Filed 10/30/14 P. v. Rowley CA2/6 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SIX 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v. 

JEFFREY MARTIN ROWLEY, 

 Defendant and Respondent. 

2d Crim. No. B256150 

(Super. Ct. No. 2013037762) 

(Ventura County) 

 Jeffrey Martin Rowley pled guilty to two felony counts of second degree 

burglary of a vehicle (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)).1 He admitted having a prior 

strike conviction for first degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 667, subds. (a)(1) & (b)-(i), 

1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and serving three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). 

 The trial court granted Rowley's Romero (People v. Superior Court

(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 508 (Romero)) motion to dismiss the prior strike 

allegation for purposes of sentencing. (§ 1385, subd. (a).) The court orally stated that 

"this particular offense and the nature of the offense [do not] warrant a lengthier prison 

sentence than what is about . . . to be imposed." It sentenced Rowley to the low term of 

16 months on each count, to be served concurrently, plus a consecutive 12 months for 

 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 
2 

one prison prior, for a total term of 28 months. The court struck the other two prison 

priors and awarded 197 days of custody/conduct credit.2 (§ 4019.) 

The People contend the trial court improperly dismissed the prior strike 

conviction allegation without considering Rowley's lengthy, serious and continuous 

criminal history and without recording its reasons for the dismissal in the court minutes. 

Rowley concedes the court committed reversible error by failing to enter its reasons for 

dismissing the prior strike in the minutes. We vacate the sentence and remand with 

instructions. 

FACTS 

 In 1993, the juvenile court sustained a petition against Rowley for 

attempted first degree burglary (§§ 664/459). While still a juvenile, Rowley admitted to 

vehicle theft. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) 

In 2000, Rowley was convicted by plea of first degree residential burglary 

(§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), the current strike prior. Rowley had entered and ransacked a 

detached garage, causing a $1,000 loss, and then entered another residence through the 

kitchen window and stole $970 in property. He was sentenced to a four-year prison term, 

plus a consecutive eight-month term for a separate conviction of petty theft with a prior 

(§ 666). 

After being released on parole, Rowley was convicted of two felony counts 

of identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)) for stealing and using the victim's credit card to 

charge approximately $780. The trial court struck Rowley's prior strike allegation and 

sentenced him to two years in prison. 

 In 2010, Rowley was convicted of forgery (§ 470, subd. (d)). The trial 

court denied his motion to dismiss the prior strike allegation and sentenced him to 32 

months in prison. 

 2 Rowley was subject to a maximum sentence in this case of 10 years 4 months, 

i.e., the high term for one second degree vehicle burglary (3 years) plus a consecutive 

term for the second vehicle burglary (8 months), doubled under the three strikes law to 7 

years 4 months, plus 3 years for the three admitted prior prison terms. (See §§ 461, subd. 

(b), 667, subds. (a)(1) & (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) 
3 

In addition to committing the two vehicle burglaries in this case, Rowley 

was charged and convicted in a separate misdemeanor case with hit and run while driving 

without a license. (Veh. Code, §§ 20002, subd. (a), 12500, subd. (a).) He was sentenced 

to 180 days, to be served concurrently with the 28-month term in this case. 

DISCUSSION 

 Section 1385, subdivision (a) permits the trial court, in furtherance of 

justice, to dismiss a prior strike allegation for purposes of sentencing if the defendant 

falls outside the spirit of the three strikes law. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 

161 (Williams).) When the court decides to dismiss a prior strike, it must state the 

reasons for that action "in an order entered upon the minutes." (§ 1385, subd. (a); People 

v. Bonnetta (2009) 46 Cal.4th 143, 145-146 (Bonnetta).) 

 Here, it is undisputed the trial court did not comply with section 1385, 

subdivision (a). Although the court orally stated its reasons for dismissing the prior 

strike, it did not enter them upon the minutes. Rowley concedes, and we agree, that 

pursuant to Bonnetta, the matter must be remanded to allow the court to correct this error. 

(Bonnetta, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 153.) 

 The requirement for a statement of reasons for dismissal is mandatory, not 

directory, and in the absence of such a statement, the order is not an effective dismissal 

under section 1385. (Bonnetta, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 152.) Bonnetta confirmed "that 

the public declaration inherent in a written order is a purposeful restraint, that . . . section 

1385's requirements are not directory and may not be disregarded, and that a reporter's 

transcript showing the trial court's motivation is not enough; the minutes must reflect the 

reason." (Id. at p. 149; see Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 531; People v. Superior Court

(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 530, 538-539.) The court rejected a rule "that would allow the 

reviewing court to uphold the trial court's order if, but only if, it finds the trial court's 

reasons to be clearly articulated [in a reporter's transcript], or if any and all of the reasons 

mentioned would justify dismissal." (Bonnetta, at p. 152.) It explained that "such a rule, 

while reducing the trial court's burden, would increase that of the appellate courts without 
4 

eliminating the possibility the reviewing court would misidentify the specific reason or 

reasons for the trial court's ruling." (Ibid.) 

 The People contend that a remand solely to correct the minutes is an 

inadequate remedy because the trial court's reasons for dismissing the prior strike, as 

reflected in the reporter's transcript, are legally insufficient. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 

at page 161, required the court to "consider whether, in light of the nature and 

circumstances of [the defendant's] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony 

convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the 

defendant may be deemed outside the [three strikes law] scheme's spirit, in whole or in 

part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one 

or more serious and/or violent felonies." In dismissing the strike, the court simply stated 

"this particular offense and the nature of the offense [do not] warrant a lengthier prison 

sentence." The People maintain the court erred as a matter of law by ignoring Rowley's 

significant criminal history, background, character and prospects in reaching its decision. 

(See ibid.) 

 Where, as here, the court's order of dismissal is ineffective, we must 

remand the matter "at least for the purpose of allowing the trial court to correct the defect 

by setting forth its reasons in a written order entered upon the minutes." (Bonnetta, 

supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 153.) In other words, we lack authority to review a dismissal that 

has not been properly entered. (Id. at pp. 151-152.) On remand, the trial court "may, but 

need not, revisit its earlier decision, as on reflection it might determine its reasoning was 

flawed or incomplete." (Id. at p. 153.) As Bonnetta explained, "[j]udicial economy is 

furthered by allowing the trial court to correct what, upon reconsideration and reflection, 

it perceives to have been an unwarranted dismissal, or to consider if a dismissal should be 

ordered for some new or different reason." (Ibid.) 

DISPOSITION 

 The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 
5 

 PERREN, J. 

We concur: 

 GILBERT, P. J. 

 YEGAN, J. 
6 

Ryan J. Wright, Judge 

Superior Court County of Ventura 

______________________________ 

 

 Gregory D. Totten, District Attorney, Lisa O. Lyytikainen, Senior Deputy 

District Attorney, for Appellant. 

 Stephen P. Lipson, Public Defender, Michael C. McMahon, Chief Deputy, 

for Respondent.