[Cite as Donahue v. McKee, 2022-Ohio-1037.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

William C. Donahue, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 21AP-492

 (M.C. No. 2021 CVF-007007)

v. :

 (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Michael P. McKee et al. :

Defendants-Appellees. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on March 29, 2022

On brief: William C. Donahue, pro se. Argued: William C. 

Donahue.

On brief: Brendan T. King, for appellees. Argued:

Brendan T. King.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court

BEATTY BLUNT, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, William C. Donahue, appeals the September 10, 2021 

judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court granting the oral motion of defendantsappellees Michael P. McKee and Laura Ann McKee to dismiss appellant's complaint for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Appellant is an attorney 

representing himself, and asserts a single assignment of error:

The trial court erred in dismissing the appellant's complaint for 

conversion by the Defendants of an automobile that was 

marital property half owned by the appellant.

{¶ 2} Appellant was married to Michael P. McKee's mother, Ellen McKee. Ellen 

McKee filed a contested divorce case against appellant on November 17, 2020, and on that 

same date filed a motion to expedite the case, asserting that she was suffering from stage 

four pancreatic cancer with a terminal prognosis. See generally Docket & Pleadings filed 
No. 21AP-492 2

in McKee v. Donahue, Franklin C.P. No. 20DR-3987. At some point on that same date, 

Ellen McKee transferred ownership of a 2013 Honda CR-V to her son, Michael P. McKee.

See Ex. A attached to Reply of Def.'s to Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. Jgmt. & Mot. for 

Dismissal of Pl's Compl., Doc. No. 20 filed in Donahue v. McKee, Franklin M.C. No. 2021 

CVF 007007 (filed Aug. 24, 2021). After that transfer, but prior to resolution of the divorce 

case, Ellen McKee died. See Suggestion of Death filed in McKee v. Donahue, Franklin C.P. 

No. 20DR-3987 (filed Feb. 1, 2021). Thereafter, appellant filed this action, arguing that 

appellees had conspired with Ellen McKee to wrongfully convert his "vested half-interest" 

in the 2013 Honda CR-V to their ownership. Appellees filed to dismiss the case, arguing 

that Ellen McKee was the titled owner of the car and had authority to transfer the vehicle.

{¶ 3} The trial court agreed with appellees and dismissed the case, concluding that

"[t]he Plaintiff has not established that a claim can be sustained against the Defendants." 

Entry, Doc. No. 23 filed in Donahue v. McKee, Franklin M.C. No. 2021 CVF 007007 (filed 

Sept. 10, 2021). Appellant timely appeals, arguing that R.C. 3105.171 establishes that the 

automobile was marital property, that he had a vested half-interest in the automobile, and 

that Ellen McKee was forbidden from transferring it because of a restraining order issued 

in the divorce case. He therefore contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim.

{¶ 4} Appellant's arguments lack merit. First, as the appellees correctly argue, 

pursuant to R.C. 3103.07, "[a] married person may take, hold, and dispose of property, real 

or personal, the same as if unmarried." (Emphasis added.) The statute confirms that Ohio 

is not a "community property" state that automatically grants each spouse a full vested 

interest in any property of the other that is acquired during the marriage. See, e.g., United 

States v. Satava, 99 F.Supp.3d 761, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (rejecting a similar argument

relying upon R.C. 3105.171, citing R.C. 3103.07, and holding that "Ohio is not a community 

property state, and spouses are free to take, hold, and dispose of property as if unmarried.").

{¶ 5} Moreover, Ohio courts have squarely rejected the theory that R.C. 3105.171 

can be used to establish an ownership interest in property beyond the context of separation 

of property between the two parties to a marriage, see, e.g., State v. Garber, 125 Ohio 

App.3d 615, 618 (9th Dist.1998), and the plain text of the statute clearly indicates that is 

only applicable in such actions. See R.C. 3105.171(B) ("In divorce proceedings, the court 

shall, and in legal separation proceedings upon the request of either spouse, the court may, 
No. 21AP-492 3

determine what constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property."). 

Accordingly, appellant's reliance on R.C. 3105.171 to establish his ownership rights is 

unavailing. 

{¶ 6} Additionally, Ohio's automotive title statute specifically states that "no court 

shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle 

sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced * * * by a certificate of 

title * * * [b]y admission in the pleadings or stipulation of the parties * * * [or in an 

appropriate action] by an instrument showing a valid security interest." R.C. 4505.04(B). 

It is beyond dispute that the 2013 Honda CR-V in question was titled solely to Ellen McKee, 

that there was no admission or stipulation in the divorce action that clearly established 

appellant's ownership interest in the automobile, and that appellant has not shown he has 

a valid security interest in the vehicle. As such, appellant cannot prove the existence of his 

ownership rights under the title statute either.

{¶ 7} Appellant has repeatedly stated to this court that he has a "vested interest" in 

the automobile. See Appellant's Brief at 6 and Appellant's Reply Brief at 5, but the authority 

he relies upon for that proposition is less than dubious. First, he has repeatedly replied 

upon a case that does not exist. See id.(both citing to "Crossley v. Shockley, 2014 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 8301 (2019)"). It appears that appellant may have meant to cite Carney v. Shockley, 

7th Dist. 14 JE 8, 2014-Ohio-5829, but that case—which deals with the reversion of 

allegedly abandoned mineral rights under R.C. 5301.56—has no bearing on whether an 

ownership interest in personal property has "vested" in the titled owner's spouse during a 

marriage. 

{¶ 8} And finally, all of appellant's arguments presume that appellees were both 

aware of and bound by a temporary restraining order issued by the domestic relations court 

in the divorce action between appellant and Ellen McKee. But as noted above, the transfer 

of the auto title occurred on the same date as the filing of divorce action, and it seems logical 

that the transfer could have occurred prior to the filing of the divorce, rendering the entire 

issue moot. We note that appellant has provided neither the trial court nor this court any 

good faith basis to conclude to that the automobile was even subject to the restraining 

order, let alone any good faith basis that Ellen McKee violated the restraining order. And 

it almost goes without saying he has provided no basis in law or fact to suggest that the 
No. 21AP-492 4

appellees—nonparties to the domestic relations action—were somehow subject to the terms 

of that order. Even assuming that the automobile was subject to an order restraining it 

from being transferred, by its plain terms that order extended only to the transferor Ellen 

McKee, not to the transferee appellees in this action. Any remedy that the appellant might 

theoretically been able to gain would have been in the form of a contempt judgment in the 

domestic relations case, not by a new action against nonparties to that case.

{¶ 9} In short, appellant's claims in this case were wholly lacking in any legal 

foundation, and largely lacking in any factual foundation. For these reasons, the trial court 

correctly concluded that appellant failed to state a claim upon which he could obtain relief, 

and his single assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 10} In their answer brief to this court, the appellees have asserted that appellant's 

conduct, both in bringing this action and then in appealing the trial court's judgment to this 

court, has been frivolous. (Appellees' Brief at 11-12.) For all of the reasons set forth in this 

opinion, we agree. App.R. 23 provides that "[i]f a court of appeals shall determine that an 

appeal is frivolous, it may require the appellant to pay reasonable expenses of the appellee.

" In Scott Elliott Smith Co., LPA v. Carasalina, LLC, 192 Ohio App.3d 794, 2011-Ohio-1602, 

(10th Dist.) this court applied the rule and observed that "a frivolous appeal 'is essentially 

one which presents no reasonable question for review.' " Id. at ¶ 27, quoting Talbott v. 

Fountas, 16 Ohio App.3d 226, syllabus (10th Dist. 1984). See also Coburn v. Auto-Owners 

Ins. Co., 189 Ohio App.3d 322, 2010-Ohio-3327, ¶ 56 (10th Dist.). 

{¶ 11} Here, it is amply clear that appellant's claims were not reasonable at the time 

of the filing and present no reasonable question for us on appeal—the law on this matter is 

well-settled, was easily discoverable by the appellant prior to the filing of his complaint and 

the filing of this appeal, and there is no good-faith basis for a modification or extension of 

the law to allow appellant's claims. Accordingly, we order that appellant, who is a licensed 

attorney that has wholly failed in his professional responsibilities to the appellees and to 

this court, shall pay to the appellees $500 as a sanction for his frivolous conduct in filing 

and pursuing this appeal.

{¶ 12} Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the 

Franklin County Municipal Court dismissing his case is affirmed. Appellees' request for 
No. 21AP-492 5

sanctions is granted, and the court awards the appellees $500 as sanction for appellant's 

frivolous appeal.

Judgment affirmed. Appellees' 

request for sanctions granted.

KLATT and MENTEL, JJ., concur.