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Filed 5/8/23 P. v. Thompson CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROMONDIS TYRON THOMPSON, 

JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A163964

(Lake County Super. Ct. Nos. 

CR958995, CR959006)

Defendant Romondis Tyron Thompson, Jr., was found guilty of felony 

evasion of a peace officer while driving in willful or wanton disregard for the 

safety of persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count one) and 

two counts of resisting, delaying, or obstructing peace officers in the 

discharge of their duties (Pen. Code § 148, subd. (a)(1); counts four and five).

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He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of four years, comprised of the 

middle term of two years on count one (doubled for a prior strike), and two

180-day terms on counts four and five (both concurrent to count one).

On appeal, defendant contends the sentences were in violation of 

section 654 because he was given multiple punishments for an indivisible 

course of conduct of evading apprehension by the police. We conclude 

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that section 

654 was inapplicable because defendant’s sentences were based on separate 

and divisible acts. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In October 2020, the Clearlake Police Department investigated 

defendant on several matters, including the reported theft of a 1997 Dodge 

pickup truck. Clearlake Police Officers Nathan Williams and Chris Kelleher 

were dispatched to a residential address where defendant was believed to be 

when they saw the Dodge truck driving by. The officers pursued the truck as 

it drove on Sonoma Avenue, a partially paved and dirt road in a residential 

neighborhood. Williams turned on the emergency lights of his vehicle and 

commenced a traffic stop of the Dodge truck as another police vehicle drove in 

front of the Dodge. As Williams and Kelleher exited their vehicle and 

approached, the Dodge truck pulled to the right and drove away.

Officers Williams and Kelleher ran back to their vehicle and pursued 

the Dodge, which was driving “in the middle of the roadway” at 

approximately 45 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone. The truck was 

not driving at a safe speed as it drove on the dirt portion of Sonoma Avenue, 

and it was “creat[ing] dust that [made] it very difficult for other vehicles to be 

seen.” The pursuit ended when defendant tried to make a left turn and 

crashed against a dirt hillside. Williams’ vehicle lost traction and rear-ended 

the Dodge truck. 

Defendant then exited the truck and fled on foot. He went to “the top of 

an incline that led to heavy brush and continued . . . through the brush.” 

Officers Kelleher and Williams pursued defendant and fired their 

department-issued tasers at him but missed. They eventually caught 

defendant and placed him in handcuffs. 
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Defendant was transported to a hospital, where he somehow managed 

to get free of his handcuffs. He ran out of the hospital room, saying, “bye, 

Kelleher” as he left. Defendant fled to the ambulance bay but collided with a 

wall and was soon apprehended. 

A petition for revocation of post release community supervision (PRCS) 

was filed in Lake County Superior Court alleging that defendant committed 

several new crimes while on release, including felony vehicle theft (Veh. 

Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and possession of stolen property (§ 496).

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In April 2021, defendant was charged by information with felony 

evasion of a peace officer while driving in willful or wanton disregard for the 

safety of persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count one); 

felony vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count two); felony receipt 

of a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a); count three); misdemeanor resisting 

arrest as to Officer Kelleher (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count four); misdemeanor 

resisting arrest as to Officer Williams (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count five); and 

battery on a hospital security guard (§ 243, subd. (b); count six). As to counts 

one, two, and three, the information alleged that defendant previously 

suffered a prior felony strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12). 

Before trial, the prosecution dismissed counts two, three, and six. 

Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and a single bench trial was 

held on both the PRCS petition and the criminal information. The trial court 

heard testimony from several witnesses, including defendant and Officers 

2 The petition further alleged that defendant committed rape by force 

(§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), oral copulation by force (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)), false 

imprisonment (§ 236), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), 

sexual penetration by force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)), misdemeanor flight from a 

peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1), violation of PRCS (§ 3452), and 

misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)). 
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Williams and Kelleher. In finding defendant guilty on counts one, four, and 

five, the court observed, defendant “knew they were police officers, he knew 

they were doing their job, and he . . . resisted, he delayed, he obstructed 

multiple times. He ran on foot, he tried to escape at the hospital.” The court 

also found true the prior strike allegation. 

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to a 

total of four years in prison, as follows: the middle term of two years on count 

one, doubled for the prior strike; a term of 180 days on count four, concurrent 

to count one; a second term of 180 days on count five, concurrent to count one; 

and a third term of 180 days as to the PRCS petition, concurrent to count 

one. 

Defendant timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

“Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or 

indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294; 

§ 654, subd. (a) [in no case shall act or omission be punished under more than 

one provision of law].) “Although section 654 literally applies only where 

multiple statutory violations arise out of a single ‘act or omission,’ it has also 

long been applied to cases where a ‘course of conduct’ violates several 

statutes. [Citations.] A ‘course of conduct’ may be considered a single act 

within the meaning of section 654 and therefore be punishable only once, or it 

may constitute a ‘divisible transaction’ which may be punished under more 

than one statute.” (People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1252 (Kwok).)

“ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives 

rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the 

intent and objective of the actor. If all the offenses were incident to one 

objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not 
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for more than one.’ ” (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 637, italics 

omitted (Beamon).) However, “a course of conduct divisible in time, although 

directed to one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and 

punishment.” (Id. at p. 639, fn. 11.) “This is particularly so where the 

offenses are temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant 

opportunity to reflect and to renew his or her intent before committing the 

next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy 

already undertaken.” (People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935 (Gaio).) 

“Thus, a finding that multiple offenses were aimed at one intent and objective

does not necessarily mean that they constituted ‘one indivisible course of 

conduct’ for purposes of section 654.” (Kwok, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1253.)

“The question whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given 

series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad 

latitude in making this determination. Its findings on this question must be 

upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them.” 

(People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312 (Hutchins).) In 

reviewing for substantial evidence, we view the entire record in the light 

most favorable to the judgment and presume in support of the judgment 

every fact that can reasonably be deduced from the record, and we do not 

reweigh conflicting evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. (People v. Skiff

(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 571, 579.) “In the absence of an explicit ruling by the 

trial court at sentencing, we infer that the court made the finding appropriate 

to the sentence it imposed, i.e., either applying section 654 or not applying it.” 

(People v. Mejia (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1045.)

Viewing the record before us in the light most favorable to the 

judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied 
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finding that defendant’s sentences were based on separate and divisible acts. 

That is, one could reasonably conclude from the record that defendant’s first 

act of reckless driving to evade the police began with the vehicle pursuit on 

Sonoma Avenue and ended when defendant crashed the Dodge truck into a 

dirt hill. He then engaged in a separate and distinct act of fleeing the officers 

on foot through the nearby brush. Then, after a further elapse of time, 

defendant again attempted to flee law enforcement when he broke free of his 

handcuffs and ran from his hospital room. Although the three acts shared 

the same objective of evading apprehension, they were sufficiently divisible in 

time and conduct to support multiple sentences. (Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 

p. 639, fn. 11.)

Defendant maintains there was too little time between the vehicle and 

foot chases for them to constitute divisible acts. But the evidence was in 

conflict on this question, and we defer to the trial court’s implied finding that 

defendant had a sufficient opportunity after the vehicle crash to reflect and to 

renew his intent to flee, this time on foot. (Gaio, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 935; see People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335 [temporal proximity 

of events does not mean they were part of one indivisible course of conduct].) 

As Williams testified, the Dodge truck came to a complete stop after crashing 

into the dirt hill. At that point in time, the vehicle chase had ended, and 

defendant could have remained inside the truck for the police to approach. 

Instead, he decided to exit the vehicle and flee on foot through a residential 

neighborhood, “thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy 

already undertaken” by his reckless driving. (Gaio, at p. 935.)

Moreover, the trial court could reasonably credit defendant’s own 

testimony that he decided to stop driving and instead run away on foot 

because he had “been to the [penitentiary] for felony evasions before” and he 
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“[knew] the seriousness of it.” That is, the court could reasonably have 

concluded that defendant committed a new and separate crime after 

reflecting on the seriousness of his reckless driving and renewing his resolve 

to escape despite the setback of the car crash. (See People v. Louie (2012) 203 

Cal.App.4th 388, 399 [“[i]f the separation in time afforded [a] defendant[] an 

opportunity to reflect and to renew [his or her] intent before committing the 

next crime, a new and separate crime is committed”].) Given the “broad 

latitude” vested in the trial court to determine the applicability of section 654 

(Hutchins, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1312), we conclude the court 

reasonably found that the vehicle and foot chases were separate and divisible 

acts, each subject to punishment.

Defendant next contends that separate punishments on counts four and 

five violated section 654 because “the hospital incident involved the same 

officers and was an indivisible course of conduct.” To the extent this 

argument assumes that the sentences on counts four and five were both

based on defendant’s flight attempt at the hospital, we are unpersuaded. 

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude 

the trial court appears to have attributed one of these counts to defendant’s 

conduct of fleeing on foot after the vehicle chase, and the other to his 

attempted escape from the hospital. Because the two acts of resisting arrest 

were separate and divisible acts, section 654 does not prohibit sentences for 

both. (Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 639, fn. 11.)

Finally, defendant argues the case should be remanded for 

resentencing in light of Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 

2021, ch. 441), which recently amended section 654 to no longer require that 

trial courts impose the longest possible term of imprisonment when multiple 

offenses are based on the same act or omission. (People v. White (2022) 86 
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Cal.App.5th 1229, 1236.) As the Attorney General points out, however, this 

argument presumes that section 654 applies to the facts of the instant case. 

Because we have concluded that the trial court did not impose multiple 

punishments for the same act or indivisible course of conduct, section 654 is 

inapplicable and there is no basis for remanding in light of Assembly Bill 

No. 518.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Tucher, P.J.

_________________________

Petrou, J.

People v. Thompson (A163964)