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No. 03-14-00422-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT 

AUSTIN, TEXAS 

WILLIAM J. COJOCAR, APPELLANT 

V.

SALLY CARRILLO, APPELLEE 

APPEAL FROM CAUSE NO. C2013-0134B 

207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY 

THE HONORABLE CHARLES STEPHENS, PRESIDING 

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

 

 William J. Cojocar, Ph.D. Clinton Lawson, Attorney at Law 

 Pro Se Counsel 755 E. Mulberry St. Suite 200 

 66th Horseshoe Canyon San Antonio, Tx 78212 

 San Antonio, TX 78258 Telephone: 210 244 2701 

 Telephone: (210) 835-5035 Email: clintonlawson@gmail.com 

 Email: william.cojocar@sri.com 

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

ACCEPTED

03-14-00422-CV

3639215

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

1/2/2015 3:35:41 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 1/2/2015 3:35:41 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
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Table of Contents

Index of Authorities......................................................................3

Statement of Facts.........................................................................4

Summary of Argument....................................................................6

Argument...................................................................................8

Appellant Counter Argument 1.........................................................11

Appellant Counter Argument 2..........................................................14

Prayer.......................................................................................18

Certificate of Compliance................................................................19

Certificate of Service......................................................................20
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Index of Authorities

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(a) (1) (B)

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1 (a) (1)

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4

Texas Family Code § 6.602

Texas Family Code § 7.009 Fraud on the Community; Division and Disposition of 

Reconstituted Estate

Texas Civil Appeals Code Guide (Chapter 8 Appellant’s Reply Brief, Paragraph 

8.5 Argument, p. 267).

N.P. v. Methodist Hosp. 190 S.W.3d217, 225
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Statement of Facts

In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(a) (1) (B), the 

Appellant wishes to set forth the correct facts herein from the Appellee Brief. 

The Appellant’s filing of the first and second amended Motion to Revoke the MSA

on 22 Jan 2014, revoking his consent to the MSA before rendition of judgment on 

10 Oct 2013; and a second amended Motion to Revoke the MSA on 25 April 2014, 

based on fraud and fraudulent inducement into signing the MSA; and requested 

that the MSA be repudiated. (CR, p. 102) This filing of the Motion to Revoke the 

MSA met the criteria of Texas Family Code § 6.602 paragraph (d), due to the 

filing of the Motion to Revoke the MSA being filed prior to the final mediation 

order hearing, which occurred on 28 April 2014. The 207th District Court 

Honorable Judge Charles Stephens ordered, “I'm going to let the Third Court 

decide if that's what you want to do; I'm going to enter the divorce decree today 

and if there's some things we need to talk about today whether or not it complies 

with the Mediated Settlement Agreement we can talk about that.” (RR, p. 16) The 

Court made the decision to enter the divorce decree on 28 April 2014, without 

allowing the Appellant to present the evidence to substantiate the Motion to 

Revoke the MSA. The Appellant subpoenaed two key witnesses to testify at the 

Motion to Revoke the MSA/Divorce hearing, and possessed significant and key 

evidence to present to the court. The Appellant’s Counsel informed Judge Stephens 
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that he possessed newly discovered evidence and subpoenaed witnesses to present 

to the court; but as stated by Judge Stephens, he did not wish to hear the evidence 

prepared and informed the Appellant’s Counsel that he would have to file a Motion 

for New Trial; in which case the Appellant’s Counsel did not insist on the evidence 

possessed for fraud be heard. (RR, p. 20-21) The Appellant provided his counsel 

all of the evidence to support the Motions to Compel and Revoke the MSA based 

on Fraud and Fraudulent inducement into signing the MSA; and the Appellant’s 

Counsel failed to pursue the presentation of this prepared evidence, that prompted 

Judge Stephens to grant the divorce and deny the Appellant his right to present the 

evidence to support his case. The evidence that was provided to the court and was 

not presented or heard is currently in possession of the Comal County District 

Attorney after the Appellant’s 18 Sep 2014 Criminal Charges filing with the 

Comal County Sheriff’s Department; pending pursuance of action from the Comal 

County District Attorney based on the decision rendered by the 3rd Appellate 

Courts of Appeals. 
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Summary of Argument

The Appellant’s argument to the Appellee Brief addresses and counters the 

Appellee’s arguments that focus on the legitimacy of the application and ruling of 

the MSA and the Appellant’s "Fraud" Arguments being unsupported by the 

Record. The Appellant notifies the Court that he was required to file a report with 

the FBI on 13 March 2014 and subsequently filed criminal charges with the Comal 

County Sheriff on 18 Sep 2014, whereby the case “evidence” remains with the 

Comal County District Attorney pending results of this appeal. The Appellant 

counters the Appellee’s first Argument by a reaffirmation of Texas Family Code § 

6.602 paragraph (a) that states that “On the written agreement of the parties or on 

the court's own motion, the court may refer a suit for dissolution of a marriage to 

mediation”, noting that the two parties did not possess a written agreement to 

mediate in accordance with the TFC § 6.602; thereby not fully complying with the 

Texas Family Code § 6.602 stipulation. This extract from the Texas Family Code 

is not a flawed reading of the statute, and the statute clearly states that in order to 

be compliant with the code, an Order to Mediate is required to be produced by 

written agreement of the parties or on the court’s own motion. The Appellee’s 

second argument is countered by the Appellant’s stating that the Appellee’s fails to 

counter the Appellant’s Argument #2 (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 27-30), based on the 

fact that the trial court erred by denying the Appellant’s Motion to Revoke the 
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Mediated Settlement Agreement and failed to consider the substantial evidence 

that the Appellant was fraudulently induced into signing the MSA, and did so 

under duress. This evidence was introduced to the Court in the Appellant’s Motion 

to Revoke the Mediated Settlement Agreement and the Motion for New Trial. The 

Appellant reiterates that he provided his counsel all of the evidence to support the 

Motions to Compel and Revoke the MSA based on Fraud and Fraudulent 

inducement into signing the MSA; and the Appellant’s Counsel failed to pursue the 

presentation of this prepared evidence, that prompted Judge Stephens to grant the 

divorce and deny the Appellant his right to present the evidence to support his 

case. These errors amounted to a denial of the Appellant’s rights as it reasonably 

calculated to cause and did cause rendition of an improper judgment in this case. 

(Tex. R. App. P. 44.1 (a)(1); (Appellant’s Brief, p. 28). The Appellant also 

provided argument in the Appellant Brief (p. 15) that the Appellant’s counsel 

miscalculated the community estate during mediation, not being in accordance 

with Texas Family Code § 7.009 Fraud on the Community; Division and 

Disposition of Reconstituted Estate; alleviating the Appellee’s argument stated in 

the Appellee Brief (p. 12). 
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Argument

The premise of the arguments posed by the Appellee’s counsel is centered 

on the compliance of the MSA and the “Fraud” arguments being unsupported by 

the record. The Appellee’s counsel states that “In the absence of any evidence of 

fraud in procuring the mediated settlement agreement, Judge Stephens properly 

entered judgment granting the divorce based on the parties' mediated settlement 

agreement when the mediated settlement agreement met the requirements of Texas 

Family Law Section 6.602”. (Appellee Brief, p. 5) 

In accordance with the Texas Civil Appeals Code Guide (Chapter 8 Appellant’s 

Reply Brief, Paragraph 8.5 Argument, p. 267), “new issues raised in the reply brief 

are generally waived; however, an appellate court may consider a new issue under 

appropriate circumstances” (N.P. v. Methodist Hosp. 190 S.W.3d217, 225). It is 

imperative to notify the Court that the Appellee’s statement that the evidence of 

fraud procuring the MSA was absent is not a valid statement of fact. The Appellant 

possessed evidence that was acquired supporting the Fraud allegation that was 

acquired before the MSA was signed and continued to acquire evidence supporting 

Fraud after the MSA was signed; and submitted all evidence over to his attorney 

Mr. James Bettersworth. When the Appellant discovered that his wife (the 

Appellee) had released and stole unclassified/For Official Use Only, Corporate 

Proprietary Material and Intellectual Property, that was protected by Federal Non-
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Disclosure Agreements, from 5 major Department of Defense Contractors and 

DOD departments, to an unauthorized and 3rd party; he notified his attorney that he 

was required to report the NDA breach, in accordance with NDA requirements, to 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This report was filed with the FBI on March, 

13th 2014; 1.5 months prior to the Motion to Revoke the MSA and Divorce 

hearing, that was held on April 28th, 2014. The Appellee’s Counsel was not 

notified of this report; nor was the Court, by the Appellant’s Attorney. This report 

to the FBI contained reported allegations from the Appellant, not only of the 

Federal NDA Information Breaches, but also of additional Federal Crimes of 

Computer crimes or intrusions into computer networks, particularly those 

associated with National Security; Corrupt activities in state, local, or federal 

governments or in law enforcement; Financial crimes that involve Fraud, Mortgage 

Fraud, or other investment fraud schemes where significant dollar losses have 

occurred; Extortion; Color of Law Abuses; Fabrication of Evidence; House 

Stealing; and Intellectual Property Theft. The FBI in took the report and notified 

the Appellant that they would review the submitted evidence; but that the case 

would more than likely be handled in the Civil Court. When this evidence was 

ready to be presented to the 207th District Court, in support of the Motion to 

Revoke the Mediated Settlement Agreement, it was not presented to the Court by 

the Appellant’s attorney; and subsequently not with the Motion for New Trial that 
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was subsequently withdrawn. The Appellant was provided counsel by post hearing

separate counsel, that the Fraud evidence possessed, required the attention of the 

District Attorney. On 18 September, 2014, the Appellant filed the following list of 

criminal charges with the Comal County Sheriff’s Department Criminal 

Investigative Division:

PC 15.01 Criminal Attempt

PC 15.02 Criminal Conspiracy

PC 16 Criminal Instruments, Interception, Use of Oral Communication

PC 21 Sexual Offenses

PC 22 Assaultive Offenses

PC 31 Theft (house stealing)

PC 32 Fraud

PC 32 Subchapter B Forgery

PC 32.32 False Statement to Obtain Property

PC 32.34 Deceptive Business Practices

PC 32.45 Misapplication of Fiduciary Property or Property of Financial 

Institution

PC 32.46 Securing Execution of Document by Deception

PC 32.47 Fraudulent concealment of Writing

 PC 32.51 Fraudulent use or Possession of Identifying Information

PC 33.02 Computer Crimes, Breach of Computer Security

 PC 34.02 Money Laundering

PC Chapter 36 Corrupt Influence

PC Chapter 37 Perjury and other Falsification

The Appellant’s Attorney, also fully aware of this criminal charges filing, did not 

inform the Appellee’s Attorney, that criminal charges were being filed by the 

Appellant. The Comal County Criminal Investigative Division has conducted an 

initial screening of the Case # 14-09-2882, and submitted it forward to the Comal 

County District Attorney. The Comal County District Attorney has not dismissed 
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the case, and is holding pursuance of action of the case, awaiting confirmation of 

civil proceedings from the 3rd Court of Appeals Appeal Case decision. The Comal 

County District Attorney maintains current possession of the evidence that 

supported the Appellant’s Motion to Revoke the MSA; thus the Appellant notifies 

the Court that this appropriate extenuating circumstance of the “absence of 

evidence”, was not absent, and that the Appellant was prepared to present the 

evidence, but was misrepresented by his attorney with the Appellant’s attorney 

choosing not to present the evidence on the Appellant’s behalf, thus supporting 

Appellant Argument #4. If the evidence possessed that was supposed to be 

presented to the Court in the Motion to Revoke the MSA is substantial enough for 

the District Attorney to consider for criminal charges filed; it should have been 

substantial enough for the Appellant’s Attorney to present to the Court, and for the 

Judge to properly hear. 

Appellee Brief Argument I. MSA in Question Complies with Section 6.602 thus 

Requiring Rendition of Judgment on the MSA.

Appellee’s Counsel argues that “Cojocar’s argument is based on a flawed reading 

of the MSA or a flawed reading of the statute-in either instance it is wrong.” 

(Appellee Brief, p. 6) As stated in the Appellant’s Brief (p. 17), “Texas Family 

Code § 6.602. MEDIATION PROCEDURES paragraph (a) states that “On the 

written agreement of the parties or on the court's own motion, the court may refer 
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a suit for dissolution of a marriage to mediation”. The two parties did not possess 

a written agreement to mediate in accordance with the TFC § 6.602; thereby not 

fully complying with the Texas Family Code § 6.602 stipulation. This extract from 

the Texas Family Code is not a flawed reading of the statute. The statute clearly 

states that in order to be compliant with the code, an Order to Mediate is required 

to be produced by written agreement of the parties or on the court’s own motion. 

Both attorney’s in this case failed to commence this mediation process in 

accordance with the specified instructions outlined in TFC § 6.602(a). Failure to 

abide by the code, by the two Texas State attorneys does not substantiate or justify 

a lack of full compliance of the code. An order to mediate was not produced by 

both attorney’s nor signed by a Judge, as required by the code, thereby starting off 

the mediation session being non-compliant with TFC § 6.602(a). This is 

substantiated by the decision from the 10th District Court of Waco 2004 Case, Lee 

vs. Lee, which does reference other districts, articulates that in this case, “there 

was no written agreement to mediate and there is no court order.” This case 

specifically states that because there was no written agreement to mediate and no 

court order to mediate that the Court, and that the parties had not complied with 

Section 6.602; therefore the Court committed error by entering the divorce decree. 

This Case versed the MSA based on the simple fact there was no written 

agreement or court order. (RR, p. 9) Additionally, as stated in the Appellant’s Brief 
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(p. 23), The Texas Family Code § 6.602 (d) also states that: “A party may at any 

time prior to the final mediation order file a written objection to the referral of a 

suit for dissolution of a marriage to mediation on the basis of family violence 

having been committed against the objecting party by the other party”. Prior to 

Mediation Order No. C-2013-0134, being heard by the 207th District Court of 

Comal County, on 28 April 2014, the Appellant filed a Motion to Revoke the 

Mediated Settlement Agreement, on 22 January 2014, with two subsequent 

amendments on 24 and 25 April 2014. This filing of the Motion to Revoke the 

MSA met the criteria of Texas Family Code § 6.602 paragraph (d), due to the 

filing of the Motion to Revoke the MSA being filed prior to the final mediation 

order hearing, which occurred on 28 April 2014. The 207th District Court 

Honorable Judge Charles Stephens ordered, “I'm going to let the Third Court 

decide if that's what you want to do; I'm going to enter the divorce decree today 

and if there's some things we need to talk about today whether or not it complies 

with the Mediated Settlement Agreement we can talk about that.” (RR, p. 16) The 

Court made the decision to enter the divorce decree on 28 April 2014, without 

allowing the Appellant to present the evidence to substantiate the Motion to 

Revoke the MSA. The Appellant also counters the Appellee’s Argument B, that 

“Even If Parties' MSA Did Not Satisfy Section 6.602{a}, Section 6.602 Still 

Requires Rendition of Judgment on Parties' MSA” (Appellee Brief, p. 7), and the 
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statement that the Appellant’s argument results in an “absurd reading of the 

statue” and a “construing the statute” (Appellee Brief, p. 8). The reading of the 

statue is clear and the requirement for Texas Family Code § 6.602, paragraph (a) is 

clear as specified. No absurd reading or construing of the statute occurred.

Appellee Brief Argument II. Cojocar's "Fraud" Arguments Unsupported by the 

Record. The Appellee’s counsel states that “Cojocar failed to preserve his 

complaints for appellate review, but also the undisputed evidentiary record is 

devoud of any evidence whatsoever that the agreement was illegal or that Carrillo 

procured the agreement by fraud, duress, or other dishonest means” (Appellee 

Brief, p. 10); and that “Cojocar did not preserve his complaint that Judge Stephens 

erred in not hearing testimony in support of Cojocar’s allegation that Carrillo 

committed fraud in procuring the MSA.”(Appellee Brief, p. 11) This argument fails 

to counter the Appellant’s Argument #2 (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 27-30). The 

Appellant clearly notifies the Court that the trial court erred by denying the 

Appellant’s Motion to Revoke the Mediated Settlement Agreement and failed to 

consider the above listed and other substantial evidence that the Appellant was 

fraudulently induced into signing the MSA, and did so under duress. This evidence 

was introduced to the Court in the Appellant’s Motion to Revoke the Mediated 

Settlement Agreement and the Motion for New Trial. The Appellee’s Counsel also 

fails to discount his personal withholding of critical discovery evidence prior to the 
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Mediated Settlement Agreement; his intimidation and coercion tactics used to 

intimidate the Appellant during the mediation session, using proclaimed possession 

of maintaining evidence that would damage the Appellant; when in fact he 

(Appellee’s Counsel) publicly voiced he never viewed, but claimed he had in his 

possession, (Appellee’s Response to Interrogatories, p. 5); and through his attempt 

to coerce the San Antonio Computer Doctor to blacken out the Appellee’s name on 

the Subpoena to Compel Production of Documents and Tangible Things Affidavit, 

to further conceal evidence that should have been submitted in Discovery; which 

was further requested by the Appellant’s Counsel in the Motion to Revoke to 

Compel for Discovery and Sanctions. As stated in the Appellant’s Brief (p. 30) 

“The trial court erred by denying the Appellant’s Motion to Revoke the Mediated 

Settlement Agreement and failed to consider the above listed and other substantial 

evidence that the Appellant was fraudulently induced into signing the MSA, and 

did so under duress.” Had the Appellant been afforded the opportunity to view the 

concealed and withheld evidence that was not presented by the Appellee’s 

Discovery (pre-mediation session), he would not have signed the MSA and 

requested a trial by jury for Marital Fraud, Fraud, Securing the Execution of a 

Document by Deception (Documents being the two Mortgage Closings and the 

Appellee’s 23 July 13 House Sale Contract), and House Stealing. The Appellee’s 

Counsel states that, “After hearing on Cojocar’s second amended motion to revoke 
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the MSA, Judge Stephens stated Cojocar was welcome to put on testimony to 

support his fraud based claims for revocation of the agreement” (RR 1:19-20); and 

that “Cojocar voluntarily elected not to provide any such testimony at that time” 

(id). This is a false statement. The Appellant’s Counsel informed Judge Stephens 

that he possessed newly discovered evidence and subpoenaed witnesses to present 

to the court; but as stated by Judge Stephens, he did not wish to hear the evidence 

prepared and informed the Appellant’s Counsel that he would have to file a Motion 

for New Trial; in which case the Appellant’s Counsel did not insist on the evidence 

possessed for fraud be heard. (RR, p. 20-21) This refutes the Appellee’s argument 

that “No Argument was made or evidence offered to the trial court concerning 

Cojocar’s complaint that the attorney miscalculated the community estate during 

mediation.” (Appellee Brief, p. 12) The Appellant “Cojocar did not chose to 

pursue his fraud claim at that time”; it was the Appellant’s Counsel who chose to 

not pursue the Appellant’s fraud claim at that time; which support’s the 

Appellant’s Argument #2, that he was misrepresented by his counsel. The 

Appellant was in the back of the court room, could not hear what was going on, 

and when called to the bench, notified Judge Stephens that he was not in agreement 

with the divorce (Appellant’s Brief, p. 38; RR, p. 34), thus supporting the 

Appellant’s Argument #5. The Appellee’s Counsel accuses the Appellant for 

“Throwing his lawyer under the bus does not void the MSA” (Appellee’s Brief, p. 
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12-13). The Appellant provided his counsel all of the evidence to support the 

Motions to Compel and Revoke the MSA based on Fraud and Fraudulent 

inducement into signing the MSA; and the Appellant’s Counsel failed to pursue the 

presentation of this prepared evidence, that prompted Judge Stephens to grant the 

divorce and deny the Appellant his right to present the evidence to support his 

case; and in doing so, the 207th District Court Honorable Judge Charles Stephens 

so stated: “I'm sure we'll be back here dealing whether or not we're going through 

the whole thing again.” (RR, p. 18) These errors amounted to a denial of the 

Appellant’s rights as it reasonably calculated to cause and did cause rendition of an 

improper judgment in this case. (Tex. R. App. P. 44.1 (a)(1); (Appellant’s Brief, p. 

28). 
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Prayer

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant William J. Cojocar, asks 

the Court to: (1) reverse the judgment for decree of divorce in order to permit the 

Appellant to file a Motion for New Trial with the 207th District Court to present 

all facts and evidence that support the pursuance of fraud and fraudulent 

inducement into the Mediated Settlement Agreement, to attain a fair and equitable 

division of the marital estate and property; and (2) allow the Appellant the 

opportunity to present to the District court the Crimes and Torts that have been 

committed against the Appellant by the Appellee; and (3) modify the Decree of 

Divorce to expunge the false inclusion of the 2012 IRS tax statement that was 

erred from being deleted from the final Decree of Divorce; (4) grant such other and 

further relief to which he may show himself justly entitled, and (5) grant the 

Appellant the opportunity to conduct an Oral Argument to aid the Court’s 

decisional process in this appeal. 
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Certificate of Compliance

Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4, I hereby certify that this Appellant Brief contains 

3,505 words. This is a computer-generated document created in Microsoft Word, 

using 14-point typeface for all text, except for footnotes which are in 12-point 

typeface. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying on the word count 

provided by the software used to prepare the document.

 /s/ William J. Cojocar

William J. Cojocar, Ph.D. 

Pro Se Counsel
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Certificate of Service

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of this brief was 

served by fax and email to counsel for Sally Carrillo, being Clinton Lawson, 

Attorney at Law, 755 E. Mulberry St. Suite 200, San Antonio, Texas 78212.

 /s/ William J. Cojocar

 William J. Cojocar, Ph.D.

 Pro Se Counsel