2020 IL App (4th) 180792-U 

NO. 4-18-0792 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ANTHONY L. MABON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Macon County 

No. 12CF1287 

Honorable 

Jeffrey S. Geisler, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed 

the trial court’s first-stage dismissal of defendant’s pro se postconviction petition. 

 

¶ 2 In September 2018, defendant, Anthony L. Mabon, filed a pro se postconviction 

petition. In October 2018, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant’s petition. The Office 

of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. In 

March 2020, OSAD filed a motion to withdraw as defendant’s counsel on appeal. This court 

granted defendant leave to file a response to OSAD’s motion by June 5, 2020. On May 29, 

2020, defendant filed his response to OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel on 

appeal. After reviewing defendant’s pro se petition and the record in this case, we grant OSAD’s 

motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s pro se

postconviction petition. 

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

September 3, 2020

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In June 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of four counts of aggravated criminal 

sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(d) (West 2012)) to A.K., a 13-year-old, 

developmentally-disabled girl. In August 2015, the trial court sentenced defendant to 

consecutive 13-year sentences on each of the four convictions. 

¶ 5 On direct appeal, defendant argued the State committed prosecutorial misconduct 

by (1) introducing evidence defendant impregnated his daughter, D.D.; (2) asking the trial court 

to send the child’s picture to the jury room during the jury’s deliberations; and (3) introducing 

evidence defendant threatened to shoot D.D.’s boyfriend if he continued to see D.D. People v. 

Mabon, 2017 IL App (4th) 150857-U, ¶ 2. Defendant also argued his trial counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective because he presented evidence defendant purportedly pushed D.D. 

down a flight of stairs, attempting to cause a miscarriage, and threatened to kill D.D. if she told 

anyone defendant was the baby’s father. Mabon, 2017 IL App (4th) 150857-U, ¶ 2. Finally, 

defendant argued he was denied a fair trial by the cumulative effect of the alleged errors. 

Mabon, 2017 IL App (4th) 150857-U, ¶ 2. 

¶ 6 This court held defendant essentially conceded the State could introduce evidence 

defendant had sex with his daughter. Mabon, 2017 IL App (4th) 150857-U, ¶ 40. Information 

regarding D.D.’s pregnancy was evidence defendant had sex with his daughter. Mabon, 2017 IL 

App (4th) 150857-U, ¶ 40. The photograph of the child was further evidence of defendant’s 

sexual conduct with his daughter. Mabon, 2017 IL App (4th) 150857-U, ¶ 41. This court found 

no merit in defendant’s argument the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. Mabon, 2017 

IL App (4th) 150857-U, ¶ 45. As for defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this 

court did not find defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
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reasonableness. Further, even if defense counsel’s performance was deficient, this court found it 

difficult to see how defendant could have been prejudiced based on all the evidence. Mabon, 

2017 IL App (4th) 150857-U, ¶ 52. This court also found no cumulative error. Mabon, 2017 IL 

App (4th) 150857-U, ¶ 54. As a result, this court affirmed defendant’s conviction. Mabon, 2017 

IL App (4th) 150857-U, ¶ 56. 

¶ 7 On September 14, 2018, defendant filed his pro se postconviction petition 

claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was actually innocent. Defendant 

alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to represent him during the plea bargaining 

process and for failing to properly cross-examine Detective Borowczyk with regard to the 

detective’s examination of defendant’s cell phone. Further, according to defendant, he asked his 

trial counsel several times to ask the State about a plea deal but counsel never did. Defendant 

also alleges the trial court violated his right to have a fair sentence because the court inaccurately 

stated defendant and the victim were related. Defendant’s actual innocence claim alleged the 

State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

¶ 8 On October 26, 2018, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant’s 

postconviction petition as frivolous and without merit. 

¶ 9 This appeal followed. 

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Defendant appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se postconviction petition. 

We apply a de novo standard of review to a first-stage summary dismissal of a postconviction 

petition. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1075 (1998). Based on 

our examination of the record, OSAD’s motion to withdraw, defendant’s response to OSAD’s 

motion, the State’s brief, and defendant’s reply to the State’s brief, we conclude, as has OSAD, 
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that an appeal in this cause is without merit.

¶ 12 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2018))

“provides a mechanism for criminal defendants to challenge their convictions or sentences based 

on a substantial violation of their rights under the federal or state constitutions.” People v. 

Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 354, 925 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-75 (2010). A proceeding under the Act is a 

collateral attack on the trial court proceedings and not an appeal from the defendant’s conviction. 

People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21, 987 N.E.2d 371. The defendant must show he suffered 

a substantial deprivation of his federal or state constitutional rights in the underlying trial 

proceedings. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21. 

¶ 13 We note any claim decided on direct appeal or that could have been decided on 

direct appeal may not be raised in a postconviction petition. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. 

“Issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal are barred by res judicata, and issues that 

could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are forfeited.” English, 2013 IL 112890, 

¶ 22. “[T]he doctrines of res judicata and forfeiture are relaxed where fundamental fairness so 

requires, where the forfeiture stems from the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or where 

the facts relating to the issue do not appear on the face of the original appellate record.” English, 

2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. 

¶ 14 OSAD first notes the trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s petition was 

timely. We agree. Defendant filed his petition on September 14, 2018. The court summarily 

dismissed the petition on October 26, 2018, well within the 90-day period allowed pursuant to 

section 122-2.1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West 2018)). 

¶ 15 As for defendant’s actual innocence claim, OSAD notes defendant is not making 

an actual innocence claim. We agree. Defendant failed to present any new evidence to support 
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his purported claim. Instead, defendant is simply arguing the State failed to prove his guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Because (1) this argument could have been made in defendant’s 

direct appeal and (2) defendant does not argue his appellate counsel was ineffective for not doing 

so, this issue is forfeited. See English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. 

¶ 16 OSAD next addressed defendant’s claim his trial counsel was ineffective for not 

seeking a plea deal from the State and for failing to properly cross-examine Detective 

Borowczyk. “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defendant.” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36, 987 N.E.2d 767 (citing 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish prejudice, a defendant must 

show a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different but for 

counsel’s deficient performance. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36. “[A] court need not 

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered 

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. *** If it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be 

so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

¶ 17 We agree with OSAD that defendant failed to present any evidence showing he 

was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged failure to seek a plea deal from the State. Defendant 

did not attach anything to his petition supporting his claim—or explain why such evidence could 

not be attached. As OSAD states in its motion, defendant “does not present any evidence that 

the State would have offered him a plea deal and that [defendant] would have accepted it.” The 

record shows defendant’s first trial counsel and the State engaged in plea negotiations but could 

not come to an agreement. On February 21, 2013, the State informed the trial court plea 
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negotiations had broken down. 

¶ 18 Our supreme court has stated a defendant must attach affidavits, records, or other 

evidence supporting the petition’s claims or explain why the supporting evidence could not be 

attached. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (2009). Because he failed 

to do so, his claim his attorney could have received a plea offer which defendant would have 

accepted is nothing more than speculation. 

¶ 19 As for defendant’s claim his trial counsel was ineffective for not properly 

cross-examining Detective Borowczyk, we agree with OSAD this claim does not make sense 

because the detective was not called as a witness for the State. If defendant meant his trial 

counsel should have asked the detective whether he found any pictures of the child victim on 

defendant’s cellular phone to impeach the child’s statement defendant had photographed and 

recorded her on his cell phone, this would have required defense counsel to elicit evidence 

regarding A.K.’s statement defendant had photographed and video recorded her. Whether to 

bring A.K.’s allegations regarding the video and photographs to the jury’s attention was a matter 

of trial strategy. An attorney’s decisions on what evidence to present are strategic decisions and 

generally immune to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the strategy is so unsound 

counsel fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing of the State’s case. People v. Reid, 

179 Ill. 2d 297, 310, 688 N.E.2d 1156, 1162 (1997). It was reasonable trial strategy for defense 

counsel not to bring A.K.’s allegation to the attention of the jurors. Regardless, this issue could 

have been raised in defendant’s direct appeal. Defendant did not allege his appellate counsel in 

his direct appeal was ineffective for failing to do so. As a result, defendant cannot raise this 

claim in his postconviction petition. See English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. 

¶ 20 As for defendant’s claim he was denied a “fair sentence” because the trial court 
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incorrectly stated defendant and the child victim were related, defendant neither raised this claim 

in his direct appeal nor argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. As a 

result, defendant cannot raise this issue in his postconviction petition. See English, 2013 IL 

112890, ¶ 22. 

¶ 21 In response to OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel on appeal, 

defendant raises three new complaints. He argues the trial court failed to correctly admonish him 

of the minimum and maximum sentences he faced. He also contends his trial attorney told him 

his sentences would not run consecutively if he was found guilty at trial. Finally, he argues the 

trial court incorrectly stated defendant “sexually assaulted” A.K. when he was convicted of four 

counts of aggravated sexual abuse. Because defendant did not include these issues in his 

postconviction petition, this court cannot consider these issues on appeal. See People v. Jones, 

213 Ill. 2d 498, 508, 821 N.E.2d 1093, 1099 (2004) (unlike our supreme court, the “appellate 

court is not free *** to excuse, in the context of postconviction proceedings, an appellate waiver 

caused by the failure of a defendant to include issues in his or her postconviction petition”). 

¶ 22 Because defendant’s pro se postconviction petition does not make a substantial 

showing of a constitutional violation, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial 

court’s first-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition. 

¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of 

defendant’s pro se postconviction petition. 

¶ 25 Affirmed.