# C_2009227EN.01000501.xml

| 22.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 227/5 |
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22.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 227/5

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant positions given at its meeting of 28 April 2009 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/C-3/37.990 — Intel (1)

Rapporteur: Spain

2009/C 227/04

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission's definition of the relevant market, so it can be left open:






  — | whether there is one relevant product market of x86 Central Processing Units (CPUs) for all computers (i.e. desktop computers, laptop computers and server computers), or |
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1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission's definition of the relevant market, so it can be left open:

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whether there is one relevant product market of x86 Central Processing Units (CPUs) for all computers (i.e. desktop computers, laptop computers and server computers), or

| — | whether there are three separate relevant product markets of: (i) x86 CPUs for desktop computers; (ii) x86 CPUs for laptop computers; and (iii) x86 CPUs for server computers. |
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whether there are three separate relevant product markets of: (i) x86 CPUs for desktop computers; (ii) x86 CPUs for laptop computers; and (iii) x86 CPUs for server computers.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the geographic scope of the relevant product market is worldwide. |
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2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the geographic scope of the relevant product market is worldwide.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that, at least between October 2002 and December 2007, Intel held a dominant position in the market. |
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3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that, at least between October 2002 and December 2007, Intel held a dominant position in the market.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Intel abused its dominant position on the relevant market by awarding:






  — | rebates to Dell, Hewlett-Packard (HP), NEC and Lenovo which were conditioned on exclusivity or quasi-exclusivity, as well as |
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4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Intel abused its dominant position on the relevant market by awarding:

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rebates to Dell, Hewlett-Packard (HP), NEC and Lenovo which were conditioned on exclusivity or quasi-exclusivity, as well as

| — | payments to Media-Saturn Holding (MSH) which were conditioned on MSH selling exclusively desktop and laptop computers based on Intel CPUs. |
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payments to Media-Saturn Holding (MSH) which were conditioned on MSH selling exclusively desktop and laptop computers based on Intel CPUs.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Intel abused its dominant position on the relevant market by granting rebates to HP, Acer and Lenovo subject to restrictive conditions concerning the commercialization of AMD-based products. |
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5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Intel abused its dominant position on the relevant market by granting rebates to HP, Acer and Lenovo subject to restrictive conditions concerning the commercialization of AMD-based products.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's assessment that the different abuses from part of a long-term comprehensive strategy aimed at foreclosing AMD from the market and constitute a single and continuous infringement. |
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6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's assessment that the different abuses from part of a long-term comprehensive strategy aimed at foreclosing AMD from the market and constitute a single and continuous infringement.

| 7. | The Advisory Committee agrees that Intel's abusive practices may affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty and may affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. |
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7.

The Advisory Committee agrees that Intel's abusive practices may affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty and may affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement.

| 8. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on Intel. |
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8.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on Intel.

| 9. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purposes of the calculation of the fine, the duration of Intel's infringement is 5 years and 3 months. |
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9.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purposes of the calculation of the fine, the duration of Intel's infringement is 5 years and 3 months.

| 10. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
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10.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

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