UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4751

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHARLES A. DAVIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:11-cr-00032-RLV-DSC-1)

Submitted: August 21, 2013 Decided: September 25, 2013

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jeffrey M. Brandt, ROBINSON & BRANDT, P.S.C., Covington, 

Kentucky, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States 

Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Kathryn Keneally, Assistant 

Attorney General, Frank P. Cihlar, Criminal Appeals & Tax 

Enforcement Policy Section, Gregory Victor Davis, Thomas J. 

Sawyer, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Appellant Charles Davis was convicted of willfully filing 

false federal income tax returns from 1996 through 2000 and from 

2004 through 2008, see 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), and obstructing the 

administration of federal tax laws, see 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). 

Davis raises various challenges to his convictions, but he does 

not challenge his sentence. We affirm.

From 1996 through 2008, Davis was employed by US Airways as 

a pilot. Each year during that period, Davis earned between 

$125,000 and $190,000. In 1996, Davis stopped filing income tax

returns on a regular basis. He submitted to US Airways a W-4 

tax form claiming “exempt” status from federal tax withholding, 

and US Airways essentially stopped withholding any income tax 

from Davis’s wages. Davis also sent numerous communications to 

the Internal Revenue Service maintaining that he was not subject 

to the internal revenue laws. Davis eventually filed returns 

for tax years 1996 through 2000, reporting either zero or almost 

no income for each year. 

In 2008 and 2009, Davis filed income tax returns for tax 

years 2004 through 2008. For each of these tax years, Davis 

attempted to avoid paying income tax by relying on false 

documents that indicated significant income tax withholdings. 

Such documents included 1099-OID forms that were purportedly 

issued by financial institutions such as Washington Mutual Bank, 
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Alaraon Trading Corp., and National Financial Services, LLC. 

Uncontroverted testimony at trial, however, established that no 

such forms were ever submitted to the IRS by these financial 

institutions. By 2008, the fabricated withholding figures Davis 

reported to the IRS had grown to a total of approximately 

$2,294,862. 

The IRS conducted civil tax examinations of Davis and 

assessed tax deficiencies against him for the years 1996 through 

2000. The IRS took measures to collect these deficiencies, but 

Davis engaged in several tactics designed to hinder the IRS’s 

collection efforts. For example, Davis twice initiated 

bankruptcy proceedings, thereby halting the IRS from taking 

action to collect pursuant to the automatic stay provision. See

11 U.S.C. § 362. Both times, however, Davis’s petition was 

dismissed quickly when he made no effort to advance his case or 

obtain relief. Additionally, Davis purported to pay his tax 

liabilities to the IRS with fictitious financial instruments 

drawn on non-existent accounts, and he also attempted to conceal 

funds from the IRS by using accounts opened with false tax 

identification numbers. 

Davis was charged with ten counts of willfully filing false 

federal income tax returns from 1996 through 2008. See 26 

U.S.C. § 7206(1). Counts one through five related to Davis’s 

income tax returns for the years 1996-2000, and counts six 
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through ten related to the years 2004-2008. Davis was also 

charged with one count of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and 

impede the due administration of federal tax laws based on 

Davis’s filing of fraudulent IRS forms; filing of bankruptcy 

petitions “to defeat IRS levies”; submitting fraudulent 

documents to the IRS in satisfaction of Davis’s tax 

deficiencies; and using false tax identification numbers to open 

a bank account. See 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).

During Davis’s initial appearance, the magistrate judge 

explained the charges against Davis and the potential penalties 

he faced if convicted. The magistrate judge further explained 

Davis’s right to be represented by a lawyer and that the court 

would appoint counsel if Davis could not afford one. Davis told 

the magistrate judge that he did not want the court to appoint 

counsel and that he wished to represent himself. Although Davis 

stated that he wanted “assistance of counsel,” Davis defined 

this term to mean clerical or administrative help with legal 

matters: “I’m not asking for [a lawyer] to represent me. . . . 

Not for [a lawyer] to represent me, but assistance. . . . I need 

someone to be on the outside to . . . do my research and file 

documents for me.” J.A. 85. Davis disclosed that he had a 

“legal advisor” who was not a licensed attorney but who would 

file documents and perform other tasks Davis was unable to 

perform while incarcerated. Davis argued that his right to 
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“assistance of counsel” required the court to appoint his 

advisor as his legal representative because his advisor 

performed tasks that “assisted” him in conducting his own 

defense. 

The magistrate judge denied Davis’s request to have a nonlawyer act as legal counsel and then asked several questions to 

clarify whether Davis in fact wanted to waive his right to an 

attorney. Following this colloquy, the magistrate judge 

concluded that Davis did not actually want an attorney and 

wished to represent himself, and that his waiver of legal 

counsel was knowing and voluntary. 

The magistrate judge also directed the Federal Public 

Defender to appoint standby counsel to answer legal questions 

for Davis. Subsequently, however, a conflict developed between 

standby counsel and Davis as to standby counsel’s proper role. 

Davis wanted him to perform administrative tasks, but counsel 

refused on the basis that his appointed role was merely to make 

himself available to answer legal questions from Davis. The 

magistrate judge relieved standby counsel, and again instructed 

Davis that the court could only appoint a trained lawyer to 

represent Davis, not a layperson to provide clerical assistance 

and to run errands. The magistrate judge repeated that Davis 

could choose to represent himself with standby counsel available 

to answer questions or explain legal principles. Davis then 
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stated on the record that, “I completely, intentionally, and 

knowingly understand and waive an attorney.” J.A. 129. 

Davis filed a document purporting to grant “power of 

attorney” to his advisor to file legal documents on his behalf 

in the criminal case. Concerned that this filing cast doubt on 

whether Davis understood the ruling of the magistrate judge, the 

government requested that the district court conduct another 

hearing to clarify whether Davis was knowingly and voluntarily 

forgoing the right to counsel as required by Faretta v. 

California. See 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).

The district court granted the request for another Faretta

hearing, at which the district judge thoroughly explained the 

charges against Davis and the criminal penalties he faced, and 

advised him that a “trained lawyer would defend you far better 

than you could defend yourself.” J.A. 155. The district judge 

admonished Davis that it would be “unwise . . . to try to 

represent yourself” and that the court “would strongly urge you 

not to try to represent yourself.” Id. The district court 

asked, “In light of the penalties that you face if you are found 

guilty and . . . the difficulties of representing yourself, do 

you still desire to represent yourself and give up your right to 

be represented by a lawyer?” Id. Davis reiterated that he did 

not want an attorney, and the district court concluded that 
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Davis had “knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to 

counsel.” Id.

Prior to trial, the government moved in limine for an order 

precluding Davis in part from (1) arguing to the jury that the 

federal tax laws are unconstitutional or otherwise invalid; and 

(2) arguing that he is not subject to the internal revenue code 

based on any interpretation of the federal tax laws that he did 

not actually rely upon at the time he engaged in the charged 

conduct. The district court granted the motion in a written 

order that provided in pertinent part: “[B]ecause a lack of 

willfulness is a defense to counts one through ten in the 

indictment, Defendant may offer his interpretation of the law to 

the extent he actually had adopted such interpretation at the 

time he committed the acts charged.” J.A. 190.

 At trial, Davis did not actively participate. Whenever 

it was his turn to question or cross-examine any witnesses or 

otherwise participate, Davis stated: “I respectfully decline in 

order to reserve my rights and privileges.” Davis was convicted 

on all eleven counts, and he received a sentence of 120 months.

On appeal, Davis first contends that his waiver of legal 

representation was not knowing or voluntary. A defendant has a 

Sixth Amendment right to defend himself in a criminal case so 

long as he “knowingly and intelligently” elects to do so. See

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted). A 
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defendant who asserts the right of self-representation must do 

so (1) clearly and unequivocally; (2) knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily; and (3) in a timely fashion. See United States 

v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2000). A defendant 

“should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that he knows 

what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” 

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted). We 

review a district court’s determination that a defendant has 

waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel de novo. See United 

States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997). 

The court reviews the findings of historical fact underlying the 

district court’s determination for clear error. See United 

States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2005).

Davis argues that his waiver of the right to counsel was 

not knowing and intelligent because he mistakenly believed that 

the Sixth Amendment right to “assistance of counsel” included 

the right to an “assistant” regardless of whether such assistant 

was a lawyer. Davis argues that because he did not understand 

the limits of the constitutional guarantee to the “assistance of 

counsel,” he could not have knowingly and intelligently waived 

such right. Throughout Davis’s pre-trial proceedings, however, 

both the magistrate judge and the district judge court corrected 

Davis’s misunderstanding by instructing Davis that he did not a 
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have a right to the appointment of a “person [who] is not a 

lawyer” but that, if appointed, standby counsel could assist 

with various practical tasks and would be available to answer 

questions. 

Davis objected to the appointment of standby counsel as 

well as full-time legal counsel. Indeed, in each pre-trial 

proceeding, Davis expressly stated that he did not want an 

attorney. Davis, a well-educated and successful pilot for a 

major commercial airline, was advised in two separate hearings 

of the potential criminal penalties he faced and the dangers of 

self-representation. Nonetheless, Davis stated on multiple 

occasions that he did not want a lawyer and declared that he 

“completely, intentionally, and knowingly underst[ood] and 

waive[d] an attorney.” We have thoroughly examined the record 

and, finding no clear error in the district court’s 

determination of fact, we conclude that the district court 

properly held that Davis understood his right to an attorney but 

unequivocally, voluntarily and intelligently waived that right. 

Next, Davis contends that he was denied his right to a fair 

trial under the Due Process Clause because the district court’s 

ruling on the government’s motion in limine had a chilling 

effect on his ability to pursue his trial strategy. We review 

the district court’s ruling on a motion in limine for abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Hornsby, 666 F.3d 296, 309 
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(4th Cir. 2012). This court “give[s] substantial deference to a 

district court’s decision to exclude evidence” and will find an 

abuse of discretion “only if the district court acted 

arbitrarily or irrationally.” United States v. Achiekwelu, 112 

F.3d 747, 753 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

The district court properly limited Davis’s evidence, 

explaining that “a defendant’s views about the validity of the 

tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness and need 

not be heard by the jury.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 

192, 206 (1991). The district court reasoned that “because a 

lack of willfulness is a defense to [the counts charging Davis 

with willfully filing materially false tax returns], [Davis] may 

offer his interpretation of the law to the extent he actually 

had adopted such interpretation at the time he committed the 

acts charged.” J.A. 190. The district court made clear that 

“evidence may be presented as to [Davis’s] actual, relied-upon 

understanding of tax law at the relevant times.” Id. 

Davis does not identify any error in the district court’s 

ruling, and, having reviewed the record, we likewise perceive no 

error. Moreover, the district court’s ruling clearly allowed 

Davis to pursue his purported trial strategy of “demonstrat[ing] 

that, based upon his own interpretations of [the] tax code, he 

had a good faith belief that his filings were accurate.” Brief 
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of Appellant at 28. The district court stated its ruling 

clearly and unambiguously, and Davis’s professed failure to 

understand the district court’s ruling affords him no basis for 

relief. 

Finally, Davis contends that we should vacate his 

convictions and dismiss the indictment for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction based on the fact that the indictment was 

not signed by the foreperson. The Western District of North 

Carolina follows the practice of redacting the signature of the 

grand jury foreperson. Davis received a copy of the redacted 

indictment. He does not suggest that the indictment failed to 

adequately inform him of the charges, nor does he explain how 

the absence of the foreperson’s signature prejudiced him. 

Even if we assume the unredacted version of the indictment 

does not bear the foreperson’s signature, this argument is of no 

avail to Davis. It is true that under the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, the foreperson of a grand jury must “sign 

all indictments.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c). But because this duty 

is only ministerial, the foreperson’s failure to sign will not 

invalidate the indictment. See Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 

339, 345 (1984). “[T]he absence of the foreman’s signature is a 

mere technical irregularity that is not necessarily fatal to the 

indictment.” Id. The lack of a signature has been roundly 

rejected as a basis for invalidating an indictment. See, e.g., 
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United States v. Morse, 613 F.3d 787, 793 (8th Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 360-61 (3d Cir. 2006); 

United States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 830-31 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Davis attempts to revive this losing argument by contending 

that the foreperson’s signature is missing because the case was 

never actually presented to a grand jury and a grand jury never 

actually issued an indictment. Davis claims the government 

simply filed the indictment without going through the grand jury 

process. Davis fails to identify anything in the record 

suggesting that the indictment is not bona fide or that the 

government knowingly filed a document that is not what it 

purports to be. We reject this frivolous argument. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Davis’s convictions. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED