NOTICE
 

The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the 

Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal 

errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts: 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501 

Fax: (907) 264-0878 

E-mail: corrections@ akcourts.us 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

ROY F. SILAS, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

Appellee. 

Court of Appeals No. A-11452 

Trial Court No. 3AN-99-1814 CR 

O P I N I O N 

No. 2602 — June 1, 2018 

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 

Anchorage, Michael L. Wolverton, Judge. 

Appearances: J. Adam Bartlett, Anchorage, under contract with 

the Office of Public Advocacy, for the Appellant. Timothy W. 

Terrell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, 

Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, 

for the Appellee. 

Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard, Judge. 

Judge MANNHEIMER. 

As a condition of his probation, Roy F. Silas was ordered to participate in 

sex offender treatment as directed by his probation officer, and to “not ... discontinue 

treatment” unless he had his probation officer’s approval. After Silas had participated 

in a sexoffender treatment program for over a year, the program director terminated him 

from the program for various reasons (reasons that we will examine in this opinion). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Based on Silas’s termination from the treatment program, the State petitioned the 

superior court to revoke his probation, alleging that Silas had violated his probation by 

discontinuing his treatment without permission. 

Silas’s attorney argued that Silas had not “discontinued” treatment, but 

rather that Silas had been involuntarily discharged from the treatment program without 

good reason. 

The superior court ruled that it did not matter why Silas was terminated 

from the treatment program. The court interpreted Silas’s condition of probation as 

requiring Silas to continue treatment until his probation officer said otherwise, and that 

Silas was in “technical violation” of his probation because he had been discharged from 

the treatment program — regardless of whether there was good cause for Silas’s 

discharge. 

We conclude that the superior court’s ruling was error. If it was true that 

Silas was discharged from the treatment program for no good reason (or for improper 

reasons), then Silas’s discharge from treatment would not establish good cause for the 

court to revoke Silas’s probation. 

As we recently explained in Pulusila v. State, __ P.3d __, 2018 WL 

2272568 (Alaska App. 2018), our law forbids a sentencing court from revoking a 

defendant’s probation unless the court finds that the facts surrounding the defendant’s 

violation of probation constitute “good cause” to revoke probation. Pulusila, 2018 WL 

2272568 at *2, 3, 6. In this context, “good cause” means a finding that “the corrective 

aims of probation cannot be achieved”, and that “continuation of [the defendant’s] 

probationary status would be at odds with the need to protect society and society’s 

interest in the probationer’s rehabilitation.” Id. at *3, quoting Trumbly v. State, 515 P.2d 

707, 709 (Alaska 1973). 

– 2 – 2602
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In Silas’s case, the superior court never reached the factual merits of the 

defense attorney’s contention that Silas was terminated from treatment without good 

reason. Thus, Silas’s case still presents disputed issues of fact that the superior court 

must address and resolve — and we remand Silas’s case to the superior court for that 

purpose. 

Silas’s case also presents other issues related to his conditions of probation. 

At the probation revocation hearing, the superior court rejected Silas’s 

request that he be allowed to socialize with Patsy Schreiber, his romantic partner and the 

mother of his children. Because the superior court failed to offer any plausible basis for 

this restriction on Silas’s family relationship, we reverse the superior court’s ruling on 

this matter. 

Additionally, after the superior court revoked Silas’s probation, the court 

added several new probation conditions. The court ordered Silas to enroll in domestic 

violence treatment, even though his case apparently presents no issue of violence. The 

court also ordered that, if a medical professional deemed it appropriate, Silas would be 

required to enroll in a residential treatment program. By adding the possibility of forced 

participation in residential treatment, the superior court illegally increased Silas’s 

sentence. See Christensen v. State, 844 P.2d 557, 559 (Alaska App. 1993). We therefore 

direct the superior court to rescind these conditions. 

Underlying facts 

In 1999, Roy F. Silas was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse of a 

minor. He was sentenced to a term of active imprisonment, followed by probation for 

10 years (with a 5-year suspended term of imprisonment). One of Silas’s conditions of 

probation required him to participate in sex offender treatment as directed by his 

– 3 – 2602
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

probation officer, and not to discontinue treatment without his probation officer’s 

approval. 

After Silas was released on probation, his probation officer directed him to 

participate in sex offender treatment. In January 2011, Silas entered the sex offender 

treatment program run by the Center for Psychosocial Development. He participated in 

this program for more than a year, until May 2012, when he was arrested for stealing a 

laptop computer. 

Severalweeks later, Silas was released from custody in connection with the 

theft of the laptop, and he re-entered the sex offender treatment program. But after a 

period of time, the director of the treatment program, Julie Holden, terminated Silas from 

the program. According to the discharge summary prepared by Holden, Silas was 

terminated from the program because he possessed several pornographic videos, because 

he did not adhere to his curfew, and because he was “unwilling[] to fully engage and 

participate in treatment”. 

After Silas was discharged from the sex offender treatment program, the 

State petitioned the superior court to revoke his probation. The State alleged that Silas 

violated the requirement that he was “not to discontinue treatment” without his probation 

officer’s approval. 

At the ensuing revocation hearing in the superior court, Silas’s attorney 

argued that Silas had not “discontinued” his sex offender treatment — rather, Silas had 

been terminated from the program against his will. Through his cross-examination of 

Silas’s probation officer and his cross-examination of Holden, as well as through Silas’s 

own testimony, the defense attorney tried to show that Holden had terminated Silas from 

the program based on erroneous assumptions about Silas’s probation conditions, and 

based on unsupported assertions about Silas’s purported “unwillingness” to engage in 

treatment. 

– 4 – 2602
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

With regard to Silas’s possession of pornographic videos, Holden’s 

testimony on cross-examination revealed that she mistakenly believed that Silas’s 

conditions of probation prohibited him from possessing pornography. 

With regard to the curfew, Silas testified that the curfew was imposed on 

him to prevent him from socializing with Patsy Schreiber, his romantic partner and the 

mother of his children. And Holden indicated that she thought the curfew was merely 

an implementation of Silas’s conditions of probation. But Silas’s probation officer 

testified that she had never prohibited Silas from having contact with Schreiber. 

With regard to Silas’s “hiding things” from his treatment providers, Holden 

asserted that Silas had engaged in acts of domestic violence while he was enrolled in the 

treatment program. But later, Holden essentially admitted that she was mistaken about 

this. 

And with regard to Silas’s alleged unwillingness to participate in the 

program, Holden offered no concrete examples of Silas’s non-participation. She merely 

asserted: 

I felt like we lost [Silas] in his participation in group 

— his honest, you know, participation in group. ... He did 

not ever really fully engage [following his return to treatment 

after his incarceration for the theft of the laptop]. And I felt 

that we had a whole series of things that were beginning to 

happen again, whether they were at our direction or probation 

or parole ... that, okay, we’re at another point here where we 

seem to have lost Roy as a client and a participant. 

But Silas, for his part, testified that he remained committed to participating in sex 

offender treatment. He contended that he stopped volunteering things in the treatment 

sessions because, whenever he spoke, the facilitator would accuse him of lying. 

– 5 – 2602
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In sum, the defense attorney tried to establish that most of Holden’s reasons 

for dischargingSilas from the treatment program were demonstrably unfounded, and that 

Silas’s alleged unwillingness to participate in group therapy was a contested matter of 

opinion. 

But during the defense attorney’s cross-examination of Holden, while the 

attorney was attempting to demonstrate that Holden lacked any substantial grounds for 

terminating Silas from the program, the judge interrupted the cross-examination and 

declared that the defense attorney’s questions were irrelevant to the issue of whether 

Silas had violated his probation. The judge indicated that Silas violated his probation 

because he was discharged from the treatment program — and that the reason for Silas’s 

termination from the program was irrelevant. At the time, Silas’s attorney seemingly 

agreed with the judge’s assessment: 

The Court: Here’s the problem ... . This is an 

adjudication [hearing, not a disposition hearing.] It seems 

abundantly clear that he was discharged from the treatment 

program. Now, if you want to talk about the reasons for that 

— as a matter of disposition — that’s fine. But for 

adjudication [purposes], is there — are you contesting that he 

was discharged? 

Defense Attorney: Well, ... this could [be relevant] to 

disposition, Judge. I mean, this is part of what you have to 

think about when you sentence him. 

The Court: Right. I get your point. ... But as far as 

adjudication, ... 

Defense Attorney: No, you’re correct. It wouldn’t 

have to do with whether he was discharged from the program. 

– 6 – 2602
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

However, later in the hearing, Silas’s attorney argued that the evidence 

presented at the hearing did not establish that Silas “discontinued” his treatment, either 

in the sense of deciding to stop treatment or even in the sense of failing to make goodfaith efforts to participate in the treatment. Rather, the defense attorney argued, the 

evidence showed that Silas was terminated from the program without good reason — 

thus preventing Silas from fulfilling his treatment requirement. 

The superior court rejected the defense attorney’s position —rulinginstead 

that Silas’s termination from the treatment program was, in and of itself, a violation of 

his probation, regardless of the reason for Silas’s termination: 

The Court: [Silas’s conditions of probation stated that 

he was to] enter and successfully complete an approved sex 

offender treatment program ... as directed by the Department 

of Corrections — period. [And] the next sentence [of that 

same probation condition] is, “The defendant is not to 

discontinue treatment without written approval of the 

probation/parole officer.” ... I’m going to find that he had an 

obligation to continue treatment ... . 

After the superior court announced this ruling, Silas’s attorney noted that 

the court had failed to address Silas’s argument that he did not “discontinue” the 

treatment program — that he was instead terminated without good reason. The superior 

court responded by declaring that even if Silas was terminated from the program without 

good reason, Silas was still in “technical violation” of his conditions of probation. 

Based on the superior court’s finding that Silas had violated his probation, 

the court revoked Silas’s probation and imposed 90 days of Silas’s previously suspended 

jail time. The superior court also added three new probation conditions, including a 

condition that required Silas to enter and successfully complete any other treatment 

programs approved by the Department of Corrections, “including but not limited to 

– 7 – 2602
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

substance abuse treatment and domestic violence programming.” The court also 

declared that this new treatment requirement could include placement “in a residential 

mental health or substance abuse program for a length of time determined necessary by 

the appropriate professional.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, Silas could be 

confined against his will in a residential treatment facility. 

Silas’s probation could not be revoked unless there was good cause — and 

Silas’s termination from the treatment program did not necessarily 

establish good cause to revoke his probation 

In Silas’s brief to this Court, he argues that he did not “discontinue” his sex 

offender treatment; rather, he was dismissed from the program involuntarily. Silas 

contends that the word “discontinue” connotes a deliberate or willful act, and that 

therefore the State had to prove that Silas deliberately or willfully ended his participation 

in the treatment program. Because Silas took no affirmative action to discontinue the 

treatment, he argues that he did not violate his probation. 

The State responds that the involuntariness of Silas’s departure from the 

treatment program should not be considered a defense — for otherwise, “any degree of 

half-hearted, minimal[] effort” would suffice to satisfy a defendant’s treatment 

obligation. 

We agree with the State that the involuntariness of Silas’s discharge from 

the treatment program is not, standing alone, a defense to the allegation that Silas 

violated his treatment requirement. As the supreme court explained in Trumbly, and as 

this Court explained in Pulusila, the real question is whether, given the reasons for 

Silas’s termination from the treatment program, the superior court could reasonably 

conclude that the aims of probation could not be achieved, and that the continuation of 

– 8 – 2602
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Silas’s probationary status “would be at odds with the need to protect society and 

society’s interest in [Silas’s] rehabilitation.” 

Under Trumbly and Pulusila, the superior court could conceivably find 

good cause to revoke Silas’s probation even if Silas had been terminated from the 

treatment program involuntarily — if, for example, despite Silas’s best efforts, his 

cognitive deficits or emotional difficulties prevented him from deriving any substantial 

benefit from the program, and if there was no alternative treatment available to achieve 

the court’s rehabilitative goals while leaving Silas at liberty in the community under 

probation supervision. 

The superior court would have confronted a similar issue if Silas had been 

terminated from treatment involuntarily because the program’s funding was cut. Under 

Trumbly and Pulusila, the question is not whether the termination of treatment was 

Silas’s fault — although Silas’s fault or lack of fault would certainly be a relevant factor 

in the court’s assessment under Trumbly and Pulusila. Rather, the question is whether, 

given the new situation, the superior court could reasonably conclude that the aims of 

Silas’s probation could no longer be achieved, and that the continuation of Silas’s 

probationary status “would be at odds with the need to protect society and society’s 

interest in [Silas’s] rehabilitation” — or whether, instead, alternative methods were 

available to achieve the goals of probation. 

In the present case, even though Silas’s attorney may have couched his 

argument in terms of the “involuntariness” of Silas’s termination from the sex offender 

treatment program, the record of the superior court proceedings clearly shows that the 

defense attorney was trying to establish that Silas was terminated from the program for 

reasons that were unfounded — reasons that did not reflect on Silas’s amenability to 

treatment. 

– 9 – 2602
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The defense attorney’s cross-examination of Julie Holden (the program 

director), as well as Silas’s own testimony at the hearing, were designed to show that 

Holden discharged Silas from the treatment program for reasons that were either 

demonstrably wrong or, at best, were supported only by vague and unspecific assertions 

that Silas had failed to “engage” — assertions which Silas actively disputed. 

For instance, Holden conceded that she had mistakenly believed that Silas’s 

possession of pornography was a violation of his conditions of probation. She also 

essentially conceded that she had been wrong in thinking that Silas had engaged in acts 

of domestic violence during his treatment. And according to Silas’s testimony, his 

curfew was imposed under the mistaken belief that his probation officer had prohibited 

him from socializing with his romantic partner, Patsy Schreiber. It is unclear whether 

Holden would have discharged Silas from the treatment program if she had understood 

the true state of affairs. 

The only remaining ground that Holden offered for terminating Silas from 

the treatment program was her assertion that Silas had not been “full[y] participating, not 

being honest, ... [not] engaging in the therapeutic process.” But other than the three 

discredited instances discussed in the preceding paragraph, Holden offered nothing 

specific to back up her conclusory assertion that Silas had not been making good-faith 

efforts to participate in treatment. And Silas (in his own testimony) actively disputed this 

assertion. 

The superior court refused to resolve any of these issues. Instead, the court 

ruled that Silas’s probation could be revoked if Silas was terminated from the treatment 

program for any reason — even if the factual premises underlying Silas’s termination 

were demonstrably mistaken or actively disputed. 

This was error. Under Trumbly and Pulusila, the question the superior 

court should have been asking is whether the circumstances of Silas’s termination from 

– 10 – 2602
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the program showed that the aims of Silas’s probation could not be achieved, and that 

continuation of Silas’s probationary status would be contrary to the need to protect 

society and the need to foster Silas’s rehabilitation. 

Because the superior court declined to resolve the factual disputes raised 

by Silas and his attorney, the existing record fails to establish whether Silas was 

terminated from treatment for reasons that cast substantial doubt on his amenability to 

treatment and the efficacy of his continued probation. Thus, the record fails to support 

the superior court’s revocation of Silas’s probation. 

We therefore vacate the superior court’s revocation of Silas’s probation. 

If the State chooses to pursue this matter further, the State must establish that there is 

good cause to revoke Silas’s probation under the legal standard that we have explained 

here. 

The new conditions of probation that the superior court added when it 

revoked Silas’s probation 

As we explained earlier, after the superior court revoked Silas’s probation 

for his alleged act of “discontinuing” sex offender treatment without his probation 

officer’s approval, the court added several new conditions to Silas’s probation. Because 

we are vacating the superior court’s finding that Silas violated his probation, any 

immediate review of these new conditions is technically moot. 1 

See State v. Henry, 240 P.3d 846, 848 (Alaska App. 2010), and Reyes v. State, 978 

P.2d 635, 640-41 (Alaska App. 1999), where this Court held that a sentencing judge cannot 

alter a defendant’s conditions of probation to the defendant’s detriment unless the State 

proves that the defendant has violated the conditions of their probation or that the defendant 

has engaged in some other post-sentencing conduct that establishes a substantial reason to 

conclude that the defendant’s current conditions of probation are not adequately ensuring the 

defendant’s rehabilitation or adequately protecting the public. 

– 11 – 2602
 

1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We nevertheless address certain aspects of these new conditions, to avoid 

any repetition of error should the State decide to renew its probation revocation petition 

against Silas. 

At the revocation hearing, Silas’s attorney challenged a purported order 

issued by Silas’s probation officer that prohibited Silas from contacting Patsy Schreiber, 

the woman who was Silas’s romantic partner and the mother of his children. Silas and 

Schreiber wanted to get married, but Silas told the court that they were prevented from 

seeing each other because of his probation officer’s order. 

The State’s response was that no such order existed. Silas’s probation 

officer, his treatment supervisor, and his mental health provider all denied that they had 

ever prohibited Silas from seeing Schreiber. 

Nevertheless, at the end of the hearing, the superior court denied Silas’s 

request to resume contact with Schreiber. The court gave no reasons for its ruling. 

The State concedes that the superior court’s ruling was error, because the 

court made no special findings to justify this interference with Silas’s familial 

relationships. See Dawson v. State, 894 P.2d 672, 680-81 (Alaska App. 1995), and 

Simants v. State, 329 P.3d 1033, 1038-39 (Alaska App. 2014). 

But there is another significant problem with the superior court’s order. 

Even though Silas alleged that his probation officer had prohibited him from contacting 

or socializing with Schreiber, the three State’s witnesses who supervised Silas’s 

probation — his probation officer, his treatment supervisor, and his mental health 

provider — all denied that such a restriction had ever been placed on Silas. Nor did they 

offer any reason why such a restriction should be placed on Silas. 

Given this record, the superior court lacked any plausible basis for 

prohibiting Silas from seeing Schreiber. We therefore reverse the superior court’s order 

on this matter. 

– 12 – 2602
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We also need to address the superior court’s decision to impose a new 

condition on Silas requiring him to enter any and all treatment programs approved by the 

Department of Corrections if he is ordered to do so by his probation officer. 

The superior court specified that these unnamed programs should include 

“domestic violence programming”, even though Silas’s case does not appear to include 

any aspect of physical violence, and even though the court made no finding that such a 

program had any connection to Silas’s rehabilitation or to preventing Silas from posing 

a danger to the public. See Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Alaska 1977). 

If the superior court again revokes Silas’s probation, and if the court again 

concludes that Silas should be required to participate in domestic violence programming, 

the court must make specific findings justifying this new requirement. 

Another provision of this same new condition of probation requires Silas 

to “enroll in a residential mental health or substance abuse program for a length of time 

to be determined necessary by the appropriate professional.” (Emphasis added.) It was 

illegal for the superior court to add this new requirement to Silas’s probation, because 

the court was potentially increasing Silas’s total period of incarceration. See Christensen 

v. State, 844 P.2d 557, 559 (Alaska App. 1993); AS 12.55.100(c). 

Conclusion 

The superior court’s “Disposition Order” — i.e., its order revoking Silas’s 

probation and adding new conditions of probation — is VACATED in part and 

REVERSED in part. 

– 13 – 2602