J-S65030-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STEPHEN KARL GRESH,

Appellant No. 3252 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered October 16, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003974-1992

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and JENKINS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2015

Appellant, Stephen Karl Gresh, appeals pro se from an order entered 

on October 16, 2014, in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. 

The order denied Appellant’s petition for court certification to the 

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) that he 

successfully completed the drug and alcohol treatment necessary to have his 

driving privileges restored pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1541(d).1 We affirm.2

____________________________________________

1

 75 Pa.C.S. § 1541(d) is also termed “Act 122.” The “Act 122” moniker is 

derived from P.L. 513, No. 122, § 1, effective December 1, 1990, which 

amended 75 Pa.C.S. § 1541 and added subsection 1541(d).

2

 As noted above, this appeal involves, at least tangentially, the suspension 

and restoration of Appellant’s driving privileges, which are issues generally 

within the appellate jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 762. However, because the instant appeal involves an element 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this matter as follows:

On February 12, 1993, [Appellant] entered into a guilty 

plea to aggravated assault and driving under the influence and 

was subsequently sentenced to eleven and one-half to twentythree months imprisonment in the Montgomery County 

Correctional Facility. As part of his sentence for driving under 

the influence, [Appellant] was ordered to undergo a [Court 

Reporter Network (“CRN”) drug and alcohol evaluation] and 

complete safe driving school. [Appellant] is currently imprisoned 

in SCI-Huntingdon on a sentence totaling eleven to twenty-five 

years. [Appellant’s] minimum release date is July 30, 2016 and 

his maximum release date is July 30, 2030.

On July 2, 2014, [Appellant] filed a “Petition for 

Certification to PennDOT” alleging that to “re-establish a 

probationary license on May 6, 2017 and to re-establish a 

restored driver’s license on March 9, 2020,” he needs the 

undersigned to certify that he has completed the requisite Act 

122 treatment program [pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1541(d)]. 

After discussions with [Appellant’s] counselor, it was determined 

that the counselors at SCI-Huntingdon aid inmates with these 

type of requests and, therefore, the undersigned denied 

[Appellant’s] request and entered an order, on July 14, 2014, 

which stated “[Appellant] is to contact his counselor, Joseph 

Dinardi, and request a restoration letter. In the event Court 

intervention is required to fulfill any requirements, [Appellant] or 

his counselor shall notify the undersigned.” After receiving 

correspondence from [Appellant] and investigating ... the matter 

further, the undersigned then entered an additional order, on 

July 28, 2014, which stated, “[Appellant] shall send Act 122 

paperwork to Montgomery County DUI Administration Center, 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

of Appellant’s judgment of sentence and not an agency decision made by 

PennDOT, we are satisfied that jurisdiction is properly before our Court. See 

Commonwealth v. Harbst, 763 A.2d 953, 955 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) 

(explaining that where a decision made pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1541 does 

not involve an agency determination by PennDOT, but rather concerns 

whether Appellant completed an element of a criminal sentence, the appeal 

should be within the appellate jurisdiction of the Superior Court).
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100 Ross Road, Suite 110, King of Prussia, PA 19406. Attn: 

Trish.” [Appellant] then filed a sample order asking the Court to 

grant his petition and notify PennDOT to remove the Act 122 

requirement. On October 16, 2014, the undersigned entered an 

order [denying Appellant’s petition] which stated, “after speaking 

to a representative from the Montco. DUI Admin. Center, it was 

revealed that [Appellant] has not completed a CRN evaluation or 

safe driving school. Both requirements must be completed 

before adult probation can send the restoration paperwork to 

clerk of courts.” On October 30, 2014, [Appellant] filed a notice 

of appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/14, at 1-2 (footnote omitted). 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for this Court’s 

consideration:3 

Whether the common pleas criminal court committed reversible 

error, when it denied Appellant’s request for certification to 

PennDOT that [Appellant] successfully completed the court 

ordered drug and alcohol treatment program (Act 122)?

Appellant’s Brief at unnumbered page 7 (full capitalization omitted).4

The statutory provision at issue is as follows: 

§ 1541. Period of disqualification, revocation or 

suspension of operating privilege

____________________________________________

3

 The docket does not reflect an order directing Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement.

4

 We point out that Appellant listed seven additional points for “relief 

requested” in his brief. Appellant’s Brief at unnumbered page 9. Insofar as 

these can be considered “questions presented,” we conclude that they are 

bald assertions of fact or law, which are not supported by argument, citation 

to the record, or relevant legal authority. Accordingly, we deem them 

waived. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 838 (Pa. 2014) 

(stating that claims which fail to contain developed argument or citation to 

supporting authority and the record, will be considered waived on appeal).
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(d) Continued suspension of operating privilege.--A 

defendant ordered by the court under section 3816 (relating to 

requirements for driving under influence offenders), as the result 

of a conviction or Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition of a 

violation of section 3802 to attend a treatment program for 

alcohol or drug addiction must successfully complete all 

requirements of the treatment program ordered by the court 

before the defendant’s operating privilege may be restored. 

Successful completion of a treatment program includes the 

payment of all court-imposed fines and costs, as well as fees to 

be paid to the treatment program by the defendant. For the 

purposes of restoring a suspended license, being current on a 

payment plan shall be considered as a part of a successfully 

completed program. If a defendant fails to successfully 

complete the requirements of a treatment program, the 

suspension shall remain in effect until the defendant completes 

the program and is otherwise eligible for restoration of his 

operating privilege. The treatment agency shall immediately 

notify the court of successful completion of the treatment 

program. The final decision as to whether a defendant has 

successfully completed the treatment program rests with the 

court.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1541(d). 

In the case at bar, Appellant did not fulfill the requirements set forth 

above because he did not provide any proof to the Montgomery County Adult 

Probation office that he completed the treatment program. The trial court 

explained its decision as follows:

It is this [c]ourt’s opinion that we have gone above and 

beyond attempting to aid [Appellant in obtaining] something he, 

realistically, will not be able to utilize for at least a year and a 

half. The fact remains that the Montgomery County Adult 

Probation Department has no proof that [Appellant] has 

completed the necessary requirements (a CRN evaluation or safe 

driving school) to obtain his license. If [Appellant] has, in fact, 

completed these requirements, it is his responsibility to send 

proof to the probation department.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/14, at 2. 
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We conclude that trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an 

error of law in denying Appellant’s petition.5 Accordingly, we affirm the 

order entered on October 16, 2014.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/20/2015

____________________________________________

5

 We point out that there is nothing prejudicial in the trial court’s order. If 

Appellant has satisfied, or at some point in the future satisfies, the 

requirements set forth in 75 Pa.C.S. § 1541(d), he can provide this proof to 

the Montgomery County Adult Probation office. At that time, the trial court 

can review the record and determine whether Appellant successfully 

completed the aforementioned requirements.