PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No: 20-1843

_______________

ABNER ANTONIO ARCOS SANCHEZ, 

a/k/a Abner Arcos, a/k/a Abner Sanchez, 

a/k/a Abner A. Snachez-Acros, a/k/a Abner Antonio 

Acros-Sanchez,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

_______________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA 1:A204-362-439)

Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal

_______________

Argued: January 26, 2021
2

Before: JORDAN, MATEY, Circuit Judges,

and HORAN,* District Judge.

(Filed: May 5, 2021)

_______________

Jerard A. Gonzalez [ARGUED]

BASTARRIKA SOTO GONZALEZ & SOMOHANO

3 Garret Mountain Plaza - Suite 302

Woodland Park, NJ 07424

Cheryl Lin

338 Palisade Avenue - Suite 255

Jersey City, NJ 07307

 Counsel for Petitioner 

William P. Barr

Micah Engler

Brendan P. Hogan [ARGUED]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Office of Immigration Litigation 

P.O. Box 878

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

 Counsel for Respondent

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

* Honorable Marilyn Horan, United States District 

Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by 

designation.
3

_______________

HORAN, District Judge.

Abner Antonio Arcos Sanchez petitions for review of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) decision 

dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial 

of his application for asylum, withholding of removal under 8 

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and withholding of removal under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Board also denied 

Arcos Sanchez’s request for remand to the IJ for administrative 

closure, which would have given time for renewal of his 

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) status. On 

this latter issue, the Board cited then Attorney General 

Sessions’ decision in Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 

271 (A.G. 2018). The Board determined that the IJ and the 

Board did not have authority to administratively close 

proceedings, unless a “regulation or a previous judicially 

approved settlement expressly authorizes such an action” as set 

forth in Castro-Tum. A.R. 4. As such, remand for 

consideration of administrative closure, while Arcos Sanchez 

pursued DACA status renewal, was denied. For the reasons 

we discuss below, we grant Arcos Sanchez’s petition for 

review, vacate the Board’s decision, and remand for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In 2002, at the age of seven, Arcos Sanchez, a native 

and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without 
4

inspection. In 2012, he applied for DACA1 status, which was 

approved. The Department of Homeland Security periodically 

granted his requests for renewals. On April 8, 2019, Arcos 

Sanchez was arrested and charged in New Jersey with sexual 

assault and endangering the welfare of a child. On May 17, 

2019, based upon that arrest and those charges, the United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) 

revoked Arcos Sanchez’s DACA status. In June 2019, the 

1 Since June 15, 2012, DACA has granted certain 

immigrant children and young adults deferred action, a form of 

prosecutorial discretion where the Department of Homeland 

Security (“DHS”) formally decides not to pursue removal of 

otherwise deportable non-citizens. See DHS, Memorandum 

from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Janet Napolitano, “Exercising 

Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 

Came to the United States as Children, (June 15, 2012), 

https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercisingprosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-aschildren.pdf, Addendum A (“Napolitano Memorandum”). To 

be considered for DACA, applicants must satisfy the 

requirements set forth in the Napolitano Memorandum. 

Specifically, the applicant must: 1. Have entered the United 

States under the age of 16; 2. Have continuously resided in the 

United States since June 15, 2007; 3. Be currently enrolled in 

school, have graduated from high school, have obtained a 

general education development certificate, or have been 

honorably discharged from the U.S. Coast Guard or Armed 

Forces; 4. Have not been convicted of a felony offense, a 

significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor 

offenses, or are otherwise not a threat to national security or 

public safety; and 5. Have been under the age of 30 as of 

June 5, 2012. Napolitano Memorandum at 1.
5

Department of Homeland Security took Arcos Sanchez into 

custody, served him with a Notice to Appear, and charged him 

as being present without having been admitted or paroled. See

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii).

In removal proceedings before the IJ, Arcos Sanchez 

applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and for relief 

under CAT. The IJ denied asylum, finding that Arcos Sanchez

failed to meet the one-year filing deadline or show 

extraordinary circumstances in the delay. The IJ denied 

withholding of removal, finding the proposed social group was 

not cognizable. Finally, the IJ denied his CAT claim, finding 

he did not demonstrate at least a fifty percent chance he would 

be tortured upon his return to Mexico. On November 6, 2019, 

the IJ issued his decision and ordered Arcos Sanchez’s removal 

to Mexico. Two weeks later, his state criminal charges were 

dismissed. 

On appeal to the Board, Arcos Sanchez challenged the 

IJ’s decision and requested the Board remand his case to the IJ 

for consideration of administrative closure. He argued that, 

because the state criminal charges were dismissed, he was 

“eligible for renewal of his DACA and re-filed with UCIS on 

January 28, 2020[,]” which would impact the disposition of his 

removal proceeding. A.R. 26. The Board denied remand, 

citing the binding precedent of then-Attorney General 

Sessions’ Castro-Tum decision, which held that, under the 

regulations governing the Executive Office of Immigration 

Review, IJs and the Board do not have the general authority to 

indefinitely suspend immigration proceedings by 

administrative closure. The Board found that, since Arcos 

Sanchez did not show that his request for remand for 

administrative closure fell within the express exceptions under 
6

Castro-Tum, his case could not be administratively closed. 27 

I. & N. Dec. at 283.

2

 Arcos-Sanchez petitioned for review of 

the Board’s decision. 

II. Jurisdiction

We have jurisdiction to review petitions under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a). We review legal conclusions of the Board de novo, 

subject to established rules of deference. Da Silva v. Att’y Gen. 

of the U.S., 948 F.3d 629, 633 (3d Cir. 2020). Here, we are 

presented with the question whether then Attorney General 

Sessions’ Castro-Tum decision properly concluded that 8 

C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) unambiguously do 

not grant IJs and the Board the general authority to 

administratively close cases. The Board denied Arcos 

Sanchez’s remand request based on the Attorney General’s 

conclusion that there is no such general authority. Arcos 

Sanchez challenges the Board’s reliance on that conclusion, 

which we will review de novo. See Da Silva, 948 F.3d at 633.

III. History of Administrative Closure

A. Pre Castro-Tum

Since at least the 1980s, IJs and the Board have utilized 

administrative closure as a docketing tool to remove cases from 

their active dockets as a matter of “administrative 

2 As noted below, the Department of Justice amended 8 

C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) for removal 

proceedings initiated after January 15, 2021. As this matter 

was initiated before January 15, 2021, the Court reviews the 

pre-amendment text.
7

convenience.” In re Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 479, 480 

(B.I.A. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

Matter of Amico, 19 I. & N. Dec. 652, 654 n.1 (B.I.A. 1988) 

(“The administrative closing of a case does not result in a final 

order,” but “is merely an administrative convenience which 

allows the removal of cases from the calendar in appropriate 

situations.”). Administrative closure allows an IJ or the Board 

to “temporarily pause removal proceedings” and place the case 

on hold because of a pending alternative resolution or because 

events outside the control of either party may affect the case. 

Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 17, 18 (B.I.A. 2017).

Even though IJs and the Board have used general 

administrative closure for almost three decades, the 

Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) and the 

regulations governing IJs or the Board do not expressly 

authorize the practice. See Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 907, 

917-18 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the general power to 

administratively close a case is employed by quasi-judicial 

bodies for “orderly management of the docket” and is 

reviewable by courts). Although the INA and its regulations 

do not specifically reference general administrative closure 

authority, the regulations both explicitly and implicitly confer 

broad powers on IJs and the Board to manage their dockets. As 

regards IJs’ authority, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) concerns their 

“powers and duties” and states in relevant part:

In conducting hearings under section 240 of the 

Act and such other proceedings the Attorney 

General may assign to them, immigration judges 

shall exercise the powers and duties delegated to 

them by the Act and by the Attorney General 

through regulation. In deciding the individual 
8

cases before them, and subject to the applicable 

governing standards, immigration judges shall 

exercise their independent judgment and 

discretion and may take any action consistent 

with their authorities under the Act and 

regulations that is appropriate and necessary for 

the disposition of such cases. ... In all cases, 

immigration judges shall seek to resolve the 

questions before them in a timely and impartial 

manner consistent with the Act and regulations.

Id. (emphases added). In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(iv)

provides that IJs shall have the authority in any removal 

proceeding to “take any other action consistent with applicable 

law and regulations as may be appropriate.” As regards the 

Board’s authority, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) states that Board 

members:

shall exercise their independent judgment and 

discretion in considering and determining the 

cases coming before the Board, and a panel or 

Board member to whom a case is assigned may 

take any action consistent with their authorities 

under the Act and the regulations as is 

appropriate and necessary for the disposition of 

the case.

Id. (emphases added).

Aside from regulations, Board decisions have also 

recognized the authority for IJs and the Board to 

administratively close cases, at first only if it was not “opposed 

by either of the parties.” Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I. & N. 
9

Dec. at 479. In Matter of Avetisyan, the Board endorsed the 

administrative closure practice and held that both 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) empower IJs and the Board 

to “take any action...as is appropriate and necessary for the 

disposition of [a] case.” 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 691 (B.I.A. 

2012). The Board applied a six-factor test to determine 

whether administrative closure was appropriate, regardless of 

government opposition. See Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 696. 

It explained that, “[d]uring the course of proceedings, an [IJ] 

or the [Board] may find it necessary or, in the interests of 

justice and fairness to the parties, prudent to defer further 

action for some period of time.” Id. The Board described two 

mechanisms to defer action: continuance and administrative 

closure. “[A] continuance may be appropriately utilized to 

await additional action required of the parties that will be, or is 

expected to be, completed within a reasonably certain and brief 

amount of time.” Id. However, the Board observed in 

Avetisyan that when the parties must “await an action or event 

that is relevant to immigration proceedings but is outside the 

control of the parties or the court and may not occur for a 

significant or undetermined period of time,” removing a case 

from the docket via administrative closure may be 

“appropriate.” Id. at 692. 

In addition, as described by the Board, administrative 

closure can facilitate “efficient management of the resources

of the immigration courts and the Board.” Id. at 695; see also 

Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir. 

2018) (citing Matter of Avetisyan as authority for 

administrative closure). Under this framework, the Board has 

issued decisions recognizing the authority for IJs to 

administratively close cases for many reasons related to the 

interests of justice or to the conservation of court resources. 
10

See e.g. Matter of Montiel, 26 I. & N. Dec. 555 (B.I.A. 2015) 

(holding administrative closure appropriate when a petitioner 

is awaiting resolution of a criminal conviction direct appeal). 

The Board reaffirmed Avetisyan in Matter of W-Y-U-, and 

clarified that “the primary consideration for an Immigration 

Judge in determining whether to administratively close or 

recalendar proceedings is whether the party opposing 

administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the 

case to proceed and be resolved on the merits. 27 I. & N. Dec. 

at 20.

B. Castro-Tum

On May 17, 2018, in Matter of Castro-Tum, then 

Attorney General Sessions employed administrative 

adjudication under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i), holding that IJs 

and the Board lack the authority to administratively close cases 

“except where a previous regulation or settlement agreement 

has expressly conferred it.” 27 I. & N. Dec. at 283. In that 

decision, the Attorney General overruled the contrary rulings 

from Avetisyan and W-Y-U-. This decision reversed the 

decades-old practice of administrative closure, endorsed by

Board decisions and rooted in prior interpretations of 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). The Attorney General 

noted a sharp increase in administratively closed cases between 

2011 and 2017, which he linked to the more permissive 

standard established by Avetisyan. Id. at 273. And he observed

that no statute or regulation explicitly grants IJs a general 

power of administrative closure. In concluding that the 

regulations do not implicitly grant authority for administrative 

closure, he held that closure cannot be “appropriate and 

necessary” to the “disposition” of cases since closure is a 

suspension that delays the final resolution of a case. Id. at 285. 
11

He further reasoned that a general power to administratively 

close cases would conflict with the regulation’s requirement 

that IJs “timely” resolve their cases. Id.

C. Post Castro-Tum 

Since the issuance of Castro-Tum, our sister courts of 

appeals have split on whether it was correctly decided. The 

Fourth and Seventh Circuits have ruled that the IJ and Board 

have general authority to administratively close cases. In 

Romero v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the regulations at 

issue and concluded that they “unambiguously confer upon IJs 

and the Board the general authority to administratively close 

cases[,]” but even if they are ambiguous, “the Attorney 

General’s reading of the regulations does not warrant 

deference because it amounts to an ‘unfair surprise.’” 937 F.3d 

282, 294-95 (4th Cir. 2019). Similarly, in Meza Morales v. 

Barr, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Castro-Tum was 

contrary to the unambiguous meaning of the regulations and 

that IJs and the Board are “not precluded from administratively 

closing cases when appropriate.” 973 F.3d 656, 667 (7th Cir. 

2020) (Barrett, J.); see also Zelaya Diaz v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 687

(7th Cir. 2021) (applying Meza-Morales). Thus, two circuits 

have concluded that the regulations at issue unambiguously 

confer general authority for administrative closure and that 

Castro-Tum was wrongly decided. On the other hand, in

Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, the Sixth Circuit held that the 

regulations unambiguously do not authorize the general use of 

administrative closure and that Castro-Tum was correctly 

decided. 981 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2020). That court held that 

§§ 1003.10 and 1003.1(d) do not delegate to IJs or the Board 
12

“the general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration 

proceedings by administrative closure.”3 Id. at 462.

IV. Discussion 

Arcos Sanchez argues that 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 

1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously grant IJs and the Board the 

general authority to administratively close cases by authorizing 

them to take “any action” that is “appropriate and necessary” 

for the disposition of cases. As such, Arcos Sanchez maintains 

that Castro-Tum was wrongly decided, and that the Board’s 

decision should be vacated and remanded so that he may seek 

administrative closure before the IJ. His position reflects the 

rulings of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. 

The government, on the other hand, argues that the 

Board was correct to apply Castro-Tum, because the 

unambiguous text of the regulations does not confer general 

authority for administrative closure. This position tracks the 

ruling of the Sixth Circuit. In the alternative, the government 

argues that, if we should find the regulations are ambiguous, 

then we should defer to Castro-Tum. In either case, the 

government asks us to uphold the Board’s decision denying 

3 On December 16, 2020, the Executive Office of 

Immigration Review within the Department of Justice issued a 

final rule, endorsing the Sixth Circuit’s position on CastroTum and codifying the Attorney General’s decision on 

administrative closure. Appellate Procedures and Decisional 

Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative Closure, 

85 Fed. Reg. 81588-01 (December 16, 2020). This rule took 

effect on January 15, 2021 and is not retroactive to this case. 

Id.
13

Arcos Sanchez’s request for remand for administrative closure. 

We will now address the issue of the general authority of IJs 

and the Board to administratively close cases.

Our consideration of the regulations, and in turn CastroTum, begins with review of the language of 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) to determine whether those

regulations are ambiguous as regards any general authority for 

administrative closure. “The basic tenets of statutory 

construction apply to construction of regulations.” Pa. Fed’n 

of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 337, 351 

(3d Cir. 2007). “If a statute or rule is unambiguous, we must 

give effect to its plain meaning.” Consol Pa. Coal Co., LLC v. 

Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 941 F.3d 95, 104 

(3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415

(2019)). In Kisor, the Supreme Court admonished that “hard 

interpretive conundrums, even relating to complex rules, can 

often be solved” without “wav[ing] the ambiguity flag.” 139 

S. Ct. at 2415. Indeed, a statute or rule cannot be “genuinely 

ambiguous” unless it remains unclear after we have 

“exhaust[ed] all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” Id. 

Consequently, our analysis proceeds by “‘carefully 

consider[ing]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose” of the 

statute or regulation. Id. (citation omitted).

In that regard, the Fourth Circuit in Romero applied the 

standard tools of interpretation by first reading the text of the 

relevant regulations. Both regulations provide that IJs and the 

Board “may take any action ... appropriate and necessary for 

the disposition” of the case. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) & 

1003.10(b). In assessing the word “any” for its plain meaning, 

Romero opined, “‘any action ... for the disposition of’ the case 

is read most naturally to encompass actions of whatever kind 
14

appropriate for the resolution of a case.” 937 F.3d at 292 

(citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit 

concluded,

4 and we agree, “this would plainly include docket 

management actions such as administrative closure, which 

often facilitate...case resolution.” Id. Second, Romero

observed, and we agree, that administrative closure qualifies as 

an “action” under §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). In fact, 

the Castro-Tum decision describes administrative closure as an 

action. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 271. Third, Romero noted the only 

limitation upon “any action” within the text of §§ 1003.10(b) 

and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) “is that the circumstances be ‘appropriate 

4 Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019),

bolstered its conclusion by comparing these regulations to the 

plain meaning afforded the word “any” in other statutes or 

regulations. See, e.g., Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 

214, 220 (2008) (concluding that “any...other law enforcement 

officer” means “law enforcement officers of whatever kind”); 

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007) (repetition of 

“any” embraced all airborne compounds); Brogan v. United 

States, 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998) (“any” false statement 

included a false statement “of whatever kind”); United States 

v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (concluding that the inclusion 

of the word “any” and the lack of restrictive language left no 

basis for limiting a provision in a sentencing statute); Harrison 

v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980) (concluding 

Congress intended “any” as “expansive language”); Citizens’ 

Bank of La. v. Parker, 192 U.S. 73, 81, (1904) (“The word any

excludes selection or distinction. It declares the exemption 

without limitation.”); Int’l All. of Theatrical & Stage Emps. v. 

NLRB, 334 F.3d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that the use of 

“any” signals that the word it modifies should receive broad 

definition).
15

and necessary’ for IJs and the [Board] to administratively close 

a case.” 937 F.3d at 293. Specifically, this clause requires that 

any action taken must be appropriate and necessary for the 

disposition of each case consistent with authorities under the 

Act and regulations. Precedent shows that the phrase

“appropriate and necessary” is treated broadly. Id. (citing

Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015) (“One does not 

need to open up a dictionary in order to realize the 

capaciousness of this phrase [‘appropriate and necessary’].”); 

see also Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 286 (2011) (noting 

“the word ‘appropriate’ is inherently context dependent”);

Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1944) 

(concluding the word “necessary ... has always been 

recognized as a word to be harmonized with its context”). We 

similarly conclude that the use of the phrase “disposition of ... 

case” relates to the context-driven phrase “appropriate and 

necessary.” Board decisions have illustrated the many contexts 

in which administrative closure is “appropriate and 

necessary.”5

 Thus, the limiting words “appropriate and 

5 See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 

2012) (administrative closure granted pending visa petition on 

adjustment of status); Matter of Rajah, 25 I. & N. Dec. 127, 

135 n.10 (B.I.A. 2009)(administrative closure granted pending 

prima facie approvable of visa petition); Matter of Hashmi, 24 

I. & N. Dec. 785, 791 n.4 (administrative closure granted 

pending application for provisional waiver ); see also 8 C.F.R. 

§ 212.7(e)(4)(iii) (DHS regulation requiring individuals in 

removal proceedings to have the proceedings administratively 

closed prior to applying for a provisional waiver). Nothing in 

§ 1003.10 or § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) suggests any limiting 

parameters on what may be considered “appropriate and 

necessary.”
16

necessary” instruct that any action taken by the IJ or the Board 

must consider case-specific circumstances.

Finally, Romero noted, and we agree, that “the rest of 

the text of the relevant regulations supports the conclusion that 

IJs and the [Board] possess broad discretion in how to manage 

their cases.” 937 F.3d at 294. As for IJs, § 1003.10(b) 

concludes, “[i]n all cases, immigration judges shall seek to 

resolve the questions before them in a timely and impartial 

manner consistent with the Act and regulations.” As for the 

Board, § 1003.1(d)(1) likewise provides that “[t]he Board shall 

resolve the questions before it in a manner that is timely, 

impartial, and consistent with the Act and regulations.” We 

agree with Romero that “administrative closure may—contrary 

to the Attorney General’s argument in Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. 

Dec. at 288–89—in fact facilitate the timely resolution of an 

issue or case.” 937 F.3d at 294. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit 

stated in Meza Morales, “not all mechanisms that lengthen the 

proceedings of a case prevent ‘timely’ resolution.” Meza 

Morales, 973 F.3d at 665.

In an opinion by now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the 

Seventh Circuit concluded in Meza Morales that “the 

immigration regulations that grant immigration judges their 

general powers [are] broad enough to implicitly encompass 

that [administrative closure] authority.” Id. Meza Morales

cited the example given by the Fourth Circuit in Romero of 

when “appropriate and necessary actions” could include 

administrative closure: “cases in which two coordinate offices 

in the executive branch are simultaneously adjudicating 

collateral applications [and] closing one proceeding might help 

advance a case toward resolution.” Id. (citing Romero, 937 

F.3d at 293). And it rejected the Government’s arguments,
17

such as that other regulatory provisions would be rendered 

superfluous or that delays caused by administrative closure are 

forbidden by the regulations. The opinion concludes that the 

regulatory preference for timeliness “is not a hard and fast 

deadline; some cases are more complex and simply take longer 

to resolve,” and therefore that preference “doesn’t justify 

departure from the plain text of the rule.” Id. at 665. In the 

end, “[e]xpeditiousness may be one ... goal [of the 

regulations], but it is not the only goal.” Id. at 666.

 We are fully persuaded that, as discussed in Romero 

and Meza Morales, the regulations afford IJs and the Board 

authority to take any action (including administrative closure) 

as is appropriate and necessary (in the context of each case) 

for the disposition of such case to resolve questions in a timely 

and impartial manner consistent with the Act and regulations. 

After applying the standard tools of interpretation, by

considering the text, structure, history, and purpose of 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), we hold that the plain 

language establishes that general administrative closure 

authority is unambiguously authorized by these regulations.

Yet, the government argues that the very same 

regulations unambiguously do not confer general authority for 

administrative closure.6 In Castro-Tum, the Attorney General

6 Our dissenting colleague similarly contends that the 

regulations do not empower IJs or the BIA to administratively 

close cases. The disagreement here, however, seems to be 

directed at how broadly those regulations were interpreted and 

applied prior to Castro-Tum, under the standard set out in 

Avetisyan, rather than at the correctness of Castro-Tum

itself. (See Dissent at 10 (“But those phrases, broad or not, are 
18

said as much and noted that, “[a]lthough described as a 

temporary suspension” of removal proceedings, 

“administrative closure is effectively permanent in most 

instances.” 27 I. & N. Dec. at 272. He reasoned that the 

regulations do not confer general administrative authority 

because such action effectively amounts to an indefinite 

suspension that delays or prevents the final disposition of a 

case and thus conflicts with regulations requiring IJs to timely 

resolve cases. 27 I. & N. at 285. The Sixth Circuit majority in

Hernandez-Serrano agreed with Castro-Tum and affirmed its 

conclusion that the regulations do not confer general authority 

for administrative closure.

not best understood to render section 1003.10(b) without 

limitation and provide IJs nearly unfettered discretion. To the 

contrary, ‘appropriate and necessary’ is itself an important 

restriction on the scope of the Attorney General’s delegation, 

and one that comes with some bite.”).) To that end, the dissent 

criticizes our example of an immigration adjudication 

prevented by the shuttling of a file back and forth between 

USCIS and the Office of Chief Counsel, calling such evidence 

“too light a breeze to propel a vast delegation of general 

administrative closure authority.” (Dissent at 15.) But the 

question before us is not whether the regulations endow IJs and 

the BIA with a “vast delegation of general administrative 

closure authority.” It is whether they entirely foreclose IJs or 

the BIA from ever exercising some degree of discretion to 

administratively close a case, as the Attorney General decided 

in Castro-Tum. Thus, the dissent’s characterization of 

“administrative closure” as “the antithesis of a final 

disposition” does not convince us that Castro-Tum was 

correctly decided. (Dissent at 7 (quoting Castro-Tum, 27 I. &

N. Dec. at 285).
19

Both Castro-Tum and Hernandez-Serrano emphasize a 

concern that administrative closure leads to delay or no final 

decision in removal cases. In fact, the opening sentence of the 

Hernandez-Serrano majority opinion states: “[a] regulation 

delegating to immigration judges authority to take certain 

actions ‘[i]n deciding the individual cases before them’ does 

not delegate to them general authority not to decide those cases 

at all.” 981 F.3d at 461. That court also observed, “[t]hus the 

reality is that, in hundreds of thousands of cases, administrative 

closure has amounted to a decision not to apply the Nation's 

immigration laws at all.” Id. at 463. Concern about 

administrative closures causing widespread delay and nondecision appears to have motivated both the Attorney 

General’s and the Sixth Circuit’s decisions. If IJs are abusing 

their discretion, that may very well be cause for concern, but it 

does not relate to the question that Castro Tum purported to 

answer—whether the regulations confer general authority for 

administrative closure. The majority in Herandez-Serrano

even conceded that “the ‘timely manner’ language is 

hortatory,” but concluded that “the IJ can resolve neither 

questions nor a case once it is administratively closed.” Id.

To this same point, the dissent observed, and we agree:

whether immigration courts have granted 

administrative closure too frequently, and have 

failed to reopen administratively closed cases too 

often, is of no significance to the question of 

whether Castro-Tum wrongly held that IJs and 

the BIA never have the discretion to decide that 

administrative closure is “appropriate and
20

necessary for the disposition” of immigration 

cases.

981 F.3d at 471. The authority to administratively close cases, 

within the appropriate and necessary context of each case, can 

and does permit IJs and the Board to answer the questions 

before them in a timely and impartial manner consistent with 

the Act and the regulations. Or in other words, delay in the 

case through administrative closure does not, by definition, 

prevent the timely disposition of the case and resolution of 

questions.

As discussed above, certain removal cases require 

resolution of questions that depend upon decisions from other 

tribunals or agencies over which neither the IJ nor the Board 

controls. The Attorney General’s Castro-Tum decision fails to 

acknowledge the fact that allowing time for the IJ or the Board 

to receive the outcome from another tribunal or agency enables

resolution of relevant questions and thus facilitates the timely

disposition of a removal case. Without the general authority to 

administratively close appropriate cases when necessary, the 

IJs and the Board may not have a sufficiently developed record

and may be less effective in managing cases. Such a result is 

not contemplated by the Act or the regulations.

 That some IJs and the Board may have used, or misused, 

administrative closure to unduly delay or permanently close 

and not decide cases does not answer the legal question of 

whether IJs or the Board have the general authority to 

administratively close cases under the regulations. Improper 

use of administrative closure to attain objectives not authorized 

by the regulations is appropriately challenged and redressed 

through appropriate review, including judicial review under an 
21

abuse-of-discretion standard. See Vahora, 626 F.3d at 917 

(review of administrative closure under an abuse of discretion 

standard). 

In addition, the INA grants the Attorney General 

rulemaking authority to set standards for immigration judges 

and the Board. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2). Indeed, 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.10(b) empowers IJs to exercise independent judgment 

and discretion in their decision making, “subject to the 

applicable governing standards” and other regulatory 

constraints. Id. As such, concern for undue delay or nondecision in removal dispositions through the application of that 

discretion, to the extent not already addressed through the 

existing regulatory framework, can be redressed through 

agency rulemaking and standards. “The Attorney General may 

amend these rules through the proper procedures. But he may 

not, ‘under the guise of interpreting a regulation, ... create de 

facto a new regulation’ that contradicts the one in place.” Meza 

Morales, 973 F.3d at 667 (citation omitted). And, even if a 

regulation leads to bad policy, we “may not do the Attorney 

General’s work for him.”7

 Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at 

474 (Clay, J., dissenting).

7 The government submitted an argument in the 

alternative that, if the regulations were found to be ambiguous 

to the question of general administrative authority to 

administratively close immigration cases, then principles of 

agency deference should be afforded to apply the agency 

interpretation as presented in the Castro-Tum decision. 

However, this appeal is resolved by our finding that the 

regulations unambiguously grant general authority for IJs and 

the Board to administratively close immigration cases. No 

issue of any deference remains for discussion or decision.
22

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the 

relevant regulations confer the general authority to 

administratively close cases to IJs and the Board. We therefore 

grant the petition for review, vacate the Board’s order, and 

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.