J-A11045-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DAVID CHARLES BEAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 603 MDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-41-CR-0001226-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: MAY 29, 2024

David Charles Bean (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order 

dismissing his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

On September 13, 2016, a jury convicted Appellant of rape of an 

unconscious person,1 and numerous related offenses. On March 20, 2017, 

the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 18 to 36 years in prison. 

This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence; on January 31, 2019, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth 

v. Bean, 194 A.3d 721, 1320 MDA 2017 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished 

memorandum), appeal denied, 201 A.3d 159 (Pa. 2019). 

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(3).
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On June 25, 2019, Appellant filed, pro se, his first timely PCRA petition. 

Following appointment of counsel, Appellant filed an amended petition. The 

PCRA court dismissed his petition without a hearing on June 2, 2020. This 

Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief; on December 7, 2021, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth 

v. Bean, 258 A.3d 544, 866 MDA 2020, appeal denied, 268 A.3d 1078 (Pa. 

2021).

On April 28, 2022, Appellant filed, pro se, the underlying PCRA petition. 

On November 29, 2022, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss 

the petition without a hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant 

requested, and the PCRA court granted, an extension of time to respond to 

the court’s notice. Appellant filed his response on March 7, 2023. On March 

13, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 21, 2023, more than 30 days later. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (a notice of appeal “shall be filed within 30 days after 

the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”). 

On April 26, 2023, the PCRA court entered an order directing Appellant 

to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Order, 4/26/23, 

at 1. Appellant did not file a Rule 1925(b) statement.2 On July 21, 2023, the 

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2 Generally, “only issues properly raised in a timely Rule 1925(b) statement 

are preserved for appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 311 A.3d 

12, 17 (Pa. Super. 2024). However, the official docket entry reflects the April 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion, wherein the court relied on its March 

13, 2023, order and opinion dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

On May 16, 2023, this Court issued a rule upon Appellant to show cause 

why we should not quash the appeal as untimely. On May 25, 2023, Appellant 

filed a response alleging the Lycoming County Clerk of Courts erroneously 

mailed the order dismissing his PCRA petition to the state correctional 

institution’s (SCI) clearinghouse in Florida. See Response, 5/25/23, at 1-2 

(averring the court’s order was treated as “regular” mail instead of “legal” 

mail, and, as a result, prison staff had to forward the order to SCI-Benner, 

where Appellant is incarcerated). 

Appellant invoked the prisoner mailbox rule. See id. at 3; see also 

Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(“Under the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem a pro se document filed on the 

date it is placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing.”). Appellant 

alleged he did not use a prison “cash slip” because he had a “free” mailing

envelope, and “SCI-Benner has no system in place to have a piece of legal 

mail ‘stamped[,]’ ‘signed’ or verified otherwise.” Response, 5/25/23, at 2 

(emphasis in original).

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26, 2023, order directing Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement was 

returned as unserved on May 19, 2023. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(B)(1) (“A copy 

of any order or court notice promptly shall be served on each party’s attorney, 

or the party if unrepresented.”). 
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“The appellant bears the burden of proving that he or she in fact 

delivered the appeal within the appropriate time period.” Commonwealth v. 

Jones 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997). Acceptable forms of proof include a 

prison “cash slip” indicating a deduction from the inmate’s account for 

postage, an affidavit declaring the date of deposit of the notice of appeal with 

prison authorities, and evidence of internal operating procedures regarding 

mail delivery. Id. “Where [] the facts concerning the timeliness [of the filing] 

are in dispute, a remand for an evidentiary hearing may be warranted.” Id.

at 426 n.3. “Where, however, the opposing party does not challenge the 

timeliness of the appeal and the prisoner’s assertion of timeliness is plausible, 

we may find the appeal timely without remand.” Commonwealth v. Cooper, 

710 A.2d 76, 79 (Pa. Super. 1998) (citation omitted). 

Here, Appellant dated his notice of appeal April 10, 2023, within the 30-

day timeframe. The mailing envelope for the notice is time-stamped beyond 

the 30-day window, on April 18, 2023. The PCRA court directed that its order 

dismissing Appellant’s petition be served on Appellant with a return receipt

(consistent with Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4)). See Order, 3/13/23, at 4. However, 

the certified record includes no return receipt. Although the docket indicates 

the order was sent to Appellant by certified mail, it does not reflect whether 

Appellant was, in fact, served. Neither the PCRA court nor the Commonwealth
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address the timeliness of Appellant’s appeal.3 Under these circumstances, we

conclude there was a breakdown in the processes of the court, and decline to 

quash the instant appeal. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 

1130, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2017) (a breakdown in the processes of the court will 

excuse a facially untimely appeal). 

In his sparse, pro se brief, Appellant claims he timely filed his PCRA 

petition. Appellant’s Brief at 3-4 (unpaginated).

“Appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is 

limited to the examination of whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

“The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a 

court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not 

timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012) (citation 

omitted). “[A]ny PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must 

be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final.” 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007); see also 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

There are three exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement:

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3 The Commonwealth did not file a brief.
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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). “[I]t is the petitioner’s burden to plead and 

prove that one of the exceptions applies[.]” Jones, 54 A.3d at 17 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 752 A.2d 868, 871 (Pa. 2002)). 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 1, 2019, when 

the 90-day period to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13 (a 

petition for a writ of certiorari is timely when filed within 90 days of denial of 

discretionary review). As a result, Appellant was required to file any PCRA 

petition before May 1, 2020. See Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1267. Appellant filed 

his petition on April 28, 2022, nearly two years after his judgment of sentence 

became final. Accordingly, we must determine whether Appellant has pled

and proven one of the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions. 

In his petition, Appellant alleged 1) “prosecutorial misconduct [and] the 

coaching of witness[es;]” 2) the “DA/state police withheld [the victim’s] phone 

records[;]” 3) the victim was “high” during her testimony; 4) certain charges 
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at trial should have been severed;

4 and 5) Appellant’s trial counsel should 

have retained a drug and alcohol expert. See PCRA Petition, 4/28/22, at 3-

4. 

The PCRA court concluded that Appellant failed to satisfy any exception 

to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements: 

[Appellant] attempts to assert the exceptions for 

interference by government officials and newly discovered facts, 

but he does not assert sufficient facts to invoke these exceptions. 

For example, [Appellant] does not allege who the government 

officials are who interfered with the presentation of his current 

PCRA claims or how they kept him from filing his current PCRA 

petition in a timely manner. [Appellant] does complain about his 

prior attorneys; however, the term “government official” does not 

include defense counsel, whether appointed or retained. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(4). He also claims that there was 

prosecutorial misconduct and coaching of witnesses[,] but those 

would seem to be underlying substantive claims that could have 

been asserted at trial, on appeal or in his first PCRA petition[,] and 

not allegations that any government official interfered with his 

ability to assert these claims previously.

With respect to his [claim of] newly discovered facts, 

[Appellant] does not allege when he discovered that the DA/state 

police allegedly withheld [the victim’s] phone records and 

numerous other calls tha[t] were presented in court, what those 

phone records could or would show, or how those records could 

or would affect the outcome of his case. Rather, it appears that 

[Appellant] is on a fishing expedition, because he is also 

requesting in his petition that the District Attorney produce state 

police logs of all phone calls made in the case and all of [the 

victim’s] phone logs and texts.

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4 The PCRA court explained in its November 29, 2022, opinion that the charges 

against Appellant involved two victims (L.K. and J.D.). See Opinion, 

11/29/22, at 4. Appellant argued that the counts related to L.K. should have 

been severed as they were sexual in nature, and, thus, overly prejudicial when 

heard in conjunction with the sexual assault counts involving J.D. See PCRA 

Petition, 4/28/22, at 4. 
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PCRA Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 2-3. 

We agree with the PCRA court’s sound analysis and conclusion. Our 

review confirms Appellant’s second PCRA petition was filed nearly two years 

after his judgment of sentence became final. Further, Appellant has failed to

plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement.5, 6 

Accordingly, because Appellant’s petition is untimely, and he has not pled an 

exception to the time bar, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing his petition. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b); Jones, 54 A.3d at 17. 

Order affirmed. 

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5

In his two-page brief, Appellant references an attached letter from his first 

PCRA counsel. Appellant’s Brief at 1. Appellant mischaracterizes his prior 

counsel’s correspondence, and states his counsel informed Appellant he “had 

[one] year from the date of the 7

th of Feb[ruary], 2023, to file another PCRA 

[petition.]” Id. Our review of the letter discloses prior counsel informed 

Appellant he must file any further PCRA petitions “within one year of the date 

the judgment became final.” Id., Attach.

6

In his petition, Appellant cited, without argument or explanation, our 

Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 401

(Pa. 2021) (holding “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, 

and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA 

counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.”). 

See PCRA Petition, 4/28/22, at 5. To the extent Appellant purported to raise 

a claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness for the first time in his untimely 

PCRA petition, this argument fails. See Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 

1130, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“Nothing in Bradley creates a right to file a 

second PCRA petition outside the PCRA’s one-year time limit as a method of 

raising ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) 

(appellate briefs must include pertinent discussion of issues raised).
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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/29/2024