United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 6, 2024 Decided June 28, 2024

No. 23-3046

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

TRISTAN CHANDLER STEVENS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:21-cr-00040-2)

Megan J. Saillant, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

T. Dietrich Hill, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With him on the brief were Chrisellen R. Kolb

and Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON, MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
2

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: On January 

6, 2021, Tristan Stevens participated in an attack on police 

officers defending the United States Capitol’s Lower West 

Terrace. The district court convicted him of, inter alia, four 

counts of feloniously assaulting and impeding police officers 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and one count of 

committing civil disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). 

At sentencing, the court concluded that Stevens committed the 

Section 111(a)(1) offenses with an intent to commit another 

felony: Section 231(a)(3) civil disorder. The court accordingly 

applied Sentencing Guideline Section 2A2.2 (Aggravated 

Assault) to Stevens’ Section 111(a)(1) offenses. See U.S.

SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.S.G) § 2A2.2 (U.S. SENT’G 

COMM’N 2021).1

Stevens appeals his sentence, arguing that the court should 

have applied guideline Section 2A2.4 (Obstructing or 

Impeding Officers) to his four Section 111(a)(1) offenses.

U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4. We disagree. We have recently held that 

“aggravated assault” unambiguously includes assault with 

intent to commit another felony and thus Section 2A2.2, not 

Section 2A2.4, is the applicable guideline. See United States v. 

Sargent, 2024 WL 2873106, at *4–7 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2024). 

The court properly applied Section 2A2.2 to Stevens’ Section 

111(a)(1) offenses because his conduct constituted “felonious 

assault” and he acted with the “intent to commit another 

felony.” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 cmt. n.1. We therefore affirm his 

sentence.

1 All references are to the 2021 United States Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual—in effect at the time of Stevens’ sentencing—

unless marked otherwise.
3

I. BACKGROUND

By statute, the U.S. Sentencing Commission 

(Commission) “establish[es] sentencing policies and practices 

for the Federal criminal justice system.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1). 

It does so by publishing “guidelines . . . for use of a sentencing 

court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal 

case” and “general policy statements regarding application of 

the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing.” Id.

§ 994(a)(1)–(2). The Sentencing Commission also publishes 

“commentary” to accompany the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.7. Commentary notes “may interpret the guideline or 

explain how it is to be applied” and “[f]ailure to follow such 

commentary could constitute an incorrect application of the 

guidelines, subjecting the sentence to possible reversal on 

appeal.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742). The Supreme Court has 

instructed us to treat the guidelines as “the equivalent of 

legislative rules adopted by federal agencies” and guideline

commentary as “an agency’s interpretation of its own 

regulations.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993).

At sentencing, the court first looks to the sentencing range 

the Guidelines establish. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). It selects the 

applicable guideline for a particular offense of conviction from 

the Guidelines’ Statutory Index. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2; see id. app. 

A. The appropriate guideline directs the court to the base 

offense level and any specific offense characteristics. Id.

§ 1B1.1(a)(2). The court can then adjust the offense level under 

various circumstances, including the victim’s status and the 

defendant’s acceptance of responsibility. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(3), (5). 

It then selects the defendant’s criminal history category to 

determine the advisory sentence range. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(6), (7). 

The Statutory Index often lists multiple guidelines for one 

offense. In that situation, the court determines which guideline 
4

“is most appropriate for the offense conduct charged in the 

count of which the defendant was convicted.” Id. § 1B1.2 cmt. 

n.1. The Statutory Index lists two guidelines for Section 111 

convictions: Section 2A2.2 (Aggravated Assault) and Section 

2A2.4 (Obstructing or Impeding Officers). U.S.S.G. app. A, at 

558. Section 2A2.4 carries a base offense level of 10, which 

level can be enhanced based on physical contact, possession 

and threatened use of a dangerous weapon or bodily injury to 

the victim. Id. § 2A2.4(a)–(b). Because the base offense level 

already incorporates a victim’s official status, Section 2A2.4 

does not permit a Section 3A1.2 level enhancement. See id.

§§ 2A2.4 cmt. n.2; 3A1.2 cmt. n.2. According to Section 

2A2.4(c)’s Cross Reference, “conduct constitut[ing] 

aggravated assault” triggers the application of Section 2A2.2. 

Id. § 2A2.4(c)(1). Section 2A2.2 carries a base offense level of 

14 with several enhancement options, including an official 

victim adjustment in certain circumstances.

2 Id. § 2A2.2(a)–

(b). The commentary defines “aggravated assault” as a 

“felonious assault” involving, inter alia, “an intent to commit 

another felony.” Id. § 2A2.2 cmt. n.1.

Both houses of the Congress convened on January 6, 2021 

to certify the results of the 2020 presidential election.3 Vice 

President Mike Pence presided over the certification. Capitol 

Police restricted access to the Capitol building and erected an 

exterior perimeter. 

The Congress halted the certification process that 

afternoon when rioters penetrated the police perimeter. In front 

2 Pursuant to Section 3A1.2, the offense level increases by 6 if 

the victim is “a government officer or employee,” the offense 

conduct was “motivated by such status” and the applicable guideline 

“is from Chapter Two, Part A (Offenses Against the Person).” 

U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(a)–(b). 

3 We draw the following facts from the trial record.
5

of the Lower West Terrace, rioters broke through the police 

line and officers fell back to a narrow scaffolding tunnel 

(Tunnel). There they established a new defensive line. Rioters 

breached the Tunnel’s first set of doors but the police line—

equipped with riot shields—held the second set of doors. 

Around this time, rioters elsewhere entered the Capitol 

building. 

Rioters in the Tunnel attacked officers with punches, metal 

poles and chemicals. Officers and rioters continuously pushed 

against each other. And rioters occasionally intensified their 

pushes into “heave-hos.” J.A. 506. This struggle continued 

until around 5:00 p.m., when police officers cleared the Tunnel 

of rioters. With the Capitol building secured, the Congress 

resumed the certification process later that evening. 

Earlier on January 6, 2021, Stevens attended the rally at 

the White House Ellipse. He then walked to the Capitol with 

others. Around 2:50 p.m., Stevens entered the Tunnel. He 

directed several of the “heave-ho” pushes against the police 

line before exiting. He then returned, picked up a riot shield 

and moved to the front. He pressed the shield against Capitol 

Police Officer Sergeant Aquilino Gonell’s head, dislodging his 

face shield and exposing him to chemicals. Gonell struck back 

with his baton but Stevens pinned him against the wall with the 

shield. Stevens left the Tunnel shortly thereafter but entered 

one last time around 4:15 p.m. to lead another push against the 

police line. The officers eventually secured the Tunnel and

Stevens then left the Capitol grounds.

A grand jury indicted Stevens—and eight co-defendants—

on fifty-three counts. As relevant here, the Indictment charged 

Stevens for his assault on Gonell pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 111(a)(1) (Count 21). It also charged Stevens with aiding and 

abetting the assaulting, resisting and impeding of law 
6

enforcement officers in the Tunnel under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)

(Counts 14, 16 and 33). Part of Chapter 7–Assault, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 111(a)(1) criminalizes “forcibly” assaulting, resisting,

opposing, impeding, intimidating or interfering with certain 

governmental officers and employees. A simple Section 111(a) 

assault constitutes a misdemeanor. If the conduct “involve[s]

physical contact with the victim of that assault or the intent to 

commit another felony,” the offense rises to a felony. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 111(a). An enhanced penalty applies if the offender uses a 

deadly or dangerous weapon or inflicts bodily injury. Id. 

§ 111(b). 

Count 35 of the Indictment charged Stevens with 

committing civil disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). 

Part of Chapter 12–Civil Disorders, 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) 

criminalizes “any act to obstruct, impede, or interfere with 

any . . . law enforcement officer” engaged in official duties 

“incident to and during the commission of a civil disorder.” A 

violation of Section 231(a)(3) constitutes a felony. Id.

In a bench trial, the district court tried Stevens alongside 

co-defendants Patrick McCaughey and David Mehaffie. The 

court found Stevens guilty of felony assault on Count 21—a 

Section 111(a)(1) count—but declined to apply the enhanced 

penalty under Section 111(b) because the riot shield, as Stevens 

used it, did not constitute a deadly or dangerous weapon. The 

court convicted Stevens on all but one of the other nine counts 

charged against him.

4 With regard to the four Section 111(a)(1)

charges (Counts 14, 16, 21 and 33), the court determined that 

Stevens committed felonies because he acted with the intent to 

4 The court acquitted Stevens on Count 34, Obstruction of an 

Official Proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), because the 

government failed to prove his intent. 
7

commit another felony—civil disorder under Section 

231(a)(3).

5

As noted supra, the Statutory Index lists guideline Section

2A2.2 and Section 2A2.4 as applicable to Section 111 

convictions. U.S.S.G app. A, at 558. The district court therefore 

had to determine the “most appropriate [guideline] for the 

offense conduct” of conviction. Id. § 1B1.2 cmt. n.1. Stevens 

objected to the application of Section 2A2.2, both in his 

Sentencing Memorandum and at sentencing. Acknowledging 

that Stevens was convicted of two separate felonies—a Section 

111(a)(1) felony and a Section 231(a)(3) felony—his counsel 

argued that they involved the same intent, that is, he violated 

Section 111(a)(1) but without the intent to commit another

felony.

For the Section 111(a)(1) offenses (Counts 14, 16, 21 and 

33), the district court disagreed. First, the court did not rely 

exclusively on the commentary definition of “aggravated 

assault.” It also cited for support the Black’s Law Dictionary

definition of “aggravated assault”—which includes assault 

with “the intent to commit another crime.” Aggravated Assault, 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The court also 

concluded that “another felony” need not involve completely

separate conduct or intent. It noted that Stevens’ Section 

231(a)(3) conviction involved an element of “mob resistance 

to law enforcement” distinct from the “run-of-the-mill assaults 

on police officers” covered by Section 111(a)(1). J.A. 2208. 

For the Section 111(a)(1) offenses, then, the court applied

5 Based on the assault on Gonell (Count 21), the court found 

that Stevens committed felony assault because he “act[ed] with the 

intent to commit civil disorder, a felony” and additionally made 

physical contact with the officer. J.A. 2095.
8

Section 2A2.2 and the official victim adjustment set forth in 

Section 3A1.2 to reach an adjusted offense level of 20.

For the Section 231(a)(3) offense (Count 35), the district 

court declined to apply the Cross Reference. Instead, it applied 

Section 2A2.4 and assigned an adjusted offense level of 10.

6

According to the court, the government failed to show Stevens 

“committed civil disorder with the intent to commit another 

felony.” J.A. 2212. It then created two groups: Group 1 for 

offenses against the line officers (Counts 14, 16 and 33) and 

Group 2 for offenses against Sergeant Gonell (Count 21). For 

both groups, the highest offense level was 20. The court added 

2 points for the grouping units, reaching a total adjusted offense 

level of 22. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Combined with Stevens’ 

lack of past criminal activity, he faced a Guidelines range of 

41–51 months’ incarceration. The court ultimately varied 

upward from the Guidelines range because of Stevens’ lack of 

remorse and a need for general deterrence, respect for law 

enforcement and just punishment for the offense. Stevens was

sentenced to 60 months’ incarceration and 24 months’ 

supervised release. 

II. ANALYSIS

Stevens makes two challenges.

7 First, he argues assault 

with intent to commit another felony is not “aggravated 

6 18 U.S.C. § 231 is not listed in the Statutory Index but the 

most analogous guideline is Section 2A2.4. See U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1

(“If the offense is a felony for which no guideline expressly has been 

promulgated, apply the most analogous offense guideline.”).

7 Co-defendant McCaughey also appealed, challenging his 

conviction. See United States v. McCaughey, Case No. 23-3061. We

consolidated McCaughey’s and Stevens’ appeals ex mero motu. 

After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fischer v. United 
9

assault.” Under Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019), he 

claims, the court should not defer to the Guidelines

commentary definition of “aggravated assault.” Second, he 

argues that his conduct does not qualify as “aggravated assault”

even under the commentary definition. “We review de novo the 

district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines in 

calculating a defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range.” 

United States v. Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 

(per curiam). If a defendant fails to preserve a challenge, we 

review for plain error. See United States v. Hunter, 809 F.3d 

677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

A. “Aggravated Assault” 

Stevens disputes the meaning of “aggravated assault” and 

argues that the district court wrongly deferred to the 

commentary definition. We recently considered whether 

“aggravated assault” as defined in Section 2A2.2 includes 

intent to commit another felony. In United States v. Sargent, 

another January 6 defendant made the same challenge that 

Stevens makes. 2024 WL 2873106, at *4–7. 

We rejected Sargent’s arguments because “aggravated 

assault” in Section 2A2.2 “unambiguously encompasses 

Sargent’s actions on January 6, 2021.” Id. at *4. As we

explained, we need not decide the proper deference standard to 

Guidelines commentary if “the language at issue has a plain 

and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute 

in the case.” Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 

337, 340 (1997)). Examining the text and structure of the 

Guidelines, the Court found that Sargent’s conduct—a 

violation of Section 111(a)(1) with intent to commit a violation 

of the Section 231(a)(3) civil disorder offense—constituted 

States, 144 S. Ct. 537 (2023) (mem.), we severed McCaughey’s 

appeal and held it in abeyance. 
10

aggravated assault within the meaning of Section 2A2.2. Id. at 

*5–7. The Commission, with the Congress’ approval,8 initially 

assigned Section 2A2.2 as the sole guideline for several 

offenses. Id. at *6. One of the specified offenses, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 113(b) (1982), punished “[a]ssault with intent to commit any 

felony” within “maritime and territorial jurisdiction.” Sargent, 

2024 WL 2873106, at *6. The Congress later moved Section 

113(b) to Section 113(a)(2). Id. Under the 2021 Guidelines, 

only Sections 2A2.2, 2A3.2, 2A3.3 and 2A3.4 apply to a 

Section 113(a)(2) violation; all but Section 2A2.2 relate to 

conduct involving sexual assault. U.S.S.G. app. A, at 558.

Now, for any non-sexual assault committed under Section 

113(a)(2) “with intent to commit another felony, the Guidelines 

require district courts to apply § 2A2.2.” Sargent, 2024 WL 

2873106, at *6 (emphasis in original). Further, Sargent held, 

Section 2A2.4 ordinarily applies to offenses involving 

interference with law enforcement. Id. It is the sole guideline 

applicable to over thirty offenses, none of which include the 

“intent to commit another felony” element. Id. Finally, the 

Commission replaced Section 2A2.3 (Minor Assault) with 

Section 2A2.4 in the Statutory Index reference for Section 111 

offenses.9 U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 64 (effective Oct. 15, 

1988). Thus, the Commission intended Section 2A2.4 to apply 

to minor assaults “while § 2A2.2 would be applied to assaults 

that were aggravated by other, separate factors.” Sargent, 2024 

WL 2873106, at *7. Because “‘aggravated assault’ plainly 

captures Sargent’s conduct,” we declined to consider what 

8 “[O]rdinarily and in practice, the commentary undergoes the 

same congressional and public review as the Guidelines.” Sargent, 

2024 WL 2873106, at *2. 

9 Section 2A2.3’s heading referred to “Minor Assault” at the 

time the Commission established Section 2A2.4. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3 

(1988). The Commission omitted “Minor” in a 2014 “stylistic change 

that does not affect the application of § 2A2.3.” U.S.S.G. suppl. to 

app. C, amend. 781 (effective Nov. 1, 2014).
11

degree of deference to accord the “aggravated assault” 

commentary definition. Id.

Sargent’s resolution of the “aggravated assault” 

commentary issue decides Stevens’ challenge as well and 

requires us to reject his challenge. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 

F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). The commentary 

definition of “aggravated assault” unambiguously covers 

Stevens’ conduct—namely, assaulting, impeding and resisting 

officers under Section 111(a)(1) with an intent to commit civil 

disorder under Section 231(a)(3). See Sargent, 2024 WL 

2873106, at *4.

B. Application of Guideline Section 2A2.2

Notwithstanding “aggravated assault” includes assault 

with intent to commit another felony, Stevens still argues that 

his conduct does not constitute “aggravated assault.”

According to Stevens, Section 2A2.2 does not apply to him. 

The Guidelines commentary defines “aggravated assault” as 

(1) “felonious assault” that involves, inter alia, (2) “an intent 

to commit another felony.” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 cmt. n.1. Stevens 

challenges both prongs’ applicability. We conclude that 

Stevens has shown no plain error in the district court’s 

conclusion that he committed felonious assault. We 

additionally find that he acted with an intent to commit another 

felony. Thus, the district court properly applied Section 2A2.2 

to Stevens’ Section 111(a)(1) convictions.

1. “Felonious Assault” 

Stevens raises two arguments regarding “felonious 

assault”: he was not convicted of felonious assault; and he only 

aided and abetted the resisting, opposing, impeding and 

interfering with police officers under Counts 14, 16 and 33. He 

does not similarly challenge Count 21, on which the court 
12

convicted Stevens of felony assault of Sergeant Gonell. 

Stevens did not make these “felonious assault” arguments in 

district court and we therefore review them for plain error. See 

Hunter, 809 F.3d at 681; Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

10 Stevens must 

show (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) affects substantial 

rights. Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507–08 (2021). If 

he makes this showing, we may grant relief if the error “had a 

serious effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Id. at 508 (quotation omitted). A “plain” 

error must be “clear under current law.” United States v. Olano, 

507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).

Stevens argues that as to the Section 111(a)(1) offenses 

against the line officers—Counts 14, 16 and 33—the court did 

not convict him of assault. The court convicted him of “[a]t the 

very least, . . . resisting, opposing, impeding and interfering 

with officers by forming a barrier to prevent them from clearing 

10 Stevens urges us to review this argument de novo because he 

is simply making new arguments in support of a preserved claim. See 

Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992) (“Once a federal 

claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in 

support of that claim . . . .”). In Yee, the petitioners challenged an 

ordinance as a taking based on physical occupation and regulations. 

Id. at 534–35. The Court concluded that these were two “separate 

arguments in support of a single claim—that the ordinance effects an 

unconstitutional taking.” Id. at 535 (emphasis in original). But 

Stevens makes two separate claims. At sentencing and on appeal, he 

has argued that he had no intent to commit “another felony.” And for 

the first time on appeal, he argues that he “did not commit a felonious 

assault.” Stevens Br. 26 (emphasis in original). Stevens has thus 

made two distinct claims challenging different elements of the 

“aggravated assault” commentary definition and we therefore review 

for plain error. Cf. In re Harman Int’l Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 791 

F.3d 90, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[O]n appeal a party may ‘refine and 

clarify its analysis in light of the district court’s ruling,’ including 

citing ‘additional support . . . .’” (citations omitted)). 
13

the tunnel.” J.A. 2075 (Oral Ruling, Sept. 13, 2022). Stevens 

also suggeststhat his aiding and abetting convictions on Counts 

14, 16 and 33 prevent those counts from constituting “felonious 

assault.” Application of the Guidelines, however, is determined 

by considering “all acts and omissions committed, aided, 

abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or 

willfully caused by the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)

(emphasis added). 

Whether he personally assaulted, or aided and abetted the 

assaulting of, law enforcement officers, Stevens’ actions—

aiding other rioters whose assaults on the officers involved 

physical contact or the intent to commit another felony—

constituted felony assault. In support of Stevens’ convictions, 

the district court found that Stevens engaged in the heave-ho 

pushes in the tunnel “to aid those rioters ahead of him who were 

engaged with the police,” J.A. 2086; the court repeatedly 

described those protestors as “coordinating their pushes to 

exert the greatest possible amount of force on the police line,” 

J.A. 2076, “continuing to press against police,” id., “bringing 

shields and other objects to use against the police” as they 

entered the tunnel, J.A. 2077, and “trying to push through the 

officers,” J.A. 2083. At sentencing, the district court explicitly 

found that Stevens “assaulted and impeded officers” and did so 

with the intent to commit another felony, rendering applicable 

the Guideline for aggravated assault. J.A. 2208. See also id. 

(finding that Stevens “assault[ed], obstruct[ed] and imped[ed] 

a line of officers”).

2. “Intent to Commit Another Felony”

Stevens also argues that he had no intent to commit 

another felony at the time he violated Section 111(a)(1). He 

preserved this argument in his Sentencing Memorandum and at 

sentencing and so we review de novo whether the Section 
14

231(a)(3) civil disorder offense constitutes “another felony” 

separate from the Section 111(a)(1) count. See Brown, 892 F.3d 

at 401. We conclude that it does. 

Each of the two felonies features distinct requirements. 

Section 111(a)(1) requires the government to prove only that 

the defendant had “an intent to assault, not an intent to assault 

a federal officer.” United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 

(1975); see also United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 

(D.C. Cir. 2002). On the other hand, in Stevens’ view, Section 

231(a)(3) requires a “purpose of obstructing, impeding, or 

interfering with one or more law enforcement officers” and that 

the assault be committed “incident to and during a civil 

disorder” that affected commerce. J.A. 2133 n.3. Section 

231(a)(3)’s distinct requirements qualify it as “another felony”

separate from Section 111(a)(1).

Stevens cites to a commentary definition of “another 

felony offense” elsewhere in the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(C). To whatever extent that definition 

informs the meaning of “another felony” in Section 2A2.2’s 

commentary, it supports the government’s interpretation. 

Section 2K2.1 enhances a firearm possession offense if the 

defendant “used or possessed any firearm in connection with 

another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (emphasis 

added). Some courts interpreted “another felony offense” to 

exclude any felonious conduct contemporaneously occurring 

with the base offense conduct. See, e.g., United States v. 

Fenton, 309 F.3d 825, 827 (3d Cir. 2002) (a defendant 

convicted of violating a felon-in-possession statute based on 

his having stolen the firearm is not subject to the “another 

felony offense” enhancement based on his theft of the firearm).

In response, the Commission broadened the term to apply to 

“any federal, state, or local offense, other than the explosive or 

firearms possession or trafficking [base] offense, punishable by 
15

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of 

whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction 

obtained.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(C); see United States v. 

Keller, 666 F.3d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 2011). Thus, any felony 

offense other than the base offense of conviction fits the 

meaning of “another felony offense.” The broad commentary 

definition of “another felony offense” suggests that “another 

felony” in Section 2A2.2’s commentary also carries a broad 

meaning. 

In sum, the district court found at trial that Stevens violated

Section 111(a)(1) with intent to commit civil disorder under 

Section 231(a)(3). Because Stevens’ actions constituted felony 

assault and he acted with the intent to commit “another felony,” 

the district court properly adhered to Section 2A2.4(c)(1)’s 

Cross Reference and applied Section 2A2.2 at Stevens’ 

sentencing.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed.

So ordered.