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*********************************************** 
GEORGE LABISSONIERE, COEXECUTOR (ESTATE

OF ROBERT LABISSONIERE) ET AL. v.

GAYLORD HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL.

(AC 42581)

Lavine, Moll and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, coexecutors of the estate of R, sought to recover damages

for the alleged medical malpractice of the defendants, a hospital, a

physician practice group, and several individual physicians. The plaintiffs, pursuant to statute (§ 52-190a), appended to their complaint an

opinion letter authored by M, a physician and general surgeon who was

board certified in surgery; the individual physicians were board certified

in internal medicine. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the

physicians’ diagnosis and postsurgical treatment of R was within the

medical specialty of surgery, that the physicians were acting outside

the scope of their specialty and, therefore, M could be considered a

‘‘similar health care provider’’ as defined by statute (§ 52-184c (c)). The

defendants filed motions to dismiss in which they claimed, inter alia,

that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because M

was not a ‘‘similar health care provider’’ to them as defined by § 52-

184c (c). The physician practice group also claimed that the trial court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it was not a legal entity at

the time R received treatment. The trial court granted the motions

to dismiss on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the

defendants and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiffs

appealed to this court. Held:

1. The trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction over the claim

against the physician practice group; it was irrelevant that the physician

practice group was not a legal entity at the time that R was treated, as

it was a legal entity at the time the action was brought against it and,

therefore, the court had subject matter jurisdiction.

2. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ action for lack of personal

jurisdiction; the plaintiffs’ unsupported conclusory allegation that the

individual physicians were acting outside the scope of their specialty

of internal medicine was insufficient to establish that they were acting

as surgeons when they treated R and, therefore, the letter authored by

M, a surgeon, was not authored by a ‘‘similar health care provider.’’

Argued March 9—officially released July 21, 2020

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for the defendants’ alleged

medical malpractice, and for other relief, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford,

where the court, Dubay, J., granted the defendants’

motions to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon,

from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Keith Yagaloff, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Thomas Anderson, with whom, on the brief, was

Cristin E. Sheehan, for the appellees (defendant Eileen

Ramos et al.).

Michael G. Rigg, for the appellee (named defendant).

Laura E. Waltman, with whom, on the brief, was R.

Cornelius Danaher, Jr., for the appellee (defendant

Sound Physicians of Connecticut, LLC).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. This appeal arises out of a medical malpractice action brought by the plaintiffs, George Labissoniere and Helen Civale, coexecutors of the estate of

Robert Labissoniere (decedent), against the defendants,

internal medicine physicians, Moe Kyaw, Madhuri Gadiyaram, and Eileen Ramos (collectively, physicians), and

their employers, Gaylord Hospital, Inc. (hospital), and

Sound Physicians of Connecticut, LLC (Sound Physicians). The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the

trial court dismissing their claims for lack of personal

jurisdiction pursuant to General Statutes § 52-190a.1 The

plaintiffs’ central claim on appeal is that the court erred

in concluding that the physicians were internists acting

within their specialty when they treated the decedent.

The plaintiffs therefore assert that the trial court erred

in concluding that the opinion letter attached to their

complaint, which was written by a surgeon, failed to

meet the personal jurisdictional requirement of § 52-

190a and the allegations of the complaint did not satisfy

the personal jurisdictional exception provided by General Statutes § 52-184c (c).2 We reject the plaintiffs’

claim. Sound Physicians argues on appeal, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against it

because it was not a legal entity at the time that the

decedent was treated at the hospital. We disagree that

the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We

therefore affirm the judgment dismissing the action for

lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

In May, 2015, the plaintiffs instituted a prior action

against the physicians and the hospital on the basis of

allegations that are substantially similar to those in the

present case. In September, 2016, the trial court, Cobb,

J., dismissed that action for lack of personal jurisdiction

because the opinion letter attached to the plaintiffs’

complaint was not authored by a ‘‘similar health care

provider,’’ as required by § 52-190a. This court affirmed

the judgment of dismissal on direct appeal. See Labissoniere v. Gaylord Hospital, Inc., 182 Conn. App. 445,

185 A.3d 680 (2018) (Labissoniere I).

In Labissoniere I, the plaintiffs alleged that the decedent was admitted to the hospital on February 14, 2013,

for medical care and rehabilitation following a hip

replacement surgery performed at St. Francis Hospital

and Medical Center (St. Francis Hospital). Id., 448. The

plaintiffs further alleged that, while under the care of

the physicians at the hospital, the decedent suffered

from ‘‘a retroperitoneal hematoma, a postoperative condition that resulted in irreversible nerve damage, as

well as hemorrhagic shock and multiorgan failure,

requiring the decedent to be transferred back to St.

Francis Hospital as an emergency admission on March

11, 2013.’’3

Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the physicians

were board certified in internal medicine and that they
‘‘provided the decedent with treatment and diagnosis

for a postoperative condition which was within the

specialty of surgery.’’ In an attempt to comply with § 52-

190a (a), the plaintiffs appended to their complaint an

opinion letter authored by David A. Mayer, a physician

and board certified general surgeon. Labissoniere v.

Gaylord Hospital, Inc., supra, 182 Conn. App. 448–49.

The physicians and the hospital moved to dismiss

the plaintiffs’ claims against them for lack of personal

jurisdiction on the ground that Mayer was not an internist and, therefore, was not a ‘‘similar health care provider,’’ as defined in § 52-184c. Id., 449. The plaintiffs

countered that Mayer was a ‘‘similar health care provider’’ pursuant to § 52-184c (c) because the physicians

were acting as surgeons during their diagnosis and treatment of the decedent’s retroperitoneal hematoma. In

ruling on the motion to dismiss, Judge Cobb reasoned

that ‘‘neither the . . . complaint . . . nor the surgeon’s written opinion letter allege[s] or state[s] that

the [physicians and the hospital] were acting outside

their specialty of internal medicine in treating the [decedent] or that they undertook the diagnosis and treatment of a condition outside of their specialty such that

their conduct should be judged against the standards

of care applicable to that specialty. Such an allegation

and expert opinion is necessary to fall within the exception contained in [§ 52-184c (c)].’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 451. Accordingly, Judge Cobb dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction.

On appeal in Labissoniere I, the plaintiffs claimed,

inter alia, that the court erred in determining that the

opinion letter did not comply with § 52-190a, and that

the exception set forth in § 52-184c (c) was inapplicable.

Id., 454. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that ‘‘the

exception in § 52-184c (c) applie[d] because they

alleged that the treatment and care the physicians rendered to the decedent fell ‘within the specialty of surgery’ and, therefore, the physicians were acting outside

of their specialty of internal medicine.’’ Id., 456. The

physicians and the hospital argued in response that

‘‘because the plaintiffs did not allege that the physicians

were acting outside the scope of their medical specialty

of internal medicine, the exception under § 52-184c (c)

did not apply, and the plaintiffs were thus obligated to

obtain an opinion letter authored by a physician board

certified in internal medicine.’’ Id. This court agreed

with the physicians and the hospital, determining that

Mayer was not a ‘‘similar health care provider’’ because

he was not board certified in internal medicine. Id., 455.

This court further concluded that ‘‘the decedent was

admitted to the hospital for ‘medical care and rehabilitation’ following a hip replacement, the actual surgical

procedure having been performed at another hospital,

by an independent surgeon. While under the . . . care
[of the physicians and the hospital], the decedent developed complications, which required treatment and diagnosis by the physicians. Although the physicians appear

initially to have misdiagnosed the decedent’s postoperative condition, nothing contained in the plaintiffs’ complaint or opinion letter suggests that the physicians

were not acting as internists. In fact, the crux of the

plaintiffs’ complaint was that the physicians were negligent in their initial assessment of the decedent’s condition, not that the physicians were negligent in performing a surgical procedure.’’ Id., 457. This court thus

concluded that ‘‘[b]ecause the plaintiffs here have not

alleged that the physicians acted outside the scope of

their specialty of internal medicine, the exception to

the definition of similar health care provider in § 52-

184c (c) does not apply. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were

required to obtain an opinion letter from an expert who

(1) had training and experience in internal medicine,

and (2) was board certified in internal medicine.’’ Id.,

459. This court, therefore, affirmed the judgment dismissing the action in Labissoniere I. Id.

In January, 2017, while Labissoniere I was pending in

this court, the plaintiffs commenced the present action

against the hospital, the physicians, and Sound Physicians. As previously noted, the plaintiffs’ complaint contains allegations that are substantially similar to those

set forth in Labissoniere I. The plaintiffs also appended

the same opinion letter authored by Mayer to the complaint, in which Mayer opined that the conduct of the

hospital and the physicians fell below the applicable

standard of care by failing to timely diagnose a retroperitoneal bleed in the decedent, conduct a CT scan of the

decedent, and transfer the decedent back to St. Francis

Hospital. The plaintiffs also named Sound Physicians as

a defendant and pleaded a count of negligence against

it. The plaintiffs further alleged that the physicians were

employed by both the hospital and Sound Physicians.

The plaintiffs again alleged that, on February 14, 2013,

the decedent was admitted to the hospital for medical

care following a previous hip replacement surgery performed at St. Francis Hospital. They further alleged that,

while under the care of the defendants, the decedent

developed a retroperitoneal hematoma, which resulted

in irreversible nerve damage. The plaintiffs alleged that

the diagnosis and treatment of that hematoma and the

decedent’s postsurgical condition were within the specialty of surgery, and not within the specialty of internal

medicine. They also alleged that ‘‘[t]he defendants

lacked the specialized training to determine whether

the decedent needed intervention for treating the decedent’s condition, a retroperitoneal hematoma. The specialized training required was in the area of general

surgery.’’ Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that neither

the hospital nor Sound Physicians had a surgeon available for consultation by the physicians.
The plaintiffs alleged that the decedent’s injuries

were caused by the negligence of the physicians in

failing, inter alia, to timely obtain a consultation with a

surgeon, to perform diagnostic imaging, and to diagnose

and treat the decedent’s condition. The plaintiffs further

alleged that the hospital and Sound Physicians were

negligent in failing to ensure that the physicians did

not commit the alleged negligence.

The hospital filed a motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs

failed to comply with § 52-190a because (1) a board

certified surgeon is not a similar healthcare provider,

(2) merely alleging that the defendants were acting outside the scope of their specialty did not satisfy the

statutory requirements of §§ 52-190a and 52-184c (c),

(3) the opinion letter failed to detail Mayer’s qualifications and, therefore, failed to show that he was qualified

to opine as to the care and treatment rendered by internists, and (4) the plaintiffs were engaging in impermissible forum shopping because Labissoniere I was filed

in the judicial district of Tolland and the present case

was filed in the judicial district of Hartford. The hospital

subsequently filed a motion to ‘‘preclude [the] plaintiffs

from contesting [its] motion to dismiss,’’ arguing that

the action was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the plaintiffs had been afforded a full and

fair opportunity to litigate the adequacy of Mayer’s opinion letter in Labissoniere I.

4 The physicians also filed

a motion to dismiss and memorandum of law in support

thereof, arguing, among other things, that the plaintiffs

had failed to offer an expert opinion authored by a

similar health care provider, thus warranting dismissal.

Sound Physicians moved to dismiss the count against

it by incorporating the same arguments set forth by

the hospital and by asserting that the claim against it

‘‘should be dismissed because [it] was not a legal entity

at the time of the [allegedly negligent treatment of the

decedent].’’ The plaintiffs objected to the defendants’

motions on the basis that Labissoniere I had been dismissed without prejudice, and, therefore, the present

case was not barred by collateral estoppel. The plaintiffs further argued that they had complied with the

requirements of § 52-190a, but they did not provide any

analytical support for that argument, aside from summarizing case law. The motions were argued before the

court, Dubay, J., on October 4, 2018. The plaintiffs

asserted at the hearing on the motions that ‘‘[t]he issue

in the [Labissoniere I] complaint was resolved by modifying the pleading to specifically state that it was outside

of the medical specialty of the internists.’’

Subsequently, prompted by Judge Dubay’s inquiries

at the hearing, both Sound Physicians and the plaintiffs

filed supplemental memoranda on the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Sound Physicians argued that

‘‘the plaintiffs do not, and cannot, dispute that Sound
Physicians was not a business entity at the time of [the

decedent’s] treatment at [the hospital]’’ and, therefore,

the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

the action asserted against it. (Emphasis in original.)

The plaintiffs filed a reply, in which they contested

Sound Physicians’ argument.

On December 7, 2017, Judge Dubay issued a memorandum of decision, in which he sua sponte imposed a

stay pending the outcome of the appeal in Labissoniere

I. While the stay was in effect, this court affirmed the

judgment dismissing Labissoniere I. The physicians

and the hospital thereafter filed supplemental briefs

in support of their motions, arguing that this court’s

decision in Labissoniere I required dismissal of the

present action, in which the plaintiffs assert virtually

identical allegations as those made in Labissoniere I.

On January 23, 2019, Judge Dubay dismissed the

plaintiffs’ action and issued a memorandum of decision

that set forth the following reasoning: ‘‘ ‘[A] broad specialty such as internal medicine often overlaps with

other medical specialties. . . . [P]hysicians who are

board certified in that specialty are often called upon

to diagnose and treat a variety of conditions that could

fall within a variety of medical specialties.’ [Labissoniere I, supra, 182 Conn. App. 458]. For this reason,

courts have often declined to create scenarios in which

health care providers in broad specialties such as internal medicine or emergency medicine may be considered

to be working outside their specialty. . . . This is not

to say, however, that physicians with broad specialties

can never act outside their scope. But given a primary

responsibility of an internist or emergency room doctor

is to initially diagnose and treat on a wide array of

injuries and illnesses, courts will not place negligence

in doing so outside their scope, regardless of the type

of injury or illness in question.

‘‘In the present case, it is undisputed that the defendant physicians are board certified specialists in internal medicine. Accompanying the plaintiffs’ complaint

is an opinion letter authored and signed by a board

certified general surgeon. To fit the opinion letter

[required by] § 52-190a, the plaintiffs rely on the § 52-

184c (c) exception.

‘‘The complaint alleges the diagnosis and treatment

of the decedent’s postsurgical complication was . . .

within the specialty of surgery. The complaint also

alleges that [the] defendants failed to exercise care and

diligence by, among other claims, failing to timely

obtain a consult or perform a CT scan. In sum, the

defendant [physicians] allegedly failed to appreciate the

decedent’s injury for what it was and therefore failed

to appropriately diagnose and treat him. Importantly,

however, the alleged actions (or inactions), regardless

of how negligent, fall within the generally accepted

practice of internal medicine and are therefore insuffi-
cient to place the defendants outside the scope of

their specialty.

‘‘Therefore, given that the defendant physicians are

internists who acted within their specialty, the § 52-

184c (c) exception does not apply and the plaintiffs are

required to present an opinion letter from a physician

specializing in internal medicine. Under these circumstances, the court agrees with the defendants that the

opinion letter is deficient [pursuant] to § 52-190a, and

the motions to dismiss are granted.’’ (Citations omitted.) This appeal followed.

I

We must first address Sound Physicians’ claim that

the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

because it was not a legal entity at the time of the

decedent’s treatment at the hospital. See Park National

Bank v. 3333 Main, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 774, 778, 15

A.3d 1150 (2011) (‘‘Once the question of lack of [subject

matter] jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be

disposed of no matter in what form it is presented. . . .

The court must fully resolve it before proceeding with

the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

‘‘We have long held that because [a] determination

regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a

question of law, our review is plenary. . . . Moreover,

[i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and

review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any

time. . . . Subject matter jurisdiction involves the

authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court

lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over

which it is without jurisdiction. . . . The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any

party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court

sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including

on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

‘‘[S]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of

the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . and a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is void.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bruno v. Travelers

Cos., 172 Conn. App. 717, 724, 161 A.3d 630 (2017).

As stated previously, Sound Physicians moved in the

trial court to dismiss the claim asserted against it on

the basis that it was not a legal entity at the time that

the physicians treated the decedent at the hospital. Following oral argument in the trial court, Sound Physicians filed a supplemental memorandum of law, in

which it argued that ‘‘the plaintiffs do not, and cannot,

dispute that Sound Physicians was not a business entity

at the time of [the decedent’s] treatment at [the hospital]

(February 14, 2013 to March 11, 2013). Sound Physicians

was incorporated and commenced [doing] business in

the state of Connecticut on April 25, 2013. . . . Accord-
ingly, the plaintiffs’ claim against Sound Physicians is

void ab initio and should be dismissed.’’ (Emphasis

in original.) Judge Dubay dismissed the claim against

Sound Physicians for lack of personal jurisdiction but

did not address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction

in his memorandum of decision.

On appeal, Sound Physicians argues that ‘‘to confer

subject matter jurisdiction upon the court, each party

to the dispute must be an actual legal entity. An entity

[without] legal existence can neither sue nor be sued.

It is undisputed that [Sound Physicians] was not a legal

entity at the time of the decedent’s medical treatment

at [the hospital].’’ Sound Physicians cites numerous

cases in support of this argument, including Omerin

USA, LLC v. Infinity Group, Superior Court, judicial

district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-17-6085890-S (May

24, 2018); Prout v. Mukul Luxury Boutique Hotel &

Spa, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain,

Docket No. CV-15-6029341-S (February 28, 2017); Washington v. Tracey, Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Docket No. CV-10-5034700-S (August 3, 2011);

and State v. Lamar Advertising of Hartford, Superior

Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-08-

5020325-S (April 5, 2011); among others.

There is a critical distinction between those cases

and the present one. In each of the cited cases, the

Superior Court dismissed the action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff brought an

action against a defendant in its trade name. In the

matter at hand, however, the plaintiffs did not sue

Sound Physicians in a trade name. The plaintiffs commenced their action on January 11, 2017, against Sound

Physicians of Connecticut, LLC, which was and had

been a limited liability company in the state of Connecticut since its registration on April 25, 2013. Sound Physicians’ emphasis on the fact that it was not a registered

legal entity at the time of the decedent’s treatment is

a red herring as it relates to the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction. The relevant question is whether Sound

Physicians was a legal entity at the time that it was sued

by the plaintiffs. Because the plaintiffs sued Sound

Physicians, a limited liability company, not a trade

name, we reject Sound Physician’s alternative ground

for affirmance.5

We now turn to the remaining issue of whether the

trial court correctly concluded that personal jurisdiction over the defendants was lacking.

II

The plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in dismissing the action for lack of personal jurisdiction by

improperly concluding that the defendant physicians

were acting within their specialty of internal medicine

and, therefore, improperly concluding that the plaintiffs’ opinion letter written by a surgeon was deficient
pursuant to § 52-190a and did not fall within the exception created by § 52-184c (c).6 We are not persuaded.

We begin with the standard of review and the applicable principles of law. ‘‘A motion to dismiss tests, inter

alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is

without jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300 Conn.

1, 10, 12 A.3d 865 (2011). ‘‘Our Supreme Court has held

that the failure of a plaintiff to comply with the statutory

requirements of § 52-190a (a) results in a defect in process that implicates the personal jurisdiction of the

court. . . . Thus, where such a failure is the stated

basis for the granting [of] a motion to dismiss, our

review is plenary. . . . Further, to the extent that our

review requires us to construe the nature of the cause

of action alleged in the complaint, we note that [t]he

interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law

for the court. . . . Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Perry

v. Valerio, 167 Conn. App. 734, 739, 143 A.3d 1202

(2016).

‘‘When a . . . court decides a . . . question raised

by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the

allegations of the complaint in their most favorable

light. . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts

to be those alleged in the complaint, including those

facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.

. . . The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which

are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must

be decided upon that alone.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., supra,

300 Conn. 10–11.

‘‘[W]e long have eschewed the notion that pleadings

should be read in a hypertechnical manner. Rather,

[t]he modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut,

is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather

than narrowly and technically . . . . [T]he complaint

must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give

effect to the pleading with reference to the general

theory upon which it proceeded, and to substantial justice between the parties . . . . Our reading of pleadings in a manner that advances substantial justice

means that a pleading must be construed reasonably,

to contain all that it fairly means, but carries with it

the related proposition that it must not be contorted

in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational

comprehension . . . . [E]ssential allegations may not

be supplied by conjecture or remote implication . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caron v. Connecticut Pathology Group, P.C., 187 Conn. App. 555, 564,

202 A.3d 1024, cert. denied, 331 Conn. 922, 206 A.3d

187 (2019).

The plaintiffs argue that the trial court failed to give
due deference to the factual allegations in their complaint in making its determination that the challenged

actions by the physicians fell within the specialty of

internal medicine. Specifically, they argue that the trial

court was obligated to accept as true their allegations

that the diagnosis and treatment of the decedent’s postsurgical complications were within the specialty of general surgery and outside the specialty of internal medicine. Accordingly, the plaintiffs contend that their

opinion letter authored by a surgeon was sufficient to

meet the requirements of § 52-190a. The defendants

counter that the plaintiffs’ mere addition of an allegation

that the physicians were acting outside their specialty

of internal medicine is insufficient to cure the deficiency

that was identified in Labissoniere I. The physicians

further argue that the complaint is devoid of any factual

allegation that the physicians actually rendered surgical

care, beyond the conclusory allegation to that effect.

We agree with the defendants.

Our resolution of this claim is controlled by this

court’s decision in Labissoniere I, which addressed the

same jurisdictional question arising out of the allegations of a complaint that are nearly identical to those

in the present case.7 Accordingly, the narrow question

with which we are presented is whether the plaintiffs

cured the jurisdictional defect as identified in Labissoniere I.

8 The essential allegations in the present complaint are the same as those in Labissoniere I. The

plaintiffs alleged in both cases that the decedent was

admitted to the hospital for medical care following a

hip replacement surgery and that the physicians were

negligent in failing to timely diagnose the hematoma

and consult with a surgeon. The plaintiffs, however,

added a conclusory allegation that the physicians had

provided the decedent with treatment and diagnosis for

a condition that was outside the specialty of internal

medicine and within the specialty of surgery, in an

attempt to comply with the statutory requirements. The

plaintiffs’ argument that we must accept as true that

new conclusory allegation is unavailing. See Caron v.

Connecticut Pathology Group, P.C., supra, 187 Conn.

App. 564 (‘‘[e]ssential allegations may not be supplied

by conjecture or remote implication’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Whether the physicians were acting as internists or surgeons is undoubtedly an essential

allegation, and the plaintiffs failed to allege any facts

from which we can infer that the physicians were indeed

acting outside the scope of internal medicine, irrespective of the label that they attach to their claim. We,

therefore, decline to accept as true the plaintiffs’ unsupported conclusory allegation that the physicians were

acting as surgeons.9

In light of the foregoing, it is still the case that ‘‘nothing contained in the plaintiffs’ complaint or opinion

letter suggests that the physicians were not acting as

internists. In fact, the crux of the plaintiffs’ complaint
was that the physicians were negligent in their initial

assessment of the decedent’s condition, not that the

physicians were negligent in performing a surgical procedure.’’ Labissoniere I, supra, 182 Conn. App. 457.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly

dismissed the plaintiffs’ action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 52-190a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) No civil action

. . . shall be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury or

wrongful death . . . whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged

that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care

provider, unless the attorney or party filing the action . . . has made a

reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that

there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in

the care or treatment of the claimant. The complaint . . . shall contain a

certificate of the attorney or party filing the action . . . that such reasonable

inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief that grounds exist for an action

against each named defendant . . . . To show the existence of such good

faith, the claimant or the claimant’s attorney . . . shall obtain a written

and signed opinion of a similar health care provider, as defined in section

52-184c, which similar health care provider shall be selected pursuant to

the provisions of said section, that there appears to be evidence of medical

negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion.

Such written opinion shall not be subject to discovery by any party except

for questioning the validity of the certificate. The claimant or the claimant’s

attorney . . . shall retain the original written opinion and shall attach a

copy of such written opinion, with the name and signature of the similar

health care provider expunged, to such certificate. . . .

‘‘(c) The failure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action.’’

2 General Statutes § 52-184c (c) provides: ‘‘If the defendant health care

provider is certified by the appropriate American board as a specialist, is

trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as a

specialist, a ‘similar health care provider’ is one who: (1) Is trained and

experienced in the same specialty; and (2) is certified by the appropriate

American board in the same specialty; provided if the defendant health care

provider is providing treatment or diagnosis for a condition which is not

within his specialty, a specialist trained in the treatment or diagnosis

for that condition shall be considered a ‘similar health care provider.’ ’’

(Emphasis added.)

3 Neither Labissoniere I nor the present action alleges a wrongful death

cause of action.

4 The hospital later amended its motion to dismiss and memorandum of

law in support thereof, asserting collateral estoppel as its primary argument

for dismissal.

5

In light of our conclusion herein, we need not address the question of

whether a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when a defendant is

sued in its trade name only. We leave that question open for another day.

6 Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court (1) ‘‘impermissibly

created a new statutory definition of the specialty of internal medicine, and

an exception thereto, without the required consideration, deference to the

factual allegations in the complaint and the circumstances surrounding [the]

decedent’s injuries,’’ (2) ‘‘erred in finding that the plaintiffs’ expert was not

a ‘similar health care provider’ within the meaning of [§§] 52-190a and . . .

52-184c (c),’’ and (3) erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim that the hospital

was vicariously and independently liable for the physicians’ conduct.

7 For a more detailed discussion of the jurisdictional question, as it pertains

to the broad specialty of internal medicine, see Labissoniere I, supra, 182

Conn. App. 445.

8 One panel of this court may not overrule the decision of a previous

panel without en banc consideration. See Boccanfuso v. Conner, 89 Conn.

App. 260, 285 n.20, 873 A.2d 208, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 905, 882 A.2d 668

(2005), and cert. denied, 275 Conn. 905, 882 A.2d 668 (2005).

9 The plaintiffs’ claim brings to mind a story attributed to Abraham Lincoln.

He used to refer to a boy who, when asked how many legs his calf would
have if he called a tail a leg, replied ‘‘five,’’ to which the response was made

that calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg. A. McClure, ‘‘Abe’’ Lincoln’s

Yarns and Stories: A Complete Collection of the Funny and Witty Anecdotes

that Made Lincoln Famous as America’s Greatest Story Teller (1901) p. 409.

Similarly, simply claiming that the physicians were acting as surgeons, and

not as internists, does not make it so in light of the factual allegations in

the complaint.