*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
MARQUIS JONES v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(AC 43862)

Alvord, Moll and Vertefeuille, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of felony

murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel,

J, had provided ineffective assistance and that his rights to due process

and to a fair trial had been violated by the prosecutor’s failure to disclose

material evidence that was favorable to the defense. Following a hearing,

the habeas court denied the petition. Thereafter, the habeas court denied

the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to

this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having

failed to demonstrate that his claims involved issues that were debatable

among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a

different manner or that the questions raised were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further: this court declined to review the

petitioner’s claim that the habeas court deprived him of his statutory

and constitutional rights in failing to admit into evidence or to consider

the transcript of his underlying criminal trial, as the petitioner did not

raise any claims relating to the habeas court’s treatment of the criminal

trial transcript in his petition for certification to appeal; moreover, based

on the underlying facts as found by the habeas court, this court concluded that the habeas court properly found that the petitioner failed

to establish that J rendered ineffective assistance, as that court correctly

determined that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice on the basis

of J’s failure to explore the condition of the victim’s body when crossexamining the state’s main witness, B, as the petitioner failed to present

B as a witness at the habeas trial, or on the basis of J’s failure to consult

and call as a witness a forensic expert as, although the petitioner asserted

that an expert could have provided important information to his counsel,

he failed to state how such information would have impacted the case,

or on the basis of J’s failure to follow up on bloodstains found in the

victim’s car, the petitioner having failed to link the victim’s car and the

bloodstains in it to the murder, and this court declined to review the

petitioner’s claim that J failed to follow up on the handling of the

victim’s car by the police, as the claim was not distinctly raised before

or addressed by the habeas court; furthermore, this court concluded

that the habeas court properly determined that there was no violation

of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83), because, although the prosecutor

failed to disclose to the petitioner that DNA evidence obtained from

bloodstains in the victim’s car generated a match to a convicted offender,

the petitioner failed to establish a connection between the murder and

those bloodstains and thus failed to show that evidence of that match

was material to his defense.

Argued January 26—officially released April 26, 2022

Procedural History

Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Tolland and tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment

denying the petition; thereafter, the court denied the

petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner

appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.

Katharine S. Goodbody, assistant public defender,

for the appellant (petitioner).

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino,
state’s attorney, and Emily Trudeau, assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The petitioner, Marquis Jones, appeals

following the denial of his petition for certification to

appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the

petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its

discretion in denying his petition for certification to

appeal, (2) deprived him of his constitutional and statutory rights by failing to admit into evidence or consider

the transcripts of the underlying criminal trial, (3)

improperly concluded that his trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance, and (4) improperly concluded that there were no violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963),

at his underlying criminal trial. We conclude that the

habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal and,

therefore, dismiss the appeal.

This court set forth the following facts, which the

jury reasonably could have found, in the petitioner’s

direct appeal from his conviction. ‘‘On the evening of

December 26, 2002, the eighteen year old victim, accompanied by his cousin, Sam Moore, attended a party at

a club in Bridgeport. The [petitioner] was at the club

at the same time as the victim and Moore. After leaving

the club, the victim and Moore went to a nearby restaurant. The [petitioner], who was armed with a gun,

arrived at the same restaurant at approximately 1 a.m.

While there, the [petitioner] learned that the victim and

Moore were interested in purchasing marijuana. The

[petitioner] told an acquaintance, Gary Browning, that

the victim and Moore had money and that he wanted

to rob them. Browning arranged to sell marijuana to

the victim and led him to a nearby backyard to complete

the sale. Thereafter, the [petitioner] approached the

victim from behind and stated: ‘You know what time it

is, run that shit.’ As Browning walked away from the

victim, the [petitioner] shot the victim in the back of

the head and took money and drugs from him. The

gunshot caused the victim’s death. The victim’s body

was found on the snow coated ground the next morning.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Jones, 135 Conn. App.

788, 791, 44 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 925, 47

A.3d 885 (2012).

The petitioner was arrested on June 4, 2008. On May

28, 2010, following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of felony murder. He was sentenced to a total

effective sentence of forty years of incarceration. Following a direct appeal, the judgment of conviction was

affirmed by this court. Id., 790.

The present habeas proceeding was commenced in

May, 2013, and, on May 10, 2019, the petitioner filed a

three count, third amended petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. The first count included a number of claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, three of which are at

issue in this appeal. The second and third counts each

alleged that his rights to due process and a fair trial

were violated by the prosecutor’s failure to disclose

material evidence that was favorable to the defense. A

trial was held over the course of two days, on August

27, 2018, and June 4, 2019. On November 26, 2019, the

habeas court, Newson, J., issued a memorandum of

decision in which it denied the petitioner’s habeas petition.

The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the court also denied. This

appeal followed. Additional facts and procedure will

be set forth as necessary.

I

The petitioner first claims that the habeas court

abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal from the court’s judgment denying his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We disagree.

General Statutes § 52-470 (g) provides: ‘‘No appeal

from the judgment rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by or on behalf of a person who has

been convicted of a crime in order to obtain such person’s release may be taken unless the appellant, within

ten days after the case is decided, petitions the judge

before whom the case was tried or, if such judge is

unavailable, a judge of the Superior Court designated

by the Chief Court Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in the decision which ought to be

reviewed by the court having jurisdiction and the judge

so certifies.’’

‘‘As our Supreme Court has explained, one of the

goals our legislature intended by enacting this statute

was to limit the number of appeals filed in criminal

cases and hasten the final conclusion of the criminal

justice process . . . . [T]he legislature intended to discourage frivolous habeas appeals. . . . [Section] 52-

470 [g] acts as a limitation on the scope of review, and

not the jurisdiction, of the appellate tribunal. . . .

‘‘Faced with a habeas court’s denial of a petition for

certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate

review of the [disposition] of his [or her] petition for

habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test

enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden,

229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and adopted in

Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126

(1994). First, he [or she] must demonstrate that the

denial of his [or her] petition for certification constituted an abuse of discretion. . . . Second, if the petitioner can show an abuse of discretion, he [or she] must

then prove that the decision of the habeas court should

be reversed on its merits. . . .

‘‘To prove an abuse of discretion, the petitioner must

demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim
involves issues that] are debatable among jurists of

reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . .

‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused

its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for

certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of

the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether

the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review

the petitioner’s substantive claims for the purpose of

ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more

of the three criteria . . . adopted by [our Supreme

Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas

court’s denial of the petition for certification.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Whistnant v. Commissioner of Correction, 199 Conn. App.

406, 414–15, 236 A.3d 276, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 969,

240 A.3d 286 (2020).

For the reasons set forth in parts II, III, and IV of

this opinion, we conclude that the petitioner has failed

to demonstrate that his claims are debatable among

jurists of reason, a court could resolve the issues in a

different manner, or the questions are adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further. Thus, we

conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal.

II

Turning to the merits of the petitioner’s first substantive claim, the petitioner claims that the habeas court

deprived him of ‘‘his constitutional and statutory rights

to the opportunity to be heard’’ by failing to admit into

evidence or consider the transcript of the underlying

criminal trial. The respondent, the Commissioner of

Correction, contends, inter alia, that this claim is not

reviewable. We agree with the respondent.

The following additional procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. On the first day of

the habeas trial, August 27, 2018, the petitioner’s habeas

counsel offered the underlying criminal trial transcript

as a full exhibit, and the respondent’s attorney objected,

noting that the transcript, which was saved on a flash

drive, did not appear to be certified and the paper copy

offered by the petitioner had notes on it. The respondent’s attorney told the court that if there was a brief

recess she would be able to review the flash drive to

determine whether the transcript was certified. The

court advised the parties that it planned a lunch recess

to afford them review time. One of the attorneys, however, had to attend another hearing in the afternoon;

therefore, the trial was adjourned without a resolution

of the transcript issue. On June 4, 2019, the second,

and last, day of the trial, the petitioner’s habeas counsel

‘‘offer[ed] the expanded record pursuant to . . . Prac-
tice Book § 23-36,1

including the transcripts of the criminal case’’; (footnote added); and the court stated that

it would accept the transcripts as part of the ‘‘underlying

record.’’2

In the court’s memorandum of decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the court

noted that, ‘‘[s]trangely, although submitted as an ID

exhibit . . . the transcript from the underlying criminal trial was never offered as a full exhibit at the habeas

trial’’ and further noted that the transcript ‘‘likely could

have offered some clarification about exactly what happened.’’

On December 10, 2019, after the habeas court denied

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner

filed a petition for certification to appeal. Although the

petitioner set forth numerous grounds on which he

proposed to appeal, he did not in any way implicate

the court’s treatment of the criminal trial transcript.

The court denied the petition for certification to appeal

on December 11, 2019. On January 28, 2020, the petitioner appealed to this court. On March 4, 2020, the

petitioner filed a motion for articulation and a motion

for rectification of appeal, arguing therein that the

‘‘habeas court erroneously determined that the underlying transcript of the criminal trial was not in evidence

and, therefore, [the court] failed to consider the transcript [in] making its decision.’’ On May 29, 2020, the

habeas court denied these motions, noting that ‘‘the

criminal transcript was not a full exhibit.’’ On August

6, 2020, the petitioner filed with this court two motions

for review with respect to the habeas court’s decisions

on those motions. This court granted the motion to

review the decision on the petitioner’s motion for articulation and ordered the habeas court to articulate

whether it considered any portion of the criminal trial

transcript when rendering its decision. The habeas

court, in its responsive articulation, explained that ‘‘the

petitioner never entered the criminal trial transcript as

a full exhibit. Since the transcripts remained an exhibit

for ID only . . . [the court] would not have considered

the exhibit in rendering the memorandum of decision

following the trial. To the extent the parties referenced

said transcript in their briefs, the court simply accepted

those as arguments of the parties based on the evidence

and full exhibits that were submitted at trial.’’ At no

point did the petitioner seek to amend his petition for

certification to appeal to include arguments related to

the court’s treatment of the criminal trial transcript.

Now, on appeal, the petitioner claims that, because

‘‘[t]he underlying transcript was offered by counsel for

the petitioner, was not objected to by the respondent’s

counsel, and was relied on both in questioning witnesses during the habeas trial and in the posttrial briefs

of the parties,’’ the court’s ‘‘[f]ailure to admit the transcript denied [the petitioner] . . . his due process right

to a meaningful opportunity to be heard. And, failure

to consider any portion of the underlying criminal tran-
script also denied [the petitioner] his due process rights

to be heard.’’ In response, the respondent argues that,

inter alia, this claim is not reviewable because ‘‘it was

not raised as a ground of error in the petition for certification to appeal.’’

‘‘As our standard of review set forth [in part I of this

opinion] makes clear, an appeal following the denial of

a petition for certification to appeal from the judgment

denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not the

appellate equivalent of a direct appeal from a criminal

conviction. Our limited task as a reviewing court is to

determine whether the habeas court abused its discretion in concluding that the petitioner’s appeal is frivolous. Thus, we review whether the issues for which

certification to appeal was sought are debatable among

jurists of reason, a court could resolve the issues differently or the issues are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . Because it is impossible

to review an exercise of discretion that did not occur,

we are confined to reviewing only those issues which

were brought to the habeas court’s attention in the

petition for certification to appeal.’’ (Citation omitted.)

Tutson v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn. App.

203, 216, 72 A.3d 1162, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 928, 78

A.3d 145 (2013); see id., 215–17 (declining to review

claim that ‘‘court improperly failed to read all of the

exhibits introduced at the habeas proceeding . . .

[b]ecause the petitioner did not raise the claim when

asking the court to rule on his petition for certification

to appeal’’); see also Schuler v. Commissioner of Correction, 200 Conn. App. 602, 610–11, 238 A.3d 835 (2020),

cert. denied, 336 Conn. 905, 243 A.3d 1180 (2021).

Further, ‘‘[i]t is well established that a petitioner cannot demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying a petition for certification to appeal if

the issue raised on appeal was never raised before the

court at the time that it considered the petition for

certification to appeal as a ground on which certification should be granted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Whistnant v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,

199 Conn. App. 416.

In the present case, the petitioner did not raise any

claims related to the court’s treatment of the trial transcript in his petition for certification to appeal. He

explains that ‘‘[t]he issue was raised and addressed in

the posttrial motions for articulation and rectification

and in the motions for review of the decisions on these

motions,’’ which provided the court with ‘‘the opportunity to address this claim.’’ The petitioner asserts that

the claim is reviewable because ‘‘[t]he court was given

the opportunity to address this issue through the

motions . . . .’’ These arguments, however, ignore the

statutory nature of habeas appeals. ‘‘Section 52-470 (g)

conscribes our appellate review to the issues presented

in the petition for certification to appeal . . . .’’ Whist-
nant v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 199 Conn.

App. 418. The petitioner’s contentions are unavailing,

and he cannot demonstrate that the habeas court

abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal on this ground.

III

The petitioner’s second substantive claim on appeal

is that the court erroneously concluded that he failed

to establish that his trial counsel, Attorney Jeffrey Beck,

rendered ineffective assistance. Specifically, the petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed (1) to attack

Browning’s testimony with respect to the condition of

the victim’s body, (2) to hire a forensic expert, and (3)

to conduct a timely and thorough investigation of the

case and asserts that, ‘‘if [defense counsel] had not

failed to take the actions discussed herein, it is probable

that the outcome would have been different.’’ We disagree.

‘‘[As it relates to the petitioner’s substantive claims]

[o]ur standard of review of a habeas court’s judgment on

ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well settled.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mourning v. Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn. App. 444, 449, 150

A.3d 1166 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 908, 152 A.3d

1246 (2017). ‘‘In a habeas appeal, this court cannot

disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court

unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review of

whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right

to effective assistance of counsel is plenary. . . .

‘‘In Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], the United States

Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he

must show that counsel’s assistance was so defective

as to require reversal of [the] conviction . . . . That

requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. . . . Because both

prongs . . . must be established for a habeas petitioner to prevail, a court may dismiss a petitioner’s

claim if he fails to meet either prong. . . . With respect

to the prejudice component of the Strickland test, the

petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s errors were

so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial,

a trial whose result is reliable. . . . It is not enough

for the [petitioner] to show that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceedings.

. . . Rather, [t]he [petitioner] must show that there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Schuler v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 200
Conn. App. 617.

A

We first address the petitioner’s contention that his

trial counsel failed to explore the condition of the victim’s body when cross-examining Browning, the state’s

main witness against the petitioner in the criminal trial.

The following additional procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. At the habeas trial,

the exhibits from the criminal trial, which included pictures of the crime scene and the victim, were entered

as full exhibits. The pictures show the victim lying face

down in the snow, with clothing partially removed, and

surrounded with footprints. In addition, Joette Devan,

a detective who responded to the crime scene, testified

that the victim was lying face down and that there were

footprints in the snow around the body. The petitioner

also presented evidence, in the form of expert testimony, that the position of the victim’s body indicated

that it had been moved after the murder occurred.3

The petitioner presented expert testimony of Attorney John Watson. When Watson was asked about the

footprints around the victim’s body, he testified that

‘‘[s]ome of [the footprints] were identified as those of

Mr. Browning because of the footwear he himself said

he was wearing, and some were identified as those of

the victim because they matched the type of footwear

the victim was wearing.’’ The petitioner’s habeas counsel then asked, ‘‘[I]f you as a defense attorney . . .

have a crime scene where the victim has been rolled

and his clothes have been pulled off him . . . to some

degree, what would you do with that?’’ Watson

responded, ‘‘I think that’s something that the forensic

expert could help defense counsel to bring to the jury’s

attention through cross-examination of the state’s witnesses that the footprints around the body were those

of Mr. Browning. So, it’s a reasonable inference that,

in fact, he was the person who tampered with the body

after the shooting.’’

The petitioner’s trial counsel also testified at the

habeas trial. The case was scheduled for trial at the

time when trial counsel was appointed to represent the

petitioner. He testified that his defense theory was ‘‘that

[the petitioner] had nothing to do with the incident at

all, wasn’t present when [the victim] was shot, and

wasn’t aware of what was going on.’’ He further testified

that his approach in cross-examining Browning was to

attack Browning’s testimony because, according to trial

counsel, ‘‘[Browning’s] testimony . . . was very weak’’

and ‘‘very incredulous.’’ The petitioner’s trial counsel

testified further that he questioned Browning about

footprints found around the body and that Browning

admitted that the footprints were his own. Trial counsel

recalled that, in his closing argument at trial, he mentioned that the victim’s body may have been moved after
the shooting. Further, on inquiry from the respondent’s

counsel, trial counsel agreed that pursuing a line of

questioning as to what may have happened to the victim’s body after the shooting would not have been relevant to the defense that the petitioner was not at the

scene and had nothing to do with the murder. Finally,

trial counsel conceded that the state never claimed that

the petitioner’s footprints were at the scene of the

crime. The petitioner never called Browning as a witness at the habeas trial.

In denying the petitioner’s amended petition for a

writ of habeas corpus, the habeas court concluded that

the petitioner’s failure to present Browning as a witness

at the habeas trial was fatal to his claim, citing Nieves

v. Commissioner of Correction, 51 Conn. App. 615,

623–24, 724 A.2d 508, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 905, 731

A.2d 309 (1999), which held that ‘‘[t]he failure of the

petitioner to offer evidence as to what [the witnesses]

would have testified is fatal to his claim,’’ as, without

the evidence, the court was ‘‘unable to conclude that

he was prejudiced.’’

On appeal, the petitioner asserts that ‘‘[a] review of

the photograph of the [victim’s] body indicates that it

‘most likely ha[d] been moved at some point after the

injury occurred’ ’’ and that Browning’s footprints were

‘‘ ‘abundant’ around the victim’s body.’’ Thus, he argues

that, because ‘‘the state had a weak case, it is reasonably

probable that the jury would have found reasonable

doubt had [his trial counsel] adequately attacked [Browning’s] testimony.’’ The respondent maintains that the

habeas court correctly determined that prejudice could

not be assessed given the fact that the petitioner did

not call Browning as a witness at the habeas trial. In

response, the petitioner asserts that, ‘‘[i]f [Browning]

had testified at the habeas trial, his answers would not

have changed the fact that [the petitioner’s trial counsel]

failed to bring to the jury’s attention the discrepancies

in [Browning’s] version of the shooting and the physical

evidence.’’ Accordingly, it is the petitioner’s position

that ‘‘how [Browning] would have answered is irrelevant and was not required’’ because ‘‘the failure of [trial

counsel’s] cross-examination of [Browning] was the

failure to challenge his testimony with the physical evidence.’’ We agree with the respondent.

‘‘It is axiomatic that a habeas petitioner who claims

prejudice based on counsel’s alleged failure to present

helpful evidence from a particular witness, must call

that witness to testify before the habeas court or otherwise prove what the witness would or could have stated

had he been questioned at trial, as the petitioner claims

he should have been.’’ Benitez v. Commissioner of Correction, 197 Conn. App. 344, 351, 231 A.3d 1285, cert.

denied, 335 Conn. 924, 233 A.3d 1091 (2020); see id.,

350–51 (‘‘petitioner failed to call the complainant to

testify at the habeas trial, or otherwise to establish what
the complainant would or could have testified to on

cross-examination, had he been questioned about his

access to and possible use’’ of chemicals involved in

underlying arson and, therefore, could not show prejudice); see also Taft v. Commissioner of Correction, 159

Conn. App. 537, 554, 124 A.3d 1 (petitioner failed to

prove prejudice when he ‘‘did not offer evidence regarding how [the witnesses] would have testified if they had

been cross-examined [differently]’’), cert. denied, 320

Conn. 910, 128 A.3d 954 (2015); Nieves v. Commissioner

of Correction, supra, 51 Conn. App. 623 (petitioner’s

failure ‘‘to offer evidence as to what [witnesses] would

have testified is fatal to his claim’’). In order for the

habeas court to assess the claim that the petitioner’s

trial counsel did not properly cross-examine Browning,

the petitioner needed to call Browning as a witness at

the habeas trial or otherwise demonstrate how Browning would have testified had his cross-examination

been conducted as now suggested by the petitioner.

Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish

prejudice, and, therefore, the court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the petition for certification to

appeal as to this claim.

B

The petitioner next claims that his trial counsel failed

to consult and call as a witness a forensic expert. Specifically, in this third claim he asserts that a forensic expert

could have (1) ‘‘told [trial counsel] that the victim’s

body had been moved subsequent to the shooting,’’ (2)

‘‘testified as to the relevance and importance of the

shoe print that was approximately [twenty] feet from

the victim,’’ and (3) ‘‘told [trial counsel] the possible

significance and could have testified regarding the victim’s car with the bloodstained seats.’’ According to the

petitioner, a forensic expert ‘‘would have bolstered the

idea that the state’s version of what happened here is

not trustworthy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The petitioner, however, has failed to demonstrate that

he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to consult and call a forensic expert.

In addition to the evidence discussed in part III A

of this opinion, the petitioner presented the following

evidence. Devan, a detective involved in the investigation, testified that the victim’s car keys were next to

the victim’s body and that the victim’s car was located

nearby. Devan testified that two of the car’s seats had

what appeared to be bloodstains on them and that the

car was towed to the police department for further

investigation. The petitioner presented evidence that

the two stains found on the car seats were human blood

and that the police removed the bloodstained fabric

from the vehicle for DNA testing, which occurred in

2003 and ruled out the victim as the source of the blood.
Michael Bourke, a forensic science examiner at the

Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, testified that DNA testing on the bloodstains

resulted in several profiles that were entered into the

Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database4

‘‘in

order to search against other forensic profiles and the

profiles from the offenders that are included [in the

database] in hopes of furthering the investigation.’’

Bourke also testified that ‘‘a match was generated to a

convicted offender in this case’’ on January 12, 2009,

identifying ‘‘Rafail E. Ferrer’’ as having DNA in the system that matched the sample from the victim’s car.

The petitioner also established that his trial counsel

did not hire or consult a forensic expert in the present

case, and he presented testimony from Peter Valentin,

a lecturer at the Forensic Science Department of the

University of New Haven, as an expert in crime scene

forensic science. Valentin testified, on reviewing a photograph of the victim’s body at the crime scene that

was a full exhibit in the criminal trial, that there had

been ‘‘some movement after the injury’’ and ‘‘the [victim] most likely ha[d] been moved at some point after

the injury occurred.’’5 Valentin also briefly testified

about a shoe print containing a bloodstain that was

approximately twenty feet from the victim. When asked

if the shoe print was ‘‘something that would be significant in trying to resolve this crime,’’ Valentin responded

that ‘‘[t]he existence of that bloodstain at such a distance from . . . where the injury occurred strongly

suggests relevance’’ and provided several theories as

to how the bloodstained footprint came to be.6

When asked about what he would have done if hired

by the petitioner’s trial counsel, Valentin said that he

‘‘would have advised [trial] counsel . . . that the automobile is a relevant item of physical evidence that needs

to be safeguarded and searched until such time as . . .

you can determine that there’s nothing of relevance

inside the vehicle.’’ With respect to the bloodstains in

the victim’s car, Valentin provided suggestions only as

to how he would have investigated the source of the

blood (i.e., by interviewing the person whose DNA was

matched with one of the bloodstains).

The habeas court determined that the petitioner failed

to establish prejudice and provided that, ‘‘[a]lthough the

petitioner did present the testimony of . . . Valentin

as an expert in crime scene forensic investigation, his

testimony was neither compelling nor enlightening. He

was not at the scene of the crime and did not examine

any of the actual physical evidence from the scene. He

also did not speak directly to anyone who was present

at the scene. In fact, from the best the court can determine, he only reviewed photographs and reports from

the crime scene, from which he generated opinions of

possible alternative meanings to the evidence or alternative avenues of investigation that he would have
advised defense counsel to pursue. What was wholly

lacking, however, were any concrete scientific or factual findings that undermined the jury’s determination

of guilt in this case.’’

We agree with the habeas court’s conclusion that the

petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by the

failure of his trial counsel to consult or hire a forensic

expert. At best, Valentin’s testimony provided thoughts

on how he would have investigated the crime scene.

With respect to the condition of the victim’s body,

Valentin’s testimony merely demonstrated that the body

may have been moved slightly, which is consistent with

the state’s theory that Browning and the petitioner

robbed the victim after he had been incapacitated.7 With

respect to the bloodstained footprint, Valentin testified

only that it might be relevant without explaining why.

Finally, with respect to the bloodstains in the victim’s

car, Valentin merely suggested that the car should have

been investigated and the person whose DNA matched

with one of the bloodstains should have been interviewed, but the petitioner did not provide any information concerning what evidence these two actions would

have unearthed.8 Further, although the petitioner

asserts that an expert could have given important information to his trial counsel, he failed to state how such

information would have impacted the case. None of the

petitioner’s evidence, especially in light of the court’s

determination that the expert’s testimony ‘‘was neither

compelling nor enlightening,’’ demonstrates a reasonable probability that, had trial counsel hired an expert,

the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. See Schuler v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,

200 Conn. App. 617.

Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish

prejudice and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion

by denying the petition for certification to appeal as to

this claim.

C

The petitioner’s final claim of ineffective assistance

is that his trial counsel failed to conduct a timely and

thorough investigation. Specifically, the petitioner argues

that his trial counsel should have followed up on the

police’s ‘‘handling of the victim’s car’’ and the bloodstains found inside the car. We address each specific

allegation separately.

1

The petitioner argues that his trial counsel should

have investigated what happened to the victim’s car

after it was in police custody and that, if his trial counsel

had done so, he would have discovered relevant information supporting the claim of inadequate police investigation and ‘‘thereby establish[ing] reasonable doubt.’’9

The respondent argues, inter alia, that this claim is not
reviewable because it was not (1) raised in the habeas

petition, (2) addressed in the petitioner’s posttrial brief,

and (3) addressed by the habeas court in its memorandum of decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. We agree with the respondent.

In the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleges that his trial counsel rendered deficient

performance because, inter alia, ‘‘[h]e failed to conduct

a timely and thorough investigation.’’ Although the petitioner specifically references the failure of his trial

counsel ‘‘to follow up on the information regarding the

bloodstain[s] on the seat[s] of the victim’s car that was

seized by the police at the time of the crime,’’ he did

not include any allegation that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate what happened to

the car after it entered police custody. In his posttrial

brief, the petitioner, with respect to the argument that

his trial counsel failed to conduct a timely and thorough

investigation, argued only that his trial counsel failed

to ‘‘pursue information regarding the bloodstains’’ and

failed to ‘‘pursue the issue of the blood swabbings.’’

Unsurprisingly, the habeas court did not address any

claim that the petitioner’s trial counsel should have

investigated the police’s ‘‘handling of the victim’s car.’’

‘‘It is well settled that this court does not consider

claims not raised in the habeas court.’’ Toles v. Commissioner of Correction, 113 Conn. App. 717, 730, 967 A.2d

576, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 906, 978 A.2d 1114 (2009);

see id., 729–30 (claim of ineffective assistance was not

reviewed because it was not included in operative petition or posttrial brief and was not ruled on by habeas

court). In addition, a claim is not reviewable when ‘‘not

raised sufficiently in the habeas court.’’ Id., 730; see also

id. (specific claim of ineffective assistance not reviewed

because habeas court considered only ‘‘broad allegation

concerning [attorney’s] ‘failure to investigate’ ’’). Further, ‘‘[i]t is well settled that this court is not bound to

consider any claimed error unless it appears on the

record that the question was distinctly raised at trial

and was ruled upon and decided by the court adversely

to the appellant’s claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Walker v. Commissioner of Correction, 176

Conn. App. 843, 857–58, 171 A.3d 525 (2017); see id.

(due process claim deemed abandoned because not

addressed in posttrial briefing and not addressed by

habeas court).

In the present case, given that this particular claim

was never distinctly raised before or addressed by the

habeas court, we decline to review this claim.

2

With respect to the petitioner’s claim that his trial

counsel ‘‘failed to follow up on information regarding

bloodstains on the seat[s] of the victim’s vehicle that

were seized by the police at the time of the crime,’’ the
habeas court determined that the petitioner failed to

make the required showing of prejudice.10 Specifically,

the court stated: ‘‘[T]he petitioner has failed to present

any evidence that the victim’s vehicle, or anything inside

of it, bore any material relationship to the crime. There

appears to be no dispute that the victim, [Browning,

and the petitioner] drove to the scene in an unrelated

vehicle, that the keys to the victim’s car were found

near his body, or that the victim’s car was locked when

the police later located it. Other than the fact that these

two blood samples were inside the victim’s vehicle, the

petitioner has provided no rational connection between

them and [the victim’s] murder. Finally, while Ferrer

was identified as the likely source of one of the bloodstains, the petitioner has provided no credible evidence

establishing when that sample was deposited in the car

or placing Ferrer even within the state of Connecticut

at the time of the crime. Therefore, even if the court

were to assume that counsel should have followed up

on this line of inquiry independently, the petitioner did

not suffer any prejudice, because the information is

irrelevant to the case.’’ (Footnote omitted.) The court

also emphasized that the petitioner’s own testimony at

the habeas trial ‘‘supports the irrelevance of anything

found inside of [the victim’s] car,’’ as the petitioner

never mentioned the victim’s car or any unknown individual in his testimony about the night of the murder.

On appeal, the petitioner argues that the bloodstains

inside the car were relevant because the police obtained

a warrant to inspect the car and had the bloodstains

tested for DNA, determining that the blood was not

the victim’s. Further, the petitioner asserts that it was

relevant because his forensic science expert testified

at the habeas trial that ‘‘who was in [the victim’s car]

with [the victim], what happened there, that’s all a matter for investigation.’’ The respondent argues that the

petitioner cannot show prejudice because he failed to

link the car and the bloodstains in it to the murder. We

agree with the respondent.

The petitioner’s argument requires us to assume that,

because the car was within the vicinity of the murder

and because the car had blood in it that matched with

someone in the CODIS system, it was somehow associated with the murder. Without more evidence, however,

we cannot so assume. Given the habeas court’s findings,

namely, that the victim arrived at the scene in a different

vehicle, the keys to the vehicle were found on the victim’s body, and the car was found locked, and given

the fact that the petitioner presented no evidence connecting Ferrer to the murder—in fact, the petitioner

presented no evidence about Ferrer whatsoever aside

from the ‘‘hit notification’’ that included his name—it

would be impossible to determine that, had the petitioner’s trial counsel followed up on the bloodstains and

subsequently procured the ‘‘hit notification,’’ the criminal trial could have had a different outcome. See Holley
v. Commissioner of Correction, 62 Conn. App. 170, 175,

774 A.2d 148 (2001) (‘‘The burden to demonstrate what

benefit additional investigation would have revealed is

on the petitioner. . . . [See] Nieves v. Commissioner

of Correction, [supra, 51 Conn. App. 624] (petitioner

could not succeed on claim of ineffective assistance on

basis of counsel’s failure to conduct proper investigation in absence of showing that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s failure to interview witnesses) . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)).

Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to prove that

he was prejudiced and, therefore, did not abuse its

discretion by denying the petition for certification to

appeal as to this claim.

IV

The petitioner next claims that his rights to due process and to a fair trial were violated by the prosecutor’s

failure to disclose material evidence that was favorable

to the defense in accordance with Brady v. Maryland,

supra, 373 U.S. 83. Specifically, he claims that the state

failed to disclose (1) exculpatory DNA evidence and

(2) a transcript from a separate criminal proceeding

that would have served as impeachment evidence. We

address each of the petitioner’s claims in turn.

A

The petitioner first claims that the state improperly

failed to provide the defense with ‘‘[e]vidence that another

convicted felon’s blood was in the car of the victim’’

in violation of Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83.

We disagree.

At the habeas trial, Bourke, the forensic examiner,

testified that the ‘‘hit notification,’’ which identified Ferrer as a DNA match with a sample taken from one of

the car seat bloodstains, was sent to the agencies that

investigated and prosecuted the crime, specifically, the

police department, the prosecutor, and the major

crimes unit. The habeas court determined that ‘‘[t]here

was no evidence that [the petitioner’s trial counsel] ever

received a copy of the hit notification form or that he

was aware of its existence.’’

In denying the petitioner’s amended petition for a

writ of habeas corpus, the habeas court determined that

‘‘the petitioner cannot establish a reasonable probability that this evidence would have had any impact on the

outcome of his case or the establishment of a defense

theory,’’ noting, ‘‘the petitioner has not established any

reasonable connection between the bloodstains on the

seat[s] and the victim’s murder, nor has he placed . . .

Ferrer near the scene of the crime.’’

On appeal, the petitioner argues that the DNA match

was material because ‘‘the fact that another person’s

blood was in the vehicle’’ ‘‘undermines [Browning’s]
version of the crime,’’ but he does not elaborate on how

this information undermines Browning’s account. The

respondent argues that ‘‘the petitioner has failed to

establish that the blood evidence was material,’’ as (1)

the blood was not at the crime scene but was in the

victim’s locked car some distance from the crime scene,

(2) the blood was dry, (3) the victim only recently had

purchased the car, and (4) the petitioner did not present

testimony from Ferrer nor did he present any evidence

linking Ferrer to the crime. We agree with the respondent.

We first set forth the standard of review applicable

to Brady claims. ‘‘As set forth by the United States

Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S.

87, [t]o establish aBrady violation, the [defendant] must

show that (1) the government suppressed evidence, (2)

the suppressed evidence was favorable to the [defendant], and (3) it was material [either to guilt or to punishment]. . . . Whether the [defendant] was deprived of

his due process rights due to a Brady violation is a

question of law, to which we grant plenary review.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryan, 193

Conn. App. 285, 315, 219 A.3d 477, cert. denied, 334

Conn. 906, 220 A.3d 37 (2019).

‘‘Under the last Brady prong, the evidence must have

been material to the case, such that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case

in such a different light as to undermine confidence in

the verdict. . . . The mere possibility that the undisclosed information might have helped the defense or

might have affected the outcome of the trial does not

meet the materiality standard. . . .

‘‘The favorable evidence must cast the whole case in

a different light. It is not enough for the defendant to

show that the undisclosed evidence would have allowed

the defense to weaken or destroy a particular prosecution witness or item of evidence to which the undisclosed evidence relates.’’ State v. Rosa, 196 Conn. App.

480, 503–504, 230 A.3d 677, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 920,

231 A.3d 1169 (2020); see id., 504, 506 (CODIS match

with DNA found on sweatshirt was not material because

there was no testimony that person who committed

crime was wearing sweatshirt, ‘‘the sweatshirt was not

found at the actual crime scene but more than half a

block away,’’ ‘‘[t]here [wa]s no evidence to indicate how

long the sweatshirt had been there or that it was even

present when the police first responded to the crime

scene,’’ there was no other evidence connecting

sweatshirt to crime, and petitioner could not connect

person identified in CODIS match to crime).

In the present case, we agree with the habeas court

that the petitioner has failed to show that the CODIS

match was material to his defense. The car that contained the bloodstains was not found at the crime scene

but on a nearby street. There is no evidence that the
victim or anyone else associated with the murder was

in or near the car that night. There is no evidence establishing how long the car had been parked there. There

is no indication that the victim’s murder is connected

to the victim’s car or that the blood was left during or

as a result of the murder—indeed, there was no evidence to suggest that the bloodstains occurred near the

time of the murder. Further, the petitioner presented

no evidence connecting Ferrer to the crime or the crime

scene. Finally, as the habeas court stated, ‘‘[t]he petitioner’s own testimony at the habeas trial supports the

irrelevance of anything found inside of [the victim’s]

vehicle. . . . Nowhere in his testimony did the petitioner reference anything to do with the [victim’s] vehicle, nor did he ever reference any ‘unknown male’ supposedly being in the vehicle with them or at the scene

of the shooting.’’

Thus, because the petitioner cannot establish a connection between the murder and the bloodstains, the

evidence of the CODIS match does not satisfy Brady’s

materiality test. See State v. Rosa, supra, 196 Conn.

App. 504;11 see also Carmon v. Commissioner of Correction, 114 Conn. App. 484, 492, 969 A.2d 854 (Counsel

was not deficient for failing to investigate cartridge box

that ‘‘was not found at the crime scene, and there was

no evidence as to when or how it was deposited in

the area . . . . The box was empty, the caliber of the

ammunition that had been contained in that box was

unknown, there was no eyewitness testimony that the

shooter had been seen taking cartridges from a box,

and there was no testimony or evidence linking that

box to the crime scene.’’ (Footnote omitted.)), cert.

denied, 293 Conn. 906, 978 A.2d 1108 (2009).

Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish

materiality and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion

by denying the petition for certification to appeal as to

this claim.

B

Finally, the petitioner claims that the state committed

a Brady violation by failing to disclose, as impeachment

evidence, certain testimony Browning gave in a separate, prior criminal trial, State v. Holbrook, Superior

Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CR-00-

0163353-T (Holbrook case). We agree with the respondent that this claim is unreviewable because the habeas

court correctly concluded that it was abandoned.

In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleged that his ‘‘due process rights in [the underlying criminal case] were violated because the state had

information that [Browning], the only witness who put

the petitioner at the scene of the crime, had previously

testified in [the Holbrook case]. . . . At that time

[Browning] admitted that he had lied under oath . . .
and said he would lie to protect himself. This information was not disclosed to trial or appellate counsel.’’

At the habeas trial, the petitioner sought to admit the

transcript of Browning’s testimony in the Holbrook case

as a full exhibit, but the court sustained the respondent’s objection.12 Following the trial, the petitioner

did not address the claim in his posttrial brief and,

therefore, presented no argument as to why the state’s

failure to provide the testimony violated his due process

rights. In its memorandum of decision, the court

deemed the claim abandoned, stating that ‘‘[t]he petitioner failed to address this issue at all in his posttrial

brief’’ and citing Walker v.Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 176 Conn. App. 856, to support its conclusion

that the claim was abandoned.

‘‘It is well settled that [w]e are not required to review

issues that have been improperly presented to this court

through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than

mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid

abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . Where a claim is asserted in the statement

of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention

in the brief without substantive discussion or citation

of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . .

These same principles apply to claims raised in the trial

court. . . .

‘‘[T]he idea of abandonment involves both a factual

finding by the trial court and a legal determination that

an issue is no longer before the court, [therefore] we

will treat this claim as one of both law and fact. Accordingly, we will accord it plenary review.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

As noted, in the present case the petitioner did not

address this claim in his posttrial brief and provided

no support for or reference to the claim in his habeas

petition. Furthermore, the petitioner has not contested

or addressed the court’s conclusion that the claim was

abandoned and has provided us with no reasons as to

why the habeas court erred in so finding. On these facts,

we conclude that the habeas court properly deemed

the claim abandoned.

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Practice Book § 23-36 provides that ‘‘[a] party may, consistent with the

rules of evidence, offer as an exhibit, or the habeas court may take judicial

notice of, the transcript and any portion of the Superior Court, Appellate

Court or Supreme Court record or clerk’s file from the petitioner’s criminal

matter which is the subject of the habeas proceeding.’’

2

In so ruling, the court stated: ‘‘I mean, here’s the thing, counsel—and I

get that there’s a Practice Book section. And I’ll put the record out this

way. You can submit—and I know the Practice Book section allows the

expanded record to be submitted. Here’s my view and I’ve written on this.

It is not my job as the judge to search through the evidence to find things

that support any lawyer’s claims. So, to the exten[t] you are admitting the

underlying record, you will still need to point the court to the parts of that

record that are relevant and you believe support the claims that you make
because otherwise I then step into the role of advocate or taking position

for one side or the other as opposed to somebody saying to me, ‘This

particular piece of evidence, Your Honor, supports my claim of X.’ So I

don’t know that I can stop you from saying I want the court as a matter of

record to consider the underlying trial record. But, to the extent you believe

any of that is relevant, you’re going to want to address it. . . . [A]nything

can be part of the record. What I’m telling is this is as I said it’s not the

court’s job to sift through the record to find things. So to the extent that

you’re entering the exhibits from the underlying trial, that’s great. Your job

is going to be this particular piece of evidence, Judge, is relevant to my

claim because X, not my job to look through the record and go, ‘Oh, this

is kind of neat; I think this is relevant,’ or ‘I think I should give them points

for this.’ That’s all I’m saying. So, the record is what it is, and the record’s

always going to be what it is. It’s counsel’s job to marshal that evidence

and to tell me how they are claiming it should be used. And just saying,

‘Here’s the record, Judge; I think the record as a whole supports my position.’

That’s not the court’s job.’’

3 Peter Valentin, a lecturer at the Forensic Science Department of the

University of New Haven, testified as a forensic science expert on the

petitioner’s behalf. The habeas court specifically determined that his testimony ‘‘was neither compelling nor enlightening.’’ See part III B of this opinion.

4

‘‘CODIS contains DNA profiles from unsolved crimes and compares them

to known samples from convicted felons that are periodically added to the

database. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 128 Conn. App. 846, 852–53 n.3, 19 A.3d

678, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 907, 32 A.3d 961 (2011).’’ State v. Rodriguez,

337 Conn. 175, 180 n.2, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).

5 Valentin specifically testified: ‘‘[I]n the photograph on the right side of

the image there is a large—there’s a collection of blood adjacent to a baseball

cap. That is inconsistent toward—it is not in the same position as the

decedent was found or as he’s photographed here. Additionally, there is a

smaller blood stain in the vicinity of the decedent’s left arm that also suggests

some movement after the injury occurred. And then there’s also some—

there are additional stains in the vicinity of that what I would call a linear

pattern near his arm that also are suggestive of movement.’’

6 Specifically, Valentin testified that he ‘‘would have suggested to [trial]

counsel that the distance that that bloodstain is from the cluster of activity

for lack of a better way of describing it where [the victim’s] body was

located suggests that that stain has relevance because my assessment would

be that there’s essentially two ways for that bloodstain to get there or there’s

two sources for that blood. Either that blood is [the victim’s] blood and it

has been brought to that location twenty some odd feet away from the

scene because it was on an object or that blood belongs to somebody who

was bleeding at a time recently because the snow would suggest temporally

when that would have occurred.’’

7

In discussing another claim, the habeas court noted that evidence regarding the condition of the victim’s body supported the state’s theory at trial

that the petitioner and Browning robbed the victim after he was killed.

8

In addition, this testimony did not take into account the fact that the

petitioner’s trial counsel was not informed about the DNA match to the

bloodstain; see part IV A of this opinion; nor did it contemplate the fact it

was undisputed that the car had been destroyed by the time trial counsel

started representing the petitioner.

9

In making this argument, the petitioner points to information that his

trial counsel would have discovered, had he conducted a ‘‘proper investigation.’’ The habeas court, however, excluded the evidence purporting to

establish what his trial counsel would have discovered. Although the petitioner notes in his principal appellate brief that ‘‘[i]nformation regarding

what happened to the victim’s car after it was impounded by the police was

improperly excluded,’’ he did not raise a claim of error with respect to this

ruling on appeal.

10 The court also determined that the petitioner failed to prove that his

trial counsel’s performance was deficient. Because we agree that the petitioner failed to prove prejudice, we need not consider the court’s determination concerning trial counsel’s deficient performance. See Schuler v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 200 Conn. App. 617.

11 The petitioner attempts to distinguish Rosa, arguing that the evidence

in the present case ‘‘was definitely connected to the crime’’ because the car

belonged to the victim while the sweatshirt in Rosa ‘‘was not connected to

the crime’’ and that the state’s case was not strong in the present case
while ‘‘there was strong evidence inculpating the defendant’’ in Rosa. These

arguments are unavailing.

First, the fact that the vehicle belonged to the victim is not enough to

connect it to the crime, as mere ownership and some proximity to the crime

scene do not in and of themselves implicate the vehicle’s involvement.

Second, the court in Rosa determined that the sweatshirt was not connected

to the case because of the collective facts. State v. Rosa, supra, 196 Conn.

App. 504, 509. Similarly, in the present case, the collective facts result in a

conclusion that the car is not connected to the case. Further, in Rosa, the

‘‘strong evidence inculpating the defendant’’ was only one factor of many

bearing on the determination that the sweatshirt was not material to the

case. Id., 509.

12 The petitioner has not raised on appeal a claim that the court erred in

excluding from evidence the transcript of Browning’s testimony from the

Holbrook case.