Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 7, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00387-CR

ERICK DURAN TOPETE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 178th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1271607

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Erick Duran Topete appeals the revocation of his community 

supervision, complaining that his Sixth Amendment right under the Confrontation 

Clause of the United States Constitution to confront and cross-examine witnesses

was violated when the trial court allowed testimony regarding an out-of-court 

statement to be admitted during the revocation hearing. We affirm.
2

Background

On July 26, 2010, appellant pleaded guilty to the felony offense of injury to 

a child. The court deferred entering an adjudication of guilt and placed appellant 

under community supervision for a four-year period. The conditions of appellant’s 

community supervision prohibited appellant from committing other offenses and 

using, possessing, or consuming alcohol and required him to pay certain fees, court 

costs, and a donation to a Family Violence Center in Harris County.

On April 12, 2012, the State moved to adjudicate appellant’s guilt, alleging 

appellant had violated the terms and conditions of community supervision by 

(1) committing an offense against the State, causing bodily injury to a person with 

whom he had a dating relationship, by applying pressure to her neck and impeding 

her breathing and circulation; (2) becoming intoxicated to the degree that he was a 

danger to himself and others; and (3) failing to pay fees, court costs, and a donation 

to a Family Violence Center. At an evidentiary hearing, appellant stipulated to 

being placed on community supervision but pleaded “not true” to all grounds for 

revocation alleged by the State.

At the revocation hearing, a deputy constable testified that he responded to a 

“911” call from appellant’s girlfriend on October 22, 2011. The girlfriend

informed the deputy that appellant threw her to the ground, jumped on top of her, 

and squeezed her neck, obstructing her airway, which made her hoarse. She had a 

bruise on her neck and bruises on her arm.

Another officer testified that he arrested appellant on November 2, 2011 for 

public intoxication. While the officer was working an extra job as a peace officer 

at a Chick-Fil-A restaurant, a woman approached him. The Officer testified,

This lady came in and told me: Officer, on the way out when I was 

leaving[,] a man jumped out of the bushes and started banging on my 
3

vehicle and it scared me. I do not know what he wanted, but it scared 

me so bad that I made a big circle and came back in on the other side 

of the restaurant because I knew you were in here to tell you.

The officer found appellant in the bushes outside of the Chick-Fil-A. Appellant 

told the officer that he was sleeping in the bushes. Appellant’s speech was slurred, 

and he had bloodshot eyes, was unstable on his feet, and had a heavy odor of 

alcohol on his breath.

The court liaison officer also testified that appellant had not paid the fees, 

court costs, and donation to a Family Violence Center required as conditions of his 

community supervision. The trial court found that “the allegations stated in the . . . 

Motion to Adjudicate the violations have been proved . . . by a preponderance of 

the evidence,” revoked appellant’s community supervision, and sentenced 

appellant to four years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 

Institutional Division. 

Discussion

In his sole issue, appellant complains that the trial court erred in admitting 

the officer’s testimony regarding the out-of-court statement associated with 

appellant’s arrest for public intoxication in violation of his Sixth Amendment right 

under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution to confront and 

cross-examine witnesses.

We review the trial court’s order revoking community supervision for an 

abuse of discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006). In a probation revocation hearing, the State must prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of his probation. Greer v. 

State, 999 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). 

Proof of a single violation is sufficient to support a revocation. Id. 
4

Appellant’s sole issue pertains to only one of the alleged violations of the 

terms and conditions of community supervision, regarding intoxication. Appellant 

does not raise any issues complaining of the State’s other allegations in the motion 

to adjudicate guilt. Even assuming appellant’s contention is correct regarding the 

Confrontation Clause, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it found 

the State proved all the allegations in the motion to adjudicate by a preponderance 

of the evidence. See Garcia v. State, No. PD-1846-11, 2012 WL 6162759, at *6 

(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2012) (holding even if State did not exercise due 

diligence, which would have been a defense to revocation based on the defendant’s

failure to report to a supervision officer, revocation based on another ground was 

supported by record). The record amply supports the State’s allegations and the 

trial court’s finding that appellant violated other terms and conditions of his 

community supervision by assaulting his girlfriend and failing to pay the required 

fines, court costs, and donation.1 See id.

We overrule appellant’s sole issue. We affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jamison, and McCally.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

 

1 Moreover, appellant does not complain that the State presented legally insufficient 

evidence of the violations of the terms and conditions of appellant’s community supervision.