United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 1, 20131

Decided October 1, 2013

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

Nos. 13-1059 & 13-1219

ASUQUO ESANG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 07 C 3540

Joan B. Gottschall,

Judge.

O R D E R

During the course of this litigation, Asuquo Esang has accused more than

twenty-five named defendants of participating in events that, he says, violated his

rights under the Constitution and Illinois law. For five years the district court sorted

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

1

unnecessary. The appeal thus is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
Nos. 13-1059 & 13-1219 Page 2

through Esang’s shifting allegations before finally dismissing the case for failure to

prosecute. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). The court also denied Esang’s motion to set aside the

dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). He appeals both decisions, and we have

consolidated the appeals for decision. We conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing and declining to reopen his case, and affirm the judgments.

Esang was pro se when he filed suit in June 2007. His initial complaint mentions

that he was arrested at the Daley Center in Chicago in July 2005, but that first version

appears to focus on Esang’s subsequent detention at a state-operated mental-health

facility in Elgin. The subject of his detention at the Elgin facility is even more prominent

in Esang’s first amended complaint. After the district court had recruited a succession of

lawyers to assist him, however, Esang obtained the court’s approval to sever all of his

claims arising from his detention in Elgin; those claims became the subject of a separate

lawsuit. See Esang v. Cook County, No. 11 C 5479 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2012). The operative

complaint in this lawsuit is Esang’s second amended complaint, which was drafted by

counsel. In it, Esang alleges that he was assaulted twice by sheriff’s department officers,

first when he was arrested at the Daley Center in July 2005 and later, in January 2007, by

three guards at the Cook County jail. The district court dismissed Esang’s federal claims

arising from the incident at the Daley Center, and all of his state-law claims arising from

both incidents, as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The court later

dismissed the remaining federal claim against the jail guards for failure to prosecute.

That was on November 7, 2012. Previously, during the initial twenty months

before counsel was recruited, the district court twice had dismissed the suit for failure

to prosecute after Esang disregarded written warnings that missing scheduled hearings

or failing to comply with court directives could result in dismissal. Both times the court

reopened the case on Esang’s motion, and in response to his assertion that one of the

court’s scheduling orders never reached him, the judge admonished Esang to update

his address with the clerk of court. Then in October 2012, after the last of his three

lawyers had withdrawn, Esang failed to attend a status hearing. The court rescheduled

the hearing and, in the written notice mailed to Esang, warned him that next time the

case would be dismissed if he did not attend.

After the dismissal Esang asked that his lawsuit be reinstated for a third time;

once again he asserted that the district court’s scheduling orders had not been delivered

to him. At a hearing on November 28, the court told him that his motion would be taken

under advisement. The judge directed Esang, in person and in writing, to go to the

clerk’s office and update his address to assure that he received future documents from
Nos. 13-1059 & 13-1219 Page 3

the court. Esang ignored this directive, and for that reason the court denied his motion

to reopen the lawsuit on December 4. He filed a notice of appeal on December 28, which

we docketed as appeal no. 13-1059. That same day Esang filed a motion asking the court

to reconsider its December 4 ruling. The court declined, reasoning that Esang had not

offered any new reason to set aside the decision. He filed a second notice of appeal,

which we docketed as appeal no. 13-1219.

Esang challenges the dismissal of his lawsuit and the refusal to vacate that

decision. A district court has discretion to dismiss a case sua sponte for want of

prosecution as part of its authority to control its docket and dispose of litigation in an

orderly and efficient manner. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962);

Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 548 (7th Cir. 2006). Esang repeatedly ignored

court orders, and his conduct caused multiple delays to the court and the defendants

despite the judge’s flexibility and willingness to accommodate his requests. Yet in his

brief Esang does not say how the district court abused its discretion except to offer the

frivolous suggestion that the judge should have used registered mail to send scheduling

orders. Mostly his brief restates allegations from his first two complaints, in particular

the allegations concerning his detention in Elgin that no longer are part of this litigation.

An appellant’s brief must include the party’s contentions and reasons for them,

with citations to authorities and the parts of the record on which the appellant relies.

FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9); Correa v. White, 518 F.3d 516, 517 (7th Cir. 2008). Generalized

assertions of error are not enough, Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir.

2001), and even pro se litigants must comply with this rule, Correa, 518 F.3d at 517. Since

none of the contentions in Esang’s brief address the reasons the district court gave for

dismissing his lawsuit and then declining to rescind that decision, he effectively

concedes the correctness of those rulings. Accordingly, both decisions are AFFIRMED.