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******************************************************IN RE EGYPT E.—DISSENT ESPINOSA,J., dissenting. Idisagreewiththemajority that the clerical errors in the record ofthe present case require that we reverse the judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of the respondents, Morsy E. (father) and Natasha E., with respect to their minor children, Egypt E. and Mariam E. In my view, themajorityistooquicktoassumethattheappealrights of the respondents were implicated by those clerical

errors. Withtheinformationwe currentlyhaveavailable to us, it is not yet clear that the respondents have been prejudiced. We have the means to attemptto determine whether their appeal rights were affected, and we should use those means before reversing the trial court’sjudgment. Clarifyingwhetherthe errorsaffected the respondents’ rightswhile retainingjurisdiction over the appeal accords the proper balance between the respondents’ right to due process and the children’s right to have an efficient and timely final judgment in this matter. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The majority focuses on the absence of answers for the clerical errors in the record. I choose instead to focus on what we do know. The father filed with this court a motion for review of the trial court’s June 9, 2016 articulation. It is undisputed that, in support of that motion, the father produced a copy of the trial court’s signed June 1, 2015 order granting the motion of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, that the petitioner was not required to make reunification efforts pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 17a-111b (a) (1) and (b) (1) (B) on the basis of ‘‘the aggravated circumstance of severe physical abuse.’’ It is also undisputed that the father provided

no explanation whatsoever as to how and when he

cameto be inpossession ofthis signedand dated order, which by his own admission was not in the copy ofthe trial court file that was certified by the trial court in this appeal. Finally, it is undisputed that the trial court, in itsJune 9, 2016 articulation, statedthat it grantedthe petitioner’s motion for a finding that no reunification efforts were required. If the father were not claiming

on appeal that he did not receive notice of this order, I would conclude that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Thefather, however, does claimthathe lackednotice ofthe June 1, 2015 order. Accordingly, I would remand the case to the trial court with direction to clarify whether it had provided such notice to the parties. See Practice Book § 60-2.1 Ifthe trial court were to respond thatithadnotprovidedsuchnotice orthatitwasunable to confirm whether it had provided such notice, then— and only then—reversal would be required. If the trial court, however, weretoissueanarticulationconfirmingthat it had provided the parties with such notice, the record would be adequate for review, because the sole relevance ofthe clericalerrorstoanydueprocessrights of the respondents is to the extent that notice is not clear, without an articulation by the trial court.2
This approach would be more consistent with this state’s policy of resolving in as expeditious a manner
as possible the question of whether a parent’s rights should be terminated. See General Statutes § 46b-142 (d).3 By reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding the case for a new trial, the majority risks unnecessary delay, inconsistent with this state’s policy

as expressly stated by the legislature in § 46b-142 (d). I finally observe that the mere fact that the majority states that the new trial is ‘‘to begin no later than September 15, 2016,’’ does not ensure speedy resolution of this matter. It is notpossible to predict what issues will arise on remand. For instance, the parties may request and be granted continuances, or unavoidable scheduling issues may create further delay. And once the trial court arrives at a final judgment, the appeals process willbeginanew. The majorityhasprolongedthismatter withoutfirstdeterminingwhetherdoingsoisnecessary. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

1 Practice Book § 60-2 provides in relevant part that with respect to an appeal before this court, the court may ‘‘on its own motion

. . . (1) order

ajudge to take any action necessary to complete the trial court record for the proper presentation of the appeal

. . . .’’

2 I also observe that if the court deemed it advisable in order to ensure that the respondents suffered no prejudice, we could allow the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the effect of the court’s June 1, 2015 order.

3 General Statutes § 46b-142 (d) provides: ‘‘Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section, the Department of Children and Families,

or any party to the action aggrieved by a final judgment in a termination ofparentalrightsproceeding, shallbe entitledto anexpeditedhearingbefore the Appellate Court. A final decision of the Appellate Court shall be issued

as soon as practicable after the date on which the certified copy of the record of the case is filed with the clerk of the Appellate Court.’’