UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

HOMER JONES, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

LUKE PETTIGREW, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 21-6106 

(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-00633-G) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

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Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

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In June 2018, Petitioner-Appellant Homer Jones, a state prisoner proceeding 

pro se,1

 petitioned for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal district court 

challenging his April 1984 Oklahoma state criminal convictions.2

 The district court 

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive 

value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 We construe a pro se appellant’s complaint liberally. Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 

F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). But we won’t serve as his 

advocate. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 

2

 Jones alleges that his convictions were entered in April 1984, but other courts 

have determined that he entered his guilty plea in February 1985. See Jones v. Bear, 

No. CIV-19-141-G, 2019 WL 3422101, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 17, 2019) (finding 

that Jones entered his guilty plea on the relevant counts in February 1985), report 

and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-19-141-G, 2019 WL 2715544 (W.D. Okla. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 20, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 21-6106 Document: 010110634627 Date Filed: 01/20/2022 Page: 1
2 

dismissed the petition as untimely because: (1) Jones filed the petition decades after 

the one-year limitations period for habeas claims had run, and (2) Jones wasn’t 

entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. The district court also denied Jones a 

certificate of appealability (“COA”). 

Jones seeks to appeal the dismissal of his petition. But to do so he needs a 

COA. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484–85 (2000). When, as here, a district 

court dismissed a petition on procedural grounds, a COA will issue only if the 

petitioner shows that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district 

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. at 478. 

Jones has not met his burden. In his briefing, he restates his largely 

unintelligible arguments made before the district court and baselessly asserts that he 

does not require a COA to appeal. He also fails to address the timeliness of his 

petition or point to legal errors warranting reversal. And upon review of the district 

court’s thorough and well-reasoned order, we conclude that reasonable jurists 

wouldn’t debate the correctness of the district court’s decision that Jones’s petition 

was untimely. Thus, having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(c)(1)(A), 

we deny Jones’s request for a COA and dismiss his appeal.

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

June 28, 2019). Whether the judgment was entered in 1984 or 1985 does not affect 

our ruling, so this discrepancy is unimportant. 

Appellate Case: 21-6106 Document: 010110634627 Date Filed: 01/20/2022 Page: 2