Filed 1/10/14 Marriage of Jones CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Marriage of KIMBERLY M. and 

FLETCHER JONES, JR.

KIMBERLY M. JONES,

 Appellant,

v.

FLETCHER JONES, JR.,

 Respondent.

 G047724

 (Super. Ct. No. 12D000041)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Ronald 

P. Kreber, Judge. Affirmed.

Kolodny & Anteau, Stephen A. Kolodny, Heidi L. Madzar; Steven E. 

Briggs for Appellant.

Seastrom & Seastrom, Philip G. Seastrom; Wasser Cooperman & Carter, 

Bruce Evan Cooperman; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robert A. Olson and Marc J. 

Poster for Respondent.

* * *
2

Kimberly M. Jones filed a petition for dissolution of her 13-year marriage 

to Fletcher Jones, Jr. Fletcher1 filed a response in which he agreed irreconcilable 

differences existed. Later that year, he moved to bifurcate the trial on the status of the 

marriage from the remaining issues. Kimberly opposed the motion, arguing the motion 

should be denied because Fletcher did not comply with the preliminary disclosure 

requirements of Family Code2 section 2337, subdivision (b). In the alternative, Kimberly 

submitted approximately 30 conditions she contended should to be attached to

bifurcation. On November 29, 2012, the court granted bifurcation and issued a judgment 

terminating the status of the marriage. It attached approximately 16 conditions to its 

judgment. Kimberly appealed and contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

concluding Fletcher’s financial disclosures met section 2337, subdivision (b)’s 

requirements, and in granting bifurcation without additional conditions. We affirm.

I

FACTS

Kimberly and Fletcher were married in July 1998, and separated in 

November 2011. They have three minor children. Kimberly filed for dissolution of their 

marriage in early January 2012 alleging irreconcilable differences. Fletcher’s response 

agreed there were irreconcilable differences. In June 2012, Fletcher filed a motion to 

bifurcate the trial of the marital status from the remaining issues, including the division of 

property, child and spousal support, and attorney fees and costs. He stated a number of 

reasons for seeking bifurcation, including the possible detrimental effect continuation of 

the marriage might have on any future investments he may make prior to a final 

resolution of the remaining issues, that he wanted to move on with his life, and he desired

 

1 We refer to the parties by their first names for ease of reading and to 

avoid confusion.

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code unless 

otherwise stated.
3

to remarry. His application for bifurcation included a request for six statutory conditions 

to be attached to the court granting his request. (See § 2337, subd. (c).)

About the same time he filed his motion for bifurcation, Fletcher served his 

preliminary declaration of disclosure. (§ 2337, subd. (b).) The declaration exceeded 90 

pages and listed assets and liabilities, partnerships and other interests, investments, and 

included an expense and income statement. The preliminary declaration listed more than 

25 pieces of real property in which one or both of the parties had an interest. These 

properties are located in California, Nevada, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, and Mexico. It also 

listed Fletcher’s car dealerships, a number of checking and savings accounts, credit union

accounts, boats, stocks, bonds or mutual funds, accounts receivable and unsecured notes, 

and more than three pages of interests in partnerships or other business interests, 

including interests in trusts. Without going into a great deal of detail, it appears 

Kimberly’s attorney was correct when he said Fletcher is worth possibly hundreds of 

millions of dollars.

Kimberly opposed bifurcation, arguing Fletcher’s preliminary declaration 

of disclosure did not comply with section 2337. In the alternative, she requested the 

court impose 31 conditions to bifurcation. The court granted bifurcation with 

approximately 16 conditions. The details of the conditions imposed and those denied are 

set forth in the discussion, below. In rejecting Kimberly’s contention that Fletcher’s 

preliminary declaration of disclosure did not comply with section 2337, the court found 

the declaration had been augmented to meet statutory requirements. Kimberly appealed.

II

DISCUSSION

The Legislature intends “‘that the dissolution of marriage should not be 

postponed merely because issues relating to property, support, attorney fees or child 

custody [are] unready for decision.’ [Citation.]” (Gionis v. Superior Court (1988) 202 

Cal.App.3d 786, 788.) “Severance of a personal relationship which the law has found to 
4

be unworkable and, as a result, injurious to the public welfare is not dependent upon final 

settlement of property disputes. Society will be little concerned if the parties engage in 

property litigation of however long duration; it will be much concerned if two people are 

forced to remain legally bound to one another when this status can do nothing but 

engender additional bitterness and unhappiness.” (Hull v. Superior Court (1960) 54 

Cal.2d 139, 147-148.) “Consistent with the legislative policy favoring no fault 

dissolution of marriage, only slight evidence is necessary to obtain bifurcation and 

resolution of marital status. On the other hand, a spouse opposing bifurcation must 

present compelling reasons for denial.” (Gionis v. Superior Court, supra, 202 

Cal.App.3d at p. 790.) 

A decision dissolving the marital status is reviewed under the substantial 

evidence standard. (DeYoung v. DeYoung (1946) 27 Cal.2d 521, 526.) Substantial 

evidence supported the trial court’s decision. Kimberly’s verified petition alleged 

irreconcilable differences and Fletcher’s declaration concurred in the presence of 

irreconcilable differences. (§ 2333.) No valid purpose would have been served by 

requiring the parties to stay married.

The Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure

Section 2337 authorizes the trial court to “sever and grant an early and 

separate trial on the issue of the dissolution of the status of the marriage apart from other 

issues.” (§ 2337, subd. (a).) Prior to granting bifurcation, the moving party must serve 

with its notice of motion “[a] preliminary declaration of disclosure with a completed 

schedule of assets and debts.” (§ 2337, subd. (b).) A preliminary declaration of 

disclosure is signed under penalty of perjury (§ 2104, subd. (a)) and must “set forth with 

sufficient particularity, that a person of reasonable and ordinary intelligence can 

ascertain, . . . : [¶] (1) The identity of all assets in which the declarant has or may have an 

interest and all liabilities for which the declarant is or may be liable, regardless of the 
5

characterization of the asset or liability as community, quasi-community, or separate. [¶] 

(2) The declarant’s percentage of ownership in each asset and percentage of obligation 

for each liability where property is not solely owned by one or both of the parties. The 

preliminary declaration may also set forth the declarant’s characterization of each asset or 

liability.” (§ 2104, subd. (c)(1),(2).)

Kimberly argues the trial court abused its discretion in concluding 

Fletcher’s preliminary declaration of disclosure met section 2337’s requirements. She

does not, however, contend the termination of the marital status should be set aside. (See 

In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 336 [failure to require 

preliminary declaration of disclosure is not jurisdictional].) Rather, she contends the 

matter should be remanded, Fletcher ordered to supply the missing information—the 

current values of listed assets and the amounts of the debts—and that she be provided an 

opportunity to seek additional conditions to the bifurcation once full disclosure has been 

made.

Whatever the relative merit of Fletcher’s original preliminary declaration of 

disclosure, the court found the declaration had been augmented to meet the requirements 

of section 2337. Because Kimberly did not include the augmented information in the 

record on appeal, we are unable to conclude the trial court erred in finding Fletcher’s 

preliminary declaration of disclosure, as augmented, met the statutory requirements. “It 

is the burden of appellant to provide an accurate record on appeal to demonstrate error. 

Failure to do so precludes an adequate review and results in affirmance of the trial court’s 

determination.” (Estrada v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 618, 620, fn. 1.) This result 

is required because the trial court’s judgment is presumed correct (Denham v. Superior 

Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564) and the appellant bears the burden of establishing 

prejudicial error (Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1213). Kimberly has not 

carried her burden. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in finding Fletcher’s 

preliminary declaration of disclosure sufficient.
6

Conditions on Granting Bifurcation

Section 2337 lists a variety of conditions a court may impose in connection 

with an order bifurcating the trial of the marital status from the remaining issues. (§ 

2337, subd. (c).) The trial court attached six statutory conditions to bifurcation. 

Specifically, Fletcher was required to: indemnify Kimberly for any taxes, reassessments, 

interest, and penalties imposed in connection with division of the community estate based 

on the parties not being married at the time of the division (§ 2337, subd. (c)(1));

maintain health insurance on Kimberly and the children pending resolution of all other 

issues (§ 2337, subd. (c)(2)); reimburse Kimberly from adverse consequences should the 

termination of the marriage adversely affect Kimberly’s ability to probate homestead the 

residence in which she resided at the time the marriage was terminated (§ 2337, subd. 

(c)(3)); indemnify and hold Kimberly harmless from any adverse consequences should

the bifurcation result in a loss of her right to a probate family allowance prior to judgment 

being entered on the remaining issues (§ 2337, subd. (c)(4); and indemnify Kimberly if 

the early termination of the marriage results in a loss of retirement, survivor, deferred 

compensation benefits (§ 2337, subd. (c)(5)) or social security benefits (§ 2337, subd. 

(c)(6).) Additionally, the court ordered Fletcher to indemnify and hold Kimberly 

harmless from any tax liabilities should she not be able to claim “‘a stepped up’ basis” on 

any property held by the parties at the time their marital status is terminated; pay 

Kimberly’s health insurance for three years after final resolution of all other issues; 

indemnify Kimberly for any loss of rights she might suffer under Probate Code sections 

100 through 104, and 120, as a result of his death and the early termination of the 

marriage; agree that any obligation imposed by the judgment terminating the marital 

relationship may be enforced against his estate in the event he dies after entry of that 

judgment; maintain the status quo on all life insurance policies pending final resolution of 

all remaining issues; agree Kimberly is entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred by her 

in an effort to enforce the provisions of the judgment in the event he breaches his 
7

obligations; agree the court reserves jurisdiction to award Kimberly damages from 

Fletcher’s community or separate property for any breach of the judgment prior to 

judgment being entered on all remaining issues, and in the event of his death, from his 

estate; inform Kimberly, prior to entering into escrow, of the purchase of any real 

property before entry of judgment on all remaining issues; abide by standard family law 

restraining orders in effect and that he is prohibited from encumbering, selling, or 

transferring any property pending judgment on the remaining issues; not to move to 

reduce spousal support payable to Kimberly if the ground for the modification is based on 

new expenses based upon his remarriage; and agree that the court maintains jurisdiction 

over all other issues of the marriage.

Kimberly contends the trial court erred in not adding a number of 

conditions she had proposed. She claims “[m]ost of the requested conditions are 

designed to protect [her] interests with respect to the property division issues which have 

yet to be resolved.” (Boldface omitted.) Her trepidation is that Fletcher would remarry, 

creating a new community with concomitant evidentiary privileges in the new spouse 

which could then be used to frustrate Kimberly’s discovery efforts. To that end, she 

asserts the trial court should have required that prior to Fletcher obtaining a marriage 

license, he must submit to her: 1) a written waiver from his intended spouse of her right 

to assert privileges under Evidence Code sections 970, 971, and 980 in further 

proceedings in the pending action, and that Fletcher consent to the new spouse being 

joined in the pending action in superior court; 2) a written waiver from his intended 

spouse of her right to claim any privilege in regard to Fletcher’s financial affairs, 

including any separate or joint income tax returns they file subsequent to their marriage;

and 3) a written waiver from his intended spouse of her right to asset any privileges under 

the California Constitution regarding privacy in Fletcher’s financial affairs and 

transactions subsequent to their marriage. Additionally, Kimberly sought a condition 

prohibiting Fletcher, in the event of remarriage, from asserting any privacy interest on 
8

behalf of himself or his new wife in connection with business or financial matters. She 

also proposed that in the event the court was not inclined to require a spousal waiver 

privilege, she should be provided an opportunity to depose the intended new wife prior to 

any marriage. Lastly, she urged the trial court to require Fletcher to post a $10 million 

certificate of deposit in the financial institution of her choosing as security for the 

proposed indemnity provisions.

We review the trial court’s decision attaching conditions to the early 

termination of the marital relationship for an abuse of discretion. (Gionis v. Superior

Court, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 790.) Aside from a trial court making a decision 

without consideration of the appropriate law and facts (see People v. Downey (2000) 82 

Cal.App.4th 899, 912), an abuse of discretion exists only when the “decision is so 

irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it” (People v. Carmony

(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377). In other words, an appellate court will not find an abuse of 

discretion unless no judge could reasonably have made the same order. (In re Marriage 

of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 866.) Thus, the question is whether given the 

extensive conditions the court placed on bifurcation, as well as the effect of Evidence 

Code section 972, subdivision (g), the court abused its discretion in refusing to include 

Kimberly’s additional proposed conditions. Using the applicable standard of review, we 

find no abuse of discretion.

First, Kimberly made no showing the rejected conditions were necessary to 

protect her interests. She argues they are necessary because the early termination of the 

marital status “may impact upon property division issues” and Fletcher’s remarriage 

would establish “new evidentiary privileges and areas of confidentiality which could be 

used to block [a] party in Kimberly’s position from obtaining full disclosure and 

discovery of information . . . the disclosure of which . . . constitutes a significant part of 
9

Fletcher’s continuing fiduciary obligations to Kimberly.”

3 The same can be said in every 

situation wherein the court bifurcates the trial, resulting in termination of the marital 

status prior to resolution of other issues. Aside from the fact that Kimberly failed to 

demonstrate the necessity of these conditions, the Legislature has set forth a number of 

specific conditions courts may impose in granting bifurcation. (§ 2337, subd. (c).) Those 

requested by Kimberly are not among them. Granted, the court may also impose any 

other condition it finds to be “just and equitable” (§ 2337, subd. (c)(10)), but the fact that 

the Legislature has specifically set forth at least nine other permissible conditions and did 

not include any of those sought by Kimberly, which again could apply in all cases, tends 

to indicate the Legislature would not consider them “just and equitable” absent a showing 

distinguishing a particular case from every other case involving bifurcation.

Additionally, Evidence Code section 972 weighs against the requests 

concerning evidentiary privileges. Subdivision (g) of Evidence Code section 972 

provides the marital privilege does not exist in “[a] proceeding brought against the spouse 

by a former spouse so long as the property and debts of the marriage have not been 

adjudicated, or in order to establish, modify, or enforce a child, family or spousal support 

obligation arising from the marriage to the former spouse; in a proceeding brought 

against a spouse by the other parent in order to establish, modify, or enforce a child 

support obligation for a child of a nonmarital relationship of the spouse; or in a 

proceeding brought against a spouse by the guardian of a child of that spouse in order to 

establish, modify, or enforce a child support obligation of the spouse. The married 

person does not have a privilege under this subdivision to refuse to provide information 

relating to the issues of income, expenses, assets, debts, and employment of either 

 

3 Kimberly asks that we take judicial notice (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)) 

of the petition for dissolution of marriage Fletcher filed and the response filed by the 

woman he married subsequent to the court terminating the marital status of Fletcher and 

Kimberly. That there was a subsequent marriage and premarital agreement does not tend 

to indicate the trial court erred in the present case. We therefore deny the request.
10

spouse, but may assert the privilege as otherwise provided in this article if other 

information is requested by the former spouse, guardian, or other parent of the child.” 

(Italics added.) In this regard, it is noteworthy that Kimberly did not dispute the 

representation of Fletcher’s attorney in the trial court to the effect that Kimberly and 

Fletcher are party to three martial agreements making virtually all of Fletcher’s property 

his separate property. Neither did she assert the agreements were unlawful. Thus, at the 

time the court decided on appropriate conditions for bifurcation, division of the extensive 

assets did not appear to be an overly complex issue. Indeed, if by virtue of the 

agreements between the parties the vast majority of the property is deemed to be 

Fletcher’s separate property, Kimberly’s need for the proposed conditions may in fact be 

less compelling than one would expect in the majority of bifurcation cases. 

This same fact—that the vast majority of the extensive holdings are

presumably Fletcher’s separate property—militates against requiring him to post a $10 

million deposit as a condition of bifurcation, the money to be used to assure 

indemnification required by other conditions. Our requirement that Fletcher post a $10 

million bond as a condition of our lifting the automatic stay of the termination of the 

marital status triggered by Kimberly’s appeal (Code Civ. Proc., § 923) does not mean, 

contrary to Kimberly’s assertion, the trial court should have required Fletcher to post the 

same amount as a condition of bifurcation. Unlike Kimberly’s request of the trial court, 

the bond we required was not for the purpose of assuring Fletcher’s compliance with the 

terms of conditions imposed on the bifurcation. Instead, our bond was to indemnify 

Kimberly in the event our lifting the automatic stay at Fletcher’s request caused her any 

harm during the appellate process. Moreover, the bond we ordered did not require 

Fletcher to deposit $10 million in a financial institution, as did Kimberly’s proposed 

condition.

For the same reasons stated above, neither did the court err in denying 

Kimberly’s request to include the following conditions: 1) that section 721 would 
11

continue to govern the conduct of the parties pending final resolution of all remaining 

issues; 2) that Fletcher must honor his fiduciary duties to Kimberly pending final 

resolution of all remaining issues; and 3) that until judgment on all the remaining issues, 

the parties will continue to be considered spouses under sections 1100 through 1103. In 

addition, whether added as an express condition or not, both parties have a continuing 

duty fiduciary duty to each other (§ 1100, subd. (e) [fiduciary duty remains “until such 

time as the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court”]) and 

sections 1100 through 1103 sufficiently protect Kimberly’s interests. For example, the 

remedy provided in subdivision (g) of section 1101 for a breach of the fiduciary duty 

includes, but is not limited to, “an award to the other spouse of 50 percent, or an amount

equal to 50 percent, of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty 

plus attorney’s fees and court costs.”

Kimberly has not demonstrated the court abused its discretion in not adding 

the above conditions to bifurcation. Consequently, we affirm.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Fletcher shall recover his costs on appeal.

MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

ARONSON, J.