1 Filed 4/18/22 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Placer)

----

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. ROMAN ANDREYEVICH GLUKHOY et al., Defendants and Appellants. C084169 (Super. Ct. No s . 62129389B , 62129389C )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Placer County, Nichols, Judge. Affirmed. Christine Vento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant , Roman Glukhoy

.
Patr icia J. Ulibarri, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Ruslan Glukhoy.

Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorney s General, Gerald A. Engl e r and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney s General, Michael P. Farrell, Assist ant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Julie A. Hokans, Supervising Deputy Attorneys

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of P arts I

– VI and VIII

– XI of the Discussion.2 General, Marcia A. Fay and Jamie A. Scheidegger, Deputy Attorney s General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Twin brothers, Roman and Ruslan Glukhoy , led police on two high speed chases , the second of which was in a stolen truck and culminated in a fatal collision killing two people

. Separate juries found them guilty of multiple offenses and allegations. 1 Ruslan , who was convicted of first degree mu rder with felony

- murder special

- circumstances, was sentenced to two terms of life without the possibly of parole

. Roman , who was convicted of two counts of second degree murder, was sentenced to 30 year s to life

. On appeal, Ruslan raises four contentions: (1) insufficient evidence supports his
residential burglary conviction; (2) insufficient evidence supports his conviction for aiding and abetting Roman’s evasion with wanton disregard ; (3) the trial court erred in

e xcluding expert testimony regarding regressed brain development in youth; and (4) the court erred in denying his motion to continue in order to make a showing of jury
misconduct

. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we reject Ruslan’s contentions

a nd affirm the judgment as to him.
Roman raises five contentions: (5) the convictions for evading a peace officer with wanton disregard and conspiracy to commit theft must be reversed because his trial
counsel inappropriately conceded those counts in closi ng argument ; (6) the murder
verdicts must be reversed in light of Senate Bill No. 1437 ( 2017

- 2018 Reg. Sess.) ( Senate
Bill 1437) , which abrogate d the natural and probable consequences doctrine for murder ; (7) the trial court failed to instruct that an aider an d abettor , liable under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, can be guilty of a lesser offense than the perpetrator; (8)

1 The prosecution had moved for dual juries to present evidence of statements that Roman and Ruslan had independently given to law enforcement. (See People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, abrogated in part by Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); Bruton v. U.S. (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2d 476].)3 the court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive terms for the two murders; and (9) remand is required for a Franklin 2 hearing

. In a supplemental brief, Roman contends (10) remand is required in light of People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 ( Dueñas ) , and (11) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to accurately reflect an imposed fee. In a second su pplemental brief, Roman asserts that based on Senate Bill No. 775 (2021

- 2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), he need not file a Penal Code section
1170.95 3 petition to obtain Senate Bill 1437 relief and we must reverse his second degree
murder conviction s and vacate the sentence. In the published portion of this opinion , we conclude that the alternative

- theory
instructional error in Roman’s case brought about Senate Bill 1437 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence establishing the valid theory of direct aiding and abetting implied malice was overwhelming. In addition , that evidence was the same
evidence the jury had to have credited to find defendant guilty based on the now invalid natural and probable consequences theory. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we reject Roman’s other contentions and affirm the judgment as to him.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution’s Case
The Thefts from Vehicles
In the early morning hours, t win brothers Roman and Ruslan Glukhoy , along with a friend, drove in the rain to Auburn to steal from unlocked cars parked on the street.

2 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 278 ( Franklin )

.
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.4 Auburn residents soon grew suspicious and called the police. Responding Auburn
P olice officers saw several suspect s return to a BMW automobile parked in a cul

- de

- sac

. 4
A n o fficer approached the BMW with his gun drawn and held in a low

- ready position.
He ordered the occupants to show their hands. One passenger, Ruslan, put his hands out
the front passenger

- side window and raised them . The driver , Roman, however, did not. As the officer approached the back of the driver’s door , the BMW sped off

. The BMW
then ma de a U

- turn in the cul

- de

- sac, then accelerated “straight towards” the officers and their patrol units, causing one of them to think the BMW was going to run over him . He
took cover behind a patrol unit. Then, at the last second, the BMW veered away, jum ping the curb onto residential lawns, crossing a driveway , before reentering the roadway and sp e ed ing away

. 5
The First Evasion and Pursuit & Theft of the Truck Thereafter, Roman led police on a high

- speed chase, and at various points drove in
the direction of officers, r an a stop sign, sp un out, drove without lights , and entered
Interstate 80 where he reach ed a speed of approximately 125 m iles per hour

. This initial
chase ended when Roman , trying to make an abrupt freeway exit in Loomis , mi ssed the

ramp , spun out and collided into an embankment in a landscape d area

. One officer described the collision as “a violent crash. The vehicle was tore up pretty good.”
Another described it as “ e xtremely violent.” This collision took place at 5:12 a.m.

4 About an hour and half before seeing the BMW in the cul

- de

- sac, officers had seen the same vehicle parked on another residential Auburn street. At that time, the vehicle was unoccupied and the hood, front

- brake rot o rs , and tailpipe were cold to the touch.

5 One officer testified the BMW was approximately 40 to 50 f eet away when it veered away. The other officer testified that when the BMW veered away, he was no longer in danger of being hit.5 B y the time the officers reached the BMW, Roman , Ruslan , and their friend had escaped. 6 Placer County Sheriff’s deputies were in foot pursuit. Around an hour later,
law enforcement was alerted that a Ford F

- 150 pick

- up truck had been stolen from a neighborhood not far from the BMW’s crash site

. 7 Ruslan was driving , with Roman in the rear passenger seat

. A second high

- speed chase ensued

. The Second Evasion and Pursuit & the Fatal Crash This pursuit included a freeway sprint on Interstate 80 toward Sacramento up to
120 m iles per hour through early morning rush hour traffic. During the freeway pursuant, Ruslan made several unsafe lane changes to get around traffic. When the traffic got heavier and began to slow , Ruslan drove the truck from the number one lan e onto the emergency lane next to the center divider. One of the pursuing deputies called this the
“suicide lane.” He described the traffic as “pretty heavy,” adding “we’re getting into rush hour traffic, a lot of vehicles headed to work.” Utilizing the suicide lane, Ruslan passed the traffic in the number one lane. At one point, the pickup moved into the diamond lane,
where there was no traffic. As the two brothers approached Antelope Road, the traffic began to spread out and Ruslan abruptly cut across the freeway lanes to the exit at Antelope Road

. He then ran a series of red light s on Antelope Road , driving 80 to 90

m iles per hour

. I t was then approximately 6:30 a.m. The chase ended when Ruslan ran a red light at high speed and collid ed with a small Kia , killing its two occupants

. The pursuit of the truck lasted approximately eight or nine minutes. We discuss the portion of the pursuit from the Interstate 80 exit , down Antelope Road to the collision site in more
detail in Discussion part V , post

.

6 The friend was separately apprehended and found with $941 in his pocket.

7 T he prosecution alleged that the keys to the truck were taken in a residential burglary that took place after defendants fled from the BMW crash and before the truck was stolen

.6 The Arrests and Statements to Law Enforcement
Ruslan and Roman then ran from the crash site without checking on the occupants
of the Kia

. Roman was arrested in a nearby neighborhood shortly there after

. Before Ruslan was arrested , startled residents in a nearby home discovered him in
their home , dri nking a glass of water. Ruslan left the house after a resident threaten ed to get his gun. At a different home, a resident discovered Ruslan trying to pry open her sliding glass door. She yelled to her boyfriend to “grab the gun.” A Sheriff’s K9 unit
soon found Ruslan in the backyard. Both juries heard that when he briefly talked to the police after his arrest, Ruslan
claimed he had been driving both vehicles. Ruslan’s jury heard statements he made to medical staff which were overheard by an officer. When asked by medical staff if he had hit the steering wheel, Ruslan replied, “Yeah I think so.” He also said he had been
involved in two accidents

— one at 70 miles per hour and another one at 90 miles per
hour

. 8 Roman also gave statements t o the police after his arrest. He denied going to Auburn to ste a l from cars, claiming they went there in the early morning hours because they had “ nothing to do ” and Auburn was a “ pretty cool place.” He said it was his idea to go to Auburn. Later, he sa id they had gone there to ste a l from cars . But he claimed they had only tried to get into a couple of cars and did not get inside

. He also, claimed at first
that Ruslan was driving the BMW when they crashed. But l ater, he admitted he crashed
the BMW. He denied going into houses to get keys and claimed the keys were in the truck when they took it. But he said he could not remember where the keys were within
the truck. He said Ruslan was driving the truck when it crashed and he was in the
bac kseat

. Roman had said earlier that he had a warrant for failing to go to court

. When

8 Ruslan apparently did not specify in which of the two accidents he had travelling at 70 and 90 miles per hour

.7 asked whether they were trying to get away from law enforcement during the evasion in the truck, Roman said, “Not from the cops. I just wanted to, not from cops in gene ral. I just, I didn’t want to go to jail .” (Italics added.) We discuss additional statements Roman made in Discussion part V, post

. Verdicts and Sentencing
Ruslan ’s jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit theft ( Pen. Code , § 182;

c ount 1) 9 ; evadi ng a peace officer with wanton disregard for safety (V eh. C ode, § 2800.2;

c ount 4) ; first degree burglary with a person present ( § 459; c ount 5) ; two counts of first degree felony murder , with find ing s of more than one murder in the first degree , and that the murder was committed during the commission of a burglary (§§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(3) & (a)(17); c ounts 6 & 7); and trespass (§ 602.5; count 8) . Ruslan’s jury
deadlocked on one count of assault on a peace officer and acquitted him of an other count of the same offense ( c ount s 2 & 3)

. Roman’s jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit theft (count 1) ; evading a peace officer with wanton disregard for safety ( c ount 4) and two counts of second degree
murder ( c ounts 6 and 7) . It found him not guilty of both counts of assault on a peace officer ( c ount s 2 & 3 ) and deadlocked on the residential burglary count

. Ruslan was sentenced to t wo terms of l ife without the possibility of parole for murder, along with concurrent terms of f our years (the middle term) for burglary, two

year s (the middle term ) for conspiracy to commit theft , two years (the middle term) for evading a peace officer , and 180 days for trespass.
Roman was sentenc ed to two consecutive 15

- year
- to

- life terms for sec ond degree murder, along with concurrent terms of two years (the middle term) for conspiracy to commit theft, and two years (the middle term) for evading a peace officer.

9 Unde signated statutory references are to the Penal Code.8 RUSLAN’S CONTENTIONS
I. Substantial E vidence

— B urglary
Ruslan contends his convic tion for burglary, and the resulting felony

- murder
convictions , must be reversed because insufficient evidence established either he or
Roman entered the home from which the keys to the Ford F

- 150 were stolen

. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
A witness testified that the morning of the crash, the Ford F

- 150 was stolen from
the front of his house. It had been parked on the street. A t t he time, the truck was new and had been provided by his employer as a company vehicle.
He testifi ed that he habitually lock ed the truck before going inside his house

. Asked on cross

- examination if he ever left the truck unlocked, he explained , “Never, unless I was going back into the hou s e for something and coming back out. I locked my
work truck.” 10 The night the truck was stolen, he left the keys on the kitchen island along with his cigarettes. Before going to bed, he took a cigarette from the pack ( leaving the pack on the counter ) and smoked on the patio before going up stairs to bed.
In the morning, he c ame out of his bathroom to hear the truck’s panic alarm. He
testified that , if pushed, the panic button on the key fob beeps the horn repeatedly

. L ook ing out the window , he saw the truck pull away from the curb. He dialed 911 and

ran ou tside to see the truck turn into a dead end, only to come back, pursued by numerous police cars.

10 A defense investigator would later testify that the witness had told him, “he thought he had locked [the truck]

. ” The witness also told him that “he didn’t worry about locking his vehicles , ” t hough, on cross

- examination, the investigator agreed the witne ss was not referring to his work truck. Rather, he told the investigator he always locked his work truck and said , “ ‘ I never leave my keys to the work truck in my work truck. ’ ”9 He went back inside his house and discovered the keys and his cigarettes were missing from the kitchen island. He testified : “And I know they were there th e night before because I had a cigarette before I went to bed.” 11 In his backyard, he saw muddy footprints he didn’t recognize around the sliding glass door to the kitchen

. The sliding glass door was locked. He also noticed the gate to his backyard, which is usually kept closed and latched, was open. The footprints by the sliding glass door appeared to head in the direction of the side garage door. And the side door to the garage , which is usually propped op en only about four inches to let the cat in, was wide open. He could not recall if the door connecting the interior of the garage to the house interior was left unlocked that night.
B. Analysis Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on app eal, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence. ( People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is “reasonable, credible and of solid value

— fro m which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ( Ibid .) “ ‘ “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury ’ s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reason ably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” ’ ” ( People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210.) In other words, “ ‘[a] reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury ’ s verdict.’ ” ( People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142 ( Penunuri ) .) And in applying
the substantial evidence test , courts “ ‘do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness ’ s credibility.’ ” ( Nelson, at p. 210 .)

11 The cigarettes were Pall Malls. After the crash, three packs of Pall Ma ll cigarettes were found in the truck.10 Ruslan maintains that because defendants had only been stealing from unlocked vehicles that night, it was reasonable to infer the truck was unlocked and the y found the key was inside

. But there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude otherwise. T he

w itness testified the truck was locked and the key was in the kitchen next to his cigarettes , which he knew because he had smoke d before going to bed

. Both the keys and the cigarettes were missing the following morning. Also , the gate to the back yard
and the door to the garage were wide open. Later, before his arrest, Ruslan entered a different home , where he was found drink ing water , and after that , he tr ied to pry open the sliding glass door of an other

— evincing a common plan or scheme of entering

res idential homes that night

. To that evidence , Ruslan picks nits

. He argues the common indicia of burglary are missing , such as a sign of forced entry

. He a vers the witness testified it was merely his custom to leave the keys on the counter, and that he only t h ough t he locked the truck.
The witness did not tell one officer that he heard the truck’s horn go off. T he sliding glass door was locked , and there was no evidence of forced entry. The re w ere shoeprints
that were not sufficiently distinguishable to permit a match. And n o forensic evidence
was found in the house. At most, these circumstances merely reconcile with a contrary finding

. M ore fundamentally, they amount to an attack on the wit ness’s credibility, which we do not
reevaluate on a substantial evidence challenge. We conclude t he witness’s testimony
constitutes s ubstantial evidence in support of the burglary conviction. This case is certainly not one where “ ‘ “ ‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury ’ s verdict

. ’ ” ( Penunuri , supra , 5 Cal.5th at p. 142

. ) Accordingly, w e thus reject Ruslan’s substantial evidence claim concerning the burglary.
II. Substantial Evidence

— Aiding and Abetting Reckless Evasion
Ruslan next contends insufficient evidence supported his conviction on cou n t 4 , aid ing and abett ing Roman’s reckless evasion from pursuing officers in the BMW

. He11 argues no evidence exists that he did anything to aid and abet Roman’s high

- speed
evasion. 12 The People respond that Ruslan’s actions before, during, and after the BMW crash
establish that Ruslan promoted and encouraged Roman ’s evasion

. The People specifically point to Ruslan putting his hands out the window when the police told him to
show hands and argue that Ruslan may have been trying to distract the police. The People also argue that his intent to aid and abet is shown by Ruslan accompanying
Ro man to stea l from unlocked car s ; the ir fleeing police together ; Ruslan ’s failure to leave the car during the chase; Ruslan continuing to flee the police with his brother after the
BMW crashed; and Ruslan ’s later false claim that he had been driving the BMW

. We
agree there was substantial evidence to support the evasion charge

. In addition t o the circumstances the People highlight , we note an additional
circumstance of significa nce: A fter Roman crashed the BMW, not only did the two brothers flee together, but together they stole another vehicle and continued evading police

— this time with Ruslan driving

. From these circumstances showing Ruslan’s
intent to aid and abet his brother’s evasion , a jury could reasonably conclude that when
Ruslan raised his hands ou tside the BMW window just before it sped off, he did so as a ruse, in order to aid and abet Roman’s flight from police.
This therefore constitutes substantial evidence of a i ding and abetting . It certainly
cannot be said that “ ‘ “ ‘upon no hypothesis wh atever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury ’ s verdict’ ” ( Penunuri , supra , 5 Cal.5th at p. 142

. )

12 As charged, count 4 could apply to Ruslan driving the Ford F

- 150, but in closing, the prosecutor made clear the prosecution’s theory was based on aiding and abetting Roman’s escape in the BMW: “So if you struggle with ... Count Four, this commission of this reckless driving from Auburn to Loomis is lengthy. And you just have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that somewhere in that, ... Ruslan was encouraging his brother to keep going.”12 III. Expert T estimony R egarding R egressed B rain D evelopment in Y outh

Ru slan next challenges the trial court’s exclusion of scien tific studies regarding regressed brain development i n youth. We find any error to be harmless

. A. A dditional B ackground
Ruslan moved in limine to have a psychiatrist testify , arguing the testimony was relevant to whether he had acted with implied malice when he collided into the Kia

. A n E vidence C ode section 402 hearing was held , at which the psychiatrist testified he had twice examined Ruslan. He found Ruslan “really didn’t have a severe mental illness”
and “he has been a rather healthy kid.” B ut Ruslan became an addict when, following a car crash, he was prescribed “a large batch of opiates.” The psychiatrist also testified that adolescents are more likely to engage in risky and impulsive behavior. A s to Ruslan , it was “ definitely possible th at Ruslan at 19, a t the time of this offense, on a biological, on a social level was more immature than even perhaps we see him today.” He also agreed that most young individuals who use drugs
make bad decisions. On cross

- examination, the expert agreed that anyone, “not grossly mentally ill,” would know driving down a wet road at 90 miles per hour in commute traffic is a bad decision. Following the hearing , the tri a l court summarized: “this is what I heard: [ adolescent s are] ... likely to engage in risky and impulsive behavior... I didn’t hear anything that wasn’t common knowledge .” The court added, the psychiatrist “clearly [said] that Ruslan does not have a mental health disorder, and that is the only defense.
This is not any information that applies to a defense. ” The court denied the request to have the psychologist testify, but noted, “ this information is all relevant on the issue of sentencing.”
B. Analysis On appeal, Ruslan challenges the exclusion of the psycholog ist’s testimony arguing the evidence was outside jurors ’ common knowledge and was relevant to13 Ruslan’s subjective awareness of the risk and whether he acted with conscious disregard
for life at the time he collided into the Kia

. We agree the evidence was relevant and probative as to the element of implied malice, but conclude that any error was harmless for the simple reason that Ruslan was convicted of first degree murder on a felony

- murder theory. There was no implied
malice require ment for that conviction

. ( People v. Howard (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1129, 1135 [felony murder “ ‘eliminates the need for proof of malice in connection with a charge of murder’ ”]; People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184 [“ ‘The felony

- murder rule imputes the re quisite malice for a murder conviction to those who commit a homicide during the perpetration of a felony inherently dangerous to life’ ”].) Thus, e ven assuming
the exclusion of the testimony was error , it had no conceivable e ffect on the verdict and

was harmless under any standard

. IV. Jury M isconduct & Ruslan ’s M otion to C ontinue Ruslan contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his trial counsel’s
motion to continue the hearing on his new trial motion grounded on alleged jury
miscondu ct. We are unable to find an abuse of discretion.
A. Additional B ackground
1. Ruslan’s M otions for a N ew T rial On December 6, 2016, Ruslan’s jury reached verdicts. The verdicts were read and recorded on December 8, 2016. Sente n cing was set for January 20, 2017. On December 12, 2016, counsel for Ruslan received an unsolicited phone call from the jury foreperson, who expressed concern about the deliberations. On December 16, 2017, counsel an d his investigator met with the foreperson and obtained a declaration
from her

. On January 13, 2017 , Ruslan filed a motion for new trial

. The motion averred that during the morning of December 8, 2016, after the jury had been reassembled in the
delibera tion room , prior to the reading of the verdicts, some jurors read about the case on14 the I nternet. 13 The subject juror stated she did not look at the I nternet, but stated : “I have an excellent memory and I remember all the facts from the time that it happened

. ” In his declaration, counsel aver r ed that during jury selection , all prospective juror s were asked if they had any prior knowledge about the case , and the subject j uror “failed to disclose her detailed knowledge of the [d] efendants.” In support of the motion was the declaration signed by the jury foreperson. In pertinent part the declaration stated:

“ 2

. On Tuesday, December 6, 2016 at approximately 4:00 P.M., the jury reached verdicts on all but one of the eight counts alleged against Ruslan Glukhoy. [ 14 ]

“ 3

. The jury reassembled at 8:30 A.M. on Thursday, December 8, 2016. During that time, we discussed the case amongst ourselves.

“ 4. At least six (6) of my fellow jurors began discussing facts about the case that were not introduced as evidence at trial; e.g., that the brother s were drug addicts, that they both had warrants out for their arrests, and that [ the daughter of a deputy who testified ] was killed.” “5. Through further discussion, I was able to determine that these facts

were learned by Internet searches after the verdicts were reached on Tuesday
afternoon. [¶] . . . [¶]
“7. On each occasion that a comment was made, [the subject juror] would
offer additional information.

13 Later , at the hear ing on the new trial motion, counsel for Ruslan conceded “whatever [the jurors] learned on the Internet didn’t have anything to do with their verdict.”

14 The jury deadlocked on count 2, assault on a peace officer.15 “8. When I asked [the subject juror] if she had gone on the Internet, she denied going online. She simply stated that, ‘I have an excellent memory and I

rem ember all of the facts from the time that it happened.’ ”
The foreperson went on to describe the subject juror as “loud, boisterous and a bully,” and opined that “she would have voted guilty on all counts the moment we began
deliberations.” The foreperso n also declared , “I believe that [the subject juror] came into the deliberations with knowledge that prevented her from deliberating fairly.” 15
2. Continuance Motion On January 18, 2017, counsel for Ruslan filed a written motion to continue the January 2 0 sentencing on two grounds: (1) Code of Civil Procedure notice requirements
for his new trial motion were in compatible with the scheduled sentencing date, and (2) he planned to call a child forensic psychiatrist who was not available on the sentencing date.
Counsel did not assert in his written motion that he needed additional time to investigate
the new trial motion. The prosecut or , who had received the continuance motion the day before, filed a n opposition , questi on ing the relevance of the psychiatrist’s testimony given the court’s lack of sentencing choices . He also noted the psychiatrist’s pretrial evaluation of Ruslan was “covered in the probation report filed in this case. ” The prosecutor added he was

unaware of any Code of Civil Procedure provision governing the proceedings, 16 but
offered to waive any notice requirement and indicated the prosecution would be ready to proceed on the new trial motion

.

15 Nowhere in the declaration did the f oreperson allege the subject juror mentioned to the jurors extraneous information concerning drug addiction and warrants during deliberations.

16 We too are unaware of any Code of Civil Procedure provisions governing new trial motions in criminal cases.16 Later that day, the trial court held a hearing on defendan t’s continuance motion.
Defense counsel led off with the issue concerning the psychiatrist. He stated his testimony could be important if there were potential future changes in the youthful
offender parole law, 17 but he could not secure the psychiatrist’s presence on January 20. Regarding the new trial motion, counsel stated his investigator ha d been “ working on it, ” but that “he’s had some problems, personal problems and holidays and all that other stuff.
It hasn’t been a normal month sin ce the verdict came in. And we didn’t rush this thing to January 20th .” ( I talics added .) Counsel added that he also needed the two days to which
he was entitled to respond to the prosecution’s opposition to the new trial motion.
The trial court denied t he motion to continue based on the psychiatrist ’s schedule, noting the court lacked sentencing discretion as to Ruslan , and there was no point to continuing the matter to make a record on the chance the parole law changed in the
future

. 18 While the court noted that counsel would have had his two days to respond to the prosecution’s new trial motion opposition by the day of sentencing , it reserved
decision as to the continuance of the hearing . The court indicat ed it was still reviewing the motion and doing its own research and may or may not determine there is a “ need to
have any additional testimony, hearings, et cetera on that motion

. ” The court noted it could “elect to have testimony. Although, . . . I would say that’s rare. It has to be based
on affidavits.” The court expressed skepticism about the foreperson’s declaration, noting
that she never reported an y concerns to the baili ff or the court before or after the verdicts. The court indicated it had just begun its review and acknowledged the re may be a basis to

17 Ruslan, who was 19 years old when he committed the murders and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, was not eligible for youthful offender parole. ( § 3051 , subdivision (b)(4) .)

18 The court also stated it would make the psychiatrist’s report part of the record on the sentencing.17 continue the new trial motion , but further noted that it may be able to rule on the motion on January 20.
Counsel told the court : “It’s possible that I will have additional information. And I stress the word possible. It is possible that I will have additional information for the Court on Friday that I do not have at the present time.” Counsel never mentioned the

poss ibility of needing a continuance to obtain additional information or to secure the presence of a witness at the new trial motion hearing.
3. New Trial Motion and Sentencing Hearing At the beginning of the hearing on January 20, 201 7 , t he court announced it would
first consider the motions for a new trial and for a continuance

. The court also noted that numerous jurors were present, but that the court had ordered the m to stay outside the
courtroom for the motion.
Ruslan’s c ounsel argued the subject j uror ’s failure to disclose that she knew Ruslan was a drug addict and had a warrant was misconduct because she was under oath
and failed to mention that during voir dire . Counsel argued that the juror’s failure to disclose prevented him from refu ting or mitigat ing what the juror believed to be true

. He added he would have challenged the subject juror for cause or exercised a peremptory challenge he had available to him. The prosecutor responded that n owhere in the declaration did it state the su bject juror learned of Ruslan’s addiction and warrant prior to trial

. It simply said she provided
“additional information.” The prosecutor maintained that once all inadmissible
information from the declaration is excised , it show s n either misconduct, n or prejudic e

. 19

19 The prosecution also asserted there was evidence at trial that numerous syringes were found in the glove box of the BMW, and the jury would have become aware the brothers were drug users based on this evidence. Our review of the record reveals that t he trial evidence did indeed establish that among the items recovered from the BMW were a18 Ruslan’s counsel responded that the declaration stated that jurors began discussing the brothers’ drug addictions and warrants , and “ [o] n each occasion that a comment was made [the subject juror] would offer additional information,” citing her “excellent memory.” Counsel went on , “ [i] f it’s not abundantly clear to the Court that they were talking about drug addiction and the warrants, then I failed in preparing this declaration .”
He added that the foreperson wa s outsid e and willing to testify that the subject juror had specifically talked about Ruslan’s drug addiction and warrants. The court replied that it had reviewed the foreperson’s affidavit. It then struck portions of the affidavit as “purporting to describe the mental process of other jurors.” 20 Reviewing the balance of the affidavit , the court explained: “The foreperson’s
declaration indicates that at least six jurors were discussing information

— and I have

“ ‘ information ’ ” in quotes because I’m using her language

— that both the Defendants were drug addicts, they both had warrants, and that [the deputy’s] daughter had died. [¶] The declaration also indicates that [the subject juror] added additional information, but there is no specifics as to what additional information was received .”
T o counsel, t he court said, “I see you’re upset, but I want you to know the Court is required to rely on the declaration

. ” Ruslan’s c ounsel interjected that he could amend the
declaration . “I appreciate that, ” the court returned, “ but this is my time to rule , ” adding , “I understand your argument, I don’t think it would change this ruling.”

glass jar containing marijuana and a marijuana grinder, as well as several syringes, one of which contained what was thought to be heroin.

20 It struck Paragraphs 9 through 13. Paragraphs 9 and 10 referred to the juror in question as a bully, that she would have voted guilty on all counts the moment deliberations began, and that she convinced other jurors on the burglary count. Paragraph 11 stated. “I believe that [the juror in question] came into the deliberations with knowledge that prevented her from deliberating fairly.” Paragraphs 12 and 13 pertained to another ju ror who, among other things, stated she was “afraid we are going to let him off with a slap on the wrist.”19 The court continued , “I have to follow the law, and the law strictly requires that I base my decision so lely on what’s in the declaration. ” 21 “The declaration ... is not specific about what information [ the subject juror ] purportedly had and what she purportedly used. ” The court went on to say , “ when we look at a motion for a new trial, the Court must try to preserve the jury verdict if it’s legally possible.” 22 The court then denied the motion for a new trial, explaining, “I gave very serious
review to counsel’s contentions

... but

... there’s no evidence other than pure speculation on behalf of [ the foreperson ], that this juror ... was biased against the Defendant or had any specific information and that that information was inherently prejudicial to the
Defendant.”
Ruslan’s counsel asked for a “reasonable continuance” to amend the declaration to provide additio nal information. He then noted they had “ recently ” found the location of
the subject juror and his investigator was supposed to talk to her the previous weekend, but a family emergency had prevented that

. Counsel did not say exactly when they
located the juror , what efforts had been made to locate her , and why the investigator or another had not attempted to talk to the juror earlier in the week before the January 20 sentencing and new trial hearing , which was on a Friday. 23
The court denied the continu ance noting , “There are other procedural remedies that you can follow should there be new and different information.” It added : “This is a

21 As we discuss post , in a criminal trial, a court must hold a hearing under certain circumstances.

22 We are not sure what the trial court meant here , and defendant did not ask for clarification. We would agree, however, that a trial court may not grant a new trial motion in the absence of evidence warranting a new trial

.
23 We take judicial notice that January 20, 2017, was a Friday. (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (h), 459 subd. (a)(2); Douglas v. Janis (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 931, 936.)20 case that is a very serious matter, and the victims are entitled to closure and to move
forward. And there is no basis to continue beyond that.” Sentencing thereupon commenced.
B. Analysis On appeal, Ruslan contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to continue. Citing People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1255 ( Hayes ), h e
argues that a trial court , once aware of possible juror misconduct, “ ‘ must “ make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary ” ’ to resolve the matter , ” and he maintains that
if such a serious allegation came down to a question of semantics, it was incumbent on
the trial court to allow clarification of the foreperson’s allegation. He adds that, “ ‘ “[a] juror who conceals relevant facts or gives false answers during the voir dire examination

. . . undermines the jury selection process and commits misconduct , ” ’ ” citing In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 111. The People respond that denying the contin uance was within the trial court ’s
discretion , arguing the court carefully analyzed Ruslan’s reasons for a continuance and
found them deficient. Further, Ruslan’s counsel had over five weeks to prepare an adequate new trial motion, and the trial court did nothing to prohibit him from investigating the asserted misconduct

. We agree with the People. As to allowing a clarification of the foreperson’s declaration , “ [w] hen a trial court
is aware of possible juror misconduct, the court ‘ must “ make whatever inq uiry is reasonably necessary’ ” to resolve the matter. [Citation

. ] It must do so, however, only when the defense comes forward with evidence that demonstrates a ‘ strong possibility ’ of prejudicial misconduct. [¶] Normally, hearsay is not sufficient to trigger the court’s duty to make further inquiries into a claim of juror misconduct .” ( Hayes , supra , 21 Cal.4th at
pp. 1255

- 1256, second italics added ; see also People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 517 ( Mora and Rangel ) [the obligation to investigate is triggered “ only when the defense provides evidence strongly suggestive of prejudicial misconduct ” and21 “ we acknowledged in Hayes and have reiterated many times, hearsay is ordinarily ‘ not sufficient to trigger the court’s duty t o make further inquiries into a claim of juror
misconduct ’ ” ] .) Citing People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, which authorizes evidentiary hearings for new trial motions in criminal cases, Ruslan asserts that at a minimum , the jury for e person should h ave been allowed to testify and clarify any vagueness in the
declaration. He further asserts: “ The jury foreperson was already at the courthouse and
could have testified

— but if not, an amended declaration would have taken very little
time. ” But as our high court has also stated: “ ordinarily a trial court does not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror misconduct when the evidence proffered in support constitutes hearsay. ” ( People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 810 ; see also Mora and Rangel , supra , 5 Cal.5th at p. 517 [ “ Hearsay evidence offered in support of a new trial motion that is based on alleged jury misconduct ordinarily is insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion in either denying the motion or declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing ’ ” ].) ( I talics added .) 24 Indeed, neither an

24 While the court in Hedg e cock authorized evidentiary hearings in new trial motions grounded on jury misconduct in criminal cases , the court was clear about the circumstances when a trial court must hold evidentiary hearing. “[W]hen a new trial motion in a criminal case is based on al legations of juror misconduct, the trial court may conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of the allegations.” ( Hedg e cock , supra , 51 Cal.3d at p. 415.) But “[a] defendant is not entitled to such a hearing as a matter of right,” and “ an evi dentiary hearing need not be conducted in every instance of alleged juror misconduct .” ( Id . at pp. 415, 419.) “The hearing should not be used as a ‘fishing expedition’ to search for possible misconduct, but should be held only when the defense has come f orward with evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred.” ( Id . at p. 419, italics added.) But “[e]ven upon such a showing, an evidentiary hearing will generally be unnecessary unless the parties’ evidence presents a material conflict that can only be resolved at such a hearing.” ( Ibid

. , italics added. ) Again, the predicate is admissible evidence and s ince there was no admissible evidence before the court, there was no conflict in any evidence for the court to res olve

.22 amended declaration, nor the foreperson’s testimony would have fixed the hearsay problem here

. T he foreperson could only testify about the subj ect juror ’s purported

statement that defendant sought to admit for the truth of the matter as serted as to the timing of when she purportedly received certain information; he offers the statement to

prove that the subject juror had been exposed to informati on about the brothers’ warrants and drug addiction before voir dire

. Defendant has offered no reason to deviate from the usual rule that “[n] ormally, hearsay is not sufficient to trigger the court’s duty to make further inquiries into a claim of juror mis conduct ” ( Hayes , supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1256) and “ ordinarily a trial court does not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror misconduct when the evidence proffered in support constitutes hearsay .” ( Dykes , supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 810.) 25 T hus, under these circumstances we cannot find an abuse
of discretion

. We realize the trial court’s ruling was not based on the purported statement of the subject juror being hearsay, but conclude we cannot find the court abused its
discretion when it would have been an abuse of discretion to consider inadmissible
evidence in granting an evidentiary hearing or to consider it in deciding the new trial
motion

. As for the continuance motion, a continuance in a criminal matter may only be granted for good cause. (§ 1050, subd. (e) ) ; People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 287 ( D’Arcy .) We review the denial of such motions for abuse of discretion. ( D’Arcy, at
p. 287.) “ ‘ “There are no mechanical tests for deciding wh en a denial of a continuance is

25 For example, if the subject juror refused to talk to investigators or provide a declaration, such a circumstance might warrant deviation from the general rule and conduct a hearing

. And, if the subject juror had provided a statement or declaratio n in which she denied making the statement attributed to her by the foreperson , the foreperson’s declaration would be admissible for the truth of the matter as a prior inconsistent statement.23 so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” ’ ” ( Id . at p p . 287

- 288.) Also, a showing of good cause requires a demonstration of diligence. ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037 ( Jenkins ).) Here, the record does not demonstrate due diligence in investigating the new trial
motion. Indeed, the original continuance motion was not grounded on the need for time to obtain additional information. And at the initial hearing on the continuance motion, counsel did not mention a need for that purpose. As the Attorney General points out,
def endant had over five weeks to investigate his jury misconduct claim. The record does
not show that the defense moved to obtain juror contact information under Code of Civil
Procedure section 237. Counsel stated the defense had “recently” located the subj ect juror , but no date or other elaboration was offered

. 26 Nor did counsel explain what
efforts had been made after he met with the foreperson on December 16, 2016. Counsel did admit that in part, because of the holidays, they “did n’t rush this thing to January
20th. ” He mentioned a plan to obtain a declaration from the subject juror the previous weekend, but his investigator had a pressing family matter. That is understandable, but no explanation was given as to why no attempts had been made b efore that weekend or in the week leading up to the Friday , January 20, 201 7 , hearing.
Because d iligence must be shown to establish good cause , we conclude that under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
contin uance. 27 ( See Jenkins , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1037 .) Indeed, o rders denying

26 We note the juror listed her place of employment on her jury questionnaire.

27 Ruslan also asserts in his opening brief that he is entitled to a new trial under section 1202. In pertinent part, section 1202 provides: “ If the court shall refuse to hear a defendant ’ s motion for a new trial or when made shall neglect to determine such motion before pronouncing judgment or the making of an order granting probation, then the defendant shall be entitled to a new trial. ” The contention is meritless. As the Attorney24 continuances are seldom successfully attacked on appeal , as such discretion is abused “only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.” ( People v. Beam e s (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920.) And as the trial court noted, there are other procedural remedies available to defendant if he was able to secure the information he sought.
ROMAN’S CONTENTIONS
V. Counsel’s C oncession of Conspiracy and Evading C ounts Roman contends the convictions for evading a peace officer with wanton disregard for safety and conspiracy to commit theft must be reversed because his trial counsel conceded those counts during closing arguments. In support he cites McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1500 , 1505 ( McCoy ) , which held that “a defendant has the right to insist
that counsel refrain from admittin g guilt,” a s well as People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th
295 , 308 ( Farwell ) , wh ich held a stipulation admitting all elements of an offense require s a constitutionally valid waiver of tr ial rights

. We find no error.
A. A dditional B ackground As noted, Roman eventually confessed to attempting to steal from cars in Auburn

. Roman’s counsel began his closing argument by telling the jury, “the basic facts are fairly straightforward, with two notable exceptions: Where were the keys to [the]
truck and did Roman do anything to aid and abet his brother during his brother’s evading.” Thereafter, he focused his argument on these two issues and the alleged assault
on the two Rocklin officers

. Later, Roman’s counsel p oint ed to verdict form for the co nspiracy count and told the jury, “That’s the box where you will write ‘guilty,’

... . It has never been an issue in this case.” He added, “We have never contested that Roman and [the friend] and Ruslan

General points out, the record plainly establish es that the trial court heard and denied defendant’s new trial motion. And Ruslan did not attempt to rebut this argument in his reply brief.25 went to Auburn to take stuff out of people’s cars.” H e added regarding the verdict , “It will be a simple one. You can find him guilty of that count.”
As to the evading count , he told the jury , “you’re going to find him guilty of this count and you should. He did damage to property, he violated more than three laws, he was driving in excess of the speed limit, and it was a long pursuit.”
B. Analysis On appeal, defendant argues that , like in F arwell , his counsel’s concession of
these counts was tantamount to a guilty plea, as it admitted the elements of the offense , reliev ing the prosecution of its burden of proof. Thus, it required a knowing and
informed waiver of his right to a jury trial on those counts. He is mistaken

. In Farwell , trial counsel stipulated to every element of an offense , and the trial

court instructed the jury to accept th e stipulation as true. ( Farwell , supra , 5 Cal.5th at p p. 298

- 299.) Our high court concluded that the “stipulation conclusively established the stipulated facts as true and completely relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof on” the stipulated count. ( Id . at p. 300.) It reasoned that “[a] stipulation that admits all of the
elements of a charged crime necessary for a conviction is tantamount to a guilty plea.” ( Id . at p. 299.) “By entering the stipulation, Farwell effectively surrendered his privilege against self

- incrimination, his right to confrontation, and his right to a jury trial o n count
2 .” ( I

d

. at p. 300

. )

Here, however, no such stipulation was entered , nor was the jury instructed to find
each element established

. Instead , the jury was expressly instructed that the prosecution must prove the elements of the conspiracy and evadi ng crimes

. And, as Roman concedes on appeal, unlike a stipulation, concessions still require the prosecution to prove , and the jury to find , the charges true beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Florida v. Nixon (2004) 543 U.S. 175, 188 [ 160 L.Ed.2d 565 ] ( Nix on ) [“Despite [trial counsel’s] concession, Nixon retained the rights accorded a defendant in a criminal trial”].)26 Roman, however, argues that a concession, like a stipulation, is the functional equivalent of a plea . He maintains that People v. Lopez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 55 ( Lopez ) , which held otherwise, was wrongly decided. He reasons that when counsel tells a jury to convict, it for all intents and purposes relieves the prosecution from proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree

. C ounsel’s concession was consistent with Roman’s unchallenged confession in which he admitted to going to Auburn to burglarize cars and driving the BMW when it
crashed during the first pursuit

. 28 And just as a pretrial confession is not the functional equi valent of a plea, n either is a strategic concession by counsel. Thus, we join another panel of this court and several other courts in concluding a concession is not tantamount to a guilty plea

. ( People v. Franks (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 883, 891 ( Franks ) ; S ee also People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1165

- 1167; People v. Burns (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 776, 784, review granted Oct. 30. 2019, S257738, review dismissed July 2 9 , 2020 ; Lopez , supra , 31 Cal.App.5 th at p. 64 [distinguishing Farwell and concluding concession did not relieve the prosecutions’ burden]; See also, People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 30 [“trial counsel ’ s decision not to contest, and even expressly to concede,

28 We also note that the concession on the evading charge was consistent with counsel’s defense on behalf of his client on the two counts of assault on a peace officer. As to those counts , in discussing the encounter in the cul

- de

- sac, Roman’s counsel argued to the jury that a reasonable inference based on the evidence could be drawn that Roman was trying to get awa y , there was no way to do so other than by driving in the direction of the officers and ultimately Roman drove the car around the officers “far away” from where their vehicles were. Counsel argued, “this was an escape, this was not an assault.” Counsel f urther argued since the inference that Roman was simply trying to escape was a reasonable interpretation of the circumstantial evidence, the jury was duty bound to find Roman not guilty of that charge. The concession that Roman was guilty of evading flowe d naturally from this argument and added credibility to his defense of the assault on a peace officer counts. Regarding the verdict forms on the assault counts, defense counsel to ld the jury , “you ’ re going to write ‘not guilty’ because if you follow the
c ircumstantial evidence test, it ’ s the only conclusion you can come up with. And that is what the jury did; Roman was found not guilty on those two counts.27 guilt on one or more charges at the guilt phase of a capital tr ial is not tantamount to a guilty plea requiring a Boykin

– Tahl waiver”].) Roman also argues , c iting McCoy , that the record must affirmatively show his waiver was voluntary and intelligent because otherwise, the record fails to evince that he
knew of his co unsel’s decision to concede guilt. Roman is mistaken. The Court in
M cCoy held that “a defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced

- based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty.” ( McCoy , supra , 138 S.Ct. at p. 1505.) But , the C ourt further explained, if a defendant remains silent, neither approving nor protesting a concession strategy, no such requirement exists. ( Id . at pp. 1505, 1509 distinguishing Nixon, supra , 543 U.S. 175 .) Thus, “ McCoy makes clear

. . . that for a Sixth Amendment violation to lie, a defendant must make his intention to maintain
innocence clear to his counsel , and counsel must override that objective by conceding guilt. ” ( Franks , supra , 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) Because the record her e contain s no express objection by Roman, McCoy is inapplicable.
T h e contention therefore fails.
VI. Natural and Probable Consequences Instruction
R oman contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte that under a natural and probable consequences theory, an aider and abettor can be guilty of a lesser

non
- target offense than the perpetrator. He acknowledges the jury was instructed th at an aider and abettor may be found guilty of a different crime than the perpetrator if the ir
mental states differ, but he maintains “the instruction was wholly inadequate because it lacked any reference to the natural and probable consequences doctrine

. . . . ” He alternatively argues his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request
the instruction.
We discuss the invalidation of the natural and probable consequences doctrine by
Senate Bill 1437 post . We must nevertheless address this issue because if Roman is28 right, his murder convictions would be reversed on this ground. However, w e find no

error. A. A dditional B ackground
Before closing arguments, the parties and the trial court discussed jury
instructions , off the record

. Back o n the record, Roman’s counsel ask ed to modify
CALCRIM No. 400 to state, “that an aider and abettor may be guilty of different crimes and different degrees of crimes where they do not have the same mental state.” He
contended that “ if [the jury is] not advised that ... an aider and abettor can have a different crime or different degree, [the jury] may erroneously conclude, if they believe that Ruslan’s act of driving was in conscious disregard for human life, that they’re required to f ind that Roman had the same mental state or is guilty of the same degree
because that’s not addressed in the [CALCRIM No.] 400 instruction

. . . . ” The prosecutor responded that the concept was adequately contained in
CALCRIM Nos. 401 29 and 403, and inclu ding it in CALCRIM No. 400 would add
confusion.
T he trial court ultimately instructed the jury , as requested by defendant , with a
modif ied CALCRIM No. 400. In part, it instructed: “A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways: One, he may have directly committed the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator. Two, he may have aided and abetted a perpetrator who directly committed
the crime.”

29 CALCRIM No. 401 instructs: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding a nd abetting that crime, the People must prove that: 1. The perpetrator committed the crime; 2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; 3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet th e perpetrator in committing the crime; AND 4. The defendant ’ s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator ’ s commission of the crime.”29 The modified CALCRIM No. 400 wen t on to instruct: “Under some circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other crimes that occurred during the commission of the first
crime. An aider and abettor may be found guilty of a different crime or degree of crime than the perpetrator if the aider and abettor and the perpetrator do not have the same
mental state .” (Italics added

. )
As to aiding and abetting second degree murder based on the natural and probable consequences do ctrine , t he court instructed using CALCRIM No. 403 , in pertinent part : “To prove that the defendant is guilty of second

- degree murder, the People must prove that, [1.] the defendant is guilty of willful evading a peace officer with a wanton disregard

... as an aider and abettor ; [2.], that during the commission of the willful evading a peace officer with wanton disregard, a co

- participant in that willful evading with wanton disregard committed the crime of second

- degree murder ; and [3.], under all
the circum stances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known that the commission of a second

- degree murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of willful evading a peace officer with wanton disregard.” ( I talics
added

. )
An d as to gross and negligent vehicular manslaughter t he court gave a similar
CALCRIM No. 403 instruction : “To prove that the defendant is guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter or negligent vehicular manslaughter, the People must prove, one, the
defendant is guilty of evading a peace officer with wanton disregard; [two] during the commission of evading a peace officer with wanton disregard, a co
- participant in that
offense committed the crimes of [ gross ][ 30 ] vehicular manslaughter or negligent vehicular manslaughter ; and three, under all of the circumstances a reasonable person in

30 In reading the instructions to the jury, the court omitted the word “gross,” but it was included in the written version of the instructions provided to the jury.30 the defendant’s position would have known that the commission of gross vehicular manslaughter or negligent vehicular manslaughter was a natural and probable

consequenc e of the commission of evading a peace officer with wanton disregard. ” (Italics added

. )
B. Analysis On appeal, Roman argues the instructions were erroneous because they failed to
inform the jury that an aider and abettor under a natural and probable cons equences theory can be guilty of a lesser crime than the perpetrator. He maintains that as instructed, his jury would believe Roman could only be found guilty of a lesser offense if
Ruslan also committed that lesser offense. We disagree.
A trial court mu st instruct sua sponte on the “ ‘ “general legal principles raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case....” ’ ” ( People v. Delgado (2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 488.) And o n appeal, when we determine a jury
instruction’s suffici ency, we consider the “entire charge of the court.” ( People v. Mills (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 898, 918.) W e also presume “jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.” ( Ibid .) Here, read together, the instructions informed Roman’s jury that an aider and abettor, under a natural and probable consequences theory, could have different culpability than the perpetrator. The jury was instructed, using CALCRIM No. 403 , that
Roman could be c onvicted , as an aider and abettor under a natural and probable consequences theory, of either second degree murder or the lesser offense s , gross or negligent vehicular manslaughter. The jury was also instructed, using the modified
CALCRIM No. 400 , that an aider and abettor need not have the same criminal culpability as the perpetrator. Considered together, we do not think the jury would have understood
the several instructions as carving out an exception for aiders and abettors convicted
under a natural a nd probable consequences theory. Instead, w e conclude a reasonable jury would have understood the modified CALCRIM No. 400 to mean what it said: “ An31 aider and abettor may be found guilty of a different crime or degree of crime than the perpetrator if the aider and abettor and the perpetrator do not have the same mental state.”
Roman ’s fallback contention that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
in failing to request the instruction he now argues was necessary also fails

. Again, a
reasonable jury would understand the instruction that an aider and abettor can have
different liability does not except aider s and abettor s found guilty under a natural and probable consequences theory . Accordingly, no prejudice can stem from the failure to request a more explicit instruction. To establish prejudice, “ [i] t is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.’ ” ( Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 104 [178 L.Ed.2d 624].) To show prejudice, defendant must show a reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable result had counsel’s performance not been deficient. ( Stricklan d v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693

- 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] ( Strickland ) ; People v

. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 21 7

- 21 8 .) “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” ( Strickland , at p. 694; accord, Ledesma , at
p. 218.) The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable. ( Richter , at p. 112.)
We conclude , based on the modified CALCRIM No. 400, that defendant has not
shown Strickland prejudice as to this assignment of error

. We also conclude post , that the evidence of defendant having the requisite mental state for implied malice murder was overwhelming, and for this separate reason, defendant was not prejudiced by the asserted error he assigns here.
V II . Senate Bill s 1437 and 775 Roman originally contended that his convictions for second degree murder must be reversed because Senate Bill No. 1437, enacted after his conviction, abrogated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder. He argued that Senate
B ill 1437’s amendments should be applied retroactively to him. Subsequently, our high32 court spoke on the issue, holding that while Senate Bill 1437 barred a conviction for second degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “ the

proc edure set forth in section 1170.95 [was] the exclusive mechanism for retroactive relief and thus the ameliorative provisions of Senate Bill 1437 do not apply to nonfinal judgments on direct appeal. ” ( People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 839.) Thereaf ter, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 775, amend ing section 1170.95 to add subdivision (g), which provides that a defendant whose conviction is not final may “ challenge on direct appeal the validity of [a murder] conviction based on ” the Senate Bill 1437 amendments

. Both sides now agree that defendant is entitled to challenge his second degree murder
convictions based on Senate Bill 775. They disagree , however, as to the outcome of that challenge. While Roman argues we must reverse the murder convic tions and vacate the sentence based on the Legislature’s invalidation of the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the Attorney General argues the alternative

- theory instructional error brought about by the retroactive application of Senate Bill 1437 is harmless. W e asked the parties
to address at oral argument whether, in light of this court’s decision in People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 ( Powell ), Roman’s jury received an erroneous instruction on aiding and abetting second degree murder

. Roman argue d that, based on Powell , there

was prejudicial instructional error as to direct aiding and abetting implied malice murder

. The Attorney General did not contest this assertion.
As we shall discuss, we conclude both errors are harmless beyond a r easonable
doubt. We begin by detail ing additional facts. A. Additional Background
1. The First Crash, Theft of the Truck and Flight on Interstate 80 Investigators began their interview of Roman by asking what had happened that morning. Roman initially responded, “It ’s just a stupid choice , ” add ing that when the police tried to stop him in Auburn, “ I was stupid when I was running.” He said he fled33 bec ause he had a warrant for not showing up to court. After the BMW crash, he and his
brother fled on foot together, jumping some residential fences.
Roman claimed when they came upon the truck, they found it to be unlocked and
h id in it for what seemed li ke 15 to 20 minutes. He got in the rear passenger seat behind
the driver’s seat where Ruslan sat. Scared by sirens they heard, they started the truck and
drove off . When asked their intent in driving the truck away, Roman replied, “Uh, just a stupid cho ice.” Roman said he looked at the speedometer w hile fleeing from law enforcement on Interstate 80, and they reached a speed of 90 miles per hour, but he denied going faster. When asked if he remembered telling Ruslan to stop or slow down, Roman said , “I don’t
remember.”
2 . The Evasive Flight on Antelope Road and Fatal Collision Roman told investigators that while they were on Interstate 80 , Ruslan asked him where they should go. Roman told him to take the Antelope exit because they were familiar with the area. Roman said, after getting off on Antelope, “[w]e didn’t know where to go from there.”
The testimony from pursuing deputies establ ished that while in the Interstate 80 rush hour traffic, the truck abrupt ly cut across the freeway lanes to exit at Antelope Road.
Vehicles on the offramp were stopped for a red light at the Antelope Road intersection , and t raffic there was , “very heavy,” with, “a lot of commuter traffic

. ” To get through this traffic, t he truck “split” the two lanes of vehicles that had stopped and drove through the red light onto Antelope Road. The roadway on Antelope Road was wet and heavily congested with traffic. T he
truck made multiple lane changes in th is traffic. There were several major intersections on Antelope Road controlled by traffic lights with cross traffic. There was cross

- traffic at almost all of the red lights they ran. When driving through the red lights, the truck took “the fastest path through” the intersections. For example, at one major intersection, to get34 around traffic, the truck crossed into the left turn lane , went through the red light and then merged back into the traffic lane on Antelope Road on the opposite side of the
intersection. One deputy testified it was more dangerous driving at high speeds on surface roads as opposed to the freeway because of intersections, potential pedestrians and bicycli sts, especially at 6:30 a.m. on a weekday. He also testified that in his opinion
it was luc k that the truck did not collide into anybody at those major intersections before
the fatal crash

. Pursuing deputies testified that the truck was travelling at sp eeds up to 80 or 90 miles per hour during the evasion on Antelope Road. And it was putting distance between the pursuing deputies, who, although traffic was moving to the side, had to slow
down as they went through intersections. The pursuit ended when Ruslan drove over an overpass at what deputies testified

was 70 to 80 miles per hour, entered the next intersection against the red light and
collided into the Kia as it was making a left turn from Antelope Road onto a side street

. The primary pursuing d eputy testified that as he was descending the overpass, he saw that
the truck had collided into the Kia and watched it push the Kia approximately 45 yards.
One motorist , stopped next to the Kia at what was then a red light , observed the
Kia drive forwar d into the intersection when the left turn signal turned green. The
motorist then saw the truck come over the overpass in the opposite direction as she proceeded forward on her green light

. Thereafter, she heard a crash and looked back to
see the truck had collided with the Kia . She estimated the truck came over the overpass

a t 75 to 85 miles per hour , and described the speed of the truck as “like a bat out of hell.”
As she saw the truck crest the overpass before the collision , she thought it would flip or
cause a collision because the roadway was wet

. Another motorist who started to follow the Kia into the intersection from the left
turn lane saw the truck speeding toward them from the opposite direction in the right turn35 lane, only to move into the center lane before entering the intersection and crashing into
the Kia. He estimated the truck’s speed as 70 to 75 miles per hour

. After the truck and Kia came to a stop, the primary pursuing deputy saw two occupants exit the truck’s passenger and driver’s side

. The driver ran around the wreckage, past the vehicle he had struck. Responding to a question posed by a juror, the deputy testified that the driver did not check on the people in the Kia

. The pers on who got out of the passenger side ran toward the sidewalk toward the person who got out of
the driver’s side and the two fled into the neighborhood, jumping fences to make their

escape. The posted speed limit on Antelope Road at the intersection where the collision
occurred was 45 miles per hour. The traffic lights at the intersection are visible from 800 to 900 feet, just before cresting the overpass. The ambient lighting from sunrise and the artificial lighting in the area illumin ated the intersection. Looking at historical crash data
and other information for the intersection , an expert civil engineer determined there was nothing indicating the roadway was unsafe. There had been no prior fatalities at the
intersection.
Acciden t reconstruction testimony established that the truck was traveling between 70 and 81 miles per hour at the point of impact. 31 But based on pre

- collision data from

31 Investigator Darrell Nishimi of the California Highway Patrol Multidisciplinary Accident I nvestigation Team (MAIT) testified as an accident reconstruction expert. Pre

collision information stored in the air bag control module of the truck recorded the truck’s speed at 70 miles per hour at the point of impact. Nishimi opined, based on his calc ulations, that the speed was actually 81 miles per hour at impact. A defense investigator opined, based on his calculations, that at impact, the truck was traveling between 70 to 74 miles per hour. The defense expert also acknowledged that the truck
was travelling faster on this surface street than the 65

- mile

- per
- hour speed limit on Interstate 80 . Additionally, he acknowledged that the Kia violated no traffic laws.36 the truck’s air bag control module, the truck was actually travelling at 93 miles per hour just one and a half seconds before the collision

. 32
B

. Aiding and Abetting Implied Malice Murder
1

. Elements of Aiding and Abetting Implied Malice Murder
The elements of i mplied malice murder relative to the actual perpetrator are: “(1) [The perpetrator ] intentionally committed an act; ( 2 ) the natural and probable consequences of that act were dangerous to human life; (3) At the time [the perpetrator] acted, [ he/she ] knew [ his/her ] act was dangerous to human life ; and (4) [T]he perpetrator deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.” (CALCRIM No. 502; People v. Navarette (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 829, 843

- 844 .)
In Powell , we held that aiding and abetting implied malice murder is a valid theory of liability for second degree murder. ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 71 0

- 7 14; accord, People v. Superior Court ( Valenzuela ) (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 499 [agreeing
with Powell that aiding and abetting implied malice murde r is a valid theory of culpability for second degree murder ] ; s ee also People v. Langi (202 2 ) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 98 2, 983 , 984, fns. 10 and 12 ( Langi ) [acknowledging Powell and Gentile and stating: “Current law thus provides that the actual killer, or a direct aider and abettor of the killing who knew that his (or her) conduct endangered the life of another and acted with conscious disregard for life, may be guilty of second degree murder”] .)
In Powell , we explained the actus re us and mens rea elements of direct aiding and abetting implied malice

. T he actus reus required of the actual perpetrator is the commission of “ a life endangering act

. ” ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) By “life endangering act,”

we mean an act for which the natural and probable consequences are dangerous to human

32 The defense accident reconstruction expert acknowledged that the 93 miles per hour
s peed recorded by the airbag control module was accurate.37 life and proximately caused death

. ( Powell , at p p

. 713, fn. 27 and 714 ; see also People v.
Knoller (2007) 41 Cal .4th 139, 143 [ describing the required act as “an act, t he natural consequences of which are dangerous to life ” or stated slightly differently, “ conduct that endangers the life of another ”]; People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296 , 300 ( Watson ) [same] .) To be culpable as a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder, the accomplice “ must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life

- endangering act

. ” ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.) Thus, the aider and abettor’s actus re u s

“ includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life endangering act. ” ( Ibid. ; accord Valenzuela , supra , 73 Cal.App.5 th at p. 501.)

“ The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act , intent to aid the perpetrator
in the commission of the act , knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life .” ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713 ; accord Valenzuela , supra , 73 Cal.App.5 th at p. 501 .)
2 . Validity of the Theory of Aiding and Abetting Implied Malice Murder Acknowledging our decision in Powell , Roman nevertheless maintains that aiding and abetting implied malice murder is not a valid theory of liability for second degree
murder and that Powell was wrongly decided

. Fundamentally, Roman critic izes our reliance in Powell on our high court’s

statement in Gentile that : “ notwi thstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that h is or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life .” ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713 and fn. 29 , quoting Gentile , supra , 10 Cal.5th at p. 850 , italics omitted. ) Roman asserts our high38 court’s statement in Gentile was dicta , and thus unnecessary to the resolution of the

case. 33
But while statements unnecessary to a court’s decision are not binding precedent,
it is well

- settled that our high court ’s “ ‘ dicta generally should be followed, particu larly where the comments reflect the court’s considered reasoning

. ’ ” ( People v. Tovar (20 17 )
10 Cal.App.5th 750, 759 , quoting People v. Rios (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 542, 563; See also, United Steelworkers of America v. Board of Education (1984) 162 Cal.Ap p.3d 823,
835 [“ Even if properly characterized as dictum, statements of the Supreme Court should be considered persuasive ” ]; City of Los Angeles v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co. (1920)
182 Cal. 652 , 660 [“The statements in the opinions of the Supreme Court of this state

... although obiter dicta , are very persuasive ” ].) In our view, the Gentile court’s
observation , in effect, recognizing t he validity of aiding and abetting implied malice
murder , was refl ective of “considered reasoning , ” and it was persuasive and should be followed. (See also, Valenzuel a, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 499 [also relying on the quotation from Gentile and concluding that Powell was “entirely consistent with Gentile in basing murder liability on the aider and abettor’s own state of mind

— conscious disregard for life ”]; Langi , supra , 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 979 [also relying on the Gentile quote ] .)
Defendant also asserts that our focus on the life endangering act and making an aider and abettor liable for the result of that act regardless of his intent to achieve that
result “simply repackaged [natural and probable consequences] murder as aiding and

33 As Roman notes the Gentile court’s statement concerning direct aiding and abetting implied malice murder was made in response to an amicus brief which argued for a hybrid version of the natural a nd probable consequences doctrine to reach scenarios illustrated in two unpublished opinions. ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713, fn. 29, citing Gentile , supra , 10 Cal.5th at pp. 849

- 851.) According to Roman, because our high court was responding to an argument by amicus , the court’s quote was unnecessary to the resolution of Gentile’s appeal.39 abetting implied malice murder.” We dis agree. As we noted in Powell , under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the prosecution was not required to prove the mental state required for implied malice : the aider and abettor was subjectively aware of
the risk of death and acted in con scious disregard thereof . On the other hand, the prosecut ion must prove those elements to establish direct aid ing and abett ing implied
malice murder

. ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p p. 711

- 713 .) This distinction was recognized by the court in Valenzuela in rejecting an argument similar to the one Roman
makes here. ( Valenzuel a, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 503

- 504 [ the natural and probable consequences doctrine the Legislature sought to eliminate in Senate Bill 1437 did not require a finding that the aider and abettor know his conduct endangers the life of another and that he acted with conscious disregard for life] ; s ee also People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1056 , 1059 [ the natural and p robable consequences for indirect aiding and abetting and the natural and probable consequences for implied malice murder “are distinctly different concepts,” the latter of which pertains to the mental state the aider and
abettor must share with the actual perpetrator and it “does not transform ” an implied
malice murder conviction into one for murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine within the meaning of section 1170.95 ]

. )
Roman next argues that Senate Bill 1437 actually eliminated aiding and abetting liability for implied malice murder by amending section 188 to provide that malice may
not be “ imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime .” ( § 188, subd. (a).) According to Roman, the theory of direct aiding and abetting implied malice
we discussed in Powell , “indicates that malice is imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in the crime.” ( Italics added.) Not so. Again, for liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the aider
and abettor need only have the intent to participate in a target offens e; guilt for the charged crime is thereby imputed to him. But for second degree murder based on implied malice, t here is no imputation of malice because, as we have explained, the direct aider40 and abettor must have the same mental state as the actual perpetrator of the charged
crime : the direct aider and abettor must act with knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life and with conscious disregard for human life

. Given th e mens rea requirement s for aidi ng and abetting implied malice , n ot only is malice not “ imputed ” on this direct aiding and abetting theory , but liability is not grounded “solely” upon participation in the crime within the meaning of section 188, subdivision (a)(3) as
amended in Senate Bi ll 1437

. Liability for murder is grounded upon the requirement that the aider and abettor personally harbor malice.
We also note that there is no indication the Legislature intended to abrogate the concept of aiding and abetting implied malice murder as mentioned in Gentile

. In this regard, we think it significant that our high court’s statement in Gentile concerning aiding and abetting implied malice was prefaced with: “ notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second degree murder

. . . .” The Legislative history of Senate Bill 775 indicates the Legislature’s intent to abrogate
the Gentile court’s holding that the petition procedure in section 1170.95 was the sole method of challenging the validity of a conviction under Senate Bill 1437. 34 But nothing in Senate Bill 775 or its legislative history indicates a rejection of our high court’s
observation concerning the availability of direct aiding and abetting implied malice
murder as a th eory of accomplice liability , nor is the re any legislative history indicating disagreement with our holding in Powell . If the Legislature inten d ed to abrogate aiding

34 An Assembly Public Safety Committee analysis states: “In Gentile , the California Supreme Court found that the petition process set forth in Penal Code sec tion 1170.95 is the exclusive remedy for retroactive SB 1437 relief on nonfinal judgments. [Citation.] Generally, the rule is that a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has pass ed. [Citation.] [¶] This bill would provide that where a conviction is not final, it may be challenged on SB 1437 grounds on direct appeal from that conviction.” ( Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen ate Bill 775 as amended July 6, 2021 , p. 11.)41 and abetting implied malice murder , we think it would have expressly done so in Senate
Bi ll 775. After all, when enacting legislation, “ ‘ T he Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial decisions

. . . in effect at the time legislation is enacted , and
to have enacted and amended statutes “ ‘ in the light of such decisions a s have a direct bearing upon them .’ ” ’ ” ( People v. C as ti llo lopez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 322, 331, italics added; People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 367 ( Licas ); People v. Overstreet (1986)
42 Cal.3d 891, 897.) We reject Roman’s contention that direct aiding and abetting implied malice murder is not a valid theory of liability for second degree murder.
C. Powell Instructional Error Anticipating our rejection of the arguments immediately above, d efendant argues that assuming aiding and abetting implied malice murder is a valid theory, the trial
court’s instructions were erroneous based on Powell

. W ith this, w e agree. Like the instructions in Powell , the standard instructions given here were not
tailored to address direct aiding and abetting l iability for implied malice murder. ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 715; see also Langi , supra , 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982 [“ As explained in [ Powell ], the standard aiding

- and

- abetting instructions are ill suited to the crime of second degree murder ,” a nd if “ a trial court uses such an instruction without tailoring it to the specifics of that crime, the instruction creates an ambiguity under which the jury may find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting second degree murder without finding that he p ersonally acted with malice ”].) Given this instructional error, we must determine whether the error was prejudicial. Before we do, we turn briefly to defendant’s second claim of error

— alternative

- theory error

— because the evolution of the legal analysis for harmless error
has occurred most recently in the context of that form of instructional error

.42 D . Retroactive Alternative

- Theory Error When a trial court instructs a jury on tw o theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and one legally incorrect, reviewing courts refer to this as alternative

theory error. ( People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 9 ( Aledamat ).) Both sides agree
the enactments of Senate Bill 1437 and 77 5 effectuated alternative

- theory error retroactively. But they disagree as to whether the error was harmless, and indeed disagree on the method for determining harmlessness.
E . Harmless Error
1. Chapman / Neder / Aledamat & Federal Authorities
As the A led a mat court explained, f or misdescription of elements and alternative

theory instructional error, we apply the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. ( Aledamat , supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9.) The

court clarified that , “ no higher standard of review applies to alternative

- theory error than applies to other misdescriptions of the elements. The same beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies to all such misdescriptions, inclu ding alternative

- theory error. ” ( Ibid .) In other words, t here is no hybrid standard for determining harmlessness ; rather, “ the
usual ‘beyond a reasonable doubt , ’ ” Chapman standard applies. ( Aledamat , at p. 3, citing Chapman , at p. 24. , italics added.) Under that standard, “[t] he reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause , including the evidence , and considering all relevant
circumstances , it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” ( Aledamat, at p. 3, italics added.) T he reviewing court asks : “ ‘ Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the

error. ’ ” ( People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827, quoting Neder v. Unite d States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 ( Neder ), italics added ; accord Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p.
715 .) As these pronouncements suggest , there is no one exclusive way to determine
harmlessness.43 Indeed , the Aledamat court cited several federal circuit court opinions that actually appl ied different methods of determining harmlessness for alternative

- theory error under
the Chapman beyond a reasonable doubt test

. ( Aledamat, supra , 8 Cal.5th at p. 11.) Four
of those federal c ases are pertinent here , in that the y focus ed on whether the verdict

“ would have been the same ” based the overwhelming nature of the evidence, instead of divining the theory the jury actually relied upon in reaching its verdict.
In United States v. Skilling (5th Cir. 2011) 638 F.3d 480 ( Skilling II ) , the circuit court, after examining the record, found the alternative

- theory error there was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence underlying a valid theory was “overwhelming.” ( Id

. at p. 483 .) In Skilling II , the defendant had been convicted of
various federal white

- collar crimes, including conspiracy to commit honest

- services fraud
and securities fraud

. ( Id

. at p. 481.) The United States Supreme Court subsequently
invalidated the honest services fraud theory advanced at trial and remanded the case back to the circuit court to determine whether submitting the invalidated theory to the jury was
harmless. ( Ibid .) 35 On remand, the G overnment argued the error was harmless as to th e conspiracy conviction , because the evidence established the defendant participated in a scheme to deceive the investing public and based on that , the court could conclude the jury would have convicted him under a valid theory : conspiracy to commit secur ities
fraud. ( Id . at p. 483.) Treating the matter as alternative

- theory error, the Skilling II court found the error
harmless. ( Skilling II, supra, 638 F.3d at p p . 481, 488 .) Consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent, the Skilling II court focused on one way to prove an alternative

- theory error harmless: “ as set forth in Neder v. United States

. . . , an error is

35 T he high court held that the honest

- services fraud statute is limited only to schemes involving bribes or kickbacks , neither of which took place in Skilling

. ( Skilling v. United States (2010) 561 U.S. 358 , 408

- 409.)44 harmless if a court, after a ‘ thorough examination of the record, ’ is able to ‘ conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the

error

. ’ [Citation

. ] If the defendant ‘ raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding,’ then the error was not harmless

. [Citation

. ] Thus, under the

. . . Neder
standard , a reviewing court, ‘in typical appellate

- court fashion, asks whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to [an acquittal] with respect to the [valid theory of guilt]. ’ ” ( Skilling II , at p. 482 , italics added .) 36 The “crux of the matter,” 37 according to the Skilling II court was “ whether, under
the Neder standard, the evidence presented at trial proves that Skilling conspired to

36 Another method of determini ng harmlessness for alternative

- theory error, cited in Skilling is when “the jury, in convicting on an invalid theory of guilt, necessarily found facts establishing guilt on a valid theory.” ( Skilling II , supra , 638 F.3d at p. 482, italics added.) We dis cuss a similar method, post

.
37 Before addressing what it characterized as the “crux of the matter” in its analysis, the Skilling II court addressed what it called “preliminary matters” raised by the defendant. First, it rejected Skilling’s claim that the fact the jury was instructed with two theories, one of which had been invalidated, was dispositive of the question of harmlessness. (S killing II , supra , 638 F.3d at p. 483.) The court reasoned that “the fact that the jury may have relied upon an invalid theory of guilt shows only that an alternative

- theory error occurred, not that the error was not harmless.” ( Ibid .) Second, the court rejected Skilling’s contention that the Government’s closing argument made it more likely the jury convicted him of conspiracy based on the invalidated theory. ( Ibid .) The court noted that the Government mentioned the invalidated theory regarding both defendants in rebuttal , but mentioned it only once as to Skilling. ( Ibid .) “Further, it never argued that the jury s hould convict Skilling solely on the honest

- services theory, nor did it tell the jury that it should disregard the evidence of securities fraud in reaching a conviction

. This single reference to Skilling’s honest services, in light of the Government’s ext ensive argument on securities fraud, merely permitted the jury to decide the case on the wrong theory. It did not force or urge it to do so, and therefore, it shows only that an alternative

theory error occurred, not that the error was not harmless .” ( Ib id

. , italics added. ) We discuss the prosecution’s closing argument in the instant case, post

.45 commit securities fraud. ” 38 ( Skilling II , supra , 638 F.3d at p. 483.) It then went on to
hold : “ Based on our own thorough examination of the considerable record in this case, we find that the jury was presented with overwhelming evidence that Skilling conspired to commit securities fraud, and thus we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
verdict would have been the same absent the alternative

- theory error. ” ( Skilling II , at pp.
483

- 484, italics added.) Similarly, in United States v. Black ( 7th Cir. 2010) 625 F.3d 386 (Black ) , another
case in volving the invalidated honest services theory , the prosecution had advanced a valid theory related to pecuniary fraud to prove mail and wire fraud . The court

38 In Neder , the trial court erroneously omitted an element of the offense. The high court held the e rroneous instruction was harmless. ( Neder , supra , 527 U.S. at p. 2.) Based on its reasoning, Neder is often cited for the proposition that where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the omitted element or elements were uncontested and (2) the evidence establishing the omitted element was overwhelming , the error is harmless

. (See Merritt , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 832; People v. Mil ( 2012 ) 53 Cal.4th 400, 410

- 411, 41 7 .) But while this was one way to establish harmlessness , the Neder court did not suggest it was the only way or set out these circumstances out as requirements. The Neder court held: “ In this situation , where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and
s upported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless.” ( Neder , at p. 1 7 .) The italicized portion of this quote

— “In this situation”

— suggests reasoning that was situational based on the circumstances in that case. Similarly, t he Neder court la ter stated that if , at the end of the reviewing court’s examination of the record, “ the court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury ver dict would have been the same absent the error

— for example , where the defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding

— it should not find the error harmless. ” ( Id . at p. 19.) The italicized text

— “for example”

— again suggests circumstances where the error would not be harmless, but nothing the Neder court said limits a court’s analysis in this regard when determining whether “i t clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error .” ( Id . at p. 18 , italics added .) Indeed, by highlighting the cited circumstances in Neder as an example, the high court implicitly acknowledge d there could be other examples or methods of determining harmlessness.46 explained: “[I] f it is not open to reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would have
convicted [defendants] of pecuniary fraud, the convictions on the fraud counts will
stand .” ( Id. at p. 388, italics added.) On one count, the Black court concluded that the
evidence of pecuniary fraud was “not conclusive” and reversed. ( Id . at pp. 392

- 393.) However, as to another count , the court concluded , “ the evidence of pecuniary fraud [was] so compelling that no reasonable jury could have refused to convict the defendants
of it” and affirmed the conviction on that count. ( Id . at p. 393.)
Our hig h court cited Skilling II and Black with apparent approval in Al e d a mat

. ( Al e d a mat , supra , 8 Cal.5th at p. 11.) 39 Thus , w e see Skilling II and Black as example s of a proper method for determining harmlessness based on the nature of the evidence establishing a valid theory beyond a reasonable doubt

. 40

39 In Al e d a mat , our high court cited Skilling II in rejecting the notion that there should be some hybrid method of determining harmlessness for alternative

- theory error different from Chapman . The Al e d a mat court wrote: “ As the court that reviewed the Skilling case on remand recognized,

. . . the [high] court ‘ did not specifically identify the harmless

error standard that is applicable to alternative

- theory errors, but it cited to a string of cases that apply a common harm less

- error standard to other types of instructional
errors ’ .” ( [] Skilling [II,] [ supra ,] 638 F.3d [at p.] 481; see id . at p. 482 [applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard].) ” ( Aledamat , supra , 8 Cal.5th at p. 11.) The Aledamat court cited Black along with a string of federal cases for the proposition that the

“ the same Chapman analysis of harmless error applies to alternative

- theory error as applies to other kinds of misdescription of the elements .” ( Ibid. )

40 Other courts , not cited in Aleda mat , have applied the Skilling II overwhelming evidence approach. (See e.g., United States v. Wright (2019) 937 F.3d 8, 30, citing Neder , supra , 527 U.S. at p. 17 [“ we are required to affirm the conviction if the evidence for either [valid] theory of guilt

. . . was so “ ‘ overwhelming

. . . that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error [Citations]

. ’ .

. . We thus confine our harmless error analysis to determining whether the government has met its burden to show that the evidence [of the valid theory] was “overwhelming ’ ” ] .) At least one other court has followed the Skilling II overwhelming evidence analysis in the context of aiding and abetting. In S priggs v. United States (2012) 52 A.3d 878 , the jury was presented with two theories on which the defendant could have been guilty of the charged burglary, either as a principal or as an aider and abettor. The defendant resided at the residence47 Further, i n two other federal circuit cases cited in Aledamat , the court employed a similar method for determining harmlessness for alternative

- theory error under the beyond a reasonable doubt test: “[I]f the evidence that the jury necessarily credited in
order to convict the defendant under the instructions given

. . . is such that the jury must
have conv icted the defendant on the legally adequate ground in addition to or instead of the legally inadequate ground , the conviction may be affirmed.” ( Bereano v. United
States (4th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3d 568, 578, italics added ( Bereano ) [addressing alternative

th eory error related to the invalidated hones t services theory of mail fraud and concluding that the evidence establishing the valid theory of pecuniary fraud was overwhelming ]; United States v. Jefferson (4th Cir. 2012) 674 F.3d 332, 361 ( Jefferson ) [also a ddressing
alternative

- theory error based on the invalidated honest services theory].) As the court in Jefferson put it, “a reviewing court is not entitled to reverse a conviction that could rest on either a valid or invalid legal theory if the court can c onclude ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’ ” ( Jefferson , at p. 361, citing Neder , supra , 527 U.S. at p. 18 , italics added .) In asserting the alternative

- theory error was not harmless here , Roman relies upon People v. Thompkins (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 365 ( Thompkins ). There, the issue addressed
was whether the alternative

- theory error stemming from our high court’s clarification of the kill zone theory for attempted murder was harmless. 41 Rejecting the idea of evaluating whether a valid theory was supported by the evidence, the Thompkins court found the error was not harmless. It reasoned: “ In assessing prejudice, Aledamat

where the burglary occurred , and the jury was misinstructed on the princip a l theory of liability related to his residence

. Citing Skilling II and noting that if “ after a thorough examination of the record, [the reviewing court] is able to conclude beyond a reasonab le doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent error ,” the Spriggs court found the error harmless given that “ the evidence of [defendant’s] guilt under an aiding and abetting theory was overwhelming .” ( Id . at p. 886 , italics added .)

41 See People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591.48 considered the likelihood that the jurors would have applied t he erroneous instruction , not simply the strength of the evidence to support a guilty verdict using the correct
instruction. [Citation

. ] This focus on the impact of the erroneous instruction rather than the strength of the evidence of guilt is central to Aledamat’s reasoning on prejudice. This is not the type of error that can be rendered harmless by ‘overwhelming’ evidence of guilt alone .” ( Thompkins , at p. 399, italics added.)
The Thompkins court acknowledged that our high court in Aledamat rejected a

“ more demanding standard of review ” for alternative

- theory error and instead held that:

“ ‘ The reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including t he evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ’ ” ( Thompkins , supra , 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.) But the Thompkins court went on to reason: “ As we understand the standard
of review , the question is not whether we think it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were actually guilty of five attempted murders based on the valid theory, but whether we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury’s actual verdicts were not

t ainted by the inaccurate jury instruction. We focus on the likelihood that the jury relied on the kill zone instruction in reaching its verdicts, not simply the likelihood of defendants’ guilt under a legally correct theory

. ” ( I

bid

. , italics added.)
To the extent that Thompkins can be read as requiring that its approach of focusing on the error’s impact on the verdict must be applied in all cases , as Roman seems to argue, we disagree with that view for two reasons. First, reviewi ng courts must

“ examin [e] the entire cause , including the evidence , and consider [] all relevant
circumstances .” ( Aledamat , supra , 8 Cal.5th at p. 3 , italics added .) And we must then
ask: “ Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error? ” ( Neder , supra, 527 U.S. at p. 18; Merritt , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 827, italics added.) Accordingly, there is no one way to establish49 harmlessness for instructional error, including alternative

- theory err or. Aledamat teaches
as much. In our view, the Thompkins approach, if generically applied in all cases, would focus the analysis through an aperture that is too narrow. Indeed, the Aledamat court specifically rejected a narrow focus on the verdicts. It did so by clarifying its earlier
statements in in People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 and In re Martinez (2017) 3
Cal.5th 1216 , regarding the harmless error standard applied in alternative

- theory error
cases. In Martinez , the court stated that alternative

- theory error , “requires reversal unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied on a legally valid theory in convicting the defendant of first degree murder.” ( Martinez , at p.
1218 , Chiu , at p. 167 [same] ) But the Aledamat court clarified that the Chiu / Martinez means of determining harmlessness was not exclusive and , “ Chiu and Martinez were only a specific application of the more general reasonable doubt test stated in cases like Neder [ C itation] a nd Merritt [ C itation] .” ( Aledamat , supra , 8 Cal.5th at p. 12.) “ [T] he reviewing court is not limited to a review of the verdict itself. An examination of the actual verdict may be sufficient to demonstrate harmlessness, but it is not necessary. In
both Chiu and Martinez , we examined the record and found that it affirmatively showed the jury might have based its verdict on the invalid theory. Because no other basis to find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was at issue, we did not explore whe ther other ways of finding the error harmless existed. Those cases merely provide one way in which a court might evaluate harmlessness. They do not preclude other ways .” ( Id

. at p. 13, italics added.) Similarly, the Aledamat court’s method of determining harmlessness in the
circumstances of that case

— a method it characterized as “[a] nonexclusive way the error50 can be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ”

— only illustrates one example of
how harmlessness can be determined. ( Aledamat , sup ra , 8 Cal.5th at pp. 14

- 15.) 42 Second, the federal circuit court cases cited by our high court in Aledamat with apparent approval identified different method s for determining harmlessness

. As we have seen, t hose methods focus ed on whether the verdict “ would have been the same ”
based the overwhelming nature of the evidence, as opposed to divining the theory the jury r elied upon in arriving at its verdict. Because the Aledamat court cited these federal
circuit court cases, we apply their persuasive analysis here

. 2. Analysis

– Harmlessness of the Alternative

- Theory Error We regard the evidence of Roman’s culpability as a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder to be overwhelming , such that the jury would have found him guilt y absent the error

. We first examine some fundamental rules concerning

42 Moreover, our high court in Aledamat did not focus on the likelihood that the jury

“ would have applied the erroneous instruction ” as suggested in Thompkins

. In Aledamat , the alternative

- theory error relat ed to the trial court’s instruction on the definition of “deadly weapon” in the assault with a deadly weapon instruction. It was alleged that a box cutter wielded by the defendant was the deadly weapon. The instruction told the jury an implement could be a deadly weapon either because it is “ inherently deadly or deadly in the way defendant used it.” ( Aledamat , supra , 8 Cal.5th at p. 6, italics added.) Because a box cutter is not inherently deadly, it was error to give the jury that alternative theory. ( Ibid .) The circumstances the Aledamat court focused upon in concluding that the error was harmless related primarily to the elements for assault with a deadly weapon in the instructions. It reasoned that defendant’s argument on appeal for prejudice presupposed that under the instructions, the jury would believe there were two ways it could find the box cutter to be a deadly weapon

– inherently deadly and how the defendant u sed it. ( Id . at p. 13.) However, t he court concluded it was “unlikely” the jury would so view the instructions. ( Ibid .) It reasoned that under the instructions (we need not detail here), it seemed “unlikely the jury would simply view the box cutter as inherently deadly without considering the circumstances, including how defendant used it.” ( I

d. at p. 14 .) The opinion, contrary to the interpretation of the Thompkins court, did not consider “ the likelihood that the jurors would have applied the erroneo us instruction .” (See Thompkins , supra , 50 Cal.App.5 th at p. 399.) It considered whether under the instructions given, the jury would have found the weapon inherently dangerous without also finding it was deadly in the way defendant used it. ( Aledamat , at pp. 14

- 15.)51 circumstances supporting a finding of aider and abettor liability and then examine th e evidence establishing the elements of aiding and abetting implied malice murder

. a. Aiding and Abetting Circumstances to Consider Aiding and abetting may be shown by circumstantial evidence. It is well

- settled
that the presence at the scene of the crime and failure to prevent it, companionship and conduct before and after the offense, including f light, are relevant to determining whether a defendant aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. ( People v. Lara (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 296, 322 ( Lara ) ; People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409; People v. Singleton (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 492 ; See also CALCRIM No. 401 .) 43 Regarding companionship, Ruslan and Roman are brothers who, a ccording to Roman, lived together. As for conduct before the murders , the two brother s conspired to commit early morning auto bur glaries and took property from vehicle s (along with a third person). Together, they then evaded law enforcement in an effort to escape apprehension. During this earlier evasion, Roman drove the get

- away vehicle , engaging in the same type of reckless and dangerous driving conduct Ruslan later employed. Together, the two brothers were involved in a serious crash resulting from Roman’s dangerous driving conduct and thereafter fled the crash scene together. Then, t ogether they commandeered a second get

- away vehicle, stealing a truck. After the crash resulting
in the murders , they again fled the crash scene together. Regarding failure to prevent the crime, at no time prior to the fatal crash did Roman try to stop Ruslan’s reckless and dangerous driving

. E ven though the evidence establishes that Roman’s own life was endangered by his brother’s driving conduct , h e could not remember ever asking Ruslan to stop or slow down.

43 It is also well

- settled that mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient in and of itself to constitute aiding and abetting, nor is the failure to take action to prevent a crime

. ( Lara , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 322 .)52 Motive is another circumstance to be considered in determining aiding and abetting l iability. (See People v. Rogers (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 502, 514 [helping the
actual perpetrator because of a “familial concern” is a motive to aid and abet].) A side from avoiding apprehension for the auto burglaries, Roman had a personal motive to aid
and abet his brother ’s reckless driving conduct ; Roman, by his own admission, did not want to go to jail on his own outstanding warrant. The evidence establishing a ll of these circumstances is uncontroverted

. We shall now discuss the evidence that is pertinent to the elements of aiding and abetting implied
malice murder

. b . The Actus Re u s A gain, “ t o be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the comm ission of the life

- endangering act

. ” ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.) Here, the life

- endangering act Roman aided was Ruslan’s driving conduct during the brothers’ ongoing effort to evade law enforcement and avoid apprehension

. There can be no serious argument that Ruslan’s driving conduct constituted an act, the natural and probable consequences of which were dangerous to human life and that this conduct was the proximate cause of the death of two peo ple. As noted, one pursuing deputy opined that it was more dangerous to drive at high speeds on surface roads as opposed to the freeway because of intersections, potential pedestrians and bicyclists, especially at 6:30 a.m. on a weekday. He further opine d that it was luck that the truck did not collide into a vehicle crossing the several intersections they went through on Antelope Road before the crash. Although the defense expert disagreed with the prosecution expert as to the precise speed at the poin t of impact, the defense expert nevertheless agreed that the truck was travelling on this surface street at a speed in excess of the speed limit on the freeway they had just exited. And b oth experts agreed that just one and one half second s before the53 col lision, the truck was travelling at 93 miles per hour; the posted speed limit was 45 miles per hour

. As one eyewitness put it, the truck was travelling like “a bat out of hell

. ” Indeed, before the crash that witness thought the truck might flip over beca use of its speed and the wet pavement.
But as our high court has stated , “ ‘ [a]n aider and abettor must do something ’ ” to be culpable

. ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 712, quoting McCoy , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1117.) So , what did Roman do? The evidence established, through his own admission, that when his brother asked where they should go, he said they should get off the freeway at Antelope Road because they knew the area. T he evidence conclusively
satisfies the actus re u s requirement for an aider and abettor here.
c. The Mens Rea As noted, “ [t] he mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act , intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act , knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life .” ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713; accord Langi , supra , 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983 ; Valenzuela , supra , 73 Cal.App.5th 501.) Like all elements of a crime, the mens rea elements of implied malice murder can be proven by circumstantial evidence. ( Valen zuela , at p. 502.) We find t he evidence of
th e required mens rea elements to be overwhelming here.
The evidence establishes that Roman knew his brother intended to continue
driv ing recklessly when he offered the advice about where to go

. In fact, when he gave that advice, Ruslan was driving recklessly on the freeway , including at some point, attempting to evade the police by using the emergency lane next to the center divider

. Nothing suggests Roman expected Ruslan to change his behavior when he told him to
exit at Antelope. As for their plans once on Antelope, all Roman said was “ [w]e didn’t
know where to go from there.” (Italics added.) Roman’s reference to “where to go f rom there” without any qualification of how they would get there shows he expected Ruslan54 to continue his evasion of the pursuing deputies. Indeed , Roman never told his brother to slow down. His own statement explains why

. A sked whether they were trying to get away from law enforcement during the evasion in the truck, Roman said, “Not from the

cops. I just wanted to, not from the cops in general. I just, I didn’t want to go to jail.” (Italics added.)
Th e totality of this evidence gives rise to only one reasonable inference: Roman expected his brother to continue their reckless flight to avoid apprehension for their earlier crimes and keep himself from going to jail on his warrant. Likewise, Roman ’s advice to get off at Antelope could only have been done with intent to aid Ruslan’s
reckless and dangerous driving conduct.
We further conclude the evidence is also overwhelming as to Roman ’s knowledge
that Ruslan’s driving conduct was dangerous to human life and that Roman acted in conscious disregard for human life when he advised Roman where to go

. Again, Roman
had earlier driven the m into what was described as an “[e]xtremly violent crash

. ” This
was less than an hour and a half before the fatal collision in the 6:30 a.m. commut er traffic. This circumstance is significant in establishing Roman’s risk awareness and conscious disregard

. (See Watson , supra , 30 Cal.3d 2 90, 293

- 294, 301 [ that the defendant had nearly collided with another vehicle before the fatal crash was considered significant proof of risk awareness and conscious disregard ]

. ) Moreover, we may look to the reason Roman gave for the specific advice he gave his brother in determining his awareness of the risk of death to people in their flight path.
Roman said they knew the area. This means that he had to have known that Antelope Road was a surface street with traffic lights controlling major intersections. Indeed,
Roman’s own accident reconstruction expert testified that the two brother s lived only a little m ore than a mile from the collision scene

. A nd o n cross
- examination, t he expert opined that a hypothetical person living in t he proximity of the collision scene would be55 familiar with the roadway , and when going over the overpass, would know about the
exis tence of the intersection where the collision occurred. Additionally, Roman admitted to investigators that he knew it was dangerous to speed and evade the police. He said he saw lights flashing and when asked what a person is supposed to do when they se e police lights, Roman said , “You ’ re supposed to pull over.” He said they were scared because “there’s so much [ sic ] cops after us.” But h e claimed they were only travelling at 50 to 60 miles per hour on Antelope Road. He knew
this because he looked at the speedometer. And , according to Roman, after Ruslan hit the
brakes , they slowed to “about like thirty

- five” at the point of the collision. Asked whether he thought it was safe to drive at 50 or 60 miles per hour in that area, Roman said, “at some points, no.” When then asked if Ruslan also knew it was dangerous, Roman said he did and added, “ I mean, I’m sure. He’s not stupid.” Notably, a l l witnesses testified the truck was travelling much faster than Roman admitted and indeed, the air bag module recorded the speed at 93 miles per hour just a second and a half before the collision. Giving a false statement evincing consciousness of guilt i s another circumstance tending to prove aiding and abetting. ( Lara , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 322.) More to the point here, regarding risk awareness , Roman’s false

statement as to speed demonstrate s he personally appreciated the risk of death posed by
h is brother’s excessive speed and tried to downplay it by claiming they were not going as fast as they were. Finally, the brothers’ conduct after the fatal collision show their disregard for the
risk their conduct presented to human life. In response to a question from one of the jurors, the primary pursuing deputy testified that after colliding into the Kia at a high rate of speed and pushing it an estimated 45 yards, the two occupants of the truck fled from the scene without checking on the occupants of the Kia

. This conduct was consistent with the prosecutor’s closing argument theme : Roman and Ruslan did not care whether they endangered or hurt anyone during the flight from law enforcement

.56 In our view, no reasonable inference can be drawn from th is evidence other than Roman aided and abetted implied malice murder. Stated differently, we see no evidence

“ sufficient to support a contrary finding,” i.e., no evidence “that could rationally lead to [ an acquittal ] with respect to the’ ” valid theory of ai ding and abetting implied malice. ( Skilling II , supra , 638 F.3d at p. 482.) It is thus clear “ beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error ” occasioned by the
retroactive alternative

- theory error he re. (See Neder , supra , 527 U.S. at p. 18; Merritt
, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 827; Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 715, italics added

. ) d. The Facts Supporting the Jury’s Verdict of Willful Evasion of a Peace Officer with Wanton Disregard Not only is the evidence supporting the valid theory here overwhelming, but that evidence is the very same evidence the jury had to have credited in finding that defendant aided and abetted the target crime for the natural and probab le consequences theory

—

eva ding a peace officer with wanton disregard for safety

. Thus, we conclude from this
additional circumstance that the jury would have convicted the defendant on the legally
valid ground in addition to the legally invalid theory

. ( See Bereano , supra, 706 F.3d at
p p

. 578

- 579 [Reasoning that “[a] conviction based on honest services fraud necessarily acknowledges that the jury accepts as true the scheme the Government has alleged, that Bereano knowingly took advantage of his client[s’] trust by sending them false bills. In accepting that this scheme took place, the jury also necessarily accepted that Bereano knowingly obtained his clients’ money by false pretenses, a finding that equates to a conviction for pecuniary fraud ”]

. ) First, we note that Roman’s jury was instructed it had t o find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Ruslan committed second degree murder before it could convict Roman based on the natural and probable consequences theory. And given that there was no eviden ce of intentional murder and the prosecutor argued the murder was based on implied malice , Roman’s jury necessarily concluded Ruslan committed implied malice murder and in57 doing so ne cessarily concluded that his driving conduct was life endangering and tha t it
caused the death of the victims

. Second, the jury had to have found that Roman did something to aid and abet the target crime. The act Roman performed to aid that crime is the same act supporting culpability for aiding and abetting implied malice murder

– he advised Ruslan to get off the freeway at an exit where they knew the area

. Wh ile we note the element of wanton disregard in the evading offense is not limited to the safety of persons

— it can be either the wanton disregard of the safety of

persons or property and the jury was so instructed

— no rational jury could have concluded from the evidence here that the driving conduct in the truck only risked the safety of property ; many peopl e on Interstate 80 and A ntelope Road that morning were clearly endangered during the flight in the truck and two people were ultimately killed

. We also acknowledge that the wanton disregard element can be established by the
commission of three or more Vehicle Code violations an d those violations need not be life endangering in the abstract

. 44 But the evidence demonstrated that t he commission of
those offenses here was life endangering. Consequently, it is clear that the evidence the jury must have credited and relied upon to f ind culpability for the target offense under

44 Regarding evading a peace officer with wanton disregard for safety , the jury was instructed in pertinent part: “A perso n acts with wanton disregard for safety when (1) he or she is aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm , [and] (2) he or she intentionally ignores that risk. [¶] Driving with willful or wanton disregard for the sa fety of persons or property includes, but is not limited to, causing damage to property while driving or committing three or more violations that are each assigned a traffic violation point . [¶] Driving at an Unsafe Speed (Vehicle Code § 22350) , Driving in Excess of Posted Speed Limit (Vehicle Code § 22348), Unsafe Lane Change (Vehicle Code § 21750), and Failure to Drive on the Right Side of the Roadway (Vehicle Code § 21650) are each assigned a traffic violation point.” (Italics added.)58 any theory of that offense , was the same evidence establishing Roman’s culpability for implied malice murder. 45 (See in Bereano , supra, 706 F.3d at p. 578 .) e. The Prosecution’s Closing Argument In arguing that the alternative

- theory error here was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Roman relies upon two isolated excerpt s of the prosecution’s initial closing argument. He argues that because the prosec utor argued the natural and probable consequences theory was the “easiest” and “cleanest” wa y to second degree murder, he was prejudiced because we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jurors did not rely on that now invalidated theory to arrive a t their verdict. But while a showing that the jury did not rely on the invalidated theory in reaching
its verdict would establish harmlessness, a gain that is not the only way harmlessness can
be established. ( Aledamat , supra , 8 Cal.5th at p. 13 .)

45 To be clear , we do not conclude that because the jury found the target offense, it necessarily found implied malice murder as a matter of law. As noted, e vading a peace officer with wanton disregard for safety can be committed without endangering people. Risk of da nger to and damage to property or three or more Vehicle Code violations are sufficient. Thus, the elements of the target offense and implied malice do not align in the abstract and a finding of culpability as to the target offense here does not necessarily equate to a finding of implied malice. (See People v. Howard (2005) 34 Cal.App.4th 1129.) Our conclusion here is based on the evidence the jury must have accepted in the context of this case to conclude Roman aided and abetted the target offe nse , not on the elements the jury necessarily found as to the target offense

. Accordingly, while we employ an analysis her e that is similar to the analysis in Aledamat , we do not employ the precise method that court used to determine harmlessness: “ The r eviewing court examines what the jury necessarily did find [as to specific elements] and asks whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the jury to find that without also finding the missing fact as well. ” ( Aledamat , supra , 8 Cal.5th at pp. 14

- 15 , italics added [Concluding that n o reasonable jury that made all of the findings necessary to find the elements of assault with a deadly weapon could have failed to find that defendant used the box cutter in a way that is capable of causing or likely to cause death or great bodily injury ].)59 The prosecutor’s argument, is nevertheless a pertinent circumstance that should be
considered in determining whether an error is harmless. ( Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 172 [concluding that the instructional error as to aiding and abetting implied malice murder was harmless as to the defendant because the prosecutor did not argue he was culpable under that theory and argued implied malice only as to the codefendant] .) But

r ather than focus on the two snippets highlighted by defendant, we have exami ned the entirety of the prosecutor’s argument concerning the two second degree murder theories.
Our review reveals his discussion focused on direct aiding and abetting implied malice at least as much as the natural and probable consequences theory

. Moreo ver, his theme from the beginning of the trial was that Roman and his brother did not care about the risks posed to others by their flight , a theme consistent with the conscious disregard for
the risk of death element of implied malice murder. The prose cutor began his initial closing argument with this same theme: “ The defendant and his brother could care less who was on the roadway at 6:30 in the morning as they were driving . . . at almost 100 miles per hour through commute traffic. Certainly didn’t care that the road they were about to get off on was much more congested and . . .
was much mor e higher likely [sic] to end in the tragedy that we’ve got in this case. [¶] The defendant and his brother could care less as they drove this truck into this small car at speeds between 74 to 80 miles per hour. They didn’t care that [the victims] were dying in that car as they got out and they kept running.” Later, i n discussing the murder counts, the prosecutor explained there were two degr ees of murder the jury was to consider, first degree felony murder based on the burglary during which the keys for the truck were stolen and second degree murder based on implied malice murder. In describing the second degree murder theory, the prosecutor told the jury there were “two different ways that a defendant is guilty of second

- degree murder. One is he is an aider and abettor to Ruslan’s implied malice murder. He is directly aiding and abetting Ruslan in committing a second

- degree murder. [¶] A nd the60 other way is this natural and probable consequence. This is sort of the least common denominator under these facts. I think it is the easiest to get to and it’s clearest to get to
second

- degree murder for Defendant Roman under this aider and abett or to natural and probable consequence. [¶] But in order to determine

. . . the defendant is guilty, you have to determine if Ruslan’s guilty of second

- degree murder because you can’t aid and abet a crime that never happened. So you have to first say, ‘ Did Ruslan commit a
second

- degree murder by implied malice?’ ” After discussing the relevant evidence establishing Ruslan’s culpability for implied malice murder, the prosecutor then turned to Roman’s culpability as a direct aider and abettor by first posing the following questions: “[W] hat was Roman’s state of
mind? Did Roman encourage this? ” He then discussed some of the circumstances we
discuss ed ante answering these questions and establishing Roman’s culpability for aiding and abetting implied malice murder, including Roman’s advice to get off the freeway at
Ant elope . The prosecutor emphasized that it was this advice “that brought Ruslan’s driving in direct conflict with” the Kia. The prosecutor argued Roman “didn’t care any
more than Ruslan did” and further argued , “[t]hey don’t care if they kill. That’s murd er under the second degree.” Turning to the alternative theory, t he prosecutor then stated, “so that’s one way. It’s even easier to get to second

- degree murder through what’s known as a natural and probable consequence doctrine. ” After discussing the evidence establishing the target offense of evading a peace officer with wanton disregard, the prosecutor again posed the question , “did Roman encourage that ?” He answered his question by telling the jury, “Again, look at the at the same thing ” and reiterated the argument he had made concerning implied malice murder , emphasizing Roman’s advice to get off at Antelope
Road . He told the jury the brothers went from the freeway to “a more conge sted road”
and argued it was “just a matter of time when there is an awful tragedy, and that’s exactly what happened.”61 C ritically, the prosecutor’s argument as to each second degree murder theory
focused on the same evidence

— or as the prosecutor put i t, “the same thing .” Similar to Skilling II , we conclude that the fact the argument permitted the jury to decide the case
based on two theories, one of which was later invalidated, “shows only that an
alternative

- theory error occurred, not that the error was not harmless.” ( Skilling II , supra , 638 F.3d at p. 483.) And like in Skilling II , the evidence of the valid theory was overwhelming . Moreover, the evidence the prosecutor focused upon and that the jury
must have credited to conclude that defendant a ided and abetted the target crime was the same that established his culpability for aiding and abetting implied malice murder. (See
Bereano , supra, 706 F.3d at p. 578 and Jefferson , supra, 674 F.3d at p. 361 .) Accordingly, w e are not persuaded by Roman’s contention that t he prosecutor’s argument here prejudiced him.
f. Conclusion

– Retroactive Alternative

- Theory Error Applying Chapman , Neder , Aledamat and the federal circuit cases we have discussed, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found
Roman guilty absent the retroactive alternative

- theory error occasioned by Senate Bill
1437.
3

. Analysis

– Harmlessness of the Powell Error As our high court has noted, the same standard of review that applies to
alternative

- theory error applies to other misdescriptions of the elements. ( Aledamat , supra , 8 Cal.5th at p. 9.) Erroneous aiding and abetting instructions are treated the same as misdescription of elements. (See Neder , supra , 527 U.S. at p. 14, quoting California v. Roy (1996) 519 U.S. 2, 5 [noting that the failure to instruct that the jury could convict the defendant as an aider and abettor only if it found that the defendant had the intent or purpose of aiding the perpetrator’s crime is an error that “ ‘could be ‘as easily characterized as a ‘misdescription of an element’ of the crime, as it is characterized as an error of ‘omission’ ” ’].)62 Accordingly, we apply the same analysis in determining harmlessness as to the
Powell instructional e rror we discussed ante and conclude the error was harmless

. Again,

we ask: “ Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error? ” ( Neder , supra , 527 U.S. at p. 18; Merritt , supra , 2
Cal.5th a t p. 827 ; Powell , supra , 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 715 .) And we conclude, based on the overwhelming evidence discussed ante that Roman’s jury would have convicted him of second degree murder based on a properly instructed implied malice theory if it had not been instructed on the now invalidated natural and probable consequences theory.
4. Conclusion
We conclude that both the retroactive alternative

- theory error and Powell instructional error here are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
VIII. Consecutive Term Sentencing Roman next contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive
terms for his two second degree murder convictions

. He argues concurrent terms are mandated by California Rule of Court , rule 4.425 (rule 4.425), as well as the body of law recognizing that individuals Roman’s age think differently than adults and are thus less culpable. We disagree.
A. A dditional B ackground In imposing two consecutive 15

- year
- to

- life terms for the second degree murder
convictions , the trial court explained that it had considered all the factors under rule 4.425: “I know his youth, drug addiction, no history of violent crimes. All of that was certainly taken into cons ideration.” 46 But focusing on the two victims, the court noted

46 Roman’s counsel had provided a statement in mitigation emphasizing Roman’s youth and attached reports chronicling interviews with Roman’s friends who described Roman as drug free until he suffe red a 2011 car crash and was prescribed pain medication. At sentencing, Roman’s counsel urged consideration of Roman’s youth: “The conduct of Roman Glukhoy and his brother ... shows a lack of maturity, a lack of an appreciation of63 Roman’s decisions had “left a trail of destruction and devastation.” And Roman and
Ruslan had had “multiple opportunities, when they were stopped, to make different
decision s .”
The court co ntinued, “[d]o we consider his youth? Yes. The Code requires that I consider all those factors, and I certainly have ... in reaching this conclusion. [¶] But one of the major issues for me is not

... if it was one impulsive act, i f i t was one impulsive dec ision, things would be different. But this was not on e impulsive act. This was repeat[ed] acts.”
B. Analysis On appeal, Roman argues the trial court abused its discretion because it did not comply with r ule 4.425

. Rule 4.425 directs the court to consider whether “(1) The crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (2) The crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; or (3) The crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather tha n being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.” The rule also allows
the court to consider “[a]ny circumstances in aggravation or mitigation ” so long as the
circumstance was not used to impose the upper term, enhance the sentence, or is an element of the crime. ( R ule 4.425.) To those factors, Roman avers that t he two murders were not predominantly independent of each other , nor did they involve separate violent acts , as t he crash happened in an instant. He also takes issue with the court ’s reference to his repeated acts, arguing the court was considering his crimes committed before the murders. He adds that in mitigation, he could be considered a passive participant for the following reasons: he

risk, a lack of impulse c ontrol, things that are consistent with adolescent thinking, and things that they can’t proceed in life thinking that way.” He also cited Roman’s remorse.64 was n ot driving , as a drug addict h e was suffering from a mental and physical condition
reduc ing his culpability , and

— as the most important mitigating factor

— he was young

. To that, Roman explains that the court failed to fully understand and factor in his
adolescent brain

. He asserts that biological research on brain development shows 19

- year
- olds have profoundly different decision making and cites Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, itself cit ing general differences between adults and juveniles under 18

. The Roper court explained that juveniles have “ ‘ [a] lack of maturity and undeveloped sense of responsibility , ’ ” are more vulnerable to negative influence and pressure , and

possess a less well f ormed character. ( Id . at pp. 569

- 570.) In holding the death penalty
for minors under 18 unconstitutional, t he Court articulated : “From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possi bility exists that a minor ’ s character deficiencies will be reformed.” ( Id

. at p. 570.)
Roman maintains that Roper illustrates why “[n]either [he], [ nor ] his identical twin brother, subjectively appreciated that evading police by speeding in commuter tra ffic was so dangerous that someone could be seriously injured or killed.”
We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion. “ ‘[A] trial court has discretion to determine whether several sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively. [Citat ions.] In the absence of a clear showing of abuse, the trial court ’ s discretion in this respect is not to be disturbed on appeal.’ ” ( People v. Caesar (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1059 disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Superior
Court ( Sparks ) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 1, 18.) “ ‘ “The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.” ’ ” ( People v. Sperling (2017 ) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1103.) Here, Roman make s no such showing. Though the fatal collision impacted both victims simultaneously, the trial court could properly consider the fact that there were two victims in imposing consecutive terms. (See People v. L eon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 452, 468 [“A trial court has discretion to impose consecutive sentences where

... a single65 act has resulted in crimes against multiple victims”] ; People v. Valenzuela (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 358, 365 [ consecutive sentences properly i mposed on two counts of vehicular manslaughter based on a single act of driving while under the influence , colliding into a car, and killing two occupants ] .) 47 Further, t he trial court did not, as Roman contends, consider Roman’s other offenses; it simply noted that the brothers’ conduct was not the result of a single impulsive act. Rather, Roman had had many opportunit ies to discontinue his dangerous conduct , including during the truck chase. And none of his proffered mitigating factors render the trial court’s ruling an abuse of discretion. Indeed, t he trial court expressly considered the factors in r ule 4.425 , including Roman’s youth . I t found Roman’s youth insufficient to warrant concurrent terms. And nothing in the record indicates Roman or Ruslan , at 19 , were incapable of understanding
that th eir reckless high speed driving could be fatal

. Moreover, we note there are numerous other aggravating factors that support ed
consecutive terms ; thus, any erro r was harmless . (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425 [“ A ny circumstances in aggravation or mitigation may be considered in deciding whether to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences”] ; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 552 [“Only one cri terion or factor in aggravation is necessary to support a consecutive sentence”] .) Roman was on both adult informal probation and juvenile probation during the crash

. As reflected in the probation report, h is conviction s have

47 And while Roman maintains his crimes did not , as the probation report reflected, indicate planni ng, sophistication, or professionalism , the record suggests otherwise. Roman selected a “safe” place and time to burglarize car s , noting the rain would conceal their activities. And he and Ruslan were able to evade numerous pursuing officer s for a signif icant period of time.66 increased in seriousness. 48 And Roman’s highly reckless conduct in driving the BMW
indicates he represents a serious danger to society

. In sum, the trial court acted well within its discretion in imposing consecutive

terms.
IX. Franklin H earing
Roman contends reman d is required for a hearing pursuant to Franklin , supra , 63
Cal.4th at page 277

. He also argues, in the a lternative, that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in fail ing to request a Franklin hearing. We find no error.
Section 3051 establish es a parole eligibility mechanism for those serving

sentence s for crimes committed as juvenile s . ( Franklin, supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.) It affords the opportunity for release during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration (depending on the controlling offense) by showing rehabilitation and gained maturity. ( Ibid .)
In Franklin , the defendant was sentenced prior to section 3051’s enactment

. ( Franklin, supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 2 76 .) Our high court remanded so the trial court could
determine whether Franklin had had a sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing

. ( Id. at p. 284.) The

court not ed , “[a]ssembling su ch statements ‘about the individual before the crime’ is typically a task more easily done at or near the time of the juvenile’s offense rather than decades later when memories have faded, records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or community mem bers may have relocated or passed away.” ( Id. at pp. 283

- 284.)

48 Roman’s prior offense s, including carrying a concealed stolen weapon and receipt of stolen property, date back to 2012 and continue to 2013 (the murders occurred in April 2014).67 Here, Roman was sentenced to a n in determinate term of less than 25 years to life for his controlling offense and is entitled to a parole hearing during his 2 0 th year of
incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(1).) But unlike in Franklin , Roman was sentenced after
section 3051’s enactment and eight months following Franklin ’s issu ance

. And w e presume defense counsel and the court were aware of the applicable law, includ ing
Fr anklin

. 49 ( See People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1105 [“Counsel is presumed competent and informed as to applicable constitutional and statutory law”] .) Further, unlike in Franklin , where it was unclear if Franklin had had the opportunity to put information relevant to a future parole hearing on the record, here, the
record indicate s Roman had that opportunity and he took advantage of it

. At sentencing,
Roman’s trial counsel provided a statement in mitigation noting Roman ’s age during the
crash and attached reports describing interviews with Roman’s friends who reported
Roman had been drug free until he was prescribed pain medication following a 2011 car
accident

. And at sentencing, Roman’s counsel argued at length regarding Roman’s youth: “The conduct of Roman Glukhoy and his brother ... shows a lack of maturity, a lack of an appreciation of risk, a lack of impulse control, things that are consistent with adolescent thinking, and things that they can’t proceed in life thinking that way.” Thus, unlike in Franklin , Roman was afforded an opportunity to present evidence
relevant to a future youthful offender parole hearing

— and such evidence was presented

. (See People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1088

- 1089 [ “unlike the defendant in
Franklin , defendant had both the opportunity and incentive to put information on the record related to a future youth offender parole hearing”].) And for this same reason,

49 Indeed, two days before sentencing, Roman’s counsel was present at a hearing where Ruslan’s counsel cited section 3051 to the trial court: “Based on the way the laws have been evolving regarding youthful offenders, and 3051 in particular allows for parol e on youthful people that were sentenced before they were to turn 23

. . . . ”68 Roman’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to request a Franklin hearing.
To the extent Roman ’s claim of ineffective assistance is construed as challeng ing
his counsel’s failure to include all relevant information, we conclude that it too fails

. Roman aver s that his trial counsel failed to provide “ sufficient evidence concerning [Roman’s] level of maturity, cognitive ability, or other youth

- related factors.” (Italics added.) He adds that counsel failed to offer “all the mitigating evidence” relevant to a future hearing. But these vague averments l eave us to speculate as to what such evidence might be. Roman does not say. Nor does he even suggest what or how much
information would be “sufficient.” Without showing what evidence counsel neglected to present and whether that evidence was available, defendant has no t carr ied his burden of showing a reasonable probability of a better outcome

. Roman , undeterred , cites People v. Tran (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 561, which rejected the People’s argument that the defendant’s failure to explain exactly what
in formation he would have provided at a Franklin hearing, rendered remand unnecessary. ( Id

. at p. 570 [“ Not knowing what their investigative efforts might turn up, it would be unrealistic to expect them to make an offer of proof at this stage of the case ”]. ) But Tran does not apply here

. Like in Franklin , Tran was sentence d before section 3051’s
enactment, hence trial counsel had no cause to consider what information to provide. (See id . at p. 570 [“because appellant’s sentencing hearing preceded Franklin, it is doubtful he would have been permitted to present evidence bearing on his future suitability for parole, even if he had asked the trial court to do so”].) Here , by contrast,

sent encing occurred well after section 3051’s enactment , and the record gives every
indication that trial counsel did consider and in fact present ed information relevant to a future parole hearing. Thus, no showing of ineffective assistance has been made. If Roman can offer more than speculation that some information useful to the parole authorities could have been introduced and preserved in the trial court, he can seek to do69 so by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (See People v. Sepulveda (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 291, 299

- 302 [rejecting defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to provision of Franklin materials and noting that the claim could be presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which would allow defense counse l to explain his decisions].) For now, Roman’s contention on appeal fails.
X. Dueñas In a supplemental brief, defendant contends remand is required for an ability to pay hearing with respect to the fines and fees imposed at sentencing. He cites in support
Dueñas , supra , 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, which held that due process requires the trial court to stay execution of restitut ion fines, as well as court operation and conviction assessments, until it has held a hearing and determined the defendant has the present ability to pay. We join courts concluding Dueñas was wrongly decided and hold that defendant
was not entitled to an ability to pay hearing for the conviction and operation assessments. ( People v. Pack

- Ramirez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 851, 860 ; People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786, 794

- 795 ; People v. Kingston (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 272, 279; People v.
Hicks (2019) 40 C al.App.5th 320, review granted November 26, 2019 , S258946 ; People
v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055; People v. Caceres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917,
923

- 929.) We therefore reject the contention.
XI. The Abstract of Judgment Finally , the parties agree the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the fees imposed. At sentencing, the trial court orally imposed a $16 0 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8 ). Yet the abstract of judgment reflects a $260 operations assessment. Agreeing with the parties, we will order the abstract corrected. ( People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [“An abstract of judgment is no t the judgment of conviction; it does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment”].)70 DISPOSITION As to Roman Glukhoy, the trial court is directed to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment reflecting the imposition of a $160 court oper ations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8). As to both defendants, we otherwise affirm the judgments

.

/s/ MURRAY, J. ∗

We concur:

/s/ HOCH, Acting P. J.

/s/ KRAUSE, J.

∗ Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.