NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TUNI DEE HERNANDEZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-17028 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02142-CKD 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Carolyn K. Delaney, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 11, 2017

San Francisco, California

Before: BEA and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and LYNN,** Chief District Judge.

Tuni Dee Hernandez appeals the district court’s order affirming an

administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of her applications for disability insurance 

benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chief United States District 

Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

SEP 6 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–34, 1382–1385. We affirm.

1. The ALJ did not err by rejecting the opinions of Hernandez’s treating 

physicians, Doctors Kathleen King and Dennis Hart. The ALJ’s determination that 

Doctor Hart’s own treatment notes did not support the level of severity endorsed in 

his opinion was a “specific and legitimate reason[] supported by substantial 

evidence” for rejecting his opinion. Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d

685, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, although the ALJ mistakenly referred to the 

treatment notes of Hernandez’s orthopedic surgeon and physical therapist as 

belonging to Doctor King, Dr. King’s notes nonetheless did not support the level of 

severity she endorsed. Thus, the ALJ properly rejected Doctor King’s opinion, and 

his error in misidentifying her treatment notes was harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 

674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on 

account of an error that is harmless.”).

2. The ALJ also did not err by rejecting Hernandez’s testimony regarding 

the severity of her symptoms.1 The inconsistencies between Hernandez’s testimony 

and the objective medical evidence, including her doctors’ treatment notes and an 

MRI of her lumbar spine, were “clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting 

Hernandez’s testimony. Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599–

 

1 Hernandez testified that she could neither sit nor stand for more than fifteen 

minutes at a time because of pain in her back and right ankle.
3 

600 (9th Cir. 1999). So were the inconsistences between her testimony and her selfreported daily activities, which included doing her laundry, cleaning the kitchen,

driving short distances, and sitting on the couch and watching her three-year-old 

nephew play games. 

3. Finally, the district court correctly concluded that any error committed 

by the ALJ at step five of the disability analysis was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d 

at 1111. There was no apparent conflict between the ALJ’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) determination that Hernandez was “limited to simple, repetitive 

tasks” and the vocational expert’s testimony that she could work as an envelope 

addresser, a job which the U.S. Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles describes as requiring “Level 2” reasoning.2 See Abrew v. Astrue, 303 Fed. 

App’x 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“[T]here was no conflict between the 

ALJ’s step five determination that [the claimant] could complete only simple tasks 

and the vocational expert’s testimony that [the claimant] could do 

jobs . . . categorize[d] at ‘Reasoning Level 2.’”); see also Moore v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 

599, 604 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding no apparent conflict between an ALJ’s RFC 

determination that a claimant could “perform[] ‘simple, routine and repetitive work 

 

2 Level 2 reasoning requires, inter alia, the ability to “[a]pply commonsense 

understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.” See 

U.S. Department of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles app. C, 1991 WL 

688702 (4th ed. 1991) (hereinafter “DOT”). 
4 

activity . . . ’” and a vocational expert’s testimony that the claimant could perform 

jobs that require Level 2 reasoning).3 Thus, even if the ALJ erred by failing to resolve 

an apparent conflict between Hernandez’s RFC and the vocational expert’s 

testimony that Hernandez could perform two other jobs that require Level 3 

reasoning,4see Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding an 

apparent conflict between an ALJ’s RFC determination that a claimant was limited 

to “simple, repetitive tasks” and a vocational expert’s testimony that the claimant 

could perform jobs that required Level 3 reasoning), any such error was harmless. 

AFFIRMED.

 

3 Nor did the opinion of Doctor T. Renfro, a government psychologist, that 

Hernandez was “able to understand, remember, and carry out simple one or two-step 

job instructions,” raise an apparent conflict with the vocational expert’s testimony. 

True, this Court has found an “apparent conflict” between an ALJ’s finding that a 

claimant is “limit[ed] . . . to performing one- and two-step tasks” and a vocational 

expert’s testimony that the claimant can meet “the demands of Level Two 

reasoning[.]” Rounds v. Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 

2015) (“The conflict between [the claimant’s] RFC and Level Two reasoning is 

brought into relief by the close similarity between [the claimant’s] RFC and Level 

One reasoning[,] [which] . . . requires a person to apply ‘commonsense 

understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions.’”). Here, however, 

the ALJ never adopted Doctor Renfro’s opinion that Hernandez was limited to 

“simple one or two-step job instructions.” Thus, Rounds is inapposite.

4 Level 3 reasoning requires, inter alia, the ability to “[a]pply commonsense 

understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written, oral or diagrammatic 

form.” See DOT app. C, 1991 WL 688702.