NO. 12-16-00296-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

RAHEEM MARK MILLER, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

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§

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APPEAL FROM THE 392ND 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Raheem Mark Miller appeals his conviction for capital murder. In three issues, Appellant 

argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment with capital murder and pleaded “not guilty.” The 

matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury was instructed that Appellant could be found “guilty” of 

capital murder either as the primary actor, an accomplice, or as a conspirator. Ultimately, the jury 

found Appellant “guilty” as charged. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 

imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, and this appeal followed.

EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY

In three issues, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s 

verdict that he is “guilty” of capital murder either as the primary actor, an accomplice, or as a 

conspirator.

Standard of Review

The Jackson v. Virginia1legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing 

court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a 

 

1 443 U.S. 307, 315–16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786–87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). 
2

criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum 

required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. 

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315–16, 99 S. Ct. at 2786–87; see also Escobedo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 

(Tex. App.–San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d). The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge 

is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see also Johnson v. State, 871 

S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to 

the verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186. A jury 

is free to believe all or any part of a witness’s testimony or disbelieve all or any part of that 

testimony. See Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff'd, 206 

S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A successful legal sufficiency challenge will result in 

rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41–42, 102 S. 

Ct. 2211, 2217–18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982).

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and 

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Rodriguez v. State, 521 S.W.3d 

822, 827 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152, 

155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of 

the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to 

support the conviction. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Juries are 

permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by the 

evidence presented at trial. Id. at 15. Juries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on 

mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions. Id. An inference is a 

conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them, 

while speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence 

presented. Id. at 16. 

The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a 

hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997). Such a charge would include one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the 

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the 

State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant 

is tried.” Id. 
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The Evidence at Trial

At trial, Rudy Pittman testified that he was in his backyard on June 8, 2014, and heard two 

gunshots coming from Robbins Road. Pittman stated that he called 9-1-1 and looked through the 

fence where he saw two people running north toward State Highway 19 and a person lying in the 

street beside a car with its driver’s door open. 

Soon thereafter, Robert Garret and his wife were driving northwest on Robbins Road when 

they came upon a white car parked in the middle of the street and a body lying on the street next to 

the driver’s side door. The two stopped to investigate. They discovered that the car’s engine was 

running and the passenger door was open. They called 9-1-1 and attempted to help the man lying 

in the road. 

According to Garret, around this time, another woman arrived on the scene. She was able 

to prompt the victim to identify himself to her as Cedric Collins, and he indicated to her that he had 

been shot. The woman left the scene before first responders arrived. She never was identified.

Chera Lambright testified that as she and her mother drove to a fast food restaurant, they 

observed two African-American males walking near the Athens High School softball fields. 

Lambright stated that the two men approached a white, four door car parked on the street by the 

softball fields. Lambright further stated that before they entered the car, the two men exchanged a 

pill bottle between them. Lambright testified that one of the men entered through the car’s front, 

passenger side door, while the other man entered through the car’s rear, driver’s side door. 

Subsequently, as they returned from the restaurant, Lambright and her mother observed the same 

car parked in the middle of the street with someone lying on the ground outside of the car. 

Athens Police Department Officer Wesley Hoover was the first law enforcement officer to 

arrive at the scene. Hoover testified that a .380 caliber firearm magazine was found lying 

underneath the victim’s body. Hoover further testified that there appeared to have been a struggle 

inside the vehicle and that the victim’s wallet was located inside the vehicle where other items were 

strewn. Hoover stated that he did not locate any shell casings outside of the vehicle.

Athens Police Department Corporal Billy Westover later arrived at the scene. Westover 

testified that he spoke to several witnesses at the scene. He further testified that he attempted to 

locate the two individuals described to him by Lambright, but was unsuccessful in doing so.
4

Athens Police Department Detective Adam Parkins led the investigation of the case. 

Parkins testified that officers located a New Orleans Saints baseball cap on the floor of the vehicle.2 

He further testified that Collins had two small entry wounds in his lower back. He also testified 

that there was an unsecured child seat in the back of the car and the rear passenger door of the car 

had child locks engaged, which made it impossible to open the rear passenger door from inside the 

car. Parkins stated that a pill bottle labeled “hydrocodone,” a pill later determined to be 

Amoxicillin, two .380 caliber shell casings,3 marijuana, and a cell phone later determined to belong 

to Collins were recovered from the vehicle. However, despite the recovery of the foregoing 

physical evidence, the police were unable to recover a firearm connected to the shooting, and 

attempts to match the DNA and fingerprints from the items located inside and outside Collins’s 

vehicle were inconclusive. 

Henderson County District Attorney’s Office Investigator Ronny Halbert testified that he 

downloaded the contents of Collins’s cell phone, which included text messages exchanged shortly 

before the shooting between Collins and “Heemi.”4 The text messages indicated that about an hour 

before the shooting, Collins was attempting to purchase hydrocodone from Appellant. They further 

indicate that, minutes before the shooting, the two had arranged to meet. 

Texas Ranger Michael Adcock also investigated the scene. He testified that there were 

footprints on the rear passenger seat of Collins’s vehicle, as well as foot prints on the car’s front 

passenger seat. Adcock testified that, based on his investigation, he believed there had been a 

struggle inside the vehicle before the shooting took place. In support of this belief, he noted that, in 

addition to the footprints on the seats, there was blood inside the vehicle, an ashtray had been 

emptied, and one of the vehicle’s cup holders had been broken.

Athens Police Department Detective Don Yarbrough met with Appellant three times during 

the course of the investigation. On June 12, 2014, Appellant came to the Athens Police station to 

“clear his name.” Appellant stated to Yarbrough that he knew nothing about the shooting and was 

not present at the scene. 

Subsequently, Yarbrough again met with Appellant when Appellant’s mother and stepfather brought him to the police station. During the ensuing recorded interview, Appellant stated 

 

2 The evidence at trial demonstrated that Appellant originally is from New Orleans, Louisiana. 

3 Parkins testified that one shell casing was located in the back seat on the driver’s side and the other was 

located on the floorboard in the rear seating area on the passenger side. 

4

“Heemi” was determined to be Appellant’s nickname. 
5

that he met Collins to sell him hydrocodone, he got into the rear passenger seat of Collins’s car, and 

Collins drove down Robbins road.5 According to Appellant, at some point during the drive, an 

unknown Hispanic man got into the car and sat behind Collins. Appellant further stated that this 

man demanded money or drugs from Appellant and Collins, pulled a gun, and shot Collins. 

Appellant stated that he escaped the vehicle through the front passenger window because the child 

lock on the rear passenger door was engaged. 

On June 16, 2014, Appellant again met with Yarbrough at the police station and gave 

another recorded statement. On this occasion, Appellant told Yarbrough that Michael Duke was 

the other person with him that day and that Duke shot Collins. Yarbrough testified that Appellant 

told him that he and Duke had a conversation about a robbery on their way to meet Collins. He 

further testified that Appellant stated that he “went along with it.” Yarbrough stated that Appellant 

told him that he saw that Duke had a gun. Yarbrough further stated that Appellant demonstrated to 

him how Collins was turned toward the rear seat as he struggled with Duke, who was seated behind 

him, when Duke shot him. 

Thereafter, Appellant met with Investigator Bobby Rachel. In this interview, Appellant 

admitted he had a gun with him when he went to meet Collins. Appellant further stated that he 

knew Duke had a gun. Appellant also stated that he pointed a gun at Collins. 

Rudy Jimenez testified that Appellant and Johnny Castenada6left his house together before 

the shooting and returned to his home together after the shooting. Jimenez further testified that the 

two arrived back at his home on foot and that Appellant was acting “unusual” at that time.7

Discussion

In order to demonstrate that Appellant was guilty of capital murder, the State was required 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that Appellant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused 

Collins’s death in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery; (2) acted with intent 

to promote or assist the commission of the offense” of capital murder and solicited, encouraged, 

directed, aided, or attempted to aid the other person to commit the offense; or (3) conspired with 

 

5 Appellant did not mention that any other person accompanied him to meet with Collins. 

6 Yarbrough testified that he believed Castenada to be the other person in the car with Appellant and Collins 

on the day in question.

7 Parkins testified that Appellant stated that he gave the gun to Rudy Jimenez. He further testified that Rudy 

Jimenez denied receiving a gun from Appellant.
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another to commit robbery, capital murder was committed by the other conspirator in furtherance 

of the robbery, and Appellant should have anticipated the capital murder as a result of the carrying 

out of the conspiracy. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2), (b) (West 2011), § 19.03(a)(2) 

(West Supp. 2017). Specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, unless 

it reasonably is apparent, based on the manner of its use that death or serious bodily injury could 

not have resulted. See Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 

Primary Actor

Appellant argues that there is no evidence supporting the jury’s finding that he shot Collins. 

According to Appellant, he consistently maintained that he did not shoot Collins, no eyewitness 

testified that Appellant shot Collins, and no physical evidence supported a finding that he shot 

Collins. 

Yet, as set forth in greater detail above, Appellant admitted that he and another person 

planned to rob Collins. Appellant’s text messages to Collins concerning a drug transaction support 

that Appellant planned to meet with Collins minutes prior to when the shooting occurred. 

Jimenez’s testimony supports that Appellant and Castenada left Jimenez’s house together and 

arrived back at the house together, with their departure and arrival times corresponding to the time 

of the shooting. Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that upon their search of Collins’s car, 

officers found loose cash, an empty pill bottle labeled “hydrocodone,” and a loose pill later 

determined to be Amoxicillin.8 Appellant admitted that that he had a gun and knew the other 

person had a gun. Thus, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to 

find that Appellant intended to commit and engaged in the commission of robbery. 

Appellant admitted that he pointed a gun at Collins.9 Moreover, Appellant stated that he 

was in the rear seat and that he climbed through the front seat to exit the car after the shooting. 

Lambright testified that one of the men she saw entered through the car’s front, passenger side door 

while the other man entered through the car’s rear, driver’s side door. Thus, a jury reasonably 

could find that Appellant was the sole occupant of the back seat of Collins’s car just prior to the 

time of the shooting. Parkins testified that one of the shell casings was found in the backseat on the 

driver’s side, while the other was found on the rear, passenger side floorboard. Parkins testified 

that based on his training and experience, his analysis of the crime scene, and with consideration 

 

8 Appellant admitted that he intended to sell Collins fake hydrocodone pills.

9 See Flanagan, 675 S.W.2d at 741 (permitting inference of specific intent to kill from use of deadly weapon).
7

given to Appellant’s statements, he believed Collins was shot from the back seat, while he 

struggled with a person in the back seat. 

Based on our review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude 

that a rational trier of fact could have found that Appellant committed capital murder as a primary 

actor. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 19.03(a)(2). Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

Accomplice

We next consider whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that 

Appellant acted with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense of capital murder 

and solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid the other person to commit the 

offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2). Appellant argues that there is insufficient 

evidence to support that he acted with the intent to promote or assist the commission of capital 

murder. 

As set forth previously, there is sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that 

Appellant intended to commit and engaged in the commission of robbery along with another 

person. Moreover, Parkins’s testimony supports the conclusion that Collins was shot during a 

struggle with a person in the back seat. A rational juror could determine that the shooter formed an 

intent to kill in that moment in order to complete the robbery and make an escape. See Flanagan, 

675 S.W.2d at 741; see also Luna v. State, No. 05-08-00998-CR, 2009 WL 2246103, at *4 (Tex. 

App.–Dallas July 29, 2009, no pet.) (op, not designated for publication) (“Intent to kill does not 

have to be formed before the trigger is pulled; it can be formed at the moment of the shooting”). 

Indeed, Appellant admitted that he pointed a gun at Collins and later gave the gun to Jimenez, after 

which point, the gun could not be located. Thus, a jury reasonably could find that Appellant, at the 

moment of the shooting, acted with intent to promote or assist the commission of capital murder 

and aided or attempted to aid the other person to commit the offense so as to complete the robbery 

and make their escape. Cf. Luna, 2009 WL 2246103, at *4. Accordingly, we conclude that there 

is legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Appellant committed capital murder 

as an accomplice. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see also TEX. PENAL CODE 

ANN. § 7.02(a)(2). Appellant’s second issue is overruled. 

Conspirator

We next consider whether Appellant conspired with another to commit robbery, wherein 

capital murder was committed by the other conspirator in furtherance of the robbery, and Appellant 
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should have anticipated the capital murder as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy. See 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b). Appellant argues that there is no evidence that he intended to 

commit a robbery or that he conspired with another to do so.

As set forth previously, there is evidence that Appellant and another person agreed to rob 

Collins. There also is evidence that capital murder was committed by one of the men in 

furtherance of the robbery. Adcock testified that the evidence caused him to conclude that there 

had been a struggle in the car. A jury reasonably could determine that Appellant was aware of the 

risks connected to committing a robbery since he and his coconspirator brought firearms along and 

that it is reasonably foreseeable that if firearms are used in perpetuation of a robbery, someone 

could be killed. Accordingly, we hold that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding 

that Appellant committed capital murder as a conspirator. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. 

at 2789; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b). Appellant’s third issue is overruled.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant’s first, second, and third issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

BRIAN HOYLE

Justice

Opinion delivered December 13, 2017.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

DECEMBER 13, 2017

NO. 12-16-00296-CR

RAHEEM MARK MILLER,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 392nd District Court 

of Henderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. B-21,539)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment 

of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court 

below for observance.

Brian Hoyle, Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.