NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

PERRY JEROME BRYARS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0504 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2019-101287-001

The Honorable Rosa Mroz, Judge (Deceased)

The Honorable Jacki Ireland, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Diane L. Hunt

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jennifer Roach

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 11-30-2023
STATE v. BRYARS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Chief Judge David B. Gass joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Perry Jerome Bryars appeals the superior court’s denial of his 

motion for a new trial on six counts of felony endangerment. Because a 

different panel of this court previously concluded that sufficient evidence 

supports the endangerment convictions, and in any case, the jury’s verdicts 

were not contrary to the weight of the evidence, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 A jury found Bryars guilty of six counts of felony 

endangerment along with counts of aggravated assault, attempted sexual 

assault, kidnapping, and attempted arson of an occupied structure, based 

on evidence he assaulted his estranged wife, M.Y., and then tried to blow

up the house she was living in. In a prior appeal arising from the same 

verdicts, Bryars challenged the sufficiency of evidence to support the 

endangerment convictions, the designation of the attempted sexual assault 

conviction as a domestic violence offense, and the superior court’s 

consideration of aggravating factors in sentencing. This court affirmed, 

rejecting Bryars’ primary argument that the superior court erred in denying 

his motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. Bryars, 1 CA-CR 22-0135, 2023 

WL 3477793, at *3, ¶ 14, *4, ¶ 21 (Ariz. App. May 16, 2023) (mem. decision). 

Because Bryars’ present appeal involves only the endangerment counts, we 

limit our factual discussion to the trial evidence on those charges.1

¶3 After Bryars repeatedly assaulted M.Y. and prevented her 

from leaving the house, she managed to escape. When M.Y. returned to the 

house about 30 minutes later, Bryars poked his head out of a garage 

window, asked if she “smell[ed] the gas,” and said, “the house is going to 

blow in five minutes.” M.Y. persuaded Bryars to come outside, and she 

1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

convictions, resolving all reasonable inferences against Bryars. See State v. 

Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 405, ¶ 3 n. 2 (App. 2015).
STATE v. BRYARS

Decision of the Court

3

called 911. When police officers arrived, they placed Bryars in handcuffs 

after “a little standoff.” 

¶4 After Bryars was taken into custody, a captain from the fire 

department arrived and found the police officers “gathered around by the 

garage,” “in close proximity . . . of the house.” The captain, who is also a 

hazmat specialist, shut off the main gas line to the property and then 

advised the officers to “clear the scene” and evacuate neighboring homes.

A few minutes later, the rest of the fire department’s hazmat team arrived 

on the scene.

¶5 The hazmat team detected “small hits of gas” as they metered 

the exterior of the “closed up” house.

2 The team proceeded carefully, 

taking about 45 minutes to allow time for the gas to dissipate. Once the 

captain determined it was “appropriate” to enter the house, he “cracked the 

front door,” saw “a lit candle on the floor,” and extinguished it. The team

entered the house, opening windows and doors as they metered, which 

enabled the gas to keep dissipating. The team discovered that gas lines to 

the oven and water heater were unconnected to those appliances and 

turned to the on position. Although the oven was electric, there was a gas 

hookup behind it. 

¶6 The hazmat team determined there was a “1 to 2 percent gas” 

concentration inside the house. At trial, the fire captain testified that the 

flammable range for natural gas is five to fifteen percent. At that 

concentration, gas is “highly explosive,” with the power of the explosion 

dependent on the volume of gas when ignited. The captain explained that

an ignition source close to the ground—like the candle on the floor in the

house—could cause a “catastrophic” explosion that would “blow[] up the 

entire home” and harm people outside it based on the volume of gas

present by the time of ignition. The captain surmised that such an explosion 

would have occurred at the house absent the mitigation measures taken by 

the fire department—unless the candle went out on its own before the gas 

concentrated to a flammable level.3 A juror asked the captain how long it 

would take, “on average” for a house of this size, “for the gas to build up to 

cause an explosion by that candle on the floor.” The captain said he could 

2 Gas will leak from a home through its eaves and other openings even 

when all the doors and windows are shut.

3 The doorbell wires had been disconnected, and the fire captain 

posited this could have been done to prevent an earlier ignition—higher up 

in the space—that would cause less impact. 
STATE v. BRYARS

Decision of the Court

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not answer the question because of the number of variables involved

—including the “cubic feet of space,” the amount of furniture taking up 

space, the size of the attic, and “the volume of flow of gas” entering the 

house. 

¶7 When Bryars was interviewed after his arrest, he admitted he 

had experience with explosives. He also admitted cutting the doorbell 

wires and lighting a candle. The jury found him guilty of the endangerment 

counts as to M.Y. and the five police officers at the scene. 

¶8 Bryars moved for a new trial under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure (“Rule”) 24.1(c), asserting the verdict was “contrary to law or the

weight of the evidence.” Although the motion did not expressly refer to the 

endangerment verdicts, Bryars argued the fire captain “was not clear as to 

how this alleged arson was an actual threat.” The superior court denied the 

motion, finding “there was substantial evidence to support the guilty 

verdicts.” The court sentenced Bryars to a presumptive one-year prison 

term on each endangerment count, to run concurrently with one another 

and with his sentences on all other convictions except for the attempted 

arson, which was ordered to run consecutively. 

¶9 Bryars noticed an appeal from the judgment of guilt and 

sentence on all convictions, but the notice did not expressly include the 

denial of his motion for new trial. See A.R.S. § 13-4033(A) (enumerating 

bases for appeal); State v. Wilson, 253 Ariz. 191, 194, ¶ 9 n.3 (App. 2022)

(finding jurisdiction lacking to consider defendant’s challenge to a denial of 

a motion for new trial where the notice of appeal did not identify that 

ruling). The superior court permitted Bryars to file a delayed notice of 

appeal from the order denying his motion for new trial in accordance with 

Rule 32.1(f), and we have jurisdiction over that appeal under A.R.S. 

§ 12-120.21(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶10 We review the superior court’s denial of a motion for new trial 

based on the weight of the evidence for an abuse of discretion. Harm, 236 

Ariz. at 406, ¶ 11. 

[I]n deciding a motion for new trial, a trial court may weigh 

the evidence and make its own determination of the 

credibility of the witnesses. If, after full consideration of the 

case, the court is satisfied that the verdict was contrary to the 

weight of the evidence, it may set the verdict aside, even if 

substantial evidence supports it.
STATE v. BRYARS

Decision of the Court

5

State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44, 49–50, ¶ 17 (2017). We do not reweigh the 

evidence and will uphold the superior court’s ruling if, “resolving every 

conflict in the evidence in support of the order, substantial evidence 

supports the trial judge’s order.” Id. at 52, ¶ 28. 

¶11 A defendant commits felony endangerment “by recklessly 

endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death.” 

A.R.S. § 13-1201. The superior court correctly instructed jurors they could 

find Bryars guilty only if he “did in fact create a substantial risk of imminent 

death.” See Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. Stand. Crim. 12.01 (endangerment) (4th 

ed. 2016). “Imminent,” which is not defined by statute, means “[a]bout to 

occur” or “impending.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English 

Language (5th ed. 2011); see also A.R.S. § 1-213 (requiring that words in a 

statute “be construed according to the common and approved use of the

language” unless the word is “technical” or has “acquired a peculiar and 

appropriate meaning in the law”); State v. Clow, 242 Ariz. 68, 71, ¶ 13 (App. 

2017) (referring to an established dictionary to determine the ordinary 

meaning of a word not statutorily defined). 

¶12 Bryars argued in his prior appeal that absent evidence the gas 

reached a combustible concentration when the endangerment victims were 

present, the trial evidence did not establish that he placed them in actual,

substantial risk of imminent death. This court determined there was 

sufficient evidence to support the verdicts. Bryars, 1 CA-CR 22-0135, at *3,

¶ 14. 

¶13 Bryars’ present argument is essentially the same as the one 

raised in his prior appeal. He contends the superior court should have 

found the endangerment verdicts were contrary to the weight of the 

evidence. Despite the technical distinction between the standards of review 

for each claim, we are hard pressed to discern a substantive difference 

among the issues on appeal. Much like our review of a denial of a motion 

for new trial, we review a sufficiency-of-evidence claim by evaluating

whether substantial evidence supports the challenged decision while 

refraining from reweighing the evidence and resolving all evidentiary 

conflicts in favor of upholding the verdict. See State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 

279, ¶ 5 (2014); State v. Barger, 167 Ariz. 563, 568 (App. 1990). 

¶14 We recognize the similarity between the standards of review

does not apply when we review a grant of a new trial under Rule 24.1(c). 

As explained by our supreme court, the trial judge has “broad discretion” 

in that circumstance, based on the judge’s personal observation and 

evaluation of the trial proceedings, “to find the verdict inconsistent with the 
STATE v. BRYARS

Decision of the Court

6

evidence” even if that evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. Fischer, 

242 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 21. But Bryars cites no decision in which an appellate 

court has held that even though substantial evidence supported the verdict, 

the superior court abused its discretion by denying a motion for a new trial 

under Rule 24.1(c). Instead, he implicitly acknowledges the equivalence of 

his prior and present claims by rearguing, in this appeal, that the 

endangerment verdicts were unsupported by the evidence. Thus, to the 

extent any meaningful differences exist in the standards of review between 

evaluating sufficiency of the evidence and denial of a motion for a new trial, 

those differences are not material to our analysis here. 

¶15 Given the substantive similarity between Bryars’ current and 

prior claims, we apply the “law of the case” to this appeal. The “law of the 

case” doctrine is a rule of general application and establishes:

that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of 

that case on the points presented throughout all the 

subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and the 

appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved and 

decided on that appeal will be considered on a second appeal 

or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues 

are substantially the same as those on which the first decision 

rested, and, according to some authorities, provided the 

decision is on the merits. 

State v. King, 180 Ariz. 268, 278 (1994) (citation omitted). 

¶16 We acknowledge the State has not argued law of the case; 

instead, the State summarily concludes that this court’s decision in the prior 

appeal—finding that the endangerment convictions are supported by 

substantial evidence—requires affirming in this appeal. Nonetheless, “[w]e 

are obliged to affirm the trial court’s ruling if the result was legally correct 

for any reason.” State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 (1984). And though we 

have discretion not to apply the doctrine to a decision that is not yet final, 

see King, 240 Ariz. at 279, we see no basis to depart from it here, see 

Powell-Cerkoney v. TCR-Montana Ranch Joint Venture, II, 176 Ariz. 275, 279 

(App. 1993) (enumerating reasons not to apply the doctrine, including 

manifest injustice or error; a “substantial change . . . in essential facts or 

issues, in evidence, or in the applicable law”; or if the prior decision did not 

decide the issue in question, did not address the merits, or is ambiguous). 

Because this court previously concluded there was sufficient evidence for 

the jury to find Bryars placed M.Y. and the officers in actual, substantial risk 

of being imminently killed, we will not revisit that determination. See
STATE v. BRYARS

Decision of the Court

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Bryars, 1 CA-CR 22-0135, at *2, ¶ 10 (explaining that evaluating the 

sufficiency of evidence underlying a conviction turns on whether 

substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict).

¶17 Even assuming there are sufficient distinctions between 

Bryars’ arguments in the first appeal and this one to merit an independent 

review, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the superior 

court’s denial of his motion for new trial. Bryars, who admittedly had 

experience with explosives, opened the gas lines and placed a lit candle in 

the house at some point during the 30 minutes she was away. The fire 

department shut off the main gas line to the house after she arrived back 

home. And the gas then dissipated for 45 minutes before it was measured 

at one to two percent concentration inside the house. The lack of evidence 

showing the precise concentration of gas before the main line was shut off 

did not preclude a reasonable inference that the concentration was high 

enough to present an actual, substantial risk of imminent death. Thus, the 

superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the endangerment 

verdicts were not contrary to the weight of the evidence. 

CONCLUSION

¶18 For these reasons, we affirm.