SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

276 

KA 13-01755 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., LINDLEY, VALENTINO, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH TARTAGLIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH D. WALDORF, P.C., ROCHESTER (JOSEPH D. WALDORF

OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (DANIEL GROSS OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Victoria M.

Argento, J.) rendered September 19, 2013. The judgment revoked

defendant’s sentence of probation and imposed a sentence of

imprisonment. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking the

sentence of probation imposed on his conviction of course of sexual

conduct against a child in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.80 [1]

[b]), and resentencing him to a determinate term of imprisonment of

three years plus seven years of postrelease supervision. We reject

defendant’s contention that County Court erred in revoking his

probation. One of the conditions of probation required defendant to

“participate in a specialized treatment program for sex offenders as

directed by the probation officer until satisfactorily terminated from

said program. Satisfactory participation includes . . . progress

toward regular treatment goals.” Defendant was referred by his

probation officer to North Coast Counseling for sex offender

treatment, but he was discharged from that program because he did not

make “reasonable progress” in treatment based on his repeated failure

to accept responsibility for his sexual offense. The discharge

summary states that defendant admitted at times that he abused the

victim, while at other times he minimized or denied such conduct. 

Although defendant concedes that he was discharged from

treatment, he contends that, because he entered an Alford plea to the

sex offense, he should not be punished for failing to admit his guilt

of the underlying offense. We note as a preliminary matter that the

record does not establish that defendant entered an Alford plea. 

Indeed, there is no mention of an Alford plea in the record, which
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KA 13-01755 

includes the transcript of the plea proceeding, and defendant did not

deny culpability or assert his innocence during the proceeding. Even

assuming, arguendo, that defendant entered an Alford plea, we would

reject his contention. In Matter of Silmon v Travis (95 NY2d 470,

472-473), a parolee who entered an Alford plea contended that the

parole board could not use his refusal to accept responsibility for

his actions as a reason to deny him release to parole. The Court of

Appeals rejected that contention, stating that “[t]he court’s

acceptance of his plea without an admission of culpability was not an

indication that the State viewed him as innocent” (id. at 475-476). 

In a footnote, the Court cited with approval an out-of-state case in

which a court found that a probation revocation based on failure to

admit guilt was proper even though defendant entered an Alford plea

(see id. at 478 n 3).

Finally, we reject defendant’s contention that his sentence is

unduly harsh and severe. 

Entered: March 27, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court