UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Airman Basic STEVEN M. CHAPMAN

United States Air Force,

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES,

Respondent

Misc. Dkt. No. 2014-16

__ M.J. __

18 February 2016

Sentence adjudged 15 July 2002 by GCM convened at Cannon Air Force 

Base, New Mexico. Military Judge: Patrick M. Rosenow.

Approved sentence: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for life with the 

possibility of parole, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to 

E-1.

Before

MITCHELL, DUBRISKE, and BROWN

Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

PUBLISHED DECISION

MITCHELL, Senior Judge:

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude we do not 

have jurisdiction for the writ of habeas corpus and deny the petition. Although we do 

have jurisdiction for a writ of error coram nobis, we determine Petitioner has not met the 

threshold requirements and deny the writ.

Background

Petitioner was convicted, contrary to his pleas, by a general court-martial

composed of officer members, of attempted premeditated murder, rape, sodomy, and 
2 Misc. Dkt. No. 2014-16

burglary, in violation of Articles 80, 120, 125, and 129, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 920, 

925, 929. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence of a dishonorable 

discharge, confinement for life with the possibility of parole, forfeiture of all pay and 

allowances, and reduction to E-1. On 14 July 2006, we affirmed the findings and 

sentence. United States v. Chapman, ACM 35564 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 14 July 2006)

(unpub. op). Our superior court affirmed our decision in a summary disposition. United 

States v. Chapman, 65 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (mem.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 952 

(2007). On 28 November 2007, a final court-martial order executed the dishonorable

discharge. Consequently, there is a final judgment as to the legality of the proceedings 

and all portions of the sentence have been ordered executed under Article 71(c)(1), 

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 871(c)(1), and the case is final under Article 76, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 

876.

Prior Writ Petitions to This Court

In 2012, Petitioner filed a writ petition for extraordinary relief seeking the 

appointment of appellate counsel to represent him in filing a writ of habeas corpus. We

do not have the authority under Article 70(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 870(c), to appoint 

appellate defense counsel; the authority to appoint appellate defense counsel was vested 

with The Judge Advocate General. We denied the petition without prejudice to refiling. 

United States v. Chapman, misc. dkt. No. 2012-03 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 28 September 

2012).

In 2013, Petitioner filed another writ with this court. The writ was in two parts: a 

writ of mandamus seeking this court to require The Judge Advocate General to appoint 

appellate defense counsel for the purpose of filing writ petitions and a writ of habeas 

corpus for failure of the military judge to sua sponte instruct on false confession and 

ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and appeal. We again denied the petition for 

the appointment of counsel without prejudice to Petitioner refiling with the assistance of 

his personally-procured counsel. United States v. Chapman, misc. dkt. No. 2013-31

(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 25 February 2014).

Petitioner has now filed a pro-se writ of habeas corpus for failure of the military 

judge to sua sponte instruct on false confession and ineffective assistance of counsel.

Writ of Habeas Corpus

The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), grants this court authority to issue 

extraordinary writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction. Loving v. United 

States, 62 M.J. 235, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citing Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534 

(1999)). However, the Act does not enlarge our jurisdiction, and the writ must be in aid 

of our existing statutory jurisdiction. Clinton, 526 U.S. at 534–35. “The courts of 

criminal appeals are courts of limited jurisdiction, defined entirely by statute.” 
3 Misc. Dkt. No. 2014-16

United States v. Arness, 74 M.J. 441, 442 (C.A.A.F. 2015). Therefore, the preliminary 

question is whether this court has jurisdiction to consider a writ petition from a petitioner 

whose court-martial conviction is final but is continuing to serve his term of confinement. 

We conclude we do not have jurisdiction and deny the writ.

In Loving, the petitioner had been sentenced to death but the sentence had not been 

approved by the President; our superior court determined that the military courts had

jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions when there is a final judgment as to the legality 

of the proceedings under Article 71(c)(1), UCMJ, but before the case is final under 

Article 76, UCMJ. Loving, 62 M.J. at 246. Implicit in this conclusion was that if the 

proceedings were final under Article 76, UCMJ, the military courts would not have 

jurisdiction. In the petition before us, direct review of Petitioner’s court-martial was 

completed when the Supreme Court denied the certiorari petition and was final shortly 

thereafter when the convening authority ordered the dishonorable discharge executed. 

Petitioner’s court-martial, therefore, has both a final judgment as to the legality of the 

proceedings under Article 71, UCMJ, and is final under Article 76, UCMJ.

We agree with our sister service court that military courts do not have jurisdiction 

over habeas corpus petitions when a court-martial has completed direct review under 

Article 71, UCMJ, and is final under Article 76, UCMJ. Gray v. Belcher, 70 M.J. 646, 

647 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2012); see also United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 920 

n.1 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court has never 

questioned that Article 76, UCMJ, limits the jurisdiction of military courts).*

We find additional support for this conclusion in the Supreme Court’s rationale 

when they concluded that military courts have jurisdiction over coram nobis petitions 

even after the proceedings are final under Article 76, UCMJ. Denedo, 556 U.S. at 916–

17. In doing so, they relied upon a coram nobis petition being an extension of the 

original proceeding. Denedo, at 912–13. Habeas corpus, conversely, is considered a 

separate civil case and record. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.4 

(1954). Consequently, a habeas corpus petition is not an extension of the direct appeal,

and the rationale in Denedo does not apply to extend jurisdiction beyond the finality of 

Article 76, UCMJ.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that the federal district courts have 

jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitioners who are imprisoned as a result of court-martial 

convictions. “The federal civil courts have jurisdiction over such applications. By 

statute, Congress has charged them with the exercise of that power.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 

U.S. 137, 139 (1953).

 

* The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals reached a different conclusion in Fisher v. Commander, 56 

M.J. 691 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001). However, that court relied on Dew v. United States, 48 M.J. 639 (Army Ct. 

Crim. App. 1998), which was repudiated in United States v. Arness, 74 M.J. 441, 443 (C.A.A.F. 2015). Because the 

underlying rationale has been rejected, we conclude Fisher is no longer persuasive authority on this issue. 
4 Misc. Dkt. No. 2014-16

Writ of Error Coram Nobis

Although framed by the pro-se Petitioner as a writ of habeas corpus, we also 

address whether we can consider the petition for a writ of error coram nobis. “The label 

placed on a petition for extraordinary relief is of little significance.” Nkosi v. Lowe, 38 

M.J. 552, 553 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993).

Appellate military courts have jurisdiction over “coram nobis petitions to consider 

allegations that an earlier judgment of conviction was flawed in a fundamental respect.” 

Denedo, 556 U.S. at 917. The writ of coram nobis is an extraordinary writ and an 

extraordinary remedy. Id. It should not be granted in the ordinary case; rather, it should 

be granted only in extraordinary cases under circumstances compelling such action to 

achieve justice. Id.; Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511; Correa-Negron v. United States, 473 F.2d 

684, 685 (5th Cir. 1973).

Although a petitioner may file a writ of coram nobis at any time, to be entitled to 

the writ he must meet the following threshold requirements:

(1) the alleged error is of the most fundamental character; (2) 

no remedy other than coram nobis is available to rectify the 

consequences of the error; (3) valid reasons exist for not 

seeking relief earlier; (4) the new information presented in the 

petition could not have been discovered through the exercise 

of reasonable diligence prior to the original judgment; (5) the 

writ does not seek to reevaluate previously considered 

evidence or legal issues; and (6) the sentence has been served, 

but the consequences of the erroneous conviction persist.

Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 126 (C.A.A.F. 2008), aff’d and remanded, 

556 U.S. 904 (2009).

This court uses a two-tier approach to evaluate claims raised via a writ of coram 

nobis. First, the petitioner must meet the aforementioned threshold requirements for a 

writ of coram nobis. Id. If the petitioner meets the threshold requirements, his claims are 

then evaluated under the standards applicable to his issues. Id. Evaluating Petitioner’s 

case under the coram nobis threshold requirements, we find that Petitioner has failed to 

satisfy several threshold requirements—the failure to meet any one alone warrants a 

denial of Petitioner’s writ.

First, a writ of coram nobis is not the only remedy available as Petitioner may seek 

relief through a writ of habeas corpus in an Article III court. See Denedo, 556 U.S. at 

911 (“[A]n extraordinary remedy may not issue when alternative remedies, such as 

habeas corpus, are available.”); see also Loving v. United States, 68 M.J. 1, 26–27 
5 Misc. Dkt. No. 2014-16

(C.A.A.F. 2009) (Ryan, J. dissenting) (“[A]n Article III court could properly consider a 

military prisoner’s habeas corpus petition and the All Writs Act does not allow this Court 

to act in the face of another, specific statute.”). Additionally, Petitioner has not served 

his sentence; he was sentenced to confinement for life with the possibility of parole and 

the sentence was affirmed. Chapman, unpub. op. at 1. His own pleadings identify that 

he is still confined. Furthermore, in regards to the claim of error in the military judge’s 

instructions, Petitioner has not set forth valid reasons why he did not seek relief earlier. 

On direct appeal, Petitioner asserted several errors and an additional 13 errors pursuant to 

his rights under United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). Chapman, 

unpub. op. at 2. Petitioner provides no explanation as to why the military judge’s failure 

to provide an instruction was not challenged during direct appeal.

Conclusion

This court does not have jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions when there is a 

final judgment as to the legality of the proceedings and all portions of the sentence have 

been ordered executed under Article 71(c)(1), UCMJ, and the case is final under Article 

76, UCMJ. Petitioner has also not carried his burden to demonstrate that his case 

presents extraordinary circumstances warranting issuance of the writ of error coram 

nobis. Accordingly, it is by the court on this 18th day of February 2016,

ORDERED:

That the petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus

and writ of error coram nobis is hereby DENIED.

FOR THE COURT

LEAH M. CALAHAN

Clerk of the Court