2013 UT App 35

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

ROSENDO ROMAN RUVALCABA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20120062‐CA

Filed February 14, 2013

Fourth District, Fillmore Department

The Honorable James M. Brady

No. 111700066

James K. Slavens, Attorney for Appellant

John E. Swallow and Michelle M. Young, Attorneys for Appellee

Before JUDGES DAVIS, MCHUGH, and VOROS.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Rosendo Roman Ruvalcaba appeals from his convictions of

possession or use of a controlled substance and possession of a

firearm by a restricted person.Ruvalcaba alleges thatthe trial court

erred in denying his motion to suppress. More particularly,

Ruvalcaba argues that the investigating officer improperly

extended the initial stop without reasonable suspicion.

¶2 In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress,

“we review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and we

review its conclusions of law for correctness.” State v. Tiedemann,

2007 UT 49, ¶ 11, 162 P.3d 1106 (citation omitted). Here, the parties
State v. Ruvalcaba

20120062‐CA 2013 2 UT App 35

stipulated to the operative facts; accordingly, we review only the

correctness of the trial court’s decision.

¶3 A traffic stop must be “lawful at its inception” and be

“executed in a reasonable manner.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,

408 (2005). Here, Ruvalcaba admits that the investigating officer

hadreasonable suspicion to initiate a stopafterthe officer observed

Ruvalcaba’s vehicle parked in the middle of a dirt road, which led

to a public campground, with the vehicle’s lights on and engine

running. Accordingly, the only issue is whether the stop was

executed in a reasonable manner. Ruvalcaba argues that once the

officer learned that Ruvalcaba was in the car and had been

sleeping, he had no reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to

investigate whether Ruvalcaba had driven while impaired by

asking Ruvalcaba to exit the vehicle and perform field sobriety

tests. Normally, police must end the stop when the initial purpose

for the stop is concluded. See State v. Hensen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 31, 63

P.3d 650. However, “[i]f, during the scope of the traffic stop, the

officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal

activity, the officer may also expediently investigate his new

suspicion.” State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 13, 229 P.3d 650.

¶4 Here, the totality of circumstances observed by the officer

supported his reasonable suspicion that Ruvalcaba had been

driving while impaired. When the officer initially observed the

vehicle it was parked in the middle of a dirt road with its motor

running and its lights on. The officerturned on his overhead lights

and got no response from anyone in the vehicle. He thenproceeded

to the vehicle where he foundRuvalcaba slumpedoverthe steering

wheel with a gun on the dashboard. The officer had to yell and

knock twice on the window beforeRuvalcaba responded.When he

didrespond,Ruvalcaba appeareddisoriented, groggy, andhis eyes

were red and watery. These circumstances justified the officer’s

question to Ruvalcaba about whether he had been drinking.

Ruvalcaba’s subsequent statement that he had been drinking, but

“not too much,” when added to the totality of preceding circum‐

stances, provided sufficient justification for the officer to ask
State v. Ruvalcaba

20120062‐CA 2013 3 UT App 35

Ruvalcaba to exit the vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. See

Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009)

(noting that “itis highlyunusualto find someone asleep behind the

wheel of a parked car, with its parking lights on, outside a drug

store at 8:00 p.m.”); United States v. Wilson, 758 F.2d 304, 306 (8th

Cir. 1985) (concluding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to

conduct aninvestigatory inquiry “basedon informationthatthe car

was parked in a fire lane with the engine running and was

occupied by two apparently unconscious persons”); York v. State,

342 S.W.3d 528, 535–37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that

defendant sitting asleep in a vehicle parked partially on the

sidewalk, with the lights on and the engine running at 3:00 a.m

raised reasonable suspicion of public intoxication); cf. State v.

Prawitt, 2011 UT App 261, ¶ 18–19, 262 P.3d 1203 (concluding that

there was probable cause to believe that the defendant was in

actual physical control of the vehicle where he was the sole

occupant of the car and was asleep in the driver’s seat). Accord‐

ingly, the trial court correctly denied Ruvalcaba’s motion to

suppress.

¶5 Affirmed.