IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA No. COA 18

- 1308 Filed: 4 August 2020 Wake County, No. 18 CVS 3241 SHEARON FARMS TOWNHOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION II, INC. , Plaintiff,

v. SHEARON FARMS DEVELOPMENT, LLC ; DAN RYAN BUILDERS

– NORTH CAROLINA, LLC ; ABBINGTON HEIGHTS, LLC ; JELD

- WEN, INC., and JELD

WEN HOLDING, INC. , Defendant s . DAN RYAN BUILDERS

– NORTH CAROLINA, LLC, Defendant/Third

- Party Plaintiff, v. JP&M ENTERPRISE, INC.; JP&M ENTERPRISE, INC. d/b/a ACE VINYL SIDING; ALPHA OMEGA CONSTRUCTION GROUP OF RALEIGH, INC.; ALPHA OMEGA CONSTRUCTION GROUP OF RALEIGH, INC. d/b/a ALPHA OMEGA CONST. GROUP OF RALEIGH; BMC EAST, LLC; BMC EAST, LLC d/b/a BMC; BMC EAST, LLC f/k/a STOCK BUILDING SUPPLY, LLC d/b/a STOCK BUILDING SUPPLY; BRINLEY ’ S GRADING SERVICE, INC.; BRINLEY ’ S GRADING SERVICE, INC. d/b/a BRINLEY ’ S GRADING SERVICE; GMA SUPPLY INC.; GMA SUPPLY INC. f/k/a GMA SUPPLY LLC d/b/a GMA SUPPLY ; LOCKLEAR ROOFING INC.; LOCKLEAR INC.; LOCKLEAR ROOFING INC. d/b/a LOCKLEAR ROOFING; LOCKLEAR INC. d/b/a LOCKLEAR ROOFING; TAYLOR ’ S LANDSCAPING, INC.; TAYLOR ’ S LANDSCAPING, INC. d/b/a TAYLOR ’ S LANDSCAPING INC., Third

Party Defendants. Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 24 September 2018 by Judge Allen Baddour in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 August
2019

. Jordan Price Wall Gray Jones & Carlton PLLC, by Brian S. Edlin and H. Weldon Jones, III, for plaintiff

- appellant.S HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 2

- Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, by Freder ick M. Thurman, Jr. and William H. Sturges, and The Sieving Law Firm, A.P.C., by Richard N. Sieving, for defendant

- appellee JELD

- WEN, Inc

.
DIETZ , Judge.
Plaintiff Shearon Farms Townhome Owners Association II, Inc. is a homeowners’ association in Wake County . In early 2018, some members of the association noticed that the siding of their homes was warped and distorted and look ed as if it were melting. After investigating the damage, t he association brought tort and warranty claims against JELD

- WEN, Inc ., a window manufacturer , alleging that the damage was the result of defective windows installed in the townhomes

. The trial court dismissed th e association’s claims against JELD

- WEN after concluding that the association lacked standing to bring those clai ms either on its own behalf or on behalf of its members

. We affirm the dismissal for lack of standing

. As explained below, t his action seeks mone tary recovery for damage to the exterior surfaces of townhomes owned by individual members of the association. Under settled standing precedent, t hose claims for individual money damages cannot be pursued by a homeowners’ association under theories of associational standing. Moreover, although the organizational declaration for the association obligates it to mai ntain and repair the exterior siding of those townhomes, that contractualS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 3

- obligation applies only to upkeep resulting from “normal usage and weathering.” The declaration expressly excludes maintenance or repair resulting from the sort of unexpected damage alleged in this complaint. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that the association lacked standing to pursue the claims alleged against JELD

- WEN because it had neither associational standing nor individual standing sufficient to confer a jus ticiable stake in the controversy. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order. Facts and Procedural History Shearon Farms Townhome Owners Association II, Inc. 1 is a no n - profit homeowners ’ association incorporated in North Carolina. The a ssociation’s members

own townhomes in a community known as “Shearon Farms Townhomes II” within the Shearon Farms neighborhood in Wake County

. In early 2018, several town home owners in the neighborhood reported to the

a ssociation that the exterior siding o n the ir townhomes was severely damaged, as if it had melted. T he association investigated and determined that this damage was “due to abnormal reflections of extremely high heat from the windows on townhome units.” In May 2018 , Shearon Farms filed this act ion against various parties involved in the construction of the townhomes and against JELD

- WEN , Inc. , the manufacturer of the windows installed in the townhomes

.

1 For ease of reference, we refer to Plaintiff Shearon Farms Townhome Owners Association II, Inc. as “Shearon Farms.”S HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 4

- JELD

- WEN moved to dismiss the claims against it for lack of standing. After

a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, finding a “ lack of standing to pursue claims against Defendant J ELD

- WEN , I NC . because Plaintiff is not legally entitled to assert claims pertaining to the windows and because the Plaintiff is not legally entitle d to assert claims for warped, distorted, or melted siding.” Shearon Farms timely appealed. Analysis I. Appealability Before we address the merits of this appeal, we must address a challenge to this Court’s jurisdiction. Shearon Farms concedes that the chall enged order is not a final judgment because the order dismiss ed its claims against J ELD

- WEN but not its claims against the other defendants named in the action. See Pratt v. Staton , 147 N.C. App. 771, 77 2

– 7 3, 556 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2001).

“ Ordinarily, this Court hears appeals only after entry of a final judgment that leaves nothing further to be done in the trial court .” Crite v. Bussey , 239 N.C. App. 19, 20, 767 S.E.2d 434, 435 (2015). “The reason for this rule is to prevent fragmentary, premature and unnec essary appeals by permitting the trial court to bring the case to final judgment before it is presented to the appellate courts.” Larsen v. Black Diamond French Truffles, Inc ., 241 N.C. App. 74, 76, 772 S.E.2d 93, 95 (2015).S HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 5

- There is a statutory exception to this general rule when an interlocutory order deprive s the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent immediate appellate review. Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture , 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994) ; N.C. Ge n. Stat §§ 1

- 277(a), 7A

- 27 (b)

. Shearon Farms argues that th e challenged order is immediately appealable under this “substantial rights doctrine” because there is a risk of inconsistent verdicts. Th e inconsistent verdicts doctrine is a subset of the substantial rights doctrine and one that is often misunderstood. In general, there is no right to have all related claims de cid ed in one proceeding. J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid

- South Aviation, Inc. , 88 N.C. App. 1, 7, 362 S.E.2d 812, 8 16 (1987). Thus, the risk that a litigant may be forced to endure two trials, rather than one, does not by itself implicate a substantial right, even if those separate trials involve related issues or stem from the same underlying event. But things are di fferent when there is a risk of “inconsistent verdicts,” meaning

“ a risk that different fact

- finders would reach irreconcilable results when examining the same factual issues a second time .” Denney v. Wardson Constr., In c., 264 N.C. App. 15 , 19 , 824 S.E.2d 436, 439 (2019)

. Importantly, n ot all claims involving the

“ same factual issues” create a risk of irreconcilable results when tried separately. For example, a fact may be relevant to two separate cl aims for two different reasons . In that circumstance, there is no substantial right to have those fact issues decidedS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 6

- together. See, e.g. , Hamilton v. Mortg. Info. Servs., Inc. , 212 N.C. App. 73, 83

– 84, 711 S.E.2d 185, 192

– 93 (2011). But when the same fact is determinative of the same issue in multiple claims , the re is a substantial right to have those factual issue s determined by the same jury to avoid the risk that two juries decide that fact differently, leading to two judgments from the same initial lawsuit with incompatible outcome s . Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, Inc ., 93 N.C. App. 20, 25

– 26 , 376 S.E.2d 488, 491

– 92 (1989)

. Here, Shearon Farms brought claims against both JELD

- WEN and a group of defendants involved in the construction of the townhomes. Many of the claims against the construction defendants are unrelated to JELD

- WEN’s windows. But some of the claims have overlapping fact ual allegations . Specifically, at least some claims against both sets of defendants involve questions of whether the windows are defective and caused the alleged damage to the siding of neighboring homes. The resolution of those fact questions is potentially determinative of both the claims against JELD

- WEN and certain claims against other defendants that are still pending in the trial court . Thus,

we a gree with Shearon Farms that it has met its burden to show that there is a risk of inconsistent verdicts. Accordingly, we hold that the challenged order affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable. II. Standing Shearon Farms challenges the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lackS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 7

- of standing. After reviewing the complaint and the recorded declaration attached to it , t he trial court concluded as a matter of law that Shearon Farms lacked standing to pursue the negligence and warranty clai ms asserted against J ELD

- WEN :

Defendant JELD

- WEN, INC

. ’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED as a consequence of Plaintiff’s lack of standing to pursue claims against Defendant JELD

- WEN, INC. because Plaintiff is not legally entitled to assert claims pertaining to the windows and because the Plaintiff is not legally entitled to assert claims for warped, distorted, or melted siding. At oral argument, Shearon Farms conceded that it understood the ruling to be one based on lack of standing. But in its briefing, Shearon Farms repeatedly refers to the standard for review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

on which relief can be granted. This is understandable because J ELD

- WEN brought its motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure , although it expressly asserted that the basis for the motion was that “Plaintiff lacks standing.” Standing is a q uestion of “ subject matter jurisdiction .” Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc ., 155 N.C. App. 110, 113, 574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002)

. As a result ,
a “standing argument implicates Rule 12(b)(1)” of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs dismi ssals based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id

. at 113

– 14, 574 S.E.2d at 51. But, t o be fair, this Court also has asserted in several cases that “lack of standing may be challenged by motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” creating confusion in our caselaw concerning theS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 8

- category of Rule 12 under which these claims should be pursued. See SRS Arlington Offices 1, LLC v. Arlington Condo. Owners Ass ’ n, Inc ., 234 N.C. App. 541, 545, 760 S.E.2d 330, 334 (2014). Ultimately, this is irrelevant because this Court has held that a Rule 12 motion “is properly treated according to its substance rather than its label” and specifically has treated a Rule 12(b)(6) motion asserting jurisdictional issues as one brought unde r Rule 12(b)(1). Williams v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ ., 104 N.C. App. 425, 428, 409 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1991). Accordingly, in our analysis we treat the trial court’s ruling as a decision on standing (as the court expressly stated in its order) and not as a dismissal on the merits for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. We begin with an overview of our State’s standing doctrine. “Standing refers to whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy such that he or she may properly seek adjudication of the matter.” Fed. Point Yacht Club Ass ’ n, Inc. v. Moore , 233 N.C. App. 298, 303, 758 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2014). “ Standing is a necessary prerequisite to a court ’ s proper exercise of subject matter jurisdiction .” Neuse River Found. , 155 N.C. App. at 113, 574 S.E.2d at 51

. Unlike the federal courts, our standing doctrine is not drawn from a constitutional “case or controversy” requirement. Id

. at 114, 574 S.E.2d at 51

– 52. Instead, North Carolina’s standing doctrine is gr ounded in the notion that a plaintiffS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 9

- must have suffered some injury sufficient to confer a genuine stake in a justiciable legal dispute:

The rationale of the standing rule is that only one with a genuine grievance

. . . can be trusted to battle the issue. The gist of the question of standing is whether the party seeking relief has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentations of issues

. Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of Adjustment , 362 N.C. 640, 642, 669 S.E.2d 279, 282 (2008) (brackets omitted). As with other issues of subject matter jurisdiction, standing is a question of law. Fuller v. Easley , 145 N.C. App. 391, 395, 553 S.E.2d 43, 46 (2001)

. Where, as here, the trial court decided the standing question without making jurisdictional findings of fact, we review the legal question of standing de novo based on the record before the trial court. Neuse River Found. , 155 N.C. App. at 11 4 , 574 S.E.2d at 51

. A. Associational s tan ding of Shearon Farms Shearon Farms first argues that it has standing under “ the test articulated in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission , 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). ” The principle articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hunt , often referred to as “associational standing,” confer s standing on an association to bring suit on behalf of its members. Our Supreme Court adopted this federal test for use in North Carolina’s standing doctrine. See River Birch Asso c s . v. City of Raleigh , 326 N.C. 100, 129

– 30 , 388 S.E.2d 538 , 555 (1990) . As the Supreme CourtS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 10

- explained in River Birch , the analysis of an associational standing claim involves three factors:

[ A ] n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization ’ s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relie f requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Id

. at 130, 388 S.E.2d at 555

. The third factor of this test ordinarily is satisfied only when the association seeks declaratory or injunctive relief. This is so because “[w] hen an organization seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on behalf of its members, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.” Id

. By contrast, this third facto r ordinarily cannot be satisfied “ where an association seeks to recover damages on behalf of its members ” because individual damage claims by their nature are “ not common to the entire membership, nor shared by all in equal degree .” Id

. Thus, in River Birch , the Supreme Court rejected a homeowners ’ association’s claims for fraud and unfair trade practices on behalf of its members because those members did not share “the injury in equal degree” but instead had varying damages depending on how the alleged fraud and deceptive practices affected their property. Id. at 130

– 31 , 388 S.E.2d at 555

– 56.S HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 11

- The same is true here. The association concedes that not all townhomes in the community suffered damage and that the damages to individual homes are not equal in degree. Thus, as with the Supreme Court in River Birch , “ we cannot conclude that the damage claims are common to the entire membership

. ” Id. at 130, 388 S.E.2d at
555. But Shearon Farms argues that this case is distinguishable because the association is co ntractually obligated to repair the damage allegedly caused by J ELD

WEN’s wi ndows and to then spread the costs of those repairs equally among the members of the association through assessments. Were that true, this would present a more difficult question of associational standing. But Shearon Farms is not contractually obligated to repair the damage to individual homeowners’ property alleged in the complaint. The recorded declaration under which Shearon Farms contends that this contractual duty arises (and which Shearon Farms attached to its complaint) refutes this argument. To be sure, as Shearon Farms contends, A rticle VIII of the declaration, in a section titled “ E xterior M aintenance,” imposes a contractual obligation on Shearon Farms to maintain and repair the exterior building surfaces of the individual townhomes: Section 1

. Exterior Maintenance by Association . In

addition to maintenance of the Townhome Common Elements, the Association shall provide exterior maintenance upon each Living Unit which is subject toS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 12

- assessment hereunder, as follows : paint, repair, replace and care for all roofs, gutters, downspouts, exterior building surfaces , trees, shrubs, grass , walks, mailboxes, fences installe d by Declarant or approved by the Association, exterior post lights (excluding electricity therefor), and other exterior improvements. (Emphasis added ). But Article VIII of t he declaration also includes another section that further defines the type of ma intenance for which Shearon Farms is responsible and expressly excludes damages not caused by “normal usage and weathering”:

Section 4

. Casualty Loss Not Included

. Maintenance and repairs under this Article arise from normal usage and weathering and do not include maintenance and repairs made necessary by fire or other casualty or damage

. (Emphasis added). We interpret this language in the declaration under ordinary contract principles subject only to an additional rule that we must strictly c onstrue the declaration “ in favor of the free use of land whenever strict construction does not contradict the plain and obvious purpose of the contracting parties .” Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass ’ n, Inc ., 360 N.C. 547, 555, 633 S.E.2d 78, 85 (2006) . A pplying ordinary contract interpretation principles, the intent of this provision is clear and unambiguous: Shearon Farms is responsible for maintenance and repairs due to expected usage and weathering, but not for maintenance or repairs caused by unexpect ed damage, such as a fire. We reach this interpretation by examining the plain language of the provision,S HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 13

- beginning with the phrase “normal usage and weathering .” The plain meaning of the word “normal” in this context means “ regular, usual .” Normal, Oxford English Dictionary ( 2n d ed. 1989 ). Thus, this first clause in A rticle VIII, S ection 4 obligates the association to make repairs expected to occur through deterioration over time

. The second clause of A rticle VIII, S ection 4 contrasts with the first by exc luding “maintenance and repairs made necessary by fire or other casualty or damage.” These three terms

— “fire,” “casualty,” and “damage”

— all carry with them a meaning that indicates they are not normal and are not events that one would expect to occur simply given the passage of time. See , e.g ., Fire, Oxford English Dictionary ( 2n d ed.
1989 ) ; Casualty, Oxford English Dictionary ( 2n d ed. 1989 ) ; Casualty , Black’s Law Dict ionary (11th ed. 2019) ; Damage , Oxford English Dictionary ( 2n d ed. 1989 ); Damage , Merriam

- Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 200 3 ). Thus, these two clauses draw a distinction between maintenance stemming from normal, expected “usage and weathering,” and maintenance stemming from unexpected events that damage the property

. Here, the complaint does not allege any damage resulting from normal usage and weathering. The exterior surface damage described in the complaint is “melting” siding that was “sever ely damaged due to abnormal reflections of extremely high heat from the windows on townhome units.” (Emphasis added). The claims against J ELD

WEN seek recovery for these “abnormal” damages through various tort and warrantyS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 14

- theories. Thus, under the plain l anguage of the declaration, the association is not obligated by contract to repair this alleged damage, which is not due to normal usage or weathering. Shearon Farms contends that we should ignore this plain language and instead interpret the provision to exclude only maintenance and repair costs that would be covered by the affected homeowners’ standard property insurance policies. To support this argument, the association points to the phrase “casualty loss” in the subtitle of A rticle VIII, S ection 4 and then to a separate section of the declaration that requires homeowners to maintain “casualty” insurance covering fire damage and other similar hazards. The association contends that, because “ [ d ] efects from workmanship are not among those peri ls typically covered” by a standard property insurance policy, this Court should read th e se two separate provisions in par i materia and interpret A rticle VIII , S ection 4 as excluding only property damage that would be covered by standard property insurance policies and accompanying endorsements. This argument fails for two reasons. First, there are countless, simple ways to draft a provision that would exclude from the association’s maintenance obligations
any damage covered by homeowners’ insurance polici es . That is not what the plain ,

u na mbiguous language of A rticle VIII , S ection 4 states. Rather than distinguishing between insured and uninsured damage, A rticle VIII distinguishes between expected maintenance and repairs

— those resulting from “normal usage and weathering”

— andS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 15

- unexpected maintenance and repairs resulting from “fire or other casualty or damage .” We must give meaning to this unambiguous language. Hodgin v. Brighton , 196 N.C. App. 126, 128

– 29, 674 S.E.2d 444, 446 (2009)

. Second, the phrase “casu alty loss” is not one used exclusively in the insurance context. For example, it is generally understood in the tax context to mean “ the total or partial destruction of an asset resulting from an unexpected or unusual event , such as an automobile accident or a tornado .” Loss , Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added)

. And, more importantly, it has a meaning in ordinary English
usage: a loss due to a “serious accident” or other “unfortunate occurrence .” Casualty, Oxford English Dictionary ( 2n d ed. 1989 ). Nothing in the text or structure of A rticle VIII indicates that we should apply special meanings exclusive to the insurance field, rather than applying the plain meaning of the chosen words

. Moreover, the association’s argument downplays the pa rticular phrasing of A rticle VIII, which not only fails to mention insurance but also is not limited to the narrow definition of “casualty loss” that may be found in many homeowners’ insurance policies. Instead, A rticle VIII broadly excludes from the association’s maintenance obligations all “ maintenance and repairs made necessary by fire or other casualty or damage .” (Emphasis added). This phrasing indicates that casualty and damage are not entirely coextensive and that the drafter included both terms to achieve the desired scope of the provision. The association’s interpretation of thatS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 16

- provision would read the phrase “or damage” out of the clause, limiting it solely to “fire” and to “casualty” losses as that term is understood in the property insuran ce context. Again, this runs counter to settled principles of contract interpretation, which require us to give meaning to the phrase “or damage.” Hodgin , 196 N.C. App.
at 128

– 29, 674 S.E.2d at 446. Accordingly , we reject Shearon Farms’ argument that A rticle VIII, S ection 4 is limited to losses covered by property insurance

. Finally, t he Supreme Court also made a separate observation about the standing of the homeowners ’ association in River Birch that is equally applicable here: the Court re jected the use of association al standing because it c ould deprive individual members of other legal remedies that may be available to them. 326 N.C. at 131, 388 S.E.2d at 556. Th at concern also is present in this case

. Homeowners whose siding is damaged by the windo ws in their neighbors’ homes may have other claims beyond those asserted in this action

— most notably, potential claims against the neighbors whose windows are allegedly causing the damage . But the association, which represents all its members, cannot “be trusted to battle” that dispute. Mangum , 362 N.C. at 642, 669 S.E.2d at 282 . Moreover, those claims

— some members of the association suing other members

— unquestionably do not “ inure to the benefit ” of all association members equally. River Birch , 326 N. C. at 555, 388 S.E.2d at 130. In a case in which some neighbors contend that the windows of other neighbors’ homes are damagingS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 17

- their property, an association representing all those members simply does not have the necessary stake in the outcome to ensure “ concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentations of issues .” Mangum , 362 N.C. at 642, 669 S.E.2d at 282. We therefore hold that Shearon Farms has not met its burden to show that it can pursue its claims based on the doctrine of associational standing described in Hunt and River Birch

. B. Independent s tanding of Shearon Farms Shearon Farms next argues that it has independent legal standing

— separate from principles of standing on behalf of its members

— because the association itself is “obligated to maintain the exterior surfaces of the townhomes” under the terms of the declarati on . As explained above, this argument is meritless. The declaration does not require the association to maintain or repair the damage to the exterior surfaces of the individual townhomes that is alleged in the complaint. Additionally, there are no allegati ons in the complaint of damage caused by J ELD

- WEN to any property of the association itself, such as the common elements of the community. 2 Accordingly, the trial court properly rejected Shearon Farms’ arguments concerning its independent standing to pursu e claims against J ELD

- WEN

.

2 The complaint alleges damage to common elements but those damages are attributed to other defendants named in the complaint. Those defendants are not parties to this appeal, which concerns separate claims against J ELD

- W EN

.S HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 18

- C. Affidavit evidencing assignment of homeowners’ claims Lastly , Shearon Farms argues that the trial court erred by declining to accept an affidavit it submitted in opposition to J ELD

- WEN’s motion to dismiss. Th at affidavit certified the accuracy of several assignments by homeowner s who are members of the association, transferring their rights to causes of action against J ELD

- WEN to the association. Shearon Farms contends that this affidavit cured any defects with respect to standing and that the trial court erred by not consider ing th at affidavit in its standing analysis

. We reject this argument. “ Our courts have repeatedly held that standing is measured at the time the pleadings are filed .” Quesinberry v. Quesinberry , 196 N.C. App. 118, 123, 674 S.E.2d 775, 778 (2009) . This is so, our Supreme Court has explained, because of the “ basic rule that the jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of affairs existing at the time it is invoked. ” Sharpe v. Park Newspapers of Lumberton, Inc. , 317 N.C. 579, 585, 347 S.E.2d 25, 30 (1986)

. The affidavit that Shearon Farms sought to introduce into the trial record documented assignments that occurred after it commenced this lawsuit. The trial court properly declined t o consider those assignments because they were not relevant to the question of whether the association had standing at the time it brought suit. Conclusion Plaintiff Shearon Farms Townhome Owners Association II, Inc. lacks standingS HEARON F ARMS T OWNHOME O WNERS A SS ’ N II, I NC
. V
. S HEARON F ARMS D EV ., LLC Opinion of the Court

- 19

- to pursue the claims against JELD

- WEN, Inc. asserted in the complaint. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order dismissing those claims for lack of standing. AFFIRMED

. Judge s BRYANT and STROUD concur .