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Un ited S ta te s v . D e lis 1 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS 2 F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 3 4 Aug ust Term 2008 5 6 7 Argued: Novembe r 21, 2008 Dec ided: Marc h 5, 2009 8 9 10 Docke t No. 08-0641-c r 11 12

_____________________________________ 13 14 UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, 15 16 Appellee , 17 18 -v.- 19 20 PI ERRE DEL I S, 21 22 Defendant- Appellant

. 23

_____________________________________ 24 25 Be fore : McL AUGHL I N, CAL AB RESI , L I VI

NGSTON, Circuit Judges

. 26 27 Def

endant- Appellant Pierre Delis appea ls f rom a decision of the United States District Court 28 for the E astern D istrict of NewYork (Cog an, J. ) a ff ir mi nga jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n f or sim ple 29 assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (5) as made applicable to the s pecia l airc raf t jurisdiction 30 of

the Un ite d St a te s b y

49 U. S.C. § 4 65 06 (1 ) e nte re d by a Ma g ist rate Judg e fo llo wi nga

be nc h tr ia l. 31 Delis contends pr incipall y t h at t h e District Court erre d in concluding that an off ensive touching 32 constitutes simpl e assa ult even in the absence of any specific intent of t he perpetrator to injure the 33 victim of the crime. 34 Affir

med and r emande d.2 1 S Y L V IA S H W E D E R ( S u s an C o r

k e r y an d C ar o l ynP o k o r

n y, 2 Assistant United States Attorney s, of counsel), for B e n t o nJ. 3 Campbell, United States Attorney , Eastern Di strict of Ne w 4 York, B rookly n, NY, for Appellee

. 5 6 YUANCHU NG L EE, Fe dera l Defe nders of New Y ork, Inc., 7 New Y ork, NY, for Defendant-Appe llant

. 8 9 L I VI

NGSTON, Circuit Judge : 10 Def

endant- Appellant Pierre Delis appe als from a Fe bruar y 1, 2008 decis i o n o f the United 11 States District Court f or the Easter

n District of Ne w York ( Coga n, J. ) af firming the J uly

12, 2007 12 judgme nt of conviction for simple assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (5) a nd the associated 13 se nte nc e of

tim e se rv e d p lus a

$1 0 f ine e nte re d a ft e r a

be nc h tr ia l be fo re Ma g ist rate Judg e Joan

M. 14 Azrack. Th is a

pp e a l r a ise s th e qu est io n of whe the r s imp le a ssa ult , a s c ri min a lize d b y

18 U. S.C. 15 § 113(a) (5), include s an off ensive touching in the absence of any specific intent by the per petrator 16 to i nf

lic t in jur y up on the vic timof

the c ri me . B e c a

us e we c on c lud e that “si mpl e a ssa ult ,” a s u se d in 17 § 113(a) (5), incor porate s both of the common-lawcrimes of assault and batte ry , we h old that an 18 offe nsive touching does constitute simple assault reg ardle ss whether the perpe trator possesse d any 19 specific intent to injure. 20 21 BACK GR OUND 22 On September 24, 2006, Delis was a

passeng er a

boar d Americ an Airlines F light 65 fr om 23 Z ur ic h, Swi tze rl and , to JohnF . K e nn e dy Ai rp or t in Ne w Y or k Ci ty . Wh ile on

the fl ig ht, he be c a me 24 involved in a loud a nd ang ry alterc ation with f light attendant L ouisa Wil liams-Be auvil, during the 25 course of which it is undisputed that Delis, at the lea st, pushed t he flight attenda nt’s hand aw ay

from 26 his fa c e . Wh e n th e fl ig ht l and e d in Ne w Y or k C it y , Del is w a s arr e ste d. A c omp la int wa s in iti a lly3 1 filed cha

rg ing D elis with assaulting a fl ight c rewmember in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46504. 2 Sub se qu e ntl y , th e Go ve rnme nt fi le d a misd e me ano r inf or matio n ch arg ing De lis wi th s imp le a ssa ult 3 in v io lati o n o f 1 8 U

. S. C. § 1 1 3 ( a ) ( 5 ) a s ma d e a p p li c a b le to th e s p e c ia l a ir c r a f

t ju r is d ic ti o n o f

the 4 United States by

49 U.S.C. § 46506(1). 5 On M ar ch 7 , 2 0 0 7 , a b en ch t ri al re gar d i n g t h i s ch ar ge w as co n d u ct edb ef o re M agi s t ra t e Ju d ge 6 Azrack. A t trial, seve ra l witnesses, including both Delis and Will iams-B eauvil, g ave va rying 7 a c c ounts of the c on fr on tatio n that ne ve rt he le ss c on c ur

re d in ma jor re sp e c ts. Ap pr oximate ly

nin e ty 8 minutes into t he flig ht, Wi lliams-Be auvil beg an t o d is trib ute me a ls to the passeng ers. Ea ch passe ng er 9 was g iven an option of chicke n or beef

. Whil e some passeng ers, including Delis, wer e still waiting 10 for mea ls, the flight c rew ran out of chicken. After W illiams-Bea uvil informed Delis that no chicke n 11 re ma ine d, the y

be g an a dis c us sio n th a t qu ic kly

e sc a late d in to a

lou d a rgume nt. 12 Wil liams-Be auvil testified t hat Delis shouted obscenities a nd then struck he r. She indicate d 13 that the blo w land e d “ jus t un de r he r le ft br e a st. ” Ap p. 32

. Af te r be ing str

uc k, sh e in st inct ive ly 14 g ra

bb e d D e lis ’s c hin

and he the n p us he d h e r h and

awa y . N e sto r Qu e c uty , ano the r fl ig ht atte nd ant, 15 testified that he a pproac hed the pa ir when he hear d scre aming and that , at the time he ar rived, 16 Wil li ams-B eauvil and D elis were arguing a bout whether

Delis had c alled Willi ams-B eauvil an 17 offe nsive epithet. Fr om the aisle behind Delis’s seat, Que cuty observe d Wil liams-Be auvil place her 18 fing er a

bout ten inches fr om Delis’s face. Quecuty then s aw Delis, “with hi s rig ht arm and [an] open 19 hand, [take] a swing at” Williams-Bea uvil, making c ontact with her arm. Id. 104 . 20 Yet anothe r witness, a passe ng er, te stified that he obser ved De lis object when he lear ned that 21 Wil liams-Be auvil had no more chicke n. An ar g um en t ensued a nd g rewlouder. The passeng er 22 eventua lly

observe d Delis “push[] [W illiams-Bea uvil] backw ards.” Id. 121.We n ote that th e jud g me nt e rr on e ou sly state s th a t D e lis wa s c on vic te d und e r 4 2 U .S. C. 1 § 46504. As a re sult, and as is noted at the e nd of this opinion, we have de termined that re mand is appropriate for the purpose of corr ectingthis error.

4 1 Delis did not dispute that he had an arg ument with Wi lliams-Be auvil about the in-flig ht meal 2 c ho ic e . Rathe r, he c la ime d th a t Will iams- B e a uv il p oin te d h e r f

ing e r at him and th at he si mpl y 3 pushed her

hand aw ay

from his f

ace . I mmediately there afte r, he wa s restra ined by another member 4 of the flig ht cre w. Delis fur ther a sserted that he re mained ca lm throughout the r emainder of the 5 fl ig ht. 6 F oll ow ingthe c omp le tio n o f t e sti mony , th e Go ve rnme nt an d D e lis ’s c ouns e l de liv e re d th e ir 7 summations. Delis’s counsel contende d during his summation t hat Delis’s a ctions, as desc ribed by 8 the ma

jor ity of the te sti fy

ing wi tne sse s, we re “ c on sis te nt wit h an int e nt to g e t [Will iams- B e a uv il’ s] 9 arm out of his fac e and not a n attempt to injur[ e] or cause harm, whic h is a requir ement for assault.” 10 Id. 187. The Mag istrate Judge re s p o n d ed that “an of fensive c ontact” is a

proper predic ate f

or a 11 sim

ple a ssa ult , a sse rt ingfu

rt he r t hat sh e “ d[id ] not be lie ve that si mpl e a ssa ult re qu ir e s an in te nt t o 12 inflict injury ” and that, in this case , “[t] h er e [ wa s ] an intent – an intent to eng ag e in an of fensive 13 touching .” Id. 18 7- 88 , 1 93 . T he re a ft e r, th e Magi st rate Judg e fo un d D e lis g uil ty of sim ple a ssa ult , 14 noting that “ the Gover nment’s proof satisfie[d] the eleme nts of the crime of si mple assault.” Id. 207. 15 Following a sentenc ing hear ing, she enter ed a judgme nt imposing a sente nce of time served a

nd a 16 $10 fine. 1 17 Delis appe aled his convic tion to the United States District Court for the Ea stern District of 18 New Y ork, ar g uing that an intent to injure is a re quired e lement of simple assault. The District Court 19 reje cted this argument. Noting that, at common law, an assault could be committed by means of a5 1 completed battery , which did not require an intent to injure , the cour t determined that conviction for 2 sim

ple a ssa ult purs ua nt to 18 U. S.C. § 1 13 (a )( 5) do e s n ot r e qu ir e a sh ow ingof

any su c h s pe c if

ic 3 int e nt. Th e Di str ic t Court the n a ff ir me d D e lis ’s c on vic tio n, re lyingin p art ic ula r u po n th e Ma g istrate 4 J u d ge’ s fi n d i n g t h at De l i s h adp o s s es s edt h e i n t en tt o en gage i nan o ff en s i v e t o u ch i n g. 5 6 DI SCU SSIO N 7 The ba sic fede ral a ssault statute was initially enac ted as pa

rt of a g ener al over

haul of the 8 fede ral c riminal code in 1909. See Act of Ma r. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 2 7 6 , 3 5 S t at

. 1088, 1143 9 (cr iminaliz ing, inte r a lia , “[w]hoever shall assault anothe r with intent to co m m i t any felony ,” 10 “ [w]ho e ve r s ha ll unla wf ull y str ike , b e a t, o r w oun d

a n o the r, ” and

“ [w]ho e ve r s ha ll unla

wf ull y a ssa ult 11 ano the r” ). I t c ur

re ntl y pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art , th a t: 12 Who e ve r, wi thi n th e sp e c ia l ma ri tim e and te rr ito ri a l juri sd ic tio n of

the Un ite d St a te s, 13 is guil ty

of an a ssa ult sh a ll b e punis he d a s f

oll ow s: 14 15 (1) Assa ult with intent to c ommit murder , by imprisonment f or not mor e than 16 tw e nty y e ars . 17 18 (2) Assa ult with int ent to commit any felony , exc ep t murder or [sex ual 19 a

bu se ], by a fi ne un de r thi s title or imp ri so nme nt fo r not mor e tha n te n y e ars , 20 or both. 21 22 (3) Assa ult with a dan ger o u s we apon, with intent to do bodily harm, a nd 23 without just cause or excuse, by a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 24 more than te n y ear s, or both. 25 26 (4) Assa ult by st ri k i n g, beating , or wounding , by a fine under this title or 27 imprisonment for not more than six mont hs, or both. 28 29 (5) Si mple assault, by a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more 30 than six months, or both . . . . 31 32 18 U. S.C. § 1 13(a ); see also 49 U.S.C. § 46506(1) (extending the rea ch of § 113 to the “ specia l6 1 a ir c ra ft

jur isd ic tio n o f t

he Un ite d St a te s” ). I t is we ll e sta bli sh e d that the sp e c if

ic int e nt t o in

jur e is 2 not a

n element of “[a]ssault by striking, be ating , or wounding ” under § 113(a) (4). See U

nited States 3 v . M

ar tin , 5 36 F .2 d 5 35 , 53 5- 36 (2 d Cir

. 19 76 ) (p e r c ur iam)

. De lis argue s, ho we ve r, tha t th e sp e c if

ic 4 intent to injure or threaten is a required element of sim ple assault under § 113(a) (5). As this appe al 5 pr e se nts a

matte r o f s tatut or

y int e rp re tatio n, wh ic h is pure ly a qu e sti on of law, our re vie w i s de novo

. 6 See U

nited States v. Santos , 541 F.3d 63, 67 ( 2d Cir. 2008). 7 As alwa

y s, our ana ly sis “‘beg ins with the pl ai n l an guag e of the statute.’” Id. (quoting 8 Universal Church v. G eltzer , 463 F.3d 218, 223 ( 2d Cir. 2006)). S ec tion 113(a)( 5) cr iminaliz es 9 “[s] imple assault,” a te rm g rounded in the c ommon law. Where, a s here , a statute incor porate s 10 lang uag e with an a cce pted common-law definition, our construction of the statute is g uided by that 11 acc epted mea

ning a bsent a c lear

contra ry indication. See United States v. Shabani , 513 U.S. 10, 13 12 (1994). Give n t h at the common-lawcrimes of battery and assa ult were closely

interre lated, we 13 consider it nec essar y to examine the traditional definitions of both crimes in construing § 113(a )(5)

. 14 At common law, the c rime of battery consisted of “the unlawful application of force to the 15 person of another ,” including an offe nsive touching

. 2 Way ne R. L afa

ve, Substantive Criminal L aw 16 § 1 6. 2, a t 55 2 ( 2d e d. 20 03 ); see also 3 Wil liam Blac kstone, Commentaries on the L aws of E ng land 17 *120 (def

ining battery as “the unlawful be ating of anothe r” a nd noting that “ [t ]he least touching of 18 another ’s per son wilfully , or in ang er, is a battery ; for the law cannot draw the line betwee n differ ent 19 deg ree s of violence , and ther efor e totally prohibits the first and lowe st stage of it: every man’s per son 20 being sacr ed, and no othe r havinga rig ht to meddle with it, in any the slightest manne r”) . Common21 law b a tte ry

did no t r e qu ir e any

sp e c if ic int e nt e ith e r t o inj ur e or to t ou c h o ff

e ns ive ly , b ut r a the r o nly 22 a more g ener al intent to commit the unlawful ac t or, indeed, me re r eckle s sness or cr iminalWe note that the passag es of B lackstone quote d here in actually perta in to the common- 2 law torts of a ssault and batter y . Bla ckstone, howe ver, e x pressly define d the cr imes of assault and batte ry by re fe re nc e to t

he pr ivate tor

ts o f t he same na

me , n oti ngthat, i n g e ne ra l, t he same definitions are applicable in both context s. See 4 Wil liam Blac kstone, Commentaries *216-17. 7 1 neg lige nce. See 6A C.J .S. As sa ult § 85 (2008) ( descr i b i n g b at t ery as a “ g ener al intent crime” that 2 require s o n ly “ th e in te n ti o n a l p e r f o r ma n c e o f an u n la

w f u l a c t” an d n o ti n g th a t “ [w ]an to nand 3 rec kless conduct may substitut e for

. . . intentional conduct”) ; 2 L af av e, su pra , § 16.2, at 556 4 (“[B]attery may be committed by conduct amounting to c riminal neg lige nce which l ega l l y causes 5 an injury .”); Rollin M. P erkins, Non-Homicide O ffenses Against the Person , 26 B.U . L . Rev. 119, 6 126 (1946) ( “[T] he wor d ‘batter y ’ is applied to every punishable application of force to the per son 7 of anothe r . . . . [C] onviction of battery can be sup p o rt ed b y h ar m t o the per son resulting from 8 c ri min a l ne g lig e nc e .” ); cf. 2 J ames Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal L aw of

Eng land 9 112-13 (1883) (“[I ]n order that an a ct may amount to a cr ime the offe nder . . . must in all case s 10 intend to do the act whic h constitutes the crime.” ). 11 B y

c on tr a st, c omm on -l aw a ssa ult con sis te d o f e ith e r atte mpt e d b a tte ry or the de lib e rate 12 inf

lic tio n u po n a no ther of a reas on a

ble fe ar o f p hy sic a l in

jur y and is o ft e n d e sc ri be d a s a

sp e c if ic 13 intent crime. See 3 Bla ckston e, su pra , at *120 (de fining assault as “ an attempt or of fer to beat 14 another , without touching him: as if o n e l i ft s u p h i s cane , or his fist, in a threatening manner at 15 another ; or strikes at h i m , but misses him ”) ; 2 L aF ave, su pra , § 16.3, at 565-66, 568 (de scribing 2 16 a ssa

ult a s g e ne ra lly

c on sis tin g of

e ith e r “ an a tte mpt e d batte ry ,” wh ic h “ re qu ir e s an int e nt to c omm it 17 a b a tt e r y , ” o r th e d e libe rate causation of “re asonable appre hension of immediate bodily harm,” which 18 require s “intent to cause [such] a re asonable appre hension”). 19 The distinction betwee n assaul t an d battery , howeve r, has be en re g ularly elided. The two8 1 te r ms h a v e o f

te nb e e nu s e d

in te r c h an g eably

. See 2 L aF ave, su pr a , § 16.1, at 551 (“ [T] he wor d 2 ‘assa

ult’ is sometim es used loosely to inc lude a batter y . . . .”); Perkins, su

pra , a t1 1 9

- 2 0 & n . 1 ( “ It 3 is n ot unc omm on to de ta il the fa c ts co ns tit uti ng a batte ry in spe a kin g of an ass a ult

. . . . ” ); se e als o 4 Beausoliel v. United States , 107 F.2d 292, 296- 97 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (c oncl u d in g th at the common-la

w 5 definition of assault included a completed of

fensive se x ual touching reg ardle ss whethe r the 6 pe rp e tr a tor

a c te d w ithint e nt t o in

jur e ). Ad dit ion a lly , e ve n a s a fo rm a l matte r, a

batte ry ha s g e ne ra lly 7 been c onsidered to c onstitut e the suc cessf ul completion of, and therefor e necessar ily to include, an 8 assault. See Perkins, su pra , at 119-20 (“A battery includes an assault. . . . Henc e a de fenda nt may be 9 c on vic te d o f a ssa

ult a lth ou g h th e e vid e nc e sh ow s a lso a batte ry .” ); se e als o Pe op le v . H e ise , 20 P.2d 10 31 7, 31 8 ( Ca l. 1 93 3) (“ B a tte ry inc lud e s ass a ult ; in fa c t, batte ry is a

c on summate d a ssa

ult . A ssa ult 11 is, the ref

ore, nece ssarily

included in batter

y .”); State v. He

fner , 155 S.E. 879, 880-81 (N.C. 1930) 12 (discussing a statute c riminaliz ing “assault[] . . . inflict[i ng ] serious injury not resulting in de ath” a

nd 13 noting that, a lthough “ [a] n ‘assa ult’ i s an off

er or attempt by

forc e or violenc e to do injury [,]

. . . 14 e ve ry

batte ry inc lud e s an a ssa

ult [an d] an a ssa

ult inf lic tin g se ri ou s in

jur y ne c ess ari ly im plie s a 15 battery”). Eve n at common law, then, a completed battery , perf ormed with only

a g ener al intention 16 to perfor

m the unlawful act or even me re c riminal neg lige nce, a lso constituted an assault. Care ful 17 e xami na

tio n of the c omm on -l aw de fi nit ion of a ssa ult the re fo re su

pp or ts the c on c lus ion

that si mpl e 18 assault, as used in § 113(a)( 5), includes c ompleted common-lawbattery , which did not require a 19 specific intent to injure. 20 We find further support for this interpre tation of § 113(a) (5) in th e b ro ad er statutory 21 str

uc tur e . Pa ra g ra ph s ( 1) thr ou g h ( 3) of

§ 1 13 (a ) e a c h e xpre ssl y

re qu ir e a pa rt ic ula r s pe c if ic int e nt. 22 See 18 U. S.C. § 1 13 (a )( 1) -( 3) (r e qu ir ingre sp e c tiv e ly “ int e nt t o c omm it mur de r, ” “ int e nt t o c omm itWe note that the orig inally enac ted ver sion of this prohibiti on did not use the term 3 “assa ult,” but rather

punished “[w]hoever shall unlawf ully strike, bea

t, or wound anothe r.” See Act of Ma

r. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 276, 35 Stat. 1088, 1143. 9 1 any

felony ,” and “ intent to do bodily harm” ). B y

contra st, paragrap h s (4 ) and ( 5) conta in no such 2 require ment. I n Ma rti n , th is C ourt re lie d u po n th is d ist inc tio n a lon e to c on c lud e that § 1 13 (a )( 4) did 3 not require that the per petrator possess the spec ific intent to injure. See 536 F.2d at 535-36. 4 I n a dd iti on , th e fe de ra l c ri min a l c od e la c ks any statut e ana log ou s to § 1 13 re fe rr inge xpre ssl y 5 to battery . The other provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 113, the only statute within the fede ral c riminal code 6 to addre ss either a ssault or b at t er y in a g ener al sense, spe ak only in terms of assa

ult. Granted, § 7 11 3( a )( 4) , w hic h c ri min a li z es “[a ]ssa ult by str iki ng , b e a tin g , o r w ound ing ,” pla inl y re a c he s so me 8 fo rm s o f b a tte ry . Ye t th is s e c tio n is re str ic te d by its langua g e to co nd uc t in vo lvi ngpa

rt ic ula r a c ts 3 9 of violence , s pecif ically “striking , beating , or wounding .” Cf. Webster’s Third Ne w International 10 Dictionary

of the Eng lish L anguag e Una bridg ed 2262 (2002) (def ining “ strike” a s, i n t e r

a lia , “ to 11 deliver or aim a stroke, blow, or thrust”). As a result, it doe s not r eac h a wide vari et y o f c o n duct 1 2 t ra d i t i o n al l y

en co mp as s edwi t h i nt h e d ef i n i t i o n o f co m m o n -l aw b at t ery , s u ch as grap p l i n g, s h o v i n g, 13 wre stling, off

ensive touching , or more subtle c onduct s uch as poisoning, a nd there fore § 113(a) (4) 1 4 i s m o r e r e a s o n a

b l y i n t e r p r e t e d a s f u rt h e r p r o s c r i b i n g a s u

b s e t o f t h e c o n d

u c t a l s o c r i m i n a l i z e d

b y § 1 5 1 1 3 ( a ) ( 5 )

. B e c a

u s e w e f in d it e xc e e d in g ly

im p la u s ib le th a t C o n g r e s s in te n d e d to c r im in a li ze 16 common-law a ssault, which was partially composed of attempted battery , but not battery itself, we 17 conclude that § 113(a) (5) is more se nsibl y interpre ted as c riminaliz ing c ompleted common-law 18 batte ry , in

a dd iti on to u ns uc c e ssf ul atte mpt e d b a tte ry

and the int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f a re a so na ble 19 a pp re he ns ion

of phy sic a l ha

rm .10 1 As § 113(a) (4) a nd 113(a) (5) c arr

y t h e s am e s entenc e, a statutory construction dee ming 2 § 1 13 (a )( 4) to cri mi nal ize me re ly a su bs e t of the c on du c t c ri min a lize d b y § 1 13 (a )( 5) wo uld 3 ordinarily

be proble matic as it wo u l d rende r § 113(a )(4) superf luous. See U

nited States v. Santos , 4 12 8 S. Ct. 20 20 , 2 02 8 n .6 (2 00 8) (p lur a lity op ini on ). Th e app aren t su pe rf lui ty c re a te d b y

thi s 5 interpre tation, however , did not a rise under § 113 as orig inally enac ted. The pr ecur sor to § 113(a) (5) 6 car

ried a maxi mum sentence of only three months wherea s the prede cessor to § 113(a) (4) carr ied the 7 curr ent maxim um sentence of six months. See Act of Ma r. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 276, 35 Stat. 1088, 8 1143. This differ ence in potential sentence was pre serve d throug h a si g nificant reorg anization of the 9 fede ral c riminal code. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 113, 62 Stat. 683, 689. The maximum 10 sentenc e for

a violation of § 113(a )(5) was ra ised to six months o n l y b y a 1994 amendment. See 11 Violent Crime Control and L aw Enf orce ment Act of 1994, Pub L . No. 103-322, sec . 320101(c) (2), 12 108 Stat. 1796, 2108. I n its orig inal form, then, the predece ssor to § 113(a) (4) affor ded additional 13 punishment to an evidently more ser ious subset of batteries and was in no way superf luous under the 14 construction adopte d here

. 15 Un ite d S

tates v . Ch esta ro , 197 F .3 d 6 00 (2 d Ci r. 19 99 ), on wh ic h D e lis re lie s h e a vil y , is a lso 16 not contrar

y to our conc lusion reg ardingthe prope r construc tio n o f § 1 1 3 (a )(5) . I n Che sta ro , th is 17 Court noted that the term “ simple assault,” as use d in both 18 U.S.C . §§ 111 and 113(a )(5) , 18 “ ‘e mbr a c e [s] the c omm on law m e anin g ’” of

a ssa ult , 1 9 7 F. 3 d a t 6 0 5 (q u o t i n g United States v. 19 Ste war t , 5 68 F .2 d 5 01 , 5 04 (6 th Cir . 1 97 8) ), wh ic h it c ha ra c te ri zed a s “ ‘e ith e r a

wi llf ul atte mpt

to 20 inflict injury

upon the per son of another , or . . . a thre at to inflict injury upon the per son of another 2 1 whi c h , w h e n c o u p le d w it h an a p p ar e n t p r e s e n t a

b il it y , c a u s e s a r e a s o n a

b le a p p r e h e nsion of 22 immediate bodily harm,” id. (q u o t i n g United States v. J ohnson , 637 F.2d 1224, 1242 n.26 (9th Cir.When Che sta ro wa s d e c ide d, § 1 11 pr ov ide d, in p e rt ine nt p art : 4 (a) I n g ener al. – Whoever – (1) f orcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interf ere s with any person de signated in [18 U.S .C. § 1114] while eng ag ed in or on acc ount of the per formanc e of of ficial duties . . .

. . . shall, where the ac ts in viol ation of this section constitute only simple assault, be fi ne d und e r t

his tit le or

imp ri so ne d n ot m or e tha n o ne y e ar, or

bo th, and in a ll other c ases, be fined unde r this titl e or imprisoned not more than three y ear s, or both. (b ) E nh anc e d p e na lty . –

Who e ve r, in t

he c omm iss ion

of any a c ts d e sc ri be d in subsection (a ), uses a

deadly or dang erous we apon (inc luding a wea pon intended to cause death or

dang er but that fa ils to do so by rea son of a de fec tive component) or

inflicts bodily

injury , shall be fined unde r this titl e or imprisoned not more than ten y ear s, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1994 & Supp. I I I1997) (since amende d). Section 1114, in turn, desig nates a s protec ted par

ties all “off

icer [s] or employ ee[s] of the United States or of a ny ag ency in any branc h of the United States Gove rnment.” Id. § 1114. 11 1 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Schmuc k v. United States , 489 U.S. 705 (1989)). We fur ther 2 note d

th a t “ s im

p le a s s a u lt , . . . in

a c c o r d w it h th e c o mm o n - la

w d e f in it io n , d o e s n o t i n v olve 3 touching .” Id. at 606. 4 I n Che

sta ro , h ow e ve r, thi s Co ur t w a s c on sid e ri ngon ly

a vo id- fo r- va g ue ne ss c ha lle ng e to 5 § 1 11 , w hic h, a t th e tim e , p re sc ri be d d if fe re nt s e nte nc ingra

ng e s f or a ssa ult s o n f e de ra l offic ia ls 6 wher e the unlaw ful ac t “consti t u t e[d] only simple assault,” “a ll other ca ses” of assault on fe dera l 7 officia ls, and assaults on fe dera l officials whe re the perpe trator “ use[d] a dea dly or dang erous 8 wea

pon . . . or inflict[ed] bodi ly injury .” 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1994 & Supp. I I I 1997) (since amende d). 4 9 A sentenc ing pr ovision is unconsti tutionally vague “if [i t] do[es] not state with sufficient c larity theThis interpretation was expressly adopted by

Congr ess in a re cent amendment to § 111. 5 See Court Security

I mprovement Ac t of 2007, Pub L . No. 110-177, sec . 208(b), 121 Stat. 2534, 2538. 12 1 conseque nces of

violating a

g iven cr iminal statute.” United St ates v. Batche lder , 442 U.S. 114, 123 2 (1979). The Chestaro Court wa s th us c on str uin g a dif fe re nt statut or

y pr ov isi on fo r t

he so le purp os e 3 of addr essi n g whether it delineated a

sufficie ntly

clea r categ ory

of conduc t rising a

bove that 4 constituting “only simple assault” but define d other than by the use of w eapons or

the infliction of 5 bodily

injury . The Court re asonably conclude d that this categ ory consisted of a ssault where contac t 6 was made

. Se e Che sta ro , 197 F.3d at 605-06. The Chestaro Court was not ca lled upon to determine 5 7 wh e the r c on du c t f a lli ngint o th is h e ig hte ne d c ate g or y c ou ld a lso c on sti tut e sim ple a ssa ult

. 8 Additionally , the use of the phrase “ o n ly s i m p l e as sault” in § 111, id. (empha sis added), 9 strong ly

su gges t s t h at co n d

u ct fa l l i n g wi t h i nt h e d ef

i n i t i o no f t h e h ei gh t en edca t ego ry al s o constitutes 10 simple assault. Section 111 contains no languag e sug g esting otherw i s e. The Chestaro Court thus 11 conclude d only

that conduct in which the perpe trator a ctually makes c ontact with the victim (a 12 cate g ory

of cr i m es t h at m ay

also be de scribed a s common-law batteries) c onstitut es a c lass of 13 assaultive beha

vior beyond simple assault alone for the purposes of

§ 111. Chestaro does not 14 descr ibe the prope r construc tion of simple assault f or the purposes of § 113. Moreove r, it is best rea d 15 as nec essar ily

imply ing that the broa d cate g ory of simple assault in bo th §§ 111 and 113 subsumes 1 6 b o t h c o m m o n - l aw a s s a u l tan d c o m m o n - l aw b a t t e r

y. 17 Finally , we note that our conc lusion is i n acc ord with the dec isions of severa l of our sister 18 Circuits interpretingsimple assault, as used in § 113(a )(5) , to encompass c ompleted common-law 19 battery

which, as note d above, doe s not require a spec ific intent to injure. See U nited States v.13 1 Lewellyn , 481 F.3d 695, 697- 99 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that simple assault includes spitting on 2 ano the r) ; United States v. W hitefeather , 2 75 F .3 d 74 1, 74 2- 43 (8 th Cir

. 20 02 ) ( ho ldi ngthat si mpl e 3 a ssa

ult inc lud e s uri natin g on

anoth e r) ; United States v. Bay es , 210 F.3d 64, 68- 69 (1st Cir. 2000) 4 (d e te rm ini ng that simpl e a ssa ult inc lud e s unw ante d s e xua l to uc hin g ); United States v. W illiams , 197 5 F .3 d 1 09 1, 10 96 (1 1th Cir . 1 99 9) (s a me ); see also Kee ble v. United States , 412 U.S. 205, 213 (1973) 6 (i nd ic a tin g t hat “ an in te nt t o c omm it serious bo dil y inj ur y ” is n ot a

n e le me nt o f s imp le a ssa ult 7 (empha sis added))

. 8 9 CO NC LU SION 10 We have co n s i d er ed al l of De lis’s contentions in this appea l and have found them to be 1 1 w i t h o u t m e r i t

. F o r t h e r e a s o n s d e s c r i b e d

h e r e i n , w e c o n c l u d e t h a tc o mp l e t e d c o m m o n - l aw b a t t e r

y, 12 including of

fensive touc hing, f

alls within the definition of t he term “simple assault” a s used in 18 13 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5) . As common-law battery did not require spe cific intent t o injure, we further 14 conclude that conviction under § 113(a) (5) f

or conduc t constituti ng common-law battery does not 15 re qu ir e any

fi nd ingof

sp e c if ic int e nt to inj ur e . As a re su lt, the Ma g ist rate Judg e ’s fi nd ingthat D e lis 16 possessed the intent to commit an offe nsive touching was entirely sufficie nt to support the judg ment 1 7 o f c o n v i c t i o n . T h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c tC o u rti s a c c o r d i n g l y AF F IRM ED . We REMAND for 18 the so le purp os e of a me nd ingthe jud g me nt t o in dic a te that D e lis wa s c on vic ted un der 18 U. S.C. 19 § 113(a) (5).