This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 ONEWEST BANK, FSB, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. 33,021 4 ENRIQUE ROMERO and ROSALIE 5 ROMERO, 6 Defendants-Appellants, 7 and 8 TAXATION & REVENUE 9 DEPARTMENT of the STATE OF NEW 10 MEXICO, 11 Defendant. 12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY 13 John M. Paternoster, District Judge 14 Johnson Law Firm, L.C. 15 Thomas L. Johnson 16 Andrew L. Johnson 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 for Appellee 19 New Mexico Legal Center, P.C. 20 Lee Boothby 21 Taos, NM 222 for Appellants 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION 2 ZAMORA, Judge. 3
{1} Having granted One Wests’s motion for rehearing in this case, we withdraw the 4 opinion filed March 29, 2016, and substitute the following in its place. We granted 5 One West’s motion for rehearing to clarify that (1) the district court never ruled on 6 whether or not the Romero’s Rule 1-060(B) NMRA motion was timely, (2) the district 7 court never ruled on whether or not the de fault judgment was void, and (3) a motion 8 pursuant to Rule 1-060(B)(4) has no time limitations. 9
{2} Appellants Enrique and Rosalie Romero (the Romeros) appealfrom the district 10 court’s order denying their motion to set aside a foreclosure judgment in favor of 11 OneWest Bank, FSB (OneWest). We hold th at the district court misconstrued and 12 misapplied Rule 1-060(B). Rule 1-060(B) doe s not require that all parties seeking 13 relief from a final judgment demonstrate excusable neglect. A demonstration of 14 excusable neglect is only required where the movant under Rule 1-060(B) expressly 15 relies on excusable neglect as the grounds fo r the motion. Here, the district court 16 abused its discretion by denying the Romeros’ motion to set aside the default 17 judgment based on the Romeros’ failure toshow excusable neglect and by failing to 183 address the grounds asserted by the Romeros as the basis for setting aside the 1 judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. 2 BACKGROUND 3
{3} On November 12, 1999, Enrique Romero signed a promissory note with Quest 4 Mortgage Corporation (Quest), and a mortgage contract withQuest as security for the 5 loan. According to OneWest, the Romero mortgage was assigned to IndyMac, Inc. 6 (IndyMac) the same day. OnJune 25, 2004, Mr. Romero conveyed the property to 7 himself and his wife, Rosalie Romero. According to the Romeros, they started getting 8 behind on their mortgage in late 2007 when Mrs. Romero was being treated for cancer 9 and the couple’s medical expenses increased dramatically. By August 2012 the 10 Romeros were behind three mortgage payments. 11
{4} The Romeros contacted IndyMac and advised that they were having trouble 12 catching up on the missed payments. IndyM ac agreed to a fo rbearance plan that 13 allowed the Romeros to pay a reduced payment for August, September, and October 14 2008. The forbearance plan was dated Augus t 25, 2008, however, the first scheduled 15 payment under the plan was due August 22, 2008. The Romeros signed the agreement 16 and sent it back to IndyMac on September 16, 2008, and paid the first forbearance 17 payment in September instead of August. The Romeros made forbearance payments 18 in September, October, November, D ecember 2008, and January2009. In February 194 2009, the Romeros called IndyMac to find outhow much their next payment would 1 be and was told to pay the normal mortgage payment amount; that no additional 2 extensions would be granted. The Romero s made payments inMarch and April 2009. 3 In April 2009, IndyMac began returning the Romeros’ payments. 4
{5} According to OneWest, IndyMac was clos ed on July 11, 2008, and the Federal 5 Department Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed as IndyMac’s receiver. On 6 March 19, 2009, the FDIC transferred IndyMac’s assets to IndyMac Mortgage 7 Services, a division of OneWest (IndyMac Mo rtgage Services). On June 18, 2009, 8 OneWest filed a complaint for foreclosure against the Romeros. According to the 9 Romeros, they were working with IndyMac Mortgage Services on a loan modification 10 and upon being served with the forecl osure complaint, hired Dunn Russell & 11 Associates, Inc. (Dunn Russell), who assure d the Romeros that it would handle the 12 loan modification and foreclosure complaint on their behalf. The Romeros paid Dunn 13 Russell $3,000, who failed to file an answer to the foreclosure complaint on behalf of 14 the Romeros. 15
{6} On September 8, 2009, OneWest moved for a default judgment. The district 16 court entered a default judgment in favor of OneWest on September 9, 2009. The 17 Romeros later claimed they did not recei ve notice of the default judgment. The 18 foreclosure sale was scheduled for October 21, 2009. 195 {7} The Romeros received a letter from IndyM ac Mortgage Services in September 1 2009 that informed them that they may qualify for a modification trial period plan. In 2 October 2009, the Romeros signed a loan modification trial period agreement with 3 IndyMac Mortgage Services and made payments pursuant to that plan. In January 4 2010, the Romeros received a letter from Dunn Russell indicating that Dunn Russell 5 was working to establish a permanent loan modification agreement for them. In March 6 2010, OneWest senta letter to the Romeros indicating that they would receive a 7 response to their loan modification request . In April 2010, the Romeros learned that 8 Dunn Russell failed and filed bankruptcy. 9
{8} In June 2010, the Romeros received a le tter advising them that their mortgage 10 payment would be increased and that the next payment at the new amount would be 11 due in July 2010. The Romeros understood this letter to say that they had been granted 12 a permanent loan modification and would not be losing their home to foreclosure. 13
{9} The Romeros made payments that were accepted by IndyMac Mortgage 14 Services in June, July, August, and September 2010. In October 2010, the Romeros 15 received a letter advising them that th ey did not qualify for a permanent loan 16 modification based on their income. According to the Romeros, they believed that 17 IndyMac Mortgage Services had based th eir loan modification eligibility on an 186 incorrect income amount and attempted to contact IndyMac Mortgage Services several 1 times, to no avail. 2
{10} On December 23, 2010, OneWest filed a partial satisfaction of judgment and 3 proceeded with the foreclos ure sale. The foreclosure sale was held on January 19, 4 2011, and the district court entered an order approving the foreclosure sale on 5 February 18, 2011. The Romeros obtained couns el who filed a motion to set aside the 6 default judgment on April 26, 2011, challenging OneWest’s standing to bring the 7 foreclosure action against the Romeros. Af ter a hearing on the Romeros’ motion, the 8 district court denied the motion, findi ng that the Romeros had “failed to show 9 excusable neglect that would relieve them of the effect of the default order, and 10 therefore, the [c]ourt need not address the issue of meritorious defenses.” This appeal 11 followed. 12 DISCUSSION 13
{11} On appeal, the Romeros arguethat: (1) OneWest lackedstanding to enforce the 14 Romero note and to foreclose the Romero mortgage; (2) OneWest’s lack of standing 15 deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, rendering the foreclosure 16 judgment void; and (3) the district court erred in denying the motion to set aside the 17 foreclosure judgment based on a failure to demonstrate excusabl e neglect. Because the 18 district court abused its discretion on rely ing on the absence of excusable neglect in 197 denying the Romeros’ motion to set aside the default judgment, we remand on that 1 basis and we do not reach the Romeros’ remaining issues. 2 Standard of Review 3
{12} “A grant or denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment rests within the 4 sound discretion of the district court.” Charter Bank v. Francoeur , 2012-NMCA-078, 5 ¶ 11, 287 P.3d 333. “However, because default judgments are generally disfavored, 6 any doubts about whether relie f should be granted are resolved in favor of the 7 defaulting defendant and, in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the plaintiff, 8 causes should be tried upon the merits.” Gandara v. Gandara , 2003-NMCA-036, ¶ 9, 9 133 N.M. 329, 62 P.3d 1211 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation 10 omitted). We review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion to set aside a default 11 judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Charter Bank , 2012-NMCA-078, ¶ 11. “An 12 abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions 13 demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.” Sims v. Sims , 1996-NMSC-078, 14 ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. “That generally we apply an abuse of discretion 15 standard of review in Rule 1-060(B) . . . determinations does not mean that every 16 determination under that rule requires us to apply the abus e of discretion standard in 17 a particular way or that we must blindl y adhere to the disc retion aspect of the 18 standard.” State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep’t v. Rawls , 2012-NMCA-052, ¶ 14, 279 198 P.3d 766. This Court will turn to de novo review when “an issue requires us to 1 determine whether the district court misapprehended the applicable law.” Id. ¶ 8. 2 The Romeros’ Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment 3
{13} Approximately nineteen months after the judgment was entered, the Romeros 4 moved to set aside the foreclosure defau lt judgment pursuant to Rule 1-060(B)(4) and 5 an amended motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1-060(B)(4) and (6) in February 2013. 6 The Romeros argued OneWest was not the real party in interest and lacked the 7 standing to bring the foreclosure action, and as a result, the default judgment against 8 them was void. 9
{14} One West asserts that the Romeros’ motion was untimely. SeeRule 1-060(B)(6) 10 (requiring that a motion under the rule be made within a “a reasonable time” or under 11 certain provisions of the rule, “not more th an one . . . year after the judgment, order, 12 or proceeding was entered or taken”). We have long recognized that a Rule 1- 13 060(B)(4) motion to set aside a void j udgment can be filed at anytime. See Marinchek 14 v. Paige , 1989-NMSC-019, ¶ 10, 108 N.M. 349, 772 P.2d 879 (stating that “when [a] 15 judgment [is] void, no limitation of time within which a motion for relief from 16 judgment must be filed”); State v. Romero , 1966-NMSC-126, ¶ 25, 76 N.M. 449, 415 17 P.2d 837 (same); Eaton v. Cooke , 1964-NMSC-137, ¶ 7, 74 N.M. 301, 393 P.2d 329 18 (same). However, the district court’s order denying the Romeros’ motion did not 199 make a determination oneway or another on the timeliness of the motion. 1 Consequently, we cannot consider the issue. See In re Termination of Parental Rights 2 of Eventyr J. , 1995-NMCA-087, ¶ 38, 120 N.M. 463, 902 P.2d 1066 (declining to 3 consider an issue that the district court had not considered in reaching its decision); 4 see also Risk Mgmt. Div., Gen. Servs. Dep't of State ex rel. Apodac a v. Farmers Ins. 5 Co. of Ariz. , 2003-NMCA-095, ¶ 5, 134 N.M. 188, 75 P.3d 404 (same). 6
{15} Rule 1-060(B) provides several grounds upon which a party may be entitled to 7 relief from a final judgment. As pertinent here, Rule 1-060(B) reads: 8 On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 9 . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 10 reasons: 11 (1) mistake, inadvertence, surp rise[,] or excusable neglect; 12 (2) newly discovered evidence[,] which by due diligence could not 13 have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 1-059 14 NMRA; 15 (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 16 [m]isrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 17 (4) the judgment is void; 18 (5) the judgment has been satisfied, re leased, or discharged, or a prior 19 judgment upon which it is based has beenreversed or otherwise vacated, 20 or it is no longer equitable that th e judgment should have prospective 21 application; or 22 (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 23 judgment. 2410 {16} In order to be entitled to relief under Ru le 1-060(B), “the party seeking to set 1 aside a default judgment must demonstr ate applicablegrounds for vacating the 2 judgment under the rule as well as a meritorious cause of action or defense.” 3 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ferri , 1995-NMSC-055, ¶ 5, 120 N.M. 320, 901 P.2d 738. 4 Generally, where “the movant makes such a showing, the district court has the 5 discretion to set aside the default [judgment].” Id. However, “[w]hen the grant or 6 denial of a motion turns on the validity of the judgment, as in a [Rule] 1-060(B)(4) 7 motion, discretion has no place.” Classen v. Classen , 1995-NMCA-022, ¶ 10, 119 8 N.M. 582, 893 P.2d 478. “If the underlying judgment is void, it must be set aside.” Id. ; 9

see Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque , 1977-NMSC-107, ¶ 12, 91 N.M. 455, 575 P.2d 10 1340 (“There is no discretion on the part of a district court to set aside a void 11 judgment.”); Chavez v. Cty. of Valencia , 1974-NMSC-035, ¶ 16, 86 N.M. 205, 521 12 P.2d 1154 (same). 13
{17} Here, the Romeros’ motion to set asid e the default judgmen t was based on the 14 theory that the underlying default judgment was void for lack of standing. Therefore, 15 under the grounds asserted, the Romeros had to show that OneWest lacked standing 16 to bring the foreclosure action and that the lack of standing rendered the default 17 judgment void. In the district court’s order denying the Romeros’ motion to set aside 1811 the judgment, the court found the following concerning the Romeros’ burden as the 1 defaulting party. 2 [T]o prevail on [a motion to set as ide a default judgment,] the movant 3 must show excusable neglect, first and foremost. Then, and only then, 4 must the movant establish that he/she has a meritorious defense. 5

. . . . 6 The [Romeros] may attack the validity of the default judgment only upon 7 their proof that good faith excusable neglect exists on their part to 8 explain the failure to answer. 9 Ultimately the district court denied the Romeros’ motion, concluding that “the 10 Romeros have failed to show excusable negl ect that would relievethem of the effect 11 of the default order, and therefore, th e [c]ourt need not address the issue of 12 meritorious defenses.” 13
{18} With regard to OneWest’s standing, the court stated: 14 [T]he [c]ourt believes that even if it set aside the default [judgment] and 15 allowed the Romero[s] to challenge the [validity of the documents 16 provided with the complaint], it would not explain or justify their non17 activity in this case. And since it appearsthat [OneWest] is now in the 18 possession of the proper original paperwork concerning the loan, a claim 19 challenging [the validity of the documents provided with the complaint] 20 would be futile[.] 21 (Emphasis added.) 22 The district court was operating under the misperception that proof of excusable 23 neglect is required in order to prevail on any Rule 1-060(B) motion, when in fact, such 2412 proof is only required where excusable negl ect raised under Rule 1-060(B)(1) as the 1 sole grounds for the motion. See Rodriguez v. Conant , 1987-NMSC-040, ¶ 21, 105 2 N.M. 746, 737 P.2d 527 (declini ng to address the issue of excusable neglect where 3 neither the motion to set aside the default judgment nor the district court’s decision 4 expressly relied on excusable neglect under Rule 1-060(B)(1), and where the district 5 court’s decision to set aside the judgmen t was supported under Rule 1-060(B)(6)). The 6 district court’s position was not supported by law, and because the district court found 7 the absence of excusable neglect to be di spositive, it failed to address the questions 8 of standing and the validity of the judgment raised by the Romeros’ motion. 9
{19} To the extent that the district court’ s finding that OneWest appeared to be in 10 possession of “the proper orig inal paperwork” at the time of the hearing on the Rule 11 1-060(B) motion, can be construed as a finding or conclusion that OneWest had 12 standing to bring the foreclosure action c oncerning the loan, the finding or conclusion 13 is not supported by the record. See Deutsche Bank Nat’ l Trust Co. v. Johnston , 20__- 14 NMSC-____, ¶ 27, ___P.3d___ (No. 34,726, Mar. 3, 2016) (reaffirming that when a 15 defendant “raises the defense that the plainti ff lacks standing to foreclose, the plaintiff 16 must then prove that it held the note at the time of filing ” and that standing to 17 foreclose can be proven by “[a]ttaching th e [indorsed] note to the complaint” or 18 “through a dated indorsement establishing when the note was indorsed to the 191 Our Supreme Court has advised the district court that when a foreclosure 17 plaintiff is seeking a default judgement, th e district court “should raise the standing 18 issue sua sponte and carefully scrutinize the plaintiff’s standing to safeguard the 19 integrity of New Mexico’s property sy stem and protect subsequent bona fide 20 purchasers.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. , 20__-NMSC-____, ¶ 27 n.4. 21 13 plaintiff”). The district court’s order doe s not expressly mention standing or address 1 possession of the promissory note at the time the foreclosure complaint was filed in 2 June 2009. 1 Moreover, the district court did not make any findings or conclusions 3 indicating, and it is not clear from our reviewof the record, what “original paperwork” 4 OneWest possessed at the time of the Ru le 1-060(B) hearing that would have 5 established its standing to foreclose. We cannot nor should we decide that Deutsche 6 Bank National Trust Co. v. Johnston automatically applied, absent the requisite 7 determination from the lower court. See In re Termination of Parental Rights of 8 Eventyr J. , 1995-NMCA-087, ¶ 38 (declining to cons ider an issue that the district 9 court had not considered in reaching its decision); see also Risk Mgmt. Div., Gen. 10 Servs. Dep't of State ex rel. Apodaca , 2003-NMCA-095, ¶ 5 (same). 11
{20} Accordingly, we conclude that the distri ct court abused its discretion in denying 12 the Romeros’ motion to set aside the default judgment based on the Romeros’ failure 13 to demonstrate excusable neglect. See N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson , 14 1999-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450 (“[W]e may characterize as an 15 abuse of discretion a discretionary decisi on that is premised on a misapprehension of 1614 the law.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Rawls , 2012- 1 NMCA-052, ¶ 14 (“This Court has held that wewill determine that a district court has 2 abused its discretion when it applies an incorrect standard , incorrect substantive law, 3 or its discretionary decision is premised on a misapprehension of the law.” (internal 4 quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Elinski , 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 8, 124 5 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209 (holding that a district court abused its discretion when it 6 exercised its discretion based on a “misapprehension of the law”), overruled on other 7 grounds by State v. Tollardo , 2012-NMSC-008, 275 P.3d 110. 8 CONCLUSION 9
{21} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse th e district court’s decision and order 10 denying the Romeros’ motion to set aside th e default judgment and remand for further 11 proceedings. 12
{22} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

14 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 15 WE CONCUR: 16 17 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 18 19 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 20