RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3774-21

G.M.T., 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

 

v.

D.C.T., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

__________________________

Submitted November 27, 2023 – Decided January 11, 2024 

Before Judges Gilson and DeAlmeida. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, 

Docket No. FV-03-2360-20.

Jacobs & Barbone, PA, attorneys for appellant (Louis 

Michael Barbone, on the brief). 

Fuhrman & Edelman, attorneys for respondent (Ronald 

B. Edelman, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3774-21

Defendant D.C.T.1 appeals from a June 30, 2022 final restraining order 

(FRO) entered against him by the Family Part pursuant to the Prevention of 

Domestic Violence Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We affirm. 

I.

 The following facts are derived from the record. In March 2021, plaintiff 

G.M.T. and D.C.T. were in the process of obtaining a divorce. They had twin 

children who were then eleven years old. The couple and their children lived 

together. 

 On March 14, 2021, D.C.T. was charged with several criminal offenses 

based on allegations that he punched and strangled his son. As a result of a court 

order prohibiting contact with his son, D.C.T. moved out of the marital 

residence. 

 After a series of incidents involving D.C.T.'s presence at the marital 

property without G.M.T.'s consent, G.M.T. filed a domestic violence complaint, 

which resulted in the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). 

 On February 3, 2022, the parties executed a consent order in which G.M.T. 

agreed to dismissal of the TRO. The consent order, which was approved by the 

1

 We use initials to preserve the confidentiality of court records concerning a 

domestic violence matter. R. 1:38-3(d)(9). 
3 A-3774-21

court, provides that all communications between the parties regarding the 

children shall be by text message only, except in an emergency. In addition, the 

consent order provides that G.M.T. shall have exclusive use of the marital 

residence and property and that D.C.T. "shall stay away from and is prohibited 

from entering the marital residence or the property of the marital residence . . . 

without prejudice as to the issue of pick-up and drop-off if and when [D.C.T.] 

is granted parenting time with the minor children. This issue will be readdressed at that time." 

 On May 18, 2022, D.C.T. resolved the criminal charges arising from the 

assault of his son by pleading guilty to a disorderly person's offense. At the 

time, he was ordered to have no contact with G.M.T., except as permitted by 

order of the Family Part. 

Ten days later, on May 28, 2022, G.M.T. filed a domestic violence 

complaint and TRO against D.C.T. She alleged that he committed the predicate 

act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, on May 28, 2022, by "contacting [G.M.T.] 

about their children" and being present at the marital property in violation of the 

consent order.2

2

 The complaint and TRO were subsequently amended administratively. The 

allegations supporting G.M.T.'s claim that D.C.T. committed harassment were 

not substantively changed. 
4 A-3774-21

After hearing testimony from both parties and viewing a video recording 

of their May 28, 2022 encounter at the marital property, the court found: 

On May 28th of 2022, while visiting a neighbor, 

[D.C.T.] saw his son playing lacrosse outside by 

himself on his property and he went to speak to his son. 

He testified that he has not seen his son in over a year 

and his son, upon seeing [D.C.T.], had run into the

house to apparently speak to his mother. 

When [G.M.T.] walked outside to see what was going 

on, she recorded [D.C.T.] standing outside his truck 

with his arms resting on the door facing her and 

[G.M.T.] told [D.C.T.] to get out of there and [D.C.T.] 

said to [G.M.T.] twice . . . "What? I'm allowed to stop 

and say hi to my children." 

[A]nd then he said, "Are you telling me I can't stop and 

say hi to my children?" 

 

The court continued: 

Here, the [c]ourt can conclude that while [D.C.T.'s] 

initial purpose in stopping may have been to say hi to 

his son that he has not seen in over a year, after his 

purpose was thwarted, [D.C.T.] chose to continue to

stand outside his vehicle. 

 The court made findings with respect D.C.T.'s intent on May 28, 2022 

after considering the 2021 acts by D.C.T. that formed the basis of G.M.T.'s first 

domestic violence complaint. The court, which heard testimony about these 

prior acts, found that 
5 A-3774-21

[w]hile this event in and of itself may not seem to

amount to anything, when viewed in light of the history, 

which is necessary, particularly in cases that allege 

harassment, where in determining whether a 

defendant's conduct is likely to cause annoyance and/or 

alarm, the defendant's past conduct towards the victim 

and the history of the relationship must be taken into 

account. 

. . . . 

There is nothing in the [c]ourt's viewing of the video 

that suggests that [D.C.T.] was making any attempt to 

leave. He stayed outside his vehicle to make his point 

with [G.M.T.] that he is there for . . . her to see him and 

the [c]ourt can conclude it was done with the purpose 

to harass because [D.C.T.] knew that by [G.M.T.] 

seeing him on the property, in light of the history, he 

intended to seriously annoy, meaning to vex, to worry, 

to trouble, to offend. 

Even his engagement with [G.M.T.] where he stated 

twice that he is allowed to be there to say hi to his 

children is said with the purpose to harass. That no 

matter what the documents may be out there dictating 

otherwise, he is still in control. 

[D.C.T.] knows he is not permitted to be there and even 

conceded to the [c]ourt that he knew what he did was 

wrong and by engaging in that confrontation with 

[G.M.T.] it punctuates his need to be in control of her 

whereabouts, her movements, and her ability to keep

away from him. 

 With respect to prior history, the court found that in 2021, after D.C.T. 

left the marital residence because he had been ordered to have no contact with 
6 A-3774-21

his son, D.C.T. returned to the property several times. On one occasion, the 

court found, D.C.T. placed a padlock on a barn in which lawn care equipment 

was stored and did not give G.M.T. a key to that lock. The court found that 

D.C.T. intended to deprive G.M.T. of access to the equipment necessary to 

maintain the property. 

The court also found that a short time later, despite a letter from G.M.T.'s 

counsel to D.C.T.'s counsel warning against any additional entry on the property, 

G.M.T. came upon D.C.T. in the barn after she cut the padlock to gain access to 

a screwdriver. That encounter was recorded by the parties. Having viewed the 

recordings, the court found that D.C.T.'s "tone" when 

telling [G.M.T.] that he recorded the event, falsely 

stating that she broke into her own shed to intimate that 

he may use this against her is harassing and is done to 

control her. 

It is intended to drive home to her that he is still in 

control of her by doing whatever he wants to do, even 

when he's well aware that he is not to engage in that 

behavior, and even when [G.M.T.'s] lawyer reminds 

him of that by way of a letter, he still does it. 

The court also addressed a video recording of D.C.T. peering through the 

backdoor of the marital residence on another occasion in 2021 when G.M.T. was 

not home. The court rejected as "disingenuous" and "not credible" D.C.T.'s 

claim that he was at the door to determine if G.M.T. had changed the locks. The 
7 A-3774-21

court also found that in 2021, D.C.T. constructed a hunting stand facing the 

home ten feet off the marital property in an adjacent State forest. The court, 

noted that the stand did not face the woods, where D.C.T. might be expected to 

hunt, and was instead intended for him to "maintain[] control over" G.M.T. and 

to "check[] up on her" by viewing the marital residence and property. 

 Based on the totality of these events, the court concluded that G.M.T. 

established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's conduct on May 

28, 2022, was intended to annoy and alarm her and constituted harassment.3

 With respect to G.M.T.'s need for protection from immediate danger or 

further abuse, the court found that an FRO was warranted in light of the ongoing divorce action, the need to facilitate D.C.T.'s reunification with the 

children, D.C.T.'s disregard of the consent order, and the children's best 

interests. The court found that without an FRO, G.M.T. would be in danger of 

a recurrence of domestic violence. The court entered an FRO on June 30, 2022. 

 This appeal followed. D.C.T. makes the following argument. 

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT [D.C.T.'S] 

INITIAL PURPOSE WAS NOT TO HARASS, WAS 

THEN SUBJECTED TO THE COURT'S 

3

 The court made no findings with respect to G.M.T.'s allegation that D.C.T. 

committed harassment by contacting her about the children. That allegation 

appeared to be based on text messages D.C.T. sent G.M.T. about reunification 

therapy with the children, which are permitted by the consent order. 
8 A-3774-21

MISAPPLICATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF 

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) BY DIVINING [D.C.T.'S] 

ULTIMATE INTENT TO HARASS FROM NONCOMMUNICATIVE AND SURREPTITIOUS 

ENTRIES ONTO THE PROPERTY THAT WERE SIX 

MONTHS AND ELEVEN MONTHS STALE. 

II. 

 "In our review of a trial court's order entered following trial in a domestic 

violence matter, we grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of 

fact and legal conclusions based upon those findings." D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. 

Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-

12 (1998)). We should not disturb the "'factual findings and legal conclusions 

of the trial judge unless [we are] convinced that they are so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably 

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 

(alteration in original) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 

N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Deference is particularly appropriate when the evidence 

is testimonial and involves credibility issues because the judge who observes the 

witnesses and hears the testimony has a perspective the reviewing court does not 

enjoy. Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988) (citing Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. 

Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1961)). 
9 A-3774-21

 The entry of an FRO requires the trial court to make certain findings. See 

Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). The court "must 

determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible 

evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

19[(a)] has occurred." Id. at 125. The court should make this determination "'in 

light of the previous history of violence between the parties.'" Ibid. (quoting 

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402). Next, the court must determine "whether a restraining 

order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)](6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to 

prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)); see also J.D. v. 

M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011). This determination requires evaluation of: 

(1) The previous history of domestic violence 

between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, 

harassment and physical abuse; 

(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or 

property; 

(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and 

defendant; 

(4) The best interest of the victim and any child; 

(5) In determining custody and parenting time the 

protection of the victim's safety; and 
10 A-3774-21

(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection 

from another jurisdiction. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a); see also Cesare, 154 N.J. at

401.] 

 Here, the trial court determined that D.C.T. committed harassment, one of 

the predicate acts set forth in the Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13). As applicable 

here, a person commits harassment if, "with purpose to harass another," he or 

she "[e]ngages in any . . . course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed 

acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person." N.J.S.A. 

2C:33-4(c). 

 For a finding of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, the actor must have 

the purpose to harass. Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 249 (App. Div. 

1995) (citing D.C. v. T.H., 269 N.J. Super. 458, 461-62 (App. Div. 1994); E.K. 

v. G.K., 241 N.J. Super. 567, 570 (App. Div. 1990)). Finding a party had the 

purpose to harass must be supported by "some evidence that the actor's 

conscious object was to alarm or annoy; mere awareness that someone might be 

alarmed or annoyed is insufficient." J.D., 207 N.J. at 487 (citing State v. Fuchs, 

230 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 1989)). A purpose to harass may be inferred 

from the evidence. Common sense and experience may also inform a 
11 A-3774-21

determination or finding of purpose. State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997) 

(citing State v. Richards, 155 N.J. Super. 106, 118 (App. Div. 1978)). 

 We have carefully reviewed the record and find that it contains sufficient 

support for the trial court's conclusion that D.C.T. committed the predicate act 

of harassment on May 28, 2022. D.C.T. admits that he drove onto the marital 

property, which he acknowledges was a violation of the consent order. D.C.T. 

claims that his intent in violating the order was to say hello to his son. The video 

recording of his encounter with G.M.T., however, depicts his defiant, and 

plainly incorrect, declarations that he is entitled to enter the marital property at 

will to visit his children. The consent order, of which D.C.T. was aware, 

unequivocally prohibits him from entering the marital property and states that

the question of his entry on the property to pick-up or drop off his children would 

be addressed by the court if and when he is granted parenting time. No order 

granting D.C.T. parenting time with his children was entered prior to March 28, 

2022. Nothing in the record supports D.C.T. purported belief that he had a right 

to drive his truck onto the marital property and greet his son. 

The record also supports the trial court's determination that D.C.T., once 

confronted by G.M.T., made no movement to leave the marital property, 

evidencing his intent to annoy and alarm G.M.T. Although D.C.T.'s brief argues 
12 A-3774-21

that when G.M.T. "told [D.C.T.] to leave, he did," the video recording depicts 

the opposite. When G.M.T. directed D.C.T. to leave the property, he stood by 

his truck, repeatedly said he was allowed "to stop by to say hi to my children," 

held up his cellphone, presumably to start recording the encounter, and stated 

"are you telling me I can't do" before the video created by G.M.T. stopped. 

There is ample support for the court's conclusion that D.C.T.'s initial refusal to 

leave the marital property and his hostile responses to G.M.T. were intended to 

alarm and annoy her and constituted harassment. 

 We also find no error in the trial court's consideration of D.C.T.'s prior 

surreptitious entries onto marital property when it concluded that his purpose on 

May 28, 2022, was to harass G.M.T. The record contains credible evidence that 

D.C.T. repeatedly engaged in conduct designed to alarm and annoy G.M.T., 

including locking her out of a barn that contained equipment necessary to 

maintain the marital property, confronting G.M.T. with a baseless accusation of 

theft, peering into her home, and erecting a hunting stand facing G.M.T.'s home 

just ten feet from the property line. The record establishes a prolonged course 

of conduct by D.C.T. designed to demonstrate his defiant presence at the marital 

property in order to alarm and annoy G.M.T. The trial court properly considered 

the May 28, 2022 event in context with D.C.T.'s past behavior. 
13 A-3774-21

To the extent we have not specifically addressed D.C.T.'s remaining 

claims, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed.