2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-5-2011

Francienna Grant v. Omni Health Care Systems of

NJ

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-4403

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Recommended Citation

"Francienna Grant v. Omni Health Care Systems of NJ" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1284.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 09-4403

_______________

FRANCIENNA B. GRANT,

Appellant

v.

OMNI HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS OF NJ, INC.; 

ADVANTAGE REHABILITATION, LLC; RONILDA PULIDO, 

individually and in her official capacity as Regional Director

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

For the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 1:08-cv-00306)

District Judge: Honorable Renee Marie Bumb

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 26, 2011

_______________

Before: SLOVITER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, Senior 

District Judge*

(Opinion filed May 5, 2011)

_______________

OPINION

_______________

 

* Honorable Louis H. Pollak, District Judge of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
POLLAK, District Judge

Because we write primarily for the parties, who are of course fully familiar with 

the background of this case, we set forth only the facts and procedural history that are of 

central relevance to our decision. On January 16, 2008, plaintiff Francienna B. Grant 

filed a complaint against defendants Omni Health Care Systems of NJ, Inc., Advantage 

Rehabilitation, LLC, and Ronilda Pulido, asserting a claim for employment 

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and assorted state common law claims. On 

August 13, 2009, following a year of discovery characterized by numerous delays, the 

defendants filed an Order to Show Cause to Compel Discovery, Award Sanctions, 

Preclude Evidence, and Dismiss Claims for Failure to Prosecute. 

The District Court‟s opinion on the motion, issued on September 24, 2009, 

described in painstaking detail how plaintiff and (especially) her attorney, Marshall L. 

Williams, “repeatedly failed to comply with the [Court‟s] scheduling orders, despite 

numerous extensions, disregarded the Federal Rules of Procedure and professional 

conduct, and ignored this Court‟s many warnings threatening sanctions.” App. at 45. 

Despite finding that “Plaintiff‟s and her counsel‟s misconduct in this case warrant

dismissal,” the District Court, in a spirit of “patience and generosity,” declined to dismiss 

plaintiff‟s case. Id. Instead, the Court gave plaintiff the opportunity to produce all 

outstanding discovery responses by October 23, 2009, and warned plaintiff and Mr. 

Williams that “NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS FOR DISCOVERY WILL BE 

GRANTED FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER” and that “FAILURE TO HEED 

THE COURT‟S FINAL WARNING WILL RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF THE CASE.” 
3

Id. at 48-49 (emphasis in original). The Court also concluded that monetary sanctions 

against Mr. Williams were warranted, and ordered the defendants to submit a fee 

application listing all fees and costs incurred as a result of his discovery misconduct. Id.

On October 26, 2009, the District Court dismissed plaintiff‟s complaint with 

prejudice, finding that plaintiff had not complied with the Court‟s September 24, 2009 

order to produce all outstanding discovery. On May 4, 2010, the District Court issued 

orders denying plaintiff‟s motion for reconsideration and partially granting defendants‟ 

motion for monetary sanctions against Mr. Williams. 

Plaintiff raises two arguments in this appeal. First, plaintiff argues that the District 

Court abused its discretion by dismissing plaintiff‟s complaint and imposing sanctions 

upon Mr. Williams. We will affirm the District Court‟s September 24, 2009, October 23, 

2009, and May 4, 2010 orders for substantially the reasons given by the District Court in 

its thorough and carefully reasoned opinions, which convincingly demonstrate that 

dismissal of plaintiff‟s complaint and the imposition of monetary sanctions against Mr. 

Williams were warranted under our precedents. 

Second, plaintiff argues that the district court erred by “vacat[ing] the Magistrate 

Judge‟s referral . . . without good cause and without extraordinary circumstances as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4).” Appellant‟s Br. at 18. This argument borders on the 

frivolous and will be rejected. There is no evidence that the District Court designated the 

Magistrate Judge to preside over this case pursuant to Section 636(c), or that the parties 
4

ever consented to such a designation.1 Instead, the district court docket demonstrates that 

the Magistrate Judge‟s rulings were made pursuant to Section 636(b). During the 

litigation, the Magistrate Judge issued only non-dispositive orders, such as scheduling 

orders, while the District Court Judge decided all dispositive motions, such as the motion 

to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment.2 While it is true that in June 2009 the 

District Court did assume responsibility over all aspects of this case, including 

discovery, under Section 636(b) the District Court was not required to make any showing 

 

1 Section 636(c) grants magistrate judges full authority “to preside at and enter 

final judgment in civil trials, including those tried before a jury, upon the written consent 

of the parties and the special designation of the district court.” Taberer v. Armstrong 

World Industries, Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 903 (3d Cir. 1992). Once the parties consent to the 

designation of a magistrate judge under Section 636(c), the district court may “for good 

cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by any 

party, vacate a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate judge under this subsection.” 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c)(4).

Magistrate judges have more limited authority under Section 636(b). See Taberer, 

954 F.2d at 903 (Under Section 636(b), “magistrates may be designated to . . . hear and 

determine any pretrial matter, except for eight categories of „dispositive‟ pretrial matters; 

and conduct hearings and recommend dispositions with regard to the eight excepted 

matters.”). Designations under Section 636(b) may be made “without regard to the 

parties‟ consent.” Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429, 438 (3d Cir. 2005). 

Unlike Section 636(c), Section 636(b) contains no limitation on a district court‟s power to 

resume control over a case that has previously been referred to a magistrate judge. See 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

2 The District Court did not enter an order specifying that the Magistrate Judge was 

being designated to conduct proceedings under Section 636(b). We have noted that 

“good practice would indicate that court orders of designation or reference state plainly 

under what statutory provision the court is proceeding.” Beazer East, 412 F.3d at 437 

n.10 (internal quotation and alteration omitted). Nonetheless, the division of labor 

between the District Court and the Magistrate Judge during the course of the litigation 

makes it clear that the designation in this case was made pursuant to Section 636(b), not 

Section 636(c).
5

of good cause or extraordinary circumstances in order to do so. Accordingly, we reject 

plaintiff‟s argument that the District Court committed error under Section 636. 

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.