ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

GREG ABBOTT 

March 13,2003 

The Honorable Dib Waldrip 

Coma1 County Criminal District Attorney 

150 North Seguin, Suite 307 

New Braunfels, Texas 78 130 

Opinion No. GA-0034 

Re: Whether a county may require the owner of 

a “junked vehicle” to erect a fence or other 

screening objects in order to shield the vehicle 

from public view (RQ-0605-JC) 

Dear Mr. Waldrip: 

You ask whether a county may require the owner of a “junked vehicle” to erect a fence or 

other screening objects in order to shield the vehicle from public view. 

Subchapter E, chapter 683 of the Transportation Code addresses the abatement of junked 

vehicles as a public nuisance. Section 683.072 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] junked vehicle, 

including part of a junked vehicle, that is visible from a public place or public right-of-way . . . is 

a public nuisance.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 4 683.072(7) (Vernon 1999) (emphasis added). 

Section 683.071 of the Transportation Code defines “junked vehicle”: 

In this subchapter, “junked vehicle” means a vehicle that is 

self-propelled and: 

(1) does not have lawfully attached to it: 

(A) an unexpired license plate; or 

w a valid motor vehicle inspection 

certificate; and 

(2) is: 

(4 wrecked, dismantled or partially 

dismantled, or discarded; or 

(B) inoperable and has remained inoperable 

for more than: 
The Honorable Dib Waldrip - Page 2 (GA-0034) 

(i) 72 consecutive hours, if the 

vehicle is on public property; or 

(ii) 30 consecutive days, if the 

vehicle is on private property. 

Id. 0 683.071 (Vernon Supp. 2003). Under section 683.073 of the Transportation Code, the offense 

of maintaining “a public nuisance described by section 683.072” is “a misdemeanor punishable by 

a fine not to exceed $200.” Id. 8 683.073(a)-(b) (V emon 1999). Upon conviction, the court must 

“order abatement and removal of the nuisance.” Id. 9 683.073(c). Additionally, pursuant to section 

683.074, a municipality or county is empowered to “adopt procedures that conform to this 

subchapter for the abatement and removal from private or public property or a public right-of-way 

of a junked vehicle or part of a junked vehicle as a public nuisance.” Id. 4 683.074(a) (Vernon Supp. 

2003). Sections 683.074, 683.075, and 683.076 describe the procedures a county must follow in 

order to abate and remove the nuisance, including notice, public hearing, judicial orders, and 

cancellation of the vehicle’s certificate of title. Section 683.078 governs removal of a junked vehicle 

to “a scrapyard, a motor vehicle demolisher, or a suitable site operated by a municipality or county.” 

Id. 6 683.078(a) (Vernon 1999). You ask whether a county, pursuant to its authority to abate and 

remove a “junked vehicle” as a nuisance, may impose fencing and screening requirements. 

A junked vehicle may be classified as a “public nuisance” subject to abatement and removal 

under subchapter E, chapter 683 of the Transportation Code, onZy if it “is visible from a public place 

or public right-of-way.” Id. 8 683.072. We must therefore consider the meaning of the term 

“visible.” The term is not defined by statute or Texas case law. According to its common usage, 

“visible” means “capable of being seen; that by its nature is an object of sight; perceptible by the 

sense of sight.” XIX OXFORD ENGLISHDICTIONARY 687 (2d ed. 1989). See TEX. GOV’TCODE ANN. 

$3lLOll(a)(V emon 1998) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according 

to the rules of grammar and common usage.“). The few out-of-state judicial decisions that have 

considered the meaning of “visible” accord with this definition. See, e.g., StriefeZ v. Charles-ikytLeaman P ‘ship, 733 A.2d 984,990 (Me. 1999) (“‘Visible’ means capable of being seen by persons 

who may view the premises.“); Colonial Trust v. Breuer, 69 A.2d 126, 129 (Pa. 1949) (“‘Visible’ 

means perceivable by the eye . . . . “1; Tritt v. Judd k Moving & Storage, Inc., 574 N.E.2d 1178,1185 

(Ohio App. 3d 1990) (“Visible means perceivable by the eye.“). 

Thus, in order to avoid classification as a “public nuisance” under section 683.072 of the 

Transportation Code, a junked vehicle or a part thereof, need only be non-visible from a public place 

or public right-of-way. No particular kind of camouflage is required by the statute to render the 

vehicle non-visible. Consequently, a county may not compel the owner of a junked vehicle to erect 

fencing, trees, shrubbery, or any other specific kind of screening. In order to abate and remove the 

nuisance, the county must demonstrate that a junked vehicle “is visible from a public place or public 

right-of-way,” i.e., capable of being seen from such location. Whether any particular form of 

camouflage is sufficient in a given instance to render a junked vehicle non-visible is of course a 

question of fact for the county to determine in the first instance. 
The Honorable Dib Waldrip - Page 3 (GA-0034) 

You also ask whether a county may import the fencing and screening requirements applicable 

to automotive salvage yards and junkyards to vehicles parked on other private property. Section 

396.021(b) of the Transportation Code provides, in relevant part: 

(b) A person who operates a junkyard or an automotive 

wrecking and salvage yard shall screen the junkyard or automotive 

wrecking and salvage yard with a solid barrier fence at least eight feet 

high. The fence must be painted a natural earth tone color and may 

not have any sign appear on its surface other than a sign indicating the 

business name. 

(c) A person who operates a junkyard or an automotive 

wrecking and salvage yard in a county with a population of 200,000 

or less shall screen the junkyard or automotive wrecking and salvage 

yard to at least six feet in height along the portion of the junkyard or 

automotive wrecking and salvage yard that faces a public road or 

residence. The person may screen the yard by any appropriate means, 

including: 

(1) a fence; 

(2) natural objects; or 

(3) plants.’ 

TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 9 396.021(b)-(c) (Vernon 1999). 

The fencing and screening standards applicable to junked vehicles in the possession of 

licensed automotive salvage yards and junkyards under chapter 396 are not applicable to junked 

vehicles maintained by individuals or businesses that do not fall within that category. In addition, 

subchapter E, chapter 683 of the Transportation Code, which, as previously discussed, addresses the 

abatement ofjunked vehicles as a public nuisance, is specifically inapplicable to a vehicle or vehicle 

part “that is stored or parked in a lawful manner on private property in connection with the business 

of a licensed vehicle dealer or junkyard,” provided that the vehicle or vehicle part is, inter alia, 

“screened from ordinary public view by appropriate means, including a fence, rapidly growing trees, 

or shrubbery.” Id. 6 683.077(a)(2)(C) (V emon Supp. 2003). Licensed automotive salvage yards and 

junkyards must follow the fencing and screening requirements of section 396.012(b). Individuals 

not embraced within the ambit of chapter 396 need only render a junked vehicle non-visible from 

a public place or public right-of-way. 

‘Section 396.021 does not apply to automotive wrecking and salvage yards covered by chapter 397 of the 

Transportation Code, i.e., those in a county with a population of 3.3 million or more, not located in a municipality in that 

county, and established on or after September, 1983. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE AN-N. ch. 397 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 

2003). 
The Honorable Dib Waldrip - Page 4 (GA-0034) 

SUMMARY 

A county may abate and remove as a “public nuisance” any 

“junked vehicle” that is visible from public or private property or a 

public right-of-way. A county may not require a particular kind 

of camouflage to render the vehicle non-visible. The fencing and 

screening standards applicable to licensed automotive salvage yards 

and junkyards under chapter 396 of the Transportation Code do not 

apply to junked vehicles parked on other private property. 

Very tru.ry yours, 

AttomegLrB’eneral of Texas 

BARRY R. MCBEE 

First Assistant Attorney General 

DON R. WILLETT 

Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel 

NANCY S. FULLER 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Rick Gilpin 

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee