An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 

A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .

NO. COA13-872

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 21 January 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

v. Rowan County

Nos. 11 CRS 054373, 004870

JASON WYLIE JOHNSON,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 20 February 2013 

by Judge W. Erwin Spainhour in Rowan County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 January 2014.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Allison A. Angell, 

Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Richard J. Costanza, for defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

Defendant Jason Wylie Johnson was indicted for misdemeanor 

larceny and felonious breaking or entering a motor vehicle 

(principal felony). He also was later indicted as a habitual 

felon. A jury found defendant guilty of the principal felony, 

and he then entered a guilty plea to the habitual felon charge.

The facts relevant to the issue on appeal are that Jerry 
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Dean, a North Carolina Alcohol Law Enforcement agent, observed

defendant break into a car belonging to Jason Carey. Agent Dean 

spoke with Mr. Carey who reported that a GPS, camera, purse, and 

car jack were missing from his car. When Agent Dean confronted 

defendant, he admitted to taking the items out of Mr. Carey’s 

car and said that they were in his vehicle.

During the charge conference for the principal felony 

trial, defendant sought to introduce into evidence a signed plea 

transcript and have the court accept his guilty plea to the

habitual felon charge. The trial court refused to accept the 

signed plea transcript and defendant’s plea. Defendant further 

explained that he wanted to introduce the plea so his habitual 

felon status would not be speculative, and he could inform the 

jury that he faced a minimum of 66 months in prison if found 

guilty of the principal felony. The trial court again denied 

defendant’s motion.

The jury was instructed as to the elements of the principal 

felony and returned a guilty verdict. The trial court then 

accepted defendant’s guilty plea to the habitual felon charge

and sentenced him to 90 to 117 months in prison. Defendant 

appeals.

_________________________

Defendant asserts that during his closing argument for the 
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principal felony trial, he should have been allowed to inform 

the jury, without mentioning the word “habitual,” that if found 

guilty of the principal felony he faced a minimum sentence of 66 

months in prison because of his habitual felon status. We 

disagree.

Defendant’s argument is based on N.C.G.S. § 7A-97, which 

provides that “[i]n jury trials the whole case as well of law as 

of fact may be argued to the jury.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-97 

(2013). In this case, the trial court’s ruling involved a 

question of law because it refused to allow defendant to argue a 

point of law to the jury which N.C.G.S. § 7A-97 allows. As a 

result, we apply a de novo standard of review. See State v. 

Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011). Under de 

novo review, we “consider the matter anew and freely substitute 

[our] own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. 

Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant acknowledges, in his brief, that we have 

previously rejected similar arguments in State v. Wilson, 139 

N.C. App. 544, 533 S.E.2d 865, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 

279, 546 S.E.2d 394 (2000), appeal after remand, 149 N.C. App. 

233, 562 S.E.2d 304 (2002), and State v. Dammons, 159 N.C. App. 

284, 583 S.E.2d 606, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 579, 589 
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S.E.2d 133 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 951, 158 L. Ed. 2d 382 

(2004). Defendant, however, argues that this case is 

distinguishable because he “effectively admitted to his habitual 

felon status before closing arguments,” and he did not intend to 

use the word “habitual” in his closing argument. To determine 

the merits of these distinctions, we review Wilson and Dammons. 

In Wilson, the defendant argued that he should have been 

allowed to inform the jury during his closing argument at the 

principal felony trial that if found guilty of the principal 

felony he might face a maximum of 210 months in prison because 

of his habitual felon status. Wilson, 139 N.C. App. at 547, 533 

S.E.2d at 868. In Wilson, we concluded that the defendant could 

not “argue to the jury the punishment he might receive as a[]

habitual felon if found guilty of the principal offense.” Id.

at 549, 533 S.E.2d at 869. In reaching this conclusion, we 

observed that a defendant does have “the right to inform the 

jury of the punishment that may be imposed upon conviction of 

the crime for which he is being tried.” Id. at 548, 533 S.E.2d 

at 868 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, this principle does not stand for the proposition that 

a defendant can “inform the jury, during a principal felony 

trial, of the possible maximum sentence which might be imposed 

upon a[] habitual felon adjudication.” Id. 
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We further noted that, N.C.G.S. § 14-7.5 requires 

bifurcation of the principal felony trial and the habitual felon 

trial. Id. This bifurcation achieves three purposes. First, 

it prevents arguments relating to habitual felon status during 

the principal felony trial because the habitual felon 

“indictment [is] revealed to the jury only upon conviction of 

the principal felony.” Id. Second, bifurcation avoids 

potential prejudice “and further precludes the jury from 

contemplating what punishment might be imposed were defendant 

convicted of the principal felony and subsequently adjudicated 

a[] habitual felon.” Id. at 548, 533 S.E.2d at 868–69. 

Finally, bifurcation allows for two different standards of proof

in the principal felony trial and the habitual felon trial. Id.

at 549, 533 S.E.2d 869. 

In Dammons, the defendant sought to inform the jury during 

his closing argument that if found guilty of the principal 

felony he would be sentenced as a Class C felon because of his 

status as a habitual felon. Dammons, 159 N.C. App. at 295, 583 

S.E.2d at 613. The defendant argued that his situation differed

from Wilson because he had been previously adjudicated a 

habitual felon, and, as a result, he could not relitigate his 

habitual felon status. Id. at 296, 583 S.E.2d at 613. The 

defendant in Dammons, however, did litigate his habitual felon 
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status, and we held that Wilson’s holding that a defendant 

cannot argue the punishment he might receive if found guilty of 

a principal felony precluded the defendant’s argument. Id.

While defendant argues that his case is unlike Wilson and 

Dammons because he “effectively admitted to his habitual felon 

status before closing arguments” in the principal felony trial

by introducing a plea transcript and his plea to the habitual 

felon charge, we do not find that this distinction warrants a 

different result. In Wilson, we clearly recognized that 

N.C.G.S. § 14-7.5 establishes an order of proceedings which 

requires that the principal felony trial take place before the 

habitual felon trial. Wilson, 139 N.C. App. at 548, 533 S.E.2d 

at 868. Therefore, defendant’s distinction is without merit 

because he could not plead to the habitual felon charge before 

the completion of the principal felony trial.

Defendant further attempts to distinguish Wilson by 

asserting that the concern in Wilson was that the defendant 

would reveal the existence of the habitual felon indictment to 

the jury, and, in this case, defendant was not going to use the 

word “habitual” in his closing argument. While in Wilson we did 

note that a habitual felon indictment is revealed to a jury only 

after a defendant is found guilty of the principal felony, this 

observation was used to explain that there must be a verdict in 
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the principal felony trial before addressing a defendant’s 

habitual felon status. Hence, this distinction is without merit 

regardless of whether the word “habitual” is used, because the 

language of N.C.G.S § 14-7.5 “logically preclude[s] argument of 

issues pertaining to the habitual felon proceeding, specifically 

and particularly including punishment, during the principal 

felony trial.” Id. Therefore, defendant’s attempts to 

distinguish his case are without merit and we find no error.

No Error.

Judges ERVIN and McCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).