UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 01-31338

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

VERSUS

ISIDRO FRANCISCO SANTIAGO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Louisiana

October 17, 2002

Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

Isidro Francisco Santiago pleaded guilty to count 1 of an

indictment charging him with conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute cocaine, reserving the right to appeal the district

court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Santiago

was sentenced to a 50-month term of imprisonment and to a four-year

period of supervised release. Santiago now appeals the district

court’s order denying his motion to suppress.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2000, Louisiana State Police Trooper Ted Raley

was conducting safety inspections of commercial vehicles on

Interstate 20 in Bossier Parish, Louisiana. Trooper Raley
1Though Raley initially testified that he first noticed the vehicle at approximately 7:00

a.m., he later conceded that the traffic stop was logged at 8:53 a.m.

2Raley also testified, however, that he believed the vehicle slowed to 50 m.p.h. after he

began his pursuit. At no time did Raley believe the vehicle was speeding and Raley made it clear

when he testified that his sole purpose for pulling the vehicle over was to investigate the flashing

light.

2

testified that at some time just prior to 9:00 a.m.,1 his attention

was drawn to a red sport-utility vehicle that was approaching from

the west. Raley claims that what drew his attention to the vehicle

was a flashing light that emanated from the dash of the vehicle

directly below the rear-view mirror. Raley was unable to determine

what the source of the light was as the vehicle passed because the

vehicle’s windows were tinted. Raley, believing that the flashing

light posed a hazard to oncoming traffic, decided to pursue the

vehicle. Just prior to pulling the vehicle over, Raley testified

that he noticed the vehicle was only going 50 miles-per-hour and

that the speed limit was 70.2 Prior to exiting his cruiser, Raley

testified that he noticed some “trinkets” hanging from the rearview mirror.

After pulling the vehicle over, Raley asked the driver, Isidro

Santiago, to exit the vehicle. Also present in the car were

Santiago’s two daughters and a woman, Josefina Vasquez. Trooper

Raley asked Santiago for his driver’s license and testified that

Santiago’s hands were shaking when he handed over the license and

that he believed Santiago exhibited “extreme nervousness.” Raley

told Santiago why he had been stopped and was able to identify the

object hanging from the mirror as a beaded chain with two golf-ball

sized crystal balls hanging from either end. Raley informed

Santiago that it is illegal in Louisiana to have objects hanging

from a car’s rear-view mirror.
3

Raley then entered into a brief dialogue with Santiago.

Noticing that Santiago had a California driver’s license and the

vehicle had California plates, Raley testified that he had concerns

about whether or not Santiago was trying to travel straight through

to his destination as many travelers try to do on such long trips.

He therefore asked Santiago why he was driving so slow, referring

to the 50 miles-per-hour that Santiago was going. Santiago told

Raley that he did not realize he was driving slowly. Raley then

asked Santiago where he was going and what he would be doing there.

Santiago told Raley that they were heading to Atlanta, Georgia, for

one week to vacation before his daughters started back at school.

Trooper Raley testified that he found this odd because school had

already started in Louisiana but Santiago told him that school did

not start until September 6th where they lived.

Trooper Raley asked Santiago whether the car belonged to him,

and Santiago said that it was his car. Trooper Raley then asked

whether the registration was in the glove box, and Santiago said

that it was. Trooper Raley asked who the young woman in the

passenger seat was and what her name was. Santiago stated that she

was his wife, but hesitated before telling Raley her name.

Finally, he pointed his right index finger at Trooper Raley and

said “‘Josefina.’” Trooper Raley testified that, “it was almost as

if he had remembered it suddenly and was glad he did.”

Trooper Raley told Santiago to wait by the front of his

cruiser as he went to the passenger window of Santiago’s vehicle to

check the registration and to look at the object hanging from the

rear-view mirror. Raley asked the passenger for her driver’s

license and for the vehicle registration. She stated that Santiago

had the registration. Raley stated that Vasquez seemed flustered

while she was digging through her purse looking for her license.
4

Her driver’s license identified her as Josefina Vasquez, not

Josefina Santiago, which led Raley to ask her whether she was

Santiago's wife. She stated that she was. 

Trooper Raley told Vasquez to remain in the vehicle with the

children as he returned to Santiago and told Santiago that Vasquez

had stated that Santiago had the registration. Santiago

volunteered to go to the vehicle to get the registration. Upon

receiving the registration, Trooper Raley noted that the vehicle

was registered to Santiago and to another woman, Justina Orochco.

Trooper Raley returned to his cruiser to run checks on the

drivers’ licenses. Trooper Raley explained that, although Vasquez

had stated that they were headed to Atlanta for a vacation, she

said they would be in Atlanta for two or three weeks. This

statement contradicted Santiago’s statement that the family

intended to vacation in Atlanta for one week and led Raley to have

some “uneasy feelings” about the situation. Raley testified,

however, that he had no specific suspicion that Santiago was

transporting drugs, though he hadn’t ruled out the possibility, but

was concerned that the car might be stolen or that the children

were abducted, and therefore called for backup. Driver’s-license

and criminal-history checks were then run on Santiago and Vasquez,

but the checks came back negative.

Trooper Raley then walked up to Santiago and asked him who

Justina Orochco was, referring to the other name listed on the

car’s registration. Trooper Raley stated, “it looked almost as if

I had hit him over the head with a sledgehammer. His eyes got big

and he kind of hesitated and he said, ‘That’s my other wife.’”

Santiago explained that Vasquez was his ex-wife and the mother of

his two children. Trooper Raley testified that he found this

explanation unconvincing and believed at that point that Santiago
5

and Vasquez were trying to conceal something. Raley testified that

he had three main concerns during the stop: 1) that the children

may have been abducted; 2) that the car may have been stolen; and

3) that the couple may have been transporting illegal narcotics.

Once the criminal history check came back negative, Raley testified

that he had satisfied himself that his first two concerns were not

a problem, but he was still concerned about the narcotics. Raley

stated, “I didn’t know - you know, I knew it wasn’t a stolen

vehicle, I knew it wasn’t the children, but I - that leads me on

into the narcotics phase or weapons phase.”

Trooper Raley told Santiago that he should remove the object

from his mirror before leaving, but before he let Santiago go, he

told Santiago that a lot of illegal contraband was being smuggled

down the interstate highways. Trooper Raley noted that Santiago

was from Santa Ana, which was relatively near the border and which

he knew to be a major source of methamphetamine, and also noted

that Santiago’s destination, Atlanta, was known to be a major

distribution point of narcotics.

Trooper Raley then asked Santiago whether he had any illegal

contraband on his person or in the vehicle. Santiago stated that

he did not, and Raley asked Santiago if he minded whether he

searched the vehicle to make sure. Santiago stated that he did not

mind. Trooper Raley produced a Louisiana-consent-to-search form in

Spanish, which Santiago signed after apparently reading it.

Trooper Jeff White then arrived at the scene, and Santiago and

Vasquez were frisked for weapons. Trooper Raley told them to stand

with the children near his cruiser with Trooper White as he

searched the front of the vehicle. Finding nothing in the front,

he then opened the rear hatch and immediately noticed that the

floor was too high. He also noticed that the plastic molding
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around the sides had been cut, leading him to believe that there

was something beneath the floor.

Trooper Raley removed the molding and attempted to pull up the

carpet. The carpet was glued to the floor, which is not typical

and Raley concluded that there was a compartment beneath the floor.

Trooper Raley then called Trooper Bruce Vanderhoeven, who had a

drug dog, and asked him to come to his location. The dog alerted

to the inside and outside of the vehicle. The vehicle was taken to

state police Troop G headquarters, where a hatch, secured with

Bondo, was found in the wheel well. Inside a compartment under the

false floor, the troopers found eight to nine packages containing

21 pounds of cocaine.

Santiago pleaded guilty to count 1 of an indictment charging

him with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine,

but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s order denying

his motion to suppress evidence. Santiago was sentenced to a 50-

month term of imprisonment and to a four-year period of supervised

release. Santiago now appeals the district court’s order denying

his motion to suppress.

DISCUSSION

Did the initial stop of Santiago’s vehicle violate the Fourth

Amendment?

Santiago contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion to suppress. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress,

this court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear

error and the court’s ultimate conclusions on Fourth Amendment

issues drawn from those facts de novo. Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). The court reviews all of the evidence

introduced at a suppression hearing in the light most favorable to

the prevailing party, in this case the Government. United States
3

 Under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 32:327(C) (West 2002), “Flashing lights are prohibited

except on authorized emergency vehicles, school buses, or on any vehicle as a means of indicating

7

v. Orozco, 191 F.3d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1999).

Santiago argues that the initial stop of his vehicle violated

his right against unreasonable searches and seizures under the

Fourth Amendment. “Evidence obtained by the government in

violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights may not be used

to prove the defendant’s guilt at trial.” United States v. Thomas,

12 F.3d 1350, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994). The standard for evaluating

traffic stops is provided by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Id.

In Terry, the Court held that limited searches and seizures

are not unreasonable when there is a reasonable and articulable

suspicion that a person has committed a crime. 392 U.S. at 21.

“Thus, if the detaining officer can ‘point to specific and

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences

from those facts, reasonably warrant [the search and seizure],’ the

intrusion is lawful." Thomas, 12 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Terry, 392

U.S. at 21); United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 758

(5th Cir. 1999) (“Officers must base their reasonable suspicion on

‘specific and articulable facts,’ not merely ‘inarticulate hunches’

of wrongdoing.”). “Any analysis of reasonable suspicion is

necessarily fact-specific, and factors which by themselves may

appear innocent, may in the aggregate rise to the level of

reasonable suspicion.” Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d at 759. 

The magistrate judge credited Trooper Raley’s testimony

finding that Trooper Raley had probable cause to investigate

whether Santiago’s vehicle was in violation of a state statute

which prohibits flashing lights except on authorized emergency

vehicles.3 Accordingly, the magistrate judge concluded, the
a right or left turn, or the presence of a vehicular traffic hazard requiring unusual care in

approaching, overtaking or passing.”

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initial stop was supported by probable cause.

We agree with the magistrate’s conclusion. Trooper Raley

testified that his attention was drawn to Santiago’s vehicle

because he saw a bright flashing light emitting from the dash area

of the vehicle. Trooper Raley characterized the light as brighter

than the strobe lights on the top of a police cruiser, “almost like

a camera flash.” Trooper Raley articulated specific facts

supporting a reasonable suspicion that Santiago was in violation of

the state statute prohibiting flashing lights in non-emergency

vehicles. See Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d at 758. Therefore, the

traffic stop was justified at its inception. 

Santiago also contends, however, that Trooper Raley should

have permitted him to leave after discovering that Santiago was not

in violation of 32:327(c). Trooper Raley testified that he

realized at the time he exited his cruiser that there was something

hanging from Santiago’s rear-view mirror. He stated that he

determined that the crystals were the light source when he went to

the vehicle to speak with Vasquez. Although the crystals hanging

from the mirror did not violate 32:327(c), Trooper Raley stated

that he believed they violated another state statute which

prohibited drivers from attaching items to their windshield. He

also stated that the crystals presented a road hazard to Santiago

and to other drivers.

Under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 32:361.1(B) (West 2002), “no person

may operate a motor vehicle with any object or material placed on

or affixed to the front windshield or to front side windows of the

vehicle so as to obstruct or reduce the driver's clear view through
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the front windshield or front side windows . . . .” Santiago

argues that Trooper Raley could not reasonably have believed that

the crystals violated the state statute because they did not

obstruct or reduce Santiago’s clear view.

In United States v. Zucco, 71 F.3d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1995),

this Court held that an initial traffic stop was valid because the

defendant repeatedly veered onto the shoulder of road, which

“arguably was a violation” of a state statute requiring drivers to

keep their vehicle within a single lane of traffic. Trooper Raley

stated that he understood the statute to prohibit affixing any

object to a car’s windshield, unless otherwise permitted by law.

Although it is doubtful whether Santiago could have been convicted

for violating 32:361.1(B) because the object did not obstruct

Santiago’s vision, Santiago arguably was in violation of the

statute. Therefore, Raley was justified in continuing to detain

Santiago for violating 32:361.1(B).

Did the detention extend beyond the valid reason for the stop?

Santiago contends that he was detained longer than was

reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. A

search and seizure must be reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the stop in the first place. United

States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397-98 (5th Cir. 2001); Terry, 392

U.S. at 19-20. The officer should use the least intrusive means

reasonably available to verify or dispel his or her suspicion in a

short period of time. Valadez, 267 F.3d at 398.

During a traffic stop, an officer can request a driver’s

license, insurance papers, and vehicle registration; he or she may

also run a computer check and issue a citation. United States v.

Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993). The officer may detain
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and question the subjects of a traffic stop during the time a

computer check is being conducted. United States v. Dortch, 199

F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 1999), opinion corrected on other grounds,

203 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, this court usually does

not scrutinize the particular questions asked during a stop so long

as they tend to relate to the purpose of the stop. United States

v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 433 (5th Cir. 2001); see also

Shabazz, 993 F.3d at 436 (“[A] police officer’s questioning, even

on a subject unrelated to the purpose of the stop, is itself [not]

a Fourth Amendment violation.”).

However, a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the

detention extends beyond the valid reason for the stop. Dortch,

199 F.3d at 198. Once a computer check is completed and the

officer either issues a citation or determines that no citation

should be issued, the detention should end and the driver should be

free to leave. Id. In order to continue a detention after such a

point, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion supported by

articulable facts that a crime has been or is being committed.

United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 2000); see also

Valadez, 267 F.3d at 398 (“[O]nce an officer’s suspicions have been

verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless there is

additional articulable, reasonable, suspicion.”).

Trooper Raley stated that he had satisfied himself that the

vehicle was not stolen and that the children had not been abducted

once the license and registration check came back negative. He

stated that, because of Santiago’s and Vasquez’ nervousness and

conflicting statements, he intended to determine whether the

vehicle contained narcotics or weapons. He then asked for and was

given consent to search the vehicle.
11

Because the traffic stop was valid initially and because a

violation of another state statute arguably became apparent after

the initial stop, Trooper Raley was permitted to ask for Santiago’s

license and registration and to run a computer check thereon.

Dortch, 199 F.3d at 198. Trooper Raley’s original justification

for the stop ended, however, at the time the computer check was

completed. Id. at 200. At that point, there was no reasonable or

articulable suspicion that Santiago was trafficking in drugs, but

Raley nonetheless continued his interrogation after the original

justification for the stop had ended. Id. at 199-200 (finding that

conflicting stories from the driver and passenger about from where

they traveled and the fact that neither were listed as authorized

drivers on the rental agreement and the driver’s nervousness did

not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking to

support a continued detention after the completion of a computer

check); see also Valadez, 267 F.3d at 396-99 (holding that once the

officer determined that the registration sticker and window tint

were valid, which were the reasons for the stop, there was no

reasonable suspicion to further detain the driver, even to run a

computer check for his criminal history); Jones, 234 F.3d at 241-42

(finding that discrepancies between the driver and passenger’s

explanations about their destination and the nature of their

business, the fact that the car had been rented by the diver’s

mother but neither he nor the passenger were listed as authorized

drivers, and the driver’s admission that he previously had been

arrested for crack-cocaine possession did not support a finding of

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Therefore it was

unreasonable for Trooper Raley to continue to detain Santiago after

the records check was completed and the extended detention violated

Santiago’s Fourth Amendment rights.
12

Was Santiago’s consent to search valid?

Santiago contends that the district court erred by determining

that he voluntarily consented to Trooper Raley’s search of the

vehicle. “Consent to search may, but does not necessarily,

dissipate the taint of a fourth amendment violation.” United

States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1993). A

two-pronged inquiry is used to determine whether consent following

a Fourth Amendment violation is valid: (1) whether the consent was

voluntarily given, and (2) whether it was an independent act of

free will. Id. Santiago does not contend that his consent to the

search was not voluntarily given. Instead, he contends that it was

not an independent act of free will.

“Even though voluntarily given, consent does not remove the

taint of an illegal detention if it is the product of that

detention and not an independent act of free will.” ChavezVillarreal, 3 F.3d at 127-28. “To determine whether the causal

chain was broken, [this Court considers]: (1) the temporal

proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent; (2) the presence

of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of

the initial misconduct.” Id. at 128. The Government has the

burden of showing admissibility. Id.

Trooper Raley testified that Santiago was being detained on

the traffic stop. Trooper Raley testified that, after he completed

the records checks, he returned to Santiago and confronted him with

the fact that a name other than Vasquez’ name was on the vehicle

registration. Immediately after Santiago explained the

discrepancy, Trooper Raley mentioned the fact that the interstate

highway was used for narcotics trafficking and asked for permission

to search the vehicle. The record does not reflect that Trooper
4

 It is unclear from the record whether Trooper Raley handed back the vehicle registration

as he testified that he received the registration but also stated that he did not seize the registration. 

However, there is no evidence in the record that Raley handed back the driver’s licenses. 

Additionally, at oral argument, counsel for both sides were asked whether the licenses were

returned and what evidence was in the record indicating such. Neither side could recall the

presence of any evidence indicating that the licenses were returned. As we have already stated

above, however, the burden was upon the government to show the admissibility of evidence

procured by the search, i.e. that the search and seizure were Constitutional and that the consent

was voluntary. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d at 127-28.

5

 Raley testified that he had three main concerns: 1) that the children may have been

abducted; 2) that the car may have been stolen; and 3) that the couple may have been smuggling

illegal narcotics. Raley testified that once the criminal background checks came back negative, he

had eliminated his first two concerns, but still believed that he should proceed to ask about

narcotics. Raley testified that this was in his mind when he asked Santiago about the other name

on the registration, Justina Orochco.

13

Raley had returned Santiago’s and Vasquez’ driver’s licenses and

the vehicle registration.4 See Dortch, 199 F.3d at 202 (noting,

similarly, that the fact that an officer had not returned the

defendants license and rental papers was a relevant factor as to

the voluntariness of the consent). Nor does the record reflect

that Trooper Raley had told Santiago that he was free to go. In

fact, Trooper Raley testified that he intended to determine whether

the vehicle contained contraband.5 The consent to search,

therefore, was contemporaneous with the constitutional violation,

and there was no intervening circumstance. Chavez-Villarreal, 3

F.3d at 128; United States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d 302, 308-09 (5th

Cir. 2002); United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 801-02 (5th Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1155 (2001); Dortch, 199 F.3d at 202-

03 (citing the fact that no intervening circumstances occurred

between the illegal detention and the consent as a factor in

finding that consent was not voluntary). Thus, under the

circumstances of this case, the consent to search was not an

independent act of free will, but rather a product of the
14

unlawfully extended detention.

CONCLUSION

Having carefully reviewed the record of this case and the

parties’ respective briefing and for the reasons set forth above,

we conclude that the district court erred in denying Santiago’s

motion to suppress. We therefore REVERSE the denial of the

suppression motion, VACATE the conviction, and REMAND with

instructions to suppress.