UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4454

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

CHRISTOPHER RAESEAN JOHNSON, a/k/a C-Murder, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, 

Chief District Judge. (5:05-cr-00209-FL) 

Submitted: September 30, 2008 Decided: October 21, 2008 

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Robert J. McAfee, MCAFEE LAW, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Christopher Raesean Johnson appeals his convictions 

and 292-month sentence after he pled guilty to possession with 

intent to distribute more than five grams of crack cocaine 

(Count 1), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000), and 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime (Count 2), in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1) (West 

2000 & Supp. 2008). Johnson’s counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating 

that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning 

whether the district court erred by denying Johnson’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea and whether the sentence is reasonable. 

Johnson has filed a pro se supplemental brief.∗

 Finding no 

reversible error, we affirm. 

 Counsel first challenges the district court’s denial 

of Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Withdrawal of 

a guilty plea is not a matter of right. United States v. 

Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). The defendant 

bears the burden of showing a “fair and just reason” for the 

withdrawal of his guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). 

“[A] ‘fair and just’ reason . . . is one that essentially 

 ∗

 We have reviewed the claims raised in Johnson’s 

supplemental informal brief and find them to be without merit. 

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challenges . . . the fairness of the Rule 11 proceeding . . . .” 

United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en 

banc). An appropriately conducted Rule 11 proceeding, however, 

“raise[s] a strong presumption that the plea is final and 

binding.” Id. at 1394. 

 Here, the district court applied the factors courts 

must consider in determining whether to permit withdrawal of a 

guilty plea. See Ubakanma, 215 F.3d at 424. Our review of the 

record convinces us that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Johnson’s motion to withdraw. See United 

States v. Dyess, 478 F.3d 224, 237 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating 

standard of review). We therefore affirm Johnson’s convictions. 

 Counsel also questions whether Johnson’s 292-month 

career offender sentence is reasonable. This court reviews the 

sentence imposed by the district court for abuse of discretion. 

Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). If the 

appellate court concludes that the sentence is “procedurally 

sound,” the court then considers the substantive reasonableness 

of the sentence. Id. This court presumes that a sentence 

imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines range is 

reasonable. United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 

2008); see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 

(2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness for within—

Guidelines sentence). 

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 In light of Gall, we find that Johnson’s sentence is 

reasonable. First, the district court committed no procedural 

error, appropriately treating the Guidelines as advisory and 

considering the Guidelines range and the factors in 18 U.S.C.A. 

§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008) before imposing a 292-month 

prison term, a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines range. 

Applying the presumption of reasonableness and finding that 

Johnson has failed to rebut the presumption on appeal, we 

conclude that his 292-month sentence is reasonable. See Go, 517 

F.3d at 218; see also Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2462-69. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

for any meritorious issues for appeal and have found none. 

Thus, we affirm the district court’s judgment and deny counsel’s 

motion to withdraw. This court requires that counsel inform his 

client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court 

of the United States for further review. If the client requests 

that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a 

petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court 

for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion 

must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED