1

 The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 99-3040 

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Donald H. Jones,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

Eastern District of Missouri.

 [PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: May 16, 2001

 Filed: October 15, 2001

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Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, HANSEN, Circuit Judge, and BARNES,1

 District

Judge. 

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

A grand jury indicted the defendant, Donald H. Jones, on two counts of

transporting child pornography in interstate commerce, one count of possessing child

pornography, and one count seeking forfeiture of the child pornography contraband

involved in and the instrumentalities used to commit the charged crimes. Jones

moved to suppress evidence obtained by the government, asserting that the evidence
2 Jones was sentenced to a term of 24 months in prison and a 3 year term of

supervised release. We were informed at oral argument that the defendant has served

the confinement portion of his sentence and is presently on supervised release.

2

was the product of a traffic stop conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The district court, adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, concluded

that the traffic stop was lawful and that the evidence should not be suppressed. Jones

entered into a conditional plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty to interstate

transportation of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and to the

forfeiture allegations, but reserved the right to appeal the district court's order

denying his motion to suppress. We reverse the judgment of the district court and

conclude that Jones's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an unlawful

detention, and that the evidence obtained during and as a result of that detention

should have been suppressed.2

I.

On December 11, 1998, at approximately 5:45 p.m., Trooper DeWitt of the

Missouri Highway Patrol observed a black Ford truck with California license plates,

driven by Jones, towing a large 29-foot camper northbound on Interstate 270. The

truck was traveling at approximately 50 miles per hour, and when Trooper DeWitt

began to pass the truck he noticed that the driver slowed down even though the truck

was already traveling under the speed limit. Suspicious, DeWitt pulled in behind the

truck/camper and followed it for approximately three miles. During this time, the

truck slowed to 38 miles per hour in a minimum speed zone of 40 miles per hour. 

Upon seeing the camper shake and its wheels cross the dividing lines of the traffic

lanes both to its left and right, DeWitt became concerned that the driver might be

tired or intoxicated. DeWitt activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle.

After the vehicles were stopped on the side of the Interstate, DeWitt exited his vehicle

and approached the passenger side of Jones's truck. Trooper DeWitt explained to
3

Jones why he had stopped him and requested that Jones exit his vehicle and

accompany DeWitt back to the patrol car. Jones complied. While in the patrol car

DeWitt asked to see Jones's driver's license and insurance card. DeWitt used his

computer to determine if the license and registration were valid and to investigate

Jones's criminal history. The results from the license and registration check returned

first, and DeWitt determined that both the license and registration were valid.

While waiting for the results of the criminal history search, and while still in

the patrol car, DeWitt questioned Jones about the nature and purpose of his trip. At

the suppression hearing, Trooper DeWitt testified that Jones appeared nervous while

inside the patrol car. Specifically, he testified that Jones's voice cracked, Jones

yawned, Jones's thumb shook, and Jones would not make eye contact with him.

Despite this apparent nervousness, Jones responded to DeWitt's questions, explaining

that he was traveling across the country from California to New Jersey to see his

family for the holidays. Jones also explained that he had no permanent address and

that the camper was his home. During this questioning, DeWitt asked Jones whether

he had any prior arrests and Jones responded that he did not. Subsequently, the

results from the criminal history check were transmitted to the patrol car. They

indicated that Jones had a prior felony arrest. By this time a second officer had

arrived at the scene, and DeWitt used this officer's cellular phone to call his

dispatcher and inquire further into Jones's prior arrest. DeWitt learned that Jones had

two prior theft arrests. DeWitt asked Jones about these arrests, and Jones initially

denied that he had prior arrests. After several more minutes of questioning, however,

Jones admitted that he might have been arrested for stealing cigarettes when he was

a minor. DeWitt believed that Jones was being evasive because the criminal history

information from the dispatcher did not comport with Jones's account. The

information from the dispatcher revealed that Jones's prior arrests had occurred within

the last four to five years, and Jones's driver's license indicated he was thirty years

old. 
4

Although suspicious that Jones might be operating under the influence, DeWitt

smelled no traces of alcohol on Jones's breath nor did he perceive any other signs that

Jones was intoxicated or otherwise impaired. DeWitt gave Jones a warning and

returned Jones's license and insurance card. Upon receipt of his documents, Jones

exited the vehicle. DeWitt then followed Jones out of the vehicle and began to ask

him more questions. DeWitt asked Jones if there was any contraband, including

narcotics, aboard the camper. Jones answered, "no, and no." He also replied that he

had owned a business in California and had fired two employees for using drugs.

DeWitt then asked Jones for permission to search the vehicle, but Jones denied

permission, stating that he had always been told "not to let the police into your

home." In response, DeWitt told Jones that he was going to call in a canine narcotics

unit to inspect the camper. Jones responded, "fine." In Jones's presence, DeWitt

radioed for the assistance of a canine unit, but was told there was none in the

immediate area. DeWitt directed that a canine unit be sent out to the Interstate

location anyway. Officer Swartz and a drug-detecting dog arrived at the scene at

approximately 7:05 p.m.--almost one hour after DeWitt called for the canine unit, and

almost an hour and one-half after the initial stop. At no point did DeWitt tell Jones

he was free to leave. 

Officer Swartz and the drug dog conducted an examination of the exterior of

the vehicle. The dog alerted to the left rear wheel of the camper. Not finding any

narcotics attached to the exterior or underside of the camper, the officers directed

Jones to unlock the camper door so that they could search the alerted area from the

inside. Jones unlocked the camper door and turned on the lights. The interior of the

camper contained furniture, including plants, cabinets, a desk, video equipment, and

a computer. The officers conducted a search of the interior of the vehicle while it

was still on the Interstate. Officer Swartz removed tape securing the cabinet drawers,

opened them, and removed papers and pictures from the drawers to see if narcotics

were hidden in the back of the drawers. Officer DeWitt observed photographs of a

nude boy on the top of the stack of papers removed from the cabinet drawers. The
5

officers did not search the area the dog had alerted to because the camper was not

fully extended and the officers were unable to access it. DeWitt and Swartz

determined that the camper needed to be extended to allow them access to the alerted

area. 

At the officers' direction, Jones drove the truck/camper to an empty fuel shed

approximately one-half mile up the Interstate, and the officers followed. Jones

extended the camper, allowing the officers to gain access to all parts of the camper.

The officers, accompanied by the drug dog, entered the interior of the camper. The

dog alerted to the left rear corner of the camper. The officers then searched that area

and other parts of the camper, but they did not find any narcotics. DeWitt did find,

however, video cassettes with homemade sleeves depicting nude pictures of young

boys. Upon seeing the pictures, DeWitt placed Jones under arrest.

II.

The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. It is well established that a roadside

traffic stop is a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware

v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). For purposes of constitutional analysis, a traffic

stop is characterized as an investigative detention, rather than a custodial arrest.

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). As such, a traffic stop is governed

by the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Generally such a stop must be

supported by at least a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. Jones does not challenge the legality of the initial stop of

his automobile, and so we need not determine its legality as a traffic stop.

The principles of Terry provide that once Trooper DeWitt lawfully stopped

Jones he was entitled to conduct an investigation "reasonably related in scope to the
6

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at

20; see also United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 502 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 962 (1991). The scope of a Fourth Amendment intrusion "will vary

to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case." Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see also United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220,

1224 (8th Cir. 1992). "The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its

underlying justification." Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. This means that the Fourth

Amendment intrusion "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop" and that the officer should employ the least

intrusive means available to dispel the officer's suspicion in a timely fashion. Id.

Consistent with these principles, our case law teaches us that a police officer, incident

to investigating a lawful traffic stop, may request the driver's license and registration,

request that the driver step out of the vehicle, request that the driver wait in the patrol

car, conduct computer inquiries to determine the validity of the license and

registration, conduct computer searches to investigate the driver's criminal history and

to determine if the driver has outstanding warrants, and make inquiries as to the

motorist's destination and purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129,

1134 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that checking validity of license and administering

criminal history check on computer was not unreasonable procedure in traffic stop);

United States v. White, 81 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir.) (stating officer may ask for license

and registration, request driver to sit in patrol car, inquire into destination and

purpose, determine if car is stolen, and check for outstanding warrants), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1011 (1996). The officer may detain the driver as long as reasonably

necessary to conduct these activities and to issue a warning or citation. See United

States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997). After Trooper DeWitt had

completed this initial investigation and determined that Jones was neither tired nor

intoxicated, that his license and registration were valid, and that there were no

outstanding warrants for his arrest, then the legitimate investigative purposes of the

traffic stop were completed. See, e.g., White, 81 F.3d at 778 (stating that upon return

of documentation and explanation of warning citation the traffic stop ends); United
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States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that reasonable scope

of the initial traffic stop extends to the moment after the return of documents when

officer asked if he could search the vehicle), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995). At

this point, with the purpose of the traffic stop completed, it would be an unreasonable

extension of the scope of the investigation for Trooper DeWitt to further detain Jones

or his vehicle, "unless something that occurred during the traffic stop generated the

necessary reasonable suspicion to justify a further detention." United States v. Mesa,

62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995). Thus, the lawfulness of the continued encounter

between DeWitt and Jones after DeWitt had returned Jones's license and registration

hinges on two determinations: whether Jones was "seized" within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment, and if so, whether the seizure was founded on a reasonable

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

Not all personal encounters between law enforcement officials and citizens fall

within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. A consensual

encounter between an officer and a private citizen does not implicate the Fourth

Amendment. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984). Even if Trooper DeWitt

had no suspicion that Jones was engaged in criminal activity, if the encounter after

the completion of the traffic stop was consensual, then the Fourth Amendment would

not prohibit Trooper DeWitt from asking questions unrelated to the traffic stop, from

seeking consent to search the truck, or even from asking if Jones would wait for the

canine unit to arrive. The determination of which police-citizen contacts fall within

the regulation of the Fourth Amendment and which do not is a fact intensive one

which turns upon the unique facts of each case. Beck, 140 F.3d at 1135; United

States v. Hathcock, 103 F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1127 (1997).

A Fourth Amendment "seizure" does not occur merely because a police officer

requests permission to search an area or poses other questions to a citizen. White, 81

F.3d at 779. Rather, "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a

reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States
3

 See 8th Cir. R. 28A(i). In our judgment, this case, although unpublished, has

persuasive value under our Rule and so we choose to cite it.

8

v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). When the officer's conduct or "questioning

is so intimidating, threatening, or coercive" that a reasonable person would not feel

free to leave, then that person has been "seized." Hathcock, 103 F.3d at 718 (internal

quotations omitted). "Circumstances that might indicate when an encounter becomes

a seizure include the threatening presence of several officers . . . or the use of

language or tone of voice [which] indicat[es] that compliance with the officer's

request [will] be compelled." Id. at 718-19 (internal quotations omitted). 

This encounter bears few of the hallmarks of consensual encounters, cf. United

States v. Garfio-Chavez, No. 98-1709, 1998 WL 416815, at *3 (8th Cir. July 22,

1998) (unpublished opinion) (officer told defendant he was free to leave and officer

did not follow defendant out of patrol car), and instead appears to us to be a situation

where a motorist submitted to a show of authority by an officer who made it evident

from his use of language and conduct that the motorist would not be free to leave

without first complying with the officer's demands.3

 In Beck we held that an

encounter between an officer and a motorist was a seizure and not a consensual

encounter when the officer told the motorist that he was calling for the assistance of

a canine unit, the motorist was present when the officer radioed for the canine unit,

and the officer then told the motorist that he was going to have a canine unit inspect

his vehicle. See Beck, 140 F.3d at 1135-36. This case presents an even stronger

case for finding a "seizure" than in Beck. In this case, Trooper DeWitt never told

Jones that he was free to leave. Cf. id. at 1135 (concluding that officer statement

"you are free to leave" indicated consensual encounter). Trooper DeWitt exited his

patrol car and engaged Jones outside the vehicle. Cf. Garfio-Sanchez, 1998 WL

416815, at *3 (concluding that fact that officer remained seated in patrol car while

speaking to motorist standing outside car militated in favor of finding consensual

encounter). Trooper DeWitt asked Jones if he could search Jones's camper, and Jones
9

told him "no," indicating that Jones did not want to cooperate. Trooper DeWitt chose

to ignore this response, instead telling Jones that he was going to call in a canine

narcotics unit to examine Jones's vehicle. Jones was present when DeWitt radioed

for assistance, and DeWitt told Jones that the drug dog would inspect his vehicle.

DeWitt's use of declarative language and his nonresponsiveness to Jones's desire to

not have his camper/home inspected would lead a reasonable person to conclude that

this encounter was not consensual, and that compliance with the officer's wishes

would be compelled. See Beck, 140 F.3d at 1135-36 (holding that consensual

encounter ended when officer told defendant that if he did not consent to search then

the officer would call for a canine unit); United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1281

(7th Cir. 1996) ("We do not believe a person . . . who had just been told that a canine

unit was being called, would feel free to get behind the wheel and drive away from

the scene."). Thus, Jones's terse response, "fine," made with the knowledge that a

third officer and a narcotics detecting dog would arrive shortly can hardly be

considered consensual. In these circumstances, we conclude that Jones was "seized"

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that the encounter between the

officers and Jones after the completion of the traffic stop was an investigative

detention beyond the scope of the original traffic stop. 

Generally, an investigative detention must remain within the scope of the

traffic stop to be reasonable. United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir.

1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1140 (1997). "However, if the response of the detainee

and the circumstances give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, an

officer may broaden his inquiry and satisfy those suspicions." Id. Only when an

officer develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot does

he have "'justification for a greater intrusion unrelated to the traffic offense.'"

Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 918 (quoting Cummins, 920 F.2d at 502). This requires that

the officer's suspicion be based upon "'particularized, objective facts which, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[] suspicion that

a crime [is] being committed.'" Beck, 140 F.3d at 1136 (quoting United States v.
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Martin, 706 F.2d 263, 265 (8th Cir. 1983)). In evaluating whether a set of facts

would give rise to reasonable suspicion, this court must look at the totality of the

circumstances and not just each independent fact standing alone. See United States

v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). Furthermore, the court may consider any added

meaning that certain conduct might suggest to experienced officers in the field,

trained in the observation of criminal activity. Beck, 140 F.3d at 1136. The officer's

reasonable suspicion cannot be, however, just a mere hunch or based on

circumstances which "describe a very large category of presumably innocent

travelers." Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980). 

The government argues that DeWitt had reasonable suspicion that Jones was

engaged in narcotics trafficking based upon a confluence of, what appear to us to be,

largely innocent circumstances. Chiefly, the government relies on the facts that Jones

slowed while being passed, his camper wheels crossed traffic lines, he gave an

inconsistent answer regarding his prior arrest record, and he acted nervously upon

being detained and questioned inside Trooper DeWitt's patrol car. We review the

district court's findings of historical fact for clear error. Beck, 140 F.3d at 1133. The

ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a question

of law which we review de novo. Id.

DeWitt was passing Jones in the left lane when he saw the truck's brake lights

illuminate. DeWitt thought this was suspicious and slowed down and pulled in

behind the camper. There is generally "nothing suspicious about a driver . . . slowing

down when he realizes a vehicle is approaching from the rear." United States v.

Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1993). This "is a normal reaction if the

driver wishes to let the tailing vehicle pass." Id. This is particularly unsuspicious in

this case where the driver of the larger vehicle, who by all accounts appeared to be

having some difficulty keeping his camper confined within its lane, might have

decelerated simply to allow the smaller vehicle to pass more quickly and minimize

the risk of an accident. After pulling in behind the camper, DeWitt trailed Jones for
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almost three miles where he observed Jones travel at a slow rate of speed and saw the

camper swerve outside of its traffic lane. We attach little suspicion of criminal

activity, as opposed to traffic law violations, to these observations for two reasons.

First, "when the officer's actions are such that any driver, whether innocent or guilty,

would be preoccupied with his presence, then any inference that might be drawn from

the driver's behavior is destroyed." United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 364, 370 (5th

Cir. 1998). Second, driving a 29-foot camper in a slow cautious manner on a dark,

cold, and windy winter night would not suggest any criminal activity was afoot

except, perhaps, driving while intoxicated. Furthermore, the camper's California

license plates might suggest that the driver was unfamiliar with Missouri roads and

weather conditions and was merely exercising sound judgment in proceeding

cautiously. Any suspicions that Trooper DeWitt harbored that Jones was tired or

intoxicated were dispelled when Trooper DeWitt questioned Jones in his patrol car.

As such, because the Trooper dispelled any suspicion that could reasonably have been

inferred from Jones's slow and cautious driving, we conclude that this behavior has

nil or de minimis value in our reasonable suspicion calculus as to whether other

criminal activity was afoot.

Jones also gave an inconsistent answer in response to DeWitt's questions

regarding Jones's criminal history. It is true that if questions reasonably related to a

traffic stop create inconsistent answers from the detainee, then the officer's suspicion

may be raised so as to enable him to expand the scope of the stop. United States v.

Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1134 (1995).

Jones's inconsistent answer regarding his prior theft arrests, however, is not the sort

of inconsistency that warrants such a conclusion. Jones's subsequent denial and then

later admission that he had been arrested is consistent with innocent behavior. There

are numerous reasons why an innocent traveler initially would be reluctant to reveal

to law enforcement authorities his criminal history; primarily for fear that it would

have the exact effect that it had here, i.e., casting unwarranted suspicion upon that

person. Also, an inconsistent answer regarding past conduct is less suspicious than
12

an inconsistent answer regarding present destination or purpose. An inconsistent

answer as to the former might cast a shadow of dishonesty upon the character of the

motorist, but an inconsistent answer regarding the latter casts suspicion and doubt on

the nature and legitimacy of the activity being investigated. See, e.g., United States

v. Lebrun, 261 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that inconsistent answers

regarding details of trip could support finding of reasonable suspicion); United States

v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802, 807 (8th Cir. 2000) (inconsistent answers regarding purpose

of trip and accommodations could support finding of reasonable suspicion). More

fundamentally, however, we fail to perceive the connection between an inconsistent

answer regarding prior minor theft arrests that occurred four to five years ago and

suspicion of interstate narcotics trafficking. In the absence of other factors

suggesting Jones was engaged in the interstate transportation of narcotics, we

conclude that this inconsistent answer could not generate a reasonable suspicion that

Jones was involved in interstate narcotics trafficking. 

The government also points to displays of nervous behavior as supporting a

finding of reasonable suspicion. We have concluded that nervousness combined with

several other more revealing facts can generate reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Foley,

206 F.3d at 804 (finding that the following facts could generate reasonable suspicion:

motorist was nervous, motorist was speeding, vehicle was rented, car contained air

freshener and masking odor, motorist gave inconsistent answers regarding destination

and purpose, motorist failed to remember name of daughter-in-law whom motorist

claimed he had just visited). We have also concluded that extreme and unusually

nervous behavior observed in conjunction with only one or two other facts can

generate reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See, e.g., Lebrun, 261

F.3d at 733 (motorist sweating profusely on a cold day). Generally, however,

"nervousness is of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion." United

States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879 (10th Cir. 1994). "[W]hile a person's nervous

behavior may be relevant, we are wary of the objective suspicion supplied by generic

claims that a Defendant was nervous or exhibited nervous behavior after being
13

confronted by law enforcement officials." United States v. Barron-Cabrera, 119 F.3d

1454, 1461 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). Because the government

repeatedly relies on nervousness as a basis for reasonable suspicion, "it must be

treated with caution." Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 879. 

DeWitt testified that Jones yawned, his voice cracked, his thumb shook, and

he failed to make eye contact with DeWitt. Trooper DeWitt testified that this was not

abnormal behavior because many motorists become nervous when pulled over and

confronted by law enforcement officials. We have determined that "[i]t certainly

cannot be deemed unusual for a motorist to exhibit signs of nervousness when

confronted by a law enforcement officer." Beck 140 F.3d at 1139. Furthermore,

Jones's behavior is rendered less suspect given that any nervous behavior he might

have displayed was likely accentuated by the appearance of another officer at the

scene. Moreover, Trooper DeWitt had never met Jones, and was unfamiliar with his

usual demeanor, and thus DeWitt's evaluation of Jones's behavior lacks any

foundation. This is troubling where the alleged signs of nervousness are not the kind

of "unusual," "exceptional," or more objective manifestations of nervousness that

might, in combination with the limited other facts presented here, support a finding

of reasonable suspicion. Everybody yawns. Cf., Lebrun, 261 F.3d at 733 (defendant

exhibited exceptionally nervous behavior, including profuse sweating during cold

weather). We conclude that any suspicion engendered by this nervous behavior is at

best minimal.

Finally, the government argues that although each of these factors when

considered alone does not engender a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is

afoot, when considered together they would support a finding of reasonable

suspicion. We agree that in some circumstances the sum may amount to more than

its parts. The facts presented in this case–minimal nervousness and an inconsistent

answer as to prior arrests–whether viewed alone or in combination, amount to little.

When an officer can cite only one or two facts, including a generic claim of
14

nervousness, as supporting his determination of reasonable suspicion, then we may

conclude that his suspicion was not reasonable, see Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 918, n.9,

for "'it is impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a

suspicious conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an

interpretation.'" Beck, 140 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Wood, 106 F.3d at 948). The

government has not provided such a reason. Therefore, we conclude that the facts

presented here do not generate a suspicion sufficient to warrant Jones's detention.

III.

Trooper DeWitt's detention of Jones past the point necessary to complete his

traffic stop investigation exceeded the scope of a lawfully initiated traffic stop. The

extended investigative detention was unsupported by a reasonable, articulable

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and therefore violated Jones's Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The evidence obtained in this

case is tainted as a result of this unlawful detention and should have been suppressed.

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963); Ramos, 42 F.3d at

1164 (stating that physical evidence obtained as a result of an illegal detention is not

admissible). We reverse the district court's judgment, we vacate Jones's conviction

and his sentence, and we remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

opinion.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.