i i i i i i



### MEMORANDUM OPI NIO N No
. 04 -0 9- 00 20 1- CR Rosanna ZA MORA , Appellant
v . STA TE of

Te xas , Appellee F ro m th e 37 9th

Judic ia l D ist

ri c t Co ur t, B e xar County , T e xas Trial Court No. 2006-CR-7205 Honora ble Ron Range l , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini , J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini , J ustice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion , J ustice Steven C. Hilbig , J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: April 7, 2010 AF F I RME D I

N PA RT, REV ERS ED AN D R EM AN DE D I N PA RT I n two issues, Rosanna Z amora appea ls from her c onviction f o r u n a uth orized use of a

vehicle. Z amora was sente nced to two y ear s imprisonment , b u t her se ntence was suspende d and she w as place d on community supervision for five y ear s. As a condition of communi ty supervision, Z amora was orde red to pa

y restitution in the amount of $8,555.94. We overr ule Z amora ’s fa ctual suff

iciency iss ue and su sta in he r r e sti tut ion iss ue in p art . B e c a

us e we su sta in Z a mor a ’s re sti tut ion iss ue in p art , we r ever se the portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding restitution and remand t his case to the04
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- 2- trial court f

or a he aringso the trial cour t may deter mine a just amount of restitut ion. We affir m the trial court’ s judgme nt in all other respe cts. B ACKG ROUND Z a mor a and the c omp la ini ng wi tne ss, Ke lly Ra be l, we re fr ie nd s. Af

te r R a be l ha d s ur g e ry

in April 2005, Z amora lived with Rabel to assist Rabel in caringfor he r childre n and her household. I n the ea rly morning hours of J une 14, 2005, Z amora was involved in a r ollover ac cident that totaled Rabel’s c ar. Z amora

was indicted f

or unauthorized use of a vehicle. At trial, Rabel and Z amora g ave conflictingtestimony

about whethe r Z amora

had per mission t o use Rabel’s car when the a ccide nt
occur red. F A C TUA L S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE E VI DE NCE I n her f irst issue, Z amora argues the evidenc e wa s fac tually insufficient to support the jury ’s finding that she committed the off ense of unauthorized use of a vehicle beca use the g reat weig ht and p re p o n d er an ce of

the evidenc e, includingthe infer ence s theref rom, lead to the c onclusion that Z amora had per mission t o use the ve hicle. A per son commits the offense of unauth o ri z ed use of a vehicle if

she intentionally

or knowing ly

operates another ’s motor-prope lled vehicle w ithout the ef fec tive consent of the owner . T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31.07(a) (Ve rnon 2003). Thus, operating a vehicle is unla wful only if the
acc used is a

war e that the operation of the vehicle is without the owne r’s c onsent. Mc Qu e e n v . S tate , 78 1 S .W .2 d 60 0, 60 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 89 ); Ba tti sev . S tate , 2 6 4 S
. W
. 3 d

2 2 2 , 2 2 7 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 08 , p e t. r e f’ d) . T e sti mony that the c ar ow ne r d id n ot g ive c on se nt t o04
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- 3- operate her

vehicle c an be suf

ficient to support a f

inding that the a ccuse d knew she did not have consent to oper ate the ve hicle. McQ ueen , 7 81 S.W. 2d a t 60 4- 05 ; Ba tti

se , 264 S.W .3d at 227. I n conductinga fa ctual suff iciency revie w, we vie w all the evide nce in a neutra l lig ht and set
a sid e the ve rd ic t on ly

if it is so con tr ary to the ov e rwhe lmi ng we ig ht of the e vid e nc e a s to be c le arl y wrongand unjust. Cai n v . S tate , 9 5 8 S
. W
. 2 d

4 0 4 , 4 0 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Clewis v. Sta te , 922 S.W. 2d 12 6, 12 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 )) ; se e als o W ats on v . S tate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ) ( e xpla ini ngthat th e “ ba sic g ro un d r ule s f or po st- Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency revie w are we ll articulated in Cain v. State. ”). I n conductingour re view, we must be mindful that
a jur y ha s a lr e a dy

pa sse d o n th e fa c ts, and

c on vic te d, and we sh ou ld ne ve r or de r a ne w tri a l si mpl y beca use we disag ree with the ver dict. W atson , 20 4 S.W. 3d a t 41 4. Th e fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y ana ly sis can be broken dow n into two prong s. Id. Th e fi rs t pr on g asks whe the r t he e vid e nc e int

ro du c e d to
su pp or t the ve rd ic t, tho ug h le g a lly su ff ic ie nt, is n e ve rt

he le ss s o w e a k th at th e jur y ’s ve rd ic t se e ms cl ea rl y wrongand manife stly

unjust. Id. at 414-15. The second pr ong asks whethe r, consider ing conflictingevidenc e, the jury ’s ver dict, though le g ally sufficie nt, is n evertheless ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Id. at 415. At trial, Rabel testified Z amora lived in Rabel’s house f or two we eks in Ap ri l 2005 and Z amora used Rabel’ s car

less than five times to transpor t Rabel’s childre n to and from sc hool. Rabel
never told Za mora she w as fr ee to use her c ar wh en ev er she wanted. Z amora and Rabe l were no longe r living in the sa

me household when Z amora totaled R abel’ s car on J une 14, 2005. Howe ver, Z amora had stay ed at Rabel’s house t he previous wee kend, and Z amora was g oing to stay

at Rabel’s house one more night be cause Z amora and Rabe l were planning to run an e rr an d t o g ether the04
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1 ... Z a m o ra ha d lo st the o n ly ke y to he r c a r a n d R a b e l wa s ta k ing he r to ge t a r e p la c e m e n t.

- 4- f o l l o w i n g d ay. 1 On t he evening of J une 13, 2005, Z amora had bee n g iven a r ide to work, a nd did not
use Rabel’s car . That same nig ht, Rabel had g one to bed e arly beca use she ha d a job interviewthe next m orning . On J une 14, 2005, shortly befor e 3:00 a.m., Rabe l was aw akene d by Z amora who was knocking at the doors. Rabe l let Z amora i n t o t he house a

nd told Za

mora, who a

ppear ed to be intox icated, that she should go to slee p. Rabel re turned to bed a nd went bac k to sleep. At 3:36 a.m., Rabel re ceive d a phone call from Z amora . Z amora told Rabel she had “r olled” Rabe l’s car . When Rabel had f

allen asle ep ea

rlier that nig ht, her purse and key s were on her dr esser ; however , when Ra b e l w a s aw ak e n e d

a t 3 :3 6 a . m. , h e r

p u r s e an d

k e y s w e r e g o n e . I mm e d iate ly a f te r r e c eiving Z a mor a ’s c a ll, R a

be l c a lle d th e po lic e and

re po rt e d h e r c ar s tol e n. Ra be l a lso c a lle d Z a mor a ’s pa re nts and asked them to c ome g et Z amora ’s dog and other possessions f rom her house. L ater , when Rabe l
re tr ie ve d it e ms f

ro m he r t ota le d c ar a

t th e imp ound

lot , she fo un d h e r w a lle t un de r t he dr ive r’ s se a t. Finally , Rabel stated that on June 14, 2005, Z amora took her c ar w ithout permission and drove her
car without authorization. Z amora , who also testified at trial, g ave a di ffe rent account of these eve nts. Za mora testified that she had lived w ith Rabel continuously from late A

pril 2005 until J une 14, 2005. When Z amora was stay ing with Ra

bel, she used Rabel’s car beca use Rabel sa id it was more comf ortable a nd the children f it better in it. Za

mora took Rabel’ s children to and f rom school “ve ry

often” in Rabel’s ca

r. Z a mor a ’s fathe r o nc e he lpe d h e r t ake the c hil dr e n to sc ho ol i n h is c ar b e c a us e the y ne e de d to tr ans po rt a bik e to s c ho ol f

or a bik e ro de o, and

the bik e wo uld

no t f it i n Ra be l’ s c ar. Ac c or din g to Z a mor a , th e bik e ro de o wa s in May 20 05 . On the night o f Jun e 13 , 2 00 5, Z a mor a dr ov e to w or

k in04
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- 5- Rabel’s car with Ra

bel’s permission. When Z amora ’s shift ended at around 2:30 a.m. on June 14, 2005, Z amora

went straig ht to Rabel’s house and let herse lf in, using the house key on Rabel’s ke y ring . Rabel wa s awake and on the computer in her bedroom. Zamora showed Rabe l the money she had made that night. Rabel indicated she was hungry , and Zamora, who a lso was hung ry , sug g ested they g et some food. Z amora then lef t t h e h o u s e in Rabel’s c ar, pla nning to g o to a nea

rby Whataburg er. Z amora

still had Rabe l’s key s in her possession. Acc ording to Z amora , Rabel knew Z amora was g oing to use Rabel’s c ar to g o g et the food. He re , Z amor a

fo c us e s h e r a

rgume nt on the se c on d pro ng of the fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y ana ly sis , i.e. , whether , consideringconflictingevidenc e, t h e jury ’s ver dict is neverthe less ag ainst the g reat
we ig ht an d pre po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e . T o s up po rt he r a rgume nt, Z a mor a

po int s to e vid e nc e in the re c or d th a t Z amor a

wa s st ayinga t Ra

be l’ s h ou se wi th p e rm iss ion , a nd argue s that if

Ra be l di d not want Z amora

to stay in her house, she could have ea sily denied Z amora

acc ess. Next, Za

mora
argue s th a t, g ive n th a t sh e wa s sta ying a t the ho us e that w e e ke nd , a nd that Ra be l w ou ld b e g oin g to bed ear ly to be rea dy for a job interview, it made no se nse that Rabel would not have g iven Z amora a house ke y

s o Zam ora c ould let herself in when she c ame home. A ccor ding to Z amora , the “f ar more log ical infe renc e” w as that Z amora was telli ng the t ruth and that she w ent to and fr om her job in R a be l’ s c ar w ithRa

be l’ s p e rm iss ion

and that sh e le ft

the ho us e to g e t foo d in Rabe l’ s c ar w ith Rabel’s pe rmission. Additi onally , Z amora argues it was illogic al for he r to have driven Rabe l’s car without h er permission because it would have made no sense to have been a rre sted while her

dog and other possessions were still at Rabel’s house . Moreove r, Zam o ra a rgues that the fa ct that the
acc ident occur

red ne ar a

Whataburg er suppor

ts her story

that she wa s using t h e ca r t o go to a04
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- 6- restaur ant to buy food for he rself a nd Rabel. F inally , Z amora argues that whe n all of the e vidence is considere d toge ther in a ne utral lig ht, it is clea r that the g rea

t weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the
e v i d e n c e s u

p p o rt s Z am o r a ’ s s t o r

y. We disag ree . We cannot say that Z amora ’s testimony

is nece ssarily

more log ical or makes
mor e se ns e tha

n Ra bel’ s te sti mony . “ What w e ig ht t o g ive c on tr a dic tor y te sti mon ia l e vid e nc e is within the sole province of the jury , beca use it turns on an eva luation of cre dibilit y and deme anor.” Cai n , 958 S.W .2d at 408-09. B eca use the jury

was e ntitled to judge the cre dibilit y of witnesses, a

nd could believe all, part, or none of the ev i d en ce p re s en ted by the par ties, it could have a cce pted Rabel’s testim o n y that Z amora did not have per

mission t o use her

car , and re

jected Z amora ’s testimony to the contra

ry . See Cha mbe rs v. Sta te , 805 S.W .2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating the jury is entitled to judge the credibility of wit nesses, a nd can c hoose to believe all, some, or none of

the testimony

prese nted by

the par ties). That the jury chose to be lieve Rabe l’s testimony over the testimony

of Z amora

does not indicate the evidenc e is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and prepo n d er an ce o f the e vidence
. Se e J oh ns on v . S

tate , 23 S.W .3d at 1, 8 (Te x . Crim. App. 2000) (s tatin g du e de fe re nc e mus t be a c c or din g the fa c t f inder’s det e rm inatio ns , p art ic ula rl y tho se deter minations conce rning the weig ht and cr edibility of the e vidence ). View ing a ll of the evidenc e in a neutra l light, we conclude the jury ’s verdic t is not a g ainst the g reat w eig ht and pre pondera nce of the e vidence . Z amora ’s first issue is overr uled. RE S T I T UT I ON O R D ER I n her se cond issue, Z amora ar gu es the trial cour t abused its discretion by including $2 ,2 50 .0 0 in

its $8 ,5 55 .9 4 r e sti tut ion or de r b e c a

us e the re wa s n o p ro of

or sti pu latio n a s to thi s04
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- 7- portion of the orde r. Zamor a does not challeng e the portion of t he restituti on order for the va lue of Rabel’s c ar in the a

mount of $6,305.94. The trial c ourt that sentenc es a defe ndant convicted of an offe nse m ay order the def endant to make re stitut ion to the victim of the offe nse. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.037 (V ernon Supp. 2009). The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, [i ]f the offense results in damag e to or loss or destruc tion of p roper ty of a vic tim of the offe nse, the trial c ourt may order the def endant . .
. to pay

an amount equa l to the g reater of: ( i) the value of the prope rty on the date of

the damag e, loss, or destruc tion; or (ii) the va lue of the pr operty on the date of sentencing , less the value of any part of the prope rty

that is returne d on the date the proper ty is returne d. Id . at art. 42.037(b) (1)( B) . The State has the burden of proving , by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e, the a mou nt o f t he los s su sta ine d b y

the vic tim
. Id . at art. 42.037(k)
. We r eview c halleng es to restitution orders unde r an a buse of discr etion standard. Cartw right
v . S tate , 6 05 S.W. 2d

28 7, 28 9 ( Te x. Cr im. App . 1 98 0) ; Le mo s v . S tate , 2 7 S. W. 3 d

4 2 , 4 5 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. re f’d)
. “Restitution must have a factual basis wit hin the loss of the victim that is ref

lected in the rec ord.” Cam pb e ll v . S tate , 5 S.W .3d 693, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Cartwright , 6 05 S.W. 2d a t 28 8- 89 (“ Du e pr oc e ss co ns ide ratio ns . . . r e qu ir e that th e re mus t be evide nce in the r ecor d to show that the amount set by the cour t has a factual ba sis.”). Thus, one limit on a trial c ourt’s discre tion is t hat the amount of r estituti o n m u s t be just, and it must have a fac tual basis within the loss of the victim. Id owu v . S tate , 73 S.W .3d 918, 922 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Cam

pb e ll , 5 S.W .3d at 696-97. The State urg es us to overr ule Z amora ’s seco n d issue beca use the re cord shows that (1) Rabel’s make -up kit, which wa s in Rabel’s ca r whe n it wa s taken by

Z amora , was va lued at04
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- 8- $2,000.00; and (2) Z amora ag ree d to pay t h e ad d itional $250.00 included in the restitution order. First, as to the m ake- up kit, the S tate arg ues t here is evidenc e in t he re cord to support this portion of the re stitut ion order, pointingto Rabel’s t estimony at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. On
cross-e x amination, Rabel, who wa s a prof essional make- up artist, testified her profe ssional make-up kit was in the bac k of her car and wa s worth $2,000.00. We conclude that Rabel’s testim o n y was adequate t o support the re stitut ion order. Se e Bu rri s v . S tate , 172 S.W .3d 75, 78 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding trial testimony from the victim about the amount of medica l expenses incurre d was a dequate to support the restitution order)
. On the other

hand, nothing in the rec ord shows Z amora ag ree d to pay

the additional $250.00 included in the re stitut ion order. A t the sentenc ing he aring , Z amora ’s counse l stated, [Z a mor a ] is w ill ingto p ay re sti tut ion fo r the ve hic le in the a mou nt that w a s li ste d in the PSI . Ibelieve it was like 63 . . . [$] 6305.94. Now, we do disag ree with $2,000.00 worth of make- up in a bottle and some br ushes, but we don’t have a proble m with the CD’s and ce ll phone and a couple of hair products of the victim. (empha sis added). A lthough defe nse counsel indicated Z amora had no problem with beingorder ed to pay restitution for the CD’s, c ell p h o n e, and hair products mentioned in the pre sentenc e inv e sti g a tio n re po rt , Z amor a ’s c ouns e l di d n ot a g re e the se ite ms w e re va lue d at a sp e c if ic a mou nt, and ther e is no evidenc e in the record showing these items wer e valued at $250.00. The presente nce investigation report does not a ppear in the record, and we cannot assume the va lue of the r efe renc ed items was $250.00. We conclude the rec ord supports restitution in the amount of $6,305.94 for Rabel’s c ar a

nd $2,000.00 for Rabe l’s make- up kit, but fails to support the remain i n g $250.00 order ed. We,04
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- 9- there fore , conclude the t rial court abused its discretion in orde ring restitution in the total amount of $8,555.94. Z amora ’s sec ond issue is overrule d in part and sustaine d in part. Z amora argues that if we sustain her second is sue, we must remand to the trial cour t for an evidentiar y hear ing to de termine the c orre ct amount of re stitut ion. We ag ree . See Ba rto n v . S tate , 21 S.W. 3d 28 7, 29 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ) ( re mand in g t he cas e fo r a he ari ngto d e te rm ine a

jus t
a mou nt o f r e sti tut ion ); Cartw right , 605 S.W .2d at 289 (same ). C ONCL US I ON We r e v e r s e th e r e s ti tuti o n o r d e r an d r e ma n d th is c a u s e to th e tr ia l c o u rt f

o r a h e ar ing on
re sti tut ion . We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt i n a ll o the r r e sp e c ts. Kar en Ang elini , J ustice

DO NO T PU B L I SH