### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 6, 200 8

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. DE VIN JAM ES

Appeal from t he Criminal Court for Shelb y County No. 05-01624 Chris Cr aft, Judge

No. W2007-01118-C CA-R 3-CD - Filed Jul y 30, 2008

The Appe llant, Devin J ames, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court afte r a jury

found him g uilty

of the re ckless homicide of Rodney Steward. A fter a

sentenc ing h e ar i n g , J a m e s r e c e i v e d

a t h i rt y- m o n t h s e n t e n c e i nt h e “ w o r kh o u s e , ” w i t h a l l b u tn i n e t y d a ys suspended, f

ollowed by

five y ear s of probation. On appeal, J ames a rg ues: (1) that the trial court’ s de nia l of ju di cial d ive rs ion

wa s e rr or ; ( 2) that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fa ili ngto g ra

nt h im f ull probation; and (3) that the trial cour t erre d in enhanc i n g h i s s en t ence six months bey ond the presumptive minimum and in imposing a probationar y term of five y ear s. After thoroug h revie w of the re cord a

nd the brief

s of the par

ties, we a ffirm.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3; Judgment of the C riminal Court Aff irme d

D AVI D G. H AYES , S R .J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W ELL ES and J AM ES C UR W OOD W I TT , J R ., JJ., joined.

Ge ra ld D . Sk a ha n, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, De vin Ja me s.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, J r

. , A tt o rn e y G e n e r a l an d Re po rt e r; Da vidH. Fin dle y, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; William L. Gibbo n s , Di s t ri ct At t o rn ey Ge n er al ; M i ch el l e P ar k s an d Al an d a D wy er , As sistant District Attorney Ge nera l, for the Appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

Fa c tu al B ac kgr ound

A Shelby County g rand jury

indicted the Appe llant for the of fense of voluntary

manslaug hter in connec tion with the death of the victim, Rodney Steward, w hich occ urre d on October 20, 2004. The Appe llant entere d a plea of not g uilty , and a jur y trial was he ld on Dece mber 6, 7, a nd 8, 2006.

The proof at trial esta

blished that on the afte rnoon of Oc tober 20, 2004, the vic tim was visiti ng at the home of

a fr iend, Sigmond Done lson, when he r ece ived a ph o n e call fr om the Appellant. Done lson testified that the victim subsequently left hi s home, and that he appear ed to be

unconce rned a fter r ece iving the phone call and nor mal in de meanor

. The victim’s f iancé , Tamiko-2-

J ackson, te stified that she knew the Appellant, a nd that the victim considere d the Appellant a g ood friend. She te stified that she talked to the victim via cell phone as he drove to the A ppellant’s home, and that the victim told her that he had to pic k up a pac kag e. Ms. J ackson te stified that she hea rd the Appellant’ s voice fa ding a way , and she also hear d unfamiliar voices in the bac kg round, followed later by the sound of sirens.

Office r T ho ma s John so n o f t he Me mph is Po lic e De pa rtme nt t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s th e fi rs t respondingoffice r at the A ppellant’s house a

round 3:00 p.m. When he arr ived, Off icer J ohnson saw the vic tim , Ro dn e y

Ste wa rd , ly ingfa c e do wn

in t he y ard

. Of

fi c e r Johns on state d tha t th e Ap pe lla nt, who appe are d calm, ca

me out of the house to g ree t him.

Offic er Ricky

Davison of the Memphis Police Depa rtment testified re g ardingphotogr aphs taken at the crime sc ene a nd other e vidence that was c ollected. O ff i ce r Davison testified that no

wea pon was found on or about the victim. He identified photogr aphs o f s p en t n ine-millimeter casing s that were found on the g round nea r the c arpor

t and driveway

of the Appe llant’s house. Offic er D avison also identified a photogr aph of a nine-mill imeter handg un that he recove red on the floor boar d of the Appellant’s For d Taurus parke d in the car port of the pr operty . He f

urther te stified that he found 2.4 g rams of c rac k coca ine in the pocke ts of the victim.

Offic er Wil liam Woodar d interviewe d a neig hbor of the Appellant, who stated that she hea rd seven shots fire d at the Appe llant’s house on the date of the of fense . Tenne ssee B urea u of I nv e sti g a tio n A g e nt D on

Carm an te sti fi e d that the Ap pe lla nt’ s nin e -m ill ime te r pis tol wo uld ho ld s ix rounds i n the clip and one in the chamber, for a tot al of seven rounds. Ag ent Carman f urther opine d that the nine shell ca sings f ound at the sce ne ca

me from the A

ppellant’s gun, as did thre e ninemilli meter bullets re trieved f rom the victim’s body . Shelby County medical e x aminer D r. Kar en Chance llor opined that Rodney Steward died as a result of multipl e gunshot wounds. She testified that she obser

ved a total of

eig ht entranc e wounds on the vic tim’s body

.

I n his wri t t en statement to the police, the Appellant said that he and Rodney Steward

arr ang e d a me e tin g a t his ho us e on the date in qu e sti on

. Th e Ap pe lla nt c la ime d that a ft e r the vic tim

wa lke d in to t

he ho us e thr ou g h the fr on t do or , a no the r m an n a me d M arc us Mo ff itt , n ic kn a me d “ B ig D, ” wa lke d in to the ho us e thr ou g h the ba c k do or

. Th e Ap pe lla nt c la ime d th a t “ B ig D” tol d h im t o “lay down[,] bitch,” and that the victim said they “we re a bout to rob [hi s] punk ass.” The Appe llant

c la ime d th a t “ B ig D” wa s arm e d wi th a nin e -m ill ime te r ha nd g un , b ut t

hat he wa s uns ur e if

the vic tim

was a rmed. The Appellant stated that he ran i n t o another room and g ot his own nine-millim eter handg un. He c laimed that when the victim and “B ig D” sa w his wea pon, they ran out the ba ck door. The Appe llant claimed that he tr ied to follow, but that “they fired shots, so [ he] waited.” He state d that he “r an out and they fired ag ain.” The Appellant claimed that he feare d for his life, and star ted fi ri nghis ow n gun . A ft e rw ard s, he state d th a t he ra n ba c k into his ho us e to ca ll 911 bu t w a s una ble
to us e the ph on e ins ide

. He we nt ba c k ou t to his c ar to ob ta in his c e ll ph on e , a nd he c la ime d th a t a white van or

truck pulled up an d s omeone inside the ve hicle starte d shooting at him aga in. The Appellant stated that he ca lled 911, ran ba ck into his house, and locke d the door.-3-

Serg eant Mullins testified that he investi g ated the are a of the proper ty in which the Appe llant cl ai m edt h at “B i g D” h ad fi re d h i s gu n , an d t h at h e w as u n s u cc es s fu l i nl o ca t i n g an y s h el l ca s i n gs to corrobor ate these statements. Serg eant Mullins revisited the prope rty to “double che ck” the scene the following day
, and he testified that he found no evidenc e of bullet strike s inside or outside the house. He further indicated that neither of the vehicles parke d at the proper ty at t h e t i m e o f t he sh oo tin g ha d b e e n s tr

uc k b y bu lle ts.

Th e Ap pe lla

nt t e sti fi e d at tr ia l, a

nd his re c oll e c tio n o f s ho oti ngthe vic timlarg e ly tr a c ke d h is written statement. He testified t hat “Big D” came in the back door and pulled a gun on him in the liv ing ro om, and he we nt ba c k to h is o ff ic e and pr oc ur e d h is o wn

g un and tw o c lip s f

ro m a c los e t. He r elated, “ Well, they

saw I had [the g un]. I t was l i k e a crazy set up. I t’s like they

ran out a nd wh e n I g ot o ut t he y sta rt e d f ir ing , s o I wa s tr

y ingto g e t ou

t ju st t o s e c ur e my

pr op e rt y and the n s ho ts

wer e fire d ag ain and then I fired.” The Appe llant testified that he fire d rapidly at both “B ig D ” and the vic tim , e mpt

y ingon e c lip of the g un , and that he pu t hi s se c on d c lip in t he g un , w hic h h e a lso emptied.

The Appe llant testified that he was twenty -four y ear s old at the time of trial, and that he had

a fo ur y e ar o ld so n of wh om he ha d joi nt c us tod y

. He state d th a t he wa s a stu de nt at th e Un ive rs ity of Me mph is, that he ra

n a g ra ph ic de sig n/m ark e tin g c omp any , a nd that he wa s a lic e ns e d re a l e state ag ent. Th e Ap p el l an t t es tified that he ha d been r obbed on two pre vious occa sions in his life. He

s tate d th a t a f

te r th e mo s t r e c e n t r o b b e r y in F e b r u ar y o f 2 0 0 4
, d

u r in g w h ic h h e w a s shot in the sh ou lde r, he bo ug ht a

g un . T he Ap pe lla

nt te sti fi e d r e g ard inghis pr e vio us e xpe ri e nc e in t he mus ic business, and spec ifically that he had written “g ang ster rap.” The Appellant explained that he was

no lon g e r i nv olv e d in

the mus ic bu sin e ss.

The State called one r ebuttal witness, Marc us Moffitt, who aff irmed that he w as known by the nickname , “B ig D.” Moffitt denied that he was with the victim on the day he was killed, and he testified that he did not rob the A pp el l ant. Moffitt testified that he did not know the A ppellant or wher e he lived. He admitted a conviction for thef t of proper

ty in 1999, arising from his purcha se of

a stolen g un. Moffitt’s wife te stified that she wa s at the home of he r sister-in-la w with Moffitt and her c hildren on the a fternoon of October 20, 2004.

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g e vid e nc e , the jur y fo un d the Ap pe lla

nt g uil ty of the le sse r o ff

e ns e

o f r e c k l e s s h o m i c i d e

. A p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o rtw a s p r e p ar e d
, an d a s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g w a s h e l d

. In

se nte nc ingthe Ap pe lla

nt a s a S tan dard, Rang e On e of fe nd e r, the tr ia l c ourt

imp os e d a

sp lit confine ment sentenc e of two y ear s and six months, with ni nety day s t o be ser

ved in conf

inement followed by five y ear s of probation. The Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which wa s denied, and he timely

filed a notice of appe al.

Ana lys is

The issues ra ised by

the Appellant on appea l relate to the leng th and manner of the sente nce imposed by

the trial cour

t. When an acc used challeng es t he length, ra ng e, or ma

nner of service of-4-

a sentence, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the sente nce w ith a presumption that the de te rm inatio ns ma de by the tr ia l c ourt

are c or re c t. T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 03 ); State v. Ashby
, 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . This presumption is “conditioned upon the af firmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the se ntencingprinciples and a ll r el ev an t fa cts and circ umstances.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 1 6 9

. T h e burden is on the Appe llant to show that the
sentenc ing w as improper . T.C.A. § 40-35-401, Sentenc ing Comm’n Cmts.

When conducting a de novo revie w of the se ntenc e, t h i s court must consider: ( a) the evidenc e, if a

ny , rec eived at the t rial and the s entenc ing hear ing; (b) t he presentenc e report; (c) the principles of se ntencingand ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and

c ha ra c te ri sti c s of the c ri min a l c on du c t in vo lve d; ( e ) a ny statut or y mit ig a tin g or

e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s; (f) any statement that the Appellant made on his own behalf; a nd (g ) the potential or la ck of pote ntial fo r r e ha bil itatio n o r t

re a tme nt. T. C.A . § § 4 0- 35 -1 02 , - 10 3, -2 10 (2 00 3) ; Ashby
, 823 S.W .2d at 168. Fur thermore , we e mphasize that facts re levant to sentenc ing must be established by a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e and not be y ond a re asonable doubt. Sta te v . W inf ie ld
, 23 S.W .3d 279, 283 (Tenn. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . P oo le , 945 S.W .2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1997) ).

I. Jud icial Diversion

The Appe llant argues that the trial c ourt abused its discr eti on in denying him judicial div e rs ion . T he Ap pe lla

nt c onte nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt un fa ir ly fo c us e d upo n ce rt a in as pe c ts o f h is lif e sty le , s uc h a s h is f

or me r “ fi na nc ia lly su c c e ssf ul inv olv e me nt i n th e ra

p mu sic bu sin e ss” and

his dropping ou t of hig h school, and that the tria l court’s de termination that the Appe llant provided untruthful testimony

at trial is not supported by the re cord.

A d e fe nd a nt i s e lig ibl e fo r jud ic ia l div e rs ion wh e n h e or sh e is f ou ndgu ilt y o r p le a ds gu ilt y to a C l a s s C
, D
, o r E f

e l o n y a n d h a s n o t p r e v i o u s l y b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f a f e l o n y o r a Cla ss A misdemeanor. See T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 31 3( a )( 1) (B )( i) (2 00 3) . With the se re qu ir e me nts in min d, it i s undisputed that the Appellant is eligible for judicia l diversion. When a trial court grants a de fenda nt judicial diversion, i t defe rs further proceedings and place s the accused on probation without entering a judgment of guilty. Id. § 40 -3 5- 31 3( a )( 1) (A ). If the de fe nd a nt s uc c e ssf ull y c omp le te s th e re qu isi te probationary period, t h e trial court is require d to discharge the def endant a nd dismiss the p r o c e e d ings, id. § 40-35-313( a)( 2), and the defe ndant may have the offic ial rec ords of the proce edings expunge d afte r dismissal of the proce edings. Id. § 40-35-313( b).

The de cision of whethe r to grant a reque st of judicial diversio n l i es within the sound dis c re tio n of the tr ia l cou rt , an d this c ou rt wi ll not dis tur b th a t de c isi on on app e a l a bs e nt a n a bu se of discre tion. State v. Robinson , 139 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004). When a de fenda nt challenge s the trial court’s denial of judicia l diversion, we may not r evisit the i s s u e if the re cord contains any substantial e vidence suppor ti n g th e tr ial court’s de cision. State v. Cutshaw , 967 S.W.2d 33 2, 34 4 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 97 ); State v. Parke r , 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

.

In dec iding whether to gra nt judici al di version, the tria l court must consider the f ollowing fac tors: (1) the a ccuse d’s amena bility t o corr ection; (2) the circ umstances of t h e offe nse; (3) theT he t r i al court ’ s r ef er ence w as m ade w i t h r egar d t o t he r ecor di ng s w r i t t en by t he A pp el l ant , en t i t l ed “N i gg az 1

T h e y H a te ” a n d “ S h o o t F irst.”

-5- acc used’s c riminal rec ord; (4) the acc used’s social history; ( 5) the status of the ac cused’ s physical and mental he alth; and (6) the deter renc e value to the acc used as we ll as others. Parker , 932 S.W.2d at 958. “The trial court should also consider whether judicial diversion will serve the ends of justice

– t he intere sts of the public as we ll as the ac cused. I d

. ; s e e a ls o S ta te v

. E le c tr

o p la ti n g , Inc. , 990 S.W .2 d 2 11 , 229 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 98 ). Th e re c or d mu st i nd ic a te that th e c ou rt ha s w e igh e d a ll of the fa ctors in re aching its determination. Elect r o p l a t i ng, Inc. , 990 S.W.2d at 229. If the trial court de nied the re quest for judicia l diversion, it should st ate in the r ecor d “the specific reasons for its determinations.” Parker
, 932 S.W.2d at 958-59. If the trial court “base d its determinations on only some of the fa ctors, it must explain why these f actors outweigh the other s.” Electroplating, Inc. , 990 S.W.2d at 229.

At the se nte nc inghe ari nghe ld i n th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ourt c le arl y a dd re sse d th e re qu isi te considerations in arriving at the dec ision to deny the A p p el l an t judicial diversion. The tria l court noted that t h e Appe llant had no prior c onvictions, and that he c urre ntly has “a g ood income.” Al tho ug h the tr ia l c ourt art ic ulate d c on c e rn s re g ard ing the Ap pe lla nt’ s so c ia l hi sto ry , s pe c if

ic a lly his dr op pin g ou t of

hig h s c ho ol, it n ote d th a t he ob ta ine d h is G ED and a pp e are d to be su

pp or tin g his children. The tr i al co u rt fo u n d the Appellant to be in “ g ood phy sical and me ntal health as f ar a s being re h ab i l i t ated.” The c ourt stated, “I do have a

problem with the ra

p music that was play ed during this trial that [ the Appellant] was produc ing, ta lking a bout shooting and killing [
, ] ” but the

c ourt e xpre ssl y

no te d, “ Ic an’ t pu

nis h [the App ell ant] f

or be ingin t

he ra p b us ine ss b e c a

us e it’ s a leg itimate business . . . .” 1

Th e tr ia l court ba se d its d e nia l of div e rs ion , in

pa rt , o n th e c ir c ums tanc e s o f t he of fe ns e , in that the Appellant admittedly shot the victim repeatedly as he r an aw ay

from the Appe llant’s house. T h e c o u rt f

o u n d t h a t“ t h e p h ys i c a l e v i d e n c e i nt h e t r i a l d o e s n o tm a t c h t h e [ A p p e l l an t ] ’ s t e s t i m o n y” with reg ard to the e vents that o cc u rr ed at his hom e. The trial court noted that, despite the Appellant’s testimony

that Moffitt, who was a lleg edly arme d, fired the initial gunshots and provoke d the Appellant to shoot the victim in self- defe nse, there was no e vidence of anothe r g un, aside fr om the Appellant’ s, having been f ired inside or outside the house. This court ha s upheld the denia l of judicial diversion on the basis of untruthf ulness. See State v. Ande rson , 857 S

. W

. 2 d 5 7 1 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ). Mo re ov e r, inState v. Dowdy , 894 S.W .2d 301, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)
, we he ld t hat c on sid e ratio n o f a

de fe nd ant’ s c and or

wh ile te sti fy

ing wa s pr ob a tiv e of

he r p ro sp e c ts for reha bilitation pursuant to T .C.A. § 40-35-103( 5). The tr ial court a lso found that diversion was

no t a pp ro pr ia te c on sid e ri ng the de te rr e nc e va lue to t he a c c us e d a

nd oth e rs , a nd tha t di ve rs ion

wo uld
not se rve the interests of the public. The c ourt conc luded, “So havingweig hed all those fa ctors, I just cannot see putting [t he Appellant] on diversion for an unnece ssary killing when he g ets on the stand an d l i es about it, and still i s persisting in lying.” After revie w, we c onclude that the r ecor d contains substantial evidenc e to support the trial c ourt’s denia l of judicial diversion.

II. F ull Probation-6-

Th e Ap pe lla

nt ar g ue s tha t the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nyingfu ll p ro batio n. “ [A] de fe nd a nt i s require d to establish his suit ability for f ull probation as distinguished from his favora ble ca ndidacy for alternative sentenc ing in g ener al.” State v. Mounge r , 7 S.W .3d 70, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) ; see also T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 30 3( b) (2 003) . T o me e t th e burd e n o f e sta bli sh ingsu ita

bil ity fo r f ull probation, t he Appellant must demonstrate that probation will “subser ve the e nds of justice and the best interest of both the public a nd the def endant.” State v. Bingham , 910 S.W .2d 448, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Hoope r , 29 S.W .3d 1, 9-10 (Te nn. 2000).

I n deter

mining one’ s suitabilit y

for full probation, the cour t may consider the circ umstances of the off ense, the defe ndant’s potential or la ck of potential for r ehabilitation, whether full probation wi ll und uly de pr e c ia te the se ri ou sn e ss o f t he of fe ns e , a nd wh e the r a

se nte nc e oth er than

fu ll probation would provide a n eff ective deterr ent t o others li kely to commit sim ilar cr imes. T.C.A. §§ 40 -3 5- 21 0( b) (4 ), -1 03 (5 ), -1 03 (1 )( B ) ( 20 03 ); see also Bingham , 910 S. W

. 2 d at 456. Denial of probation may

be base d solely upon the circ umstances of the offe nse whe n they

are of such a

nature as to outweig h all other factors favoring probation. Id. (c i t i n g Fletche r , 805 S.W .2d at 788-89).

I n deter mining whe ther to g rant or de ny full probation, additi o n al considera tions include the defe ndant’s criminal rec ord; social hi story and pre sent condition of the defe ndant, including his or her me ntal and phy sical conditions wher e appr opriate; defe ndant’s amenability to corr ection and g ener al attitude, including behavior since

arr e st, ho me e nv ir on me nt, c ur re nt d ru g us a g e , e mot ion a l sta

bil ity , p a st e mpl oy

me nt, g ener al re putat i on, marital stability , family responsibility , and the be st interests of both the defe ndant and the public.

S t a t e v

. B l a c k

hu rst , 7 0 S

. W

. 3 d

8 8
, 9 7 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g State v. W ashington , 866 S.W. 2d 95 0, 95 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; State v. Boy d , 925 S.W .2d 237, 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ).

The Appe llant did not subm it an argument in support of full probation at sentenc ing, a nd the
tr ia l c ourt ma de no sp e c if

ic fi nd ing s on this iss ue

. No ne the le ss, we c on c lud e that th e Ap pe lla nt d id

no t satis fy

his burd e n to e sta

bli shthat fu ll pr ob a tio n wo uld “ su bs e rv e the e nd s o f j us tic e and the be st interest of both the public a nd the def

endant.” Acc ording ly
, we conclude that this iss ue is without merit.

III . Se nt e nc e Enha nc e m e nt

The Appe llant challeng es the trial c ourt’s imposition of an additional period of f i ve y ear s probation, following his rele ase from “wor khouse” confinement, for hi s Class D felony conviction. The Appe llant cites s t at i stical data on the aver ag e split confinement se ntence leng th for fe lony convictions in Tennesse e and argues that “the single enhanc ement fac tor [applicable in his case] and extensive mitigation s hould have produce d a probation sentenc e in l ine with the median se ntence ,” which he a

rg ues is substantially less than the five y ear probationar

y term imposed. I n response , the-7-

State char acte rizes the Appellant’s relianc e upon such statistical da ta as a reque st that this cour t perf orm a c omparative proportionality revie w of his sentenc e, as a pplicable in ca

pital case s.

We a g r e e w it

h th e St a te th a t th e A p p e ll an t’ s ar g u me n t is mi s p la c e d

. B a sed upon the application of one enhanc ement fa ctor, a nd appropr iately

rec og nizi ng the applicable mitigating fac tors, the trial cour

t enhanced the A

ppellant’s sente nce only

six months bey ond the minimum

s e n te n c e f o r a St an d ar d
, Ra

n g e O n e o f

f e n d e r c o n v ic te d o f a Cl a s s D f e lo n y , w h ic h is tw o y e ar s

. We conclude that the nature and cha rac teristics of the c riminal conduct invol v ed warra nt the enhanc ement of the Appellant’ s sentence six months bey ond the pre sumptive mini mum. See T.C.A. § 40-35-210( b)(4) (2003). Insofar as t h e Appellant alleg es er ror in the tria l court’s a

pplication of these fa ctors, we conclude that such a c halleng e to this aspect of the sentenc e is unava iling.

Moreove r, the a

pplicable se ntencinglaw cle arly sup p o r ts th e tria l c o u

r t’ s decision to sentenc e the Ap pe lla

nt t o tw o y e ars and

six mo nth s’ inc arc e ratio n, wi th a ll b ut n ine ty da y s su sp e nd e d, a s w e ll

a s it s im po sit ion of a pr ob a tio na

ry te rm of fi ve y e ars . T he re le va

nt s ub se c tio n p ro vid e s:

I f t he c ourt de te rm ine s th a t a

pe ri od of pr ob a tio n is a

pp ro pr ia te , th e c ourt

sh a ll

se nte nc e the de fe nd ant t o a sp e c if ic se nte nc e bu t sh a ll su sp e nd the e xec uti on of a ll or part t h ereof and pla ce the defe ndant on supervise d or unsuper vised probation either immediate ly

or af ter a period of c onfinement for a period of time no less than the minimum s entenc e allowe d under the classification and up to and including the statutory maxi mum tim e for

the class of

the conviction off

ense.

T

. C

. A. § 4 0 -3 5 -3 0 3 (c )( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 3 ). T h e S en t en ci n g C o m m i s s i o ncomments provide that “ ev en t h o u gh the leng th of the ac tual sentenc e is restric ted to that require d by the particula

r rang e, the judge may fi x the le ng th of pro bat io n up to t he statut or

y ma ximumfo r t

he c la ss o f t

he of fe ns e [,]” thu s, authorizing a

trial court to impose a le ng t h i er p robation per iod for a de fenda nt than the ac tual imposed sentence

. Id.
, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. Moreove r, trial courts are g iven much latitude in fix ing the leng th of probation. Stat e v. J oseph Ray E

vans , No. M2006-02748-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jan. 9, 2008). The maximum penalty for the Appellant’s C lass D fe lony conviction is twelve y ear s. T.C.A. § 40-35-112( c)( 4). Thus, bec ause the trial court imposed afivey e ar t e rm of pr ob a tio n in

thi s c a se , th e se nte nc e is c le arl y a uth or ize d by statut e

. Ac c or din g ly , th is issue is without m erit.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the judgme nt of the Shelby County Criminal Court is aff

irmed.

___________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, SENIOR JUDGE