i 

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Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. 

Chairman 

State Board of Insurance 

1110 San Jacinto Boulevard 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Opinion No. m-734 

Re: Whether an insurance carrier 

m=Y consider completion of a 

defensive driving course under 

article 6701d, section 143A. 

V.T.C.S. 

Dear Mr. Olson: 

You ask several questions about the practice engaged in by some 

insurance companies of considering the completion of a defensive 

driving course as the equivalent of a conviction of certain misdemeanor offenses under article 6701d, V.T.C.S., the Uniform Act 

Regulating Traffic on Highways. Your questions are: 

1. Does article 6701d, section 143A, prohibit 

insurers from considering completion of a defensive 

driving course for underwriting purposes or does it 

merely prohibit the charge from being considered by 

a court in assessing punishment for subsequent 

traffic citations? 

2. If the statute prohibits the consideration 

of completion of a defensive driving course for 

underwriting purposes, would an insurer's consideration of such completion violate the Deceptive 

Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act, Business 

and Commerce Code section 17.46 and thereby allow 

enforcement by the State Board of Insurance under 

article 21.21, section 7 of the Insurance Code? If 

not, would such an act violate other Insurance Code 

provisions? 

You advise that various insurance companies charge increased insurance 

prices when an insured or a person seeking insurance takes a defensive 

driving course in exchange for dismissal of a traffic citation under 

section 143A of article 6701d. 

Section 143A of article 6701d, V.T.C.S., provides: 

p. 3414 
Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. - Page 2 (JM-734) 

(a) When a person is cherged with e misdemeanor offense under this Act, other then a 

violation of Section 51. committed while operating 

a motor vehicle, the court: 

(1) in its discretion may defer proceedings 

end allow the person 90 days to present evidence 

that, subsequent to the alleged act, the person 

has successfully completed e defensive driver’s 

course approved by the Texas Department of Public 

Safety or other driving safety course approved by 

the court; or 

(2) shall defer proceedings end allow the 

person 90 days to present written evidence that, 

subsequent to the alleged act, the person has 

successfully completed a defensive driver’s course 

approved by the Texas Department of Public Safety 

or another driving safety course approved by the 

court, if: 

(A) the person presents to the court en 

oral request or written motion to take a 

course ; 

(B) the person has a valid Texas driver’s 

license or permit; end 

(C) the person’s driving record es maintained by the Texas Department of Public Safety 

does not indicate successful completipn of a 

driving safety course under this subdivision 

within the two years immediately preceding the 

date of the alleged offense. 

(b) When the person complies with the provisions of Subsection (a) of this section and the 

evidence presented is eccepted by the court, the 

court shall dismiss the charge. 

When a charge is dismissed under this section, 

the charge may not be pert of the person’s driving 

record or used for any purpose, but the court 

shall report the fact that a person has successfully completed a driving safety course and the 

date of completion to the Texas Department of 

Public Safety for inclusion in the person’s 

driving record. The court shall note in its 

report whether the course was taken under the 

procedure provided by Subdivision (2) of Subsection (a) of this section for the purpose of 

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Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. - Page 3 (JM-734) 

providing information necessary to determine 

eligibility to take a subsequent course under that 

subdivision. (Emphasis added). 

Resolution of your first question depends on whether the 

underscored language in section 143A applies to insurance companies. 

It has been suggested that the directive that “the charge may not be 

pert of the person’s driving record or used for any purpose” applies 

only to the courts. This language, however, is broad end is not, by 

its terms, limited to the courts. Because the prohibition is somewhat 

emb iguous, its scope depends on the legislative intent behind the 

phrase in question end behind the whole of section 143A. 

Legislative intent is derived from a general review of en entire 

enactment es well es from an examination of the circumstances existing 

at the time of enactment, any “evil” to be corrected by the statute, 

end the purpose to be accomplished by the statute. The legislature 

added section 143A to article 6701d in 1975. Acts 1975, 64th Leg., 

ch. 738, et 2406. As originally enacted, the provision applied only 

when the courts exercised their discretion to apply it. In 1979, the 

legislature emended section 143A to require the courts to apply the 

section to defendants who comply with the three requirements set forth 

in subsections (a)(2)(A), (B), and (C) of section 143A. Acts 1979, 

66th Leg., ch. 610, et 1359; see Attorney General Opinion NW-428 

(1982) . The bill analysis to thisamendment notes that 

[e]ven though [section 143A] is advantageous to 

people in that it gives them en alternative to 

traffic fines and raised insurance retes. the law 

is only applicable to those persons whom the court 

chooses to allow the benefit. (Emphasis added). 

This language indicates that one of the primary purposes for the 

alternative provided by section 143A is to prevent en increase of 

insurance premiums. 

It is significant that the bill also emended subsection (f) of 

section 21 of article 6687b, V.T.C.S., the statute governing the 

department’s jurisdiction over Texas drivers’ licenses, to provide 

that the department may not release the reasons for the completion of 

a driving safety course. The department may only release this 

information to the courts for the purpose of determining eligibility 

to take a subsequent course uuder section 143A. The fact that the 

legislature restricted the access of all persons except. the courts to 

the information indicates chat the legislature intended the 

prohibition to apply broadly. Consequently, section 143A prohibits 

insurers from considering a charge that is dismissed pursuant to 

section 143A as pert of a person’s driving record and from using the 

dismissal of the charge for “any purpose.” 

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Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. - Page 4 (JM-734) 

You also ask whether, if section 143A prohibits the consideration 

of the completion of a defensive driving course under section 143A for 

insurance purposes, such consideration violates the Texas Deceptive 

Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act, Business end Commerce Code 

section 17.46, thereby allowing the board to prohibit the conduct 

under article 21.21, section 7, of the Insurance Code. Secrion 7 

authorizes the board to issue a cease end desist order against: persons 

found , after a board hearing, to have violeted the unfair 

competition/deceptive acts provisions of the Insurance Code or the 

Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act. It should be 

noted that the board does not hold the exclusive means to regulate the 

legality of insurance practices. See Attorney General of Texas v. 

Allstate Insurance Company, 687 S.Wx 803 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1985, 

writ ref’d n.r.e.). Additionally, section 16 of article 21.21 of the 

Insurance Code creates a private cause of action for treble damages 

for injury from unfair or deceptive insurance practices (1) prohibited 

in section 4 of article 21.21, or (2) rules lawfully adopted by the 

Insurance Board under article 21.21, or (3) described in the Deceptive 

Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act as unlawful. See Royal 

Globe Insurance Company v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 577 S.W.2d688, 691 

(Tex. 1979). 

Subsection (b) (12) of section 17.46 of the Business end Commerce 

Code, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, provides that the term 

“f else, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices includes . . . 

representing that en agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, 

or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are 

prohibited by law.” (Emphasis added). As indicated, section 143A of 

article 6701d, V.T.C.S.. prohibits insurers from considering the 

completion of a defensive driving course under section 143A as pert of 

a person’s driving record or for any other purpose. Consequently, the 

practice could fell within et least one express prohibition of the 

Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act. A violation of 

the act necessarily depends on the facts in each case. See Royal 

Globe Insurance Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., supra; Attorney General 

Opinion JK-218 (1984). 

Your final question is whether, if the practice in question does 

not violate the Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act, 

the practice violates other Insurance Code provisions. Because your 

question is premised on a negative response to your inquiry about the 

Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act, it is not 

necessary to address it in full in this opinion. You should be aware, 

however, that a number of Insurance Code provisions are implicated. 

For example, article 5.09 of the code prohibits distinctions or 

discrimination between insureds having like hazards. See also Ins. 

Code art. 21.21, §4(7). Considering the completion of a defensive 

driving course as the equivalent of a conviction for insurance 

purposes raises discrimination questions. 

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Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. - Page 5 (JM-734) 

Moreover, article 5.01-l of the Insurance Code provides: 

A rating plan promulgated by the State Board of 

Insurance respecting the writing of motor vehicle 

insurance, other than insurance written pursuant 

to Section 35 [assigned risk plans] of the Texas 

Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act (Article 

6701h. Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), may not 

assign any rate consequence to a charge or conviction, or otherwise cause premiums for motor 

vehicle insurance to be increased because of a 

charge or conviction for a violation of the 

Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, as 

amended (article 6701d. Vernon's Texas Civil 

Statutes) . . (Emphasis added). 

A full discussion of these provisions is beyond the scope of your 

opinion request. 

SUMMARY 

Section 143A of article 6701d. V.T.C.S.. the 

Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, prohibits insurers from considering the completion of 

a defensive driving course under section 143A for 

the dismissal of a traffic citation as part of a 

person's driving record for insurance purposes. 

Subsection (b)(12) of section 17.46 of the Texas 

Business and Commerce Code (the Deceptive Trade 

Practices - Consumer Protection Act) defines as 

unlawful an agreement that "confers or involves 

rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not 

have or involve, or which are prohibited by law." 

Consequently, because consideration of a defensive 

driving course is prohibited by section 143A of 

article 6701d, V.T.C.S., it Is prohibited by 

subsection (b)(12) of section 17.46 of the 

Business and Commerce Code. Additionally, 

considering the completion of a defensive driving 

course under section 143A as the equivalent of a 

conviction for insurance purposes raises discrimination questions which implicate other 

orovisions of the Insurance Code. 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

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Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. - Page 6 (JM-734) 

--Y 

NARY KELLER 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLIE STJUKLEY 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Cormnittee 

Prepared by Jennifer Riggs 

Assistant Attorney General 

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