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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 16-1816
J E SUS D E L GAD O-A R T E A GA , Petitioner,

v.

J E F F S E S S I ON S

, Att or ney General of the United Stat es, Responden t.

Peti tio n fo r Review o f an Order ofthe Bo ard o f Immi gratio n Appe als. No. A0 89 -2 81 -3 90

A RGU E D N OV E MB E R 29, 2016

— D E C I D E D M ARC H 23, 2017

A M E ND E D M A

Y 12, 2017 *

Before B AU E R

, F L AUM , and H AMI L TON

, Circ uit Judges

.

This amen d e d opi nio n repl aces and supersede s the opi nio n tha t was * i ssued by the pan el o n March 23 , 2 01 7, and repo rted at 852 F.3 d 6 35

.2 No. 16-1816
B AU E R , Cir cui t Judge. Ov er sev en y ears and three petiti ons later , these proceedings hav e come to a conclu si on. Petiti oner , Jesu s Delgado-Art eaga (“ Delg ado”), petiti ons for rev i ew of

an or der of the Board of Immi gr ation Appeals’ deci si on affi rming the i mmi gr ation judge’ s deni al of wi thholding of remov al, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (3), and relief under the Conv ention Agains t T

or ture, 8 C.F .R. § 1208.16(c)

. Delgado challen ges aspects of the e x pedi ted remov al process under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) and a corr espond ing reg ulati on, 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(g)(2)( i ). He a l so clai ms that the Board commi tte d

v arious legal err or s. For the following reasons, w e di smi ss the petiti on for rev i ew in part for lack of jurisdi cti on and deny the remain der o f hi s peti tion for rev i ew.

I. BACKGRO UND Delgado, a nati v e and ci tizen of Mex i co, enter ed the Uni ted St ates wi thout inspec tion three tim es, most r e ce ntly in May 1999. In December 2009, he w a s convic ted in Illinoi s state court of felony possess i on of cocaine wi th intent to de li v er in violati on of 720 Ill

. Comp. St at. § 570/401(c) (2). He w as sentenced to six months’ i mpri sonment wi th tw o y ears of probation. 1

In 20 10 , Del gado was sub jec t to remo v al pro ceed i ngs pursuant to 1 8 U.S .C. § 12 29 a, b ut those pro ceed i ngs were termi nat ed. He fi l ed a peti tio n wi t h t his Co urt, objecti ng to the termi nati on of the § 12 29 a pro ceed i ngs. Once DHS i niti ated pro ceed i ngs under § 12 28 (b), Del gado fi l ed a moti on fo r v ol unta ry di sm i ssa l of his fi rst peti tio n, which this Co urt granted. Delgad o v. Lynch , 14 -3 12 7 (7 th Ci r. Apri l 15 , 20 15 ). He fi l ed a seco nd peti tio n with this Co urt after he was i ssued the F i nal Admi nistrative Remova l Order, b ut b efo re he compl eted the reason abl e fear i nterview. The (co ntinued. ..)No. 16-1816 3
On Mar ch 3, 2015, the Department of Homeland S e cu r i ty ini tiated expedited remov al proceedin gs pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)

. See 8 C.F .R. § 238.1 (setting fort h pr ocedures). DHS
serv ed Delgado a Notice of Intent, chargin g that Delgado w as
remov able under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)( 2)(A)( i i i ) as an al ien convic ted of an agg r a v a t e d felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)( 43)(B)

. On Mar ch 16, 2015, DHS i ssu ed a Fin al Admini strat i v e Remov al Or de r (“F ARO”), finding Delgado deport able as charged and or dering that he be removed to Mex i co. Delgado expr essed a fear of ret urning to Mex i co to a DHS offi cer who then refer red hi m t o t he Chi cago Asylum Offi ce for a re asonable fear interv i ew
. On Mar ch 31, 2015, an asylum offi cer interv i ew ed Delgado wi th hi s atto rney present. On April 15, 2015, the asylum offi cer found that Delgado w as credible, but conclu ded that h e di d not establi sh a reasonable fear of persecuti on or tor ture in Mex i co. Delgado requested that an IJ re v ie w the asylum offi cer’s neg a t iv e deci si on. After a rev i ew , the IJ found that Delgado had establi shed a reasonable possi bi li ty tha t he w ould be p ersecuted or tor tured in Mex i co. Accordingly , on April 30, 2015, the IJ v acated the asylum offi cer’s deci si on, a nd placed Delgado in “wi thholding-only” proceedings. See 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(g)(2)( i ). The IJ permi tte d Delgado to fi le an appli cation for wi thholding of remov al a nd r e l i ef under the CA T , whi ch he fi led on June 16, 2015. See id

.

( ...c onti nued) 1 government fi l ed a moti on to di smiss the peti tio n, which we granted b ecause t he F A RO was not “f i nal” fo r purpo ses of our review. Delgad o v. Lynch , 1 5- 18 10 (7 th Ci r. A ug. 7, 20 15 ).4 No. 16-1816
On August 5, 2015, the IJ held a hearin g on the merits. Both Delg ado and hi s wi fe testifi ed in supp or t of hi s appli cat io ns
. He arg ued th a t he had not been convic ted of an aggr av ated felony and that he should have been allow ed to apply for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158. At the hearin g, the IJ conclu ded that i t w as not authorized to rev i ew DHS’s deter minati on that Delgado w as convic ted of an aggr a v a t ed felony

. The IJ ruled that Delgado w as not eli gib le for asylum on tw o g r o unds : he

w as not permi tte d to apply for i t in “ wit hh o lding-only” proceedings; and, he w as in remov al proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)

. Thus, the IJ consi dered only Delgado’s appli cati ons for wi thholding of remov al and relief under CA T. On S e p t e mber 23, 2015, the IJ deni ed both appli cati ons. First, the IJ found that Delgado’s testim ony and corr obor atin g evidenc e w as insu ffi ci ent to meet his burden of proo f under the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1)( B)(i i ). Alter nati v ely , the IJ conclu ded that ev en i f Delga do establi shed hi s burden
o f p r o o f, the IJ w ould hav e deni ed Delgado’s appli cati on for wi thholding of remov al becau se he had been co nv icted of a “particu larly seri ous cri me.” The IJ found that 720 Ill. Comp. St at. § 570/40 1 (c)(2) w as catego ric ally a “drug tr affi cking cri me,” and thus, an i lli cit t r a ffic kin g aggr av ated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)( 43)(B)

. Becaus e Delgado’s convic

tion w a s an aggr av ated felony , the IJ conclu ded i t w as presum ed to be a “particu larly seri ous cri me,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (3)( B)(i i ). The IJ noted that the Att or ney General has deter mined that drug tr affi cking aggr av ated feloni es “presumpti v ely consti

tute” particu la r ly seri ous cri mes absent “ext rao rdin ary and compelling ci rcums tances.” Y -L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (BIANo. 16-1816 5 2002); see Bosede v
. Mukasey, 512 F .3d 946, 949–51 (7th Ci r
. 2008). In or der to rebut thi s presumpti on, the a p p l i c ant mus t establi sh that his convic tion inv olv ed “(1) a v ery small quanti ty , (2) a
v ery modest payment, (3) only periph eral inv olv ement, (4) the absenc e of any violence or threat of violence, (5) the absenc e of any connecti on to or gani zed cri me or ter ro ris m, and (6) the absenc e of any adv erse or harmful effect on juv eni les.” Bosede, 512 F .3d at 9 5 1 (c it ing Y -L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 276–77). If the appli cant sati sfi es all si x cri ter i a, the appli cant mus t also show “other , more unus ual ci rcums tances ( e.g. , the p r o spective di strib uti on w as solely for soci al purposes, rat her than for profit).” Id. (quoting Y

-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 277). The IJ held that Delgad o’s convic tion w as a “particu larly seri ous cri me” becau se Delgado fai led to meet the factors as
r e quired under Mat ter of Y -L-

. Speci fi cally

, the IJ found that Delgado fai led to show th a t hi s convic tion di d not hav e an adv erse effect on juv eni les becau se Delgado li v ed wi th a niney ear -old chi ld. The I J also found that Delgado fai led to establi sh a periph eral ro le in hi s drug-tr affi cking convic tion. Lastly , ev en i f Del g a d o met hi s burden under Mat ter of Y -L-, the IJ conclu ded that i t w ould have d e nied the appli cati on becau se Delgado di d not show i t w as more li kely t ha n not that he

w ould face persecuti on in Mexico. Delgado appealed to the Board, and requested rev i ew by a three -memb er panel. He challen ged essenti ally ev ery aspect of the IJ’s deci si on. Addi tionally , he arg ued that the IJ incorre ctly declined to consi der an asylum appli cati on becau se 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(g)(2)( i ) i s ultra vires
.6 No. 16-1816
On Mar ch 14, 2016, a single-memb er Board adop t e d and affi rmed the I J’ s deci si on, and enter ed an or der di smi ssing Delgado’s appeal. The Board declined to consi der Delgado’s arg ument that 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(g)(2)( i ) i s ultra vires , reasonin g that i t lacked authority to make such a ruling. The Board conclu ded that th e I J proper ly found that Delgado’s aggr av ated felony convic tion presumpti v ely consti tuted a “particu

l arly seri ous crime.” The Board explic i tly agr eed wi th the IJ’s finding that Delgado fai led to establi sh that he had only periph eral inv ol vem ent in hi s drug-tr affi cking convic tion. In addi tion, the Board found that Delgado fai led to establi sh tw o other requirements under Mat ter of Y -L- : that hi s co nv icti on
w as not connected to any or gani zed cri me; and, that the drugs

w ere t o be di strib uted solely for soci al purposes. A motion to reconsi der w as denied. Thereafter , Delgado fi led thi s peti tion for r eview

. II. DISCUSSION Generally

, w e lack jurisdi cti on to rev i ew deni als of dis cretiona r y relief, inclu ding asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)( 2)(C); Aparicio-Brito v
. L

ynch , 824 F .3d 674, 68 6 (7t h Ci r
. 2016). “But, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)( 2)(D ), we ret ain jurisdi cti on to rev i ew consti tutional c lai ms an d questi ons of law rai sed in a peti tion for rev i ew

.” P e re z- Fue ntes v
. L

ynch , 842 F .3d 506, 510 (7th Ci r
. 2016) (ci tation omi tte d). Where, as here, the Board adopts and affi rms the IJ’s deci si on and prov i des i ts own analysi s, w e
rev i ew both deci si ons. Halim v
. Holder, 755 F .3d 506, 511 (7th Ci r . 2014). First, Delgado contends that DHS lacks legal aut ho rity to i ssu e re mov al or ders on behalf of the Att or ney GeneralNo. 16-1816 7 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) , and that § 1228(b) requires
remov al or ders be i ssu ed by IJs. Se co nd , he arg ues that he should hav e been permi tte d to apply for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 becau se t he r e gulation at 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(g)(2)( i ) i s ultra vires
. Lastly , he arg ues that the Board commi tte d v arious legal err or s and fai led to follow i ts procedures when adjudi cating hi s case, such as fai ling t o r efer the
case to a t hree-member panel, engaging in i mproper factfinding, and ov erlo oking hi s arguments on appeal. A. No Jurisdi cti on to Review Chall enges to th e Expedited R emov al Process Delgado challen ges DHS’s FARO dated Mar ch 16 , 2 0 1 5, arg uing that DHS lacked legal authority to or der Delgado’s
remov al under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) , and that the plain language of § 1228(b) requi res that finalor ders of remo v al be i ssu ed by IJs. W e need not address these clai ms becau se Delgado’ s challen ges to DHS’s remov al or der w ere render ed moot when the IJ or dered that he be removed pursuant to DHS’s FARO. Art i cle III li mi ts our rev i ew to “Cases” and “Contr ov ersi es,” and an “actual contro v ers y ” mu st exis t thro ugh all stages of

rev i ew
. Already , LLC v
. Nike, Inc. , 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013). “[I]f

an ev ent occurs
... that makes i t imp o ss ibl e for the court to gr ant ‘any effectual relief whatev er’ to a prev ai ling party , the appeal mus t be di smi ssed.” Chur ch of Sci entology of Cal. v
. United States , 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (ci tation omit t e d ). A case becomes moot “when the i ssu es presented are no longer ‘li v e’
or the parties lack a legally cogni zable intere st in the outcome.”8 No. 16-1816 Qureshi v
. Gonza les , 442 F .3d 9 8 5 , 988 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (ci tation omi tte d). Here, no l ive case or contro v ersy exis ts becau se w e cannot gr ant any effectual relief to Delgado. He asks t ha t w e
ov ert urn DHS’s FARO and remand for further proceedings before an IJ. But this hypot hetic al remand w ould consi st only of an IJ i ssu ing a remov al or der; any remaining challen ges are wit ho ut merit or hav e been w ai v ed. Assu ming that i t w ere possi ble to gr ant such relief, i t remain s tr ue that the IJ i ssu ed an
or de r that or dered Delgado be removed pursuant to DHS’s FARO. As a result, the case i s moot and w e lack jurisdi cti on to
rev i ew thi s ch allenge. Lastly , w e note that the jurisdi cti onal i ssu e here i s furt her hi ghli ghted when consi dering the T enth Ci rcui t’s deci sio n in Osun a-G utierrez v
. Johnson , 838 F .3d 1030, 1033–35 (10th C i r
. 2016). There, the petiti oner brought an i denti cal challen ge, but it fa iled o n t he merits. Despi te the same ar guments, t here are cri tic al factual di fferences. In Osun a-G uti errez, the petiti oner
w as not placed in wi thholding-only proceedings, and, according l y , the petiti oner petiti oned di rectly from DHS’s FARO wi thout any proceedings before an IJ. Id

. Unli ke the petiti oner in Osun a-G utierrez, an IJ or dered that Delgado be removed consi sten t an d p u rsu ant to DHS’s FARO. Thi s di fference shows how the i ssu e presented by Delgado i s no longer “li v e.” Whi le i t i s t empting to fall in line wi th the T enth Ci rcui t, this factual d i ffe re n c e p re c ludes us from reaching the merits. Becaus e there i s no case or contro v ersy , w e mus t di smi ss Delgado’s challen ge for lack o f juris di cti on.No. 16-1816 9
B. No Jurisdi cti on to Review Chall enge to 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(g)(2)( i) Next, Delgado contends that 8 C.F .R. § 12 0 8

. 3 1(g)(2)( i ) i s ultra vires becau se i t i mpermiss ibly precluded hi m from applying for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)( 1). He clai ms that § 1158 permit s a l l ali ens to apply for asylum reg ardless of whether the ali en i s subject t o admini strat i v e remov al under § 1228(b)

. In other w or ds, Delgado clai ms that he w a s “injure d” when the reg ulati o n deni ed hi m the oppor tuni ty to apply for asylum. W e la ck jurisdi cti on to rev i ew thi s challen ge becau se Delgado cannot meet the injury -in-fac t element required for st a nding. T

o establi sh an injury in fact, Delgado mus t sh o w that he “suffered an inv asi on of a legally prot ected intere st that i s concrete and particu larized and actual or i mmine nt, not conjectural or hypot hetic al.” S p ok e o, Inc. v
. Robins , 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) ( ci tation and quotation marks omi tte d). Delgado cannot clai m he suffered an “inv asi on of a legally prot ected intere st” when 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(g)(2)( i ) pr ecluded hi m from applying for asylum. Asylum i s a form of di screti onary relief in whi ch “there i s no liberty intere st at stake.” Delgado

v
. Holder, 674 F

. 3 d 7 5 9 , 765 (7th Ci r
. 2012); see Ali v
. Ashcroft, 3 9 5 F .3d 722, 732 (7th Ci r
. 2005) (notin g “deni al of such relief does not i mpli cate due process”). B e ca use Delgado fai ls to establi sh a n inj ury in fact, he lacks standing to challen ge § 1208.31(g)(2)( i ). Therefore , w e di smi ss thi s challen ge for lack of jur i sdi cti on.10 No. 16-1816
C. Chall enges to the Board’s Deci sion and Procedures
1. Three-Member Panel Delgado arg ues that the Board err ed by no t refer ring hi s
case to a three -memb er p a ne l

. A single member may take “adv antage of the streamlined procedures fo und in 8 C.F .R. §§ 1003.1(e)(4) , (e)(5 ) fo r ro utine cases that can be processed qui ckly .” Joseph v
. Holder, 579 F .3d 827, 832 (7th Ci r
. 2009). The reg ulati ons give a single member di screti on to refer an appeal to a three -memb er panel under si x di fferent ci rcums tances, but ref e r r al i s not required

. 8 C.F .R. § 1003.1(e)(6) (li sting ci rcumstances ); see W

ard v
. Holder, 632 F .3d 395, 398–99 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (notin g “di screti on
... i s l e ft to the panel member assi gned to the case”)

. In W

ard, w e w ere unabl e to find that the Board “violated the rev i ew pr ocedures set forth in § 1003.1(e) when

a single member render ed a deci si on on petiti oners’ appeal in hi s di screti on wi thout refer ring i t to a panel of three .” 632 F .3d at 399. Li ke the single member in W ard, the single member here had the di screti on to refer the appeal to a three -memb er panel, but di d not do so. Delgado fai ls to demonstrate that the Board violated the rev i ew procedure s a s se t fort h in 8 C.F .R. § 1003.1(e).
2. Improper Fact-Findin g Next, Delgado contends that the Board violated 8 C.F .R. § 1003

. 1 (d)(3)(iv) by engaging in i mproper fact-finding when i t affi rmed the IJ’s conclu si on that Delgado w as convic ted of a “particu larly seri ous cri me,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (3)( B)(i i ). “An arg ument that the Bo a r d has exceeded the scope of rev i ew permi ssi ble under [8 C.F .R. § 1003.1(d)( 3)(iv)] i s a legal one, for the purpose of § 1252(a)( 2)(D ).” Rosiles-Camarena v
. Holder, 735No. 16-1816 11
F

. 3d 534, 536 (7th Ci r
. 2013). The reg ulati on prov i des t ha t “[e]xcept for taking admini strat i v e notic e of commonly known facts ..., the Board wi ll not engage in factfinding in the course of deci ding appeals.” 8 C.F .R. § 1003.1(d)( 3)(iv); see Estrada

Mart inez v
. L

ynch , 809 F .3d 886, 894 (7th Ci r
. 2015) (“The Board

mus t not find facts in the fi rst instance

... .”); Lin v
. Holder, 630 F .3d 536, 545 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (“[T ]he Board i s not permi tte d to engage in fac t-finding on appeal.”). Delgado arg ues that the Board i mpermi ssi bly found that Delgado fai led to establi sh tw o addi tional requirements under Mat ter of Y

-L- : the absenc e of or gani zed cri me inv olv ement and “other , more unus ual ci rcums tances” ( i.e. , drugs w ere t o be di strib uted solely for soci al purposes). See Y -L-, 23 I. & N. Dec.
a t 276–77

. In response, the government does not di spute Delgado ’ s a rg ument, but clai ms that the Board’ s addi tional fact-finding w as harmlesserr or
. W e agr ee wit h Delgado that the Board exceeded the permi ssi ble scope of rev i ew when i t m ade the tw o findings at i ssu e in t he first instance. Nonet heless, Delgado fai ls t o show that he w as prej udi ced by the Board’ s i mpermi ssi ble factfinding. See Issaq v
. Holder, 617 F .3d 962, 967 (7th Ci r
. 2010); Perez-Fuentes , 842 F .3d at 512 (n oting that a petiti oner mus t show that the alleged err or “may hav e had the potent i al to change t he outcome of the hearin g” (ci tation omi tte d)). H ere, the Board adopted the IJ’s deci si on, and explic i tly agr eed wi th the IJ’s finding that Delgado di d not establi sh that he had only periph eral inv olv ement in the drug-tr affi cking c onvicti on. B y adopting the IJ’s decis i on, the Board also agr eed wi th the IJ’s finding that Delgado fai led to show that hi s convic tion di d not12 No. 16-1816
hav e an adv erse effect on a j uve nil e. Despi te the Board’ s i mpermi ssi

ble fact-finding, Delgado sti ll fai ls to sati sfy tw o factors un d e r Matter of Y -L-

. He di d not show how he w as prej udi ced.
3. Arguments to the Board Delgado ar g ues that the Board ov erlo oke d and fai led to consi der hi s arg ume nt s on appeal. “A clai m that the [Board] has c ompletely i gnor ed the evi dence put fort h by a petiti oner i s an allegation of legal err or .” Perez-Fuentes , 842 F .3d at 512 (q uo t ing Iglesias v
. Mukasey, 540 F .3d 528, 531 (7th Ci r
. 2008)). Thi s inclu des a clai m that the Board “fai led to exer ci se di scretion at all by comp l etely i gnor ing an arg ument.” Iglesias , 540 F .3d at 530–31. Al though the Board “does not hav e to wri te
an e x e g esi s on ev ery contention, i t mus t consi der the i ssu es rais ed, and announc e i ts deci si on in ter ms s uffi ci ent to enable

a rev i ewing court to percei v e that i t has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Id. at 531. “W e hav e frequently remanded
cases when the BIA’s or the IJ’s fai lure to di scu ss potent i ally meritorious arg uments or evidenc e calls into questi on whether i t adequately consi dered th[ose] arg uments.” Kebe v
. Gonza les , 473 F .3d 855, 857 (7th Ci r . 2007) (c ollectin g cases)

. Delgado li sts, as w e hav e done si mi larly here, sev eral arg uments that he clai ms w ere i gnor ed by t he Board: (1) hi s request for a th r e e-memb er panel in hi s appeal to the Board; (2) that the IJ fai led to proper ly dev elop the recor d; (3) that the IJ conduc ted an incorre ct “patter n or practic e” analysi s under 8 C.F .R. § 1208.16(b) (2)( i ); and, (4) hi s arg ument concerning an unpubli shed Board deci si on concerning Flor i da state law (the Board addr essed an d rej ected thislast argument).No. 16-1816 13 Delgado’s clai m, alone, that the Board “complet e ly i gnored” an arg ument, does not suffi ci ently “enable a rev i ewing court” to de t e rmine whether that arg ument i s “potent i ally meritorious .” “ [I ]t i s not the w or k of thi s Court to formulate arg uments fo r the parties.” Kurzawa v
. Jorda n , 146 F .3d 435, 447–48 (7th Ci r
. 1 9 9 8 ), no r wi ll w e atte mpt to do so here. “[F]ai lure to adequately dev elop and supp or t these arg uments results in w ai v er .” Lin , 630 F .3d at 543. Delgado’s challenge i s perfunctory ; he si mply li sts th ese arg uments one-by-one, wi thout any explanation. Therefor e, w e wi ll consi der these arg uments wai v ed. III. CONCLUSION For the foreg oin g reasons, w e DISMI SS Delgado’s petiti on for rev i ew in part fo r l ack of jurisdi cti on and DENY the remain der o f hi s peti tion for rev i ew
.