1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 08 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### FITZGERALD ET VI R 

### v . BARN STA B LE SC HOOL COMMITT EE ET AL



### . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST C I RCUIT No. 07–1 12 5. Ar g u ed December2, 2008—Dec ided Jan u a r y21, 2009 Petition er s fil e d su it ag ain s t r e spon den t s, th e loc a l sc h ool distr i c t ’ s

g o v e rn in gboar d an d su per i n t en den t , alle gi n gth at th ei rr e spon se to alleg a tion s of sex u al h a r a ss men tof peti ti oners’ daught er by an older student was i n adequate, r a isingc l aims u n der , in t e ra l ia, Title IX of th e Edu c ationAmen dmen t s of 1 972, 20 U. S. C. §1681 (a), an d 4 2 U. S. C. §1983 forv i olationof th e Equ a lPr otec tionClau se of th e Fourteenth Am endment. Among it s r u ling s , th e D i str i ct Cou r t dis

misse d th e §1983 c l ai m. Th e Fir s t Cir c u i t affir m ed, h o ldin gth at, under this Co urt’s precedents, Ti tl e IX’s i m pliedprivat e remedy was s u fficient l y co m p rehens ive t opreclu de the use of §1983 to advance c o nstitutional c l aims. Held: 1. Title IX does not preclude a §19 83 ac tionallegi n gu n c on stitu

tion al g e n d er disc r i min a tioninsc h ools. Pp. 4–12. (a) In Mid d le sex Cou n ty Se we rageAu th orityv. Natio n al Sea Clam m ers Ass n . , 453 U. S. 1 ; Smithv. Robinson , 468 U

. S. 992; an d Rancho Palos Ver d esv. Ab ra m s , 544 U. S. 113, th is Cou r t fou n dth at par t ic u l arst at u t or yen ac tmen t s pr ec lu ded §198 3 c l a i ms wh er e it was establi s hed that Cong r e ss i n tended the statute’ s r e med i al sc heme to “b e the exclus ive av en ue thr o ughwhic h a pla i ntiff ma y a s s e rt [s uch] cla i m s ,” Smith, supra, a t1 009

. In det e rmining whet he r Congres s in

tended for asub s eq uent statute to preclude the enforce ment of a fe d

er al r i gh t u n d er§198 3, th e Cou r t has pl aced primary emphasi s on the natur eand ex tent of that sta t u t e’ s r e medialsc h e m e . See Se a Clam m ers, 453 U. S., at 20. Wh er e th e §1 983 c l ai m alle g e s a c o n s ti

tu tion al v i olat ion , a lac kof con gr e ssional intent to pr ec l u de mayalso be in fer r e d from a c o mpar i s onof the r i ghts and pr otections of the2 FITZGERALD v. BARNSTA B LE SCHOOL COMM. Sy llabu s oth e rstatu t e an d th ose ex istin gu n d erth e Con s titu tion

. Pp. 4–7. (b) Inth e abse n c eof a c o mpreh e n s iv e r e medial sc h e me c o mpar a ble to those at issue in Sea Clammers , Smith , and Rancho Palo s Ver d es , and in light of the divergent co vera ge of Tit l e IX a n d t h e Equal Pr otec ti on Clause, it must be c o nc luded that Titl e IXwas not meant to be a nex c l usiv e mec h anism for addr essingg e nderdisc r i mi

n a tioninsc h o ols, ora su bsti tu te for§1983 su its a s a mea n s of en for c in gc o n s titu tio n al r i gh ts. Pp. 7–12. (i) Title IX ’ s o n lyex pr ess enfor c e ment mec h anism, 20 U. S. C. §168 2, is ana d min i str a tiv e pr oc ed ure resulting in the withdrawal of federa l funding from nonco m plia nt in stitutions

. This Court ha s a l so recognized an implied pr ivate right of action, Canno nv. University of Chicago , 441 U. S. 677, 71 7, for wh ich bothin ju n c tive r e lief an d damag e s ar e av ailable, Fra n klinv. Gwi n n ett Coun ty Public Schools , 503 U. S. 60, 76. Th ese r e medies st an d instar k c o n t r a stto th e “u n usuallyelabor a te,” “c ar efull ytailor e d,” an d “r estr ic tiv e ” enfor c e ment schemes of th e statutes in Sea Clammers , Smith , and Rancho Palos Ver d es . Unli ke those statutes, Title IXha s no a d minis t ra tive ex

ha us tion req u irement a n d no notice provis ions

. Pla i ntiffs ca n file di

rectly in court under its implied priv ate right of action and can obtain t h e full ra ng e of rem e dies. Accordin gly, pa ra llel a n d concu rre nt §198 3 cla i ms will neither ci rcumve n t required procedures nor allow a cces s t onew rem e dies

. Moreover , unde r Rancho Palos Ver d es , “[t]he provision of an express, priv ate means of redress in the statute itse lf” is akey consideration in de termin ing con g res s i ona lintent , a n d “ t h e exis t e nce of a m o re res t rict ive priv ate rem e dy for statutory violation s has been the d ividing line between th os e cas e s in which

. . . an action wou l d lie u n d er§198 3 an dt h ose inwh ich we have held tha tit would n o t.” 54 4 U. S ., at 12 1. Ti tl e IXc o n t ain s n oex pr ess pr iv ate r e medy , mu c hless a mor er e str i c t iv e on e. Pp. 7–9. (ii) Because T i tle IX’s protections are narrower in so me re spec ts an d br o a derinoth e r s th anthose guaranteed under the Equal Pr otec tion Cla u se, the Cour t c a nnot agr ee with the Fir s tCir c u it that Con gr e ss sawTitle IXa s t h e sole me an s of c o r r e c t in gu n c on stitu

tional g e nderdisc r i minationin sc h ools. Title IXr e ac h e s in stitu t ion s an d pr ogr a ms th at r e c e iv e f e der a l fu n d s, 20 U. S. C. §1 681( a), wh ic h may include nonpublic instit utions, §168 1( c ) , bu t it h a s c o n s isten t ly been inter p r e ted a s nota u thor izin gsu it ag ain s tsc h ool offic i als, teachers, and other individuals. Moreover, while the constitutional provision reaches only stat e actors , §1983 equal prote c tion claims maybe br ou gh t ag ain s t in d iv i du als a s well as sta t e en ti ties. Westv. Atk i ns , 487 U. S. 42, 48– 51. An d Title I Xex empts fr om its r e s t r i c tions sev e r a lac tiv i ties th at maybe c h alleng ed on c o nstitutiona l grounds. See, e.g. , §1681(a)( 5 ). Ev enwh er e par t ic u l arac tiv i ties an d3 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Sy llabu s par t ic u l ardefen d an ts ar e su bjec t to bothTitle IXan d th e Equ a l Pr o tec t ion Clause , the standar d s forestabli s hingliabili tymaynot b e wholly congruent. Comp are Geb serv. LagoVista Indepe nde nt School Dist. , 524 U. S

. 274, 290, wi t h Monell v. Ne w York City Dept. of Social Servs

. , 436 U. S. 658, 69 4. Pp. 9–11. (iii) The Court’s conclusion is consistentwith Title IX’s context and history. Because the Congress that enacted Title I Xauthorized the Attor n eyGener a l to interv ene in p r ivate suit s a lleging sex dis

crimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U. S. C. §200 0h–2, Co n gr e ss mu st h av eex plic itlyenv i sion ed th at pr iv ate pla i ntiffs would b r ing cons titutiona lclaims t ocha llenge gender dis

crimination via §1983. Moreover, Ti tle IXwas modeled afterTitle VI of the Civil Ri ghts Act of 1964, Cannon, supra, at 69 4– 695, an d, at the time of Ti tle IX ’ s 1 9 7 2 enac tment, the lowerc o ur ts r o utinelyin

t e rpret e d Tit l e VI t oa llow for pa ra llel a n d conc ur rent§ 1 9 8 3 cla i ms. Ab s e nt cont ra ry evidence , itfollows t h a t Congres s int e nded Tit l e IX to be interpret e d sim ilarly to allow for par a llel and concurre nt §198 3 c l aims. Pp. 11 –12.

2. As neitherof the c o ur ts below addr ess e d the mer i ts of petition

ers’ constituti onal claims or even the suff iciency of thei r pleadings, this Court will not do so in th e first instance he re. Pp. 1 2–1 3. 504 F. 3d 16 5, r e v e r s ed an d reman d ed.

ALITO , J ., deliv ered the opini o n forauna ni mous Court._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 07–1 12 5


### LISA FITZ GERAL D , ET VI R 

### , PETI TIONERS v. BARNSTA B LE SCHOOL COMMITTEE ET AL



### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FIRSTCIRCUIT [Jan u a r y21, 2009] 

### J USTICE 

### ALI T O 

### delivere dthe opinio n of the Court. The issue i nthis case of peer-on-peer sexual harassment is whether Title IX of t h e Education Amendments of 197 2, 86 Stat. 3 73, 20 U. S. C. §1681(a), precludes an action under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging uncon

stitutional gender discrimination in schools

. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that it does. 504 F. 3d 165 (2007). We reverse. I Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we assu me the truth of the facts a s alleged in petitioners’ complaint. During the 2000–2001 school yea r , the daughter of peti

tioners Lisa and Robert Fitzgerald was a k i ndergarten student in the Barnstable, Mass achusetts, school system, and rode th e bus to school each morning. One day she told her parents that, when ever she wo re a dress, a third-gra d e boy on the s c hool bus w o uld bully h e r into lifting her skirt. Lisa Fitzgerald immediately called the school principal, Frederick Scully, who arrangedameeting later that da y with the Fi tzgeralds, their daughter, and an other school2 FITZGERALD v. BARNSTA B LE SCHOOL COMM. Opinion of theCourt 

### official, Lynda Day. Scully and Day then questioned the alleged bully, who denied the allegations. Da y also inter

viewed the bus driver and several students who rode the bus. She concluded that she could not corroborate the girl’s version of the events. The Fitzgeralds’ daughter then provided new details of the allegedabuse to her parents, who rela yed them to Scully. Specifically, she told her parents that in addition to bullying her into rai s ing he r skirt, the boycoerced he r into pulling down her underpants and spreading her legs

. Scully sche duled a second meeting withthe Fitzgeralds to discuss the additional details an d again questioned th e boy and other students. Meanwhile, the local police department con d ucted a n independen t investigation and con c luded there was insuf

ficient evidence to bring crimi nal charges against the boy. Based partl y on the police investigation and partly on the school’s own investigation, Scully similarl y concluded there was insufficient evidence to wa rra nt discipline. Scully did propose remedial mea s ures to the Fitzgeralds. He suggested transferring their daughter to a different bus or l e aving rows of empty sea t s between the k i nder

garteners and older students on the original bus. The Fitzgeralds felt that these proposals pu nished the i r daughter instead of t h e boy andcountered with alterna

tive propos als. They suggested transferring the boy to a different bu s or placing a monitor o nthe origin al bus. The Barnstable school system’s superintendent, Russell Dever, did not act on these proposals. The Fitzgeralds began driving their daugh t er to school to avoid further bullying on the bu s, but she continued to report unsettling incidents at school. The Fitzgeralds reported each incident to Scully. The Fitzger a lds’ daugh

ter had an unusual n u mber of ab sences du ring the re

mainder of the school year. In April 2002, the Fitzgeralds filed suit in District3 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### Court, alleging that the school sy stem’s response to their allegations of s e xual harassment had beeninadequat e, resulting in furtherha rassment t o their dau ghter. The i r complaint included: (1) a claim for violation of Title IX against th e Barnstab le School Committee (the scho ol system’s governing body), (2) claims under42 U. S. C. §1983 for violations of Title IX and the Equ a l Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against the school committee and Dever, and (3) Massachusetts state-law claims against the school comm ittee and Dever. The school com m ittee and Dever (r e s pondents here), fileda motion to dismiss, which the Dist rict Cour t g r anted as t o the §1983 claims and the state-law claims. On the Title IX claim, the school committee filed a motion for summar y judgment, which the DistrictCo urt also gra n ted. Hun t er v. Ba rnstab le School Co mmitte e, 4 56 F. Supp. 2d 255, 266 (Mass. 2006). The Court o f Appeals for the First Circuit affir m ed. 504 F. 3d 165. Turning first to the Title IX cla i magainst the school committee, the court note d three poi n ts thatwe re not in dispute: (1) the school committee was the recipient of federal funds and was therefore subject to Title IX, (2) the school committee had actual knowledge of the harass

ment the Fitzgeralds’ daughter suffered, and (3) if t h e allegations of the complaint were true, th e harassment was “severe, pervasive and objectively offensiv e.” Id ., at 172. The court concl u ded that the Fitzgeralds’ Title IX claim lacke dmerit, ho wever, beca use the response of the school com m ittee and Dever to the reported harassment had been objectively re asonable. Id ., at 175. The Court of Appeals turned ne xt to the F i tzgeralds ’ §1983 claims. Relying on this Court’s prece d ents in Mid

dlesex Cou n ty Sewera ge Authori t yv. Nation al Sea Cl a m mers A ssn. , 453 U. S. 1 (1981), Smithv. Ro binson , 468 U. S. 992 (1 984), and Rancho Palos Verdesv. Ab ra ms , 5 44 U. S. 113 (2005), the court characterized Title IX’s implied4 FITZGERALD v. BARNSTA B LE SCHOOL COMM. Opinion of theCourt 

### private rem e dy as “sufficiently comprehensive” to preclude use of §198 3 to advance statutory claims based on Title IX itself. 504 F. 3d, at 179. This reasoning, the court hel d , “appl[ied] with equal force” to the constitutional claims. Ibid

. The c o urt conclu ded that “C ongress saw Title IX as the sole m e ans of vindicating th e c o nstitutional right to be free from gender discrimination perpetrate d by educa

tional instit utions.” Ibi d

. The Court of Appeals’ decision deepeneda conflict among the Circuits re garding wh ether Title IX precludes use of §198 3 to redress unconstitutional gen d er discrimi

nation in s c hools. Compare Bru n eau ex rel. Schofield v . South Kortright Central School Dist ., 163 F. 3d 749, 758– 759 (CA2 1 998); Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools91 F. 3d 857, 862–863 (CA7 1996); Pfeiffer v. Mar i on C e nt er Area School Dis t ., 917 F. 2d 779, 789 (CA3 1990), with Communities for Equity v. M i c h i ga nH i ghSc h o o l A t h le t i c Assn. , 459 F. 3d 676, 691 (CA6 2006); Crawf o rd v. Davi s , 109 F. 3d 1281, 1284 (CA8 1997 ); Seamons v. Snow , 84 F. 3d 1226, 1234 (CA1 0 1996). We granted certiorari to resolve thi s conflict, 553 U. S. ___ (2008), and we now reverse. II A In relevant part, 42 U. S. C. §1983, provides: “Every pers on who, under color of any statute , ordi

nance, regu lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the Unite d States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu

nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party inju red in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”5 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### In three ca ses, this Court has fou n d that s t a t utory enac t

ments precluded claims under this statute. Sea Cla m mers , sup r a; Smith , supra; Ranc ho Palos Verdes , su pra. These cases establish that “[t]he crucial con s ideration is what Congress intended.” Smith , 468 U. S., at 1012. If Congress intended a statute’s rem e dial schem e to “be the exclusive avenue through whicha plaintiff may asse rt [the] claim,” id ., at 10 09, the §1983 claims are preclude d. See Rancho Palos Ve rdes , 544 U. S., at 1 20–121 (“The critical que stion, then, is whethe r Cong ress meant th e judicial remedy authorized by [t he statute] to coexist with an alternative remedy available ina §1983 action”). In those ca ses in which the §198 3 claim is based on a statutory right, “eviden c e of such c o ngressional intent may be found directly in the statute creating t h e right, or inferred from the statute’s creation of a comprehensive enforcemen tscheme that is incompatible with individual enforcemen tunder §19 83.” Id., at 120 (intern a l quotation marks omitted). In cases in which the §1983 claim alleges a constituti onal violation, lack of congressiona lintent ma y be inferred from a comparison of the rights and protec

tions of the statute and those existing under the Constitu

tion. Where the conto u rs of suchrights andprotections diverge in significant ways, itis not likely that Congress intended to displace §1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights. Our conclusions regarding congressional intent can be confirmed by a statute’s context. Id., at 127 (B REYER 

### , J. , concurrin g) (“[C]onte x t, not just literal text, will often lead a court to Congres s ’ intent in respect to a particular s t atute”). In determining wheth e r a subseq uent statute precludes the enforcement of a federal right under §1983, we have placed prim ary emphas is on the nature and e x tent of that statute’s re medial scheme. See Sea Cl ammers, su pra, at 20 (“When the remedial devices provided in a particula r Act are su fficiently c o mprehensive, they m a y suffice to6 FITZGERALD v. BARNSTA B LE SCHOOL COMM. Opinion of theCourt 

### demonstrate congressional inte ntto preclude the remed y of suits under §1983”). Sea Cl amm ers illustrates this approach. The plaintiffs brought su it under §1983 for violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Actandthe Marin e Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. This Cou rt’s analysis foc u sed on th ese two sta t utes’ “unu sually elab o rate enforcement provisions,” which authorized the Envi

ronmental Protection Agency to seek civil and criminal penalties for violations, permitte d “ ‘an yint e rested per

son’ ” to seek judicial r e view, and contained detailed citi

zen suit provisions allowing for injunctive relief. 453 U. S., at 13–14. Allowing parallel §1983 claim s to proceed, we concluded, would have thwarted Congress’ intent in formulating and detailing these provisions. In Smith , the plaintiffs alleged deprivation of a free, appropriate public education for their handicapped child, in violation of the Education of the Ha ndicapped Act (EHA) and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Departing from the pat

tern of the plaintiffs in Sea Clam mers, the Smit h plainti ffs relied on §1983 to assert independent constitutional rights, not to assert the statutory r i ghts guara n teed by the EHA. As in Sea Cla m mers , ho wever, this Court focu sed on the statute’s detailed remedia lscheme i nconcluding that Con gress intended the st atute to provide the so le avenue for relief. Smith , 468 U. S., at 1011 (noting “the comprehensive nature of the procedures and guarantees set out in the [the statute] and Co ngress’ express efforts to place on loc a l and state educ ation a l agencies the primary responsibility for deve loping a plan to acco mmodate t h e needs of eac hindividual handicapped child”). In Rancho Palos Verd e s , we again focused on a statute’s remedial s c heme in inferringcongressional intent for exclusivity. After being denied a permit to build a ra dio tower on h i s property , the plaintiff brough t claims fo r7 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### injunctive relief under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA) and for damages and attorney’s fees under §1983. Noting that th e TCA provides highly detailed and restrictive administr a tive and judicial remedies, a n d explaining that “limita t ions upon the remedy contained in the statute are deliberate and are not to be evaded through §1983,” we again concluded that Congress mus t have intended the stat utory remedies to b e e x clusive. 5 4 4 U. S., at 12 4. In all three cases, the statutes at issue required plain

tiffs to comply with particular procedures and/or to ex

haust parti cular admi nistrative remedies prior to filing suit. Sea Clammers , supra, at6 ; Smith , su p ra, at 1011 – 1012; Rancho Palos Verdes , sup ra, at 122. Offering plain

tiffs a direct route to cou rt via §1983 would have circu m vented these procedures and gi ven plaintiffs access to tangible benefits—such as dama ges, attorney’s fees, a n d costs—that were unavailable under the statutes. 1 

### “Allow

ing a plaintiff to circu mvent” the statutes’ p r ovisions i n this way would have been “inconsistent with Congres s ’ carefully ta ilored scheme.” Smith , supra, at 1 012.

——————

1 The statutes at issue in Sea Clammersan d Smithdid not allow for damag e s. Th e statu t e at i ssu e in Ran c h oPalos V erd e sdid not e x pr esslyallow f o rdamag e s, b u t some lowerc o ur ts inter p reted it to do so

. Th e statu t e s at i ssu e in Sm i t han d Rancho Palos V e r d esdid not allow for attorney’s fees and costs. See Sea Cla m m ers , 453 U. S., at 6–7, 13 – 14 ( a ddr ess i n gth e Feder a l WaterPollu t i onCon t r o l Ac t, 86 S t at. 81 6, as a m en ded, 33 U. S. C. §125 1 et seq ., and the Marine Protection , Resear c h , an d San c tu ar ies Ac t of 197 2, 8 6S t a t . 10 52, as amen ded, 3 3 U. S. C. §1401 et seq

. ); Smith , 468 U. S., a t1 010 –1 01 1 ( a ddr essin gth e Edu c ationof th e Han d ic a pped Ac t, 84St at. 175, a s a m en ded, 2 0 U. S. C. §1400 et seq .); Ranc ho Palos Ve rdes , 544 U. S., at 12 2– 123, a n d n n . 3, 4 (addressin gth e Telec o mmu n i c a tion s Ac t of 199 6, 110 St at. 5 6 , 47 U. S. C. §332(c )(7)).8 FITZGERALD v. BARNSTA B LE SCHOOL COMM. Opinion of theCourt 

### B 1 Section 901(a) of Title IX provides: “No person in the United States shall, on thebasis of sex, be excluded from participatio nin, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to di scrimination under any educati o n program or ac tivityreceiving Federal financial as sistance.” 20 U. S. C. §1681(a). The statute’s only express enforcem e nt mechanism, §1682, is an administrative procedure resulting in the with

drawal of federal funding from institutions that are not i n compliance. In addition, this Court has recognized an implied private right of action. Cannon v. University of Chica go , 441 U. S. 677, 717 (1 979). In asuit brought pursuant to this private right, b o th injunctive relief an d damages are available. Franklin v. Gwinnett Coun ty Public Scho ols , 503 U. S. 60, 76 (1992). These rem e dies—withdrawal of federal fun d s and an implied cause of action—stand in stark co ntrast to t h e “unusually elaborate, ” “ca refully tailored,” and “restri c tive” enforcement schemes of the statutes at issue in Sea Clammers , Smith , and Rancho Palo s Verde s . Unlik e those statutes, Title IX has no administrative exhaustion re

quirement and no notice provisions. Under its implied private ri gh t of action , plaintiffs can file directly in cou rt, Cannon , supra, at 717, and can obtain the f u ll range of remedies, see Franklin , supra, at 72 (con cluding th at “Congress d i d not intend to limit the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX”). As a result, parallel an d concurrent §1983 claims will neither circum vent required procedures, nor allow access to new remedies. Moreover, this Court explained in Rancho Pa los Verde s that “[t]he provision of an expres s , private means of r e dress in the statute its e lf” is a key consideration in deter

mining congressional intent, and that “the existence of a9 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### more restrictive priva t e reme dy for statutory violations has beenthe dividing line between those cases inwhich we have held that an action would lie under §1983 an d those in wh ich we have held that it would not.” 544 U. S., at 121 (em p hasis added). As noted, Title IX contains no express pri v ate remed y , much les s a more re strictive on e. This Court has never h e ld that an implied righ t of action had the effect of precluding suit under §1983, likely be

cause of the difficulty of discerning congressional intent in such a situation. See Franklin , supra, at 76 (S CALI A 

### , J., concurring in judgmen t) (“ Quite o b viously, th e search for what was Congress’ re me dial int e nt as to a right whose very e x istence Congre ss did not e x pressly ac knowledge is unlikely to succeed”). Mindful that we should “not lightly conclude that Congres s intended to preclude reliance on §1983 as a remedy for a subs tantial equ a l protection claim,” Smith , 468 U. S., at 1012, we see n o b a sis for doing so here. 2 A comparison of the s ubstantive rights and protections guaranteed under Title IX and under the Equal Protection Clause lends further support to the conclusion that Con

gress did n o t intend Title IX to preclude §1983 constitu

tional suits. Title IX’s protections are narrower in some respects an d broaderin others. Because th e protectio n s guaranteed by the two sources of law diverge in this way, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that “Congress saw Title IX as the sole means of vindicating the constitu

tional right to be free from gender discrimination perpe

trated by educational in stitutions.” 504 F. 3d, at 179. Title IX reaches institutions and programs th at receive federal funds, 20 U. S. C. §1681(a), which may include nonpublic institutions, §1681(c), but it has consistently been interpreted as not autho rizing suit against school officials, teachers, and other individuals, see, e.g. , Ha rtl e y10 FITZGERALD v. BARNSTA B LE SCHOOL COMM. Opinion of theCourt



### v. Parn ell, 193 F. 3d 1263, 1270 (CA11 1999). The Equ a l Protection Clause reaches only state actors, but §1983 equal protection claims may be b r ought agai nst individu

als as well as municipalities and certain oth e r state enti

ties. West v. Atkins , 48 7 U. S. 42, 48–51 (1988). Title IX ex empts from its restrictions several activities that may be challenged on constitutional grounds. For example, Title IX ex empts ele m entary and secondary schools from its prohibition ag ainst discrimination in admissions, §1681(a)(1); it exempts military servi c e schools andtraditionally single-sex public colleges from all of its provisions, §§1681(a)(4)–(5). Some exempted activi

ties may form the basis of equa l protection claims. See United States v. V i rgin ia , 518 U. S. 515, 534 (1996) (men

only admissions policyat Virgini aMilitary Institute vio

lated the Equal Protection Clause); Mississippi Univ. fo r Womenv. Hogan , 458 U. S. 718, 731 (1982) (women-only admission policy at a traditiona lly single-sex public college violated the Equal Protection Clause). Even wher e particular activities and partic u lar defen

dants are subject to both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, the standards for establishing liability may not be wholly congruent. Fo r example, a Title IX plaintiff ca n establish sc hool distric tliability b yshowing that a singl e school administrator with aut ho rity to ta ke correctiv e action responded to h a rassment with deliberate indiffer

ence. Gebs er v. Lago Vista Independent Sch ool Dist., 524 U. S. 274, 290 (1998). A plaintif f stating a similar claim via §1983 for violationof the Equal Protection Clause by a school district or other municipal entity must show that the harassment was the result of municipal custom, policy, or prac tice. Monell v . Ne w Yor kCity Dep t . of Socia l Serv s. , 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978). In light of the diverge n t coverage of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clau se, as well as the abs ence of acom prehensive remedial scheme comparable to those at issue11 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### in Sea Clammers , Sm ith , and Rancho Palos Verdes , we conclude that Title IX was not meant to be a nexclusive mechanism for addressing gender discri mination in schools, or a substitute for §1 983 suits as a means of en forcing constitutional rights. Ac cordingly, we hold that §1983 suits based on t h e Equal P r otection Clause remain available to plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools

. 

### 3 This conclusion is consistent with Title IX’s c o ntext and history. In enacting Title IX, Con gress amended §902, 7 8 Stat. 266– 267, 42 U. S. C. §200 0h–2 to a u thorize th e Attorney General to intervene in private suits alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the Equa l Protection Clause. See §906, 8 6 Stat. 375 (adding the term “sex” to the listed grounds, which already included race, color, religion or national origin). Accordingly, it appears that the Congress that en acted Title IX explicitly envisioned that pri v ate plaintiffs would bri n g constitu

tional claims to challenge ge nder discrimination; it m u st have recognized that plaintiffs would do so via 42 U. S. C. §1983. Moreover, Congress modeled Ti tle IX afterTitle VIof the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Cannon, 441 U

. S., at 694– 695, and passed Title IX with the explicit un derstanding that it wou l d be interpreted as T i tle VI was, id ., at 696

. At the time of Title IX’ s enactmen t in 1972, Title VI was routinely interpreted t o allo w for parallel and concurre nt §1983 claims, see, e.g. , Alvarado v. El Paso Independent School Dist ., 445 F. 2d1011 (CA5 1971); Nashville I–40 Ste ering Comm. v. Elli ngton , 387 F. 2d 179 (CA6 1967); Bossie r Pa r i sh School Bd. v. Le mon , 370 F. 2d 847 (CA5 1967), and we presum e Congress was awa r e of this whe n it passed Title IX, s ee Franklin , 5 03 U. S., at 71 (in asses s ing Congre ss’ intent, “we evaluate the state of the law12 FITZGERALD v. BARNSTA B LE SCHOOL COMM. Opinion of theCourt 

### when the Legislature passed Title IX”). Inthe absenceo f any contra ry evidence, it follows that Congress intended Title IX to be interpr e ted similarly to allo w forparal l el and concurrent §1983 claims. At the least, this indicates that Congress did not affirmatively intend Title IXto preclude such claims. 2 

### III One matte r remains. Respond e nts contend that th e judgment o f the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on independen t grounds—namely, that the Fitz geralds hav e no actionab le §1983 claim on which to proceed. They contend th at the Court of Appe als’ holding that neither the school committee nor De ver actedwi th deliberate indifference is conclus ive and forecloses a§1 983 constitu

tional claim based on a similar theory of liability. The y contend that all other §1983 constitutional cla i ms onthes e facts are p r ecluded by the Fitz g e ralds’ failure to allege such claims adequately or to preserve them on appeal. The Fitzgeralds respon d that they have no in tention of relitigating the issue of deliberate indifference. They intend, they say, to advance claims of discriminatory

——————

2 Respondents ar g u e that c o nstituti onal p r otections against gender disc r i min a tionwer emin i mal in1972, a s th e on lyg e n d er -based equ a l protection case this Court had de cided employed a rational basi s stan dar d

. Reed v. Reed , 404 U. S. 71, 76 ( 197 1). Bu t se e Gu n t h e r , In S e a rch of Evolving Doct rine on aCha n gin gCourt : A Mo del for Newer Equ a l Pr otec t i on , 86 Harv . L. Rev

. 1, 34 (197 2) ( Reed e x emplified the applica t ion of rationality review “wit h bi te ”). Theyfur therar g u e tha t b e ca us e Congr e s s could not have view ed th e Equal Protection Clause as offering am e aningful rem e dyfor s e x discri mination by sc hools, it could n o t h av eenv i sion ed an d in ten d ed forTitle IXan d §1983 c o n s titu tion al claims to proc eed s i de by s i de. But the rel e vant questionis not whether Congress envi sioned that the two ty pes of claims would proceed to

get h er in a d dr es s i ng gende rdis crim i nati on in schools; it is whether Congres s a ffirm a t ively int e nded t opr ecl u de this result. The limited nature of co nstitutional protection s a g a i ns t gender di s crimina tion in 197 2 offer s n o ev iden c eth at Con gr e ss did.13 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### treatment in the inves t igation of student behavior and in the treatment of student complaints, which they were foreclosed f r om develo ping at the earliest st ages of litiga

tion by the dismissal of the §1983 claims. As the Fitzgeralds note, no cour t has addr essed the merits of their constitutional claim s or eventhe sufficienc y of their pleadings. Ordinarily , “we do not decide in the first instan ce issues not decided below,” National Colle

giate Athle t ic Assn. v. Smith , 525 U. S. 459, 470 (1999) , and we see no reason for doing so here. Accordin gly , we revers e the Court of Appeals’ judgment that the Di strict Court ’ s dismissal of the §198 3 claims wa s proper and remand this case for further proc eedings con

sistent with this opinion. It is so orde red.