Filed 1/22/24 Friends of Westwanda Drive v. City of Los Ange les CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

FRIENDS OF WESTWANDA DRIVE,

Plaintiff and Appellan t

,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant and Respondent;

KARLA SHAHIN et al.,

Real Parties in Interest and Appellants

. B3149 32

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.

19 STCP04 113 )

APPEAL S from a judgment of the Superior Court of

Los Angeles County. Mitchell L. Beckloff , Judge. Affirmed.

Channel Law Group, Jamie T. Hall and Julian K.

Quattlebaum for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Luna & Glushon and Kristina Kropp for Real Parties in

Interest a nd Appellants.2 Hydee Felstein Soto, City Attorney, Timothy McWilliams,

Managing City Attorney, and Steven G. Martin, Deputy City

Attorney for Defendant and Respondent.

_______________________________________

Friends of Westwanda Drive (Friends), an unincorporated

association, sought to set aside a determination by the City of Los

Angeles (City) that a tree

- removal permit and proposed

construction of a home (Project) were exempt from environmental

review under the California Environmenta l Quality Act (CEQA)

(Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq. ) . The trial court denied the

writ petition, concluding, in part, the action is moot. We affirm

the decision, concluding the case is moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Karla Shahin owns a lot on the corner of Westwanda Drive

and Stovell Lane in Benedict Canyon. The lot is surrounded by

existing single

- family homes in a hillside residential

development. Real parties in interest Shahin and her husband,

Armen Melkonians, (collectively real parties) planned to build a

two

- story single

- family home with a footprint of 1,500 square feet

(the Project) on the lot.

As relevant here, the Project required the removal of three

City

- protected Coast Live Oak trees and six “remnant” California

Blac k Walnut tree stumps. 1 The Project was designed to

accommodate the four remaining Coast Live Oak trees on the lot.

1 C alifornia Black Walnut trees are also protected, but not as stumps. ( L.A. Mun. Code

, § 46.01.) Apparently, the prior owner of the lot had the trees cut down because they had died or were in poor condition due to the draught.3 On September 26, 2017, Shahin applied to the Bureau of

Street Services (BSS) for a tree

- removal permit and included an

arborist’s report as required by the City’s Protected Tree

Ordinance. BSS recommended the tree

- removal permit be

approved, the Project be found exempt from CEQA

environmental review

, and 12 replacement trees be planted

pursuant to the o rdinance.

On March 7, 2018, the Board of Public Works held a

hearing to consider the tree

- removal permit. Two speakers

opposed removing the protected trees, arguing that doing so

would harm the Benedict Canyon ecosystem and a wildlife
corridor in the area. They claimed “dozens” of resi dents were

against the tree

- removal.

During the hearing, the Board of Public Works discussed

how the Project was to be constructed to avoid harming the

remaining and replacement protected trees and to minimize any

negative impacts on the environment caused by removing the

trees. When the hearing concluded, the Board of Public Works

voted to approve Shahin’s permit application and found the

Project was exempt under CEQA. Issuance of the permit was

conditioned on the planting of replacement trees. On March 14,

2018, BSS issued the tree

- removal permit. On March 15, 2018,

the three trees and six stumps were removed.

II. Administrative Appeals

On August 31, 2018, Friends appealed the Board of Public

Work s ’ s decision. BSS submitted a report recommending the

a ppeal be denied.

The appeal was forwarded to the City Council’s Public

Work s and Gang Reduction Committee. Following an August 7,4

2019 hearing, the appeal was then forwarded to the City Council

without recommendation

. On August 20, 2019, the City Council heard and denied the

appeal. The same day, the City filed a Notice of Exemption

(NOE) with the recorder’s office of Los Angeles County. As

pertinent here, the NOE stated the Project was approved and

included the removal of three protected trees and six t ree stumps
with the planting of replacement trees pursuant to the Protected

Tree Ordinance. The NOE also stated the Project qualified for

construction under CEQA categorical exemptions and no CEQA

exceptions applied.

III. Writ Proceedings

Friends sought a writ of mandate compelling the City to

vacate and set aside the tree

- removal permit, among others, and

to prepare and certify a legally adequate environmental review

under CEQA for the project.

The petition pleaded traditional mandamus (Code Civ.

Proc.

, § 1085) and, in the alternative, administrative mandamus

( id.

, § 1094.5).

The trial court clearly viewed the petition as seeking

administrative mandamus, given that Friends had pursued an

administrative appeal before the City Council and the court had

an ad ministrative record before it. (See Stanford Vina Ranch

Irrigation Co. v. State of California (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 976,

995

– 996.)

Following a lengthy hearing, the trial court denied the writ

petition on April 23, 2021. 

### In its written ruling, the court

concluded the Project fell into one but not both category

exemptions found by the City and there were no applicable

exceptions. The c ourt also concluded the entire action was5



### moot; the trees had been removed. On June 2 1 , 202 1 , the trial

court entered judgment for the City. This appeal followed on August 19, 2021

. DISCUSSION

I. Timeliness of the Appeal

We reject the City’s threshold co ntention Friends’s appeal

must be dismissed as untimely. Relying on Meinhardt v. City of

Sunnyvale (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 43

, review granted June 15,

2022, S274147 ( Meinhardt ), and cases cited therein , the City

argues Friends failed to file the notice of appeal within the

requisite 60 days after service of the trial court’s April 23, 2021
order denying the petition. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule

8.104(a)(1)(B).)

The appellate court in Mei n hardt

, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th

43 , review granted, held wh en “ a court has entered a ruling on a

writ petition that constitutes a final judgment, any party seeking

appellate review of that ruling must timely appeal from that final

judgment

— and the time to file a notice of appeal is not restarted

by the trial court ’ s subsequent entry of a document styled as a

‘ judgment ’ that merely reiterates the prior final judgment. ” ( Id.

at p. 50.) Here, by contrast, t he trial court ’ s order of April 23,

2021 was not a final judgment. Instead, the court ordered the

City to prep are and serve a judgment, and also allowed Friends

10 days in which to object and prepare an alternative form of

judgment for the court ’ s consideration. The time for Friends to
appeal began running when the court entered its final judgment

on June 21, 2021. Friends timely filed a notice of appeal on

August 19, 2021, 59 days from the entry of judgment.6

II

. CEQA Overview

CEQA “establishes a comprehensive scheme to provide

long

- term protection to the environment. It prescribes review

procedures a public agency must follow before approving or carrying out certain pro jects .” ( Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1092. ) “ Under C E QA

and its implementing guidelines, an agency generally conducts

an initial study to determine ‘ if the p roject may have a significant

effect on the environment. ’ ” ( Friends of College of San Mateo

Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College Dist

. (2016) 1

Cal.5th 937, 945.) “ If there is substantial evidence that the

p roject may have a significant effect on the environment, ” then

the agency must generate an environmental impact report (EIR)

prior to approving the p roject. ( Ibid. )

“ For policy reas ons, the Legislature has expressly exempted

several categories of p roject s from review under CEQA.

[Citation.] By statute, the Legislature has also directed the

Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency .

. . to establish ‘ a list

of classes of p roject s that have been determined not to have a

significant effect on the environment and that shall be exempt

from ’ CEQA.” ( Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley

,

supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1092.) Th ere are 33 categorical

exemptions. ( Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15300

– 15333. 2 ) Among

them is the Class 3 exemption for small structures (Guidelines

, § 15303 ) and the Class 32 exemption for infill development

2 S ection s 15000 et seq. of title 14 of the California Code of Regulations are the implementing administrative regul ations,

and are referred to as “Guidelines.” (See Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 380, fn. 2.)7

projects (Guidelines

, § 15332). The City decided the Project fell

into both categorical exemption s , thereby obviating the need for

an EIR. (

Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of

Arcadia (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 418, 429 [“ If an exemption applies,

the p roject is excused from environmental review”].)

C ategorical exemptions

, however, can be subject to certain

exceptions. If an exception applies, the exemption is foreclosed,

and an EIR is necessary. ( Arcadians for Environmental

Preservation v. City of Arcadia , supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 436 ;

Guidelines

, § 15 3 00.2.)

Before the City Council and the trial court, Friends

maintained , in part, that based on the Project’s “location” and/or

“unusual circumstances” the Class 3 and Class 32 category

exemptions we re unavailable , thereby requiring an EIR . (See

Guidelines

, § 15300.2, subds. (a) [ l ocation exception ] & (c)

[ unusual circumstances exception ]. 3 ) In a nutshell, Friends’s

3 T he “ l ocation exception ” provides: “Location. Classes 3, 4, 5, 6, and 11 are qualified by consideration of where the project

is to be located

— a project that is ordinarily insignificant in its impact on the environment may in a particularly sensitive environment be significant. Therefore, these class es are considered to apply in all instances, except where the project may impact on an environmental resource of hazardous or critical concern where designated, precisely mapped, and officially adopted pursuant to law by federal, state, or local agencies .” T he

“ un usual circumstances exception” provides: “Significant Effect. A categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment due to unusual

ci rcumstances.” (Guidelines

, § 15300.2, subds. (a) & (c), respectively.)8

theory was removing the protected trees not only damages the

trees, but also destroys the habitat (the Coast Live Oak

California Black Walnut woodland) created by having trees on

the lot , which, in turn, diminishes the number of wildlife species

depending on the woodland for survival

. III. Mootness

Generally

, courts do not issue advisory opinions based on hypothetical facts or controversies that are merely academic

. ( People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 ; Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd

. (2021 ) 61

Cal.App.5th 1093, 1135.) A case “ ‘ should be dismissed as moot

when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the

appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief. ’ ” ( Santa

Monica Baykeeper v. City of Malibu (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1538,

1547.) This rule has been applied to CEQA challenges.

( Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77

Cal.App.4th 880, 888; Parkfo rd Owners for a Better Community v. County of Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 722

– 723 [writ

petition].)

Relying on our decision in Hixon v. County of Los Angeles

(1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 370 ( Hixon ) the trial court concluded the

“entire action is moot.” In Hixon

, county residents petitioned for

a writ of mandate to compel the county to obtain an EIR for

street

- widening projects that involved the removal of numerous

roadside trees and the replacement of new, younger trees. ( Id. at
pp. 373, 376.) The trial court declined to order an EIR because

the trees had already been removed and replaced and “no public

benefit would be gained by requiring an EIR.” ( Id. at p. 377.) We

agreed, explaining: “The pr oject is ended, the trees are cut down

and the subject is now moot insofar as resort to a planning or9

informational document, which is what an EIR is.” ( Id . at

p. 378.)

Here, the trial court properly concluded the case is moot.

Just as in Hixon , the court is unable to grant Friends any

effective relief. Friends’s administrative appeal requested the

City Council to “ revoke and set

- aside the approval of the tree

removal permit.” Friends’s writ petition commanded the City to

“[v]acate and set aside approval s of the Project, including but not

limited to, the Tree

- Removal Permit for the Project.” The

petition also sought an injunction “prohibiting any actions by [the

City] until [the City] has complied with all applicable state,

federal and local laws and req uirements of CEQA.”

Whether preserving the trees (and their woodland) on the

lot qualified as an exception has long been rendered moot by the

permitted removal of the trees five months before the Board of

Public Works’ s decision was appealed. We cannot turn back the

clock and restore those trees and their woodland.

Friends resist this conclusion by arguing that reversing the

City’s decision would allow: (1) the California Black Walnut

stumps to be replanted either elsewhere or on the Project’s lot;

(2) similar woodland to be preserved in another location, or

(3) the Project to be altered

— by bird

- safe glass, no night lighting,

and changed fencing

— or eliminated entirely so th e trees could be

replaced and the woodland restored.

We are not persuaded. That a ruling by this court could

provide effective relief because preparation of an EIR might

possibly result in Project modifications or other mitigation

measures is wholly specu lative. Further, the record shows the

Project was substantially finished at the time of the writ

proceedings in April 2021. At this late date, preparation of an10

EIR would not serve any meaningful purpose. Finally, it is

unclear how mitigation measures u ndertaken off the lot would

redress any purported environmental losses that occurred on the

lot, which is the relief Friends has sought.

There are three discretionary exceptions to the rules

regarding mootness: (1) when the case presents an issue of broad

public interest that is likely to recur; (2) when there might be a

recurrence of the controversy between the parties; and (3) when

material questions remain. ( Cucamongans United for Reasonable

Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th

4 73, 479

– 480.) None of these exceptions apply. No issues of

broad public importance are implicated. As the trial court noted,

Friends’s claim that the dispute was whether proposed homes in

the Santa Monica Mountains zone, and particularly within

designated habitat blocks, can bypass environmental review is

both an overstatement and a misstatement. The issue here was

limited to a single

- family residence at a specific location in the

Santa Monica zone. Because the subject trees are gone, a

recurre nce of a dispute over the tree

- removal permit is unlikely.

For the same reason, n o material questions of significant import

remain. For these reasons, we agree with the trial court that any

opinions in this case would be purely advisory.

CEQA was not des igned to require generation of

meaningless paperwork ( Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com.

(1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 283), and it would not be reasonable to
interpret the statute as compelling preparation of an EIR that

would be a pointless waste of Californi ans ’ limited tax dollars.

Thus, we affirm the trial court’s decision that the case is moot.11 Because we affirm the judgment on the ground of mootness,

we do not reach the issues whether exceptions barred both the

Class 3 and Class 32 category exemptions in this case. 4

4 R eal parties do not join in the City’s arguments on appeal that the City Council properly rejected Friends’s challenge to the City’s reliance on the Class 32 c ategory exemption. Ins tead, they have filed an opening brief as “cross

- appellants” to advance essentially the same arguments as the City. We note the core of

th e se arguments

— whether Los Angeles Municipal Code section 

### 12.21.C.10(i)(3) supported the City’s issuance of building and grading permits

— is the subject of the related appeal, Friends of Westwanda Drive v. City of Los Angeles ( Jan. 22, 2024

, B321479 ) [nonpub. opn. ]

.12 DISPOSITION

The judgment that the entire action is moot is affirmed.

The parties shall bear their own c osts on appeal

. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.