Cite as 2023 Ark. 54

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. CR-22-433

SIR JEFFERY MCNEIL-LEWIS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: March 30, 2023

APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

[NO. 18CR-21-104]

HONORABLE RANDY F. 

PHILHOURS, JUDGE

AFFIRMED.

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice

Criminal defendants have the right to confront witnesses against them. McNeilLewis contends the circuit court erred by admitting (i) two 911 calls reporting a shooting

and (ii) a dash cam video containing statements from an eyewitness. The speakers on the

calls and the eyewitness were not present at trial and were unavailable for him to crossexamine. We conclude the 911 calls were properly admitted as nontestimonial statements 

and conclude any error from the admission of the dash cam video was harmless. The 

additional issues on appeal were not preserved for our review. We affirm. 

I. Factual Background

Sir Jeffery McNeil-Lewis was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree battery, 

eight counts of terroristic threatening, and firearm enhancements for each charge. These 

charges followed a shooting in West Memphis, Arkansas. He was tried on the charges. 

Testimony from the jury trial showed that the shooting victims—Jarvis Moore and Stacy 
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Abram—had been doing electrical work in a vacant house. They had taken their lunch 

break on the front porch when two men started shooting at them from across the street. 

Moore suffered a gunshot wound to the head and died a short time later at the hospital. 

Abram suffered a gunshot wound to his arm but survived. Abram later identified McNeilLewis as one of the shooters.

The police apprehended McNeil-Lewis at the scene; additional evidence connected 

him with the shooting. Police recovered guns from a house across the street owned by 

McNeil-Lewis’s sister. Witnesses had seen McNeil-Lewis leaving this house. These guns

matched the shell casings found at the crime scene and the bullet recovered from Jarvis 

Moore’s head. Gunshot residue was found on McNeil-Lewis’s hands.

Along with this evidence, the State presented evidence from witnesses absent from 

trial: two 911 calls and a video from a police dash camera. The video showed statements 

from Aaliyah Perry, an eyewitness. But Perry never appeared at trial because the State failed 

to serve her with the subpoena. The defense argued the evidence violated McNeil-Lewis’s 

right to confrontation and that the statements were inadmissible hearsay. The court

nevertheless admitted the video.

Lillian Blazin, patrolwoman at the West Memphis Police Department, testified about 

the events surrounding the video. Officer Blazin arrived at the crime scene a few minutes 

after she had been dispatched. Officer Blazin started “asking questions because there was a 

rather large crowd,” and encountered Aaliyah Perry, who told Blazin that she’d seen “the 

whole thing.” Officer Blazin said Perry appeared shaken: “She was terrified. She was 
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absolute [sic] petrified. She was shaking.” Officer Blazin then took Perry to her patrol car,

and their conversation continued while Perry sat in the back seat. 

Perry told Officer Blazin that “there was one fat man and one skinny guy that had 

done the shooting.” Officer Blazin told Perry that she would need to go to the station to 

give a statement, got more background information from Perry, and then closed the door 

to the patrol car. A few seconds later, Perry quickly knocked on the patrol car window as 

the police were clearing people from the crime scene. According to Officer Blazin’s

testimony at trial, Perry identified McNeil-Lewis as the shooter. This is the part of the 

exchange between Perry and Officer Blazin from the patrol car:

BLAZIN: I’m going to run here real quick and see if they’ve got something. 

Okay. What’s your name, baby?

PERRY: Aaliyah Perry.

BLAZIN: Okay. Phone number and address, one in Arkansas.

PERRY: Oh, my gosh.

BLAZIN: All right. What’s your name?

PERRY: Aaliyah Perry.

BLAZIN: Aaliyah Perry, Aaliyah Perry. What’s your birthday?

PERRY: May 30, 2002.

BLAZIN: 5/30/02, 5/30/02. All right. Baby, I’m going to place you in our - -

you’re not in trouble. You’re good. Just breath. [sic] Okay. Try and 

think of anything and everything. Okay. All right. Yeah, she will. 

She’s going to have to give a statement.

[Ed. note: Perry quickly knocks on patrol-car door]

PERRY: I think that’s him.
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BLAZIN: Huh?

PERRY: I think that’s him.

BLAZIN: Who?

PERRY: The guy.

BLAZIN: Which ones?

PERRY: Oh, man. It is him. The big dude.

SPEAKER: [Indiscernible.]

PERRY: It is him.

SPEAKER: The one the detective is with?

PERRY: It is him. It’s the big dude.

BLAZIN: Which one? Which one?

PERRY: Both of them.

BLAZIN: That my partners are talking to[]?

PERRY: Yes.

BLAZIN: 5944, my witness is saying that the big one was probably involved.

PERRY: No, he was. They ran into this house.

BLAZIN: Ok. I gotcha, baby. Don’t get her out of the car. She can stay in 

there. What have you got, McPhearson? Oh, I thought you were 

McPhearson. What do you need, sir? I thought that was Nick. It’s 

Cap. He said he’s okay.

Was it both of them?

PERRY: Yes.

BLAZIN: Which one?

PERRY: The one in the white. Wait, I want to make sure. I think the one 

with the white shirt [indiscernible]. I know it was a small dude. I 

know it was that big guy because they both right here.
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BLAZIN: Okay. So it was the big one and then which one?

PERRY: I don’t know. Because I know [indiscernible] the one in the white 

shirt.

BLAZIN: You think it was the one in the white shirt?

PERRY: White shirt and they both had guns.

Officer Blazin relayed this information to the other officers, who arrested both McNeilLewis and the alleged accomplice. 

The jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The case then went to a 

sentencing hearing. Neither side presented witnesses, but both gave closing arguments. The 

jury sentenced McNeil-Lewis to life imprisonment plus fifteen years. Several weeks later, 

McNeil-Lewis filed a motion for a mistrial alleging a juror had failed to disclose being related 

to someone in law enforcement. The circuit court never ruled on the motion, which was 

deemed denied. McNeil-Lewis now appeals from the convictions and this deemed-denied 

motion.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Confrontation Clause and Hearsay

McNeil-Lewis challenges the admission of the 911 calls and admission of the dash

cam video. He argues all were inadmissible hearsay and violated his right to confront 

witnesses against him. As to the 911 recordings, we hold that the hearsay argument wasn’t 

preserved and that the recordings were admissible under the Confrontation Clause as 

nontestimonial statements. As to the dash cam video, we conclude its admission was harmless 

error. 
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Hearsay statements are admissible against a defendant in a criminal trial when two 

conditions are met. First, the statement must fall under a hearsay exception; second, the 

statement cannot violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses 

against him. Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 145, 282 S.W.3d 778, 782 (2008). We review the 

constitutional question about the Confrontation Clause de novo. Id. 

The Confrontation Clause analysis begins with the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). There, the Court held “testimonial” 

hearsay was inadmissible in criminal cases except when the witness was unavailable and 

when the declarant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 68. The Court “left 

for another day” what evidence counted as testimonial, but concluded it included “at a 

minimum . . . prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former 

trial; and to police interrogation.” Id.

The Court clarified the definition of “testimonial” in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 

813 (2006). That case consolidated two appeals—Davis itself and Hammon v. Indiana. Davis

asked whether a 911 call counted as testimonial; Hammon asked the same question about a 

victim’s affidavit signed shortly after police responded to a domestic-violence call. Id. 817–

21. To resolve these questions, the Court created a “primary purpose” test to distinguish 

between nontestimonial and testimonial statements:

Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 

circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 

to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 

They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is 

no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 

establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
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Id. at 822.

Applying this test, the Court concluded the 911 call in Davis was nontestimonial 

because the declarant was describing “events as they were actually happening, rather than 

describing past events”; because questions from 911 dispatch were intended to “resolve [a] 

present emergency”; and because the encounter took place in an informal setting when the 

declarant was giving “frantic answers . . . over the phone in an environment that was not 

tranquil or . . . safe.” Id. at 827. In Hammon, on the other hand, the Court concluded the 

affidavit was testimonial because, when the statement was obtained, the declarant told the 

police that “things were fine . . . and there was no immediate threat to her person.” Id. at 

830. The police, at that time, were not trying to find out “what is happening, but rather 

what happened.” Id.

1. 911 calls

As to these 911 calls, we first hold that McNeil-Lewis failed to preserve his argument 

that the circuit court abused its discretion when it admitted this evidence as an exception to 

hearsay. Below, defense counsel objected only on the Confrontation Clause, relevance, and 

that the evidence was substantially more prejudicial than probative. “An appellant may not 

change the grounds for his argument on appeal and is instead limited to the scope and nature 

of the objections presented at trial.” Stover v. State, 2017 Ark. 66, at 5, 511 S.W.3d 333, 

335. We address only his Confrontation Clause argument asking whether the 911 calls were

testimonial or nontestimonial.

These calls are sufficiently like the facts in Davis. The statements described events as 

they were happening. In the first call, the declarant frantically asks the 911 dispatcher to 
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send an ambulance because a man had been shot and was lying on the ground. In the second 

call, the declarant repeated the same information about a man having been shot and that 

shots were being fired. These statements reported a shooting injury and described present

events. We affirm the circuit court’s ruling that these statements were nontestimonial 

because, when viewed objectively, their primary purpose was to seek police assistance for 

an ongoing emergency.

2. Dash cam video

As to the dash cam recording, even if the video had been improperly admitted, we 

still have no basis to reverse and remand for a new trial.1 The erroneous admission of hearsay

does not justify reversal when the error was harmless. Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 668, 79 

S.W.3d 370, 383 (2002). Confrontation Clause violations also receive harmless-error 

analysis. Roston v. State, 362 Ark. 408, 410, 208 S.W.3d 759, 760 (2005) (citing Delaware v. 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)). That analysis includes several factors: (i) whether the 

statement was important to the prosecution’s case; (ii) whether the statement was 

cumulative; (iii) whether other testimony corroborated or contradicted the statement; (iv) 

whether cross-examination was otherwise extensive; and (v) whether the prosecution’s case 

was strong overall. Id. Applying those factors here, we conclude the admission of the dash

cam video was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681 

(noting conviction should not be set aside if constitutional error is harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt). 

1See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 2023 Ark. 12, at 18 (affirming based on harmless error after 

assuming the evidence had been improperly admitted).
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First, while the statement was important to the prosecution’s case as it involved an 

identification of the defendant, the statement was cumulative to other eyewitness testimony. 

Stacy Abram, one of the victims, also identified McNeil-Lewis both by a photoidentification lineup shortly after the shooting and then at trial. Second, Perry’s identification 

was relayed through Officer Blazin’s testimony; that is, one reason the jury knew that Perry 

had identified McNeil-Lewis was through Officer Blazin’s subsequent elaboration at trial.

And Officer Blazin was subject to cross-examination by the defense. This examination 

included questions about the relation of the patrol car to the crime scene; whether the 

windows were tinted; whether the crowd could have obstructed Perry’s view; and other 

questions meant to test the accuracy of Perry’s identification. 

Third, the court permitted the defense wide latitude to introduce evidence of Perry’s 

later inability to make an identification. And finally, the State’s case included other physical 

evidence of McNeil-Lewis’s guilt, like the gunshot residue on his hands and the expert 

testimony connecting the guns found at his sister’s house with the bullets and shell casings 

found at the scene and in the deceased victim’s body. For these reasons, any error was 

harmless.

B. Procedurally Defaulted Arguments

McNeil-Lewis’s final two arguments were not preserved for our review. The first 

involved the prosecutor’s argument to the jury during the sentencing hearing. McNeilLewis argues the statement improperly appealed to the jury’s passions and that we should 

review the argument even though defense counsel failed to object. But we have rejected 

these types of arguments before, noting that to preserve an argument for appeal regarding 
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closing statements, defense counsel must make a contemporaneous objection. E.g., Buckley 

v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 68–70, 76 S.W.3d 825, 834–35 (2002). 

The next issue involves the circuit court’s denial of a posttrial motion about juror 

misconduct. The motion argued a juror failed to disclose being the child of the former 

Crittenden County Sheriff, even though asked about relation to law enforcement in the 

juror questionnaire and during voir dire. The motion noted that defense counsel discovered 

this possible relation “after the jury found the defendant guilty while waiting for a sentencing 

decision.” Defense counsel is required to raise an issue of jury misconduct at the first 

opportunity. Hendrix v. State, 298 Ark. 568, 569, 768 S.W.2d 546, 547 (1989). The first 

opportunity would have been while waiting for sentencing. Yet counsel waited until fifteen 

days after the trial to file the motion. A motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct 

should contain a statement that the defense did not know about the misconduct until after 

trial. Owens v. State, 300 Ark. 73, 78, 777 S.W.2d 205, 207–08 (1989). Because counsel 

failed to raise the allegation during the trial proceedings, we do not consider the merits. 

III. Rule 4-3(a)

In compliance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a), the record has been 

examined for all objections, motions, and requests made by either party that the circuit court 

decided adversely to the appellant. No prejudicial error has been found.

Affirmed. 

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Rachel Kemp, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen.; and Michael Zangari, 

Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.