UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ 

 ) 

SHEA M.

1, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 1:21-CV-02204 (GMH)

 ) 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Commissioner of ) 

Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. )

____________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Shea M. brought this action seeking to reverse the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security, Kilolo Kijakazi (“Defendant” or “the Commissioner”), denying 

Plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits under Title II of the 

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She alleges that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

erred in several respects when determining that she had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform light work with some additional limitations. Specifically, she contends that the ALJ 

failed to consider certain evidence, that he improperly evaluated the opinion evidence, and that his 

hypothetical questions to the vocational expert (“VE”) were flawed. She seeks reversal of the 

Commissioner's decision and a judgment that she is entitled to benefits or, in the alternative, 

remand for a new administrative hearing. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ's decision should 

be affirmed. 

1 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee on Court 

Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Memorandum from Hon. 

Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chair, Comm. on Ct. Admin. & Case Mgmt. to Chief Judges of the U.S. Cts. of Appeals, Chief 

Judges of the U.S. Dist. Cts., Clerks of the U.S. Cts. of Appeals, and Clerks of the U.S. Dist. Cts. (May 1, 2018), 

available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-ap-c-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2023).
2

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the administrative record, the Court will deny 

the Commissioner’s motion for affirmance, deny Plaintiff’s motion to the extent it seeks reversal, 

but grant Plaintiff’s motion to the extent that it seeks remand to the Social Security Administration 

for further administrative proceedings.

2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To be eligible for SSI benefits under the Social Security Act, the Social Security 

Administration must find a claimant to be “disabled,” meaning that the individual is “unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected 

to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). To 

make that determination, an ALJ gathers evidence, holds a hearing, takes testimony, and performs 

the following five-step, sequential inquiry of the disability claim: 

Step one: whether the claimant is engaging in “substantial gainful activity”;

3

Step two: whether the claimant has a “severe” medically-determinable physical or 

mental impairment or combination of impairments;

4

2 The relevant docket entries for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion are (1) the administrative record (ECF No. 

11), (2) Plaintiff’s motion for judgment of reversal (ECF No. 18), (3) Defendant’s motion for judgment of affirmance 

and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for judgment of reversal (ECF No. 20), and (4) Plaintiff’s opposition to 

Defendant’s motion for judgment of affirmance/reply in further support of Plaintiff’s motion for judgment of reversal

(ECF No. 23). The page numbers cited herein are those assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF system.

3 “Substantial gainful activity” is work that “involves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties” and 

is “done (or intended) for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.910; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1510 (defining “substantial 

gainful activity” for the purposes of Social Security disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) claims). “If [the claimant 

is] doing substantial gainful activity, [the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)] will find that [the claimant is] not 

disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) (defining the step one inquiry for DIB 

claims). 

4 An impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” if it “significantly limit[s]” a claimant’s “physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities,” such as “walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching,

carrying, or handling”; “seeing, hearing, [or] speaking”; “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple 

instructions”; exercising judgment; “[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers[,] and usual work 

situations”; or “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.922; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522 

(defining a severe impairment for the purposes of DIB claims). 
3

Step three: whether the claimant’s impairment is equivalent to one of the disabling 

impairments listed in the appendix of the relevant regulation, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1 (the “Listings”); 

Step four: whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing his or 

her past relevant work;

5 and 

Step five: whether the claimant, in light of his or her age, education, work 

experience, and RFC—i.e., the most he or she is able to do notwithstanding his or 

her physical and mental limitations—can still perform another job available in the 

national economy.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (outlining the five-step sequential inquiry 

for the purposes of DIB claims); Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “An 

affirmative answer to question 1 or negative answers to questions 2 or 4 result in a determination 

of no disability. Affirmative answers to questions 3 or 5 establish disability.” Hines v. Bowen, 

872 F.2d 56, 58 (4th Cir. 1989).

The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps of the evaluation. Callahan 

v. Astrue, 786 F. Supp. 2d 87, 89 (D.D.C. 2011). At step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner to identify specific jobs available in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform. Id. In making this determination, an ALJ may call a vocational expert to testify at the 

hearing as to whether, based on the claimant’s RFC, he or she can perform other work that exists 

in the national economy. Id. at 90.

B. Plaintiff’s Disability Claims and Procedural History

Plaintiff was born on May 25, 1979 and has a high-school diploma. ECF No. 11-2 at 40. 

5 “Past relevant work” is work “done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long 

enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(1); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1) (defining 

“past relevant work” for the purposes of DIB claims). If the claimant can perform his or her past relevant work, a 

finding of “not disabled” is mandated. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) 

(defining the step four inquiry for DIB claims).
4

Her earnings records show a small amount of work income in 2013 and none since. ECF No. 11-

5 at 14. 

On May 28, 2019, the Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging disability beginning 

January 1, 2017. ECF No. 11-3 at 16. Plaintiff claimed disability due to schizophrenia, psychosis, 

and a ruptured bone in her left leg. Id. Her claim was denied initially on November 21, 2019, and 

upon reconsideration on April 20, 2020. ECF No. 11-4 at 2, 10. She thereafter requested a hearing 

before an ALJ. Id. at 13. On November 23, 2020, with Plaintiff’s consent, an ALJ held a 

telephonic hearing due to the extraordinary circumstance presented by the Coronavirus pandemic. 

ECF No. 11-2 at 35–65. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing via telephone and was represented by 

counsel. Id. A vocational expert also testified at the hearing. Id. 

Plaintiff testified that from 2011 to 2013 she worked as a child-care attendant and preschool 

teacher’s aide. Id. at 41. She stated that she stopped working in this position in 2013 because 

“[t]hey said I wasn’t paying attention to the children or something,” and she had not applied for a 

job since. Id. Plaintiff confirmed that she lives in the District of Columbia, and that she has lived 

by herself, in the same apartment, for roughly two years. Id. at 42. She said that she does not have 

a driver’s license but takes the bus once a month to see her doctor. Id. at 42–43. Specifically, 

Plaintiff testified that she has a friend come with her, taking multiple bus lines to travel from her 

apartment in Southeast D.C. to her doctor’s office in Northeast D.C. Id. at 42–44. Plaintiff 

explained that she “barely[s] go[es] outside” because she is “scared,” and that she has a friend 

come with her because without her friend, she would get in “[a] lot of trouble” because she would 

otherwise think that “somebody” is “after [her] and stuff like that.” Id. In response to the ALJ’s 

questions, Plaintiff stated that she had no hobbies, did not socialize with friends, and had not been 

outside of the Washington D.C. area for any reason in the prior two years. Id. at 44–45. Plaintiff
5

also testified that the medications she was taking were “sometimes” helpful, and that when she 

takes her medications, she does not hear voices. Id. at 45. 

Regarding her mobility, Plaintiff testified that she is not able to walk three blocks because 

her “legs will give out,” and that the bus stop she uses is less than one block from her apartment. 

Id. at 45–46. Plaintiff said she could only stand for five minutes before needing to sit down because 

otherwise she feels her left leg would break, and she further testified that she could sit for roughly 

thirty minutes before needing to get up to shake her left leg. Id. at 46–47. Plaintiff continued that 

because she can “lift nothing,” she has someone go to the grocery store for her. Id. She also said

that she cannot climb stairs, explaining that both her apartment and her doctor’s office are on the 

first floor, and that she uses the ramp to board the bus. Id. As for household chores, Plaintiff said 

that her friend does the laundry, dishes, sweeping, and vacuuming and also takes out the trash. Id. 

at 49.

The ALJ then asked Plaintiff about her ability to concentrate. Id. at 48. Plaintiff answered 

in the affirmative when asked if she had trouble with her concentration. Id. The ALJ then inquired 

about the records in Plaintiff’s file that indicated she liked reading books and cooking. Id. In 

response, she testified that she does not read books, and that she does not cook but instead eats 

microwave dinners. Id. The ALJ then asked Plaintiff why she thought she had been unable to 

obtain and hold a job. Id. The Plaintiff answered that she cannot “stay focused,” and that her 

“mind wanders.” Id. 

Next, the ALJ asked the Plaintiff about the records in her file which indicated that she told 

her doctor that she traveled to Myrtle Beach in May 2019 to celebrate her 40th birthday. Id. at 50. 

Plaintiff responded that she had never been to Myrtle Beach, did not remember telling her doctor 

that, and again testified that she had not left town since May 2019. Id. 
6

In response to follow up questions from her counsel, Plaintiff testified that she used to 

enjoy reading, but that her “mind is not focused on reading right now.” Id. at 52. Plaintiff also 

testified that hearing voices makes it difficult to concentrate, and that she hears voices every day, 

even when taking her medication. Id. at 53–56. 

Next, the ALJ presented a series of hypothetical questions to the vocational expert. First, 

he proposed a hypothetical individual of the same age, education, and vocational background as 

Plaintiff, who was limited to light work as defined in the SSA, with the following additional 

limitations: she can stand and/or walk for two hours out of an eight-hour workday; occasionally 

operate foot controls with the left lower extremity; frequently operate foot controls with the right 

lower extremity; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and occasionally climb ramps or stairs, 

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and/or crawl; perform only jobs that can be executed while using a 

cane for ambulation; must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, wetness, excessive 

vibration, hazardous moving machinery, and unprotected heights; perform only simple, routine, 

repetitive tasks in a low-stress work environment (with low stress defined as no strict production 

quotas, no assembly line pace work) involving occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; and changes in work duties must be introduced gradually. Id. at 57–58. 

The VE answered that such a hypothetical individual could not perform Plaintiff’s past work but 

could perform jobs within the national economy including Router, Marker, and Non-Postal Mail

Clerk positions. Id. at 58. If the hypothetical individual was further restricted to only sedentary 

work (rather than light work) as defined by the SSA regulations, the VE stated that such an 

individual could still perform jobs in the national economy, including Addresser, Assembler, and 

Document Preparer. Id. at 59. 

Next, as relevant here, Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE whether there would be jobs in the 
7

national economy if the hypothetical individual would further require the assistance of another 

person to follow two-step commands. Id. at 60–61. The VE answered that such a person would 

not be employable. Id. at 27. Alternatively, Plaintiff’s counsel asked if the hypothetical individual 

would be employable if she suffered from distracting hallucinations that made concentration 

difficult. Id. The VE explained that if a concentration deficiency resulted in a productivity loss 

of fifteen percent or greater, then such a person would not be employable. Id. 

C. The ALJ’s Decision

On December 24, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 13–29. 

That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff's request for review in June 2021. Id. at 2–7. The following summation of the ALJ’s 

decision will focus on those issues that are the subject of this appeal. 

1. Substantial Gainful Employment, Severe Impairments, and the Listings

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the date of her SSI application. ECF No. 11-2 at 18. At step two, he found that the Plaintiff 

had the following impairments that could be classified as “severe” under the regulations: statuspost left lateral tibia plateau fracture and open reduction and internal fixation, status-post right 

fibula fracture, bilateral knee osteoarthritis, status-post left lateral meniscus tear, left knee 

arthrofibrosis, left knee Pellegrini-Stieda lesion, osteopenia, schizophrenia, schizoaffective 

disorder, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. At step three, the ALJ found 

that, either singly or in combination, Plaintiff’s physical impairments did not meet or medically 

equal the severity of any of the impairments in the Listings, including Listing 1.06, which 

addresses fractures of the femur, tibia, pelvis or tarsal bones, and Listing 1.02, which addresses 

dysfunction of major weight-bearing joints. Id. at 18–19.
8

The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairments of 

schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder, 

considered singly and in combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria of Listings 12.03, 

12.04, or 12.15. Id. at 19–21. In making this determination the ALJ considered whether the 

“paragraph B” criteria of the listings were satisfied. Id. To satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria, 

Plaintiff's mental impairments must result in at least one extreme or two marked limitations6 in the 

following areas of functioning: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) 

interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or 

managing themselves. Id. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had only a moderate limitation with respect 

to each of those four domains, and thus did not meet the paragraph B requirements. Id. at 20.

In making that determination, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s “routine mental health 

treatment,” her largely unremarkable mental status examination findings and her “significant 

activities of daily living.” Id. Specifically, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff’s “treatment history 

for her mental health issues has been conservative, limited predominantly to prescription 

medication and counseling with no evidence of significant in-patient treatment or hospitalizations 

due to mental health concerns from the relevant period.” Id; see generally ECF No. 11-7. Her 

mental status examinations, while showing “some issues with anxiety, mood, and anger,” also 

typically found her to be “alert and oriented with a cooperative attitude, normal speech, logical 

thought process, intact associations, appropriate thought content, no suicidal or homicidal ideation, 

and fair insight and judgment.” ECF No. 11-2 at 20. Moreover, she was often found to have 

“normal appearance, fair recent and remote memory, fair attention span and concentration, and 

6 A marked limitation means functioning in the area “independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained 

basis is seriously limited[.]” ECF No. 11-2 at 19; see 20 C.F.R § 404.1520a. An extreme limitation is the “[inability]

to function in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.” ECF No. 11-2 at 19–20; 

see 20 C.F.R § 404.1520a.
9

fair fund of knowledge.” Id. As an example, the ALJ gave weight to the fact that, in her 

consultative examination, Plaintiff was dressed appropriately, maintained good eye contact, and 

was properly oriented. Id. (citing ECF No. 11-9 at 300). The ALJ acknowledged that while 

Plaintiff had “some” memory impairment and a diminished affect, she also revealed no evidence 

of hallucinations or delusions, no evidence of impaired judgment, and no suicidal ideation. Id. 

The ALJ also relied on what he characterized as Plaintiff’s “extensive” activities of daily 

living. Id. Specifically, the ALJ pointed to records that Plaintiff vacationed in Myrtle Beach for 

her birthday in May of 2019; records that indicated she cooks, and enjoys reading; and her 

statement in May 2020 that she “like[s] to go do stuff.” Id. (citing ECF No. 11-9 at 163, ECF No. 

11-10 at 36). Additionally, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s function report where she indicated that 

she needs no reminders for personal needs or grooming, can prepare her own meals, and can 

perform household chores without encouragement. Id. (citing ECF No. 11-6 at 23–33). On that 

same report, Plaintiff further indicated that she is able to use public transportation, go shopping in 

stores, pay bills, count change, handle a savings account, and use a checkbook and money orders. 

Id. Finally, she also stated that she spends time with others on occasion and is able to go out alone. 

Id. In sum, the ALJ determined that given Plaintiff’s history of conservative mental health 

treatment, unremarkable mental status examinations, and activities of daily living, her impairments 

result in, “at most, moderate limitations to the four [paragraph B] functional categories.” ECF No. 

11-2 at 20. The ALJ found no record evidence that the “paragraph C” criteria of Listings 12.03, 

12.04, and 12.15 were met, which include “a minimal capacity to adapt to changes in [the 

claimant’s] environment or to demands that are not already part of [her] daily life. Id. at 21. 
10

2. Plaintiff’s RFC 

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform “light work” except that 

she can stand and/or walk for only two hours out of an eight-hour workday; occasionally operate 

foot controls with the left lower extremity; frequently operate foot controls with the right lower 

extremity; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, and/or crawl; is limited to jobs that can be performed while using a cane for 

ambulation; must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, wetness, excessive vibration, 

hazardous moving machinery, and unprotected heights; can perform only simple, routine, 

repetitive, low-stress jobs (no strict production quotas, no assembly line pace work) involving 

occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the general public; and can adapt to 

changes in work duties only if they are introduced gradually. Id. SSA regulations define “light 

work” as involving “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of 

objects weighing up to 10 pounds. . . . [A] job is in this category when it requires a good deal of 

walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of 

arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). SSR 83-10 further explains that “the full range of 

light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for . . . approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour 

workday.” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5–6.

In determining that RFC, the ALJ explained that he considered all of Plaintiff’s symptoms, 

and the extent to which those symptoms could reasonably be accepted as consistent with the 

objective medical evidence and other evidence. ECF No. 11-2 at 21. The ALJ further noted that 

he also considered the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings. Id. The ALJ 

also explained that he engaged in the required “two-step process” when analyzing Plaintiff's 

symptoms, first considering whether her medically determinable impairments could be expected 
11

to produce her symptoms, and then evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her 

symptoms to determine the extent to which they limited her work-related activities. Id. Ultimately, 

the ALJ found that while Plaintiff's impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her

symptoms, the alleged intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were “not 

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” Id. at 22. 

In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s own statements concerning 

her mental health symptoms and their impact on her ability to work and perform daily activities. 

Id. As relevant here, the ALJ pointed to records where Plaintiff indicated that she is able to prepare 

her own meals, perform household chores, and shop in stores. Id. The ALJ next observed that in 

Plaintiff’s function report, she alleged that her impairments affect her ability to lift, squat, bend, 

stand, reach, walk, kneel, climb stairs, remember, complete tasks, concentrate, understand, follow 

instructions, and get along with others. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff estimated that she could lift no 

more than one pound and walk approximately one mile before needing fifteen to twenty minutes 

rest. Id. She estimated that she could pay attention for only thirty minutes, does not finish what 

she starts, struggles to follow written and spoken instructions, does not get along with authority 

figures, and does not handle stress or changes in routine well. Id. The ALJ next turned to 

Plaintiff’s hearing testimony where she testified that she could not walk very far, stand for only 

five minutes, and sit for thirty minutes before needing to shift positions. Id. Finally, the ALJ 

recalled that Plaintiff estimated that “she could lift no weight and does not climb steps or 

push/pull.” Id. Next, turning to Plaintiff’s alleged mental health limitations, the ALJ highlighted

Plaintiff’s statement that she has difficulty concentrating and is unable to focus. Id. Further, the 

ALJ recalled Plaintiff’s allegations that she needs assistance in performing household chores like 

laundry, leaves the house only once per month, experiences paranoia and hallucinations, and has 
12

anger issues. Id. 

Next, the ALJ discussed the medical evidence concerning Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal 

issues. Id. at 22–23. Providing the relevant background, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff injured her 

left knee during an altercation in November 2017, which, as the ALJ observed, was before the 

period at issue. Id. As relevant here, the ALJ also noted that Plaintiff was hospitalized for 

approximately two weeks, had surgery on the knee (without complications), and was treated with 

medication and physical therapy throughout 2018. Id. 

Turing to the period at issue, the ALJ first pointed to images of Plaintiff’s left knee taken 

in October of 2019, which showed some ossification of the medial collateral ligament, but also 

noted a healed left tibial plateau fracture with no evidence of hardware complication, unremarkable 

soft tissues, and a maintained joint space. Id at 23 (citing ECF No. 11-9 at 301). The ALJ then 

recounted the results of diagnostic images performed on both Plaintiff’s knees in December of 

2019, which revealed ossification of the MCL, lineal ossification along the lateral femoral condyle, 

no joint effusion, and normal soft tissues. Id. (citing ECF No. 11-9 at 309). Those images further 

revealed intact hardware and a healed fracture of the left tibia, evidence of prior hardware within 

the distal femur, and a healed fracture within the proximal right fibula. Id. The ALJ concluded 

that the “results of these diagnostic images are inconsistent with an individual suffering from 

debilitating musculoskeletal impairments.” Id. 

Next, the ALJ turned to Plaintiff’s treatment history and observations throughout her 

various medical appointments. Id. The ALJ noted that although Plaintiff’s injury did require 

surgery, her treatment during the period at issue was predominantly limited to prescription 

medication and physical therapy. Id. (citing the record generally) The ALJ acknowledged that 

Plaintiff alleged that she experiences near-constant pain and discomfort, but “she was typically 
13

noted to be in no distress throughout her medical appointments from the relevant period.” Id. 

(citing ECF No. 11-7 at 210, 212, 215, 220, 223, 225; ECF No. 11-9 at 306, 307, 319, 323, 429, 

430, 433, 435, 437, 438, 441; ECF No. 11-10 at 101). Likewise, the ALJ drew a contrast between 

Plaintiff’s testimony that she cannot walk a block and records where she was “noted to ambulate 

with a normal gait on multiple occasions.” Id. The ALJ further observed that although Plaintiff 

alleged that she was completely unable to lift or carry any weight, she was “often noted to have 

normal strength in her extremities throughout the relevant period.” Id. Finally, the ALJ noted that 

during Plaintiff’s October 2019 Consultative Examination she needed no help changing for the 

exam or getting on and off the exam table, and she rose from the chair without difficulty. Id. at 

23–24. The ALJ thus concluded that, taken together, the observations of Plaintiff and the results 

of her diagnostic images did not support the extent of symptoms she alleged. Id. 

The ALJ concluded that the totality of the medical evidence did not support debilitating 

physical issues. Id. at 24. Specifically, he found that the medical evidence revealed that Plaintiff’s 

left tibia and right femur fractures had “healed,” that she had “no significant upper extremity 

impairments,” and that this conclusion was further supported by Plaintiff’s own account of her 

daily activities as documented in her function report. Id. Nevertheless, “to accommodate the 

claimant’s pain and lower extremity issues,” the ALJ crafted an RFC that limited her to 

“ambulating no more than two hours out of an eight-hour workday with additional pushing/pulling 

limitations with her lower extremities, an allowance to use a cane for ambulation, and the 

additional postural and environmental limitations detailed [in the RFC].” Id. 

Next the ALJ turned to Plaintiff’s mental health impairments. Here, too, the ALJ ultimately 

concluded that the record did not support debilitating mental health symptoms. Id. The ALJ began 

by noting that Plaintiff’s treatment history for her mental health issues had been conservative, 
14

limited predominantly to prescription medications and counseling with no evidence of significant 

in-patient treatment or hospitalizations due to mental health concerns from the relevant period. Id. 

The ALJ also explained that the Plaintiff’s medications seemed to be effective in relieving her 

symptoms, as Plaintiff stated, “[W]hen I take my medication I don’t hear voices.” Id. (citing ECF 

No. 11-9 at 149). The ALJ also discussed the records of Plaintiff’s numerous mental health exams

which noted some issues with anxiety, mood, and anger, but also typically found Plaintiff to be 

alert and oriented with a cooperative attitude, normal speech, logical thought process, intact 

associations, appropriate thought content, no suicidal or homicidal ideation, and fair insight and 

judgment. Id. Moreover, these same records often described Plaintiff as having a normal 

appearance, fair recent and remote memory, fair attention span and concentration, and fair fund of 

knowledge. Id. (citing ECF No. 11-8 at 430; ECF No. 11-9 at 34, 61, 94, 113, 119, 139, 164, 177, 

201, 229, 256, 278, 346, 356, 370, 392, 418; ECF No. 11-10 at 35, 40, 58, 66; ECF No. 11-11 at 

208; ECF No. 11-12 at 33, 38, 43, 48, 53, 58, 63, 68, 72, 76-77, 81, 89; then citing the record 

generally). The ALJ observed that these records were consistent with Plaintiff’s consultative 

examination, which, while indicating “some” memory impairment and a diminished affect, also 

revealed no evidence of hallucinations or delusions, no evidence of impaired judgment, and no 

suicidal ideation. Id. 

The ALJ found further support for his conclusion that Plaintiff was not suffering from 

debilitating mental health symptoms by reviewing Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. Id. at 24–

25. He recounted that although Plaintiff testified that she does not leave the house, according to 

her own treatment records, she traveled from her home in D.C. to Myrtle Beach, South Carolina,

to celebrate her birthday in May 2019. Id at 24 (citing ECF No. 11-9 at 163). The ALJ also pointed 

to records from May 2020 that indicated that Plaintiff was bored during the coronavirus pandemic 
15

lockdowns because “[she] like[s] to go do stuff.” Id. (citing ECF No. 11-10 at 36). The ALJ also 

discussed records where Plaintiff indicated she sometimes enjoyed cooking and reading books. Id. 

(citing ECF No. 11-6 at 23–33). And finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff asserted in her function 

report that she needs no reminders for personal needs or grooming, can prepare her own meals, 

perform household chores without encouragement, use public transportation, go shopping in 

stores, pay bills, count change, handle a savings account, and use a checkbook and money orders. 

Id at 25. The same report indicated that she spends time with others on occasion and is able to go 

out alone. Id. 

Finally, the ALJ concluded that the totality of the evidence, particularly Plaintiff’s 

conservative treatment history, numerous normal mental status observations, and activities of daily 

living both as documented by the medical evidence and as reported by the Plaintiff herself, did not 

support the extent of symptoms as alleged by the Plaintiff. Id. Nevertheless, the ALJ also found

that Plaintiff did have mental health issues which supported the additional non-exertional

limitations he included in the RFC. Id. 

The ALJ then turned to the opinion evidence. Id. at 25–27. Beginning with the opinion of 

State Agency medical consultants Lisa Venkataraman, M.D., and Eduardo Haim, M.D., the ALJ 

found they were persuasive. Id. at 25. The ALJ first noted that in their opinions, Plaintiff had the 

capacity to lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and stand/walk for two hours and 

sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday. Id. The ALJ found that, “[a]s detailed in the 

analysis above, these opinions are both consistent with and supported by the medical evidence of 

record. Id. Specifically, the ALJ explained that the finding that the Plaintiff could lift up to 20 

pounds was “consistent with the lack of significant impairment with regard to the claimant’s upper 

extremities and the numerous findings of the claimant exhibiting normal strength.” Id. The ALJ 
16

also reasoned that the findings that the claimant was limited to only two hours of standing and/or 

walking, as well as use of her left lower extremity, was “consistent with the claimant’s history of 

surgery and observations of cane use throughout her treatment history.” Id. However, “out of an 

abundance of caution,” the ALJ held that the record supported “slightly more restrictive” 

limitations than the opinions of Drs. Venkataraman and Haim suggested, but that that those minor 

additions did not detract from the supportability and consistency of their opinions. Id. 

Next, the ALJ concluded that the opinion of Marisela Gomez, M.D., was not persuasive 

because it used vague, undefined terms, leaving the ALJ unable to conduct a consistency and 

supportability analysis. Id. at 25–26. 

The ALJ next considered the opinions of Nancy Heiser, Ph.D., and Gemma M. Nachbahr, 

Ph.D., both of which the ALJ found to be persuasive. Drs. Heiser and Nachbahr opined that the 

Plaintiff experiences moderate limitations to her ability to understand and remember detailed 

instructions, carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended 

periods, and complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions. Id. at 26. 

Moreover, they found moderate limitations to the claimant’s ability to interact appropriately with 

the public, accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism, get along with coworkers 

and peers, maintain socially acceptable behavior, and respond appropriately to changes in the work 

setting. Id. The ALJ explained, “As detailed in the analysis above, these opinions are both 

consistent with and supported by the medical evidence of record.” Id. Specifically, the ALJ 

reasoned that the opinions were “consistent with the fact that while the claimant has treatment for 

mental health issues, observations of the claimant typically found her to be alert and oriented with 

a cooperative attitude, with normal speech, logical thought process, intact associations, and 

appropriate thought content, no suicidal or homicidal ideation, and fair insight and judgment.” Id. 
17

The ALJ further explained that the opinions were “further supported by the observations of the 

claimant with fair recent and remote memory, fair attention span and concentration, and fair fund 

of knowledge.” Id. And lastly, the ALJ found that the opinions were “consistent with the 

claimant’s activities of daily living, which reflect vacations, an interest in going out, and an ability 

to live independently.” Id. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that their “findings of only moderate 

limitations are generally consistent with and supported by the medical evidence, and they are 

determined to be persuasive.” Id. 

Finally, the last opinion that the ALJ considered was that of Cassandra Thompson MSN, 

FNP-BC, PMHNP-BC, from MBI Health Services. Id. (citing ECF No. 11-12 at 158–159). Nurse 

Practitioner Thompson opined that Plaintiff experiences marked limitations in her social

functioning and her ability to go about daily activities, is unable to interact appropriately with coworkers or supervisors on a sustained basis, and is unable to respond appropriately to typical work 

situations or adjust to changes in the workplace. ECF No. 11-2 at 26. Nurse Practitioner 

Thompson also determined that working with others would be tedious for the Plaintiff, and that

she is limited in her ability to function in a work setting. Id. The ALJ found Nurse Practitioner 

Thompson’s opinion unpersuasive. Id. The ALJ explained that, “[n]otably, [her] opinion is not 

consistent with or supported by the very treatment notes from MBI Health Services [where she 

worked], which consistently noted in their mental status examinations that the claimant had a 

cooperative attitude, normal speech, logical thought process, intact associations, appropriate 

thought content, no suicidal or homicidal ideation, and fair insight, judgment, memory, attention 

span, concentration, and fund of knowledge.” Id. On that basis, the ALJ concluded that Nurse 

Practitioner Thompson’s “opinion is not supported by the [facility’s] own treatment notes” and 

therefore is “not persuasive.” Id. 
18

In sum, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's treatment history, the objective clinical findings, 

Plaintiff's subjective complaints, and the medical opinions in concluding that Plaintiff has the 

capacity to perform light work with the limitations set forth in the RFC.

3. Conclusion of the Five-Step Sequential Inquiry

In conclusion, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has past relevant work as a Child Care Provider. 

Id. at 27. However, relying on the testimony of the VE at the November 2020 hearing, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work. Id. Continuing to rely on the testimony of 

the VE, the ALJ next determined that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the claimant can perform. Id. Specifically, again harkening back to the VE’s 

testimony, the ALJ identified three occupations that an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC would be 

able to perform—a Router, Marker, and a Non-Postal Mail Clerk. Id. at 28. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A federal district court has jurisdiction over a civil case challenging a final decision of the 

Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision 

if it is based on substantial evidence in the record and the correct application of the relevant legal 

standards. Id.; Butler, 353 F.3d at 999. 

“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner’s decision is not 

based on substantial evidence or that incorrect legal standards were applied.” Lane-Rauth v. 

Barnhart, 437 F. Supp. 2d 63, 64 (D.D.C. 2006). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It 

requires “more than a scintilla [of evidence] but can be satisfied by something less than a 
19

preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 315 F.3d 362, 365–66 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003) (quoting FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. FERC, 287 F.3d1151, 1160 (D.C. Cir 2002)). 

“The substantial evidence standard requires considerable deference to the decision rendered by the 

ALJ.” Crosson v. Shalala, 907 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995). The reviewing court may neither 

reweigh the evidence presented to it nor replace the Commissioner’s judgment “concerning the 

credibility of the evidence with its own.” Id.; see also Butler, 353 F.3d at 999 (finding that the 

district court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence but only to determine whether the ALJ’s findings 

are “based on substantial evidence and a correct application of the law”). However, “this standard 

of review requires the Court to carefully scrutinize the entire record to ensure that the 

Commissioner, through the ALJ, has both analyzed all of the evidence available and has 

sufficiently explained his/her reasoning and the weights given to the facts.” Pinkney v. Astrue, 

675 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Lane-Rauth, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (“[T]his standard 

of review ‘calls for careful scrutiny of the entire record,’ to determine whether the Commissioner, 

acting through the ALJ, ‘has analyzed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the weight he 

has given to obviously probative exhibits[.]’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Butler, 353 

F.3d at 999)). Moreover, the Court’s job is to “consider the grounds actually proffered by the 

ALJ” rather than to make those determinations for itself, Ward v. Berryhill, 246 F. Supp. 3d 202, 

210 (D.D.C. 2017), or credit “post-hoc rationalization[s]” advanced by the parties, Cooper v. 

Berryhill, No. 16-cv-1671, 2017 WL 4326388, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2017). See also SEC v. 

Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (holding that a reviewing court “must judge the propriety 

of [an agency’s judgment] solely by the grounds invoked by the agency”); Jones v. Astrue, 647 

F.3d 350, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196). In applying this standard, courts 

“must also be mindful of the harmless-error rule. Consequently, even if [the court] perceive[s] 
20

error,” it must “affirm the Commissioner's decision unless the error is prejudicial.” Saunders v. 

Kijakazi, 6 F.4th 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

III. DISCUSSION

As noted, Plaintiff’s appeal rests entirely on the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC, 

which she contends was flawed. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his consideration of 

the medical opinion evidence, specifically with respect to the supportability and consistency 

factors, as well as the factor pertaining to the medical sources’ relationship with the Plaintiff. 

Second, Plaintiff levels a laundry list of grievances as to the ALJ’s consideration of the evidence 

in the record. And finally, she contends that the ALJ failed to include Plaintiff's moderate 

limitations in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace in his RFC assessment, rendering as 

flawed his hypothetical questions to the vocational expert at Plaintiff's hearing. For the reasons 

discussed below, Plaintiff’s arguments on the first and second issue fail, but the Court will remand 

on this third issue. 

A. The ALJ’s Assessment of the Opinion Evidence 

The Plaintiff makes two arguments for reversal with respect to the ALJ’s assessment of the 

medical opinion evidence. Plaintiff first submits that the ALJ failed to consider the medical 

sources’ relationships with the Plaintiff when weighing their opinions. ECF No. 18 at 22. Second, 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ conflated and thus failed to properly consider the supportability and 

consistency factors that are set out in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. ECF No. 18 at 13–21. The Court 

finds that neither argument warrants remand.

As to Plaintiff’s first argument, SSA regulations governing claims filed, like this one, after 

March 27, 2017, provide that an ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, 

including controlling weight, to any medical opinion,” including an opinion from a medical source 
21

who has treated the claimant.7 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Rather, medical findings from a medical 

source are evaluated by analyzing (1) the supportability of the opinion—that is, the “objective 

medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by [the] medical source to support his or 

her medical opinion []”—and (2) the consistency of the opinion with other evidence in the record. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2), (c)(1)–(2). Of lesser importance are the medical source’s relationship 

with the claimant, including the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of 

examinations, the purpose of the treatment relationship, the kinds and extent of examinations and 

testing performed, and whether the medical source examined the claimant or merely reviewed 

evidence; the specialization of the medical source; and “[o]ther factors” such as the medical 

source’s familiarity with other evidence or understanding of the SSA’s policies. § 416.920c(c)(3)–

(5). The governing regulations stipulate that the supportability and consistency factors are the 

“most important” an ALJ must consider when “evaluat[ing] the persuasiveness of medical 

opinions.” § 416.920c(a). As such, ALJs must “explain how [they] considered the supportability 

and consistency factors for a medical source's medical opinions . . . in [the] . . . decision.” 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2); see also Carolyn W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 20-cv-00423, 

2022 WL 4244214, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2022) (“The regulation therefore imposes a burden 

of explanation, or mandatory articulation, upon ALJs.”). As for the remaining, less important 

factors, the ALJ must consider them, “but is not required to” expressly explain that consideration 

in their decisions. C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2); see also Morales v. Berryhill, 484 F. Supp. 3d 130, 

143 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (where the ALJ's “reasoning and adherence to the regulation[s] are clear,” a 

7 Prior to March 27, 2017, the SSA's regulations required that medical opinions rendered by an individual's treating 

physician be accorded “‘controlling weight’ if they are not inconsistent with other substantial record evidence and are 

well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 1003 (citing 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2)).
22

“slavish recitation of each and every” factor to be considered in assigning weight to a treating 

source's opinion is not required (quoting Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2013))).

As for Plaintiff’s second argument—that the ALJ failed to evaluate both the consistency 

and supportability of the medical opinions in question—the ALJ’s treatment of the medical 

opinions of Drs. Venkataraman, Haim, Heiser, and Nachbahr can be grouped together, while the 

ALJ’s assessment of Nurse Practitioner Cassandra Thompson’s opinion requires separate analysis. 

1. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinions of Drs. 

Venkataraman, Haim, Heiser, and Nachbahr 

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to evaluate the supportability of the medical 

opinions of Drs. Venkataraman, Haim, Heiser, and Nachbahr, has merit but the Court ultimately 

deems that error harmless. ECF No. 18 at 15, 16. Again, SSA regulations require that ALJs 

“explain how [they] considered” both the consistency and the supportability factors when 

evaluating a medical source’s opinion in their decisions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Here, while the 

ALJ explained how the medical record generally was consistent with the opinions of Drs. 

Venkataraman, Haim, Heiser, and Nachbahr, he did not explain how those opinions were 

supported by the doctors’ own explanations and/or assessment of the medical evidence concerning 

Plaintiff’s impairments. 

Importantly, supportability and consistency are different concepts. “Supportability 

addresses the extent to which the medical opinion is explained by the provider and supported by 

objective findings . . . [w]hereas consistency addresses the extent to which a medical opinion is 

consistent with the record evidence as a whole, including evidence from other medical and 

nonmedical sources.” Wachholz v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-1412, 2022 WL 787932, at *4 (E.D. Wis. 

Mar. 15, 2022). Here, the ALJ conflated those concepts with respect to his evaluation of the 

opinions of Drs. Venkataraman, Haim, Heiser, and Nachbahr. The ALJ stated that each of their 
23

opinions was “both consistent with and supported by the medical evidence of record.” ECF No. 

11-2 at 25–26. He then provided examples from the record evidence consistent with the functional 

limitations proposed by the doctors. Id. The ALJ explained, for example, that the finding of Drs. 

Venkataraman and Haim that Plaintiff could occasionally lift up to 20 pounds was “consistent with 

the lack of significant impairment with regard to the claimant’s upper extremities and numerous 

findings . . . exhibiting normal strength,” and that their finding that Plaintiff could only stand and/or 

walk for up to two hours, was “consistent with the claimant’s history of surgery and observations 

of cane use throughout her treatment history.” Id. at 25. The ALJ provided similar examples of 

how the findings of Drs. Heiser and Nachbahr of moderate limitations to Plaintiff’s mental 

functioning were consistent with evidence in the record. Id. at 26. This analysis is sufficient to 

satisfy the requirement that the ALJ consider and explain how the doctors’ medical opinions were 

consistent with other evidence in the record. However, it does not satisfy the supportability 

requirement that an ALJ evaluate and explain the extent to which the doctors themselves explained 

the basis for their opinions and relied on objective evidence to reach them. Stated another way, 

“[f]or the ALJ to have adequately discussed the supportability of the State agency . . . opinions, 

the ALJ needed to evaluate what the State agency [medical providers] said they based their opinion 

on—not simply how their opinions compared to the record evidence as a whole, which only goes 

to the consistency of the State agency . . . . opinions.” Mary W. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-

cv-5523, 2022 WL 202764, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2022), report and recommendation adopted 

sub nom. Wiseman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-cv-5523, 2022 WL 394627 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 

9, 2022). Here, the ALJ made no mention of what Drs. Venkataraman, Haim, Heiser, and 

Nachbahr based their opinions on, so the Court is left with no basis on which to conduct a 

meaningful review of the ALJ’s supportability analysis. See Stith v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-02312, 
24

2022 WL 493526, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. 

Stith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 20-cv-02312, 2022 WL 485488 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 

2022) (“While the ALJ may have intended to consider the supportability and consistency factors 

together, he only addresses consistency[,] rending the analysis insufficient.”). That was error. 

However, the Court finds this error is harmless because the ALJ either “adopted the 

medical opinion [in question] or made findings consistent with the medical opinions.” See 

Lorraine R. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 20-cv-00396, 2022 WL 4232839, at *5 (S.D. Ohio 

Sept. 14, 2022) (finding failure to articulate supportability to be harmless error where ALJ 

“adopted medical opinion or made findings consistent with the opinion” (quoting Wilson v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004))); see also Davis v. Berryhill, 272 F. Supp. 

3d 154, 177 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding error “stemming from the weight” given to a medical opinion 

under prior set of regulations to be harmless error, where findings from the opinion were consistent 

with the ALJ’s RFC determination). Here, the ALJ ultimately adopted limitations consistent with 

those found by the state agency consultants. Regarding Plaintiff’s limitations resulting from her 

mental health impairments, the ALJ found, consistent with the findings of Heiser and Nachbahr, 

that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in all domains. ECF No. 11-2 at 20; ECF No. 11-3 at 7, 22. 

Regarding her physical limitations, the ALJ in large part adopted Venkataraman and Haim’s 

findings and only “out of an abundance of caution regarding [Plaintiff’s] physical conditions” did 

the ALJ include additional limitations in the RFC with regard to her right lower extremity, ability 

to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and ability to tolerate certain environmental exposures. ECF 

No. 11-2 at 25; ECF No. 11-3 at 9–10, 23–24. The ALJ explicitly stated that such additional 

limitations “do not detract from the consistency and supportability” of the opinions; therefore, the 

ALJ can fairly be held to have adopted limitations consistent with those found by the state agency 
25

consultants. ECF No. 11-2 at 25. Consequently, even though the Court perceives error in the 

ALJ’s articulation of supportability with respect to the opinions of the state agency consultants, 

because the Court finds that the error is harmless, the Court “affirm[s] the Commissioner's 

decision” on this basis. Saunders, 6 F.4th at 4. 

2. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Opinions of Nurse Practitioner Thompson 

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s evaluation of Nurse Practitioner Thompson’s opinions

was deficient is not well-taken. ECF No. 18 at 16–17. Recall that Nurse Practitioner Thompson 

opined, among other things, that Plaintiff had marked limitations in her social functioning and was

unable to interact appropriately with co-workers or supervisors on a sustained basis, to respond 

appropriately to typical work situations, or to adjust to changes in the workplace. ECF No. 11-2 

at 26 (citing ECF No. 11-12 at 158–59). The ALJ found that those opinions were “not consistent 

with or supported by the very treatment notes from MBI Health,” where Nurse Practitioner 

Thompson practiced, which consistently noted in their mental status examinations that the claimant 

had a “cooperative attitude, normal speech, logical thought process, intact associations, appropriate 

thought content, no suicidal or homicidal ideation, and fair insight, judgment, memory, attention 

span, concentration, and fund of knowledge.” Id. That was a sufficient basis for the ALJ to 

conclude that Nurse Practitioner Thompson was overstating the severity of Plaintiff’s limitations 

and that her opinions in that regard were unpersuasive. 

Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ considered only the consistency factor in evaluating Nurse 

Practitioner Thompson’s opinion is incorrect. Unlike the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions 

considered above, the inconsistency identified by the ALJ between Nurse Practitioner Thompson’s 

opinion and her own medical facility’s treatment notes goes to both the supportability and 

consistency factors, as the ALJ recognized. See, e.g., Bruno v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-cv-
26

2633, 2021 WL 6494779, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2021) (finding that the ALJ adequately 

discussed the supportability factor by “highlight[ing] [the physician’s] own treatment notes”—

which indicated that, among other things, the claimant “had 5/5 strength in her extremities,” “full 

musculoskeletal range of motion,” “and a normal gait”—and concluding that the treatment notes 

“were inconsistent with—and did not support—[the physician’s] own assessment” of the 

claimant’s capabilities), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 125289 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 

13, 2022); Catherine R. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 20-cv-1503, 2021 WL 5235543, at *7 

(D. Or. Nov. 10, 2021) (finding that the ALJ adequately discussed the supportability of the 

physician’s opinion that the claimant “was unable to walk a ‘city block[ ] without rest’” by 

contrasting it to “the doctor’s own treatment notes that revealed [claimant] presented with a normal 

gait and normal range of motion in her joints” (quoting the record)). Though the supportability 

and consistency factors are distinct, here the analysis of Nurse Practitioner Thompson’s opinions 

overlapped, and the ALJ’s consideration of both factors together was appropriate. 

Plaintiff’s next argument—that the ALJ failed to consider Nurse Practitioner Thompson’s

treating relationship with the Plaintiff when weighing her opinion—is faulty. As noted above, 

unlike the “most important” factors of supportability and consistency, ALJs “may, but are not 

required to, explain how [they] considered the factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)” of the 

regulation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). Among the lesser important factors is the medical 

source’s “[r]elationship with the claimant.” § 416.920c(c)(3). Plaintiff concedes the “ALJ was 

not required to explain how he considered the treating relationship,” but nevertheless submits that 

“it is clear from the decision that he failed to consider them at all.” ECF No. 23 at 8. To adopt 

Plaintiff’s argument would be to require that the ALJ articulate their reasoning as to each and every 

factor. The governing regulations reject that position, and as discussed above, here the ALJ 
27

articulated good reasons for concluding that—even though Nurse Practitioner Thompson was a 

treating source—her opinion was unpersuasive.

Finally, Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ should have found Nurse Practitioner 

Thompson’s opinion to be persuasive as other record evidence supports it, misses the mark. The 

question for this Court is not whether other evidence may have supported the ALJ had he found 

her opinion persuasive, but whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that her

opinion was not persuasive. See Ali v. Colvin, 236 F. Supp. 3d 86, 90 (D.D.C. 2017) (“If supported 

by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained ‘even where substantial 

evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of 

the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Rosado v. 

Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992))); see also Hines v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-

cv-620, 2021 WL 1895011, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2021) (“That [plaintiff] can point to other 

evidence in the record that might have supported [the medical] opinion is unavailing. This court 

does not review the record to determine whether evidence could have supported a different result, 

but whether evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 

WL 1571659 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2021). That is, the critical question is whether the ALJ’s actual 

findings concerning her opinion were supported by substantial evidence. See Melanie A. S. v. 

Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-185, 2022 WL 1721196, at *14 (D.D.C. May 12, 2022) (explaining that, in 

evaluating ALJ’s assessment of physician’s opinion, “[t]he question is not whether the evidence 

supports another conclusion, but rather whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence”), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1718987 (D.D.C. May 27, 2022). 

Here, the ALJ’s conclusion that Nurse Practitioner Thompson’s opinions were not supported by,

or consistent with, the treatment notes from her own medical facility, satisfies that standard. 
28

Biestek v. Berryhill, —U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (“[W]hatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency [under the substantial 

evidence standard] is not high.”). 

B. The ALJ Did Not Fail to Consider Certain Evidence in the Record in

Formulating Plaintiff's RFC

Plaintiff devotes the bulk of her brief arguing that the ALJ failed to consider all of the 

evidence in the medical record in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. According to Plaintiff, this includes 

a failure to consider evidence of her mental symptoms; evidence of her physical symptoms;

evidence of her daily activities; and finally, evidence regarding the assistance she receives. ECF 

No. 18 at 22–35. Ultimately these arguments amount to impermissible requests for the Court to 

reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, these arguments will be rejected. 

The Commissioner’s findings must be upheld if they are “‘supported by substantial 

evidence’ and ‘not tainted by an error of law.’” Ali, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (quoting Porter v. 

Colvin, 951 F. Supp. 2d 125, 129 (D.D.C. 2013)). The question is not, then, whether substantial 

evidence supports Plaintiff’s position, but rather, whether there is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the Commissioner’s] conclusion[s].” Id. at 

90 (quoting Brown v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 703, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). That is, “[i]f supported by 

substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding[s] must be sustained ‘even where substantial 

evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of 

the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].’” Id. (final alteration in original) (quoting 

Rosado, 805 F. Supp. at 153); see also Morales, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (“Even where the 

administrative record may also adequately support contrary findings on particular issues, the 

ALJ’s factual findings must be given conclusive effect so long as they are supported by substantial 

evidence.” (quoting Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010))); Kober v. Apfel, 133 F. 
29

Supp. 2d 868, 873 (W.D. Va. 2001) (“The Commissioner’s decision, ‘if supported by substantial 

evidence, must be affirmed even though the reviewing court believes that substantial evidence also 

supports a contrary result.’” (quoting Estep v. Richardson, 459 F.2d 1015, 1017 (4th Cir. 1972))). 

Applying that standard here, none of Plaintiff’s challenges to the ALJ’s findings succeeds.

1. Plaintiff’s Mental Health Symptoms 

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to consider the entire record concerning her alleged 

mental health symptoms, including evidence regarding her purported hallucinations. ECF No. 18 

at 23. But again, the Court’s task is not to reweigh the evidence, but, rather, to determine whether 

the ALJ cited sufficient support to back up his findings. See Jackson ex rel. M.J.J. v. Berryhill, 

249 F. Supp. 3d 141, 147 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Plaintiff appears to be asking this court to conduct a de 

novo review of the ALJ’s decision and reweigh the evidence to determine whether or not the 

child’s limitation in each of the two domains is ‘marked.’ Such an evaluation, however, is 

inconsistent with the applicable standard of review.”). The Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion 

that Plaintiff is not suffering from debilitating mental health symptoms is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

To support that finding, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff had a history of conservative

treatment of her mental health symptoms, “limited predominantly to prescription medications and 

counseling with no evidence of significant in-patient treatment or hospitalizations.” ECF No. 11-

2 at 24 (citing the record generally). Specifically regarding her hallucinations—and contrary to 

Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ ignored these symptoms—the ALJ reasonably observed that “the 

claimant’s treatment appears to be effective in relieving her symptoms,” because “the claimant 

indicated that ‘when I take my medications I don’t hear voices.’” 8 Id. (citing ECF No. 11-9 at 

8 Plaintiff relies on Nurse Practitioner Thompson as further support for the debilitating nature of her hallucinations. 

ECF No. 18 at 6. But as discussed above, the ALJ reasonably found that Nurse Practitioner Thompson’s opinion was 
30

149). The ALJ also observed that during the relevant period, the Plaintiff had many health 

examinations where she was reported to be “alert and orientated” with a “logical thought process,”

and “intact associations.” Id. (citing ECF No. 11-8 at 430; ECF No. 11-9 at 34, 61, 94, 113, 119, 

139, 164, 177, 201, 229, 256, 278, 346, 356, 370, 392, 418; ECF No. 11-10 at 35, 40, 58, 66; ECF 

No. 11-11 at 208; ECF No. 11-12 at 33, 38, 43, 48, 53, 58, 63, 68, 72, 76-77, 81, 89; then citing 

the record generally). Finally, the ALJ contrasted Plaintiff’s purported symptoms with her 

significant activities of daily living, which included references to vacationing in Myrtle Beach for 

her birthday in May 2019, and records from May 2020 noting that she cooks, reads books, and 

“like[s] to go do stuff.” Id. at 24–25 (citing ECF No. 11-9 at 163; ECF No. 11-10 at 36). Further, 

the ALJ observed that in Plaintiff’s function report, “she indicated that she needs no reminders for 

personal needs or grooming, can prepare her own meals, and perform household chores without 

encouragement. The claimant further indicated that she is able to use public transportation, go 

shopping in stores, pay bills, count change, handle a savings account, and use a checkbook and 

money orders. She also stated that she spends time with others on occasion and is able to go out 

alone.” Id. (citing ECF No. 11-6 at 23–33). Taken together, substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not suffering debilitating mental health symptoms. 

2. Plaintiff’s Physical Symptoms

Next, Plaintiff charges that the ALJ ignored evidence from Plaintiff’s treating orthopedic 

doctor and incorrectly assessed her subjective reports of pain. ECF No. 18 at 26. Neither attack 

unpersuasive because it was “not consistent with or supported by the very treatment notes from MBI Health,” where 

she practiced, which consistently noted in their mental status examinations that the claimant had a “cooperative 

attitude, normal speech, logical thought process, intact associations, appropriate thought content, no suicidal or 

homicidal ideation, and fair insight, judgment, memory, attention span, concentration, and fund of knowledge.” ECF 

No. 11-2 at 26.
31

should be sustained. Again, the ALJ here marshaled substantial evidence to support his conclusion 

that Plaintiff is not suffering from debilitating physical impairments. 

First, beginning even before the period at issue, the ALJ noted that following Plaintiff’s 

2017 surgery, she treated her physical ailments conservatively through “through medication and 

physical therapy throughout 2018,” and updated X-rays in April and May of 2018 showed only

“mild narrowing of the lateral joint space,” “some calcification in the medial and collateral 

ligaments,” and “mild to moderate medial compartment joint space narrowing,” with “the right 

proximal fibular diaphysis in the advanced stages of healing.” ECF 11-2 at 22, 23 (citing ECF No. 

11-7 at 150, 191). Then turning to the period at issue, the ALJ similarly relied on images from 

October and December 2019 that “noted a healed left tibial plateau fracture with no evidence of 

hardware complication,” and “unremarkable soft tissues,” among other results that “are 

inconsistent with an individual suffering from debilitating musculoskeletal impairments.” Id. at 

23 (citing ECF No. 11-9 at 301, 309). Specifically, with respect to Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ 

erred in assessing her pain, the ALJ supported this conclusion by contrasting Plaintiff’s assertions 

as to her pain and discomfort with her “treatment history and observations throughout her various 

medical appointments.” Id. For example, the ALJ reasonably gave weight to the fact that “while 

the claimant alleged that she experiences near-constant pain and discomfort, she was typically 

noted to be in no distress throughout her medical appointments from the relevant period.” Id. The 

ALJ further pointed out that although Plaintiff testified that she could only walk around the corner, 

“she was also noted to ambulate with a normal gait on multiple occasions.” Id. And although 

Plaintiff claimed she could carry little to no weight, “she was often noted to have normal strength 

in her extremities throughout the relevant period”—notably needing “no help changing” for 
32

medical exams, nor any “help getting off the exam table,” and being able to “[rise] from the chair 

without difficulty.” Id.

Plaintiff does not meaningfully contest that this analysis of her musculoskeletal condition 

meets the substantial evidence standard, but instead points to other evidence that she alleges the 

ALJ failed to consider, including evidence from orthopedist Dr. Debritz who ordered her

December 2019 X-rays, as well as related records from George Washington University Hospital 

where Dr. Debritz’s office was located. ECF No. 23 at 13. Although Plaintiff is correct that the 

ALJ’s decision does not mention Dr. Debritz or George Washington University Hospital by name,

the ALJ made explicit that his findings were made only “[a]fter careful consideration of the entire 

record.” ECF No. 11-2 at 17, 21. More, the ALJ does in fact cite Dr. Debritz’s records for the 

proposition that Plaintiff “was typically noted to be in no distress throughout her medical 

appointments.” ECF No. 11-2 at 23 (citing to, inter alia, ECF No. 11-9 at 429, where Dr. Debritz

noted that the Plaintiff was in “no acute distress, well appearing and well nourished”). So, Plaintiff 

overstates the case when she claims that the ALJ’s opinion “illustrated his failure to consider [Dr.

Debritz’s records] in their entirety.” ECF No. 23 at 13. 

In any event, “[a]n ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that such 

evidence was not considered in a Social Security disability case.” Charles v. Astrue, 854 F. Supp. 

2d 22, 30 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing, inter alia, Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 

2005)). Here, because as shown above the ALJ far exceeded the “substantial evidence” standard 

in concluding that Plaintiff did not suffer from a debilitating physical aliment, her challenge to that 

finding fails. 
33

3. Plaintiff’s Activities of Daily Living 

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s analysis and conclusions with respect to her activities 

of daily living were erroneous. ECF No. 18 at 31. Here too, Plaintiff’s arguments fail. As 

discussed above, it was entirely appropriate for the ALJ to consider Plaintiff’s daily activities in 

making his findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i) (listing daily activities as a relevant factor

in the subjective complaint analysis). At the same time, the Court recognizes that “[d]isability 

does not mean that a claimant must vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human and 

social activity.” Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971 (3d Cir. 1981). Ultimately, Plaintiff’s 

complaints as to this part of the ALJ’s analysis do not constitute grounds for remand because the 

ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s daily activities formed just one part of a decision that was further 

supported by opinion evidence and objective medical evidence.

Turning to her specific complaints, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by twice referencing 

her vacation in Myrtle Beach in 2019 because she testified that she did not take that trip, and even 

if she had, it would not constitute substantial evidence that she was not disabled. ECF No. 18 at 

31. Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. It was reasonable for the ALJ to discount her testimony 

denying that she took the trip when records from Nurse Practitioner Thompson documented that 

in May 2019, Plaintiff reported that, “I am doing good—I went to Myrtle Beach for my birthday.” 

ECF No. 11-9 at 163; see also ECF No. 11-2 at 20. In any event, “the credibility determination is 

solely within the realm of the ALJ.” Grant v. Astrue, 857 F. Supp. 2d 146, 156 (D.D.C. 2012). 

Further, while the alleged Myrtle Beach trip alone may not constitute substantial evidence, as 

discussed above, it is just one piece of the larger body of evidence that supports the ALJ’s decision

that she did not have disabling mental or physical impairments. 
34

Likewise, Plaintiff’s argument that “[n]o evidence supports the ALJ’s statement that [the 

Plaintiff] reads books and cooks,” is simply incorrect. ECF No. 18 at 32. As the ALJ cited, the 

Plaintiff’s MBI records from a telehealth visit in May 2020 documents that she said she was bored 

with coronavirus because “she likes to go do stuff,” and notes that “[Plaintiff] enjoys cooking, 

reading books, and sometimes listening to gospel music.” ECF No. 11-2 at 24–25 (citing ECF No. 

11-10 at 36). Again, this Court will not reweigh the evidentiary value of Plaintiff’s later testimony 

that allegedly contradicts these records. The ALJ has already made that determination. 

In the same vein, Plaintiff’s charge that “[t]he ALJ did not consider the fact that [Plaintiff]

leaves her house just once a month, nor the fact that when [she] does leave the house, she is 

accompanied by a friend to help her navigate public spaces,” must also be set aside. ECF No. 18 

at 32. The ALJ explicitly considered in his decision the fact that Plaintiff needed assistance to 

perform daily life activities. ECF No. 11-2 at 22 (“Further, the claimant alleged that she needs 

assistance in performing household chores like laundry and only leaves the house once per month.”

(emphasis added)). Thus, the ALJ did not ignore Plaintiff’s claims, rather the “ALJ’s opinion 

[made] clear that he recognized and understood [the claimant's] alleged limitations as to her ability 

to perform daily activities” by “explicitly acknowledg[ing]” such limitations.” Colter v. Kijakazi, 

No. 20-cv-632, 2022 WL 715218 at *14 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2022). Having in fact considered this 

evidence, the ALJ nevertheless pointed to Plaintiff’s trip to Myrtle Beach and indications that she

cooks, reads books, and “like[s] to go do stuff” to conclude that “the claimant’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” ECF No. 11-2 at 22. So, 

like in Colter, “[c]ontrary to Plaintiff's insinuations, the ALJ did not ignore or disregard her 

testimony as to the extent to which she can perform her daily activities. Rather, as the ALJ 
35

explained, he found that Plaintiff's alleged severity of symptoms was not entirely in accord with 

her professed daily activities, taking into account the relevant limitations.” Colter, 2022 WL

715218 at *14. 

4. Plaintiff’s History of Receiving Assistance 

Plaintiff’s final argument on this front is that in assessing the extent to which Plaintiff’s 

symptoms impair her ability to engage in daily activities, the ALJ also failed to consider evidence 

regarding the extent of assistance that she receives. ECF No. 18 at 34. Though framed as a 

separate argument, it largely overlaps with Plaintiff’s other arguments, and it is rejected for the 

same reasons. 

Plaintiff is correct that “[t]he ALJ cannot “ignore[] the limited fashion [in which] the 

plaintiff engages in . . . [her] activities.” Jackson v. Barnhart, 271 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 

2002). But that is not what happened here. As noted above, the ALJ considered that “the claimant 

alleged that she needs assistance in performing household chores like laundry.” ECF No. 11-2 at 

22 (emphasis added).

9

 As for Plaintiff’s ability to independently use public transportation, the

ALJ, citing Plaintiff’s function report, observed that “the claimant further indicated that she is able 

to use public transportation,” and that she “is able to go out alone.” ECF No. 11-2 at 20 (citing to 

ECF No. 11-6 at 28). Though Plaintiff later testified to the contrary, again, the fact that the ALJ 

relied on a report where the Plaintiff indicated that she could use public transportation, and go out 

alone, does not mean that he failed to consider Plaintiff’s later testimony on the subject. It simply 

means the ALJ gave more weight to her medical records, as he was permitted to do in making his 

9 Similarly, despite Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, the ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s history of treatment from 

social workers. As the ALJ notes, Plaintiff had a history of receiving “counseling,” but there was “no evidence of 

significant in-patient treatment or hospitalizations due to mental health concerns from the relevant period.” ECF No. 

11-2 at 24.
36

credibility determination. Grant, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (“[T]he credibility determination is solely 

within the realm of the ALJ.”). 

C. The RFC Does Not Adequately Address Plaintiff’s Moderate Limitation in 

Concentrating, Persisting, and Pace

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s RFC does not properly account for her moderate 

limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace (“CPP”). ECF No. 18 at 38. On this 

argument, the Court agrees, finding that Plaintiff's moderate limitations in the CPP domain were 

not adequately addressed by the RFC. 

The CPP domain “refers to the [claimant’s] abilities to focus attention on work activities 

and stay on task at a sustained rate.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(E)(3). The ALJ 

found here that Plaintiff has a “moderate limitation” with regard to CPP. ECF 11-2 at 20. In SSA 

parlance, a “moderate” limitation means that the claimant’s “functioning in this area 

independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is fair.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(F)(2)(c). Though the SSA regulations do not define “fair,” as this Court 

has previously explained, “a moderate limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace 

‘necessarily establish[es] some deficit in [the claimant's] ability to sustain focused attention and 

concentration long enough to permit the timely and appropriate completion of tasks commonly 

found in work settings.’” Nsiah v. Saul, No. 19-cv-42, 2020 WL 12948519, at *14–16 (D.D.C. 

May 12, 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Terri D. v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-22, 2018 WL 

4688740, at *8 (W.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2018)); see also Demetria R. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-3227, 

2022 WL 3142376, at *14 (D.D.C. June 30, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 

WL 3139026 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2022).

The Plaintiff does not—and could not—argue that her RFC is completely devoid of 

functional limitations relevant to CPP. Her RFC is restricted to work that is “simple, routine, 
37

repetitive, low-stress (no strict production quotas, no assembly line pace work) involving 

occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the general public; and changes in work 

duties must be introduced gradually.” ECF No. 11-2 at 21. Other courts have recognized that such 

non-exertional limitations are related to the CPP domain. See Laura A. 2022 WL 3644810, at *10;

Mitchell v. Kijakazi, No. 19-cv-2560, 2021 WL 5310541, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2021). Whether 

they are sufficient to address Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitation is a separate question. 

“An ALJ must tailor a claimant’s RFC to his or her specific limitations.” Mirlin T. v. 

Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-960, 2021 WL 9217635, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2021), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3139032 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2022) (citing Williams v. Colvin, 

134 F. Supp. 3d 358, 365 (D.D.C. 2015)). To achieve a proper fit, many ALJs attempt to account 

in the RFC for a “moderate” CPP limitation by restricting the claimant to simple, routine, and/or 

repetitive work (or some derivation of those limitations), as the RFC does here. These restrictions 

have received mixed reviews by district courts. Compare, e.g., Patrice V. v. Saul, No. 18-cv-2221, 

2019 WL 3778771, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2019) (finding that limiting the claimant to one to four 

step routine, repetitive tasks did not, without further explanation, sufficiently address moderate 

CPP limitations), and Eichelberger v. Colvin, No. 16-cv-3299, 2018 WL 2740018, at *2 (D. Md. 

Apr. 12, 2018) (similar), with, e.g., Taft W. v. Saul, No. 19-cv-2781, 2020 WL 7074628, at *4 (D. 

Md. Dec. 3, 2020) (finding that limiting claimant to one to four step routine, repetitive tasks 

adequately addressed moderate CPP limitations), and Stout v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-2596, 2015 WL 

7351503, at *12 (D. Md. Nov. 20, 2015) (similar). Though the D.C. Circuit has yet to weigh in 

on this issue, district courts have set out some guiding principles that are sufficient to resolve the 

CPP issue in this case. 
38

“As numerous courts have noted, . . . the problem with finding a moderate CPP limitation 

by requiring ‘simple, routine, and repetitive tasks’ is that such a restriction, without more, does not 

actually address plaintiff’s mental impairments because the difficulty of a task does not necessarily 

say anything about his ability to concentrate on it.” Johnson v. Saul, No. 19-cv-3829, 2021 WL 

411202, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2021). That said, as this Court has explained previously, “it is 

decidedly not the case that ‘an RFC limiting a claimant to,’ for example, simple, routine, unskilled, 

and/or repetitive work and tasks with a limited number of steps ‘can never be consistent with a 

moderate limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.’” Laura A. v. Kijakazi, No. 

21-cv-451, 2022 WL 3644810, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2022) (quoting Nsiah, 2020 WL 

12948519, at *15 n.4). Rather, an ALJ may be found to have adequately accounted for a plaintiff’s

moderate CPP limitation either (1) by including additional limitations in the RFC relevant to the 

CPP domain beyond an unadorned “simple, routine, and repetitive tasks” (or its equivalent) 

restriction, or (2) by “adequately explain[ing] why, notwithstanding [the moderate CPP limitation], 

[the plaintiff’s] overall limitations [ ] ‘do not affect [his or her] capacity to sustain simple, routine, 

or unskilled work.’” Terri D. v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-00011, 2018 WL 4688740, at *8 (W.D. Va. 

Sept. 28, 2018) (quoting Perdue v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-173, 2015 WL 5771813, at *6 (W.D. Va. 

Sept. 30, 2015)); see also Nsiah, 2020 WL 12948519, at *15 n.4 (the critical inquiry is whether 

the ALJ “explain[ed] how such an RFC is consistent with the claimant's trouble with concentration, 

persistence, or pace”); Demetria R., 2022 WL 3142376, at *16 n.16. The Court finds that the ALJ 

did not do either sufficiently in this case. 

Addressing the first issue, the Court starts with the premise that “[g]enerally, limiting a 

claimant to “simple, routine, and repetitive tasks” is insufficient to address a moderate CPP 

limitation because “the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task.” 
39

Petty v. Colvin, 204 F. Supp. 3d 196, 206 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 

638 (4th Cir. 2015)). Here, beyond simply limiting Plaintiff’s RFC to “simple, routine, and 

repetitive” tasks, the ALJ also restricted the RFC to work that is “low-stress (no strict production 

quotas, no assembly line pace work) involving occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public; and changes in work duties must be introduced gradually.” ECF 

No. 11-2 at 21. These additional limitations are not materially different, however, from RFC

restrictions that this Court has rejected in the past as being insufficient to address a moderate CPP 

limitation. See Nsiah, 2021 WL 372784, at *15 (concluding that an RFC restricting claimant to 

“simple, routine, unskilled tasks; occasional changes in a routine work setting; and occasional 

interaction with the public, co-workers, and supervisors” did not adequately account for claimant’s 

moderate CPP limitations); Mirlin T., 2021 WL 9217635, at *10 (finding that the “ALJ’s 

limitations of ‘simple work, without fast pace or strict production quotas’ did not adequately 

address Plaintiff’s moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace”). 

In Mirlin T., for example, this Court held that an RFC including a limitation to “simple 

work without fast pace or strict production quotas” was problematic because such phrases were 

not “common, vocationally relevant functional limitations,” and as they were left undefined by the 

ALJ, they did not give the judge enough information to conduct meaningful appellate review. 2021 

WL 9217635, at *9 (quoting Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2019)); see also 

Perry v. Berryhill, 765 Fed. App’x 869, 872–73 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding that the phrase “nonproduction oriented work setting” was not a well-defined term of art); Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 

809, 815 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing how the phrase “fast paced production” without a further 

definition “would have been impossible for the VE to assess”); Wendy S. v. Saul, No. 19-cv-3553, 

2021 WL 168444, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 19, 2021) (finding that the limitation of “no fast pace or strict 
40

production requirements” was unreviewable without further explanation from the ALJ). But see 

Johnson v. Kijakazi, No. 18-cv-2749, 2022 WL 2452610, at *3 (D.D.C. July 6, 2022); Johnson, , 

2021 WL 411202, at *6 n.5. The language used in the RFC here—“low-stress(no strict production 

quotas, no assembly line pace work)”—suffer from the same deficiency in that they are 

impermissibly vague. Because the Court is not certain of the limitation created by the phrase and 

the ALJ did not explain what he meant by it, that ambiguity frustrates this Court’s ability to conduct 

meaningful appellate review of the ALJ’s determination. Furthermore, “if the relevant RFC terms 

are ‘not common enough for [a court] to know what they mean without elaboration’ . . . [t]he 

[c]ourt cannot decisively say that . . . the [vocational expert] would have identified the same, or 

any, positions the hypothetical person could perform.” Geneva W. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,

No. 18-1812, 2019 WL 3254533, at *3 (D. Md. July 19, 2019) (internal citation omitted); see also 

Thomas, 916 F.3d at 312.

Notably, the Commissioner has not identified any authority where a court found limitations 

similar to those imposed by the ALJ here to be adequate to account for a moderate CPP rating. 

Instead, the Commissioner submits that Plaintiff’s arguments are foreclosed by the fact that the 

Social Security Regulations were updated in January 2017. ECF No. 20 at 32. Specifically, the 

Commissioner emphasizes that the SSA’s regulations define the word “moderate” as a “fair” 

ability to function in a particular area. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 

1 § 12.00(F)(2)(c). The Commissioner thus concludes that “[p]laintiff’s ability to ‘stay on task’ is 

therefore addressed, up front, with the ‘moderate’ rating: her ability to function in that area ‘on a 

sustained basis’ is ‘fair.’” Id. But this argument misses the point. As explained above, regardless 

of the specific meaning of “fair,” a “moderate” limitation in CPP “necessarily establishe[s] some 

deficit in [the claimant’s] ‘ability to sustain focused attention and concentration’ long enough ‘to 
41

permit the timely and appropriate completion of tasks commonly found in work settings.’” Terri

D., 2018 WL 4688740, at *8 (quoting 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.00(C)(3) (2015)). 

The Commissioner cites no authority for the proposition that the CPP issue can be disposed of 

simply by observing that the updated SSA’s regulations define the word “moderate” as a “fair” 

ability to function in a particular area. Indeed, many of the cases discussed above grappled with 

this CPP issue well after the SSA’s regulations were updated in 2017, and notwithstanding the new 

regulations “a ‘moderate’ limitation in CPP is still significant in the subsequent RFC analysis.” 

Laura A., 2022 WL 3644810, at *11. 

Having determined that the RFC the ALJ assigned failed to include limitations adequate to 

account for Plaintiff’s moderate CPP rating, the Court next searches the ALJ’s opinion for any 

explanation as to why the ALJ might have concluded that such limitations were unnecessary in 

light of the record. That review establishes that the ALJ assigned a moderate CPP rating, assigned 

an RFC that failed to adequately account for Plaintiff’s concentration issues, and provided this 

Court with no explanation as to why additional concentration-based limitations were unnecessary. 

Finally, the Commissioner advances no argument that the ALJ’s failure to account for 

Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitations constituted harmless error.

10 Given this Court’s conclusion 

that Plaintiff's moderate CPP limitations were not adequately addressed by the RFC, and that the 

ALJ’s question to the vocational expert included only the limitations outlined in the RFC, see ECF 

No. 11-2 at 58, the Court concludes that the ALJ may not have provided an accurate hypothetical 

10 Errors of this kind have previously been considered harmless if “(1) medical evidence demonstrates that a claimant 

can engage in simple, routine tasks or unskilled work despite limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace and 

that the hypothetical question given to the expert is limited to only include only unskilled work or (2) the hypothetical 

otherwise implicitly account[s] for a claimant’s limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace[.]” Mirlin T., 2021 

WL 9217635, at *11 (quoting Petty, 204 F. Supp. 3d. at 206) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Commissioner 

makes no effort to apply standard here, and the Court will not make that argument for her. In any event, for the reasons 

stated previously, it does not appear that such a showing could be made based on the record here. 
42

question to the vocational expert. See Petty, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 205 (an ALJ’s failure to convey 

accurately the claimant's limitations to the expert can serve as grounds for reversal because it 

“undermines the expert's testimony that a claimant can perform other work,” an instrumental 

aspect of determining whether the claimant qualifies for disability benefits). Accordingly, the 

Court will grant the Plaintiff’s motion for remand on this basis. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will enter an Order DENYING Defendant’s motion 

for judgment of affirmance (ECF No. 20), GRANTING IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for judgment 

of reversal (ECF No. 18) to the extent that it seeks remand to the Social Security Administration

for further administrative proceedings, DENYING IN PART to the extent that it seeks reversal, 

and REMANDING this case to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Date: April 21, 2023 ___________________________________

G. MICHAEL HARVEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE