OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 

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 The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Knuckles, Appellant. 

 [Cite as State v. Knuckles (1992), Ohio St.3d .] 

Criminal law -- Once an accused invokes his right to counsel, 

 all further custodial interrogation must cease and may not 

 be resumed in the absence of counsel -- Interrogation may 

 be resumed, when -- "Interrogation," defined. 

1. Once an accused invokes his right to counsel, all further 

 custodial interrogation must cease and may not be resumed 

 in the absence of counsel unless the accused thereafter 

 effects a valid waiver or himself renews communication 

 with the police. (State v. Williams [1983], 6 Ohio St.3d 

 281, 6 OBR 345, 452 N.E.2d 1323, paragraph four of the 

 syllabus, followed.) 

2. When a statement, question or remark by a police officer 

 is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 

 from a suspect, it is an interrogation. (Rhode Island v. 

 Innis [1980], 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 

 297.) 

 (No. 91-1838--Submitted October 14, 1992--Decided December 

15, 1992.) 

 Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. 

CA89-11-159. 

 Shortly after midnight on January 31, 1989, defendant, 

John C. Knuckles, Sr., was arrested on an outstanding warrant 

for writing bad checks. This arrest, however, was admittedly a 

pretext for bringing him in to talk about the murder of Bobby 

Bennett, for which the defendant was a suspect. He was taken 

to Hamilton police headquarters where he was given his Miranda 

warning. 

 The defendant, a former sheriff's deputy, acknowledged 

that he understood his rights and immediately requested an 

attorney. Instead of ending the questioning, one of the three 

police officers present said, "We want to talk to you about 

Bobby Bennett." 

 The defendant responded, "Oh, I thought you wanted to talk 

about the bad check warrants * * *. I don't want to talk about 

the bad checks, but I will talk to you about Bobby Bennett's 

death." He then signed a Miranda waiver and spoke to the 
police for two hours. During this period he made incriminatory 

statements which assisted the police in locating evidence used 

against him in his trial. 

 The defendant was indicted for aggravated murder, 

aggravated robbery, tampering with evidence, and drug abuse. A 

motion to suppress defendant's statements was filed, but was 

overruled after a suppression hearing. A jury found the 

defendant guilty on all counts and he was sentenced to life 

imprisonment. 

 The Butler County Court of Appeals affirmed the 

conviction, finding, inter alia, that the trial court properly 

overruled defendant's motion to suppress. 

 This cause is before this court upon a motion for leave to 

appeal. 

 

 John F. Holcomb, Prosecuting Attorney, Daniel J. 

Gattermeyer and Daniel G. Eichel, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorneys, for appellee. 

 James Kura, Ohio Public Defender, John A. Bay and Kris H. 

Walker, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 

 

 Herbert R. Brown, J. The single issue before the court 

is whether the statement "We want to talk to you about Bobby 

Bennett" is a "further interrogation" prohibited by Edwards v. 

Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378. 

Edwards and its progeny have established a bright-line test for 

dealing with defendants who invoke their right to counsel. 

Simply stated, if a defendant requests counsel, the police must 

stop all questioning and interrogation immediately. Any 

statement, question or remark which is "reasonably likely to 

elicit an incriminating response" is an interrogation. Rhode 

Island v. Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 

1689-1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308. 

 Although the court of appeals correctly stated the law it 

erred in applying it. The appeals court held that the 

statement "We wanted to talk to you about Bobby Bennett," made 

after the defendant had requested counsel, was not an 

interrogation. For the reasons which follow, we disagree. The 

the use of statements made by the defendant after his request 

for an attorney violated his right under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments (as set forth in Edwards, supra) to have 

counsel present during custodial interrogation. 

 In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct 1602, 

16 L.Ed.2d 694, 36 O.O.2d 237, the United States Supreme Court 

held that when a defendant requests an attorney, the police 

must stop interrogation until an attorney is present. 

"Interrogation" has been defined as including "any words or 

actions on the part of the police (other than those normally 

attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know 

are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from 

the suspect." (Footnotes omitted.) Rhode Island v. Innis 

(1980), 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-1690, 64 

L.Ed.2d 297, 308. It is not necessary to phrase the 

communication in the form of a question to constitute an 

interrogation. 

 Once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, police may 

talk to him only if the defendant himself initiates further 
communications. Edwards v. Arizona, supra. "This 'rigid' 

prophylactic rule *** embodies two distinct inquires. First, 

courts must determine whether the accused actually invoked his 

right to counsel. * * * Second, if the accused invoked his 

right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further 

questioning only on the finding that he (a) initiated further 

discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and 

intelligently waived the right he had invoked." (Citations 

omitted.) Smith v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 

490, 492-493, 83 L.Ed.2d 488, 493-494. This bright-line test 

prevents the police from wearing down and confusing the 

defendant to obtain a waiver of his rights. Id. at 98, 105 

S.Ct. at 494, 83 L.Ed.2d at 495-496. 

 The Edwards, bright-line prophylactic rule is equally 

applicable to "police-initiated interrogation following a 

suspect's request for counsel * * * in the context of a 

separate investigation." Arizona v. Roberson (1988), 486 U.S. 

675, 682, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2098, 100 L.Ed.2d 704, 714. Once 

counsel is requested, the police may not question the defendant 

regarding any crime until an attorney is present.1 If they do, 

they violate the defendant's constitutional rights and any 

statements obtained cannot be used. 

 In the present case, the defendant, Knuckles, requested 

counsel immediately after the police read him his rights. At 

this point questioning should have stopped. However, the 

police "informed" Knuckles that they only wanted to talk to him 

about Bobby Bennett, not the bad checks charge he was arrested 

for. There are several factors which require the holding that 

the statement "We want to talk to you about Bobby Bennett" was 

an interrogation prohibited by Edwards. 

 First, the only reason Knuckles was arrested was so the 

police could talk to him about Bennett's murder. They had no 

intention of pursuing the bad checks charge. The statement was 

more than the "offhand remarks" in Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 

303, 100 S.Ct. at 1691, 64 L.Ed.2d at 309, which were found not 

"reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." 

"[W]here a police practice is designed to elicit an 

incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that 

the practice will not also be one which the police should have 

known was reasonably likely to have that effect." Id., 446 

U.S. at 302, 100 S.Ct. at 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d at 308, fn.7. 

 Second, even if the arrest for the bad checks charge had 

not been a pretext for bringing Knuckles in to talk about 

Bennett's murder, the statement was still interrogatory in 

nature. The statement invited a response. 

 Finally, the rule in Edwards was adopted to avoid cases 

such as this. The prosecution argues the statement was made 

simply to advise Knuckles of the subject matter the police 

wanted to discuss. However, Edwards gives the police a rigid 

bright-line rule for dealing with suspects who have invoked 

their right to counsel. 

 As we said in State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 

6 OBR 345, 452 N.E.2d 1323, at paragraph four of the syllabus: 

"Once an accused invokes his right to counsel, all further 

custodial interrogation must cease and may not be resumed in 

the absence of counsel unless the accused thereafter effects a 

valid waiver of his right to counsel or himself renews 
communication with the police." The bright-line rule 

established in these cases eliminates the need for ad hoc 

determinations by the courts regarding what communications with 

a defendant are permissible once counsel is requested. It 

removes uncertainty by stopping all interrogation. It clearly 

tells the police what cannot be done. 

 This is not to say that once a suspect requests counsel 

the police may not ask routine questions necessary for 

booking. Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990), 496 U.S. 582, 110 S.Ct. 

2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528. But even these questions are limited. 

In Muniz the court allowed questions regarding the defendant's 

name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and 

current age. It did not allow a question asking the date of 

the defendant's sixth birthday. The statement made to 

Knuckles, after he had asked for counsel, was not a routine 

booking question. 

 Accordingly, we hold that the statement "We want to talk 

to you about Bobby Bennett" was an interrogation prohibited by 

Edwards. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and 

the cause is remanded. 

 Judgment reversed 

 and cause remanded. 

 Moyer, C.J., Sweeney, Douglas and Wright, JJ., concur. 

 Holmes and Resnick, JJ., separately dissent. 

 

FOOTNOTE 

 1 The court of appeals cited McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 

501 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158, for the 

proposition that a request for counsel is offense-specific. 

McNeil concerns the Sixth Amendment right to have counsel 

present at adversarial hearings. The case before us deals with 

the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during 

interrogation to guard against self-incrimination. McNeil is 

not applicable to this case. 

 

 Holmes, J., dissenting. Although I am in agreement with 

the law as stated in the syllabus of this opinion, I 

respectfully dissent because of the majority's failure to 

properly apply the law to the facts of the instant appeal. 

 As correctly stated at the outset of the majority's 

opinion, the crucial issue for our discussion is whether 

appellant was subjected to "interrogation" within the meaning 

of Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 

64 L.Ed.2d 297. There, the United States Supreme Court 

construed "interrogation" more broadly than meaning police 

questioning of the suspect. The Fifth Amendment privilege 

against compulsory self-incrimination could not adequately be 

safeguarded unless law enforcement officials were also 

prohibited from conduct which amounted to the "functional 

equivalent" of express questioning. Accordingly, the court 

held: "[T]he definition of interrogation can extend only to 

words or actions on the part of police officers that they 

should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 302, 100 

S.Ct. at 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d at 308. 

 The Innis court, in finding that no interrogation took 

place, rejected any definition of "interrogation" which focused 
exclusively on the existence of police compulsion, however 

subtle it may have been.2 However, the suspect's response 

must, in addition, have been "the product of words or actions 

on the part of the police that they should have known were 

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 

303, 100 S.Ct. at 1691, 64 L.Ed.2d at 309. If the suspect's 

statements were not evoked as a result of police compulsion, 

then the second prong of the definition of "interrogation" has 

not been satisfied. In other words, we must look to the 

reasonable perceptions of the suspect in determining whether he 

or she was subjected to "interrogation." If a suspect would 

reasonably feel that the police conduct or words did not call 

for a response, no interrogation can be said to have taken 

place. 

 I am confused and troubled that the majority has chosen to 

characterize the statement "We wanted to talk to you about 

Bobby Bennett" as an interrogation. This statement was not a 

question, nor can it be considered to be the functional 

equivalent of express questioning. Nothing in this remark 

could have been reasonably perceived by appellant (a 

forty-two-year-old former deputy sheriff) as calling for a 

response, let alone a waiver of Miranda rights and the 

initiation of his subsequent conversation. Moreover, there is 

ample evidence in the record which strongly suggests that 

appellant welcomed this comment as an opportunity to mislead 

the police investigation through his deceptive theories on who 

shot the victim. Appellant's subsequent incriminating remarks 

were more likely evoked by his desire to lead the police astray 

than they were by his perception that the officer wanted him to 

speak. In this sense, the comment did strike a "responsive 

chord," thereby permitting appellant to say what he wanted 

about his version of the Bennett murder. 

 What the majority characterizes as a "bright-line rule" 

emanating from Innis and its progeny is, in effect, the 

inevitable result of the majority's misapplication of the 

nuances of the constitutional privilege against compulsory 

self-incrimination. The majority goes far beyond safeguarding 

this privilege by unnecessarily crafting what amounts to an 

anticommunication obligation on the part of police officers. 

By this reasoning, any communication other than that usually 

attendant to arrest and custody will amount to 

"interrogation." Also, by this reasoning, the forseeability of 

the incriminating response is irrelevant--what matters is only 

that the arrestee began to talk. 

 Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals. 

 

FOOTNOTE: 

 2 See Innis, at 303, 100 S.Ct. at 1691, 64 L.Ed.2d at 309: 

 "The Rhode Island Supreme Court erred, in short, in 

equating 'subtle compulsion' with interrogation. That the 

officers' comments struck a responsive chord is readily 

apparent. Thus, it may be said, as the Rhode Island Supreme 

Court did say, that the respondent was subjected to 'subtle 

compulsion.' But that is not the end of the inquiry. It must 

also be established that a suspect's incriminating response was 

the product of words or actions on the part of the police that 

they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response. This was not established in the 

present case." (Emphasis added.) 

 

 Alice Robie Resnick, J., dissenting. This case presents a 

striking example of a court taking a rational rule of law 

developed under a specific set of circumstances, blindly 

applying that rule of law to a completely dissimilar set of 

circumstances, and reaching a totally illogical conclusion. 

Consequently, because I am dismayed by the majority's result, I 

dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, 

and affirm defendant's conviction. 

 The court of appeals correctly concluded that the 

statement "We wanted to talk to you about Bobby Bennett" was 

not an interrogation. The appellate court properly grasped the 

circumstances surrounding that statement and recognized it for 

what it was: the mere recitation of a fact uttered by a police 

officer who was terminating the questioning of a suspect. This 

statement was in no way "reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response" in the sense of Rhode Island v. Innis 

(1980), 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297. The 

majority's declaration that the statement "invited a response" 

is unsupported by the record. 

 In disagreeing with the court of appeals' conclusion on 

the significance of this statement, the majority ignores 

important facts and selectively emphasizes irrelevant ones 

(such as police motivation in bringing defendant in for 

questioning). Defendant's response to the statement at issue 

clearly indicates that the statement cannot be accurately 

characterized as an interrogation. Defendant responded, "Oh, I 

thought you wanted to talk about the bad check warrants * * *. 

I don't want to talk about the bad checks, but I will talk to 

you about Bobby Bennett's death. * * * I love that man. As a 

matter of fact, I have got a couple theories on who may have 

done it that you guys would probably be interested in." 

 The court of appeals correctly understood the significance 

of defendant's remarks, when considered in the context of the 

accompanying circumstances of this case. Defendant was at one 

time a deputy sheriff. Testimony at trial indicated that 

someone had altered the firing pin and barrel of the alleged 

murder weapon, which was discovered in the trunk of defendant's 

car, in an attempt to preclude any chance of police matching 

that handgun with bullets removed from the victim's body. 

Clearly, defendant responded enthusiastically when the Bennett 

murder was mentioned. It may be easily deduced that defendant 

obviously believed he had outwitted the authorities, and was 

anxious to perfect the deception. Thus, the record reveals 

that the statement by the police officer referring to Bobby 

Bennett was not a "further interrogation." Therefore, 

defendant's response was offered voluntarily. No violation of 

Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 

L.Ed.2d 694, 36 O.O.2d 237, occurred. 

 The majority states that the decision in Edwards v. 

Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 

is designed to avoid cases such as this by giving a bright-line 

rule to follow. However, application of the Edwards rule is 

dependent on an initial determination that an interrogation has 

occurred. Since the majority is incorrect when it finds that 
an interrogation occurred, its resort to the Edwards 

bright-line rule is likewise flawed. 

 It is unfathomable how the majority could find that 

defendant's Miranda rights were violated in these 

circumstances. The majority correctly recognizes that the 

Edwards test "prevents the police from wearing down and 

confusing the defendant." Smith v. Illinois (1984), 696 U.S. 

91, 98, 105 S.Ct. 490, 494, 83 L.Ed.2d 488, 495-496. However, 

Edwards is irrelevant here. It is glaringly obvious that no 

intimidation of the defendant, either overt or subtle, by 

police occurred. Instead, defendant, a former deputy sheriff, 

seized upon the opportunity presented by an innocuous statement 

and offered unsolicited incriminatory remarks. 

 In conclusion, the two syllabus paragraphs are correct 

statements of basic hornbook law. However, the majority is 

mistaken when it finds that under the Innis standard, as set 

forth in the second syllabus paragraph, further interrogation 

occurred in the circumstances of this case. The majority's 

result is based on a skewed view of the events that took 

place. I vigorously dissent.