IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-41151

HENRY ZOCH, II, Individually and on behalf of The Estate of Henry Zoch 

III, Deceased, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

MAGNA SEATING (GERMANY) GMBH, formerly known as Intier 

Automotive Seating Systems, GmbH, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CV-578

Before SOUTHWICK, GRAVES, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

KURT D. ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judge:*

Plaintiff-Appellant, Henry Zoch, II, appeals the district court’s dismissal 

of his claims against Defendant-Appellee, Magna Seating (Germany) GmbH, 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

The primary issue for our consideration in this appeal is whether the district 

court erred in determining that, under a stream-of-commerce theory, it could 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 22, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

2

not exercise specific jurisdiction over Magna Seating (Germany) GmbH, a 

foreign manufacturer of vehicle component parts. For the reasons set forth 

herein, under the particular facts of this case, we conclude that specific 

jurisdiction is lacking and that the district court’s judgment should be 

affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Underlying Facts

On October 15, 2014, 31-year-old Henry Zoch, III (“Zoch”) was driving 

his 2008 Daimler Smart Fortwo in Plano, Texas, when he was rear-ended by a 

2006 Ford Taurus after slowing or stopping for traffic. The impact pushed 

Zoch’s vehicle into the Toyota Camry in front of it. Neither of the drivers of 

the other two vehicles involved was seriously injured, and the damage to Zoch’s 

vehicle was relatively minimal. However, due to an alleged malfunction in the 

driver’s seat anchor of Zoch’s Smart Fortwo, the seat collapsed “rear-ward” and 

“inboard” during the accident, causing Zoch to be propelled backward inside 

the vehicle and hit his head on the rear of the vehicle’s interior. As a result, 

Zoch suffered a brain injury and died the following day. 

The Smart Fortwo that Zoch owned and was driving at the time of his 

accident (sometimes referred to herein as “the subject vehicle”) was designed 

by Daimler AG (“Daimler”) in Germany. It, like other 2008 Smart Fortwos, 

was manufactured in France, using component parts from various suppliers. 

The metal structural components of the driver’s seat for the vehicle were 

designed by German company C. Rob Hammerstein GmbH & Co. KG, later 

known as Johnson Controls Metals and Mechanisms GmbH & Co. KG, 

(“JCMM”) in Germany in accordance with specifications provided to it by 

Daimler AG. One of JCMM’s sister companies then manufactured the metal 

and structural components of the 2008 Smart Fortwo seats, which were sold 

and supplied to Appellee herein, Magna Seating (Germany) GmbH (“Magna”), 

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

3

formerly known as Intier Automotive Seating Systems, GmbH.1 Magna, in 

turn, assembled the seats for the 2008 Smart Fortwo, including the structure, 

trim, foam and plastic parts, in Germany, after which it sold and furnished the 

finished seats to Daimler’s Smart Fortwo assembly plant in France. 

Completed 2008 Smart Fortwos were sold across the globe, with Europe being 

the largest market for the vehicle. 

After being manufactured in France, the subject vehicle was sold to 

Smart USA Distributor LLC, which was the general importer of Smart vehicles 

to the United States at the time. In September 2008, Smart USA Distributor 

LLC sold the vehicle to Mercedes-Benz of Houston North. Thomas Berggren 

III bought the vehicle from that dealership on or around September 19, 2008. 

Mr. Berggren kept and used the vehicle in Louisiana for about six years. A 

Toyota dealership in Plano, Texas, acquired the vehicle from Rosary Berggren, 

a Louisiana resident, through a trade-in. Zoch then purchased the instant

vehicle and, shortly thereafter, he and the vehicle were involved in the fatal 

accident. 

District Court Proceedings

Following Zoch’s death, his father, Henry Zoch, II (“Plaintiff”), instituted 

this products-liability lawsuit on behalf of himself and Zoch’s estate, against 

multiple parties allegedly responsible for Zoch’s death, including Magna, in the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division, 

invoking diversity jurisdiction.2 Magna is alleged to have “designed, tested, 

and supplied the [driver’s] seat [in Zoch’s Smart Fortwo], chose[n] the metal 

used in the seat’s anchorage and fittings, and designed the seat-related 

1 Magna, a German company, “designs, develops, and manufactures automobile seats, 

seating assemblies and component parts in Germany, which are then supplied to various 

automobile manufacturer assembly plants in Europe.” 

2 The case was later transferred to the Sherman division on a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 

motion to transfer venue. 

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

4

components and anchorages generally.” Plaintiff’s complaint asserts causes of 

action against all defendants for, inter alia, “design defect,” “manufacturing 

defect,” negligence, and violation of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 

82.003. 

After allowing the parties to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery, but 

without conducting a hearing, the magistrate judge (“magistrate”) issued a 

report and recommendation suggesting that a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss 

for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Magna should be granted. In his report 

and recommendation, the magistrate rejected Plaintiff’s arguments that the 

court could exercise specific jurisdiction over Magna under the stream-ofcommerce theory. The district judge adopted the magistrate’s report and 

recommendation, granted Magna’s motion, and dismissed the claims against 

Magna for lack of personal jurisdiction.3 Plaintiff now appeals the district 

court’s ruling, arguing that the magistrate and the district court improperly 

applied a stream-of-commerce approach that is stricter than the one adopted 

by this court. As discussed below, we find that it was proper to grant Magna’s 

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a Rule 12(b)(2) dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de 

novo. Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 2016). The 

plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Id. Where, as here, the 

district court rules on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without conducting an evidentiary 

hearing, the plaintiff may meet his burden with prima facie evidence. Id.; see 

also Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., 921 F.3d 

522, 539 (5th Cir. 2019). In determining whether the plaintiff has presented a 

3 In the same order, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against two other 

defendants—JCMM and Magna International, Inc.—for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff does not appeal the dismissal of his claims as to those defendants. With respect to 

JCMM, Plaintiff ultimately settled his claims. 

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

5

prima facia case of personal jurisdiction, we “must accept the plaintiff’s 

uncontroverted allegations, and resolve in his favor all conflicts between the 

facts contained in the parties’ affidavits and other documentation.” Patterson, 

826 F.3d at 233 (alteration in original omitted) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION

General Principles of Personal Jurisdiction 

“[A] federal district court’s authority to assert personal jurisdiction in 

most cases is linked to service of process on a defendant who is subject to the 

jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district 

court is located.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (quoting FED. R.

CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). Thus, in a diversity case, a federal court may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if “the forum state’s longarm statute extends to [such] defendant and the exercise of jurisdiction 

comports with due process.” Carmona v. Leo Ship Mgmt., Inc., 924 F.3d 190, 

193 (5th Cir. 2019). Since “the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of 

federal due process, the two-step inquiry reduces to only the federal due 

process analysis.” Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 921 F.3d at 530; see also 

Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2010) (“Our long-arm 

statute reaches as far as the federal constitutional requirements for due 

process will allow. Consequently, the statute’s requirements are satisfied if 

exercising jurisdiction comports with federal due process limitations.” (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

“Because a state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes defendants to 

the State’s coercive power, it is subject to review for compatibility with the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which limits the power of a 

state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident 

defendant.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., S.F., 137 S. Ct. 

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

6

1773, 1780 (2017) (alterations in original omitted) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). To comport with due process demands, a plaintiff in a 

diversity case must establish that the non-resident defendant “purposely 

availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by 

establishing minimum contacts with the state” and that “the exercise of 

jurisdiction [] does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.” Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 921 F.3d at 530 (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). 

Certain types of contacts support a court’s exercise of general jurisdiction 

over a non-resident defendant, while others support exercise of specific 

jurisdiction. Id. General jurisdiction “requires continuous and systematic 

forum contacts and allows for jurisdiction over all claims against the 

defendant, no matter their connection to the forum.” In re Depuy Orthopaedics, 

Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 778 (5th Cir. 2018) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Specific jurisdiction, on the 

other hand, demands a connection between the suit and the forum. BristolMyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780. On appeal, as below, Plaintiff makes no 

arguments as to general jurisdiction, only urging that specific jurisdiction 

exists as to Magna. Plaintiff further limits his argument to the applicability 

of the stream-of-commerce theory, which is discussed below. Thus, our focus 

is also so-limited. 

Specific Jurisdiction

Whether specific jurisdiction can be properly asserted over a nonresident defendant is dependent on “the relationship among the defendant, the 

forum, and the litigation.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 283–84 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). For the exercise of specific jurisdiction to comply 

with due process, “the suit must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s 

contacts with the forum.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780 

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

7

(alternations in original omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “In other words, there must be an affiliation between the forum and 

the underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes 

place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Id.

(alteration in original omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Such activity or occurrence must “create a substantial connection 

with the forum State.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284. Absent this connection, 

“specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s 

unconnected activities in the State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 

1781. “[A] defendant’s general connections with the forum are not enough.” 

Id. Consistent with these principles, “specific jurisdiction is confined to 

adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy 

that establishes jurisdiction.” Id. at 1780 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

Considering the foregoing precepts, in determining whether due process 

allows the exercise of specific jurisdiction, this court applies the following 

three-factor test: 

(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum 

state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities toward the 

forum state or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of 

conducting activities there; (2) whether the plaintiff’s cause of 

action arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related 

contacts; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is 

fair and reasonable.

Carmona, 924 F.3d at 193 (quoting Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 

F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2006)). 

Notably, with respect to the minimum-contacts inquiry (our factor 1), the 

Supreme Court has stressed that, because due process limits states’ judicial

authority in order to protect the liberty of non-resident defendants, significant 

contacts are those that “the defendant himself creates with the forum State.” 

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

8

Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 

462 (1985)); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1779 (“The primary 

focus of our personal jurisdiction inquiry is the defendant’s relationship to the 

forum State.”) Thus, while “a defendant’s contacts with the forum State may 

be intertwined with his transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other 

parties,” the “defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry” cannot be 

satisfied by merely demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff or a third 

party and the forum state. Walden, 571 U.S. at 284, 286.

If the plaintiff demonstrates satisfaction of the first two factors with 

respect to each of his claims, then the burden shifts to the non-resident 

defendant to show, under the third factor, “that exercising jurisdiction would 

be unfair or unreasonable.” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429,

433 (5th Cir. 2014). 

Stream-of-Commerce Theory

In the context of products-liability cases, like the case presently before 

us, an analysis involving a stream-of-commerce metaphor is often employed to 

assess whether the non-resident defendant has minimum contacts with the 

forum (our factor 1).4 As the Supreme Court has explained, courts use the 

metaphor to allow for jurisdiction where “the product has traveled through an 

4 The modern jurisdictional stream-of-commerce concept stems from World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980), where the Supreme Court stated: 

[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is not simply an 

isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or 

distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other 

States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its 

allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner 

or to others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process 

Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its 

products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be 

purchased by consumers in the forum State.

Id.

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

9

extensive chain of distribution before reaching the ultimate consumer.” 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 926 (2011) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The stream-of-commerce 

doctrine “recognizes that a defendant may purposefully avail itself of the 

protection of a state’s laws—and thereby [] subject itself to personal 

jurisdiction—by sending its goods rather than its agents into the forum.” In 

re: Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 888 F.3d at 753. 

The Fifth Circuit has found this doctrine and thus minimum contacts

satisfied so long as the court determines “that the defendant delivered the 

product into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it would be 

purchased by or used by consumers in the forum state.” Ainsworth v. Moffett 

Eng'g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bearry v. Beech Aircraft 

Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir.1987)). In other words, “mere foreseeability 

or awareness [is] a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction if 

the defendant's product made its way into the forum state while still in the 

stream of commerce.” Id. (quoting Luv N' care, Ltd. v. Insta–Mix, 

Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir.2006)); Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson 

Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993). But, “[t]he defendant’s contacts [with 

the forum state] must be more than ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated, or [the 

result] of the unilateral activity of another party or third person.’” ITL Int’l, 

Inc. v. Constenla, S.A., 669 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2012)).

In Ainsworth, we reaffirmed the validity of our stream-of-commerce test 

despite the Supreme Court’s interjection on the topic in McIntyre, a fractured 

opinion which did not produce a majority.5 Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 178 (citing 

5 The facts of McIntyre are straightforward: the plaintiff was injured by a machine, 

which was produced by a manufacturer in England and sold to a national distributer who 

sold that machine―and no others―to New Jersey. 563 U.S. at 878. The New Jersey Supreme 

Court found that New Jersey could exert personal jurisdiction over the English manufacturer 

under its stream of commerce theory. Id. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. 

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

10

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 563 U.S. 873 (2011)). We recognized 

that our test, “in not requiring that the defendant target the forum, was in 

tension with the plurality opinion” of Justice Kennedy,6 which would “permit[]

the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have 

targeted the forum.” Id. (citing McIntyre, 563 U.S. at 882 (Kennedy, J.)). But 

that opinion was not, we explained, controlling.7 Id. Rather, “[w]hen a 

fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 

enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as 

that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 

narrowest grounds.” Id. (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 

(1977)). Accordingly, we held that it was Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion

that “furnished the narrowest grounds for the decision” and was controlling. 

Id. And, because Justice Breyer simply applied existing Supreme Court 

precedent to the specific facts presented in that case, our pre-McIntyre streamof-commerce holdings were not abrogated. Id.

Yet, we also acknowledged that Justice Breyer’s concurrence illuminated 

the outer limits of our “foreseeability” test. Id. at 178-79. He criticized New 

Jersey’s test for personal jurisdiction, which would subject a foreign defendant 

to jurisdiction so long as it “knows or reasonably should know that its products 

are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to 

those products being sold in any of the fifty states.” McIntyre, 563 U.S. at 891. 

Justice Breyer cautioned against such a test that would “rest jurisdiction... 

upon no more than the occurrence of a product-based accident in the forum 

State” and “permit every State to assert jurisdiction in a products-liability suit 

against any domestic manufacturer who sells its products (made anywhere in 

6 Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas.

7 A principal more recently reiterated in In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prod. 

Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521, 549 (5th Cir. 2014)(“Our stream-of-commerce test, in not requiring 

that the defendant target the forum, is in tension with [McIntyre’s ] plurality opinion.”) 

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

11

the United States) to a national distributor, no matter how large or small the 

manufacturer, no matter how distant the forum, and no matter how few the 

number of items that end up in the particular forum at issue.” Id.

Nonetheless, in Ainsworth, we found it unnecessary to “call upon such a 

broad power” for Mississippi to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign 

manufacturer, Moffett. 716 F.3d at 179. Instead, we determined that Moffett’s 

203 forklift sales in Mississippi over ten years, which constituted 1.55% of its 

United States sales, soundly established sufficient minimum contacts to vest 

that authority in Mississippi. Id. This was true notwithstanding that Moffett

lacked actual knowledge of those sales because Mississippi was the fourth 

largest poultry-producing state in the country, and Moffett’s forklifts were 

designed for poultry-related uses. Id. Thus, Moffett could have reasonably 

expected that such sales would be made and that it could also be haled into 

court in Mississippi. Id.

Analysis

Keeping these principles in mind, we now turn to whether Magna could 

have reasonably expected that its product would be sold or used in Texas.8 In 

8 Magna argues that we should apply the “stream-of-commerce-plus” test used by 

Texas courts over our own stream-of-commerce approach if we determine that the two would 

produce different results. Because we conclude that the district court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over Magna under this court’s application of the stream-of-commerce doctrine, 

which Magna contends is less stringent than Texas’, we need not resolve the merits of 

Magna’s argument. We point out, however, that both the Texas Supreme Court and this 

court have recognized that Texas’ long-arm statute extends to the limits of federal due 

process. See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 921 F.3d at 530; Spir Star AG, 310 S.W.3d at 

872 (“Our long-arm statute reaches as far as the federal constitutional requirements for due 

process will allow. Consequently, the statute’s requirements are satisfied if exercising 

jurisdiction comports with federal due process limitations.” (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted)). Thus, when a Texas court interprets and applies the stream-of-commerce 

theory to determine whether a non-resident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with 

Texas to allow for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, it engages in a federal due process 

analysis—not an interpretation of the Texas long-arm statute. Magna provides no authority 

as to why this court should give Texas courts’ interpretation of the requirements of federal 

due process precedence over our own. Accordingly, without expressly deciding, we note that 

Magna’s argument appears to lack merit.

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

12

arguing affirmatively, Zoch proffered evidence that Magna knew it was 

supplying seats for more than 130,000 Smart Fortwo vehicles destined to be 

sold in the United States; its contract with Damlier required unique designs to 

meet safety standards specific to the United States; and, Magna did not 

attempt to geographically limit where the cars and, in turn, its seats would be 

sold. Zoch contends that the foregoing facts, along with the facts that Texas is 

one of the largest and most populated states; that Texas has one of the largest 

American motor vehicle markets in terms of licensed drivers and registered 

vehicles; and that four Smart Fortwo dealerships were opened in Texas, 

demonstrate that Magna must have known, and even intended, that its 2008 

Smart Fortwo drivers seats would be sold and used in Texas. 

But this evidence demonstrates only that Magna, a German company, 

manufactured, sold, and supplied vehicle seats for 2008 Smart Fortwos to 

Daimler’s assembly plant in France, knowing that those seats would be placed 

in vehicles ultimately destined for the United States generally, not Texas

specifically. Importantly, Plaintiff has not provided, and conceded at oral 

argument that he does not have, any evidence that Magna was aware that any 

of its seats manufactured for the 2008 Smart Fortwo would likely end up in 

Texas. Such attenuated activity and scarce knowledge by Magna cannot be 

said to have “create[d] a substantial connection with the forum State [of 

Texas].” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284.

While jurisdiction does not rely on a finding that Magna targeted Texas, 

there must be some proof that it placed its product “into the stream of 

commerce with the expectation that it would be purchased by or used by 

consumers in the forum state.” Ainsworth,716 F.3d at177 (emphasis added). 

Zoch’s evidence regarding the number of registered drivers and vehicles in 

Texas is insufficient to conclude that Magna “should [have] reasonably 

anticipate[d] being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

13

U.S. at 297. This is because there are drivers and vehicles in each of the fifty 

states,9 and Zoch’s evidence, at most, proves only that its contract with Damlier 

“might lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty states.” McIntyre, 

564 U.S. at 890–91 (Breyer, J.) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Thus, this case is unlike Ainsworth, where the forum state was 

unique in its poultry production―a form of commerce, unlike the automobile 

industry, that is not immensely prevalent among citizens of each of the fifty 

states. Ainsworth,716 F.3d at177. 

But this case is distinct from Ainsworth in other important respects as 

well. First, Zoch presented no evidence as to the number of 2008 Smart 

Fortwos actually sold in Texas or income generated from those Texas sales 

from which we could perhaps infer Magna’s knowledge of the likely number of 

its seats that would end up in that state. And, without these numbers, we can 

only speculate whether Magna’s contacts with Texas more closely resemble

McIntyre’s single metal sheering machine found in New Jersey or Ainsworth’s

two hundred forklifts found in Mississippi.10 Only the latter would make a 

strong case for jurisdiction. Second, unlike the manufacturer in Ainsworth, 

Magna did not have an exclusive sales contract with the distributor and did 

not have control over or delegate control over the sales or marketing of the 

final product. Id. at 177 (The foreign defendant “was aware that[, pursuant to 

9 Zoch makes much of the fact that there are four Smart Fortwo dealerships in Texas. 

But because there is no evidence that Magna was aware of these dealerships, we are not 

convinced that their existence alone makes it more reasonable for Magna to expect its seats 

to be sold in Texas. And, other than because Texas has the second most registered drivers in 

the United States, Zoch offers no additional reasons why Magna would reasonably expect 

Damlier to have four dealerships in Texas. Thus, Zoch’s two arguments―that Texas has the 

second most drivers and that Texas has the second most dealerships―collapse in on each 

other. 

10 It may be reasonable to assume, due to the four dealerships in Texas, that more 

than one Smart Fortwo was sold there. However, Zoch bears the burden of proof on the first 

two elements of jurisdiction, so we are reluctant to assume that enough Smart Fortwos were 

sold in Texas to, like Ainsworth, find minimum contacts satisfied on this basis. 

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

14

the exclusive sales and distribution agreement, the distributor] marketed its 

product throughout the entire United States”). Rather, Magna provided a 

component part of the product to a manufacturer, Damlier, who then controlled 

these aspects.11 We therefore lack the type of conclusive evidence the court in 

Ainsworth relied on in finding that the manufacturer had minimum contacts 

with the forum state.

Finally, we note that Zoch’s argument, at its core, relies on the fact that 

Texas―by virtue of it being a populous state―commands a large portion of the 

automobile market. Permitting jurisdiction in this instance, without more 

than the facts in this record, would essentially confer jurisdiction to any state 

with a large population where a manufacturer sells its products to a national 

distributor. Justice Breyer’s McIntyre concurrence cautioned against these 

types of broad sweeping jurisdictional tests and advised considering additional 

limiting factors in these circumstances, i.e., the number of products in the 

forum state, the size of the manufacturer, and its proximity to the forum. 

McIntyre, 563 U.S. at 891. And, again, Zoch failed to produce any concrete 

evidence of the number of Smart Fortwos in Texas or of Magna’s size; but we 

do know that Magna is domiciled far from the forum state in Germany. 

Therefore, Justice Breyer’s additional limitations further suggest that 

jurisdiction is improper in Texas. 

We emphasize that our holding in this case―that application of the 

stream-of-commerce theory does not result in a finding of minimum 

contacts―is limited to the specific facts of this case. We make no broad 

pronouncements with respect to the stream-of-commerce theory; and our 

11 In assessing Magna’s contacts (or lack thereof) with Texas, we will not impute any 

conduct or knowledge of Daimler, Smart USA Distributor LLC, or any other entity to Magna, 

since the “defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry” cannot be satisfied by merely 

demonstrating contacts between . . . a third party and the forum state. Walden, 571 U.S. at 

284, 286.

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/22/2020
No. 18-41151

15

decision should not be read as prohibiting the exercise of specific jurisdiction 

over all component parts manufacturers. Specific jurisdiction should be 

determined on a case-by-case basis under the facts of each individual case.

Because we conclude that Plaintiff did not establish minimum contacts 

with Texas and, therefore, did not satisfy the first prong of this court’s threefactor test for specific jurisdiction, we need not address the second and third 

prongs of our test—whether Plaintiff’s claims arises out of Magna’s contacts 

with Texas and whether exercising jurisdiction over Magna would be fair and 

reasonable. See Carmona, 924 F.3d at 193. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 18-41151 Document: 00515391942 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/22/2020