Docket No . 107192.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

WEDGE C. LAZENBY et al ., Ap pel l an ts, v . MA RK’S CONS TRUC TION, IN C., et al. , Appell ees.
Opinion filed January 22, 2010.

JUSTICE BU RKE de l i

v er ed th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justice Fi tzgerald an

d Justice s Freem

an, Thom as, Ki lb ride, Gar man, a nd Kar meier co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

In the e arl y morni ng h ours of A ugust 30, 2001 , a f

i re br o ke o ut in t he bas eme nt o f a

Pa r k R id ge, Ill

in ois, resi dence wh ic h was un der
co nst ru ct ion. Fi

ref i ghters Wedge C. La

zenb y (L azenb y) an d Derek R. Decker (Decker) (collectiv ely herein after referred t o as plain tiff s) responded

to the fi re. Whi le attempting t o loca t e t he so ur ce o f the fi re, Lazen by fel l through an un pr otec ted f l oor op en i n g to t he ce ment base ment be low a nd

was sev erely in jured. Decker was

in jured wh en he fell f ro m a ladde r w hile att empt ingto re sc ue La ze nby. Pla int iffs fi le d suit in the c ircu it co ur t of Co ok Co unt y agains t Mark’ s Co nst ru ct ion, Inc. ( Ma

rk’ s C ons

tructi on) , th e g en

era l con tractor working on the h

ome.1 Pr ior to tr ia l, the tr ial cou rt entered summar y judgment for Iz ra el and againstLazen

by o n th e basi s that

Mar k’s Const ruct ion assumed sole resp onsibi

li ty for t he sa fety of the job s ite. T he tria l cour t la ter s evered from this cas e al l c lai m s again st Izrae l a nd State Farm Mut ual Aut omobile Insura nce Com pan y (S ta te Fa rm), which repr esented Izr ael dur ing the proceed in gs. Izrael thus is n ot

a party tothis appeal. K

ol bi arz w as vo lu ntaril y d ism iss ed as an in di vidual d ef en dan t pri or t o t rial

.

-2- The trial court entered

summary judg ment a gainst Dec ker , finding that Mark’s Construct ion h ad no duty

t o pr event Decker’s inj uries. Fo llowing a trial on Lazenb y’ s clai ms, t he t rial co ur t ent er ed jud gment on the j ury ’s ge ne ral ve rdi ct f orMa rk ’s Con str uc ti on . B oth

pla int iffs appeal ed, and th e a

pp el l ate cou rt a f f i rm ed th e tr i al cou rt’ s j udgm

en t. No. 1–06 –2969(un

pub l i shed order

und er Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 23). The i ssues presen

ted in thi s appeal are: (1) whether section 9f of t he Fi re Investigation A

ct (Act) (425 I LCS 25/9f (West 20 04) ) appl ie d r et r o ac t ive ly t o De ck er ’s cla im s ; an d (2) whether the trial courterred in

fai li ng to enter a judgm

ent notwithstandi

ng the verdict (jud gment n.o.v. ) or or der a new t rial for Laze nby. Fo r t he r eas ons th at f ol l ow, we af f i rm th e a pp el l ate cou rt.

BACK GROUND On Dece m ber 28, 20 01, p la i nti

f f s f i l ed a c om pl ai nt b as ed on negl ige nceag ain st M ark’s Bui lde rs, Inc., and Marek K

olbi arz, ind ividua lly

and doi ng bus in ess as M ark’s Bui

lde rs, Inc. (later correct ed to Mark’ s Constructi

on, I nc. , he rein

after ref erred to as Mark ’sCons

tructi on). On A

ugust 29, 2003, plainti ff

s fi led thei r fi rst
am ended compl ai nt, all egi ng construction negl

ige nce an d premises l i ab i l i ty an d a ddi ng Mi ch ae l Izrae l , th e ow

ne r of thehou se, as a de f en da n t. 1 In resp onse , Mark ’s Cons tructi on f i l ed m otion s f or sum mary j udgm en t, alleging that pl

ai nti f f s’ cl ai m s w ere ba rre d by the com mon la w“f irem an’s rule” b ecause thei

r in juri es resul ted f rom r isk s no r mally associ ated wi

th f i ref i ghti ng d uti es, a nd th at plai ntif f s’ i nj uri es w ere unf oreseeable.2 Coun ts V and XI, as sert ed by Laz enby, a nd counts VIII, X, a nd X II , as ser ted by

Deck er, were di smi ssed wi th pre jud ice pursuant to section

2–615 of the Code of

Civi l P ro cedu re (7 35 I LCS 5/2–61 5 (We st 2 004 )) and a re not at is sue in this app eal.
-3- On April 26, 2004, pla

in tif fs fi le d their s econd am

ended com pl ai n t, t he co mplaintat iss ue in t his appeal . Plai ntif fs al le ged 12 counts based
on the ori esof

con stru cti on negl ige nce (counts I and II); prem is es l i ab i l i ty (c oun ts I II a n d I V) ; v i ol ati

on of sta tutor y du ty (c oun ts V and VI); will ful and want on co nstr uct ion (co unt s VII and VI II ); will ful and wan ton prem i ses l i ab i l i ty (c ounts IX

and X); and w ill

ful and
wan ton vi ola tion of statutory du

ty (c ounts X

I and XII). 2 On Jul y 28, 200 4, the

tria l courtgr an

ted su m mary j udg men t f or Ma rk ’s Con str uc ti on as to De cker ’s

cl ai m s i n cou n ts II, IV, an

d VI, finding th at u n der the f i re man ’s ru l e, Ma rk ’s Con str uc ti on h ad n o du ty to De ck er fo rhis inj uries. T he cou rt rejecte d Decke r’s argumen t t hat
se cti on 9f o f the Act ret ro act ivel y i mposed a d ut y on Mark’s Co nst ru ct ion. 425 IL CS 25 /9f (We st 2004 ) (l andown er or oc cupi er hasa du t y of re aso nable ca re t o a firefight er who is inj ur ed d ue t o t he l ac k of mai nte na nc e of the pre m i se s i n th e c ours e of

res pon di ng to a f i re). Al l of Decker’s cl

ai ms were thus di sm

is sed o r d ispo sed of by
sum mary judg m en t p rior to trial . The sum mary j udg men t moti on dir ected a t Laze nby was d enied be cau se t he co ur t held t hat t he fi reman’ s rule did not apply to Lazenby ’s i

nj uries. Laze nby an d M ark ’s Constru cti on proce ed ed

to a j ury tri al on Decem ber 2, 200 5. Kolbiar z t est ifi

ed a s an a dver se w itne ss f or t he pla in tif f an d al so on hi s own beh

al f. Hetestifi

ed t hat , o n t he eve ning of Augu st 29, 200 1, he left t he r es ide nc e a t ap pr o ximat ely 6: 30 p. m. after t he oth er wor kers h ad l ef t. Th e s tai rwa y to the basemen t wa s n ot ye t insta lled, lea ving an o pen ho le in the f l oor m eas ur ing ap pr o ximat ely

16 f eet b y 4 f eet. Kolbiar z es t imated t hat t he bas ement f l oorwa s abo ut 10 fe et below t he o pening. He a dmitt ed t hat t he unprotect ed

h ol e w as a s af ety haza rd . Alt hou gh a gu ar dr ail p r ev io us ly had been inst alled ar ou nd t he ho le, t he guardrail was rem oved that day to per mit dr ywall wor k and Kolbiar z de cided t o w ait u nt il the next
mor ningto replac e the guardrail because the house waslock ed a nd he did not expe ct anyone else t o e nt er t he ho use dur ingthe ni ght. When asked o n c r o ss - ex amina t io n w hy he did no t bu y a pie ce of pl

ywood at-4- a lumber st or e t o c ove r t he hole , he replie d that t he store was cl osed. Kol bi arz further tes tif

ie d that an orange construction f ence surrounded the outside of the resi

dence. Laze nby testi f i ed on h i s ow n b eh al f . H e state d that he an d h is partne r, f

i ref i ghter Ka ren Carri l l o, arri ve d at the

sce ne i n a f i re dep ar t ment veh

ic le . He stated t hat he recei ved a r ad io o r de rfr o m his act ingba ttali on ch i ef , Al vi n Portel l , to “f orce en try” i nt o t he resi dence

. Accordi ngly, he fo rc ed t he do or op en wit h an axe and enter ed t he resi

dence wi th Carril lo. Mem bers of the e

ngi ne crew followed them i nsi de wi th a hose. The house was fi ll ed wi th sm oke, lim iting visibi

lity to app ro ximately six t o nine i n ch es . Acc ordi

n g to La ze nby, Lieuten

an t Pl ach sai d tha t he w as g oin

g upstai rs to l ook f

or t he fire and La

zenb y res pon de d that he w oul

d l ook f ort he fire in t he basemen t. W hi l e c rawl i ng on th e f l oorwit h a

f l ashl i gh t to se arc h f or th e sea t of t he fire, Laze nby felt an o bject wit h his handwhich h e t hou ght was the tread and ri ser of a st air. The objec t gave way, and he fell he ad f i rst through

an open i ng i n the f l oor. He heard a

lo ud met allic
cr ash, whi ch h e assum ed was caus ed b

y the ob j ect h i ttin g the f l oor. A folding l adder c am

e down th rou gh th e hol e b ut was pull

ed back because it wasto o smal

l. Decke r then f el l thr ough the hol e, on top of La ze nby. Both fi

refi ghters used a second l

ad der t o e sca pe fr om t he hole

. Laze nby testifi ed that the “two-in, two -out ” pol i cy i s a f i re dep ar t ment guide li

ne that i s n ot al wa y s f oll owe d to the le

tt er. It states that fo rev er y t wo f

i ref i ghters wh

o enter a bui l di ng, two f i ref i ghters sta nd at t he ready to go in if

something happens t o t hem. Lazenb y admit t ed t hat beca use he and Car rillo we re in the firs t vehicle o n t he scene, or dinar ily

t hey wo uld st ay ou t side t he building and man the backupli ne as the “ two- out ” compan

y. W hen asked if h e vi olated any prin ci ple s of the two-in, two-o ut guidel in e, Lazen by answered that

he did n ot. He testif

ie d that t he o nly o r de rhe r ec eiv ed wa s t o fo r ce en t ry. Laze nby furt her ack now ledge d t hat he wa s t ra ined t o s ou nd t he f l oor f orhaza rd s by

using a t oo l such a s an a xe o r a pipe p ole, but t hat he h ad n ei th er of th es e too l s wi

th h i m at th e ti me of th e a cc i den t. Plain tiff ’s sa fet y exp er t , De nnis Pu ch als ki, t es t if ie d t hat t he prote cti on of ope n h ole s i n f l oors i s an i m portant s af

ety conc ern on a con stru cti on site . I n t his insta nce, t he unp ro t ect ed flo or op ening violated co ns t ruc t io n s af

et y cu stom s and practi ce and v iolated-5- g uide li nesis sued by

the Occupational

Safety and Hea

lt h A dm i ni stra ti on (OSHA ) and by

va ri ous con structi

on i ndu stry associations. Af

ter bein g r em oved, the guardrails shoul d have been rein stall ed to ensu re prope r si te saf ety . Puch al ski testi f i ed th at “[t]h

ere is never a tim

e-out asf ar a s th e p rotecti on* ** a

t al l poi nts i n ti me y ou protect the ope

ni ng.” He st at ed t ha t if

proper pro tective dev

ic es had been used, Lazen

by ’s f al l a nd i nj ury would not have occurred. At the cl ose of pl ai

ntif f’ s case in

ch i ef , Laz en by m oved f or a directed finding on th e i ss ueof Ma r k’ s C o nst ruc t io n’s ne glig en ce in faili ng to cover o r protec t the f l oor ope ni ng an d on the i ss ueof pr oximat e ca use . T he t rial co ur t denied t he mot ion. Fi refi ghter Ca rri l l o tes ti f i ed on b eh al f of t he de fense t hat she did not hear any or der s t o “fo rc e ent ry” int o t he re si den ce or to se arc

h f or t he seat o f the f

ire. Ca r r ill o foll owed Lazenb

y i nsi de the residence, followed by the l i n e cre w w i

th t he ho se. As Laz enby was e nt er ing t he house, he was y

el li ng, “L et’s go, let’s go.” Ca rr ill o he ar d t he ac t ing lieut enant yell, “Wa it fo rt he ho se

. ” C ar r illo ye l led t o La ze nby, “W edge, wai t. Wedge, wait.” Lazen

by then f el lthr ou gh the h

ole. Ca rr illo di d n o t he ar La ze nby s ay a nyt hi ng abo ut t rying t o find t he b as em en t. Fi re Li eutenant Al

vi n Portell al so test if

ie d for the def

ense. Po r t ell
was the shi

ft comm ander an d th e hi ghe st ran

ki ng of f i cer a t the f i re scene. He stated t hat he ne ver gave Laze nby an or der t o e nt er t he resi dence or t o s ear ch fo r t he se at o f t he fire , no rdid any ot her off ic er order La ze nby t o en t er t he bu ild i ng. P orte l l sta ted th at a n ord er to “f orce entry” i s to force ope n a door , but no t necessa r ily to enter a bui ldi ng. Lazen by engaged in “f reela nci ng”an d v i ol ate d the c ha

i n of
co mmand by en teri ng the bu i l di ng wi thou t rec ei vi ng orde rs to do s o. Port el l e xpl ai ned tha t “ f ree l an ci ng ” i s a term of art which me ans that
a firefight er do es t hings o n his ow n wit hou t an or der and wi thout
com m un i ca ti on with others, putting them sel vesand other f

i ref i ghters i n dang er . B ot h Po rt ell and Ca rr ill o fu rt her t est ifi

ed t hat whe n t he y arriv ed at the scene they

noticed that

the house wasobviously

under
co nst ru ct ion. Defens e expert witnes s John A gosti testif

ie d that La ze nby w o uld have be en i n v i ol ati on of t he “budd y system” by pr oc eed ing t o find t he seatof the f i re w i thou t voi cecon tac t or ph y si cal con tac t wi th C arr i l l o. A gosti stat ed that pro ceeding i

nto a buildi

ng with onl

y a f lash li ght-6- wo uld h av

e b een a v i ol ati onof standard pra

cti ce a nd tra i ni ng f or a f i ref i ghter. He further testif

ie d that Lazenb

y’ s i nj uries were the di

rect result of his una ut hor ized e nt ry into t he building and t hat , ha d Laze nby not been f

reela nci ng, h e w oul

d n ot h av e f al l en i n to the hole

. At t he tr ial ’s co nclusio n, t he t rial co ur t instr uct ed t he jury o n t he affirmative defen

s e of compa

rative n egl ige nce. The j ury returned a general ve r dic t o n V er dic t Fo r m C in f av or of Ma rk’ s C ons tructi on an d agai n st L az en b y , a n d th e c our t en tered j udgm en t on th e v erdi ct. Pla int iffs fi

le d a post t rial mot ion, wit h Laze nby seek ing a judg ment
n.o.v. or , in t he alt er nat ive, a new t rial, a nd De cke r se eking a t rial. T he trial cou rt d en i ed pl ai n ti f f s’ posttri al motion i n f ul l an d s tate d that “therei s n o ju st reas on to del

ay en f orcem en t or appea l of th i s order.” 210 Il l . 2d R. 3 04(a). On appe al , the a

pp el l ate cou rt uphel d the

tri al cou rt’ s entr y of
sum mary judgm ent agai nst Decker. The court held that, whi l e th e l egi slature intend ed fo r se ct ion 9 f of t he Ac t to a pp ly r et r o ac t ive ly, due process concerns un der the Ill

in ois Constitut ion pr ohibit t he retroacti ve appl i cation of section 9f to thi s ca se. Th

e app el l ate court up he ld the t ri al court ’s r efusa l to dire ct a ver dict , e nt er a judg ment
n.o.v. , or gra nt a ne w tri al to La zenb y . No. 1–06–2969 (unpubl is hed order under

Supreme Court Ru

l e 23). Ac cordi

ngl y , the a ppel l ate court aff irm ed t he trial cou rt’ s j udg men t. W e al l owe d pl

ai nti f f s’ pe ti ti on f or l eav e to appea

l (210 Il l . 2d R. 3 15).

AN AL YSIS I. Retro active Appl

ic ation of Section 9f At t he o ut se t , w e no t e t hat se ver al iss ue s r aise d by t he p laint iffs in t he ir br ief be fo re t his c o ur t hav e be en fo rfe it ed bec au se pla int iffs fai le d to ra i se th em i n th e c i rc ui t cou rt, a pp el l ate co ur t , o rin t he ir

pe ti ti on f orl eav e to appea

l . T hese in

cl ude Lazen

by ’s argum

ent that the tr ia

l courterred i

n fa il i n g to d i re ct a v erdi ct on th e iss ue of pr ox i mate cause; Dec ker ’s ar gument t hat t he f i re man ’s ru l e does n ot ap pl y to his wil lf ul and w ant on c ond uct claims; and D eck er ’s ar gument t hat t he fi reman’s rule does n

ot appl y b ecause h

is in juri es res ulted f

ro m the
na rrow stai rwel l open i ng or a cardb oard

box rathe r than f rom th e f i re it se lf. Se e 1 55 I ll. 2 d R

. 36 6( b) ( 2) ( iii) (“ A pa rty may not u rge aserr or on re v i ew of th e r ul i n g on th e p ar ty ’s post-tri al moti on an y poi n t,-7- ground, or relief not spec ifi ed in the mo tio n”); Brow n v. Deca tur Memo rial

Hosp ital , 83 Ill. 2d 344, 349 ( 1980) ( an appell ant must pr ese nt h i s c on

ten ti on s wi th sp ec i f i ci ty i n a p ost trial m oti on to pr ese rve the m for re view); Marshall v. Burger King Corp. , 222 Ill . 2d 422, 430-31 ( 2006) (i ssues ra i sed f or the f i rst ti me on a ppea l are f orfe i ted); Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co. , 227 Ill . 2d 302, 320-21 ( 20 08 ) ( failu r e t o r ais e a n iss ue in a petition f or leave to appeal f orf ei ts the i ss ueon the me rits). Fi ndi ng those i ssuesfo r feit ed , we will not ad dress them on their meri ts. Tu rning to the is sue proper ly raise d by Decker, we mus

t decide whether section 9f

of t he A ct a

pp l i ed re troacti v el y to i m pos e a du ty on Mark ’sCons

tru c tion . Deck

er con tend s tha t the legi slature ex pr es sly int en de d s ec t io n 9 f t o ap ply t o ca us es cu rr en t ly pe nd ing in t he co ur t s. Sin ce his claims wer e pe nding in t he t rial co ur t at t he t ime of t he st at ut e’ s e na ct men t , De ck er as ks t his c o ur t t o ap ply th e statu te to t his case and t o r everse t he tr ial cou rt ’s ent ry o f summary judg ment aga inst him. T he ap pellat e co ur t in the case at bar reject ed Deck er’s argume n t an d h eld t ha t ap plying se ct io n 9 f r et r o ac t ive ly wo uld “i mpose a n

ew du ty on defen dants that did n

ot exi st two yea

rs pri or to sec t ion 9 f’s enac t ment a t t he t ime of Dec ker ’s inj ur ies,” t her eby violat ingdefen

dant’s due process ri

ghts. No

. 1–06–2969 (unpubl is hed order un der Su prem e Court Ru

l e 23). T his matte

r c om es b ef oreusi n th e c on te xt o f a m

oti on f or sum mary j udgm en t. Sum mary judgm ent is proper if, wh

en vie we d in t he l i gh t m ost f av ora ble to the nonmovi ng party, t he pl eadings, de pos i ti on s, ad m i ss i on s, an

d a f f i da v i ts on f i l e dem on strate that the re is no g enuine issue a s t o a ny mater ial fact a nd th at th e m ov i n g p ar ty is en ti tl ed to j udgm

en t a s a m atter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 200 4). Our re

vi ew of the c i rcui t court’s g

ran t of su m mary jud gme nt is de novo

. Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Filan , 216 Il l . 2d 653 , 661 (2 005). W e al so revi ew de novo t he
con sti tuti on al i ty of a statute and whether a party’ s constitutional ri ghts ha ve be en vi ola ted. Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak , 22 3 I ll. 2d 318 , 334 (2 006). Sec ti on 9f o f the Act beca me effect iveon July 22, 2003 . It stat es: “The ow ner or oc cup ier o f the premises an d hi s or her ag en ts o we fir e fight er s who ar e o n t he pr emises in t he performa nce of th ei r of f i ci al du ti es con du cti ng f i re-8- invest igat ions o rinsp ec t io nsor res pon di ng to f i re a l arm s or actual fire s o n t he pr emi ses a d ut y of re aso nable ca re in the
ma in tenance of th e p re m i se s a cc ordi n g to ap plic ab le f

i resaf ety codes, regulations, or din

ances, an d g en er ally a pp lica ble saf ety standards, including any de cisions by the I lli nois c ou rt s. T he
owner or occupi

er of the prem i ses and hi s or h er age

nts a re not rel i eved of the duty of re aso nable ca re if the fire figh t er is in jured due to the l ac k of maint en an ce o f t he pr emis es in t he
cour se of responding to a fire, false al arm , or his or her inspection or in

vestigation of the premi ses.
*** This Section applies to all causes of act ion tha t have accrued, will accrue, or are currently pendi ng bef ore a court of c ompetent jurisdiction, including courts of review.” (Em phasi s ad ded.) 4 25 IL CS 25 /9f

(We st 2004 ). In asse ssing wh et he ra s t at ut e s ho uld be ap plie d r et r o ac t ive ly, t his courthas adopted the approach set forth by the Uni ted St ates Su pr eme Courtin Landgraf v. USI FilmProdu cts , 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 22 9, 114 S . Ct. 1483 (1994 ). Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak , 223 Ill . 2d318, 330-32 (2006), citing Commonw ealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill . 2d 27, 37-39 (2001 ). This court recently sum ma rized the Landgraf

test as foll

ows: “The thres

hol d i nqu i ry is whet her t he leg isla t ur e h as ex pr es sly prescrib ed

the temporal reac

h of a s tatut e. I f it has, t he
ex pre ss i on of

l eg i sl ati v e i n ten t m us t b e g i v en ef f ec t absent a constitutional

prohibition . If

, however, t he st at ut e co nt ains no express pr ovisio n re gar ding its tem poralreach, t he court must det er mine wh eth er th e n ew sta tute wo uld have re t ro act ive ef f ec t, ke ep ing in

mind the gen er al

pri n ci pl e th at prospe cti

v i ty is the a ppropri ate def aul t ru l e. In mak ing t his det er minatio n, a co urt w ill

co nsider whet her re t ro act ive app licatio n of t he new statute wil

l i mpa ir ri ghts a party possess ed when actin g, in creases a party’ s lia

bi li ty f or past co nduct, or impose n ew dutieswith res

pect to transactions al

ready c ompleted. If
re t ro spe ct iveap plic at io n o f t he ne w la w h as ine qu it ab le
cons eque nc es, a courtwi l l pr es um e th at th e statu te doe s n ot govern abs ent cl ear

l egi slati ve i nten t fa vori ng s uch a res ul t.” ( E mph as is adde d.) John Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas , 23 4 I ll.-9- 2d 393, 405 (2009), citin

g Allegis , 223 Ill . 2d at 330-31 (c iting Landgraf

, 511 U.S. at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 262, 114 S. Ct. at 150 5, and Commonw ealth Edison , 196 Il

l . 2d at 38 ). In the statut e at iss

ue, the legi

sl ature cl ea r ly expr esse d it s inte nt that t he st at ut e b e g ive n r et r o ac t ive effe ct

. Se ct io n 9f states t hat “[ t ] his Section appl

ie s to all causesof ac t io n t ha t ha ve ac cr ue d, will accrue, or ar e cu rr ent ly pen ding befo re a co ur t of c omp et ent jurisd ictio n, in

cludi ng court s of revi ew.” 425 I LCS 25/9f (We st 2004 ). At the t im e of t he stat ut e’s enactment, this casewa s be fo r e t he cir cu it
cou rt. Ac co r di ng ly, purs ua

nt to Landgraf

, w e must follow t he leg isla tu re’s in

tention t o apply the statut e to this case unl ess t h e constituti on proh i bi ts us f rom d oin g so. Allegis , 223 Ill . 2d at 332. Two dec isions fro m this co ur t ar e inst ru ct ive on t he constitutional im pli cations of the retro active applic ation of a s tatut e. In Henrich v. Li bertyvilleHigh School , 186 Ill . 2d 381 (1998), an amen dme n t t o se cti on 3–108 of the Local

Governm

ental and Govern

me ntal E mp loy ees Tort Imm

uni ty Ac t (745 ILCS 10/3–108 (West 1994) ) allowing claims of willful and wanton m

is conduct against local

pu blic entities and emp lo yees t oo k effec t almost fou r year s aft er t he plaint if f’sca us e o f a ct io n a cc rue d. T his co ur t r ef us ed t o ap pl y th e amendment re t ro act ively because t he de fendant school dis trict had a “ve st ed righ t” to the tot al

im mun ity provided b

y the unam ended statut e. Henrich , 186 Ill . 2d at 404. We defi ned a vested right as “ ‘a
com pl ete and un condi tional dem and or exem

pt io n t hat may be equatedwith a

p roper t y inter est ,’ ” pr ot ect ed fr om legislat ive inter fere nc e by t h e du e pr oc ess c lause of t he I lli nois C ons t itu t ion. Henrich , 186 I l l . 2d

at 404, quot in

g First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead , 171 Il l . 2d 282 , 291 (1 996). A “ ‘v ested gr ound o f def

ense is as f ull y protected from b ei

ng cut off or destr oyed

by an act of t he l egi slature as i s a ves

ted caus e o f acti

on.’ ” Henrich , 186 Ill . 2d at 404-05, qu oting 1 6A

C.J.S

. Co n st i t u t i o n a l

L a w §260(b), at 91 (1984 ). Th e s ch

ool di stri ct’ s u nc on d itio nal imm

unit y under t he
unam ende d statut e d

i d n ot de pen d on th e en try of a j udgm en t. Theref ore, “ [t]h e a men de d s ec ti on

3–108 [could] not reach

back and take that vested righ

t away, i mpose a new du ty on th e s ch ool di str i ct, and breathe l

if e i nto t hi s previ

ously barred clai m .” Henrich , 186 Ill . 2d at 405.-10- In our s ub se que nt d ec i si on in Commonw

ealth Edison , we he ld

that app lyi ng certain tax

rate amen

dme nts to t ax le vies thatwere adopted by W i l l Cou n ty sh ortl y b ef oreth e e f f ec ti v e date of th e a men dm en ts did not violate the t axpay er’s due pro cess rights un de rt he I llino is Consti tution ( I ll. Cons t. 1970, a rt. I, §2). Commonw

ealth Edison , 196 I ll. 2d at 44-45. I n our anal

ys is of the retroact iv

ity is sue, we hel

d that t he La nd gr afapproach i s “the appropri ate means of determi ni ng when new le gis la tion sh ould be applie d to exi stin

g c ontrove

rsies.” Commonw

ealth Edison , 196 Ill . 2d at 39. Al though we “sw itch ed t he fo cus of t he first st ep o f the retroac ti vi ty an al y sis f rom ‘ves ted righ ts’ to le gis la

tive i ntent” ( John Doe A ., 234 Ill . 2d a t 4 11 ), w e n ev er th el es s h el d th at Henrich “remains rel

evan t *** i ns of ar a s i t de f i ne s th os e i ntere sts th at are prot ectedfro m legislative int er fere nce by t he due pr oc ess c lause of t he I llino is Constitution.” Commonw ealth Edison , 196 Ill . 2d at 47. We
sa id t hat ou r ho lding in Henrich , that t he sc ho o l di stri ct’stort i m m un i ty def en se h ad “ ve sted,” and thus was

prot ected from j udic ia

l in terference, was “s imp ly aspecifi c exam ple of the gene

ral m axi m that ‘settled expectations h

onestly arriv ed at with respect to substantial i n terests ough

t not to be def eated.’ ” Commonw

ealth Edison , 196 I ll. 2d at 48, quo ting Moore v. Jackson Park Hospital , 95 Ill . 2d 223, 241-42 (1983) (Ryan , C.J., concurring, j oine d by Underwoo d and Moran , JJ.). We dis t ing uis he d t he fac t s in Henri ch fr o m t ho se in Commonw

ealth Edison i

n two i m portant res

pects . Fi rst, the statutory amendment in Henrich b ec am e e f f ec ti v e a l most f our yea rs af te r t he plain tiff ’s ca us e of ac ti on arose, w hile t he pe r io d o f r et r o ac t ivit y in Commonw

ealth Ediso n was only six wee ks. Sec ond , a pplying t he
am ended st at ut e t o t he cla im in Henrich wo uld have meant “resurrectin

g a cl ai m that ha d prev i ousl y be en ba rred i n i ts en tire ty.” In contrast, the taxpay er was aware of the tax i tself prior to t he tax
ra te amendment an

d di d n ot h av e a v ested ri gh t i n th e r ate of t axat ion. Commonw

ealth Edison , 196 Ill . 2d at 48-49. The app ellate co ur t in the inst ant cas e and in Randich v. Pirtano Co nstru ction Co. , 34 6 Il l . A pp. 3d 4 14 ( 200 4), rel i ed on Commonw

ealth Edison to f

i nd tha t se cti on 9 f coul d n

ot co nst it ut io na lly

be appl ie d to the p laint iff

s’ claims. I n Randich , t he pla int iff was an e me rgency me dic al techni ci an (EMT) who was in

jured-11- in an exp losio n when he responded t o t he sc ene o f a leaking g as main. The ap pe llat e c o ur t fo un d th at t he fireman’s ru le pr event ed t he plain tiff ’s recovery f

or inj uries

he i ncur r ed wh il e r esp ond ing t o t he si tua ti on gi vi ng r i se to the em ergen cy

. Randich , 346 Ill . App. 3d at 423; se e al so Vroegh v. J& M Forkl ift , 165 Ill . 2d 523, 527 (1995) (“[ The f i rem an ’s ] rul e p rovides t hat an o wner or oc cup ier o f land must exercise r ea so na ble car e t o p re vent injury to firemen t hat might
r es ult fr o m a

cau se inde pend ent of t he fire, but has no dut y to pr event i nj ury resu l tin g f rom th e f i re i tself ”). The pl ai nti f f f i l ed a p eti ti on for re hear ing asse rt ing t hat t he ne wly enacted sec t ion 9 f app lied re t ro act ively to his claims becau se t he sta tute expr essly st at es t hat it ap plies t o p ending c aus es o f act ion. Randich , 346 Ill. App . 3 d at 426 -2 7. In a sup plement al op inion, t he Randich cou

rt c onc lude d that section 9f could n ot be appl

ie d
r et r o ac t ive ly

to the defe

ndan ts to im pose a duty upon them

t ha t did not pr ev io us ly

exist . T he cour t held that t he defen dants’ due pro cess ri gh ts wo uld be violat ed by r et ro act ively applying sect ion 9 f to t he plain tiff ’s clai m

. Randich , 346 Ill . App. 3d at 430 , c iting Commonw

ealth Edison , 19 6 I ll. 2d a t 48- 49. The co ur t held t hat t he de f en da n ts had a “vest ed r ight t o t ot al imm unit y from t he pros ecution of pla in tif f’ s negl ige nce cl ai m.” Randich , 346 Ill . App. 3d at 430, citing Henrich , 18 6 I ll. 2d at 404; see al so Harraz v. Snyder , 28 3 I ll. App. 3d 254, 256-57 (1996) (apply in g a v ested ri gh ts anal y si s wh ere t he vested righ t was establis

hed f rom the comm

on la w and l ater t aken away by a statute). The cou

rt f ur th er h el d th at i m pos i n g a n ew du ty on the de f endan ts more than f

our years af

ter t he acci

dent occurred would unf

ai rly resurrect a

clai m that wa s onc e b arred

. Randich , 346 Ill . App. 3d at 430. We agree wi

th the reasoni

ng of the Randich co ur t and hold that section 9f may not be co nstitutionall

y appl ied to Decker ’s cl aim

s. A
re t ro act ivech an ge in

the la w that im poses a new

duty i s “prohi

bi ted
as a v i ol ati on of

t he du e pr oc ess c lause of t he I lli nois C ons t itu t ion, and th e l eg i sl atu rei s wi th out a uth ori ty to enact such

a l aw even

if that is its ex press i ntention.” Valdez v. Zollar , 281 Ill . App. 3d 329, 333 (1996) , ci ting A rmstead , 171 Ill . 2d at 290. T he statute at is sue im poses a duty of reasonable care on lan downers a nd occu pi

er s to f i re f i gh te rs who ar e injure d du e t o t he lack of maint enanc e o f the premi ses in the cou rse of respo ndi

ng to fi res. The par ties a gre e that-12- t he duty did not exis

t pr i or t o e nact ment o f the st at ut e. Unde r t he fai rness co nsid er at io ns o f Commonw ealth Edison , apply

in g section 9f
r et r o ac t ive ly

wou l d di stu rb Ma rk ’s Con str uc ti on ’s “ sett le d
ex pe cta ti on s” an d i m pos e a du ty th at d i d n ot prev i ous l y ex i st. Th e imm unit y pro vided by t he fireman’s ru le is simi lar t o t he i m m un i ty f oun d to b e a “ v ested ri gh t” in Henrich . T he fire man ’s rule “goes to t he thr

es hol d qu es ti on of whether a

n ow ne r or oc cu pier of land has an y duty to fi re fi gh ters i nju r ed wh ile fig ht ing a fir e o n his premi ses. Whe r e t he rule app lies, it means t hat no dut y is i mpo sed by t he l aw.” Vroegh , 165 Ill . 2dat 530, citin g Court v. Grzelinski , 72 I ll. 2d 141 , 1 48 ( 197 8) . “[ T] her e is no point at which a def endan t subj ect to the ‘fireman’s

ru le’ can be sa id t o ha ve be en ev en po t en t ially liable f orthe i nj ury or wrongf

ul death . The

re coul d ne ver ha ve bee n a me ritorious cl ai

m b ecause there n

ever was a duty that wa s breache d.” Vroegh , 165 Ill. 2d at 531 . At th e time of Decker ’s injuries, Mar k’s Constru cti on had a valid expe ct at ion u nd er the l aw th at n o du ty exi stedt o fire fighte rs injur ed in t he co urse of thei r ordi na ry firefight ingduties. The p eri od of re troacti v i ty i n th i s c as e, a l thou gh of le sser im port ance, also weighs i

n f avor of f in din g no retro act iv it y. Sec ti on 9f was enacted al

most two years af

ter Deck er wa s i nj ured, a
muc h long er per iod of t ime than t he six we eks in Commonw ealth Edis on
. Retroacti

ve l y i m pos i ng l i ab i l i ty on M ark ’s

Constru cti on f or faili ng t o fulfill a du t y it did no t ha ve at t he t ime o f De ck er ’s inju ry is contrar y to notions of due

proces s in the I lli

nois C ons t itu t ion. Acco rdi ng ly, we aff

irm the entry of summ

ary j udgment against Deck er.

II. Mot i on

f or J udgm en t n.o.v. or New Trial Laze nby con ten dsth at th e t r ial c ourt erred in

fai li ng to enter judg ment n.o.v. or o rder a new trial based on the c ourt ’s prej udic ia l
err orin denying his mot ion fo r a dire ct ed finding o n defend ant ’s negl ige nce. In su ppo rt , La zenby

ci tes the evidence at

tr ial that Mark’s Constru cti on f ai l ed to pr ovid e fall pro t ect ion fo r t he hol e i n v i ol ati on o f sa fe st and ar ds and pr ac t ice s; Ko lbiar z’ s t es t imon y t hat he le ft t he ho le unprotect ed when

he l ef t work f orthe even

in g and that he kn

ew t he hole was a saf

ety hazard; an

d p laint iff

’s ex pert’s testim

ony tha t Mark’s Co nst ruc t io n’s fa il ure to provide f

al l protection vi

olated-13- con stru cti on sa f ety cu stom s and pr act ices and violat ed O SH A and ot her guidel

in es. A di re cte d verdi

ct or j udgm en t n.o.v. sho uld be granted onl y w hen

“ al l of the evi dence, when view ed in it s asp ect most favo ra ble to t he opp on en t, so overwh el

m i ngl y f av ors m ovan t that no c ontrary

verdict base d on that evi dence could ever stand.” Pedrick v. Peor ia & Eastern R.R. Co. , 3 7 I ll. 2d 4 94, 510 (1 967 ). Jud gment n.o. v. is i n appr opri ate

if “reasonable

mi nds m igh t dif fer as to i nf ere nc esor co nclusio ns to b e d

ra wn f rom th e f ac ts presented.” Pasquale v. Speed Produ ctsEngineering , 166 Ill . 2d 337, 351 (1995). We rev ie w de
novo t he t rial co ur t ’s de cision d enying Laze nby’s mot ion fo r jud gment
n.o.v. York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center , 22 2 I ll. 2d 147 , 178 (2 006). In this case, even

befo re t he de fense p re sent ed it s ca se in chief, t he j ury heard ev ide nce that both L azenb

y and Ma rk’s Cons tructi on we

re n eg l i gen t. Altho ugh L az en by dis pu t ed so me o f t he ev ide nc e o f his negl ige nce, a r evie wing co ur t “sho uld no t us ur p t he fu nc t ion o f the j ury and sub stitute its j udgme nt on questions of

fact f ai rly subm itted, tried, and d et er mined fro m the e vidence which d i d n o t gr ea t ly pr ep on dera

te ei ther way. [Ci

tations.]” Maple

v. Gustafson , 151 Ill . 2d 445, 452-5 3 (199 2). Give n t he co nflic t ing ev ide nc e a t t r ial, pa r t icu lar ly

the sig nifi cant evi dence of Lazen by ’s n egl ige nce presen

ted by the def ense, we can

not say that al

l of the evi dence, v ie wed favo r ab ly to Mark’ s Constructi

on, “ so overwh el

m i ngl y f av or[ ed ] [ La ze nby] t hat no con

trar y ve rdi ct b as ed on that evi dence could ever stan d.” Ped rick , 37 Ill . 2d at 510. T hus, we concl ude that the tr ia

l courtdi d n ot er r i n re f us i n g to gr an

t a dire ct ed ve rd ict o r jud gment
n.o.v. The standard of revi

ew i s diff

erent with regar d t o Laze nby ’s postt rial moti on f or a n ew trial . O n a m oti on f or a n ew trial , the c our

t, after wei ghi ng the ev ide nce, wi ll set asi de the verdict and order a new trial “ ‘ if t he ve r di ct is c o nt r ar y t o t he ma nifest w eight of t he
ev id en ce.’ ” Maple , 151 Ill . 2d at 454, quo ting Mizow ek v. De Franco , 64 Ill . 2d 303, 310 (1976). A verdict i s aga in st t he
man if est wei ght of the evi

dence “ ‘where the opposi

te co ncl us io n is cle ar ly evi dent or where the fi

ndi ngs of the jur y a re unreasonab le , arb i trary an d n ot b as ed up on an y of th e ev i den ce .’ [C i

tations. ]” Maple , 151 Ill . 2d at 454. We wil l n ot reverse a co ur t ’s r uling on a-14- moti on fo rne w t r ial u nle ss it is

aff irm ative ly shown that

the tri al court clearl y abuse d i ts di scre tion

. Maple , 151 Ill . 2d at 455. Laze nby ha s fa iled t o mee t his burden t o e st ablish his ent itlement to a n ew t r ial. T he jur y re t ur ne d a ge ne r al v erd ict for Mar k’s Constru cti on an d d id not sp ec i f y an y f i nd i ng s of f ac t. La zenb y di d n ot su bmit a special i

nter ro gat or y as to t he basis of the jury’s fi ndi ng. The jury’s verdict, t heref

ore, is si le nt as to the

j ury ’s rea sons f orfind ing in f av orof the def

endan t. Gu y v. Steurer , 239 Ill . App. 3d 304, 307 (1 992 ). “ ‘When t her e is a g ener al verd ict a nd mor e t han o ne theory is pr ese nt ed, t he verdict wil l b e uphel d if there was suf

fi ci ent evi dence to su st ain eit he rt he o ry, an d t he [ mo vin g p ar t y] , h av i n g f ai l ed to request special

in terro gator ie s, cann

ot compl ai n.’ ” Di llon v. Evanston Hospital , 199 Ill . 2d483, 49 2 (200 2), quot in g Witherell v. Weimer

, 118 Il l . 2d 321 , 329 (1 987). The re quir ement t hat a co mplaining pa rty request a spe cial inter ro gat or y applies bo t h t o a co mplaining pla int iff and to a com

pl ai ni ng d ef endan t. Krklus v. Stanley , 359 Il l

. App. 3d 471, 479(20 05) . Se e al so Strino v. Premier Healthcare A ssociates, P.C. , 365 Ill . App. 3d 895, 904 (2006) (where a defen dant rais es two ormore def

enses , under

the “two iss

ue” rule , a general

verdict creates a pr esu mpt ion t hat t he jur y found in favor of t he de f en da nt on ev ery one of the def en ses ). In this case, the j ury was

in structed t o fill o ut Ve r dic t Fo r m C if it f o und either (1) f

or the de f endan t and agai nst the pl ai ntif f , or (2) “that pla in tif f’ s contrib

uto ry n egl ige nce w as mo re t han 50 % o f the to talpr oximat e ca use of t he injury o r d amage for which r eco ve ry is sough t.” The jury wa s fur t her instr uct ed t hat “if the p laint iff’ s contri butory ne glig en ce is more than

50% o f the tot al proxim

ate cause of the in jury or damage f

or which re co ver y is sou ght , t he de fendant sh all be f oun d n ot l i ab l e.” Th e j ury retu rn ed a g en era l ve rdi ct on Ve r di ct Fo r m C f

o rMa r k’ s C o ns t ruc t io n a nd ag ain st La ze nby. The general v

erdict rendered by the jury creat es a presu m ption that the jury f

ound in f avor o f Mark’s Construct ion on every defense rais ed, in cl udin g that Lazenb

y was greater than 50 % negligent , a nd thus ba rred from an

y recove ry. See Dillon , 19 9 Ill. 2d at 492 ; G uy , 239 Ill . App. 3d at 307. Based on our rev

i ew of the re cord, we find t he r e w as cle ar ly sufficient evi den

ce to sus tai n the v erdi

ct on the theory of c omp ar at ive negl ige nce. The j ur

y wa s pre se

n te d wit h evidenc e t hat Laze nby-15- violated the chai n of com ma nd an d the department’s po licies by
en te ring the house wi

thout orders or authorization. The evi dence fur ther showed that Lazenb

y c ontinued i

nto t he h ouse bef ore a charged hos e line ha d ar rive d, igno re d a d irect or der t o w ait, and fai le d to u se an ax e o ro t he rt o o l t o so un d t he flo o rin fr o nt o f him. Lazenby’s

su pe rior off ic er and the def

ense ex pert bot h testif

ie d that Laze nby violated t he depar tment’s po licies and br eac hed t he stan dard of car e by “freelanc ing” and that, had Lazenb y n ot been freel anci ng, he wo uld no t have be en injure d. The evidenc e wa s su ffi cient for t he j ury to have concl

uded Lazenby

was m ore th an

50 % n eg l i gen t, t her eby barri ng an y rec o ve ry . Be ca us e the j ury ’s

ve rdi ct w asnot agains t the ma nifes t weigh t o f the ev ide nce, weconcl

ude that t he trial
co ur t did no t ab us e it s d isc r et io n in r efu sing t o gr an t a n ew t r ial.

CONCLUSION For t he fo re go ing re aso ns, w e affirm the judg ment of th e a pp el l ate cou rt.
Aff irmed

.