IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-40826

Summary Calendar

HILDA BERTA RAMOS, 

 Plaintiff – Appellant

v.

WEBB CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

 Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:15-CV-55

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This appeal arises out of the tragic death of O.R., a minor child and the 

adopted son of Hilda and Agustin Ramos (collectively “Plaintiffs”). O.R. was 

allegedly involved in an illicit relationship with Fallon Cremar (“Cremar”), one 

of his teachers at Bruni High School (“BHS”). On February 18, 2013, R.J. 

Montalvo (“Montalvo”), a BHS teacher, saw O.R. hugging Cremar. Montalvo 

reported this to his superiors at BHS. Two days later, after investigation by 

the BHS principal and WCISD superintendent had already begun, O.R. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 29, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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committed suicide. Following O.R.’s death, Plaintiffs filed suit against Cremar, 

WCISD, the Benavides Independent School District (“Benavides”), and the 

Freer Independent School District (“Freer”), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1681. After Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Benavides and Freer, WCISD 

moved for summary judgment on all claims. Finding that Plaintiffs had 

produced no summary judgment evidence demonstrating that either WCISD

or its officials acted with deliberate indifference, the district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of WCISD and certified its order as immediately 

appealable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). We agree with the 

district court and therefore AFFIRM.1

On appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment because there was record evidence (1) indicating WCISD 

violated Title IX by failing to adequately respond to Cremar’s alleged 

harassment of O.R. and (2) indicating WCISD violated § 1983 by failing to 

properly train or supervise its employees.2 Though the standards for school 

district liability under § 1983 for a failure-to-train claim and Title IX differ 

slightly,3 both require Plaintiffs to show that either WCISD or its officials in 

charge of supervising Cremar acted with deliberate indifference.4

 

1 We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standards as the district court. Haverda v. Hays Cnty., 723 F.3d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 

2013). Summary judgment is appropriate only if, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmovant, “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

2 Below, Plaintiffs also alleged that WCISD violated § 1983 by creating a danger that 

caused O.R.’s abuse and suicide and, alternatively, that WCISD violated § 1983 by ratifying 

Cremar’s abusive actions. Plaintiffs did not substantively brief those theories on appeal and, 

consequently, they are abandoned. See Gann v. Fruehauf Corp., 52 F.3d 1320, 1328 (5th Cir. 

1995).

3 See Doe on Behalf of Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 220 n.8 (5th Cir. 

1998).

4 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292–93 (1998) (“Until Congress 

speaks directly on the subject, however, we will not hold a school district liable in damages 

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“The deliberate indifference standard is a high one.”5 “To act with 

deliberate indifference, a state actor must ‘know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an 

excessive risk to [the victim’s] health or safety.’”6 In other words, “the plaintiff 

must demonstrate culpability beyond mere negligence or even gross 

negligence.”7 The state actor’s conduct “must amount to an intentional choice, 

not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.”8 Moreover, even if the 

state actor has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to the victim, if 

he responds reasonably to that risk, he will not be held liable even though the 

harm ultimately occurs.9

Here, the Plaintiffs cannot show that either WCISD or its officials acted 

with deliberate indifference. It is undisputed that WCISD had in place policies 

that prohibited teacher-student relations and that required reporting of sexual 

harassment. It is also undisputed that WCISD held regular training sessions

on these policies. These policies, even if imperfect, were not so inadequate that 

they were “likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights.”10 Thus, they 

cannot support an inference that WCISD itself was deliberately indifferent. 

The Plaintiffs also did not set forth facts from which a reasonable jury 

could conclude that WCISD officials were deliberately indifferent to O.R.’s 

plight. On February 18, 2013, Montalvo observed O.R. hugging Cremar. 

Montalvo immediately reported his observation to BHS Principal Humberto 

 

under Title IX for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student absent actual notice and 

deliberate indifference.”); Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010) 

(“For Sanders-Burns to succeed on her [§ 1983] failure to train claim against Plano, she must 

demonstrate that . . . Plano was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy . . . .”).

5 Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 641 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. 

Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998)).

6 Id. (quoting McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 326 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002)).

7 Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 380 

F.3d 872, 883 (5th Cir. 2004).

8 James v. Harris Cty., 577 F.3d 612, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2009).

9 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2000).

10 Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).

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Soliz (“Soliz”). Soliz then asked Montalvo to record a written statement of his

observation, which Montalvo did. The next morning, Soliz asked Cremar for a 

statement regarding the incident, and he personally observed O.R. for any 

abnormal behavior but found none. That same day, Dr. Severita Sanchez

(“Sanchez”), the WCISD Superintendent, questioned Cremar in person 

regarding the incident, and, although Cremar denied any impropriety, 

Sanchez placed her on administrative leave. Later that day, Sanchez asked 

Antonio Flores (“Flores”), a WCISD security guard regularly stationed at BHS,

to talk with O.R. the following morning and ensure that he was well. In their 

conversation the following morning, O.R. told Flores that he did not have a 

relationship with Cremar and that he “just wanted to give her a hug.” Flores 

assured O.R. that he had done nothing wrong and instructed O.R. to give a 

written statement. That evening, O.R. took his own life. On this record, WCISD 

officials did not knowingly and recklessly disregard potential abuse or danger 

to O.R.11 Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute whether any WCISD officials

acted with deliberate indifference toward O.R.’s constitutional rights.

For these reasons and for the reasons stated by the district court, we 

AFFIRM.

 

11 See Whitley, 726 F.3d at 641.

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