J. S37040/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

RAHEEM B. FORD, : No. 2255 EDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 18, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0005923-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019

Raheem B. Ford appeals from the July 18, 2018 judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following his 

conviction of robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, theft by unlawful taking, 

and burglary.1 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual history:

The complainant, Sharnell Davis, testified that on 

June 21, 2017, she was the victim of a robbery and 

burglary in her home at 6158 Windsor Street, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania[,] where she lived with her 

three small children, ages four (4), three (3), and 

five (5) months. Her father had just passed away in 

June 2017 and to avoid loneliness she asked her 

cousin Layla Muhammed to live with her following his 

death. At the time, Layla Muhammed was dating 

[appellant], and the complainant said as a result she 

knew [him] for the past two and a half (21⁄2) years. 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a), 903(a), 3921(a), and 3502(a), respectively.
J. S37040/19

- 2 -

She noted that she met [appellant] around five times 

previously and that he had stayed at her house on two 

prior occasions. The last time she saw [appellant] was 

the Sunday before the date of the incident when she 

dropped her cousin Layla off at his house on 

10th [S]treet. Layla subsequently returned to the 

complainant’s house for the next three days.

On the date in question[], Layla was picked up by 

[appellant] at 5 am at the complainant’s house. The 

complainant explained that she went shopping with 

her friend Dior Bryant, and that Layla called her 

throughout the day. She noted that when they 

returned to her house, Layla called again. Thereafter, 

the complainant was sitting at her computer between 

the dining room and the living room with her infant 

child in her arms while her friend, Ms. Bryant, was on 

the couch in the living room. Almost a half-hour later 

after receiving the last call from Layla, two intruders 

entered the complainant’s house. The complainant 

explained that her front door was unlocked because 

her children were playing on the front steps before she 

told them to come in after it began to rain.

A masked intruder immediately went up the stairs 

while the second unmasked intruder held the 

complainant, her children, and Ms. Bryant in the living 

room at gun point. The unmasked intruder had a 

cross tattoo on his face and another tattoo on his 

neck; he told the complainant to “Go get that shit” 

and to give her son to Ms. Bryant while pointing the 

gun at her and her infant son. The complainant went 

upstairs to her room and retrieved a bag of $400 in 

money and coins that had belonged to her father. The 

complainant testified that she recognized [appellant] 

as the masked intruder when they made eye contact 

in the upstairs hallway as he exited her deceased 

father’s room. He was wearing a “homemade ski 

mask” with large eye holes and a mouth hole cut out. 

When they returned downstairs, the unmasked 

intruder told the complainant to get on the floor and 

[appellant] suggested that they put them in the 

basement. The group was told to stay in the 

basement and did for what seemed like 15 to 
J. S37040/19

- 3 -

20 minutes. Hearing no more noise upstairs, they 

climbed out a window and went to the home of the 

complainant’s sister to call the police.

. . . .

Following the robbery, the complainant was distraught 

and returned to her house to meet law enforcement. 

Back at her house, she informed police of [appellant’s] 

identity and was subsequently brought to Southwest 

Detectives. The complainant identified [appellant] as 

the masked intruder and told police where she 

thought he lived based on where she dropped off her 

cousin in the past. The complainant explained that in 

an attempt to identify the other intruder she had her 

son’s stepmother “screenshot” [appellant’s] 

Instagram page. She claimed to have discovered a 

picture of [appellant] with the other intruder that she 

emailed to detectives on July 12, 2017. On 

cross-examination, the complainant explained that 

she had seen [appellant] on prior occasions but that 

he was not allowed back to her house because he had 

brought a gun there in 2013. The complainant stated, 

however, that she and [appellant] had a “cordial 

relationship.”

. . . .

Detective Matthew Carey testified that he was the 

assigned detective on the case and he interviewed the 

complainant at Southwest Detectives. 

Detective Carey testified that the complainant told 

him that [appellant] committed the crime and that she 

identified where he lived on Google [M]aps as 

801 North Warnock Street. Detective Carey stated 

that the complainant reported that around $400 in 

change and marijuana had been taken. As a result, a 

search warrant was prepared and executed at 

[appellant’s] home. Proof of residency was found 

along with numerous live .45 caliber rounds in the 

back bedroom of the house. Detective Carey testified 

that later on in the investigation the complainant 

provided him with a picture of [appellant] with the 
J. S37040/19

- 4 -

second intruder, Rashan Roberts, who was armed and 

unmasked. The complainant identified 

Rashan Roberts in a photo array and a search warrant 

was prepared and executed for his home at 911 North 

Marvine Street, just two blocks away from 

[appellant’s] address. A black mask was found and 

Mr. Roberts was arrested. On cross-examination, 

Detective Carey stated that he was not aware of any 

cameras that were located in the area of the robbery. 

Police never recovered a gun, marijuana, or clothing 

matching the descriptions of the intruders.

Trial court opinion, 2/15/19 at 2-6 (citations to the record omitted).

The Commonwealth charged appellant with, inter alia, robbery, 

conspiracy to commit robbery, theft by unlawful taking, and burglary. 

Appellant filed a pretrial motion in limine in which he sought to suppress 

evidence of bullets found in his house. The trial court denied appellant’s 

motion. A jury convicted appellant of the aforementioned crimes on March 1, 

2018. On July 18, 2018, the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate 

of 21⁄2-5 years’ imprisonment.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this court on July 24, 2018. 

The trial court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and appellant timely 

complied. The trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did not the trial court err and abuse its 

discretion by permitting testimony of the 

complainant’s identification of appellant from a 

photograph posted on Instagram and admitting 

that Instagram photograph into evidence, in 

violation of appellant’s state and federal 
J. S37040/19

- 5 -

constitutional rights, where the Instagram post 

was not properly authenticated pursuant to 

Pa.R.E. 901 inasmuch as the Commonwealth 

presented no direct or circumstantial evidence 

regarding to whom the Instagram account 

belonged?

2. Did not the trial court err and abuse its 

discretion by denying appellant’s motion 

in limine to preclude introduction of bullets 

found in appellant’s home, in violation of 

appellant’s state and federal constitutional 

rights, where introduction of such evidence was 

irrelevant and any probative value was 

outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice?

3. Did not the trial court err and abuse its 

discretion in denying appellant’s request for a 

mistrial where the Commonwealth’s statement 

to the jury during summation that it should 

“have the courage to do the right thing and find 

the defendant guilty,” constituted expression of 

an improper personal opinion regarding 

appellant’s guilt in violation of appellant’s state 

and federal constitutional rights?

Appellant’s brief at 4-5.

In his first issue on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion when it admitted a photograph posted on Instagram into 

evidence, which the complainant used to identify appellant’s accomplice, 

Rashan Roberts.

2

 (Id. at 13.) Appellant further avers that the photograph 

was not authenticated and that the Commonwealth did not disclose who 

posted the photograph, nor did it disclose the date of the photograph. (Id.) 

 

2 The Commonwealth did not try appellant and Mr. Roberts together.
J. S37040/19

- 6 -

Appellant further contends that he was unfairly prejudiced because the 

photograph established that he knew Mr. Roberts. (Id. at 18.)

Appellate review of the admission of evidence before the trial court is 

governed by the following standard of review:

It is firmly established, “questions 

concerning the admissibility of evidence 

lie within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and [a reviewing court] will not 

reverse the court’s decision on such a 

question absent clear abuse of 

discretion.”

Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 503-504 

(citations omitted). Additionally,

[i]t is not sufficient to persuade the 

appellate court that it might have reached 

a different conclusion[;] it is necessary to 

show an actual abuse of the discretionary 

power. An abuse of discretion will not be 

found based on a mere error of judgment, 

but rather exists where the court has 

reached a conclusion [that] overrides or 

misapplies the law, or where the 

judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Christine, [] 125 A.3d 394, 397 

([Pa.] 2015) (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Sweitzer, 177 A.3d 253, 260-261 (Pa.Super. 2017).

In his argument, appellant relies upon our decision in Commonwealth 

v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154 (Pa.Super. 2018), which states that because the

Commonwealth did not present any direct or circumstantial evidence linking 

the defendant to certain Facebook chat messages and photographs, the trial 
J. S37040/19

- 7 -

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Commonwealth’s motion 

in limine to introduce evidence obtained from the defendant’s purported 

Facebook page. (Appellant’s brief at 14-15, citing Mangel, 181 A.3d at 1164.) 

In Mangel, the Commonwealth sought to introduce screenshots from a 

Facebook page supposedly belonging to the defendant. Mangel, 181 A.3d at 

1155. Specifically, the Commonwealth wanted to introduce screenshots 

consisting of undated online and mobile chat messages and a screenshot of a 

photograph of what appeared to be bloody hands that someone else 

purportedly posted to the defendant’s Facebook page. Id. This court held 

that in order for such evidence to be admissible, it must be authenticated 

using more than mere confirmation that the Facebook page belonged to a 

particular person. Id. at 1161, citing Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 

1105 (Pa.Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided court, 106 A.3d 

705 (Pa. 2014).

Generally, “[w]hen the evidence in question is a photograph, it may be 

authenticated by testimony from a person who has sufficient knowledge that

the photograph fairly and accurately reflects what the proponent is purporting 

that photograph to reflect.” Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 128 A.3d 806, 

814 (Pa.Super. 2015), rev’d. on other grounds, 173 A.3d 733 (Pa. 2017), 

citing Nyce v. Muffley, 119 A.2d 530, 532 (Pa. 1956).

Here, the Commonwealth used the photograph at issue only for 

identification purposes. In its brief, the Commonwealth argues that there was 
J. S37040/19

- 8 -

“never any dispute as to the actual identity of the individuals in the 

photograph.” (Commonwealth’s brief at 12.) Indeed, the complainant 

testified that she identified Mr. Roberts after seeing a photograph of both 

Mr. Roberts and appellant on appellant’s Instagram page. (Notes of 

testimony, 2/27/18 at 85-87.) Accordingly, we find that through the 

complainant’s testimony, the Commonwealth was able to authenticate the 

photograph and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

admitted the photograph into evidence.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred and abused its 

discretion when it denied his motion in limine in which appellant sought to 

preclude the introduction of bullets found in his grandmother’s house where 

he was living. (Appellant’s brief at 19.) When reviewing the denial of a motion 

in limine, we apply the evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. 

Commonwealth v. Schley, 136 A.3d 511, 514 (Pa.Super. 2016), citing 

Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1022 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 99 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2014).

Here, appellant specifically contends that evidence of the bullets 

recovered in his grandmother’s house was irrelevant or, in the alternative, 

was prejudicial because its inclusion could “lead[] to the inference that 

appellant has access to firearms and ammunition where he was not charged 

with violations of the Uniform Firearms Act and no firearm was recovered.” 

(Appellant’s brief at 22.)
J. S37040/19

- 9 -

Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a 

material fact in the case or tends to support a 

reasonable inference regarding a material fact. 

Although a court may find that evidence is relevant, 

the court may nevertheless conclude that such 

evidence is inadmissible on account of its prejudicial 

impact.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 749 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 

A.2d 1182, 1188 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 986 A.2d 150 (Pa. 2009).

Here, the trial court concluded that the bullets recovered from 

appellant’s bedroom were relevant and were not unfairly prejudicial because 

of his participation in a gunpoint robbery and burglary. (See trial court 

opinion, 2/15/19 at 10.) As noted by the Commonwealth, our supreme court 

has held the following:

A weapon not “specifically linked” to the crime is 

generally inadmissible; however, the fact “the 

accused had a weapon or implement suitable to the 

commission of the crime charged . . . is always a 

proper ingredient of the case for the prosecution. 

[Commonwealth v.] Robinson[, 721 A.2d 344,] 

351 [(Pa. 1998)]. “Any uncertainty that the weapon 

is the actual weapon used in the crime goes to the 

weight of such evidence.” Commonwealth v. 

Williams, [] 640 A.2d 1251, 1260 ([Pa.] 1994) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Caccioletti, [] 425 A.2d 387, 

390 ([Pa.] 1981)). “The only burden on the 

prosecution is to lay a foundation that would justify an 

inference by the finder of fact of the likelihood that the 

weapon was used in the commission of the crime.” 

[Commonwealth v.] Lee, [662 A.2d 645,] 652 [(Pa. 

1995)] (citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, [] 561 

A.2d 699, 707 ([Pa.] 1989) (“If a proper foundation is 

laid, the weapon is admissible where the 
J. S37040/19

- 10 -

circumstances raise an inference of the likelihood that 

it was used.”)).

Christine, 125 A.3d at 400.

Here, applying the Christine court’s discussion of weapons to the 

ammunition seized in this case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion due to the fact that appellant was alleged to have participated in a 

robbery and burglary in which firearms were brandished. Further, we find

that the prejudice of introducing the presence of bullets in appellant’s bedroom 

did not outweigh its probative value. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion in limine.

In his third and final issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred 

when it denied his request for a mistrial after the prosecutor implored the jury 

to have “the courage to do the right thing” during the Commonwealth’s closing 

argument at trial. (Appellant’s brief at 23.) Specifically, appellant contends 

that the remark was inflammatory, prejudicial, represented an expression of 

the prosecutor’s improper personal opinion pertaining to appellant’s guilt, and 

therefore, denied appellant a fair trial. (Id.)

When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial, 

particularly in the context of a prosecutor’s comments during closing 

argument, we are held to the following standard of review:

Our standard of review for the denial of a motion for 

a mistrial is limited to assessing whether the trial court 

abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Cash, [] 

137 A.3d 1262, [1273] (Pa. [] 2016). More 

specifically, this Court has provided the following 
J. S37040/19

- 11 -

standards for reviewing a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct in a closing statement:

it is well settled that any challenged 

prosecutorial comment must not be 

viewed in isolation, but rather must be 

considered in the context in which it was 

offered. Commonwealth v. Correa, [] 

664 A.2d 607 ([Pa.Super.] 1995). Our 

review of a prosecutor’s comment and an 

allegation of prosecutorial misconduct 

requires us to evaluate whether a 

defendant received a fair trial, not a 

perfect trial. Commonwealth v. Rios, [] 

721 A.2d 1049 ([Pa.] 1998). Thus, it is 

well settled that statements made by the 

prosecutor to the jury during closing 

argument will not form the basis for 

granting a new trial “unless the 

unavoidable effect of such comments 

would be to prejudice the jury, forming in 

their minds fixed bias and hostility toward 

the defendant so they could not weigh the 

evidence objectively and render a true 

verdict.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 

[] 861 A.2d 898, 916 ([Pa.] 2004) 

(quotation and quotation marks omitted). 

The appellate courts have recognized that 

not every unwise remark by an attorney 

amounts to misconduct or warrants the 

grant of a new trial. Commonwealth v. 

Faulkner, [] 595 A.2d 28 ([Pa.] 1991). 

Additionally, like the defense, the 

prosecution is accorded reasonable 

latitude, may employ oratorical flair in 

arguing its version of the case to the jury, 

and may advance arguments supported 

by the evidence or use inferences that can 

reasonably be derived therefrom. 

Commonwealth v. Carson, [] 913 A.2d 

220 ([Pa.] 2006); Commonwealth v. 

Holley, 945 A.2d 241 (Pa.Super. 2008). 

Moreover, the prosecutor is permitted to 

fairly respond to points made in the 
J. S37040/19

- 12 -

defense’s closing, and therefore, a proper 

examination of a prosecutor’s comments 

in closing requires review of the 

arguments advanced by the defense in 

summation. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 

[] 889 A.2d 501 ([Pa.] 2005).

Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d 606, 615 

(Pa.Super. 2016).

Commonwealth v. Scott, 146 A.3d 775, 778-779 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 166 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2017).

Here, appellant takes exception to the following from the 

Commonwealth’s closing argument to the jury:

When you deliberate, I’d ask that you use your 

common sense. Common sense in a criminal case can 

be described as: The ability to see things as they 

really were and the courage to do the right thing 

based upon that.

This young lady, Sharnell Davis, saw things as they 

really were on June 21st, 2017 and every time since 

then she’s had the courage to do the right thing based 

upon that, even at the risk of ruining family 

relationships.

I’d ask you likewise, to have the courage to do the 

right thing and find [appellant] guilty.

Notes of testimony, 2/28/18 at 104-105 (emphasis omitted).

Based upon our review of the record, we find that the Commonwealth 

“‘neither caused the jury to form a fixed bias or hostility towards appellant nor 

did [it] ask the jury to send a message to the judicial system or . . .’ the 

community.” Commonwealth v. Patton, 985 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Pa. 2009), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Hall, 701 A.2d 190, 203 (Pa. 1997), 
J. S37040/19

- 13 -

cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Pennsylvania, 523 U.S. 1082 (1998). See 

also Commonwealth v. Ervin, 766 A.2d 859, 865 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal 

denied, 793 A.2d 904 (Pa. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Ervin v. 

Pennsylvania, 536 U.S. 939 (2002) (finding that imploring the jury to have 

courage, when used in the context of speaking of the courage of witnesses at 

trial, was not an objectionable argument on the part of the prosecutor). 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

appellant’s request for a mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/23/19