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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 10, 2015 

v No. 322969 

Ionia Circuit Court 

DONALD GLENN LASLEY, LC No. 2013-015854-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: OWENS, P.J., and MURPHY and HOEKSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant Donald Glenn Lasley was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated 

murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony 

(felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility 

of parole with respect to the murder conviction and to two years’ imprisonment for the felonyfirearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.

 Defendant first argues that he was denied his right to present a defense when the trial 

court precluded him from introducing expert testimony on “battered person syndrome”1 and 

witnesses who could support a finding that defendant was previously abused by the victim. The 

trial court denied admission of the evidence on the determination that a pretrial notice of selfdefense had not been filed by defendant, effectively rendering the evidence irrelevant. We 

initially note that there is no statutory or court-rule requirement that a defendant file a pretrial 

notice regarding a claim of self-defense. See MCL 780.971 et seq. (Self-Defense Act); MCR 

6.001 et seq. But the trial court’s ruling also reflected an accurate recognition that battered 

person syndrome is generally connected to a self-defense theory. 

 

1

 Earlier cases from this Court and our Supreme Court discussed what has been termed “battered 

wife syndrome,” “battered woman syndrome,” or “battered spouse syndrome.” See, e.g., People 

v Christel, 449 Mich 578, 580; 537 NW2d 194 (1995); People v Wilson, 194 Mich App 599, 

600-603; 487 NW2d 822 (1992). We shall use the more generic term “battered person 

syndrome” throughout this opinion, given that the adult victim and alleged perpetrator of the 

abuse was defendant’s daughter. 
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 We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 93; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision “falls outside the range of reasonable and 

principled outcomes.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Any 

preliminary questions of law, e.g., whether a rule of evidence or statute precludes the 

admissibility of evidence, are reviewed de novo, bearing in mind that a court abuses its 

discretion when it admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. People v Lukity, 460 

Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). 

 A criminal defendant has a right to present a defense under the state and federal 

constitutions. People v Kurr, 253 Mich App 317, 326; 654 NW2d 651 (2002). “Although the 

right to present a defense is a fundamental element of due process, it is not an absolute right[,] 

[and] [t]he accused must still comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed 

to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” People v 

Hayes, 421 Mich 271, 279; 364 NW2d 635 (1984) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The 

admissibility of expert testimony is governed by MRE 702, which provides: 

 If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 

fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if 

(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the 

product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 

principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 

 “A court considering whether to admit expert testimony under MRE 702 acts as a 

gatekeeper and has a fundamental duty to ensure that the proffered expert testimony is both 

relevant and reliable.” People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106, 120; 821 NW2d 14 (2012). In 

Kowalski, our Supreme Court stated: 

 In People v Christel,[449 Mich 578, 592; 537 NW2d 194 (1995),] we 

observed that expert testimony is needed when a witness's actions or responses 

are incomprehensible to average people. Thus, we permitted a prosecution expert 

to testify about battered woman syndrome and how a victim of domestic violence 

might deny, repress, or minimize the abuse. We held that this type of testimony 

was relevant and helpful when needed to explain a complainant's actions. 

 The common theme in these cases is that certain groups of people are 

known to exhibit types of behavior that are contrary to common sense and are not 

within the average person's understanding of human behavior. In these instances, 

an expert's specialized testimony may enlighten the jury so that it can intelligently 

evaluate an experience that is otherwise foreign. [Kowalski, 492 Mich at 124 

(citations, quotation marks, alteration brackets, and ellipses omitted).] 

 As part of the battered person syndrome, the abused person lives in constant fear, coupled 

with a perceived inability to escape a continuing cycle of abuse, eventually resulting in a belief 
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that the only options are to endure the abuse, to strike back, or to commit suicide. People v 

Wilson, 194 Mich App 599, 603; 487 NW2d 822 (1992). 

 “In most cases, the battered woman syndrome is offered by the defendant in a case of 

homicide in which the defendant is claiming self-defense.” Christel, 449 Mich at 589. In the 

context of self-defense, testimony regarding the syndrome has been used to show how a battered 

person reacts to the batterer, to explain the reasonableness of the battered person’s perception 

that danger or great bodily harm is imminent, and to rebut a prosecutor’s assertion that the 

defendant could have left rather than kill the batterer. Wilson, 194 Mich App at 604. Defendant 

correctly asserts that expert testimony on battered person syndrome is not limited to self-defense 

claims. As touched on above, in Christel, 449 Mich at 589, our Supreme Court acknowledged 

the “minority of situations in which the evidence is offered to help evaluate the credibility of the 

complainant instead of exculpating the accused.” Under those circumstances, expert testimony 

“is relevant and helpful . . . to explain a complainant’s actions, such as prolonged endurance of 

physical abuse accompanied by attempts at hiding or minimizing the abuse, delays in reporting 

the abuse, or recanting allegations of abuse.” Id. at 580. 

 Here, we conclude that the proposed expert testimony on battered person syndrome was 

not related to a claim of self-defense, nor relevant to evaluating credibility. Defendant never 

raised a claim of self-defense, arguing instead, as reflected in closing argument, that “[t]his was 

an accidental shooting,” and that “[h]e never intended to kill his daughter.” Defendant himself 

testified that, while the victim had made a move for the shotgun that defendant had retrieved and 

threatened to shoot defendant if she got hold of the gun, the discharge that killed his daughter 

was ultimately accidental, occurring when he jerked the gun back. Also, defendant’s statements 

to the 911 operator and his confession to the lead detective indicated that he shot his daughter 

after she had verbally abused him, absent any threatening actions by the victim, which shooting 

was the culmination of seven years of intolerable behavior by defendant’s daughter, with 

defendant reaching his breaking point. His confession did not evidence in any manner selfdefense. A defendant claiming self-defense “implies his actions were intentional but that the 

circumstances justified his actions.” Wilson, 194 Mich at 602. Thus, expert testimony on 

battered person syndrome was unnecessary relative to a self-defense claim, as there was no 

assertion or evidence that the shooting was committed in self-defense. Moreover, expert 

testimony on battered person syndrome was not sought to be introduced to assist the jury in 

assessing the credibility of the victim or defendant. 

 To the extent that defendant now argues on appeal that expert testimony on battered 

person syndrome was relevant to defendant’s credibility, we fail to see any significant 

connection between the syndrome and defendant’s accident theory such that his credibility would 

have been meaningfully bolstered by the testimony. Indeed, expert testimony on battered person 

syndrome, along with the supporting evidence of abuse, would likely have bolstered the 

prosecution’s case, considering that such testimony and evidence would have been consistent 

with defendant’s confession to police. Defendant also argues that had the trial court not 

excluded the expert testimony and purported evidence of abuse prior to trial, defendant could 

have pursued self-defense at trial as an alternative defense theory. However, at the pretrial 

hearing that covered the issues concerning battered person syndrome and whether to instruct on 

voluntary manslaughter, defense counsel stated that self-defense was not being pursued and that 

battered person syndrome was going to serve as a basis to negate the intent to kill, as we discuss 
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below. Further, we fail to see how defendant could have possibly testified to both accident and 

an intentional shooting done in self-defense. 

 Defendant argues that expert testimony on battered person syndrome was crucial to the 

defense theory that defendant did not possess the requisite state of mind to commit murder, and 

that, at most, defendant committed voluntary manslaughter. Thus, defendant offers that the 

proposed testimony was relevant to help negate his intent. However, defendant offers no legal 

authority supporting the proposition that evidence on battered person syndrome is relevant in this 

regard. As discussed in Wilson, 194 Mich App at 603, battered person syndrome speaks to 

situations in which an individual comes to believe that his or her only options are to endure the 

abuse, strike back, or commit suicide. Defendant fails to explain in any meaningful and 

convincing manner how battered person syndrome would prevent a person from forming the 

intent to kill or from acting with premeditation or deliberation.2

 Rather, testimony on battered 

person syndrome is admitted for the purpose of demonstrating that the battered person was 

justified in killing his or her batterer, given the perception that danger or great bodily harm was 

imminent. Id. at 602. Furthermore, defendant’s accident theory already provided a basis for 

defendant to argue that he lacked the intent to kill his daughter. 

 Defendant’s argument also suggests that battered person syndrome, along with the 

proffered evidence of abuse, were relevant to the offense of voluntary manslaughter. “[T]o 

show voluntary manslaughter, one must show that the defendant killed in the heat of passion, the 

passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not a lapse of time during which a 

reasonable person could control his passions.” People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 535-536; 664 

NW2d 685 (2003). Insulting words, as opposed to words of an informative nature, generally do 

not constitute adequate provocation. People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 391; 471 NW2d 346 

(1991).3

 We find it unnecessary to ascertain whether battered person syndrome and the alleged 

supporting evidence may have been relevant to the crime of voluntary manslaughter and the 

question whether defendant acted in the heat of passion as caused by adequate provocation. We 

also find it unnecessary to determine whether the evidence in general supported a voluntary 

manslaughter instruction. Defendant waived the issue when his counsel stated at trial that, in 

light of the evidence, a voluntary manslaughter instruction would not be appropriate and that he 

was satisfied with instructions solely on first- and second-degree murder. See People v Carter, 

462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (waiver is the intentional relinquishment or 

 

2

 Defendant’s argument poses a comparison to the defunct defense of diminished capacity. Since 

1975, the insanity defense has been governed by statute. People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223, 

230; 627 NW2d 276 (2001), citing 1975 PA 180. In Carpenter, the Supreme Court held that the 

Legislature created “an all or nothing insanity defense” and that “evidence of mental incapacity 

short of insanity cannot be used to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific 

intent.” Id. at 237 (emphasis added). Carpenter explicitly rejected the continuing viability of a 

“diminished capacity” defense. Id. at 235-236. 

3

 According to defendant’s statement to the police, the shooting was triggered by insulting words 

communicated by the victim to defendant, although couched in a history of abuse. 
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abandonment of a known right). A defendant is not allowed to waive objection to an issue at 

trial and then claim error on appeal. People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 520; 583 NW2d 199 

(1998). Defendant has not raised any associated claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Further, defendant cannot establish the necessary prejudice in order to avoid the harmless error 

rule, given that the jury convicted him of first-degree murder and rejected a second-degree 

murder conviction. See People v Raper, 222 Mich App 475, 483-484; 563 NW2d 709 (1997).4

 Defendant contends, however, as he did in the context of self-defense, that had the trial 

court, prior to trial, not excluded expert testimony on battered person syndrome and the 

testimony of witnesses who were supposedly prepared to testify to abuse, there would have been 

sufficient evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction and the jury may have 

seriously considered a lesser charge.5 First, when defendant argued before trial in favor of 

admitting the evidence at issue, he focused exclusively on the now-rejected argument that it 

negated the element of intent; defendant did not argue that the evidence should be admitted to 

advance a voluntary manslaughter theory. Additionally, assuming the relevancy of the evidence, 

as bearing on whether defendant acted in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation, it is 

difficult if not impossible to reconcile an intentional killing predicated on manslaughter with 

defendant’s testimony that the shooting was an accident. Although the evidence would have 

been consistent with defendant’s description of what occurred as conveyed to the police in his 

confession, we conclude that reversal is unwarranted, because defendant has not established 

prejudice, where he has not argued, let alone shown, that the evidence was sufficient to 

overcome the general rule that insulting words do not constitute adequate provocation. In sum, 

reversal is unwarranted with respect to defendant’s arguments regarding battered person 

syndrome, the associated evidence of abuse, and voluntary manslaughter. 

 

4

 In Raper, 222 Mich App at 483-484, this Court explained: 

 In this case, defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The jury was 

instructed on first-degree murder and second-degree murder, and found defendant 

guilty of first-degree murder. The jury's rejection of second-degree murder in 

favor of first-degree murder reflected an unwillingness to convict on a lesser 

included offense such as manslaughter. Thus, even if defendant's trial counsel had 

requested a manslaughter instruction and the trial court had failed to give such an 

instruction, such error would have been harmless. For the same reason, defendant 

cannot show that his counsel's failure to request a manslaughter instruction caused 

him prejudice. [Citation omitted.] 

5

 Implicit in defendant’s argument is that nothing can be made of the fact that the jury failed to 

convict him of second-degree murder, given that the jury did not have the benefit of hearing 

testimony on battered person syndrome and, perhaps more importantly, hearing extensive 

testimony of the abuse itself. 
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 Next, defendant argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when the 

interrogating detective did not “scrupulously honor” his purported invocation of the right to 

silence. As a result, defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting a recorded interview 

containing his statements that were made after he asserted his right to remain silent. Defendant, 

however, waived this claim by stipulating on the record to the admission of the entire recorded 

interview into evidence. Carter, 462 Mich at 215-216. Defendant bootstraps a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Even assuming—without deciding—that defendant 

unequivocally asserted his right to remain silent and that it was not “scrupulously honored” by 

the detective, see People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 145; 854 NW2d 114 

(2014), he cannot establish the requisite prejudice, assuming counsel’s performance was 

deficient, People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Before defendant

presumably asserted his right to remain silent in the recorded interview, he provided a very 

lengthy and detailed description of the victim’s killing, including the fact that he retrieved a 

shotgun from his bedroom, removed the lock, loaded the gun, and shot the victim. The latter part 

of the interview was no more inculpatory than these admissions. Given that this evidence was 

properly before the jury, defendant cannot establish that admission of the full interview 

prejudiced him. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Donald S. Owens 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra