UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JANICE PEPPERMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF

No. 99-1366

EDUCATION; MONTGOMERY COUNTY

PUBLIC SCHOOLS; SUPERINTENDENT,

Montgomery County Public

Schools,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.

(CA-96-2292-JFM, CA-97-2558-JFM)

Submitted: November 16, 1999

Decided: December 2, 1999

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and TRAXLER,

Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Bruce M. Bender, VAN GRACK, AXELSON & WILLIAMOWSKY,

Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Patrick L. Clancy, David R. Warner, VENABLE, BAETJER & HOWARD, L.L.P., Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Janice Pepperman appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees on her disability discrimination claim. We affirm. We also deny the Appellees' request that we

take judicial notice of certain facts.

I.

Pepperman was a public school teacher in Montgomery County,

Maryland. From 1988 to 1997, she was the resource teacher--a position equivalent to department head--for the foreign languages department at Quince Orchard High School. During that period, she

engaged in an escalating conflict with three teachers under her supervision. In 1997, the administration at Quince Orchard recommended

that she be removed from her position as resource teacher due to her

inability to resolve this problem within her department.

Pepperman attributes both the animosity of the three teachers and

her treatment by the school administration to the fact that she is morbidly obese. According to her proffers below, her weight prevents her

from walking quickly or for long distances. Thus, she contends, her

obesity is a disability, and the actions of the teachers and administration at Quince Orchard violated the Americans with Disabilities Act

("ADA").

II.

This appeal arises from a case that was filed in a Maryland court,

removed to federal court by the Appellees, and consolidated by joint

motion with another case filed by Pepperman against the Montgom-

 2
ery County Board of Education. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the Board on all of Pepperman's claims. We

review that decision de novo. See Shaw v. Stroud , 13 F.3d 791, 798

(4th Cir. 1994).

Pepperman initially contends that the lower court overlooked evidence that her supervisor violated the ADA's anti-threat provision, 42

U.S.C. § 12203(b) (1994). This argument fails on two procedural

grounds. First, it was not made below, so it is not properly before us.

See Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222, 1227 (4th Cir.

1998). Second, even if it had been raised below, it would have been

untimely. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 12117 (1994); McCullough

v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 35 F.3d 127, 131 (4th Cir. 1994).

Pepperman next asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to her claim that the Quince Orchard administration

retaliated against her for her assertion of her rights under the ADA.

We assume without deciding that all of the decisions about which

Pepperman complains amounted to adverse employment actions and

that Pepperman has made out a prima facie case that these actions

were retaliatory. Nevertheless, summary judgment was proper,

because the School Board proffered an alternative explanation for its

conduct (the conflict between Pepperman and three teachers in her

department), and Pepperman has not shown that this explanation was

pretextual. See Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 442

(4th Cir. 1998) (discussing the framework for analyzing retaliation

claims). The evidence offered by Pepperman to undermine the

Board's explanation fails because it focuses on her own views and

those of outside observers, not the perceptions of the decision makers

accused of discrimination. See Beall v. Abbot Labs., 130 F.3d 614,

620 (4th Cir. 1997).

Pepperman's third challenge to the district court's decision relates

to her claim that her co-workers violated the ADA by engaging in disability harassment. The district court found that, despite the effects of

her obesity, Pepperman is not disabled within the meaning of the

ADA and therefore does not qualify for the statute's protection. We

agree. See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105-08 (3d Cir. 1996);

Penchisen v. Stroh Brewery Co., 932 F. Supp. 671, 674-75 (E.D. Pa.

1996), aff'd, No. 96-1807 (3d Cir. May 9, 1997) (unpublished);

 3
Hazeldine v. Beverage Media, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 697, 703-05

(S.D.N.Y. 1997).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's decision

granting summary judgment in favor of the Montgomery County

Board of Education. In light of this disposition, we decline to take

judicial notice of three decisions by Maryland courts, as requested by

the School Board. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 4