ANALYSIS REPORT ON

FIRE FIGHTER FATALITIES

Prepared for

Federal Emergency Management Agency

U.S. Fire Administration

Contract No EMW-92-C-3900

August 1993

Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations express in this

publication do no necessarily reflect the view of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency
This document was scanned from hard copy to portable document format (PDF)

and edited to 99.5% accuracy. Some formatting errors not detected during the

optical character recognition process may appear.
Acknowledgements

This study was funded by the U.S. Fire Administration of the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It would not have been possible

without the cooperation and assistance of the U.S. fire service, the United States

Fire Administration, the Public safety Officers' Benefits Program of the

Department of Justice, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, the Bureau of

Land Management of the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Indian

Affairs, the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. military, all of whom

contributed data to this study.

The assistance of other NFPA staff members is also acknowledged: Dr.

John R. Hall, Jr., Assistant Vice President, Fire Analysis and Research; Martin

Henry, Assistant Vice President, Public Fire Protection; Alison Miller,

Christopher Conley, Gary Stein, Michael Sullivan, Kenneth Tremblay and

Michael Karter, Fire Analysis and Research Division; and William Baden, Jon

Jones, Carl Peterson and Gary Tokle, Public Fire Protection Division.

The authors also wish to acknowledge the assistance of USFA staff,

particularly John Ottoson, Project Officer, for their suggestions and support.

Rita F. Fahy

Arthur Washburn

Paul R. LeBlanc

Project Staff

National Fire Protection Association
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Table of Contents

Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Introduction ............................................................... 1

Who Is a Fire Fighter? ................................................. 1

What Constitutes an On-Duty Fatality? ..........................

Sources of Initial Notification ...................................... 3

Procedure for Including a Fatality in the Study ............. 4

Additional Data Collection Completed

for the Contract ...................................................... 5

1992 Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 7

A. Type of Duty .......................................................... 7

B. Cause and Nature of Fatal Injury or Illness... ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

C. Ages of Fire Fighters ................................................ 14

D. Fire Ground Deaths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

E. Time of Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

F. Month of the Year

G. State and Region

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

H. Analysis of Urban/Rural/Suburban Patterns

in Fire Fighter Fatalities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Fatal Accidents Involving Tankers 1983 - 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Fire Ground Fatalities As a Result of Structural Collapses

1983 - 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

References ............................................................................... 47

i
List of Figures

Figure Page

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2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

l l

12

13

14

15

16 Fire Fighter Fatalities in Structural Collapses 1983 -

1992

17

18

Title

On-Duty Fire Fighter Deaths 1983-1992

Fire Fighter Deaths 1992 by Type of Duty

Fire Fighter Deaths 1992 by Cause of Injury

Fire Fighter Deaths 1992 by Nature of Injury

Fire Fighter Deaths 1992 by Age and Cause

of Death

Average Death Rates per 10,000 Fire Fighters

1988-1992

Fire Ground Deaths in 1992 by Fixed Property Use

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1992 by Time of Alarm

Fire Fighter Fatalities by Time of Alarm 1983-1992

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1992 by Month of Year

Fire Fighter Fatalities by Month of Year 1983-1992

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1992 by Region

Motor Vehicles Accidents Resulting in Fire Fighter

Fatalities 1983-1992

Fatal Tanker Accidents 1983 - 1992

Profile of Drivers in Fatal Tanker Accidents 1983 -

1992

Fatalities in Structural Collapses by Year 1983 - 1992

Fatalities in Structural Collapses by Region 1983 -

1992

8

9

12

13

15

16

19

20

22

23

24

27

31

34

35

4 1

42

43

ii
List of Tables

Table Title Page

1 1992 On-Duty Fire Fighter Fatalities by State 25

2 Fire Fighter Death Rates by Region 1992 26

111
Background

For a decade and a half, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

has developed the most complete records on U.S. fire fighter fatalities - both in

breadth of coverage and depth of detail - of any organization. This data base has

been used to support the fire fighter fatality studies produced by NFPA each year

since 1974.

For more than 10 years, NFPA also has worked with FEMA’s U.S. Fire

Administration (USFA) to provide, in a timely manner, lists of fire fighter

fatalities and their next of kin to support the National Fire Academy’s annual Fire

Fighter Memorial Service, analyses of each year’s fire fighter fatalities, and

briefings on the latest experience. Under the present contract, NFPA has provided

the USFA with lists, both hand lettered and typed, of 1992 fire fighter fatalities and

with lists of names and addresses of next of kin and of fire department chiefs for

use in the Memorial Service in October 1993.

In August, a briefing on the 1992 experience and two special analyses was

presented by NFPA staff to USFA staff and guests in Emmitsburg, MU. Through

the briefing and analysis, this contract continued the trend toward more extensive

analysis of patterns and trends in specific parts of the fire fighter fatality problem.

With 16 years of experience now classified in its computer data base, NFPA is able

to provide increasingly detailed and focused examinations of the specific parts of

the problem addressable by particular strategies.

The deliverables under this contract are (a) this analysis report, (b) the

incident and casualty data on diskette in NFIRS Version 4.1 format, which is

being delivered separately, (c) the various lists described above, and (d) the briefing

provided in August. 31st.

iv
I. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to analyze the circumstances surrounding fire

fighter fatalities in the United States in 1992 in an attempt to identify potential

means for reducing the number of deaths that occur each year. In addition to the

1992 findings, this study will also include special analyses of particular recurring

scenarios, using NFPA’s data base of fire fighter fatalities from 1983 through 1992.

A. Who Is a Fire Fighter?

For the purpose of this study, the term fire fighter covers all members of

organized fire departments, whether career, volunteer or combination; full-time

public service officers acting as fire fighters; state and federal government fire

service personnel; temporary fire suppression personnel operating under official

auspices of one of the above; and privately employed fire fighters including trained

members of industrial or institutional fire brigades, whether full- or part-time.

Under this definition, the study includes not just local or municipal* fire

fighters but also seasonal and full-time employees of the U.S. Forest Service and

state wildland agencies; prison inmates serving on fire fighting crews; fire

fighters for the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the

Bureau of Fish and Wildlife, the National Park Service, and the U.S. Department

of Energy; military personnel performing assigned fire suppression activities;

civilian fire fighters working at military installations; and members of industrial

* For this report, the term municipal fire fighters refers to members of city, town, county and

township fire departments, members of independent volunteer fire departments providing

primary protection to a municipality and contract fire departments providing primary fire

protection. It excludes federal and state employees and contractors and members of prison

and industrial fire brigades.

1
fire brigades.

B. What Constitutes an On-Duty Fatality?

The term on-duty refers to being at the scene of an alarm, whether a fire or

non-fire incident; being en route while responding to or returning from an alarm;

performing other assigned duties such as training, maintenance, public

education, inspection, investigations, court testimony and fund raising, and being

on call, under orders or on stand-by duty other than at home or at the individual’s

place of business.

On-duty fatalities include any injury sustained in the line of duty that proves

fatal, any illness that was incurred as a result of actions while on duty that proves

fatal, and fatal mishaps involving occupational hazards that occur while on duty.

The types of injuries included in the first category are mainly those that occur on

the fire ground, in training, or in accidents while responding to or returning from

alarms.

The most common examples of fatal illness incurred on duty are fatal heart

attacks. Another example is a fire fighter who contracted hepatitis when a victim

being transported by ambulance pulled out his intravenous needle and stuck the

fire fighter.

A few examples of fatal occupational mishaps that have occurred in the past

include fire fighters who died of asphyxiation while working on fire apparatus in

closed garages, a fire fighter who fell through a slide pole hole while working

around the station, a fire fighter electrocuted while raising a banner for a town

event, a volunteer fire fighter who was fatally injured when he fell down a flight of

stairs in his home while responding to an alarm, a fire inspector who fell through

a skylight, and a fire fighter killed when the aerial ladder he was strapped to

2
collapsed as he was hanging a banner.

Also included in the file are fire fighters who were murdered while on duty.

These include fire fighters shot by snipers while on the fire ground, fire fighters

shot in the station by off-duty or former fire fighters, one who was kidnapped and

shot after responding to a verbal request for assistance, and one who was killed

when a pipe bomb planted in his car exploded as he left the station.

Fatal injuries and illnesses are included even in cases where death is

considerably delayed. When the onset of the condition and death occur in different

years, the incident is counted on the basis of the former. For example, a Michigan

fire fighter died in 1986 after years of recurring seizures resulting from a brain

injury received in 1979 when he was struck by a hose coupling. Because his death

was the direct result of his injury, and the injury occurred in 1979, he is counted

as a 1979 fatality.

The NFPA recognizes that these definitions should include chronic illnesses

(such as cancer) that prove fatal and that arise from occupational factors. In

practice, there is as yet no mechanism for identifying fatalities that are due to

illnesses that develop over long periods of time. This creates an ambiguous picture

on the issue of occupational versus other factors as causes of fire fighter deaths.

This is recognized as a gap that cannot now be filled because of the limitations in

tracking the exposure of fire fighters to toxic environments and substances and the

potential long-term effects of such exposure.

C. Sources of Initial Notification

As an integral part of its ongoing program to collect and analyze fire data,

NFPA solicits information on fire fighter fatalities from the U.S. fire service and a

wide range of other sources. These include the U.S. Fire Administration and the

3
Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program (PSOB). Both are organizations with

whom NFPA has maintained long-standing cooperative efforts in collecting and

analyzing fire fighter fatality data. Other contacts include federal agencies such

as the U.S. Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Indian

Affairs and the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of Interior, the

U.S. military, the Department of Energy, and the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA). In recent years, significant assistance has been received

from the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, an organization made up of

representatives of state and federal wildland agencies.

The NFPA also receives notification from fire service organizations such as

the International Association of Fire Fighters, state fire associations, state

training organizations, state and local fire marshals, and fire service

publications. A network developed over the years of individuals interested in the

area of fire fighter fatalities also assists in identifying incidents, especially those

that occur outside of large urban areas or that involve non-fire-incident-related

fatalities. Among these individuals are fire fighters, photographers, fire buffs,

and members of the insurance industry.

Notification of fatal incidents also comes from NFPA members and staff and

through the use of a newspaper clipping service that reads all daily and weekly

newspapers in the country.

D. Procedure for Including a Fatality in the Study

After initial notification of a fatal incident is received, contact with the local

fire department is made by telephone to verify the incident, its location and the fire

department involved. Data collection forms for the fatality and the fire, if it was a

fire incident, are sent to the responsible local official identified during the

4
telephone follow-up. After the forms are returned to NFPA, a final decision is

made to include or exclude the fatality, based on the inclusion criteria described

previously. In order to make a final determination, additional information is

sometimes sought, either by contacting the fire department directly to clarify some

of the details or by obtaining data elsewhere, such as medical documentation

frequently available from PSOB.

Some of the material that might be received to document an incident

includes casualty forms, both NFPA fire fighter fatality study reporting forms and

NFIRS-type forms; NFPA’s Fire Incident Data Organization (FIDO) major-fire

report form or the department’s own incident reporting form, if a fire incident was

involved in the fatality; medical data such as death certificates or autopsy reports;

special investigation reports from other agencies; police and motor vehicle

accident reports, if applicable; photographs and diagrams; and additional

newspaper accounts. Incidents to be included in the study are then recorded in

NFPA’s FIDO system, which includes both incident and casualty information. By

mutual agreement of the USFA and NFPA project staff, the same inclusion

criteria were used for the USFA study as are used in the NFPA study.

Work described to this point was done as part of NFPA’s ongoing program of

data collection and analysis in the area of fire fighter fatalities and was completed

at no cost to FEMA.

E. Additional Data Collection Completed for the Contract

To meet FEMA’s request for a list of the next-of-kin of the 1992 fatalities and

the names and addresses of the fire chiefs, a follow-up mailing was sent to all

departments asking them to verify the victims' names and dates of fatal injury, the

names and addresses of the departments and chiefs, and the names and

5
relationships of the next of kin. Telephone calls were made to non-responding fire

departments to obtain the information.

6
II. 1992 Findings

Seventy-four fire fighters died while on duty in 1992, the lowest total in the 16

years that NFPA has done this study. As shown in Figure 1, this is a decrease of

30.8 percent from the year before, and a 45.6 percent decrease from 1988, the most

recent peak year.* This continued drop in fire fighter deaths is extremely

encouraging, and although such a low total cannot be expected to repeat in 1993, it

seems evident that progress has been made in reducing on-duty fire fighter

fatalities. However, since these deaths do continue to occur, efforts need to be

maintained and even intensified throughout the fire service. This study will

report some of the most frequently occurring scenarios and will present some

conclusions and recommendations to address the problem.

A. Type of Duty

The distribution of deaths by type of duty being performed is shown in Figure

2. The largest proportion of deaths occurred during fire ground operations (52.7

percent).

Of the 39 fire ground deaths, 20 were due to heart attacks, six to internal

trauma, six to crushing injuries, five to asphyxiation, and two to burns. Fifteen of

the victims were career fire fighters and 24 were volunteers.

The second largest category involved responding to and returning from

alarms, which accounted for slightly more than a quarter of the deaths - a result

consistent with the findings in previous years. Eleven of these 20 deaths were due

* The totals for some earlier years have been adjusted to reflect new information received since

the earlier studies.

7
Figure 1

On-Duty Fire Fighter Deaths

1977 - 1992

Number of Deaths
Figure 2

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1992

by Type of Duty
to heart attacks, one to a stroke, one to being struck by a fire apparatus that was

backing up to a hydrant on arrival at the incident scene, and the remaining seven

were due to collisions. One was a career fire fighter and 19 were volunteers.

Three were killed while responding to or returning from false calls -- two had

heart attacks and the third was the fire fighter mentioned above who was struck by

apparatus at what turned out to be an alarm malfunction.

There were five deaths related to training activities. Of these, two were due

to heart attacks. One was the result of a collision in a personal vehicle returning

from a training session. A safety officer drowned at a diver training exercise.

And finally, a fire fighter fell from a ladder during recruit training.

There were four deaths while working at non-fire incidents. One fire fighter

was struck by a falling tree during hurricane cleanup operations. Another

drowned while checking a vehicle submerged in a stream for possible victims.

Two fire fighters died of heart attacks -- one while removing a gunshot victim from

a canyon and the other while investigating a smoke detector activation.

The remaining six deaths occurred while performing other duties. Three of

these fire fighters suffered fatal heart attacks during normal station duties. Two

were performing vehicle maintenance -- one was crushed between two vehicles

and the other suffered a heart attack as a result of exposure to carbon monoxide

fumes. One fire fighter died of a stroke while undergoing a stress test.

B. Cause and Nature of Fatal Injury or Illness

As used in this study, the term cause refers to the action, lack of action, or

circumstances that directly resulted in the fatal injury, while the term nature

refers to the medical nature of the fatal injury or illness, or what is often referred

to as the cause of death. Often, the fatal injury is the result of a chain of events, the

l0
first of which is recorded as the cause. For example, if a fire fighter is struck by a

collapsing wall, becomes trapped by the debris, runs out of air before being

rescued, and dies of asphyxiation, the cause of fatal injury recorded is “struck by

collapsing wall” and the nature of fatal injury is “asphyxiation.”

Figure 3 shows the distribution of deaths by cause of fatal injury or illness.

As found in most previous years, the largest proportion of deaths (in this case, over

half) were due to stress or overexertion. Six of these 40. deaths were specifically

attributed to strenuous physical activities. Stress deaths usually result in heart

attacks or strokes.

The next major category was struck by or contact with objects. These 21

deaths included 14 from motor vehicle accidents, three by collapsing walls, two by

falling snags at wildland fires and one each by a log at a burning log pile and a

falling tree limb at a hurricane cleanup.

Ten fire fighters were caught or trapped -- two by structural collapses; two

by rapid fire progress; two by being lost inside buildings; two underwater who

drowned; one by fire department apparatus during maintenance; and one who

became caught on something in a basement and was unable to escape.

Fire fighter deaths over the past 10 years that resulted from structural

collapses are discussed in more detail in a separate section of this report.

Two fire fighters were killed as a result of falls -- one from a window while

attempting to escape a backdraft and one from a ladder during recruit training.

One fire fighter died as a result of exposure to carbon monoxide fumes while

working on apparatus in a closed station.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of deaths by the medical nature of the fatal

injury or illness. The largest proportion of deaths were due to heart attacks. Of

these 38 deaths, medical documentation indicated that 10 of the victims had prior

heart problems, either previous heart attacks or bypass surgery; and three others

11
Figure 3

Fire Fighter Deaths 1992

by Cause of Fatal Injury
Figure 4

Fire Fighter Deaths: 1992

by Nature of Injury
had severe arteriosclerotic heart disease (defined for this study as arterial

occlusion of at least 50 percent but usually found to be in excess of 70 percent). Five

other victims suffered from hypertension. Medical documentation was not

available for the other 20 heart attack victims.

The other categories of nature of fatal injury were internal trauma (13

deaths), crushing (10 deaths), asphyxiation (six deaths), bums (two deaths),

strokes (two deaths), drowning (two deaths) and amputation (one death). The six

asphyxiation deaths included two disoriented inside buildings until their air

supplies were depleted, two trapped by rapid fire progress in buildings, one

trapped in a basement when caught on some object and one exposed to carbon

monoxide in a closed fire station.

C. Ages of Fire Fighters

The ages of fire fighters who died in 1992 ranged from 17 to 80 years with a

median age of 45.5 years.

The distribution of fire fighter deaths by age and cause of death is displayed

in Figure 5. Seventy percent of the fire fighters over age 40 who died were killed by

heart attacks. The youngest fire fighter who died of a heart attack was 34 years

old.

Figure 6 shows the death rates by age categories using estimates of the

number of fire fighters in each age group from NFPA’s 1990 profile of fire

departments and the fatality data from 1988 through 19921. As the graph shows,

the death rate is lowest for fire fighters under age 40, slightly below the average

rate for those aged 40 to 49, and much higher than average for fire fighters aged 50

and over. This is a reflection of the fact that although only 14 percent of all fire

fighters are over age 50, that age group accounted for 37 percent of the deaths from

14
Figure 5

Fire Fighter Deaths 1992

by Age and Cause of Death
Figure 6

Average Death Rates per 10,000 Fire Fighters

1988 - 1992

Deaths per 10,000 Fire Fighters
1988 through 1992, including almost 60 percent of all heart attack deaths. When

the rates are calculated for non-heart-attack deaths, fire fighters aged 60 and over

have a rate more than twice the average.

With the consistent prominence of heart attacks among the reasons for onduty fire fighter deaths, one obvious question is whether these heart attacks might

simply be age-related deaths that only coincidentally appear to be due to the

unusual hazardous exposure of fire fighting. For the first time this year, data

from. the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics was used to check this

hypothesis.2

When we look at death rates due to heart attacks in the general male

population and among fire fighters, we find that the heart attack death rate per

10,000 fire fighters in any age group is never more than 10 percent the rate for the

general population. For example, the rate of on-duty heart attack deaths for fire

fighters age 60 and over was 3.1 deaths per 10,000 fire fighters while for the

general population it was 55.1 and 125.5 deaths per 10,000 population for men aged.

55 to 64 and 65 to 74, respectively. This comparison is consistent with the

hypothesis that fire fighter on-duty heart attack deaths are mostly or entirely a

reflection of the normal risks of the fire fighter’s age and not a result of unusual

job hazards. A more complete analysis would require examination of the rate of

off-duty heart attack deaths among fire fighters. It is possible that job-related

heart attack deaths occur off-duty as a delayed reaction to accumulated exposure to

fire effects. On the other hand, it is possible -- consistent with these statistics --

that fire fighters are (as they should be) generally more fit and healthy than their

respective age peers and that their total heart attack death rate (on-duty and offduty) could be lower than the general-population average.

1 7
D. Fire Ground Deaths

The distribution of the 39 fire ground deaths by fixed property use is shown

in Figure 7. The largest share of fire ground deaths (38.5 percent) occurred at

residential structure fires. These 15 deaths included 12 in one- and two-family

dwellings, two in a hotel and one in an apartment building. This is consistent

with the 16 deaths in residential structure fires in 1991, and in line with the

annual average of 17 deaths per year over the last 10 years.

There were nine deaths in wildland fires in 1992. There were five deaths in

storage properties, two of which were dwelling garages. Three deaths occurred in

public assembly buildings -- two in a church and one in a restaurant. There were

three deaths due to fires in vacant buildings and one in a building undergoing

renovations. There was one death each at a store, a manufacturing property and

at a vehicle fire.

To put the hazards of fire fighting in various types of occupancies into

perspective, the number of deaths per 100,000 structure fires was examined by

fixed property use. The rates were calculated using the estimates of fire

experience from NFPA’s 1992 fire loss study3. There were 3.2 fire fighter deaths

per 100,000 residential structure fires, compared to 9.6 deaths per 100,000

nonresidential structure fires. Although three times as many fires occurred in

residential structures, the size, complexity and special hazards often associated

with nonresidential structures result in a much greater risk at such fires.

E. Time of Alarm

The distributions of 1992 fire ground deaths and total deaths by time of

alarm are shown in Figure 8. The highest number of fire ground deaths occurred

18
Figure 7

Fire Ground Deaths in 1992

by Fixed Property Use
Figure B

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1992

by Time of Alarm

Based on 37 fire ground fatalities and

63 total fatalities for which alarm

time was reported.
for alarms between 11 am and 1 pm. There is another peak between 9 pm and 3

am. The eight deaths in the first peak included four deaths in three wildland

fires. The second peak time period included two double-fatality fires. The

distributions of deaths by time of alarm over a 10-year period are shown in Figure

9. The number of deaths in both categories was at the highest level for alarms

between 1 and 9 pm and dropped to the lowest level in the early morning hours.

F. Month of the Year

Figure 10 shows the distribution of 1992 fire fighter deaths by month. The

same information for 1983 through 1992 is shown in Figure 11. The ten-year

analysis shows that fire ground deaths are highest in the winter months and in

July.

G. State and Region

The distribution of fire fighter deaths by state is shown in Table 1. Thirtyfive states are represented on the list, led by Pennsylvania with eight deaths and

Illinois with seven. The experience by region4 is displayed in Table 2 and Figure

12. The Northcentral region lost the largest number of fire fighters (22), followed

by the South (21). The Northeast lost 18 fire fighters and the West, 13. The

Northcentral region had the highest average fire ground death rate. Only the

South had a rate lower than the national average.

H. Analysis of Urban/Rural/Suburban Patterns in Fire Fighter Fatalities

The U.S. Bureau of the Census defines urban as a place having at least 2,500

21
Figure 9

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1983 - 1992

by Time of Alarm

Based on 521 fire ground fatalities and

950 total fatalities for which alarm

time was reported.
Figure 10

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1992

by Month of Year

Based on 39 fire ground fatalities and

74 total fatalities.
Figure 11

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1983 - 1992

by Month of Year

Number of Deaths

Based on 547 fire ground fatalities and

1150 total fatalities.
Table 1

1392 On-Duty

Fire fighter Fatalities

State Number of Deaths State Number of Deaths

Alabama

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Florida

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Louisiana

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Missouri

2

1

2

4

2

1

2

1

2

7

2

1

3

1

3

1

4

1

Montana

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New York

North Carolina

Ohio

0klahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

Tennessee

Texas

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

Wisconsin

1

2

1

3

1

2

1

1

8

1

1

2

5

1

1

1

2

TOTAL: 74

25
Region

Northeast

Northcentral

South

West

Total 74 39 1.99

Table 2

Fire Fighter Death by Region

1992

Number of Number of fire

Fatalities Ground Deaths

18 9

22 12

21 9

13 9

Fire Ground

Death Rate

per 100,000 Fires

2.06

2.85

1.19

2.56

2 6
Figure 12

Fire Fighter Fatalities 1992

by Region
population or lying within a designated urbanized area. Rural is defined as any

community that is not urban. Suburban is not a Census term but may be taken to

refer to any place, urban or rural, that lies within a metropolitan area defined by

the Census but is not one of the designated central cities of that metropolitan area.

Fire department coverage areas do not always conform to the boundaries of

Census places. For example, fire departments organized by counties or special

fire protection districts may have both urban and rural .sections, and there are

Federal, state, and private fire fighters. In such cases, it may not be possible to

characterize the entire coverage area of a fire department as rural or urban, and

one must assign a fire fighter death as urban or rural based on the particular

community in which the fatal injury occurred.

Based on these rules, the following patterns were found and are shown with

available patterns for the general population and for the population of fire fighters

specifically in local fire departments:

Urban* Rural Total

Total 1992 fire fighter fatalities 45 (61%) 29 (39%) 74 (100%)

Suburban location 7 9 16

Local fire department only** 44 (66%) 23 (34%) 67 (100%)

U.S. population (1990)

U.S. fire fighters (1991) total***

U.S. fire fighters (1991), career***

U.S. fire fighters (1991), volun.***

75% 25% 100%

61% 39% 100%

97%

49% 51%

100%

100%

* Note that the classification of fire fighters into urban and rural is based strictly on the

population protected by the fire department and not on other community boundaries.

However, if fire fighter fatalities were similarly classified, the distribution would shift by

at most two percentage points, so the points here are not affected.

** Excludes one military fire fighter hilled in an urban location and four federal fire fighters

and contractors and two state contractors hilled in rural locations.

*** U.S. Fire Department Profile Through 1991, Quincy, Massachusetts: National Fire

Protection Association, Fire Analysis and Research Division, October 1992. All

percentages are for fire fighters in local fire departments.

2 8
As shown above, the distribution of local fire fighter fatalities fell between

the distribution of the whole U.S. population and the distribution of local fire

fighters. This same result was reported for 1989 and 1991 fatalities.

In 1987, we reported that the distribution of fire fighter fatalities from local

fire departments was closer to the distribution of the whole U.S. population than to

the distribution of fire fighters from local fire departments, suggesting that urban

fire fighters faced a greater risk of dying than rural fire fighters. In 1988 and 1990,

we reported that the distribution of local fire fighter fatalities was closer to the

distribution of local fire fighters, suggesting a similar risk of dying for urban and

rural fire fighters.

Since the results fluctuate back and forth each year, it is not advisable to

read too much into them. We can conclude though that urban fire fighters face at

least as great a risk as rural fire fighters. But, more importantly, our analyses of

fire fighter deaths over the years have indicated that fire fighter safety can be more

reliably attributed to proper training, equipment and incident management than

to geographical location.

29
III. Fatal Accidents Involving Tankers, 1983 - 1992

Accidents involving motor vehicles account for a significant share of fire

fighter deaths each year, and the prevalence of tanker accidents among the total,

particularly in the past two years, prompted a closer look at that part of the fire

fighter fatality problem.

From 1983 though 1992, 173 of the 1150 fire fighter fatalities (15.0 percent)

were the result of motor vehicle accidents and collisions and one in six of those

deaths involved tankers.* (See Figure 13.) These 27 tanker-related deaths were

the result of 25 road accidents. (Six of these deaths occurred in just the last two

years.) Twenty-two of the victims were killed while responding to alarms, three

were returning from alarms, one was killed at the scene of a wildland fire and

one was killed while returning from refueling the apparatus.

Profile of Accidents

Sixteen of the accidents were attributed to failing to negotiate curves and

thereby losing control of the vehicle. These accidents resulted in 18 fire fighter

deaths. Six accidents occurred when drivers went off the edge of the road and

then lost control when they overcorrected the direction of the vehicles. One driver

failed to heed a stop sign and the tanker was struck at an intersection by a logging

truck. One driver went through a red light and struck an automobile in the

intersection and overturned. One driver’s brakes failed as he entered an

intersection. Although he swerved to avoid a car in the intersection, they collided

and the tanker overturned.

Four of the victims were riding on the outside of the apparatus and were

* This does not include an additional 77 fatalities that occurred when fire fighters fell from or

were struck by moving vehicles.

30
Figure 13

Motor Vehicle Accidents Resulting in

Fire Fighter Fatalities

1983 - 1992
either thrown from the vehicles or were crushed during rollovers. One of the

deaths was due to smoke inhalation and another to bums after the tankers

involved in the two separate incidents caught fire after the accidents. The

remaining 21 deaths were due to traumatic injuries such as internal trauma and

crushing. Of the 27 victims, 22 were not wearing seatbelts. Seventeen of the 22

were ejected or thrown from the vehicle. One victim who was wearing a seatbelt

suffered fatal head injuries in a rollover.

In several of the incidents, drivers were reportedly exceeding posted speed

limits, but even speeds far below posted limits can be excessive, given the effect

that the shifting of the water in the tank can have in combination with a very

slight shift in direction. As one accident observer reported, the driver can stop the

truck, but he or she cannot stop the water. It is often reported that it is the

shifting of water in the tank that caused the driver to lose control, but as reported

in one incident where the tank was baffled and filled, it was the weight of the

water in the tank that pulled the vehicle out of the curve. A gallon of water

weighs just over 8 pounds. The reported capacity of the tankers involved in these

accidents ranged from 850 to 3,500 gallons, or 7,100 to 29,200 pounds in addition to

the weight of the vehicle itself.

Road conditions did not appear to be a factor in these accidents. Twenty of

the 25 accidents occurred in daylight on dry, paved roads during clear weather.

The roads where the other accidents occurred were gravel (two accidents), tar and

gravel and dirt. In the remaining incident, the road surface was not reported.

Although excessive speed was only infrequently cited in the accidents, it is

interesting to note where the vehicles were headed at the time the accidents

occurred. Only five were responding to reports of structure fires, situations

where time would be clearly of the essence. Nine tankers were responding to

forest and grass fires, two to vehicle fires and two to motor vehicle accidents (one

32
with a gasoline leak). The three remaining emergency responses were to a dump

fire, a dumpster fire and to standby for a Life Flight. Four of the tankers were

returning to stations -- two from wildland fires and two from routine fueling and

topping off procedures.

Profile of Victims

Twenty-three of the victims were members of local volunteer fire

departments. Since tanker apparatus are used to compensate for a limited piped

water supply, they are generally used in rural areas, which are nearly all served

by volunteer fire departments. Of the remaining four victims, three were

seasonal employees of state or federal forestry agencies and one was a member of

a prison inmate fire brigade. The distribution of deaths over the lo-year period is

shown in Figure 14.

The victims in these accidents ranged in age from 19 to 77 years, with most

in their 20s. Years of service ranged from one week to 45 years. Since the

majority of the accidents were the result of driver error, it is worth looking at the

profile of drivers.

The drivers’ ages and years of service are shown in Figure 15. The ages of

the drivers ranged from 20 through 72 years, with a median age of 28 years. Their

years of service with the fire department ranged from one week to 45 years. The

median was 2 1/2 years. It is important to remember, however, that time of

service on the fire department is not necessarily an accurate indication of actual

experience in driving a tanker. Four of the drivers, though, had no more than six

months on the job at the time of their fatal accidents.

Summary and Conclusions

The use of tankers is essential in rural fire fighting, but they present

33
Figure 14

Deaths in Tanker Accidents

1983 - 1992

Number of Deaths
Figure 15

Profile of Drivers in Fatal Tanker Accidents

1983 - 1992
special problems. Large tankers tend to have a high center of gravity. When a

tank is only partially full, the side-to-side center of gravity will change as the

vehicle comers and water is forced to one side of the tank. Baffling in the tank

will help slow the movement of water as a vehicle rounds a curve.

Some fire departments use converted military vehicles or tank vehicles

designed for fuel delivery. These vehicles are not designed for emergency

response. Military vehicles are built with a high center of gravity and adding a

tank only raises that height, increasing the vehicles’ instability at higher speeds

and on turns. Fuel delivery vehicles are generally not baffled.

Of the 25 tankers involved in fatal accidents in the past 10 years, eight were

designed and built as tankers and four were known to be converted. Information

on whether the tankers involved in these. accidents were built to fire apparatus

standards or not was generally not available. However, if a vehicle is not designed

and built to be a fire apparatus, even an experienced driver can have problems

operating the vehicle under emergency conditions.

The inexperience of drivers can also play a role in the incidence of fatal

tanker accidents. One of the drivers had only been on the job for one week. But

inexperienced drivers include not only young people, but also older fire fighters

who are infrequently called upon to drive a vehicle that requires handling that is

very different from maneuvering a passenger car or truck. Other reported factors

included driver fatigue, failure to use seatbelts, and failure to observe traffic laws.

Although we don’t know whether the tanker share of fatal accidents (or

accidents generally) is disproportionate to their share of the fleet, proper

construction and maintenance of the vehicle, increased training and an

awareness of the potential problems with tankers are essential to reducing the

frequency of deaths in tanker accidents. The major problems identified in

accidents over the past 10 years included:

36
• inexperienced drivers

• lack of use of safety equipment

• maintenance of apparatus

• high center of gravity of the vehicle/water tanks

• failure to observe laws.

37
IV. Fire Ground Fatalities As a Result of Structural Collapse,

1983-1992

For the purpose of this analysis, structural collapses are defined as

incidents where the failure of structural member(s) resulted in the collapse of a

structure or portion(s) of a structure. This analysis breaks structural collapses

into two categories: 1) incidents where fire fighters were caught or trapped in

collapses and 2) incidents where fire fighters were fatally struck by collapses.

Incidents in the first category generally involve fire fighters operating inside

structures. Their deaths may be the result of injuries resulting from being

pinned by structural components or the collapse may cause their entrapment and

subsequent death as a result of running out of air. Incidents in the second

category generally involve fire fighters operating outside structures who died of

trauma or crushing injuries as a result of being hit by parts of the collapsing

structure.

From 1983 through 1992, there were a total of 1,150 fire fighter fatalities, 547

of which occurred on the fire ground. Seventy-one of the 390 deaths at structure

fires were the result of structural collapses. This included 45 fire fighters caught

or trapped in 31 fires and 26 fire fighters fatally struck by collapses at 23 fires.

This analysis will look at the two categories separately and discuss how such

incidents can be prevented, or minimized.

Caught or Trapped

Of the 45 fire fighters caught or trapped by structural collapses, 19 were

asphyxiated, 14 died of bums and 12 died of crushing injuries or internal trauma.

Twelve of the victims were volunteer and 33 were career fire fighters. The largest

number of deaths were the result of roof collapses (27 deaths), followed by floor

38
collapses (13 deaths), ceiling collapses (3 deaths) and wall collapses (2 deaths).

Of the 27 deaths caused by roof collapses, eight of the victims were operating

on the roof of the structure at the time it collapsed. Six of the eight were

performing ventilation, one was involved with fire suppression and one was doing

forcible entry. Nine fire fighters were involved with suppression activities inside

the structure at the time of the collapse. Six (including four in one incident) were

attempting to gain access to the fire area when the roof collapsed. Three were

trying to escape the collapse but were caught when it occurred and one fire fighter

was climbing a ladder in a church when the roof collapsed.

The activities of fire fighters caught in floor, ceiling and wall collapses

broke down as follows: fire suppression inside the structure (10 deaths), forcible

entry (two deaths), search and rescue (two deaths), directing operations (two

deaths), escaping (one death) and overhaul (one death).

Struck by Object

Of the 26 fire fighters struck by objects during structural collapses, 17 died

of crushing injuries and nine died as a result of internal trauma. Twelve of the

victims were volunteer and 14 were career fire fighters. All but two of the victims

were struck by walls or pieces of walls. Those two were struck by collapsing

chimneys.

Twenty of the victims were operating handlines at the time of the building

collapses. The other six victims were performing these activities: forcible entry,

ventilation, raising a ladder, escaping, directing operations and leaving the

structure after searching for an occupant.

Patterns in Collapse Incidents

The breakdown of fatal incidents and associated fatalities by fixed property

3 9
use is shown in Figure 16. As can be seen, these deaths occur in a wide range of

properties. Twenty-six of the 54 fires, resulting in 33 of the 71 deaths, were of

incendiary or suspicious origin. Where it was possible to identify construction

details, we found that 12 of the incidents, resulting in 19 of the deaths, involved

buildings with truss roofs. In these fires, the estimated elapsed time between fire

department notification and collapse ranged from four to 45 minutes, illustrating

again, the potential risk to fire fighters of this type of construction.

The distribution of deaths over the lo-year period is shown in Figure 17.

Multiple-fatality incidents occurred in six of the 10 years. The worst two incidents

occurred at an auto dealership in Hackensack NJ where five career fire fighters

were killed and at a printing company in Brackenridge PA where four volunteer

fire fighters were killed. Overall, two thirds of the victims of these incidents were

career fire fighters. The distribution of fires by region is shown in Figure 18.

Of the 54 structures involved in these fires, 45 were only one or two stories

high. The other nine were three stories or higher.

Factors Identified in FataI Incident

Media reports of fatal structural collapse incidents often include quotes

from people on the scene saying the building “collapsed without warning.”

Although it is true that imminent collapse cannot be expected to be announced

there are conditions observed in some of these incidents that provided some

warning that extreme caution was required. These conditions included: heavy

fire conditions on arrival, roof-mounted air conditioning and heating units and/or

snow load on flat roofs, and the presence of a parapet, overhang or other

appendage (including chimneys). Another factor to look for is a bowed roof on a

large flat roof that might indicate truss construction.

Some operations conducted on the fire scene resulted in exposing fire

40
Figure 16

Fire Fighter Fatalities in Structural Collapses

1983 - 1992
Figure 17

Fatalities in Structural Collapses by Year

1983 - 1992

Number of Deaths
Figure 18

Fatalities in Structural Collapses by Region

1983 - 1992
fighters to increased risk of structural collapse. These included simultaneous

interior and exterior suppression operations, conducting overhaul after master

streams had been in use for a long period of time, exterior handline operations too

close to fire-weakened structures, operating in narrow alleys between fire

buildings and their exposures, freelancing and working too close to structures

after safety lines had been established. Backdrafts and partial roof collapse

should also be seen as indicators of potential disaster. .Failure to communicate

that a structure has been evacuated and fire fighter impairment from drugs or

alcohol are examples of preventable situations that occurred in some of these

incidents.

How can such Deaths be Prevented?

It’s easy in hindsight to point out what went wrong in a particular incident

and to state what should have been done. But what can a fire department do to

prevent building collapses from killing fire fighters?

Pre-fire planning is key to recognizing problems in or with a structure that

may make it more likely to collapse in a fire. The factors to look for include

lightweight construction features such as wood trusses and unprotected steel bar

joists, Buildings that have obvious signs of weakness include those which have

had a previous fire, those where an adjacent structure with a common separating

wall has been removed and those where reinforcing rods are exposed. The use of

dropped ceilings indicates the presence of confined spaces where a concealed fire

could be growing over the heads of working fire fighters. Building alterations that

have occurred within a building over time can alter the structure’s integrity. If a

building has no automatic suppression or detection equipment, a more advanced

fire condition may exist by the time the fire department is notified.

There are signs to look for on arrival at an incident. Although it will

44
usually not be possible to know at the outset that a fire was intentionally set, the

status of the occupancy can give a good indication of the likelihood of arson.

Buildings that are vacant, condemned, under demolition or renovation, or even

closed for the night are frequent targets for such fires. Heavy roof loading,

including heating and air conditioning equipment as well as snow, can reduce a

roofs integrity under fire conditions. Fires of long duration cause weakening of

structural members. It is also important to realize that every 250 gpm stream

applied to the building can add up to one ton per minute to the load the.

increasingly-weakened structure is carrying.

Many fire departments work with city officials to have vacant buildings

boarded up or demolished when they become a hazard. If access to a building is

prevented, the likelihood of an arson fire is greatly reduced and the fire

department can also be reassured that no trespassers will be in the building

requiring dangerous search and rescue operations.

45
V. Conclusions and Recommendations

The remarkably low total for fire fighter fatalities in 1992 is less than half

the total observed when NFPA began conducting annual studies of the problem 16

years ago. Although great strides have been made in reducing parts of the

problem, deaths still occur and many are preventable.

Interestingly, the decrease in fatalities in 1992 occurred across the board, so

we find that heart attacks still account for about half the total deaths. Motor

vehicle accidents, mainly while responding to alarms, continue to account for

approximately one-fifth of the deaths. Approximately half the deaths annually

occur on the fire ground. These are the major areas where continued efforts

must be concentrated.

This year’s report included analyses focusing on parts of two of these areas.

Deaths as a result of structural collapse can often be prevented through pre-fire

planning, careful attention to changing conditions of the structure during the

fire, and an incident management system that accounts for the location of all

individuals at the fire scene.

Tanker accidents, although they constitute a small portion of the total

number of deaths each year, illustrate problems that occur in the use of other

vehicles as well. Failure to use safety equipment, failure to follow traffic laws,

and excessive speed for road conditions apply to tanker accidents as well as to

accidents that occur each year in private vehicles responding to alarms.

We do not expect to see such a low total for fire fighter deaths in 1993, but

the success in 1992 shows what can be accomplished. Preventable deaths are still

occurring and continued vigilance, emphasis on safe practices, health, fitness,

and training must be maintained.

46
References

1.

2.

3.

4.

Michael J. Karter, Jr., U.S. Fire Departmmt Profile through 1991, Quincy,

MA: National Fire Protection Association, Fire Analysis and Research

Division, October 1992.

Statistical Abstract of the United States - 1992, U.S. Bureau of the Census,

112th Edition, 1992.

Michael J. Karter, Jr., “U.S. Fire Loss in 1992,” NFPA Journal, Vol. 87,

No. 5, (September 1993).

The four regions defined by the U.S. Census Bureau are as follows:

Northeast: ‘Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New

Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.

Northcentral: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,

Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.

South: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,

Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina,

Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West

Virginia.

West: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado; Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,

Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

47