[Cite as Carroll v. Grafton, 2014-Ohio-4534.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

LONNIE CARROLL 

 Appellant 

 v. 

VILLAGE OF GRAFTON 

 Appellee 

C.A. No. 13CA010380 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 12 CV 177794 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: October 14, 2014 

 

CARR, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Lonnie Carroll, appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of 

Common Pleas. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} The Village of Grafton employed Mr. Carroll as chief of police until August 27, 

2012, when he was placed on paid administrative leave by the mayor and informed that his 

employment was terminated subject to concurrence by a vote of the village council. Council 

confirmed the termination by majority vote at a special meeting held the following day. Mr. 

Carroll filed an action seeking declarations that the Grafton chief of police is not an at will 

employee; that the chief of police may only be terminated for cause, as provided by R.C. 

737.171; that his termination was unlawful; and that he is entitled to reinstatement. The parties 

filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the legal questions involved. The trial court 

granted the Village’s motion, concluding that the Village’s Charter conflicted with the provisions 
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of R.C. 737.171 and that, because the Charter provisions controlled, Mr. Carroll’s employment 

was properly terminated under the provisions of the Charter. Mr. Carroll appealed. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [THE VILLAGE’S] MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING [MR. CARROLL’S] CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 

{¶3} Mr. Carroll’s assignment of error is that the trial court erred in its determination 

that the Charter conflicts with R.C. 737.171 with respect to the termination of the chief of police. 

Consequently, Mr. Carroll’s position is that the relevant Charter provisions must be harmonized 

with the statute. We do not agree. 

{¶4} Under Civ.R. 56(C), “[s]ummary judgment will be granted only when there 

remains no genuine issue of material fact and, when construing the evidence most strongly in 

favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, ¶ 

10. This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison 

Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). 

{¶5} Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution grants municipalities the 

authority “to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their 

limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general 

laws.” When a municipality exercises its home rule powers on a matter of local selfgovernment, conflicting charter provisions prevail over parallel state laws. State ex rel. 

Lightfield v Indian Hill, 69 Ohio St.3d 441, 442 (1994). A threshold issue, therefore, is whether 

charter provisions conflict with state laws addressing the same subject matter. 
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{¶6} In that respect, “[m]unicipal charters are to be so construed as to give effect to all 

separate provisions and to harmonize them with statutory provisions whenever possible.” State 

ex rel. Paluf v. Feneli, 69 Ohio St.3d 138, 142 (1994). “In the absence of express language in a 

charter demonstrating a conflict with a statute, it is the duty of courts to harmonize the provisions 

of the charter and statutes relating to the same matter.” State ex rel The Ryant Commt. v. Lorain 

Cty Bd. of Elections, 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 112 (1999). In other words, “[t]he rule of charter 

supremacy applies only where the conflict appears by the express terms of the charter and not by 

mere inference.” State ex rel. Regetz v. Cleveland Civ. Serv. Comm., 72 Ohio St.3d 167, 170 

(1995), quoting State ex rel. Ryan v. Kerr, 42 Ohio App.19, 25 (8th Dist.1932). Nonetheless, 

when a municipal charter sets forth a procedure that differs from that required by a statute, the 

charter procedure has been held to supplant State law in its entirety even though it may be silent 

on specific issues upon which the relevant statute speaks. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kohl v. 

Dunipace, 56 Ohio St.2d 120 (1978); State ex rel. Bindas v. Andrish, 165 Ohio St. 441 (1956), 

syllabus; Esarco v. Tarpley, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 48, 2008-Ohio-4516. 

{¶7} In this respect, the Ohio Supreme Court has concluded that when a municipal 

charter includes language regarding a subject, it can be inferred that the charter provisions reflect 

the municipality’s intent to fully supplant statutes that would otherwise apply. See Andrish at 

445 (“[B]y specifying that its councilmen shall have certain specific qualifications, the people of 

Youngstown in their charter have inferentially expressed an intention that those are to be the 

only qualifications required of them. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”) When a municipal 

charter provides some procedure for the termination of its employees, it creates a conflict 

sufficient to require that the charter provisions apply instead of relevant statutes. Murphy v. 

Village of Powell, 5th Dist. Delaware Nos. 95-CA-E-12-093, 95-CA-E-12-095, 1996 WL 
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488017, * 2 (July 29, 1996). In Murphy, for example, the village charter provided that the 

municipal administrator was tasked with appointing, promoting, disciplining, transferring, 

demoting, and discharging employees, subject to the authority of the mayor. Id. The Fifth 

District Court of Appeals concluded that this general language conflicted with – and therefore 

supplanted – application of R.C. Chapter 737 with respect to the employment of a police officer. 

Id.

{¶8} The situation presented in this case is similar. R.C. 737.171 describes the 

statutory procedure that applies to the removal of a municipal police chief from office: 

Except as provided in section 737.162 of the Revised Code, if the mayor of a 

village has reason to believe that a duly appointed marshal of the village has been 

guilty of incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, 

insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, or any other 

acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in the performance of the 

marshal’s official duty, the mayor shall file with the legislative authority of the 

village written charges against that person setting forth in detail the reason for the 

charges and immediately shall serve a true copy of the charges upon the person 

against whom they are made. 

Charges filed under this section shall be heard at the next regular meeting of the 

legislative authority occurring not less than five days after the date those charges 

have been served on the person against whom they are made. The person against 

whom those charges are filed may appear in person and by counsel at the hearing, 

examine all witnesses, and answer all charges against that person. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the legislative authority may dismiss the 

charges, suspend the accused from office for not more than sixty days, or remove 

the accused from office. 

Action of the legislative authority removing or suspending the accused from 

office requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of all members elected to it. 

In the case of removal from office, the person so removed may appeal on 

questions of law and fact the decision of the legislative authority to the court of 

common pleas of the county in which the village is situated. The person shall 

take the appeal within ten days from the date of the finding of the legislative 

authority. 
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The terms of the statute, therefore, provide that a termination will be initiated by a mayor by 

filing charges with the legislative authority, considered at a hearing by the legislative authority 

after the police chief is afforded notice, and ultimately given effect by a 2/3 vote of the 

legislative authority. Id. In this context, the statute also provides that a municipal police chief 

can only be terminated for cause, which is in turn defined: “incompetency, inefficiency, 

dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, 

neglect of duty, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in the 

performance of * * * official duty.” 

{¶9} A comparison of the Charter and the statute demonstrates that the Charter sets 

forth a different process. Under its terms, “[t]he Police Chief shall be appointed by the Mayor 

with the approval of the majority of the membership of Council. He or she may be removed 

from office by the Mayor, but such removal shall not take place without the concurrence of the 

majority of the membership of Council.” The Charter is silent regarding the processes through 

which the removal is communicated to Council and Council considers the matter, but R.C. 

737.171 explains that written charges are filed with the legislative authority and served upon the 

police chief. The statute also provides a timeline and procedure for Council to consider the 

removal and for the police chief to be heard. The Charter is silent with respect to appeal rights, 

but R.C. 737.171 explains how a police chief may appeal removal. While the statute explicitly 

states that a police chief can only be terminated for cause, the Charter is silent. 

{¶10} The Village’s Charter sets forth a procedure that differs from that provided in 

R.C. 737.171. Specifically, it is notable that under R.C. 737.171, a mayor may bring charges 

against a police chief, but only a legislative authority can terminate a police chief’s employment. 

Under the Charter, however, the mayor has the authority to remove the police chief, and the 
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removal is effective upon the concurrence of a simple majority of council members. The 

Charter’s procedure is silent with respect to some other issues upon which R.C. 737.171 speaks, 

but in light of the explicit conflict, we are not compelled to fill those silences by resort to R.C. 

737.171. See Andrish, 165 Ohio St. 441, at paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶11} The provisions of the Charter conflict with the procedure set forth in R.C. 

737.171, and, therefore, the provisions of the Charter control with respect to the termination of 

the police chief. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to the Village, and 

Mr. Carroll’s assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶12} Mr. Carroll’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 
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Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 

WHITMORE, J. 

CONCURS.

BELFANCE, P. J. 

CONCURRING IN PART, AND DISSENTING IN PART.

{¶13} I concur with respect to the majority’s conclusion that the Charter controls the 

removal process of a police chief but dissent from its conclusion that the Charter also controls 

the substantive reasons or conditions which would allow for removal of the police chief because 

the Charter does not clearly and expressly supersede and override the provisions of R.C. 737.171 

on the same subject. 

{¶14} “In matters of local self-government, if a portion of a municipal charter expressly 

conflicts with a parallel state law, the charter provisions will prevail.” State ex rel. Lightfield v. 

Indian Hill, 69 Ohio St.3d 441, 442 (1994). “A municipality must clearly and expressly state the 

areas where the municipality intends to supersede and override general state statutes.” Id. at 443. 

“[I]n the absence of express language in a charter demonstrating a conflict with a statute, it is the 

duty of courts to harmonize the provisions of the charter and statutes relating to the same 

matter.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State ex rel. Finkbeiner v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of 

Elections, 122 Ohio St.3d 462, 2009-Ohio-3657, ¶ 31. 

{¶15} Because the Charter provides a procedure to remove the police chief that is 

expressly in conflict with the statute, I concur that the Charter controls with respect to the 

removal process. I diverge from the majority’s analysis when it uses this conflict to conclude 
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that the Charter also controls the circumstances under which a police chief may be removed. 

R.C. 737.171 expressly delineates the reasons and circumstances for removal of a police chief. 

In particular, the statute provides for removal for cause: the statute lists “incompetency, 

inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment 

of the public, neglect of duty, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in 

the performance of the marshal’s official duty” as reasons for discharge. See R.C. 737.171. The 

Charter, however, does not address in any manner the circumstances under which it is 

appropriate to remove a police chief. Thus, this is not an area where the municipality has clearly 

and expressly stated its intention to act contrary to the statute. The substantive question of what 

constitutes removable conduct is entirely different and distinct from the procedure that is 

authorized to effectuate that removal. Thus, I do not think it is appropriate to say that, because 

the procedure for removal conflicts with the statute, then the behavior that warrants removal also 

must be governed by the Charter. The only conflict between the Charter and the statute is in the 

area concerning the procedure for removal. Accordingly, because I see no express conflict 

between the statute and the Charter with respect to what constitutes removable conduct, the 

statute and Charter should be harmonized. See State ex rel. Finkbeiner at ¶ 31. As the statute 

requires cause for removing the police chief, see R.C. 737.171, Mr. Carroll was entitled to a 

declaration that he could only be terminated for cause as provided by R.C. 737.171. 

APPEARANCES:

KEVIN POWERS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

CARA M. WRIGHT, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.