer Mortg

. ) , 1 78 B.R. 222, 2 2 5 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) , aff’d , 91 F.3d 151 (9th Cir. 1996) (table) (stating t hat “ an obje ction to a proof of claim may be filed at any time”) ; see also Mo rton v. Morton ( In re Morton ) , 298 B.R.
301, 309

– 10 ( 6th Cir. BAP 2003) ( “ Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor Bankrup tcy Rules contain a bar dat e or d e adline for filing objections to
claims in a chapt er 13 case and we wil l not read one into the law where

none exists

. ” ).21 More importantly, t h e claims filing pro ce ss nec essari ly occu rs
pos tp etition

. It, therefore, h as noth ing t o do with chapter 13 eligi bility
which is measured as of the date of the filin g of the p e t ition

. In re Slack , 187
F.3d at 1073

. F or this very reason , th is Panel previously rejected a virtually
identical a rgument in a prior case

. See In re Ho , 274 B.R. at 87 1 n.5 ( stating
that court c ould not look a t po stpe t iti on eve n t s and hence reject ing the

argum ent th at deb t must be counted for elig ibility purposes when it is
deemed allowed under § 502(a) (citing In re Slack , 187 F.3d at 1073 )).

F un dame nt ally , EmCyte ’ s pos iti on is unsound. D eterm i ning eligibilit y based on proofs of claim filed “ woul d be a dangerous practice and impr operly puts eligibility in control of the creditor. ” Lantzy v. Rojas
( In re Lantzy ) , BAP No .CC

- 1 0

- 1057

- K i LP a , 2010 WL 62 59984, at *6 ( 9th Cir.
BAP Dec. 7, 2010) . As Lant zy further obse rved, ha d Congress intended that proof s of claim be the d eterminative factor in whether an individual could proceed under chapter 13, it would have so specified. Id. (c iting In re
Edwards , 51 B.R. 7 90, 791 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985) )

. At oral argument bef ore this panel , EmCyte attempted to argue fo r the first time that the exhibi ts att ac hed to its proof of claim de mon strated
that its claim wa s liquidated. EmCyte never made th is argu ment in the bankruptcy court , nor did it do so in its appeal brief

. Instead, EmCyte specified in its appeal brief that it was rel ying e xclusively on the evidentiary effect of its proo f o f c l aim un der Rule 3001(f) to establ ish its22 liquidated claim. I ndeed, EmC yte unreasonably inferred Stahl ’ s bad faith
from her decision not to object to its claim pr ior to confirmation

. 10

B e cause its appeal brief rel ied exclusively on Rule 3001(f) to support

i ts liq uidation argument , EmCyte effecti vely forfeited its be lated argume nt
that the exhibits attached to its proof of claim established that it s claim was liquidate d. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Wu , 626 F.3d 483, 487

– 88 (9th Cir. 2010) (declining to address matters not speci fically and distinctly argued in the app ellant's opening b rief); Brownfield v. City of Yakima , 612 F.3d 1140, 1149 n.4 (9th C ir. 2010) (same). S till, we have carefull y examined the
exhibits attached to EmCyte ’ s proof of claim. They do not establish “ to a legal certainty ” that Stahl in bad faith mis

- scheduled Em Cyte’s claims in order to fall within § 109( e)’s eligibility lim its. S ee In re Fountain , 612 B.R. at
748

– 4 9 ; In re Guastella , 341 B.R. at 920

- 21. To the contrary, EmCyte ’ s exhibit s actually support Stahl’s description of the amount of the c laims as “unknown” and her listing of the claims as unliquidated. Far from fixing the amount of damages EmCyte alle ge dly incurred a s a result of Stahl’s
conduc t, the exhibits refl ect that the liquidation of damages was an issue
reserved for trial.

10 Stahl has pointed out that no pu rpose would have been served by prema turely objectin g to E mCyte ’ s proof of claim wh en litigation was proceeding on EmCyte ’ s comp laints in non bankruptcy court s as a re sult of E mCyte ’ s relief from stay motion granted for the very purpose of liqu idat ing its cla im s outside of the bankruptcy co urt.23 Acc ordi n gly , EmCyte ’ s proo f of claim does not support reve r sal of
the b ankruptc y cour t ’ s determination that Stahl ’ s un secure d debt fell

wi thin § 109(e) ’ s el igibility limits.

C O NCLUSION

For th e reasons set forth above , we AF FIRM the bankruptcy co urt ’ s plan con fir mati on order. 11

11 In her appeal br ief, Stahl ar gue d that EmC yte ’ s appeal i s frivolous and that she shoul d be awarded her fees and costs pursuant to Rule 8020. We declin e to cons ider Stahl ’ s request because she did not file a separate ly

- noticed mo tion as required by th e R ule. See Simpson v. Burkart (In re Simpson) , 366 B.R. 64, 7 7 (9th Cir. BAP 2007) (citing Tanzi v. Comerica Bank

– Cal

. (In re Ta nzi), 297 B.R. 607, 613 (9th Cir. BA P 2003) )

.