J -S05006-17 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellee 

v. 

ALBERT VICTOR RAIBER, 

Appellant No. 1315 MDA 2016 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 3, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0001524-2012 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and PLATT, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2017 

Appellant, Albert Victor Raiber, appeals from the order denying his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9541 et seq. After careful review, we affirm. 

The PCRA court summarized the pertinent procedural and factual 

history of this case as follows: 

On January 17, 2013, [Appellant] was convicted by a jury 

of his peers of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, Indecent 

Assault, Indecent Exposure, Corruption of a Minor, [multiple] 

Simple Assaults and False Imprisonment. Attorney Christopher 

L. Reibsome represented [Appellant] through trial. On July 29, 

2013, [Appellant] was determined to be a Sexually Violent 

Predator (SVP), given a lifetime Megan's Law registration 

requirement, and was sentenced to an aggregate incarceration 

term of twenty-nine (29) years and three (3) months to seventytwo (72) years. See [N.T.] SVP Hearing and Sentencing, 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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7/26/[]13, at 36. On August 8, 2013, [Appellant] filed a Post - Sentence Motion challenging two counts of his sentence that 

were based on a previous conviction. This [c]ourt granted 

[Appellant's] Post -Sentence Motion on December 18, 2013[,] 

and resentenced [him] to an aggregate incarceration term of 

sixteen (16) and one half years to forty-six (46) and one half 

years. See [N.T.] Resentencing, 12/18/[]13, at 5. 

On January 17, 2014, [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal. 

[He] filed his Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal on February 10, 2014. On March 6, 2014, this [c]ourt, 

by Opinion and Order, requested that the Superior Court dismiss 

the appeal. The Superior Court affirmed this [c]ourt's judgment 

of sentence on September 4, 2014. See Commonwealth v. 

Raiber, [107 A.3d 218] (Pa. Super. ... 2014) [(unpublished 

memorandum)]. 

[Appellant] initially filed the present Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA) Petition on July 9, 2015. Attorney Mark Bayley was 

ultimately appointed [as Appellant's] PCRA counsel on August 

27, 2015. This [c]ourt granted two motions extending 

[Appellant]'s deadline to file an amended PCRA Petition on 

October 16, 2015 and December 18, 2015. [Appellant] timely 

filed an Amended PCRA Petition on January 14, 2016, as well as 

addendums to the Petition on February 2, 2016 and February 29, 

2016. [A] [h]earing on the Petition occurred on March 3, 2016 

at which time the [c]ourt directed the parties to file briefs. The 

Commonwealth and [Appellant] filed timely briefs on March 31, 

2016 and April 11, 2016, respectively.... 

BACKGROUND 

The above -captioned charges arose out of allegations of a 

pattern of sexual abuse that occurred in December [of] 2011. At 

trial, the Commonwealth first called the victim, J.W. 

J.W. testified that, in December 2011, he befriended 

another boy named N.U. N.T. Trial, 1/16/13, at 40. J.W. was 

twelve years -old at the time. Id. The two boys spent a lot of 

time together over the 2011 Christmas break. Id. at 39-40. 

J.W. went to N.U.'s home on fi[ve] or six occasions, spending the 

night on three or four occasions.1° Id. at 43, 75. At the time, 

N.U. lived with [Appellant], his grandfather. Id. at 41-42. Nancy 

Raiber ([Appellant]'s wife), Beth Leevy ([Appellant]'s daughter), 

Brian Leevy (Beth's husband), Earl Brown (Beth's brother), and 

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Melanie Oreck (Brown's fiancé and N.U.'s mother) also lived in 

the home. Id. at 183, 185, 187-88. 

1° Defense witness, Beth Leevy[,] testified that J.W. spent 

the night on two occasions and came over once or twice 

before then. Id. at 186. 

The home itself was a small, three bedroom, single -wide 

trailer. Id. at 47, 78, 187, 193, 201. The trailer included, in 

sequence of proximity to the front door, the living room, the 

kitchen, and a hallway leading to two bedrooms, the bathroom, 

and the master ([Appellant]'s) bedroom. Id. at 47. 

J.W. identified the [Appellant] at trial. Id. at 42. He testified 

that he spent time with [Appellant] when N.U. was not around. 

Id. J.W. and [Appellant] watched movies in [Appellant]'s 

bedroom aloneil and went shopping on occasion. Id. at 42-43. 

J.W. testified that [Appellant] shut and sometimes locked his 

bedroom door while the two watched movies in the [Appellant]'s 

bedroom. Id. at 82. J.W. went on to testify about a number of 

occasions on which [Appellant] smacked or sexually abused him. 

11 J.W. conceded on cross examination that people came in 

and out of [Appellant]'s bedroom when he watched movies 

with [Appellant], but testified that he and [Appellant] 

were, on ocassion, alone for a period of time. Id. at 78 - 79. Beth Leevy testified that her husband, Brian, and 

brother, Earl Brown, were running back and forth into the 

bedroom watching the movie with J.W. and [Appellant]. 

Id. at 186. 

J.W. testified that on approximately six occasions, [Appellant] 

smacked his rear end with a stick, paddle, belt, whip or his 

hands. Id. He also stated that [Appellant] pinched his rear end 

on a few occasions. Id. at 66. J.W. testified that on more than 

one occasion, while J.W.'s pants and underwear were pulled 

down, [Appellant] bent J.W. over his knee and smacked his rear 

end. Id. at 61. The smacking resulted in bruising or scratching. 

Id. 

J.W. described, in detail, one occasion on which 

[Appellant] tied J.W.'s hands and feet to the bedframe with rope 

and hit J.W. with a paddle, belt and whip. Id. at 53-55. J.W. 

stated that on another occasion, [Appellant] handcuffed J.W.'s 

hands to [Appellant]'s bed and smacked J.W. Id. at 55-57. 

J.W. identified a photograph of the belt, paddle, whip, handcuffs 

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and rope as the items that [Appellant] used to smack or restrain 

J.W. Id. at 74-75. 

J.W. testified that the [Appellant] once drove him and one 

of [Appellant]'s friends12 to the video game store, GameStop. 

Id. at 62. J.W. stated that [Appellant] dropped the friend off in 

front of GameStop and drove behind the store. There, 

[Appellant] smacked J.W. on the rear end while J.W. was face 

down on the passenger seat with his pants, but not underwear, 

pulled down. Id. at 63-64. 

12 It appears that [Appellant]'s "friend" was his stepson, 

Daniel Brown, who testified that he went with [Appellant] 

and J.W. to GameStop on one occasion. Id. at 177-80. 

Daniel Brown is also referred to as "Jay[."] Id. at 204. 

J.W. testified that [Appellant] rubbed, licked and sucked 

his penis on one occasion. Id. at 58-59. He testified that 

[Appellant] once entered the bathroom while J.W. was showering 

and washed J.W.'s entire body, including his groin area and 

buttocks, with a "spongy washcloth[."] Id. at 50, 59-60. J.W. 

stated that [Appellant] dried him off after the shower, rubbing a 

towel in a painful manner in between his legs. Id. at 60-61. 

J.W. testified that, on another occasion, [Appellant] instructed 

J.W. to bring him soap while [Appellant] was in the shower. 

J.W. did so. He saw [Appellant]'s side and saw that [Appellant] 

was nude. Id. at 65. 

Following J.W.'s testimony, the Commonwealth called 

J.W.'s mother and stepfather, forensic interviewer Kim Duffy, 

Pennsylvania State Trooper Nathaniel Lieberum, Fulton County 

(PA) Chief Probation Officer Dan Miller, and Pennsylvania State 

Trooper Courtney Pattillo. 

J.W. reported the allegations of abuse and showed bruising 

to his parents on December 31, 2011. Id. at 83, 96-97. J.W.'s 

mother called the Pennsylvania State Police to report the 

allegations that same day. Id. at 98. The family met with 

Pennsylvania State Trooper Courtney Pattillo at the State Police 

barracks on January 2, 2012. Id. at 149. Trooper Pattillo 

interviewed the parents and referred the family to the Children's 

Advocacy Center for a forensic interview. Id. at 149-50. On 

January 9, 2012, forensic interviewer, Kim Duffy, interviewed 

J.W. about the allegations of abuse. Id. at 101, 124. 

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Kim Duffy testified that she did interview J.W. regarding 

the allegations on January 9, 2012. Id. at 124. Trooper Pattillo 

observed the interview via closed-circuit TV. Id. at 121-24. 

Duffy confirmed that the interview recording that the 

Commonwealth played for the jury was a fair and accurate 

depiction of her January 9, 2012 interview of J.W. Id. at 126. 

Trooper Pattillo identified the [Appellant] and testified that 

he interviewed [him] on January 10, 2012. Id. at 152-53. With 

the assistance of his initial report, Trooper Pattillo testified about 

his initial meeting with [Appellant]. Trooper Pattillo testified that 

he asked [Appellant] about each of the six incidents that J.W. 

disclosed in his forensic interview the day before. Id. at 156. 

Trooper Pattillo stated that [Appellant] admitted to spanking 

J.W. in his bedroom and holding hands with the boy. Id. at 156- 

58. Trooper Pattillo testified that [Appellant] denied having ever 

gone to GameStop with J.W. and denied performing oral sex on 

the boy. Id. at 157-158. 

Trooper Pattillo then discussed a January 12, 2012 search 

warrant to search the contents of [Appellant]'s trailer. Id. at 

161. Trooper Pattillo testified that he recovered several pieces 

of physical evidence from [Appellant]'s bedroom. Id. at 162. 

Those items included a whip found in a bedroom closet, two sets 

of hand cuffs found in different closets, two sets of ropes found 

tied to the legs of [Appellant]'s bed and another rope found in a 

travel bag, a black leather belt, and a black leather paddle. Id. 

at 164-67. Trooper Pattillo arrested [Appellant] that day. Id. at 

170. 

Trooper Lieberum testified to interviewing [Appellant] in 

2005 and ultimately charging him with simple assault, corruption 

of minors and indecent exposure. Id. at 135-40. Trooper 

Lieberum further testified to [the] basis for the 2005 charges: 

[Appellant]'s admission to striking two naked children with a 

belt, undressing himself and ordering a child to strike him, and 

lying in bed nude with a child and hugging him. Id. at 138. 

Chief Miller testified that, in a pre -sentencing investigation 

interview, [Appellant] made the same admissions he made to 

Trooper Lieberum regarding the 2005 incidents. Id. at 143-46. 

[Appellant] ultimately pled guilty to corruption of minors as a 

result of the charges. Id. at 144. 

Attorney Reibsome's strategy at trial was "essentially - this 

could have never happened because everybody was around the 

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child." N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/3/16. Attorney Reibsome first 

called [Appellant]'s stepson, Daniel Brown, to testify. Brown 

testified that he went to GameStop with [Appellant] and J.W., 

the three got out of the car at approximately the same time, and 

entered the store together. N.T. Trial, 1/16/13, at 176-77. 

Brown further testified that nothing inappropriate happened 

while he was in the car. Id. at 178. 

Attorney Reibsome next called [Appellant]'s daughter, 

Beth Leevy.13 Leevy testified that she was living in [Appellant]'s 

home in December 2011 when J.W. spent time there. Id. at 

184. She testified that she was unemployed, and was present in 

the home "24/7" when J.W. was home, not even leaving to run 

errands. Id. at 184-85. Leevy stated that people w[]ere always 

in the home and that J.W. was never home alone with 

[Appellant]. Id. at 188. Leevy testified that [Appellant] did help 

J.W. with his homework in [Appellant]'s bedroom. Id. at 186. 

She further testified that J.W. watched movies in [Appellant]'s 

bedroom with him but Leevy's husband and brother "were 

running back and forth to that room watching movies with 

them." Id. Leevy stated that she did not witness anything 

inappropriate. Id. at 188. 

13 [Appellant] and his then -wife were awarded custody of 

Leevy when she was 15 months old. Id. at 183. 

Leevy also testified to the physical makeup of the home 

stating that it was a small, single -wide trailer. Id. at 187, 193. 

She testified that the distance from the living room to the 

master bedroom is about 10 feet. Id. at 187. She stated that 

the walls are "paper -thin" and that most noises can be heard 

through the walls.14 Leevy did not recall hearing any noises 

from the master bedroom while J.W. and [Appellant] were in 

there. Id. She further stated that had she heard strange noises 

from the bedroom, she would have gone back there. Id. at 194. 

14 Conversely, J.W. testified that you couldn't really hear 

voices traveling through the walls. Id. at 78. 

Finally, Attorney Reibsome called [Appellant]'s wife, Nancy 

Raiber. Raiber testified that she was living with [Appellant] in 

the relevant time period. Id. at 196-97. She stated that she 

was unemployed and home the entire time J.W. was there. Id. 

at 198-99. Raiber testified that J.W. took a shower at the home 

on one occasion and she did not see [Appellant] go into the 

shower with him. Id. at 199. 

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Raiber testified that the [Appellant] and J.W. were alone 

together very few times, "[j]ust long enough for him to go down 

and pick up (Daniel Brown)." Id. She stated that she never saw 

anything inappropriate happening when J.W. was at the home. 

Id. at 200. 

Raiber also testified to the physical makeup of the home 

stating that it was a three -bedroom, single -wide trailer. Id. at 

201. She stated that the walls were constructed of dry wall and 

that persons in the home can hear what is going on in other 

rooms. Id. at 200-01. Raiber did, however, testify that a 

person would not necessarily hear a muffled cry unless he or she 

was at the bathroom right next to the bedroom. Id. at 203. 

In his closing argument, Attorney Reibsome conceded that 

[Appellant] committed simple assault, spanked J.W., and that 

"there was probably false imprisonment[."] N.T. Trial, 1/17/13, 

at 6, 9. He argued that the oral sex allegation was inconsistent 

with the allegations of spankings and inconsistent with 

[Appellant]'s charges. Id. at 7-10. Attorney Reibsome noted 

that J.W. called [Appellant]'s home to visit after the alleged oral 

sex incident, and argued that such unprompted action on J.W.'s 

part did not make sense if J.W.'s version of the event was to be 

believed. Id. at 7-8. 

Attorney Reibsome stated that J.W. was "far from an 

innocent person" and claimed that J.W. embellished his story 

because he did not want to return to [Appellant]'s home. Id. at 

20, 8. He argued that Ms. Duffy's testimony, and the forensic 

interview itself, was biased because Ms. Duffy's job to elicit 

testimony to be used in trial. Id. at 14-15. He argued that 

because no oral sex occurred, [Appellant] was neither guilty of 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse nor corruption of minors. 

Id. at 18-19. 

Ultimately, the jury found [Appellant] guilty on all charges. 

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 8/26/16, at 1-8 (some footnotes omitted). 

Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant's petition by 

order dated August 3, 2016. On August 9, 2016, Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal, and then filed a court -ordered, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

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statement on August 25, 2016. The PCRA court issued its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion on August 26, 2016. 

Appellant now presents the following questions for our review: 

1. Did the trial court err in denying ... Appellant's Amended 

Motion for [PCRA] Relief where ... Appellant's trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to elicit testimony from Nancy 

Raiber that she had reason to believe that [J.W.] had 

snooped through a dresser drawer in ... Appellant's 

bedroom? 

2. Did the trial court err in denying ... Appellant's Amended 

Motion for [PCRA] Relief where, in conjunction with the 

first ineffective assistance of counsel issue set forth above, 

... Appellant's trial counsel was additionally ineffective for 

failing to interview and call [N.U.] - who could have 

testified at trial that he was present in ... Appellant's home, 

along with others, at the time [J.W.] showered there, that 

... Appellant did not enter the bathroom while [J.W.] 

showered, that it would not have been possible for ... Appellant to have entered the bathroom while [J.W.] 

showered without [N.U.'s] observing ... Appellant['s] doing 

so, and that ... Appellant had never made sexual or 

otherwise inappropriate advances on him - and for failing 

to elicit testimony from Beth Leevy that she was present in 

... Appellant's home, along with others, at the time [J.W.] 

showered there, that ... Appellant did not enter the 

bathroom while [J.W.] showered, and that it would not 

have been possible for ... Appellant to have entered the 

bathroom while [J.W.] showered without her noticing? 

Appellant's Brief at 8. 

This Court's standard of review regarding an order denying a petition 

under the PCRA is as follows: 

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. 

This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court's ruling if it 

is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. 

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This Court may affirm a PCRA court's decision on any grounds if 

the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the 

factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those 

findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we 

afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the 

petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal 

citations omitted). 

We must begin by briefly addressing the timeliness of Appellant's 

petition, because the PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and 

may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a 

petition. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). 

Here, it is undisputed that Appellant's PCRA petition was timely. On 

September 4, 2014, this Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence. 

Appellant filed his pro se PCRA petition on July 9, 2015, well within the oneyear time limitation set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) ("Any petition under 

this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed 

within one year of the date the judgment becomes final...."). Accordingly, 

the PCRA court had jurisdiction to entertain Appellant's PCRA petition, and 

we have jurisdiction to entertain Appellant's appeal. 

Each of Appellant's claims concerns whether his trial counsel, Attorney 

Reibsome, provided ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). In order to 

successfully establish an IAC claim, Appellant is required 

to show: (1) that the claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel 

had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or 

inaction; and, (3) that, but for the errors and omissions of 

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counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 

the proceedings would have been different. 

Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (Pa. 1999). 

Appellant's first IAC claim posits that Attorney Reibsome was 

ineffective for failing to elicit testimony from Nancy Raiber, Appellant's wife, 

regarding her suspicion that the victim snooped through their dresser 

drawer. Essentially, Appellant contends that such testimony would have 

offered an alternative explanation for the victim's familiarity with the sex 

toys discovered by police in Appellant's bedroom, to counter the inference 

that such knowledge could have only derived from Appellant's having 

performed the alleged criminal acts against the victim. The PCRA court 

dismissed this claim as having failed to prove any of the three prongs of the 

IAC test enumerated in Kimball. However, we need not address each 

prong in our review as "[f]ailure to prove any prong of this test will defeat 

an ineffectiveness claim." Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 

2014). 

We begin with the arguable merit prong of Appellant's first IAC claim. 

At the PCRA hearing, Nancy Raiber was asked what she "knew about [J.W.] 

snooping around in [her] bedroom...." N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/3/16, at 33. 

Ms. Raiber answered: 

Um, I went to get a hanky out of my dresser drawer and I 

noticed my dresser drawer was open, which had all my lingerie 

in it. And, at that time, I asked [Appellant] ... "Why is my 

dresser drawer open?" He sa[id], "I have no idea." So, I closed 

my dresser drawer and I left the room, went back out to the 

living room to where my computer was. 

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Id. She was then asked why she suspected J.W. had looked through the 

drawer. She said that at that time she noticed the open drawer, J.W. was 

with Appellant in the room, doing his homework and "reading out of the 

Bible with Appellant." Id. at 34. She suggested that J.W. was alone at 

some point because Appellant had used the bathroom. Id. She also stated 

that all of the sex toys in question were located in the closet, not in her 

lingerie drawer. Id. 

In rejecting this claim as lacking arguable merit, the PCRA court stated 

that the allegation of ineffectiveness "was factually inaccurate" because, 

even if the jury had credited Ms. Raiber's PCRA hearing testimony, it did not 

establish any link to the location where the sex toys were kept, as confirmed 

both by Mr. Raiber's testimony and the police's search which uncovered 

those items. PCO at 12. The court went on to opine that "[t]here is no 

factual support for [Appellant's] proposed theory" that J.W. 'must have' 

snooped through the closet if he snooped through Ms. Raiber's dresser 

drawer. Id. Indeed, as cited by the PCRA court, Ms. Raiber specifically 

testified that she had no reason to believe that anyone had 'snooped' 

through any other area of the bedroom. See N.T. PCRA Hearing at 35-36. 

Appellant counters that the PCRA court "seems to assume that the 

bedroom closet was located in some other part of the universe, rather than 

right next to the bedroom drawer. The ... court's position wrongly presumes 

that the defense cannot use simple circumstantial evidence just as 

effectively as the prosecutor." Appellant's Brief at 29. We disagree with 

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Appellant's characterization of this testimonial evidence. Ms. Raiber did not 

observe J.W.'s snooping through her lingerie drawer. She merely testified 

that it was open. Moreover, she testified that nothing was missing from the 

drawer. N.T. PCRA Hearing at 36. Ms. Raiber did not even indicate that 

anything was out of order in the drawer when she found it open. She also 

specifically testified that she had no reason to suspect that anyone had 

'snooped' through her bedroom closet. Id. Given these facts, we conclude, 

as did the PCRA court, that Appellant's attempt to connect this essentially 

trivial fact (an open lingerie drawer) to the otherwise unsubstantiated 

allegation that J.W. snooped through an entirely different location, albeit a 

nearby one, does not cross the threshold of what constitutes an arguably 

meritorious claim. It is merely conjecture built on a foundation of rote 

speculation. While this Court might have been tempted to agree that actual 

evidence (direct or circumstantial) of J.W.'s snooping could have supported 

the secondary inference of snooping in the closet, given the close proximity 

of the two locations, we simply reject the notion that Ms. Raiber's suspicion, 

based merely on an open drawer, was competent circumstantial evidence to 

that effect. Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in 

determining that Appellant's first IAC claim lacked arguable merit. The 

court's decision and analysis were free of legal error and supported by the 

facts of record. As noted above, we therefore need not address the 

remaining prongs of the IAC test for this claim. 

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Next, Appellant presents two separate, but partially -related IAC claims 

in the second question he presents for our review. We will address each in 

turn. First, Appellant asserts that Attorney Reibsome was ineffective for 

failing to call N.U. to testify for the defense. N.U. testified that he was 

willing to testify at Appellant's trial that 1) Appellant did not enter the 

bathroom on the occasion that J.W. took a shower in the Raiber home, and 

that it was not possible for Appellant to entered the bathroom unobserved; 

and 2) that N.U. never observed Appellant engage in sexually inappropriate 

acts with himself, J.W., or anyone else. Appellant's Brief at 8. This sub - claim itself can be separated into multiple claims; however, each is governed 

by the same standard. "[I]n order to obtain relief on the basis of an 

ineffectiveness claim premised upon counsel's failure to call witnesses, 

[A]ppellant must establish that: 1) the witness existed; 2) the witness was 

available; 3) counsel knew or should have known about the witness; 4) the 

witness was prepared to cooperate and testify at trial; and 5) absence of the 

testimony prejudiced appellant. Commonwealth v. Smolko, 666 A.2d 

672, 679 (Pa. Super. 1995). The first four parts of the Smolko test are not 

in dispute in this appeal; N.U. existed, he was available to testify, counsel 

knew about him, and N.U. was willing to testify at Appellant's trial. The 

remaining prejudice element of the Smolko test is, in essence, the same as 

the three -pronged IAC test set forth in Kimball. 

The PCRA court determined that Appellant's IAC claims regarding N.U. 

are of arguable merit. We disagree with this analysis in one respect: N.U.'s 

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testimony that Appellant did not engage or attempt to engage in sexually 

inappropriate acts with N.U., or with anyone other than J.W., was simply not 

relevant to the issues in dispute at Appellant's trial. N.U. was not a victim in 

this case. Accordingly, testimony concerning Appellant's relationship with 

him was, at best, improper character testimony. See Commonwealth v. 

Van Horn, 797 A.2d 983, 988 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that testimony by 

a defendant's relatives that the defendant had not "sexually abused any of 

them ... does not constitute proper character testimony" because it was not 

testimony "regarding [the defendant's] 'general reputation in the 

community."). As such, this aspect of Appellant's claim lacks arguable 

merit. As to the remaining sub -parts of Appellant's claim, regarding trial 

counsel's failure to call N.U. to testify, we agree with the PCRA court's 

assessment that arguable merit exists, with respect to trial counsel's failure 

to call N.U. to testify about the shower incident, and the fact that he never 

observed Appellant abusing J.W. These aspects of N.U.'s testimony would 

have been clearly relevant to the issues under consideration at Appellant's 

trial. 

Therefore, we now turn to the reasonable basis prong. The PCRA 

court found that Attorney Reibsome had a reasonable basis to decline to call 

N.U. to the stand in Appellant's defense: 

Attorney Reibsome testified that, while he does not recall 

interviewing N.U., he does recall discussing with [Appellant]'s 

family whether N.U. should testify due to his age and either 

behavioral or mental health issues. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/3/16, 

at 13. Attorney Reibsome recalled being uncomfortable "putting 

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an unknown on the stand" and recalled coming to an agreement 

with [Appellant]'s family that he would not call N.U. to testify. 

Id. at 14. Attorney Reibsome further testified that he had Nancy 

Raiber testify specifically to the shower incident. Id. 

N.U. testified that he suffers from anxiety and bipolar 

disorder and has been medicated for those conditions almost all 

of his life. Id. 43 -44. He further stated that his anxiety issues 

arise when he is in a small area with a lot of people, and that he 

deals with the anxiety by trying to remain calm and fighting it 

out the best he can. Id. at 44. 

We find that, due to N.U.'s age and medical issues, 

Attorney Reibsome had a reasonable basis in deciding not to call 

N.U. to testify. As such, [Appellant]'s claim fails the second ... prong [of the IAC test]. 

PCO at 17. 

Appellant argues that "[there] are no facts in the record to suggest 

that the defense had anything to lose by calling [N.U.] to testify and ... the 

defense had much to gain. Trial counsel should not have relied on third 

party opinions under such circumstances[,]" and "in the absence of an 

interview," counsel's "statement that [N.U.] was an 'unknown,' ... does not 

support his decision to forego his testimony." Appellant's Brief at 33. 

We note that Appellant did not present a claim to the PCRA court that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to interview N.U. See Appellant's 

Amended PCRA Petition, 1/14/16, at 2 ¶4(b). "[T]he question of failing to 

interview a witness is distinct from failure to call a witness to testify." 

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 950 A.2d 945, 960 (Pa. 2008). Accordingly, 

we must deem this issue waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) ("Issues not raised 

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in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

appeal.").1 

As to Appellant's remaining argument concerning Attorney Reibsome's 

basis for not calling N.U., Appellant baldly asserts that the defense had 

'nothing to lose,' by offering N.U.'s testimony; however, Attorney Reibsome 

expressed concerns with putting a mentally unstable individual on the stand. 

Appellant offers no legal authorities suggesting that this strategy for not 

calling N.U. to testify was improper, or that it is trumped by an alternative 

'nothing to lose' strategy. Moreover, we cannot view Attorney Reibsome's 

decision in a vacuum. He testified that his decision was also informed by the 

fact that he already had a witness to testify regarding the shower incident, 

as well as to Appellant's conduct around J.W., as Mrs. Raiber claimed to 

have been always present when J.W. was at their home. N.T. PCRA Hearing 

at 13-14. 

Our Supreme Court has stated: 

"With regard to 'reasonable basis,' the PCRA court 'does not 

question whether there were other more logical courses of action 

which counsel could have pursued; rather, [the court] must 

examine whether counsel's decisions had any reasonable basis.' 

1 Even if this fact was not known to Appellant when he filed his amended 

PCRA petition, he failed to seek to amend his petition to add such a claim 

after testimony establishing the factual basis for it arose during the course of 

the PCRA hearing. Moreover, Appellant did not raise this claim appropriately 

in his brief, as it does not appear in his statement of the questions 

presented, but instead is offered in the middle of his argument pertaining to 

trial counsel's failure to call N.U. to testify. 

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Commonwealth v. Bardo, ... 105 A.3d 678, 684 (2014)[]. 

"Where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, '[a] 

finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not 

warranted unless it can be concluded that an alternative not 

chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than 

the course actually pursued." Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 

Pa. 4, 33, 84 A.3d 294, 311-12 (2014)[]. 

Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 618 (Pa. 2015). 

Given these circumstances, as well as Appellant's failure to offer legal 

authority to the contrary, we are constrained to conclude that the PCRA 

court did not err as a matter of law in determining that Attorney Reibsome 

had a reasonable basis to decline to call N.U. to testify on Appellant's behalf. 

We also conclude that the facts of record adequately support the basis for 

that decision. Appellant's 'nothing to lose' theory does not, in our view, 

constitute an alternative strategy offering "a potential for success 

substantially greater than the course actually pursued." Id. (emphasis 

added). It merely offers an alternative with some potential for success, no 

matter how slight. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this 

aspect of his second IAC claim. 

Finally, Appellant contends that Attorney Reibsome was ineffective for 

failing to elicit testimony from Beth Leevy that she was present when J.W. 

showered in Appellant's home, that Appellant did not enter the bathroom 

during that time, and that it would have been impossible for him to do so 

unnoticed. The PCRA court accepted that there was arguable merit to this 

claim, and that Attorney Reibsome lacked a reasonable basis for failing to 

elicit such testimony from Ms. Leevy. PCO at 18-19. We ascertain no 

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reason to dispute those determinations, and we are not being asked to do so 

by the parties in this case. 

However, the court did determine that Appellant was not prejudiced by 

trial counsel's omission in this regard, and so we move directly to 

consideration of the third IAC prong. The PCRA court reasoned: 

[Appellant] argues that Attorney Reibsome's failure to 

question Beth Leevy about the shower incident, particularly 

coupled with N.U.'s testimony of the same, "would have enabled 

the defense to argue that four witnesses, including another child, 

directly contradicted J.W.'s claims on the only two alleged 

assaults that could be connected with precise times." 

[Appellant]'s 4/11/16 Memorandum in Law, at 30. [Appellant] 

alleges that "[t]here is a reasonable probability that the inclusion 

of this cumulative testimony would have changed the result of 

the trial." Id. 

Cumulative testimony is generally unnecessary to avoid 

prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, 

the cumulative prejudicial effect of multiple omissions by trial 

counsel, even where each omission does not satisfy the 

prejudice prong alone, may warrant a new trial. See 

Commonwealth v. Champney, 65 A.3d 386 (Pa. 2013); 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523 (Pa. 2009). In 

Champney and Johnson, however, the multiple ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims satisfied the two initial [IAC] prongs 

but could not satisfy the prejudice prong alone. Here, however, 

we have dismissed [Appellant]'s claim regarding N.U.'s 

testimony because Attorney Reibsome had a reasonable basis in 

deciding not to call N.U. to testify. Consequently, the rule 

established in Champney is inapplicable here.18 Thus, 

[Appellant]'s instant claim stands alone. We find that Beth 

Leevy's testimony regarding the shower incident is cumulative as 

Nancy Raiber testified to the shower incident at trial. 

18 Furthermore, N.U. and Beth Leevy provided 

contradictory testimony as to the shower incident. N.U. 

testified that he was in [Appellant]'s bedroom with 

[Appellant] when J.W. showered whereas Leevy testified 

that everyone was in the living room. Id. at 39-40, 49. 

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Furthermore, Leevy's testimony called into doubt Mrs. 

Raiber's testimony regarding the shower incident. Leevy 

testified that Mrs. Raiber likely would not have been able to see 

the bathroom door due to where she was seated in the living 

room. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/3/16, at 49. 

Accordingly, we find that [Appellant] suffered no prejudice 

as a result of Attorney Reibsome's failure to question Beth Leevy 

about the shower incident. As such, [Appellant]'s claim fails the 

third [IAC] prong. 

PCO at 20-21 (some internal citations omitted). 

We agree with the PCRA court. Leevy's proposed testimony was 

cumulative of Mrs. Raiber's testimony regarding the shower incident. 

Accordingly, the prejudice suffered by Appellant by the omission of that 

testimony must have been less than had no such testimony been offered at 

all. Moreover, whatever benefit Appellant would have reaped from this 

additional, cumulative testimony could have easily been undermined by the 

conflicts in the testimony between Mrs. Raiber and Ms. Leevy. Indeed, it is 

not inconceivable that such a conflict could have harmed Appellant more 

than he gained from the additional testimony. 

To prove prejudice under the third prong of the IAC test, Appellant 

must show that "there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different" absent counsel's error. Kimball, 

724 A.2d at 333. Appellant's argument simply fails to convince us that the 

presence of Ms. Leevy's proposed testimony could have produced such a 

reasonable probability, given its cumulative nature, and because it could 

have actually undermined the testimony to the same effect actually elicited 

at trial. Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court's determination that 

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Appellant was not sufficiently prejudiced by counsel's omission to warrant 

relief is free of legal error and supported by the record. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

J seph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 2/28/2017 

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