alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6251

TIRAN LATRAYER BROWN, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. WILLIAM WILLIAMS; J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR., Attorney General of the State of Maryland; JAMES S. SMITH, Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge. (1:06-cv-01696-WDQ) Submitted: June 10, 2008 Decided: June 27, 2008 Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Tiran Latrayer Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Gary E. O. Connor, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.* For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988). We deny Brown’s request to treat his motion for an extension of time to “research [his] next move” as a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc, because the motion did not indicate Brown’s intent to seek appellate review. SeeSmith v. Barry , 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992). - 2 - PER CURIAM: Tiran Latrayer Brown seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). Except as provided in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), neither this court nor the district court may extend the time to note an appeal more than sixty days after the judgment was entered. Ali v. Lyles , 769 F.2d 204, 205 (4th Cir. 1985). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on October 29, 2007. The notice of appeal was filed on February 3, 2008. * Because Brown failed to file a timely notice of appeal or- 3 - to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 77 

To provide for a credit for certain health care benefits in determining the 

minimum wage. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 6, 2009 

Mr. ISSA introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To provide for a credit for certain health care benefits in 

determining the minimum wage. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Health Care Incentive 

5 Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MINIMUM WAGE CREDIT FOR HEALTH CARE BENE7 FITS PROVIDED TO EMPLOYEES. 

8 (a) RULEMAKING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

9 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Labor shall 

10 promulgate a rule requiring that, for any employer enVerDate Nov 24 2008 00:04 Jan 09, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H77.IH H77

wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
2 

•HR 77 IH

1 gaged in interstate commerce that is required by Federal 

2 or State law to pay a minimum wage at a rate that is 

3 higher than the minimum wage required by section 6(a) 

4 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 

5 206(a)) as in effect on September 1, 1997, such employer 

6 be permitted, in accordance with regulations promulgated 

7 by the Secretary, to include the value of creditable health 

8 care benefits provided by such employer to an employee 

9 in determining the wage such employer is required to pay 

10 an employee. Such rule shall include the following: 

11 (1) CREDITABLE BENEFITS.—The Secretary 

12 shall define the categories of health care benefits 

13 provided by an employer to employees to be consid14 ered creditable for purpose of this section, which 

15 shall include a contribution to a health savings ac16 count or similar account. 

17 (2) VALUATION.—The Secretary shall establish 

18 a method for determining the value of such health 

19 care benefits for purposes of such credit. 

20 (3) REQUIRED MINIMUM VALUE.—The Sec21 retary shall determine a minimum value of such ben22 efits that an employer shall provide to an employee 

23 in order to include any portion of such benefits as 

24 such a credit. 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
3 

•HR 77 IH

1 (4) MINIMUM CASH WAGE NOTWITHSTANDING

2 CREDIT.—In no case shall the credit permitted by 

3 the rule promulgated under this section exceed the 

4 difference between the minimum wage under section 

5 6(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 

6 U.S.C. 206(a)) as in effect September 1, 1997, and 

7 the wage rate otherwise applicable. 

8 (b) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of the rule required 

9 under this section, the terms ‘‘employer’’, ‘‘employee’’, and 

10 ‘‘wage’’ shall have the meanings given such terms in sec11 tion 3 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 

12 U.S.C. 203). 

Æ 


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<PAGE>

                                                                EXHIBIT 23.1

                            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration 
Statement (Form S-8 Number 33-71578) pertaining to the Employee New Stock 
Purchase Plan, as amended, the Registration Statement (Form S-8 Number 
33-71580, 33-35640 and 2-98541) pertaining to the 1990 Amended and Restated 
Stock Option Plan, as amended, the Registration Statement (Form S-8 Number 
33-71484) pertaining to the 1993 Stock Option Plan for Outside Directors, and 
the Registration Statement (Form S-8 Number 33-17194) pertaining to the 1985 
Restricted Value Stock Plan, as amended of Grubb & Ellis Company and 
Subsidiaries of our report dated August 18, 1997 (except for Note 1(k) as to 
which the date is March 21, 1998), with respect to the 
financial statements of Grubb & Ellis Company and Subsidiaries included in 
the Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) for the year ended June 30, 1997, filed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.


ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Chicago, Illinois
March 21, 1998
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Case 7:07-cv-05739-KMK Document 62-6 Filed 06/18/2008 Page 1 of 2
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Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Employment and Training Administration

          - [NAFTA-04392]

                    In accordance with Section 250(A), Subchapter D, Chapter 2, Title II, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2273), the Department of Labor issued a Certification for NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance on February 5, 2001, applicable to workers of Unilever-Bestfoods, Lipton, Dallas, Texas. The notice was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on March 2, 2001 (66 FR 13087).                

At the request of the State agency, the Department reviewed the certification for workers of the subject firm. The workers are engaged in the production of 50 pound bulk margarine cubes. New information shows that some workers separated from employment at Unilever-Bestfoods, Lipton had their wages reported under a separate unemployment insurance (UI) tax account for Conopco, Inc., a company established by the subject firm to handle worker compensation nationwide.

Accordingly, the Department is amending the certification to properly reflect this matter.

The intent of the Department's certification is to include all workers of Unilever-Bestfoods, Lipton, who were adversely affected by a shift of production of margarine to Canada.

The amended notice applicable to NAFTA-04392 is hereby issued as follows:

All workers of Unilever-Bestfoods, Lipton, Conopco, Inc., Dallas, Texas, who became totally or partially separated from employment on or after December 5, 1999, through February 5, 2003, are eligible to apply for NAFTA-TAA under Section 250 of the Trade Act of 1974.

Signed at Washington, DC, this 23rd day of April, 2001.

Linda G. Poole,

Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.

[FR Doc. 01-11102 Filed 5-2-01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-10418 Conference Calendar

DARRELL RUSSELL, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:97-CV-15

- - - - - - - - - - April 19, 1999 Before JONES, SMITH, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Darrell Russell, Texas prisoner # 674336, appeals from the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for failure to exhaust his state remedies. The district court granted a certificate of appealability on the exhaustion issue. Unbeknownst to the district court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Russell’s state application shortlyNo. 98-10418 -2- before the entry of the district court’s order. The respondent now concedes exhaustion. Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings. Russell’s motions to expedite the appeal are DENIED as MOOT. VACATE AND REMAND; MOTIONS DENIED.
#### Louis Joy Corp., Respondent, v Boris Breslow Corp., Defendant, and Bigman Brothers, Inc., Appellant.

Order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Anita R. Florio, J.), entered November 21, 1986, which granted a motion to reargue an order of the court entered September 24, 1986, granting plaintiffs motion to direct that defendant appear for a further examination before trial, but adhering to the prior determination, unanimously reversed, on consent of the plaintiff-respondent, without costs, and the motion of the plaintiff directing defendant to appear for a further examination is denied.

Appeal from the order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Anita R. Florio, J.), entered September 24, 1986, is dismissed as superseded by the appeal from the above order, without costs.

Under circumstances not necessary to detail here, the court granted plaintiff-respondent’s request to direct defendant, previously deposed, to appear for a further examination before trial. In a letter to this court, counsel for plaintiff-respondent informs us that plaintiff-respondent is not contesting this appeal, and had indicated its willingness to enter into a stipulation withdrawing its application for leave for a further examination before trial. Accordingly, the order granting the further examination before trial should be vacated. Concur— Sandler, J. P., Ross, Milonas, Kassal and Smith, JJ.
DISMISS; and Opinion Filed October 9, 2013. 

# S

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 11

- 01648

- CV

SIMONE HOTALING HOAG , IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE CARL L.

HOAG, JR AND SIMONE HOTALING HOAG REVOCA BLE TRUEST, Appellant
V.
LEGACY TEXAS BANK , Appellee

On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 380

- 05037

- 2009

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices O’Neill, Lang

- Mier s, and Evans Opinion by Justice O’Neill
Before this Court is appellant’s stipulation regarding judgments and dismissal of appeal.

Having reached a settlement agreement, the parties agree to dismiss this appeal . We grant

appellant’s motion and dismiss th is appeal. T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 43.2(f).

111648F.P05 /Michael J. O'Neill/
MICHAEL J. O’NEILL JUSTICE– 2

– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

SIMONE HOTALING HOAG, IN HER
CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE CARL L. HOAG, JR. AND SIMONE HOTALING
HOAG REVOCABLE TRUST , Appellant

No. 05

- 11

- 01648

- CV V.

LEGACY TEXAS BANK, Appellee On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 380

- 05037

- 2009. Opinion delivered by Justice O’Neil l, Justices Lang

- Miers and Evans participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED

.

It is ORDERED that each party shall bear their own cost of the appeal.

Judgment entered this 9 th day of October, 2013.

/Michael J. O'Neill/

MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
JUSTICE
#### Ford *vs.*Clark, administrator

If one sues a partnership and is non-suited, he cannot re-commence his action against one of the partners individually within six months after such non-suit, so as to prevent the statute of limitations from attaching, under §2932 of the Code.

December 22, 1885.

Partnership. Statute of Limitations. Before Judge Fain. Catoosa Superior Court. February Term, 1885.

Ford brought suit, on September 29,1884, against Clark, as administrator of John D. Gray, deceased, on an open account, due in 1870. To prevent the bar of the statute of limitations from attaching, it was alleged that, in 1873, suit was brought on the account against-John D. Gray, Allen Kennedy and Charles Chamberlin, as partners, plaintiff believing that the latter two were partners of the former in the purchase of the articles on which the account was based; that Chamberlin, being a non-resident, was not served; that Kennedy pleaded no partnership and obtained a judgment in his favor on that issue; that Gray having died pending the case, Clark, his administrator, *613was mado a party; that the case was non-suited; and that this action against the administrator of Gray was brought within six months thereafter. By amendment, it was alleged that there had never been any joint property of Gray and Chamberlin in the state; that plaintiff proceeded against them all as partners, on the ground that they had held themselves out as such; that in the original suit, both Kennedy and Chamberlin filed pleas of no partnership, and no evidence was introduced on the trial, when the non-suit was granted, to overcome such pleas, but the original scheme of the suit having failed, the, plaintiff was simply trying to hold Gray, by whom the account was contracted, liable for what he received.

On demurrer, the case was dismissed, and the plaintiff excepted.

W. K. Moore, by brief; W. C. Glenn, for plaintiff in error

R. J. McOamy, for defendant.

Blandford, Justice.

The precise question is this : If one sues a partnership, and is non-suited, can an action be re-commenced against one of the partners individually within six months after such non-suit, so as to prevent the statute of limitations from attaching, under section 2932 of the Code ? That section enacts that, “ If a plaintiff shall be non-suited, or shall discontinue or dismiss his case, and shall re commence within six months, such renewed action shall stand on the same footing as to limitation with the original case. . . .”

We are satisfied that a suit against a partnership which has been non-suited or dismissed is not the same as an action against an individual; hence, when such suit against a partnership has been non-suited, and another.action has been instituted against an individual whom it was alleged belonged to or was a member of the firm formerly sued, *614the latter action, although commenced within six months from the dismissal of the former suit, will not prevent the bar of the statute of limitations from attaching to the cause of action, under section 2932 of the Code.

Judgment affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony Pacheco, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Feldman, J.), rendered August 14, 1987, convicting him of attempted rape in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

A defendant’s claim that the courts lack the statutory or inherent power to vacate a guilty plea may be tested in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of a writ of prohibition *(Matter of Kisloff v Covington,*73 NY2d 445). The defendant here did not seek to raise this contention by way of such a proceeding, but declined the offer to go to trial and reentered his guilty plea with the express understanding that he would receive a sentence of 3 to 9 years’ imprisonment *(cf., People v Daniels,*132 AD2d 667; *People v Brunson,*131 AD2d 689).

"[A] plea of guilty generally precludes appellate review of nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings” *(People v Motley,*
      *64269 NY2d 870, 871-872). Thus, by entering a guilty plea, a defendant forfeits his right to seek reversal of his conviction on a variety of grounds *(see, People v Motley, supra*[nonjurisdictional challenges to indictment precluded by the guilty plea]; *People v Taylor,*65 NY2d 1 [guilty plea results in forfeiture of a defendant’s right to challenge identification testimony or the prosecution’s failure to furnish notice of its intention to offer evidence of the defendant’s statements at trial]; *People v Coombs,*138 AD2d 619 [by pleading guilty the defendant forfeits any claim on the issue of his statutory right to a speedy trial]; *People v Filomeno,*138 AD2d 734 [a defendant forfeits his right to challenge the factual basis for a guilty plea where he accepts a bargained-for plea to a lesser crime than that charged in the indictment]; *People v Corti,*88 AD2d 345 [a defendant who enters a guilty plea prior to a decision on a suppression motion waives final determination of the motion]).

Similarly, in the instant case, the defendant’s claim that the court improperly vacated his original guilty plea was forfeited when he pleaded guilty the second time.

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Brown, J. P., Kooper, Harwood and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 10.4



                     DESCRIPTION OF GRUBB & ELLIS COMPANY
                 EXECUTIVE OFFICER INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN


Grubb & Ellis Company has an incentive compensation program for the executive
officers which is reviewed for modification annually, under which each executive
officer may receive, in addition to any individually determined base
compensation, cash incentive compensation. This program, beginning in the 1999
calendar year, provides for incentive compensation based upon achievement of
goals related to the Company, and as applicable, business divisions, with
respect to revenue and certain measures of profitability, as well as goals
related to other business plan objectives for each individual.



W:\cv\3480
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Freedom Resources Enterprises, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Neil Christiansen, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.









Date: September 15, 2005

/s/ Neil Christiansen

Neil Christiansen

Chief Executive Officer

Chief Financial Officer
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