# C_2009047EN.01000801.xml

| 26.2.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 47/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.2.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 47/8

---

Summary of Commission Decision

of 19 September 2007

relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty

(Case COMP/39.168 — PO/Hard Haberdashery: Fasteners)

(notified under document number C(2007) 4257 final)

(Only the English, French and German versions are authentic)

(2009/C 47/08)

On 19 September 2007, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
   (1)
  , the Commission herewith publishes the names of the parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed, having regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. A non-confidential version of the decision is available on the Competition Directorate General website at the following address:

On 19 September 2007, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003

1

, the Commission herewith publishes the names of the parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed, having regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. A non-confidential version of the decision is available on the Competition Directorate General website at the following address:

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/index.html

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/index.html

1.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | The decision was addressed to A. Raymond Sarl (hereafter ‘A. Raymond’), Berning & Söhne GmbH & Co. KG (hereafter ‘Berning’), Coats Holdings Ltd, Coats Deutschland GmbH (hereafter ‘Coats group’), Scovill Fasteners Inc., Scovill Fasteners Europe S.A. (hereafter ‘Scovill group’), William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, Éclair Prym Group S.A. (hereafter ‘Prym group’), YKK Corporation Japan, YKK Holding Europe B.V., YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH (hereafter ‘YKK group’) and Fachverband Verbindungs- und Befestigungstechnik (hereafter ‘VBT’). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The decision was addressed to A. Raymond Sarl (hereafter ‘A. Raymond’), Berning & Söhne GmbH & Co. KG (hereafter ‘Berning’), Coats Holdings Ltd, Coats Deutschland GmbH (hereafter ‘Coats group’), Scovill Fasteners Inc., Scovill Fasteners Europe S.A. (hereafter ‘Scovill group’), William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, Éclair Prym Group S.A. (hereafter ‘Prym group’), YKK Corporation Japan, YKK Holding Europe B.V., YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH (hereafter ‘YKK group’) and Fachverband Verbindungs- und Befestigungstechnik (hereafter ‘VBT’).

| (2) | The products concerned by the four separate infringements were zip fasteners, other metal and plastic fasteners (hereinafter ‘other fasteners’) and attaching machines. Each of the four infringements covered the whole territory of the Community. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The products concerned by the four separate infringements were zip fasteners, other metal and plastic fasteners (hereinafter ‘other fasteners’) and attaching machines. Each of the four infringements covered the whole territory of the Community.

2.   CASE DESCRIPTION

2.1.   Procedure

| (3) | The findings in this Decision arise out of inspections carried out by the Commission in November 2001 pursuant to Article 14(3) of Regulation 17 at the premises of several producers of hard and soft haberdashery products. These inspections and other investigative measures by the Commission triggered applications from Prym group, Coats group and YKK group for immunity or reduction of fines under the Commission's leniency programme. A first Statement of Objections was notified to the parties in September 2004 and a supplementary Statement of Objections was notified in March 2006. An oral hearing was held in July 2006. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The findings in this Decision arise out of inspections carried out by the Commission in November 2001 pursuant to Article 14(3) of Regulation 17 at the premises of several producers of hard and soft haberdashery products. These inspections and other investigative measures by the Commission triggered applications from Prym group, Coats group and YKK group for immunity or reduction of fines under the Commission's leniency programme. A first Statement of Objections was notified to the parties in September 2004 and a supplementary Statement of Objections was notified in March 2006. An oral hearing was held in July 2006.

2.2.   Summary of the infringement

| (4) | The Commission discovered evidence that the undertakings had taken part in one or several single and continuous infringements of Article 81(1) of the Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Commission discovered evidence that the undertakings had taken part in one or several single and continuous infringements of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.

2.2.1.   Cartel 1: The Baseler-Wuppertaler and Amsterdamer cooperation

| (5) | This cartel involved A. Raymond, Berning, the Scovill group, the Prym group, the YKK group and the association VBT and ran from 24 May 1991 until at least 15 March 2001. During this period the above undertakings agreed among other things on coordinated price increases in annual ‘price rounds’ and exchanged confidential information on prices and the implementation of price increases with respect to ‘other fasteners’ and their attaching machines. This collusion took place in the framework of the work circles organised by the trade association VBT. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

This cartel involved A. Raymond, Berning, the Scovill group, the Prym group, the YKK group and the association VBT and ran from 24 May 1991 until at least 15 March 2001. During this period the above undertakings agreed among other things on coordinated price increases in annual ‘price rounds’ and exchanged confidential information on prices and the implementation of price increases with respect to ‘other fasteners’ and their attaching machines. This collusion took place in the framework of the work circles organised by the trade association VBT.

2.2.2.   Cartel 2: The bilateral cooperation between the Prym group and the YKK group

| (6) | This cartel involved the Prym group and the YKK group and ran from 13 August 1999 until at least 13 January 2003. During this period the two leading manufacturers of fastening products in Europe fixed prices on a product-by-product and country-by-country basis and allocated customers with respect to ‘other fasteners’ and their attaching machines. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

This cartel involved the Prym group and the YKK group and ran from 13 August 1999 until at least 13 January 2003. During this period the two leading manufacturers of fastening products in Europe fixed prices on a product-by-product and country-by-country basis and allocated customers with respect to ‘other fasteners’ and their attaching machines.

2.2.3.   Cartel 3: The tripartite cooperation between the YKK group, the Coats group and the Prym group

| (7) | This cartel involved the YKK group, the Coats group and the Prym group and ran from 28 April 1998 until at least 12 November 1999. During this period the three manufacturers of zip fasteners met on a number of occasions to exchange price information and to discuss price increases. The three undertakings also agreed on a methodology to set minimum prices for zip fasteners in Europe. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

This cartel involved the YKK group, the Coats group and the Prym group and ran from 28 April 1998 until at least 12 November 1999. During this period the three manufacturers of zip fasteners met on a number of occasions to exchange price information and to discuss price increases. The three undertakings also agreed on a methodology to set minimum prices for zip fasteners in Europe.

2.2.4.   Cartel 4: The bilateral cooperation between the Coats group and the Prym group

| (8) | This cartel involved the Coats group and the Prym group and ran for more than 21 years, from 15 January 1977 until at least 15 July 1998. The products concerned by the cartel were zip fasteners and ‘other fasteners’. During the period of infringement the two undertakings shared the market for haberdashery, namely by preventing the Coats group from entering the market for ‘other fasteners’. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

This cartel involved the Coats group and the Prym group and ran for more than 21 years, from 15 January 1977 until at least 15 July 1998. The products concerned by the cartel were zip fasteners and ‘other fasteners’. During the period of infringement the two undertakings shared the market for haberdashery, namely by preventing the Coats group from entering the market for ‘other fasteners’.

2.3.   Fines

| (9) | In fixing the amount of the fines, the Commission took into account the gravity and duration of the infringements, as well as the existence of aggravating and/or attenuating circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

In fixing the amount of the fines, the Commission took into account the gravity and duration of the infringements, as well as the existence of aggravating and/or attenuating circumstances.

| (10) | The association VBT was, however, considered separately given its specific role as an association of undertakings which performed different tasks and made different decisions from the parties to the agreements and considering that VBT's participation in the cartel arrangements was limited primarily to its role as secretariat for the Baseler and Wuppertaler work circles and facilitator of the price arrangement between the cartel members (which are addressees of this decision as well). The Commission, therefore, considered it appropriate to impose a symbolic fine on VBT of EUR 1 000 for its participation in the Baseler-Wuppertaler and Amsterdamer infringement (Cartel 1), in accordance with point 5(d) of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (2) (hereafter ‘the Guidelines on fines’). |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The association VBT was, however, considered separately given its specific role as an association of undertakings which performed different tasks and made different decisions from the parties to the agreements and considering that VBT's participation in the cartel arrangements was limited primarily to its role as secretariat for the Baseler and Wuppertaler work circles and facilitator of the price arrangement between the cartel members (which are addressees of this decision as well). The Commission, therefore, considered it appropriate to impose a symbolic fine on VBT of EUR 1 000 for its participation in the Baseler-Wuppertaler and Amsterdamer infringement (Cartel 1), in accordance with point 5(d) of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (2) (hereafter ‘the Guidelines on fines’).

2

2.3.1.   Gravity

| (11) | Taking into account the nature of the infringements, their likely impact on the market and their geographical scope, the Commission concluded that all four infringements should be qualified as very serious. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Taking into account the nature of the infringements, their likely impact on the market and their geographical scope, the Commission concluded that all four infringements should be qualified as very serious.

2.3.2.   Differential treatment

| (12) | Within the category of very serious infringements, the scale of likely fines makes it possible to apply differential treatment to undertakings in order to take account of differences in their effective economic capacity to cause significant damage to competition. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Within the category of very serious infringements, the scale of likely fines makes it possible to apply differential treatment to undertakings in order to take account of differences in their effective economic capacity to cause significant damage to competition.

2.3.2.1.   Cartel 1: The Baseler-Wuppertaler and Amsterdamer cooperation

| (13) | The undertakings were divided into two different categories according to their relative importance in the market. The YKK group and the Prym group were placed in a first category and the Scovill group, A. Raymond and Berning in a second category. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The undertakings were divided into two different categories according to their relative importance in the market. The YKK group and the Prym group were placed in a first category and the Scovill group, A. Raymond and Berning in a second category.

2.3.2.2.   Cartel 2: The bilateral cooperation between the Prym group and the YKK group

| (14) | In view of their relative importance in the market, both the YKK group and the Prym group were placed in the same category. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In view of their relative importance in the market, both the YKK group and the Prym group were placed in the same category.

| (15) | In setting the starting amount for the two undertakings, the level of the starting amount imposed on the same undertakings in relation to Cartel 1 was taken into consideration. The bilateral infringement (Cartel 2) ran partly in parallel with the multilateral infringement (Cartel 1) on the same product markets and constituted an arrangement by which the two leading manufacturers reinforced their cooperation to achieve incremental effects on the relevant markets. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In setting the starting amount for the two undertakings, the level of the starting amount imposed on the same undertakings in relation to Cartel 1 was taken into consideration. The bilateral infringement (Cartel 2) ran partly in parallel with the multilateral infringement (Cartel 1) on the same product markets and constituted an arrangement by which the two leading manufacturers reinforced their cooperation to achieve incremental effects on the relevant markets.

2.3.2.3.   Cartel 3: The tripartite cooperation between the YKK group, the Coats group and the Prym group

| (16) | The undertakings were divided into three different categories according to their relative importance in the market. The YKK group was placed in a first category, the Coats group in a second category and the Prym group in a third category. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The undertakings were divided into three different categories according to their relative importance in the market. The YKK group was placed in a first category, the Coats group in a second category and the Prym group in a third category.

2.3.2.4.   Cartel 4: The bilateral cooperation between the Coats group and the Prym group

| (17) | In view of the nature of this infringement it was not appropriate to apply any differential treatment to the two undertakings concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

In view of the nature of this infringement it was not appropriate to apply any differential treatment to the two undertakings concerned.

2.3.3.   Sufficient deterrence

| (18) | In order to set the amount of the fine at a level which ensures a sufficiently deterrent effect, the Commission considered it appropriate to apply a multiplication factor to the fines imposed. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In order to set the amount of the fine at a level which ensures a sufficiently deterrent effect, the Commission considered it appropriate to apply a multiplication factor to the fines imposed.

| (19) | With its worldwide turnover the YKK group is a much larger player than the other addressees. Accordingly, the Commission considered it appropriate to multiply the fines for the YKK group. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

With its worldwide turnover the YKK group is a much larger player than the other addressees. Accordingly, the Commission considered it appropriate to multiply the fines for the YKK group.

2.3.4.   Increase for duration

| (20) | Individual multiplying factors were also applied according to the duration of the infringement by each legal entity. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Individual multiplying factors were also applied according to the duration of the infringement by each legal entity.

2.3.5.   Attenuating circumstances

| (21) | In line with point 28 of the Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (3) (hereafter ‘2002 Leniency Notice’), the applications for immunity and/or leniency concerning Cartels 1 and 2 were assessed under that notice, whereas the applications concerning Cartels 3 and 4 were assessed under the Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (4) (hereafter ‘1996 Leniency Notice’). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

In line with point 28 of the Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (3) (hereafter ‘2002 Leniency Notice’), the applications for immunity and/or leniency concerning Cartels 1 and 2 were assessed under that notice, whereas the applications concerning Cartels 3 and 4 were assessed under the Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (4) (hereafter ‘1996 Leniency Notice’).

3

4

| (22) | Unlike point 23 of the 2002 Leniency Notice, the 1996 Leniency Notice does not provide for any specific reward to a leniency applicant that discloses facts previously unknown to the Commission and affecting the gravity or duration of the cartel. It is therefore appropriate to consider any such cooperation under the attenuating factors. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Unlike point 23 of the 2002 Leniency Notice, the 1996 Leniency Notice does not provide for any specific reward to a leniency applicant that discloses facts previously unknown to the Commission and affecting the gravity or duration of the cartel. It is therefore appropriate to consider any such cooperation under the attenuating factors.

| (23) | As the Coats group and the YKK group provided the Commission with facts previously unknown to the Commission, which permitted the Commission to establish the entire duration of Cartel 3 (tripartite zip infringement), the two undertakings qualified for an attenuating factor justifying a reduction of the basic amount of the fine to be imposed on the two undertakings for this infringement. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

As the Coats group and the YKK group provided the Commission with facts previously unknown to the Commission, which permitted the Commission to establish the entire duration of Cartel 3 (tripartite zip infringement), the two undertakings qualified for an attenuating factor justifying a reduction of the basic amount of the fine to be imposed on the two undertakings for this infringement.

2.3.6.   Application of the 1996 Leniency Notice: reduction of fines

| (24) | With respect to Cartels 3 and 4 the addressees of the Decision cooperated with the Commission for the purpose of receiving the favourable treatment set out in the 1996 Leniency Notice. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

With respect to Cartels 3 and 4 the addressees of the Decision cooperated with the Commission for the purpose of receiving the favourable treatment set out in the 1996 Leniency Notice.

2.3.6.1.   Cartel 3: The tripartite cooperation between the YKK group, the Coats group and the Prym group

| (25) | In accordance with Section D of the 1996 Leniency Notice and in view of the Coats group's and the Prym group's level of cooperation, both undertakings were granted a 35 % reduction of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed for this infringement if they had not cooperated with the Commission. The YKK group was, however, not granted any reduction of the fine under the 1996 Leniency Notice. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

In accordance with Section D of the 1996 Leniency Notice and in view of the Coats group's and the Prym group's level of cooperation, both undertakings were granted a 35 % reduction of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed for this infringement if they had not cooperated with the Commission. The YKK group was, however, not granted any reduction of the fine under the 1996 Leniency Notice.

2.3.6.2.   Cartel 4: The bilateral cooperation between the Coats group and the Prym group

| (26) | In accordance with section C of the 1996 Leniency Notice and in view of the Prym group's extensive and substantial cooperation, the undertaking was granted a reduction of 75 % of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed for this infringement if it had not cooperated with the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

In accordance with section C of the 1996 Leniency Notice and in view of the Prym group's extensive and substantial cooperation, the undertaking was granted a reduction of 75 % of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed for this infringement if it had not cooperated with the Commission.

2.3.7.   Application of the 2002 Leniency Notice: reduction of fines

| (27) | With respect to Cartels 1 and 2 the addressees of the Decision cooperated with the Commission for the purpose of receiving the favourable treatment set out in the 2002 Leniency Notice. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

With respect to Cartels 1 and 2 the addressees of the Decision cooperated with the Commission for the purpose of receiving the favourable treatment set out in the 2002 Leniency Notice.

2.3.7.1.   Cartel 1: The Baseler-Wuppertaler and Amsterdamer cooperation

Point 23(b), first indent (reduction of 30-50 %)

| (28) | The evidence submitted by the Prym group represented significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession, strengthening the Commission's ability to prove the facts of the anti-competitive practices. The Prym group was the first undertaking to meet point 21 of the 2002 Leniency Notice and was granted a 30 % reduction of the fine. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The evidence submitted by the Prym group represented significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession, strengthening the Commission's ability to prove the facts of the anti-competitive practices. The Prym group was the first undertaking to meet point 21 of the 2002 Leniency Notice and was granted a 30 % reduction of the fine.

Point 23(b), second indent (reduction of 20-30 %)

| (29) | The evidence submitted by the YKK group represented significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession, strengthening the Commission's ability to prove the facts of the anti-competitive practices. The YKK group was the second undertaking to meet point 21 of the 2002 Leniency Notice and was granted a 20 % reduction of the fine. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The evidence submitted by the YKK group represented significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession, strengthening the Commission's ability to prove the facts of the anti-competitive practices. The YKK group was the second undertaking to meet point 21 of the 2002 Leniency Notice and was granted a 20 % reduction of the fine.

2.3.7.2.   Cartel 2: The bilateral cooperation between the Prym group and the YKK group

Point 8(b) — Immunity

| (30) | The Prym group's submission enabled the Commission to find an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty. Hence, the Prym group qualified for full immunity from the fine. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The Prym group's submission enabled the Commission to find an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty. Hence, the Prym group qualified for full immunity from the fine.

Point 23(b), first indent (reduction of 30-50 %)

| (31) | The evidence submitted by the YKK group represented significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession, strengthening the Commission's ability to prove the facts of the anti-competitive practices. The YKK group was the first undertaking to meet point 21 of the 2002 Leniency Notice and was granted a 40 % reduction of the fine. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The evidence submitted by the YKK group represented significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession, strengthening the Commission's ability to prove the facts of the anti-competitive practices. The YKK group was the first undertaking to meet point 21 of the 2002 Leniency Notice and was granted a 40 % reduction of the fine.

3.   DECISION

Cartel 1: The Baseler-Wuppertaler and Amsterdamer cooperation

| (32) | The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty by agreeing, for the periods indicated, on coordinated price increases and by exchanging confidential information on prices and the implementation of price increases:






  (a) | A. Raymond Sarl, from 24 May 1991 to 1 December 1999; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(32)

The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty by agreeing, for the periods indicated, on coordinated price increases and by exchanging confidential information on prices and the implementation of price increases:

(a)

A. Raymond Sarl, from 24 May 1991 to 1 December 1999;

| (b) | Berning & Söhne GmbH & Co. KG, from 24 May 1991 to 19 August 2000; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Berning & Söhne GmbH & Co. KG, from 24 May 1991 to 19 August 2000;

| (c) | Scovill Fasteners Europe S.A., from 24 May 1991 to 15 March 2001; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Scovill Fasteners Europe S.A., from 24 May 1991 to 15 March 2001;

| (d) | Scovill Fasteners Inc., from 31 December 1996 to 15 March 2001; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Scovill Fasteners Inc., from 31 December 1996 to 15 March 2001;

| (e) | William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, from 24 May 1991 to 15 March 2001; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, from 24 May 1991 to 15 March 2001;

| (f) | Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, from 1 August 1994 to 15 March 2001; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, from 1 August 1994 to 15 March 2001;

| (g) | YKK Corporation Japan, from 1 March 1997 to 15 March 2001; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

YKK Corporation Japan, from 1 March 1997 to 15 March 2001;

| (h) | YKK Holding Europe B.V., from 1 March 1997 to 15 March 2001; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

YKK Holding Europe B.V., from 1 March 1997 to 15 March 2001;

| (i) | YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH, from 24 May 1991 to 15 March 2001; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH, from 24 May 1991 to 15 March 2001;

| (j) | Fachverband Verbindungs- und Befestigungstechnik, from 24 May 1991 to 19 August 2000. |
| --- | --- |

(j)

Fachverband Verbindungs- und Befestigungstechnik, from 24 May 1991 to 19 August 2000.

Cartel 2: The bilateral cooperation between the Prym group and the YKK group

| (33) | The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty by agreeing, for the periods indicated, to fix prices, notably minimum, average and target prices, to monitor price increases through the regular exchanges of price lists and frequent bilateral contacts, and to allocate customers by not undercutting each other's offers to clients:






  (a) | William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, from 13 August 1999 to 13 January 2003; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(33)

The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty by agreeing, for the periods indicated, to fix prices, notably minimum, average and target prices, to monitor price increases through the regular exchanges of price lists and frequent bilateral contacts, and to allocate customers by not undercutting each other's offers to clients:

(a)

William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, from 13 August 1999 to 13 January 2003;

| (b) | Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, from 13 August 1999 to 13 January 2003; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, from 13 August 1999 to 13 January 2003;

| (c) | YKK Corporation Japan, from 13 August 1999 to 13 January 2003; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

YKK Corporation Japan, from 13 August 1999 to 13 January 2003;

| (d) | YKK Holding Europe B.V., from 13 August 1999 to 13 January 2003; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

YKK Holding Europe B.V., from 13 August 1999 to 13 January 2003;

| (e) | YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH, from 13 August 1999 to 13 January 2003. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH, from 13 August 1999 to 13 January 2003.

Cartel 3: The tripartite cooperation between the YKK group, the Coats group and the Prym group

| (34) | The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty, for the periods indicated, by exchanging price information, by discussing prices and price increases between themselves, and by agreeing on a methodology to fix minimum prices for standard products:






  (a) | YKK Corporation Japan, from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(34)

The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty, for the periods indicated, by exchanging price information, by discussing prices and price increases between themselves, and by agreeing on a methodology to fix minimum prices for standard products:

(a)

YKK Corporation Japan, from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999;

| (b) | YKK Holding Europe B.V., from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

YKK Holding Europe B.V., from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999;

| (c) | Coats Holdings Ltd., from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Coats Holdings Ltd., from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999;

| (d) | Coats Deutschland GmbH, from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Coats Deutschland GmbH, from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999;

| (e) | William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999;

| (f) | Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, from 28 April 1998 to 12 November 1999;

| (g) | Éclair Prym Group S.A., from 13 January 1999 to 12 November 1999. |
| --- | --- |

(g)

Éclair Prym Group S.A., from 13 January 1999 to 12 November 1999.

Cartel 4: The bilateral cooperation between the Coats group and the Prym group

| (35) | The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty, for the periods indicated, by agreeing to share the haberdashery market by preventing Coats Group from entering the market for ‘other fasteners’:






  (a) | William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, from 15 January 1977 to 15 July 1998; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(35)

The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty, for the periods indicated, by agreeing to share the haberdashery market by preventing Coats Group from entering the market for ‘other fasteners’:

(a)

William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, from 15 January 1977 to 15 July 1998;

| (b) | Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, from 1 August 1994 to 15 July 1998; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, from 1 August 1994 to 15 July 1998;

| (c) | Coats Holdings Ltd., from 15 January 1977 to 15 July 1998. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Coats Holdings Ltd., from 15 January 1977 to 15 July 1998.

| (36) | For the infringements referred to above, the following fines were imposed:
  Cartel 1: The Baseler-Wuppertaler and Amsterdamer cooperation






  (a) | A. Raymond Sarl: EUR 8 325 000; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(36)

For the infringements referred to above, the following fines were imposed:

Cartel 1: The Baseler-Wuppertaler and Amsterdamer cooperation

(a)

A. Raymond Sarl: EUR 8 325 000;

| (b) | Berning & Söhne GmbH & Co. KG: EUR 1 123 000; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Berning & Söhne GmbH & Co. KG: EUR 1 123 000;

| (c) | Scovill Fasteners Europe S.A. and Scovill Fasteners Inc., jointly and severally liable: EUR 6 002 000; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Scovill Fasteners Europe S.A. and Scovill Fasteners Inc., jointly and severally liable: EUR 6 002 000;

| (d) | William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, jointly and severally liable: EUR 24 913 000; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, jointly and severally liable: EUR 24 913 000;

| (e) | YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH: EUR 68 250 000, of which YKK Corporation Japan and YKK Holding Europe B.V. are jointly and severally liable for EUR 49 000 000; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH: EUR 68 250 000, of which YKK Corporation Japan and YKK Holding Europe B.V. are jointly and severally liable for EUR 49 000 000;

| (f) | Fachverband Verbindungs- und Befestigungstechnik: EUR 1 000. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

Fachverband Verbindungs- und Befestigungstechnik: EUR 1 000.

Cartel 2: The bilateral cooperation between the Prym group and the YKK group

| (a) | YKK Corporation Japan, YKK Holding Europe B.V. and YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH, jointly and severally liable: EUR 19 500 000. |
| --- | --- |

(a)

YKK Corporation Japan, YKK Holding Europe B.V. and YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH, jointly and severally liable: EUR 19 500 000.

Cartel 3: The tripartite cooperation between the YKK group, the Coats group and the Prym group

| (a) | YKK Corporation Japan and YKK Holding Europe B.V., jointly and severally liable: EUR 62 500 000; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

YKK Corporation Japan and YKK Holding Europe B.V., jointly and severally liable: EUR 62 500 000;

| (b) | Coats Holdings Ltd. and Coats Deutschland GmbH, jointly and severally liable: EUR 12 155 000; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Coats Holdings Ltd. and Coats Deutschland GmbH, jointly and severally liable: EUR 12 155 000;

| (c) | William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, jointly and severally liable: EUR 6 727 500, of which Éclair Prym Group S.A. is jointly and severally liable for: EUR 5 850 000. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, jointly and severally liable: EUR 6 727 500, of which Éclair Prym Group S.A. is jointly and severally liable for: EUR 5 850 000.

Cartel 4: The bilateral cooperation between the Coats group and the Prym group

| (a) | William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, jointly and severally liable: EUR 8 897 500; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, jointly and severally liable: EUR 8 897 500;

| (b) | Coats Holdings Ltd.: EUR 110 250 000. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Coats Holdings Ltd.: EUR 110 250 000.

| (37) | The undertakings listed above shall immediately bring to an end their infringement, insofar as they have not already done so. They shall refrain from repeating any act or conduct as the infringement found in this case, and from any act or conduct having the same or similar object or effect. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The undertakings listed above shall immediately bring to an end their infringement, insofar as they have not already done so. They shall refrain from repeating any act or conduct as the infringement found in this case, and from any act or conduct having the same or similar object or effect.

---

(1)  OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ C 9, 14.1.1998, p. 3.

2

(3)  OJ C 45, 19.2.2002, p. 3.

3

(4)  OJ C 207, 18.7.1996, p. 4.

4

---