United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 21-1002, 22-1154

BOSTON EXECUTIVE HELICOPTERS, LLC,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

FRANCIS T. MAGUIRE, individually and in his capacity as manager 

of the Norwood Memorial Airport; MARK P. RYAN, individually and 

in his capacity as a clerk of the Norwood Airport Commission; 

MARTIN E. ODSTRCHEL, individually and in his capacity as a 

member of the Norwood Airport Commission; KEVIN J. SHAUGHNESSY, 

individually and in his capacity as a clerk of the Norwood 

Airport Commission; MICHAEL SHEEHAN, individually and in his 

capacity as a member of the Norwood Airport Commission; LESLIE 

W. LEBLANC, in his capacity as a member of the Norwood Airport 

Commission; PAUL V. SHAUGHNESSY, in his capacity as a member of 

the Norwood Airport Commission; HYLIE HUTCHENS, in his capacity 

as a member of the Norwood Airport Commission; NORWOOD AIRPORT 

COMMISSION; THOMAS J. WYNNE, individually and in his capacity as 

former chairman of the Norwood Airport Commission; NORWOOD 

MEMORIAL AIRPORT; TOWN OF NORWOOD,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge] 

Before

Lynch, Thompson, and Kayatta,

Circuit Judges.

Eric H. Loeffler, with whom Davids & Cohen, P.C. was on brief, 
for appellant.

David S. Mackey, with whom Mina S. Makarious, Jonathan T. 

Elder, and Anderson & Kreiger LLP were on brief, for appellees.

August 15, 2022
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KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. This appeal represents the 

latest bout in an acrimonious quarrel between Boston Executive 

Helicopters (BEH) and the Town of Norwood, which runs the Norwood 

Memorial Airport (collectively, "Norwood"). BEH sued Norwood in 

2015, contending that Norwood and one of BEH's competitors, 

FlightLevel, conspired to prevent BEH from becoming a Fixed Base 

Operator at the airport. The parties resolved their dispute --

albeit temporarily -- by entering into a written settlement 

agreement in July 2019. Dissatisfied with Norwood's performance

under the settlement agreement, BEH moved the district court to 

enforce the agreement as construed by BEH. The district court 

denied the motion, and BEH appealed. While the appeal was pending, 

BEH moved the district court to rescind the settlement agreement, 

or, in the alternative, to reconsider its rejection of BEH's motion 

to enforce the agreement. The district court denied those requests

as well, and BEH appealed once again. Concluding that Norwood did 

breach one provision of the settlement agreement, we reverse the 

district court on that one score. We otherwise affirm the denial 

of both motions. Our reasoning follows.

I.

A.

BEH is a helicopter business that operates out of the 

Norwood Memorial Airport in Norwood, Massachusetts. Since its 

founding in 2010, BEH has attempted to lease ramp space from the 
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airport in order to operate as a Fixed Based Operator (FBO).1 In 

late 2012, the Norwood Airport Commission (NAC) -- a government 

agency that controls the airport -- approved BEH's fuel facility 

and hangar; a month later the Norwood Fire Department approved its 

fuel system; and the Board of Selectmen -- which oversees the NAC 

-- approved its fuel permit. The Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) then approved BEH's fuel system and operations. At that 

point, BEH was ready to operate as an FBO as soon as it leased 

ramp space from Norwood and completed construction of a hangar.

After BEH and Norwood failed to come to an agreement to 

lease the necessary ramp space, BEH sued in 2015. The gravamen of 

BEH's complaint was that Norwood conspired with BEH's competitor 

-- FlightLevel -- to "restrain competition and protect the 

incumbent FBO at the Airport." According to BEH, Norwood had been 

stringing it along, inducing it to build a new hangar and obtain 

permits, just to pull the rug out from under BEH when it came to 

acquiring the necessary lease, all so FlightLevel would remain the 

only FBO at the Norwood airport.

On Norwood's motion, the district court dismissed all

BEH's claims save one. The court held that BEH adequately alleged 

1 An FBO is a private business granted the right by an airport 

to operate at the airport and provide aviation services, like 

fueling, parking, and maintenance.
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that, in refusing to issue an FBO permit, Norwood had retaliated 

against BEH for exercising its First Amendment rights.

B.

After several years of litigation, the court set a trial 

date for December 10, 2018. In the weeks leading up to the trial, 

the parties engaged in settlement negotiations. Eventually, they 

orally agreed upon an eight-page, unsigned term sheet, which 

sketched out the skeleton of a settlement agreement. The agreedupon terms required Norwood to approve BEH as an FBO and to provide 

BEH a five-year lease of designated property at the airport, 

including a ramp known as the West Apron that BEH needs to operate 

as an FBO. The term sheet did not mention any easement for 

FlightLevel on the to-be-leased ramp. Nevertheless, when 

Norwood's attorney sent BEH a fleshed-out draft of the settlement 

agreement, it contained the following language:

The West Apron Lease shall be subject to an 

easement allowing [FlightLevel] to access the 

fueling facility located on Lot G.

BEH objected. That same day, it returned a redline of the proposed 

agreement with the easement language crossed out. In brackets, 

BEH explained to Norwood that an easement was not consistent with 

its proposed hangar construction -- which Norwood elsewhere in the 

draft agreed to assist in approving -- and insisted that the 

easement be terminated (or that the rights be assigned to BEH, who 

could then "deal with FlightLevel"). BEH worried that an easement 
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would interfere with its use of the West Apron by, for example,

requiring it to move parked aircraft (if even possible, given space 

constraints) to accommodate FlightLevel's passage.

Norwood balked at deleting the language stating that the 

lease would be subject to an easement for FlightLevel. Several 

other disputes concerning the wording of the settlement agreement 

also arose. At that point, BEH returned to the district court 

asking that it require Norwood to enter into an agreement in accord 

with the term sheet. The parties engaged in further motion 

practice regarding the terms of the settlement, after which the 

court held a two-day settlement conference to address the remaining 

items of contention, including whether the West Apron lease would 

be subject to an easement. The impasse regarding an easement

resolved when Norwood's lawyer announced in open court:

The Board of Selectmen met in executive 

session yesterday and have basically approved 

all of those three items in favor of Boston 

Executive Helicopter. So I have revised the 

Settlement Agreement and Release so that there 

no longer is an easement on the West Ramp.

(Emphasis added.) Based on that representation, the parties signed 

a final settlement agreement. As relevant to this appeal, Norwood 

promised:

(1) to enter into a "standard form, non-exclusive 

lease" with BEH for the West Apron, which would 

enable BEH to operate as an FBO;
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(2) to support BEH's application to the FAA for the 

removal of "TOFA" (i.e., taxiway object free area) 

markings from BEH's leased areas;2

(3) to contemporaneously provide all emails and 

correspondence between Norwood and FlightLevel; 

(4) to allow BEH to participate in all meetings 

regarding negotiations with the FAA over a Joint 

Corrective Action Plan (JCAP) based on the FAA's 

finding that Norwood had violated BEH's rights; 

and

(5) a payment to BEH.

After a brief skirmish over Norwood producing an 

executed copy of the agreement and paying the settlement proceeds,

the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal on September 12, 2019. 

The court "retain[ed] jurisdiction" to "resolve any disputes that 

may arise from the implementation of the settlement agreement's 

terms."

C.

Just over a year later, BEH was back in court moving to 

enforce the settlement agreement. According to BEH, it still did 

not have a lease for ramp space that could be used as planned for 

2 TOFA markings delineate the area that must be kept free of 

parked aircraft and other objects (including vehicles) not needed 

for air navigation or ground maneuvering, and any vehicle must 

give right of way to oncoming aircraft.
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FBO operations because Norwood only offered a lease for the West 

Apron that it said would be subject to an easement held by 

FlightLevel. BEH also alleged that Norwood undermined its petition 

with the FAA to remove TOFA markings from its taxiway (which 

Norwood had promised to support) by affirmatively advocating for 

the markings to expand into the areas containing BEH's hangar. 

BEH complained that Norwood purposefully withheld communications

with FlightLevel that it had agreed to provide to BEH. And BEH 

faulted Norwood for failing to invite it to negotiations with the 

FAA over the JCAP. Finally, BEH accused Norwood of both fraud in 

the inducement concerning the settlement agreement and continuing 

to retaliate against it.

The district court denied BEH's motion to enforce the 

settlement agreement. As for the easement to FlightLevel, the 

court focused on the fact that the written settlement agreement 

did not actually say that Norwood had to provide a lease free of 

an easement for FlightLevel. Rather, it only required Norwood to 

provide a "standard form, non-exclusive lease agreement." The 

district court reasoned that "non-exclusive" unambiguously means 

that the lease need not be free of encumbrances, regardless of the 

express statement to the contrary by Norwood's counsel during the 

settlement hearing. According to the district court, it mattered 

not what had been said before the agreement was signed. For the 

TOFA markings, the court held that Norwood satisfied its 
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responsibility by submitting a letter to the FAA supporting BEH's 

application for their removal. The court found that the settlement 

agreement did not restrain Norwood from taking any other actions 

with respect to TOFA markings at the airport. The court rejected

the remaining claimed violations of the settlement agreement 

because BEH did not "identify any documents specifically or

generically" that it thought Norwood should have provided and 

because Norwood was not required to invite BEH to attend "meetings 

at which the FAA is in attendance." Finally, the court declined

to consider any argument that Norwood committed fraud in the 

inducement or that Norwood was continuing to retaliate against BEH 

because those claims went beyond simply enforcing the settlement 

agreement, which is all the court retained jurisdiction to do.3

BEH timely appealed.

D.

While BEH's appeal was pending, a few things happened on 

the ground that affected the record on appeal.

First, BEH and Norwood actually signed a five-year lease 

for the West Apron. That lease, as BEH points out, says nothing 

about encumbrances; nevertheless, Norwood continues to maintain 

3 The district court also denied two other aspects of the 

motion not raised in BEH's appeal of its original motion to 

enforce. First, the district court found that Norwood did not 

breach a provision of the agreement regarding the makeup of its

Board of Selectmen. Second, the district court declined to 

sanction Norwood.
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that FlightLevel still has an easement to use the West Apron. The 

lease also includes a so-called integration clause, which Norwood 

contends moots any dispute concerning the nature of the lease 

called for by the settlement agreement. Norwood sought to 

supplement the appellate record with the newly executed lease. In 

the absence of any opposition, and because a claim of mootness

bears on our jurisdiction, we granted Norwood permission to do so. 

Cf. Redfern v. Napolitano, 727 F.3d 77, 83 (1st Cir. 2013).

Then, in July 2021, BEH received a response to a publicrecords request, which included (according to BEH) documents that 

should have been provided under the settlement agreement and which 

were proof that Norwood committed fraud to induce the settlement. 

So BEH, like Norwood before it, sought to supplement the appellate 

record. Norwood opposed the motion, and we ultimately denied it.

In the weeks following oral argument before this court, 

BEH filed with the district court an omnibus motion for rescission 

of the settlement agreement or, in the alternative, 

reconsideration by the district court. BEH mostly just repeated 

the arguments it made before and had made on appeal, but it also 

raised the new evidence received through its public-records 

request. The district court correctly rebuffed BEH's motion

because the court no longer had jurisdiction given BEH's pending 

appeal. See United States v. Brooks, 145 F.3d 446, 455–56 (1st 

Cir. 1998) ("[T]he filing of a notice of appeal 'divests a district 
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court of authority to proceed with respect to any matter touching 

upon, or involved in, the appeal.'" (quoting United States v. Mala, 

7 F.3d 1058, 1061 (1st Cir. 1993))).

BEH timely appealed that ruling. We dismissed that 

appeal without prejudice and (while retaining jurisdiction)

ordered the case itself remanded in part for the sole purpose of 

having the district court consider the new motion. The district 

court promptly denied both the motion for rescission, as outside 

its retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, and the

alternative motion for reconsideration, as not made within a 

reasonable time and because "BEH merely recycle[d] arguments 

already rejected." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), (c)(1).

BEH, for the third time, timely appealed. We 

consolidated the first and third appeals (the second having been 

dismissed).

II.

We begin with BEH's motion for rescission of the 

settlement agreement or, in the alternative, for reconsideration.

The district court held that it did not have jurisdiction 

to hear BEH's motion to rescind the settlement agreement because 

the district court only retained jurisdiction to enforce it. We 

agree. See Vikas WSP, Ltd. v. Econ. Mud Prods. Co., 23 F.4th 442, 

453 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding that hearing a fraud claim through 

a district court's ancillary power to "enforce the settlement" 
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would "stretch retained jurisdiction too far"). BEH's arguments 

based on fraud in the inducement should have been raised in a 

separate suit, likely in state court. Indeed, BEH appears to have 

already done so. See Answer to Second Am. Verified Compl. & Am. 

Countercl. at 39–41, FlightLevel Norwood, LLC v. Bos. Exec.

Helicopters, LLC, No. 1982CV01099, Dkt. No. 35 (Norfolk Super. Ct. 

filed Mar. 22, 2021).4

As for BEH's appeal of the denial of its motion to

reconsider the order denying BEH's motion to enforce, we find the 

dispute, for the most part, moot on appeal. We are, in this 

opinion, considering BEH's appeal of the district court's 

rejection of its original motion to enforce, and BEH's motion to 

reconsider that order raises substantially the same points. So

our decision on the merits of the original motion resolves the 

latter.

4 BEH's continued attempt to enforce the settlement agreement

seems, at least at first blush, misplaced given its pending state 

court action seeking to rescind that very agreement. Norwood, 

though, claims no material inconsistency between the two requests. 

Nor do we see any such inconsistency. In essence, BEH is arguing 

in the alternative: rescind the settlement agreement or, if not, 

enforce it. This alternative argument seems odd only because its 

two components are being pressed in different courts for 

jurisdictional reasons. In theory, this runs the risk that the 

two courts could issue contradictory decisions to enforce and to 

rescind. But neither party suggests that such an inconsistent 

grant of mutually conflicting alternatives is possible as matters 

now stand.
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There are two exceptions, however. First, the motion to 

reconsider included newly acquired evidence that, BEH contends, 

shows that Norwood breached its obligation to provide all 

communications with FlightLevel. We address that evidence below. 

Second, BEH's motion to reconsider (and appeal of its denial) 

revives one argument that it did not raise in its direct appeal of 

the district court's order denying its motion to enforce, namely 

that Norwood breached a provision of the settlement agreement 

related to the makeup of the Board of Selectmen. But BEH's oneparagraph argument in its reconsideration appeal fails to explain 

how Norwood breached this provision, nor does it cite any authority 

supporting its contention. So we find it waived. See United 

States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

III.

We turn next to BEH's appeal of the district court's 

denial of its motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Given 

that the district court denied the motion based on its reading of 

the agreement's text, without relying on any fact finding, we

"review the district court's interpretation of a settlement 

agreement de novo," applying state contract law. In re Volkswagen 

and Audi Warranty Extension Litig., 692 F.3d 4, 13, 15 (1st Cir. 

2012). Here, Massachusetts law plainly governs. See id. at 17–

21 (applying choice-of-law principles).
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BEH maintains that Norwood has breached provisions of 

the settlement agreement regarding (1) leasing the West Ramp, 

(2) removing TOFA markings, (3) receiving communications between 

Norwood and FlightLevel, and (4) attending meetings regarding 

negotiations with the FAA. We conclude, as BEH argues, that 

Norwood agreed in the settlement agreement to provide a lease for 

the West Ramp without an easement in favor of FlightLevel,

reversing the district court on that score, but we otherwise affirm 

the district court's rejection of the motion to enforce.

A.

Under the settlement agreement, Norwood was obligated to 

grant BEH "standard form, non-exclusive lease agreements" for two 

ramps, including the West Apron on which Norwood now claims there 

is an easement. BEH contends that this obligation, construed in 

light of the parties' negotiations, requires Norwood to provide a 

lease for the West Apron free of any encumbrance in favor of 

FlightLevel. Norwood offers two rejoinders: (1) How to interpret 

the obligation to grant leases under the settlement agreement is 

now "moot" because the parties have actually entered into a lease 

for the West Apron, which is fully integrated and accordingly 

supersedes any prior agreements "with respect to the matter 

covered" in the new lease; and (2) in any event, the district court 

correctly held that the settlement agreement did not obligate

Norwood to provide a lease free of any easements. For the 
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following reasons, we think that BEH has the better position on 

each of these arguments.

1.

Norwood's "mootness" argument hinges on the application 

of the integration clause in the new lease to bar any recourse to 

the prior settlement agreement in construing the parties' rights 

and obligations regarding the leased premises. The lease's 

integration clause states: "This Lease represents the entire 

agreement between the parties hereto with respect to the matter 

covered herein. No other agreement, representations, warranties, 

proposals, oral or written, shall be deemed to bind the parties."

Norwood would have us read "the matter covered herein" 

as including whatever obligations Norwood has under the settlement 

agreement to lease the West Apron. But the lease does not so 

state. Rather, the cited clause is limited to the matters covered 

by the lease, and the lease does not address the subject of 

easements at all.5 Indeed, the lease (unlike the settlement 

agreement) does not even contain the word "non-exclusive" deemed 

so crucial by Norwood and the district court in construing the 

settlement agreement itself. And neither party points to any 

5 The lease disavows any representation by Norwood that the 

leased premises is "fit for the uses to which [it is] placed by 

the lessee." In context, we do not read this reservation as 

bearing on legal title or title impairments, such as an 

encumbrance.
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default rule allocating to one party or the other the risk that a 

leasehold may be subject to an easement that defeats a principal 

and mutually understood purpose of the lease.

We, therefore, see no reason why the lease must be viewed 

as inconsistent with a prior obligation to provide a West Apron 

lease without an easement. See 11 Williston on Contracts § 33:31 

(4th ed. Nov. 2021 Update) ("[A] written agreement [is not 

superseded or invalidated] by a subsequent integration relating to 

the same subject-matter, if the agreement is not inconsistent with 

the integrated contract, and [] is made for separate 

consideration."); see also De Blois v. Boylston & Tremont Corp., 

183 N.E. 823, 827 (Mass. 1933) (explaining that a prior agreement 

is still applicable as long as it is not so inconsistent with the 

new contract that they cannot stand together). Rather, if we were

to find that Norwood had agreed in the settlement agreement to 

lease the West Apron to BEH with any easement in favor of 

FlightLevel removed, the executed lease would stand at most as an

incomplete performance of such an agreement. Accordingly, nothing 

in the lease's integration clause renders moot the issue of whether 

the parties, before signing the new lease, agreed that there was 

to be no such encumbrance.

2.

That, then, brings us back to whether the parties ever

so agreed. That is, should the settlement agreement be read as 
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calling for a lease of property unburdened by an encumbrance of 

the West Apron in favor of FlightLevel that rendered BEH's intended 

use unavailable?

The parties' prolonged negotiations prior to signing the 

settlement agreement make it crystal clear that there was to be no 

encumbrance in favor of FlightLevel. The parties stood at an 

impasse over precisely this issue, with BEH steadfastly insisting 

that no encumbrance should exist. That impasse only broke when 

Norwood dramatically announced in open court that "there no longer 

is an easement on the West Ramp" and agreed to strike the language 

reserving an easement "allowing [FlightLevel] to access the 

fueling facility" on the to-be-leased property.

Of course, even crystal-clear parol evidence that the 

parties negotiated an agreement on a point can be rendered 

essentially irrelevant by a clear contrary statement in a 

subsequent written memorialization of the parties' final 

understanding. See Gen. Convention of New Jerusalem in the U.S., 

Inc. v. MacKenzie, 874 N.E.2d 1084, 1087–89 (Mass. 2007). And, 

here, there was another such written agreement executed after 

Norwood gave the foregoing assurance: the settlement agreement

itself. The district court accepted Norwood's argument that the 

settlement agreement's requirement that Norwood provide a 

"standard form, non-exclusive lease" was unambiguous and 

accordingly precluded any reliance on the evidence of the parties' 
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negotiations. For precisely this reason, the district court put 

entirely to one side the foregoing crystal-clear parol evidence.

With the benefit of more time and the focus provided by 

appellate briefing, we disagree. The settlement agreement, like 

the new lease, makes no mention either way of encumbrances. It 

does contain the word "non-exclusive," but it is hardly selfevident that the word as used here was intended to allow Norwood

to turn around and encumber the property so as to fundamentally 

interfere with its intended use. Certainly that word cannot mean, 

for example, that Norwood could simultaneously lease to multiple 

FBOs property that could only support one FBO.

Our reluctance to construe "non-exclusive" as "not 

excluding easements that would fundamentally interfere with the 

property as an FBO" finds support in the fact that, in context,

the notion of exclusivity has an entirely different meaning and 

purpose. Lessees of a commercial property often would prefer that 

the lessor not lease other portions of its property to a 

competitor. For example, a supermarket leasing space in a mall 

might well want the owner of the mall to give the lessee an 

"exclusive" deal, barring the leasing of other lots in the mall to 

a competing supermarket. So, too, here, might an FBO at an airport

prefer to construe its lease as barring the airport from leasing 

airport property to a competitor.
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But federal law prohibits exclusivity of precisely that

type. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103(e);6 47107(a)(4).7 And Norwood has

previously found itself in hot water for granting such exclusivity 

to a tenant (notably, FlightLevel). See Final Decision and Order, 

Bos. Air Charter v. Norwood Airport Comm'n, FAA Docket No. 16-07-

03, Final Decision and Order, 2008 WL 4186034 (Aug. 14, 2008). 

The FAA found Norwood violated, among others, the "Exclusive 

Rights" grant assurance, which "implements the provisions of 49 

U.S.C. §§ 40103(e) and 47107(a)(4)." Id. at *15, *24–26.

To construe contract language precipitated by federal 

regulation, courts should look at "the regulation and the federal 

6 "No Exclusive Rights at Certain Facilities. A person does 

not have an exclusive right to use an air navigation facility on 

which Government money has been expended. However, providing 

services at an airport by only one fixed-based operator is not an 

exclusive right if [] it is unreasonably costly, burdensome, or 

impractical for more than one fixed-based operator to provide the 

services." 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e)(1).

7 "General Written Assurances. The Secretary of 

Transportation may approve a project grant application under this 

subchapter for an airport development project only if the Secretary 

receives written assurances, satisfactory to the Secretary, that 

[inter alia] a person providing, or intending to provide, 

aeronautical services to the public will not be given an exclusive 

right to use the airport, with a right given to only one fixedbase operator to provide services at an airport deemed not to be 

an exclusive right if-- (A) the right would be unreasonably costly, 

burdensome, or impractical for more than one fixed-base operator 

to provide the services; and (B) allowing more than one fixed-base 

operator to provide the services would require reducing the space 

leased under an existing agreement between the one fixed-base 

operator and the airport owner or operator." 49 U.S.C. 

§ 47017(a)(4).
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policy underlying the regulatory scheme." Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans 

Servicing, LP, 738 F.3d 432, 436 (1st Cir. 2013) (en banc) (lead 

opinion of equally divided court); see also Feaz v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A., 745 F.3d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir. 2014) (adopting the 

position of Kolbe's lead opinion). Here, the regulatory context 

provides strong evidence that "non-exclusive" means that the 

airport can allow competing FBOs, not that it can grant 

incompatible rights in the same land to others. This conclusion 

finds further support in the fact that the only discussion of 

exclusivity in Norwood's standard-form lease is in relation to the 

FAA requirements: "It is understood and agreed that . . . nothing 

herein contained shall be construed as granting or authorizing the 

granting of an exclusive right within the meaning of Section 308 

of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958."8

It therefore seems quite likely that the term "nonexclusive" was intended by the parties simply to make clear that, 

in accord with federal non-exclusivity rules, Norwood was not 

obligated to bar other FBOs from the airport. So read, it would 

say nothing about whether there could be an easement over the 

8 Norwood's standard-form lease is referenced in the 

settlement agreement and is therefore appropriately considered to 

aid our interpretation. See 11 Williston on Contracts § 30:26 

(4th ed. Nov. 2021 Update) ("[A] contemporaneous writing known to 

the parties may shed light on the meaning of a contract without 

being part of the contract.").
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leased property. But we need not make that determination 

definitively. At the very least, the settlement agreement is 

ambiguous as to whether the language "standard form, non-exclusive 

lease" allows Norwood to let another FBO use the very same real 

estate leased to BEH, much less to do so in a manner that 

significantly constrained BEH's own use of the West Apron. See

PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 600 (1st Cir. 1996) ("A 

contract term is ambiguous if it is 'capable of more than one 

meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person 

who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement 

and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages, and 

terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or 

business.'" (quoting Walk-In Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. Breuer Cap. Corp.,

818 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying New York law))).

To "ascertain[] the intent of the parties as imperfectly 

expressed in ambiguous contract language," Massachusetts courts 

look to extrinsic evidence, with "the parties' negotiations" being 

the most important. Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank of 

Bos., 75 F.3d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, Norwood 

contends that the court still cannot consider representations made 

in the negotiation process because the settlement agreement also 

contains an integration clause, which states that the agreement 

"supersedes all prior written and oral agreements and all 

contemporaneous oral negotiations, commitments and understandings 
- 22 -

between the parties" and that they "have not relied upon any other 

representations or statements made by any person or entity." But,

"whether or not [a writing] is integrated," "negotiations prior to 

or contemporaneous with the adoption of [that] writing are . . .

admissible to establish . . . the meaning of the writing." 

11 Williston on Contracts § 33:26 (citing Restatement (Second) 

Contracts § 214(c)); see also Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 284 

N.E.2d 238, 243 (Mass. 1972) (holding that while parol evidence 

"cannot be employed to vary an integrated written agreement," it 

is "properly considered" to "assist in determining what the parties 

intended"). Thus, the settlement agreement's integration clause 

does not bar our consideration of the negotiations "to interpret 

and apply language used in" that agreement. Simon v. Simon, 625 

N.E.2d 564, 568 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (citing Tzitzon Realty Co.

v. Mustonen, 227 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Mass. 1967)).

Luckily, the negotiations over this provision clearly 

indicate the parties' intentions on this precise issue. A quick 

recap: Norwood wanted to allow for an easement, BEH objected, an 

impasse arose. Norwood then publicly announced that its Board of 

Selectmen had decided the item in favor of BEH, and the language 

providing for an easement was stricken. This lead-up to the 

signing of the settlement agreement resolves any relevant 

ambiguity about the meaning of the term "standard form, nonexclusive lease" as intended by the parties. We, therefore, 
- 23 -

conclude that a "standard form, non-exclusive lease," as used in 

this agreement, means a lease unencumbered by an easement in favor 

of FlightLevel to the extent it materially impedes BEH's intended 

use of the to-be-leased ramp.

In summary, the parties' negotiation of the settlement 

agreement made it eminently clear that the West Apron to be leased 

to BEH was not to contain an easement in favor of FlightLevel. 

And nothing in the subsequently signed agreement or the executed

lease spoke to this subject in a manner that precludes reference 

to the negotiation in construing the language of the settlement 

agreement or in determining whether Norwood has fully complied 

with that agreement by leasing the West Apron subject to an 

easement it had promised to remove. Accordingly, on remand, the 

district court need fashion an appropriate remedy to the extent 

that Norwood has yet to provide a lease for the West Apron free of 

any easement in favor of FlightLevel.9

B.

The settlement agreement contains the following 

provision concerning so-called TOFA markings, which limit the 

space within the leased area that BEH can actively use:

9 In passing, BEH contends that the court "also erred in 

failing to address [its] claim that [Norwood] failed to provide a 

lease to BEH for the amount of space promised under the Settlement 

Agreement which, in and of itself, warrants reversal." We treat 

this undeveloped argument as waived on appeal. See Zannino, 895 

F.2d at 17.
- 24 -

BEH shall prepare a petition to the FAA, with 

appropriate plans or drawings, seeking 

approval for the removal of all TOFA and/or 

OFA markings in Taxiway 3. The NAC shall 

submit a letter to the FAA in support of BEH's 

petition for TOFA and/or OFA relief within 

thirty (30) days after the receipt of BEH's 

submission to the FAA. If approved by the 

FAA, the TOFA/OFA markings on Taxiway 3 shall 

be removed by the NAC within sixty (60) days.

BEH contends that Norwood violated this TOFA provision by 

attempting to undermine BEH's petition to the FAA for approval to 

remove the TOFA markings. As proof, BEH points to two actions by 

Norwood.

BEH claims, first, that Norwood breached this agreement 

because its letter was late. Assuming that to be so, the record 

is nevertheless bereft of evidence that the delay caused any harm. 

Moreover, on its face, the letter otherwise complies with the 

agreement. We therefore agree with the district court that BEH's 

request to "enforce" this provision of the settlement agreement 

makes no sense.

BEH claims, second, that Norwood has breached the 

agreement by seeking, months after submitting its letter 

supporting the removal of TOFA in Taxiway 3, to increase TOFA 

markings in other areas around BEH's hangar. BEH, though, points 

to no language in the various agreements or even the parties' 

negotiations suggesting any obligation by Norwood not to seek 

additional TOFA markings. The settlement agreement only requires 
- 25 -

Norwood to "submit a letter in support of BEH's petition" for the 

removal of existing TOFA and, if the petition is approved, to 

remove those markings. Norwood has complied with the first 

requirement (albeit late), and there is no indication in the record 

that BEH's petition has been granted to trigger the second. Nor 

does BEH point us to any evidence in the record that Norwood's

proposed markings duplicate or overlap with the markings BEH seeks 

to remove.

On appeal, BEH tries a different tack, contending that 

Norwood could be found to have breached the implied covenant of 

good faith, which Massachusetts recognizes in some circumstances, 

see Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Reg. Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255–56 (Mass. 

1977), but not in others, see Uno Rests., Inc. v. Bos. Kenmore 

Realty Corp., 805 N.E.2d 957, 964 (Mass. 2004). BEH only obliquely 

referred to the implied covenant of good faith in its motion to 

enforce filed in the district court: In one line of its memorandum 

of law, it alleged that Norwood breached "the letter and spirit" 

of the agreement. But, as to the latter, it said nothing more. 

It cited no pertinent cases. Nor did it try to explain how these 

facts would qualify under Massachusetts law. And its supporting 

affidavit offered no explanation for how the requested new TOFA 

markings by themselves frustrated the purpose of the agreement. 

Indeed, we cannot even tell from the appellate briefs where the 

proposed markings would be in relation to the existing markings. 
- 26 -

This argument, "not seasonably advanced below[,] cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal." Johnson v. Johnson, 23 F.4th 136, 

143 (1st Cir. 2022).10

C.

In a handwritten and initialed provision of the 

settlement agreement, the parties agreed:

For a period of eighteen (18) months following 

execution of this Agreement, and subject to 

any applicable exemptions under the 

Massachusetts Public Records Law, the Town and 

the NAC agree to copy, or distribute copies, 

to both BEH and FlightLevel Norwood, LLC . . .

any and all email and correspondence, by and 

between the NAC and BEH or [FlightLevel], 

contemporaneously with any such 

communications.

BEH contends that Norwood has "continually failed to 

comply" with this provision and has "continued to conceal

communications." Thus, BEH believes the district court erred by 

failing to order Norwood to produce communications falling under 

the provision or to order Norwood to certify that all such 

communications have been provided. We disagree. As the district 

10 BEH did more or less advance this argument in its motion 

for reconsideration before the district court, but the court found 

that motion untimely under Rule 60(c). "District courts enjoy 

considerable discretion" in deciding Rule 60 motions, Cotto v. 

United States, 993 F.2d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1993), and BEH offers 

no argument establishing that the district court abused that 

discretion regarding the TOFA provision.
- 27 -

court held, BEH failed at that time to identify any communications 

subject to the provision that had not been produced.

In its motion for reconsideration, BEH pointed to newly 

discovered emails it received through a public-records request 

that it claims Norwood should have produced earlier.11 But in its 

appeal from the district court's denial of its motion for 

reconsideration, it did not raise this argument in its opening 

brief. Although BEH described the new evidence in its statement 

of the case, it failed to make any argument that Norwood thus 

breached the provision of the settlement agreement requiring 

Norwood to share certain communications with BEH; BEH instead 

focused exclusively on how the new evidence supported its fraud 

claims. BEH thus waived any such argument. See Clarendon Nat'l 

Ins. Co. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 954 F.3d 397, 407–08 (1st Cir. 

2020) (deeming waived an argument only "mention[ed] in 

[appellant's] opening brief's statement of the case" and "not 

discuss[ed] elsewhere in its briefs"); see also Britto v. Prospect 

Chartercare SJHSRI, LLC, 909 F.3d 506, 514 (1st Cir. 2018) (deeming

waived an argument that appellant only included in the 

11 We assume without deciding that this portion of BEH's 

motion to reconsider was timely under Rule 60(c).
- 28 -

"jurisdictional section" and "statement-of-the-case section" of 

his brief, but did not discuss "in the brief's argument section").12

D.

Finally, we turn to BEH's allegation that Norwood 

breached the settlement agreement by excluding it from meetings 

with the FAA. Norwood agreed that

BEH shall be allowed to participate in any

meetings, and be copied on all correspondence, 

regarding the negotiation with the FAA 

regarding negotiation of required remedial 

measures in connection with [an FAA 

determination], with the intention and goal of 

crafting a "Joint Corrective Action Plan."

The district court interpreted this provision to only 

require BEH's participation in meetings "regarding the 

negotiation" with the FAA, but not any meetings with the FAA 

itself. But the provision broadly states that BEH "shall" be 

permitted to participate in "any" meetings -- and copied on "all" 

correspondence -- regarding the negotiation with the FAA. And it 

is hard to say that a meeting with the FAA "regarding negotiation" 

of a JCAP does not "regard[] the negotiation with the FAA."

12 To the extent BEH is harmed by a later-discovered 

withholding by Norwood or some new evidence suggests that Norwood 

is not telling the truth, the district court has retained 

jurisdiction to continue to enforce this settlement agreement. At 

this juncture, however, we are left to affirm the district court's 

dismissal of BEH's motion as it pertains to communications.
- 29 -

It is unclear, however, what relief BEH is now seeking

under this provision. BEH points to no ongoing or future 

negotiations with the FAA to which it could be invited, nor does

BEH explain what, if anything, Norwood must now do. Accordingly, 

we affirm the district court's denial of BEH's motion to enforce 

this provision of the settlement agreement because there currently 

is no basis to think that it will be breached in the future.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the denial of BEH's 

motion to enforce the settlement agreement as it pertains to 

Norwood's failure to provide a lease of the West Apron free of an 

easement in favor of FlightLevel and remand for consideration of 

this claim consistent with this opinion. We otherwise affirm the 

denial of the motion to enforce, the denial of the motion to 

rescind, and the denial of the motion to reconsider. Each party 

will bear its own costs.