Opinion issued February 23, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-22-00147-CV

———————————

SIXTO P. MEJIA, Appellant

V.

DIGNA BERNAL, Appellee

On Appeal from the 257th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2019-07367

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal concerns the division of property between divorcing spouses. In 

three issues, Appellant Sixto P. Mejia contends the trial court erred by awarding 

Appellee Digna Bernal a disproportionate share of the marital estate and attorney’s 

fees. We affirm.
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Background

Appellant Sixto P. Mejia (“Mejia”) and Appellee Digna Bernal (“Bernal”) 

lived together for 18 years before establishing a common-law marriage in late 2015, 

after Bernal’s previous marriage in El Salvador legally dissolved.

1 They have two 

adult children and two minor children.

Mejia and Bernal separated in July 2018, and Bernal filed for divorce in 

January 2019 on the grounds of insupportability and cruelty. Bernal asked the trial 

court to appoint her and Mejia as joint managing conservators of their minor children

and to grant her the right to designate the children’s primary residence. Mejia 

answered and counter-petitioned for divorce, asserting that he should decide the 

children’s primary residence and that the marriage was insupportable and should be 

dissolved because of Bernal’s cruelty and adultery. Both parties sought a 

disproportionate share of the marital estate. 

Bernal and Mejia reached a mediated settlement agreement as to the children 

and proceeded to a final hearing on the division of property in July 2021. The 

community property included certain bank accounts, Mejia’s retirement benefits, 

several vehicles, and some debt. In addition, the parties owned two homes purchased 

1 Mejia claimed at trial that Bernal misled him about the finality of her Salvadoran 

divorce when they first moved in together. Bernal’s counsel responded that Bernal 

was mistaken about the legal status of her prior marriage when she purported to 

marry Mejia in October 1997. 
3

before their marriage as tenants in common: (1) a home on Holmwood Drive (where 

Bernal resided with the children after separating from Mejia), and (2) a home on 

Cataldo Court (where Mejia resided after the separation). 

The only trial witnesses were Mejia and Bernal. Bernal testified that Mejia 

abused her “physically, psychologically, and sexually” during their 20-year 

relationship. She disclosed that Mejia hit her three times and forced her to have 

sexual intercourse, including anal intercourse to which she did not consent, on 

multiple occasions. Although she did not report the abuse to law enforcement, she 

told family and friends. Bernal acknowledged at trial that she had been dating 

another man, R. Alfaro, for about a year. She denied that she was romantically 

involved with Alfaro before separating from Mejia. 

Bernal testified that she earned $1600 per month cleaning houses and had no 

other source of income. She did not receive retirement or health insurance benefits

from her employers. Among other things, Bernal was responsible for making the 

mortgage payment on the Holmwood Drive home and the loan payments on two of 

three vehicles in her possession.

2 She testified that none of the vehicles were worth 

more than what was owed on them. In addition, Bernal was responsible for costs of 

up to $600 per month for one child to play baseball, and she owed $6000 in credit 

2

It was undisputed that the parties’ oldest son used and paid for the third vehicle in 

Bernal’s possession. 
4

card debt and more than $6000 in attorney’s fees. Bernal acknowledged that Mejia 

paid $1500 per month in child support, but she testified that he had not paid $3200 

in spousal support or $3000 in attorney’s fees awarded by an associate judge in 

pretrial temporary orders in December 2019. 

Mejia denied the abuse alleged by Bernal. He also testified that Bernal lied 

about being married to another man in El Salvador while also claiming to be married 

to Mejia. He explained that prior to December 2015, he was unaware that Bernal’s 

prior Salvadoran marriage had not been dissolved legally. He believed that he and 

Bernal were living together as husband and wife before Bernal’s Salvadoran divorce 

became final. He continued to live with Bernal after learning the truth. Mejia asked 

the trial court to consider in its property division whether Bernal desired to remarry 

with Alfaro.

Mejia testified that he earned between $4000 and $4600 per month working 

for a cleaning company. He had an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan with a balance 

of around $113,000.3 Mejia also possessed two vehicles—one was paid for and one 

was not. Mejia was responsible for the remaining loan payments.

In its final decree of divorce, the trial court granted Bernal’s petition and 

dissolved the marriage on the grounds of insupportability and cruelty. Although the 

decree does not recite that it awards a disproportionate division of the community 

3 Bernal testified that Mejia’s 401(k) balance was $117,000. 
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property or assign any value to the assets and debt allocated to the parties, the parties 

agree that the trial court awarded Bernal a greater share of the marital estate. The 

trial court awarded Bernal fifty percent of Mejia’s retirement benefits and the three 

vehicles in her possession, one of which the decree instructs is for the use of the 

parties’ adult son. In addition, the trial court recognized the home on Holmwood

Drive and its corresponding debt as Bernal’s separate property. The trial court 

ordered the sale of the Cataldo Court home and a 60/40 split of the sale proceeds in 

Bernal’s favor. 

Neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Property Division

In his first and second issues, Mejia contends the trial court abused its 

discretion by awarding Bernal a disproportionate share of the marital estate. While 

it is difficult to discern the precise nature of Mejia’s complaint about the property 

division, Mejia points to portions of the trial transcript concerning Bernal’s 

relationship with Alfaro, Bernal’s discovery responses regarding an unequal share 

of the community property, and the occupancy and relative sizes of the parties’ 

jointly owned homes. Mejia also cites cases examining the role of fault in property 

divisions. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758, 761–62 (Tex. 1980) (holding

trial court may consider fault of one spouse in breaking up marriage when dividing

property); Hedtke v. Hedtke, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (Tex. 1923) (recognizing trial court’s 
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obligation to do “complete equity” in property division). Considering these 

references and citations and applying a liberal construction of Mejia’s brief, we 

presume Mejia’s first and second issues complain that there was no reasonable basis 

for Bernal to receive a larger share of the marital estate. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9 

(briefing rules to be construed liberally); Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 

2008) (“Appellate briefs are to be construed reasonably, yet liberally, so that the 

right to appellate review is not lost by waiver.”).

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

In a divorce decree, the trial court must “order a division of the estate of the 

parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the 

rights of each party and any children of the marriage.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001; see 

Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018) (defining “just,” “right,” 

and “due regard”). The trial court has wide discretion in dividing the marital estate. 

See Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998); Murff v. Murff, 615 

S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981). We presume the trial court exercised its discretion 

properly, and we will not disturb the trial court’s property division on appeal absent 

a clear abuse of discretion. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698–99; Mathis v. Mathis, No. 

01-17-00449-CV, 2018 WL 6613864, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 

18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court’s ultimate division need not be equal if

it is equitable. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698–99; Zieba v. Martin, 928 S.W.2d 782, 790 
7

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (op. on reh’g). There must be some 

reasonable basis for an unequal property division. See Fuentes v. Zaragoza, 555 

S.W.3d 141, 162 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); O’Carolan v. 

Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

In exercising its discretion, the trial court may consider many factors,

including the spouses’ earning capacities, disparity of income and abilities, 

education, business opportunities, relative physical condition, relative financial 

condition, disparity of ages, size of separate estates, nature of the property, and the 

benefits the spouse who did not cause the marriage breakup would have enjoyed had 

the marriage continued. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699. “The circumstances of each 

marriage dictate what factors should be considered in division of the marital estate.” 

Roberts v. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d 224, 232 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. 

denied) (citing Young, 609 S.W.2d at 761). 

A trial court does not abuse its discretion if its decision rests on conflicting 

evidence or if there is some evidence of a substantial and probative character to 

support the property division. Zieba, 928 S.W.2d at 787. The appellant must show 

that the trial court’s abuse of discretion caused a division of property so 

disproportionate that it is manifestly unjust and unfair. Hedtke, 248 S.W. at 23.
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B. No Abuse of Discretion 

Ordinarily, to determine whether the trial court divided the marital estate in a 

“just and right” manner, we must have the trial court’s fact findings on the value of 

the community property. See Wells v. Wells, 251 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2008, no pet.) (“It is difficult—if not impossible—to determine whether 

the trial court abused its discretion by dividing the marital estate when we do not 

know what percentage of the marital assets either party received.”). “Without such 

findings, [we] cannot know the basis for the trial court’s division of property, the 

values assigned to the community assets, or the percentage of the marital estate that 

each party received.” Goode v. Garcia, No. 01-20-00143-CV, 2021 WL 6015296,

at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

Because Mejia did not request findings of fact and none were filed, we do not 

know precisely what share of the marital estate either party received. But it is 

undisputed that the parties’ community property was disproportionately divided in 

Bernal’s favor, and thus we may assess whether an unequal distribution constitutes 

an abuse of discretion. See Wells, 251 S.W.3d at 841 (considering propriety of 

unequal division in absence of valuation findings because there was no dispute that 

property was disproportionately divided); Mohindra v. Mohindra, No. 

14-06-00056-CV, 2007 WL 3072057, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

Oct. 23, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).
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The trial court granted a divorce on both no-fault and fault grounds. In the 

absence of findings of fact, we do not know if the trial court considered evidence of 

fault on Mejia’s part in making its property division. But fault is recognized as a 

factor that trial courts may consider when dividing community property. See Murff, 

615 S.W.2d at 698; Young, 609 S.W.2d at 762; see also Mohindra, 2007 WL 

3072057, at *2 (acknowledging trial court’s discretion to consider fault in dividing 

parties’ marital estate even when no-fault divorce is granted). Bernal testified that 

she endured physical, psychological, and sexual abuse throughout the marriage. 

Although Mejia denied the abuse and attempted to elicit testimony that Bernal was 

also at fault because she deceived him about her marital status in El Salvador and 

became involved with Alfaro before ending her relationship with Mejia, the trial 

court could have disbelieved Mejia and believed Bernal. See Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 

700 (noting trial court in divorce case has opportunity to observe parties on witness 

stand and determine their credibility); see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 

802, 819 (Tex. 2005) (instructing appellate court not to impose its own opinions on 

credibility and weight of witness testimony over those of factfinder). 

The trial court also could have considered the evidence of the parties’ needs 

and relative income, earning capacity, and financial condition. The testimony at trial 

established that Mejia’s monthly income was more than double, and at times even 

triple, Bernal’s monthly income. And his employment provided him additional 
10

financial benefits that Bernal’s did not. These disparities in income, earning 

capacity, and financial condition also support the trial court’s unequal division of 

the marital estate. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699. 

Given the evidence presented, we cannot say that the trial court’s property

division was manifestly unjust or unfair. We thus hold that Mejia has not shown the 

trial court abused its discretion.

We overrule Mejia’s first and second issues.

Attorney’s Fees

In his third issue, Mejia contends the trial court erred by affirming the 

attorney’s fees awarded to Bernal’s counsel in temporary orders issued by an 

associate judge. Again, it is difficult to discern the precise nature of the error alleged 

by Mejia in this issue. His argument reads in its entirety:

On December 10th, 2019, [Bernal’s] counsel’s Application for 

Temporary Orders was set for hearing. During that period, [Mejia’s] 

counsel[’s] wife ha[d] passed, he was not feeling well, and had 

appointments set with his primary physician, and he filed a motion for 

continuance specifying his reasons for requesting the continuance . . . . 

Notwithstanding, . . . [Bernal’s] counsel proceeded with [her] request 

for temporary orders and the Associate Judge awarded her temporary 

attorney[’s] fees. [Mejia’s] counsel proceeded and filed his appeal [of] 

the Associate Judge[’s] ruling, [and] the [trial] judge refused to consider 

his appeal.

Considering this argument and applying a liberal construction of Mejia’s brief, we 

presume this issue challenges the attorney’s fee award on the ground that the 
11

temporary orders hearing should have been continued because Mejia’s counsel was 

unavailable. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9; see also Perry, 272 S.W.3d at 587.

Mejia cites no legal authorities to support his argument. A brief must contain 

“a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations 

to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Failure to cite to any legal 

authority or to provide substantive analysis in support of an issue results in waiver. 

RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d 116, 126 (Tex. 2018). We conclude 

Mejia has waived this issue by failing to cite any legal authorities.4 See Eagle Oil & 

Gas Co. v. Shale Expl., LLC, 549 S.W.3d 256, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2018, pet. dism’d) (“Failure to cite any authority in support of a contention waives 

the contention.”).

Even if Mejia had properly briefed this issue, he would be unable to show 

error. A trial court may not grant a continuance “except for sufficient cause 

supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by operation of law.” TEX. R.

CIV. P. 251. Absence of counsel generally does not establish good cause for a 

4 We note Bernal’s argument that Mejia has waived this issue for another reason: 

because he did not challenge the temporary orders by filing a petition for writ of 

mandamus in this Court. While the case law cited by Bernal recognizes that 

temporary orders like those issued here may be challenged through mandamus, see, 

e.g., In re Ostrofsky, 112 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, 

orig. proceeding), they do not stand for the proposition that a party challenging

support obligations initially imposed in temporary orders must file a mandamus 

petition in lieu of an appeal from a final judgment confirming the temporary orders.
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continuance “except it be allowed in the discretion of the court, upon cause shown 

or upon matters within the knowledge or information of the judge to be stated on the 

record.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 253. And a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance 

due to unavailability of counsel typically will not be disturbed on appeal when the 

record is silent on whether the conflicting settings were avoidable or why counsel 

did not take earlier steps to make the trial court aware of the conflicting settings. See, 

e.g., R.M. Dudley Constr. Co. v. Dawson, 258 S.W.3d 694, 701 (Tex. App.—Waco 

2008, pet. denied) (concluding no abuse of discretion in denying motion for 

continuance when “record does not show the efforts, if any,” taken by attorney to 

have conflicting proceeding reset and there was “no explanation why the motion for 

continuance was filed after the pretrial and on the day before trial”). 

Mejia sought a continuance of the temporary orders hearing because his 

counsel had “an immigration trial” and a doctor’s appointment “scheduled for the 

same day.”

5

It was incumbent on Mejia’s counsel to notify the trial court promptly

of these scheduling conflicts. See HARRIS CNTY. FAM. R. 8.7 (“It is the duty of 

counsel to report promptly to the court immediately upon learning of a conflicting 

engagement that might preclude that counsel’s availability for trial. Failure to do so 

may result in sanctions.”). The record calls into doubt whether he did so. 

5 Although Mejia argues on appeal that the passing of counsel’s wife was another

reason for a continuance, that reason was not stated in the motion. 
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Despite being served with notice of the setting for the temporary orders 

hearing four days earlier, Mejia’s counsel did not file his verified motion for 

continuance until 5:09 p.m. on the day before the hearing. See In re K.A.R., 171 

S.W.3d 705, 711 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (concluding 

appellant’s attorney failed to notify trial court of conflicting settings as soon as she 

was aware of them, “which was no later than” date she received notice of trial court’s 

order setting case for trial). The record is silent on whether Mejia’s counsel took 

steps to avoid the conflicting trial setting or reschedule the conflicting doctor’s 

appointment and as to why he did not notify the court of these conflicts sooner. 

Consequently, the record would not support disturbing the trial court’s ruling. See 

In re W.A.B., No. 14-18-00181-CV, 2019 WL 2181205, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding denial of motion 

for continuance was not abuse of discretion where father did not notify trial court of 

conflicting settings as soon as he was aware of them or explain why he failed to take 

earlier steps to avoid conflicting settings); Reyna v. Reyna, 738 S.W.2d 772, 775 

(Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ) (holding counsel failed to take reasonable steps 

to avoid conflict).

We overrule Mejia’s third issue.
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Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s final decree of divorce.

Veronica Rivas-Molloy

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.