### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 14

- 3701 J ERMAINE J ACKSON , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

C ITY OF P EORIA , I LLINOIS , et al. , Defendants

- Appellees

.

____________________ Appeal from the Unit ed States District Court for the Central District of Illinois

. No. 13

- 1130

— James E. Shadid
, Chief Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 25, 2015

— D ECIDED J UNE 3, 2016

____________________

Before W OOD , Chief Judge , and B AUER and E ASTERBROOK , Circuit Judges

. E ASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge

. Clarence Heinz was the vi ctim of a home invasi on in October 2011. One burglar e ntered, punched Heinz and locked him in a closet, then was joined by a second burglar. They stole some of Heinz’s po ssessions, including his car (the y got the keys from his home). Police arrested Jermaine Jackson for this crime. After he was acquitted at trial, he turned the tables and sued the police2 No. 14

- 3701

under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. One of Jackson’ s theories is that the police arrested him without probable cause. Yet Heinz identified Jackson’s pi cture in a photo spread, and one of Heinz’s neighbors ident ified Jackson as one of two people he had seen loitering ou tside Heinz’s house near the time of t he burglary. Jackson’s own son told the police that his father had committed some burglaries recently. Eyewitness identifications supply pro bable cause for an arrest. See, e.g., Gramenos v. Jewel Cos ., 797 F.2d 432 , 437

– 41 (7th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Chicago , 913 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1990). Jackson contends that the police are culpable for failing to investigate his alibi before arresting him. But police may arrest and leave to the judicial process the question whether a defense applies. See, e.g., Baker v. McC ollan , 443 U.S. 137, 145

– 46 (1979); Hurem v. Tavares , 793 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2015); Askew v. Chicago , 440 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2006). Jackson also maintains that the photo spreads were conducted imprope rly, with the officers suggesting to the witnesses that they choose his picture. For this claim of serious official misco nduct he offers ... nothing. The witnesses testified by depos ition that no such thing occurred. So did the officers. It takes a dispute of material fact to move a case past summary judgment to trial. Because Jackson has no evidence for his contention, the police were entitled to summary judgment. (The existence of probable cause also knocks out Jackson’s
state

- law theory that he is a victim of malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Swick v. Liautaud , 169 Ill. 2d 504, 512 (1996). ) Jackson also accuses the police of searching his home without a warrant. Once again he offers no evidence. TheNo. 14

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police indeed search ed his home to see whether it contained evidence tying him to the burglary (it didn’t), but th e search was authorized by a warrant. According to Jackson, one o fficer entered his home, searched, and came back later with the warrant and a second officer . Jackson produced an aff idavit stating that one of his neighbors told a member of Jackson’s family that an officer had done this, and that the family member had relayed the information. But affidavits must be based on personal knowledge, and this was double hearsay . In discovery, the neighbor denied t elling anyone that a police officer had entered Jack son’s home before the warrant issued. That left Jackson bereft of evidence. Jack son’s next theory of liability is that the police denied him a fair trial by not investigating his alibi adequately and withholding exculpatory evidence. The problem with this theory is that he had a trial and was acquitted. A “fairer” tr ial could not have ended more favora bly to him. We held in Saunders

- El v. Rohde , 778 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2015), that a pe rson acquitted at trial cannot recover on a theory that the trial was unfa ir. The acquittal itself is the relief to which the pe rson is entitled. An acquitted person walks free, so the co nduct of the trial cannot have led to unwarranted custody. A ttorney Scott T. Kamin, who represents Jackson, also repr esented Saunders

- El and is therefore well aware of that dec ision. Yet his brief on appeal in this case does not mention our decision in Saunders

- El

. After the appellees’ brief relied heavily on Saunders

- El , Kam in did not file a reply brief. L awyers are not entitled to ignore contro lling, adverse pre cedent. We expect (and are entitled to) better performance by members of the bar.4 No. 14

- 3701

The arrest (as opposed to the trial) did subject Jackson to a period of custody, but it was justified b y the probable
cause to arrest and l ater by an indict ment . Jackson main tains that he was mistreated during this custody by being held i ncommunicado and without food for several days. That would be a good ground for recovery against the jailers (if it happened), but Jackson did not sue any of the guards. He

s ued only the arresting officers. His theory is that the officers instructed the guards to mistreat him. For this assertion he has

— once again

— not a smidge n of evidence. He does not say that he heard any police officer issue such instructions. He does not ex plain how he learned about these supposed instructions. Discovery did not turn up instructions to mi streat him. The police and the jailers said in discovery that no such instructions had been issued or received. An argument of this kind, resting on nothing at all, is irresponsible. Atto rney Kamin should count himself lucky that the appellees have not requested sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38.
A FFIRMED