[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10281

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

KELVIN DAISE, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR AND CANNABIS BOARD, 

WASHINGTON STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 

DEPARTMENT, 

WASHINGTON STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS 

COMMISSION, 

WASHINGTON STATE ETHICS BOARD, et. al,

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 1 of 11
2 Opinion of the Court 21-10281

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-14289-KMM

____________________

Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Kelvin Daise, Jr., proceeding pro se,1 appeals the 

district court’s orders dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff’s second amended complaint and denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of that dismissal.2 Plaintiff also appeals the district 

1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 

F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). 

2 Generally speaking, an involuntary dismissal without prejudice constitutes 

a final order for purposes of appeal. See Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 

1481 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Robinson v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 673 F.2d 

1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 1982) (concluding that an order dismissing involuntarily 

an action without prejudice, while leaving open the possibility of an amended 

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 2 of 11
21-10281 Opinion of the Court 3

court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”) and the district court’s striking of Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. No reversible error has been shown; we 

affirm.

In August 2020, Plaintiff filed pro se this civil action against 

the State of Washington. Plaintiff moved for leave to proceed IFP. 

The district court -- pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) -- dismissed sua 

sponte and without prejudice Plaintiff’s amended complaint for 

failure to state a claim. The district court explained that Plaintiff’s 

complaint constituted an impermissible shotgun pleading, lacked 

sufficient information and specificity to enable the district court to 

determine whether Plaintiff’s claims might be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and included non-cognizable claims. The district court ordered Plaintiff to amend his complaint to cure the 

identified deficiencies. The district court ordered Plaintiff’s case 

administratively closed and denied as moot all pending motions, 

including Plaintiff’s pending IFP motion.

Plaintiff filed timely a second amended complaint. Plaintiff 

named as defendants the State of Washington, which he said included “Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, Washington State Employment Security Department, Washington State 

Public Employees Relations Commission, Washington State Human Rights Commission, Thurston County, [and] Pierce County.” 

complaint, becomes a final order if the plaintiff elects to appeal the dismissal 

instead of amending the complaint). 

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 3 of 11
4 Opinion of the Court 21-10281

Plaintiff purported to assert claims for unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation based on race and sex, invasion of privacy, violations of due process and equal protection, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As relief, Plaintiff sought a 

declaratory judgment as well as compensatory and punitive damages. 

The district court reopened Plaintiff’s case and ordered 

Plaintiff to “pay the filing fee, or request that the Court reopen his 

prior Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on or before October 

21, 2020.” Plaintiff paid the filing fee on 5 October.

On 19 October 2020, the district court issued a pretrial order 

setting forth certain deadlines (“Scheduling Order”). In the Scheduling Order, the district court ordered the parties to file a joint 

scheduling report within 10 days of the joint scheduling conference: a conference that was required to be held (at the latest) within 

60 days of reopening Plaintiff’s case. If defendants were not served 

prior to the established deadline, the district court directed Plaintiff 

to move for an enlargement of time, not to exceed 90 days from 

the reopening of Plaintiff’s case. The district court also advised that 

failure to file the joint scheduling report could result in dismissal of 

the case. Plaintiff never filed a joint scheduling report and never 

moved for an enlargement of time. 

On 14 December 2020, Plaintiff moved -- under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 55 -- for default judgment based on defendants’ failure to respond to his complaint. The district court struck Plaintiff’s motion, 

explaining that it could not enter a default judgment until after the 

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 4 of 11
21-10281 Opinion of the Court 5

clerk had entered a default against the party that had purportedly 

failed to defend. Plaintiff then moved for the clerk to enter default 

against defendants. In response to Plaintiff’s motions, the clerk entered a “Non-Entry of Default” and stated that no executed summons or executed waiver of service had been entered on the 

docket.

On 31 December 2020 -- 91 days after Plaintiff’s case was reopened -- the district court sua sponte dismissed without prejudice 

Plaintiff’s case. The district court explained that the deadline for 

filing a joint scheduling report had expired and that no extension 

had been requested. The district court said that “[t]he Parties may 

move to reopen this matter upon the Parties filing a joint scheduling report.” The district court later denied Plaintiff’s motions for 

rescission and for reconsideration of the dismissal order.

I.

On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the district court abused 

its discretion when the district court ordered Plaintiff to pay a filing 

fee without first ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for IFP or otherwise 

providing notice that Plaintiff was unentitled to IFP status. Plaintiff’s argument misstates the record. 

After Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, the district court issued an order reopening Plaintiff’s case. In that order, 

the district court noted that Plaintiff’s earlier-filed IFP motion had 

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 5 of 11
6 Opinion of the Court 21-10281

been denied as moot and that Plaintiff had filed no renewed IFP 

motion. The district court then ordered Plaintiff to either pay the 

required filing fee or to move to reopen his initial IFP motion. Despite having been given the express option to do so, Plaintiff never 

sought to reopen his IFP motion. Instead, Plaintiff paid the required filing fee on 5 October. On this record, we see no abuse of 

discretion. 

II.

Plaintiff next challenges the district court’s striking of Plaintiff’s 14 December 2020 motion for default judgment. In striking 

Plaintiff’s motion, the district court said that “default judgment 

cannot be entered until the Clerk of the Court has entered default 

against a party that has failed to defend.” 

On appeal, Plaintiff contends that default judgment was appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55: Plaintiff says he effected proper 

service on defendants and defendants failed to plead or defend 

against Plaintiff’s suit within the pertinent time. Plaintiff claims the 

district court clearly erred by requiring Plaintiff to first request an 

entry of default from the clerk: an error Plaintiff says violated his 

due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment.

We review the district court’s order striking Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 6 of 11
21-10281 Opinion of the Court 7

See Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (reviewing for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion 

for default judgment); State Exchange Bank v. Hartline, 693 F.2d 

1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982) (reviewing the district court’s decision 

to strike a pleading under an abuse-of-discretion standard).

Rule 55 presents a two-step process for a plaintiff to obtain a 

default judgment. First, a plaintiff must apply to the clerk for an 

entry of default. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Under Rule 55(a), the 

clerk of court “must enter” a default against a party who “has failed 

to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit 

or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after the clerk’s entry 

of default -- and if “the plaintiff’s claim is [not] for a sum certain or 

a sum that can be made certain by computation”3 -- the plaintiff 

“must apply to the court for a default judgment.” See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 55(b). The district court may then “conduct hearings or make 

referrals . . . when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to: (A) 

conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) 

establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate 

any other matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 

The district court abused no discretion in requiring Plaintiff 

to first seek an entry of default under Rule 55(a) before the district 

court would consider Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment under Rule 55(b). The district court’s order is consistent with the 

3 The operative complaint in this case does not present a claim for a sum certain or the like.

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 7 of 11
8 Opinion of the Court 21-10281

procedure set out in Rule 55. Furthermore, under Rule 55, a clear 

distinction exists between the clerk’s entry of default (which 

“must” be entered upon the defendant’s failure to plead or defend) 

and the district court’s entry of a default judgment (which requires 

an evidentiary hearing and other proceedings). See SEC v. Smyth, 

420 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005). In his motion for default judgment, Plaintiff asserted only that Defendants had failed to plead or 

otherwise to defend within the required time: arguments that pertained to a clerk’s entry of default, not the district court’s entry of 

default judgment. 

To the extent Plaintiff challenges the clerk’s non-entries of 

default, those docket entries are not final appealable orders over 

which we have jurisdiction. For background, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

III.

Plaintiff next challenges the district court’s dismissal without 

prejudice of his second amended complaint. 

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal 

of a case for failure to comply with court orders. See Foudy v. Indian River Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 845 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2017). 

“A district court has inherent authority to manage its own 

docket so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of 

cases.” Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape 

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 8 of 11
21-10281 Opinion of the Court 9

Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). 

This authority permits a district court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff fails to prosecute or fails to comply with a court order. Id. 

“While dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, 

generally is not an abuse of discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 

F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). In addition, a dismissal without prejudice is generally not considered an abuse of discretion because the 

plaintiff may still refile. See Dynes v. Army Air Fore Exch. Serv., 

720 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983) (determining that the district 

court’s dismissal of a case based on plaintiff’s failure to file a courtordered brief was not an abuse of discretion because the case was 

dismissed without prejudice); Boazman v. Econ. Lab., Inc., 537 

F.2d 210, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1976) (providing that a district court’s dismissal without prejudice is generally subject to “a less stringent 

standard of review . . . because the plaintiff would be able to file his 

suit again.”). 

Under the circumstances presented in this case, the district 

court abused no discretion in dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. In its Scheduling Order, the district court ordered the parties to file a joint scheduling report by a 

set time and warned that failure to comply with the Scheduling Order could result in dismissal. Plaintiff, however, never filed either 

the required joint scheduling report or a motion for an extension 

of time to do so. Given these facts -- and that the district court’s 

dismissal was made without prejudice and that the district court 

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 9 of 11
10 Opinion of the Court 21-10281

gave Plaintiff the opportunity to reopen the case upon filing the 

required document -- we cannot conclude that the district court 

abused its discretion.4

IV.

The district court also abused no discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration of its dismissal. In his motions for 

reconsideration, Plaintiff never disputed his failure to comply with 

the district court’s Scheduling Order. Nor did Plaintiff explain his 

failure to seek an extension of time. Plaintiff asserted only that he 

had tried unsuccessfully to contact defendants about the scheduling hearing. In his motions, Plaintiff focused chiefly on arguments 

he had already raised in his motions for default and for default judgment. In short, Plaintiff demonstrated no “extraordinary circumstances” that would have warranted reconsideration. See M.G. v. 

St. Lucie Cty. Sch. Bd., 741 F.3d 1260, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Movants for reconsideration must show ‘extraordinary circumstances 

justifying the reopening of a final judgment.’” (alteration omitted)); 

Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 

4 Plaintiff contends for the first time on appeal that the Scheduling Order violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1). Plaintiff also makes a conclusory argument --

without citation to authority or arguments in support -- that the Scheduling 

Order violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and 

equal protection. These arguments are not properly before us on appeal. 

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 10 of 11
21-10281 Opinion of the Court 11

2009) (“A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to ‘relitigate 

old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have 

been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’”). That the district 

court -- in denying reconsideration -- said repeatedly that it would 

reopen Plaintiff’s case upon the filing of the joint scheduling report 

further demonstrates no abuse of discretion. 

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 21-10281 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 11 of 11