[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State

v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4347.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4347

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BROWN, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4347.]

Criminal law—R.C. 2913.42(A)(1)—Tampering with records—Litigation 

privilege—The common-law litigation privilege does not shield a person 

from criminal liability for tampering with records in violation of R.C. 

2913.42(A)(1)—Litigation privilege applies to civil suits only for 

defamatory statements made during judicial proceedings that were 

reasonably related to those proceedings—Court of appeals’ judgment 

reversed and cause remanded for that court to address assignments of error 

not previously reached.

(No. 2021-0392—Submitted March 9, 2022—Decided December 7, 2022.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,

No. C-190399, 2021-Ohio-597.

__________________
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FISCHER, J.

{¶ 1} Appellee, Monai Sherea Brown, filed a bogus quiet-title action 

against a homeowner in Cincinnati to take possession of his home. Appellant, the 

state of Ohio, prosecuted Brown for criminal offenses related to her filing of that

civil case. Brown was convicted of tampering with records in violation of R.C. 

2913.42(A)(1), which prohibits a person from falsifying any writing or record

“knowing the person has no privilege to do so.” (Emphasis added.) The First 

District Court of Appeals reversed Brown’s conviction, finding that her false 

statements were “privileged” because she made them in a judicial proceeding,

2021-Ohio-597, ¶ 25, and holding that those privileged statements could not form 

the basis of her tampering-with-records charge, id. at ¶ 26.

{¶ 2} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal to determine whether the 

rule of absolute privilege, also known as the litigation privilege, which was applied 

by the appellate court, precludes successful prosecution of a tampering-withrecords charge. See 163 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2021-Ohio-1896, 168 N.E.3d 1195. We 

hold that the litigation privilege, which protects a person from civil liability for 

defamatory statements that were made during judicial proceedings and that were 

reasonably related to the proceedings in which they were made, does not shield a

person from criminal liability related to those statements. Therefore, we reverse 

the judgment of the First District, and we remand the cause for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Brown files a quiet-title action against an unsuspecting homeowner

{¶ 3} Brown had never met Loie Hallug, the owner of 511 McAlpin 

Avenue, and had allegedly never stepped foot inside his home. Yet, on July 21, 

2017, Brown filed a quiet-title action against Hallug seeking to take his home, as 

she had done to at least two other unsuspecting homeowners.
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{¶ 4} Brown’s complaint to quiet title against Hallug was fraught with 

inconsistencies and misrepresentations. Brown claimed to be the lawful owner of 

511 McAlpin Avenue. Though she acknowledged that Hallug had once had an 

interest in the property, she alleged that Hallug had lost his interest in the property 

when he failed to pay his mortgage and “permanently abandoned” his home. She 

recognized that the “original owners” would have superior rights to her own, but 

she claimed that Hallug’s “non-use and permanent abandonment” of the property

in combination with her “subsequent act of actual physical possession of said 

premises” resulted in a transfer of ownership to and possession of the property by

her. However, in an affidavit attached to her complaint, Brown declared that Hallug 

was the lawful owner of 511 McAlpin Avenue. And while she claimed ownership 

of the property in her complaint, a fact she swore to be true, Brown asserted in an

affidavit of indigency she filed in the quiet-title action that she did not own any 

property.

{¶ 5} Additionally, in her complaint filed in the Hamilton County Court of 

Common Pleas on July 21, 2017, Brown maintained that she had entered the 

property at 511 McAlpin Avenue to take possession of it. Brown stated that she 

“entered” the property on August 1, 2017—a date that was 11 days in the future. 

Not only had this date not yet occurred when Brown filed her complaint to quiet 

title, but the date of possession that Brown identified in her complaint was 

inconsistent with the declaration in her affidavit attached to the complaint in which 

she averred that she took possession of the property on July 31, 2017—a date that 

was ten days in the future.

{¶ 6} Brown asserted in her complaint that Hallug had been “personally 

notified” (boldface and underlining deleted) of her “claim of rights in ownership” 

of the property. She further stated in her affidavit that Hallug had been notified in 

a “letter of intent” sent “via certified mail” to 511 McAlpin Avenue of her intention 

to possess and occupy the property. Despite Brown’s assertions in her complaint
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and the attached affidavit that she had notified Hallug of her intent when she filed 

her complaint, she had not done so—a fact she later admitted at trial.

{¶ 7} Rather, six days after filing the quiet-title action against Hallug, 

Brown sent Hallug a letter of intent to acquire his property by “claiming title by 

right and/or adverse possession.” In her letter, Brown demanded that Hallug pay 

her $733 for improvements to the property that she had never made. She also 

warned Hallug that if he did not respond to her demands, she may pursue legal 

action, even though she had already done so.

{¶ 8} Hallug received Brown’s letter of intent on August 9, 2017. He

thought Brown’s letter was “ridiculous.” Although Hallug’s home had been vacant 

for two months in 2017 during his divorce proceedings and although he had 

experienced some financial difficulties that put his mortgage in arrears, Hallug 

eventually moved back into the home, and he worked with his mortgage lender to 

amend his mortgage. Brown did not make any improvements to Hallug’s home

while the property sat vacant. Her demands for monetary compensation for 

improvements made to the home were based on bogus factual assertions. 

Nevertheless, Hallug responded to Brown’s letter of intent at the return address that 

was provided on the envelope, rejecting her request for money and her claims to 

his home. But Hallug’s response never reached Brown; it was returned to sender.

{¶ 9} Soon thereafter, Hallug was served with Brown’s complaint against 

him. Hallug also discovered that Brown had placed the water bill for 511 McAlpin 

Avenue in her name. Hallug paid an attorney $1,500 to represent him in the quiettitle action. Hallug’s attorney filed a motion to dismiss Brown’s complaint, which 

the common pleas court granted.

B. Brown is charged with crimes related to her quiet-title action against 

Hallug

{¶ 10} The financial-crimes unit of the Cincinnati police department 

investigated Brown after discovering her connection with a family that had filed
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several quiet-title actions, false mechanics’ liens, and other legal documents against 

property owners in an effort to take their properties. A grand jury indicted Brown 

on charges of tampering with records kept by a governmental entity in violation of 

R.C. 2913.42(A)(1), theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3), and unauthorized use 

of property in violation of R.C. 2913.04(A). Brown pleaded not guilty, waived her 

right to counsel, and proceeded pro se.

{¶ 11} At trial, the state presented witness testimony demonstrating that 

Hallug had been the owner of 511 McAlpin Avenue since 2014, that Hallug 

remained the owner as of the date of Brown’s criminal trial in 2019, and that Hallug 

had never abandoned the property as Brown claimed in her complaint. Brown even 

admitted that some of the statements that she had made in her complaint were false.

{¶ 12} The state also elicited testimony from Brown in which she conceded 

that her affidavit of indigency included a false statement. Brown alleged in her 

affidavit of indigency that she had no assets and no income, and she signed the 

affidavit acknowledging that she was “subject to criminal charges for providing 

false information” therein. However, Brown admitted that she owned a vehicle 

when she filed her affidavit of indigency, but she failed to include it in the “[o]ther 

property” category of the assets section of the form.

{¶ 13} The jury found Brown guilty of tampering with records, acquitted 

her of unauthorized use of property, and could not reach a decision on the theft 

count. After receiving the verdicts for the tampering-with-records and 

unauthorized-use-of-property counts, the state dismissed the theft count. The trial 

court sentenced Brown to one year in prison and ordered her to pay restitution to 

Hallug in the amount of $1,500.

C. The First District reverses Brown’s conviction

{¶ 14} Brown appealed her conviction to the First District, raising three 

assignments of error. In her first assignment of error, she argued that her conviction 

was based on insufficient evidence because either she had a privilege to make false 
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statements during a judicial proceeding or the state did not prove that she knew she 

had no such privilege.

{¶ 15} The appellate court reversed Brown’s conviction based on her first 

assignment of error, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support a 

tampering-with-records conviction because Brown’s statements in the quiet-title 

action were “privileged” under the doctrine of absolute privilege, which shields a 

person from being held civilly liable for defamatory statements that person made 

in judicial proceedings so long as those statements bear a reasonable relation to 

those proceedings. 2020-Ohio-597 at ¶ 25. The court of appeals therefore reversed 

the trial court’s judgment and discharged Brown without reaching her remaining 

assignments of error. Id. at ¶ 26-28.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

{¶ 16} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal to consider the 

following proposition of law: “The public policy underlying the civil immunity 

relied upon by the First District does not support a similar application of criminal 

immunity.” See 163 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2021-Ohio-1896, 168 N.E.3d 1195. We 

consider this issue in the context of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge.

{¶ 17} Determining whether evidence is legally sufficient to support a 

verdict is a question of law that we review de novo. See State v. Groce, 163 Ohio 

St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio-6671, 170 N.E.3d 813, ¶ 7. We determine whether the 

evidence presented at trial, “when viewed in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Dent, 163 Ohio St.3d 390, 2020-

Ohio-6670, 170 N.E.3d 816, ¶ 15.

{¶ 18} Under R.C. 2913.42(A)(1), a person is guilty of tampering with 

records when that person falsifies a writing or record “knowing the person has no 

privilege to do so, and with the purpose to defraud or knowing that the person is 

facilitating a fraud.” This means that the state had to prove (1) that Brown falsified 
January Term, 2022

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a writing or record, (2) that Brown knew she did not have the privilege to do so, 

and (3) that Brown did so with the purpose to defraud or with the knowledge that 

she was facilitating a fraud. The issue in this case concerns the second element: 

Brown had to know that she did not have the privilege to falsify a writing or record.

A. The litigation privilege

{¶ 19} We first deal with the issue of privilege. The General Assembly has 

defined “privilege” as “an immunity, license, or right conferred by law, bestowed 

by express or implied grant, arising out of status, position, office, or relationship, 

or growing out of necessity.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(12). The question in this case is 

whether the common-law rule of absolute privilege, also known as the litigation 

privilege, shields Brown from being criminally prosecuted for tampering with

records. We hold that it does not, for two reasons: (1) the litigation privilege does 

not shield a person from being held criminally liable for making a defamatory 

statement in a judicial proceeding even when that statement bears a reasonable 

relation to the proceeding and (2) even if it did, at least one of the false statements 

Brown made in her filings in the quiet-title action against Hallug was not 

defamatory and thus cannot be protected by the litigation privilege.

1. History of the litigation privilege in Ohio

{¶ 20} The litigation privilege is a deeply rooted common-law rule that 

protects individuals from defamation lawsuits. See generally Hayden,

Reconsidering the Litigator’s Absolute Privilege to Defame, 54 Ohio St.L.J. 985, 

1012, 1014-1015 (1993). In the rule’s infancy, “neither party, witness, counsel, 

jury [n]or Judge [could] be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for words spoken 

in office.” Rex v. Skinner, 98 Eng.Rep. 529, 530, Lofft 55 (K.B.1772). This 

concept led to the development of the English rule regarding litigation privilege:

“[N]o action will lie against a party to an action for any defamatory statement made 

by him in a pleading, either in civil or criminal proceedings, even though such 

statement is false and malicious, and even though irrelevant to the matter in issue.” 
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(Emphasis added.) Erie Cty. Farmers’ Ins. Co. v. Crecelius, 122 Ohio St. 210, 212-

213, 171 N.E. 97 (1930). While the English rule regarding litigation privilege 

forms the basis of the American rule, the two differ significantly. See id. at 213; 

Mauk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 97-98, 67 N.E. 152 (1903); Levy v. Littleford, 

19 Ohio Dec. 604, 605-606, 1909 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 29 (1909). The English rule, 

as explained above, is broad, see Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 649 (6th 

Cir.1968); whereas the American rule, which was adopted by this court, limits the 

types of defamatory statements that are considered privileged and limits the 

circumstances in which the privilege applies. See Surace v. Wuliger, 25 Ohio St.3d 

229, 231-233, 495 N.E.2d 939 (1986).

{¶ 21} Early on, this court acknowledged that there were many views on the 

litigation privilege, ranging from absolute privilege for all statements made during 

judicial proceedings, to all relevant statements made during judicial proceedings, 

to all not false and maliciousstatements made during judicial proceedings. Lanning 

v. Christy, 30 Ohio St. 115, 118-119 (1876). This court initially adopted the rule 

that “[n]o action will lie for any defamatory statement made by a party to a court 

proceeding, in a pleading filed in such proceeding, where the defamatory statement 

is material and relevant to the issue.” Erie Cty. Farmers’ Ins. Co. at syllabus. The 

court, recognizing the need to protect litigation participants from defamation 

lawsuits, adopted the rule. Id. at 215. Though the court specifically said that “[n]o

action will lie” against a party for defamatory statements made in certain contexts, 

(emphasis added) id. at syllabus, the court emphasized that the litigation privilege 

would not shield a person from criminal prosecution for perjury or from an action 

for malicious prosecution, id. at 215.

{¶ 22} In Surace, this court clarified the rule announced in Erie Cty. 

Farmers’ Ins. Co. and adopted the American rule: “As a matter of public policy, 

under the doctrine of absolute privilege in a judicial proceeding, a claim alleging 

that a defamatory statement was made in a written pleading does not state a cause 
January Term, 2022

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of action where the allegedly defamatory statement bears some reasonable relation 

to the judicial proceeding in which it appears,” Surace at syllabus; see also id. at

232-233. Adopting the public-policy considerations that were discussed in Erie 

Cty. Farmers’ Ins. Co., this court acknowledged that the litigation privilege may 

“ ‘afford immunity to the evil disposed and the malignant slanderer’ ” but 

explained that the privilege was necessary to protect the administration of justice 

by preventing “ ‘a multitude of slander and libel suits’ ” and by encouraging “ ‘an 

honest suitor’ ” to pursue his or her legal remedies. (Emphasis added.) Surace at 

232, quoting Erie Cty. Farmers’ Ins. Co. at 215. Although the court expanded the 

litigation privilege in Surace to protect defamers from civil liability, it did not 

extend the privilege to protect them from criminal liability.

{¶ 23} Since Surace, this court has applied the litigation privilege to provide 

civil immunity to individuals who have made defamatory statements during judicial 

proceedings that were reasonably related to those proceedings. See Hecht v. Levin,

66 Ohio St.3d 458, 613 N.E.2d 585 (1993), paragraph two of the syllabus (a person 

who makes a relevant statement in an attorney-discipline proceeding enjoys an 

absolute privilege against a civil action for defamation); M.J. DiCorpo, Inc. v. 

Sweeney, St.3d 497, 634 N.E.2d 203 (1994), syllabus (an informant who provides 

an affidavit, statement, or other information to a prosecuting attorney when

reporting the commission of a crime is entitled to an absolute privilege against civil 

liability for the statement made if it bears some reasonable relation to the criminal 

activity reported); Reister v. Gardner, 164 Ohio St.3d 546, 2020-Ohio-5484, 174 

N.E.3d 713, ¶ 10 (the litigation privilege provides absolute immunity from civil 

suits for defamatory statements that were made during and were relevant to judicial 

proceedings). This application is consistent with Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio 

Constitution, which gives citizens the right to free speech but acknowledges that 

they are “responsible for the abuse of the right.” That provision further provides

that a person may be criminally prosecuted for libel—i.e., a defamatory statement 
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that has been published, see R.C. 2739.01—but must be acquitted if the jury finds 

that the statement was true and published with good motives for justifiable ends. 

Article I, Section 11, Ohio Constitution.

2. The litigation privilege does not shield a person from being held criminally 

liable for tampering with records

{¶ 24} Brown argues that the litigation privilege could extend to shield a 

person from criminal charges when the offense requires the defendant to have acted

without “privilege.” Brown points us to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision 

in State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis.2d 516, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998), to 

support this position. Under Wis.Stat. Section 942.01(3), a person whose 

“communication [is] otherwise privileged” is shielded from prosecution for 

criminal defamation. Id. at ¶ 38. Based on the legislative history of that statute, the 

Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the common-law privilege of absolute 

immunity protects a person who makes defamatory statements in a legal proceeding 

from prosecution for criminal defamation just as it would protect that person from 

a civil defamation action, because the communication was made in an “otherwise 

privileged” context. Id. at ¶ 38-43.

{¶ 25} We acknowledge that R.C. 2913.42(A)(1) and Wisconsin’s

criminal-defamation statute both allow a person to avoid criminal liability if the 

person makes a statement that is privileged. But Brown has not provided, nor can 

we find, any legislative history in Ohio to support her argument that the litigation 

privilege extends beyond protecting a person from civil liability for a defamatory 

statement that was made during a judicial proceeding and was reasonably related

to that proceeding. Rather, over 100 years of precedent and Article I, Section 11 of 

the Ohio Constitution refute Brown’s assertion that the common-law litigation 

privilege shields a person from criminal liability for libelous or perjured statements. 

See, e.g., Reister, at ¶ 10; Erie Cty. Farmers’ Ins. Co., 122 Ohio St. at 215, 171 

N.E. 97; Costell v. Toledo Hosp., 38 Ohio St.3d 221, 223-224, 527 N.E.2d 858 
January Term, 2022

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(1988). Even the Restatement of Torts on absolute immunity makes clear that the 

litigation privilege does not extend beyond civil defamation actions. See 3 

Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Sections 583, 584, 587, 635 (1977). To extend 

the litigation privilege into the criminal realm, even for defamatory statements 

made during a judicial proceeding, would be inconsistent with this court’s 

precedent and Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution.

{¶ 26} Therefore, we hold that the litigation privilege that shields a person

from civil liability for defamatory statements that the person made during a judicial 

proceeding and were reasonably related to that proceeding does not extend to 

protect that person from criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Reister, 164 Ohio St.3d 

546, 2020-Ohio-5484, 174 N.E.3d 713, at ¶ 8, 10, 14; see also Article I, Section 11, 

Ohio Constitution. Accordingly, Brown was not shielded from criminal liability

for the statements she made in the quiet-title action that she filed against Hallug,

and the First District erred in holding otherwise.

B. There is sufficient evidence that Brown knew she had no privilege to 

provide false statements in her filings in the quiet-title action

{¶ 27} Brown argues that even if the litigation privilege does not extend to 

her false statements, her conviction is based on insufficient evidence because the 

state did not prove that she made those statements knowing that she was without 

privilege to do so. This argument is without merit.

{¶ 28} Under R.C. 2913.42(A)(1), a person is guilty of tampering with 

records when that person falsifies a writing or record “knowing the person has no 

privilege to do so.” “When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an 

element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively 

believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or 

acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.” R.C. 2901.22(B). Thus, 

there is sufficient evidence to prove that Brown falsified a writing or a record 

knowing that she had no privilege to do so if she subjectively believed that there 
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was a high probability that she did not have a privilege to make a false statement 

or if she acted with a conscious purpose to avoid learning that fact.

{¶ 29} Beyond the fact that this court has never recognized the litigation 

privilege as shielding a person from criminal liability for making defamatory

statements, the documents that Brown filed in the quiet-title action are evidence 

that she in fact knew that she had no privilege to make false statements in her 

filings. Both the complaint to quiet title and the affidavit of indigency contained 

statements that Brown could be subject to criminal prosecution if she lied in those 

documents. She signed and filed each document knowing that fact. Looking at this 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence is sufficient to

demonstrate that Brown knew that she had no privilege to lie in her filings in the 

quiet-title action.

{¶ 30} Therefore, Brown’s argument that the state did not provide sufficient 

evidence to prove that she knowingly acted without privilege is without merit. The

first assignment of error Brown asserted in the court of appeals concerning the 

sufficiency of the evidence should have been rejected.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 31} We hold that the litigation privilege does not shield a person from 

being held criminally liable for false statements that the person made during judicial 

proceedings and that were reasonably related to the proceedings. We reaffirm that 

the litigation privilege provides absolute immunity from civil suits only for 

defamatory statements that were made during judicial proceedings and that were 

reasonably related to those proceedings. Reister, 164 Ohio St.3d 546, 2020-Ohio5484, 174 N.E.3d 713, at ¶ 10; Surace, 25 Ohio St.3d at 233, 495 N.E.2d 939. Thus, 

the false statements that Brown made in her complaint against Hallug to quiet title 

and in her affidavit of indigency can form the basis of her conviction for tampering

with records in violation of R.C. 2913.42(A)(1), and the court of appeals erred in 

holding otherwise.
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{¶ 32} We also find that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Brown 

acted “knowing she had no privilege to do so” when she filed her quiet-title 

complaint and affidavit of indigency with admittedly false statements and when she 

acknowledged in those filings that she could be subject to criminal liability for

providing false information therein. Therefore, Brown’s first assignment of error 

on appeal should have been rejected.

{¶ 33} For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the First District Court 

of Appeals. We remand the cause to the appellate court to resolve Brown’s second 

and third assignments of error.

Judgment reversed

and cause remanded.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and SMITH and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.

KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only.

DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J.

JASON P. SMITH, J., of the Fourth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

DEWINE, J.

_________________

DONNELLY, J., dissenting.

{¶ 34} Because I would dismiss this appeal as having been improvidently 

allowed, I dissent. This is not an appropriate case in which to explore the element 

of “privilege” in the offense of tampering with records in violation of R.C. 2913.42, 

because tampering with records was not an appropriate charge under the facts of 

this case.

{¶ 35} R.C. 2913.42, which establishes the offense of tampering with 

records, prohibits the adulteration of a writing or record. That statute states that no 

person shall “[f]alsify, destroy, remove, conceal, alter, deface, or mutilate any 

writing, computer software, data, or record.” R.C. 2913.42(A)(1). The offense of 

tampering with records “does not refer to the [adulteration of] particular statements 
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contained in the writing” but refers instead to tampering with the writing or record 

“as a whole.” Bradley v. Miller, 96 F.Supp.3d 753, 781 (S.D.Ohio 2015). The 

concept of a falsified document connotes the genuineness of the document itself 

rather than the factual truth of the statements contained therein. See Gilbert v.

United States, 370 U.S. 650, 658, 82 S.Ct. 1399, 8 L.Ed.2d 750 (1962), quoting 

Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760, 763-764 (10th Cir.1954) (holding that a 

document is not a forgery “[w]here the ‘falsity lies in the representation of facts, 

not in the genuineness of execution’ ”).

{¶ 36} Appellee, Monai Sherea Brown, authored and filed a civil complaint 

that contained false statements of fact. It would have been proper to charge Brown 

with perjury, in violation of R.C. 2921.11(A), or falsification, in violation of R.C. 

2921.13(A)(1), since both of those offenses prohibit “knowingly mak[ing] a false 

statement” in an “official proceeding.” However, Brown did not tamper with her 

own original writing. Therefore, she should not have been prosecuted for 

tampering with records, in violation of R.C. 2913.42(A)(1).

{¶ 37} Neither of the offenses that fit Brown’s conduct have an element of 

lack of privilege. See R.C. 2921.11 and 2921.13. There is no point in using this 

case to analyze the meaning of “privilege” as that term is used in R.C. 2913.42(A). 

Doing so risks unintended consequences in cases in which charges for tampering 

with records would actually be appropriate. I would dismiss this appeal as having 

been improvidently allowed, and I therefore dissent.

STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. 

Springman Jr. and Alex Scott Havlin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 

appellant.

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David H. 

Hoffmann, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
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