[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10233

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JACETA ANYA STREETER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cr-00076-TJC-LLL-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10233

Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jaceta Streeter, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals 

the district court’s denial of her motion for compassionate release 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as modified by § 603(b) of the First 

Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 519 (“First Step Act”), 

arguing that the court abused its discretion in its weighing of the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and determining that no extraordinary 

and compelling circumstances warranted her release.

We review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses 

its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its determination, or makes clearly 

erroneous factual findings.” United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 

1345 (11th Cir. 2021).

Generally, district courts do not have the authority to modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed, but they may 

do so within the limited circumstances provided by § 3582(c). 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010). 

As amended by § 603(b) of the First Step Act, § 3582(c) now provides, in relevant part, that:

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the 

[BOP], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights 

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to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on 

the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the 

receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the 

term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they 

are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and 

that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, under the First Step Act, a 

district court may reduce a term of imprisonment for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” consistent with relevant Sentencing 

Commission policy statements, but only after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable. 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 

(11th Cir. 2021). “Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must find that 

all necessary conditions are satisfied before it grants a reduction.” 

Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237. The absence of any one of the necessary 

conditions—support in the § 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and 

compelling reasons, and adherence to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy 

statement—forecloses a sentence reduction. Id. at 1237‐38. In 

other words, a court may not grant a defendant’s motion for compassionate release unless the § 3553(a) factors favor it. See id. at 

1237. Among other factors, § 3553(a) lists the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote 

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respect for the law, and provide just punishment; and the need to 

afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public 

from the defendant, and provide the defendant with necessary 

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1)-(2). If a defendant fails to show that the § 3553(a) factors justify a sentence reduction, the court may end its analysis 

there. See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1348. Additionally, nothing on the face 

of § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a district court to conduct the compassionate release analysis in any particular order. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 

1240.

Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides the applicable policy statement for § 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. 

We have previously held that “a district court cannot grant a motion for reduction if it would be inconsistent with the [Sentencing] 

Commission’s policy statement defining ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons.’” United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). The application notes to 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 list four categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons: (A) the defendant’s medical condition; (B) the defendant’s age; (C) the defendant’s family circumstances; and (D) “Other 

Reasons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1(A)-(D)). Subsection 

D serves as a catch-all provision, providing that a prisoner may be 

eligible for relief if, “[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau 

of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and 

compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons 

described in subdivisions (A) through (C).” Id., comment. (n.1(D)). 

The defendant’s own medical condition qualifies as an 

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extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release if 

he or she is “suffering from a serious mental or physical condition . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to 

provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility 

and from which he or she is not expected to recover.” Id., comment. (n.1(A)). Moreover, the incapacitation of the caregiver of a 

defendant’s minor child also qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. Id., comment. (n.1(C)(i)). 

While Application Note 1(C)(i) does not require the defendant to 

show the unavailability of another caregiver, the availability of one 

may inform the exercise of the district court’s discretion. See Harris, 989 F.3d at 911 (“Because [§ 3582(c)(1)(A)] speaks permissively 

and says that the district court ‘may’ reduce a defendant’s sentence 

after certain findings and considerations, the court’s decision is a 

discretionary one.”). Nevertheless, “[a] district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors 

that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an 

improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 

F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). When a district court considers the § 3553(a) factors, it need 

not explicitly discuss each of them or state on the record that it has 

explicitly considered each of them. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 

F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).

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Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors, nor in its allocation of 

more weight to certain factors—namely the seriousness of 

Streeter’s offense, her extensive criminal history and evidence of 

her high risk of recidivism, and the need to promote respect for the 

law and afford adequate deterrence—over others. Tinker, 14 F.4th 

at 1237. While the court was not required to continue its analysis 

upon determining that the § 3553(a) factors did not favor Streeter’s 

release, see Giron, 15 F.4th at 1348, it nevertheless additionally 

found that no extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting her release were present because she did not show that 

J.W.’s caregivers were incapacitated, nor did she show that she was 

the only other available caregiver for him if they were. For these 

reasons, the district court properly denied Streeter’s motion for 

compassionate release. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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