An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. 

Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North 

C a r o l i n a R u l e s o f A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA14-1102

Filed: 3 March 2015

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

Wilkes County

Nos. 10 CRS 1087-89, 52859

MICHAEL LEE SHEETS

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 May 2014 by Judge William Z. 

Wood, Jr. in Wilkes County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 

February 2015.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Jennifer T. Harrod, Assistant Attorney 

General, for the State.

Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by James R. Grant, Assistant Appellate 

Defender, for defendant-appellant.

TYSON, Judge.

Michael Lee Sheets (“Defendant”) appeals from convictions of two counts of 

first degree sex offense with a child, two counts of crime against nature, and one count 

of indecent liberties with a child. We find no error in Defendant’s convictions or the 

judgments entered thereon.

I. Factual Background
STATE V. SHEETS

Opinion of the Court

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On 8 November 2010, a grand jury indicted Defendant on two counts of first 

degree sex offense with a child, two counts of crime against nature, one count of 

indecent liberties with a child, and one count of disseminating obscenity to a minor 

under the age of thirteen. 

The State’s evidence tended to show that in 2009, J.P., age eight, lived with 

her mother, Rosalind Elmore (“Ms. Elmore”) and Defendant, her mother’s boyfriend. 

One day, Defendant told J.P. that “if [she] didn’t do what he wanted [her] to do that 

he would lie and tell [her] mom . . . things that weren’t true, which [she] knew would 

either hurt [her mom] or hurt [her].” J.P. testified Defendant made her perform oral 

sex on him on several occasions. She also testified Defendant touched her chest and 

put his mouth on her genitals. 

At trial, J.P. testified Defendant would enter her name into a “Google” image 

search. J.P.’s true given name is “rather unusual” and is the same as that of a 

pornographic actress. Defendant would show J.P. the search results of images of a 

nude blonde woman. Defendant also made J.P. watch pornography on the computer. 

On 2 August 2010, Defendant and Ms. Elmore ended their relationship and 

Defendant moved out of Ms. Elmore’s house. That evening, J.P. told a relative, whom 

she called “Aunt Christina,” about Defendant’s behavior and actions. After talking 

to J.P., Aunt Christina informed J.P.’s parents. Her family subsequently filed a 

report with the Wilkes County Sheriff’s Office. 
STATE V. SHEETS

Opinion of the Court

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On 10 August 2010, J.P.’s father took her to Brenner Children’s Hospital in 

Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Elizabeth Goodman (“Ms. Goodman”), a sexual 

assault nurse examiner, interviewed J.P. J.P. told Ms. Goodman about Defendant’s 

conduct, explaining “[she] got harassed” and “[b]ad stuff happened to [her].”

On 9 September 2010, J.P. was seen at Brenner Children’s Hospital by Dr. 

Sara Sinal (“Dr. Sinal”), a pediatrician with the child abuse team. Dr. Sinal’s 

examination of J.P. showed no physical signs of sexual abuse. This result was 

consistent with Defendant’s actions as J.P. had described them. 

SBI Special Agent Alan Flora (“Agent Flora”) testified that he had replicated

Defendant’s Google image search of J.P.’s name. Prior to his testimony, Defendant 

renewed a pre-trial motion in limine objecting to Agent Flora’s anticipated testimony. 

After a lengthy voir dire of Agent Flora, and over Defendant’s objection, the trial court 

permitted Agent Flora to testify about the results of his Google image search. Agent 

Flora testified he performed the Google image search of J.P.’s name on his stateissued computer and the search returned “numerous images of a nude blonde female.”

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied engaging in any 

inappropriate behavior with J.P. He could not offer an explanation for J.P.’s 

allegations that he had sexually abused her. 

At the close of the State’s evidence, upon Defendant’s motion, the trial court 

dismissed the dissemination of obscenity to a minor charge. On 23 May 2014, the 

jury returned verdicts finding Defendant guilty on the remaining charges. 
STATE V. SHEETS

Opinion of the Court

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The trial court arrested judgment on the crime against nature convictions and 

consolidated one of the sex offense convictions with the indecent liberties conviction. 

Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent active terms of 192-240 months 

imprisonment. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.

II. Issues

Defendant argues the trial court erred by (1) closing the courtroom to 

bystanders without making the necessary findings to support closure; and (2) 

admitting evidence of the Google image search performed by Agent Flora. In his brief, 

Defendant also argued the trial court erred by referring to J.P. as “the victim” in the 

jury charge. Defendant conceded this issue at oral argument, in light of our Supreme 

Court’s holding in State v. Walston, __ N.C. __, 766 S.E.2d 312 (2014) (holding trial 

court’s use of the word “victim” in pattern jury instructions was not error). 

III. Analysis

A. Courtroom Closure

Defendant asserts his federal and state constitutional rights to a public trial 

were violated by the trial court’s decision to close the courtroom during J.P.’s 

testimony. He argues the trial court failed to make the requisite findings to support 

closure. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

Defendant failed to object to the State’s motion to exclude bystanders from the 

courtroom during J.P.’s testimony. Defendant has failed to preserve this issue for 
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Opinion of the Court

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appellate review. “Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not 

be considered for the first time on appeal.” State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87, 552 

S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (citation omitted). 

2. Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure

Nevertheless, Defendant asks this Court to invoke Rule 2 of the Appellate 

Rules of Procedure to review the merits of his argument. Under Rule 2, this Court 

may suspend the rules in order “[t]o prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to 

expedite decision in the public interest.” N.C.R. App. P. 2 (2013).

Our Supreme Court has addressed the appropriateness of invoking Rule 2 on 

many occasions. “Rule 2 relates to the residual power of our appellate courts to 

consider, in exceptional circumstances, significant issues of importance in the public 

interest or to prevent injustice which appears manifest to the Court and only in such 

instances.” State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 315-16, 644 S.E.2d 201, 205 (2007) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he exercise of Rule 2 was intended to be limited 

to occasions in which a fundamental purpose of the appellate rules is at stake, which 

will necessarily be rare occasions.” Id. at 316, 644 S.E.2d at 205 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

Nothing in either the record or either party’s brief demonstrates “exceptional

circumstances” sufficient to justify suspending or varying the rules in order to 

prevent “manifest injustice” to Defendant. Id. at 315, 644 S.E.2d at 205.
STATE V. SHEETS

Opinion of the Court

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Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-166, “[i]n the trial of cases for rape or sex 

offense . . . the trial judge may, during the taking of the testimony of the prosecutrix, 

exclude from the courtroom all persons except the officers of the court, the defendant 

and those engaged in the trial of the case.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-166 (2013). The 

general rule is that 

[i]n clearing the courtroom, the trial court must determine 

if the party seeking closure has advanced an overriding 

interest that is likely to be prejudiced, order closure no 

broader than necessary to protect that interest, consider 

reasonable alternatives to closing the procedure, and make 

findings adequate to support the closure.

State v. Jenkins, 115 N.C. App. 520, 525, 445 S.E.2d 622, 625 (citation omitted), temp. 

stay allowed, 336 N.C. 784, 447 S.E.2d 435, disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 804, 449 

S.E.2d 752 (1994); see also Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48, 81 L.Ed.2d 31, 39 

(1984).

This Court has held that “where defendant consents to the closure, the trial 

court is not required to make specific findings of fact.” State v. Starner, 152 N.C. App. 

150, 154, 566 S.E.2d 814, 817, cert. denied, 356 N.C. 311, 571 S.E.2d 209 (2002). Cf. 

Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 81 L.Ed. at 39 (requiring the trial court to make closure no 

broader than necessary, consider alternatives, and make findings of fact to support 

closure where closure ordered over defendant’s objection). 

The State moved to exclude bystanders from the courtroom during J.P.’s 

testimony pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-166. When the trial court inquired as to 
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Opinion of the Court

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defense counsel’s position on this matter, Defendant’s attorney responded, “I don’t 

wish to be heard on that either, Your Honor.” After defense counsel acquiesced to the 

State’s motion, the trial court granted the motion and engaged in the following 

colloquy with the State:

MS. POSEY: Yes. Okay. And I believe Your Honor needs 

to make specific findings of fact that I have outlined in the 

motion, that I have advanced an overriding interest for the 

victim to be able to testify, that closure is no broader than 

necessary to protect that interest, and that the Court has 

considered reasonable alternatives to closing the 

procedure.

THE COURT: Sure. I will so find.

The trial court later entered a written order, which included the Waller factors above 

and excluded bystanders from the courtroom during J.P.’s testimony. 

In light of Defendant’s consent to the closure of the courtroom, we exercise our 

discretionary authority and decline to invoke Rule 2. This argument is dismissed.

B. Agent Flora’s Google Image Search

Defendant asserts the trial court erred by admitting Agent Flora’s testimony 

regarding the Google image results from the search he performed. He argues this 

testimony was speculative, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial.

1. Standard of Review

“Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law, thus we review the trial 

court’s admission of the evidence de novo.” State v. Kirby, 206 N.C. App. 446, 456, 697 

S.E.2d 496, 503 (2010) (citation omitted). However, whether to exclude evidence is a 
STATE V. SHEETS

Opinion of the Court

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decision within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 602, 652 

S.E.2d 216, 227 (2007) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1271, 170 L.Ed.2d 377 

(2008). Thus, “a trial court’s ruling will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing 

that the ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned 

decision.” Kirby at 457, 697 S.E.2d at 503 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

2. Analysis

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact 

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.C.R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence 

may be excluded under Rule 403 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” 

N.C.R. Evid. 403.

Defendant argues Agent Flora’s testimony was speculative and irrelevant

because of the potential differences between conducting the search on the SBI’s 

computer as compared with Defendant’s computer at a different date and time. 

Agent Flora’s testimony was introduced at trial to corroborate J.P.’s allegation 

that Defendant had showed her images of a nude blonde woman, which were the 

results returned from a Google image search of J.P.’s name. Agent Flora did not 

intend for his Google image search to be an exact replication of Defendant’s alleged 

Google image search. Rather, Agent Flora performed the Google image search of the 
STATE V. SHEETS

Opinion of the Court

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same “rather unusual” name shared by both J.P. and the pornographic actress in an 

effort to corroborate J.P.’s allegations by establishing that this information was 

available on the Internet. “An individual piece of evidence need not conclusively 

establish a fact to be of some probative value. It need only support a logical inference 

of the fact’s existence.” State v. Payne, 328 N.C. 377, 401, 402 S.E.2d 582, 596 (1991). 

Agent Flora’s Google image search, which returned the same results as J.P. had 

alleged and testified to, was relevant because it directly corroborated J.P.’s testimony. 

Defendant asserts even if Agent Flora’s testimony was relevant, it should have 

been excluded under Rule 403 as unfairly prejudicial. N.C.R. Evid. 403. Defendant 

argues that jurors generally assign extraordinarily high probative value to expert 

opinions and “the trial court’s admission of this wholly speculative evidence from an 

expert in computer forensic examination risked misleading the jury about the 

strength of that evidence.” We disagree.

“[I]t is defendant’s burden to show prejudice from the admission of evidence.” 

State v. Oliver, 210 N.C. App. 609, 615, 709 S.E.2d 503, 508 (citation omitted), disc. 

review denied, 365 N.C. 206, 710 S.E.2d 37 (2011). In order to show prejudice, 

Defendant must show that “a different result likely would have ensued had the 

evidence been excluded.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited an explanation from Agent 

Flora that his Google image search was not identical to the search J.P. described. 

Agent Flora testified that a “safe search” filter would affect search results by 
STATE V. SHEETS

Opinion of the Court

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eliminating explicit content and Google search results change with the passage of 

time. Agent Flora testified to the search he performed and its limitations, such as 

the fact that certain factors could have caused different search results on his 

computer versus Defendant’s computer. 

The jury was provided a balanced view of the appropriate weight to give Agent 

Flora’s testimony. Defendant has failed to show any prejudicial error by the trial 

court in allowing this testimony. Defendant’s argument is overruled.

Conclusion

Defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial errors he preserved and 

argued. We find no error in Defendant’s convictions or the trial court’s judgment.

NO ERROR.

Judges ELMORE and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).