The Honor able He rman J. W eber , United S tates Dist rict J udg e for the Southern District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0072n.06 F iled: Janu ary 29, 2009 No. 07-5512 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. MARK E. WI L KI

NS De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR THE EA STE RN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE O P I N I O N

BEFORE: McK

EAGU E and GRIF F IN, Circ uit Jud ges; and WEBE R, Distric t Judge. * McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. Def endant Mark Estell Wilkins appeals his jury conviction and sente nce in c onnection with a mortga g e fraud scheme i n which he obtained ex cess funds from mortg ag e lende rs by purcha sing rea l pr operties using inflated sales price s. Finding that defe ndant’s arguments lack mer it, we AF F IRM

. I On July 25 , 20 06 , de fe nd ant and his fi anc é e , Jay Ann Snyde r, we re ind ic te d o n f our c ounts
. Counts On e and

Tw o c ha rg e d d e fe nd ant w ithwi re fr a ud in vio la tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 13 43 . Co un ts Th re e and Fou r char ge d d e fe nd ant w ithmakin g fa lse and fr a ud ule nt s ta te me nts to t

he U. S.No. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedure s Act of 1974 (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et 1 seq. , a HUD -1 for

m is required to be included at a ll real estate s ettlements. Among other thing s, the fo rm is m e ant to “c on sp ic uo us ly and c le arl y ite mize a ll ch arg e s impo se d upo n th e bo rr ow e r a nd a ll char g es imposed upon the seller in connec tion with the settlement.” 12 U.S.C. § 2603. Do no va n B arn e s- B a ss a

nd An g e la Ma

ri e B y rd a lso ple a de d guil ty

fo r t he ir pa rt ic ipatio n in 2 the prepa ration of the fa lse HUD- 1 forms. They wer e ea ch sente nced to 18 months’ imprisonment and c oo pe rate d in

the inv e sti g a tio n invo lvi ngSny de r a nd de fe nd ant. - 2 - De pa rtme nt o f H ou sin g and Ur ba n De ve lop me nt (“ HU D” ) on HU D- 1 s e ttl e me nt s ta te me nt f or ms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Acc ording to the indictment, be g inning sometime in April 2001 and c ontinuing until about J anuar y 200 3 , D e f

e n d a nt and Sny der de fra

uded mortg ag e lende rs by

purcha sing r eal pr operties using false H UD-1 f

orms that ref

lected inf lated sale s prices a

nd fee s. Sny der, a mortg ag e broke r, assisted

1 in p re pa ri ngthe do c ume nts fo r t

he tr ans a c tio ns , w hil e de fe nd ant a cte d as buy e r o f t he pr op e rt ie s. Snyde r d ir e c te d th e ow ne rs of the tit le c omp any Exe c uti ve Ti tle , D on ov an B arn e s- B a ss a nd An g e la Marie B y rd, to prepa

re two HUD- 1 forms—one r efle cting the ac tual sales pric e, which w as g iven to t he se lle r, and the oth e r re fl e c tin g the inf la te d sa le s pr ic e , wh ic h wa s g ive n to the le nd e r. Th is i s known as a

“double- HUD” transac tion. As a re sult of these ac tions, the mortga g e lende r disbursed

m o r e m o n e y t h ani to t h e r w i s e w o u l d

h a v e l o an e d

. D e f

e n d an tan d

S n yd e r s p l i tt h e e x c e s s m o n e y. Def endant e ventually

defa ulted on all of the loans a nd the prope rties went into fore closure. With ou t a ple a a g re e me nt, Snyde r p le a de d guil ty to a ll c ounts of the ind ic tme nt. De fe nd a nt, 2 ho wev er, p lea dedno t gui lt y andpro ceede d t o a j u r y t r i a l

. Attr ial , An gela M ari e By rd an d FBI Special Ag ent Anthony Tug g le t estified for the gover nment. At the close of t he gover nment’s proof, d ef en d an t m o v ed for judgme nt of ac quittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Fe dera l Rules of CriminalNo. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 3 - Procedur e. The district court ora lly denied the motion as to Counts One and Tw o and re serve d judgme nt as to Counts Three a nd Four . Sny der the n testified for the defe nse. She admitted that the

sc he me a lle g e d in

the ind ic tme nt w a s a c c ur a te , e xce pt i ns of ar a s it a lle g e d th a t de fe ndant wa s a knowing participa

nt. Sny der testified that defe ndant never knew a bout the double HUD- 1 forms or t h at t h e s ch em e wa s fra

udulent. After

a two-da y trial, the jury

found def

endant g uilty on all four

c ounts of the ind ic tme nt. After the jury returne d its verdic t, defe ndant renewe d his motion for judgme nt of ac quittal pursuant to Rule 29. I n the alter native, he soug ht a new tr ial pursuant to Rule 33 of the F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedure

. The district c ourt found no basis for vacating the jury ’s ver dict and denied the motion. At the sentenc ing phase, the district court de termined that the ba se off ense le vel was 18 a

nd that the cr iminal hist ory

cate g ory was I , which yielded a SentencingGuidelines ra ng e of 27 to 33 months. Defenda

nt moved for a

downwar d depar

ture, which the district c ourt denied. The district court then s e n te n c e d

d e f e n d an t t o 2 7 mo n th s ’ im

p r is o n me n t a

n d 3 y e ar s o f

s u p e r v is e d r e le a s e on

eac h count, to be ser

ved conc urre nt l y . The district cour t also order ed def

endant to pay

restitution of $260,633.39. De fenda nt timely appea led his conviction and sente nce.

II Def endant makes essentially two arguments on appea l. First, he c ontends that the evide nce prese nted at trial wa s insufficient to sustain his c onviction. Second, he argues that the district court

e rr e d in imp os inga

se nte nc e of

27 mon ths ’ i mpr iso nme nt. A. Suf fi ciency of the EvidenceNo. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 4 - I n revie wing a cha lleng e to the suff iciency of the e vidence , we must consider “whe ther, a fter vie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to the pr os e c uti on , a

ny ra tio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have found the essential elements of the cr ime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Un ite d S tat es v . D av is , 4 7 3 F. 3 d 6 8 0 , 6 8 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. W oods , 877 F.2d 477, 479 (6 t h Cir. 19 89 )) ; se e als o J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 (1 97 9) . In c on du c tin g thi s r e vie w, we mus t “view all evidenc e and resolve all rea sonable infe renc es in favor of the g overnme nt.” United States

v . H ug hes , 505 F.3d 578, 592 ( 6th Cir. 2007). We will neither independe ntly weig h the evidenc e

n o r j u d g e t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s , an d w e w i l l n o ts u

b s t i tu t e o u r

j u d g m e n tf

o r t h a to f t h e j u r y. Id. ; United States v. Garrido , 467 F.3d 971, 984 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 06). Moreove r, we note that “cir cumstantial evidenc e alon e ca n s ustain a g uilty verdic t,” and it “ne ed not re move eve ry

rea sonable hy

pothesis except that of g uilt.” Hughes , 5 0 5 F. 3 d at 5 9 2 (q u o t i n g United States v. Stone , 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir. 1984)). Ac cording ly , a def endant c halleng ing the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e “bea

rs a ver y heavy burden.” United States v. Abboud , 438 F.3d 554, 589 ( 6th Cir. 2006). 1. Coun ts O ne

and Two : W ire Fra ud Counts On e and

Tw o o f t he ind ic tme nt a lle g e d th a t de fe nd ant e ng aged in wi re fr a ud in vio la tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 13 43 , w hic h p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art : Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or fo r o bta ini ngmon e y

or pr op e rt y by me ans of

fa lse or frau du le nt p re te ns e s, repr esentations, or promises, transmits or cause s to be transmitted by means of w ire . . . in interstate or f

oreig n commerc e, any writing s . . . for the pur pose of e x ecuting such sche me or a

rtifice, sha ll be fined unde r t h i s t i t l e or imprisoned not more than 20 y ear s, or both.No. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 5 - To c on vi c t a d e f

e n d an t u n d e r § 1 3 4 3 , t h e g o v e r n m e n t m u s t p r o v e “ ( 1 ) a s c h e m e o r art if ic e to de fr a ud ; (2) us e of int e rs ta te wi re c omm un ic a tio ns in furt

he ra nc e of the sc he me ; and

(3 ) i nte nt t o deprive a victim of money or prope rty .” United States v. Daniel , 329 F.3d 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (q u o t i n g United States v. Prince , 214 F.3d 740, 747- 48 (6th Cir. 2000)). Def endan t d o e s n o t d is p u te th a t th e e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d a t tr ia l e s ta b li s h e d th e f

ir st two elements of a

§ 1343 violation. “A s cheme to defr aud includes any plan or course of action by which

someone i n tends to . . . deprive a nother by dece ption of money

or prope rty

by means of f

alse or fra udulent prete nses, re prese ntations, or promises.” Id. (q u o t i n g United States v. Gold Unlimited, Inc. , 177 F.3d 472, 479 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). Sny der a dmitted the exi stence of such a scheme to defra

ud wh en s h e p l ea d edgu i l ty

t o t h e i n d i ct m en tan d

wh en s h e t es t i fi edt h at t h e d es cr i p t i o no f t h e m o rt gage fr a ud sc he me in the ind ic tme nt wa s a c c ur a te
. F ur the r, the re is no dis pu te re g ard ingthe ou t- of -s ta te wire tra nsfer s made to Executive Title’s esc row a ccount at SunTrust Bank. Ul tim a te ly , th e n, de fe nd ant o nly c ha lle ng e s his spe c if

ic int e nt a nd kn ow ingpa

rt ic ipatio n in the sche me to defr aud. To satisfy the intent r equire ment of § 1343, the g overnme nt must prove not

on ly that th e de fe nd ant “m a [de ] a ma te ri a l misr e pr e se ntatio n o r k no wi ng ly omi t[te d] a

ma te ri a l f a c t, but also that the misrepre sentation or omission [had] the purpose of inducing the victim of the fra ud to part with proper

ty or under

take some action that he would not otherw ise do absent the misrepre sentation or omission.” Daniel , 3 2 9 F. 3 d at 4 8 8 (q u o t i n g Un ite d Stat es v. De Sa nti s , 134 F.3d 760, 764 ( 6th Cir. 1998)). I ntent is g ener ally considere d to be a que stion of fac t to be resolved by the trier of

fac t; accor dingly , a jury

finding of intent “should not be lig htly overturne d.” Id

.No. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

Def endant arg ues t hat Agent Tugg le’s testi mony is not cre dible, beca use he did not rec ord 3 his interview with def

endant. B ut defe ndant ca n point to nothi ng requiringthe interviewto be r e c o r d e d , an d

t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f A g e n t T u g g l e ’ s a c c o u n to f t h e i n t e r v i e w w a s a

qu e s t i o nf

o r t h e j u r y. - 6 - Her e, def endant a rg ues that although h e s i g ned the c losing doc uments for some of the pr op e rt ie s, he ne ve r k

ne w a bo ut t he do ub le -H UD sc he me or that the tr ans a c tio ns we re ill e g a l. As support for his ar g ument, he points to Sny der’ s testimony . Sny der t es t i fi ed that def endant ne ver knew a bout the two HUD state ments and that she ne ver told him there w as any fra ud. Even c rediting Sny der’ s t es t i m o ny as to defe ndant’s state of mind, however , two other witnesses provided te stimony that supported the jury ’s finding of intent. First, Ang ela Ma rie B y rd testified that defendant participated in the scheme to obtain additional money from mortg ag e lende rs by inflating the sales price s of proper ties. She also testified that either she or her partne r, Donova

n Ba rnes- Ba ss, would expl ain the information on both HUD- 1 forms to defe ndant. Specific ally , she te sti fi e d th a t th e y

wo uld sh ow de fe nd ant t

he HU D- 1 f

or m f or the le nd e r, wh ic h r e fl e c te d th e fa lse inflated sale s price, a

nd would then show him the HUD- 1 form for the seller, which re flec ted the re al sales pric e. She stated that they would also i n fo rm d ef

en dant of the e x cess amount of funds he would rec eive. Moreove r, F BI Special Age nt Tug g le testified that, duringthe cour se of a n interview with defe ndant, def

endant a dmitted that he wa s p re s en t at all of the c losings for the sale of

the proper ties, persona lly neg otiated t he sales price s for the pr operties, a nd knew that he was borr owing

mor e tha n th e sa le s p ri c e on

the pr op e rt ie s. Acc ording to Ag ent Tug g le, def endant a lso admitted 3 that he had r ece ived more mone y than he neede d to buy

the houses, and that he had use d the money to do repa irs and re n o v ations on the proper ties. Defe ndant also admitted to Ag ent Tug g le that heNo. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 7 - and Sny der ha d purcha sed som e four-whe el all-ter rain ve hicles and ha d done re pairs and r enovations

on the ir ow n r e sid e nc e wi th t

he e xce ss f

un ds

. Given the t e s ti mo ny

of both By

rd and A g ent Tug g le, and c onsidering our def ere ntial standard of re view, we conclude that a rational trier of fac t c ould ha ve found a spec ific intent on the par t of de fe nd ant t o d e pr ive mor

tg a g e le nd e rs of mon e y the y wo uld no t ot he rw ise have le nt. Ac c or din g to the te sti mony , d e fe nd ant k ne w h e wa s r e c e ivi ngmor e mon e y tha n ne e de d to purc ha se the pr op e rt ie s. He al s o kn ew t h at t h e HU D- 1 fo rm s re fl ec t edt wo d i ff er en ts al es p ri ce s . T h i s wa s m o re t h an en o u gh

e vid e nc e fo r t

he jur y to c on c lud e tha

t th e g ov e rnme nt h a d s a tis fi e d it s b ur de n o f p ro vin g a sp e c if ic intent to defra

ud. See U

nited States v. Crossley , 224 F.3d 847, 857 (6th Cir. 2000) (hol d i n g that

e vid e nc e wa s su ff

ic ie nt t o s up po rt

c on vic tio n f

or ma il f ra ud wh e re it w ou ld h a ve be e n o bv iou s to defe ndant that she wa s not entitled to insurance c laim money ); Un ite d S

tat es v . B irn ie , 193 Fe d. Ap px. 5 28 , 5 35 -3 6 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 6) (f

ind ingthat e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt to c on vic t a

de fe nd ant w ho se role in the wire fra u d wa s t o ac t as the buy er) . As a re sult, the evidence was suff icient to support defe ndant’s convic tion under § 1343. 2. Coun ts T

hre eand Four : F als eSta te ments Counts Th re e and

F our a lle g e d a idi ngand

a be tti ngan d

f a l s e o r f r a u d u l e nt mate ri a l st a te me nts made in a ny matter within the jurisdiction of the United States Governme nt. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art : [W ]hoever, i n any

matter within the jurisdiction of the executive . . . br anch of the Gover nment of the United States, knowing ly and willfully

. . . (2) make s any

materia lly

false f ictitious, or fraudulent state ment or re prese ntation; . . .No. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 8 - sh a ll b e fi ne d und e r t

his tit le , [or ] imp ri so ne d n ot m or e tha n 5 y e ars . To convict a

defe ndant under § 1 0 0 1 , t h e g overnme nt must prove that (1) the de fenda nt made a statement; (2) the statement was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; (3) the statement was material; (4) the def endant made the statement knowing ly and willfully ; an d (5) the statement per tained to a

m a t t e r o r a c t i v i t y w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o no f a f e d e r a l a g e n c y. Un ite d S

tat es v . S te e le , 933 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (6th Cir. 1991) (e n banc) . As discussed above, the testimony of B y rd and A g ent Tug g le was

su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli shthe fi rs t, se c on d, and fo ur th el e me nts : that def

e nd ant kno wi ng ly

and wi llf ull y made a false or fra

udulent statement by signing two differ ent HUD- 1 forms, one of which re flec ted

an in fl ate d s a le s p ri c e fo r t he pr op e rt ie s. De fe nd ant, ho we ve r, c ha lle ng e s th e thi rd and fi ft h

e l e m e n t s : t h e m a t e r i a l i t y o f t h e f a l s e s t a t e m e n t s , an d

t h e j u r i s d i c t i o no f

th e f e d e r a l a g e n c y. F ir st, de fe nd ant a

rgue s th a t th e state m e nt s c on ta ine d in the HU D- 1 f

or ms w e re no t “ ma te ri a l” be c a us e the mor

tg a g e le nd e rs did no t make any of the loa ns in r e lia nc e on the state me nts
. But “ [a] statement is materia l for purpose s of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 if it has the natura l tendency to influence or is capa ble of influenc ing the fede ral a g ency ,” not the m o rtg ag e lende r. Un ite d S tat es v . Lu tz , 154 F. 3 d 5 8 1 , 5 8 8 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . G au din , 5 15 U. S. 5 06 , 5 09 (1 99 5) ); se e als o Uni ted St ates v . S

wai m , 7 5 7 F

. 2 d 1 5 3 0 , 1 5 3 5 ( 5 th Ci r . 1 9 8 5 ) ( n o ti n g th a t “ [t ]h e r e le v an t te st of materia lity

. . . looks to whether the s tatement had the capa city to impair the functioningof a g overnme nt ag ency , not the Association” g ranting the loan). “ I t i s n o t n ec es sary to show that the statement ac tua lly influence d an ag ency , but only that it had the ca

pacity to do so.” Lut

z , 154 F.3d at 588 (e mphasis added)

.No. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 9 - I n Lut z , the def endant, a mor t gage broker a

nd loan orig inator, fa lsely chec ked a box on a H U D f o r m c e rti f y in g th a t s h e h a d c o n d

u c te d a f a c e - to
- f a c e in te r v ie w w it h a b o r r o wer . Id. She argued that such a

false statement could not ha ve been material be cause the form wa s never rec eived by HUD. Id. The court discussed the importance of HUD ’s re quirement of a fac e-to-f ace interview, which allows a

loan orig inator to verif

y the borrow er’ s identity and obtain a more complete f inancial picture of the applica

nt. Id. The court also noted t hat “HUD relies on the l ender having obtained all of the re quired infor

mation at the initial application stag es.” Id. As a re sult, “[e] ven if HU D [did]

n o t r e ly o nth e c e rti f

ic a ti o ns tate me n t d ir e c tl y , th e s tate me n t [ w a s ] s ti ll mate r ia l b e c a u s e it [h a d ] a natura l tendency

to influence .” Id. Ultimately , then, the “the g overnme nt was not require d to show that the form itself we nt to HUD in order to establish that the false i n formation on the form was materia l.” Id. He re , b o t h By

rdan d M i ch ae l S u n d , a r ep re s en t at i v e o f o n e o f t h e d ef ra u d edm o r t g age lender s, testified that fede ral lawrequire s the use of the HUD- 1 form at closing s, and that the for m is important in the closing , the mortg ag e proce ss, a nd the lender ’s decision. For example, By rd testified that the for

m expl ains the pur chase price and the loan a mount, as well as all fe es and char g es, to all parties involved in the tra nsaction. More over, unde r the Rea l Esta t e S ettlement Procedur es Ac t of 1974 (“RESPA”), 12 U .S.C § 2601 et seq. , a HUD -1 for m is required at all rea l estate se ttlements. It is meant to “ conspicuously and clea rly itemiz e all char g es imposed upon the borrowe r and a ll charg es imposed upon the seller in c onnection with the settlement.” 12 U.S.C. § 2603. Be cause of the stated importance of the disclosure s on the HUD- 1 form, then, state ments onNo. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 10 - the form have a “ natura l tendency to influence ” eve n if HUD ma y not directly

rely upon them. Lut

z , 154 F.3d at 588. As in Lut z , t h e r e w a s s u f

f i c i e n te v i d e n c e t o s u

p p o rta f i n d i n g o f m a t e r i a l i t y. De f e n d an t a ls o ar g u e s th a t s tate me n ts ma d e o n th e H U D

- 1 f o r ms w e r e n o t w it

h in the j u r i s d i c t i o no f

a f e d e r a l a g e n c y. For

purposes of § 1001, “

jurisdiction” should not be defined

narr owly or i n a st rictly

technica l sense. United States v. Gibson , 881 F.2d 318, 322 ( 6th Cir. 1989);

se e als o U

n i t e d S t a t es v . R o d

g e rs , 4 6 6 U.S. 475, 480 (1984). Rather , an ag ency has jurisdiction “whe n it has the power

to exercise author ity

in a particular situation,” a s distinguished fr om a matter “per iphera l to the bus iness” of the ag ency . Gibson , 8 8 1 F. 2 d at 3 2 2 (q u o t i n g Ro dg e rs , 466 U.S. at 479). Moreove r, “[f]edera l depar tments and ag encie s have ‘ the power t o ex er ci se authority ’ in a g reat ma ny matters not c ompletely controlled by those depar tments or ag encie s.” Id. And “[t] here is no implicit require ment that the statements be ma de dire ctly to, or eve n be re ceive d by , the fe dera l depar tment or ag ency .” Id. ; s e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t es v . D av is , 8 F.3d 923, 929 ( 2d Cir. 1993). Ultimately , “it is the mere e x istence of the fe dera l a g ency ’s supervisory authority that is important to determining jurisdiction.” Da v is , 8 F.3d at 929. Her e, the district cour

t corre ctly

conclude d, “as a m att er of law and c ommon sense,” that HUD ha s jurisdiction ove r HUD -1 for ms. United States v. W

ilkins , N o . 1 :0 6

- CR

- 7 6

- 0 2 , 2 0 0 7 WL 896147, at *8 (E.D. T enn. Mar . 22, 2007). As state d ab ov e , a HUD -1 se ttl e me nt s ta te me nt f or m is require d by

RESP A, 12 U.S.C § 2601 et seq. , and HUD ’s implementing Regulation X, see 24 C.F .R. § 3500.1 et seq ., in e ve ry c los ing“ inv olv inga

fe de rally re la te d mo rt g a g e loa n in wh ic h th e re is a borrowe r and a seller,” 2 4 C

. F. R

. § 3 500.8. The for m further s RESP A’s aim of “ more e ffe ctiveNo. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 11 - a dv anc e dis c los ur e to h ome buy e rs and se lle rs of se ttl e me nt c os ts. ” 12 U. S.C. § 260 1( b) (1 ). As bo th By rd and Sund testified, it is critically imp o rt ant to all parties to a r eal e state transa ction. I mportantly , the Secr etar

y of HUD has the authority to de velop and pre scribe the HUD- 1 form “a s the standar d rea l estate settlement f orm in all transac tions in t he United States whic h involve fede rally related mortg ag e loans.” 12 U.S.C. § 2603(a). Acco rdi ng ly , w e c on c lud e that th e fa lse statements on the HUD -1 for ms in thi s case perta ined to a matter within the jurisdiction of HUD. Be cause there was suff

icient evidenc e for

the jury t o fi n d a violation of § 1001, we a ffirm defe ndant’s convic tion as to Counts Three and F our. B. Sentence Def endant ne x t challeng es the district cour t’s imposit ion of a 27-month sente nce. 1. Offe nse Leve l Reduction Pursu ant to § 3B 1.2 First, defe ndant argues that he was entitled to a two-leve l reduc tion of the offe nse leve l under § 3 B 1

. 2 ( b ) o f

t h e S e n t e n c i n g G u i d e l i n e s f o r b e i n g a “ m i n o r p art i c i p an t ” i nt h e c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. “Whether a

defe ndant is entitled to a downwar d offe nse-leve l a djustment unde r U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 ‘depe nds heavily

on fac tual deter

minations, which we re view only for clear err or.’” United States v. Bailey , 4 8 8 F. 3 d 3 6 3 , 3 6 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . H arris , 3 97 F .3 d 4 04 , 4 09 (6 th Cir. 2005)). De fe nd ant b e ars the burd e n o f p ro vin g by a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that he is entitled to a re duction. Id. A “ min or pa rt ic ipa nt” is o ne “ wh o is le ss c ulp a ble tha n mos t ot he r p art ic ipa

nts , b ut w ho se role c ould n o t b e d escr ibed as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 c mt. n. 5. I n consideringdefe ndant’s reque st for a reduc tion at t he sentencing phase, the district court noted that defe ndant was involvedNo. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 12 - in a larg e number o f the fr a

ud ule nt d ou ble -H UD tr ans a c tio ns that oc c ur re d thro ug ho ut t

he c ours e of the sche me. The c ourt also pointed out that, acc ording to the t es t i m o n y at trial, the settlement pa pe rs we re c ov e re d in

so me de ta il at th e c los ing s. Moreove r, defe ndant knew that he would re ceive

e xce ss fund s fr om t

he tr ans a c tio ns and

pe rs on a lly

pr of ite d f ro m th e se tr ans a c tio ns . B a se d o n th e se fac ts, the district court concluded that defe ndant had not satisfied hi s burden of establishing that he

was a minor participant in the f raudule nt scheme, a

nd there fore reje cted his r equest for a reduc tion under § 3B 1.2. On a pp e a l, d e fe nd ant e sse nti a lly re pe a ts t he same argume nts he ma de to t he dis tr ic t c ourt
. He a rg ues that he did not conceive of the double-H UD sche me, nor did he or g anize, manag e, or coordinate it. As an electricia n, he claims he had littl e knowledge of t he mortgag e lendingfield. He

c la ims that Snyde r, B arn e s- B a ss, and B y rd we re the “ pr of

e ssi on a ls” wh o we re most ac tiv e ly inv olv e d in

the fr a ud . A c c or din g to d e fe nd ant, he wa s o nly the re to s ig n th e pa

pe rw or k a nd ob ta in the excess funds, as instruc ted. Ultimately , howeve r, we are unable to conc lude t h a t t h e d is tric t c o u

r t’ s f a c tu a l d e terminations

wer e cle arly

err oneous. On those f

acts, the c ourt’s finding that defe ndant was not less culpa ble than

mos t of the oth e r part ic ipa

nts —a nd the re fo re that he did no t qua lif y a s a mino r part ic ipa

nt— wa s a lso not clear ly

err oneous. And althoug h defe ndant argues that he did not org anize or plan the f raudule nt scheme at issue here , “[w]e have reje cted absenc e from the planning of a conspirac y as the ba sis for

a reduc ed role .” Un ite d S

tat es v . D uc k

ro , 466 F.3d 438, 447 (6th Cir. 2006). Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the district court’s r efusa l of the re quest for a n offe nse leve l reduc tion under § 3B 1.2. 2. Calculat

ion of Am ount

of Loss Pursuan t to § 2B1.1No. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 13 - De fe nd ant n e xt argue s tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt imp ro pe rl y

c a lc ulate d th e los s attr ibuta ble to h is

a c tio ns fo r p ur

po se s o f cal culat inghis of fe ns e le ve l un de r § 2B 1. 1 o f t he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine d the los s to be $2 61 ,0 00 .0 0 a nd de nie d d e fe nd ant’ s r e qu e st f or a c re dit of $43,351.45, the amount alleg edly expended in repa iring and re novating the prope rties. Def endant contends that he should have be en sente nced ba sed on a los s of $127,998.15—hi s alleg ed per sonal share of the e x cess f

unds re ce i ved as a

result of the f

raudule nt scheme, a s opposed to the total

a mou nt o f e xce ss f

un ds re c e ive d amon g a ll co c on sp ir a tor s. He a lso c la ims that he wa s e nti tle d to

a cr edit of $43,351.45 for the amount expended on improvements to the proper ties. This would have resulted in a ne t loss of $84,646.70, an offe nse leve l of 14 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.( b)(1) (E), and a se ntencingrang e of 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. We reviewthe district court’s f indings of f

act a s to loss for clea

r er ror. United St a tes v. Triana , 468 F.3d 308, 321 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Actual loss is the “re asonably fore seea ble pec uniary

harm that re sulted from the off ense.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (i). “[ R] easona bly fore seea

ble pecuniary harm” is define d as “ha rm that the def

endant knew or, under the circumstanc es, re asonably should have known, w as a pote ntial result of the of

fense .” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 c mt. n.3(A)(iv). H ere , actua l loss included not only the amount of proc eeds de fenda nt himself pockete d, but also the amount of loss resulting from the e ntire scheme . When he split the ex cess f und s with Sny der, de fenda nt knew he w as not rec eiving all of the proc eeds; other

individuals were a l s o b en ef i t t i ng from the sc heme. Thus, the district court’s de te rm inatio n th a t de fe nd ant s ho uld be re sp on sib le fo r t

he fu ll $ 26 1, 00 0 los s was no t c le a rl y

e rr on e ou s.No. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 14 - Fur ther, the district c ourt did not clear ly err in deter mining that defe ndant was not entitled to a cr edit for the a

mount ex pended to improve t he properties. I ndeed, the SentencingGuidelines provide that the loss amount should be reduce d by the “money returne d, and the f air mar ket value of the pr op e rt

y re tur ne d a nd the se rv ic e s r e nd e re d, by the de fe nd ant o r o the r pe rs on s a c tin g joi ntl y with the defe ndant, to the victim be fore the defe nse was de tected.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)

. Her e, howe ver, the loss amount had alre ady been c redited w ith the sales prices of t he prope rties that had been s old at foreclosure

. And as the gove rnment points out, the sales price s of these pr operties would have a ccounte d for a ny value c reated by

the improvements. An a dditional credit for the amount expended on the improveme nts, then, was not war rante d. Ac c or din g ly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t c omm it e rr or in c a lc ulatin g the a mou nt o f a c tua l lo ss under § 2B 1.1. 3. Downwar d Departure/Reasonableness of Sentence Finally , in just over one pag e of his brief, de fenda nt argues that his sentenc e wa s “excessive in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 3553.” Appellant’s Br . at 52. He quote s 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and then “submits that for all the r easons de tailed above , the Trial C o urt should have g rante d a downwar d depar

ture a nd sentenc ed [defenda

nt] below the a

pplicable Guide lines Rang e.” Id. I nitially , we note that the district court’s ref usal to g rant defe ndant’s reque st for a dow nwar d depar ture is not revie wable on a ppeal, be cause the di strict court ex plicitly stated that it was aw are of its discr etion to gr ant such a depar ture. Se e Un ite d Stat es v . P uc k e tt , 422 F.3d 340, 344 ( 6th Cir. 2005).No. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

Al tho ug h d e fe nd ant a

rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t cou

rt fa ile d to c on sid e r t

he dis pa ri ty be tw e e n h is 4 sentenc e and the 18-month sentence s rec eived by By rd and B arne s-B ass, “[s] ubsection 3553(a )(6) is conc e r n e d w it h national disparities amongthe many defe ndants with simil ar c riminal backg rounds convicted of

simil ar c riminal conduct. I t is not conce rned with disparities betwee n one individual’s sentenc e and another

individual’s sentence .” United States v. Simmons , 501 F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, althoug h the district c ourt had the discretion to c onsider defe ndant’s sente nce in lig ht of the sente nces of

other individuals, § 3553 did not require the district court to do so. Id. at 624. - 15 - F ur the r, ins of

ar a s def e nd ant ch a lle ng e s the re a so na ble ne ss o f h is s e nte nc e , h e ha s f a ile d to sufficie n t l y d ev el o p that argument and has the ref ore w aived it on appe al. Dillery v. City of Sandusky , 398 F.3d 562, 569 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (“ I t i s we l l -e s tablished that ‘issues adve rted to in a perf unctory manner , unacc ompanied by some eff ort at develope d argumentation, ar e deemed

wa i v ed

. ’” (q u o t i n g United St ates v. Layne , 19 2 F .3 d 5 56 , 5 66 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) )) . E ve n w e re we to addre ss the merits of the re asonable ness ar g ument, howeve r, we would c onclude that the district

c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in imp os ing a 27 -m on th se nte nc e and that th e se nte nc e wa s b oth proce durally

and substantively

rea sonable. See G all v. United States , 128 S. Ct. 586, 594-97 (2007). The re cord indicates that the district c ourt committed no signific ant proce dural e rror , “such a s failing t o c a l c u l a t e ( o r i mp r o p e r l y c a l c u l a t i n g ) t h e G u i d e l i n e s r an g e , t r e a t i n g t h e G u i d e l i n e s a s m an d a t o r y, failing to consider the § 3553( a) f actor s, selectinga sente nce ba sed on cle arly err oneous facts, or fail i n g t o adequately

explain the chosen sentenc e.” Id. at 597. Moreove r, bec ause de fenda nt’s 4

s en t e n c e f

a l l s wi t h i n

t h e p ro p er l y

ca l cu l at edGu i d el i n es ra n ge of 27 to 3 3 mo nth s, we a ff or d it a p re s u m p t i o n of substantive re asonable ness. United States v. Carter , 5 1 0 F

. 3 d 5 9 3 , 6 0 1 ( 6 th

Ci r. 2007). De fenda

nt has fa iled to rebut this presumption by showing that the district court “ selec t[ ed] the sentenc e ar

bitrarily , base[d] the sentenc e on impermissible fac tors, fail[ed] t o consider pe rtinentNo. 07-5512

United States of America v . W ilkins

- 16 - § 3553(a) fac tors or [ga

ve] an unrea sonable amount of weig ht to any pertinent fa ctor.” United States v. H us e in , 478 F.3d 318, 332 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Ac c or din g ly , d e fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e wa s b oth proce durally

and substantively

rea sonable. III For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM defe ndant’s convic tion and sentenc e.