[Cite as In re K.D., 2019-Ohio-1077.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In the Matter of: : 

 No. 18AP-746 

[K.D.], : (C.P.C. No. 16JU-6823)

 

[S.F., : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

 

 Appellant]. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on March 26, 2019 

 

On brief: Nicole L. Thornton, Guardian ad Litem. 

On brief: Robert J. McClaren, for Franklin County Children 

Services. 

On brief: William T. Cramer, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, S.F. ("biological father"), biological father of K.D., appeals from 

the decision and judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division 

of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, terminating his parental rights and placing K.D. in 

the permanent custody of appellee, Franklin County Children Services ("FCCS"). For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} This case involves FCCS's request for permanent custody of K.D., born 

December 2011. At the time of K.D.'s birth, K.D.'s mother was married to D.D. ("legal 

father"), and D.D. became K.D.'s legal father. However, subsequent DNA testing confirmed 

S.F. is K.D.'s biological father. 
No. 18AP-746 2 

{¶ 3} Prior to the instant action, K.D. had been the subject of four complaints 

brought by FCCS since 2015 regarding an allegation of abuse, neglect, and/or dependency. 

The fifth, and most recent, complaint, which is the fourth refiling of the original complaint 

and is the subject of this case, was filed on May 31, 2016 and alleges K.D. is an abused, 

neglected, and dependent child. At that date, K.D. was four years old and was already in 

the temporary custody of FCCS, not living with mother and legal father. FCCS filed the 

abuse, neglect, and dependency action after receiving information that K.D. was the victim 

of sexual activity, that mother and legal father were injecting heroin with K.D. present, that 

there is domestic violence between mother and legal father, that the home conditions are 

"deplorable," the home has no water or gas due to mother and legal father's drug use, that 

police have been dispatched to the home seven times in a one-month period to respond to 

issues concerning narcotics, guns, and domestic violence, and that mother and legal father 

have not made K.D. available to FCCS to assess her safety. (May 31, 2016 Compl. at 1.) The 

complaint states K.D. has a developmental disability, a genetic disorder, and requires 

physical and speech therapy. Additionally, the complaint states K.D. required treatment 

from an ENT due to possibly being hit in the face, and K.D. required dental procedures to 

remove rotten teeth. Moreover, the complaint states K.D. disclosed sexual abuse by both 

mother and legal father. K.D. has been diagnosed with a mental health condition and 

requires psychiatric and psychological care. 

{¶ 4} Pursuant to the complaint, mother had missed 16 drug screens and legal 

father had not completed orientation for drug treatment program. Mother has attended 

supervised visits with K.D. while under the influence of drugs. At the time of the complaint, 

legal father had a domestic violence criminal conviction from 2014 and a pending 

revocation warrant. 

{¶ 5} The trial court granted FCCS a temporary order of custody ("TOC") on June 2, 

2016 and issued no contact orders with the child by mother and legal father. Subsequently, 

in an uncontested proceeding on July 5, 2016, the trial court adjudicated K.D. an abused, 

neglected, and dependent minor, and the trial court again ordered mother and legal father 

to have no contact with K.D. Biological father, who resides in Iowa, then filed a motion for 

legal custody on August 2, 2016. 
No. 18AP-746 3 

{¶ 6} At a subsequent dispositional hearing on August 19, 2016, the trial court 

granted an order of temporary custody and commitment ("TCC") to FCCS, approved a case 

plan, ordered mother and legal father to have no contact with K.D., and ordered FCCS not 

to place K.D. with biological father without a court hearing. While the trial court dismissed 

biological father's motion for legal custody, it permitted biological father to remain a party 

to K.D.'s case. The trial court also ordered that a copy of the phone call schedule between 

K.D. and biological father be given to K.D.'s counselor. 

{¶ 7} FCCS filed a motion for a second extension of the TCC order on November 29, 

2016, and the trial court granted the motion to extend on January 10, 2017 with additional 

orders that the child's guardian ad litem be notified prior to any change in placement and 

that FCCS was to confer with K.D.'s therapist to determine an appropriate schedule for 

visits with biological father. On March 22, 2017, FCCS then filed a motion to approve an 

amended case plan to add for biological father mental health assessment and services, a 

psychological assessment and recommendations, parenting classes, visitation, 

participation in the child's treatment and needs as recommended by K.D.'s professional 

providers, and cooperation with Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ("ICPC") 

services. FCCS additionally proposed that legal father perform a domestic violence 

assessment. Then, on May 5, 2017, FCCS filed a motion asking the trial court to review the 

August 19, 2016 order regarding K.D.'s visits with biological father. 

{¶ 8} On June 1, 2017, the magistrate granted FCCS's motion to approve and adopt 

the amended case plan, suspending biological father's face-to-face parenting time until 

further court hearing. However, the order permitted regular telephone contact between 

K.D. and biological father to continue pursuant to the schedule determined between FCCS 

and biological father. 

{¶ 9} Eventually, on June 6, 2017, FCCS filed a motion for permanent court 

commitment ("PCC"), also known as permanent custody, of K.D. The trial court held a 

pretrial conference on September 20, 2017 and set a status conference to allow time for 

biological father to undergo a psychological evaluation, a parent/child observation, and for 

completion of the ICPC process in Iowa. However, as of December 1, 2017, neither the ICPC 

process nor the parent/child observation had been completed. Thus, the trial court set 

another status conference for March 2, 2018. 
No. 18AP-746 4 

{¶ 10} At the final status conference on July 11, 2018, the trial court ordered a faceto-face visit between K.D. and biological father to allow observation by the caseworker. 

Subsequently, on August 12, 2018 the attorney guardian ad litem and the lay guardian ad 

litem filed a joint report recommending the court grant FCCS's motion for permanent 

custody. 

{¶ 11} The matter ultimately came for trial on August 20, 2018. Neither mother nor 

legal father appeared for trial. However, biological father appeared and testified that he 

had five children, including K.D. His other four children are grown. Biological father 

testified that he currently lives in Iowa with his adult daughter and her children, ages 11 and 

5. The 11-year-old has spina bifida and is confined to a wheel chair, and biological father 

testified he regularly physically assists his grandson and attends doctor appointments. 

Additionally, biological father testified his grandson has an IEP for school and that 

biological father has participated in the IEP process with his grandson. 

{¶ 12} Biological father testified he met mother online in 2009 or 2010 and that she 

agreed to move to Iowa to live with him. However, biological father said mother moved 

back to Ohio when she was pregnant and never returned, telling biological father she had 

miscarried the pregnancy. Biological father said he saw a picture of mother with a baby on 

her lap and suspected he might be the child's father due to the timing of the photograph. 

He said he inquired with mother's relatives about the baby and was told that legal father 

was the child's father. 

{¶ 13} Biological father testified he learned that K.D. had been removed from 

mother's care in September 2015 and he then became involved in K.D.'s case. In November 

2015, biological father completed DNA testing. FCCS added biological father to K.D.'s case 

plan in December 2015. The parties agree that none of the allegations in the original 

complaints related to biological father. 

{¶ 14} Biological father testified he first met K.D. in December 2015 when he 

attended a visit with K.D.'s maternal grandparents. He then received scheduled visitations 

with K.D. for one time a month moving forward. However, in October 2015, after only two 

visits between biological father and K.D., FCCS requested biological father's visits be 

cancelled based on the recommendation of K.D.'s therapist. Biological father participated 
No. 18AP-746 5 

in a parent-child observation in February 2018 and again in August 2018, just prior to trial, 

for a total of four visits since December 2015. 

{¶ 15} Alysha Stuck, the caseworker from FCCS assigned to K.D.'s case, testified that 

both mother and legal father failed to complete the case plan. FCCS referred mother and 

legal father for numerous drug programs but neither one followed through. Additionally, 

Stuck testified mother and legal father were inconsistent with visitation prior to the nocontact order in November 2015, and there were no visitations at all after the no-contact 

order due to K.D.'s disclosing sexual and physical abuse to her therapist. Ultimately, FCCS 

lost contact with mother and legal father in March 2016. 

{¶ 16} Stuck further testified that K.D. has been in continuous custody of FCCS since 

June 29, 2015, and that K.D. had been in the same foster placement from July 2015 to July 

2018. However, following concerns regarding the foster mother's driving "erratically" with 

children in the car, including driving on sidewalks and curbs, FCCS placed K.D. in respite 

care while it investigated the situation. (Aug. 20, 2018 Tr. at 90.) Once K.D. was in respite 

care, Stuck testified her behavior started to improve, and the respite care ultimately 

transitioned into a new foster home for K.D. K.D. has been with her current foster parents 

since July 2018, and she had a previous relationship with the new foster parents because 

they had previously served as respite care for K.D. Stuck testified K.D. is doing well in her 

new foster home, has good communication with her new foster parents, refers to her foster 

parents as "mom" and "dad," hugs her new foster parents, and K.D. is bonded with her new 

foster parents. (Aug. 20, 2018 Tr. at 130.) The new foster home is a potential adoptive 

home. Additionally, Stuck noted that since her placement in the new foster home, K.D. has 

ceased wetting her pants and there has been a decrease in K.D.'s other behavioral 

disturbances. 

{¶ 17} Stuck testified regarding the requirements of biological father's case plan. 

Pursuant to the case plan, biological father was to have stable housing and income; 

maintain consistent visits with K.D.; complete the ICPC process and follow any 

recommendations; attend K.D.'s medical appointments; complete a domestic violence 

assessment, parenting classes, and a psychological evaluation; and ensure K.D.'s needs 

were met. Stuck agreed that biological father had stable housing and income. 
No. 18AP-746 6 

{¶ 18} With regard to the parenting classes, FCCS referred biological father to a 

parenting class in Iowa. While the program did not have a set number of classes needed 

for completion, biological father stopped attending after three classes because he felt the 

sessions were not beneficial to K.D.'s needs. Stuck testified that FCCS then encouraged 

biological father to maintain contact with K.D.'s therapist as an alternative way to get more 

direct recommendations on the care K.D. would require, but biological father failed to do 

so. Thus, Stuck said biological father did not complete the parenting classes portion of the 

case plan. 

{¶ 19} As to the domestic violence assessment, Stuck testified it was made a 

requirement of biological father's case plan because he had a prior criminal conviction in 

Iowa for domestic violence. Biological father was referred for individual counseling. Stuck 

testified biological father has consistently attended counseling for one year, but that this 

portion of the case plan is ongoing and not completed. 

{¶ 20} Stuck testified that it was "extremely common" for K.D. to report that she did 

not want to participate in telephone calls with biological father, and that K.D. would 

frequently indicate her stomach hurt when it was time to make a phone call. (Aug. 20, 2018 

Tr. at 117.) While Stuck said she did not have any particular concerns in her observations 

of the in-person visits between K.D. and biological father, K.D. reported after the most 

recent visit in August 2018 that she did not want to do any more visits with biological father. 

Stuck testified K.D. exhibits "mixed emotions" about the visits with biological father, and 

she said she does not believe K.D. is bonded with biological father. (Aug. 20, 2018 Tr. at 

121.) Stuck agreed it would be difficult for K.D. to form a bond with biological father after 

only four, short in-person visits over the course of three years. 

{¶ 21} Regarding the ICPC requirements, Stuck testified biological father completed 

two ICPC assessments. The first was denied due to biological father's criminal and legal 

history, including a sexual abuse allegation from 2001 that Iowa children's services deemed 

"founded," a 2001 domestic abuse conviction, and a 2005 conviction for operating a vehicle 

while intoxicated. (Aug. 20, 2018 Tr. at 110.) The second ICPC was approved with 

recommendations that biological father complete visitation with K.D., participate in K.D.'s 

treatment, and continue a parenting program. Stuck testified biological father had not 

followed through with those recommendations as of the time of trial. She additionally 
No. 18AP-746 7 

testified that the reason the second ICPC was approved was because by the time of the 

second ICPC, more than ten years had passed since biological father's most recent criminal 

conviction. 

{¶ 22} Despite the fact that the ICPC was technically approved, Stuck testified that 

FCCS continued to have concerns with biological father stemming from the founded 

allegation of sexual abuse. Specifically, the allegation was that biological father repeatedly 

sexually abused his step-daughter from the time she was in seventh grade until she was a 

senior in high school. Stuck testified this allegation presents concern for FCCS in 

considering placing K.D. with biological father. Additionally, Stuck testified FCCS had 

additional concerns stemming from the psychological evaluation that biological father 

completed in which biological father attempted to minimize his history of sexual abuse 

allegation despite the finding that the allegation was "founded." At trial, biological father 

continued to deny the past allegation of sexual abuse, testifying his ex-wife manufactured 

the claim as part of a contentious divorce. 

{¶ 23} FCCS also had concerns that biological father reported in his psychological 

evaluation that he had no history of domestic violence despite his 2001 conviction for 

domestic abuse. Thus, despite biological father technically completing the psychological 

component of his case plan, Stuck testified K.D.'s service team continues to have "concerns" 

about biological father. (Aug. 20, 2018 Tr. at 115.)

{¶ 24} Stuck also testified about K.D.'s medical needs. K.D. has post-traumatic 

stress disorder ("PTSD") and reactive attachment disorder. She has issues with wetting her 

pants during the day and masturbation, as well as two self-harm incidents at school in 

which she threatened to hurt herself with scissors. K.D. sees a psychiatrist every six months 

and receives trauma therapy once a week. Additionally, K.D. takes medication for PTSD 

and to help with sleep. Although biological father maintained contact with the FCCS service 

team and participated in all the case reviews, he did not attend K.D.'s appointments. FCCS 

asked biological father to maintain contact with K.D.'s counselors and providers, but K.D.'s 

therapist did not feel it was appropriate for biological father to be involved. As a result, 

FCCS would update biological father on K.D.'s medical and educational appointments but 

did not provide him with the actual schedule of appointments. Biological father testified 

he attempted to communicate with K.D.'s school and therapist but they refused to 
No. 18AP-746 8 

communicate with him without a release from FCCS. Biological father additionally testified 

that he had been in contact with a school in Iowa about K.D.'s potential needs but was told 

the school could not make any progress on an IEP for K.D. until they could personally 

evaluate her. 

{¶ 25} K.D. visits with her maternal grandparents approximately once a week, and 

the guardian ad litem concluded those visits are in K.D.'s best interest. The new foster home 

has expressed willingness to continue the visits with the maternal grandparents. 

Additionally, maternal grandparents oppose biological father getting custody of K.D. out of 

fear that he may sexually abuse K.D. 

{¶ 26} Victoria Shaker, K.D.'s guardian ad litem, also testified. Shaker testified she 

did not see a significant bond between biological father and K.D., and she noted K.D.'s 

discomfort with the telephone contact with biological father. Shaker testified she has 

ongoing concerns with the sexual abuse allegation against biological father, especially given 

K.D.'s history of acting out sexually. Additionally, Shaker testified that K.D. is "doing very 

well" in her current foster home, noting that she has ceased wetting her pants and has 

demonstrated an ability to redirect her urges for behavior outbursts. (Aug. 21, 2018 Tr. at 

23.)

{¶ 27} Ultimately, both the FCCS caseworker and the guardian ad litem testified it 

was their recommendation that granting the request for PCC for purposes of adoption was 

in K.D.'s best interest. 

{¶ 28} Following the trial, the trial court granted FCCS's motion for permanent 

custody of K.D. The trial court considered the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) and determined 

there was clear and convincing evidence that it was in K.D.'s best interest to grant the 

motion for permanent custody. The court journalized its decision in a decision and 

judgment entry dated September 21, 2018. Biological father timely appeals. 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 29} Biological father assigns the following errors for our review: 

[1.] The trial court's determination that appellant's parental 

rights should be terminated is not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. 
No. 18AP-746 9 

[2.] The trial court's determination that the agency made 

reasonable efforts to unify this family is not supported by clear 

and convincing evidence. 

III. Standard of Review 

{¶ 30} "In reviewing a judgment granting permanent custody to FCCS, an appellate 

court 'must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the judgment and the trial 

court's findings of facts.' " In re J.T., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1056, 2012-Ohio-2818, ¶ 8, 

quoting In re P.G., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-574, 2012-Ohio-469, ¶ 37. " '[I]f the evidence is 

susceptible of more than one construction, we must give it that interpretation which is 

consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the [juvenile] court's 

verdict and judgment.' " In re Brooks, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-164, 2004-Ohio-3887, ¶ 59, 

quoting Karches v. Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 19 (1988). 

{¶ 31} "Judgments are not against the manifest weight of the evidence when all 

material elements are supported by competent, credible evidence." J.T. at ¶ 8. "Pursuant 

to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a trial court may grant permanent custody if after a hearing it 

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that * * * such relief is in the best interest of 

the child." Id. at ¶ 9. "Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts to be 

established." In re K.L., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-218, 2013-Ohio-3499, ¶ 14. "It is more than a 

mere preponderance of the evidence but does not require proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt." Id.

IV. First Assignment of Error – Best Interest of the Child 

{¶ 32} In his first assignment of error, biological father asserts the trial court erred 

in granting permanent custody to FCCS. More specifically, biological father argues the trial 

court erred when it determined the termination of his parental rights was in the best 

interest of the child.

{¶ 33} "Parents have a constitutionally-protected fundamental interest in the care, 

custody, and management of their children." In re H.D., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-707, 2014-

Ohio-228, ¶ 10, citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). The Supreme Court of 

Ohio recognizes the essential and basic rights of a parent to raise his or her child. In re 

Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990). However, these rights are not absolute, and a 
No. 18AP-746 10 

parent's natural rights are subject to the ultimate welfare of the child. In re Cunningham, 

59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979). In certain circumstances, therefore, the state may terminate 

the parental rights of natural parents when such termination is in the best interest of the 

child. H.D. at ¶ 10, citing In re E.G., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-26, 2007-Ohio-3658, ¶ 8, citing 

In re Harmon, 4th Dist. No. 00 CA 2694 (Sept. 25, 2000); In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619, 

624 (9th Dist.1994). 

{¶ 34} In deciding to award permanent custody, the trial court must take a two-step 

approach. K.L. at ¶ 18. The court must first determine if any of the factors set forth in R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1) apply. Id. Here, there is no dispute that K.D. was in the temporary custody 

of one or more public children service agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or 

more months of a consecutive 22-month period, satisfying R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). 

{¶ 35} Once the trial court determines that one of the circumstances in R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1) applies, the trial court must then determine whether a grant of permanent 

custody is in the best interest of the child. In re A.J., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-864, 2014-Ohio2734, ¶ 16; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). In determining the best interest of a child, R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1) directs that the trial court must consider all relevant factors including, but 

not limited to, the following: 

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the 

child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-ofhome providers, and any other person who may significantly 

affect the child; 

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or 

through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the 

maturity of the child; 

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the 

child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 

twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month 

period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one 

or more public children services agencies or private child 

placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two-month period and, as described in [R.C. 

2151.413(D)(1)], the child was previously in the temporary 

custody of an equivalent agency in another state; 
No. 18AP-746 11 

(d) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement 

and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a 

grant of permanent custody to the agency; 

(e) Whether any of the factors in [R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11)] 

apply in relation to the parents and child. 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). 

{¶ 36} The trial court considered all of the above statutory factors with respect to 

K.D. and concluded that an award of permanent custody was in the best interest of the child. 

Biological father disagrees with the juvenile court's conclusions. We will address biological 

father's argument with respect to each of the statutory factors.

 A. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) – Parent, Child, and Sibling 

 Interrelationships 

{¶ 37} The testimony from the FCCS caseworker and the guardian ad litem was 

consistent that K.D. is not bonded with biological father. She has a good relationship with 

her current foster parents and her behavior has improved since her placement there. 

Though biological father argues the lack of bond between him and K.D. is attributable to 

his limited visits with K.D., we note that K.D. often expressed that phone calls with 

biological father made her stomach hurt and she expressed a desire to no longer visit with 

biological father. Based on the evidence presented, this factor weighs in favor of an award 

of permanent custody to FCCS.

 B. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) – The Child's Wishes 

{¶ 38} There was no in camera interview of K.D. However, based on K.D.'s 

communications with the caseworker and the guardian ad litem, as well as their 

observations of K.D.'s behavior, K.D. did not have the maturity or ability to fully understand 

the concepts of permanent custody and adoption. Both the caseworker and the guardian 

ad litem reiterated that K.D.'s behavior has improved in her most recent foster placement, 

and that improvement of behavior seemed to be indicative of her comfort level with her 

current placement. The caseworker and the guardian ad litem also expressed concern 

about how moving K.D. to a placement with biological father would affect K.D. given how 

long she has been in the continuous custody of FCCS. 

 
No. 18AP-746 12 

 C. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) – Custodial History of the Child 

{¶ 39} At the time FCCS filed for permanent custody, K.D. had been in the 

temporary custody of FCCS for more than 23 months, which is more than 12 of a 

consecutive 22-month period. Further, by the time trial commenced in August 2018, K.D. 

had been in FCCS custody for more than 3 years. Biological father does not raise any 

argument with respect to this factor.

 D. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) – Need for Legally Secure Placement 

{¶ 40} The final consideration under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) is the child's need for a 

legally secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a 

grant of permanent custody to FCCS. It is through this factor that biological father argues 

the trial court erred in determining granting FCCS's motion for permanent custody is in 

K.D.'s best interest. 

{¶ 41} As the trial court noted in its decision and judgment entry, K.D. has lived 

most of her life without a secure placement. She has been in continuous foster care for 

more than three years due to her mother and legal father's abuse and neglect. After 

spending more than two years in the same foster placement, her stability was disrupted 

following concerns that her then foster mother's erratic driving posed a danger to K.D. 

Additionally, K.D. has special needs, including PTSD, reactive attachment disorder, 

possible intellectual and developmental issues, and behavioral issues requiring an IEP for 

school. She receives treatment from an occupational therapist, a speech therapist, a 

primary care physician, a psychiatrist, a children's therapist, and a trauma-based therapist. 

We agree with the trial court that K.D. is in great need of a legally secure placement.

{¶ 42} Biological father agrees that K.D. is in great need of a legally secure 

placement, but he disagrees with the trial court's conclusion that placing K.D. in his care 

would not achieve such a legally secure placement. Though biological father established 

paternity through DNA testing during the fourth refiling of FCCS's complaint, he 

nonetheless waited more than four years to make contact with K.D. despite believing he 

was her father from the time she was an infant. Biological father does not dispute the trial 

court's conclusion that he had not formed much of a bond with K.D., but he blames their 

lack of bond on geographical distance and FCCS's decision to suspend his in-person visits 
No. 18AP-746 13 

pursuant to the recommendation of K.D.'s therapist. As the trial court notes, however, 

biological father chose to remain in Iowa after learning he was K.D.'s biological father.

{¶ 43} The trial court noted additional concerns with biological father as a 

placement option for K.D. On top of the non-existent bond between biological father and 

K.D., biological father also had a history of domestic violence, driving under the influence, 

and a "founded" prior allegation of sexual abuse of his step-daughter. His history led to the 

denial of biological father as a suitable placement under the first ICPC. Though the second 

ICPC was approved due to passage of time, both the FCCS caseworker and the guardian ad 

litem testified they had ongoing concerns with biological father's background.

{¶ 44} While biological father was permitted telephone contact with K.D. three 

times a week, the testimony indicated biological father was inconsistent in calling K.D. until 

an order of the trial court monitored the calls. The trial court found that biological father's 

own actions "contributed greatly" to the delay and limitation of in-person visits with K.D. 

(Sept. 21, 2018 Decision & Jgmt. Entry at 15.)

{¶ 45} Despite the lack of bond, biological father argues he has substantially 

complied with his case plan, including maintaining stable housing and income, attending 

counseling, and attending some parenting classes. However, "R.C. 2151.414(D) does not 

require courts to deny a children services agency's motion for permanent custody solely by 

virtue of a parent's substantial compliance with the case plan." Brooks at ¶ 62.

{¶ 46} We agree with the trial court that while biological father seems "wellintentioned," his efforts in the more than two years that he became involved in the case 

were not significant enough to form a bond with K.D. (Decision & Jgmt. Entry at 16.) 

Though he asserts that he attempted to make contact with K.D.'s treatment providers but 

was told he was not authorized to receive information, biological father provided no 

evidence that he attempted to follow up with FCCS to obtain a release to speak with K.D.'s 

treatment providers. He was uncertain of K.D.'s exact diagnoses and treatment needs. He 

stopped attending parenting classes after only three classes because he determined they 

were not helpful to K.D.'s specific situation. Despite being ordered to undergo a domestic 

violence assessment as part of the case plan, he declined to do so, and he minimized the 

significance of his past history of domestic violence and sexual abuse allegations in his 

psychological evaluation. During his testimony, biological father repeatedly blamed FCCS 
No. 18AP-746 14 

for the lack of a bond between himself and K.D., failing to account for the ways his actions 

and inactions contributed to the lack of bond. By his own admission, biological father made 

no effort to be a part of K.D.'s life until she was in the temporary custody of FCCS, and he 

does not seem to recognize that his complete absence from the first four years of K.D.'s life 

is likely the predominant factor in the lack of a parent-child bond.

{¶ 47} The trial court additionally noted that in her current treatment foster home, 

K.D. is bonded to her foster parents, appears comfortable, is attaching, improving, and 

happy. There is a great need for K.D. to maintain access to her team of doctors and 

therapists that have been in place for over three years, and her current foster home, which 

is a prospective adoptive home, provides her that continued access. 

{¶ 48} Based on all the testimony and evidence presented, including the entire case 

file, the trial court determined permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. Having 

reviewed the entire record, we conclude the trial court had clear and convincing evidence 

to conclude permanent court commitment was in the best interest of K.D. Accordingly, we 

overrule biological father's first assignment of error. 

V. Second Assignment of Error – Efforts to Reunify the Family 

{¶ 49} In his second and final assignment of error, biological father argues the trial 

court erred in concluding FCCS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Under R.C. 

2151.413(D)(3)(b), a children's services agency may not file for permanent custody "[i]f 

reasonable efforts to return the child to the child's home are required under [R.C. 2151.419, 

and] the agency has not provided the services required by the case plan to the parents of 

the child or the child to ensure the safe return of the child to the child's home." R.C. 

2151.419(A)(1) provides that a children's services agency must prove that it has made 

"reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child's home, to eliminate 

the continued removal of the child from the child's home, or to make it possible for the child 

to return safely home." 

{¶ 50} Biological father relies on the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in In re C.F., 

113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, for the proposition that "the state must have made 

reasonable efforts to reunify the family prior to the termination of parental rights." C.F. at 

¶ 21. However, the Supreme Court continues to hold in C.F. that the reasonable efforts 

requirement under "R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) does not apply in a hearing on a motion for 
No. 18AP-746 15 

permanent custody filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413." C.F. at ¶ 43. "This is because a child 

support agency must have proven reasonable efforts prior to filing a motion for permanent 

custody." In re A.N.F., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-905, 2018-Ohio-3689, ¶ 21, citing In re E.R. 

J.R., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-82, 2017-Ohio-7188, ¶ 53. "If the agency has not established that 

reasonable efforts have been made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, 

then it must demonstrate such efforts at that time." C.F. at ¶ 43. Thus, where the record 

reflects that the trial court has made a finding that the agency has made reasonable efforts 

as required by R.C. 2151.419(A)(1), the prohibition on filing a motion for permanent 

custody under R.C. 2151.413(D)(3)(b) does not apply. A.N.F. at ¶ 21, citing In re K.L., 10th 

Dist. No. 13AP-218, 2013-Ohio-3499, ¶ 40. 

{¶ 51} Here, the trial court made findings that FCCS made reasonable efforts to 

prevent the continued removal of the child from the home on January 10, 2017. At that 

time, the finding stated biological father was not participating in case services and has a 

criminal background including sexual abuse of a minor. These findings satisfy the 

reasonable efforts requirement under R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). A.N.F. at ¶ 22. 

{¶ 52} Despite this finding, biological father argues FCCS did not do enough to 

facilitate reunification with K.D. As K.D. has never lived with biological father, it seems 

biological father's argument has less to do with reunification and instead correlates to his 

argument under the first assignment of error that the trial court should not have found 

granting FCCS's motion for permanent custody to be in the best interest of the child. 

Biological father again blames FCCS for the lack of bond between biological father and K.D., 

alleging FCCS failed to provide him with specific referrals for parenting classes and 

domestic violence counseling, failed to provide him with the appropriate releases to be able 

to communicate with K.D.'s treatment providers, and failed to facilitate face-to-face visits 

between biological father and K.D.

{¶ 53} The evidence discussed in our resolution of biological father's first 

assignment of error explains the efforts FCCS made to facilitate a bond between biological 

father and K.D. However, biological father's own history of domestic violence and sexual 

abuse resulted in the denial of the first ICPC, unquestionably contributing to a delay in the 

formation of any bond. Biological father once again attempts to shift any blame in a lack of 

bond with K.D. to FCCS despite his waiting more than four years to take a DNA test and 
No. 18AP-746 16 

not following up on recommendations of the case plan in order to have more contact with 

K.D. FCCS provided biological father with assistance for visits, made gas cards available, 

offered partial reimbursement for hotel stays, and made efforts to help biological father 

make steps towards approval as a possible placement for K.D. 

{¶ 54} Based on the entire record, there was clear and convincing evidence that 

FCCS made reasonable efforts under the circumstances to facilitate biological father's 

participation in the case. Ultimately, all of the factors combined led to the conclusion that 

granting FCCS's motion for permanent custody was in K.D.'s best interest. We overrule 

biological father's second and final assignment of error. 

VI. Disposition 

{¶ 55} Based on the foregoing reasons, clear and convincing evidence supports the 

award of permanent custody to FCCS. Having overruled biological father's two 

assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common 

Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch.

Judgment affirmed. 

BRUNNER and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur.