NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SAMUEL P., Appellant,

v.

MINDY D., A.P., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0163 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS21164

The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Mindy D., Avondale

Appellee

FILED 12-01-2022
SAMUEL P. v. MINDY D.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Samuel P. (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating his parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 Father and Mindy D. (“Mother”) are the parents of A.P., born 

in 2014. When A.P. was two years old, Mother abruptly left the relationship

with Father because, according to her, he was emotionally and physically 

abusive and abusing drugs and alcohol. She obtained a protective order 

against Father that year, and thereafter, the parents hardly communicated 

at all.

2 Mother and child initially moved in with maternal relatives and

eventually, into their own home.

¶3 After the breakup, Mother remained in phone contact with 

A.P.’s paternal grandmother and facilitated regular visits between paternal 

grandparents and A.P. for the next three years. Father was sometimes 

present at these visits but had no other contact with A.P. Father sent the 

child no cards, gifts, or letters and made only a few child support payments 

over several years.

¶4 In 2019, Father was in and out of jail for various drug charges.

That September, Mother remarried. Two months later, she ended visits 

between A.P. and paternal grandparents after they mentioned pursuing 

visitation through court. Once those visits ended, Father had no further 

contact with A.P. 

1 “We review an order terminating a parent’s relationship with his or her 

child . . . in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s 

ruling.” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 296, ¶ 17 (App. 2013).

2 The evidence does not suggest that A.P. was included in the protective 

order.
SAMUEL P. v. MINDY D.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 Father was arrested in 2020 for drug charges and later 

sentenced to four years imprisonment for a separate armed robbery 

conviction.

¶6 In December 2021, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s 

parental rights, as relevant here, based on his lengthy felony incarceration

and abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (B)(4). Afterwards, Father sent 

A.P. a few postcards. After a trial, the superior court terminated Father’s 

parental rights, and he appealed. This court has jurisdiction under Article 

6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 

12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile 

Court 601(a).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Father argues no reasonable evidence supports the superior 

court’s determination that he abandoned A.P. In the alternative, he argues 

that Mother prevented contact between him and the child. Father also 

argues that termination was not in A.P.’s best interests.

¶8 A parent’s right to custody and control of his own child, while 

fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 

246, 248-49, ¶¶ 11-12 (2000). Termination of a parental relationship may be 

warranted where the state proves one statutory ground under A.R.S. 

§ 8-533 by clear and convincing evidence. Id. “Clear and convincing” means 

the grounds for termination are “highly probable or reasonably certain.” 

Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284-85, ¶ 25 (2005). 

¶9 This court “will accept the [superior] court’s findings of fact 

unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings and will affirm a 

severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 4 (App. 2002). This court does not reweigh the 

evidence, but “look[s] only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the 

court’s ruling.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 

(App. 2004). 

¶10 A parent may forfeit his parental rights if he abandons his 

child. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Abandonment occurs when the parent fails to 

“provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, 

including providing normal supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). Abandonment 

is measured by a parent’s conduct, not his subjective intent. Michael J., 196 

Ariz. at 249-50, ¶ 18. The court must consider whether “[the] parent has 

provided reasonable support, maintained regular contact, made more than 
SAMUEL P. v. MINDY D.

Decision of the Court

4

minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and 

maintained a normal parent-child relationship.” Id.

¶11 Here, the superior court found that Father failed to maintain 

a normal parent-child relationship with A.P. for almost four years. Its

specific findings were that:

Father’s relationship [with A.P.] consisted of occasional 

supervised visits when the Child was visiting with the 

Paternal Grandmother during Grandmother’s scheduled 

visitations . . . . Father never had custody of the child 

overnight, nor did he seek to arrange his own visitation 

outside of paternal grandmother. The paternal grandmother, 

as opposed to father, was the main factor in maintaining 

father’s relationship with the child. After Paternal 

Grandmother’s visits ended in 2019, Father did not take 

appropriate steps to try to maintain and nurture the 

parent-child relationship. Father testified that he placed the 

responsibility of his visitation with his child on Mother. 

Father testified that he did not seek a remedy through the 

courts. Father has not had contact with his daughter since 

2019.

Reasonable evidence supports the courts findings.

¶12 Father contends he often visited A.P. between 2016 and 2019, 

but Mother testified he did not. Based on A.P.’s statements to her, Mother 

testified that Father missed most of A.P.’s visits with her grandparents, and 

when Father was there, “he would be in his room asleep or talking on the 

phone.” Moreover, sometimes Father would tell A.P. he was coming for a 

visit, but he did not show up.

¶13 After hearing this evidence, the superior court concluded that 

Father did not provide reasonable support for or normal supervision to 

A.P., and did not maintain regular contact with the child. This court will 

not reweigh that determination on appeal. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 282, 

¶ 12 (“The resolution of such conflicts in the evidence is uniquely the 

province of the juvenile court as the trier of fact; we do not re-weigh the 

evidence on review.”).

¶14 Father argues alternatively that his abandonment was 

justified because Mother prevented regular contact between him and A.P.

by not sharing her address and phone number with him. But the record 

shows that neither parent initiated much conversation with the other after 
SAMUEL P. v. MINDY D.

Decision of the Court

5

their breakup, even after the protective order presumably expired in 2017.

Moreover, Father did not seek out parenting time through the courts, or

additional time through Mother, because he felt the arrangement with

paternal grandparents “was working.” And although Mother never shared

her address with Father, he did not ask her for it. Nor did he ever attempt 

to contact Mother through his parents. Father has not shown that Mother 

restricted Father’s ability to interact with A.P. See Calvin B., 232 Ariz. at 297, 

¶¶ 23–25 (holding father did not abandon son because mother prevented 

their contact despite father’s consistent efforts).3

¶15 Father also argues that termination was not in A.P.’s best 

interests. In addition to finding a statutory ground for termination, the 

superior court must also determine what is in the best interests of the child 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22. Once the 

court finds a parent unfit under at least one statutory ground for 

termination, “the interests of the parent and child diverge,” and the court 

proceeds to balance the unfit parent’s “interest in the care and custody of 

his or her child . . . against the independent and often adverse interests of 

the child in a safe and stable home life.” Id. at 286, ¶ 35. “[A] determination 

of the child’s best interest must include a finding as to how the child would 

benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the 

relationship.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). 

Courts “must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time 

of the severance determination, including the child’s adoptability and the 

parent’s rehabilitation.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, 

¶ 1 (2018). 

¶16 The court may find that a child would benefit from 

termination if there is an adoption plan or if the child is adoptable, Id. at 

150-51, ¶¶ 13-14, or if the child “would benefit psychologically from the 

stability an adoption would provide.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. 

JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994). 

¶17 Here, Father maintains that termination is not in A.P.’s best 

interests because it will deprive her of a relationship with him and his 

family. Father’s assertion, even if true, fails to establish that no reasonable 

evidence supports the court’s order. Indeed, the court found that 

termination would benefit A.P. because “it would allow [her] to address the 

feelings of abandonment she suffers from her father’s neglect.” The court 

3 Because sufficient evidence supports the abandonment ground for 

termination, we need not consider Father’s arguments regarding the 

length-of-felony-sentence ground. See Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 49, ¶ 14.
SAMUEL P. v. MINDY D.

Decision of the Court

6

also found that A.P. “is able to articulate how being free to be adopted by 

her stepfather would allow her to put the pain and hurt she suffered due to 

her father’s neglect behind her and move forward with the father figure she 

feels has provided the parental relationship she needs.” Finally, the court 

found that Mother and stepfather were meeting A.P.’s needs and that

stepfather wished to adopt her. Reasonable evidence supports these 

findings.

¶18 Father claims that Mother needed to provide expert testimony 

to evaluate the degree to which Father’s abandonment affected A.P. 

emotionally, but provides no controlling authority to support his position.

And Mother and stepfather’s testimony about A.P.’s feelings is sufficient to 

support a best-interests determination. See In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424, ¶ 7 

(App. 2001) (This court will not disturb the superior court’s order unless 

“there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the judgment or 

. . . the judgment is contrary to any substantial evidence.”). On this record, 

Father has shown no error. 

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.