## IN THE COUR T OF CRIMINA L APPEALS OF TEX AS
N o. P D - 1411- 07

J O S E L U IS P E N A , A p p ell a n t

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON S TATE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW I N C A U S E N O . 1 0 - 0 3 - 0 0 1 0 9 - CR FRO M TH E TEN TH CO UR T O F APPEA LS LEON CO UNTY

H OL C OM B , J ., f

i l e d a di s s e nt i ng o

pi ni on, i n whi c h P RI CE and J OHNS ON , JJ. , j oi ned. C OCHR AN , J ., j oi ne d i n Par t I of the op i ni on.
I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt fr om the ma

jor ity ’s ho ldi ng that a

pp e lla nt’ s Te xas c on sti tut ion a l c la im
wa s n ot p re se rv e d, fo r t

he fo llo wi ngtw o r e a so ns . 1. Ou r p re v iou s d

isp os iti on of t

his c as e . Ibelieve this holding is especia lly inappropriate in the proc edura l context of t his case . As the majority

has indicate d, this is not the first time the State has petitioned this Court on thi s exact same issue. I n fac t, the S tate presented this issue when it filed i ts first petition, in May 2005, statingPENA - Pag e 2

specific ally : “Did the Court of Appe als err by reve rsing the t rial cour

t’s decision on a le g al theory not presente d e ith e r to thetri al c ou rt o r to theCou rt o f A pp e als b y

t h e c o mp l a i n i n g p a rt y ?” (Emphasis added.) We gr anted r eview on that question and J udg e He rvey , in her dissent fr om our ensuing opinion, ex pressly noted t hat s he would “dec ide t hat t he st ate c onstitut ional claim dec ided by the Te nth Court wa s not ‘preserv ed in the trial below .’” Pe na v . S tat e , 1 9 1 S. W. 3 d

1 3 3 , 1 4 7 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ) ( He rv e y , J., dis se nti ng ) (e mph a sis a dd e d) (c itatio n o mit te d) . B ut Jud g e Me y e rs , who also then dissented f rom our opinion, disag ree d with her on that point. As he noted: At trial, defe nse counse l arg ued in his motion t o suppress that the a dmission of the te st r e su lts a nd

the te sti mony

surr ound ingthe m wo uld

vio la te his du e pr oc e ss r ig hts g ua ra nte e d b y bo th t he Un ite d Sta te s Con sti tut ion a nd the Te xas Con sti tut ion

. Thus , the issue of a

violation of Appellant’s rights under the Due Course of L aw pr ovision wa s raised and preserv ed at trial

. Id. at 139 (Mey ers, J., diss enting ) (e mphasis added)

. I ndeed, Judge Mey ers re i terated his position on t he pre servation of err or issue whe n he articulated his rea sons for dissenting in that case : As this issue is now properly before us , and no statute or case law prec edent r equire s us to send the ca se bac k to the court of appea ls, it violates common sense a nd judicial e c on omy to r e mand

it. Id. (empha sis added). Even thoug h this disag ree ment betwee n the j udg es on the preservation of er ror que stion was clea r, the Court declined to a ddress that issue at that time. See 191 S.W .3d at 136 n.14. B ut pr e ser vatio n o f e rr or

is m or e tha

n ju st a te c hn ic a lity . I t is a c tua lly a pr oc e dura l gatewaythat the parties must pass in order to have their claims hear d on the merit. We do not addre ss an issue if the party was require d to pr eser ve err or, but f

ailed to do so. Thus, when we rema nded this case to the court of appea ls, actua lly order ing it to obtain brief ing f rom the par

ties on the un de rly ing

c lai m i tse lf

,PENA - Pag e 3

we ha d in effe ct allowed a ppellant to pass throug h the proc edura l gateway
. I n other wor ds, even tho ug h w e mig ht h a ve e xpre ssl y de c lin e d to a dd

re ss t he pr e se rv a tio n is su e , we did imp lic itl y

a dd re ss it a nd de c id ed eith e r t

hat a pp e lla nt had prese rved e rror

or that he should be exc used from the prese rvation re quirement in lig ht of the question pre sented in this case

. I n fac t, our opi nion clea

rly sug g ests that we did conside r the pre servation issue and resolved it i n a pp e lla nt’ s f a vo r. We state d that “ [w]e have pr e vio us ly he ld, a nd re a ff ir m to da y , th a t a pp e llate
c ourt s a re fr e e to re vie w ‘u na ssi g ne d e rr or ’ –

a c la im that was preserv ed in the trial below but was not raised on a

ppeal.” Id. at 136 (e mphasis added)

. We added that, “[i] n conducting such a r eview, howeve r, the que stion becomes whe ther c erta in circumstanc es oblig ate a cour t to assign such er

ror by order ing br iefing from the pa rties.” Id. (e mph a sis in or ig ina l)

. Thus , whe n we re mand e d th e c a se order ing the court of a

ppeals to obtain brief

ing f rom the par t i es, we were acknow ledg ing that
a pp e lla nt’ s c la im had been “ prese rved in the trial below” even though it had “not [been] raised on appea l.” Id. Our opinion was a lso quite clea r on our reasons for excusing the pre servation requireme nt in t his c a se . A s w e state d, “ [w]e re c og nize that man y , if not mos t, of the ty pe s o f e rr or

tha t w ou ld pr omp t sua spon te appellate attention need not be assig ned bec ause the err or involved constitutes

a n o b v io u s v io lati o n o f e s ta b li s h e d rules. N

o ve l constitutional

issues are a different matter .” Id. (first, sty listi c empha sis in original; later emphase s added) . As we e x plained later in the opinion, We d o n ot s ug g e st that an a pp e llate c ourt

mus t or de r b ri e fi ng eve ry tim e it decide s to raise on its own a point of err or not br iefe d by the parties. As we indicated ear lier, some rule s – constitutional or otherwise – a re a lrea dy

fi rmly established t h ro u gh pri o r l i t i gat i o n , h av i n g al re ad y p as s edt h ro u gh t h e f

i re s o f a d v er s ar i al t es t i n g. And rules that do not expand the re ach of the fe dera l or st at e constit utions can be overturne d by

the L eg islature; althoug h the cost of mistakes r eg ardingthose ty pes of ru l es is high, a

reme dy exis ts. B u t a n o v e l r u l e th a t e x p a n d s th e r e ac h o

f aPENA - Pag e 4

constitutional

provision can hamstring the Legislature as well as frustrat e trial c ou rts an d p ro se c uto rs w ho re lie d u po n th e ru le tha t wa s p re v iou sly in e ffe c t. Id. at 137-38 (e mphasis added)

. The ma jo r it y in th e p r e s e n t c a s e a c kn o w le d g e s o u r p r e v io u s h o ld in g th a t t h e T exas constitutional que stion in t he pre sent ca se is a novel issue. See Maj. op. at *5 (“We re cog nized that wh e the r t he du e cou rse of la

w p ro vis ion

g ra nts mor e pr ote c tio n th a n th e Du e Pr oc e ss C la us e is a
no ve l st a te c on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on a nd the re fo re re qu ires carefu l de lib e ratio n b y a n a pp e llate
co u rt
. ”) (c i t i n g Pena , 191 S.W .3d at 136-37). I n spite of its acknowle dg ment of and e ven appa rent ag ree ment with that holding, howe ver, the curr ent majority then proc eeds to dismiss that underly ing claim o n t h e s ame pr eser vation-of- err or g round that our pr evious majority had in ef fec t excused
s p e c i f i c a l l y be c au se

o f it s r e c og nition that the underly ing T exas constituti onal question in the prese nt
case was a

novel issue. What’s m o re , wh i l e the major ity in our previous opinion had spent considera ble time discussin g, and thus had in fa ct eng ag ed in “c are ful delibera tion,” id. , b e fo re it ultimate ly

conclude d that the cour

t of appe als had e rre d only beca use of its “fa ilure to aff

ord the parties a n opportunity

to brief” that underly

ing Texas constitutional iss ue, see Pe na , 191 S.W .3d at 138, the cur

rent majority

does not eve n try

to expl ain its departur e fr om our previous lenie ncy on the question of er

ror pr eser vation. I n other wor ds, it does not ex plain why what wa s no doubt good la w to the previous majority , enabling it to order the cour t of ap p ea l s t o p roceed on the me rits of the underlying T exas constituti onal claim, is not such g ood law any more. Ibelieve it is fair to say that we are in eff ect rever sing our ear lier decision, at l east as far a s the pre servation issue is concerne d. I n my opinion, the que stion of preser vation beca

me moot when
we re mand e d th e c a se to t he c ourt of a pp e a ls ordering

it to procee d on t h e u n d er l y i n g TexasPENA - Pag e 5

constitutional iss ue by

reque sting the pa

rties’ brie fs on i t. As I noted earlier, we i ssued t hat opinion in Ap ri l 2 0 0 6. The c ourt of appe als complied with our orde rs; and the pa rties complied with that
c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tio ns , r e se a rc hin g a nd fi lin g br ie fs wi th t

ha t c ourt on the u n derlying Texas constitutional

issue . T he n, in M a y

20 07 , th e c ourt of a

pp e a ls pr e se nte d a v e ry

de ta ile d a nd in- de pth analy sis of that same issue in a published opinion. The State then f iled the cur

rent pe tition, i n J une 2007, and we are now dec iding this ca se in April 2009. I n other wor ds, it has been a lmost t hree y ear s since we rema

nded this case to the court of appea ls with orders to obtain the par ties’ brief ing
on the un de rl y ingTe xas c on stitu ti on al is su e . I su bmi t th a t w e a re no w i n e ff e c t estopped

from de c lin ingto a dd

re ss that unde rl y ing iss ue be c a us e of our o wn

e a rl ie r o rd e rs . We c a nn ot a

nd sh ou ld
no t put th e pa

rt ie s and the c ourt of app eal s thr ou g h a ll this tim e , e ff or t, a nd e xpe ns e of

tr y ingto comply with our own orde rs to addre ss an issue, and then ref use t o addre ss that issue ourselves on the g round that it had neve r bee n prese rved f or our r eview, in the f

irst place. It is sim pl y

not fair,
e it h e r to th e p a rti e s o r

to th e c o u rt of a

p p e a ls ; a n d it c e rta in ly d o e s n o t r e f le c t w e ll o n th is Co u rt. We need to be consistent in the approa ch we take, at least in our dea ling with the same ca se. 2. Appellant did preserve error Pe rs on a lly , I

be lie ve that a

pp e lla nt d id p re se rv e e rr or . T he tr ia l tr ans cri pt is r e ple te wi th appellant’ s repe ated a ssertion of his rig hts under both the F eder al Due Proc ess Clause and the Texas Due Course of L aw provision. I f he truly believed that both these provisions were sy nony mous and provided identical

pr ote c tio n, he did

no t ne e d to ke e p in vo kin g the state law. Th e F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit uti on is s uf fi c ie nt t o p ro vid e a de fe nd a nt in a state tr ia l w ith all the due pr ocess pr otection g uara nteed by the fe dera l constituti on. Thus, the fa ct that appe llant
c a re fu lly a nd re pe a te dly

we nt to the tr ou

ble of inv ok ingbo th o f t

ho se pr ov isi on s e ve ry

sin g le tim ePENA - Pag e 6

t h at h e ob j ec t ed , i n d i ca t es t h at h e w as h o p i n g one or the other would provide g reater prote ction and, there fore , did his best to preserve err or on whiche ver g round the a ppellate c ourts ultimately decide d did provide more pr otection. I n a dd iti on , I fi nd it sig nif ic a nt that a

pp e lla nt, in his “ Om nib us Pr e tr ia l Mo tio ns ,” cl ear ly asked the trial court to suppre ss the evidenc e in questio n (t es t i m o n y and re ports related to the marijuana that was de stroy ed by

the State bef

ore a ppellant cou l d h av e it independe ntly tested) b ec au se it had bee n obtained in violation of “the U nited States Consti tution or the Texas Con sti tut ion .” (E mph a sis a dd e d. ) Th e tr ia l c ourt a lso re c og nize d the po ssi bil ity of dif fe ri ngle ve ls of protec tion affor ded by

the fe dera l and state provisions, as it stated: Now, the Court unde rstands that we have lost e vidence here and in the se t y p e [ of] case s the defe ndant must show that the prosec ution acted in ba d faith when it failed to p re se rv e the e vid e nc e to s ho w v iol a tio n o f d ue pr oc e ss or

due cour se of law

. (Emphasis adde d.) I t is also important to note t hat appellant did not stop at invoking the fe dera l Due Proce ss and the state Du e Cours e of

L a w p ro vis ion s. He a lso inv ok e d p ro vis ion s o f t he Te xas H e a ltha nd

Sa fe ty Code and the Te x as Code of Criminal Proce dure. The purpose of his effor ts was quite clea

r: the State had destroy ed what both the trial court and the court of a ppeals ag ree d was “ materia l” evidenc e
a g a ins t hi m, a

nd he wa s try in g t o inv ok e wh a te ve r a uth or ity – f e de ra l or state – th a t he c ou ld possibly think of that might have provided him with the most protection in light of suc h destruction. I t is the State’ s burden to pr ov e the de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t; an d Te xas law in pa rt ic ula r r e qu ir e s th e Sta te to take “at least five r andom and r epre sentati v e s am p l es ” of “ a contr olled substance pr operty or plant” and to prese rve “a sufficient quantit y ” to be provide d for discove ry by the def ense, be fore the State is allowed to destroy the rest of such evidenc e. See T EX . H E AL TH & S AF E TY C ODE § 481.160.PENA - Pag e 7

Appellant could not have been c harg ed or pr osecute d for possessing marijuana if the 1 d ef en s e h adb ee n ab l e t o t es tan d p ro v e t h e s u

b s t an ce t o b e s o m et h i n g other than marijuana

. The c hemist testified that he could not per sonally reme mber that pa

rticular te sting 2 beca use it had bee n almost five y ear s since he ha d done that testing . He ther efor e re lied e x c l u s i v e l y o n t h e a f

o r e m e n t i o n e d

l a b r e p o rtf o r h i s t e s t i m o n y. B ut i n th is c a se , th e Sta te de str oy e d the ve ry e vid e nc e that e sta

bli sh e d a pp e lla nt’ s g uil t, y e t st ill fe lt

1 fre e to pr ocee d with the prosec ution on the basis of a lab r eport a nd testimony

based so le ly

on that lab repor t, even though the defe nse had ne ver g otten a cha nce to vindicate his rig hts, under Texas 2 law , to independently

test and conf

irm the identity

of the de stroy ed evide nce. I n f a c t, d e fe ns e c ouns e l ma de the se c on c e rn s q uit e c le a r w he n h e tol d th e tr ia l c ourt : And I would ag ain j ust -- if I understand the Court [ is] g oing to let this testimony in, that this was tested as mar ijuana, that it was mar ijuana and the weight o f t he marij u an a, and when the Court found that it wasn’t done purpose fully by the laboratory , be it the State of Te x as, that puts defe nse counse l in a po s t u re, Judge , wher e we are force d to assume the burden and prov e a negative
. (E mph a sis a dd e d. ) T he Court ’s e mpathy wa s e qu a lly

c le a r a s it re sp on de d, “ Ikn owtha t, M r. Cahil l. But y ou know, I

didn’t write the law .” I t even e laborated furthe r: I ’m just try ing to f

ollow the law and that’s what these case s say . I rea liz e it puts the defe ndant in a pre dicament. And you’re doing just what I would do if Iwas in y our sh oe s. B ut I did

n’ t w ri te the law. Ihave g ot t o f oll owthe law that th e c ourt s w ri te f o r me a n d th a t’ s w h a t I ’ m tr y in g to d o a n d th a t’ s w h a t th e y to ld me to do so I ’m do ingit. The trial c ourt was in f

ac t q u ite understandingand af forde d the def

ense c ounsel eve ry opportunity

to offer a ca se – any case – providing the protec tion that appellant soug ht to e x clude the evidenc e in question. But then, no suc h case law exi s t s ! As I noted ea rlier, this Court itself had
rec og nized in our first opinion in t his case that whether the Tex as Du e C ourse of L aw pr ovision provides g reater support than the fede ral Due Process of L aw is a nove l question. Thus, all thatPENA - Pag e 8

Ie xpre ss n o o pin ion

a bo ut t he me ri t of

the un de rl y ingc la im i n th is c a se , e xce pt t o n ote 3 that, in some case s at least, we have he ld that the Texas Consti tution offers more protec tion than the compar able pr ovisions of the fede ral Constituti on. Se e, e .g ., He itm an v . S tat e , 815 S.W .2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (conc luding that “ this Court, when analy zing and inter

preting Ar t. I , § 9, Te x. Con st. , w ill no t be bo un d b y Sup re me Court

de c isi on s a dd

re ssi ngthe c omp a ra

ble Four th Amendment issue.”) (footnote omitted). appellant c ould and did do was to invoke both those fe dera l and Texas provisions. W hether one of them offe red more protec tion than the other wa s a question of lawthat could b e ad dresse d and
re so lve d o nly

by a n a pp e llate c ourt
. The de fense counsel submitted pre- trial motions, arg ued vig orously at the suppre ssion he a ri ng , a nd ob je c te d c on sis te ntl y

thr ou g ho ut t

he tr ia l on the g ro un ds of bo th t

he fe de ra l D ue Pr oc e ss Clause and

the Te xas D ue Cours e of

L a w p ro vis ion s. I n e xpla ini ngthe se g ro un ds fo r h is o bje c tio ns , the defe nse counsel made it c ry stal clea r that he was try ing to invoke w hicheve r authority – fede ral

or s t a t e – w o u l d h a v e p r o v i d e d h i m t h e m o s tp r o t e c t i o n t o e x c l u d e t h e e v i d e n c e i n qu e s t i o n . In short, I believe that the defe nse counsel made his point abundantly clea r to make the trial court a

war e of his complaint and thus prese rved err or under the Texas Rule of Appellate Proc edure 33.1 on the
un de rl y ingTe xas c on sti tut ion a l que sti on in thi s ca se . We s ho uld the re fo re no w p ro c e e d to a dd re ss that underlying que stion. 3 * * * * * * * * * * * * The majority

adds the following in response to the f irst issue Iraised: Finally , we c onsider an issue raised by the dissent. The dissent conte nds that we implicitly

ruled that Pena ’s due c ourse of law complaint was pre serve d when we re mand e d th is c a se in 2 00 6. Ho we ve r, a s n ote d a bo ve , w e e xplic itl y

de c ide d n ot t o addre ss preser

vation at that time. We did this beca use the co u rt of appe als neve r expressly ruled on the issue be fore proceeding to the merits of the issue a s “unassig ned er

ror.” There fore , when r emanding for br iefing , we took int o acc ount tw o im po rt a nt p oli c y

int e re sts : f

ir st, to a llo w the pa

rt ie s to have a n o pp or

tun ity to brief the threshold prese rvation question g iven the novelty of the issue; a nd second,PENA - Pag e 9

Maj. op. at 9. 4 t o a l l o w t h e c o u rt o f a

p p e a l s t o d e c i d e t h e i s s u e i n t h e f i r s ti n s t a n c e w i t h b r i e f

i n g . It defie s logic to say

that we implicitly

ruled on the pr eser

v at i on issue when we expressly declined to do so. Maj. op. at 8-9 ( citations omitt ed). The majority

fails to rea liz e, howe ver , t h at we did not m ention any of this in our previous opinion. See P ena , 191 S.W .3d. For instance, our opinion ne ver state d that the cour t of appe als had failed to “ expressly rule[] ” on the pr eser vation issue. See id. We also never instructed the c ourt of appea ls to either addr ess or request brief ing on that issue. See id. Thus, contra ry to the curr ent
ma jor ity ’ s a s s e rt i o n , w e n e v e r “ a l l o w [e d ] t

h e p a rt i e s t o h a v e a n o p p o rtu n i t y t o b r i e f t h e t h r e s ho ld prese rvation question.” See Maj. op. at 9. Moreove r, our e arlier opinion say s nothing a

bout the “two important policy interests” only now ar ticulated by

the cur rent majority

. See id. ; see also Pe na , 191 S.W .3d. I n fac t, the onl y time that we talked about preservation was in that footnote i n which we
e x p r e s s l y declined

to add ress the que stion of preser vation. See P ena , 191 S.W .3d. at 136 n.14. Ex cept f or that one footnote, our entire opinion was devoted exclusively to the question of whethe r it was appropr iate for t h e court of a ppeals to have addre ssed the underlying Texas constituti onal iss ue wi tho ut fi rs t ob ta ini ng br ie fi ng fr om t he pa rt ie s on that underly

ing issue. I

n short, there was nothing in our e arlier

opinion that could have aler ted either the parties or the c ourt of appe als to the fac t that they

wer e supposed to addr ess any thing other

than the under ly ing issue. F ina lly , I do n’ t se e a ny

thi ngthat “ de fi e s lo g ic ” in poi nti ng ou t the inc on sis te nc ie s in bo th 4 our pre vious and curr ent opinions. As I noted ea rlier, we had stated in our p re vious opinion t hat “[w]e have pre viously

held, and rea ffirm today , that appellate courts are fre e to review‘unassig ned
err or’ – a claim that was pr eser

ved in t he trial below but was not ra ised on appe al.” See P ena , 191PENA - Pag e 10

Maj. op. at 9 (e mphasis added)

. 5 S.W .3d. at 136. Except for that one footnote in which we expressly declined to a ddress the pres er v at i o n question, see id. at 136 n.14, we de voted the entire opinion to dis cussing the lower court’s ne ed for

obtaining pa

rty briefingon the under ly ing T exas constituti onal issu e. I n fac t, we conclude d that opinion by order ing the court of a

ppeals to o b t ai n s uch brie fing solely on that

u n d e r l y i n g i s s u e . T h e o n l y l o g i cal way to rec oncile this appar ent discre pancy betwee n the disavowing f

o o tn o te a n d th e r e s t o f th e o p in io n is to a s s u me th a t w e h a d d e c id e d to r e lax the prese rvation re quirement in lig ht of the novelty of the unde rly ing que stion presented in the c ase, a nd that the p ur

po se of the dis a vo wi ngfo otn ote wa s me re ly to n ote our u

nw ill ing ne ss t o e xpre ssl y dis c us s our r e a so ns fo r h a vin g re la xed that r e qu ir e me nt. But th e c u r

r e n t m a jo r it y c o n te s ts th is lo g ic a l a s s u mp ti o n a n d in s is ts th a t w e h a d

in e f fec t
rese rved some r ight to dismiss thi s case on the g rou n d s of pre servation, in spi te of a ll the time, money and ef fort spent by

the par ties and the c ourt of appe als addres s i n g the under ly ing T exas Constit utional issue that we had explicitly order ed them to a ddress three y ear s ag o. But if that is true, then the only logic al ex planation for the above- mentioned discre pancy betwee n the footnote a

nd the rest of our

ear ly opinion is t hat we ha d been int e rn all yinconsiste n t when, on the one hand, we devoted pr actica lly

our entire opinion discussing the lowe r cour t’s need f or obtaining party

briefing

so le ly on the under ly ing T exas constituti onal issue; wh i l e, on the other ha nd, summarily

declined t o ad dress what the majority now ca lls “the thr esh old p r e s e r v a ti o n qu e s ti o n ” in

a me r e f o o tnote
. 5 See P ena at 136 n.14. I

su b m i t , h o we v er , that there was no such inter nal inconsistency

in our previous opinion, and that it is the curr ent opinion summarily dismiss ing the underlying c laim that is actual ly in c o n s is te n t w it h o u r e a r li e r a

p p r o a c h

. B u t n o matt e r h o w o n e c h o o s e s to lo o k a t it, IPENA - Pag e 11

believe that the only

clea r messag e that our opinion sends out today is that we ar e consistent in being inc on sis te nt. F or a ll the fo re g oin g re a so ns , I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.

FI L ED: April 8, 2009. PUB L I SH