J-S32007-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DION CRAWFORD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 335 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 4, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0012507-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 19, 2021

Dion Crawford appeals from the judgment of sentence, imposed in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, after the court convicted him, 

following a nonjury trial, of obstructing the administration of law,1tampering 

with physical evidence,2 and possession of drug paraphernalia.3 Upon careful 

review, we vacate Crawford’s judgment of sentence as to his convictions for 

obstructing the administration of law and tampering with physical evidence, 

discharge him with regard to those convictions, and remand the case to the 

trial court for resentencing on the remaining count of possession of drug 

paraphernalia.

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910.

3 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
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The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this case 

as follows:

On October 23, 2019, Penn Hills Police responded to a laundromat 

located on Robinson Boulevard for a report of a suspicious male. 

The 911 caller reported that a black male, wearing a black leather 

jacket, blue jeans, and a blue ballcap had been observed 

damaging the machines inside the laundromat. When the 

responding officer arrived, he observed a black male matching the 

description provided by the 911 caller standing in front of the 

business. The officer directed the male, later identified as 

Crawford, to place his hands on the police vehicle, at which point 

Crawford surreptitiously reached into his right front pocket and 

retrieved a small metal cylindrical object, which he then abruptly 

deposited onto the ground. The officer observed Crawford’s 

actions and recognized the item he [had] deposited onto the 

ground as a crack pipe. When the officer asked Crawford if he 

was in possession of any other contraband or weapons, Crawford 

fled the scene and led the officer on a foot pursuit before 

ultimately being apprehended. Crawford continued to be 

noncompliant and refused to place his hands behind his back. Two 

backup officers eventually arrived and assisted the initial officer in 

taking Crawford into custody.

Following a nonjury trial on October 29, 2020, Crawford was found 

guilty of [the above offenses]. On February 4, 2021, Crawford 

was sentenced to [concurrent] period[s] of two (2) years’ 

probation in relation to his convictions for obstruction and 

tampering with evidence[.] No further penalty was imposed in 

relation to Crawford’s conviction for possession of drug 

paraphernalia. Crawford subsequently filed a notice of appeal to 

the Superior Court on March 5, 2021, and thereafter filed his 

concise statement of [errors] complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/21, at 2-3.

On appeal, Crawford challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his convictions for tampering with evidence and obstructing the 
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administration of law.4 Our standard of review of a sufficiency claim is wellsettled:

We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and 

all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support 

the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element 

of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.

The evidence established at trial need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, 

part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the 

province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s burden 

may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt 

about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact[-]finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter 

of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined 

circumstances.

Commonwealth v. N.M.C., 172 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Crawford first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction for tampering with physical evidence. Here, Crawford argues that 

the trial court’s conclusion that he

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4

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court concluded that Crawford had 

waived his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence because his Rule 

1925(b) statement “offers no material facts in support of his contention” and 

“fails to cite any precedential authority in support of his sufficiency 

challenges.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/21, at 4. We disagree. Rule 1925 

specifically states that “[t]he judge shall not require the citation to authorities 

or the record[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). Moreover, we find that Crawford’s 

statement “identif[ies] each error that [he] intend[ed] to assert with sufficient 

detail to identify the issue to be raised[.]” Id. Accordingly, we will review 

Crawford’s claims.
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“surreptitiously deposited the [crack pipe] onto the ground upon 

being approached by police” is definitively refuted by the dashcam 

footage entered into evidence during trial. The footage 

demonstrates that [] Crawford emptied his pockets only after

Officer [Christopher] Broker had approached and detained him, 

and that he did so casually and in full view of Officer Broker. 

Moreover, Officer Broker’s testimony contains no suggestion that 

there was anything “surreptitious[]” about the manner in which [] 

Crawford “deposited” the crack pipe. To the contrary, Officer 

Broker testified that he “watched [Crawford] pull the crack pipe 

out of his pocket and then [] watched it hit the ground” and 

answered in the affirmative when asked if [] Crawford had 

dropped the crack pipe “at [his] feet.” There was also no evidence 

that the crack pipe was in any way damaged; to the contrary, 

Officer Broker testified that he did not recall whether the object 

shattered. 

Brief of Appellant, at 11 (citations to record omitted).

In support of his argument, Crawford relies on our Supreme Court’s 

decision in Commonwealth v. Delgado, 679 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1996). There, 

police were conducting a controlled buy with a confidential informant (“CI”). 

After the CI made contact with Delgado—the target—the CI gave the police 

the pre-arranged hand signal to intervene. Police approached Delgado, who 

then fled down an alley. As he was doing so, one of the pursuing officers

observed Delgado throw an object on top of a small building. The object was 

retrieved and subsequently determined to be a plastic bag containing 17.1 

grams of cocaine. Delgado was convicted of possession of cocaine, possession 

of cocaine with intent to deliver, and tampering with evidence.

On allowance of appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Delgado’s 

tampering conviction, holding that:

Delgado’s act of discarding contraband in plain view of the police 

does not rise to a level of conduct that constitutes the destruction 
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or concealment of evidence as contemplated by the statute. The 

act of throwing the bag of cocaine while being chased by the police 

was nothing more than an abandonment of the evidence. We 

reach this conclusion mindful of the principles of construction for 

the Crimes Code:

The provisions of [the Crimes Code] shall be construed 

according to the fair import of their terms but when the 

language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be 

interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this 

title and the special purposes of the particular provision 

involved.

18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 105.

We note that in general a conviction for simple possession of 

cocaine is a misdemeanor of the third degree punishable by a 

maximum term of imprisonment of one year. 35 P.S. §§ 780–

113(16), (37)(b); 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 106(b)(9). Tampering with 

evidence is a misdemeanor of the second degree punishable by a 

maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

4910(1); 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 106(b)(7). Under these circumstances, 

we do not believe that the General Assembly intended the simple 

act of abandoning evidence in plain view of the police to constitute 

the commission of an additional crime of a greater degree.

Id. at 225. 

As relevant here, a person commits the offense of tampering with 

evidence where, “believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 

pending or about to be instituted, he . . . alters, destroys, conceals or removes 

any record, document or thing with intent to impair its verity or availability in 

such proceeding or investigation[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910. 

To establish the offense of tampering with evidence, the 

Commonwealth must prove three interrelated elements: (1) the 

defendant knew that an official proceeding or investigation was 

pending (or about to be instituted); (2) the defendant altered, 

destroyed, concealed, or removed an item; and (3) the defendant 

did so with the intent to impair the verity or availability of the item 

to the proceeding or investigation.
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Commonwealth v. Toomer, 159 A.3d 956, 961 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Here, upon careful review of Officer Broker’s testimony, as well as the 

dashcam video, we are constrained to agree with Crawford that this case is 

analogous to Delgado and, therefore, his conviction for tampering cannot 

stand. Officer Broker testified as follows at trial:

Q. And once you made contact with the defendant, what 

happened?

A. Based on the way that the call came in, I instructed Mr. 

Crawford to place his hands on the patrol vehicle.

Q. And was he compliant?

A. He was at first.

Q. When you say he was at first, what do you mean by that?

A. I instructed Mr. Crawford to place both of his hands on the 

hood of my police vehicle in front of my dashcam.

Q. And once you did that, what did you do next?

A. Mr. Crawford then reached down into his pocket and pulled out 

an object and threw it on to the ground. I asked Mr. Crawford 

what that was. He responded, [“]A crack pipe, sir.[”]

. . .

Q. And was it immediately apparent to you what the defendant 

had dropped?

A. It was.

Q. And did the defendant identify this object as a crack pipe?

A. He did say it was a crack pipe.

N.T. Nonjury Trial, 10/29/20, at 10-11.

The dashcam footage of the above-described interaction shows Officer 

Broker standing directly behind Crawford and slightly to Crawford’s right. 
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Crawford removes an item (subsequently determined to be a crack pipe) from 

his left jacket pocket and passes it from his left hand to his right hand. As 

Officer Broker holds the sleeve of Crawford’s right jacket arm, Crawford drops

the item on the ground using that same arm. Officer Broker can be seen 

watching as the item falls to the ground.5 

Here, as in Delgado, Crawford’s act of “discarding contraband in plain 

view of the police does not rise to a level of conduct that constitutes the 

destruction or concealment of evidence as contemplated by the statute.”

6 Id.

(emphasis added). Moreover, possession of drug paraphernalia—here, a crack 

pipe—is an ungraded misdemeanor, punishable by not more than one year’s 

incarceration. See 35 P.S. 780-113(i); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 106(b)(9), (8). 

Tampering with evidence is a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable 

by a maximum of two years’ incarceration. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 4910(1); id. at

§ 106(b)(7). As the Supreme Court concluded in Delgado, “we do not believe 

that the General Assembly intended the simple act of abandoning evidence in 

plain view of the police to constitute the commission of an additional crime of 

a greater degree.” Delgado, 679 A.2d at 225. Accordingly, even viewing the 

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5 The verbal exchange between Officer Broker and Crawford is inaudible.

6 The Commonwealth’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Jones, 904 A.2d 24 

(Pa. Super. 2006), is misplaced. There, Jones actually destroyed the 

evidence—believed to be a crack pipe—with which he was charged with 

tampering by stepping on it as he walked towards a patrol car prior to his 

arrest.
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evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, 

we agree with Crawford that his conviction for tampering cannot be sustained.

Crawford next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction of obstructing the administration of law. A person is guilty of that 

offense where he:

intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of 

law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical 

interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any 

other unlawful act, except that this section does not apply 

to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit 

to arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official 

duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without 

affirmative interference with governmental functions.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101 (emphasis added). 

In order to establish that Crawford obstructed the administration of law 

under section 5101, the Commonwealth must establish that: (1) he had the 

intent to obstruct the administration of law; and (2) he used force or violence, 

breached an official duty, or committed an unlawful act. Commonwealth v. 

Goodman, 342, 676 A.2d 234, 235 (Pa. 1996). The obstruction statute 

specifically excludes from its ambit “flight [or] refusal to submit to arrest.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5101. The explanatory note to Model Penal Code section 242.1, 

which the legislature adopted, verbatim, in section 5101, explains this 

exception as follows:

Specifically excluded from [s]ection 242.1 are the acts of “flight 

by a person charged with crime” and “refusal to submit to arrest.” 

The effect of these exclusions is to relegate such conduct 

to the [s]ection 242.2 offense of resisting arrest. This 

provision covers a person who, for the purpose of preventing a 
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lawful arrest, “creates a substantial risk of bodily injury” or 

“employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to 

overcome the resistance.” This language exempts from 

liability nonviolent refusal to submit to arrest and such 

minor acts of resistance as running from a policeman or 

trying to shake free of his grasp. The policy judgment 

underlying this curtailment of coverage is that authorizing criminal 

punishment for every trivial act of resistance would invite abusive 

prosecution. Of course, [s]ection 242.2 does not limit the 

policeman’s authority to pursue a fleeing suspect or to use force 

if necessary to effect an arrest.

Model Penal Code § 242.1, Explanatory Note (emphasis added).

The trial court found the evidence to be sufficient to sustain a conviction 

under section 5101 where Crawford’s “actions, viewed collectively, were 

sufficient to establish that, knowing he was the subject of a police 

investigation, [he] intentionally obstructed the administration of law . . . by 

attempting to discard the crack pipe before the police officer discovered it on 

his person.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/21, at 6. We disagree. 

Here, Crawford did not use force or violence, breach an official duty, or 

commit an unlawful act. Goodman, supra. Rather, as we concluded above, 

he merely attempted to abandon evidence in plain view of Officer Broker. 

When Officer Broker asked Crawford what the object was, he immediately 

admitted that it was a crack pipe. Crawford’s subsequent act of shaking free 

from Officer Broker’s grasp and fleeing is specifically excluded from 

consideration under the statute. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101; see also Model 

Penal Code § 242.1, Explanatory Note.

The Commonwealth argues that 
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[w]hile [section 5101] does indicate that it does not apply to 

“flight by a person charged with crime [or the] refusal to submit 

to arrest,” the statute’s plain language makes clear that it only 

does not apply in those circumstances in which the flight occurs 

“without affirmative interference with governmental functions.” 

Here, Officer Broker testified that[,] after he had to forcibly take 

hold of one of Crawford’s hands in an attempt to get him to comply 

with his request to put his hands on the vehicle’s hood, Crawford 

broke away from him and ran off. The Commonwealth submits 

that this action by Crawford would certainly qualify as an 

affirmative interference with the investigation that Officer Broker 

was trying to undertake, and, as a result, the exception for flight 

. . . is actually inapplicable to [Crawford].

Brief of Appellee, at 10. We disagree. 

The logic of the Commonwealth’s argument would have us define 

“affirmative interference with governmental functions” to include any act of 

noncompliance or flight, thus effectively negating the exception contained 

within the statute. If mere flight and refusal to submit to arrest, alone, 

constituted an “affirmative interference with governmental functions,” the 

language exempting flight and similar acts would be entirely superfluous, 

contrary to the basic tenets of statutory construction, and render the offense 

of resisting arrest, see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104, meaningless. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1921(a) (requiring courts to aim to give effect to all of a statute’s provisions). 

We decline to usurp the function of the legislature, which is “presumed not to 

intend any statutory language to exist as mere surplusage.” Commonwealth 

v. Ostrosky, 909 A.2d 1224, 1232 (Pa. 2006).

In the alternative, the Commonwealth further argues that, “even putting 

aside Crawford’s flight, his actions with the crack pipe are alone sufficient to 

sustain his conviction,” as “even unsuccessful attempts to obstruct the 
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administration of the law satisfy the terms of the statute.” Brief of Appellee,

at 11. We disagree. The statute requires that a defendant obstruct the 

administration of law “by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, 

breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101. The 

act of dropping a crack pipe, in full view of a police officer, and then candidly 

admitting to having done so upon questioning, plainly does not satisfy the 

language of the statute.

In light of the foregoing, we are constrained to vacate Crawford’s 

judgments of sentence, and discharge him, as to his convictions for tampering 

with evidence and obstructing the administration of law. Because the trial 

court imposed no further penalty on Crawford’s conviction for possession of 

drug paraphernalia, we are obliged to remand for resentencing. See 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 510 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[W]here 

this Court vacates a conviction in a multiple count appeal, and vacating the 

conviction upsets the trial court’s overall sentencing scheme, this Court must 

remand for re-sentencing because sentencing lies within the sole discretion of 

the trial court.”).

Judgments of sentence vacated and Appellant discharged as to 

convictions for tampering with evidence and obstructing the administration of 

law. Case remanded for resentencing on possession of drug paraphernalia. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/19/2021