COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

WENDY KAY SWEARENGIN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1798-00-3 SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 JUNE 26, 2001 

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE 

 CITY OF STAUNTON 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF STAUNTON 

Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Judge 

 John W. Appleford (Law Offices of John W. 

Appleford, on briefs), for appellant. 

 (James Glick; Vellines, Cobbs, Goodwin & 

Glass, P.L.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 

 Wendy Kay Swearengin appeals the decision of the circuit 

court terminating her parental rights to her sons, Joshua and 

Jacob. She contends on appeal that the circuit court erred in 

terminating her parental rights because it was bound by the 

juvenile and domestic relations district court consent decree 

which had as its agreed goal the return of her two sons to her 

home. She argues that the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court decree was based upon a contractual entrustment 

agreement which was binding upon the parties and that agreement, 

when approved by the juvenile court, became the law of the case 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
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and was binding on the circuit court. Swearengin asserts that 

the Department of Social Services (DSS) was bound by the 

agreement which precluded it from seeking termination of her 

residual parental rights and for DSS to do so would be a breach 

of the contract which the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court approved. Because these issues were not raised 

in the de novo circuit court hearing, they were not properly 

preserved for appeal and we cannot consider them here for the 

first time. Rule 5A:18. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL 

 Swearegin presents the following questions on appeal in her 

opening brief: 

I. Did the Agreement of the parties on 

October 15, 1998 providing for foster care 

for the Swearengin children while appellant 

was in prison followed by return to the 

mother of their custody upon her release, 

and the subsequent Order of the Juvenile and 

Domestic Relations District Court entered on 

January 14, 1999 approving that Agreement 

and foster care plan, become the law of the 

case so as to preclude the subsequent entry 

by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 

District Court and Circuit Courts of orders 

terminating appellant's parental rights? 

II. Did the circuit court err in ordering 

the termination of appellant's parental 

rights after the Juvenile and Domestic 

Relations District Court had erred in 

directing appellee to file for such 

termination because of "the parents' 

extensive history with the court system," 

and the fact "both parents are 

incarcerated," when (a) all parties to the 
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dispute had agreed that the mutual plan was 

foster care for the children followed by 

return home upon appellant's release from 

prison; and (b) that plan had in fact been 

approved by the Juvenile and Domestic 

Relations District Court? 

 Swearengin contends that she preserved the foregoing 

questions for appeal based upon the following circuit court 

proceeding: 

The objection was made and the questions 

thereby preserved by the filing by appellant 

of the Agreed Order (App. 7), as Defendant's 

Exhibit A in defense of the parental rights 

termination petition, and by appellant's 

unsuccessful request of the court to enforce 

the Agreed Order as written and to deny the 

petition. No transcript of the hearing was 

made so as to memorialize the specific time 

this request was made. 

 "The Court of Appeals will not consider an argument on 

appeal which was not presented to the trial court." Ohree v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). 

See Rule 5A:18. The record fails to show that Swearengin raised 

or argued in the trial court the issues she now raises on 

appeal. The trial court's letter opinion and final order do not 

reflect that appellant raised those issues before it, the final 

order was signed without comment or objection by Swearengin's 

attorney, and the letter opinion indicates that the only issue 

raised and argued by Swearengin in the trial court was whether 

DSS bore its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

"the necessary elements under Section 16.1-283." Because 

Swearegin argues issues on appeal other than the sufficiency of 
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the evidence to support the order of termination, Rule 5A:18 

bars our consideration of these questions on appeal. 

 The filing of the "Agreed Order" from the juvenile and 

domestic relations district court and merely requesting that the 

court enforce that order in the de novo proceeding was 

insufficient to place the circuit court on notice of 

Swearengin's contentions that the return-to-home provision of 

the entrustment agreement was contractually binding on the 

parties and had become the controlling law of the case. 

Without a pleading or argument presented in the circuit court 

expressly presenting those issues to the circuit court, 

Swearengin did not raise these questions in the circuit court 

and has not preserved the issues for appeal. 

 Furthermore, the "Agreed Order" contains no statements 

indicating that Swearengin argued in the juvenile court that the 

"return-to-home" provision of the entrustment agreement was 

contractually binding on DSS and on the courts. Moreover, 

because we review appeals from courts of record, Code 

§ 16.1-405, the "Agreed Order" from the juvenile court does not 

preserve an issue being appealed to this Court from the circuit 

court. See Code § 16.1-136 (an appeal to a circuit court from a 

court not of record is tried de novo). 

 Thus, because Swearengin's claims of breach of contract and 

application of the law of the case doctrine were not raised in 

the de novo hearing in the circuit court, see Commonwealth v. 
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Luzik, 259 Va. 198, 206, 524 S.E.2d 871, 876 (2000); American 

Filtrona Co. v. Hanford, 16 Va. App. 159, 164, 428 S.E.2d 511, 

514 (1993), and because trial courts are vested with broad 

discretion in making decisions regarding a child's best 

interests, Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 

13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991), the record 

reflects no reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice 

exceptions to Rule 5A:18. Accordingly, the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

Affirmed.