COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

MICHAEL RAY MANES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0862-96-2 PER CURIAM 

 SEPTEMBER 24, 1996 

TCB CONSTRUCTION, INC. 

AND 

ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Michael R. Manes, pro se, on brief). 

 (Benjamin J. Trichilo; Trichilo, Bancroft, 

McGavin, Horvath & Judkins, on brief), for 

appellees. 

 Michael Ray Manes contends that the Workers' Compensation 

Commission erred in finding that (1) he was not a credible 

witness; (2) his right carpal tunnel syndrome and current 

disability are not causally related to his July 6, 1993 injury by 

accident; and (3) he failed to market his residual capacity. 

Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we 

conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27. 

I. 

 It is well-settled that credibility determinations are 

within the fact finder's exclusive purview. Goodyear Tire & 

Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 374, 381, 363 S.E.2d 433, 437 

(1987). In reviewing the commission's decision, we do not 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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consider any medical reports which were not properly before it. 

 Based upon Manes' failure to reveal his 1983 work accident and 

his pre-July 6, 1993 bilateral carpal tunnel symptoms, as well as 

other discrepancies between his assertions of total disability 

and the medical records, the commission was entitled to conclude 

that Manes' testimony was not credible. 

 II. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). In 

holding that Manes failed to prove that his right carpal tunnel 

syndrome was caused by his July 6, 1993 injury by accident, the 

commission found as follows: 

 Dr. [Robert] Rutkowski opined that [Manes'] 

carpal tunnel syndrome was not causally 

related to his compensable injury by accident 

on July 6, 1993. In an October 13, 1994 

report, Dr. [George N.] Stergis indicated 

that "given the absence of pre-existing 

complaints or alternative explanations," 

[Manes'] carpal tunnel syndrome is causally 

related to his employment. It is obvious 

from this report that Dr. Stergis was unaware 

of [Manes'] complaints of right wrist pain as 

early as 1986. After viewing a portion of 

the hearing transcript, Dr. Stergis concluded 

that [Manes] has a pre-existing history of 

carpal tunnel syndrome. 

 After a thorough review of the medical 

record, it appears that none of the 

physicians involved in this matter indicate 

within a reasonable degree of medical 

certainty that [Manes'] right carpal tunnel 

syndrome is causally related to the July 6, 

1993 incident. 

 The commission's findings are fully supported by the medical 
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records. "Questions raised by conflicting medical opinions must 

be decided by the commission." Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 

8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1989). Moreover, in 

its role as fact finder, the commission was entitled to determine 

what weight, if any, was to be given to the various medical 

opinions in the record. "It lies within the commission's 

authority to determine the facts and the weight of the evidence 

. . . ." Rose v. Red's Hitch & Trailer Servs., Inc., 11 Va. App. 

55, 60, 396 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1990). Credible evidence in the 

record supports the commission's finding that Manes did not bear 

his burden of proving that his right carpal tunnel syndrome and 

continuing disability were related to his July 6, 1993 injury by 

accident.1

 III. 

 "In determining whether a claimant has made a reasonable 

effort to market his remaining work capacity, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the prevailing 

party before the commission . . . ." National Linen Serv. v. 

McGuinn, 8 Va. App. 267, 270, 380 S.E.2d 31, 32 (1989). A 

claimant still has the burden of proving his entitlement to 

benefits, and to do that he has the burden of proving that he 

 

 1We recognize that the Supreme Court ruled in Stenrich Group 

v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 199, 467 S.E.2d 795, 802 (1996), that 

carpal tunnel syndrome is not compensable as an occupational 

disease if it is caused by repetitive motion. However, employer 

did not raise the issue of whether Manes' condition constituted a 

disease before the commission. Accordingly, we do not address 

this issue on appeal. 
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made a reasonable effort to procure suitable work but was unable 

to market his remaining work capacity. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. 

v. Bateman, 4 Va. App. 459, 464, 359 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1987). 

 Relying upon Dr. Stergis' October 13, 1994 report, the 

commission found that Manes was only partially incapacitated. In 

light of medical records supporting the commission's decision 

that Manes was at most partially disabled and in light of his 

failure to provide evidence of his marketing efforts, we hold 

that credible evidence supports the commission's finding. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the commission's 

decision. 

 Affirmed.