J-S60007-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Y.A.J., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: Y.A.J., A MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 718 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Dispositional Order February 26, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-40-JV-0000017-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: Y.A.J., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: Y.A.J., A MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 719 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered February 26, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-40-JV-0000451-2017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 23, 2018
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Appellant, Y.A.J., presently twelve years old, appeals from the 

dispositional order1 entered on February 26, 2018, in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Luzerne County. We affirm.

Appellant was charged at docket number JV 451-2017 with receiving 

stolen property,2 a misdemeanor of the first degree, as a result of an incident 

on May 15, 2017. Appellant was alleged to have stolen a bicycle from the 

garage of Deborah and Christopher Parker. N.T., 2/26/18, at 45, 51. Mr. 

Parker eventually found the bicycle, damaged, but with its original serial 

number intact, outside of Appellant’s elementary school. Id. at 48–49, 52–

54. While Appellant initially claimed his parents bought him the bicycle, there 

was no such supporting evidence offered at the adjudicatory hearing. Id. at 

55–56, 63.

While on informal probation, Appellant was charged at docket number 

JV 17-2018 with terroristic threats, a misdemeanor of the first degree, and 

one count each of three summary offenses—harassment, disorderly conduct, 

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1

 “In juvenile proceedings, the final order from which a direct appeal may be 

taken is the order of disposition, entered after the juvenile is adjudicated 

delinquent. The order of disposition in a juvenile matter is akin to the 

judgment of sentence in a criminal matter in that both are final orders subject 

to appeal.” In Interest of P.S., 158 A.3d 643, 649 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(internal citations omitted), appeal denied, 174 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2017).

2

 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).
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and criminal trespass—as a result of an incident on January 7, 2018.3 

Appellant, accompanied by three other juveniles, entered a Save-A-Lot store 

on January 7, 2018, at approximately 4:15 p.m. N.T., 2/26/18, at 10–12. 

Appellant began cursing and hurling racial epithets at employees, who told 

Appellant to leave the store. Id. at 6, 7, 10–11. Appellant stepped out of the 

store, stood at the open doorway and yelled, “I will blast you, nigger, you 

don’t know me,” and opened his jacket, revealing the black handle of a 

firearm. Id. at 7–8.

The juvenile court summarized the procedural history as follows:

[Appellant] had been on informal probation commencing on 

January 2, 2018[,] under Petition JV# 451-2017 and as a result 

of the incident alleged in JV# 17-2018 he was detained and placed 

in shelter care. [Appellant] had a detention hearing before the 

hearing officer on January 18, 2018[,] and was returned to his 

home under house arrest with electronic monitoring and directed 

to comply with a psychological evaluation at Children’s Service 

Center. The evaluation occurred on January 30, 2018.

An adjudication hearing was held on February 26, 2018[,] 

on both petitions at which time [Appellant] was found factually 

responsible for all charges contained in the two stated petitions. 

Having been found factually responsible for the delinquent acts of 

Receiving Stolen Property under Petition JV# 451-2017 and 

Terroristic Threats under Petition JV# 17-2018[,] the juvenile was 

found to be in need of treatment, rehabilitation and supervision 

and declared a delinquent child in accordance with the Law of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Following testimony and 

arguments, the [c]ourt ordered placement at Glen Mills Academy.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/4/18, at 1–2.

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3

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2706(a)(1), 2709(a)(1), 5503(a)(1), and 3503(b)(1), 

respectively.
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On March 6, 2018, Appellant filed a post-dispositional motion for 

reconsideration, which the juvenile court denied on April 4, 2018. Appellant 

filed timely notices of appeal to this Court. We consolidated the appeals sua 

sponte on May 23, 2018.

Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal:

1. Whether the evidence, in 17-JV-2018, was sufficient to 

establish that [Appellant] was responsible for terroristic threats 

where it failed to establish that [Appellant] made a threat or 

possessed the intent to terrorize?

2. Whether the juvenile court erred or abused its discretion in the 

disposition imposed where the disposition was neither the least 

restrictive nor most individualized disposition that could have, 

under the circumstances, been imposed?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Appellant’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his adjudication of terroristic threats. When examining a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adjudication of delinquency, this 

Court employs a well-settled standard of review:

When a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute 

a crime if committed by an adult, the Commonwealth must 

establish the elements of the crime by proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt. When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence following an adjudication of delinquency, we must review 

the entire record and view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth. In determining whether the 

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden 

of proof, the test to be applied is whether, viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all 

reasonable inferences therefrom, there is sufficient evidence to 

find every element of the crime charged. The Commonwealth may 

sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence.
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The facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with a 

defendant’s innocence. Questions of doubt are for the hearing 

judge, unless the evidence is so weak that, as a matter of law, no 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth. The finder of fact is free to 

believe some, all, or none of the evidence presented.

Interest of P.S., 158 A.3d at 650 (citing In Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 

1188 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal citations omitted)).

The juvenile court determined that Appellant committed, inter alia, 

terroristic threats with the intent to terrorize another, which is defined as 

follows:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of terroristic 

threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a 

threat to:

(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to 

terrorize another;

18 Pa.C.S. § 2706. “The elements necessary to establish a violation of the 

terroristic threats statute are: (1) a threat to commit a crime of violence; and 

(2) that the threat was communicated with the intent to terrorize.” 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 144 A.3d 926, 936 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 167 A.3d 698 (Pa. 2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Vergilio, 103 

A.3d 831, 833 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that 

he either terrorized the victim or intended to terrorize another. Appellant’s 

Brief at 6. His tripartite claim avers, in alternative arguments, that 1) the 
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victims were unaware of the threat, 2) Appellant did not utter a threat, and 

3) Appellant lacked the requisite intent to terrorize. Id. at 6–12. We disagree.

Appellant asserts that the only Save-A-Lot employee to testify at the 

adjudication hearing, Sav-A-Lot night manager Thaliya Dublin, testified that 

Appellant and his cohorts were cursing at Diane Grigan, also referred to as 

Ms. Dee,4 and the store manager, Mr. Jones.5 Appellant’s Brief at 4, 7–8. 

Appellant maintains that because Ms. Dublin was “not a named victim,” the 

evidence was insufficient to establish that Mr. Jones or Ms. Dee either heard 

or were made aware of the threat or saw the firearm. Id. at 10. Appellant 

also avers that because he never “mentioned a gun,” his statement, “I will 

blast you, [******], you don’t know me,” did not “rise to a threat of violence.” 

Id. at 11. Lastly, Appellant argues that his threat was a mere “result of 

transitory anger, rather than a result of an intent to terrorize.” Id. at 12.

In contrast to Appellant’s version, Ms. Dublin testified that Appellant had 

been in the store on prior occasions and had been asked to leave “a lot of 

times.” N.T., 2/26/18, at 6. Ms. Dublin described the scene on January 7, 

2018, as follows:

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4

 Ms. Dee was hospitalized with the flu on the date of the hearing and did 

not testify. N.T., 2/26/18, at 9.

5

 Mr. Jones’s first name is not identified in the record.
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Well, when I came to the situation [Appellant] was like 

cursing at Miss Jones,[6]telling her, You n........, and Eff you, and 

all this stuff. I was like, What’s going on? And Miss Dee was like, 

Oh, this kid came again. I was like, Can you please leave the 

store[?] And then they were asking him to leave the store and as 

he proceeded out the store I was with him in front of the store. 

And I was telling him, You’re too young, just go, just leave, just 

go home. And he was still there cursing, arguing.

* * *

Then he continued cursing. He was like, I will blast you, 

n....., you don’t know me. I was telling him, you’re too young, 

just leave, just go home. You don’t want to go to jail. And Miss 

Dee proceed[ed] to call the police. And he was like with his hand 

in his jacket. That’s when I saw like a black handle and I realized 

it was a gun. And I told Miss Dee, I said that’s a gun. I think 

that’s a gun.

Id. at 7–8.

Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, “[D]irect communication of [a] threat 

between the perpetrator and the victim is not a requisite element of the crime 

of terroristic threats.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 664 A.2d 123, 127 (Pa. 

Super. 1995). Moreover, Appellant’s assumption that neither Ms. Dee or Mr. 

Jones could have heard Appellant’s threat is not supported in the record. Ms. 

Dublin described Appellant as standing “[i]n front of the store. In front of the 

door.” N.T., 2/26/18, at 7. She stated Appellant “was telling my co-worker 

that he gonna blast him and shoot him, and he was telling Miss Dee, You’re a 

bitch, and that stuff.” Id. at 8. Ms. Dublin described Appellant’s threats as 

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 It is unclear from the record whether the reference to Miss Jones is a 

typographical error referring to Mr. Jones, the Sav-A-Lot manager, or a 

reference to another employee.
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“Very loud.” Id. When Appellant made the threat and revealed the gun in his 

jacket, Ms. Dublin told Miss Dee, “[T]hat’s a gun.” Id. at 8. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s conduct met the requirement that the threat must be 

communicated to the victim. Kelley, 664 A.2d at 127 (defendant’s 

communication of a threat to the victim’s secretary, who later told the victim, 

was sufficient communication of a threat). As noted supra, the crime of 

terroristic threats requires that the defendant communicates a threat “either 

directly or indirectly.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a) (emphasis added). We recently 

reiterated that “terroristic threats do not have to be communicated directly.” 

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 47 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 161 A.3d 791 (Pa. 2016). Here, the Commonwealth proved that 

Appellant made a threat to commit a crime of violence, and the threat was 

communicated with the intent to terrorize another or with reckless disregard 

for the risk of causing terror. Commonwealth. v. Sinnott, 976 A.2d 1184, 

1188 (Pa. Super. 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 30 A.3d 

1105 (Pa. 2011). Because the evidence reflects that Appellant successfully 

and intentionally communicated his threat, this challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence for his terroristic-threats conviction merits no relief.

We also reject Appellant’s claim that his threat was not a threat but 

merely was nonverbal communication that was insufficient to support the 

crime of terroristic threats. Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant’s 

communication constituted both a verbal threat, “I will blast you, [******],” 
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and a threatening gesture, by moving aside his jacket to reveal a firearm. 

N.T., 2/26/18, at 7–8.

We similarly reject Appellant’s final challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, that his statement was a mere spur-of-the-moment outburst. 

Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant relies upon Walls, 144 A.3d 926, claiming 

that his threat was merely a result of “transitory anger, rather than a result 

of an intent to terrorize.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. We disagree. This Court 

acknowledged numerous times that “[b]eing angry does not render a person 

incapable of forming the intent to terrorize.” Id. at 936; Commonwealth v. 

Walker, 836 A.2d 999, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2003); Commonwealth v. 

Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 730–731 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Moreover, the fact pattern in Walls is dissimilar. We noted therein that 

the appellant did not specifically threaten harm to the prosecutor presently or 

in the future, he merely made a spur-of-the-moment statement as he was 

being led away. Walls, 144 A.3d at 937. That is not the case here. Appellant 

carried a gun into a store from which he previously had been banned, he 

shouted “I will blast you, [******],” while simultaneously revealing his 

concealed weapon. N.T., 2/26/18, at 7–8. As the Commonwealth avers, 

Appellant “cannot now claim innocence because the situation he deliberately 

[created] allegedly made him angry.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 14. Like the 

juvenile court, we find the evidence more than ample to establish terroristic 

threats.
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In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the juvenile court erred or 

abused its discretion in the disposition imposed because it was “neither the 

least restrictive nor most individualized disposition” that could have been 

imposed. Appellant’s Brief at 12. As noted, the juvenile court placed Appellant 

at Glen Mills, a residential facility for the treatment of twelve to fourteen-yearold adolescents that typically is a six-month program. Id. at 12, 15; N.T., 

2/26/18, at 77. Appellant argues that the Glen Mills disposition is “overly 

restrictive and punitive,” and the juvenile court overlooked several other 

programs. Appellant’s Brief at 13, 15.

Our standard of review of a dispositional order is settled. “[T]he Juvenile 

Act grants to the court broad discretion in disposition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341, 

§ 6352; In re Love, 646 A.2d 1233 (Pa. Super. 1994).” Commonwealth v. 

K.M.-F., 117 A.3d 346, 350 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In the Interest of 

A.D., 771 A.2d 45, 53 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc)). Therefore, we may not 

overturn a juvenile court’s decision unless that discretion was manifestly 

abused. In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 664 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 512, “Dispositional 

Hearing,” provides, in pertinent part, that the juvenile court state on the 

record in open court its disposition, the reasons therefore, the terms, 

conditions, and limitations of the disposition, and if the court removes the 

juvenile from his home, findings and conclusions of law that formed the basis 
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of its decision consistent with 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301 and 6352. Pa.R.J.C.P. 

512(D). This juvenile court explained its disposition as follows:

The [c]ourt considered all factors listed in Rule 512(D) and 

found the least restrictive option to be placing [Appellant] at Glen 

Mills Academy.

The [c]ourt heard inter alia, extensive testimony from 

juvenile probation Officer Jamie Harned regarding her familiarity 

with [Appellant] and involvement in his supervision. (N.T.: pg. 65 

thru 76), Paul McDonough, (N.T. 76 thru 78), Kathleen Lech, (N.T. 

78 thru 81) and Portia Brown, (N.T. 81 thru 88) all incorporated 

herein by reference. In particular at N.T. 92 thru 94 the [c]ourt 

outlined its reasons for the disposition at Glen Mills Academy and 

specifically found:

Out-of-home placement is appropriate and I direct that 

[Appellant] shall be placed at Glen Mills Young Offender Program.

The following facts that indicate out-of-home placement [is]

appropriate include, but not limited to, the serious nature of the 

offenses. He presents a clear danger to himself and others in the 

community. There has been a history of failure under community 

supervision. Home life renders removal imperative, and

[Appellant] has treatment needs that require specialized care.

This disposition is best suited to [Appellant’s] treatment, 

supervision, rehabilitation and welfare, imposing the minimum 

amount of confinement that is consistent with the protection of 

the public, and the rehabilitative needs of this young man, 

providing balanced attention to the protection of the community, 

imposition of accountability for offenses committed, and the 

development of competencies to enable this young man to 

become a responsible and productive member of the community.

This disposition and placement is necessary to address the 

serious issues of [Appellant] which cannot be addressed with least 

restrictive measures. Out-of-home placement was considered, 

and there has been a history of failure not only in school but in 

the community. I feel he poses a danger to himself and others. I 

incorporate the entire record. And I do believe he has specialized 

needs which will be best addressed at Glen Mills which will address 

any anger, emotional, behavioral, educational, health, substance 

issues, inter alia.
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I am concerned for his safety and the safety of others. I 

incorporate the entire record of this proceeding, including the 

history of failure under community supervision, and home life, 

rendering removal imperative, along with the treatment needs as 

outlined to me today that require specialized attention.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/4/18, at 21–22.

At the hearing, Appellant’s statements, when he previously was confined 

at Vision Quest, were read into the record by Appellant’s probation officer, Ms. 

Jamie Harned:

[Appellant] stated on multiple occasions that he will fight, shout 

or do whatever he has to. [Appellant] described taking six shots 

at anybody who tells him to do something he doesn’t like.

[Appellant] also stated he will punch out his probation [officer] or 

judge if he doesn’t go home. [Appellant] would also describe how 

he would cut his monitor off if he was on house arrest. [Appellant] 

stated that his family taught him to live and think this way and he 

doesn’t make threats, they are promises.

N.T., 2/26/18, at 68. Ms. Harned testified that Appellant had not “taken 

accountability for his negative behavior.” Id. at 70.

Ms. Harned also described Appellant’s behavior at Lynwood Elementary 

School as consistent with his attitude expressed above. At the dispositional 

hearing, she identified nine incidents, including a fight with another student 

that required the intervention of six staff members to subdue Appellant, the 

destruction of a “de-escalation room,” and threats directed to staff. N.T., 

2/26/18, at 66–67. Ms. Harned recommended confinement at the Young 

Offender Program at Glen Mills School. Id. at 70.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s issue is devoid of 

merit. Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s February 26, 2018 

dispositional orders.

Dispositional orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/23/2018