alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Morgan
Stanley Tangible Asset Fund L.P. and is qualified in its entirety
by reference to such financial instruments.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                      31,821,345
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                5,499,342<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              39,214,236<F2>
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                39,214,236<F3>
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             (967,318)<F4>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               543,738
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,511,056)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,511,056)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,511,056)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Receivables include interest receivable of $113,363 and subscriptions
receivable of $5,385,979.
<F2>In addition to cash and receivables, total assets include net unrealized
gain on open contracts of $97,560 and Investment in U.S. Treasury Bills
of $1,795,989.
<F3>Liabilities include accrued brokerage fees of $102,169, accrued management
fee payable of $69,979, and service fee payable of $27,991.
<F4>Total revenue includes realized trading revenue of $(1,378,000), net
change in unrealized of $97,560 and interest income of $313,122.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed April 20, 2022

. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D22

- 0287 Lower Tribunal No. 21

- 18442

________________ 

### Nicolas Ivan Leibovich , Appellant ,
vs. 

### The Plurinational State of Bolivia, Appellee,

A n Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami

- Dade County, Alan Fine , Judge. Metschlaw, P.A., and Lawrence R. Metsch , for appellant

. Greenberg Traurig, P.A., and Francisco O. Sanchez, Joshua M. Mandel, and Gideon A. Levy , for appellee. Before SCALES, LINDSEY, and LOBREE , JJ. PER CURIAM.2 Nicolas Ivan Leibovich (nonparty below) seeks certiorari review of the trial court’s order denying him a protective order in response to Bolivia’s subpoena duces tecum. We treat Leibovich’s petition as an appeal from a final order because, unlike ordinary discovery orders, the order here is final

as to Leibovich. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) (“If a party seeks an improper remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been sought[.]”); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Llovet , 330 So. 3d 1006, 1009 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021); Varela v. OLA Con do. Ass’n , Inc. , 279 So. 3d 266, 276 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019); United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. L. Off. Of Herssein & Herssein, P.A. , 233 So. 3d 1224, 1230 n.6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). And finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. See Tien v. Akerman LLP , 320 So. 3 d 309, 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). Affirmed

.
Exhibit 32

                    CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Public Storage  Properties,
Ltd. (the  "Partnership") for the year ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  Ronald L.
Havner, Jr., as Chief Executive Officer of Public Storage, Inc., and John Reyes,
as Chief  Financial  Officer of Public  Storage,  Inc.,  each hereby  certifies,
pursuant  to  18  U.S.C.   ss.1350,   as  adopted  pursuant  to  ss.906  of  the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
         Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Partnership.

/s/  Ronald L. Havner, Jr.
------------------------------------
Name:    Ronald L. Havner, Jr.
Title:   Chief Executive Officer of Public Storage, Inc.,
         Corporate General Partner
Date:    March 31, 2005

/s/  John Reyes
------------------------------------
Name:    John Reyes
Title:   Chief Financial Officer of Public Storage, Inc.,
         Corporate General Partner
Date:    March 31, 2005



This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the  Partnership for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Maritime Commission

Notice is hereby given that the following applicant has filed with the Federal Maritime Commission an application for licenses as Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier and Ocean Freight Forwarder—Ocean Transportation Intermediary pursuant to section 19 of the Shipping Act of 1984 as amended (46 U.S.C. app. 1718 and 46 CFR 515). 

Persons knowing of any reason why the following applicants should not receive a license are requested to contact the Office of Transportation Intermediaries, Federal Maritime Commission, Washington, DC 20573. 

Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier and Ocean Freight Forwarder Transportation Intermediary Applicant: 

Alpico International Inc., 13281 Eastern Avenue, #2, Palmetto, FL 34221 

Officers: Ildes R. Alpizar, President (Qualifying Individual), Edward Alpizar, Vice President 

Dated: April 20, 2001. 

Bryant L. VanBrakle, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 01-10289 Filed 4-25-01; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6730-01-P
Case 1:07-cv-04507-AKH Document 26 Filed 10/15/2007 Page 1 of 7Case 1:07-cv-04507-AKH Document 26 Filed 10/15/2007 Page 2 of 7Case 1:07-cv-04507-AKH Document 26 Filed 10/15/2007 Page 3 of 7Case 1:07-cv-04507-AKH Document 26 Filed 10/15/2007 Page 4 of 7Case 1:07-cv-04507-AKH Document 26 Filed 10/15/2007 Page 5 of 7Case 1:07-cv-04507-AKH Document 26 Filed 10/15/2007 Page 6 of 7Case 1:07-cv-04507-AKH Document 26 Filed 10/15/2007 Page 7 of 7
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 1415** 

In R e: MATTHEW RICHARD PALMIERI , Petitioner

.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

.

Submitted : June 11, 2012 Decided: July 18, 2012

Before DAVIS, DIAZ, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Petition dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Matthew Richard Palmieri, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Matthew Richard Palmieri has filed a petition for a writ of Quo Warranto and a writ of mandamus asking this court to order the Director of the Defense Security Service (“DSS”) to demonstrate the authority for certain alleged actions taken against him and t o provide him with due process in connection with the suspension of his security clearance. We lack jurisdiction to consider Palmieri’s petition, and therefore dismiss it. The All Writs Act vest s all statutorily created courts, including this court, wi th authority to issue “all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions . . . .” See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). However, Palmieri’s petition, stemming from the suspension of a security clearance currently under review by the Depa rtment of Defense, fails to implicate the independent basis for our jurisdiction necessary for this court to proceed under the All Writs Act. See In re Chambers Dev. Co. , 148 F.3d 214, 223 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the All Writs Act requires that

“ the case may at some future time come within the court’s appellate jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, we dismiss Palmieri’s petition. ∗ We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

∗ This disposition, of course, is without prejudice to any right Palmieri may have to seek mandamus relief in an appropriate district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2006).3 legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process. PETITION DISMISSED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael Mattocks, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Shaw, J.), rendered February 23, 1982, convicting him of rape in the first degree (two counts), sodomy in the first degree (four counts), attempted sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts), and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, *90after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the pretrial lineup at which he was identified by the complaining witness was unduly suggestive because he wore an open-necked shirt while the other five participants wore turtleneck shirts, and, further, in that he was 22 years old and the other participants were 17, 18, and 19 years of age, respectively. An examination of the lineup photographs leads us to agree with the hearing court’s finding that the lineup was "not tainted in any respect”. The differences between the defendant’s age and the ages of the stand-ins were not discernible from their appearance. Nor was there any evidence that the complainant had any reason to perceive the defendant’s open-collared shirt as significant, particularly in the absence of any mention of shirt style in the victim’s description of the perpetrator. There is no requirement that a defendant in a lineup must be surrounded by people nearly identical in appearance *(see, United States v Reid,*517 F2d 953; *People v Rodriguez,*124 AD2d 611), and, in the instant case, there did not exist a substantial likelihood of misidentification *(see, Neil v Biggers,*409 US 188).

Additionally, we find that the court’s alibi charge, when examined as a whole, sufficiently conveyed to the jury the applicable law regarding the People’s burden of proof *(see, People v Colon,*122 AD2d 151, *lv denied*68 NY2d 810; *People v Seabrooks,*120 AD2d 691). Moreover, defendant’s claim of error with respect to the alibi charge has not been preserved for review.

Lastly, there is no reason to disturb the sentencing court’s determination as we do not find the sentence imposed to be excessive under the circumstances. Mollen, P. J., Brown, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-6964

JAMES WILLIAM BERRY, SR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

PAUL KIRBY, Commissioner of Corrections;

HOWARD PAINTER, Warden, Mount Olive Correctional; JOHN & JANE DOE, unknown defendants,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Charles H. Haden II, Chief

District Judge. (CA-99-483-5)

Submitted: December 16, 1999 Decided: December 29, 1999

Before MURNAGHAN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James William Berry, Sr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

James William Berry, Sr., appeals from the district court’s

order denying relief on his civil complaint filed under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 (1994), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1999), and 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2201, 2202 (1994). We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning

of the district court. See Berry v. Kirby, No. CA-99-483-5 (S.D.W.

Va. July 16, 1999). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
**Reflecting Commitment to Our Nation**

----

The name of the command, boldly fashioned on the periphery, reflects its commitment to our nation and to providing the warfighting fleet commanders with forces ready to conduct sustained combat operations in the far corners of the Earth.The world, encircled in Navy's blue and gold fighting colors, signifies the global nature of the command's mission as the Nation's primary naval force provider, the fleet's voice in the Navy requirements process, and the Navy-wide focal point for fleet readiness in support of the combatant commanders and their naval component commanders.The bald eagle represents the fleet, ever vigilant, able to dominate its environment and, when necessary, be decisively lethal. The four arrows, clutched securely within the eagle's talons, represent the fleet's striking power and its ability to provide credible combat power anywhere in the world's four oceans. The four stars represent the authority of the commander and are silver in color to indicate the joint nature of the command's mission and the joint warfighting capability of the fleet.The fouled anchor is symbolic of naval heritage and of the strong bond between the past, present, and future generations of Navy leaders. It also recognizes that the combat readiness of the fleet is anchored in a shore infrastructure that is well organized, manned by professionals, and efficient in execution.

#####  

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###### Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command   |   1562 Mitscher Ave., Suite 250   |   Norfolk, Virginia 23551-2487

###### Official U.S. Navy Website
<PAGE>
                                                                 Exhibit 31


                    SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION

         I, William M. Lasky, certify that:

         1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of JLG Industries,
Inc.;

         2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
annual report;

         3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report.

                              Date: July 29, 2003

                              /s/ William M. Lasky
                              --------------------
                              William M. Lasky
                              Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer

         I, James H. Woodward, Jr., certify that:

         1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of JLG Industries,
Inc.;

         2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
annual report;

         3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report.

                            Date: July 29, 2003

                           /s/ James H. Woodward, Jr.
                           --------------------------
                           James H. Woodward, Jr.
                           Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     In  connection  with the Quarterly Report of Freedom Resources Enterprises,
Inc.  (the  "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2002 as
filed  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the
"Report"),  I,  Neil  Christiansen,  Chief  Executive  Officer  of  the Company,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906
of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  that  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge:

     (1)  The  Report  fully  complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and  result of operations of the
Company.




Date:  November  13,  2002                    /s/ Neil  Christiansen
                                              ------------------------
                                              Chief  Executive  Officer
##### 



Exhibit 12
 CALCULATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
(in millions)
 Years Ended July 31,2006
    
    
    2005
    
    
    2004
    
    
    2003
    
    
    2002EarningsIncome before cumulative
effect of change in accounting
principle
    
    $
    149.3
    
    
    $
    57.2
    
    
    $
    26.6
    
    
    $
    12.4
    
    
    $
    12.9Income tax provision
    
    
    92.8
    
    
    
    35.9
    
    
    
    15.3
    
    
    
    2.6
    
    
    
    6.3Earnings
    
    
    242.1
    
    
    
    93.1
    
    
    
    41.9
    
    
    
    15.0
    
    
    
    19.2Fixed ChargesInterest expense
    
    
    27.3
    
    
    
    32.2
    
    
    
    38.1
    
    
    
    28.0
    
    
    
    16.3Portion of rental expense
representative of interest
factor
    
    
    3.1
    
    
    
    3.4
    
    
    
    3.2
    
    
    
    3.0
    
    
    
    3.0Fixed charges
    
    
    30.4
    
    
    
    35.6
    
    
    
    41.3
    
    
    
    31.0
    
    
    
    19.3Earnings before income tax
provision and fixed charges
    
    $
    272.5
    
    
    $
    128.7
    
    
    $
    83.2
    
    
    $
    46.0
    
    
    $
    38.5Ratio of earnings to fixed charges
    
    
    9.0x
    
    
    
    3.6x
    
    
    
    2.0x
    
    
    
    1.5x
    
    
    
    2.0x
#### In the Matter of Kenneth Moss, Appellant, v Charles Scully, as Superintendent of Green Haven Correctional Facility et al., Respondents.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination, dated August 29, 1987, made after a Superintendent’s Tier III hearing, finding the petitioner guilty of using alcohol, and imposing a penalty, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Jiudice, J.), entered April 29, 1988, which dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, and the judgment entered April 29, 1988, is vacated, the petition is granted, the determination is annulled on the law, without costs or disbursements, the charge is dismissed, the penalty is vacated, and the respondents are directed to expunge all references to the charge and the proceedings from the petitioner’s institutional record.

Since the petitioner raised the issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support the August 29, 1987, determination in his *pro se*CPLR article 78 papers, the matter should have been transferred to this court (CPLR 7804 [g]). Nevertheless, we treat the matter as though it had been properly transferred and dispose of all of the issues de novo *(People ex rel. McClatchie v Reid,*105 AD2d 721, 722).

The August 29, 1987, determination finding the petitioner guilty of using alcohol was based solely upon a purported positive breathalyzer test result.

However, we agree with the petitioner’s contention that a proper foundation was not laid for the admission of the breathalyzer test result *(see, Matter of Sanchez v Hoke,*116 AD2d 965; *Matter of Kincaide v Coughlin,*86 AD2d 893; *cf., People v Freeland,*68 NY2d 699, 700; *People v Mertz,*68 NY2d 136, 148). Specifically, there was no evidence presented from which it could be concluded (1) that the breathalyzer and the ampoules used with it had been tested within a reasonable time in relation to the petitioner’s test, and found to be properly calibrated and in working order at the time the test was administered to the petitioner *(see, People v Mertz, supra,**578at 148); (2) "that the chemicals used in conducting the test were of the proper kind and mixed in the proper portions” *(People v Freeland, supra,*at 700); and (3) that the breathalyzer was operated properly during the test *(see, People v Freeland, supra,*at 699). We find no merit to the respondents’ contention that the petitioner waived the foundation requirement *(see, Matter of Sanchez v Hoke, supra,*at 966). Consequently, there was insufficient evidence to support the charge.

The August 29, 1987, determination is therefore annulled, the charge dismissed, and all reference to the charge and the proceedings are to be expunged from the petitioner’s institutional record *(see, Matter of Hartje v Coughlin,*70 NY2d 866; *Matter of Vogelsang v Coombe,*105 AD2d 913, 914, *affd*66 NY2d 835; *Matter of Hilton v Dalsheim,*81 AD2d 887, 888). Thompson, J. P., Lawrence, Balletta and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.