J-A21041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.C.K.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1355 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0001581-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.-C.K.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1356 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court

Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000535-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 28, 2022

K.S. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered April 22, 2022, in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights to her son K.C.K.S. (Child), born in June 2015.1 Mother also 

____________________________________________

1 On April 22, 2022, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of J.W.

(“Father”) and any unknown putative father. At this time, only Mother filed

an appeal.
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appeals from the April 22, 2022, order related to Child’s dependency case,

which changed his permanency goal from reunification to adoption. After 

careful review, we affirm the termination decree and dismiss the appeal from 

the goal change order as moot. 

On October 3, 2019, the Department of Human Services (DHS) received 

a General Protective Services (GPS) report alleging Mother was verbally 

abusive to Child and hit him in the chest with a blue plastic baseball bat. See

N.T., 4/22/22, at 9-10. The report also indicated that Mother had sex with a 

paramour while Child was in the room. Id. at 10. During this incident, 

another woman was in the room doing drugs and Child reported touching the

woman’s private parts. Id. Finally, the report stated that Mother severely 

struggles with her mental health and that she abuses phencyclidine (PCP). 

Id.

Accordingly, DHS obtained an order of protective custody (OPC) for 

Child. On October 4, 2019, at a shelter care hearing, the trial court lifted the 

OPC and ordered the temporary commitment to DHS to stand. On October 

25, 2019, the court adjudicated Child dependent, who was then four years 

old. On the same day, the court entered an aggravated circumstances order 

because Mother previously had her parental rights terminated to four of her 

other children. See Aggravated Circumstances Order, 10/25/19, at 1.

DHS provided Mother with single case plan (SCP) objectives: 1) attend 

Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) for parenting and employment classes; 
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2) attend the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for a forthwith drug screen, an 

assessment, and three random drug screens; 3) participate in a mental health 

evaluation at Behavioral Health Services (BHS); and 4) attend supervised 

visits with Child. See N.T. at 13. 

During the pendency of the case, Mother did not comply with these 

objectives. Mother did not make any progress towards alleviating the 

circumstances that brought Child into the custody of DHS. See N.T. at 16-

17. CUA made numerous referrals on behalf of Mother, but Mother never 

availed herself of the ARC classes, CEU assessment, drug and alcohol 

treatment, drug screens, or the BHS mental health evaluation. Id. at 13-16. 

Additionally, Mother was inconsistent with visitation, and on July 21, 2021, at 

the conclusion of a permanency review hearing, the trial court suspended her 

visitation.2 Id. at 15-16. Her visits were suspended because Mother 

repeatedly tried to leave the facility with Child and told Child, without further 

specification in the record, to touch younger girls inappropriately. Id. at 15. 

On September 21, 2021, DHS filed a petition for the involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8), and (b), and a separate petition to change Child’s permanency 

____________________________________________

2 Mother appealed the trial court’s order suspending her visitation. This Court 

affirmed the order on January 5, 2022, because Mother posed a “grave threat” 

to Child and no other therapeutic intervention or other support would protect 

Child from Mother. In the Interest of K.C.K.S., 1688 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. 

Jan. 5, 2022) (unpub. memo.). Mother’s visitation remained suspended 

through the termination of her parental rights on April 22, 2022.
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goal from reunification to adoption. The trial court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on April 22, 2022. At this time, Child was six years old and was 

represented by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and separate legal counsel. 

Mother was represented by counsel and testified. DHS presented the 

testimony of CUA case manager, Rochelle Richards.

At the conclusion of the April 22nd hearing, the trial court granted DHS’s

petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Sections

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and change Child’s permanency goal to 

adoption. Mother filed timely notices of appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a 

Rule 1925(a) opinion on June 13, 2022. This Court consolidated Mother’s 

appeals sua sponte on June 16, 2022.

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for review:

1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) in the absence of 

clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit or 

unwilling to perform parental duties?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and 2511(b) in the 

absence of clear and convincing that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of 

[Child]?

3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its 

discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) in the absence of clear and 

convincing evidence that termination would best serve the 

needs and welfare of Child?
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4. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights and 

changing [Child’s] goal to adoption, where the trial court 

caused the deteriorated bonds between [Mother] and 

[Child] by suspending her visits with [Child] several months 

prior to the goal change/termination of parental rights 

hearing?

Mother’s Brief at 3.3

We review an appeal from an order terminating parental rights with the 

following deference to the trial court’s determination:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. [A] decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of

parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

____________________________________________

3 Legal counsel for Child filed a letter joining DHS’s brief in support of 

terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing Child’s permanency goal to 

adoption. We note, with disapproval, that Child’s GAL did not a file a brief or 

letter in this appeal.
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that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

4

 Here, we analyze the court’s termination 

decrees pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

____________________________________________

4

In order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with 

the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section

2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
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to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must show three 

components: (1) that the child has been removed from the care of the parent 

for at least 12 months; (2) that the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re Adoption of 

J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

Unlike other subsections, Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court 

to evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led 

to the placement of the children. In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super. 

2017). “[T]he relevant inquiry” regarding the second prong of 

Section 2511(a)(8) “is whether the conditions that led to removal have been 

remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at 

the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Further, the Adoption Act prohibits the court from considering, as part of the 

Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, “any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described [in the petition] which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

We observe that Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b) both require a court 

considering a termination petition to assess the needs and welfare of the 
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relevant child or children. However, the needs and welfare analysis required 

by Section 2511(a)(8) is distinct from the needs and welfare analysis required 

by Section 2511(b), and must be addressed separately. See In re C.L.G., 

956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). 

This Court has recognized “that the application of [Section 2511(a)(8)] 

may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward 

resolving the problems that had led to the removal of her children.” In re 

Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led 

to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute 

implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to 

assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 

stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. 

Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates 

only a short period of time, to wit [18] months, in which to 

complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child 

who has been placed in foster care.

Id. (citations omitted).

With respect to subsection 2511(b), we consider whether termination of 

parental rights will best serve the Children’s developmental, physical and 

emotional needs, and welfare. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). “In this context, the court must take into account whether a 

bond exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy 

an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. “[A] parent’s basic 

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted, 
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upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have 

proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (citation omitted).

“When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. [Instead, s]ocial workers and caseworkers can offer 

evaluations as well.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations omitted). 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 

(Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks omitted. “Above all else . . . adequate 

consideration must be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent’s 

own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination 

of parental rights.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations and quotation 

marks omitted).

In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion

by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a) because DHS failed to present clear and convincing evidence. See

Mother’s Brief at 7. Specifically, regarding Section 2511(a)(8), Mother posits 

that DHS did not prove that the conditions that contributed to Child’s 

placement continue to exist and cannot or will not be remedied by Mother 

within a reasonable period of time. Id. at 12. Mother argues that she 

attempted to complete her SCP objectives. Id. at 13. She baldly asserts that 
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she reached out to CUA case manager, Ms. Richards, for assistance, but 

Mother did not receive the requested support. Id. Without support from CUA, 

Mother contends that it was impossible for the trial court to determine if the 

conditions that contributed to Child’s placement could be remedied in a 

reasonable time. Id. Mother’s argument is belied by the record.

In its opinion, the trial court aptly stated,

Throughout the life of the case, Mother has been ordered to the 

CEU for an assessment and to submit random drug screens. She 

was also ordered to BHS for a mental health evaluation and to 

ARC for parenting classes. Since the Child was adjudicated, 

Mother has not engaged in any of her single case plan objectives. 

Additionally, Mother failed to visit Child consistently, and her visits 

were eventually suspended due to her behavior and the effect on 

the Child when she did attend. (Trial Ct. Order 10/28/20 at 1 

(stating that Mother had missed 42 visits with Child). . . . 

Moreover, the CUA [c]ase [m]anager testified that Mother has not 

met any of the Child’s needs since he was removed from her care, 

and that she has not remedied any of the issues that led to the 

Child’s placement.

Trial Ct. Op., 6/13/22, at 12 (some record citations omitted). 

A careful review of the record supports the trial court’s findings. 

Primarily, at the time of the termination hearing, Child had been in the care 

of DHS for over thirty months. Regarding the second factor of Section 

2511(a)(8), Child was placed with DHS due to physical and emotional abuse, 

concerns over Mother’s mental health, and Mother’s drug use. As related 

supra, Mother did not avail herself of any of the referred resources. Mother’s 

argument relies on a passing reference that she informed Ms. Richardson that 

she was unable to participate in ARC classes electronically. N.T. at 29-31. 
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Mother also stated that after her home was burglarized, she asked Ms. 

Richardson for help, but CUA could not provide assistance because Child did 

not reside with her. Id.

Ms. Richardson testified that multiple referrals were made on behalf of 

Mother to ARC, CEU, and BHS, but Mother never participated in any of these 

programs. N.T. at 13-16. BHS told Ms. Richardson that they did not want to

work with Mother due to her aggressive behavior, but Ms. Richardson referred 

Mother again. Id. at 14-15. Subsequently, Mother arrived late for her 

appointment and then attacked the guards because they would not let her in 

the closed courthouse. Id.

Mother was also inconsistent with visitation, and when Mother did visit, 

she told Child to disobey his caregivers and to touch the younger girls 

inappropriately at his daycare. N.T. at 15. Additionally, Mother frequently 

attempted to remove Child from the visitation facility. Id. at 15, 24.

Ultimately, as set forth above, in July 2021, the trial court suspended 

visitation, which remained suspended through the termination of Mother’s 

parental rights. Id. at 15-16. Furthermore, Mother testified that because 

her house was burglarized, her home was no longer appropriate for Child until 

repairs were made. Id. at 16, 30-31. Thus, the trial court was well within its 

discretion to find that the conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

Children still exist and reunification was not imminent.
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In her brief’s second issue, Mother combines the analysis of the third 

factor in Section 2511(a)(8) with Section 2511(b), but as referenced supra, 

the needs and welfare analysis required by Section 2511(a)(8) is distinct from 

the needs and welfare analysis required by Section 2511(b) and must be 

addressed separately. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc). Accordingly, we address the third factor of Section 

2511(a)(8) first.

The trial court correctly determined that termination would best serve 

the needs and welfare of Child. Ms. Richardson testified that Child has a close 

relationship with his resource parent who provides him with love, safety, 

stability, and support. N.T. at 21. Ms. Richardson also testified that Child 

receives specialized services, and the resource parent is very engaged in 

ensuring that Child receives all necessary services. Id. at 22. Child calls the 

resource parent “mommy” and has stated that he wants “my mommy to be 

my mommy.” Id. at 23, 26. In contrast, Ms. Richardson stated that, Mother 

does not meet any of Child’s needs and Child would not suffer irreparable 

harm if the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 22-23. 

Based on the foregoing testimony, the trial court was well within its 

discretion to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8) 

because: (1) Child has been removed from Mother’s care far in excess of the 

12-month statutory minimum; (2) the conditions which led to Child’s removal 
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continue to exist; and (3) termination would best serve the needs and welfare 

of Child.

In Mother’s second issue, she argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating her parental rights under Section 

2511(b) where DHS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

terminating Mother’s rights would best service the emotional needs and 

welfare of Child. See Mother’s Brief at 13. Mother argues that the trial court 

failed to consider the parent-child bond between Mother and Child, specifically 

when the trial court, at the termination hearing, stated that “[i]t’s clear to me 

that [Mother] loves [Child].” Mother’s Brief at 15-16; N.T. at 37. Mother 

further contends that evidence of Child’s bond with the resource parent is 

unreliable because legal counsel hired a social worker to speak with Child on 

his behalf and Ms. Richardson stated that Child did not specifically indicate 

that he wants to be “adopted.” Mother’s Brief at 16.

At the close of the termination hearing, the trial court indicated that it 

is clear that Mother loves Child, but “[u]nfortunatley, loving your child isn’t 

enough sometimes. You have to be able to meet your child’s needs both 

emotionally, mentally, [and] physically.” N.T. at 37. In its opinion, the trial 

court determined that “termination is in the best interest of the Child as he 

has established a strong parent-child bond with his kinship caregiver who has 

provided the Child with consistent love, safety, stability, and support.” Trial 

Ct. Op. at 13. 
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The record confirms the trial court’s findings. Mother’s argument that 

the trial court did not consider the bond she shared with Child is unsupported 

by the record. The trial court explicitly acknowledges at the close of the 

termination hearing that Mother loves Child, but that love is not enough. N.T.

at 37. As related supra, “[a]bove all else . . . adequate consideration must 

be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent’s own feelings of love 

and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights.” 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Further, the trial court heard testimony from Ms. Richardson that Mother 

influenced Child in a negative manner whenever she visited. See N.T. at 15-

16. Additionally, Ms. Richardson testified that Child does not want to see 

Mother. Id. at 23. Ms. Richardson further stated that Child would not suffer 

irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, and that it would 

be in Child’s best interest for Mother’s rights to be terminated. Id. at 21-23. 

Finally, although Child, who was six years old at the time of the 

termination hearing, did not specifically state that he wants to be “adopted,” 

he informed Ms. Richardson that he wants the resource parent to be his 

“mommy.” N.T. at 23. Legal counsel confirmed Child’s desire to be adopted.

5

 

N.T. at 35-36. Therefore, Mother’s second issue fails, and the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in determining that termination best serves Child’s

____________________________________________

5 Legal counsel did not speak with Child directly. Counsel contracted with a 

social worker, Roya Paller, to speak with Child on his behalf. N.T. at 35-36. 
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developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 

2511(b).

In her third issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

by changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption where 

DHS failed to provide sufficient evidence that a goal change would best suit 

Child’s needs and welfare. See Mother’s Brief at 16. Given our disposition 

affirming the termination decree, Mother’s argument pertaining to the order 

is moot. Therefore, we do not review it. See In the Interest of D.R.-W., 

227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in 

ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force 

or effect.”) (citation omitted).

In Mother’s final issue, she argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in terminating her parental rights and changing Child’s goal to 

adoption where the trial court caused the bond between Mother and Child to 

deteriorate by suspending visitation several months prior to the 

termination/goal change hearing. See Mother’s Brief at 18. Mother argues 

that the termination of Mother’s parental rights should be reversed because 

the suspension of her visitation directly impacted the bond between her and 

Child. Id. 

Mother’s argument is without merit because a panel of this Court 

affirmed the suspension order. See In the Interest of K.C.K.S., supra. 

Therefore, that order is not before us. Further, Mother’s argument indicates
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that she still fails to take responsibility for her actions as the trial court did not 

arbitrarily decide to suspend her visitation. Indeed, Mother caused her 

visitation to be suspended and any subsequent deterioration of her bond with 

Child based on that suspension. Accordingly, Mother’s final issue is without 

merit.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree terminating Mother’s 

parental rights and dismiss as moot Mother’s appeal of the order changing 

Child’s permanency goal to adoption.

Termination decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/28/2022