### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Ma y 11, 200 5 S es sio n

CHR ISTOP HERCO OK v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 2000-T-108 M onte Watkins, Ju dge

No. M2004- 02251-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Jul y 22, 2005

The pe titioner, Christopher Cook, appea ls th ed e n ia l o f h is p e ti tion f

or post-convic tion relief, a rg uing that he recei ved ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

tr ia l c ou ns e l. A ft e r o ur re vie w, we a ff

ir m th e po stconviction court’s denial of the petition.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O GL E and R O BERT W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Kenne th Quillen, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Christopher Cook.

Paul G. Summers, At t o rn eyGe n er al an d R ep o rt er ; P re s t o n S h i p p , As s i s t an tAt t o rn eyGe n er al; Victor S. Joh ns on , I I I , D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; a ndRog e r M oo re , A ssi sta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

Acc ording to the State’s re citation of the facts at the submis sion hearing , the petitioner wa s involved in an automobi le ac cident on September 15, 1999, which injured the two occupants of the vehicle he struck. The petitioner wa s also injured, and blood tes t s re v ealed minimal amounts of drug s in the petitioner’s sy stem at the time of the a ccide nt. Subsequently , on April 3, 2003, he pled
g uil ty to D UI
, fir st o ff

e ns e , a ndtw o c ou nts of re c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt andwa s se nte nc e d to

co n s ecutive te rms of ele ven months, twenty -nine da y s for e ach of fense , all suspended e x cept f or forty -eig ht hours, with the balanc e to be served on probation. No di rec t appea l was filed. O n Marc h 2 5
, 2 0 0 4
, th e p e ti ti o n e r f il e d a p e ti ti o n f

o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f
, c laim in g th e fa cts wer e “insuffic ient . . . to support the g uiltypleas” ; “[t] he trial c ourt failed to a dequate ly advise [him] of his constituti onal rig hts”; the pl eas were involuntary and “not knowing ly and int ellige ntly made” ; and trial c ounsel was inef fec tive for “ not adequately investigat[ ing] the under ly ing f acts.”-2-

At the Aug ust 4, 2004, evidentiary hearing, Wayne Cook, the p e titioner’s fathe r, testified that the petitioner wa s “[one] hundred perce nt” di sabled as a result of t he accident and rec eived soc ial

security disability benef

its. He a cknowledg ed that the pe titioner can “ walk, talk, drive ” and “ [t ]ake

car e of himself.” He assisted the petit ioner in reta ining trial counsel and said he and the petitioner met twice with counsel: once at the reta ining se ssion and once in c ourt. Cook said he “a cce pt[ ed] the plea ba

rg ain for [the petitioner]” bec ause he had the petitioner’s power of attorne y . Ex plaining that the dec ision to plead g uilty had been more his de cision than the petitioner’s, Cook said, “ [The petitioner] wanted to take it fu rt h er , beca use he de finitely

knew that he was not drinking that parti c u la r d a y

. . . . I w a s lo o k in g a t mo n e y , r e c o r d f o r h im in th e f

u tu r e , a n d s o o n li k e th is
, and I made the decision.” He sa id they acc epted the ple a bar g ain “f ifteen to twe nty

minutes” afte r lea

rning the re sults of the petiti o n er ’s blood test. He ac knowledg ed that the pe titioner was not under the influence of drug s, other than his pre scribed me dications, on the day of the g uiltypleas.

Thomas Buhler, the petitioner’s first cousin, testified t hat he briefly talked with the petitioner

on th e mo rn ing of

the a c c ide nt a ndob se rv e d n o s ig ns of a lc oh ol i nto xicatio n, wh ic h “ [he ] wo uld have sme lled” bec ause “ [t he petitioner] was like rea l c lose to [him] .” Buhle r acknow ledg ed that he did not know if the petit ioner had taken any drug s befor e the acc ident. Buhle r said that trial c ounsel

ne ve r c on ta c te d h im.

To ny a Whit e d, the pe tit ion e r’ s g ir lf ri e nda t th e tim e of

the a c c ide nt, te sti fi e d th a t sh e a te lun c h w ith the pe tit ion e r “ te n o r f if te e n mi nu tes before ” the a c c ide nt andhe wa s “ [c]o mpl e te ly sober.” Whit ed said the pe titioner was see ing a psy chiatrist and taking “Va lium[ ] for his nerves, a nd some type of de pression medicine .” She said the petitioner’s medication did not intoxi cate him but acknow ledg ed he had suffere d two seizures in the past. She did not know why there was marijuana in the petitioner’s sy stem on the day of the a ccide nt. She said trial counsel ne ver c ontacted he r.

Th e p et itioner testified that taking his case to tria l would have c ost an additional five tho us a nddo lla

rs . H e wa s n ot a sk e d ab ou t the vo lun tari ne ss o f h is p le a s, the me e tin g s h e ha d w ith trial counsel, the f

acts of the acc ident, or how trial counsel should ha ve known that Tony a Whited or Thomas B uhler would a id the defe nse.

Tria l c ou ns e l te sti fi e d h e ha d b e e n p ra c tic ing la w s inc e De c e mbe r 198 7 a ndha d f oc us e d h is
pr a c tic e on “ DU I

de fe ns e a ndoth e r a lc oh ol anddr ug re la te d v e hic ula

r a ssa ult s, ve hic ula

r h omi c ide s, and that sort of thi n g” s i n ce Dec ember 1996. He sa id he was a

founding member of

the National College for DU I Def

enses and had “proba

bly had over, since 1996, at least two hundred hours of .

. . continuing e ducation in this field.” He stated he ha d repr esente d “[h] undreds” of clients cha rg ed with DUI -re lated off

enses a nd could “look at a case and dete rmine what the issues are and what the

are as with problems ar e going to be. And I understand – e specia lly

here in Davidson County – what the jury attitudes are toward the se ca ses, and ha ve a g ood fee l for that.”

Cou ns e l te sti fi e d h e int e rv ie we d the p eti ti on e r a bo ut the a c c ide nt, bu t th e pe tit ion e r “ jus t did n ’ t h a v e a n y

r e c o ll e c ti o n ” a s a

r e s u lt o f th e s e r io u s h e a d in

ju r y h e s u s tain e d in th e a c c ide nt. Acc ording to counsel’s notes, the accident occurre d befor e the pe titioner picked Whited up for lunch-3-

a ndthe pe tit ion e r wa s un able to g ive c ou ns e l th e na me of a ny on e he ha d s e e n b e fo re the a c c ide nt. Af te r the pe tit ion e r’ s toxic olo g y re po rt re ve a le d mariju a na , Dia zep a m, an d Lido c a ine in h is s y ste m, counsel re sear ched the drug s and lea rned tha t Diazepam wa s a ca lming ag ent and that Lidocaine

co u l d ca u s e d i z z i n es s an d d ro ws i n es s

. Di s cu s s i n g h i s v i ew o f t h e ca s e af t er re ce i v i n g t h e t o x i co l o gy

re po rt , tria l c ou ns e l e xpla ine d th e we akn e sse s in the de fe ns e :

I a m lo ok ing a t th is: I ’v e g ot an a c c ide nt with no expla natio n. I ’v e g ot two lit tle old ladies that are injured. I ’ve g ot a per son with drug s in their sy stem. And, I , also, know someth i n g that I

believe the State doesn’t know a bout his prior conviction h i s t o ry

. And base d on that I enter ed discussions with [ the petitioner] and his dad about what we should do.

Trial counse l acknowle dg ed that the pe titioner had no convictions prior to the September 15, 1999,

acc ident but had bee n convicted of DUI in Hickman County

befor e he was a

rre sted for the offe nses

re la te d to the a c c ide nt.

Counsel also expl ained the pr oblem in defe nding a DUI char g e whe n h i s cl i ent had

me a su ra ble a mou nts of

dr ug s in his sy ste m a t th e tim e of the a c c ide nt:

[J ]ury s are , kind of, anti DUI , whether it’s drug s or alcohol, or

whateve r it is. And wh e n a ju ry

he ars the nu mbe rs , a ndthe y kn ow that so me on e ha s g ot that in the ir
sy stem, then it is not g ood.

. . . I n my experience
, that’s something I would ra t her the m no t kn ow abo ut i f I

c a n k e e p th e m f

ro m kn ow ing abo ut i t.

Cou ns e l r e c a lle d th a t th e pe tit ion e r, no t hi s f a the r, ma de the de c isi on to ple a d g uil ty . He sa id he discussed the petitioner’s rig hts w ith him and believed he unde rstood them. Counsel’s “number one priority

was one : No felony

conviction; two, no enhanc ed DUI conviction.” He said that neither the petitioner nor his father “ express[ed]

. . . any dissatisfaction with [hi s] s ervic e or the outcome of this case.”

Medica l rec ords pre sented a t the evidentiary hearing show ed that the pe titi o n er h ad a “possible seizure disorder ” and pr eviously had bec ome unconsc ious while driving and run his car into a ditch. Trial counse l said he did not remembe r see ing that information. Counsel acknowle dg ed that he didno t in te rv ie w a ny wi tne sse s.

AN AL YSI S

The pe titioner’s sole claim on appeal is that he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel in that counsel “f

ailed to conduct a rea sonable investigation.” Specifica lly , he ar g ues trial counse l was inef fe ct i ve in not interviewing Tony a Whited and not “eve n rea d[i ng ] t he discove ry materia l provided by

the State,” asserting that these recor ds would have reve aled previously he had a seizure while driving and “w as unconsc ious when his car crosse d the ce nter line.”-4-

I n order to asce rtain the c ompetence of counse l, Tennesse e courts have a pplied standards develope d in f

eder al case law. See State v. T ay lor, 968 S.W .2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (n oti ng that th e sa me sta nd ardfo r d e te rm ini ng in eff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l th a t is app lie d in fede ral c ases also applies i n Tenne ssee)

. The United States Supreme Court articulated the standa rd in S tr ic kla ndv. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 1 04 S. Ct . 2 05 2, 80 L . E d. 2d67 4 ( 19 84 ), wh ic h is widel y ac cepte d as the a

ppropriate standard f

or all cla ims of a convicte d petitioner that counse l’s assistance was de fec tive. The standard i s firmly g rounded in the belief that counsel play s a role that is “ critica l to the ability of the adver sarial sy stem to produce just re sults.” I d. at 685, 104 S. Ct. at 20 63 . T he Str ic kla ndsta nd ardis a tw o- pr on g te st:

F ir st, the pe tit ion e r mus t sh ow that c ou ns e l’ s p e rf orma nc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. Th is require s showing that counsel made err ors so s erious that counse l was not fu nc tio nin g a s th e “ c ou ns e l” g ua rante e d th e pe tit ion e r b y

the Sixth A me nd me nt. Second, th e petiti oner must show that the de ficient pe rformance prejudice d the defe nse. This requir es showing that counsel’s e rror s were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

I d. at 6 8 7
, 1 04 S. Ct . at 2064. The Strickland Court f urther e x plained the meaning of “def icient
p e r f o r m a n c e ” i n t h e f

i r s tp r o n g o f

t h e t e s ti n t h e f

o l l o w i n g w a y:

I n any case prese nting a n ineffe ctiveness c laim, the performanc e inquiry must be whether co u n s el’s assist ance was re asonable considering all the circ umstances . . . . N o p ar ti c u la

r s e t o f d e ta il e d ru le s f

o r c o u n s e l’ s c o n d u c t c a n s a ti s f a c tor ily take

acc ount of the variety

of circ umstances f

ace d by defe nse counse l or t h e range of leg itimate decisions reg arding how best to repr esent a criminal petitioner.

I d. a t 68 8- 89 , 1 04 S. Ct . a t 20 65

. Th e pe tit ion e r mus t e sta bli sh “ that c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n f e ll below an obje ctive standa rd of r easona

bleness under

preva iling prof

essional norms

. ” H o u s ev

. State
, 44 S.W .3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996))

.

As fo r the pr e

jud ic e pr on g of the te st, the Str ic klandCou rt e xpla ine d: “ Th e pe tit ion e r mus t show that there is a rea sonable proba bilitythat, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr oc e e din g wo uldha ve be e n d if fe re nt. A r e a so na

ble pr ob abil ity

is a pr ob abil ity

su ff ic ie nt t o undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S . Ct. at 2068; see also Ove rton v. Sta te , 8 74 S.W. 2d6, 11 (T e nn . 1 99 4) (c on c lud ing that pe tit ion e r fa ile d to e sta bli sh that “ the re is a

rea sonable proba

bilitythat, but for counse l’s err ors, the outcome of the p roce eding s would have be en dif fe re nt” ). Cou rt s n e e d n ot a pp ro a c h th e Str ic klandte st i n a sp e c if ic or de r o r e ve n “ a dd re ss b oth components of the inquiry if the petitioner make s an insufficie nt showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069; se e also Goad, 938 S.W .2d at 370 (stating that “fa ilure to prove e ither def iciency
or pre judice provide s a suffic ient basis to deny relief on the ineff

ective a ssistance c laim”).

The pe titioner at a post-c onviction relief he aring has the burden of proving the alleg ations of fa ct by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2003). A pe tition-5-

based on ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel is a sing le g round for relief, ther efor e all fa ctual alleg ations must be presente d in one claim. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-206(d)

. We note that when post-conviction proce eding s have inc luded a f ull evidentiary

hearing, a s in this case , the trial judg e’s f indings of f

act a nd conclusions of law are g iven the ef fec t and weig ht of a jury verdic t, a nd this c ourt is “ bound by the trial judge ’s finding s of fa ct unless we c onclude that the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord preponder ates ag ainst the judg ment enter ed in the ca use.” B lack v. State, 794 S.W .2d 752, 755 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). The reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that the conduct of counsel fa lls withi n the rang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance, see Stri ck l an d
, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct . at 2066, and may not second-g uess the tac tical and
str a te g ic c ho ic e s ma de by tr ia l c ou ns e l un le ss tho se c ho ic e s w e re un inf orme d b e c a us e of

ina de qu a te pr e pa ratio n. Se e He lla

rdv. Sta te , 6 29 S.W. 2d4, 9 (T e nn

. 19 82 ). Th e fa c t th a t a str a te g y or ta c tic failed or hurt the def

ense doe s not alone support the claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l. See Th omp so n v . St a te , 9 58 S.W. 2d15 6, 16 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 97 ). F ina lly , a pe rs on c ha

rg e d w ith a criminal offe nse i s not entitled to perfe ct re prese ntation. See Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . As explained i n S t at e v

. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 462 (Tenn. 1999)
, “[c]onduct that is unreasonable under the fac ts of one ca se may be per fec tly

rea sonable unde r the fac ts of another .”

Since the petitioner pled g uilty to the char g es, he “ must show ‘prejudice ’ by demonstrating that, but for counse l’s err ors, he would not ha ve pleade d g uiltybut would have insisted upon g oing to trial.” Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Hill v. L ockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. C t. 366, 370, 88 L . Ed. 2d 203 (1985); Ba nkston v. State, 815 S.W .2d 213, 215 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 91 )) . H ill e xpla ins the sh ow ing of pr e jud ic e a pe tit ion e r w ho ple d g uil ty mus t make:

I n many

g uiltyplea c ases, the “pre judice” inquiry

will closely

rese mble the inq uiry e ng a g e d in by

c ou rt s r e vie wi ng ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi st ance c ha lle ng e s to convictions obtained throug h a trial. F or example, wher e the a lleg ed err or of c ounsel is a failure t o investigate or discove r potentially exculpatory

evidenc e, the determination whether the err or “pr ejudiced” the petitioner by causing him to plead
g uilt y ra t h er t h an g o to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the

e vid e nc e wo uldha ve le d c ou ns e l to c ha ng e his re c omm e nd a tio n a s to the ple a . T his assessment, i n t u rn, wil l depend in lar g e part on a pre diction whether the evidenc e likely would have c hang ed the outcome of a tria l.

474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct . at 370.

Whe n s p e c i f

i c a l l y c h a l l e n g i n g t h e a t t o r n e y ’ s p e r f o r m a n c e o r s tr a t e g y , t h e p e t i t i o n e r m us t

overc ome the pre sumption of competence . This presumption “is not some pr es u m p t i o n that the particula r def en s e l aw y er in re ality

focuse d on and, then, de liberate ly decide d to do or not to do a specific act,” but that “ what the particula r defe nse lawy er did at trial--for example, what witnesses he pre sented or did not pre sent--w ere acts that s o m e re asonable lawy er mig ht do.” Chandler v.-6-

United States, 218 F.3 d 1 3 0 5
, 1314 n.15 (11th Cir. 2000). To over come this presumption, “a
pe tit ion e r m us t e sta

bli sh that no c omp e te nt c ou ns e l w ou ld h a ve take n th e a c tio n th a t hi s c ou ns e l di d
take .” I d. a t 13 15 (f

oo tno te omi tte d) . A dd iti on a lly , a pe tit ion e r c a nn ot re c e ive re lie f on the c la im of a n a tto rn e y ’s fa ilu re to b ri ng in e vid e nc e a ndwi tne sse s “ un le ss h e c a n p ro du c e a ma te ri a l w itn e ss wh o ( a ) c ou ld h a ve be e n f ou ndby a re a so na

ble inv e sti g a tio n an d (b) wo uldha ve te sti fi e d f a vo ra bly in support of his defe nse if ca lled.” B lack, 794 S.W.2d at 757-58.

The post-c onviction court ac cre dited trial counsel’ s testimonyand found tha t the “[p] etitioner’s g uiltyplea wa s supported by the fa cts.” We note that, at the submissi on hearing, the petitioner ag ree d with the State’s recitation that he collided with the vi ctims’ vehicle, injuring the vic tim s, onSe pte mbe r 5 , 1 99 9, wh ile ha vin g min ima l a mou nts of dr ug s in his sy ste m. T he po stconviction court found that the “[p] etitioner’s g uilty plea [transcript] clea rly shows not only

that [t he trial judg e] ex plained [to him ] hi s constitutional rights, b u t also that [the] [p] etitioner under stood those rig hts and dec lined [t he trial judg e’s] offe r to furthe r explain those rig hts to him ” and that “the [p] etitioner knowing ly

and voluntarily

pled g uiltyto the char g es ag ainst him.” Moreove r, the c ourt ruled that the “ [p] etitioner has not prove n that [t rial counse l’s] work was not ‘within the ra ng e of

c omp e te nc e de ma nd e d o f atto rn e y ’s [sic ] in c ri min a l c a se s, ’ andthat hi s c a se was pr e jud ic e d a s a result of c ounsel’s ineff

ectivene ss.”

Th e tr a ns c ri pt of th e su bmi ssi on he ari ng sh ow s th e pe tit ion e r w a s q ue sti on e d a s to his
entering the pleas of guilty
, and the court found him “compe tent and ably repr esente d” and his plea s “voluntary .” As the petitioner entered his pleas, he aff irmed his understanding that he wa s pleading
g uiltyto “three separ ate c rimes . . . and a ll of them will g o on [hi s] rec ord” and that he “w ill be on
pr ob a tio n f

or thi s th re e -y e ar p e ri od .” He a lso re sp on de d, “ No , sir ,” wh e n the c ou rt a sk e d h im i f i t

ne e de d to “ e xpla in [h is] rig hts fu rthe r. ” L a stl y , w he n th e c ou rt a sk e d the pe tit ion e r ho w h e c ho se to plead to ea ch count of

rec kless endang erme nt and the DUI , first offe nse, he responded, “ Guilty .”

Trial counse l testified t hat, i n investigating the matter, he relied on the pe titioner’s statement to him , whi c h wa s bri e f sin c e the pe tit ion e r h a d n o r e c oll e c tio n o f the a c c ide nt, a ndc omp le te d h is investigation which produce d no rea sonably favor able witnesse s s i n ce the petitioner provide d no names of pe ople he saw before the accident. Acc ording to his notes, the acc ident occur red be fore the petit ioner met with Tony a W hited. The submi ssion hearing transcript shows the petitioner was fully advised of his rig hts and voluntarily pled guilty to DUI and reckless endang erme nt. Since he did not testify

at the evidentiary hearing about his g uiltypleas, ther e is no rea son to doubt counsel’s

a sse rt ion that th e pe tit ioner freel ya ndvo lun tari ly ple d g uil ty . T he re c or d s up po rt s th e po stconviction court’s determination that the petitioner failed to e stablish counsel was inef fec tive.

To establish that he wa s prejudice d by trial counsel’s a lleg edly ineffe ctive re prese ntation, the petitioner asse rts that he would not have pled g uiltyif trial counse l had prope rly investigated and informed him of the c onsequenc es of plea ding g u i l t y

. Howeve r, we conclude that the re cord supports the post-conviction court’s determination that counsel properly investigated t he ca se and informed the pe titioner of hi s rig hts and the conse quence s of pleading g uilty . As we pr eviously have set out, the petitioner wa s questioned at leng th by the t rial court before the ac cepta nce of the pleas-7-

of g uil ty

. Al tho ug h he arg ue s on app e a l that he wo uld no t ha ve ple d g uil ty , a bs e nt c ou ns e l’ s e rr or s, the fa ct re mains that the o n l y p roof in thi s reg ard he prese nted at the e videntiary hearing w as the
te sti mon y of his fathe r, wh o c la ime d it wa s he
, a nd no t th e pe tit ion e r, wh o h a d a c c e pte d th e g uil ty plea. The testimony of t he petiti oner’ s trial counsel, accr edited by the pos t-conviction court, and the
tr a ns c ri pt o f the su bmi ssi on he ari ng , b e lie thi s c la im.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing a uthorities and rea soning, w e af firm the post-convic tion court’s denial of the petition.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE