Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

SAMUEL J. BEASLEY GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

CHANDRA K. HEIN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

BRYAN M. STRICKLER, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 18A02-1401-CR-42

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE DELAWARE CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Kimberly S. Dowling, Judge

Cause No. 18C02-1112-FA-12

October 22, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge
2

Case Summary

Bryan Strickler appeals his 100-year sentence for two counts of Class A felony 

child molesting. We affirm.

Issues

The issues before us are:

I. whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing Strickler; and

II. whether his sentence is inappropriate.

Facts

In August 2011, Ashley Stapert began living with a long-time friend, Nikki 

Chambers, at Chambers’s apartment in Muncie. Chambers had a daughter, J.F., who was 

born in May 2011. In October 2011, Strickler, Stapert’s boyfriend, also moved in. 

Chambers would often leave J.F. in Stapert and Strickler’s care while she worked during 

the daytime. J.F. also sometimes slept at night near Strickler and Stapert in the 

apartment’s living room.

Late in the night of November 7, 2011, or early morning of November 8, Stapert 

awoke to see Strickler lying naked on the floor behind J.F., who also was naked. Stapert 

could see that Strickler’s penis was near J.F.’s buttocks. Strickler then threatened to hit 

Stapert if she did not join him on the floor with J.F. Stapert obliged, then began 

performing oral sex on and placed her finger inside J.F.’s vagina while Strickler remained 

behind J.F., holding her. This continued for about five minutes. Stapert then ended her 

participation, and she did not witness any additional conduct by Strickler.
3

The next morning, Stapert told Chambers what had happened.1

 Chambers kicked 

Stapert and Strickler out of the house. J.F., meanwhile, had gone to visit her father. 

Later in the day, J.F.’s father called Chambers to tell her that he had observed red bumps 

that looked like hemorrhoids near her anus. Chambers then called police and told J.F.’s 

father to take her to the hospital. At Riley’s Children’s Hospital in Indianapolis, the red 

bumps were diagnosed as genital warts. According to Stapert, Strickler also had genital 

warts around this same time. J.F. also had an anal fissure and was constipated, both of 

which may be indicators of sexual abuse, but the doctor who examined J.F. could not 

determine whether she had suffered “acute trauma” from such abuse. Ex. 2. Strickler 

later admitted to a friend that he had “done something” to J.F., but he claimed that he had 

been forced to do so by Stapert, whom Strickler claimed to be afraid of due to her violent 

tendencies. Tr. p. 136.

The State charged Strickler with one count of Class A felony child molesting and 

one count of Class A felony attempted child molesting. The first count alleged that 

Strickler had performed oral sex on J.F., while the second count alleged that Strickler had 

rubbed his penis on J.F.’s buttocks. After a bench trial, Strickler was convicted as 

charged. Although there was no evidence that Strickler had performed oral sex on J.F., 

his conviction on that charge apparently was based on accomplice liability for Stapert’s 

actions. 

 1 Stapert indicated in her testimony that she told Chambers about the molestation; Chambers testified that 

Stapert originally said that Strickler had tried to “smother” J.F. Tr. p. 150.
4

After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court issued a detailed sentencing 

statement that noted fifteen aggravating circumstances and four mitigating circumstances. 

Among the aggravating circumstances, the trial court found:

7. The Crime is particularly devastating to the victim in 

that she will live with the long term physical effects of a 

sexually transmitted disease as a result of being sexually 

abused . . .

8. The Defendant was in a position having care and 

control of the victim of the offense, to wit: fulfilling the role 

of caregiver and a trusted family friend having a duty to 

protect her from this type of criminal behavior . . .

* * * * *

11. The harm or injury of [sic] damage suffered by the 

victim was both significant and greater than the elements 

necessary to prove the elements of the offense . . . .

App. p. 256. Included among the mitigators, the trial court noted Strickler’s lack of prior 

criminal convictions and his “possible learning disability and a possible mental health 

issue . . . .” Id. The trial court imposed the maximum sentence of fifty years for each 

conviction, to be served consecutively. Strickler now appeals.

Analysis

Strickler makes distinct arguments both that the trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing him and that his sentence is inappropriate. We engage in a four-step process 

when evaluating a sentence. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007). First, 

the trial court must issue a sentencing statement that includes “reasonably detailed 

reasons or circumstances for imposing a particular sentence.” Id. Second, the reasons or 

omission of reasons given for choosing a sentence are reviewable on appeal for an abuse 
5

of discretion. Id. Third, the weight given to those reasons, i.e. to particular aggravators 

or mitigators, is not subject to appellate review. Id. Fourth, the merits of a particular 

sentence are reviewable on appeal for appropriateness under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). 

Id. Even if a trial court abuses its discretion by not issuing a reasonably detailed 

sentencing statement or in its findings or non-findings of aggravators and mitigators, we 

may choose to review the appropriateness of a sentence under Rule 7(B) instead of 

remanding to the trial court. See Windhorst v. State, 868 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ind. 2007).

I. Abuse of Discretion

An abuse of discretion in identifying or not identifying aggravators and mitigators 

occurs if it is “‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before 

the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’” Id.

at 490 (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). Additionally, an abuse 

of discretion occurs if the record does not support the reasons given for imposing 

sentence, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the 

record and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of 

law. Id. at 490-91.

Strickler challenges the trial court’s finding that he gave J.F. a sexually transmitted 

disease, which formed the basis of aggravators seven and eleven listed above. In 

particular, he notes the undisputed evidence in the record that genital warts, which are 

caused by a strain of human papillomavirus (“HPV”), have an incubation period of not 

less than two to three weeks after infection and will not be visible before that time. This 

evidence came from a nurse’s testimony and reports prepared by the Centers for Disease 
6

Control and Prevention and medical researchers. Thus, Strickler asserts he could not 

have been the cause of the genital warts observed on J.F. on November 8, 2011, because 

the incident for which he was convicted occurred during the previous night; the genital 

warts would have to have been related to an exposure to HPV that occurred at least two 

to three weeks previously. 

We agree that, as a scientific matter of fact, the genital warts observed on J.F. on 

November 8, 2011, could not have resulted from the actions of Strickler during the 

previous night. However, Strickler moved into Chambers’s residence several weeks 

previously and had been assisting with J.F.’s care and had access to her during that time 

period. Strickler does not deny that he had genital warts during this time period. 

Although Strickler was not charged with any other molestations of J.F. and Stapert did 

not testify about any other incidents during trial, she did tell police, in a statement 

admitted into evidence, that Strickler had molested J.F. on other occasions. The trial 

court was not forbidden from inferring that Strickler may have committed earlier acts 

against J.F. See Vermillion v. State, 978 N.E.2d 459, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)

(reaffirming that trial courts may rely upon uncharged misconduct as an aggravating 

circumstance). Thus, the conclusion that Strickler was the cause of J.F.’s genital warts is 

not clearly against the logic and effect of the circumstances before the trial court. The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on that fact as the basis for two of its 

aggravating circumstances.

Strickler also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he was 

a “caregiver and a trusted family friend” of Chambers’s as stated in the eighth 
7

aggravating circumstance. App. p. 256. He notes that although Stapert had known 

Chambers for a long time, he was essentially a stranger to Chambers before he moved in. 

Regardless, Chambers did entrust Strickler with the care of J.F. for extended periods of 

time. Courts have upheld abuse of a position of trust as a legitimate aggravating 

circumstance in similar situations. See Martin v. State, 535 N.E.2d 493, 498 (Ind. 1989) 

(affirming that defendant was in position of trust when he beat his live-in girlfriend’s son 

to death while babysitting); Shaffer v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) 

(affirming that defendant was in a position of trust over children he molested, whom his 

wife babysat in her and defendant’s home), trans. denied. Even if the extent to which 

Strickler occupied a position of trust in Chambers’s home and over J.F. was debatable, 

we cannot re-evaluate the weight that a trial court decides to place on a proper 

aggravating circumstance.2

 See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion with respect to this aggravating circumstance.

II. Inappropriateness

We now assess whether Strickler’s sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 

7(B) in light of his character and the nature of the offense. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d 

at 491. Although Rule 7(B) does not require us to be “extremely” deferential to a trial 

court’s sentencing decision, we still must give due consideration to that decision. 

Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We also understand and 

recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Id. 

 2 In any case, the trial court said it only was giving “some weight,” not “significant weight,” to this 

aggravating circumstance. See App. p. 256. 
8

“Additionally, a defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that his or 

her sentence is inappropriate.” Id.

The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, 

and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement 

of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” 

Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “should focus on the forest—

the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of 

counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. Whether a sentence is 

inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the 

crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given 

case. Id. at 1224. When reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence under Rule 7(B), 

we may consider all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court in 

sentencing the defendant, including whether a portion of the sentence was suspended. 

Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).

Regarding the nature of the offense, Strickler was allowed to live in Chambers’s 

apartment and was entrusted with the care of Chambers’s six-month-old daughter. In 

return, Strickler took advantage of the situation to perform sexual acts upon a fragile 

infant on at least one occasion, if not more. Strickler also forced Stapert to join in his 

heinous acts by making physical threats against her.3

 Ultimately, he passed along his 

HPV infection to a baby. Chambers noted she will have to one day tell J.F. what 

 3 Strickler questions Stapert’s credibility on this point, but we must view the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the judgment.
9

happened because of the HPV infection and the risk it may pose to J.F. in the future.4

 

Even after Strickler’s conviction and in pre-sentencing discussions with a probation 

officer, Strickler continued to insist that Stapert had forced him to molest J.F. This 

reveals a failure to accept complete responsibility for his own actions.

As for Strickler’s character, he was twenty-three at the time of the offense and 

these are his first criminal convictions. He has pending charges for three misdemeanor 

offenses allegedly committed before the molestations. There was some evidence 

presented that Strickler may have a learning disability and have some unspecified mental 

health issues, but their relation to the offense are unclear.

Strickler contends that his case compares favorably to others in which our supreme 

court reduced sentences for child molestation. In exercising our power to review and 

revise sentences, we may compare sentences of those convicted of the same or similar 

offenses, although such comparison is not required. Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 

471-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The first case Strickler cites is Rivers v. State, 915 N.E.2d 

141 (Ind. 2009). In that case, the trial court imposed consecutive thirty-year sentences 

for two counts of Class A felony child molesting, but our supreme court ordered that they 

be served concurrently. Rivers, 915 N.E.2d at 144. The defendant in that case had no 

other criminal history and had molested his seven or eight-year-old niece, with whom the 

defendant had otherwise had a positive relationship before the molestation occurred. 

There was no indication in the opinion that the niece had been physically injured by the 

 4 The evidence from the CDC and medical research reports is unclear as to the extent to which J.F.’s 

future health is threatened by the HPV infection, but it seems clear that there is a risk. Thankfully, the 

medical documents indicate that the strain of HPV that causes genital warts is different from the strain 

associated with cancer. 
10

acts, which occurred very close in time, and the defendant committed no other 

molestations for seven years before the niece disclosed what had happened.

The second case is Monroe v. State, 886 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 2008). The defendant 

in that case received a total 100-year sentence for five counts of Class A felony child 

molesting, which our supreme court ordered reduced to a total aggregate term of fifty 

years. Monroe, 886 N.E.2d at 581. The facts of the case revealed the defendant had 

repeatedly molested a child of his live-in-girlfriend for two years, when the victim was 

between the ages of seven and nine; as in Rivers, there is no indication in the opinion that 

the victim sustained any injuries, aside from those inherent in molestation. The 

defendant’s criminal history consisted only of driving-related misdemeanors. Our 

supreme court stated that the defendant’s position of trust over the victim warranted an 

aggravated sentence, but also noted, “the five counts of child molestation were identical 

and involved the same child,” and it could not discern a reason for imposing consecutive 

sentences. Id. at 580. 

The final case is Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967 (Ind. 2002). There, the trial 

court imposed a maximum fifty-year sentence upon a defendant convicted of Class A 

felony child molesting for one incident of performing oral sex on a five-year-old girl and 

videotaping the incident. Our supreme court reduced the sentence to forty years.5

 

Buchanan, 767 N.E.2d at 974. Among other things, the court noted “that this crime was 

 5 The court applied the “manifestly unreasonable” standard for reviewing sentences that was in effect at 

the time.
11

committed without excessive physical brutality, the use of a weapon, or resulting physical 

injury,” and was only a one-time occurrence. Id. at 973.

Although Strickler has no criminal history, and his convictions are related solely 

to a one-time non-violent occurrence, we find his case to be distinguishable from Rivers, 

Monroe, and Buchanan. Most notably, J.F.’s age at the time of the incident makes 

Strickler’s conduct undeniably outrageous. Our supreme court has observed, “a victim’s 

age . . . suggests a sliding scale in sentencing, as younger ages of victims tend to support 

harsher sentences. . . . The younger the victim, the more culpable the defendant’s 

conduct.” Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. 2011). As a six-month-old, J.F. 

was completely powerless to do anything to resist Strickler and she was unable to report 

what he did to anyone. If Stapert had not confessed to Chambers, his conduct might 

never have been discovered. Additionally, infecting a child with a sexually transmitted 

disease certainly increases the egregiousness of a molestation. See Brown v. State, 760 

N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Strickler took advantage of 

Chambers’s generosity in allowing him to live in her apartment by preying on her infant 

child. And, he continues to shift the blame for what happened onto Stapert, failing to 

take responsibility for his actions as a grown man. All things considered, we cannot say 

that Strickler’s 100-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and his character.

Conclusion

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Strickler, and his sentence 

is not inappropriate. We affirm.
12

Affirmed.

BRADFORD, J., and BROWN, J., concur.