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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : KENNETH WILLIAMS , : : Appellant : No. 2140 EDA 2014 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on September 10, 2012

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP

- 51

- CR

- 0001587

- 2010; CP

- 51

- CR

- 0003262

- 2010; CP

- 51

- CR

- 0003265

- 2010;

CP

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- CR

- 0007274

- 2010
BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J. : FILED OCTOBER 14, 2015 Kenneth Williams (“Williams”) appeals, nunc pro tunc , from the judgment of sentence entered following his conviction of six counts each of robbery and criminal conspiracy, and four counts of possessing an instrument of crime “(PIC”). 1 We affirm.
In its O pinion, the trial court summarized the procedural and factual history of this case, which we adopt as though fully restated herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 1

- 5. Williams presents the following claims for our review:
I. Is [Williams] entitled to an arrest of judgment with regard to his conviction for six counts of robbery, six counts of criminal conspiracy and four counts of [PIC] since the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdicts of guilt as

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(i), 903, 907.J

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- the Commonwealth failed to sustain its burd en of proving [Williams’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
II. Is [Williams] entitled to a new trial as a result of the pretrial [O]rder that granted the Commonwealth’s [M]otion to [C]onsolidate?
III. Is [Williams] entitled to an arrest of judgment since the tr ial court erred when it denied [Williams’s M]otion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600?
IV. Is [Williams] entitled to a new trial as a result of the trial court’s ruling that denied his request to redact a portion of the statements he gave to police?
Bri ef for Appellant at 5. Williams first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
convictions. Id. at 15. Williams argues that “the testimony presented at trial did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] was a co

- conspirator

or acco mplice to the crimes of robbery, criminal conspiracy or [PIC].” Id. at 20. Williams contends that he was not identified by any Commonwealth witness as being involved in the crimes. Id. Rather, Williams asserts, the case against him violated the corpus delicti rule, as it was “almost exclusively based on the statements he provided to police.” Id. In its Opinion, after setting forth the appropriate law, the trial court thoroughly addressed Williams’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underl ying each of his convictions, and concluded that they lack merit. Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 6

- 11. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on the basis of its Opinion with regard to Williams’s first claim. See id.J

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Williams next claims that the trial court improperly granted the Commonwealth’s Motion to Consolidate the charges against him. Brief for Appellant at 38. According to Williams, “[a] review of the facts of each of the incidents show s that there are more differences than similarities that would militate against consolidation.” Id. at 42. Williams contends that “there is no evidence that each of the robberies is unique[,] or that the evidence of each robbery would have been admissibl e in the trial of the others to prove common plan or scheme by [Williams].” Id. Williams acknowledges that at the hearing on the Commonwealth’s Motion, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Williams allegedly drove his co

conspirator to each location to commit the robbery; the crimes occurred within a period of 31 days; the crimes occurred within a three

- mile radius of each other; the crimes occurred between 9:00 p.m. and 11:15 p.m.; and each victim was robbed by the co

- conspirator at gunpoint. Id. at 45. Notwithstanding, Williams asserts that the location, time manner and circumstances of each crime was not unique, and did not exhibit a pattern warranting consolidation. Id. “In reviewing a trial court decision to consolidate offenses for trial, o ur standard is abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Thomas , 879 A.2d 246, 260 (Pa. Super. 2005). Offenses charged in separate informations may be tried together if they are “based on the same act or transaction” or if “the evidence of each of the offen ses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by theJ

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jury so that there is no danger of confusion.” [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 582(A)(1). The court has discretion to order separate trials if “it appears that any party may be prejudiced” by consolidating the charges. [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 583. Our Supreme Court has established a three[

- ]part test, incorporating these two rules, for deciding the issue of joinder versus severance of offenses from different informations. The court mus t determine whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other; whether such evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger of confusion; and, if the answers to these inquiries are in t he affirmative, whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses. Thomas , 879 A.2d at 260 (some citations omitted). In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Williams’s challenge to the consolidation of the charges for trial, and concluded that it lacks merit. Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 11

- 12. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth i n its Opinion, and affirm on this basis. See id. In his third claim, Williams argues that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. Brief for Appellant at 47. In particular, Williams disputes the trial court’s failure to attribute to the Commonwealth the delay from November 2, 2009, to February 4, 2010. Id. at 49. Williams asserts that during this time period, he was not transported from Montgomery County to Philadelphia, as “February 4, 2010 was given as the earliest possible day for a protracted room.” Id. Williams contends that it is the Commonwealth’s responsibility to assure that he was transported to Philadelphia. Id.J

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Williams states that during the June 16, 2010 scheduling conference, he was given a trial date of January 13, 2011. Id. Williams argues that this delay was not necessarily beyond the Commonwealth’s control, “since, as previously stated, it is the Commonw ealth’s obligation to assure that the accused is tried within the time limitations of Rule 600.” Id. Therefore, Williams claims, the trial court improperly determined “that the time frame totaling 306 days was excusable delay[,] and that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in bringing [him] to trial.” Id. We review such claims according to the following principles: In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of a trial court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion . Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the la w is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused. The proper scope of review ... is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the [trial] court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, thi s Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s righ t to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not designed to insulate the criminally accused fromJ

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good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth. So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial righ ts of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. In considering [these] matters ..., courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual a ccused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law enforcement as well. Commonwealth v. Thompson , 93 A.3d 478, 486

- 87 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). Rule 600 provides, in relevant part, as follows: (A) Commencement of Trial; Time for T rial (1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. (2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods. (a) T rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

*** (C) Computation of Time
(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.J

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In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Williams’s claim and concluded that it is without merit. Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 12

- 14. Specifically, the trial court determined that “the time frame totaling 306 days was excusable delay and the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in bringing [Williams] to trial.” Id. at 14. We agree with the sound analysis and conclusion of the trial court, as expressed in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis. See id. at 12

- 14. Finally, Will iams claims that the trial court improperly failed to redact a portion of Williams’s statements to police. Brief for Appellant at 51. Specifically, Williams argues that the trial court should have redacted the portion of his statement “that referenced ot her robberies for which he was convicted in another jurisdiction or never charged or convicted.” Id. According to Williams, “[b]y allowing the Commonwealth to present testimony concerning other robberies that [Williams] may have committed resulted in the trial court’s permitting the jury to hear evidence of unrelated criminal activity.” Id. at 52. The following standard governs our review of the admissibility of evidence: Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and wi ll be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Admissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at is sue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.J

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- Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing and due considerati on. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused. Commonwealth v. Borovichka , 18 A.3d 1242, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Levanduski , 907 A.2d 3, 13

- 14 (Pa. Super. 2006) ( en banc ) (internal citations omitted)). In its Opinion, the tr ial court addressed this claim and concluded that it lacks merit. Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 14

- 15. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on the basis of its Opinion with regard to this claim. See id. Additionally, w e note the following. The harmless error doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects the reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” We have described the proper analysis as follows: Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis ; or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evide nce; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Hairston , 84 A. 3d 657, 671

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Here, the challenged statements are cumulative of other, previously admitted evidence. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 15 (citing N.T., 1/26/12, at 8). As such, our review discloses that any error by the trial court was harmless. See Hairston , 84 A.3d at 671

- 72. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2015Circulated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PMCirculated 09/09/2015 02:58 PM