No. 86-280 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsHAROLD NOEL ST. GODDARD, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable G. Todd Baugh, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Donald A. Garrity, Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana 

Donna K. Heffington, Deputy County Atty., Billings, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 13, 1987 

Decided: March 19, 1987 

Filed: W(AR 1 9 1987 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Defendant, Harold St. Goddard, appeals a Yellowstone 

County District Court jury verdict convicting him of sexual 

intercourse without consent. We affirm. 

Defendant was a teacher and track coach during the 

school years 1983-84 and part of 1984-85. The victim, C.L., 

was under the age of 16 and an eighth grader at another 

school. C.L. contends that during this time, she and 

defendant entered into a romantic liaison. A sexual 

relationship allegedly started with defendant fondling C.L. 

on December 17, 1983. Sexual intercourse eventually occurred 

on numerous occasions. However, C.L. is apparently unable to 

remember specific details or dates other than August 9, 1984. 

C.L. testified at trial that she was attending a debate 

conference in Billings, Montana, on August 9, 1984. 

Defendant allegedly came to the dorm where she was staying 

and drove her to a motel where he had rented a room. C.L. 

testified that she became angry with defendant that night and 

did not wish to engage in sexual intercourse with him. She 

further testified that she fell asleep and awoke to defendant 

performing sexual intercourse on her. 

Defendant allegedly ended the relationship in the fall 

of 1984. C.L. wrote numerous letters to defendant asking him 

to contact her. The letters contained false information 

designed to engage defendant's sympathies and force him to 

communicate with her. C.L.'s mother found drafts of the 

letters in C.L.'s wastebasket. Charges were thereafter 

brought against defendant, alleging that defendant engaged in 

sexual intercourse without consent with an individual under 

the age of 16 on August 9, 1984. 
Defendant denies having a romantic or sexual 

relationship with C.L. C.L. babysat for his two sons. 

Defendant and his wife were friends of C.L.'s parents. 

Defendant contends that he and C.L.'s mother had an affair in 

the summer of 1984. After finding his wife in bed with 

defendant, C.L. ' s step-father sought revenge by having these 

charges brought. 

The jury trial lasted five days. Testimony was obtained 

from many individuals, including defendant, the victim, her 

friends, her doctor and her social worker, Linda Crummett. 

Ms. Crummett is a clinical social worker who specializes in 

treating victims of sexual abuse. She had been counseling 

C.L. for sexual abuse for nearly a year at the time of the 

trial. Ms. Crummett was a witness for the State. On 

cross-examination, victim's counsel elicited the following 

testimony: 

Q. Ms. Crummett, you indicated that [C.L.] had 

evidenced suicidal tendencies, anxiety, extremely 

worried? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Now if you had falsely accused someone of 

having sexually assaulted you don't you think those 

symptoms might likely be present? 

A. I don't think they could be maintained over 

this amount of time. 

Q. You don't think they could? 

A. Nor do I think she would submit herself to this 

kind of process. 

Q. You don't think she would be extremely worried, 

she'd be anxious or be suicidal if she falsely 

accused this man of having had sexual intercourse 

with her, that's your testimony? 

A. That's possible, but I don't think it could be 

sustained. 
Q. Again your testimony is based upon what she has 

told you, what the county attorney has told you, 

what the investigating officers have told you, and 

what her parents have told you? 

A. Yes, and I believe her. 

Q. And you believe her? 

A. Yes, I do. 

Tr. vol. I, p. 46, In. 1-24. 

Defense counsel made no objection to or motion to strike 

Ms. Crummett's comment that she believed the victim. There 

was no motion for mistrial either. In her closing argument, 

the prosecutor briefly referred to Ms. Crumrnett 's statement 

that she believed the victim's story. Again, no objection 

was made. 

Following five hours of deliberation, the jury reached a 

guilty verdict. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to ten 

years in the Montana State Prison and ordered to pay C.L. 

$3,000 for counseling expenses. Two issues are raised on 

appeal : 

1. In a prosecution for sexual intercourse with a 

child, may an expert in sexual abuse express the opinion that 

she believes the story of the prosecuting witness? 

2. Was it error to allow the prosecuting witness to 

testify that she and the defendant had engaged in sex on 

other occasions? 

Appellant objects to Ms. Crummett's statement that she 

believed the prosecuting witness as invading the province of 

the jury. Appellant acknowledges that no objection or motion 

to strike was entered at the time Ms. Crummett made the 

statement. He claims, however, that the issue may be raised 

on appeal anyway under the "plain error" rule. However, the 
1983 Legislature substantially limited application of the 

"plain error" rule in criminal appeals. 

46-20-104. Scope of appeal by defendant. . . . (2) Upon appeal from a judgment, the court may 

review the verdict or decision and any alleged 

error objected to which involves the merits or 

necessarily affects the judgment. Failure to make 

a timely objection during trial constitutes a 

waiver of the objection except as provided in 

46-20-702. 

46-20-702. Types of errors noticed on appeal. . . No claim alleging an error affecting 

jurisdictional or constitutional rights may be 

noticed on appeal, if the alleged error was not 

objected to as provided in 46-20-104, unless the 

defendant establishes that the error was 

prejudicial as to his guilt or punishment and that: 

(1) the right asserted in the claim did not exist 

at the time of the trial and has been determined to 

be retroactive in its application; 

(2) the prosecutor, the judge, or a law 

enforcement agency suppressed evidence from the 

defendant or his attorney that prevented the claim 

from being raised and disposed of; or 

(3) material and controlling facts upon which the 

claim is predicated were not known to the defendant 

or his attorney and could not have been ascertained 

by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 

The alleged error does not meet the criteria contained 

in S 46-20-702, MCA. We therefore refuse to entertain the 

first issue. 

The second issue is whether it was error to allow C.L. 

to testify about other occasions when she and the defendant 

had engaged in sexual intercourse. Rule 404(b), M.R.~vid. 

and State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957, 

control. Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid. states: 

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, acts. Evidence of other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 

the character of a person in order to show that he 

acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 

accident. 

In Just, supra, this Court further limited the use of 

other crimes evidence. Before other crimes evidence may be 

admitted, the State must provide: 

1) notice of the introduction of the evidence; 

2) an explanation to the jury at the time of the 

introduction of the evidence about the purpose for 

which the evidence is introduced; and 

3) an instruction that the evidence is to be 

received only for the enumerated limited purposes. 

Just, 184 Mont. at 274, 602 P.2d at 963-964. 

All criteria have been met in this instance. A Just, 

notice was filed by the State 3 days before the start of the 

trial. The jury was cautioned before the introduction of the 

evidence. See transcript, vol. I, p. 59, In. 4-18. The jury 

was instructed on the same matter in Instruction No. 4. 

Just, supra, also contains a four-part test for 

determining whether the other crimes are substantively 

admissible. They are: 

1) similarity of crimes or acts; 

2) nearness in time; 

3) tendency to establish a common scheme, plan or 

system; and 

4) probative value of the evidence outweighs the 

prejudicial effect. 

Just, 184 Mont. at 269, 602 P.2d at 961. 

Again, all criteria are met. The evidence is of crimes 

identical to the one with which defendant is charged. The 

acts occured within a 9 month span. They show the system of 

operation engaged in by the defendant, engaging in a sexual 
relationship with C.L. Finally, their probative value 

outweighs their prejudicial effect. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: