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. e du/thir dc ir c uit_2015/862PRECEDENTIAL

U NITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 14

- 3814

__________

MICHELLE PRECIA JONES,

Appellant

v.

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; ALFRED OUTLAW

__________
On Appeal from the United S tates Distri ct Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2

- 12

- cv

- 06582 ) District Judge: Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr.

__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 23, 2015

Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, Jr. and KRAUSE,

Circu it Judges

.

(Filed: August 12, 2015 )2 Olugbenga O. Abiona
1st Floor
1433 South 4th Street Philadelphia, PA 19147

Brian M. Rhodes
356 North State Road Springfield, PA 19064

Attorneys A

ppellant

Danielle Banks
Michelle K. Carson Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Y oung 2600 One Commerce Square
2005 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorneys Appellee s

__________

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge

. In this appeal

, we consider whether a suspension with

pay constitute s an “adve rse employment action” under the substantive discrimination provision of Title VII

. We hold
that it typically does not.

I
Michelle Jones was fired in 2011 by her employer, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). SEPTA says it dismi ssed Jones for submitting fraudulent timesheets; Jones says her termination was the3 culmination of years of unlawful sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation. The District Court entered judgment for SEPTA, Jones v. SEPTA , 2014 WL 3887747 ( E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2014), and Jones filed this appeal

. SEPTA is a public transit agency that serves Philadelphia and its environs. In 2001, Jones began working as an administrative assistant in SEPTA’s Revenue Operations D epartment under the supervision of Alfred
Outlaw

. On December 1, 2010, Outlaw suspended Jones with full pay after he discovered apparent fraud in her timesheet s

. Jones promptly informed SEPTA’s E qual E mployment
O pportunity (EEO) O ffice that she intended to file a complaint against Outlaw. At a meeting the following week,
Jones told the EEO O ffice that he had “sexually harassed” and “retaliated against” her

. App. 167.

In the meantime, Outlaw referred the timesheet matter to SEPTA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG)

. After an
extensive inves tigation

, OIG concluded in February 2011 that
Jones collected pay for days she hadn’t worked by submitting
fraudulent timesheets. SEPTA suspended Jones without pay on February 22 , 2011 and formally terminated her in April of that year.

Jones continued to press her grievances throughout this process. In March 2011, she filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission alleging that Outlaw had sexually harassed her and other female employees, ordered her to do personal work for him during
bu siness hours, and retaliated against her for resisting this mistreatment by accusing her of timesheet fraud. SEPTA therefore ended its internal investigation, but not before concluding that Outlaw had engaged in inappropriate behavior by once asking Jones to step on his back to relieve4 spinal pain. This “lapse in judgment” was noted in Outlaw’s
annual performance evaluation, and he was required to attend a training session regarding SEPTA’s sexual harassment policy . App. 1089

– 90.
Jones ultimately filed sui t against SEPTA and Outlaw
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Her amended complaint alleged gender
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Huma n Rights
Act (PHRA) . She also alleged a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution

, common law wrongful termination, and retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act. The District Court dismissed the wrongful te rmination claim and subsequently granted summary judgment to SEPTA an d Outlaw on the remaining
claims. Jones has appealed only the Court’s summary judgment on the Title VII, PH RA, and constitutional claims

. II

The District Court exercised jurisdiction un der 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 , and 1367 . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of a summary judgment is plenary. EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 778 F.3d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 2015).

III
The linchpin of the Dist rict Court’s opinion was its
hold ing that Jones’s claims fail principally because her initial suspension with pay was not an adverse action within the meaning of the employment discrimination laws. Jones , 2014 WL 3887747, at *3

– 4, 6, 9

. This is an issue of first impression in the Third Ci rcuit. Although we need not consider and do not decide whether a paid suspension5 constitutes an adverse action in the retaliation context, see infra Section IV

- B, we hold that such a suspension generally
does not constitute an adverse action in the substan tive
discrimination context.
Title VII forbids employers “ to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, beca use of such individual’ s race, color, religion, sex , or national origin .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 2(a)(1). Our analysis of claims arising
under this “ substantive provision ” is governed by the three

step framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411
U.S. 792 (1973): first we ask whether the plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; if she has, we ask whether the emp loyer has advanced a legitimate reason for its conduct; and finally we give the plaintiff an opportunity to prove that the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual. See Fuentes v. Perskie , 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).

A Title VII plaintiff must prove that she suffered an adverse employment action in order to satisfy step one of McDonnell Douglas

. See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003). We have described an adverse employment action “as an action by an employer that is serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Store

y v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs. , 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004) ( internal quotation marks omitted)

. The District Court held that Jones’s suspension with

pay did not constitute an adverse employment action under
Title VII. See Jones , 2014 WL 3887747, at * 4 . Although the
District Court noted that we have “ not addressed this issue,” it6 also noted that other courts of appeals have unanimously concluded that “placing an employee on paid administrative leave where there is no presumption of termination” is not a n adverse employment action under the substantive provision of
Title VII. Id. ; s ee Joseph v. Leavitt , 465 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] dministrative leave with pay during the pendency of an investigation does not, without more, constitute an adverse emp loyment action. ”); Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of
Corr. , 423 F.3d 886, 891

– 92 (8th Cir. 2005); Peltier v. United
States , 388 F.3d 984, 988 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Von Gunten v. Maryland , 243 F.3d 858, 869 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that “placing [an employee] on administrative leave with pay for a short time to allow investigation” is not an adverse action for retaliation purposes)

, abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548
U.S. 53, 60 (2006) ; Breaux v. City of Garland , 205 F. 3d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 2000) (placement on paid administrative leave is not an adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim)

. But cf. Dahlia v. Rodriguez , 735 F.3d 1060,
1078

– 79 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (placement on paid
administrati ve leave can be an adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim).

Like the District Court, w e think this chorus is on pitch. A paid suspension pending an investigation of an employee’s alleged wrongdoing does not fall under any of th e forms of adverse action mentioned by Title VII’s substantive provision. That statute prohibits discrimination in hiring, firing, and “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” § 2000e

- 2(a)(1). A paid suspension is neither a refusal t o hire n or a termination

, and by design it does not change compensation

. Nor does it effect a “serious and tangible” alteration of the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” Storey , 390 F.3d at 764, because “ the terms7 and conditions of employmen t ordinarily include the possibility that an employee will be subject to an employer ’ s disciplinary policies in appropriate circumstances ,” Joseph

, 465 F.3d at 91. We therefore agree with our sister courts that a suspension with pay, “without more,” is not an adverse employment action under the substantive provision of Title
VII. Id.
Applying this legal standard to the facts of this appeal, we readily agree with the District Court that Jones’s suspension with pay did not constitute an adverse employment ac tion. I n her brief, Jones summarily declares that her “indefinite suspension” that began on December 1, 2010 was an adverse employment action without providing any argument for why this is so. Jones Br. 44. Having failed to marshal evidence that her suspen sion with pay was atypical in any way, Jones’s argument fails for the same reasons stated by our sister courts in the cases we have cited. Accordingly,

we hold that Jones’s suspension with pay from December 1 to February 22 (when SEPTA suspended her withou t pay) was not an adverse employment action under the substantive provision of Title VII.

IV
The fact that Jones’s initial suspension with pay was not an adverse employment action evi scerates much of Jones’s appeal but doesn’t doom it entirely. Therefore, we turn to her specific claims under Title VII, the PHRA, and the
Constitution

. Her statutory claims turn on whether summary judgment for SEPTA was appropriate on the Title VII claims

. “[T]he PHRA is to be interpreted as identical to federal anti

discrimi nation laws except where there is something specifically different in its language requiring that it be treated differently,” Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. , 283 F.3d8 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002), and Jones identifies no relevant
distinction here. Furthermore , O utlaw was a defendant on the
PHRA counts of the complaint and not on the Title VII counts, and his liability as an “aide[r] and abett[or] ” under the
PHRA hinges on SEPTA’ s liability. App. 1119 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 62, 66); see Dici v. Pennsylvania , 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996). Our main inquiry, then, is whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to SEPTA on Jones’s claims of gender discrimination and retaliation under
Title VII.

A

1
To state a prima facie case of gender discrimination,
the District Court said, Jones was required to “ show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) the particular disciplinary measure was an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances of the disciplinary measure give rise to an inference of
discrimination. ” Jones , 2014 WL 3887747, at *3. We see no
error in this formulation. See Geraci v. Moody

- Tottrup, Int’l,
Inc. , 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996) (“ The elements of [the] prima facie case

. . . must not be applied woodenly, but must rather be tailored flexibly to fit the circumstances of each type of illegal discrimination. ”).

To the extent that Jones’s discrimination claim is
based upon her initial paid suspension , her claim fails for

want of an adverse em ployment action for the reasons stated
herein

. See supra Part III. To the extent that her claim is based upon her subsequent suspension without pay and termination, however, we agree with the District Court that
the chief defect of her claim lies in the fi nal ele ment of the prima facie case

— the requirement of “some causal nexus”9 between her gender and her adverse treatment by SEPTA

. Sarullo , 352 F.3d at 798. The record is devoid of evidence supporting an inference that Jones’s suspension without pay
and ter mination were products of discrimination instead of
the natural result of SEPTA’s investigation into the allegations of timesheet fraud.

Jones’s briefs are “ not a model of clarity,” SEPTA Br. 34, but her main contention on this point seems to be that a

re asonable jury could draw an inference of discrimination because SEPTA declined to punish male employee s who engaged in the same alleged misconduct as she. S ee Filar v. Bd. of Educ. , 526 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 2008) (“ All things being equal, if an employ er takes an action against one employee in a protected class but not another outside that class, one can infer discrimination. ”). Jones points to
evidence that at least one male SEPTA employee, John Solecki, was permitted by Outlaw to underreport his vacat ion time to compensate him for unpaid overtime work. But even if this practice was against SEPTA rules, it was materially different from Jones’s mis conduct because Solecki did not fraudulently claim pay for work he never performed. Because
of this distinct ion, the treatment of Solecki could not support an inference that Jones’s suspension without pay and
termination were motivated by discrimination rather than by SEPTA’s good

- faith conclusion that Jones submitted false
timesheets.

2
Jones also argues that she was the victim of a hostile
work environment. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson

, the Supreme Court held “that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on
sex has created a hostile or abusive work envi ronment.” 47710 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). The Court went on to hold that workplace sexual harassment can be actionable under such a theory

, so long as it is “sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Id. at 67.
In a pair of later cases, the Court elaborated on when

an e mployer can be held vicariously liable under Title VII for harassment of an employee by her supervisor. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742 (1998)

. Those decisions distinguished between “(1) harassment that ‘ culminates in a tangible employment action, ’ for which employers are strictly liable, and (2) harassment that takes place in the absence of a tangible employment action, to which employers may assert
an affirmative defense

. ” Pa. State Pol ice v. Suders , 542 U.S. 129, 143 (2004) (citations omitted). This defense, which has
come to be known as the Faragher

– Ellerth defense, applies when the employer “ exercised reasonable care to avoid
harassment and to e liminate it when it might occur” and the complaining employee “ failed to act with like reasonable care to take advantage of the employer ’ s safeguards and otherwise to prevent harm that could have been avoided .” Faragher

, 524 U.S. at 805.

Jones claims she has cited sufficient evidence of

severe or pervasive sexual harassment by Outlaw. T he
District Court said this was irrelevant even if true, Jones

, 2014 WL 3887747, at *5 & n.3, and we agree. Even if Jones had evidence of severe or pervasive sexual harassment,
SEPTA was entitled to the Faragher

– E llerth defense.
First, the defense is available to SEPTA because any sexual harassment of Jones by Outlaw did not “culminate[] in a tangible employment action.” Faragher , 524 U.S. at 808. The Supreme Court has defined a “tangible employment
action” as “a significant change in employment status, such as11 hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Ellerth , 524 U.S. at 761. Regardless of whether this t erm means precisely the same thing as “adverse employme nt action

, ” we think it clear that neither phrase applies to Jones’s initial paid suspension

, which is the only action that Jones can link to the alleged
harassment

. A s the District Court observed, SEP TA’s decisions to suspend Jones without pay and then terminate her were “based on the OIG investigation report, which itself relied on information independent from what was produced by Outlaw.” Jones , 2014 WL 3887747, at *6.

Second, SEPTA satisfies both p rongs of the Faragher

– Ellerth defense on the merits. As the District Court noted, SEPTA took several steps in response to Jones’s allegations of harassment: it conducted an investigation, made finding s , developed a “plan of action,” required Outlaw to atte nd a counseling session, and gave him a demerit on his evaluation.
Id. at *7. Jones claims that this is not enough, but her arguments are unconvincing. Although it appears Outlaw never received training on SEPTA’s sexual harassment policy until
after she c omplained

, Jones identifies no authority showing
that this precludes SEPTA from asserting the Faragher

– Ellerth defense. She also highlights Outlaw’s admission that he did not comply with SEPTA policy when he asked her to step on his back, but she doesn’t e xplain how this fact supports imposing vicarious liability on SEPTA. Jones further objects that Outlaw was given only a “slap on the wrist

, ” Jones Br. 26,
but a showing that discipline was imposed is not required to prove that an employer’s remedial action was adequate, see Knabe v. Boury Corp. , 114 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 1997). Indeed, a light punishment may have been suitable in view of SEPTA’s finding that Outlaw’s only proven misconduct was12 the spine

- stepping incident. Finally, Jones attacks SEPTA’s
har assment policy for encouraging employees to report harassment to their supervisors, suggesting that the policy failed because her supervisor was Outlaw. But t he policy states that a n employee is expected to “[r]eport any incident immediately to his/her sup ervisor or to SEPTA’s EEO[
Office ] ,” and any sensible employee would surely go the EEO

route instead of complaining only to the very person committing t

he harassment. App. 70 3 (emphasis added).
That brings us to the second Faragher

– Ellerth prong, which is even less favorable for Jones. Jones worked for Outlaw for about 10 years, and she asserts that she was subject to “pervasive” sexual harassment the entire time

. Reply Br. 10. Despite 10 years of alleged harassment, she admits that she never made a compla int until Outlaw accused her of timesheet fraud, despite the fact that she knew that the EEO Office fielded such comp laints

— in fact, she had previously worked in SEPTA’s Office of Civil Rights

, apparently the EEO Office’s predecessor

. App. 145

– 46, 872;

see SEPTA Br. 47

– 48. This demonstrates that Jones “failed to
act with .

. . reasonable care to take advantage of the employer’s safeguards and otherwise to prevent harm that
could have been avoided.” Faragher , 524 U.S. at 805. Even if
Jones could offer eviden ce of severe or pervasive sexual
harassment by Outlaw , therefore, her hostile work environment claim fails because no reasonable jury could
hold SEPTA liable for such harassment. Accordingly, w e will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment on Jones’s statutory claims of gender discrimination.

B
The other statutory claim at issue arises under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII

, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 3(a).13 “ A prima facie case of illegal retaliation requires a showing of (1) protected employee activi ty; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee ’ s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee ’ s protected activity and the employer ’ s ad verse action.” Allstate , 778 F.3d at 449 ( internal quo tation
marks omitted). Jones posit s that her suspension by Outlaw and her termination by SEPTA were retaliation against her informal complaints to Outlaw about his behavior and her formal complaint to the EEO Office. Outlaw’s suspension of Jones with pay w as not actionable retaliation, however,
because Jones has identified no evidence showing that her alleged informal complaints caused Outlaw to suspend her. Therefore, we must focus on whether a reasonable jury could conclude that SEPTA’s decisions to suspe nd Jones without pay and then terminate her were acts of retaliation.

Jones’s claim fails because there is no evidence that
her complaints of harassment caused SEPTA to discharge her, and her efforts to establish a causal connection go nowhere. First, Jon es claims that “she never falsified her timesheets” and suggests that this supports an inference that SEPTA’s actions were motivated by a desire for revenge rather than a bona fide belief that Jones had stolen wages. Jones Br. 51.
The District Court found no evidence supporting Jones’s denial of wrongdoing, however, and also rightly noted that showing that an employer incorrectly found an employee guilty of misconduct is insufficient to prove retaliation

anyway

. See Jones , 2014 WL 3887747, at *10

– 11 & n.7; see also Fuentes , 32 F.3d at 766

– 67.
Jones also makes much of numerous alleged defects in OIG’s investigation of her timesheet submissions, arguing that these imperfections are evidence of bad faith and14 “animosity” on SEPTA’s part. Jones Br. 47. She says, for example, that OIG interrogated her “by ambush” about the timesheet fraud; didn’t allow her to review the timesheets in question during that session ; didn’t investigate whether someone besides Jones tampered with her timesheets; and didn’t look into wh ether any timesheet discrepancies were resolved by “adjustment forms” filed by Jones. Id. at 47

– 48,
54. Each of t hese grievances is either unfounded or too petty

to serve as evidence of r etaliation, and the District Court did not err in treating them as su ch. See Jones , 2014 WL 3887747, at *12

– 13.

Jones also argues that a reasonable jury could find retaliation here on a “cat’s paw” theory of liability. In Staub v. Proctor Hospital

, the Supreme Court interpreted a federal statute prohibiting employment disc rimination against members of the military to make employers liable when an employee’s “supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and .

. . is a proximate cause
of the ultimate employment action.” 562 U.S. 411

, 422 (2011) (footnote omitted) . In McKenna v. City of Philadelphia

, we approved the extension of this theory of liability to the Title
VII context. 649 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2011) . Jones argues it applies here beca use, even if there is no direct evidence that SEPTA’s decision to terminate her was discriminatory, Outlaw’s accusation of timesheet fraud was driven by animus and contributed to Jones’s termination.
Even if Jones did produce evidence that Outlaw’s

accus ation was based on animus, her resort to the cat’ s paw theory would still be unavailing

. It may be true that Outlaw’s
conduct was a but

- for cause of Jones’s termination, as she may never have b een fired for timesheet fraud had Outlaw not15 reported the matte r to OIG. But proximate cause is required in cat’s paw cases, and that requires “ some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged” and excludes links that are “remote, purely contingent, or indirect.” Staub

, 562 U.S. at 41 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Staub Court declined to adopt a “hard

- and

- fast rule” that an employer’s intervening exercise of independent judgment ( e.g. , between the supervisor’s biased report of employee wrongdoing and the termin ation of the e mployee) precludes a finding of proximate cause. Id. at 420

. But the
Court did indicate that proximate cause will not exist when the employer does not rely on the “supervisor’s biased report”
in taking the ultimate adverse action. Id. at 421 (noting that i t “is necessary in any case of cat’s

- paw liability” that “the independent investigation rel[y] on facts provided by the biased supervisor”).

Here, Jones offers no evidence that Outlaw influenced the OIG investigation or SEPTA’s termination decision beyond getting the ball rolling with his in itial report of timesheet fraud. The only evidence Jones cites in support of her cat’s paw theory is that Outlaw conducted the initial investigation of Jones’s timesheets; OIG interviewed Outlaw
and informed him of Jone s’s harassment claims ; and Outlaw
communicated with OIG and the SEPTA official who
determined J ones committed timesheet fraud. As the District Court acknowledged, though, the record also shows that SEPTA decided to terminate Jones “based on an investigatio n independent from Outlaw” that relied on forensic handwriting analysis (to determine if the signatures on Jones’s timesheets were phony) and “email, computer, and building access records.” Jones , 2014 WL 3887747, at *12. This case is a far cry from McKenn a , where there was no evidence that the employer relied on anything besides the allegedly biased16 supervisor’s say

- so in deciding to terminate the employee.
See 649 F.3d at 179. Here, undisputed evidence excludes the possibility that SEPTA merely “adopted [ Outlaw’ s] biased
account of the events. ” I d. For those reasons, w e agree with the District Court that cat’s paw liability does not apply here.

In her only other attempt to conjure a causal connection between her complaints of sexual harassment and
her ter mination, Jones notes that we have previously held that “temporal proximity between the protected activity and the termination is sufficient to establish a causal link.” Woodson v. Scott Paper Co. , 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997). But
Jones ignores other cases holding that “the timing of the alleged retaliatory action must be ‘unusually suggestive’ of retaliatory motive before a causal link will be inferred.” Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co. , 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) ( quoting Robinson v. City of Pittsb urgh , 120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir. 1997) )

. We reject Jones’s suggestion th at a gap of nearly three months ( between Jones’s harassment complaint and SEPTA’s determination that she committed
time sheet fraud) raises a red flag, especially when SEPTA spent tho se three months on a thorough investigation into her alleged malfeasance

. Because a reasonable jury could not find a causal link between her allegations of harassment and any adverse employment action, we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment o n the retaliation claims.

C
Jones’s remaining claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allege violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
District Court held that Jones forfeited her constitutional claims by failing to mention them in her response to SEPTA and Outlaw’s motion for summary judgment. See Jones , 2014 WL 3887747, at *14. Although Jones’s respons e did mention17 those provisions ( if only fleetingly, see Supp. App. 324, 335 )

,
we will nevertheless affirm the Court’s judgment on the

con stitutional clai ms

. S ee Hughes v. Long , 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We may affirm a District Court’s judgment on grounds other than those considered by the District Court itself.”). First, Jones expressly waives her constitutional claims against SEPTA on appeal . Jones Br. 62 n.4. Second, in support of her constitutional claims against Outlaw, she makes no affirmative argument that is distinguishable from her statutory arguments and provides no
coherent reason why her evidence succeeds under § 1983
even if it fai ls under Title VII. In the absence of such argument, we will not disturb the District Court’s summary judgment for SEPTA and Outlaw. See United States v.
Dunkel , 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) ( per curiam) (“A skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more th an an assertion, does not preserve a claim. Especially not when the brief presents a passel of other arguments .

. . . Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” (citation omitted)).

* * *

For the reasons stated, we hold that Jones’ s suspension with pay did not constitute an adverse employment action
under the substantive provision of Title VII. And any adverse
actions Jones did suffer were not sufficiently linked to any alleged misconduct to support a claim of discrimination or

reta liation . Accordingly, the District Court did not err in entering summary judgment for SEPTA

, and we will affirm
that order.