United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2005-7190 

ELIZABETH H. BONNER, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Mark Healy Bonner, of Great Falls, Virginia, argued for claimant-appellant. 

Leslie Cayer Ohta, Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United 

States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. 

With her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and Bryant G. 

Snee, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were David J. Barrans, Deputy 

Assistant General Counsel, and Jamie L. Mueller, Attorney, United States Department 

of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

Chief Judge William P. Greene, Jr. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

2005-7190 

ELIZABETH H. BONNER, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

_______________________ 

 DECIDED: August 16, 2007 

 _______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and GAJARSA, 

Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge ARCHER. Dissenting opinion filed by 

Circuit Judge NEWMAN. 

ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Elizabeth Bonner (“Mrs. Bonner”) appeals the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims’ (“Veterans Court”) affirmance of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ 

(“Board”) determination that she was not entitled to an effective date earlier than 

November 1, 1994, for dependency and indemnity compensation (“DIC”). Bonner v. 

Nicholson, No. 02-0742 (Vet. App. June 17, 2005). Because we conclude that the 

Veterans Court neither misinterpreted Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 

2004), nor committed harmful error, we affirm the Veterans Court’s judgment. 
I. 

Rear Admiral Emmett P. Bonner (“Admiral Bonner”) died on August 1, 1975, 

following a distinguished career in the United States Navy. Shortly thereafter, his wife, 

Elizabeth Bonner, filed a claim for DIC with the Veterans Administration Regional Office 

(“RO”) listing “cancer” as the cause of Admiral Bonner’s death. The supporting 

evidence filed with this claim included an autopsy report from the National Naval 

Medical Center (“NNMC”) listing Hodgkin’s disease as cause of death and a death 

certificate listing Hodgkin’s disease as the “immediate cause” of death. The RO 

determined the cause of death as Hodgkin’s disease, a form of cancer, which had been 

diagnosed during Admiral Bonner’s hospitalization from January to April 1975. The RO 

denied the claim for DIC because there was no evidence of service connection. The 

decision was not appealed and, therefore, became final. 

Thereafter, 38 C.F.R. § 3.313 was issued in 1990 to address service connection 

for injuries caused by exposure to herbicides during military service in Vietnam. It 

provided, in pertinent part, that “[s]ervice in Vietnam during the Vietnam Era together 

with the development of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma [“NHL”] manifested subsequent to 

such service is sufficient to establish service connection for that disease.” 

38 C.F.R. § 3.313(b) (1990). This regulation was made retroactive to August 5, 1964. 

55 Fed. Reg. 43,123 (Oct. 26, 1990). 

The following year the Agent Orange Act of 1991 was enacted. This Act directed 

the Secretary, in certain circumstances, to establish presumptions of service connection 

for other diseases found to be associated with herbicide exposure while serving in the 

military. 38 U.S.C § 1116. Any presumption afforded by this statute was to be effective 

2005-7190 2
only prospectively from the date the final regulations were issued. 

38 U.S.C. § 1116(c)(2). In 1994, pursuant to the Agent Orange Act, the VA added 

Hodgkin’s disease to the list of diseases presumptively associated with exposure to 

herbicides in Vietnam. 59 Fed. Reg. 5106 (Feb. 3, 1994) (in relevant part amending 

38 C.F.R. § 3.309 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.307). 

In 1995, pursuant to a claim by Mrs. Bonner under the Radiation Exposure 

Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725, tissue samples from Admiral 

Bonner were examined by the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”). The findings of this 

examination reported that “immunohistochemical studies favor the diagnosis of nonHodgkin’s lymphoma.”1

 Based on this conclusion and, presumably, the above 

regulations promulgated in the 1990s, Mrs. Bonner submitted a letter to the VA stating 

that Admiral Bonner’s death was likely related to NHL; that Admiral Bonner had been 

exposed to radiation during his military service; and that she was, therefore, entitled to 

DIC effective as of the date of her 1975 claim. 

The RO treated this letter as a request to reopen Mrs. Bonner’s previously 

denied claim on the basis of new and material evidence under 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (2000). 

The RO awarded Mrs. Bonner DIC effective November 1, 1995, the date of receipt by 

the VA of her letter, based on the non-appealed finding that Hodgkin’s disease caused 

Admiral Bonner’s death but applying the presumption of service connection for such 

 1

 Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the 1995 NIH report reexamining 

Admiral Bonner’s condition at the time of his death was ambiguous in that his illness 

“simulat[ed] Hodgkin’s Disease” but also “favor[ed] a diagnosis of non-Hodgkin’s 

lymphoma.” This does not demonstrate that the 1975 diagnosis of Hodgkin’s Disease 

as the cause of death was indisputably incorrect. After a detailed review of the 1995 

NIH report, the RO concluded that the evidence was also consistent with Hodgkin’s 

Disease. Regardless, as explained below, the cause of Admiral Bonner’s death was not 

relevant to the decision of the Veterans Court. 

2005-7190 3
disease under the Agent Orange Act. Mrs. Bonner filed a Notice of Disagreement 

contending that because she filed a claim for service connection for the cause of 

Admiral Bonner’s death shortly after his death, the effective date for DIC should be the 

date on which he died, August 1, 1975. The RO subsequently issued a statement of the 

case which granted an earlier effective date for DIC benefits of November 1, 1994, one 

year prior to the November 1, 1995 application to reopen the claim. This award was 

based upon the regulation that provides that if a claim is reviewed more than one year 

after the effective date of a change in the law, as was the case here, benefits may be 

authorized for a period of one year prior to the date of receipt of such request. See

38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3). 

Following several more exchanges between Mrs. Bonner and the VA, in August 

1999, the RO issued a supplemental statement of the case noting Mrs. Bonner’s 

assertion that NHL was the cause of Admiral Bonner’s death. This supplemental 

statement of the case clarified the bases for the RO’s determination that the cause of 

Admiral Bonner’s death was Hodgkin’s disease. Specifically, the RO stated that the 

1995 NIH biopsy and medical records did not provide a definitive diagnosis of NHL. 

The RO noted that the presence of Reed-Sternberg cells and variants found in the 1995 

biopsy was consistent with a diagnosis of Hodgkin’s disease. The RO also indicated 

that the final diagnosis in the 1995 report of “malignant lymphoma, large cell, 

immunoblastic type, with necrosis involving the lymph nodes [and] liver,” was similarly 

consistent with Hodgkin’s lymphoma. 

Mrs. Bonner appealed this decision to the Board. The Board first noted that in 

order for Mrs. Bonner to receive benefits under 38 C.F.R. § 3.313(a), the denial of her 

2005-7190 4
1975 claim had to have been a denial of a claim for service connection for NHL, not a 

denial of service connection for another disease. Based on this conclusion, the Board 

opined that it did not need to reach the issue of whether an effective date for an award 

of DIC based on Mrs. Bonner’s 1975 claim would have been warranted if the RO had 

awarded DIC in 1995 based on a cause of death from NHL, as opposed to Hodgkin’s 

disease. This was “because the denial of [Mrs. Bonner’s] original claim in 1976 was a 

denial based on [a claim for] cause of death from Hodgkin’s disease, not NHL.” In other 

words, Mrs. Bonner was ineligible for retroactive benefits under § 3.313 because her 

1975 claim was for Hodgkin’s disease and not NHL.2

 Having made this determination, 

the Board explained that for the reasons posited by the RO, the earliest effective date 

Mrs. Bonner could receive was November 1, 1994. 

Mrs. Bonner appealed the Board’s decision to the Veterans Court. Affirming the 

Board’s action, the Veterans Court concluded that “the evidence established that Mrs. 

Bonner’s [1975] claim was one for Hodgkin’s disease as the cause of her husband’s 

death, and, therefore, we cannot conclude that the evidence reasonably raised any 

claims for the cause of death by types of cancer other than Hodgkin’s disease.” 

Bonner, 19 Vet. App. at 19-20. The Veterans Court also noted that the Board did not 

disturb the RO’s finding that the evidence of record revealed Hodgkin’s disease as the 

cause of Admiral Bonner’s death and therefore the cause-of-death finding remained 

 2

 Under VAOPGCPREC 5-94 (a VA General Counsel Precedential Opinion) 

benefits under § 3.313 are awarded retroactive to “the date . . . of an original claim for 

that [NHL] benefit . . . if the claimant was otherwise eligible on the date of claim.” 

(emphasis added). Thus, in order to receive benefits under § 3.313, the original claim 

must have been one for NHL. 

2005-7190 5
Hodgkin’s disease. The Veteran’s Court then concluded that “the Board had a plausible 

basis to find that the cause of Mr. Bonner’s death was Hodgkin’s disease.” Id. at 21. 

Mrs. Bonner challenges the Veterans Court’s determinations. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292. 

II. 

A. 

 We have limited jurisdiction to review a decision of the Veterans Court. We may 

review the validity of “a rule of law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any 

interpretation thereof . . . that was relied on by the [Veterans Court] in making the 

decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (2000). Included within this review is whether the 

Veterans Court exceeded its jurisdiction, Wanner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1124, 1128 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004) (explaining that the “Veterans Court’s compliance with its jurisdictional statute 

is a question of law, reviewed de novo” by this court), and whether the Veterans Court 

“misinterpreted our rulings in earlier decisions on an issue of law,” Moody v. Principi, 

360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We review de novo a claim that the Veterans 

Court committed legal error. Id. However, absent a constitutional issue, we lack 

jurisdiction to review factual findings of the Veterans Court or that court’s application of 

law to fact. Id.

B. 

 Mrs. Bonner alleges two errors in the Veterans Court’s decision. First, Mrs. 

Bonner asserts the Veterans Court misconstrued our decision in Moody v. Principi

(“Moody”) when it did not read her 1975 claim for “cancer” as encompassing a claim for 

NHL. This position is grounded in the assertion that the clinical findings contained in the 

2005-7190 6
1975 autopsy report also supported a determination that Admiral Bonner’s death was 

caused by NHL. Second, Mrs. Bonner contends the Veterans Court exceeded its 

jurisdiction when it decided a factual issue, the cause of Admiral Bonner’s death, that 

the Board did not reach in the first instance. Mrs. Bonner concedes that in order for her 

“to prevail ultimately in receiving DIC as of the date of her original claim, she will have to 

establish that her husband died of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and that her original claim 

was broad enough to encompass non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.” 

 The government argues that we lack jurisdiction to review the factual 

determination that Hodgkin’s disease was the cause of Admiral Bonner’s death. It 

further argues that the Veterans Court correctly concluded that the Board did not err in 

holding that Mrs. Bonner was not entitled to a 1975 effective date for DIC benefits. 

Additionally, the government contends that Mrs. Bonner failed to demonstrate how the 

VA erred in developing her 1975 claim and that even if Mrs. Bonner were able to show 

that she had reasonably raised a claim for NHL in 1975 that has not yet been 

adjudicated, such an error is to be corrected through a motion asserting the VA had 

committed clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”). 3

C. 

 In Moody, we reiterated that “with respect to all pro se pleadings,” id. at 1310, the 

VA must give a sympathetic reading to the veteran’s filings by “’determin[ing] all 

potential claims raised by the evidence, applying all relevant laws and regulations,’” id.

(quoting Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). We can find no 

 3

 The only way the RO’s unappealed 1976 decision can be collaterally 

attacked is through a claim of “clear and unmistakable error” (“CUE”). At oral argument, 

Mrs. Bonner conceded that a CUE claim was not at issue in this case. Therefore, the 

issue of the validity of the 1976 decision is not before us. 

2005-7190 7
indication that the Veterans Court misinterpreted this mandate. In fact, the Veterans 

Court expressly recited the legal standard quoted above. Bonner, 19 Vet. App. at 18. 

The Veterans Court examined the evidence of record and concluded: 

At the time of the 1976 RO adjudication, the evidence established that 

Mrs. Bonner’s claim was one for Hodgkin’s disease as the cause of her 

husband’s death, and, therefore, we cannot conclude that the evidence 

reasonably raised any claims for the cause of death by types of cancer 

other than Hodgkin’s disease. Compare Moody, Szemraj, Roberson. 

Id. at 19-20. 

 Mrs. Bonner does not explain how the Veterans Court purportedly misinterpreted 

Moody. In Moody we rejected the Veterans Court’s suggestion that in order for 

pleadings to be read as containing a potential claim there must have been “evidence 

undebatably establish[ing]” the existence of such a claim. Moody, 360 F.3d at 1310. 

Mrs. Bonner does not argue that the Veterans Court required her to make a more 

stringent showing than that required by Moody. Nor does she contend that the 

Veterans Court improperly determined that the mandate of Moody did not apply here. 

In essence, Mrs. Bonner takes issue with the Veterans Court’s application of Moody. 

That is, she disagrees with the Veterans Court’s conclusion that a claim for NHL was 

not supported by the evidence before the RO in 1976. However, the interpretation of 

the 1975 claim “is essentially a factual inquiry, and it is beyond our jurisdiction to make

2005-7190 8
that determination.” Moody, 360 F.3d at 1310.4

 

 Mrs. Bonner also contends that the Veterans Court exceeded its jurisdiction 

when it decided a factual issue—the cause of Admiral Bonner’s death—that the Board 

did not reach. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a), the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction is limited to 

deciding issues that are “necessary to its decision and presented” to it. 

38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4) (2000) (stating “[i]n any action brought under this chapter, the 

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, to the extent necessary to its decision and when 

presented, shall . . . in the case of a finding of material fact adverse to the claimant 

made in reaching a decision in a case before the Department with respect to benefits 

under laws administered by the Secretary, hold unlawful and set aside or reverse such 

finding if the finding is clearly erroneous”). The Board determined that Mrs. Bonner was 

not entitled to DIC prior to November 1, 1994, regardless of whether Admiral Bonner’s 

death was caused by Hodgkin’s disease or NHL. 

The Veterans Court did not decide or rely on the cause of Admiral Bonner’s 

death in affirming the Board’s decision. Rather, it relied on the characterization of Mrs. 

Bonner’s 1975 claim, evidenced by the supporting documentation, as one for death 

caused by Hodgkin’s disease. The Veterans Court merely concluded that this 

information provided a plausible basis for the RO’s determination that Hodgkin’s 

 4

 We note that when the VA fails to construe the veteran’s pleadings to 

raise a claim, such an error is properly corrected through a CUE motion. See Bingham 

v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that the VA’s failure to 

consider all aspects of a claim is properly challenged through a CUE motion); Andrews 

v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating “when the VA violates 

Roberson by failing to construe the veteran’s pleadings to raise a claim, such claim is 

not considered unadjudicated but the error is instead properly corrected through a CUE 

motion”). CUE is not simply a “buzz word” as stated by the dissent. It is a statutorily 

created avenue for challenging a VA decision. See 38 U.S.C. § 5109A. 

2005-7190 9
disease was the cause of death. Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that the 

Veterans Court exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding a factual issue not “necessary” to 

its decision, any such error would be harmless, as the grounds for the Veterans Court’s 

decision would remain in place. Accordingly, we need not decide if the Veterans Court 

exceeded its jurisdiction in this instance. 

III 

The judgment of the Veterans Court is therefore 

AFFIRMED. 

2005-7190 10
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

 2005-7190 

ELIZABETH H. BONNER, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

 v. 

R. JAMES NICHOLSON, 

Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

The Department of Veterans Affairs relied on a plainly incorrect autopsy diagnosis to 

deny Mrs. Bonner the Dependency and Indemnity Compensation benefits to which she is 

entitled. From the panel majority's denial of these benefits and refusal to correct the 

concededly incorrect cause of death, I respectfully dissent. 

Admiral Emmett Peyton Bonner was a Naval officer who graduated from the United 

States Naval Academy in 1939. His naval career included service in World War II, Korea, 

and Vietnam. While in the service he was exposed to radiation during atmospheric nuclear 

testing in the South Pacific in 1958, and may have been exposed to Agent Orange in 

Vietnam. He retired at the age of 54 and died of cancer three years later. 
2005-7190 2 

Admiral Bonner's wife, the appellant, applied for Dependency and Indemnity 

Compensation, listing the cause of death as "cancer." An autopsy performed at the time of 

death by the National Naval Medical Center (NNMC) listed the cause of death as Hodgkin's 

Disease. Mrs. Bonner's claim was initially denied as not being service connected, since 

neither Hodgkin's Disease nor other forms of lymphoma (Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma or 

NHL) were presumptively service connected. 

The National Institutes of Health subsequently reviewed the autopsy report and a 

group of slides that the government had preserved. The conclusion was that the original 

diagnosis of Hodgkin's Disease was incorrect, and that Admiral Bonner died of NonHodgkin's Lymphoma. It is not disputed that the second diagnosis is the correct one. 

The panel majority, while asserting that the cause of death is a factual matter not 

open to our review, speculates about the meaning and accuracy of the two autopsy reports. 

 Thus the court proposes that the 1975 diagnosis of Hodgkin=s Disease as the cause of 

death may have been correct. The majority's preference for the 1975 diagnosis of 

Hodgkin=s Disease is contrary to NIH's undisputed conclusion that the autopsy "favors" 

non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and that the earlier diagnosis was incorrect. For example, the 

1995 NIH report states that "although the infiltrate contains cells which resemble ReedSternberg cells and variants, the infiltrate lacks the usual inflammatory background of 

Hodgkin's disease. Immunohistochemical studies favor the diagnosis of non-Hodgkin's 

lymphoma." Reed-Sternberg cells, and the "usual inflammatory background" found to be 

absent, are mandatory elements of Hodgkin's disease. See Ramzi S. Cotran, et al. 

Robbins Pathologic Basis of Disease 5th ed. 2001, App. at 96-116. The NIH report 

concludes with the following paragraphs: 
2005-7190 3 

The patient was a 57 year old white male diagnosed as lymphocyte-depleted 

Hodgkin's disease in January 1975 and treated with combined chemotherapy 

and radiation, who died 8/1/75. At autopsy he was found to have extensive 

nodal and hepatic involvement by lymphoma, initially interpreted as 

consistent with Hodgkin's disease. The major pathological question 

addressed to us was whether, in light of current concepts, the tumor would 

be reclassified as a non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. 

Microscopic examination of the lymph nodes and liver nodules show massive 

involvement by malignant lymphoid cells. The malignant cells are large, 

pleomorphic cells, with prominent nucleoli, some of which resemble ReedSternberg cells and variants. However, the background infiltrate is sparse 

and composed of small, mature lymphocytes. It lacks the normal mixed 

inflammatory background of Hodgkin's disease as well. The malignant cells 

are histologically identical in appearance to those seen in the biopsies of the 

abdominal mass (dated 2/6/75) and axillary lymph node (dated 4/3/75). 

Immunoperoxidase stains were performed on paraffin sections of the 

submitted surgical material and favor the diagnosis of non-Hodgkin's 

lymphoma. (See attached surgical pathology, report NIH #S95-5688) 

T-cell rich B-cell lymphomas simulating Hodgkin's disease have been well 

described, and represent a 4-5% misdiagnosis of Hodgkin's disease. Indeed, 

a review of originally classified lymphocyte-depleted Hodgkin's disease cases 

at the National Cancer Institute revealed 26% with a high-grade nonHodgkin's lymphoma, the majority of those cases were further classified as 

diffuse, large cell, immunoblastic type lymphomas. 

The NIH report concluded that Admiral Bonner died of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and the 

Board of Veterans Appeals agreed. See Appeal of Elizabeth Bonner, No. 96-35144 (BVA 

Sept. 27, 2001) at 3 (setting forth the finding of fact that "the RO received evidence from 

the National Institutes of Health (NIH) indicating that the diagnosis of Hodgkin's disease 

made in the veteran's case in 1975 was in error and that the veteran had actually died of 

non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL).") No contradiction to that finding is mentioned by the 

Board, or by the Veterans Court. 

My concern is not that the Regional Office initially arrived at an incorrect cause of 

death based on an incorrect autopsy report. My concern is that the Board refused to 
2005-7190 4 

change its ruling despite accepting the new and unchallenged information in the NIH 

autopsy report, leaving the plainly incorrect diagnosis unrepealed and thereby denying the 

widow her entitlement. 

 Nonetheless, the DVA has refused to correct the error in Admiral Bonner's records, 

thereby reducing the statutory benefits available to Mrs. Bonner. By statutory enactment 

after the Viet Nam war, Congress established the presumption that deaths from both 

Hodgkin's Disease and Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma are service connected, but placed 

different retroactive effects on these determinations. Thus a veteran who died of NonHodgkin's Lymphoma entitles his widow to compensation retroactive to 1964; that is, the 

claim benefits from the presumption of service connection, even if the claim had been 

denied before the statutory and regulatory provisions were enacted. However, 

compensation for Hodgkin's Disease is awarded only for the period after the law was 

enacted and only for a year before the claim is filed. (The difference appears to relate to 

Agent Orange exposure in Viet Nam). Thus, whether Admiral Bonner died of Hodgkin's 

Disease or Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma determines whether Mrs. Bonner receives 

compensation from 1994 or from 1975. 

Mrs. Bonner filed another request for compensation in 1995, requesting 

compensation from the filing of her original claim in 1975. The VA, applying the rules for 

Hodgkin's Disease based on the original autopsy, awarded compensation from 1994. The 

Regional Office refused to change the diagnosis despite the corrected autopsy report. The 

Board of Veterans Appeals remarked that the two autopsies reached different conclusions, 

but held that since the claim as originally filed was for Hodgkin's Disease, Mrs. Bonner 

could not receive the retroactive benefit of the Non-Hodgkin's statute and regulations. On 
2005-7190 5 

appeal, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ruled that the cause of death was 

Hodgkin's Disease since the Regional Office had made that determination and the BVA had 

not disturbed it. 

The claim as initially filed by Mrs. Bonner named "cancer" as the cause of death. It 

is not disputed that both Hodgkin's Disease and Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma are forms of 

cancer. However, the Veterans Court affirmed the BVA ruling that the initial claim for 

"cancer" was really a claim based on Hodgkin's Disease because the evidence initially 

presented to the Regional Office stated that diagnosis. The Veterans Court refused to 

consider the second autopsy report. 

Neither Mrs. Bonner nor the VA can be charged with prior knowledge that the 

original autopsy report was incorrect. The proper procedure is to correct the veteran's 

records in accordance with the correct autopsy report. It is not an unreviewable factual 

question of whether the VA is required to recognize an undisputed error in the veteran's 

records, and to apply the correct cause of death to survivors' claims. Upon such 

recognition, Mrs. Bonner's claim would be subject to determination on the correct grounds, 

whether or not she used the buzz-words "clear and unmistakable error (CUE)" in her 

petition (as the government argues). The obligatory veteran-friendly position of the law 

governing veterans' claims negates this hyper-technical reason whereby the Veterans 

Court refused to consider the merits of Mrs. Bonner's claim. From my colleagues' 

acceptance of this reasoning, I respectfully dissent.