No. 81-12 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1981 

STATE OF MONTANA, ex rel., CROCKETT 

S. HARRY, 

Petitioner, 

DISTRICT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL 

DISRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, IN 

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GLACIER, et al., 

Respondents. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: 

Counsel of Record: 

For Petitioner: 

John P. Moore argued, Cut Bank, Montana 

For Respondent: 

James C. Nelson argued, County Attorney, Cut Bank, 

Montana 

Mark Murphy argued, Asst. Atty. General, Helena, 

Montana 

Submitted: April 20, 1981 

Decided : 1AR/ 2 6 1981 

Filed: MAY 2 6 1961 
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an original proceeding wherein the petitioner 

seeks a writ of prohibition or other appropriate relief. 

Petitioner requests the relief from this Court in an attempt 

to vacate and annul certain orders of the respondent, 

Glacier County District Court, made and entered on November 

17, 1980, in the case of State v. Crockett S. Harry, 

District Court Cause No. DC 80-24. After a hearing on the 

petition, the Court issues the following opinion. 

In September 1979 petitioner Crockett S. Harry was 

injured in an industrial accident, entitling him to workers' 

compensation benefits. A lump sum settlement was eventually 

received from the State Workers' Compensation Division by 

petitioner on June 10, 1980. The proceeds of the 

settlement, amounting to $7,000, were deposited with the 

First National Bank in Cut Bank, Montana. The money has 

remained on deposit with the bank throughout this proceeding 

and has never been commingled with any other funds. 

On November 2, 1980, petitioner was arrested and 

charged with deliberate homicide. He appeared with courtappointed counsel for arraignment on November 5, 1980. Upon 

interviewing petitioner, the District Court learned of the 

$7,000 certificate of deposit and, as a result, found that 

petitioner was not indigent and could employ his own 

attorney. The court advised petitioner to retain private 

counsel and that, if he chose to keep his court-appointed 

attorneys, he would be required to defray the costs of their 

appointment . 

Petitioner, on November 17, 1980, again appeared with 

appointed counsel and advised the District Court that he was 
unable to find an attorney who would take his case. The 

District Court at this time allowed for petitioner's 

continued representation by appointed counsel but with the 

proviso that he utilize the $7,000 certificate of deposit to 

reimburse Glacier County, Montana, for the fees and costs 

incurred in his defense. The court then issued an order 

directing the Cut Bank First National Bank not to cash the 

$7,000 certificate of deposit and ordering petitioner not to 

assign, hypothecate, pledge or in any manner liquidate the 

certificate without further order of the court. 

On December 15, 1980, petitioner filed a motion to 

quash. The grounds for the motion were: (1) the order was 

made without any notice or opportunity to be heard; and (2) 

the $7,000 workers' compensation settlement is totally 

protected from any attachments, garnishments, assignments or 

debts. The District Court denied the motion, and the 

petition for relief was filed with this Court. Petitioner 

now seeks to vacate and annul the District Court's order 

seeking the $7000 certificate of deposit to be used to 

reimburse Glacier County for the costs of his appointed 

counsel. 

The main thrust of petitioner's argument is that 

workers' compensation funds are exempt from being held 

liable in any manner for the debts of the recipient. 

Section 39-71-743, MCA, is pertinent in this regard and 

provides as follows: 

"Assignment or attachment of payments. No 

payments under this chapter [the Workers' 

Compensation Act] shall be assignable, 

subject to attachment or garnishment, or be 

held liable in any way for debts." 

This section has yet to be interpreted by this Court. 
We now conclude, however, that the provided exemption is 

absolute, allowing a blanket protection against claims of 

every kind, including the one at issue. 

The underlying purpose and objective of workers' 

compensation legislation is to insure the injured worker 

that he will be compensated for disabilities caused by 

industrial accidents which, when added to his remaining 

earning ability, will enable him to function without being a 

burden to others. See Mahlum v. Broeder (1966), 147 Mont. 

386, 412 P.2d 572; 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen's 

Compensation, B 2.50 at 11 (1978). 

In accordance with this objective and to assure its 

maximum benefit for the injured worker, the Montana 

legislature has specifically provided that payment of a 

workers' compensation award shall be exempt from all forms 

of seizures. If this exemption is to now be liberally 

construed in favor of the worker, as mandated by section 

39-71-104, MCA, it must be given effect as written, and the 

exemption must be deemed complete. 

Respondent argues that the exemption does not extend 

to governmental entities seeking to recover public monies 

expended to support the injured worker. We acknowledge that 

this position has been upheld in other jurisdictions on the 

rationale that governmental entities should be granted the 

status of an "extraordinary" creditor so as to keep the 

injured worker from becoming a public charge. See State v. 

Coburn (Iowa 1980), 294 N.W.2d 57; McDougald v, Norton (D.C. 

Conn. 1973), 361 F.Supp. 1325. The cited cases, however, 

are not controlling, and we reject their application. We 

hold that the statutory exemption is total as to any and all 
creditors, including a county governmental entity seeking to 

recover funds expended for a defendant's appointed counsel. 

A writ of prohibition is hereby granted, and the 

District Court's order seizing the proceeds of the 

petitioner's workers' compensation award is vacated. 

We concur: 

Chief Justice 
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell, specially concurring : 

I concur in the result. 

In my view the order of the District Court directing the 

First National Bank not to cash the $7,000 certificate of deposit 

and ordering relator not to assign, hypothecate, pledge or 

liquidate the certificate must be vacated and set aside. Relator 

was denied procedural due process by entry of this order without 

notice and an opportunity to appear and contest the order. 

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Chief Justice