Opinion filed June 25, 2015

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

___________

No. 11-13-00180-CR

___________

GILBERT ROMAN CORRALES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 238th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR39641

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The jury convicted Gilbert Roman Corrales of the third-degree felony offense 

of assault-family violence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A)

(West Supp. 2014). Appellant pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph, and the 

jury assessed his punishment at confinement for a term of four years and a fine of 

$1,500. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. We affirm.
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In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient 

to show that he was the person convicted in a prior judgment of conviction that the 

trial court admitted into evidence. Proof of the prior conviction was required to 

elevate the misdemeanor assault offense to a third-degree felony offense of assaultfamily violence. See id. Specifically, Appellant argues that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove his identity as the person convicted of the prior offense because 

he did not expressly stipulate to the judgment and because no other evidence was 

presented that linked him to the prior judgment. 

We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set 

forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 

912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we examine all of the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on 

that evidence and any reasonable inferences from it, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010). 

 To prove the third-degree felony offense of assault-family violence under 

Section 22.01(b)(2)(A), the State must show that the defendant committed an assault 

against a person whose relationship with the defendant is described by 

Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005 of the Texas Family Code1and that the 

defendant had been previously convicted of an offense involving family violence. 

See PENAL § 22.01(b)(2)(A). Here, the State alleged that, on May 8, 2008, in Cause 

No. 121043 in the County Court at Law in Midland County, Texas, Appellant had 

been previously convicted of assault against a member of his family and household.

 

1TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.0021(b), 71.003, 71.005 (West 2014).
3

To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a prior conviction exists and that the 

defendant is linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007). There is no specific manner in which the State must prove these 

two elements. Id. Some of the ways by which a defendant may be linked to a prior 

conviction is through the testimony of a fingerprint expert, through the testimony of 

a witness who personally knows that the defendant was previously convicted and 

can identify the defendant, by the defendant’s stipulation or judicial admission, or 

by a photograph that is contained in the prior judgment or pen packet. See, e.g.,

Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Littles v. State, 726 

S.W.2d 26, 31–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 

Here, the State offered, and the trial court admitted without objection, a prior

judgment of conviction of assault-family violence against a “GILBERT ROMAN 

CORRALES.” When the prosecutor offered the judgment that reflected the prior 

conviction, he said: “[A]t this time, I’m going to offer State’s Exhibit 11 [the 

judgment of conviction] into evidence. I believe this was going to be stipulated by 

Defense.” Whereupon, defense counsel stated that he had no objection, and the trial 

court admitted the judgment. Immediately after the trial court admitted the judgment 

into evidence, the prosecutor said, “And just for the record, Your Honor, this is The 

State of Texas versus Gilbert Roman Corrales in County Court, Midland County, 

Texas, Cause Number 121043, in which the Defendant, on May 8th, 2008, was 

convicted for the offense of assault-family violence.” Defense counsel did not 

respond to the prosecutor’s statement. State’s Exhibit No. 11 was published to the 

jury without further comment by defense counsel, and the State called its next 

witness.

When a defendant stipulates to a prior conviction, he waives his right to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the prior conviction on appeal. 
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Bryant v. State, 187 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A stipulation is “a

kind of judicial admission” and relieves the State from its burden to prove the fact 

that has been stipulated. Id. at 400–01. The question in this case becomes whether 

Appellant’s silence to the prosecutor’s representation that he had stipulated to the 

prior conviction is sufficient to show that he stipulated to the evidence. 

In Matthews v. State, counsel for the State and for the defendant stipulated, 

during the guilt/innocence phase, that there was a witness that could identify the 

defendant as the same person who was previously convicted of the misdemeanor 

offense of driving while intoxicated. Matthews v. State, 414 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1967). On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court erred when 

it admitted evidence of his prior conviction because “he did not personally join or 

waive his right to confrontation of the witness and right against self-incrimination” 

in a written stipulation. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a written 

stipulation, as is required under Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure2 when a defendant waives his right to a jury trial and stipulates to the 

evidence, was not required under these circumstances. Id. The court opined that, 

because the defendant did not object to the stipulation, he acquiesced in the 

stipulation and was bound by it. Id.

Relying on Bryant and Matthews, the Beaumont Court of Appeals recently 

held that the defendant’s silent acquiescence to defense counsel’s oral stipulation 

regarding the defendant’s prior convictions was binding on the defendant and that

the defendant was thus precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the stipulated 

evidence. Vanness v. State, No. 09-13-00335-CR, 2014 WL 3387007, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont July 9, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). The court also noted that the defendant did not object to the admission 

 

2TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (West 2005).
5

of two exhibits that contained copies of documents purporting to establish his prior 

convictions. Id. at *4 n.2.

We believe that, when taken in context, in its entirety, the statement of the 

prosecutor that we have quoted above constituted a stipulation as to the identity of 

Appellant as being the same person as named in the prior judgment of conviction. 

Neither Appellant nor his attorney made any objection to the State’s recitation, nor 

did they correct it in any way; they “clearly acquiesced in it.” See Stribling v. State, 

542 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that the defendant acquiesced 

to the stipulation by failing to object). In addition, defense counsel stated that he 

had no objection to State’s Exhibit No. 11—the judgment of prior conviction—and

did not object to the prosecutor’s statement, which was made in the jury’s presence, 

that Appellant had been convicted of the offense of assault-family violence on 

May 8, 2008, in Midland County. 

As we have said, no specific method of proof is required to prove the elements 

related to judgments of prior convictions. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. The totality 

of the circumstances determines whether the State met its burden of proof as to those 

elements. Id. at 923. 

We hold that Appellant acquiesced in the State’s representation that he 

stipulated to the identity issue in connection with the prior conviction when neither 

he nor defense counsel corrected or objected to the prosecutor’s statements. We also 

note that the judgment of conviction contains the same name as that of Appellant. 

While that alone might not be enough to link the defendant to the prior judgment, 

the jury also had before it the State’s representation that Appellant stipulated to the 

conviction and Appellant’s silent acquiescence to that representation. 

Therefore, we hold that, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, a 

rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had 
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been previously convicted of assault-family violence. Appellant’s sole issue on 

appeal is overruled.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JIM R. WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE

June 25, 2015

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.