Analysis Report on

Fire fighter Fatalities

Prepared by

Fire Analysis and Research Division

National Fire Protection Association

#l Batterymarch Park

Quincy, MA 02269

Prepared for

Federal Emergency Management Agency

U.S. Fire Administration

Contract No. EMW-88-C-2868

August 1989

Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this

publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency.
This document was scanned from hard copy to portable document format (PDF)

and edited to 99.5% accuracy. Some formatting errors not detected during the

optical character recognition process may appear.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study was funded by the U.S. Fire Administration of the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It would not have been possible without

the cooperation and assistance of the U.S. fire service, the United States

Fire Administration, the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program of the

Department of Justice, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, the Bureau of

Land Management of the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Indian

Affairs, the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. military, all of whom

contributed data to this study.

The assistance of other NFPA staff members is also acknowledged: A.

Elwood Willey, Assistant Vice President, Research and Fire Information

Services; Dr. John Hall, Director, Fire Analysis and Research Division;

Martin Henry, Director, Public Fire Protection Division; Kenneth Tremblay,

Alison Norton, John Barry, Michael Karter, and Kenneth Taylor, Fire Analysis

and Research Division; and William Baden and Carl Peterson, Public Fire

Protection Division.

The authors also wish to acknowledge the assistance of USFA staff,

particularly John Ottoson, Project Officer, for their suggestions and support.

Special thanks go to Nancy Schwartz for typing the several drafts of this

report.

Rita F. Fahy

Arthur E. Washburn

Paul R. LeBlanc

Project Staff
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I .

1

2

3

4

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

Table of Contents ..................

List of Figures ...................

List of Tables ...................

Background .....................

Introduction ....................

A. Who Is a Fire Fighter? ..............

B. What Constitutes an On-Duty Fatality? ......

C. Sources of Initial Notification .........

D. Procedure for Including a Fatality in the Study .

E. Additional Data Collection Completed

for the Contract. ...............

1988 Findings ....................

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

Type of Duty ....................

Cause and Nature of Fatal Injury or Illness ...

Ages of Fire Fighters ..............

Fire Ground Deaths. ...............

TimeofDay ...................

Month of the Year ................

State and Region. ................

Analysis of Urban/Rural/Suburban Patterns

in Fire Fighter Fatalities. ..........

Fire Fighter Deaths in Structural

Collapses 1979-1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fire Fighter Deaths While Responding

to Alarms 1979-1988. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fire Fighters Struck by Vehicles 1979-1988. . . . . .

Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . .

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

-iPage

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iv

V

1

5

6

6

9

13

16

18

20

21

26

29

37

46

50

52
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Title Page

Line of Duty Fire Fighter Deaths

1979-1988 7

Fire Fighter Deaths 1988 by

Type of Duty 8

Fire Fighter Deaths 1988 by

Cause of Injury 11

Fire Fighter Deaths 1988 by

Nature of Injury 12

Fire Fighter Deaths 1988 by Age

and Cause of Death 14

Average Death Rates per 10,000

Fire Fighters 1984-1988 15

Fire Ground Deaths in 1988

by Fixed Property Use 17

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1988 by

Time of Day 19

Fire Fighter Fatalities by Time

of Day 1979-1988 21

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1988 by

Month of Year 22

Fire Fighter Fatalities by

Month of Year 1979-1988 23

Fire Fighter Fatalities in Structural

Collapses 1979-1988

30

Fire Fighters Caught or Trapped in

Structural Collapses by

Fixed Property Use 1979-1988

32

Fire Fighters Struck by Objects in

Structural Collapses by Fixed

Property Use 1979-1988

33

Fatalities in Structural Collapses

by Year 1979-1988

35

Fatalities in Structural Collapses

by Region 1979-1988

36

-ii-
BACKGROUND

For more than a decade, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

has developed the most complete records on U.S. fire fighter fatalities - both

in breadth of coverage and depth of detail - of any organization. This data

base has been used to support the fire fighter fatality studies produced each

year by NFPA since 1974.

Over the past eight years, NFPA also has worked with FEMA's U.S. Fire

Administration (USFA) to provide, in a timely manner, lists of fire fighter

fatalities and their next of kin to support the National Fire Academy's annual

Fire Fighter Memorial Service, analyses of each year's fire fighter fatalities

and briefings on the latest experience. Under the present contract, NFPA has

provided the USFA with lists, both hand lettered and typed, of 1988 fire

fighter fatalities and with a list of names and addresses of next of kin and

of fire department chiefs for use in the Memorial Service in October 1989.

In August, a briefing on the 1988 experience and three special analyses

was presented by NFPA staff to USFA staff in Emmitsburg, MD. Through the

briefing and analysis, this contract continued the trend toward more extensive

analysis of patterns and trends in specific parts of the fire fighter fatality

problem. With over a decade of experience now classified in a computer data

base, NFPA is able to provide increasingly detailed and focused examinations

of the specific parts of the problem addressable by particular strategies.

The deliverables under this contract are (a) this analysis report, (b) the

incident and casualty data on diskette in NFIRS Version 4.0 format, which is

being delivered separately, (c) the various lists described above, and (d) the

briefing provided in August.
I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to analyze the circumstances surrounding fire

fighter fatalities in the United States in 1988 in an attempt to identify

potential means for reducing the number of deaths that occur each year. In

addition to the 1988 findings, this study will also include special analyses

of particular recurring scenarios, using NFPA's data base of fire fighter

fatalities from 1979 through 1988.

A. Who Is a Fire Fiqhter?

For the purpose of this study, the term "fire fighter" covers all members

of organized fire departments, whether career, volunteer or mixed; full-time

public service officers acting as fire fighters; state and federal government

fire service personnel: temporary fire suppression personnel operating under

official auspices of one of the above; and privately employed fire fighters

including trained members of industrial or institutional fire brigades,

whether full- or part-time.

Under this definition, the study includes not just municipal fire

fighters, but also seasonal and full-time employees of the U.S. Forest Service

and state forestry agencies; prison inmates serving on state forest service

crews; fire fighters for the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Indian

Affairs, the Bureau of Fish and Wildlife, the National Park Service, and the

U.S. Department of Energy; military personnel performing assigned fire

suppression activities; civilian fire fighters working at military

installations; and members of industrial fire brigades.

-l-
B. What Constitutes an On-Duty Fatality?

The term "on-duty" refers to being at the scene of an alarm, whether a

fire or non-fire incident; being en route while responding to or returning

from an alarm; performing other assigned duties such as training, maintenance,

public education, inspection, investigations, court testimony and fund

raising; performing non-fire duties on official assignment; and being on call,

under orders or on stand-by duty other than at home or at the individual's

place of business.

On-duty fatalities include any injury sustained while on duty that proves

fatal, any illness that was incurred as a result of actions while on duty that

proves fatal, and fatal mishaps involving occupational hazards that occur

while on duty. The types of injuries included in the first category are

mainly those that occur on the fire ground, in training, or in accidents while

responding to or returning from alarms. The most common examples of fatal

illnesses incurred on duty are fatal heart attacks.Another example is a fire

fighter who contracted hepatitis when a victim being transported by ambulance

pulled out his intravenous needle and stuck the fire fighter. A few examples

of fatal occupational mishaps include fire fighters who died of asphyxiation

while working on fire apparatus in closed garages, a fire fighter who fell

through a slide pole hole, a fire fighter electrocuted while raising a banner

for a town event, a volunteer fire fighter who was fatally injured when he

fell down a flight of stairs in his home while responding to an alarm, and a

fire inspector who fell through a skylight.

-2-
Also included in the study are fire fighters who were murdered while on

duty. These include fire fighters shot by snipers while on the fire ground,

fire fighters shot in the station by off-duty or former fire fighters, and one

who was kidnapped and shot after responding to a verbal request for assistance.

Fatal injuries and illnesses are included even in cases where death is

considerably delayed. When the onset of the condition and death occur in

different years, the incident is counted on the basis of the former. For

example, a Michigan fire fighter died in 1986 of a brain injury received in

1979 when he was struck by a hose coupling, resulting in recurring seizures.

Because his death was the direct result of his injury, and the injury occurred

in 1979, he is counted as a 1979 fatality.

The NFPA recognizes that these definitions should include chronic

illnesses (such as cancer) that prove fatal and that arise from occupational

factors. In practice, there is as yet no mechanism for identifying fatalities

that are due to illnesses that develop over long periods of time and that

thereby present an ambiguous picture on the issue of occupational versus other

factors as causes.This is recognized as a gap that cannot now be filled

because of the limitations of the state of the art in tracking and analysis.

C. Sources of Initial Notification

As an integral part of its ongoing program to collect and analyze fire

data, NFPA solicits information on fire fighter fatalities from the U.S. fire

service and a wide range of other sources. These include the U.S. Fire

Administration and the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program (PSOB). Both

are organizations with whom NFPA has maintained long-standing cooperative

efforts in collecting and analyzing fire fighter fatality data. Other

contacts include federal agencies such as the U.S. Forest Service of the

-3-
Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Bureau of Land

Management of the Department of Interior, the U.S. military, the Department of

Energy, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In

recent years, significant assistance has been received from the National

Wildfire Coordinating Group, an organization made up of representatives of

state and federal forestry agencies.

We also receive notification from fire service organizations such as the

International Association of Fire Fighters, state fire associations, state

training organizations, state and local fire marshals, and fire service

publications. A network developed over the years of individuals interested in

the area of fire fighter fatalities also assists in identifying incidents,

especially those that occur outside of large urban areas or that involve

non-fire-incident-related fatalities. Among these individuals are fire

fighters, photographers, fire buffs, and members of the insurance industry.

Notification of fatal incidents also comes from NFPA members and staff and

through the use of a newspaper clipping service that reads all daily and

weekly newspapers in the country.

D. Procedure for Including a Fatality in the Study

After initial notification of a fatal incident is received, contact with

the local fire department is made by telephone to verify the incident, its

location and the fire department involved. Data collection forms for the

fatality and the fire, if it was a fire incident, are sent to the responsible

local official identified during the telephone follow-up. After the forms are

returned to NFPA, a final decision is made to include or exclude the fatality,,

based on the inclusion criteria described previously. In order to make a

-4-
final determ ination, additional information is sometimes sought, either by

contacting the fire department directly to clarify some of the details or by

obtaining data elsewhere, such as medical documentation frequently available

from PSOB.

Some of the material that might be received to document an incident

includes casualty forms, both NFPA fire fighter fatality study reporting forms

and NFIRS-type forms; NFPA's Fire Incident Data Organization major-fire report

form or the department‘s own incident reporting form, if a fire incident was

involved in the fatality; medical data such as death certificates or autopsy

reports:special investigation reports from other agencies; police and motor

vehicle accident reports, if applicable; photographs and diagrams; and

additional newspaper accounts. Incidents to be included in the study are then

coded into NFPA's Fire Incident Data Organization (FIDO), which includes both

incident and casualty information. By mutual agreement of the USFA and NFPA

‘project staff, the same inclusion criteria were used for the USFA study as are

used in the NFPA study.

Work described to this point was done as part of NFPA's ongoing program of

data collection and analysis in the area of fire fighter fatalities and was

completed at no cost to FEMA.

E. Additional Data Collection Completed for the Contract

To meet FEMA's request for a list of the next-of-kin of the 1988

fatalities and the names and addresses of the fire chiefs, a follow-up mailing

was sent to all departments asking them to verify the victims' names and dates

of fatal injury, the names and addresses of the departments and chiefs, and

the names and relationships of the next of kin. Telephone calls were made to

non-responding fire departments to obtain the information.

-5-
II. 1988 FINDINGS

One hundred thirty-two fire fighters died in the line of duty in 1988. As

shown in Figure 1, this is a slight increase of 1.5 percent from the year

before.The totals for 1987 and 1988 are the highest since 1981.* Although

it is too soon to suggest an established upward trend, these findings do

underline the urgent need for strong, effective action to reduce the death

toll. This study will report some of the most frequently occurring scenarios

and will present some conclusions and recommendations to address the problem.

A. Type of Duty

The distribution of deaths by type of duty being performed is shown in

Figure 2.The largest proportion of deaths occurred during fire ground

operations. Eleven of the 63 fire ground deaths occurred in two incidents.

One involved the collapse of a truss roof that killed five fire fighters in

Hackensack, New Jersey. The other incident occurred at a construction site in

Kansas City, Missouri, and involved the explosion of a trailer filled with

ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) blasting agent. That incident resulted

in six deaths.

Of the 63 fire ground deaths, 24 were due to heart attacks, 12 to internal

trauma, 11 to asphyxiation, 10 to crushing injuries, and one each to burns,

fractures, electrocution, stroke (CVA), aneurysm and heat stroke. Twenty-five

of the victims were career fire fighters and 38 were volunteers.

* The totals for some earlier years have been adjusted to reflect new

information received since the earlier studies.

-6-
Figure 1

Line of Duty Fire Fighter Deaths

1979 - 1988
Figure 2

Fire Fighter Deaths 1988

by Type of Duty
The second largest category involved responding to and returning from

alarms, which accounted for over a quarter of the deaths -- a result

consistent with the findings in previous years. Fifteen of these 38 deaths

were due to heart attacks, one to gunshot wounds, and the remaining 22 to

collisions.

There were 11 deaths while working at non-fire incidents. These included

three fire fighters who suffered heart attacks while working at motor vehicle

accidents, three fire fighters struck by passing vehicles while working at

motor vehicle accidents, two electrocuted while removing cats from power

poles, one due to traumatic injuries when a malfunctioning steam boiler

exploded, one due to asphyxiation while attempting to rescue a trapped worker

from a ship's tank and one struck by a falling tree limb while investigating

an arcing power line.

The number of deaths related to training activities dropped to nine in

1988 from 15 in 1987. This reflects, in part, a rare, multiple-fatality

training accident that occurred in 1987. In 1988, one death occurred during a

live fire training exercise.

The remaining 11 deaths occurred while performing other duties -- 10

deaths during normal station and administrative duties and one while piloting

an aircraft transporting wildland fire personnel.

B. Cause and Nature of Fatal Injury or Illness

As used in this study, the term "cause" refers to the action, lack of

action, or circumstances that directly resulted in the fatal injury while the

term "nature" refers to the medical nature of the fatal injury or illness or

what is often referred to as the cause of death. Often, the fatal injury is

-9-
the result of a chain of events, the first of which is recorded as the cause.

For example, if a fire fighter is struck by a collapsing wall, becomes trapped

by the debris, runs out of air before being rescued and dies of asphyxiation,

the cause of fatal injury recorded is "struck by collapsing wall" and the

nature of fatal injury is "asphyxiation."

Figure 3 shows the distribution of deaths by cause of fatal injury or

illness. As found in most previous years, the largest proportion of deaths

were due to stress. Five of these 54 deaths were specifically attributed to

strenuous physical activities. The second major category was struck by or

contact with objects. These 50 deaths included 32 motor vehicle accidents,

five fire fighters struck by collapsing walls, four struck by falling tree

limbs or snags, three by electrocution, two struck by hoses, one who came in

contact with fumes, one felled by exposure to extreme weather, one due to

complications after dislocating his knee while working around equipment at the

station and one fatally shot after being kidnapped when he responded to a

verbal request for assistance.

Twenty-four fire fighters were caught or trapped -- seven by explosions,

five in a roof collapse, four by interior collapse, three by being lost inside

a building, two by fire progress, two by flashover, and one underwater, where

he drowned.Three fire fighters died as a result of falls -- two from fire

apparatus and one from a ladder. One fire fighter died as a result of

exposure to smoke.

Fire fighter deaths over the past ten years that occurred as a result of

structural collapse are discussed in more detail in a separate section of the

report.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of deaths by the medical nature of the

fatal injury or illness. The largest proportion of deaths were due to heart

attacks. Of these 53 deaths, medical documentation indicated that 11 of the

-10-
Figure 3

Fire Fighter Deaths 1988

by Cause of Injury
Figure 4

Fire Fighter Deaths 1988

by Nature of Injury
victims had prior heart problems, either previous heart attacks or bypass

surgery, and two others had severe arteriosclerotic heart disease (defined for

this study as arterial occlusion of at least 50 percent). Four other victims

suffered from hypertension and four were diabetics. Medical documentation was

not available for the other 32 heart attack victims.

The other categories of nature of fatal injury were internal trauma (40

deaths), crushing (15 deaths), asphyxiation (13 deaths), electrocution (3

deaths>, stroke (2 deaths), aneurysm (2 deaths), and one each due to burns,

drowning, gunshot wounds and heat stroke.

C. Ages of Fire Fighters

The ages of fire fighters who died in 1988 ranged from 18 to 81 years with

a median age of 46 years.

The distribution of fire fighter deaths by age and cause of death is

displayed in Figure 5. Almost two-thirds of the fire fighters over age 40 who

died were killed by heart attacks. The youngest heart attack victim was 38

years old.

Figure 6 shows the death rates by age categories using estimates of the

number of fire fighters in each age group from NFPA's 1986 profile of fire

departments and the fatality data from 1984 through 1988'. As the graph

shows, the death rate is lowest for fire fighters aged 20 to 39, slightly

above the average rate for those aged 40 to 49, and much higher than average

for fire fighters aged 50 and over. This is a reflection of the fact that

although fewer than 15 percent of all fire fighters are over age 50, that age

group accounted for over a third of the deaths from 1984 through 1988.

-13-
Figure 5 

Fire Fighter Deaths 1988

by Age and Cause of Death
Figure 6

Average Death Rates per 10,000 Fire Fighters

1984 - 1988

Age Groups

Note: These figures combine career and volunteer fire

fighters. The two groups may have very different age

distributions, which are not reflected here.
D. Fire Ground Deaths

The distribution of the 63 fireground deaths by fixed property use is

shown in Figure 7. As has been the case every year except 1987, the largest

proportion of fire ground deaths occurred in residential properties - 20

deaths in 1988, including 16 deaths in one- and two-family dwellings and four

in apartment buildings.

Thirteen deaths occurred in wildland fires, an improvement over the 1987

experience when there where 17 fatalities at wildland fires. Four fire

fighters died of heart attacks -- one due to smoke exposure, the other three

due to stress. Another fire fighter had a stroke, while another died of heat

stroke. In separate incidents, three fire fighters were killed when they were

struck by falling tree sections. One fire fighter was electrocuted when he

came in contact with a downed power line that had started a small grass fire.

The pilot of a spotter plane guiding air tankers over a forest fire was killed

when his plane crashed. A fire fighter standing on the side of a moving

tanker was killed when the vehicle overturned in a ditch and he was pinned

underneath. Another fire fighter was crushed when a parked brush fire unit

began to roll on a hillside and then overturned as she was starting the pump

on the back of the vehicle.

There were ten deaths each in mercantile and storage properties. These

incidents include five deaths that occurred when the wood truss roof of an

automobile dealership collapsed, and six deaths that occurred at a

construction site when a trailer storing 45,000 pounds of ANFO blasting agent

exploded. (For full descriptions of these incidents, see "The Hackensack

Fatalities" in the October 1988 issue of Fire Command and "The Kansas City

Tragedy" in the April and May 1989 issues of Fire Command'.)

-16-
Figure 7

Fire Ground Deaths in 1988

by Fixed Property Use
Three fire fighters were killed i n fires in manufacturing properties and

one each at a church fire and in a fire at a ballroom. In separate incidents,

two fire fighters were killed when walls collapsed on them at fires involving

buildings under demolition. One fire was of incendiary origin. In two other

incidents, fire fighters suffered fatal heart attacks at the scene of fires in

vacant buildings. And one fire fighter died of a heart attack at the scene of

a vehicle fire.

In all, 18 fire fighters died at the scene of incendiary or suspicious

fires. Ten of these deaths were at structure fires, two were at wildland

fires and the remaining six occurred at the incident involving trailers

storing ANFO at a contruction site. (Six other fire fighters were killed en

route to incendiary or suspicious fires.)

To put the hazards of fire fighting in various types of occupancies into

perspective,the number of deaths per 100,000 structure fires was examined by

fixed property use. The rates were calculated using the estimates of fire

experience from NFPA's 1988 fire loss study3. There were 3.6 fire fighter

deaths per 100,000 residential structure fires, compared to 11.9 deaths per

100,000 nonresidential structure fires. Although almost three times as many

fires occurred in residential structures, the size, comp lexity and special

hazards often associated with nonresidential structures result in a much

greater risk at such fires.

E. Time of Day

The distribution of 1988 fire ground deaths and total deaths by time of

alarm is shown in Figure 8. The two peaks are the time periods where the

large multiple-fatality incidents fall -- five deaths at the Hackensack, New

Jersey, fire at 2:59 pm and six deaths in the Kansas City, Missouri, fire at

-18-
Figure 8

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1988

by Time of Day

Based on 60 fire ground fatalities and

113 total fatalities for which time

was known.
3:41 am. The distribution of deaths by time of day over a ten-year period is

shown in Figure 9. The number of deaths in both categories was at the highest

between 1:00 and 9:00 pm and drops to the lowest level in the early morning

hours.

F. Month of the Year

Figure 10 shows the distribution of 1988 fire fighter deaths by month.

The same information for 1979 through 1988 is shown in Figure 11. The deaths

in July 1988 inc ude the five deaths in Hackensack. November includes the six l

deaths in Kansas City. The ten-year analysis shows that fire ground deaths

are higher in the winter months and in midsummer.

G. State and Region

The distribution of fire fighter deaths by state is shown in Table 1.

Thirty-four states are represented on the list, led by Pennsylvania with 17

lost the largest number of fire fighters (481, fo

Northcentral region (29) and the West (23). When looking at fire ground

deaths, we see that the Northeast and Northcentral regions both have higher

deaths. The experience by region4 is displayed in Table 2. The Northeast

llowed by the South (321, the

than average death rates. The fire ground death rate was higher in the West

than in the South because so many of the wildland deaths occurred in the West,

while the South has many more fires overall than the West.

-20-
Figure 9

Fire Fighter Fatalities by Time of Day

1979 - 1988

Based on 591 fire ground fatalities and

1017 total fatalities for which time

was known.
Figure 10

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1988

by Month of Year

Based on 63 fire ground deaths and

132 total fatalities.
Figure 11

Fire Fighter Fatalities by Month of Year

1979 - 1988

Based on 637 fire ground deaths and

1249 total fatalities.
State

Alabama

California

Colorado

Florida 3

Georgia 2

Idaho 2

Illinois 2

Indiana

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana 1

Maine 1

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Mississippi

Missouri

Number of Deaths

1

4

3

4

2

3

6

3

State Number of Deaths

Montana 2

New Hampshire 1

New Jersey 11

New York 14

North Carolina 2

Ohio 5

Oregon 4

Pennsylvania 17

South Carolina 3

South Dakota 2

Tennessee 3

Texas 4

Vermont 1

Virginia 1

4 Washington 3

3 Wisconsin 1

9 Wyoming 5

Table 1

1988 Line of Duty

Fire Fighter Fatalities

TOTAL: 132

-24-
Table 2

Fire Fighter Death Rate by Region

1988

Region

Northeast

Northcentral

South

West

Number of Number of Fire

Fatalities Ground Deaths

48 25

29 18

32 11

23 9

Fire Ground Death Rate

per 100,000 Fires

4.77

3.00

1.19

2.31

Nationwide 132 63 2.59

-25-
H. Analysis of Urban/Rural/Suburban Patterns in Fire Fighter Fatalities

The U.S. Bureau of the Census defines "urban" as a place having at least

2,500 population or lying within a designated urbanized area. "Rural" is

defined as any community that is not urban. "Suburban" is not a Census term

but may be taken to refer to any place, urban or rural, that lies within a

metropolitan area defined by the Census but is not one of the designated

central cities of that metropolitan area.

Fire department coverage areas do not always conform to the boundaries of

Census places. For example, fire departments defined by counties or special

fire protection districts may have both urban and rural sections, and there

are Federal, state, and private fire fighters. In such cases, it may not be

possible to characterize the entire coverage area of a fire department as

rural or urban, and one must assign a fire fighter death as urban or rural

based on the particular community in which he was operating when fatally

injured.

Based on these rules, the following patterns were found and are shown with

available patterns for the general population and for the population of fire

fighters specifically in local fire departments:

Urban Rural Total

Total 1988 fire fighter fatalities 74 (56%) 58 (44%) 132 (100%)

Suburban location 40 21 61

-26-
Local fire department only*

Urban

72 (60%)

Rural

48 (40%)

Total

132 (

U.S. population (1980) 74% 26% 100%

U.S. fire fighters (1987), total** 58% 42% 100%

U.S. fire fighters (1987), career** 97% 3 % 100%

U.S. fire fighters (1987), volun.** 46% 54% 100%

100%)

In 1988, the distribution of fire fighter fatalities from local fire

departments (60 percent urban, 40 percent rural) was closer to the 1987

distribution of fire fighters from local fire departments (58 percent urban,

42 percent rural) than to the 1980 distribution of the whole U.S. population

(74 percent urban, 26 percent rural), suggesting that the the risk of dying,

as measured by local fire fighter deaths per 100,000 local fire fighters, is

nearly the same in urban and rural areas. The result is surprising, however,

since rural areas are generally served by volunteer fire fighters, who

typically would average fewer work (exposure) hours per year than career fire

fighters and who would therefore be expected to have a lower risk of death per

100,000 fire fighters, as a separate career/volunteer analysis did show. A

similar result was found in 1986.

For 1987, however, the distribution of fi

fire departments was closer to the distributi

re fighter fatalities from local

on of the whole U.S. population

than to the distribution of fire fighters from local fire departments. That

suggested that, for 1987, urban fire fighters faced a greater risk of dying

than fire fighters in rural areas, which was not unexpected since urban areas

* Excludes two military service fire fighter killed in an urban location and

10 Federal, state and contract fire fighters killed in rural locations.

* * "U.S. Fire Department Profile Through 1987," Quincy, Massachusetts:

National Fire Protection Association, Fire Analysis Division, November

1988. All percentages are for fire fighters in local fire departments.

*** Note that the classification of fire fighters into urban and rural is

based strictly on the population protected by the fire department and not

on metropolitan area considerations. However, if fire fighter fatalities

were similarly classified, the distribution would shift by at most two 

percentage points, so the points here are not affected.

-27-
are generally served by career fire fighters who average more hours of

exposure per year than volunteer fire fighters and therefore would be expected

to have a higher risk of death per 100,000 fire fighters.

Since the results fluctuate back and forth each year, it is not worthwhile

to read too much in to them. It will be necessary to collect several years

worth of data and do a multi-year analysis before any firm conclusions can be

drawn.

-28-
III. FIRE FIGHTER DEATHS IN STRUCTURAL COLLAPSES

1979-1988

From 1979 through 1988, 93 of the 474 fire fighters who were killed at

structure fires died as a result of structural collaspe. For the purpose of

this analysis, the following definition of structural collapse is used: the

failure of structural member(s) resulting in the collapse of a structure or

portion(s) of a structure. Two categories of structural collapse are

described. The first includes incidents where fire fighters were caught or

trapped by a collapsing roof, wall, floor or ceiling. Most victims in this

category were inside or on the roof of the building.The second category

includes incidents where fire fighters were struck by a collapsing roof, wall,

or ceiling or pieces of a wall.In these cases, the injury occurred when the

victim was outside a structure. The breakdown for the 93 fatalities is shown

in Figure 12.

Fatalities as a Result of Being Caught or Trapped

Of the 93 victims, 56 were caught or trapped by structural collapse -- 31

of the victims were asphyxiated, 13 died of burns and 12 died as a result of

crushing injuries or internal trauma. The building components involved in the

collapses were the roof (30 deaths), floor (19 deaths), ceiling (5 deaths) and

wall (2 deaths). Another 140 fire fighters were injured in these incidents,

and one fire fighter was killed when he jumped from a window to escape

flashover in a fire where a collapse killed two other fire fighters.

The 30 deaths in roof collapses occurred in 21 incidents. Ten of the

victims in seven incidents were on the roof performing ventilation, 17 were

inside performing fire suppression activities, two were inside pulling

ceilings, and one was involved in a search for occupants.

-29-
Figure 12

Fire Fighter Fatalities

in Structural Collapses

1979 - 1988
Fifteen of the 26 victims caught or trapped by floor, wall or ceiling

collapse were involved in fire fighting activities, four were performing

search and rescue, three were killed during overhaul (one was supervising),

two were performing ventilation, and two were supervising operations.

Figure 13 shows the distribution of the 56 fatalities by fixed property

use.

Fatalities as a Result of Being Struck by Collapse

Of the 93 victims of structural collapse, 37 were struck by collapsing

walls or pieces of walls -- 20 died of crushing injuries and 17 as a result of

internal trauma. Another 74 fire fighters were injuried in these incidents.

The 37 deaths in wall collapses occurred in 33 incidents. All of these

victims were outside the structure at the time of the collapse. At the time

of the collapse, 30 of the victims were operating handlines (one from an

elevated platform) or performing other suppression activities, including

supervision of hoseline operations, setting up a master stream appliance and

ventilation. Three fire fighters were killed as they were escaping the

building and two (in separate incidents> were attempting to move vehicles.

One died when a natural gas explosion caused a wall collapse as he and others

attempted to rescue an elderly woman from a fire escape. One fire fighter was

attempting to open a door with a ceiling hook when the wall collapsed on him.

In 12 of the 33 incidents mentioned above, the roof was reported to have

collapsed, and in another the floors collapsed, pushing the walls out and

causing them to collapse. Three explosions caused fatal wall collapses -- one

incident killed four fire fighters. The failure of fire fighters to maintain

a safe distance between themselves and the building appears to have been a

factor in almost all of the wall collapse fatalities.

Figure 14 shows the distribution of the 37 fatalities by fixed property

use.

-31-
Figure 13

Fire Fighters Caught or Trapped

in Structural Collapses

1979 - 1988
Figure 14

Fire Fighters Struck by Objects

in Structural Collapses

1979 - 1988
Collapses Involving Truss Roofs

Seven of the collapses were reported to involve truss roofs. (This

analysis does not include the 1978 fire where six New York City fire fighters

were killed when the roof of a supermarket collapsed.) Six of these collapses

resulted in 11 fire fighters being caught or trapped. (Nine of these fire

fighters were inside buildings;one was on the roof.) The seventh collapse

resulted in a fire fighter being struck by a collapsing.wall after the roof

collapsed. The most severe incident, in terms of loss of life, occurred in

1988 when five fire fighters were killed when the wood bowstring truss roof of

a New Jersey automobile dealership suddenly collapsed while the men were

working. inside.

Summary

Over the lo-year period, 93 fire fighters died on the fire ground as a

result of structural collapses. Fifty-six were caught or trapped in the

collapse, and 37 were struck by collapsing walls or sections of walls.

Thirty-nine of the 74 fires were of incendiary or suspicious origin and

resulted in 50 deaths.Fifty-one of the structures were one or two stories

high, while 22 others were three stories or higher. No information was

available on the height of the other building.

The distribution of the 93 deaths by year is shown in Figure 15.

Sixty-six of the victims were career fire fighters and 27 were volunteers.

The distribution of deaths by region is shown in Figure 16.

As mentioned in the discussion above, the failure of fire fighters to

maintain a safe distance between themselves and the building was a factor in

almost all of the cases where fire fighters were struck by wall collapses. As

for the cases of fire fighters caught or trapped by structural collapse, fire

fighters operating in or on buildings rely on good fire ground supervision

that can alert them to the danger of possible collapse of the involved
Figure 15

Fatalities in Structural Collapses

1979 - 1988
Figure 16

Fatalities in Structural Collapses by Region

1979 - 1988
IV. FIRE FIGHTER DEATHS WHILE RESPONDING TO ALARMS

1979-1988

From 1979 through 1988, 335 fire fighters died while responding to or

returning from emergencies or other incidents. As shown in Figure 17, these

deaths accounted for slightly more than a quarter of all fire fighter

fatalities and bear closer examination because so many of the deaths involve

factors that should be preventable.

Of these 335 deaths, 235 involved fire fighters responding to alarms.

Most of the 100 deaths while returning from alarms were due to heart attacks.

It may not be surprising, given the emotional stress of responding to an

incident, that 73 of the deaths while responding were due to heart attacks and 

two others were due to strokes. But at least 36 of the heart attack victims

had existing heart problems or prior heart attacks. illustrating once again

the danger of heart-impaired fire fighters continuing to participate actively

on their fire departments. Four other heart attack victims had hypertension.

The importance of regular physical monitoring, as called for by NFPA 1500,

could not be more clear.

Almost all of the remaining 160 deaths while responding to alarms were the

result of motor vehicle accidents. See Figure 18.1 These included 109

collisions and vehicle overturns, 30 falls from apparatus, and 11 cases of

victims struck by vehicles. (The other 10 deaths include three drownings, two

struck by doors, one struck by a falling tree, one fall on stairs, one fall

over an object, one gunshot victim, and one carbon monoxide poisoning.)

The problem of fire fighters falling from apparatus was discussed in the

1987 contract report and the problem of fire fighters being struck while

operating at or approaching incident scenes is discussed in the next section

-37-
Figure 17

Fire Fighter Deaths While Responding to

or Returning from Incidents

1979 - 1988
Figure 18

Fire Fighter Deaths While Responding

by Cause of Injury

1979 - 1988
of this report. The analysis of incidents involving falls from apparatus

showed that in the most common scenario, the victims were thrown from the back

step of pumpers as the apparatus rounded a curve. Others were bounced off

when the apparatus went over a rut, curb or speed bump or lost their grip when

vehicles stopped at incident scenes or stopped and started up again in

traffic. Fire fighters struck at or near incident scenes most often were

operating at traffic accidents or vehicle fires. Most incidents occurred

after dark or under conditions of poor visibility.

The rest of this section will concentrate on the 109 deaths that resulted

from collisions or vehicles overturning. As shown in Figure 19, the greatest

proportion of these 109 deaths involved private vehicles (38.5 percent),

followed by engines or pumpers (21.1 percent) and tankers (19.3 percent).

Twenty-three of the 44 deaths involving private vehicles were the result

of collisions with other vehicles; 16 involved collisions with objects such as

utility poles, trees and bridge abutments; and two resulted from vehicles

overturning. There were no details given on the other three accidents.

Five of the deaths were the result of four incidents involving motorcycles.

Factors reported concerning the collisions with other vehicles were failure to

stop at a red light or stop sign (5 deaths), failure to yield (4 deaths),

failure to heed railroad crossing warning lights (3 deaths), and failure of

other drivers to yield (2 deaths). In five of the 16 accidents resulting in

collisions with objects and in the two overturning accidents, excessive speed

was mentioned as a factor. In another accident, the fire fighter's vehicle

hydroplaned during a severe rainstorm, indicating excessive speed for the

existing road conditions. In eight of the accidents, the roads were wet. In

another, the driver lost control on a patch of ice. Drunk driving by fire

fighters was mentioned as a factor in two of the accidents.

-40-
Figure 19

Fire Fighter Deaths While Responding

by Type of Vehicle Involved

1979 - 1988
The problem of collisions while responding to alarms in private vehicles

involves volunteer fire fighters almost exclusively. The only career fire

fighter involved in such an incident was a full-time forestry employee who was

called back to duty to fight a wildfire and was responding in his own car.

The frequency of these accidents has been increasing in recent years. (See

Figure 20.) Over half of the accidents occurred in the last three years, an

average of eight deaths per year.

The 23 deaths involving pumper-type apparatus were the result of 17

accidents. These accidents included one five-fatality and one three-fatality

incident. Six of the accidents were the result of collisions with other

vehicles, two were the result of brake failure, and the remainder were due to

drivers losing control either when failing to negotiate a curve or when

driving off the pavement. No details were available on one incident.

Speeding was mentioned as a factor in five of the accidents, including two

where the fire fighters driving had blood alcohol levels greater than 0.1%.

The failure of other drivers to respond appropriately to the flashing lights

and sirens of the apparatus was mentioned in four of the six collisions and

one of the lost control incidents. Another collision involved two fire

department vehicles responding by different routes from the same station.

Both trucks slowed at the intersection, but neither one stopped. The sixth

collision occurred when an engine responding to an EMS call was struck by a

train. The warning lights at the crossing were operating but the driver

apparently was not aware how close the approaching train was.

The 21 deaths in tanker collisions while responding to alarms were the

result of 19 accidents.

-42-
Figure 20

Fatalities in Private Vehicles

1979 - 1988
There are basically three types of tankers in use by fire departments --

those built from the ground up as tankers, former military and other vehicles

converted to tankers, and new chassis with tanks added. Of the 19 tankers

involved in these accidents, seven were known to be converted. Details on

baffling were not generally available.

The use of tankers is essential in rural fire fighting, but extra care

must be taken to consider their stability. Military vehicles have a high

center of gravity as originally designed. Adding a tank above increases the

vehicle's instability at higher speeds and on turns, and the weight of the

water can seriously tax the truck's suspension, brakes and tires.

Fifteen of the accidents were attributed to failure to negotiate curves

and losing control of the vehicles. Two fire fighters were killed in separate

collisions when the drivers of the tankers failed to heed stop signs at

intersections and were struck by trucks. Two other tankers overturned when

their drivers swerved at intersections to avoid hitting other vehicles.

Excessive speed was cited as a factor in seven of the accidents.

The inexperience of drivers also played a role in the incidence of fatal

tanker accidents.Inexperienced drivers include not only young people but

also older fire fighters who are infrequently called upon to drive a vehicle

that requires handling quite different from a passenger car or truck.

Other types of vehicles involved in accidents while responding to alarms

were aircraft (7 deaths), ambulances and rescue vehicles (4 deaths), ladder

trucks (3 deaths), brush fire vehicles (3 deaths), other fire department

vehicles (2 deaths), a marine fire/rescue boat (1 death), and a National Guard

truck (1 death). 

Over the ten-year period, almost 20 percent of all fire fighters who died

in the line of duty died while responding to alarms. One-third of those

deaths were the result of heart attacks and strokes. Almost half were killed

-44-
in collisions and vehicle overturns. Excessive speed for the road conditions

or type of vehicle, failure to observe traffic laws, driving while intoxicated

and lack of safety procedures or equipment are all factors cited in these

accidents,

Fire fighting is a hazardous enough profession without such a high loss of

life while trying to reach the emergency scene. In addition to careful

driving on their own part, fire fighters driving any type of vehicle in a

response must be alert to the actions of other drivers who may not be aware of

or heed operating emergency lights and sirens.

-45-
V. FIRE FIGHTERS STRUCK BY VEHICLES

1979 - 1988

From 1979 through 1988, 34 fire fighters were struck and killed by private

vehicles or fire department apparatus. These include only those incidents

where the accident victim was a pedestrian; they do not include incidents

where fire fighters fell from vehicles and then were struck. Although this is

a fairly small portion of deaths over the ten-year period, these deaths are

particularly tragic because they were so preventable.

As shown in Figure 21, the activities of the fire fighters at the time of

the accidents were:operating at a traffic accident (9 deaths); directing

traffic (8 deaths); operating at a vehicle fire (4 deaths); operating at a

brush or forest fire (4 deaths); operating at a structure fire (3 deaths);

working at a training exercise (1 death); evacuating flood victims (1 death);

removing rocks from a highway (1 death); refilling a pumper (1 death);

responding to a fire station on foot (1 death); and waiting along a road to be

picked up while en route to an accident (1 death). Seventeen of the accidents

occurred between 6 pm and 7 am;fifteen occurred between 7 am and 6 pm. Time

was not reported for the other two incidents.

The drivers in nine of the incidents were reported to be intoxicated.

Fire fighters operating on or near roadways need to be aware that the

unpredictable behavior of drunk drivers can compromise even the most careful

precautions.In two incidents, fire fighters were killed by drivers who

veered around fire police attempting to block the road or divert traffic.

Three of the eight fire fighters who were killed while directing traffic

were not wearing any reflective clothing or using flashlights or flares. All

-46-
Figure 21

Activities of Fire Fighters Struck by Vehicles

at the Time of the Incidents

1979 - 1988
of the drivers reported that they did not see the fire fighters. Another fire

fighter, who was tending to a person ejected in a motor vehicle rollover, was

struck by a vehicle he was trying to wave away from the victim. The road was

dark and the fire fighter had no flashlight or flares.

In at least two cases, the warning lights that fire fighters relied on to

increase the safety of their operations actually seemed to be contributing

factors in the accidents. In one, a pumper being refilled at a pond was

parked two feet off the road facing oncoming traffic with headlights and

four-way hazard flashers on in dense fog. The driver of a pickup truck

thought the pumper was coming at him and swerved off the road to avoid it,

striking the fence around the pond and eventually hitting the pumper and one

of the fire fighters. In the other incident, a driver passing a fire scene

reportedly was distracted by the vehicles of volunteer fire fighters parked on

both sides of the road with their blue lights flashing. This driver hit a

fire fighter who was directing traffic.

Seven fire fighters were killed crossing roads or highways while

responding to the fire station or to motor vehicle accidents or fires. In

another accident, a fire fighter was struck and killed as he stepped out from

behind the engine to stretch a line across the street. The driver of the car,

a volunteer fire fighter headed to the station, was blinded by the engine's

high beams. The victim was carrying a hydrant-assist valve on his right

shoulder that apparently obstructed his ability to see the oncoming

vehicle. Another fire fighter stepped in front of a work train while

evacuating a flooded area. Another stepped in front of an approaching vehicle

that she believed was driven by another fire fighter coming to pick-her up to

respond to a motor vehicle accident. It was actually a police car responding

to the same incident, whose driver did not see her.

-48-
Five fire fighters were killed when they crossed or moved onto road; that

had not been closed to traffic. Three were operating at wildland fires, one

was extinguishing bales of hay on the roadway, and the fifth was removing

rocks from a rockslide.

One fire fighter at the scene of a structure fire was struck by a dump

truck that had been ordered for use during cleanup. Another was directing a

tanker backing down a road to a dwelling fire, when he fell and was run over.

These incidents illustrate the need for fire fighters to exercise caution

while crossing streets and highways or operating on them. Fire fighters may

not be as visible to drivers as they believe themselves to be. The use of

flashlights, flares, and protective clothing with reflective stripes should be

mandatory when directing traffic or operating at accident scenes. Warning

lights on vehicles should be in operation, but fire fighters must be aware

that drivers can be confused by them.Care must be exercised when stepping

onto or operating on roadways. When fire fighters are operating along a

roadway where visibility is obscured, the road should be closed to traffic.

Fire fighters should not assume a road is closed and should be aware that fire

apparatus still might be moving along a road that is closed to the public.

They also must be aware of the danger of intoxicated drivers whose behavior

will be unpredictable and who can defeat even the most careful deployment of

apparatus and fire fighters.

-49-
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although it would be premature to suggest that fire fighter fatalities are

definitely on the increase, it is apparent that no significant gains have been

made in recent years to reduce the overall death toll. Some encouragement can

be found in the reduction of deaths due to smoke exposure (one death in 1988)

and falls from apparatus while responding (no deaths in 1988), but areas where

significant reductions could be made still exist. For example, this year, as

in every previous year but one, heart attacks continue to be the major cause

of death, and most of those victims had suffered previous heart attacks, had

had bypass surgery or had severe, detectable heart disease.

This year's report focused on three other areas: fatalities in structural

collapses, deaths while responding to alarms and fire fighters fatally struck

at the scene of incidents. The first analysis was prompted to some degree by

the five-fatality incident that occurred in New Jersey. The other analyses

address areas where attention is needed in order to reduce needless fatalities.

The structural collapse analysis serves as a reminder of the need of fire

fighters to maintain a safe distance between themselves and the building when

operating outside of an involved structure and the need of careful fire ground

supervision so that fire fighters operating inside a building can be warned in

time of an impending collapse. The continued use throughout the country of

truss roof construction will pose risks of building collapse to fire fighters

and underlines the need for them to be familiar with the buildings within

their jurisdiction and the hazards associated with their construction.

Deaths while responding to alarms continue to make up a significant

proportion of the total deaths, and so, a special analysis of these deaths was

-50-
included in this year's report. The findings highlighted the need for driver

training, both for apparatus drivers and drivers of personal vehicles.

Traffic laws need to be obeyed, even during a response. Apparatus drivers

need to be aware of the handling problems associated with emergency vehicles,

particularly tankers. Fire fighting is a hazardous enough occupation without

the high loss of life that is occurring annually before even reaching the fire

ground.

The analysis of fire fighters fatally struck by vehicles while operating

at incidents serves to highlight an area of particularly preventable deaths.

A factor commonly observed in these deaths was the inattention of the victim

to his or her surroundings. Another was the failure to use reflective

clothing or special lighting when operating on or near a roadway. The problem

of drunk drivers is more difficult for the fire fighter to deal with, but

awareness of the danger they pose and reasonable defense against them are

necessary.

Further reductions in fire fighter deaths can be accomplished if changes

in operating procedures and attitudes are made in order to improve fire

fighter safety.

-51-
REFERENCES

1. Michael J. Karter, Jr., "U.S. Fire Department Profile through 1987,"

Quincy, MA:National Fire Protection Association, Fire Analysis and

Research Division, November 1988.

2. The full reports from the investigations of these fires are also available

from NFPA's Fire Investigations Division.

Thomas J. Klem. "Summary Investigation Report - Five Fighter Fatalities,

Hackensack, New Jersey, July 1, 1988”

Michael S. Isner, "Investigation Report - Blasting Agent Explosion, Six

Fire Fighters Killed, Kansas City, Missouri, November 29, 1988"

See also:

Jack Yates, "Six Firefighter Fatalities in Construction Site Explosion,

Kansas City, Missouri (November 29, 1988," Report 024 of the Major Fire

Investigations Project conducted by TriData Corporation under contract to

the U.S. Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

3. Michael J. Karter, Jr., "U.S. Fire Loss in '1988," Fire Journal, Vol. 83,

No. 5, (September 1989).

4. The four regions as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau include the

following 50 states and the District of Columbia:

Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,

New York, Pennsylvania, Rhose Island, and Vermont.

Northcentral: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,

Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.

South: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,

Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina,

Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

West: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,

Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washingon, and Wyoming.

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