This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0723

Wilson Newongeby Kpahn, 

petitioner, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent

Filed January 25, 2016

Affirmed

Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-07-029966

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Worke, 

Judge. 
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

WORKE, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to correct his 

sentence, arguing that the district court erred by treating the motion as a petition for 

postconviction relief and concluding that the petition was time barred. We affirm. 

D E C I S I O N

Postconviction relief

Appellant Wilson Newongeby Kpahn argues that the district court erred when it 

treated his motion to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03 as a petition for 

postconviction relief. Kpahn presents an issue regarding the interpretation of a 

procedural rule and statute, which is subject to de novo review. State v. Coles, 862 

N.W.2d 477, 479 (Minn. 2015). 

The appellant in Coles was sentenced according to a plea agreement. Id. at 480. 

In his motion to correct his sentence under rule 27.03, Coles argued that his sentence was 

illegal because the district court impermissibly imposed an upward durational departure. 

Id. at 479. The supreme court stated that when the sentence is “part of a plea agreement, 

a motion to change that sentence impacts more than simply the sentence, and [r]ule 27.03 

does not apply.” Id. at 481. The supreme court held that because Coles’s “challenge to 

his sentence implicates more than simply his sentence . . . it is properly viewed as a 

petition for postconviction relief . . . not as a motion to correct a sentence under [r]ule 

27.03.” Id. at 482. 
3

Here, on March 31, 2008, Kpahn pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and a 

first-degree murder charge was dismissed. Kpahn agreed that the district court had 

discretion to impose a sentence from a 367-423 month range. The 367-month sentence 

represented the top-of-the-box guidelines sentence, and the 423-month sentence was a 

departure from the sentencing guidelines. Kpahn understood that any sentence greater 

than 367 months in prison would be a departure, and he waived his right to a jury 

determination on whether aggravating factors existed to support a greater sentence. On 

May 21, 2008, the district court sentenced Kpahn to 423 months in prison, finding that a 

departure was appropriate because Kpahn acted with particular cruelty and had a history 

of violence with the victim, his girlfriend. 

Kpahn acknowledges that he “agreed to a sentencing range . . . when he pleaded 

guilty.” He also cites Coles, but fails to show how this case is distinguishable. Because 

Kpahn’s motion to correct his sentence impacts more than just his sentence, the district 

court properly treated his motion as a petition for postconviction relief. 

Time barred

The district court denied Kpahn’s motion after determining that it was time barred 

under the postconviction-relief statute. This court reviews the denial of postconviction 

relief, including a denial for lack of compliance with the postconviction statute of 

limitations, for an abuse of discretion. See Greer v. State, 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn.

2013). 

A petition for postconviction relief must be filed no “more than two years after the 

later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or 
4

(2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.”1 Minn. Stat. § 590.01, 

subd. 4(a) (2014). A case becomes final when “the availability of direct appeal has been 

exhausted, the time for a petition for certiorari has elapsed or a petition for certiorari with 

the United States Supreme Court has been filed and finally denied.” O’Meara v. State, 

679 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Minn. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Danforth v. 

Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008). 

Kpahn was sentenced on May 21, 2008. He had 90 days to file a direct appeal, 

which he did not do. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 4(3)(a). Because he did not file 

a direct appeal, Kpahn’s case was final 90 days after he was sentenced in 2008, which 

was more than two years before he filed the motion to correct his sentence on December 

1, 2014. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

Kpahn’s petition was time barred. 

Claims for relief

The district court concluded that even if Kpahn’s motion to correct his sentence 

were not time barred, he still was not entitled to relief. This court reviews the denial of 

postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Greer, 836 N.W.2d at 522. 

Kpahn claims that his sentence was based on an erroneous criminal-history score, 

his sentence impermissibly exceeded the presumptive sentence because he did not waive 

his rights under Blakely, and he did not understand the plea agreement. We have 

considered these arguments and conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

 

1 There are exceptions to the statute of limitations, but Kpahn does not argue that any 

exception applies. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2014). 
5

discretion in denying relief. See Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 20 (Minn. 2004) (rejecting 

arguments without detailing consideration of each argument).

Affirmed.