U.S. Fire Administration

National Safety 

Culture Change

Initiative

FA-342/April 2015

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

We provide national leadership to foster a solid 

foundation for our fi re and emergency services 

stakeholders in prevention, preparedness, and 

response.

National Safety 

Culture Change Initiative

Study of Behavioral Motivation on 

Reduction of Risk-Taking Behaviors 

in the Fire and Emergency Service

Developed by the 

International Association of Fire Chiefs

through a partnership with the 

U.S. Fire Administration

April 2015

National Safety Culture Change Initiative i

Table of Contents

Project Team.................................................................................................................................................1

Working Group..................................................................................................................................................1

Staff.....................................................................................................................................................................1

Executive Summary.....................................................................................................................................3

Contributors.................................................................................................................................................3

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................3

Understanding the Fire and Emergency Service Culture.......................................................................5

What Drives Firefighter Behaviors?................................................................................................................6

Examples of Inappropriate Risk Behaviors ...................................................................................................6

What Is Culture?...........................................................................................................................................7

Aspects of the Culture .....................................................................................................................................8

Cultural Change .........................................................................................................................................10

Resistance to Change.....................................................................................................................................11

Toward a Safety Culture ...........................................................................................................................12

Areas of Focus for Cultural Change in Fire and Emergency Services......................................................13

Situational Awareness....................................................................................................................................14

Individual Responsibility..........................................................................................................................15

Leadership..................................................................................................................................................16

Health and Wellness.......................................................................................................................................16

Training.............................................................................................................................................................17

Initial Firefighter Training ........................................................................................................................18

Officer Training ..........................................................................................................................................19

Emergency and Personal Vehicle Operation..........................................................................................20

Factors Influencing Safe Emergency Response......................................................................................... 20

Seat Belt Use....................................................................................................................................................21

Recruiting........................................................................................................................................................ 22

Environmental Factors.................................................................................................................................. 22

Summary.....................................................................................................................................................23

Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................................25
ii April 2015

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National Safety Culture Change Initiative 1

Project Team

Working Group

Cumberland Valley Volunteer Firemen’s 

Association (CVVFA) — Jim Watson

International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) 

Safety, Health and Survival (SHS) Section — 

I. David Daniels

International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) — 

Patrick Morrison

National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF) — 

Victor Stagnaro

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) — 

John Caufield

National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health (NIOSH) — Murrey Loflin

National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC) — 

Sarah Lee

North American Fire Training Directors 

(NAFTD) — Eriks Gabliks

NAFTD/University of Illinois Fire Service 

Institute — Brian R. Brauer

U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) — Bill Troup, 

Project Officer

USFA — Brad Pabody

USFA — Burt Clark, Ed.D.

Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 

Health — Keshia M. Pollack, Ph.D., M.P.H.

Staff

Facilitator — Courtney Bulger

Project Manager — Vicki Lee

Project Manager — Melissa Hebert

Technical Writer — William Stipp

IAFC National Programs — John Woulfe
2 April 2015

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National Safety Culture Change Initiative 3

Executive Summary

Controlling and extinguishing hostile fire comes 

at a great cost to human life and secondarily at 

great financial expense. Despite improvements in 

personal protective equipment (PPE), apparatus 

safety devices, more availability of training, greater emphasis on firefighter health and wellness, 

and decreases in the number of fires and dollar 

loss due to fires, the rate of on-duty firefighter 

death and injury has remained relatively unchanged in the past four decades. The National 

Safety Culture Change Initiative (NSCCI) project is 

a joint partnership of the U.S. Fire Administration 

(USFA) and the International Association of Fire 

Chiefs (IAFC) aimed at identifying both positive 

and negative culture and climate found in the 

American fire and emergency service community. 

NSCCI, through this study and its website, www.

ffsafetyculture.org, and other project efforts, 

will identify adverse behaviors and recommend 

changes to both culture and climate for occupational safety and health within the fire and 

emergency service.

Contributors

The organizations and individuals who contributed to this paper were selected as a representative cross section of the fire service. The intent 

was to capture both the breadth of the fire service, encompassing the different delivery models 

of emergency response, and the depth of the 

fire service by including groups that had agendas 

to look at the specific needs of the fire service. 

Additionally, the individual experiences of those 

connected to the creation of this paper, both 

within and outside of the fire service, provided 

a rich backdrop for discussion and comment of 

diverse viewpoints throughout the development 

of the paper.

Introduction

The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF) 

has asserted that the culture of the fire and emergency service is a major contributor to the fatal 

trend in firefighter health and safety (Siarnicki, 

2010). This culture has not been concisely defined, 

but literature suggests both that it exists as a 

stand-alone concept and that it has unique characteristics that are uncommon to nonuniformed professions. Soeters, a leading scholar in the organizational culture of military and emergency service 

units, states that the peculiarities of organizations, 

such as the fire and Emergency Service, “justify the 

special attention of researchers to the culture and 

identity of these ... organizations” (Soeters, 2000, p. 

466). An understanding of the culture can be used 

to develop safer practices to reduce the number of 

firefighters killed and injured each year.

This effort is directly related to three of NFFF’s 

16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives (FLSIs). FLSI 

1, which states: Define and advocate the need 

for a cultural change within the fire service 

relating to safety; incorporating leadership, 

management, supervision, accountability, and 

personal responsibility (NFFF, 2011), is an overarching initiative, acknowledging that the organizational culture of the fire service must undergo a 

change to accept the other 15 recommendations. 

Without understanding the culture within a fire 

and emergency service organization, it is likely 

that changes called for in the other 15 initiatives 

cannot be successfully implemented or sustained.

Initiatives 2 and 6 are also very relevant to this 

project. Since 50 percent of line-of-duty deaths 

(LODDs) are attributed to cardiovascular events 

and one-third of these deaths are in people with 

known cardiac histories, health and safety of 

agency members is a controllable risk factor (NFFF, 

2011, p. 13). Initiative 6 encourages implementation of and adherence to existing medical and 

fitness standards, while Initiative 2 focuses on 

empowerment of all members of a department 

to be involved and engaged with departmental 

health and safety while around the station, while 

responding to and returning from calls for service, 

and while operating at emergency scenes.

The initial research phase of this study was directed toward clearly identifying and defining the 

problem. There is widespread acceptance of the 

presumption that behavioral issues contribute 

to both firefighter injuries and LODDs and that 

some type of cultural change is needed to alter 

the perceptions of acceptable and unacceptable 

risks. The objective of the research effort is to 

narrow the focus to identify the particular behaviors that need to be addressed.

The NSCCI project is aimed at identifying the aspects of fire and emergency service culture that 

contribute to preventable occupational illnesses, 

injuries and fatalities and subsequently changing 

those cultural norms that either promote or tolerate excessive risk behaviors. The Project Team 

developed this document based on the perspec-
4 April 2015

tive that the expansion of a more appropriate 

safety culture should not be seen as a challenge 

to the overall fire service nor contrary to the mission of saving lives and protecting property. This 

document focuses on integrating safety into the 

fire service culture without diminishing any of its 

existing positive aspects.

It should be mentioned that understanding fire 

and emergency service culture as it relates to fire 

prevention activities is also important, although 

this project does not include that perspective.

Throughout this paper, the term fire and emergency service is used to broadly capture any 

type of emergency response organization that 

responds to fires or other crises that erupt in 

communities throughout the U.S. An effort was 

made to be inclusive of nonfirefighting areas, 

but there is little literature available that looks 

broadly at emergency services that are not 

directly engaged in firefighting. However, a study 

produced under a cooperative agreement between the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), with support from the Health 

Resources and Services Administration’s (HRSA’s) 

Emergency Medical Services for Children (EMSC) 

program, and the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) looks specifically at an 

“EMS Culture of Safety” and can be accessed at 

http://www.emscultureofsafety.org/wp-content/

uploads/2013/10/Strategy-for-a-National-EMSCulture-of-Safety-10-03-13.pdf.
National Safety Culture Change Initiative 5

Understanding the Fire and 

Emergency Service Culture

From the origins of an organized fire and emergency service in the U.S. through the early 1970s, 

very little attention was directed toward firefighter safety (Granito, 2003); the inherent risk factors 

of firefighting and emergency operations were 

recognized and simply accepted as unavoidable 

occupational hazards. Generations of firefighters 

were subjected to extreme risks, in most cases 

because their mission was considered essential and there were few alternatives available to 

them. The image of the firefighter, which is the 

foundation of the fire and emergency service 

culture, was built around selfless heroism — the 

firefighter is always ready to face any risk and, if 

necessary, to make the supreme sacrifice in order 

to save lives and property.

Serious efforts to address firefighter safety began during the 1970s and expanded significantly 

through the 1980s and 1990s, coinciding in part 

with major advances in protective clothing and 

equipment, as well as the development of more 

effective tools and procedures that allowed for 

fire suppression operations to be conducted with 

better calculated risks to the firefighter. During 

that time period, operational procedures began 

to incorporate firefighter health and safety as primary objectives, on a par with saving civilian lives 

and as a higher priority than saving property 

(Linke, 2008). National Fire Protection Association 

(NFPA) 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program was published in 

1987 as the first consensus standard to address 

occupational safety and health for organizations 

delivering emergency services.

The NSCCI project is directed toward this particular aspect of the effort to further reduce LODDs, 

as well as decreasing occupational injuries and 

illnesses within the fire and emergency service. 

It is intended to identify and examine the factors that cause or influence firefighters to make 

decisions and engage in actions that involve 

unnecessary and avoidable risks, which often 

places their own lives, and potentially the lives of 

their fellow firefighters, in danger when there are 

less dangerous options available. Expressing the 

concept in terms of risk management, this would 

refer to situations where the potential gain is out 

of balance with the potential loss.

Photo by Ron Moore, Courtesy of Cornbelt (Illinois) Fire 

Protection District
6 April 2015

This paper and its proposed strategies for reducing risk-taking behaviors in the fire and emergency service are based on a literature review, 

focused discussions, and the experiences and 

collective knowledge of members of the Project 

Team and reviewers.

What Drives Firefighter Behaviors?

U.S. society as a whole may contribute to the risk 

behaviors that are demonstrated within the fire 

service. Communities expect an urgent and timely 

response to emergencies and disasters with fully 

trained individuals arriving on adequately staffed 

apparatus. However, public knowledge of the complexities and challenges of building, maintaining and 

delivering such service capabilities is often transparent or invisible to those funding the services until 

the system fails to meet public expectations. Some 

fire and emergency service organizations do not 

have the resources to implement advanced training 

programs or provide training beyond that which is 

minimally required for each position.

Firefighters who are questioned in relation to their 

high-risk behaviors often refer to either public or 

organizational expectations of selfless heroism. 

Such perceptions are consistent with the popular 

image of the firefighter as a daring individual who 

is willing to risk life and limb to save the life of a 

total stranger and who is lauded for doing so.

Those with a traditional outlook often express 

disagreement with the emphasis that has been 

directed toward “acceptable risks” and “rules of 

engagement,” claiming that they promote nonaggressive and ineffective operations. The opposing 

viewpoint asserts that there are times when it is 

appropriate to be boldly aggressive and times to 

be intelligently cautious. The focus of this paper 

is to seek out areas where the level of safety in 

the provision of a fire and emergency service 

organization can be improved without diluting or 

lessening the critical mission of service delivery.

Examples of Inappropriate Risk 

Behaviors

Firefighters are routinely called upon to deal with 

situations that involve risks that could result in 

their death or injury or contribute to an occupational illness or disability. Several of these risk 

factors are inherent to the nature of the work 

that firefighters perform; however, the level of 

exposure to those risks varies depending on decisions that are made and actions that are taken 

— or not taken — when faced with a particular 

situation and set of circumstances. A general risk 

management philosophy in the fire service is risk 

a lot to save a lot, risk a little to save a little, and 

risk nothing to save nothing (Linke, 2008).

Most of the discussion of risk exposure is written 

in the context of structural firefighting, where the 

concepts of offensive versus defensive strategy are easily defined. Offensive strategy places 

firefighters in close contact with the fire, inside 

the burning building, and involves a certain level 

of inherent risk. Defensive strategy keeps firefighters outside, in what should be safe exterior 

locations, to minimize risk. This concept requires 

some extrapolation to be applied to other emergency responses and scenes.

While the Incident Commander’s (IC’s) decisions 

establish a theoretical level of acceptable risk that 

applies to every individual involved in an incident, at 

times, individual firefighters knowingly or unknowingly expose themselves to higher levels of risk than 

the IC has deemed acceptable. This is a particular 

problem when individual perceptions of acceptable 

risk are different from the IC’s perceptions.

Fire and emergency service organizations should 

concentrate on implementing and demonstrating 

an effective and measurable model of firefighter 

training. This model supports and emphasizes the 

behaviors learned during initial firefighter training 

(recruit training) and continuously builds upon 

those experiences to build advanced skill sets 

throughout their service as a firefighter/EMS provider. This training should subscribe to the philosophy that health and safety are the capstone of any 

model. The focus areas of risk behavior modification are education, training, health and wellness.

With regard to vehicle operations for both personally owned and agency-owned vehicles, fire and 

emergency service organizations should concentrate on implementing and demonstrating an effective and measurable model of driver/operator 

training that advances skill sets throughout tenure as a firefighter, ensures quality, and provides 

for driver/operator accountability. The focus areas 

of risk behavior modification are driver capability, 

quality assurance and accountability.

Fire and emergency service organizations must 

also focus on moving toward compliance with national standards for health and wellness, fitness 

for duty, and emergency scene rehabilitation.

In each of these cases, scenarios can present 

themselves where emergency responders act 

without a full understanding of the potential 

scope and fallout from their actions, leading to illness, injury or death that is out of alignment with 

the potential value of the chosen action.
National Safety Culture Change Initiative 7

What Is Culture?

To change the undesirable components of fire 

and emergency service culture, one must first 

understand the broad construct of culture and 

then apply this framework within the fire and 

emergency service. Schein describes the culture 

of a group as the “basic, shared, assumptions” 

learned by a group as it solves problems (2004, 

p. 17). He indicates that when this problem-solving is successful, the methods are taught to new 

members as correct solutions to the problems 

(Schein, 2004). Hofstede refers to these methods 

and assumptions as the “collective programming 

of the mind” (2001, p. 1). Kluckhorn similarly 

defines culture as “patterned ways of thinking,” 

based upon traditional and historical ideas (1951, 

p. 86). All three of these definitions identify 

culture as a process that occurs in the individual, 

based upon learned behaviors that are influenced by a group and the group’s history.

Culture is reflected in a group’s internal characteristics, its character, and its daily existence (Goodman, Zammuto, & Gifford, 2001). It is influenced 

by organizational history, policies, uniforming, 

facilities, vocabulary, leadership and management 

within an organization (Compton, 2003). Uniformed professions, such as police departments, 

fire and emergency service organizations, and 

military units, have such unique cultures unto 

themselves that they have characteristics, such as 

a sense of duty and allegiance, that are not found 

in such a strong degree in other professions.

“Culture can be difficult to substantively define, 

but culture truly describes how things are done 

in the [fire and emergency service] organization” (Compton, 2003, p. 24). This comment may 

allude to how entwined the culture of the fire and 

emergency service organization is with all aspects 

of the operations and delivery of services. The 

culture impacts how the firefighters interact with 

each other, from where a firefighter or officer sits 

at the dinner table, which seat they can occupy in 

the TV room and when they may sit down, where 

they sit on emergency apparatus and what their 

roles at emergency scenes will be, to how they 

may interact with other members of the company. 

While these rituals and values have some commonality across the different fire and emergency 

service organization types and sizes throughout 

the U.S., it would be both inaccurate and irresponsible to assume that these traits and values 

are reflected identically in all fire and emergency 

service organizations. However, since the fire and 

emergency service functions as individual organizations within the framework of a larger organizational culture, there should be some common 

themes and values that are present throughout 

most fire and emergency service organizations.

Uniformed organizations, such as fire and emergency service organizations, represent “specific 

occupational cultures that are relatively isolated 

from society” (Soeters, 2000, p. 465). Archer (1999) 

supports this with his assertion that the fire and 

emergency service is “characterized by its strong 

culture,” which includes the use of a uniform, 

hierarchical command structure, promotion solely 

from within the existing ranks, and long-standing 

traditions (p. 94). Fire and emergency service organizations further differ from other organizations/

businesses in that they are exposed to uncommon 

levels of danger, work unusual or shift schedules, 

require a great deal of physical and mental stamina from their members, and can recall staff and 

cancel their prescheduled leave due to emergencies or staffing shortages (Soeters, 2000).

This culture of the fire and emergency service 

has evolved through a complex process of group 

learning (Thompson & Bono, 1993). This group 

learning occurs during training, emergency responses, downtime around the fire station, and 

informal activities, such as cookouts, meals at 

the department, storytelling, and watching TV. In 

some cases, in the fire and emergency service, 

methods espoused as solutions may be incorrect, 

but they are perpetuated because they are viewed 

as traditions (Gasaway, 2005). Pessemier supports 

this in his 2008 discussion of improving fire and 

emergency service organization safety by stating:

“Normalization of unsafe practices can 

also occur as a result of the fact that 

other individuals take the same [incorrect 

or unsafe] actions. If, in general, nothing 

bad happens as a result of unsafe practices, and if everyone else in the organization participates in the same practices, 

then these practices become part of the 

normal and accepted way of accomplishing tasks. As a result, Fire and Emergency 

services organization history and traditions can create a culture that is difficult 

to change” (2008b, p. 3).

In June of 2007, nine firefighters from Charleston, South Carolina, were killed in a fire in a large 

furniture store. The analysis of operations of the 

Charleston Fire and Emergency Services organization revealed that, among many factors, “The culture of the Charleston Fire Department promoted 

aggressive offensive tactics that exposed firefight-
8 April 2015

ers to excessive and avoidable risks and failed 

to apply basic firefighter safety practices.” As a 

result, in the initial report on changes that need to 

be accomplished in the department to prevent a 

reoccurrence of a similar tragedy, one of the highest priority items is a change to the department’s 

“Culture and Leadership” (Routley, 2007).

In addition to the number of fatalities, it is important to consider the number of on-the-job 

injuries that firefighting contributes to annually. 

NFPA reports that in 2012, there were 69,400 

job-related injuries. Peterson identifies over 

95,000 injuries per year (2010), and Houdous, 

Pizatella, Braddee and Castillo support this with 

a calculation of 90,000 injuries per year, with an 

increasing rate of injury in the fire and emergency service (2004). Brennan (2011) extracted 

from NFPA the number of on-scene emergency 

injuries to be 32,205 in 2009 and compared these 

to the number of members of the U.S. military 

who were wounded in combat. In the period from 

October 2001 through August 2008, there were 

30,568 U.S. service members wounded in 

action — less than the number of firefighters 

injured in the single year 2009 (Brennan, 2011). It 

should be mentioned here that the likelihood of 

all on-the-job injuries and related illnesses being 

reported consistently is suspect and that the 

numbers are probably higher.

Aspects of the Culture

Being service-focused, having a strong identity and 

role in the community, and being willing to accept 

risk are all positive traits when they exist in an environment that is safety-focused (Compton, 2003).

Before discussing some of the negative traits that 

have been documented about the culture of the 

American fire and emergency service community, 

one must remember that no culture is all good or 

all bad. Traits offered in this paper are to further 

the point that a change is necessary, so more of 

the negative traits are elucidated. Additionally, 

there are more examples in the peer-reviewed 

literature of the failures of the culture, as these 

events tend to receive more attention than the 

daily successes and examples of positive action. 

According to Brunacini, the original firefighters in 

colonial America in 1740 were selected to protect their community based on their ability to 

do three things: (1) They had to be fast, to get to 

emergencies in a minimum amount of time; (2) 

they had to be willing to take great personal risks 

to get close to the fire; and (3) they had to be 

able to put water on the fire, to get the fire wet

to extinguish it (1998). Brunacini identifies these 

three traits as the core tenet of even the modern 

firefighter’s culture, even though actions should 

be more measured and risks should be better 

assessed in this modern age. Firefighters should 

operate in full protective clothing and within an 

accountability system in the performance of their 

duties (1998). Having a fire and emergency service 

that embraces the notion of “fast/close/wet” may 

misalign with the goal of operating safely. Clark 

furthered Brunacini’s message by adding that if 

firefighters continue to ascribe to fast/close/wet 

as the way to respond to fire emergencies, the 

inevitable result is risk, injury and death (2011).

Firefighter fatalities are closely linked to unsafe 

practices and a fire and emergency service culture that is not fully committed to safety (Cross, 

2010). This lack of commitment to safety is not a 

new problem in the fire and emergency service. 

In 1973, the National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control published the landmark study 

“America Burning.” This initial look at the fire 

problem in the U.S. revealed that 6,200 people, 

including firefighters, died annually as a result 

of hostile fire (Bland, 1973). Additionally, over 

100,000 injuries were reported annually, with 

a dollar loss of over $10 billion (in 1973 dollars) 

(Bland). The report estimated a nationwide rate 

of 300 fires per hour, which translates to over 

2.7 million fires annually. In 2007, there were less 

than 1.6 million fires in the U.S., leading to 3,430 

fire deaths and a property loss of $14.6 billion 

(Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 

2008). This represents a 44 percent reduction in 

the number of civilian deaths from fire, and a 40 

percent reduction in the number of fires overall. During that same time period, there was no 

reduction in the number of firefighters who died 

in the performance of their duties.

In 2011, Kunadharaju, Smith and DeJoy conducted 

an analysis of 189 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health firefighter fatality reports for the time period 2004-2009. They found 

that there were four higher-order causes of 

firefighter death and injury: insufficient resources, inadequate preparation, insufficient incident 

command structure, and suboptimal personnel 

readiness (Kunadharaju, Smith & DeJoy). They 

concluded that these four higher-order causes 

“may actually be tapping the basic culture of 

firefighting ... the job must get done, get done as 

quickly as possible, and with whatever resources 

are available” (p. 179). They also advocated for 

additional research in the area of defining the culture of the fire and emergency service.
National Safety Culture Change Initiative 9

As has been shown for other occupational safety 

problems, the true root causes of many firefighter fatalities may be traceable back to basic cultural attributes (Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000). The focus 

on culture as a factor in firefighter fatalities is not 

new, with IAFC, NFFF and the International Association of Fire Fighters being three high-profile 

organizations identifying culture as a critical area 

for change within the fire and emergency service. 

Various task forces and panels have called for 

culture change within firefighting organizations. 

What is new here is an initial attempt to probe for 

cultural symptoms using a very important and 

valuable data source: firefighter fatality investigations. Although the conclusions presented in 

the present research are not in any way definitive or final, they do highlight the importance of 

cultural factors in firefighter line-of-duty fatalities 

and suggest some specific factors that should be 

examined in future research.

David Archer concurs with this description of the 

fire and emergency service culture, and elaborates 

on what he calls the discipline code, which “is highly prescriptive, promotes ... from within the organization only ... has long standing traditions, and is 

predominantly white-male dominated” (1999, p. 

1). He further discusses that this system is perpetuated through the cultural processes that individuals are introduced to when they go through the 

paramilitary-style initial training.

Baigent identified five key areas of culture that 

are common in interactions between firefighters 

(2001, p. 7):

1. Ostracizing anyone different.

2. Ostracizing anyone who doesn’t conform.

3. Bullying and threatening anyone who resists 

the dominant group.

4. Excluding outsiders from fire station life.

5. Frequent joking as an instrument to continue 

bullying.

Brunacini’s description of the treatment of new 

firefighters who don’t follow the direction of the 

older firefighters is consistent with Baigent’s 

criteria.

Lewis, a scholar studying issues of gender and racial inequity in firefighter selection and training, 

juxtaposes the image of firefighters as heroes 

against the culture of firefighting: “Firefighters 

around the world are heroes in the hearts and 

minds of the public. ... However, research into the 

culture of firefighting worldwide has also shown 

disturbing and quite ‘uniform’ characteristics 

have been normalized by many under the guise 

of tradition” (2004).

Phillip Schaenman conducted a study of over 

1,000 firefighters’ attitudes and perceptions 

regarding safety in the wildland firefighting 

environment. Respondents described the culture as being one “of hardship, adventure, close 

friendships, and commitment; experience over 

rank ... enjoys stories of conquest and danger,” 

and pride at how different a wildland firefighter’s 

life is from the rest of society (1996, p. 193). One 

respondent described the culture as one with 

“long traditions” (p. 196). These varied descriptions of aspects of the culture make up the tightly 

woven fabric of the American fire and emergency 

service community that bears closer investigation 

and analysis. Organizational cultures such as this 

are more complicated and have a greater impact 

on decision-making than insiders to the culture 

typically realize (Vaughan, 1997). Organizational 

values within the fire and emergency service are 

the “shared standards and core beliefs that guide 

decisions and actions within” the fire and emergency service (Cochran, 2006, p. 454).
10 April 2015

Cultural Change

It is evident that many interrelated factors must 

be addressed in order to produce a significant 

change in outcomes in terms of reducing line-ofduty injuries and deaths and improving overall 

firefighter safety and health. The existing fire and 

emergency service culture, as it relates to occupational safety and health, was identified as both 

a cause and an effect of the current situation. 

A cultural change would set the stage for many 

incremental changes that would produce the 

desired positive impact.

Cultural researcher Edgar Schein identified the 

fundamental components of an organizational 

culture as a system of shared behaviors, values, 

assumptions and beliefs (2004). He describes 

these components as a three-layer system:

• Assumptions and beliefs.

• Values.

• Behaviors.

This model begins with a system of shared 

assumptions and beliefs that provides the foundation for organizational values. Those values, 

in turn, create expectations for acceptable and 

unacceptable behaviors. To apply this model to 

one particular aspect of the fire and emergency 

service, it could be stated that firefighters tend to 

attack fires in a manner that is bold and aggressive because their value system provides positive recognition for this type of behavior. These 

values are based on the belief that the mission 

of the fire and emergency service is to extinguish 

every fire as quickly as possible and the assumption that the best way to control a fire is to hit it 

hard and fast.

All three layers of this model were described by 

the symposium participants in the discussions 

that produced the 16 FLSIs. It was noted that 

unsafe attitudes and behaviors often prevail in 

spite of the common knowledge that there are 

less risky alternatives that could result in fewer 

deaths, injuries and illnesses. In fact, it was noted 

that efforts to promote health and safety were 

often met with resistance and scorn, reinforcing 

the notion that they created conflict with established attitudes, assumptions and values.

The existing system of assumptions and beliefs 

reinforces particular values:

• Every LODD is automatically labeled as heroic, no matter the circumstances (versus an 

occupational fatality that is preventable).

• Recommendations to follow standard operating procedures and exercise appropriate 

caution are described as cowardly.

• The urgency of quickly arriving at the scene 

of an emergency justifies driving in a manner 

that endangers the lives of other motorists 

and pedestrians who may be encountered en 

route, as well as the responders themselves.

The same sense of urgency:

• Justifies attempting to don protective clothing 

and equipment en route as opposed to being 

properly seated and belted in an approved 

riding position.

• Allows inadequately trained drivers to operate emergency vehicles.

• Allows poorly designed and poorly maintained vehicles to be operated.

The three-layer model suggests that cultural 

change has to occur progressively, beginning with 

changes in assumptions and beliefs that gradually bring about changes in the values that are 

accepted and shared by the individuals within 

an organization. Changes in the organizational 

values legitimize and promote changes in behavior. These behaviors need to be reinforced by 

an ongoing commitment to safety culture at the 

organizational level and among individual firefighters and their crews. This three-stage process 

is described as the most natural and effective 

manner of accomplishing a cultural change.

The application of this approach to the firefighter 

safety issue suggests that the first priority should 

be to convince individuals, companies, departments, and society as a whole that the current 

rates of death and injury are unacceptable and 

that operating with a higher regard for safety 

would not compromise the mission of controlling 

fires and saving lives. The large-scale acceptance 

of these new assumptions and beliefs would lead 

to a change in the value system so that being safe 

would be given equal weight to being effective in 

controlling fires and saving civilian lives. The new 

values would encourage firefighters to be more 

careful and to stop engaging in reckless behaviors that lead to preventable deaths and injuries.

It is also possible to work in the opposite direction, from the top down, although this approach 

is much more likely to encounter resistance. Every 

fire chief has the ability to establish rules and regulations that require changes in behavior within 

his or her own fire and emergency service organi-
National Safety Culture Change Initiative 11

zation. For example, the consistent enforcement 

of a strict policy requiring the use of seat belts in 

fire apparatus would probably, over a period of 

time, result in a change of values — at least with 

regard to seat belt use. Ultimately, the members 

of the fire and emergency service organization 

would come to accept and integrate seat belt use 

as part of their organizational culture.

Members of the fire and emergency service, especially fire chiefs, must align their personal values with the organizational values, and they must 

model these values (Cochran, 2006). The leader 

must then ensure alignment of values within the 

organization in order to ensure a strong work 

ethic; appropriate treatment of stakeholders; a 

cooperative atmosphere; teamwork; and high 

levels of dedication, discipline and commitment 

(Cochran). Therefore, not having a description 

of the values or culture makes it difficult, if not 

impossible, for a leader to initiate organizational 

change, since there is a limited baseline upon 

which to center the change interventions.

The difference between the two approaches is 

that the bottom-up strategy should enable much 

more comprehensive changes in behavior once 

the new values become accepted, especially since 

firefighters would be involved with identifying 

solutions (and doing so could bolster their buyin). The top-down approach is likely to encounter 

resistance for every individual change in behavior 

that is introduced. The large-scale cultural adjustment may eventually be accomplished; however, 

it is likely to be a slow and lengthy process.

The statement within FLSI 1 that the cultural 

change must incorporate leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal 

responsibility is an expression of the need to 

address the process with a unified effort at every 

level in order to accomplish the objective, working 

from the bottom up and from the top down. The 

successful insertion of occupational safety and 

health into the fire and emergency service value 

system should support numerous behavioral 

changes that could lead to a significant reduction 

in occupational deaths, injuries and illnesses.

Resistance to Change

Resistance to change, even change initiated internally, is often cited as a significant characteristic 

of fire and emergency service culture. This factor 

is often expressed with a mixture of pride and 

amusement by slogans such as “200 years of tradition unimpeded by progress” (Fire Department 

of New York (FDNY)).

Resistance to external influences is sometimes 

described as a particular characteristic of the 

American fire and emergency service culture. 

Although it is evident that more and more external influences are demanding compliance and 

adjustment, particularly in relation to occupational safety and health, there is no question that 

the fire and emergency service culture strongly 

resists being told what to do.

These factors underline the point that the type 

of cultural change that is the target of FLSI 1 will 

require significant adjustments to some of the 

values and beliefs that are commonly associated 

with fire and emergency service culture. This can 

only be accomplished by convincing firefighters 

at every level that the change is both desirable 

and necessary, and that the adjustments may 

be accommodated without compromising any of 

the highly valued aspects of fire and emergency 

service culture.
12 April 2015

Toward a Safety Culture

The culture of the American fire and emergency 

service community is a contributing factor to the 

high incidence of injury and death. Daniels (2005) 

asserts that until the fire and emergency service 

is willing to make substantial changes in training, 

procedures, equipment and recruiting, this fatal 

trend shall continue. In some cases, the injurious 

behaviors may have originated as a bad habit that 

evolved slowly over time into a tradition, slowly 

injecting a poor practice or dangerous procedure 

into the fire and emergency service organization 

over generations (Gasaway, 2005). Firefighters 

may engage in an unsafe act, thinking it is the correct way to operate or behave because the unsafe 

act or technique was how they were originally 

instructed (Gasaway). Storytelling and instruction from an older generation of firefighters to 

a younger generation of firefighters is a trait of 

the tightknit culture. This can be advantageous 

when the information is appropriate and relates 

to current department operating guidelines and 

situations, but it can be detrimental when there is 

no “filter” to ensure that the hand-me-down messages are safe and effective (Schaenman, 1996).

An additional issue cited by Pessemier is that “the 

U.S. Fire and Emergency Service does not have 

an institutionalized methodology for managing 

safety” (2008b, p. 1). He identifies this as a conflict 

between the organizational mission of the fire and 

emergency service and the view of safety as completing demands, instead of synergistic values.

Schneider (1973) suggests that cultures should be 

“for” something, for example “for service” or “for 

safety.” One possible solution to the American 

fire and emergency service community’s dilemma of how to change this culture is to develop 

an understanding of what it is and then refocus 

it to be “for” a different value or concept. Slight 

shifts in the practices within the fire and emergency service are likely to be more successful 

than large, sudden change (Daniels, 2005b). 

Schaenman identified that firefighters recognize the importance of safety, but they aren’t 

always sure about how to accomplish an activity 

safely (1996). Incrementally moving the current 

values, and therefore the culture of the fire and 

emergency service, toward a safety culture can 

provide the framework and strategies for how to 

address both of these potential issues.

A safety culture reflects the values, norms, 

assumptions and expectations regarding safety 

(Mearns, 1999). A company’s safety culture is expressed by management’s safety practices, which 

are reflected in the workplace safety climate (i.e., 

employees’ perceptions, attitudes and beliefs 

about risk and safety) (Mearns, 1999). A positive 

safety culture, as part of comprehensive safety 

improvement interventions, has been shown to 

influence safety behaviors by maximizing employee motivation and improving safety knowledge, which, in turn, helps to improve employee 

compliance, thereby resulting in safer behaviors 

and fewer injuries. 

Pessemier (2008a) furthers this notion of moving toward a safety culture in the fire and emergency service. For illustration, the Phoenix Fire 

Department has shifted from a transactional 

service model to one of building longer-term and 

deeper relationships by shifting the focus of its 

culture from “for service” to “for building longterm relationships” (Schneider, Bowen, Ehrhart, & 

Holcombe, 2000). This ability to change a culture 

in the fire and emergency service is supported by 

Hofstede, who states that an organizational culture 

is easier to change than a national culture (2001).

The culture of the U.S. could be modified toward 

a safety culture. The nuclear industry coined the 

term following accidents at Chernobyl in 1986 

and at Three Mile Island in 1979 and used it to 

describe what was lacking in these two events. 

It is a concept that encompasses “a combination 

of managerial, organizational, and social factors” 

that contribute to accidents and near misses 

(Freimuth, 2006). Once cultural goals and expectations were identified, they were reinforced 

by managers to instill and then reinforce these 

changes. Regarding culture in the American fire 

and emergency service community, it has been 

said that “without the emergence of a new safety 

culture, all attempts [at increasing firefighter 

safety] will be in vain” (Siarnicki, 2010, p. 9).

Climate exists within a culture, so moving toward 

a safety culture would require movement toward 

a safety climate. While the main focus of this paper is cultural (versus climate) change, it is worth 

acknowledging the concept of climate and its 

close relationship to culture while differentiating 

the two concepts. Safety climate is not only a set 

of values, beliefs and perceptions about safety as 

a concept, but also the policies, procedures and 

practices that support safety in an organization 

(Colley, Lincolne, & Neal, 2013; Goulart, 2013). 

Climate is more temporal and local to a particular 

unit, whereas culture is broader and spans the 

entire organization, and in some cases, the profession (Mortenson, 2014).
National Safety Culture Change Initiative 13

One of the gradual shifts that can be made from 

the current culture toward a safety culture is to 

focus on fire-safe behavior, shifting away from 

heroic acts. Alan Brunacini, former chief of the 

Phoenix Fire Department and a firefighter there 

since 1958, describes the problem with the 

current nonsafety culture that focuses on heroic 

acts in this way:

“For 225 years, it was OK for a burning 

building to kill us. When the fire kills us, 

our department typically conducts a huge 

ritualistic funeral ceremony, engraves our 

name on the honor wall, and makes us 

an eternal hero. Every Line of Duty Death 

gets the same terminal ritual regardless 

if the firefighter was taking an appropriate risk to protect a savable life or was 

recreationally freelancing in a clearly 

defensive place ... Genuine bravery and 

terminal stupidity both get the same eulogy. Our young firefighters are motivated 

and inspired to attack even harder by the 

ceremonialization of our battleground 

death” (2008, pp. 6-7).

By emphasizing actions that violate safety guidelines and awarding firefighters for heroic acts 

that come at a greater-than-usual level of risk 

or unnecessary danger (Walton et al., 2000), the 

message being communicated within the culture 

is that these types of behaviors are acceptable 

and will be rewarded. “Most of the awards for 

valor usually involve ... doing things you aren’t 

supposed to do. It’s in our nature to want to save 

someone. If nothing goes wrong despite ignoring 

the rule, you’ll be praised for saving someone” 

(Peterson et al., 2010, p. 27). Brunacini explains 

this disregard for safety by suggesting that today’s firefighters “... have never stopped hearing 

Ben [Franklin]’s voice tell them to be Fast/Close/

Wet when they are responding to a fire. I think 

this is what culture really means in the current 

safety discussion” (2008, p. 9). Firefighters need 

a safety culture message that speaks louder than 

Ben Franklin’s whispers to effect a change within 

a system that promotes and rewards appropriate 

risk management behaviors.

A concise summary for the role of culture in the 

fire and emergency service is provided in this 

quote from the Charleston, South Carolina, report 

on nine firefighters killed in 2007: “The cultural 

lessons may be the most important and also the 

hardest to embrace” (Laws, 2008, p. 64). Making 

sense of cultural lessons such as this requires a 

solid understanding of the organization’s history 

(Hofstede, 2001). While much of the work on injury 

and fatality reduction in firefighting has focused 

on technology and increasingly more stringent 

regulations, little has focused on the culture.

A closing thought from Hofstede (2000) serves as 

a fitting end to the discussion of the organizational culture and values in the fire and emergency 

service and the need for a shift in this culture to 

reduce on-duty fatalities. “Uniformed organizations have to balance their attempts to introduce 

new ways of working ... with the necessity of preserving traditional basics. Changing uniformed 

cultures requires patience and wisdom” (p. 481). 

It is the intent of this research to develop some of 

the wisdom necessary to effect a positive change 

in the fire and emergency service by reducing 

the number of on-duty deaths through first 

understanding the existing values of the fire and 

emergency service. 

Areas of Focus for Cultural Change in 

Fire and Emergency Services

Thus far, this report has defined culture, described 

the origins and characteristics of the culture of the 

American fire and emergency service community, 

and made a case to move toward a safety culture. 

The staggering death and injury toll within the fire 

and emergency service has also been detailed, 

and from that description, it is clear that the losses 

experienced are disproportionate to the decreasing number of fires in the U.S.

The culture of unsafe practices may be so deeply 

ingrained that efforts to change are viewed as 

challenges to fundamental beliefs, while other 

unsafe practices are created by the culture of the 

fire and emergency service as a whole. Still other 

behaviors, which are not cultural or motivational, 

are the result of an individual’s health or family 

history. The Project Team focused on the changes 

that could be standardized and easily implemented within an organization to effect change.

Using the focus areas and their objectives, the 

Project Team concentrated on developing sets 

of behaviors for chief officers, Company Officers 

(COs) and firefighters that minimize risk. These 

behaviors were derived using a frequency analysis 

and consensus of the working group. Risk-taking 

behaviors have been shown to be an organizational problem and not one that lies solely with firefighters’ behaviors; therefore, strategies to change 

firefighter behavior need to address multiple levels of influence. The working group identified the 

following areas of focus: situational awareness, 

individual responsibility, leadership, health and 

wellness, training, vehicle operations, seat belt 

usage, recruiting, and environmental factors.
14 April 2015

Situational Awareness

Fire and emergency service organizations should 

concentrate on implementing and demonstrating 

an effective and measurable model to improve 

situational awareness of all responders, along 

with the command and control of all incidents. 

One way to encourage this change is for fire and 

emergency service organizations to draw on a 

risk management approach that obtains input 

from firefighters and involves a cyclical process 

of identifying operations or activities that pose 

high risk for injuries, redesigning operating 

procedures to reduce risks, implementing these 

changes, and evaluating their impact. The focus 

areas of risk behavior modification are situational 

awareness and inadequate command, control 

and supervision.

There is considerable room for discussion in 

defining the boundary limits for acceptable and 

unacceptable risk in relation to potentially survivable or nonsurvivable conditions, and increased 

situational awareness aids in establishing these 

limits. Situational awareness is defined as “the 

perception of the elements in the environment 

within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of 

their status in the near future” (Endsley M., 1988).

The study of decision-making with its many subsets, including situational awareness, is at its core: 

the study of human factors and human error. It is 

the study of complex interactions of human behavior and the consequence of those actions. One 

area of scholarly agreement is that understanding 

of the complex interaction between human causal 

factors is always likely to see changes, though it is 

imperfect and incomplete (Wall, 2012). S. Dekker 

points out that some labels, such as complacency 

or loss of situational awareness, are a better and 

more accurate description of events than labeling 

an accident as human error; they appear to give a 

reason behind the behavior. In high-risk occupations that have already failed to predict complex 

situations, it is nearly impossible to completely 

engineer all safety mechanisms; thus, human 

decision-making must be studied and well-understood (Dekker, 2002).

Situational awareness becomes a key factor in 

cases where it is not known whether a building is 

occupied or unoccupied and whether the occupants are still alive or already deceased. Should 

firefighters risk their lives to search for potential 

occupants under extreme fire conditions when 

there are no clear indications that the building is 

occupied, or where fire conditions suggest that it 

is extremely unlikely that anyone could be saved?

Photo by Ron Moore, Courtesy of Cornbelt (Illinois) Fire 

Protection District
National Safety Culture Change Initiative 15

Photo by Ron Moore, Courtesy of Prosper (Texas) 

Fire Rescue

Individual Responsibility

The two key aspects that apply to every member 

of the fire and emergency service at every level 

are accountability and personal responsibility. 

Every individual, from entry-level firefighter to 

fire chief, must be accountable for meeting the 

expectations assigned to his or her role and position within the fire and emergency service. All 

individuals must also accept personal responsibility for their own health and safety, as well as for 

that of their co-workers and particularly for that 

of anyone they supervise.

Accountability is an inherent aspect of management and supervision, expanding at each successive level of hierarchy. The fire chief cannot avoid 

accountability for the overall performance of the 

fire and emergency service organization and for 

every positive or negative occurrence. The fire 

chief must hold subordinates accountable for 

performance within their areas of responsibility. 

The same principle applies to every level, down 

to the individual firefighter who is accountable to 

the organization as a whole but directly accountable to a supervisor and usually also to a group 

of co-workers.

Accountability is often ignored until something bad 

happens — in this case, an incident that results in 

on-duty injury or death. Positive accountability is 

associated with ensuring that all of the proper policies and programs are in place to prevent this type 

of occurrence, whereas negative accountability begins with attempting to explain why they were not 

in place after a preventable event has occurred. 

The most undesirable type of accountability 

comes from outside an organization, when 

individuals have to defend the organization, or 

even themselves, in legal proceedings.
16 April 2015

Photo by Ron Moore, Courtesy of Prosper (Texas) Fire Rescue

Leadership

Leadership is often mentioned as a key component in relation to implementing safety policies 

and programs. Change is unlikely to occur unless 

the leaders of an organization embrace the effort 

and demonstrate a commitment to the endeavor. This applies directly to the formal leadership, 

which includes labor as well as management, and 

it often includes informal but influential leaders 

within the organization.

Effective leadership must go beyond simply issuing directives and policy statements. The members of a fire and emergency service organization 

can generally differentiate between policies that 

are intended to satisfy a duty or responsibility 

and legitimate efforts to lead the organization 

in a specific direction. There are many examples 

of fire and emergency service organizations that 

have issued policies that are based on recommended safety and health standards and then 

failed to demonstrate a true commitment to 

those policies.

Health and Wellness

Almost half of all firefighter fatalities in the U.S. 

are cardiac-related (USFA), and the majority of 

those deaths are found to be related to pre-existing and preidentified medical conditions. These 

factors reinforce the message that all firefighters 

should be periodically evaluated to ensure that 

they are medically and physically fit to perform 

their expected duties. This message is incorporated within NFPA 1500. It is also expressed in FLSI 

6, which states: Develop and implement national medical and physical fitness standards that 

are equally applicable to all firefighters, based 

on the duties they are expected to perform. 

Although the message is clearly stated and its 

importance is widely accepted, the American fire 

and emergency service community has been very 

slow to adopt mandatory policies to implement 

such requirements. The necessary standards 

have been developed and adopted, yet there are 

still fire and emergency service organizations 

without programs of this nature and tens of thousands of active firefighters who have not been 

medically certified for emergency duty.

The two primary factors that inhibit the adoption 

of mandatory medical and fitness standards are 

cost and the belief that a substantial percentage 

of fire and emergency service members would be 

unable to meet the requirements. This behavioral 

aspect reflects the determination of many individuals who join the fire and emergency service 

or who continue to serve in spite of their medical 

status and physical fitness limitations. Indeed, 

many fire and emergency service organizations 

would face a serious crisis if the recommended 

policies were immediately mandated, as they may 

lack the resources to medically screen all personnel and to recruit new members to replace those 

who are found to be ineligible for service.

Cost is a significant problem for the various types 

of fire and emergency service organizations; however, the potential loss of active members may 

be a more critical concern for many volunteer fire 

and emergency service organizations that are already dealing with recruiting and retention issues 

and don’t have the added incentive of pay to bring 

new recruits in. In addition, volunteer fire departments face additional barriers, such as the fact 

that they typically do not provide health insurance 

for their members, they typically don’t have access to a department doctor, and departments in 
National Safety Culture Change Initiative 17

rural areas may not have easy access to medical 

resources. Within the career fire and emergency 

service, the concern tends to be associated with 

the fate of career employees who are determined 

to be unfit for duty.

The individual determination of many fire and 

emergency service members to remain active 

in physically demanding positions in fire and 

emergency service organizations, in spite of risks 

to their own health, is evident from the half of 

LODDs that result from medical causes. This behavior may be driven by dedication to the fire and 

emergency service mission, as well as the sense 

of membership within the fire and emergency 

service community.

Training

While training is often viewed as an essential 

component to accomplish any type of positive 

change in firefighter behavior, it is also frequently 

noted that inappropriate training is encouraging 

or reinforcing high-risk behaviors. This suggests 

that the problem may not be limited to inadequate training; it may also involve applicable 

training that establishes inappropriate attitudes, 

actions, beliefs and behaviors.

Fire and emergency service training organizations must be conscious of the behavioral influences that are incorporated within the content of 

their training programs, as well as the manner in 

which training is being delivered. The attitudes, 

beliefs and behaviors of the instructor may be 

more influential than the program content itself.

In addition to ensuring that the intended content is delivered and the desired attitudes and 

behaviors are developed, it is essential to ensure 

that training activities are conducted with a high 

degree of safety. The annual reports of firefighter 

fatalities almost invariably include deaths associated with training activities, whether from traumatic 

injuries or medical causes. The latter category 

often includes overexertion, heat stress, and a variety of known and unknown medical conditions.
18 April 2015

Initial Firefighter Training

Firefighter competency is foundational to firefighter safety. Training for firefighters (NFPA 1001, 

Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications) 

should include educational components that discuss the new science and research now available, 

including fire behavior based on factors such 

as fuels present, the limitations of PPE, and the 

limitations of the human body when fighting fire 

in the new protective ensembles. Back to basics 

isn’t more hose evolutions — it is the why behind 

what we do. Fire and emergency service organizations should continue to monitor research and 

the ensuing evidence to adapt/update protocols 

and practices that improve safety and fire protection. Firefighters should be taught to evaluate the 

risk of every action so they never have to answer 

“I don’t know” when asked why they took a particular action. Firefighters should not take action 

without knowing the possible consequences.

The fire and emergency service has seen and 

heard of presentations based on the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) and National Institute 

of Standards and Technology (NIST) research conducted with the Chicago Fire Department; FDNY; 

Spartanburg, South Carolina Fire and Rescue; 

and others that suggest a change to traditional 

first-arriving actions. These research reports, 

based on science, suggest changes to the initial 

on-scene report and operational mode, which are 

designed to limit exposure to risk, that include 

“aggressive defensive operation being performed 

in preparation for an interior attack.”

The UL and NIST live burn tests are aimed at 

quantifying emerging theories about how fires 

are different today. This difference is largely due 

to new building construction and the composition of home furnishings and products that in the 

past were mainly composed of natural materials, 

such as wood and cotton, but now contain large 

quantities of petroleum-based products and synthetics that burn faster and hotter. Whereas a fire 

in a room once took approximately 20 minutes to 

experience “flashover” — igniting all the contents 

— this can happen with today’s products in as 

little as four to five minutes.

The primary motivation for the live burn experiments is the changing dynamics of fires. The contents of American homes have changed significantly in the past few decades. Plastics and other 

synthetic materials have replaced the natural 

materials that once made up the bulk of furniture 

items. In addition, modern living spaces tend to 

be more open, less compartmentalized and better insulated than homes built years ago, leading 

to increased fire spread in “modern dwellings.”

The UL/NIST studies suggest that a change in 

traditional tactics begins with a direct exterior 

attack, making the interior safer for entry when 

the interior attack begins. This is being viewed 

as particularly appropriate in reduced staffing 

or delayed backup situations. These changes 

may pose a cultural challenge with the use of the 

verbiage, such as “aggressive exterior attack” 

instead of the traditional “defensive operation,” 

which implies that we are giving up. Regardless of 

how the incident begins, in the most critical situations, the IC has to make the decision to switch 

from an offensive strategy to a defensive strategy 

and withdraw firefighters from interior operating 

positions based on an ongoing assessment of 

incident scene hazards.
National Safety Culture Change Initiative 19

Officer Training

Training for COs (NFPA 1021, Standard for Fire 

Officer Professional Qualifications) should include 

educational components, such as health and 

safety, leadership, and tactics for new building 

construction features, in addition to those changing components for firefighters. Back to basics 

for COs is not simply more leadership classes — it 

also includes the principles of reading smoke, 

adequate size-up with a declaration of strategy, 

understanding fire behavior, building construction, victim survivability profiling, and using the 

Incident Command System to help manage the 

incident with safety as the overarching, guiding 

principle. COs should be asking themselves:

• “Am I training on the types of incidents to 

which we actually respond?”

• “Do we have experience or training on this 

type of incident?”

• “Is another company better trained or 

equipped to handle this incident?”

Training for chief officers (NFPA 1021) should also 

include educational components related to budgeting (execution and understanding) and maximizing partnerships to improve service delivery. 

Back to basics for chief officers who operate on 

the fireground should include skills needed for 

proper apparatus placement, managing multiple 

divisions/groups, and managing personnel accountability, in addition to those new skills being 

learned at the CO level.

Officers who have responsibilities for overseeing a fire and emergency service organization’s 

health and safety program should be meeting 

the requirements of NFPA 1521, Standard for 

Fire Department Safety Officer. Training for such 

officers should include educational components, 

such as health and safety program management, 

workplace safety compliance, fireground tactics, 

hazard recognition, and Incident Safety Officer’s 

responsibilities. While not every department has 

a designated Health and Safety Officer, it should 

be every officer’s responsibility to function as a 

“safety officer” both on and off the fireground.
20 April 2015

Emergency and Personal Vehicle Operation

The operation of fire and emergency service 

organization vehicles and apparatus warrants 

specific attention. As indicated by the NFPA, 

during the time period 1998-2013, 13 percent of 

LODDs occurred while responding to or returning from calls for service. Organizations should 

concentrate on implementing and demonstrating 

an effective and measurable model of driver/operator training that advances in skill sets throughout a career and that ensures quality and driver/

operator accountability. The focus areas of risk 

behavior modification are driver capability, quality assurance and accountability.

Factors Influencing Safe 

Emergency Response

The basic nature of the emergency response 

mission encourages drivers to reach the scene 

of an incident as quickly as possible, and in the 

case of more rural departments, firefighters are 

encouraged to first reach the fire station more 

rapidly. Traffic laws provide specific allowances 

and exemptions for emergency vehicles in order 

to reduce response times. Sirens, air horns, 

warning lights, as well as larger and more powerful engines tend to increase the sense of urgency 

and the driver’s perception of invincibility.

The two factors that are most often identified in 

relation to reducing emergency vehicle crashes 

are increased driver training and enforcement/

strict adherence to safe driving procedures. The 

logic of these influences is self-evident; however, 

attention must also be directed toward the factors that encourage drivers to stretch the limits 

of reasonable and prudent driving habits.

In addition, response time is often used as a 

primary performance indicator for fire and emergency service organizations, and shaving a few 

seconds from the annual average response time 

is considered to be a significant accomplishment. 

All of these factors appear to justify higher levels 

of risk when responding in an emergency mode. 

Driving faster is closely associated with driving 

more aggressively — taking chances and forcing 

or challenging other drivers to yield the right of 

way. Excessive speed is a known risk factor for 

crashes and crash-related death and injury.

Additional factors have been identified as encouraging inappropriate emergency vehicle driving 

habits. Competition and peer pressure may encourage faster response simply to get to the scene 

of an incident first or ahead of a rival company. In 

some fire and emergency service organizations, 

faster response speeds have been noted when 

multiple companies are responding to the same 

incident than when only a single company is responding. At the same time, each of these factors 

is offset by the expectation to drive safely and with 

due regard for the safety of all others who may be 

encountered en route to the location of the emergency incident. Safety is presented as a legal and 

moral obligation as well as an organizational value.

Driver/Operator policies will assist every jurisdiction in establishing the guidance needed for 

their members to safely operate all vehicles when 

responding to or returning from an incident, beginning with proper licensure for the jurisdiction, 

as well as proper training on how to drive and 

operate the specific emergency vehicles that the 

driver will be responsible for. It is prudent that 

not only departmental policies but also national guidelines be established that define tiered 

emergency responses for all departments. These 

policies must address both personal and department vehicles and cover both emergency and 

nonemergency driving expectations.

Photo by Ron Moore, Courtesy of Prosper (Texas) 

Fire Rescue
National Safety Culture Change Initiative 21

Based on the assumption that every organization 

may need to create or revise driver/operator policies, a list of potential incentives that organizations can use to promote driver/operator behavioral changes and a list of possible consequences 

that organizations may face if they choose not 

to adopt a driver/operator policy are provided at 

www.ffsafetyculture.org.

Seat Belt Use

The broad scope of the cultural issue becomes 

evident when it is applied to the question of why 

many firefighters do not use seat belts when riding 

in fire apparatus. While the adoption and enforcement of a policy requiring the use of seat belts 

appears to be relatively uncomplicated, the issue is 

considerably more complex than it appears.

The vast majority of fire and emergency service 

organizations have adopted official written policies 

that require firefighters to use seat belts whenever 

vehicles are in motion. There are no known written policies in fire and emergency service organizations that allow for the nonuse of seat belts. 

Requirements to use seat belts are incorporated 

in many state vehicle codes, and the same policy 

is clearly stated in NFPA 1500. In addition, tremendous efforts have been put forth to educate firefighters on the need to use seat belts and promote 

their use as a personal safety decision.

Considering all of these efforts, it is appropriate 

to ask why so many firefighters continue to not 

use seat belts. Below is a list of factors that have 

been identified as contributors to the problem:

• The belief that the urgency of emergency response requires donning protective clothing 

and equipment en route.

• The belief that a fastened seat belt will delay 

the firefighter’s ability to exit the vehicle upon 

arrival at the scene of the emergency.

• The difficulty of manipulating inadequately 

designed seat belts in the limited seating 

space that is available and in the presence of 

breathing apparatus straps.

• The sense of personal invincibility that comes 

from riding in a vehicle that is larger and 

heavier than most other vehicles on the road.

• The fear of being viewed as nonconforming 

when others are not using their seat belts.

• The failure to enforce officially adopted policies 

creates the impression that compliance is not a 

high priority for managers and supervisors.

Photo by Ron Moore, Courtesy of Prosper (Texas) Fire 

Rescue
22 April 2015

While all of the noted rationalizations apply to 

emergency response, they often carry over to 

nonemergency situations. Firefighters may easily 

develop the attitude that if it is acceptable to ride 

to an emergency without a seat belt, then there 

is no need to wear a seat belt when returning 

from the emergency or when riding in a fire and 

emergency service organization vehicle for any 

other reason.

One key factor appears to be the priority that is 

directed toward seat belt use by the fire chief and 

senior level officers of the fire and emergency 

service organization. A strong policy statement 

accompanied by a serious enforcement policy is 

usually effective in achieving a high level of compliance. In larger organizations, the policy must 

be enforced at each successive level of supervision down to the individual firefighter.

Where there are valid technical issues, such as 

problems with the design and installation of seat 

belts, management must be prepared to address 

those problems as part of the overall strategy. 

Members cannot be expected to work with equipment that does not perform the required function.

Recruiting

An important point made by Hofstede (2000) 

is that one way to change the culture of a uniformed organization, such as the fire and emergency service, is to recruit more members with 

values that are different or independent from 

the organization. Soeters and Boer (2000) found 

this to be the case to help reduce military aircraft 

accidents. By incorporating more civilians and 

fewer people who had been indoctrinated into 

the military value system, a cultural shift toward 

a safer work environment ensued, and the number of aircraft accidents was reduced.

The same factors tend to influence individuals to 

become firefighters, both career and volunteer. 

The fire and emergency service is often viewed as 

an attractive outlet for individuals who are seeking opportunities to face extreme challenges and 

imminent danger. The recognition that is often 

associated with heroic actions is further motivation for many individuals to become involved in 

the fire and emergency service. The strongest, 

bravest and most daring individuals are often 

motivated to become firefighters.

The whole notion of daring and death defiance 

is continually applied to the fire and emergency 

service from external sources. The public tends 

to view firefighters as individuals who are willing 

to face extreme risks in order to save lives and 

property. These public perceptions are naturally 

incorporated into the firefighters’ self-image and 

tend to further promote risky behaviors.

The media portrayal of fire and emergency service 

workers is generally not realistic, and it does not 

represent a true slice of what the work of the fire 

and emergency service is. Protective clothing may 

be altered or not used to show an actor’s face or 

demonstrate a level of aggression or risk that is 

unreasonable in a real-world setting. This image 

is further reinforced by slogans such as “No Fear” 

and “Are You Tough Enough to Be a Hero?” as 

well as graphics portraying firefighters as dragon 

slayers and warriors facing overwhelming threats 

with nothing more than courage and daring. Peer 

pressure and competition often entice a “more 

daring” spirit than other individuals, companies, 

or fire and emergency service organizations. In 

some cases, actions that demonstrate appropriate 

caution are viewed as cowardly or impossible.

The warrior image is increasingly used to promote 

a sense of preparedness to engage in actions that 

require high levels of training and involve extreme 

physical challenges. These concepts are not inconsistent with the values of a strong safety culture. 

In many cases, the warrior image is presented in 

a context that appears to label the safety movement as a cowardly approach, expressing the notion that warriors are not concerned with safety 

because they are able to overcome any adversity.

Environmental Factors

It has been observed that the current fire and 

emergency service generation has been raised in 

an environment that glorifies risk and expresses 

little or no concern for the potential negative 

consequences of bad decisions. The Internet 

along with tremendous expansion in the use of 

social media outlets, such as Facebook, Twitter 

and Instagram, and the influence of national 

fire service websites provide a continual supply 

of video clips and photos showing individuals 

risking life and limb in the pursuit of thrills and 

recognition. While many of these efforts result 

in obvious injuries, the consequences of such 

misadventures are never included in the video 

that is posted. There is an aura that even anonymous recognition for extreme daring is sufficient justification to accept the consequences of 

failure. Additionally, newer members who are 

accustomed to playing video games that allow 

individuals to experience simulated confrontation 

with every conceivable danger, with absolutely 

no risk of death or injury to the thrill seeker, may 

contribute to a lack of understanding of real-life 

consequences of high-risk behaviors.
National Safety Culture Change Initiative 23

Summary

The culture of the American fire and emergency 

service community is rich and time-honored. 

The culture has aspects that provide superior 

protection for life and property, while it also has 

portions that contribute unnecessarily to firefighter and emergency worker injury and death. 

The culture can be changed at national, state and 

local levels without diminishing the quality of 

services provided by enhancing firefighter competencies needed at emergency scenes. Both the 

culture and climate can be moved toward a common sense, safety-oriented approach to balance 

the risks and rewards of questionable behaviors 

better.

This report generates important ideas that can be 

implemented to address culture and climate in an 

effort to change behavior in the American fire and 

emergency service community, which will lead to 

fewer injuries and deaths.

This document provides a foundation for future 

work in this area that will involve developing enhanced online educational materials and outreach. 

fire and emergency service organizations and 

individual responders can begin to engage in this 

move toward positive cultural change by visiting 

www.ffsafetyculture.org.
24 April 2015

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National Safety Culture Change Initiative 25

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For more information or copies of this publication, please contact:

U.S. Fire Administration

16825 South Seton Avenue

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727

800-561-3356

www.usfa.fema.gov

FA-342/April 2015