IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 07, 2015

WILLIAM L. JENKINS v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Wayne County

No. 2014CV5383 Robert L. Jones, Chancellor

________________________________

 No. M2014-02210-COA-R3-CV – Filed February 29, 2016

_________________________________

Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks review of a disciplinary proceeding finding 

him guilty of assault on another inmate. Petitioner asserts that the disciplinary board violated 

various Tennessee Department of Correction regulations in the conduct of the hearing and 

that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the decision 

of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

RICHARD H. DINKINS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,

JR., P.J., M.S., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J. joined.

William L. Jenkins, Wartburg, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Nathan D. Tilly and James I. Pentecost, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellees, Adam 

Hendrix, Arvil Champan, Greg Keeton, Judy Williams, Melissa Rodriguez, and Byron Ponds.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andree S. Blumstein, Solicitor 

General; and Jennifer L. Brenner, Senior Counsel, for the Tennessee Department of 

Corrections.

OPINION

William L. Jenkins, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of 

Corrections (“TDOC”), filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery 
2

Court for Morgan County on January 14, 2014; he sought review of the action of the South 

Central Correctional Facility disciplinary board which resulted in his conviction for assault 

with a deadly weapon, with serious injury.

1

 The petition alleged that the board acted 

arbitrarily, illegally, and in violation of various TDOC policies in finding him guilty; that the 

conviction relied on “the sole testimony of confidential informants without independently 

assessing or verifying the reliability” of the testimony or the informant; that it “ignored 

exculpatory evidence provided by the victim”; and that Mr. Jenkins had unsuccessfully 

appealed the conviction to the warden of the institution and the Commissioner of TDOC. 

The writ was issued, and the record filed.

In due course Mr. Jenkins filed a motion for summary judgment along with several 

other motions; the respondents moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 

12.02(3) and/or (6). The court subsequently entered an order dismissing the CCA 

respondents; granting Mr. Jenkins‟ motions to add TDOC as a respondent and to compel the 

respondents to file a complete record of the disciplinary proceeding; and denying the State 

respondent‟s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the court entered an order holding that “[a]fter a 

full review of the record in this case, including confidential documents filed under seal, the 

Court finds there was adequate evidence to justify the findings and disciplinary actions 

against the Petitioner and further finds that there were no violations of any laws or 

regulations.” The court dismissed the case, along with all pending motions. 

Mr. Jenkins appeals, asserting that the court erred in dismissing the petition on its 

merits, in denying the motion for summary judgment, and in disregarding his complaints of 

alleged “fraudulent conduct or fraudulent pleadings” filed by respondent‟s counsel. 

I. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The disciplinary board‟s action is reviewed through the common-law writ of certiorari,

which provides a limited scope of review. Rhoden v. State Dep’t of Corr., 984 S.W.2d 955, 

956 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Powell v. Parole Eligibility Re. Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1994). The inquiry before the court is whether the board exceeded its jurisdiction or 

acted illegally, fraudulently or arbitrarily; the intrinsic correctness of the decision is not 

reviewed and relief will not be granted if the decision was reached in a lawful and 

constitutional manner. Maney v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, No. 01A01-9710-CV-00562, 1998 

WL 755002, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1998). Our review of the evidence on appeal can 

 

1

 The disciplinary action for which review was sought occurred while Mr. Jenkins was incarcerated at South 

Central Correctional Facility, which is located in Wayne County; therefore the case was transferred to 

Chancery Court for Wayne County in April 2014. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-803. In addition to the 

disciplinary board, the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner of TDOC, the TDOC Liaison, and several 

employees of Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”), which ran the facility under contract with TDOC, 

were named as respondents; the CCA employees were subsequently dismissed. 
3

be no broader or more comprehensive than the trial court‟s review. Watts v. Civil Serv. Bd. 

for Columbia, 606 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. 1980); Jacks v. City of Millington Bd. of Zoning 

Appeals, 298 S.W.3d 163, 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). As to issues of law, our review is de 

novo, with no presumption of correctness. Whaley v. Perkins, 197 S.W.3d 665, 670 (Tenn. 

2006); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). 

II. DISCUSSION

At the outset we address Mr. Jenkins‟ contention that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for summary judgment. In our consideration of this issue, we are guided by the 

following holding in Jackson v. Tennessee Dep’t of Correction:

The issuance by the trial court of a writ of certiorari is simply a command by 

the trial court to the inferior tribunal or administrative agency to send the 

record made before the agency in the proceeding to the court for review of that 

record. Gore v. Tennessee Dept. of Correction, 132 S.W.3d 369, 375 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2003) (citing Conners v. City of Knoxville, 189 S.W. 870, 872 (Tenn. 

1916)). Once the complete record has been filed, the reviewing court may 

proceed to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief without any 

further motions, and if the court chooses, without a hearing. Jeffries v. 

Tennessee Dept. of Correction, 108 S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 

The trial court was only under the obligation to review the record and 

determine whether the Board acted illegally, fraudulently, arbitrarily or outside 

its jurisdiction. The trial court was under no obligation to dispose of the 

Petitioner‟s motion for summary judgment before dismissing his petition. 

No. W2005-02240-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1547859, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2006). 

Inasmuch as the court considered the issues raised in the certiorari petition on their merits, 

there was no error in denying the motion for summary judgment. 

Mr. Jenkins next contends that the court‟sfinding that there were no violations of law, 

regulation, or procedure was in error, and argues that there were violations of TDOC policies 

502.01(VI)(L)(4)(c)(2) and (3), and (d)(1)2in the following manner: 

 

2

 TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(c)(2) and (3) and (d)(1) state: 

4. The disciplinary hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the following procedures:

* * *

c. If the inmate pleads “not guilty”, he/she shall be permitted the following:

* * *

(2) To have the evidence against him/her presented first. The board/hearing 

officer shall consider all evidence which it finds to be reliable, whether or 

not such evidence would be admissible in a court of law.
4

(A) unlawful denial of requested witness and/or failure to complete proper 

forms in doing so; 

(B) withholding of critical evidence and requested evidence clearly relevant to 

case;

(C) concealment or disregarding of exculpatory evidence provided by the 

victim and DNA lab results which were clearly beneficial to plaintiff‟s 

defense; 

(D) inadequate 24 hour notice as result of inaccurate/misleading or omitted 

information;

(E) . . . allowing Adam Hendrix and Carolyn Jordan to remain on the board 

panel after both had openly admitted to personal involvement in the case prior 

to the hearing.

With respect to the alleged violation of TDOC policy 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(c)(3), Mr. 

Jenkins identifies inmate Driver, the victim of the assault, as the witness who was not 

permitted to testify. The record, however, reflects that inmate Driver‟s statement was 

submitted at the hearing as part of the investigation of the incident; in the statement Inmate 

Driver wrote, “I can say that I did not see Jenkins with a weapon or trying to assault me in 

any kind of way.” The record does not show that Mr. Jenkins requested that inmate Driver 

be called as a witness; it does show, however, that inmate Driver‟s statement was signed by 

Mr. Jenkins on October 3, 2013, a week prior to the hearing, and by the chairperson of the 

disciplinary board on October 10, the date of the hearing. 

This statement was not adverse to Mr. Jenkins in any respect; indeed, in his brief on 

appeal, Mr. Jenkins states that “the victim in this case was also the witness for the plaintiff 

and submitted a written (and verified) statement on the Plaintiff‟s behalf clearing the 

Plaintiff‟s name of any involvement.” It is apparent that the members of the disciplinary 

board determined that the evidence was not entitled to be given weight. The record, 

however, does not show that TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(c)(3) was violated. 

It is not clear from Mr. Jenkins‟ brief on appeal what specific evidence he asserts was 

withheld from him. The record contains a document styled “Motion To Compel Defendants 

To File Complete Disciplinary Record (pursuant to T.C.A. § 27-9-109(a)” filed by Mr. 

Jenkins on May 19, 2014, and an order entered August 4 addressing various motions, 

including the motion to compel; as to that motion, the order states:

On May 19, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion To Compel Defendants To 

File Complete Disciplinary Record alleging that Page 9 of 9 of the Disciplinary 

 

(3) To cross-examine any witness (except a confidential source) who

testified against him/her and to review all adverse documentary evidence 

(except confidential information).
5

Hearing Summary, statements made by Inmate Jermaine Driver, and of the 

Petitioner‟s appeal to the Commissioner were omitted. Respondents filed a 

notice of Filing of the certified disciplinary record on March 20, 2014, in 

Morgan County and on April 21, 2014, in Wayne County. While the certified 

record does contain an Incident Statement signed by Inmate Jermaine Driver, it 

does not appear to contain the appeal to the Commissioner dated November 4, 

2013, a copy of which the Petitioner filed with his motion to compel, nor does 

it include Page 9 of 9 of the Disciplinary Report Hearing Summary. 

Therefore, Petitioner‟s Motion to Compel is well-taken. IT IS, THEREFORE, 

ORDERED that Respondents file a complete, legible, and certified record of 

the parole proceedings pertaining to the Petitioner‟s disciplinary hearing 

conducted on October 10, 2013, and subsequent appeals as soon as possible 

after receipt of this order. 

 

The defendants filed a response to the order on August 19 in which their counsel: reported

that the original page 9 of 9 of the disciplinary report “became detached from the petitioner‟s 

original disciplinary documents and cannot be located”; attached documents relating to 

appeal to the commissioner in November 2014, with an explanation that the decision under 

review was the disciplinary board hearing on October 10, 2013, and that counsel was not 

aware that Mr. Jenkins had initiated another appeal; resubmitted the certified disciplinary 

record, with an explanation that the reference to the “parole proceedings” in the order “may 

have been a typographical error, and that the court seeks a „clean‟ certified record of the 

disciplinary proceedings.” The record does not support Mr. Jenkins‟ contention that 

evidence relative to the disciplinary proceeding was withheld from him; to the contrary, he 

successfully moved the trial court to compel the defendants to produce the complete record 

of the disciplinary proceeding. 

Without citing to the record, Mr. Jenkins argues in his brief that “the Defendants 

withheld all evidence related to the case despite the fact that there was an ample amount 

collected, such as blood stained knives, blood stained clothing, pictures of the scene, 

voluntary DNA samples provided by Plaintiff, and several different investigative reports.” 

The record does not show what, if any, effort Mr. Jenkins made to compel the production of 

the evidence and what that evidence may have shown.3 Neither the trial court nor this court 

can base review of the proceeding on unsupported and conclusory allegations. To the extent 

the absence of the evidence was brought to their attention, the members of the disciplinary 

board were free to assign such weight to that fact as each deemed appropriate.4

 

3

 The rights of an inmate who has pled “not guilty” to the offense which is the subject of the disciplinary 

hearing are set forth at TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(c) and do not include the right to discovery. 

4

 Mr. Jenkins contends that exculpatory evidence was “conceal[ed] or disregard[ed].” Inasmuch as the 

disciplinary board, as fact finder, is free to consider or not consider specific evidence, we review only whether 
6

Mr. Jenkins‟ brief does not explain the factual or legal basis of the claim of 

“inadequate 24 hour notice as result of inaccurate/misleading or omitted information.” In the 

absence of the same, we cannot address this contention. See Murray v. Miracle, 457 S.W.3d 

399, 403 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014), appeal denied (Feb. 19, 2015).

Mr. Jenkins alleges in his brief that Ms. Jordan, a member of the panel which heard 

this matter, made corrections to errors in the disciplinary report prior to the hearing, after the 

errors were brought to her attention by Mr. Hendrix, another member of the panel; he asserts 

that their actions violated TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(A)(5)(b), (c), and (d).5 Assuming 

these allegations are true, the action of correcting errors in the report does not rise to the level 

of participating in the investigation or establishing personal knowledge of the incident such 

as to violate the regulation. 

III. CONCLUSION

We have reviewed the entire record and considered each argument made by Mr. 

Jenkins. In accordance with the narrow standard of review applicable to this case, we agree 

with the conclusion reached by the trial court that there is evidence in support of the decision 

of the disciplinary board and that there is no factual or legal basis from which to conclude 

that the board acted illegally, fraudulently or arbitrarily. The decision of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 

________________________________

RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE

 

the evidence in the record provides a factual basis for the board‟s decision and not the extent to which any

evidence may have been disregarded. 

5

TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(A)(5)(b), (c), and (d) states:

5. No employee shall be permitted to sit on the panel of the board hearing a given case if any 

of the following conditions exist:

a. He/she is the reporting employee.

b. He/she participated directly in the investigation.

c. He/she has personal knowledge concerning the case, except in those instances where 

knowledge of the incident is so widespread as to be known by most employees (i.e., 

common knowledge).

d. He/she has a personal interest in the outcome of the case.

e. He/she is the inmate‟s assigned counselor, inmate relations coordinator (IRC), or unit 

manager.