[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13901

Non-Argument Calendar

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GREGORY KEVIN SAMUELS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WMC MORTGAGE, LLC, 

GE HOLDINGS INC., 

GQ HOLDING 1329, LLC, 

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS, 

NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF FLORIDA, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13901

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00870-RBD-LRH

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Before GRANT, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Gregory Samuels, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district 

court’s dismissal -- for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction -- of Samuels’s civil action. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.

In 2021, Samuels filed pro se this civil action in the district 

court. In his amended complaint, Samuels named seven defendants: (1) WMC Mortgage LLC; (2) GE Holdings Inc.; (3) GQ Holdings 1329, LLC; (4) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; 

(5) the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida; (6) Kondaur Capital 

Corporation; and (7) Tyler Stiglich. Briefly stated, Samuels purported to assert claims against defendants for fraud and for violation of his due-process rights stemming from the state-court foreclosure proceedings on his home. 

The Ninth Judicial Circuit -- as a party defendant -- moved 

to dismiss Samuels’s amended complaint on various grounds, 

1 We read liberally appellate briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. 

Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se

pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 

1998).

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21-13901 Opinion of the Court 3

including for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(1). 

The district court granted the Ninth Judicial Circuit’s motion. The district court concluded that it, as a federal court, lacked 

subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Samuels’s challenges to the 

state foreclosure proceedings. The district court thus dismissed 

without prejudice Samuels’s civil action as barred by the RookerFeldman2 doctrine.3 This appeal followed.

On appeal, Samuels argues chiefly that the district court 

erred in dismissing his complaint without first addressing his claims 

on the merits: conduct Samuels says violated due process and his 

right to a jury trial. According to Samuels, “justice” outweighs “judicial expedience” such that the district court should have exercised 

its discretion under Rule 12(i) and deferred ruling on the Ninth Judicial Circuit’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion until a trial on the merits. 

Samuels also asserts that his amended complaint stated a claim for 

relief and was, thus, not subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). 

Construed liberally, Samuels’s pro se appellate brief challenges only the timing of the district court’s ruling on the Rule 

12(b)(1) motion. We reject Samuels’s timing argument: a federal 

2 Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

3 The district court also noted that it had already dismissed two substantially 

similar lawsuits filed by Samuels against many of the same defendants.

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court must “inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction 

at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings.” See Univ. of S. 

Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Samuels raises no substantive argument challenging the correctness of the district court’s determination that the district court 

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Samuels’s claims or that 

Samuels’s claims were barred by Rooker-Feldman. Samuels has 

thus abandoned the argument that the district court concluded incorrectly that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. See Sapuppo v. 

Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A 

party fails to adequately ‘brief’ a claim when he does not ‘plainly 

and prominently’ raise it, ‘for instance by devoting a discrete section of his argument to those claims.’”); Timson v. Sampson, 518 

F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se

litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant 

are deemed abandoned.” (citations omitted)). 

Because Samuels has failed to challenge the only basis for 

the district court’s order of dismissal, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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