UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4424

CHARLES EDWARD YOUNG,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4500

SCHANEN DUVENE WATTS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4537

CHARLES EDWARD YOUNG,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.

Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge.

(CR-97-128, CR-99-1104)

Submitted: October 31, 2001

Decided: January 14, 2002

Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

William H. Ehlies, II, WILLIAM B. EHLIES, P.A., Greenville, South

Carolina, for Appellant Young; Riche T. McKnight, WOMBLE,

CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE & RICE, P.L.L.C., Atlanta, Georgia, for

Appellant Watts. Scott N. Schools, United States Attorney, E. Jean

Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Charles Young pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base

(crack), 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994), and failure to appear, 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3146(a)(1) (West 2000). He received a career offender sentence of

252 months imprisonment for the first offense, U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2000), and a consecutive thirty-month

sentence for the second offense. Schanen Duvene Watts pled guilty

to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base (crack), 21 U.S.C. § 846

(1994), and was sentenced to 130 months imprisonment. Young

appeals his sentences, alleging that the district court erred in computing his criminal history. Watts appeals his conviction on the ground

that his guilty plea was involuntary. We affirm Young’s sentence and

Watts’ conviction. 

Young argues that the prior state drug offenses for which he was

sentenced on the same date in 1989 should all have been grouped

together and treated as related cases because they were all committed

within three months, they were of the same character, and they were

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consolidated on the state court sentencing docket. See USSG § 4A1.2,

cmt. n.3. However, as Young acknowledges, Application Note 3 to

§ 4A1.2 provides that "[p]rior sentences are not considered related if

they were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest

(i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing

the second offense)." Young’s prior offenses that had a common

arrest date were correctly grouped together. The remaining offenses

were separated by intervening arrests and could not be treated as

related cases under Application Note 3 to § 4A1.2.

Moreover, even if all five prior drug offenses had been considered

related cases and treated as one prior offense, Young would still be

in criminal history category VI because he was correctly sentenced as

a career offender. As required by USSG § 4B1.1, Young was over

eighteen when he committed the offense of conviction, the offense of

conviction was a felony controlled substance offense, and he had

prior convictions for a crime of violence (aggravated assault and battery), and one or more convictions for controlled substance offenses.

Therefore, we find no error in the sentence imposed by the district

court. 

Watts contends that his guilty plea should not have been accepted

by the district court because it was involuntary. He argues that he was

unaware that his plea would expose him to punishment for either the

possession or distribution of crack cocaine. This court has held that

an "appropriately conducted Rule 11 proceeding . . . raise[s] a strong

presumption that the plea is final and binding." United States v.

Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States

v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1393 (4th Cir. 1992)). 

Our review of the guilty plea colloquy discloses that the district

court complied fully with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although Watts maintained that he had

sold only cocaine powder, the district court carefully explained that

Watts was charged in a crack conspiracy, explained the elements of

the offense, explained that Watts could be sentenced for involvement

with crack under the principle of relevant conduct even if he had limited his personal activity to the sale of cocaine powder, explored more

than once what the government was prepared to prove, and gave

Watts ample time to consult with his attorney and decide whether he

UNITED STATES v. YOUNG 3
wished to plead guilty to the charge of conspiring to distribute crack.

On this record, Watts’ contention that he was confused by certain

statements made by his attorney, the government attorney, and the

district court are unavailing. 

We therefore affirm the judgment in both cases. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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