COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA18 

Court of Appeals No. 15CA0414 

Weld County District Court Nos. 12CR424 & 12CR506 

Honorable Shannon D. Lyons, Judge 

Honorable Todd L. Taylor, Judge 

The People of the State of Colorado, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

Bradford Steven Raehal, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, SENTENCED VACATED IN PART, 

AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS 

Division VII 

Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS 

Lichtenstein and Richman, JJ., concur 

Announced February 23, 2017 

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Patricia R. Van Horn, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Krista A. Schelhaas, Alternate Defense Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant 
1 

¶ 1 Bradford Steven Raehal was convicted of multiple sexual 

offenses in connection with his sexual abuse of two boys, S.F. and 

J.H. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in granting 

the prosecution’s joinder motion, denying his motion to suppress 

evidence, and admitting unproven prior acts evidence under CRE 

404(b). 

¶ 2 We reject each of these contentions, and therefore affirm 

Raehal’s convictions. However, Raehal also contends that the court 

erroneously designated him a sexually violent predator without 

making the necessary findings. We agree, and thus we vacate this 

designation and remand for appropriate findings. 

I. Background 

¶ 3 Raehal was living in the basement of S.F.’s family home when 

he was arrested for failing to register as a sex offender. Shortly 

after the arrest, S.F. disclosed that Raehal had sexually assaulted 

him on numerous occasions. 

¶ 4 During a forensic interview, S.F. detailed the assaults and 

reported that Raehal had taken nude pictures of him on a digital 

camera. Police officers thereafter obtained and executed a search 
2 

warrant for Raehal’s residence and seized the digital camera. 

Forensic analysis of the camera recovered thirteen previously 

deleted pictures of S.F. and Raehal engaged in sexual activity. 

¶ 5 J.H., who also lived at S.F.’s house, initially denied that he 

was sexually assaulted by Raehal, but he later reported three 

separate incidents of sexual abuse. While the boys each reported 

different types of sexual contact, both S.F. and J.H. alleged that 

abuse occurred in Raehal’s semitrailer, that Raehal had provided 

them with videogames, and that he initiated the contact by rubbing 

lotion on their backs. 

¶ 6 Raehal was initially charged in separate cases for the incidents 

with S.F. (12CR424) and the incidents with J.H. (12CR506). The 

prosecution moved to join the cases before trial, and the district 

court granted the motion over defense counsel’s objection. 

¶ 7 After a jury trial, Raehal was convicted of two counts of sexual 

assault on a child by one in a position of trust (one for acts against 

S.F. and one for acts against J.H.) and two counts of sexual assault 

on a child as part of a pattern of abuse (one for acts against S.F. 

and one for acts against J.H.). He was further convicted of two 
3 

counts of sexual exploitation of a child for the possession and 

production of sexually exploitive material relating to the pictures 

taken of S.F. In a separate proceeding, Raehal was adjudicated a 

habitual sex offender against children. The district court 

designated him a sexually violent predator and sentenced him to 

112.5 years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. 

II. Joinder 

¶ 8 Raehal contends that the district court erred in joining the 

cases alleging abuse of S.F. and J.H. While he admits that S.F.’s 

testimony would have been admissible as CRE 404(b) evidence in 

the case relating to J.H., he insists that the cases were improperly 

joined because the explicit photographs depicting Raehal and S.F. 

engaged in sexual acts would not have been admissible in J.H.’s 

trial. 

¶ 9 Although Raehal objected to the pretrial joinder of the cases, 

the People contend that Raehal waived this claim because he did 

not renew his objection during trial. See People v. Bondsteel, 2015 

COA 165, ¶ 27 (cert. granted Oct. 31, 2016). We disagree, and 

conclude that the claim was adequately preserved. 
4 

¶ 10 The division in Bondsteel held that an objection to joinder is 

unpreserved if not renewed at trial, id., but the division also 

acknowledged that its holding departed from nearly fifteen years of 

contrary precedent. See People v. Gross, 39 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Colo. 

App. 2001) (requiring only a pretrial objection to preserve the issue). 

Raehal’s trial preceded the Bondsteel decision. Accordingly, we 

decline to impose its new rule on Raehal. See Bondsteel, ¶ 30 

(recognizing that, “[t]o hold that the issue is waived, despite this 

precedent, could be a retroactive application of a new rule, which 

might implicate due process”). 

¶ 11 A trial court may order two or more criminal complaints to be 

tried together if the offenses could have been joined in a single 

complaint. Crim. P. 13. Two or more offenses may be charged in 

the same charging document if the offenses are of the same or 

similar character or are based on two or more connected acts or 

transactions or parts of a larger scheme or plan of action. Crim. P. 

8(a)(2). 

¶ 12 We review a decision concerning the joinder of separate 

charges for an abuse of discretion. People v. Curtis, 2014 COA 100, 
5 

¶ 14. An abuse of discretion occurs when the joinder causes actual 

prejudice as result of the jury’s inability to separate the facts and 

legal theories applicable to each offense. Id. at ¶ 15; People v. 

Gregg, 298 P.3d 983, 985-86 (Colo. App. 2011). There is no 

prejudice where evidence of each offense would be admissible in 

separate trials. Gregg, 298 P.3d at 986. 

¶ 13 Pursuant to CRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 

acts is inadmissible if its relevance depends on an inference that 

the person has a bad character and acted in conformity with that 

character. However, this evidence may be admissible for other 

purposes. CRE 404(b); see also § 16-10-301(1), C.R.S. 2016 

(permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of other sexual 

offenses for any purpose other than propensity because “such 

evidence of other sexual acts is typically relevant and highly 

probative”). 

¶ 14 Raehal concedes that, under CRE 404(b), S.F.’s testimony 

describing the sexual assaults would have been admissible in a 

separate trial on the charges related to J.H., but he insists that the 

photographs depicting the abuse would not have been admissible. 
6 

According to Raehal, the court should have conducted a separate 

Rule 404(b) analysis with respect to the photographs and 

determined that the sexual conduct shown in the photographs was 

not sufficiently similar to the sexual conduct described by J.H. For 

example, Raehal says, S.F. and J.H. both testified that Raehal 

rubbed lotion on them as a prelude to sexual activity, but the 

photos did not depict that particular conduct. 

¶ 15 We disagree that the district court was required to separately 

analyze the photos under CRE 404(b). Raehal does not allege that 

the taking of the photographs was an independent prior bad act 

under Rule 404(b). The photographs were admitted not to prove a 

common scheme or plan but simply to corroborate S.F.’s testimony. 

See People v. Roark, 643 P.2d 756, 762 (Colo. 1982) (“[P]hotographs 

are admissible to depict graphically anything a witness may 

describe in words.”); see also People v. Herrera, 2012 COA 13, ¶ 33. 

When photographs are admitted for this purpose, the admissibility 

test articulated in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 

1990), is inapplicable. 
7 

¶ 16 Accordingly, we need only address Raehal’s claim that the 

photographs were unduly prejudicial under CRE 403. Pursuant to 

Rule 403, “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” CRE 

403. Photographs are not inadmissible “merely because they 

present vividly to the jurors the details of a shocking crime.” People 

v. Villalobos, 159 P.3d 624, 630 (Colo. App. 2006) (quoting Martinez 

v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 177, 235 P.2d 810, 814 (1951)). Nor are 

they rendered inadmissible because these “grim details . . . might 

shock or otherwise upset the trier of fact.” People v. Drake, 748 

P.2d 1237, 1248 (Colo. 1988). Evidence is only unfairly prejudicial 

if it has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper 

basis such as sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror. 

People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043 (Colo. 2002). While the 

photographs are undoubtedly upsetting, given their probative value 

in corroborating S.F.’s testimony and proving the sexual assault, we 

cannot say that they are unduly inflammatory in the context of a 

sexual assault on a child case. See People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 

747 (Colo. 1999) (Photos of entry wounds “were not particularly 
8 

shocking in the context of a murder.”); People v. Guffie, 749 P.2d 

976, 983 (Colo. App. 1987) (probative value outweighed prejudice of 

graphic pictures of homicide victim, even though witness had 

already testified to the contents of the photos). 

¶ 17 Raehal also contends that the district court further erred by 

failing to provide an instruction limiting the purposes for which the 

jury could consider his conduct against S.F. in determining guilt as 

to J.H. See § 16-10-301(4)(d). However, because defense counsel 

did not request such an instruction when the evidence was 

introduced, we analyze this issue under the plain error standard of 

review. People v. Underwood, 53 P.3d 765, 771 (Colo. App. 2002). 

Under plain error, we will reverse only if the error was obvious and 

“undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to 

cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” 

People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005) (quoting People v. 

Sepulveda 65 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Colo. 2003)). 

¶ 18 Even if we assume the court erred by failing to give a limiting 

instruction, any error did not affect the reliability of the judgment of 

conviction. 
9 

¶ 19 Although it did not provide a limiting instruction directing the 

jury not to consider any evidence of other acts as propensity 

evidence, the district court specifically instructed the jury that 

“[e]ach count charges a separate and distinct offense and the 

evidence and law applicable to each count should be considered 

separately, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other count.” 

We presume the jury followed this instruction, which similarly 

limited the jury’s consideration of the evidence. See Curtis, ¶ 23. 

¶ 20 In sum, because any error could not have cast serious doubt 

on the reliability of the judgment of conviction,reversal is not 

required. 

III. Seizure and Subsequent Search of Digital Camera 

¶ 21 Raehal further contends that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress the explicit photographs because 

the digital camera on which they were discovered was outside the 

scope of the search warrant. In the alternative, he asserts that even 

if the camera was properly seized, it was illegally searched because 

it was not analyzed until months later, long after the warrant had 
10 

expired. We reject both contentions and conclude that the district 

court did not err in denying Raehal’s motion to suppress. 

¶ 22 Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a 

mixed issue of fact and law. People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1221-22 

(Colo. 2000). While we will defer to a trial court’s findings of fact 

that are supported in the record, the trial court’s legal conclusions 

are subject to de novo review. Id. at 1222. 

¶ 23 The search warrant specifically authorized the seizure of “any 

and all computer systems and computer equipment,” “any and all 

storage media,” and “any and all computer peripheral devices 

attached or unattached to the computer to include but not limited 

to . . . physical devices which serve to transmit or receive 

information to and from the computer.” The warrant also 

authorized the officers to look for and seize “images, video, or 

drawings which portray child pornography.” In addition, the 

warrant affidavit reported S.F.’s statement that the defendant had 

taken digital pictures of him with a gray or silver digital camera. 

¶ 24 In deciding whether items discovered during the execution of a 

search warrant are within the scope of the warrant, police officers 
11 

are not obliged to interpret its terms narrowly. People v. Gall, 30 

P.3d 145, 153 (Colo. 2001). 

¶ 25 We agree with the district court that digital cameras “are 

certainly physical devices that can transmit and receive information 

from computers,” and, therefore, the digital camera seized from 

Raehal’s residence was within the scope of the search warrant. 

¶ 26 Moreover, when executing a warrant, officers may search the 

location, including any containers or “technological containers” at 

that location that are reasonably likely to contain items described in 

the warrant. Id. (upholding seizure of computer because it was 

reasonably likely to serve as a “container” for writings). Here, the 

officers were authorized to search for images of child pornography, 

and the digital camera was reasonably likely to serve as a 

“technological container” for these images, especially in light of the 

victim’s statement, contained in the affidavit, that Raehal had taken 

pictures of him with a digital camera. Accordingly, the camera was 

properly seized pursuant to the warrant. 

¶ 27 Raehal asserts, in the alternative, that even if the camera was 

lawfully seized, it was unlawfully searched because the forensic 
12 

analysis occurred outside the statutory fourteen-day time frame for 

executing the warrant. See § 16-3-305(6), C.R.S. 2016; Crim. P. 

41(d). According to his argument, because the original warrant had 

expired before the camera was searched, unless the police obtained 

a second warrant, the later analysis of the camera constituted an 

unconstitutional warrantless search. 

¶ 28 The warrant, though, was executed within the fourteen-day 

deadline. The requirement that search warrants be executed 

promptly prevents officers from conducting searches long after the 

probable cause supporting the search has expired. See People v. 

Russom, 107 P.3d 986, 991 (Colo. App. 2004); see also United 

States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1173 (8th Cir. 2009). But in this 

case, when the warrant was executed, the officers still had probable 

cause to believe that the camera would be found in Raehal’s house 

and that it would contain images of child pornography. 

¶ 29 The officers were not required to conduct an analysis of the 

digital camera at Raehal’s house. Typically, search warrants which 

specifically authorize the seizure of technology contemplate the later 
13 

search of that media. See United States v. Gregoire, 638 F.3d 962, 

967-68 (8th Cir. 2011).1 

¶ 30 And a second warrant to search properly seized media is not 

necessary where the evidence obtained in the search does not 

exceed the probable cause articulated in the original warrant. See 

United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 2012); see also 

United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 2006). 

Here, based on an affidavit establishing probable cause, the search 

warrant expressly authorized the examination of any computer and 

storage devices for images of child pornography. Because the 

images could not have been altered or deleted once the camera was 

seized, probable cause for the search did not dissipate in the 

interval between the initial seizure of the camera and its 

subsequent search. Brewer, 588 F.3d at 1173 (Because the 

evidence at issue was “electronically-stored files in the custody of 

 

1 We note the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure analog to Crim. 

P. 41(d) was amended in 2009 to state that, “[u]nless otherwise 

specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or 

information consistent with the warrant. The time for executing the 

warrant in Rule 41(e)(2)(A) and (f)(1)(A) refers to the seizure or 

on-site copying of the media or information, and not to any later 

off-site copying or review.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B). 
14 

law enforcement[,] . . . the several months’ delay in searching the 

media did not alter the probable cause analysis.”); United States v. 

Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Probable cause to 

search was unaffected by the delay and the reasons to search the 

computer and hard drives did not dissipate during the month and a 

half the items sat in an evidence locker.”); United States v. Syphers, 

426 F.3d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 2005) (One-year delay in searching 

computer after it was seized did not invalidate the search because 

the delay did not “cause[] a lapse in probable cause.”). 

¶ 31 The cases Raehal cites do not undercut this rule. In those 

cases, a second warrant to search electronic media was required 

because, while conducting the subsequent search of the media, 

evidence of a different crime was inadvertently uncovered. 

Generally, to continue to search for evidence of this second crime, a 

second search warrant is required. See United States v. Carey, 172 

F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (the original warrant authorized a 

search of the computer for evidence related to illegal drug sales; 

when the officers found evidence of another crime — possession of 

child pornography — another warrant was needed to search for this 
15 

evidence); Grimmett, 439 F.3d at 1268 (“[L]aw enforcement may not 

expand the scope of a search beyond its original justification.”). 

Where, as here, the evidence uncovered on the media was within 

the scope of the original search warrant, the original warrant is 

sufficient to authorize the search. See Grimmett, 439 F.3d at 1268 

(distinguishing Carey and concluding that the original warrant 

authorized the subsequent computer search because the evidence 

uncovered was within the original justification for the search and 

seizure of the computer). 

IV. Factual Predicate for CRE 404(b) Evidence 

¶ 32 At trial, pursuant to Rule 404(b), the prosecution presented 

evidence of two previous incidents in which Raehal had sexually 

assaulted minor boys. Raehal contends that this evidence was 

improperly admitted because the prosecution’s offer of proof was 

inaccurate. We are not persuaded. 

¶ 33 Before a trial court may admit other acts evidence, it must 

first determine whether the prosecution has established by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the other act occurred and the 

defendant committed it. § 16-10-301(4)(b); People v. Gallegos, 226 
16 

P.3d 1112, 1116 (Colo. App. 2009). This determination may be 

made based on an offer of proof. § 16-10-301(4)(c). 

¶ 34 Prior to trial, the prosecution moved to admit evidence, 

pursuant to section 16-10-301 and Rule 404(b), that Raehal had 

previously sexually assaulted two young boys. In the offer of proof, 

the prosecution summarized the boys’ statements to police, which 

alleged that Raehal had sexually assaulted them after inviting them 

to his home to play video games. The detective’s reports were 

attached to the offer of proof. 

¶ 35 Shortly after the boys’ disclosures to the police, Raehal was 

charged with two counts of sexual assault on a child and one count 

of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse. Raehal 

was convicted of one count of sexual assault on a child, and a 

mistrial was declared on the other two counts.2 

¶ 36 In the motion to admit the Rule 404(b) evidence, the 

prosecutor accurately stated that these acts “resulted in a 

 

2 While the pattern of abuse count was dismissed by the court, the 

second sexual assault on a child count was dismissed by the 

prosecution after the victim’s mother stated that she did not want 

to put her child through another trial. 
17 

conviction for Sexual Assault on a Child in Adams County case 

95CR1806.” However, less accurately, she also averred that “[t]he 

defendant has been convicted of the offenses set forth in the Offer of 

Proof.” 

¶ 37 Despite the imprecise nature of this second statement, the 

court was not under any illusions that Raehal was convicted of both 

counts of sexual assault on a child arising out of the offer of proof. 

Rather, the court explicitly acknowledged that Raehal was only 

convicted of one count arising from these allegations, but 

nonetheless determined that the offer of proof was sufficient to find, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that all of the prior acts 

occurred. See Kinney v. People, 187 P.3d 548, 554 (Colo. 2008) 

(“Prior act evidence can be admitted even though the defendant was 

acquitted of the criminal charges arising out of the act.”). 

Accordingly, the district court’s determination that the prior acts 

occurred was not based on erroneous information. Because Raehal 

does not otherwise challenge the admission of this evidence, we 

perceive no error. 
18 

V. Designation as a Sexually Violent Predator 

¶ 38 Finally, Raehal contends, and the People concede, that the 

district court erred by designating him a sexually violent predator 

without first making specific findings of fact on the record. 

¶ 39 Section 18-3-414.5(2), C.R.S. 2016, requires district courts to 

make specific findings of fact regarding whether a defendant is a 

sexually violent predator. See People v. Loyas, 259 P.3d 505, 512 

(Colo. App. 2010); People v. Tuffo, 209 P.3d 1226, 1231 (Colo. App. 

2009). But here, the district court did not make any findings on the 

record on this issue. Accordingly, we must vacate Raehal’s sexually 

violent predator designation and remand for further findings. See 

Tuffo, 209 P.3d at 1231-32. 

VI. Conclusion 

¶ 40 The judgment of conviction is affirmed. We vacate the district 

court’s determination that Raehal is a sexually violent predator, and 

remand for further findings on this issue. 

JUDGE LICHTENSTEIN and JUDGE RICHMAN concur.