UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ANSAARI SHAKKA, a/k/a Joseph

Carter,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MAARFU AULU; WILLIAM D. LEWIS,

Correctional Officer; NEWTON

KENDIG, Dr., Chief Medical Officer

of the Division of Correction,

Defendants-Appellees, No. 98-6278

and

SEWALL SMITH, Warden; THEODORE

PURNELL, Major; SEIGFRIED

PRESBURY, Correctional Officer;

WAYNE TANNER, Correctional

Officer; SERGEANT BONDS; J.

MORGAN, Lieutenant,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Susan K. Gauvey, Magistrate Judge.

(CA-92-1424-WMN)

Argued: January 29, 1999

Decided: February 24, 1999

Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: David Paul King, HOGAN & HARTSON, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. David Phelps Kennedy, Assistant

Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:

Ralph S. Tyler, HOGAN & HARTSON, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland,

for Appellant. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, a Maryland inmate, brought this suit alleging denial of

his federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. He appeals

from a judgment for the defendant correctional officers and officials

following a jury trial, arguing that the district court erred when it: (1)

denied his Batson motion; (2) allowed the jury verdict to be tainted

by alleged violations of the trial court's order granting plaintiff's

motion in limine; and (3) granted summary judgment to Warden

Smith.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his challenge

to the defendants' peremptory strike of Juror # 232, pursuant to

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). It is well settled that a civil

litigant's exercise of a peremptory jury challenge on account of race

violates the equal protection rights of the prospective juror and that

the opposing party has standing to object in order to raise the

excluded person's rights. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,

500 U.S. 614, 618 (1991). When a party challenges the exercise of a

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peremptory challenge on equal protection grounds, that party bears

the burden of proving intentional discrimination by the opposing

party. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. As explained by this court in

United States v. Malindez, 962 F.2d 332, 333 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

506 U.S. 875 (1992); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir.

1995), and others, the Supreme Court has delineated a burden-shifting

procedure for courts to use in analyzing a claim of purposeful discrimination in the jury selection process. A finding by the district

court as to whether or not a peremptory challenge was exercised for

a racially discriminatory reason is given great deference by this court.

We review that finding only for clear error. See Jones, 57 F.3d at 421

(citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-65 (1991)). "Indeed, as we have previously noted, the district court is especially

well-suited to resolve challenges to peremptory strikes of jurors

because it has observed with its own eyes the very act in dispute."

Jones, 57 F.3d at 421 (citations omitted).

In this case, the defendants' counsel articulated several reasons for

the strike: (1) because the juror answered no questions on voir dire;

(2) because she made a facial expression of concern for the appellant;

and (3) because she lived in a high-crime area of Baltimore, but did

not answer any questions on voir dire relating to crime, suggesting

that she may have had undisclosed attitudes about the criminal justice

system which counsel had not had a chance to explore through

follow-up questions. The trial judge questioned the defendants' counsel about her reasons for the strike, heard argument on the issue by

appellant's counsel, considered the matter, and then denied the Batson

motion. The trial court specifically found that the challenged strike

was not the result of purposeful discrimination ("I cannot find as the

law requires me to find that the defense has purposefully discriminated") and that the reasons given for the strike were not pretextual

("I will find that I do not find the explanation given for the striking

of either Mr. Jenkins or Ms. Thomas pretextural[sic]. . ."). J. A. at

161-62. Accordingly, we find no clear error in the trial court's handling of the appellant's Batson motion.

Appellant next challenges appellees' alleged violations of an order

granting appellant's motion in limine. Specifically, appellant objects

to: statements describing inmates at the facility in which appellant

was incarcerated as a "super secure place" housing a "very special

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elite group of inmates;" testimony regarding appellant's destruction of

the plumbing in his cell; cross-examination of appellant in which

counsel elicited information regarding his disassembly of his wheelchair and barricading himself in his cell; testimony by a defense witness that appellant had thrown excrement on correctional officers;

testimony by the warden that appellant had referred to his own father

as an "Uncle Tom;" testimony by another defense witness describing

appellant as presenting a very difficult situation"by history and reputation," who constituted a "management problem," and was "extremely manipulative and extremely combative," and whose

wheelchair or crutches "could be fashioned as weapons."

This court has repeatedly emphasized the substantial deference

afforded a trial court on most evidentiary rulings. See United States

v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.

Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 155 (4th Cir. 1990); Beaty Shopping Ctr.,

Inc. v. Monarch Ins. Co., 315 F.2d 467, 471 (4th Cir. 1963); Thomas

J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1989). In

many of the instances to which appellant objects, the trial judge properly sustained appellant's objections, granted appellant's motions to

strike, and promptly issued curative instructions to mitigate any prejudicial effect of the objectionable statements. We have previously held

that only under the "most extraordinary circumstances" does a limiting instruction fail to "cure[ ] . . . unfair prejudice." United States v.

Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct.

1842 (1997); see also United States v. Masters , 622 F.2d 83, 87 (4th

Cir. 1980). Those statements allowed to stand were relevant to issues

before the court and we find no abuse of discretion in allowing the

statements. While the trial judge twice denied appellant's motion for

a mistrial, such a ruling is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545, 552 (4th Cir. 1997) (citation

omitted). The court observes no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's

denial of appellant's two motions for a mistrial.

Arguing that the objectionable statements incurably prejudiced the

jury, appellant seeks a new trial. However, "`[a] new trial (in these

circumstances) should be ordered only when substantial prejudice has

occurred.'" United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 211 (4th Cir. 1976)

(quoting United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 49 (3d Cir. 1975)).

Because we found that the court did not abuse its discretion in relation

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to the statements, there is no basis for a new trial. The appellant nevertheless cites the jury's verdict as evidence that the jury was prejudiced. To the contrary, the jury's finding in appellant's favor on the

significant issue of medical need demonstrates that the jury was not

so prejudiced as to be unwilling to carefully evaluate the merits of

appellant's claim. Accordingly, the court holds that the jury's verdict

was not so tainted as to require a new trial.

The appellant next maintains that the trial court improperly granted

Warden Smith summary judgment. Summary judgment may be

granted if, after consideration of such items as depositions, affidavits

or certifications, and after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See

Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Stone

v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1977)).

The appellant alleged both direct and supervisory liability against

Warden Smith. He offered no evidence, however, to create a genuine

issue of material fact regarding Warden Smith's liability in either

regard. Accordingly, the court finds no error in trial court's grant of

summary judgment in the Warden's favor.

For the reasons stated above, this court affirms the judgment of the

district court.

AFFIRMED

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