UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4714

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVID CAMPOS-PALENCIA, a/k/a Luis Daniel Leyva, Jr., a/k/a 

Daniel David Gonzalez Palencia,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:15-cr-00174-FL-1)

Submitted: August 29, 2016 Decided: August 31, 2016

Before TRAXLER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John S. Coalter, COALTER LAW P.L.L.C., Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United 

States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Barbara D. Kocher, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

David Campos-Palencia pled guilty to illegal reentry of a 

previously deported alien subsequent to a felony conviction, in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1) (2012). The district 

court imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 40 months’ 

imprisonment. On appeal, Campos-Palencia contends that his 

sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

This court reviews any sentence, “whether inside, just 

outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range, under a 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. 

King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2012). The district court’s 

factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and its legal 

conclusions de novo. United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 271 

(4th Cir. 2013). 

In determining whether a sentence is procedurally

reasonable, the court considers whether the district court 

properly calculated the applicable advisory Guidelines range, 

gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate 

sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors,

relied on facts that were not clearly erroneous, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence and any deviation 

from the applicable Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 49-51 (2007).
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If the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we evaluate its

substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality 

of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from

the Guidelines range.” Id. at 51. If the sentence is outside 

the Guidelines range, we “consider the extent of the deviation 

from the guidelines range, but must give due deference to the 

district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a 

whole, justify the extent of the variance.” United States v. 

Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 2012) (alterations 

omitted).

Campos-Palencia claims that the district court violated 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i) when it relied on a disputed portion of 

the presentence report without first ruling on the dispute. The 

record reveals that Campos-Palencia failed to properly alert the 

court to this objection. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Further, 

when Campos-Palencia belatedly referred to the disputed 

information at the sentencing hearing, he failed to provide any 

support for his argument. “A mere objection to the finding in 

the presentence report is not sufficient. Without an 

affirmative showing the information is inaccurate, the court is 

free to adopt the findings of the presentence report without 

more specific inquiry or explanation.” United States v. Love, 

134 F.3d 595, 606 (4th Cir. 1998) (alterations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we reject this argument.
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Campos-Palencia also claims that the district court failed 

to provide individualized reasoning for his sentence. This 

assertion is belied by the record, which demonstrates that the 

district court considered several factors specific to CamposPalencia. Campos-Palencia attacks the significance or weight 

the district court assigned to the various factors considered by 

the court, but we conclude the court did not err.

Campos-Palencia next asserts that the district court erred 

by citing only possession of firearms as the reason for the

upward variance on its Statement of Reasons form and by 

disproportionately relying on his firearm possession to the 

exclusion of other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in its oral 

explanation. We reject these arguments. At sentencing, the 

district court expressly discussed several considerations. 

While the district court may have accorded more significance to 

the firearms, such a decision is within its discretion. United 

States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011). Further, 

we reject any claim that the court’s written statement of 

reasons is insufficient. 

Finally, Campos-Palencia broadly asserts that his sentence 

is substantively unreasonable because the facts of his case do 

not merit a sentence of 40 months’ imprisonment. In light of 

Campos-Palencia’s failure to provide specific support for this 

argument, the district court’s explanation of the sentence,
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including references to multiple § 3553(a) factors, and the 

deference accorded to a district court’s sentence, we conclude 

that this argument is without merit. 

Accordingly, because we conclude that Campos-Palencia has 

failed to demonstrate that his sentence is procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable, we affirm the sentence. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately expressed in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED