J-S09013-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

T.L. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2093 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 3, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003991-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2021

Appellant, T.L., appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on 

November 3, 2020. On this direct appeal, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel 

has filed both a petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and an accompanying 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We conclude that 

Appellant’s counsel has complied with the procedural requirements necessary 

to withdraw. Moreover, after independently reviewing the record, we conclude 

that the instant appeal is wholly frivolous. We, therefore, grant counsel’s 

petition for leave to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

The trial court ably summarized the facts underlying Appellant’s 

convictions:

At trial, the [Victim,] C.V., then [15] years old, testified that 

her father, Appellant in this case, sexually abused and 

assaulted her throughout her childhood. The abuse started 
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out by [Appellant] touching her private parts over her 

clothing, but then escalated to rape when she was in the 

[fifth] grade. She described being sexually assaulted 

“frequently” by Appellant, [] vaginally, orally[,] and anally. 

In addition to the sexual assaults, Appellant beat, punched[,] 

and whipped her with a belt if she tried to resist.

C.V. first disclosed the abuse to a sixth grade friend. She 

also told her stepmother, who also resided in the household 

with Appellant[;] however, her stepmother did nothing. 

Finally, when she was in eighth grade, C.V. told a friend 

because she thought she was pregnant. This friend informed 

her school counselor, and then C.V. disclosed to the 

counselor. . . .

Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/21, at 2-3 (citations omitted).

A jury found Appellant guilty of rape, involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse (“IDSI”) with a child, unlawful contact with a minor, endangering 

the welfare of children, incest, and IDSI with a person less than 16 years of 

age.1 On September 20, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve 

an aggregate term of 22 to 44 years in prison for his convictions. “The [trial] 

court also notified Appellant of his requirement to register and report for life 

as a ‘Tier III’ sex offender under ‘Megan’s Law.’” Commonwealth v. T.L., 

226 A.3d 640 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum) at 1, appeal 

denied, 237 A.3d 409 (Pa. 2020).

Appellant filed a notice of appeal and, on January 17, 2020, this Court 

issued a memorandum decision where we affirmed Appellant’s convictions, 

affirmed the judgment of sentence in part, and “vacated only that portion of 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(b), 6318(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), 4302(a), and 

3123(a)(7), respectively. 
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the judgment of sentence regarding Appellant’s sex offender registration and 

reporting requirements.” Id. As to Appellant’s sex offender registration and 

reporting requirements, we declared:

The [trial court’s] written sentencing order in this case 

includes sex offender conditions, lifetime registration, and 

compliance with “all Tier III Megan’s Law requirements.” This 

directive is inherently inconsistent, because Megan’s Law has 

no “tiers” but does require lifetime registration for Appellant’s

conviction for rape. On the other hand, [the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)] has a Tier III 

lifetime registration with additional requirements, which are 

not included in Megan’s Law. To the extent Appellant’s 

registration requirements implicate SORNA, recent case law 

has called into question the validity of applying SORNA 

registration requirements to offenses committed before the 

effective date of SORNA [(December 20, 2012)].

. . .

If [Appellant’s] offenses occurred before and after the 

effective date of SORNA, then [Appellant] “is entitled to the 

lower reporting requirements of Subchapter I, absent a 

specific finding of when the offenses related to the 

convictions actually occurred.” [Commonwealth v. Alston, 

212 A.3d 526, 530 (Pa. Super. 2019)].

Instantly, Appellant committed the offenses at issue between 

2008 and 2017, which time frame straddles the effective date 

of SORNA. When the jury convicted Appellant of [the 

offenses,] the jury did not find specific dates when Appellant 

committed the offenses. Without a specific finding from the 

chosen factfinder of when the offenses occurred, Appellant is 

subject to the less stringent reporting requirements of 

Subchapter I of SORNA.

Commonwealth v. T.L., 226 A.3d 640 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished 

memorandum) at 12-15 (emphasis and some citations omitted), appeal 

denied, 237 A.3d 409 (Pa. 2020).
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This Court, therefore, affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence in part 

and vacated “only that portion of the judgment of sentence regarding 

Appellant’s sex offender registration and reporting requirements.” Id. at 15. 

We then remanded the case to the trial court, with instructions for the trial 

court to “impose the Subchapter I registration and reporting requirements of 

SORNA and to instruct Appellant on those requirements.” Id.

After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for 

allowance of appeal, the case returned to the trial court. As the trial court 

explained:

Per the instruction included in [the] opinion and order by the 

Superior Court filed on January 17, 2020, a re-sentencing 

hearing was held on November 3, 2020. Appellant was 

provided with a written copy of the SORNA Subchapter I 

reporting requirements prior to the hearing. . . .

Whereas the only portion of [Appellant’s] sentence that was 

vacated [] was that concerning Appellant’s sex offender 

registration and reporting requirements, there were no other 

issues addressed at the hearing. Counsel informed the [trial] 

court that he had an opportunity to discuss the new SORNA 

requirements with Appellant and he was also able to speak 

to Appellant privately on video before [Appellant] was 

re-sentenced by the [trial] court. The registration and 

reporting requirements that had been previously imposed 

were vacated, and Appellant’s sentence was amended to 

reflect the imposition of the reporting requirements of 

Subchapter I of SORNA.

The [Commonwealth] read the colloquy to Appellant

explaining the SORNA requirements and thereafter Appellant 

stated that he had no questions regarding the requirements 

that were read to him. Thereafter, counsel advised Appellant 

of his appellate rights.

. . .
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At the conclusion of being advised of his appellate rights, 

Appellant instructed counsel to file a notice of appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/21, at 3-4 (citations, footnotes and some 

capitalization omitted).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant’s counsel 

filed a petition for leave to withdraw and counsel accompanied this petition 

with an Anders brief.

Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, this Court must first 

determine whether appointed counsel has fulfilled the necessary procedural 

requirements for withdrawing as counsel. Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 

A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa. Super. 1998).

To withdraw under Anders, court-appointed counsel must satisfy 

certain technical requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for 

leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of 

the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous.” 

Miller, 715 A.2d at 1207. Second, counsel must file an Anders brief, in which 

counsel:

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the 

record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; 

(3) set[s] forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and (4) state[s] counsel’s reasons for concluding 

that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the 

relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes 

on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
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Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the Anders brief to his or her 

client and advise the client “of [the client’s] right to retain new counsel, 

proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.” 

Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the 

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the 

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal 

is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5; see also 

Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en 

banc) (holding that the Anders procedure requires this Court to review “the 

entire record with consideration first of the issues raised by counsel. . . . 

[T]his review does not require this Court to act as counsel or otherwise 

advocate on behalf of a party. Rather, it requires us only to conduct a review 

of the record to ascertain if[,] on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that 

counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated. We need not analyze those 

issues of arguable merit; just identify them, deny the motion to withdraw, and 

order counsel to analyze them”). It is only when all of the procedural and 

substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be permitted to 

withdraw.

In the case at bar, counsel complied with all of the above procedural 

obligations. We must, therefore, review the entire record and analyze whether 

this appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. 
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A prior panel of this Court remanded the case for a limited purpose: for 

the trial court to “impose the Subchapter I registration and reporting 

requirements of SORNA and to instruct Appellant on those requirements.” 

Commonwealth v. T.L., 226 A.3d 640 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished 

memorandum) at 15 (emphasis and some citations omitted), appeal denied, 

237 A.3d 409 (Pa. 2020). Further, the trial court thoroughly complied with 

this Court’s directive on remand. In this appeal following resentencing, 

Appellant may only raise issues “related to the issue on remand.” 

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 789 A.2d 252, 253-254 (Pa. Super. 2001)

(“where a case is remanded to resolve a limited issue, only matters related to 

the issue on remand may be appealed”). 

Given the limited scope of review, Appellant’s counsel was unable to 

discover any non-frivolous appellate issues – and, after an independent review 

of the entire record, we agree with counsel, as we see nothing that might 

arguably support this appeal. Therefore, we conclude that the appeal is wholly 

frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant 

counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw.

Petition for leave to withdraw appearance granted. Judgment of 

sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/12/2021