alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. BANTA UNGURU,

Defendant

- Appellant. No s

. 22

- 10088 22

- 10089

D.C. No s . 2:21

- cr
- 00270

- SMB

- 1

2:20

- cr
- 00542

- SMB

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 18, 2023 * *

Before: GRABER, PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals, Banta Unguru appeals from the district court’s
judgment s and challenges his guilty

- plea convictions and aggregate 87

- month

sente nce for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, and
possession of 15 or more counterfeit or unauthorized access devices, in violation of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JAN 26 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 22

- 10088 & 22

- 10089

18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1028A(a)(1), and 1029 (a)(3) , respectively

. Pursuant to Anders

v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Unguru ’s counsel has filed a brief stating that
there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of

record. Unguru has filed a pro se brief

. No answering brief has been filed.
Unguru waived h is right to appeal his conviction s and sentence. Our
independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80
(1988), discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the waiver. See United

States v. Watson , 582 F.3d 974, 986

- 88 (9th Cir. 2009). Unguru’s pro se
arguments that the government breached the plea agreement , and that his plea and
appellate waiver were not knowing and voluntar y, are not supported by the record.
We accordingly dismiss the se appeals

. We remand, however, with instructions to correct the written judgment s to conform to the oral pronouncement of sentence by (1) imposing a 12

- month term
of supervised release on the aggravated identity theft count, and (2) deleting the
phrase “(outpatient and/or inpatient)” from s pecial supervised release condition 1
in both judgments. See United States v. Hernandez , 795 F.3d 1159, 1169 (9th Cir.
2015) (unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence controls over inconsistent
written judgment )

. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED ; REMANDED to correct the judgment s .
#### In the Matter of Daniel Zinicola, Appellant, v Nassau County Medical Center, Respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent Nassau County Medical Center, dated June 1, 1987, which declined to issue to the petitioner a diploma, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lockman, J.), entered December 8, 1987, which dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs, for reasons stated by Justice Lockman. Thompson, J. P., Lawrence, Balletta and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
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EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Sybron Dental Specialties, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the Report), I, Floyd W. Pickrell, Jr., Chief Executive Officer, and I, Bernard J. Pitz, Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.



/s/    FLOYD W. PICKRELL,
JR.Floyd W. Pickrell, Jr. Chief Executive OfficerDecember 14, 2005/s/    BERNARD J. PITZBernard J. Pitz Chief Financial OfficerDecember 14, 2005




This certification accompanies
this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### In the Matter of Richard Hontoria, Appellant, v Philip Coombe, Jr., as Superintendent of Eastern Correctional Facility, Respondent.

Appeal unanimously dismissed *(see, People ex rel. Aguilar v Kelly,*143 AD2d 535). (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Wyoming County, Kane, J. — art 78.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Denman, Green, Balio and Davis, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C SECTION 1350)

The undersigned, as the Chief Executive Officer of Logility, Inc., certifies that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
fiscal quarter ended January 31, 2008 (the Report), which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Logility, Inc. at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350) and shall not be relied upon for any other purpose.



|                             |  |                         
|---------------------------- |  | ------------------------
|This 10th day of March, 2008 |  | /s/ J. Michael Edenfield
|                             |  | J. Michael Edenfield    
|                             |  | Chief Executive Officer 

The undersigned, as the Chief Financial Officer of Logility, Inc., certifies that, to the best of his knowledge
and belief, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended January 31, 2008 (the Report), which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Logility, Inc. at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350) and shall not be relied upon for any other purpose.



|                             |  |                        
|---------------------------- |  | -----------------------
|This 10th day of March, 2008 |  | /s/ Vincent C. Klinges 
|                             |  | Vincent C. Klinges     
|                             |  | Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Logility, Inc. and will be retained by Logility, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

The information in this Exhibit 32.1 shall not be deemed filed
for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, nor shall it be deemed incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, except as shall be expressly set forth by specific reference in such
filing.
#### In the Matter of Thomas Moran et al., Petitioners, v Cesar A. Perales, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents.

Consolidated proceedings pursuant to CPLR articles 78 and 30 to review two determinations of the respondent Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, dated May 4, 1987 and June 19, 1987, respectively, which, after separate hearings, denied the petitioners’ applications for Medicaid transportation reimbursement.

Adjudged that the determinations are confirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the proceeding is dismissed, on the merits.

The petitioners both suffer from schizophrenia and both receive Social Security disability benefits and medical assistance. As part of their prescribed treatment, they attend a "psychosocial club” known as the Herricks Exchange. The petitioners are seeking reimbursement from the Department of Social Services for their travel costs incurred as a result of their attendance at the Herricks Exchange. The club is operated by the Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center under contract with the Nassau County Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities. It is authorized to provide out-patient clinical treatment for its clients pursuant to an operating certificate issued to the hospital by the New York State Office of Mental Health. Since Nassau County voluntarily participates in the Herricks Exchange, the responsibility to provide transportation reimbursement does not rest with the State Medicaid program *(see,*14 NYCRR 575.5 [c]). Rather, the obligation to provide transportation may lie with the Nassau County Department of Mental Health.

The petitioners further contend that the failure of the Department of Social Services to reimburse them for their travel costs violates both their State and Federal Constitutional rights. While the petitioners are correct in claiming *948that the State Constitution imposes upon the State an affirmative duty to aid the needy *(see,*NY Const, art XVII, §§ 1, 3), it does not require that all expenses which a needy person incurs must be paid by the Department of Social Services *(see, Matter of Bernstein v Toia,*43 NY2d 437, 448-449). The petitioners’ equal protection argument must likewise fail. The petitioners failed to demonstrate that Medicaid recipients who attend a psychosocial club are being reimbursed by the Department of Social Services. Absent a showing of disparate treatment among the Medicaid recipients attending psychosocial programs, there is no violation of equal protection. Bracken, J. P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.
# CE2010137EN.01006201.xml

| 27.5.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 137/62 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.5.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 137/62

---

Thursday 2 April 2009Community statistics on external trade ***II

P6_TA(2009)0205

European Parliament legislative resolution of 2 April 2009 on the common position adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics relating to external trade with non-member countries and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1172/95 (15248/2/2008 – C6-0065/2009 – 2007/0233(COD))

2010/C 137 E/16

(Codecision procedure: second reading)

The European Parliament,

The European Parliament

having regard to the Council common position (15248/2/2008 – C6-0065/2009),

having regard to its position at first reading (1) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2007)0653),

1

having regard to Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty,

having regard to Rule 67 of its Rules of Procedure,

having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on International Trade (A6-0126/2009),

| 1. | Approves the common position; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Approves the common position;

| 2. | Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the common position; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the common position;

| 3. | Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council pursuant to Article 254(1) of the EC Treaty; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council pursuant to Article 254(1) of the EC Treaty;

| 4. | Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to have it published in the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

4.

Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to have it published in the Official Journal of the European Union;

Official Journal of the European Union

| 5. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and Commission. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and Commission.

---

(1)  Texts Adopted, 23.9.2008, P6_TA(2008)0414.

1

---
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Iowa Telecommunications Services, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31,
2004 (the Report), I, Craig A. Knock, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                     |  |                                                                                                                                         
|-------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: March 30, 2005 |  | /s/    CRAIG A. KNOCK                                                                                                                   
|                     |  | Craig A. Knock Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer Principal Accounting Officer
Iowa Telecommunications Services, Inc.
<PAGE>

                          EXECUTIVE PERQUISITE/FLEX POLICY
                             EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1998


A.   EXECUTIVE PERQUISITES

     The Company will provide for the direct payment of selected perquisite
     expenses that are offered because of competitive compensation practice
     and/or because the service is being expensed in the business interests
     of the Company.

     The following outlines the executive perquisites offered:

     --   Physical examination every three years under 40 years of age, every
          two years over age 40

     --   Tax preparation fees up to $750/year

     --   Tax gross-up on 25% of the imputed income from the IRS  "Annual Lease
          Value Table" and IRS defined fuel costs for personal use or actual
          expense

     --   Automobile actual operating expenses

<PAGE>

B.   OFFICER FLEX ACCOUNT

     The Company will reimburse Corporate officers for the reasonable cost
     of certain services.  The maximum allowable reimbursement will be up to 10%
     of the officers' annual base pay.

     Expenses eligible for reimbursement are as follows:

     --   Athletic, country and business club memberships

     --   Automobile lease, or, if the automobile is purchased, monthly
          reimbursement equivalent to the pro-forma lease cost

<PAGE>

C.   INELIGIBLE EXPENSES

     The following expenses will no longer be eligible for direct payment
     or reimbursement:

     --   Home security system

     --   Legal advice

     --   Tax assistance in excess of $750/year

     --   Financial counseling

     --   Daycare for children

     --   Season tickets to sporting and cultural events

     --   First class business travel

     --   Spouse travel not required by business needs

     --   Additional personal liability insurance

     --   Additional business liability insurance

     --   Education for children

     --   Additional business travel insurance

     --   Supplemental life insurance

     --   Up to $3,000/per calendar year of health care expenses not covered by
          Company benefit plans

     --   Personal computer leases
#### Ruth A. Choiniere, as Executrix of John A. Choiniere, Deceased, et al. Respondents, v American Motors Corp. et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. (And Another Action.)

In an action to recover damages for wrongful death, American Motors Corporation and Jeep Corporation appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County *333(Lerner, J.), dated September 23, 1986, as granted the plaintiffs motion to vacate certain notices of depositions served by the appellants upon nonparty witnesses.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs motion is denied; in the event the parties and the nonparty witnesses cannot agree as to a time and place for the examinations before trial, they shall proceed at a time and place to be fixed by the appellants who shall give written notice thereof to the plaintiff and the nonparty witnesses not less than 10 days before the scheduled examinations.

The plaintiff claims damages for the alleged wrongful death of her decedent arising out of a one-vehicle accident, upon the theories of negligence and products liability. The appellants, in an attempt to secure information with respect to the decedent’s medical history, served notices to take deposition upon certain nonparty witnesses pursuant to CPLR 3101 (a) (4). The plaintiff moved to vacate such notices on the ground that the appellants failed to demonstrate that special circumstances existed which would justify the depositions of the nonparty witnesses.

We find that the court erred in granting the plaintiffs motion to vacate the notices to take deposition of the three nonparty witnesses. The appellants made an adequate showing that, in order to prepare for trial, it was necessary to examine two of the decedent’s treating physicians and the insurance company which had administered his medical insurance plan *(see, New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Kelly,*113 AD2d 285; *Heitzman v Abrahamson,*97 AD2d 811). It appears that the decedent suffered from high blood pressure and obesity for several years prior to his death. The decedent’s psychiatrist indicated at her deposition that she had no records with respect to the decedent. The nonparties, however, have possession of records pertaining to the decedent’s medical condition, illnesses and physical complaints in the not-too-distant past. Such information is material and necessary *(see,*CPLR 3101 [a]; *Shapiro v Levine,*104 AD2d 800, 801) to the preparation of the appellants’ defense to the action, especially with respect to an evaluation of damages *(see, Wiseman v American Motors Sales Corp.,*101 AD2d 859). Mollen, P. J., Brown, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-7347

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JOHNNY MACK BROWN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior District Judge. (CR-94-27; CA-03-536-7) Submitted: January 19, 2005 Decided: February 16, 2005 Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Johnny Mack Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Ruth Elizabeth Plagenhoef, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Johnny Mack Brown, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336- 38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Brown has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We grant the motion to file a pro se supplemental brief and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Frederick Wade Kirby, Also Known as Wade Frederick Kirby, Also Known as Sundance, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Harris, J.), rendered February 3, 1984, convicting him of rape in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the evidence adduced at trial established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the *653verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]). ’

We reject the defendant’s contention that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney failed to call the defendant’s landlady as a witness. "It is not for this court to second-guess whether a course chosen by defendant’s counsel was the best trial strategy, or even a good one, so long as defendant was afforded meaningful representation” *(People v Satterfield,*66 NY2d 796, 799-800). We note that the defendant’s further claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are based on facts outside the record and therefore are not properly before this court.

Finally, under the circumstances of this case, we find that the sentence imposed was not excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Niehoff and Harwood, JJ., concur.