COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Beales, O’Brie n and Senior Judge Annunziata Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

SOFIA KHALID-SCH IEBER, F/K/A SOFIA TANWEER HUSSAIN OPINION BY v. Record No . 1204-18-4 JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES APRIL 30, 2019 HAROON HUSSAIN

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY David A. Oblon, Judge Rebecca Wade (Wade, Grimes, Friedman, Meinken & Leischner, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. A. Van McFadden (The McFadden L aw Office, PLLC, on brief), fo r appellee.

This case concerns a review of a trial court’s custody modific ation order regarding the parties’ three childre n. At the conclusion of ore tenus hearings, the trial c ourt entered an order largely granting father Haroon Hu ssain’s motion for a modificat ion of custody of the children. Mother Sofia Khalid-Schieber now challenges the custody modific ation order on appeal.
I. B ACKGROUND On appeal, we are required to vie w the facts in the light most favorable to father because he was the prevailing party before the trial court. See Wright v. Wright, 61 Va. App. 432, 451 (2013). So viewed, mother and f ather were married in 2001 and had three children together – daughter S.H., son I.H., and daughter H.H. 1 At the time of the trial c ourt’s ruling in April 2018, S.H. was 15 years old, I.H. was 13, and H.H. was 9.

1 We use initials, instead of the children’s names, in an attemp t to better protect their privacy.PUBLISHED- 2 - In the summer of 2011, mother trav eled to England with the thre e children, with father’s consent, to visit mother’s fam ily. When she stayed longer than planned and father could not get in contact with her, he filed leg al action in the Family Divisi on of a court in London that culminated in an order directing m other to return with the chil dren to Virginia, where the family actually lived. Mother returned t o Virginia in late December 2 011, and mother and father thereafter separated. They eventually entered into a custody a greement in which they agreed to joint legal and physical custody of the three children and in w hich they established a 50/50 schedule for physical custody. The custody agreement was enter ed as an order of the trial court on July 25, 2014. On December 22, 2014, the trial court entere d a final decree of divorce, which incorporated the provisio ns of the July 25, 2014 order. In Oct ober 2015, mother married Todd Schieber. On January 20, 2017, father filed a“Petition to Modify Custodyof Minor Children” alleging a material change in cir cumstances and seeking full le gal and physical custody of the children. (During the ore tenus hearing on April 4, 2018, father modi fied his request to instea d seek only joint legal and physic al custody of the older childre n and to seek sole legal custody and sole physical custody of H.H.) On January 16, 2018, mother fil ed a “Motion to Modify Custody and Visitation,” also alleging a m aterial change in circumstanc es and seeking sole legal and physical custody of all the childre n. The motions of mother an d father were consolidated, and

ore tenus hearings on the motions wer e conducted between April 2, 2018 an d April 5, 2018 and on April 9, 2018. 2
At the ore tenus hearings, father testified tha t, for approximately one month af ter the finalization of the divorce i n December 2014, the parties follo wed the terms of the custody

2 During these proceedings, the tri al court also considered and ruled on an order for mother to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for violating the July 25, 2014 custody and visitation order. The s how cause is not at issue i n this appeal.- 3 - agreement, but that after that point, he began facing difficult ies in picking up the children to spend his custodial time with them. According to father’s test imony, when he would arrive to pick up the children, the ch ildren would often delay for hours, would not cooperate in leaving with him, and would refer to fat her derisively using pronouns s uch as “him” rather than using a name for him. He testified that mother would not help or encou rage the children to come with him – and essentially encourag ed the children not to go with hi m. Father also testified that, whe n the children went to his house , they would notbring along with them the clothes or sports e quipment needed for their week end sports activities, requiring father to return to mother’s house to retrieve their necessitie s. He testified that, when he purchased clothes or other items for the children while they we re in his physical custody, the children would take those items b ack to mother’s house so they did not have their necessities when they returned to father’s house. He also testified that h e began to have the meetings to exchange the children at a polic e station and that, even there, the children would often refuse to go with him. He testified that he contacted the police on mult iple occasions when he was unable to pick up the children for his cu stodial time. He also introd uced into evidence an emergency motion that he filed with the court in July 2017 seeking to pre vent the continued denial of his access to the children. The trial judge found that “Mother and Mr. Schieber, by their o wn admission, do not encourage the kids to go with father. . . . They want the rebe llion from the children who refer to the father as a pronoun.” The judge also found that “Mr. Schie ber acts like father’s not even a human being. He won’t even ackno wledge his presence. He is mo deling poor behavior in front of the kids.” In addition, “[n]e ither the mother, nor Mr. Schi eber has been willing to encourage the kids to go with the father , and the children don’t want to go with the father” for his scheduled custody time. The trial judge f ound that these circumstances p laced father in an “absolute- 4 - no-win situation.” The trial j udge also found that “exchanges [were] filled with great drama and anxiety.” Mother testified that father abused her and the children. Two police officers who investigated allegations of physi cal and sexual abuse testified concerning their investigations. Officer Munoz testified that his investigation di d not result i n bringing any charges, and Detective Cooper testified that, except for one instance, fathe r was not criminally charged and that, even for the one investiga tion that resulted in charges, those charges were dropped. Two officials of Fairfax County Chil d Protective Services (CPS) – w ho conducted assessments investigating allegations of abus e by father – testified that they closed those assessments because they found the claims against father to be unsubstantiated. Fa ther also introduced into evidence documentation from CPS regarding why it closed its investigatio n into father. He also testified that he did not abuse the children and that, in the various inv estigations against him, CPS never made any findings of abuse or negl ect. After considering the e vidence, the trial judge found that “these investigations never resu lted in a finding against the f ather” and that there was “no history of family abuse, despite a larg e amount of unproven allegations .” In fact, the trial judge found that the only allegation of abus e that was proven was that of m other’s assault on father during an argument when father began to r ecord mother with his cell phone and mother knocked the phone out of his hand onto the ground. The judge noted that the cons equence of the allegations against father, however, was that “[w]h ile the allegations go nowhere, because they were false,” they have had “the practical effect of s eparating the kids from the father while they’re being investigated, because they must be investigated.” The trial co urt found that, although father did not abuse the childre n or mother, the children – under mother’s influence – “likely now believe they’ve been abused.” In f act, the trial court found: the mother had an active campaign to alienate the father from t he children. The Court finds that [ by] convincing the children of- 5 - abuse that never happened, and by not actively persuading the children to have a relationship w ith the father, she effectivel y denied the father with access t o, or visitation w ith the childr en. The court finds that the mother schemed to alienate [S.H.] and [I.H.] from the father[, which ] was successful. The alienationof [H.H.] from the fath er is in progress. Father testified that mother a lso made decisions concerning the mental health of the children without notifying him. He t estified that when I.H. wa s hospitalized in September 2017, mother delayed in informing fath er of his hospitalization. Acc ording to father’s testimony, when father discovered I.H. had bee n hospitalized and attempted to v isit him, father was prevented from doing so by medical staff. In addition, according to fath er, mother enrolled the two younger children, I.H. and H.H., in mental health treatment without first notifying father. At the time of the ore tenus hearings in April 2018, father te stified that he had not seen S.H. since January 2017, had not s een I.H. since March 2017, an d had not seen H.H. since June 2017. The trial court made a findi ng of fact that, during the time that father had “almost zero involvement with the children,” t he “mother’s sole custody resu lt[ed] in distress” to the children. The trial judge found that I.H. s uffered from “suicidal ideatio n and depression,” which led to his hospitalization at a psychiatri c hospital in September 2017; th at both S.H. and I.H. were taking psychiatric medications; a nd that H.H. had begun to hurt hersel f. He summarized that, while the three children were so lely in mother’s care, “the children’s me ntal health is getting progressively
worse.” The trial judge also found that mother excluded father from med ical and mental health decisions concerning the child ren. The trial court found, “[M] other and Mr. Schieber wanted to guide things. I find that mother and Mr. Schieber convinced th e medical team that the father was a monster, based on incomplete information, resulting in the me dical providers . . . effectively excluding him from the serious treatment consultations . . . .” The trial judge also noted that “Mother manipulates treatment pr oviders” and that “it does not appear that the treatment is being- 6 - used for treatment; it seems lik e it’s being used for validatio n. One provider says something, the mother likes, mother accepts it. . . . When a provider says so mething she doesn’t like, she insures failure.” Considering all of the eviden ce, the trial judge noted, “Almost anything the Court does or doesn’t do in this case, is going t o result in distress to the children.” The trial judge stated, “The parties have left this court with no easy choices.” The court found, however, “many material changes of circumstances” to j ustify a modification of custody and visitation. In delivering his ruling from the bench, the trial judge stated, “I’ve considered each and every one of the statutory factors of [§ 20-124.3] of Virgini a code” and went on to method ically list each of the factors and to provide his findings of fact a nd some of his reasoning for e ach of the factors. Ultimately, the court granted father sole leg al and physical custody of H.H – a nd gave joint legal and shared physical custody of S.H. and I.H. t o mother and father. Pursua nt to the order, S.H. and I.H. were to continue to live with mother , but father had “final decision -making authority to decide on any matter in which there is a dis pute between the parties,” as wel l as “sole authority to select healthcare providers and therapist s for all of the parties’ min or children . . . .” The trial court noted that it considered a vari ety of options, including reunif ication therapy and gradual reintroduction of father into the lives of the children, but th at such attempts had been unsuccessful with these parties i n the past. The court also ex pressed that the decision “to split up the children [is] an act that it [did] not take lightly at all. ” However, the cour t indicated that it feared H.H.’s relationship w ith father would be undermined by a lso requiring that the two older children live with father – or s pend considerable time with him – until father found that he was prepared to have them spend mor e time with him and H.H. (and co uld tell they were not trying to undermine H.H.’s relationship with father). The trial court no ted that it was “picking the best of the bad choices, in an effort to p rotect the best interests of the children,” but split up the- 7 - children’s primary physical cust ody, fearing that “the older ch ildren would only reinforce the mother’s narrative and frustrate the reconciliation [of H .H.] w ith the father.” Mother filed numerous objections and now appeals the trial court’s order.
II. A NALYSIS On appeal, mother’s assignments of error fall broadly into two categories: (1) the trial court abused its discretion con cerning the modification of cust ody in the order that it crafted, and (2) the trial court erred in making findi ngs of fact that were not supported by the evidence. “In determining whether a cha nge in custody is warranted, the trial court applies a two-part test: (1) whether a c hange of circumstances has occur red since the most recent custody award; and (2) whether such a c hange would be in the best inter ests of the child.” Parish v. Spaulding, 26 Va. App. 566, 570-71 (1998). “[T]rial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to g uard and to foster a child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328 (1990). “A trial c ourt’s determination of a child’s best interests ‘is reversible on appeal only for a n abuse of that discretion, and a trial court’s decision will not be set aside unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support i t.’” Rubino v. Rubino, 64 Va. App. 256, 261-62 (2015) (quotin g Farley, 9 Va. App. at 328)

. Concerning the trial court’s fi ndings of fact, “[w]hen a trial court hears evidence at an ore

tenus hearing, its factual findings are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evi dence to support them.” D’A mbrosio v. D’Ambrosio, 45 Va. App. 323, 335 (2005). A. Whether the Trial Court Abus ed its Discretion in its Custody Modification Order

Mother alleges that the trial court erred in its custody modifi cation order because the custody arrangements of the orde r were not in the best interest s of the children as required by Code § 20-124.3. More specifically, mo ther argues that (1) the trial court erred in giving father- 8 - sole legal and physical custody of H.H. and “tie-breaking autho rity in decisions” for the older children because he was not cap able of assessing and meeting th e needs of the children since he had “practically no rela tionship with them”; (2) the court’s or der “was designed to punish [mother] rather than to protect the best interests of the child ren”; and (3) the trial court “failed to consider or give sufficient we ight to the relationship of the s iblings with each other as required by Va. Code § 20-124.3(4) when the Court ordered [H.H.] to be r emoved from her siblings with no plan to reunify or e ncourage contact.” 1. Capability of Father to A ssess the Children’s Needs Mother argues that the trial c ourt erred in award ing father “so le legal and physical custody of [H.H.], and removing her from her Mother’s care with out evidence that [father] was capable of assessing and meeting he r needs, without evidence th at doing so would be in [H.H.]’s best interests, and while ac knowledging that doing so would cau se [H.H.] distress.” She also argues that the trial court erre d in granting father “tie-break ing authority in decisions for [S.H.] and [I.H.] when there was no evidence that [father] was capable of assessing the children’s needs pursuant to Va. Code § 20-124.3(3) and all evidence presented w as that he has practically no relationship with them . . . .” The judge found, however, that “prior to [father’s] marginalization, [he] had a good relationship with t he children,” and the eventu al marginalization came as a consequence of mother’s influen ce and actions. The judge’s fin dings included a finding that father “has been blocked by the m other from having a relationsh ip with them, via her brand of emotional trauma.” The judge also found that mother “is unable to assess the emotional needs of the children. She has harme d the children by reinforcing unbel ievable allegations of abuse against them.” The trial court found that mother’s sole custod y of the children while father “has [had] almost zero involvement w ith the children” has resulted i n great distress and worsening conditions for the children. Sp ecifically, while in mother’s s ole care, I.H. was “admitted to a- 9 - mental health hospital, and is [ on] psychiatric medications, [S .H.] is on psychiatric medication, [H.H. is] starting to scratch he rself.” The court concluded th at it “can’t giv e custody to the mother. She effectively has so le custody right now, and the ch ildren’s mental health is getting progressively worse.” These findings by the trial court illustrate that the trial jud ge weighed the fact that father had not had the opportunity to demon strate his current ability to assess the needs of the children against the mother’s demonstrat ed inability to meet the medical and mental health needs of the children. After considering these facts, the trial court concl uded that giving father the final decision-making authority was in the children’s best interests. In its final order, the trial court stated: if the Father had the power of legal custody, including medical and social service provider decisi ons, he could select providers wh o could improve the health and wel fare of all thr ee children and reverse their current negative trajectory because the Mother chooses providers based on who she can influence with incomplet e or inaccurate facts. Thus, while the trial court rec ognized that father had virtuall y no contact with the children for months and “has been completely m arginalized” from their lives, it ultimately concluded that giving father this final decisi on-making authority was the best course of action for the older children and that giving him sole custody of H.H. was the best course of action for her. Given the deterioration of the child ren under mother’s sole care, we cannot say that this was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Regarding H.H. specifically, th ere was evidence to show that onvarious occasions, she would happily spend time with father and her paternal cousins u ntil mother would call. After talking to mother, her demeanor w ould change and she would star t to cry and say she wanted to go home to mother. Over time, H .H. began to act very different ly toward father. The trial judge found that H.H. had, in essence, be en “cut off” from spending t ime with her cousins in father’s- 10 - family. H.H. also began to maint ain a “trauma book” listing ne gative things about father. Concerning this “trauma book,” the trial judge concluded that “ she was coached” by mother. In short, prior to such negative int erference from mother, H.H. en joyed a good relationship with father. Although at the time of the hearings, father had not s een H.H. for months, the trial judge did not err by concluding that th eir long-term relationship was such that father could assess her needs and provide appropriate care, as he had done in the past.

2. Whether the Trial Judge’s Order “Was Designed to Punish App ellant Rather Than to Protect the Best Interest of the Children” Mother also claims that “the trial Court erred in crafting an O rder which, in its entirety was designed to punish [mother] ra ther than to protect the bestinterest of the children.” However, the record shows that the court did consider the best inter ests of the children. Furthermore, contrary to mothe r’s argument, to give sole custod y to mother would instead have punished father for the actions of mother , as evidenced from the tria l judge’s order. The judge decided that outcome was not in t he best interests of the child ren. The trial court clearly decided that mother was, in essence, subor dinating the medical and psyc hological needs of the children to her overall goal of controlling outcomes and “manipulat[ing] tr eatment providers.” Therefore, while the trial court encourag ed cooperation between the two pa rties, it gave f ather “final decision-making authority to deci de any matter in which there i s a dispute between the parties . . . after consulting with [mother] by email and consi dering her opinion of the childrens’ [sic] needs[.]” It is apparent from the recor d that, in deciding the outcome of the case, the trial judge methodically considered each of the required factors from Code § 20-124.3, various possible outcomes, and the best interests of the children. The trial ju dge acknowledged, “Almost anything the Court does or doesn ’t do in this case, is going to result in distress to the children.” In crafting its order, the court stated that “[t]his is a famil y in crisis.” In an attempt to- 11 - accomplish a “reversal of this family’s downward spiral,” it ch ose “the best of the bad choices, in an effort to protect the best i nterests of the children.” The trial judge thoughtfully considered his options, openly acknowledged that th e decision before him was n ot an easy one, and, in light of the required statutory factors , entered the or der that he belie ved was in the children’s best interests. We hold that, in doi ng so, he did not abuse his dis cretion. 3. Consideration of the Importance of the Relationships Betwee n the Siblings Mother also argues the trial court erred by not giving sufficie nt weight to the relationship of the siblings with each other as required by Code § 20-124.3( 4). That sub-section requires the trial court, when assessing the be st interests of the child, to consider the “needs of the child, giving due consideration to other important relationships of th e child, including but not limited to siblings, peers and extended family members[.]” Generally, “[w]here it is reasona bly possible, brothers and sis ters of tender years should be reared together, and have the full benefit of natural ties o f affection and interest that such association develops.” Hepler v. Hepler, 195 Va. 611, 623 (195 4). However, while the trial court must carefully consider the effect of the separation of s iblings, this consideration is only one of many factors that the tri al court must consider in makin g its assessment. See Code § 20-124.3. As this Court has prev iously held, this one consid eration is not paramount to all others. Hughes v. Gentry, 18 Va. App. 318, 323-24 (1994). Here, the trial court considered all the factors and ultimately decided that separating the children to some extent was nece ssary to protect the children’s best interests. It was within the trial court’s discre tion to do so consistentwith the best inte rests of the children. See Code § 20-124.3; Rubino, 64 Va. App. at 261- 62. The court stated th at its decision to send the children to live in different homes was “an act that it does no t take lightly at all,” and provided some of its reasoning for the de cision. The trial judge explai ned that he “considered- 12 - reunification therapy, and gradua l reintroduction of the father into the children’s lives with increasing visitation. However, t hat’s been tried, and it’s be en unsuccessful. The mother won’t let that happen.” The judge als o “considered flipping the cust ody to the father, of all the children . . . .” However, he decided against giving sole physical cust ody of all the children to father because he believed “the older children would only reinforce th e mother’s narrative and frustrate the reconciliation with the fathe r.” The judge believed that, as the youngest sibling, H.H. was particularly vulnerable to nega tive influence from her older si blings, and he found the best way to rebuild a relationship with her father was t o isolate her, f or a limited time, from her older siblings, whom the court found “ar e afraid [of] or hate the fat her.” The trial judge’s order allowed for father to have time to re-establish h is relationshi p with H.H., following which the older siblings could then be allo wed to communicate with and sp end time with the ir young sister. Furthermore, although the trial court order placed the siblings so that they were to live with different parents (S.H. and I .H. with mother; H.H. with fa ther), the siblings were not fully separated on a permanent basis. F ather was granted sole legal and physical custody of H.H., but mother and father share joint legal and physical custody of the two older children – S.H. and I.H. Although for the first two months following the entry of the or der, mother and the older two siblings were not to contact H.H ., mother and the two older sib lings were permitted to have visitation and contact wi th H.H on or after July 1, 2018. 3 Indeed, the trial judge explicitly stated that “[t]he parties may mutually agree to additional parenting time for all three children[,] to trading parenting time dates, to relax parenting time condition s,” and expressed h is hope that “a new arrangement may foster reuni fication” and that “the weight of the past is left in the past, and the future becomes free of overt conflict.” Therefore, the cou rt’s order does not necessarily

3 While mother’s evening visitation three times per week was req uired by the order, it was up to father’s sole discreti on whether the older siblings c ould attend those visits or have other communication with H.H.- 13 - separate the siblings for more than two months but instead prov ides for contact and visitation between the siblings after the i nitial period following the ent ry of the order. In light of the record before us, w hich includes extensive fact ual findings made by the trial judge (which were supporte d by credible evidence in the r ecord) and ample statements by the judge showing his reasoning and the consideration he gave t o determining the appropriate decision, we cannot say that the trial judge abus ed his discret ion in determining what was in the best interests of the three children. B. Whether the Trial Court’s Factual Findings are Supported by Credible Evidence Mother’s remaining assignments of error contend the trial court erred in its findings of fact. In short, the remaining a ssignments of error all assign error to the court’s factual findings that father did not abuse mother and children. “It is well established that the trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determines the weight to be given to their test imony, and has the discretion t o accept or reject any of the witness’ testimony.” Str eet v. Street, 25 Va. App. 380, 387 (1 997) ( en banc ). “Where, as here, a court hears evidence ore tenus , its findings are entitled to t he weight of a jury verdict, an d they will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or withoutevidence to support them.” Gray v. Gray, 228 Va. 696, 699 (1985). “The d ecision of the trial j udge is peculiarly entitled to respect for he saw the parties , heard the witnesses testify and was in closer touch with the situation than [the appellate] C ourt, which is limited to a rev iew of the written record.” Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 200 (1977). This case was heavily fact-intensive. The ore tenus hearings took place over the course of five days and included testim ony from more than twenty witne sses. At the conclusion of the evidence, the judge made extens ive findings of fact, including findings on the credibility of mother and father – both of whom testified during the hearings. The court succinctly stated, “the- 14 - Court finds that the father is credible.” In contrast, regardi ng mother’s credibil ity, the trial court stated, “I saw and heard the mother testify in Court. I heard all the other evid ence, was able to make assessments about her cred ibility, and I didn’t find her t o be credible.” The court also elaborated: One may not see this on the ultimat e transcript of this trial, but when she cried, it appeared t o be overacting and scriptive [sic ]. The testimony on direct and cross appear to be testimony from two different people. On direct, she w as direct, articulate, and charming. The overreacting and over-moding [sic] notwithstanding. On cross, however , she looked like a zombie. In fact, Ms. McFadden had to even ask if she was on medication or something. The transition was live in Court , and full[y] observable. In addition, the court found, “Mother admittedly lied to the po lice officer” conducting an investigation into an allegati on of abuse and “was forced to admit to the lie, which is one of the reasons why credibility is ver y low in this Court’s eyes.” Allegations of abuse must alway s be taken seriously and proper ly investigated, as the trial judge noted was done here through multiple investigations of fa ther. The trial judge listened to the testimony of the investiga ting officers, who testified that , in all of their inve stigations against father, only one investig ation resulted in criminal charges aga inst him, and those charges were then actually dropped. The trial judge also considered testimo ny from two CPS officials who investigated the allegations, a s well as documents detailing th e history of CPS investigations of father – all of which the trial judge found are “investigations that lead nowhere.” The trial judge concluded that “the abuse neve r happened.” In fact, the trial judge found that the only substantiated abuse allegation w as of mother’s assault on fathe r when she knocked a phone out of his hand. In this case where so much turned on the testimony from the witnesses, including multiple police officers and CPS officials who investigated the many allegations of abuse against- 15 - father, the trial court conside red the extensive testimony of a ll of the numerous witnesses and made determinations as to the ir credibility. Based on the reco rd before us, we cannot say that there is no credible evidence to s upport the tria l judge’s find ings of fact that father did not abuse mother or the children. Consequently, we will not disturb thos e findings of fact on appeal.
III. C ONCLUSION In short, we hold that the tria l court did not abuse its discre tion in entering the custody modification order as it did. T he trial judge considered all o f the evidence and found the children to be “in absolute distress.” H e found there had been a materi al change in circumstances. He considered all of the factor s required by Code § 20-124.3 for d etermining the best interests of the children in deciding custody – and also considered multiple opt ions for how to modify custody. He then carefully chose what he c onsidered to be the best cours e of action – placing S.H and I.H. with mother and placing H.H. w ith father (and directing no cont act with H.H. by mother or the older siblings for two months i n order to enable father to rebu ild his relationship with her). The trial judge indicate d that he hoped this “new arrangement” woul d be helpful in “foster[ing] reunification.” In addition, we cannot say that there is no credible evidence t o support the trial court’s findings of fact that father did no t abuse mother or the childr en. The judge considered all of the extensive evidence before hi m (including testimony by over twen ty witnesses), weighed the credibility of the witnesses (i ncluding finding father to be cr edible and mother not to be credible), and, accordingly, made the findings of fact that mot her on appeal now asserts are error. Given the totality of the eviden ce, we certainly cannot say tha t the trial court is plainly wrong or without credible evidence to s upport its finding s of fact on ap peal. For all of these reasons, we a ffirm the decision of the trial c ourt. Affirmed.