If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

May 4, 2023

v No. 361243

St. Clair Circuit Court

KEITH DAJUAN WILLIAMS, LC No. 21-000094-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and SWARTZLE AND FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 

grams of heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and one count of possession with intent to deliver less 

than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). Defendant was sentenced, as a third-offense 

habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to 3 to 40 years’ imprisonment for each conviction, to be served 

concurrently. Defendant now appeals by leave granted.1 We affirm.

On December 14, 2020, law enforcement executed a search warrant at the address of 903 

Griswold Street, Port Huron, Michigan, after a month-long narcotics investigation had been

conducted of defendant and the residence. Upon entering the apartment, officers located 

defendant, and two other residents, Anne-Marie Gill and Marvin Kern, Jr. Kern was interviewed 

on scene and later released. The search of the residence yielded a dealer’s quantity of heroin, 

cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and United States currency. Officers discovered a brown bag 

containing a mixture of narcotics on the left side of a stairwell, which was located directly outside 

of the apartment. Defendant and Gill were arrested, taken in custody, and subsequently 

interviewed at the local sheriff’s office. Defendant asserted, during his interview with the police, 

that he had been living in Detroit, and would only visit the Griswold apartment on occasion. 

 

1 See People v Williams, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 8, 2022 (Docket 

No. 361243). 
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Defendant advanced that he had not been selling narcotics from that residence, and attributed the 

$237 found on his person to working “odd jobs.”

Following the preliminary examination, a pretrial hearing, and a motion hearing, defendant 

accepted the prosecution’s plea agreement. The sentencing information report (SIR)

recommended an assessment of 10 points for Offense Variable (OV) 19, MCL 777.49(c), because 

defendant allegedly interfered with the administration of justice by lying to law enforcement in the 

course of a criminal investigation. At sentencing, neither party objected to the information in the 

presentence investigation report or the scoring of the guidelines, and the trial judge sentenced 

defendant according to the Michigan Department of Correction’s (MDOC) recommendation. 

Approximately six months after sentencing, defendant filed a motion for resentencing; he argued 

that the trial court erred by assessing 10 points instead of 0 points for OV 19 because defendant 

did not interfere with the administration of justice and was merely maintaining his innocence 

following the officers’ successful narcotics raid. The prosecution responded that defendant 

explicitly lied to the officers in an attempt to shift responsibility for the drug trafficking to the two 

other Griswold residents, and he further attempted to hide the brown bag of narcotics in the 

stairwell outside of the apartment itself to avoid police detection. The trial court denied 

defendant’s motion and held that OV 19 was properly assessed at 10 points because defendant 

took overt action to avoid being held accountable for his actions and ultimately lied to the police 

despite being advised of his right to remain silent.

Defendant now argues the trial court erred by assessing 10 points instead of 0 points for 

OV 19 because defendant did not intend to hamper, hinder, or obstruct a police investigation by 

asserting his innocence following the fruitful execution of the search warrant and his arrest. 

Moreover, defendant asserts he was entitled to resentencing because the guidelines range would 

change after the scoring error was corrected. We disagree. 

For issues pertaining to sentencing guidelines scoring on appeal, “the circuit court’s factual 

determinations are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). “Whether the facts, as 

found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of 

the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de 

novo.” Id.

“[I]f a minimum sentence falls within the appropriate guidelines range, a defendant is not 

entitled to be resentenced unless there has been a scoring error or inaccurate information has been 

relied upon.” People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 88; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). “Offense variables are 

properly scored by reference only to the sentencing offense except when the language of a 

particular offense variable statute specifically provides otherwise.” People v McGraw, 484 Mich 

120, 135; 771 NW2d 655, 664 (2009). The sentencing offense is defined as “the crime of which 

the defendant has been convicted and for which he or she is being sentenced.” Id. at 122 n 3. The 

instructions for scoring OV 19 are found in MCL 777.49, which requires the assessment of 10 

points if “[t]he offender otherwise interfered with or attempted to interfere with the administration 

of justice, or directly or indirectly violated a personal protection order.” MCL 777.49(c). “[T]he 

plain and ordinary meaning of ‘interfere with the administration of justice’ for purposes of OV 19 

is to oppose so as to hamper, hinder, or obstruct the act or process of administering judgment of 

individuals or causes by judicial process.” People v Hershey, 303 Mich App 330, 343; 844 NW2d 
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127 (2013). In scoring OV 19, a court may consider the defendant’s conduct after the completion 

of the sentencing offense. People v Baskerville, 333 Mich App 276, 301; 963 NW2d 620 (2020).

Defendant argues that his statements to the law enforcement on December 14, 2020, 

addressing (1) defendant’s involvement in the sale of narcotics, (2) defendant’s current residence, 

and (3) defendant’s source of income, were an attempt to maintain defendant’s innocence, and did 

not interfere with the administration of justice. Defendant further advanced that while the trial 

court premised its decision to deny his motion for resentencing by distinguishing his conduct from 

the defendant in Hershey, defendant similarly did not intend to hamper, hinder, or obstruct the 

judicial process.

In Hershey, the defendant advanced that the trial court erred when it assessed 10 points for 

OV 19 because his failure to comply with a court order that required him to pay child support, and 

a violation of his probation terms, did not amount to an interference with the administration of 

justice. Hershey, 303 Mich App at 342. This Court agreed with the defendant and noted prior 

caselaw established that the following conduct constituted an interference or attempted inference 

with the administration of justice: “providing a false name to the police, threatening or intimidating 

a victim or witness, telling a victim or witness not to disclose the defendant’s conduct, fleeing 

from police contrary to an order to freeze, [or] attempting to deceive the police during an 

investigation.” Id. at 344. Comparatively, the defendant’s refusal to pay child support did not 

impact the lower court’s ability to administer judgment in the applicable divorce and child support 

proceedings, and the defendant’s parole violation did not prevent the lower court from entering a 

judgment of sentence. Id. at 345. Ultimately, this Court held that because the preponderance of 

the evidence did not support a finding that the defendant interfered with the administration of 

justice, the trial court erred by scoring OV 19 at 10 points. Id. at 346. 

We conclude defendant’s statements to law enforcement constituted an attempt to deceive 

the police during an investigation, and the context of defendant’s conduct is distinguishable from 

the circumstances in Hershey. Defendant argues that his statements occurred after the criminal 

investigation concluded much like Hershey when the defendant’s failure to pay child support 

occurred after the lower court ordered him financially responsible. “[T]he circumstances described 

in OV 19 expressly include events occurring after the completion of the sentencing offense,” and 

“scoring OV 19 necessarily is not limited to consideration of the sentencing offense.” People v 

Smith, 488 Mich 193, 195; 793 NW2d 666 (2010). Moreover, unlike a failure to pay child support 

or a parole violation, which does not implicate other parties, defendant attempted to divert 

suspicion and responsibility to the two other Griswold residents by denying his involvement in the 

sale of narcotics and claiming he lived elsewhere. Defendant also asserted that he only stayed at 

the Griswold apartment on occasion, but a local deputy, whose department was surveilling the 

Griswold address for one month prior to executing the search warrant, testified that defendant was 

living there for at least a week or two before the execution of the search warrant notwithstanding 

the fact that defendant’s permanent address was in Detroit, Michigan. Providing false information 

to a police officer during an investigation necessarily constitutes interference with the 

administration of justice, Smith, 488 Mich at 201-202, and the trial court found a preponderance 

of the evidence supported this conclusion. 

Defendant further argues the month-long investigation of defendant based on a suspicion 

of narcotics trafficking, in addition to the fruitful execution of the search warrant, occurred before 
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defendant’s statements and made it virtually impossible for defendant to impede an investigation 

that was already complete or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. Defendant 

notes that this assertion is supported by the fact he was eventually bound over on the possession 

charges and pled guilty. This Court has stated that interference “with the administration of justice 

encompasses more than just the actual judicial process. Law enforcement officers are an integral 

component in the administration of justice, regardless of whether they are operating directly 

pursuant to a court order.” People v Barbee, 470 Mich 283, 287-288; 681 NW2d 348 (2004). 

Additionally, attempts to deceive police that result in a hindrance of their investigation, even if 

those efforts are unsuccessful, may be scored under OV 19. People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 

204; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). Following the execution of the search warrant, officers recovered 

heroin, cocaine, and various drug paraphernalia that demonstrated that someone in the Griswold 

apartment was responsible for narcotics trafficking. Defendant’s statements following his arrest 

are best characterized as “self-serving attempts at deception obviously aimed at leading police 

investigators astray or even diverting suspicion onto others and away from him,” and onto Gill and 

Kern, who were present at the scene when the raid occurred. Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 204.

During the preliminary examination, the deputy noted that he saw only the defendant in 

the stairwell outside the apartment before uncovering the bags of narcotics; the deputy saw the 

defendant continuously peering out of the apartment and appeared to be conducting 

countersurveillance. Moreover, the brown bag found in the stairwell immediately outside the 

apartment contained the heroin and cocaine mixture that matched Gill’s description of how 

defendant routinely packaged multiple types of narcotics. Based on this information, the trial 

court could have reasonably inferred by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant attempted 

to hide evidence of narcotics trafficking in the stairwell thereby hampering a criminal 

investigation. See Hershey, 303 Mich App at 344 (stating that deceiving police investigators to 

prevent incriminating evidence from being used throughout judicial process constitutes inference 

with the administration of justice). 

Defendant argues that our Supreme Court has expressed concerns with the broad 

application of OV 19 as Justice Markman argued in his dissent in People v Spangler, 480 Mich 

947, 948 (2007) (MARKMAN, J., dissenting). In Spangler, the defendant was assessed 10 points 

under OV 19 because he hid himself, and various drug paraphernalia, in a closet when the police 

arrived at a house to investigate a crime committed by another individual. Id. While a 4 to 3 

majority denied leave to appeal, Justice Markman opined, “[g]iven that it would be extraordinary 

for a criminal perpetrator not to attempt to hide evidence of his or her crime or to make such crime 

less detectable, it would seem that OV 19 would almost always be scored under the trial court’s 

interpretation.” Id. While we recognize Justice Markman’s apprehensions about the scoring of 

OV 19, we must follow published precedent. See Smith, 318 Mich App at 286 (hiding from the 

police constituted an interference with the administration of justice because the act intended to 

hinder the police investigation); see also Hershey, 303 Mich App at 344.

Defendant maintains that characterizing his conduct as an attempt to interfere with the 

administration of justice is equivalent to holding that anything a defendant does or says, short of 

turning himself into law enforcement or making a full confession on the spot, warrants assessing 

points under OV 19. As the trial court noted, under Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 469; 86 S Ct 

1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), a defendant has a right to remain silent. It has long been established 

that a Mirandized defendant will be held accountable for what he says, and those words may be 
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used against him in a future proceeding. Id. In this particular circumstance, defendant chose to 

lie to the police during the course of a criminal investigation and attempted to deceive the officers 

into potentially believing that the two other residents were responsible for the drug operations out 

of the Griswold apartment. 

Lastly, defendant argues his trial counsel’s failure to object to the improper scoring of OV 

19, which resulted in a higher guidelines range, deprived defendant of his Sixth Amendment right 

to the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.

“To preserve the issue of whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance, the defendant 

must move for a new trial or evidentiary hearing in the trial court or move for remand on appeal.” 

In re LT, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 356667); slip op at 3. 

Defendant did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at any point in the lower 

court proceedings or move for remand on appeal; therefore, our review is “limited to mistakes 

apparent on the record.” See People v Petri, 279 Mich App 407, 410; 760 NW2d 882 (2008)

(when a defendant does not move for a new trial or Ginther2hearing, this Court’s review is limited 

to the existing record). 

“Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of 

fact and constitutional law.” People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 90; 808 NW2d 815 (2011)

(quotation marks omitted), quoting People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). 

“A judge must first find the facts, and then must decide whether those facts constitute a violation 

of the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.” Id. “This Court reviews 

for clear error a trial court’s factual findings, while we review de novo constitutional 

determinations.” Johnson, 293 Mich App at 90.

“In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden is on the 

defendant to demonstrate that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness” and that deficiency prejudiced the defendant. People v Crews, 299 Mich App 

381, 400; 829 NW2d 898 (2013). “Prejudice occurs if there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for defense counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” An attorney’s 

“[f]ail[ure] to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201. Because the trial court 

properly scored OV 19, any objection to the court’s assessment of points would have been 

meritless. As a result, defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to 

object to the scoring.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle 

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney 

 

2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).