NO. 95-036 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1995 

IN RE MARRIAGE OF 

ROBIN N. JEPPPESEN, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

KARL GRANT JEPPESEN, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Barbara E. Bell, Bell & Marra, 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Joan E. Cook and M. Gene Allison, 

Attorneys at Law, Great Falls, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: October 12, 1995 

Decided: November 21, 1995 

Clefk 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing 

Company. 

Robin Jeppesen filed a petition in the District Court for the 

Eighth Judicial District in Cascade County for dissolution of her 

marriage to Karl Grant Jeppesen (Grant). Following a three-day 

hearing, the court entered its decree of dissolution. In its 

decree, the court divided the couple's personal and real property, 

provided for joint custody of the couple's minor child, awarded 

primary physical custody to Robin, and awarded reasonable 

unsupervised visitation to Grant. The court also found that Robin 

had frustrated visitation when she violated the temporary 

visitation order, and ordered that she pay Grant's mileage and 

attorney fees. Robin appeals from the District Court's decree. We 

affirm the District Court. 

There are six issues on appeal: 

1. Did the District Court err when it adopted Grant's 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim? 

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

quashed the subpoena issued for Grant's employment records? 

3. Did the District Court improperly limit Robin's rebuttal 

time? 

2 
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

granted Robin and Grant joint custody of their minor child and 

allowed unsupervised visitation by Grant? 

5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

divided the couple's real and personal property? 

6. Did the District Court err when it found that Robin 

frustrated Grant's visitation and awarded attorney fees and mileage 

to Grant? 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Robin and Grant dated and lived together for several years 

prior to their marriage in 1982. During November 1986, Robin gave 

birth to their daughter, Karlene. At that time, Grant was employed 

as a deputy sheriff in Toole County. They lived in Sunburst, 

Montana, in a house they purchased in 1983 for $18,500. 

In 1991, Robin purchased a home in Cascade with funds she had 

received from a personal injury settlement in 1988. She paid 

$25,000 toward the purchase price. She agreed to pay the $30,000 

balance periodically. She moved into the Cascade home in June 

1993, and filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Grant 

on August 13, 1993. On September 25, 1993, Robin's twenty-one-year 

old daughter from a previous relationship, Casey, filed a sexual 

abuse complaint against Grant. Casey alleged that Grant had 

sexually abused her over a nine-year period, until she was 

seventeen years old. Casey had made similar allegations in 1980, 

when she was eight years old. Those charges were eventually 

dismissed with prejudice. 

3 
As a result of Casey's allegations in 1993, the Toole County 

Sheriff's office terminated Grant's employment. However, no 

criminal charges were filed, and Grant later agreed to a release of 

and settlement with Toole County which, in part, characterized his 

termination of employment as retirement. In addition, the 

agreement provided that the County would expunge all records 

related to the charges from Grant's personnel file and that Grant 

would release all claims against the County. On July 11, 1994, the 

investigation was closed "with finality and with prejudice." 

The issues raised by the parties were tried during three days 

in November and December 1994. Both parties submitted separate 

home studies related to the issue of custody. In addition, Casey 

renewed her allegations that Grant had sexually abused her over a 

period of nine years, and Robin's sister, Dawn, testified that she 

had been sexually assaulted by Grant in 1977. 

The District Court found that "credibility problems exist with 

[Dawn and Casey]," and determined that "both [Robin and Grant] are 

fit and proper persons to be granted custody and control of 

[Karlene] .'I Based on those findings, the court decreed that Robin 

and Grant should have joint custody of Karlene, that Robin would be 

Karlene's primary caretaker, and that Grant would have reasonable 

unsupervised visitation. 

The District Court also divided the couple's real and personal 

property, and ordered Robin to pay $1077.50 for attorney fees and 

costs that Grant incurred as a result of Robin's frustration of his 

visitation. 

4 
ISSUE 1 

Did the District Court err when it adopted Grant's proposed 

findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim? 

At the conclusion of the trial in this case, the District 

Court ordered each party to prepare and submit proposed findings of 

fact, conclusions of law, and an order. Robin asserts that the 

District Court erred when it adopted Grant's twenty-three page 

findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim. She specifically 

asserts that "the trial court has adopted findings which are overly 

comprehensive of much unimportant and irrelevant detail, while at 

the same time failing to address the main issues in the case." 

Adoption of a party's proposed findings and conclusions is 

specifically authorized by Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P., so long as the 

findings are supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions 

are correct. In In reMarriageofNikolaisen (1993), 257 Mont. 1, 5, 847 

P.2d 207, 289, we set forth our standard of review: 

When reviewing the adequacy of the findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, we examine whether they are 

sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to provide a 

basis for a decision, and whether they are supported by 

substantial evidence. 

While we acknowledge that the District Court's findings in 

this case were in some instances over-inclusive and irrelevant, we 

hold that the court did comprehensively address the allegations of 

sexual abuse, the child custody considerations, and the division of 

the couple's real and personal property. Although the court 

adopted Grant's findings and conclusions verbatim, we hold that 

those findings and conclusions were sufficiently comprehensive and 

5 
pertinent to provide a basis for the court's decision and that 

those findings which were essential to the court's decision were 

supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. 

We therefore hold that the court did not err when it adopted 

Grant's proposed findings, conclusions, and order. 

ISSUE 2 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it quashed 

the subpoena issued for Grant's employment records? 

At trial, John Seidlitz testified that he had represented 

Grant in negotiations with Toole County after Grant was terminated 

from his employment in 1993. The release and settlement agreement 

which resulted from those negotiations provided, in part, for 

nondisclosure of facts related to Grant's termination. The 

agreement provided: 

The only information the County will provide to anyone 

inquiring about [Grant's] present or past work status is 

[Grant's] period of employment, his work classification, 

his beginning of subsequent rates of pay, his rank, his 

description of duties and that [Grant] retired from his 

employment effective November 23, 1993. 

Seidlitz's testimony did not exceed the parameters of this 

confidentiality agreement. 

After Seidlitz testified, however, Robin subpoenaed Grant's 

employment records. The District Court granted Grant's motion to 

quash on the grounds that revealing the records would violate the 

confidentiality agreement between Grant and Toole County. On 

appeal, Robin asserts that the court's decision to quash the 

subpoena was erroneous and prejudicial because she was denied the 

6 
opportunity to effectively rebut Grant's testimony regarding 

conduct which led to his termination. However, a review of the 

record suggests otherwise. Criminal investigation records which 

fully disclosed the extent of any evidence in support of Casey's 

charge were available for Robin's use. However, she chose not to 

use them during her cross-examination of Seidlitz or Grant. We, 

therefore, hold that in light of the confidentiality agreement 

between Grant and Toole County, and because there was another 

available source of the information that Robin sought, the District 

Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Grant's motion 

to quash Robin's subpoena. 

ISSUE 3 

Did the District Court improperly limit Robin's rebuttal time? 

The Jeppesen's dissolution trial was scheduled for a three-day 

period during the final weeks of the District Court Judge's term of 

office. At the end of the second day of testimony, the Judge asked 

if two to three hours would be sufficient time within which to 

complete presentation of the evidence. Neither Grant nor Robin 

objected. On the final afternoon of the trial, the Judge noted 

that the testimony would have to be finished by 5 p.m., or the case 

would be tried over again by his replacement after the first of the 

year. After Grant's direct and cross-examination were complete, 

five minutes remained for rebuttal evidence. Robin now asserts 

that "because the court did not take the time to hear rebuttal, the 

court has made erroneous findings and failed to address the issue 

of whether [Grant] poses a threat to his daughter." 
We conclude that the District Court did not deprive Robin of 

time for rebuttal testimony. Robin failed to object to the court's 

decision to allow three hours for testimony on the last day of 

trial. Furthermore, the judge did not decline to hear Robin's 

rebuttal, but merely remarked that he would not be the sitting 

judge if the trial was continued. If Robin did need more time, she 

had the option of requesting the court to continue the trial to a 

future date. 

ISSUE 4 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it granted 

Robin and Grant joint custody of their minor child and awarded 

unsupervised visitation to Grant? 

We review a district court's findings of fact in child 

custody cases to determine whether those findings are clearly 

erroneous. InreMarriageofDreesbach (19941, 265 Mont. 216, 220-21, 875 

P.2d 1018, 1021. We will not reverse the final custody and 

visitation determinations which are based on those findings unless 

an abuse of discretion is clearly demonstrated. Dreesbach, 875 P.2d 

at 1021-22. 

Robin maintains that the District Court erred when it awarded 

Grant joint custody and unsupervised visitation. She contends that 

she should have been awarded sole custody of Karlene pending 

determination of Grant's fitness, and that the court should have 

continued to limit Grant to supervised visitation until he 

completed a sex offender evaluation. Robin specifically asserts 

8 
that the court's findings are not supported by the record, that the 

court failed to take her home study into account when it made its 

determination, and that the court erroneously declined to require 

Grant to undergo a sex offender evaluation. 

The record demonstrates, however, that the District Court did 

have the benefit of adequate testimony and evidence on which to 

base its custody and visitation decision. The court heard 

testimony from several unbiased observers who had personally 

observed Grant's close relationship with Karlene. The court 

interviewed Karlene in chambers without either parent present. The 

court reviewed a home study submitted by each party. Finally, 

although the court heard testimony from Robin's sister, Dawn, and 

her daughter, Casey, about Grant's alleged sexual abuse of them, it 

determined that neither witness was credible. The court further 

noted that there was no evidence of any inappropriate behavior 

between Grant and Karlene. 

The record is also clear that the District Court did, in fact, 

review both parties' home studies before it reached its final 

determination. The court acknowledged both reports in its findings 

of fact and stated: "The Court has reviewed the home studies and 

finds that both parties have an adequate physical environment in 

which to raise Karlene. [Robin] can provide a stable and suitable 

home environment for Karlene." Where two separate reports with two 

different recommendations are submitted, the district court is in 

the best position to review and evaluate the information. Although 

we require the district court to consider submitted reports, it 

9 
does not follow that the court must adopt a report's recommendations regardless of other evidence. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Maxwell ( 1991) , 

248 Mont. 189, 192-93, 810 P.2d 311, 313. 

Finally, we hold that the District Court did not err when it 

chose not to require that Grant participate in a sex offender 

evaluation. The decision about whether to order such an examination is discretionary and will not be overturned absent a showing 

that the court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Njos ( 19 9 5 ) , 2 7 0 

Mont. 54, 60, 889 P.2d 1192, 1196. Mere allegations of sexual 

abuse, without more, are insufficient to trigger the requirement of 

a sex offender evaluation. In this case, the District Court was in 

the best position to determine whether the allegations had some 

merit, and whether there was any potential for injury to Karlene. 

We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion when it 

determined that a sex offender evaluation was unnecessary. 

For these reasons, we affirm the District Court's child 

custody and visitation decision. 

ISSUE 5 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it divided 

the couple's real and personal property? 

A district court's division of marital property is reviewed to 

determine whether the findings of fact on which the division is 

based are clearly erroneous, and if not, whether the division based 

on those facts was an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Smith 

(1995), 270 Mont. 263, 267-68, 891 P.2d 522, 525. 

10 
The factors to be considered in the division of the marital 

estate are set forth in § 40-4-202, MCA. The statute vests broad 

discretion in the district court to equitably apportion marital 

property. hzreMarriageofCollett (1981), 190 Mont. 500, 504, 621 P.2d 

1093, 1095. A court need not articulate each factor separately as 

long as the findings are sufficient to allow nonspeculative review 

by this Court. InreMarriageofSyljuberget (1988), 234 Mont. 178, 185, 763 

P.2d 323, 326. 

Robin contends that the Court erred when it divided the 

personal property based on the list presented for the first time in 

Grant's proposed findings because Grant failed to present property 

exhibits at trial, no testimony was presented concerning many items 

on the list, and some of Grant's testimony directly contradicted 

her testimony. 

A review of the record reveals that either Robin or Grant 

testified concerning nearly every item of personal property. 

Moreover, those items not discussed at trial, but which were 

awarded to Grant, were awarded consistent with Robin's proposed 

distribution. We, therefore, conclude that the District Court did 

not abuse its discretion when it divided the couple's personal 

property. 

Robin also challenges the District Court's division of the 

real property located in Cascade and Sunburst. First, she alleges 

that Grant was not entitled to any portion of the Cascade property 

because she made the $25,000 down payment and has made all of the 

11 
payments from her personal injury settlement money. Second, Robin 

contends that the court erred when it assigned a $90,000 value to 

the Cascade property and divided it without any testimony regarding 

its present value. 

Robin cites our decision in InreMarriageofBradshaw (1995), 270 

Mont. 222, 891 P.2d 506, to support her assertion that Grant was 

not entitled to any of the Cascade property. In Bradshaw, we stated 

that the source of the property was a major factor to be considered 

by the court when it divided the property pursuant to § 40-4-202, 

MCA, and held that the wife was not entitled to any share of equity 

in the house purchased by husband prior to the marriage. Bradshaw , 

891 P.2d at 511. 

Bradshaw is distinguishable from this case. In Bradshaw, the 

property at issue was bought prior to the marriage and paid for 

entirely out of the husband's personal injury compensation. The 

couple in Bradshaw was separated within five months of the marriage 

and filed for divorce during the first year of marriage. That 

court found that the wife made no contributions to the maintenance 

and value of the property. Bradshaw , 891 P.2d at 511. 

In this case, testimony reveals that the property Was 

purchased during Grant and Robin's eleven-year marriage as a family 

vacation home. Furthermore, while testimony did establish that 

Robin made the down payment, she was given credit for that payment 

before the equity in the property was divided and there was no 

evidence that the remaining payments were made from her settlement 
money. Finally, evidence in the record supports the court's 

finding that Grant contributed to the home by making repairs to it. 

In fact, Grant testified that in the summer of 1993 he spent 

thirty-nine days in Cascade working on their residence and making 

necessary repairs. Specifically, Grant testified that he hooked 

the underground pumping system up to the pump in the river, helped 

drill the new well, helped "pin" the well, put in water heaters, 

fixed the showers, fixed the bathroom sinks, and rewired the water 

heater from gas to electric. Because the property in this case was 

purchased during the marriage, and because Grant contributed to the 

property, we hold that the District Court did not err when it 

awarded a portion of the property to Grant. 

Robin also contends that the court erred when it assigned a 

$90,000 value to the Cascade property and divided it without any 

testimony concerning the present value of the equity. Robin 

testified that she purchased the Cascade property for $55,000, that 

she had made a down payment in the amount of $25,000, and that 

approximately $30,000 was still due for the property. Based on 

that testimony, the court awarded each party one-half of the equity 

in the property which it valued at approximately $90,000. The 

equity was to be calculated after deducting Robin's initial $25,000 

payment. Therefore, with or without testimony regarding the 

property's present value, we conclude that Robin's share was 

equitably determined. 

13 
For these reasons, we hold that the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion when it awarded each party one-half of the 

equity in the Cascade property. 

Similarly, Robin alleges that the District Court erred by 

failing to evaluate and assign repayment of the debt owed for the 

Sunburst property. The parties agreed that the value of the 

Sunburst property was $20,000 and the court found that each party 

should be given one-half of the equity in the property. The court 

dealt with the debt in Finding of Fact No. 108 which specifies that 

both parties will be responsible for the joint debt on the real 

property but that the judgment lien on the Sunburst property, 

resulting from a premarital dispute, will be Grant's sole 

obligation. Therefore, the judgment lien will not be included in 

the determination of the equity in the Sunburst property, and 

Robin's contention that the court erred by not specifying how the 

allocation of debt affects the award of equity is misplaced. 

Moreover, the amount of the debt is not relevant because the 

equity, which is determined by subtracting the debts, is to be 

equally divided. 

Based on the record, we conclude that the District Court's 

findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that the court did 

not abuse its discretion when it divided the couple's marital 

property. 

ISSUE 6 

Did the District Court err when it found that Robin frustrated 

Grant's visitation and awarded attorney fees and mileage to Grant? 

14 
Section 3-l-523, MCA, provides that contempt orders from the 

district courts are final and not normally reviewable by this 

Court; however, we make an exception in family law cases. In Ye 

MarriageofDreesbach (1994), 265 Mont. 216, 223-24, 875 P.2d 1018, 1022. 

Our review of contempt orders is limited to whether the district 

court acted within its jurisdiction and whether the evidence 

supports the order. In YE Marriage of Sullivan (19931, 258 Mont. 531, 

539-40, 853 P.2d 1194, 1200. 

Grant moved that the District Court hold Robin in contempt for 

frustrating visitation when she failed to comply with the court 

order pertaining to Grant's temporary rights to supervised 

visitation. The District Court set a date for a contempt hearing 

but, after stipulation by the parties, combined the contempt 

proceedings with the final trial on the merits. 

At trial, Grant testified that he was denied visitation on 

sixteen occasions. Additionally, he testified that he was denied 

visitation on all birthdays and holidays, including Father's day 

and Easter Sunday. Furthermore, he testified that he was forced to 

drive 110 miles one way for each unsuccessful visitation. 

Robin asserted at trial that she was not under an obligation 

to let Karlene go with Grant because he did not always use those 

supervisors who had been approved by the court. However, an 

approved supervisor for Grant and Karlene's visitation rebutted 

Robin's testimony when she testified that Robin's attorney was 

informed about substitute supervisors and although he indicated 

15 
that he might need to talk with them, never did. The supervisor 

also testified that she and Grant encountered much difficulty 

getting Robin to allow Grant to have his supervised visitation, and 

that on at least five to ten occasions, she and Grant went to pick 

up Karlene only to find that Robin had failed to deliver the 

child. 

Despite the court-ordered supervised visitation, Robin 

attempted to keep Grant from seeing Karlene. Robin had no 

authority to limit or place any restrictions on Grant's visitation. 

The District Court's contempt order was, therefore, supported by 

the evidence that Robin consistently frustrated the court's 

visitation order. 

We next consider whether the District Court's punishment for 

contempt was appropriate. Section 3-1-519, MCA, provides in 

pertinent part that " Eilf it be adjudged that he is guilty of the 

contempt, a fine may be imposed on him not exceeding $500 or he may 

be imprisoned not exceeding 5 days, or both." 

Robin challenges the contempt punishment because it exceeds 

the $500 maximum. Specifically, the District Court awarded Grant 

attorney fees and mileage in the amount of $1,077.50. However, 

this Court has held that a district court has equitable powers to 

punish a party for contempt beyond the terms of 5 3-l-519, MCA. 

Dreesbach , 875 P.2d. at 1023. In Dreesbach, we affirmed a contempt 

order which required the petitioner to seek professional counseling 

and which resolved a conflict concerning child support arrearages 

and day care obligations against the petitioner. Dreesbach, 875 P. 2d 

16 
at 1023. Similarly, we have upheld contempt punishments which 

imposed a thirty-day jail term and reasonable attorney fees. In re 

MarriageofBoharski (1993), 257 Mont. 71, 77, 847 P.2d 709, 713; Inre 

MarriageofRedfern (1984), 214 Mont. 169, 173, 692 P.2d 468, 470. 

We conclude, after a review of the record, that the District 

Court was warranted in awarding attorney fees and costs to Grant. 

Although the award exceeds the $500 provided for in § 3-l-519, MCA, 

we hold that the evidence supports the finding of contempt and that 

the court acted within its jurisdiction and equitable powers when 

it imposed the punishment. 

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decree of the 

District Court. 

/ Jus ic'e 

We concur: 

rA%Y -/7