NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY JODI JELOUDOV, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-17345 

D.C. No. 3:20-cv-02492-VC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 12, 2021**

Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Gregory Jodi Jeloudov appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Prather v. AT&T, Inc., 847 F.3d 

1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 20 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-17345 

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011)

(dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed on the basis of res judicata Jeloudov’s

claims alleging workplace discrimination and harassment because they involved 

the same primary right raised in a prior state court action that resulted in a final 

judgment on the merits. See San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City 

Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009) (federal court must follow 

state’s preclusion rules to determine effect of a state court judgment; discussing 

elements of claim preclusion under California law); Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, 

Inc., 230 P.3d 342, 348 (Cal. 2010) (under the primary rights theory, “a judgment 

for the defendant is a bar to a subsequent action by the plaintiff based on the same 

injury to the same right, even though [she] presents a different legal ground for 

relief” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Estate of 

Redfield, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 407 (Ct. App. 2011) (“A dismissal with prejudice 

following a settlement constitutes a final judgment on the merits.”).

The district court properly dismissed Jeloudov’s remaining claims for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction because Jeloudov failed to allege a federal question. 

See Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45 (2015) (claims that are “wholly

insubstantial” or “obviously frivolous” are insufficient to “raise a substantial 

federal question for jurisdictional purposes”).
3 20-17345 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice. See

Fed. R. Evid. 201; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(standard of review).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Jeloudov’s

complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. 

See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of review and explaining 

that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

We reject as unsupported by the record Jeloudov’s contentions that the 

district court was biased against her.

Jeloudov’s motion for default (Docket Entry No. 7) is denied.

AFFIRMED.