1

The Honorable Ralph Erickson, United States District Judge for the District of

North Dakota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Karen K.

Klein, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of North Dakota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-4099

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Ronald O. Lee, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of North Dakota.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of *

Social Security Administration, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: April 22, 2008

Filed: May 5, 2008

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Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Ronald O. Lee appeals the district court’s1

 order affirming the denial of

disability insurance benefits (DIB). In a 2002 application, Lee alleged disability since

November 1999 from a back injury. Following a January 2004 hearing, an

administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Lee was not disabled as of June 21, 2001,

his date last insured (DLI) for purposes of DIB. Specifically, the ALJ found that
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We decline to consider Lee’s assertions about evaluations or injuries that

occurred after his DLI.

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(1) Lee’s discogenic and degenerative disorders were severe, but not of listing-level

severity; (2) his allegations of limitations were not entirely credible; and (3) his

residual functional capacity (RFC) for light work was compatible with his past

relevant work as a credit manager. The Appeals Council denied review, and the

district court affirmed. 

First, we find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that the preDLI medical records do not support the extent of Lee’s subjective complaints of pain.

See Flynn v. Astrue, 513 F.3d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review;

substantial evidence is enough that reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to

support decision); Pyland v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1998) (to qualify for

DIB, claimant must establish existence of disability before expiration of insured

status). While the ALJ discredited Lee in part based on Lee’s reported daily activities-

-which seem to be quite limited, see Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir.

2007) (person’s ability to engage in personal activities such as cooking, cleaning, or

hobbies does not amount to substantial evidence that he has functional capacity to

engage in substantial gainful activity)--the ALJ gave other valid reasons for his

credibility findings. See Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 696 (8th Cir. 2007) (when

ALJ explicitly discredits claimant and gives good reasons for doing so, court will

normally defer to his credibility determination).2

 

Second, the RFC determination is for the ALJ to make based upon the medical

records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own

description of his limitations. See Flynn, 513 F.3d at 792. Because we find that the

ALJ properly discredited Lee’s subjective complaints, the ALJ’s RFC findings are

supported by substantial evidence: a July 2000 functional capacity evaluation, and the

opinion of a treating physician and others that the evaluation was accurate. See id.
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(RFC determination must be supported by some medical evidence as RFC is medical

question). While the treating physician later changed his opinion as to Lee’s RFC,

this did not occur until 2003, well after the DLI. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

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