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WILLIAM RAVEIS REAL ESTATE, INC. v. PETER

ZAJACZKOWSKI ET AL.

(AC 37843)

Lavine, Sheldon and Flynn, Js.

Argued November 17, 2016—officially released April 25, 2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Kamp, J.)

Enrico Vaccaro, with whom, on the brief, was Emily

A. Gianquinto, for the appellants (defendants).

Tracey Lane Russo, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. The defendants, Peter Zajaczkowski and

Iwona Zajaczkowski, appeal from the judgment of the

trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in favor

the plaintiff, William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. On appeal,

the defendants claim that the court(1) erred in concluding that they had breached the exclusive agreement

they had with the plaintiff, (2) abused its discretion by

awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs in the

absence of an evidentiary hearing, and (3) violated General Statutes § 42-150aa with respect to the award of

attorney’s fees. We affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

In its memorandum of decision issued on February

26, 2015, the trial court made the following findings of

fact. The plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation with its

principal office located in Shelton, is a real estate brokerage firm that represents buyers and sellers. The

plaintiff commenced the present litigation to obtain

payment of a real estate commission it alleged it was

owed in connection with the defendants’ purchase of

a home at 6 Blackhouse Road (Blackhouse property)

in Trumbull.1 The plaintiff alleged that it was due a

commission pursuant to an agreement between the parties known as an ‘‘Exclusive Right to Represent Buyer

Authorization’’ (agreement). The defendants denied

that an enforceable agreement existed between them

and the plaintiff and that they owed the plaintiff a commission. The defendants alleged three special defenses

as to the plaintiff’s cause of action2 and a two count

counterclaim.3

The defendants are husband and wife, who have two

school aged children. Iwona Zajaczkowski, a native of

Poland, had resided in Connecticut for approximately

seventeen years by the time of trial. She had been

employed by Connor Corporation, a marketing company. Peter Zajaczkowski was employed as an executive director of process engineering at Morgan Stanley

Fund Services. He previously was employed by General

Electric Corporation and Deloitte & Touche. He had

earned a bachelor of science degree in business management and a master’s degree in business administration and finance from the University of Connecticut.

Early in 2010, the defendants were living in an apartment and wanted to purchase a three or four bedroom

house with a yard. Although they wanted to find a home

in Trumbull to take advantage of its public schools,

they were willing to look at homes in other Fairfield

county towns. They had no time constraints, but ideally

wished to purchase a home before the month of September so that their son could enter school at the beginning

of the school year.

The court found that a friend of the defendants had

referred them to Freda Takacs, a licensed real estate
agent who had been affiliated with the plaintiff for

approximately fifteen years. Peter Zajaczkowski made

the initial contact with Takacs and described to her the

type of home the defendants wished to purchase and its

preferred location. Thereafter, Takacs identified houses

to show the defendants. In addition, she gave the defendants access to the plaintiff’s listing book, a nonproprietary service that the plaintiff’s agents offer to

customers so that customers can perform their own

Internet searches of homes available for purchase.

Peter Zajaczkowski actively searched for homes that

met the defendants’ specifications by using the listing

book and regularly contacting Takacs about properties

that the defendants wished to view.

Prior to showing the defendants a particular house

on March 29, 2010, Takacs presented them with the

agreement. The agreement is a preprinted, three page

form with the plaintiff’s name appearing prominently

at the top of each page. Before Takacs presented the

agreement to the defendants, she entered certain information onto it, including the term of the agreement

and the compensation to be paid to the plaintiff. The

agreement was for a term of one year, from March 29,

2010 to March 29, 2011. The agreement provided, in

part, that Takacs, as the buyer’s agent, was to use diligent efforts to locate property that met the defendants’

specifications and that she was to negotiate the terms

and conditions of the purchase of any property the

defendants wished to buy. The agreement also provided

that if the defendants purchased a home during the term

of the agreement, the plaintiff was to earn a commission

equal to 3 percent of the sale or exchange price of the

purchased property. In addition, the plaintiff was to

earn an administrative fee of $195. The defendants

signed and initialed each page of the agreement on

March 29, 2010. They did not request that any of the

terms of the agreement be changed. Takacs, as the

plaintiff’s authorized agent, signed the agreement on

behalf of the plaintiff.

After the agreement was signed, Takacs showed the

defendants a number of homes in Monroe, Trumbull,

and Fairfield, including 77 Russ Road (Russ Road property) in Trumbull. The defendants submitted an offer

to purchase the Russ Road property, but the transaction

was not consummated because a bank appraisal failed

to support the purchase price and mortgage financing

contingencies. Although there was some evidence that

the defendants’ offer was higher than the fair market

value of the property, Peter Zajaczkowski testified that

he was not pressured by Takacs to submit an offer. The

defendants, however, criticized Takacs’ efforts to work

with the bank’s appraiser to ensure that the appraisal

satisfied the mortgage lending requirements. Despite

this criticism, the court found that Takacs acted with

appropriate diligence during the negotiations regarding

the defendants’ attempt to purchase the Russ Road
property.

The court found that following their failed attempt

to purchase the Russ Road property, the defendants’

relationship with Takacs deteriorated. Peter Zajaczkowski felt that he could no longer work with her and by

October 15, 2010, he wished to terminate the agreement.

Takacs did not agree to rescind the agreement and

reminded Peter Zajaczkowski of the defendants’ obligations under the agreement. On November 5, 2010,

Takacs sent an e-mail message to Peter Zajaczkowski

stating: ‘‘[t]o be told that you no longer want to work

with me after I worked so hard stung and made me feel

unappreciated and I told you so. This is not cancellation

of a contract and it is still in force. My frustration at

being rejected does notin any way negate yourresponsibility to work with my company if you choose to buy

without me or my company, we will be pursuing you

for commission.’’ The court found that Linda Myers,

the plaintiff’s sales manager, was the only individual

within the company with authority to terminate an

agreement. Myers never agreed to terminate the parties’ agreement.

The court also found that despite Peter Zajaczkowski’s claim that he terminated the agreement, he

continued to use the listing book provided by the plaintiff to research available properties subsequent to October, 2010. On December 21, 2010, he contacted Takacs

to ask her opinion about a piece of property in Trumbull.

Although Peter Zajaczkowski testified that he contacted

Takacs to ask her input ‘‘as a friend,’’ Takacs testified

that she reminded him of their mutual obligations under

the agreement. Takacs wrote in an e-mail to Peter Zajaczkowski on December 21, 2010: ‘‘[p]lease also do know

that you need to go through William Raveis for any

house you want to purchase. This is the same as when

you have your house on the market. The agency gets

paid if you sell during a listing contract and gets paid

if you buy during it as well.’’

On January 5, 2011, the defendants submitted a written offer to purchase the Blackhouse property through

Chris Carey, a real estate agent not affiliated with the

plaintiff. The defendants had a fully executed purchase

and sale contract with the sellers of the Blackhouse

property by January 21, 2011, and obtained title to the

Blackhouse property on April 12, 2011. The defendants

have not paid the plaintiff a commission with respect

to their purchase of the Blackhouse property.

In resolving the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim

alleged in count one, the court found that the agreement

is entitled, ‘‘Exclusive Right to Represent Buyer Authorization.’’ The term of the agreement was from March

29, 2010 to March 29, 2011. The agreement identifies

the buyers as the defendants and provides in relevant

part: ‘‘You, Buyer(s) [the defendants] appoint Us [the

plaintiff] as Your exclusive real estate Broker to repre-
sent You and assist You in locating and purchasing

or exchang[ing] real property acceptable to You and

generally described as residential real estate located

within the State of Connecticut . . . . During the term

of this Authorization You will work exclusively through

Us in locating and purchasing or exchanging the Property.’’ The agreement also states with respect to the

defendant: ‘‘(A) You will tell Us about all past and current contacts with any real property or any other real

estate agents and refer all leads or information about

the Property to Us. (B) You will cooperate with Us and

be reasonably available to examine real property.’’

The court found that the agreement also imposed

certain duties on the plaintiff, to wit: ‘‘(A) We will use

diligent efforts to find property within Your specifications. (B) We will negotiate on Your behalf for terms

and conditions agreeable to You. (C) We will assist and

act in Your interest regarding the location and purchase

or exchange, as the case may be, of the Property.’’

As to the compensation due the plaintiff, the court

found that section VI of the agreement states in part:

‘‘You agree to pay Us a fee of . . . 3 % of the sales or

exchange price of the real property You purchase. This

fee will be waived if We collect from the Seller or Listing

Agency.’’ Also, the agreement provides: ‘‘In addition to

the above compensation and upon passing of title, You

agree to pay [the plaintiff] an Administrative Fee of

$195.00. This fee does not apply to purchases financed

by government loans (VA, CHFA, FHA).’’

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the

court found that on November 21, 2010, while the

agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants was

in full force and effect, the defendants entered into

an exclusive right to represent buyer agreement with

Carey, a real estate broker with Carey & Guarrera. On

January 5, 2011, the defendants submitted a written

offer to purchase the Blackhouse property through

Carey, who was not affiliated with the plaintiff. A fully

executed contract to purchase the Blackhouse property

was in effect by January 21, 2011, and the closing took

place on April 12, 2011. The court credited Carey’s testimony that at no time was he aware that the defendants

previously had entered into ‘‘an exclusive right to represent buyer authorization’’ with the plaintiff.

The court also found that the defendants were not

unsophisticated consumers. Peter Zaczkowski holds a

bachelor of science degree in business management

and a master’s degree in business administration and

finance. He was employed by large corporations, including Morgan Stanley Fund Services and Deloitte & Touche. Peter Zaczkowski was very engaged in the process

of researching and locating potential homes to purchase. The court found that the defendants’ claim that

they were forced into signing the agreement and that

they could not negotiate different terms was not
credible.

The court concluded, therefore, that the defendants’

actions constituted a breach of the agreement that they

had entered into with the plaintiff. As a consequence

of the defendants’ breach of the agreement, the court

awarded the plaintiff damages of $12,300 pursuant to

the agreement, which provides that the defendants

agree to pay the plaintiff ‘‘3 [percent] of the sales or

exchange price of the real property [they] purchase[d]

. . . upon passing of title . . . .’’4

The court, however, found in favor of the defendants

on the plaintiff’s counts of fraudulent misrepresentation

and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.5 With respect to the defendants’ counterclaims,

breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, the court found that the defendants failed to meet their burden of proof.

On March 5, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for

reargument and reconsideration (motion to reargue) of

the judgment for the plaintiff on its breach of contract

claim. The defendants argued that the plaintiff was not

entitled to be paid 3 percent of the purchase price of

the Blackhouse property because the transfer of title

occurred after the term of the agreement. Moreover,

the defendants argued that the contract into which they

entered forthe Blackhouse property was unenforceable

as it was illusory. The plaintiff objected to the motion

to reargue on the ground that the motion to reargue

had failed to identify a case or principle of law that the

court had overlooked. The court denied the motion to

reargue on the ground that the defendants had failed

to identify any new issue or principle of law or appellate

authority that was not previously raised and considered

by the court in its memorandum of decision.

The defendants appealed on April 6, 2015. On April

15, 2015, the court awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees

and costs in the amount of $12,293, and the defendants

filed an amended appeal. Additional facts shall be set

forth as necessary. We now turn to the defendants’

claims on appeal.

I

The defendants first claim that the court erred in

concluding that they breached their agreement with the

plaintiff by entering into ‘‘[a] fully executed contract’’

to purchase the Blackhouse property during the term

of the agreement when the contract to purchase the

Blackhouse property was illusory, unenforceable, and

not a contract as a matter of law. We need not decide

this claim because the court found that the defendants

breached the agreement on other grounds.

Our review of the defendants’ claim requires us to

construe the contract. ‘‘The standard of review for the

issue of contract interpretation is well established.

When . . . there is definitive contract language, the
determination of what the parties intended by their

contractual commitments is a question of law. . . .

Accordingly, our review is plenary. . . . [W]here the

legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must

determine whetherthey are legally and logically correct

and whether they find support in the facts set out in

the memorandum of decision; where the factual basis

of the court’s decision is challenged we must determine

whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light

of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record,

those facts are clearly erroneous.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Giedrimiene v.

Emmanuel, 135 Conn. App. 27, 34, 40 A.3d 815 (2012).

Following oral argument in this court, we sua sponte

ordered the trial court to articulate its decision.6 The

court issued its articulation on December 16, 2016. The

court found that the parties entered into an exclusive

buyer representation agreement. Section V (B) of the

agreement states that the defendants ‘‘represent that

[they] have not signed and will not sign any representation authorization or agreements which are in effect

during the term of this Authorization with any other

broker or brokerage firm for the location, purchase or

exchange of residential real estate located in the Towns

identified . . . .’’

The court also stated that on November 21, 2010,

while the agreement was in full force and effect, ‘‘the

defendants entered into another exclusive buyer representation agreement with another real estate broker,’’

Carey. The defendants never advised Carey that they

had entered into the agreement with the plaintiff. If

Carey had been made aware of the agreement, he would

not have entered into an agreement with the defendants.

The court found that, by entering into an agreement

with Carey, the defendants breached the provisions of

section V (B) of the agreement.

The court further found that section I (A) of the

agreement provided that the defendants had appointed

the plaintiff to be their ‘‘exclusive real estate Broker

to represent [them] and assist [them] in locating and

purchasing or exchang[ing] real property acceptable to

[them] . . . .’’ The defendants also agreed that, during

the term of the agreement, they would ‘‘work exclusively through [the plaintiff] in locating and purchasing

or exchanging the Property.’’ Section IV (A) of the

agreement provided that the defendants ‘‘will tell [the

plaintiff] about all past and current contacts with any

real property or any otherreal estate agents and refer all

leads orinformation about the Property’’ to the plaintiff.

The court found that the defendants breached the provisions of sections I (A) and IV (A) of the agreement

when they knowingly entered into the agreement with

Carey while the agreement with the plaintiff was in

effect.
Pursuant to Carey’s testimony, the court found that

the defendants utilized his agency to view properties

that they had determined would meet their needs. On

January 5, 2011, with Carey acting as their agent, the

defendants submitted an offer to purchase the Blackhouse property. On January 21, 2011, the defendants

executed a contract to purchase the Blackhouse property with Carey acting as their exclusive agent. At no

time did the defendants contact the plaintiff to express

theirinterest in the Blackhouse property, and at no time

did they use the plaintiff as their broker to purchase

that property. Takacs had sent e-mail messages to the

defendants on more than one occasion to remind them

that the agreement had not been cancelled and that, if

the defendants wished to purchase a house, they had

to use the plaintiff as their agent. The defendants proceeded to work with Carey despite those reminders.

The court found that, when the defendants failed to

use the plaintiff as their exclusive real estate broker,

and, when during the term of the agreement, the defendants did not work exclusively through the plaintiff in

locating and purchasing the Blackhouse property, the

defendants breached the provisions of section I (A) of

the agreement. The court found that when the defendants did not ‘‘refer all leads or information’’ about the

Blackhouse property to the plaintiff, they breached the

provisions of section IV (A) of the agreement.

The court also articulated on ‘‘which of the defendants’ actions found to constitute breach of the

agreement’’ it awarded damages to the plaintiff. The

court found that the defendants entered into an

agreement with Carey while the agreement with the

plaintiff was in effect, did not inform Carey of the existence of the agreement the defendants had with the

plaintiff, and did not inform the plaintiff of their

agreement with Carey. The defendants did not use the

plaintiff as their exclusive real estate broker to represent them in locating and purchasing the Blackhouse

property, nor did they work exclusively through the

plaintiff to locate and purchase that property. The

defendants did not refer leads or information about the

Blackhouse property to the plaintiff.

The court articulated that it awarded damages to the

plaintiff pursuant to section VI of the agreement. The

agreement required the defendants to pay the plaintiff

a fee of 3 percent of the sales price of the real property

that they purchased. The court awarded damages to

the plaintiff as a result of the defendants’ entering into

an agreement with Carey during the term of their

agreement with the plaintiff. The court also awarded

damages as a result of the defendants’ negotiating and

entering into a binding contract to purchase and ultimately buy the Blackhouse property for $410,000. The

closing on the Blackhouse property did not take place

until April 12, 2011, which was beyond the termination
date of agreement. Nonetheless, the defendants negotiated and entered into an enforceable contract to purchase that property during the time their agreement

with the plaintiff was in effect. The defendants actively

participated in the process of identifying prospective

properties. They frequently used their access to the

plaintiff’s resources to identify new properties that

came to market that may have met their housing needs.

The court specifically rejected the defendants’ argument that they were not aware of or did not understand

their obligations—including their obligation to purchase a home using the plaintiff as their exclusive real

estate agent—under the agreement.

Although the court found that the defendants

breached the agreement with plaintiff by entering into

an enforceable contract to purchase the Blackhouse

property during the time their agreement with the plaintiff was in effect, that was not the only basis for its

finding that the defendants breached their agreement

with the plaintiff. The court found other ways in which

the defendants violated the agreement that led proximately to their finding and eventually purchasing the

Blackhouse property. To wit: the court found that the

defendants breached the agreement by entering into an

exclusive agreement with Carey while the agreement

with the plaintiff was still in effect; they did not inform

Carey of the existence of their agreement with the plaintiff; they did not use the plaintiff as their exclusive

real estate broker to represent them and assist them in

locating and purchasing the Blackhouse property; they

did not work exclusively through the plaintiff to locate

and purchase the Blackhouse property; and they did

not refer information about the Blackhouse property

to the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendants do not claim

that any of the court’s findings, other than the enforceability of the contract to purchase the Blackhouse property, are clearly erroneous or that the court’s

conclusions are not legally correct.

On the basis of our review of the record and the

court’s articulation, we conclude that the court did not

award damages to the plaintiff merely because the

defendants entered into a fully executed contract to

purchase the Blackhouse property in January, 2011,

which was within the term of their agreement with the

plaintiff.7 The court found that the defendants breached

numerous provisions of the contract during the term

of the contract, but two are particularly significant,

namely, they entered into an agreement with Carey and

they executed a contract to purchase the Blackhouse

property. Consequently, the defendants damaged the

plaintiff in that their breach of the agreement led

directly and proximately to the plaintiff’s loss of a commission. The court properly measured the damages by

3 percent of the purchase price of the Blackhouse property, a commission the plaintiff would have earned if

the defendants had continued to work with Takacs,
or another of the plaintiff’s agents, as the agreement

required them to do. We, therefore, conclude that the

court’s award of damages was legally correct. The

defendants’ first claim, therefore, fails.

II

The defendants’ second claim is that the court

improperly awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees without

holding an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of

the defendants’ claim. In its memorandum of decision,

the court stated that the agreement ‘‘permits the plaintiff to recover costs and attorney’s fees. The plaintiff

shall submit an affidavit setting forth its claim for these

expenses.’’ On March 9, 2015, the plaintiff’s counsel

filed an affidavit seeking $11,984 for attorney’s fees and

$2602.80 for costs. On March 16, 2015, the court ordered

the plaintiff to submit a more detailed accounting of

both time spent and costs incurred on or before March

30, 2015. The plaintiff complied with the order by submitting approximately six pages of detailed billing and

cost records. On April 6, 2015, the defendants filed an

appeal to this court.8 On March 9, 2015, the plaintiff

filed a bill of costs, which the clerk of the court rejected

because the present case was on appeal to this court.

On April 15, 2015, the court issued a memorandum

of decision regarding attorney’s fees. In its memorandum of decision, the court summarized the nature of

the case and its judgment in favor of the plaintiff. It

stated: ‘‘A trial before the court commenced on July

15, 2014, and ended on October 17, 2014. Although there

were five days of evidence, only two days were full trial

days.’’ The court found that the plaintiff submitted an

affidavit of fees and expenses and, thereafter, on March

30, 2015, submitted time and billing records detailing

the requested attorney’s fees and expenses. The plaintiff

was seeking attorney’s fees in the amount of $11,984

and costs of $2602.80. The court cited the legal basis

for the award of attorney’s fees in a case such as the

present one. ‘‘[A] contract clause providing for reimbursement of ‘incurred’ fees permits recovery upon the

presentation of an attorney’s bill, so long as that bill is

not unreasonable upon its face and has not been shown

to be unreasonable by countervailing evidence or by

the exercise of the trier’s own expert judgment.’’ Storm

Associates, Inc. v. Baumgold, 186 Conn. 237, 246, 440

A.2d 306 (1982).

The court found that the invoice submitted by the

plaintiff was not unreasonable on its face. Plaintiff’s

trial counsel billed at the rate of $125 per hour for outof-court time and $200 per hour for in-court time. The

court found the rate to be reasonable and that the number of hours billed reflected the fact that the trial

occurred over five separate trial days or parts thereof.

Significantly, the court found that the defendants did
not file any objection with respect to the plaintiff’s

filings as to attorney’s fees and costs. The court found

the request for attorney’s fees to be reasonable and

awarded the plaintiff the sum of $11,984.

As to costs, the court found that the plaintiff had

submitted an invoice in the amount of $2602.80, but that

the majority of the expenses were for the acquisition of

transcripts of the court proceedings. The court did not

request a transcript be submitted posttrial. The court,

therefore, awarded costs of $309 relating to marshal

service fees. The total fees and costs awarded by the

court was $12,293.

On April 24, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to

reargue and for reconsideration of the court’s award

of attorney’s fees. The defendants claimed that the contract on which the court relied to award attorney’s fees

is illusory and failed to comply with General Statutes

§ 20-325a (b); in the alternative, if the contract on which

the court relied to award attorney’s fees is a legally

enforceable agreement, the defendants claimed that the

court erred in awarding attorney’s fees without first

conducting an evidentiary hearing, and the contract

is a consumer contract, the present action was not

commenced by an attorney who is not a salaried

employee of the plaintiff and the amount awarded is

in excess of the 15 percent permitted by § 42-150aa (b).

The defendants asked the court to vacate its award of

attorney’s fees. The court did notrule on the defendants’

motion to reargue, and the defendants have taken no

action to secure a ruling on the motion. On December

23, 2015, the defendants amended their appeal to challenge the court’s award of attorney’s fees.9

We now turn to the standard of review and law pertinent to the awarding of attorney’s fees by the trial court.

‘‘A trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees is

reviewable for abuse of discretion. . . . [When

determining] reasonableness of requested attorney’s

fees . . . more than [a] trial court’s mere general

knowledge is required for an award of attorney’s fees.

. . . The burden of showing reasonableness rests on

the party requesting the fees, and there is an undisputed

requirement that the reasonableness of attorney’s fees

and costs must be proven by an appropriate evidentiary

showing. . . . [T]here must be a clearly stated and

described factual predicate for the fees sought, apart

from the trial court’s general knowledge of what constitutes a reasonable fee. . . . That factual predicate

must include a statement of the fees requested and a

description of services rendered.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 118 Conn. App. 367,

371–72, 984 A.2d 1084 (2009); see also Commission on

Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan, 285 Conn.

208, 237–38, 939 A.2d 541 (2008).

The defendants’ claim on appeal is that the court’s

award of attorney’s fees must be reversed because the
court did not hold an evidentiary hearing and provide an

opportunity forthem to challenge the reasonableness of

the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees. Our resolution

of the defendants’ claim turns on the timeliness of their

objection to the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees

and costs. See Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 480–81,

839A.2d 589 (2004). The courtfound that the defendants

never filed an objection to either of the plaintiff’s

requests for attorney’s fees, that is either the plaintiff’s

initial affidavit filed on March 9, 2015, or its more

detailed request filed on March 30, 2015. The court,

therefore, was under no obligation to hold a hearing at

which the defendants could litigate fully the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees sought. See id., 479–80 n.14.

It is an ‘‘undisputed requirement that the reasonableness of attorney’s fees and costs must be proved by an

appropriate evidentiary showing.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. House,

202 Conn. 106, 121, 520 A.2d 162 (1987). Our Supreme

Court has noted that ‘‘courts have a general knowledge

of what would be reasonable compensation for services

which are fairly stated and described . . . and that

[c]ourts may rely on their general knowledge of what

has occurred at the proceedings before them to supply

evidence in support of an award of attorney’s fees.’’

(Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Snyder, supra, 267 Conn.

471. ‘‘Even though a court may employ its own general

knowledge in assessing the reasonableness of a claim

for attorney’s fees, we also have emphasized that no

award for an attorney’s fee may be made when the

evidence is insufficient.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 472. A party need not, however, present

expert testimony regarding attorney’s fees. Id., 473. A

trial court properly may rely on a financial affidavit as

well as its own general knowledge and involvement

with the trial to ascertain a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Id., 474.

In Shapero v. Mercede, 262 Conn. 1, 10, 808 A.2d 666

(2002), our Supreme Court concluded that the court’s

‘‘general knowledge [of what constitutes a reasonable

attorney’s fee] and the referee’s unchallenged findings

relevant to the value of the plaintiff’s services provided

sufficient support for the challenged finding that $275

per hour was an appropriate measure of the value of

those services.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.)

‘‘[O]ur case law demonstrates, to support an award

of attorney’s fees, there must be a clearly stated and

described factual predicate for the fees sought, apart

from the trial court’s general knowledge of what constitutes a reasonable fee.’’ Smith v. Snyder, supra, 267

Conn. 477. ‘‘[A] threshold evidentiary showing is a prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees.’’ Id. ‘‘[W]hen a

court is presented with a claim for attorney’s fees, the
proponent must present to the court at the time of trial

or, in the case of a default judgment, at the hearing

in damages, a statement of the fees requested and a

description of the services rendered. Such a rule leaves

no doubt about the burden on the party claiming attorney’s fees and affords the opposing party an opportunity

to challenge the amount requested at the appropriate

time.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 479.

Our review of the plaintiff’s March 30, 2015 filing

of time records and description of services rendered

indicates that the plaintiff met its burden of providing

a factual predicate upon which the court could determine an award of attorney’s fees. The defendants did

not object to the plaintiff’s initial affidavit for attorney’s

fees or its subsequent filing in response to the court’s

orderfor more information, thereby triggering a hearing

to litigate the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees

requested. This situation is similar to that in Smith v.

Snyder, supra, 267 Conn. 480. In Smith, our Supreme

Court affirmed the trial court’s award of $20,000 in

attorney’s fees ‘‘because the defendants did not oppose

or otherwise take any action in response to the plaintiffs’ request for $25,000 in fees in their post-damages

hearing brief. Although the proponent bears the burden

of furnishing evidence of attorney’s fees at the appropriate time, once the plaintiff in this case did make such

a request, the defendants should have objected or at

least responded to that request. Had the defendants

demonstrated any interest in objecting to the plaintiffs’

request for attorney’s fees, the trial court would have

been obligated to grant the defendants an opportunity

to be heard.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 480–81. Our

Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney’s fees

in Smith ‘‘in light of the defendants’ failure, prior to

this appeal, to interpose any objection whatsoever to

the plaintiffs’request for attorney’s fees. In other words,

the defendants, in failing to object to the plaintiff’s

request for attorney’s fees, effectively acquiesced in

that request, and, consequently, they now will not be

heard to complain about that request.’’ (Emphasis in

original.) Id., 481.

In the present case, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit

requesting costs and attorney’s fees on March 9, 2015.

In response to the affidavit, the court ordered the plaintiff to submit a more detailed affidavit by March 30,

2015. The plaintiff filled a more detailed affidavit as

ordered by the court. On April 6, 2015, the defendants

filed an appeal. Thereafter, the court issued a memorandum of decision on April 15, 2015. The defendants never

objected to the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees

until they filed a motion to reargue and for reconsideration after the court had ruled on the plaintiff’s detailed

time records. Despite the fact that the defendants filed

an appeal on April 6, 2015, they did not amend their

appeal to challenge the attorney’s fees awarded until

December 23, 2015. Because the defendants failed to
timely object to the award of attorney’s fees that would

have triggered their right to litigate the reasonableness

of the fees requested, we conclude that the court did

not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees without holding an evidentiary hearing.10

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff’s complaint sounds in three counts: breach of contract,

fraud and misrepresentation, and breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing. The defendants also alleged two counterclaims: breach

of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

2 The defendants asserted the following special defenses: anticipatory

breach of the agreement, mutual rescission of the agreement and that the

agreement fails to comply with General Statutes § 20-325a.

3

In count one of their counterclaim, the defendants alleged that the plaintiff was responsible for their inability to get a mortgage for 77 Russ Road

in Trumbull, which caused them to suffer money damages. In count two of

their counterclaim, the defendants alleged that the plaintiff’s conduct was

wilfull, wanton, and malicious and, therefore, breached the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing of the agreement.

4 The court did not award an administrative fee, which was a contingent

fee. No evidence was presented as to how the defendants financed the

purchase of the Blackhouse property.

5 The court also addressed the defendants’ special defenses. In their first

special defense, the defendants alleged that the agreement was not enforceable pursuant to General Statutes § 20-325a (b), which by its express language prohibits the bringing of an action to recover a real estate commission

unless services were performed pursuant to a written contract. See Thornton

Real Estate, Inc. v. Lobdell, 184 Conn. 228, 230, 439 A.2d 946 (1981) (statute

has been strictly construed). At trial, the defendants claimed that the

agreement is void because it fails to ‘‘show the date [on which such] contract

was entered into or such authorization given’’ as provided by § 20-325a (b)

(3). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court found it undisputed,

pursuant to the testimony of Iowna Zajaczkowski and the type written text

of the agreement, that the defendants and Takacs signed the agreement on

March 29, 2011.

In their second special defense, the defendants alleged that the plaintiff

anticipatorily breached the agreement. ‘‘Anticipatory breach of contract

occurs when a party communicates a definite and unequivocal manifestation

of intent not to render the promised performance at the contractually agreed

upon time.’’ Koski v. Eyles, 37 Conn. Supp. 861, 862, 440 A.2d 317 (1981).

The court found that there was a breakdown in the relationship between

Takacs and the defendants, but that Takacs made clear that there were

other agents of the plaintiff who were willing to work with the defendants

to locate a suitable property. The evidence established that the plaintiff did

not engage in conduct constituting an anticipatory breach of the agreement.

The court further found that the evidence did not support the defendants’

third special defense of mutual rescission. ‘‘A definite election to rescind a

contract is final and operates as a waiver of any claim for damages for

breach of the contract. A rescission is effective when, in addition to a

restoration of status quo, an intention on the part of both parties that the

contract be rescinded exists.’’ Gordon v. Indusco Management Corp., 164

Conn. 262, 266, 320 A.2d 811 (1973). Myers was clear and unequivocal that

the plaintiff never agreed to rescind the contract. Moreover, Takacs explicitly

informed Peter Zajaczkowskithat the plaintiff did not consentto a rescission.

The defendants raised a fourth defense for the first time in their posttrial

brief, in which they claimed that the agreement was unenforceable because

it is a contract of adhesion and contains terms that are unreasonable and

unconscionable. The court found, as a matter of law, that the fourth special

defense was not properly before the court as it had not been specially

alleged. See Practice Book § 10-50. If the defendants had intended to rely

on this theory, they were required to plead it initially or seek to amend their

existing special defenses.

6 We sua sponte ordered the trial court, pursuant to Practice Book § 60-

5, ‘‘to articulate which of the defendants’ actions constituted a breach of

the agreement they entered into with the plaintiff. Also, the court is ordered

to articulate upon which of the defendants’ actions found to constitute

breach of the agreement between the [plaintiff] and the defendants did the
court award damages to the plaintiff. The trial court shall file a written

articulation of its decision with the Appellate Court Clerk [within thirty

days of issuance of notice of this order].’’

7 Because we conclude that there were factual and legal bases on which

the court properly found that the defendants breached the agreement and

awarded the plaintiff damages, we need not decide whether the contract

to purchase the Blackhouse property was illusory, unenforceable, and not

a contract as a matter of law, as the defendants claim.

8 See Hylton v. Gunter, 313 Conn. 472, 479, 97 A.3d 970 (2014) (judgment

is final for purposes of appeal when trial court has awarded, but not yet

determined amount of, attorney’s fees); Paranteau v. DeVita, 208 Conn.

515, 523, 544 A.2d 634 (1988) (judgment for purposes of appeal final even

though amount of attorney’s fees to be determined).

9 Practice Book § 61-9 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Should the trial court,

subsequent to the filing of a pending appeal, make a decision that the

appellant desires to have reviewed, the appellant shall file an amended

appeal within twenty days from the issuance of notice of the decision as

provided for in Section 63-1.’’ The plaintiff did not object to the untimely

filing of the defendants’ amended appeal.

10 The defendants also claim that the amount of the court’s award of

attorney’s fees was improper pursuant to § 42-150aa. The defendants also

failed to timely raise this claim in the trial court, and we decline to review

it on appeal.