* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

May 4, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-20560

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MANFRED KREUTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-01-CR-618-ALL)

--------------------

Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Manfred Kreuter appeals his convictions

for wire fraud and money laundering. He contends that the evidence

is insufficient to support his wire fraud convi ctions and that,

because those convictions do not stand, there is no underlying

illegal act to support the money laundering conviction. After

reviewing the record and the arguments of counsel, we are satisfied

that a rational trier of fact could have found th at the evidence

established the essen tial elements of the offenses beyond a2

reasonable doubt. U nited States v. Romero-Cruz

, 201 F.3d 374, 376

(5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Jaramillo

, 42 F.3d 920, 923 (5th

Cir. 1995).

Kre uter also asserts that the district court erred in

admitting into evidence letters of credit and testimony relating to

those letters of credit, insisting that the documents were not

properly verifi ed and constituted inadmissible hearsay. To the

extent that the records were introduced to show Kreuter’s knowledge

of what they sa id, the letters of credit were not hearsay. F E D

.

R. E VID

. 801(c). To the extent that the documents were used to show

that Kreuter received funds as a result of his entering into

transactions with the international buyers, the district court did

not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence: It would be

admissible under the “residual exception” to the hearsay rule

contained in F ED

. R. E VID

. 807. S ee United States v. Wilson , 249

F.3d 366, 374-76 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Perez

, 217 F.3d

323, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2000).

Kreuter argues furthe r that the district court erred in

allowing a witness to make legal conclusions in her testimony. He

cannot establish that the admission of the statements constituted

reversi ble error. S ee Kaiser v. New York

, 394 U.S. 280, 381 n.5

(1969); United States v. Miranda

, 248 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir.

2001).

Finally, Kreuter asserts that the district court erred in not

instructing the jury that, to establish wire fraud, the government3

had to show that the defendant acted “willfully” or “voluntarily

with specific intent to disobey or disregard the law.” As he did

not object to the instructions on this ground or request this

instruction, review is for plain error. United States v. Martin

,

332 F.3d 827, 834 (5th Cir. 2003). Kreuter has not shown that the

instruction given was plainly erroneous. S ee United States v.

Ismoila

, 100 F.3d 380, 399 (5th Cir. 1996). Kreuter’s convictions

and the sentences imposed are, therefore ,

AFFIRMED.