United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Argued December 11, 2018 

Decided January 2, 2019 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 18-1609 

JAN KOWALSKI MCDONALD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

COOK COUNTY OFFICERS 

ELECTORAL BOARD, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 1:18-cv-01277 

John J. Tharp, Jr., 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Jan Kowalski McDonald, an Illinois attorney proceeding pro se, appeals the 

district court’s denial of injunctive relief against the Cook County Officers Electoral 

Board to keep her name on the May 2018 Democratic primary ballot as a candidate for 

Cook County Clerk. We dismiss the appeal as moot. 

Ms. McDonald sought to run for Cook County Clerk this past spring. To be 

included on the Democratic primary ballot, Illinois law required that she submit a 

petition for nomination containing “at least the number of signatures equal to 0.5 

percent of the qualified electors of his or her party who cast votes at the last preceding 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-1609 Page 2 

general election in Cook County.” 10 ILCS 5/7-10(d)(1). Given the number of qualified 

voters in the 2016 election, Ms. McDonald had to obtain 8,236 signatures to be included 

on the ballot. 

Ms. McDonald submitted a petition with 22,057 signatures. The Cook County 

Clerk’s Office, which serves as the chief election authority for the county, examined 

Ms. McDonald’s petition (as it does for any petition) and found that only 8,684 of the 

signatures were valid. A private party later objected to the propriety of some of those 

remaining signatures, see 10 ILCS 5/10-8, and the hearing officer assigned to the case 

determined that many addresses had been altered. The Cook County Officers Electoral 

Board, which hears objections to candidacies and petitions, held a hearing and adopted 

the hearing officer’s recommendation. The Board invalidated more than 700 signatures, 

leaving Ms. McDonald 320 signatures shy of the 8,236 necessary to qualify for the 

primary. The Board voted unanimously to remove her name from the ballot. 

Ms. McDonald brought this action alleging that her exclusion from the primary 

ballot under 10 ILCS 5/7-10(d)(1) for failing to meet the 0.5 percent signature 

requirement violated the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, and the Voting Rights Act. She sought a temporary restraining 

order enjoining the Board from enforcing the 0.5 percent signature requirement that 

kept her off the ballot because it was inconsistent with another subsection of the statute, 

10 ILCS 5/7-10(a), which requires candidates for statewide office to obtain only 5,000 

signatures to secure a spot on the ballot (as opposed to the 8,236 signatures 

Ms. McDonald needed to collect for countywide office).1 Therefore, she asked the court 

to order that her name be kept on the primary ballot. 

 

1 Ms. McDonald principally relied on Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 

(1979). In that case, the Supreme Court determined that a provision of the Illinois election code that 

required independent candidates and new political parties to obtain more than 25,000 signatures to 

appear on the ballot for the Chicago mayoral election violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 186. Noting that this signature requirement was substantially higher than 

a similarly situated candidate or party for statewide office needed, the Court held the provision 

unconstitutional because the State Board of Elections had not advanced any compelling reason for 

imposing a higher minimum-signature requirement on citywide candidates than on statewide 

candidates. Id.; see also Gjersten v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for City of Chi., 791 F.2d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 1986) 

(determining that the state’s ten percent minimum-signature requirement for candidates seeking office of 

ward committeeman was unconstitutional because the State Board of Elections did not advance any 

compelling reason why a ward committeeman in Cook County had a higher signature requirement than 

a township committeeman outside of Cook County). 
No. 18-1609 Page 3 

The district court construed her motion as a request for a preliminary injunction 

and denied relief. The court determined that Ms. McDonald could not establish a 

reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of her claim (i.e., that the 0.5 percent 

signature requirement is unconstitutional). To succeed on the merits, according to the 

district court, Ms. McDonald had to demonstrate that the signature requirement 

severely burdened her constitutional rights. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 

(1992). A burden is severe when no “reasonably diligent candidate could be expected to 

be able to meet the requirements and gain a place on the ballot.” Stone v. Bd. of Election 

Comm’rs for City of Chi., 750 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bowe v. Bd. of Election 

Comm’rs of City of Chi., 614 F.2d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir. 1980)). The district court believed 

that Ms. McDonald undermined her argument that no reasonably diligent candidate 

could meet the requirement because she herself was close to obtaining the necessary 

number of signatures. The court also pointed out that at least eight candidates running 

for Cook County offices were able to obtain the requisite number of valid signatures. 

The district court finally explained that this circuit (as well as the Supreme Court) has 

upheld signature requirements more demanding than the one complained of here. 

Ms. McDonald appealed the district court’s order, and we directed the parties to 

file supplemental briefing on a jurisdictional question: whether the motion denied by 

the district court was for a temporary restraining order, the denial of which is not 

appealable. See Wheeler v. Talbot, 770 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 2014). We determined that 

Ms. McDonald’s appeal was from a denial of a preliminary injunction and allowed the 

appeal to proceed to briefing. Order, McDonald v. Cook Cnty. Officers Electoral Bd., No. 

18-1609 (7th Cir. Apr. 4, 2018). 

Ms. McDonald now argues that the signature requirement is severely 

burdensome, especially for a candidate such as herself who do not join a “slate.”2 The 

Board counters that Ms. McDonald’s claim is moot because the primary election is over. 

We agree with the Board; there is no longer a live case to adjudicate because a 

decision on the merits would not change the status quo. See Stone v. Bd. of Election 

Comm’rs for City of Chi., 643 F.3d 543, 544–45 (7th Cir. 2011); Gjertsen v. Bd. of Election 

Comm’r of City of Chi., 751 F.2d 199, 202 (7th Cir. 1984). Ms. McDonald sought to enjoin 

the Board to keep her name on the March 2018 primary ballot, but that primary 

occurred nine months ago. She also asks that we order that her name be printed on the 

 

2 In Illinois, a petition may contain the names of two or more candidates for offices within the State, 

county, or judicial district from the same established party. See Illinois State Board of Elections,

2018 Candidate’s Guide 51 (April 4, 2018).
No. 18-1609 Page 4 

November 2018 general election ballot, but that election has also passed. Her case is 

moot because the relief that she specifically sought in the district court in her motion for 

interlocutory relief—an order that she be included on the ballot—would not affect the 

results of an election that has already happened. 

In her reply brief, Ms. McDonald asserts that the passage of an election does not 

render an election-related challenge moot if the claim is capable of repetition yet evades 

review. This exception applies where: “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too 

short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable 

expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” 

F.E.C. v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 

523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). 

Ms. McDonald’s appeal does not satisfy the exception because her action does 

not evade review. Before us is an interlocutory appeal; Ms. McDonald’s underlying suit 

is still live in the district court.3 She may continue to litigate her suit seeking a 

declaratory judgment that the signature requirement is unconstitutional, as well as 

damages caused by the Board’s alleged violation of her civil rights. In those 

proceedings, she will be able to obtain review of the signature requirement before the 

next election for Cook County Clerk in 2022. See Stone, 643 F.3d at 545 (because the 

plaintiff was able to obtain review of the signature requirement before the next 

applicable election, the case did not fall within the “capable of repetition, yet evading 

review” exception). 

We therefore dismiss Ms. McDonald’s appeal of the district court’s denial of 

injunctive relief as moot. 

APPEAL DISMISSED 

 

3 Indeed, the parties proceeded to brief the Cook County Officers Election Board’s motion to dismiss 

filed after the primary election.