1

Filed 6/24/22 P. v. Accredited Surety and Casualty Co. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ACCREDITED SURETY AND 

CASUALTY COMPANY, INC.,

Real Party In Interest and 

Appellant.

 A162988

(Sonoma County Super. Ct. 

No. SCR6807701)

Defendant Ronald Mazzaferro was charged with several counts of 

misdemeanor violating a court order to prevent domestic violence and 

evading a peace officer in two separate cases, and appellant Accredited 

Surety and Casualty Company, Inc. (the surety) posted a $100,000 bond that 

was transferred from one case to the other when the two were consolidated. 

After defendant failed to appear on November 6, 2019, the trial court ordered 

bail forfeited and later denied the surety’s motion to vacate the forfeiture. 

The surety contends that bail was exonerated by failure to provide notice of 

the transfer and that the trial court lost jurisdiction to declare bail forfeited 

when it did not do so on three dates when defendant did not appear prior to 

November 6, 2019. We affirm. 
2

BACKGROUND

On May 3, 2016, in Sonoma County Superior Court Case No. SCR680697, defendant was charged with two misdemeanors: violating a court 

order to prevent domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a))

1 and 

evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a)), both on April 30, 

2016. In Sonoma County Superior Court Case No. SCR-680770-1, also filed 

on May 3, defendant was charged with three more counts of violating a court 

order to prevent domestic violence (§ 273.6, subd. (a)) on March 22, April 21, 

and April 25, and with another count of evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, 

§ 2800.1, subd. (a) ) on April 28. The record does not contain the complaint in 

either case, but the trial court later described the section 273.6 charges as 

alleging that defendant “violat[ed] an Elder Protection order obtained by his 

elderly mother.” 

On May 5, defendant was released from custody when the surety,

through its agent Romelli Bail Bonds, posted bond number AF-00863510 in 

Case No. SCR-680697 in the amount of $100,000. The trial court set a 

readiness conference in Case No. SCR-680697 for May 24. 

On May 24, defendant was present in court. The trial court granted 

the prosecution’s oral motion to consolidate Case No. SCR680697 into Case 

No. SCR-680770-1. The trial court also ordered that “Bail bond #AF00863510

in the amount of $100,000 [be] transferred into this case from SCR-680697.”

There is no indication in the record that notice of this transfer was ever given 

to the surety.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
3

Over the next two years, numerous hearings took place, including 

approximately twenty hearings where defendant personally appeared. In 

2021, the trial court would later observe: “[T]his case has had an 

extraordinarily long history for a misdemeanor. It has been set for trial 

repeatedly. The case has been intensely litigated by defendant throughout 

its history. Defendant has filed at least three non-statutory motions to 

dismiss; more than one demurrer, more than one discovery motion, he filed at 

least on[e] Petition for Habeas Corpus, and filed at least one Writ Petition.” 

On July 5, 2018, defendant was not present in court but appeared 

through counsel pursuant to section 977.

2 According to the minutes, the 

prosecution requested a warrant for defendant’s non-appearance, the trial 

court denied the request, and defense counsel then objected to requiring 

defendant’s personal appearance. The matter was continued until August 31, 

and the court ordered defendant to be present on that date. 

On August 31, defendant was not present. There is no transcript of the 

hearing in the record, but the minutes from that date provide that defense 

counsel appeared and “has been directed to have his client present at the 

next court hearing,” which was set for November 9.

On November 9, defendant was present. 

On November 12, the minutes provide: “People request Defendant 

ordered to be present Counsel objects to defendant being present Court does 

not order defendant present.” 

On February 6, 2019, defendant was not present, and the trial court 

ordered that he be “personally present at all readiness and trial dates.” 

2 “In all cases in which the accused is charged with a misdemeanor 

only, they may appear by counsel only, except as provided in paragraphs 

(2) and (3).” (§ 977, subd. (a)(1).) 
4

Defendant personally appeared at some six hearings over the following 

eight months. 

On Thursday, October 24, defendant was present, and the trial court

set the following dates for pretrial, jury selection, and trial: October 28, 29, 

30, and 31, and November 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12. 

As the trial court would later explain:

“When court recessed on October 24, 2019, the next scheduled trial date 

was Monday, October 28, 2020[3]. What became known as the Kincaid fire 

started on Sunday, October 27, 2020 and the Sonoma County Superior Court 

was closed the following week. (See, Transcript of Electronic Recording of 

proceedings on November 4, 2019, p. 1:23-27; the court closure is discussed in 

the transcript. The closure was also confirmed by General Order Re: 

Implementation of Emergency Relief Authorized Pursuant to Government 

Code Section 68115 by Chair of Judicial Council, filed October 29, 2019, 

Sonoma County Superior Court, deeming Monday, October 28 through 

Friday, November 1, 2019 to be court holidays, pursuant to Government Code 

section 68115(a)(1)).” 

The trial court notified counsel for the parties that trial would resume 

on Monday, November 4. Defendant was not present on that date. Defense 

counsel told the trial court: “I represent Ronald Mazzaferro, but he is not 

present, and I don’t know where he is, Your Honor.” He went on: “I have 

tried to call Mr. Mazzaferro, and his voice—it went straight to voicemail. I’ve 

left him a text message without any response. [¶] The last time I met with 

Mr. Mazzaferro was Friday, October 25th, at my office, and we were awaiting 

for—I guess to see what happened with the fires, et cetera, or you know, we—

3 The references to 2020 appear to be mistakes in the trial court’s order, 

as the rest of the order makes clear that the Kincaid fire took place in 2019.
5

we—it was—the court was cancelled due to the fires.” Defense counsel had 

forwarded the court’s message indicating that trial would resume on 

November 4 to defendant’s email, but did not receive any response. The trial 

court issued and stayed a bench warrant until the next day at 1:30 p.m., in 

order to “give you 24 hours to get your client in here.” 

The next day, November 5, defendant was again not present. Defense 

counsel indicated that he had called, emailed, and sent a text message to 

defendant, but had not received any response. The trial court then noted: “It 

appears he may have been downstairs just a bit ago and filed this document. 

It’s another document in the case with no name put at the top. [¶] . . . [¶] It 

was signed on October 25th. It was filed today. There’s no bate stamp 

indicating it was left at an earlier time.” The trial court again issued a bench 

warrant in the amount of $10,000, “but I will allow Mr. Mazzaferro to be cited 

to appear tomorrow afternoon at 1:30.” The trial court also suggested it was 

considering making a finding that the defendant had voluntarily absented 

himself from trial such that it could proceed in his absence: “Again, it 

appears to me based on a very strong inference that Mr. Mazzaferro is the 

one who filed this document. So that would mean he’s coming to court and 

simply deciding not to come to trial.” 

On November 6, defendant was again not present. The trial court

found that the defendant had voluntarily absented himself from trial and

ordered bail forfeited. 

On December 3, the surety filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture and 

exonerate bail. The surety argued that the bond was exonerated under 

section 1303 when the court failed to mail notice to the surety that it had 

transferred bail from case No. SCR-680697 to case No. SCR-680770-1, and 

that the court lost jurisdiction to declare bail forfeited when it failed to 
6

declare a forfeiture when defendant did not appear on August 31, 2018, 

November 4, 2019, and November 5, 2019. 

On January 7, 2021, the prosecution filed a “non-opposition” to the 

motion, and on January 13, the court requested supplemental briefing “on the 

propriety of the court continuing the hearings on August 31, 2018, 

November 4, 2019, and November 5, 2019.” 

On June 2, the trial court issued a 10-page written order denying the

motion. With respect to the transfer of the bond, the trial court found the 

changes authorized by the bond language because “[t]he action with which 

[case No. SCR-680697] was consolidated alleged additional violations of . . . 

section 273.6(a) based on defendant’s alleged failure to comply with the terms 

of the same protective order obtained by his elderly mother.” 

With respect to the August 31 failure to appear, the trial court found:

“The record adequately discloses the contention over whether 

defendant should be forced to appear—at a non-trial, non-essential hearing—

because the prosecution wanted the court to order the defendant to show up. 

When the defendant failed to appear and his attorney picked up the 

argument about the defendant’s right to appear through counsel in 

misdemeanor cases where he had left off at the prior hearing, the court 

informed defense counsel that the defendant had to come to court at the next 

hearing [on November 9, 2018]; which he did.” 

And with respect to defendant’s failure to appear on November 4 and 5, 

2019: “The uncertainties created by the Kincaid Fire combined with 

defendant’s long history of appearing in court either in person or through 

counsel, was a sufficient basis to excuse defendant’s non-appearance on 

November 4, 2019,” and “[t]he extraordinary circumstance of the Kincade 

fire, the court closure, and defendant’s multi-year history of making his court 
7

appearances was a sufficient basis to excuse defendant’s non-appearance on 

November 5, 2019 and to continue the matter for one more day.” 

Summary judgment was subsequently entered against the surety, from 

which the surety appeals.

DISCUSSION

The Bond Is Not Exonerated For Failure to Comply with the 

Notice Provisions of Section 1303

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Generally, we review an order resolving a motion to vacate a bond 

forfeiture under an abuse of discretion standard, “subject to constraints 

imposed by the bail statutory scheme.” (County of Orange v. Lexington Nat. 

Ins. Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1491–1492.) “As the Supreme Court 

has noted, however, ‘[t]he abuse of discretion standard is not a unified 

standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial 

court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for 

substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its 

application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and 

capricious.’ ” (County of Los Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group (2009) 

173 Cal.App.4th 538, 543.) “[W]here, as here, the facts are uncontested, and 

the issue concerns a pure question of law, we review the decision de novo.” 

(People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 913, 917; 

People v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 915, 919 (Amwest).)

The surety argues that it is entitled to exoneration of the bond under 

section 1303, which provides as follows:

“If an action or proceeding against a defendant who has been admitted 

to bail is dismissed, the bail shall not be exonerated until a period of 15 days 

has elapsed since the entry of the order of dismissal. If, within such period, 
8

the defendant is arrested and charged with a public offense arising out of the 

same act or omission upon which the action or proceeding was based, the bail 

shall be applied to the public offense. If an undertaking of bail is on file, the 

clerk of the court shall promptly mail notice to the surety on the bond and the 

bail agent who posted the bond whenever the bail is applied to a public 

offense pursuant to this section.” 

Analysis

The surety relies on cases holding that “section 1303 requires the 

called-for notice of transfer of the bail without regard to similarity of the 

pleadings or the parties,” and “[t]he surety need not show prejudice”—

instead, “failure of the court to give notice to the surety within 15 days of the 

transfer of the bail to the new complaint exonerates the undertaking.” 

(People v. Surety Ins. Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 848, 854; see People v. 

Resolute Ins. Co. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 433, 436–437.) As noted, there is no 

indication in the record that any notice of the transfer of bail was given to the 

surety. 

But section 1303 is inapplicable, because that section applies only “[i]f 

an action or proceeding against a defendant who has been admitted to bail is 

dismissed.” The complaint in Case No. SCR-680697 was not dismissed—

instead, Case No. SCR-680697 was consolidated into Case No. SCR-680770-1. 

(See People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [section 1303 does 

not apply where new complaint filed after the bond posted; instead it applies 

only “when the bail bond posted on one action is transferred to new charges 

filed soon after the first action is dismissed”]; People v. International Fidelity 

Ins. Co. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1398–1400 [section 1303 does not apply 

to amended information based on the same originally pleaded facts].) 
9

In addition, the charges in case No. SCR-680770-1 are encompassed by

the language of the bond itself, which provides that the surety “hereby 

undertakes that the above-named defendant will appear in the above-named 

court on the date above set forth to answer any charge in any accusatory 

pleading based upon the acts supporting the complaint filed against him/her 

or in duly authorized amendments thereof, in whatever court it may be filed

and prosecuted.” Thus, the surety undertook to guarantee defendant’s 

appearance in SCR-680770-1 if the complaint in that action was “based upon 

the acts supporting the complaint filed against him” in SCR-680697, “or in 

duly authorized amendments thereof.” 

As noted, the record does not contain the complaints, or any description 

of the facts underlying the charges, in either SCR-680697 or SCR-680770-1.4 

However, both cases involve violations of section 273.6, subdivision (a) in a 

similar time frame—March and April of 2016. And according to the trial 

court’s order, “[t]he action [No. SCR-680770-1] with which [No. SCR-680697]

was consolidated alleged additional violations of Penal Code section 273.6(a) 

based on defendant’s alleged failure to comply with the terms of the same 

protective order obtained by his elderly mother.” Under these circumstances, 

the allegations in No. SCR-680770-1 arise from the same course of conduct as 

those in No. SCR-680697, and the bond covers both. (See People v. Indiana 

Lumberman’s Mutual Insurance Company (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1541, 

4 Neither party’s brief contains any description of the facts underlying 

the complaints against defendant, but the surety does not dispute the trial 

court’s characterization of those facts. And to the extent the record is silent, 

it must be construed against the surety’s argument of error. (See Jameson v. 

Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [“ ‘Consequently, [the appellant] has the 

burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an 

adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the 

appellant]’ ”].)
10

1549–1550 [finding consolidation covered by identical bond language where 

two complaints were “based upon the same course of conduct”]; People v. 

International Fidelity Ins. Co., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1397–1398

[finding identical bond language covers “charges or enhancements [that] arise 

out of the same facts that were alleged in the original complaint”]; People v. 

Bankers Ins. Co., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 6–8 [similar].)

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding 

Sufficient Excuse on August 31, 2018, and November 4 and 5, 2018

Applicable Law

Under section 1305, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] court shall in open court 

declare forfeited the undertaking of bail or the money or property deposited 

as bail if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear” for any 

occasion where his or her presence in court is “lawfully required.” However, 

section 1305.1—added in 1993, and restating in substance former section 

1305, subdivision (b)—provides: “If the defendant fails to appear for 

arraignment, trial, judgment, or upon any other occasion when his or her 

appearance is lawfully required, but the court has reason to believe that 

sufficient excuse may exist for the failure to appear, the court may continue 

the case for a period it deems reasonable to enable the defendant to appear 

without ordering a forfeiture of bail or issuing a bench warrant.” 

In considering a previous version of the statute that provided that the 

court must declare bail forfeited “ ‘if, without sufficient excuse, the defendant 

neglects to appear’ ” when lawfully required, our Supreme Court explained 

that “[t]he failure to so declare an immediate forfeiture upon the 

nonappearance of a defendant bailee can be justified only where there is some 

rational basis for a belief at the time of his nonappearance that there exists a 

sufficient excuse therefor,” and “[w]hat constitutes a sufficient excuse 
11

generally rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . .” (People v. 

United Bonding Ins. Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, pp. 903, fn.4, 906–907 (United 

Bonding).) 

Courts have since applied this same reasoning to the “reason to believe 

that sufficient excuse may exist” language now contained in section 1305.1: 

“The Supreme Court’s language and reasoning on this issue in United 

Bonding appear equally applicable to an interpretation of the language added 

to the statute in 1969, as it would be impossible for a trial court, in the 

exercise of sound judicial discretion, to have ‘reason to believe that sufficient 

excuse may exist’ for a nonappearance if there were not some basis in fact for 

such a conclusion. (§ 1305, subd. (b) [now § 1305.1].) There could be no good 

faith ‘belief’ to support a delay in ordering forfeiture that was not grounded in 

‘some rational basis.’ ” (People v. Surety Ins. Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 22, 

27, quoting United Bonding, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 906; see Amwest, supra, 

56 Cal.App.4th at p. 923.) 

Importantly, “the test is not whether it has been conclusively 

demonstrated a defendant had an actual and valid excuse for his 

nonappearance to justify continuing a hearing without declaring a bail 

forfeiture.” (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 945, 953

(Ranger).) Section 1305.1 “requires the court [to] only have ‘reason to believe 

that sufficient excuse may exist for the failure to appear.’ ” (Ranger, at 

p. 953, fn. omitted, quoting § 1305.1.)

The factual basis for the sufficient excuse finding must appear 

somewhere in the trial court record—in the minutes or in the reporter’s 

transcript. (See People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 784, 

797 (North River); Amwest, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 922; People v. Frontier 

Pacific Ins. Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 889, 895–896.) 
12

“The law traditionally disfavors forfeitures and this disfavor extends to 

forfeiture of bail. (People v. United Bonding Ins. Co.[, supra,] 5 Cal.3d [at 

p.] 906.) Thus, sections 1305 and 1306 must be strictly construed in favor of 

the surety to avoid the harsh results of a forfeiture. [Citation.]” (People v. 

Surety Ins. Co., supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 26.) This is in part because “the 

public interest . . . prefers the appearance of a defendant rather than a 

monetary penalty.” (County of Los Angeles v. Surety Ins. Co. (1985) 

165 Cal.App.3d 948, 950.)

“Where a statute such as section 1305, subdivision (b) [now section 

1305.1], requires a court to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner, to 

follow a particular procedure, or to perform subject to certain limitations, an 

act beyond those limits is in excess of its jurisdiction. [Citations.]” (People v. 

Surety Ins. Co., supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 26.) Thus “[i]f the court fails to 

declare a forfeiture at the time of the defendant’s unexcused absence, it is 

without jurisdiction to do so later.” (People v. Safety National Casualty Corp.

(2016) 62 Cal.4th 703, 710 (Safety National).)

We review a trial court’s finding of sufficient excuse for abuse of 

discretion. (See United Bonding, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 906–907 [“What 

constitutes a sufficient excuse generally rests within the sound discretion of 

the trial judge”]; Ranger, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 952 [“The 

determination whether an excuse is sufficient is a matter within the trial 

court’s discretion”]; People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 418, 

425–426 [reviewing finding of sufficient excuse for abuse of discretion]; 

People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 127, 135 

[same].)5

5 The surety argues that because the facts are undisputed, we are faced 

with a pure question of law that we review de novo. (See County of Los 

Angeles v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309, 314.) But 
13

“In most situations involving a section 1305, subdivision (b) [now 

section 1305.1] determination the only reasons before the trial court are the 

evidence or representations furnished by defendant’s counsel. The cases 

demonstrate that the courts have cooperated with defense counsels’ requests 

and have liberally relied on their representations.” (People v. Nat’l Auto. & 

Cas. Ins. Co. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 302, 306.)

By way of example, sufficient excuse has been found where defense 

counsel represented that defendant’s mother was dying of cancer (People v. 

Ranger Ins. Co. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 13, 17, 19–20); in a situation where 

“there may be an emergency [defendant] attended to, and he may be . . . 

available tomorrow morning” (Amwest, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925–

926); where defense counsel’s “client had told him that he had gone to 

Stockton for medical treatment due to severe internal bleeding” (People v. 

Sur. Ins. Co. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 197, 199); and where defense counsel 

stated “there’s a possibility [defendant] might be in the San Francisco area” 

because “[t]here’s also another action pending in San Francisco” (People v. 

Wilshire Ins. Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 256, 258). Even vague representations 

by counsel have been found sufficient—i.e., where defendant had never 

previously failed to appear and defense counsel was “concerned something 

has happened.” (See Ranger, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 953.)

August 31, 2018

The surety does not discuss the trial court’s reasons for finding 

sufficient excuse may have existed on August 31, 2018, simply asserting that 

the first case cited by the surety does not involve appeal from a trial court’s 

finding of sufficient excuse under section 1305.1. (See People v. Am. Bankers 

Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 348, 350–351.) The second case does not 

involve bond forfeiture at all. (See Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 

43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712.) We will follow the authorities cited in the text and 

conclude that the better view is that our review is for abuse of discretion. 
14

“[t]here is no indication in the minutes of any excuse, factual or otherwise, for 

the failure to appear.” We disagree. 

The minutes for July 5, 2018 provide: “People request a warrant for 

Defendant’s nonappearance. Court denies request. Defense Counsel objects 

to personal appearance Matter continued to 8-31-18 8:30am Courtroom 4, 

Further Proceedings Defendant ordered to be present 8-31-18.” 

On August 31, defendant was not present. And the minutes provide: 

“Defendant not present Defense counsel appearing: J. Lemmon Counsel has 

been directed to have his client present at the next court hearing.” 

In its order denying the motion to vacate the forfeiture, the trial court 

later explained:

“The record adequately discloses the contention over whether 

defendant should be forced to appear—at a non-trial, non-essential hearing—

because the prosecution wanted the court to order the defendant to show up. 

When the defendant failed to appear and his attorney picked up the 

argument about the defendant’s right to appear through counsel in 

misdemeanor cases where he had left off at the prior hearing, the court 

informed defense counsel that the defendant had to come to court at the next 

hearing; which he did. As defense counsel later argued, and the record

demonstrates: ‘Mr. Mazzaferro does not miss court, as the court is well 

aware.’ At that point, this was indisputably true. The record shows that 

there were no further issues regarding defendant’s appearances through 

counsel. Later in the proceedings, when the court ordered the defendant to 

be personally present for all trial and pre-trial hearings, defendant complied.” 

Thus, the record indicates that there was there was some “contention” 

on July 5 as to whether defendant should be required to personally appear, 

and that the defense counsel objected to such appearance. On August 31, 
15

defense counsel “picked up the argument . . . where he had left off at the prior 

hearing,” an argument that was resolved by the trial court ordering that the 

defendant appear at the next hearing—held on November 9—which he did. 

Although the minutes of July 5 indicate that “[d]efendant ordered to be 

present 8-31-18,” there was apparently some lack of clarity around that order

because of defense counsel’s objection to requiring defendant’s personal 

appearance and his argument that he could appear through counsel, an 

argument which was not definitively resolved until the hearing on August 31. 

In short, the record admits the possibility that defendant was not 

unequivocally required to be present on August 31 or that his counsel did not 

so inform him. (See People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2017)

14 Cal.App.5th 127, 131, 135 [defendant may have had excuse where defense 

counsel indicated he may have been “confused” by “issuance of two separate 

court dates”]; People v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1289, 

1293 [finding excuse where there was “confusion” as to whether defendant 

was required to appear and he had “appeared at every previous hearing and 

throughout the trial”].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that defendant may have had sufficient excuse for his nonappearance on August 31. 

November 4 and 5, 2018

Again, the surety does not address the trial court’s reasoning behind its 

finding of sufficient excuse on November 4 or 5, 2019—its opening brief does 

not even mention the Kincaid fire. It simply asserts that “the transcripts of 

the hearings held on November 4, and 5 do not contain any excuse for the 

defendant’s failure to appear in court as lawfully required.” Again, we 

disagree. 
16

On Thursday, October 24, defendant was present in court and ordered 

to return on Monday, October 28. On Friday the 25th, defendant met with 

defense counsel at his office, waiting “to see what happened with the fires.” 

However, over the weekend, the Kincaid fire began, resulting in the closure of 

the courthouse for the entire week of October 28. The trial court informed 

defense counsel, through its judicial assistant, that trial would resume on 

Monday November 4, and defense counsel forwarded that message to his 

client’s email but did not receive any response. On November 4, defense 

counsel indicated that he had called and texted defendant, but had not seen 

or heard from him since October 25th. Thus, the record supported the 

inference that defendant may have had sufficient excuse for his nonappearance on November 4, either because of the Kincaid fire itself or 

because the fire prevented him from receiving notice that trial was to resume 

on that date. (See People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., supra,

14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 131, 136; People v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co., supra,

83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293.) 

In addition, defense counsel noted that “Mr. Mazzaferro does not miss 

count, as the court is well aware. I don’t think he’s ever missed court.” 

Indeed, at this point, with the exception of the August 31 non-appearance 

discussed above, defendant had personally appeared in court each and every 

time he was ordered to do so— approximately 28 times over a period 

spanning two years and four months. The trial court could permissibly 

conclude from this long history of attendance that the defendant’s absence on 

November 4 was with excuse. (See Ranger, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 

[defendant’s past history of making court appearances “over a several month 

period provided a ‘rational basis for believing there might be a sufficient 

excuse for the defendant’s absence”].) 
17

In sum, as the trial court put it: “The uncertainties created by the 

Kincaid Fire combined with defendant’s long history of appearing in court 

either in person or through counsel, was a sufficient basis to excuse 

defendant’s non-appearance on November 4, 2019.” We agree.

As the trial court explained, “[t]he circumstances known to the court on 

November 5, 2019 were not markedly different than the circumstances 

known to the court on November 4, 2019.” Defense counsel had still not had 

any contact with defendant, despite having called, emailed, and texted him. 

There was still no indication that defendant had ever received notice that the 

trial was set to resume on November 4. Although a document had been filed 

in the case, evidently on November 5, there was no confirmation that 

defendant had filed it himself. In short, the situation was essentially 

unchanged from the day before. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that defendant’s non-appearance may have again been with 

sufficient excuse. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 
18

_________________________

Richman, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_________________________

Stewart, J.

_________________________

Mayfield, J. *

People v. Accredited Surety and Casualty Company, Inc. (A162988)

*Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, Judge Cindee Mayfield, sitting as 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.